Department of State bulletin

Afli<>i

Ul-ii

V

. 1

IKi

t

lli

i>^5Cjf^^J5;r; :;'

fS^s

«;;;:;?■

m^

'Ur r-

jfi?hiiJ'<1;

■ifi;":

cJfo

~Bi

3^

^

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No.

Apnl 6, 1964

FOREIGN AID

Message of t?ie President to tlie Congress 618

PRESIDENT JOHNSON DISCUSSES THE PRESIDENCY 623

THE TOILSOME PATH TO PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 630

THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Address by President Johnson 535

JOURNiVLISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
by Assistant Secretary Manning 641

THE REQUISITES OF ABUNDANCE

by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 560

For index see inside back cover

Foreign Aid

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS >

To the Congress of the United States :

The most important ingredient in the develop-
ment of a nation is neither the amount nor the
nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and
commitment of the government and people di-
rectly involved.

To those nations which do commit themselves
to progress under freedom, help from us and
from others can pixivide the margin of differ-
ence between failure and success.

This is the heart of the matter.

The proposals contained in this message ex-
press our self-interest at the same time that
they proclaim our national ideals.

We will be laying up a harvest of woe for us
and our children if we shrink from the task of

'Transmitted Mar. 19 (White House press release) ;
also printed in H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess., wUich
includes a draft of a bill "To amend the Internal
Revenue Code of 19.54 to allow a credit against tax for
certain investment in less developed countries, and for
other purposes" and a draft of an act "To amend
further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
and for other purposes."

grappling in the world community with poverty
and ignorance.

These are the grim recruiting sergeants of
conununism.

They flourish wherever we falter. If we de-
fault on our obligations, communism will ex-
pand its ambitions.

That is the stern equation which dominates
our age, and from which there can be no escape
in logic or in honor.

NO WASTE, NO RETREAT

It is against our national interest to tolerate
waste or inefficiency or extravagance in any of
these programs. But it is equally repugnant
to our national interest to retreat from our ob-
ligations and commitments while freedom re-
mains under siege.

We recognize that the United States cannot
and should not sustain the burden of these pro-
grams alone.

Other nations are needed in this enterprise of
mutual help. Encouraging signs exist that the
process of sharing the burden is steadily
growing.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1293 PUBLICATION 7670 APRIL 6, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Usned by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department Infor-
mation le Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb : 52 issues, domestic J8.60,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is indexed in the Readers' Guide ta
Periodical Literature.

518

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The best way for the I'nited States to stimu-
late this growth and to broaden tiiis partnersiiip
in freedom is to make our own example an
incentive to our friends and allies.

We need the assurance of stability and prog-
ress in a world restless with many dangers and
anxieties.

PRUDENT AND RESPONSIBLE PROGRAMS

In this progi-am we do not seek to cover the
whole world. Aid on a worldwide scale is no
part of our purpose.

We seek instead, through prudent and respon-
sible programs, to help carefully selected coun-
tries whose survival in freedom is essential —
and whose collapse would bring new opportu-
nities for Communist expansion.

There are no easy \nctories in this campaign.
But there can be sudden disasters. We cannot
ask for a reprieve from responsibility while
freedom is in danger. The vital interests of the
United States require us to stay in the battle.
We dare not desert.

Economic and military assistance, used at the
right time and in the right way, can provide
indispensable help to our foreign policy in
enabling the United States to influence events
instead of merely reacting to them. By com-
mitting a small part of our resources before
crises actually occur, we reduce the danger and
frequency of those crises.

Our foresight becomes a shield against
misfortune.

The recommendations contained in this pro-
gram for fiscal year 190.5 are designed to move
the aid program in that direction.

The)' reflect views and experience of the
Congress, of the executive branch, and of in-
formed private citizens.

FIVE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
FOR A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM

First : The request for funds must he realistic.

For economic assistance, new authorisations
of $917 million for f-tcal 1965 are recommended.
Specifically, I recommend $335 million for
supporting assistance, $22.5 million for tech-
nical cooperation, $1.3-1 million for contribu-
tions to international organizations, $150 mil-
lion for the President's contingency fund, and

$73 million for administrative and miscellane-
ous expenses.

For military a^ssistance, I recom,mend that
the Congress provide a continuing authoriza-
tion, subject to an annual review of each year's
proposals by the authorizing committees in
both Houses.

For fiscal 1965, I recommend no additional
authorizations for the Alliance for Progress
or for development lending assistance in Asia
or Africa. PLxisting authorizations for these
programs are adequate.

The appropriations recommended for fiscal
1965 total $1 billion for military assistance and
$2.Ji. billion for economic assistance.

In fiscal 1964, the initial request was $4.9 bil-
lion, later reduced to $4.5 billion.

This fiscal year, the request, of $3.4 billion is
$1.1 billion less than last year's request, al-
though about the same as was available last
year, taking into consideration the unexpended
balance from the year before.

Moreover, more than 80 percent of aid funds
will be spent in the U.S. The impact of the
program on our balance of payments will be
less than ever before.

INSURANCE TO AVOID COMMITTING
AMERICAN MEN TO WAR

These requests reflect a determination to con-
tinue to improve the aid program both in con-
cept and administration. The overall request
represents a great deal of money — but it is an
amount which we should, in all prudence, pro-
vide to serve essential United States interests
and commitments throughout the world.

More than 1 million American men in uni-
form are now stationed outside the United
States. As insurance to avoid involving them
and the Nation in a major conflict, we propose
to spend through aid programs less than 4 cents
out of every tax dollar.

If there is any alternative insurance against,
war, it might be found in an increase in the de-
fense budget. But that would require not only
many times more than $3.4 billion, for a mili-
tary budget which already takes more than 50
cents out of every tax dollar, but also a several-
fold increase in our own militaiy manpower.

The foreign assistance requested will pi-ovide

APRIL G, 1964

519

— the crucial assistance we have promised the
people of Latin America who are committed to
programs of economic and social progress;

— continued economic development in India,
Pakistan, and Turkey under the major interna-
tional aid consortia to which we are a party;

— the United States share of voluntary con-
tributions to the United Nations technical co-
operation programs and to such special interna-
tional jDrograms as the work of the United Na-
tions Children's Fund and the development of
the Indus Basin ;

— funds to meet our commitments to the free-
dom of the people of South Vietnam, Korea,
and for the other obligations we have under-
taken in Asia and Africa.

Secoxd: The funds I am requesting will he
concentrated where they will produce the best
results and speed the transition from United
/States assistance to self-support wherever
possible.

Two-thirds of the proposed military assist-
ance will go to 11 nations along the periphery
of the Sino-Soviet bloc, from Greece and Tur-
key through Thailand and Vietnam to the Re-
public of China and Korea. These funds are
a key to the maintenance of over 3.5 million
men under arms, raised and supported in
large measure by the countries receiving the
assistance.

The need for supporting assistance — funds
used primarily in countries facing defense or
security emergencies — will continue to be re-
duced. Fourteen countries which received sup-
porting assistance 3 years ago will receive none
in fiscal year 1965.

Four-fifths of the present request will go to
four countries: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and
Jordan.

Two-thirds of the developinent lending pro-
posed for fiscal 1965 (including Alliance for
Progress lending) will be concentrated in six
countries: Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey,
Pakistan, and India.

Funds for educational and technical coopera-
tion— to help start schools, health centers, agri-
cultural experiment stations, credit services,
and dozens of other institutions — are not con-
centrated in a few countries. But they will
be used for selected projects to raise the ability

of less fortunate peoples to meet their own
needs. To carry out tliese projects we are seek-
ing the best personnel available in the United
States — in private agencies, in universities, in
State and local governments, and throughout
the Federal Government.

Wlierever possible, loe will speed up the
transition from reliance on aid to self-support.

In 17 nations the transition has been com-
pleted and economic aid has ended. Fourteen
countries are approaching the point where soft
economic loans and grants will no longer be
needed. New funds for military equipment
gi'ants are being requested for seven fewer
countries for fiscal 1965 than for the present
year.

Third: We must do more to utilize private
initiative in the United States — and in the de-
veloping countries — to promote economic de-
velopment ahroad.

During the past year :

— the first new houses financed by U.S. pri-
vate funds protected by AID guarantees were
completed in Lima, Peru ;

— the first rural electrification surveys, con-
ducted by tlie National Eural Electric Coopera-
tive xVssociation under contract to AID, were
completed and the first rural electrification
loan — in Nicaragua — was approved;

— the first arrangement linking the public and
private lesources of one of our States to a de-
veloping country was established, between Cali-
fornia and Chile.

This effort must be expanded.

Accordingly., we are encouraging the estdb-
lishment of an Executive Service Corps. It
will provide American businessmen with an
opportunity to furnisli, on request, teclmical and
managerial advice to businessmen in developing
countries.

During the present year, the possibilities for
mobilizing increased private resources for the
development task will be developed by the Ad-
visory Committee on Private Enterprise in For-
eign Aid established under the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1963.

In this connection, two specific legislative
steps are recommended:

One., legislation to provide a special tax credit
for private investment hy U.S. businessmen in

520

DEPARTMEXT OF STATE BULLETIN

less developed countries.

Two, additional authority for a final install-
ment of the pilot prograin of guaranteeing
private VJS. hotising investments in Latin
America.

Fourth : We will continue to seek greater
international participation in aid.

Other free-world industrial countries have
increased their aid commitments since the early
1950's. There are indications that further in-
creases are in store. Canada recently an-
nounced that it expects to increase its aid
expenditures by 50 percent next yeai*. A 1963
British white paper and a French official re-
port pul)lislied in January 1964 point in the
same direction. Other nations have rechiced
interest rates and extended maturities on loans
to develo]>insr countries.

Of major importance in this effort are the
operations of the International Development
Association. Under the agreement for replen-
ishing the resources of this Association, which
is now before the Congress for approval, other
countries will put up more than $1.40 for everj-
dollar the U.S. provides to finance on easy terms
development projects certified as sound by the
"World Bank — projects which the developing
countries could not afi'ord to pay for on regular
commercial terms. This is international shar-
ing in the aid effort at its best. For to the ex-
tent we fiiruish funds to IDA, and they are
augmented by the contributions of others, the
needs of developing countries are met, thus
reducing the amounts required for our own
bilateral aid programs.

Under the program before you the U.S.
would be authorized to contribute $e312 million
over a 3-j'ear period. Against this other coun-
tries have pledged $438 million, which will be
lost in the absence of the U.S. contribution.
Action is needed now so that the Association
may continue to undertake new projects even
though the first appropriation will not be re-
quired until fiscal year 1966.

/ urge the Congress to authorize U.S. par-
ticipation in this continued IDA subscription.

Fifth: Let us msist on steadily increasing
efiiciency in assistance operations.

After careful study, I have decided to con-
tinue the basic organization of aid operations.

established after intensive review in 1961.
Economic assistance operations will continue
to be centered in the Agency for International
Development, militai-j' assistance openitions in
the Department of Defense. Both will be sub-
ject to firm foreign policy guidance from the
Secretary of State.

STEPS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF AID

One officer, Assistant Secretary of State
Mann, has been assigned firm policy control
over all aspects of our activities in Latin
America.-

Full support will be given to the newly
created Inter-American Alliance for I'rogress
Committee whicli is designed to strengthen the
aspect of partnership in the alliance.

The AID Administrator has instructions to
embark on a major program to improve the
quality of his staff — and to reduce the total
number of AID employees by 1,200 by the end
of fiscal year 196.5.

The AID Administrator has been directed
to continue to consolidate AID missions with
U.S. embassies and, wherever possible, to elimi-
nate altogether separate AID field missions.

The Secretary of Defense has been directed
to continue to make substantial reductions in
the number of personnel assigned to military
assistance groups and missions.

In this connection, I recommend two specific
legislative steps:

One, legislation to provide the AID Admin-
istrator with authority to terminate a limited
number of supervisory and policymaking em-
ployees notioithstanding other provisions of
lnu\ and to extend the existing Foreign Service
^'■selection out" authority to other personnel.

This is essential if the Administrator is to
carry out my desire — and that of the Con-
gress— that he improve the quality of the AID
staff and, at the same time, reduce its total
size.

Two, legislation to permit outstanding
United States representation on the Inter-
Am-erican Alliance for Progress Committee
under the leadership of Amhassador Teodoro
Moscoso.

■ See p. 540.

APRH. 6, 19G4

521

Finally, I am appointing a general advisory
committee, as suggested by Senator [Jolm
Sherman] Cooper and others, on foreign eco-
nomic and military assistance problems. It
will be composed of distinguished private citi-
zens with varied backgrounds and will serve
as a continuing source of counsel to me. In
addition to its general responsibility the com-
mittee will examine aid programs in individual
countries. These reviews will be made by mem-
bers of the advisory conmiittee, augmented as
necessary by additional persons. I would hope
that at least four or five country reviews, in-
cluding two or three in Latin America, will be
completed in the present year.

A PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN
THE FAMILY OF THE FREE

I am convinced this program will enable the
United States to live in a turbulent world with
a greater measure of safety and of honor.

There is in our heart the larger and nobler
hope of strengthening the family of the free,
quit* apart from our duty to disappoint the
evil designs of the enemies of freedom.

We wish to build a world in which the weak
can walk without fear and in which even the
smallest nation can work out its own destiny
without the danger of violence and aggression.

This program, based on the principle of mu-
tual help, can make an essential contribution
to these purposes and objectives which have
guided our nation across the difficulties of these
dangerous yea re.

I recommend this program to the judgment
and the conscience of the Congress in the be-
lief that it will enlarge the strength of the free
world —

— aid in frustrating the ambitions of Com-
munist imperialism,

— reduce the hazards of widespread conflict,
and

— support the moral commitment of free men
everywhere to work for a just and peaceful
world.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House,
March 19, 1964.

U.S. To Increase Economic
and Military Aid to Viet-Nam

Secretary of Defe7ise Robert S. McNarrmra
and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, returned to Washington
on March 13 from a 5-day inspection trip to the
Republic of Viet-Nam. Folloit^ing is the text
of a White House stat.e7nent released on March
17 at the conclusion of their report to the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council.

White House press release dated March 17

Secretai-y McNamara and General Taylor,
following their initial oral report of Friday,
today reported full}- to President Johnson and
the members of tlie National Security Council.
The report covered the situation in South Viet-
Nam, the measures being taken by General
Khanh and his government, and the need for
United States assistance to supplement and sup-
port, these measures. There was also discussion
of the continuing support and direction of the
Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam.

At the close of the meeting the President ac-
cepted the report and its principal recommenda-
tions, which had the support of the National
Security Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October, when
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last
reported fully on it,^ there have miquestionably
been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken
maximum advantage of two changes of govern-
ment, and of more longstanding difficulties, in-
cluding a serious weakness and overextension
which had developed in the basically sound
hamlet program. The supply of arms and
cadres from the north has continued; careful
and sophisticated control of Viet Cong opera-
tions has been apparent; and evidence that such
control is centered in Hanoi is clear and
immistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and
his government are iicting vigorously and eflfec-
tively. They have produced a sound central
plan for the prosecution of the war, recogniz-
ing to a far greater degree than before the cru-
cial role of economic and social, as well as mili-

' Bulletin of Oct. 21, 1963, p. G24,

522

DBa'ARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tary, action to insui-c tluit sirens cleared of tlie
Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this phin, General Khanh re-
quires the full enlistment of the people of South
Viet-N:im, partly to augment the strengt.h of
his aiitiguerrilla forces, but particularly to pro-
vide the !idministratoi-s, health workers, teach-
ers, luid others wjio must follow up in cleared
areas. To meet this need, and to pi-ovide a more
equitable and common basis of service, General
Khanh has informed us tliat he projK)ses in the
near future to put into efl'ect a National Mobili-
zation Plan that will provide conditions and
terms of serWce in appropriate jobs for all able-
bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up
to i-e<iuired levels the pay and status of the para-
military forces and to create a highly trained
guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on
its own ground.

Finally, limited but significant additional
equipment is proposed for the air forces, the
river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment now has the power to clear any part
of its territory. General Khanh's new program
is designed to clear and to hold, step by step
and province by province.

This program will involve substantial in-
creases in cost to the South Vietnamese econ-
omy, which ill turn depends heavily on United
States economic aid. Additional, though less
substantial, military assistance funds are also
needed, and increased United States training
activity both on the civil and military side.
The policy should continue of withdrawing
United States personnel where their roles can
be assumed by South Vietnamese and of send-
ing additional men if they are needed. It will
remain the policy of the United States to fur-
nish assistance and support to South Viet- Nam
for as long as it is required to brmg Commu-
nist, aggr&ssion and terrorism under control.

Se<;retary McNamara and General Taylor re-
ported their overall conclusion that with con-
tinued vigorous leadership from General Khanli
and his government, and the carrying out of
these steps, the situation can be significantly im-
proved in the coming months.

President Johnson Discusses
the Presidency

Following are the foreign policy portions of
a television interview with President Johnson
conducted at the White House on March J 4 by
William II. Lawrence of the American Broad-
casting Company, Eric Sevareid of tJie Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, and David Brinkley
of the National Broadcasting Company.

White House press release dated March 15

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, considering
the violent and abrupt manner of your succes-
sion to the Presidency, I think everyone
agrees that the transition has gone remarkably
smoothly. Did this just happen, or did you
start to plan these things, say, in those few
hours in Air Force 1 as you flew back from
Dallas?

The President: Well, we had a lot of help
in the planning, Mr. Lawrence. A lot of
thoughts that went through my mind, as I left
the hospital, and on the way to Air P'orce 1,
and while we were waiting for Judge Hughes
and Mrs. Kennedy to come aboard — I wasn't
sure whether this was an international con-
spiracy, or just what it was, or what might
happen next. I was sure that the whole Nation
had been shaken and the world would be in
doubt.

As I rode back, I recognized that our first
great problem was to assure the world that
there would be continuity in transition, that
our constitutional system would work. I real-
ized the importance of uniting our people at
home and asking them to carry forward with
the program ; so I immediately plamied to have
the bipartisan leaders come to the Wliite House
upon my arrival.

I asked the membei*s of the Cabinet who were
then in town, the Director of the National Se-
curity Council, and Mr. McNamara and others
to meet me at ^Vndrews, and I appealed to all
of those men to work with me on the transition
and to try to so conduct ourselves as to assure
the rest of the world that we did have conti-
nuity and assure the people of this coimtry
that we expected them to unite.

APRIL 6, 1964

523

Very shortly thereafter, President Eisen-
hower came down and spent some time with
me exploring the problems that he expected
to arise confronting a new President. Presi-
dent Truman came in and gave me his counsel,
and we started off with the help and plans of
a good many people and substantially well
organized.

I don't know how well the Government did
its part of the transition, but the people's part
was well done.

Mr. Lawrence : Wliat were your first priori-
ties, Mr. President ?

The President: The first priority was to try
to display to the world that we could have con-
tinuity and transition, that the program of
President Kennedy would be caiTied on, that
there was no need for them to be disturbed and
fearful that our constitutional system had been
endangered — to demonstrate to the people of
this country that, although their leader had
fallen and we had a new President, we must
have imity and we must close ranks and we
must work together for the good of all America
and the world.

Mr. Lawrence: Well, did you have any con-
cern about the international posture that you
must adopt so that, one, all of our allies would
be reassured, and our potential enemies
wouldn't get any wrong ideas ?

The President: Oh, yes; and I spent the first
full week meeting with more than 90 represent-
atives from the nations of the world and trying
to explain to them our constitutional system,
and what they could expect imder it, and how
we carry on the program that we had begun,
and that I had been a part of the Kennedy-
Johnson ticket that won the election in 1960,
that we had a Kennedy- Johnson program, that
I had been a participant in the formulation of
that program, and that we would carry it on —
maybe not as well as the late President could
have, had he lived, but as best we could — and
they need have no fear or no doubt.

Mr. Lawrence: Wliat was the image that you
wanted the potential enemy to get?

The President: That we were sure and we
were confident that we were united, that we had
closed ranks, and not to tread on us.

Mr. Sevareid: Did you send any kind of pri-
vate messages to Chairman Khrushchev soon
after you became President ?

The President: No. We had representatives
from all the nations here. I spent 2 or 3 days
speaking to those representatives.

Mr. Mikoyan was here, and I had a long visit
with him, and I talked to him about the visit
that Premier Khinishchev had made me when
I was leader in the Senate, and we exchanged
views for a period of time here in the office,
just about the time of the fimeral.

Mr. Lawrence: Did the subject come up of
a possible exploratory, get-acquainted session
with Mr. Khrushchev ?

The President: No. We both expressed de-
sire in our discussion that we understand each
other better and that we would be glad to meet
at some time when we felt that the agenda was
such that would give promise of reaching some
solution to the many problems that confront
the two countries. But no definite plans were
made for a meeting. None were proposed, but
it was accepted as a possibility.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, if I could
make you a self-critic for a moment, what, if
anything, that has happened in these last 120
days would you do differently were you to do
it again ?

The President: Well, I don't know about
that. I am sure that we have made a good many
mistakes, but I don't know of any recommenda-
tion that I have made that I would change.

I would favor the same measures that I have
recommended to the Congress. I would liandle
the developments and the foreign policy fields
such as Panama and Guantanamo and Zanzi-
bar— Cyprus — as we have handled tliem.

So while I am sure that we could improve on
them if we had more time, in the light of what
developed I wouldn't change any.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, tlie hundred
days are over now, and the transition is over.
This is now the Johnson administration. Could
you give us an idea — not necessarily specific,
unless you care to — what direction you would
say your administration would take hereafter?

524

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

What new approaches or ideas or philosophies
we might see ?

The President: Well, I think a message going
to the Congress on Monday will indicate one
approach. We are delormined, and we have a
gronp of dedicated men tliat are going to try to
get at the roots and the causes of poverty that
cause 20 percent of our people to live otf of less
than $3,000 a year.

We are going to try to get at the roots and
the c^iuscs and find the solution to doing some-
thing about half a million men that, are rejected
each yejxr because of mental or physical reasons
for service.

AVe are going to try to recognize and proceed
on the basis that illiteracy and ignorance and
disease cost this Government billions of dollars
per year and make for mucli unhappine,ss.

And the program of poverty this year is one
example of what I would like to think will be
carried on and grow in the years to come. I
want this Government first of all to be dedi-
cated to peace in our time, and do everything
that we can conceivably do, any place, any time,
with anyone, to resolve some of the differences
that exist among mankind.

In order to do that, tliis Government must be
prepared and we must maintain strength and
power tliat would insure our safety if attacked.
In order to have peace, and to be prepared, we
must be solvent and fiscally responsible. So
for that reason we have tried to eliminate waste
at everj- corner. I don't believe that we are
going to make the Treasury' over by cutting out
a few automobiles or turning out a few lights.
But I do think it is a good example when you
walk through the corridor and you see the
closets where lights burn all day and all night
just because someone didn't turn them off.

So we have tried to set that example and we
want a Government that is seeking peace, that
is prepared for any eventuality, that is fiscally
solvent, and that is compassionate, that meets
the needs of the people for health and for edu-
cation, and for physical and mental and spirit-
ual strength. And our Government — that is
the kind of a Johnson administration I would
like to have and that is the kind that we are
working toward.

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Mr. Jirinkley: You have liad reports in the
last day or two from tlie Amljas.sailor to France
[Charles E. Bohlen] and from Secretary
[of Defense Robert S.] McNamara. Can you
t«ll us anything of what ho reported to you
from Viet-Nam?

The Prenident: Yes, he made a veiy lengthy
report and I think a responsible and construc-
tive one. We are going to consider it in the
Security Council further the early part of the
week.^ AVe have problems in Viet-Nam, as we
have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara
has been out there — this is his fourth trip. We
are very anxious to do what we can to lielp those
people preserve their own freedom. We cher-
ish ours, and we would like to see them preserve
theirs. We have furnished them with counsel
and advice, and men and materiel, to help them
in their attempts to defend themselves. If peo-
ple quit attacking them, we'd have no problem,
but for 10 years this problem has been going on.

I was reading a letter only today that (xen-
eral Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem
10 years ago,- and it is a letter that I could have
well written to President IQianh and sent out
by Mr. McNamara.

Now, we have had that problem for a long
time. We are going to have it for some time in
the future, we can see, but we are patient people,
and we love freedom, and we want to help
others preserve it, and we are going to try to
evolve the most effective and efficient plans we
can to continue to help them.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Kennedy said, on the sub-
ject of Viet-Nam, I think, that he did believe in
the "falling domino" theory, that if Viet-Nam
were lost that other countries in the area would
soon be lost.

The President: I think it would be a very
dangerous thing, and I share President Ken-
nedy's view, and I tliink the whole of South-
east Asia would be involved and that would in-
volve hundreds of millions of people, and I
think it's — it cannot be ignored, we must do
everything that we can, we must be responsible.

' For text of a White House statement released at
the close of a meetinp of the National Security Council
on Mar. 17, see p. 522.

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

APRIL 0, 1004

525

we must stay there and help them, and that is
what we are going to do.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, during tlie
New Hampshire primary campaign. Governor
Rockefeller criticized what he called "divided
counsel" that was going out from Washington
to the leaders of Viet-Nam. He said that while
you and Secretary Rusk and Secretary'
McNamara were committed to winning the war
and defeating the Viet Cong, the Senate Ma-
jority Leader, Senator [Mike] Mansfield,
seemed to find favor with the idea of neutrali-
zation advanced by President de Gaulle of
France. What is your reaction to Governor
Rockefeller's criticism ?

The President: Well, I think the Governor
should know that Senator Mansfield is very ex-
perienced in the field of foreign relations, and
served as a distinguished member of that com-
mittee, and when he made his speech in the Sen-
ate, he spoke for himself, and so stated. He
was not speaking the administration viewpoint,
and he did not leave any such impression.
From time to time he has given me his counsel
over the years in this general area of Southeast
Asia, but when he made this speech he spoke for
himself entirely, and there is no division in the
administration between Secretary Rusk and
Secretary McNamara and myself. We all feel
alike on the matter.

I think that there could even be some di-
vision between Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Lodge
[Henry Cabot Lodge, American Ambassador to
the Republic of Viet-Nam], judging from what
you have said. Mr. Lodge sees things pretty
much as we do, and we are going to continue
with our progi-am, and it is going to be a re-
sponsible one, and we think a fruitful one.

Mr. Lwwrence: Do ih& recommendations that
Secretary McNamara brought back fi-om his
last trip envisage a continuing role for Mr.
Lodge in handling policies in South Viet-Nam?
The President: Yes. Yes, he luis a very ini-
portant role. He met with me in my office 2
days after I became President, and I said to
him at that time, "You are my top man there,
and I want you to have the kind of people you
want, and I want you to caiTy out the program
you recommend and you will have our support
here." He has worked very hard at that job,
and we have sent him some new people from

time to time, and we will be sending more. He
has command of the full resources tliat we have
out there, and he works very well with our peo-
ple.

Mr. Lawrence: One of your speeches at the
University of California in Los Angeles indi-
cated a kind of hint to me that we might carry
the war to the North Vietnamese if they didn't
quit meddling in what you call a "dangerous
game." ^ Are there any such plans that you
can talk about at this time, sir ?

The President: No, and I made no such hint.
1 said it was a dangerous game to try to supply
arms and become an aggressor and deprive peo-
ple of their freedom, and that is true, whether
it is in Viet-Nam or whether it is in this hemi-
sphere, wherever it is.

Mr. Laiorence : Mr. President, do we face the
decision on Viet-Nam of the order of magnitude
of Korea, for example?

The President : No, I don't think so. I think
that we have problems there, we have difficulties
there — we have had for 10 ye-ars — and as I told
you, a good many things have come and gone
during that period of time; as long as there
are people trying to preserve their freedom, we
want to help them.

America's Role in a Changing World

Mr. Brinkley : Well, Mr. President, not only
do we have a new administration in this coun-
try, but we also have what might be described
as a new world, since it is Sivid now that the
postwar world is over, and the American lead-
ership is challenged and questioned both by
friends and enemy alike in many places now.
So it is an entirely different world, very differ-
ent world, from what it was a few years ago.
What is your view and assessment of it? How
do you see the American role from here on, now
that we are no longer the unquestioned leader
of the entire West ?

The President: Well, I think that, as long as
we are living in a world with 120 nations, we
have got to realize that we have got 120 foreign
policies. And we are living in a world where
we recognize 114 other nations, and some tliat

^ For text of remark.s made by President Johnson at
Charter Day ceremonies at UCLA on Feb. 21, see ibi4..
Mar. 3G. 1964, p. 399.

526

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUUJITIN

we don't recognize, and so I think at this time
that our nation is held in high ostoom and re-
spet;t and affection generally among the peoples
of the world — the free world. I realize that
we have dis<"ouraging incidents from time to
time, and we have problems, and because we try
to help with those problems, sometimes the role
of the peacemaker is not a very happy one.
And so, for that rea.son, we have to do things
that we don't want to do sometimes, and are
rather irritating — and sometimes we are abused
because we do them, and sometimes we are mis-
understood. But if the final result is good,
then our action is justified.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, about 10 years
ago an American Secretary of State termed
neutrality as something immoral. Not long ago
President Kennedy talked about making the
world safe for diversity. Is a more and more
diverse world, with the dimini.shing of the im-
portance of great alliances, a trend toward a
safer world ?

The President: Yes, I think so. And you
must remember this : that we are having all the
new nations that are emerging, and they are
coming in without experience, and they have
their pride. A good many of them have the
feeling that — pent-up feelings that they have
nurtured for years and years. And they have
an opportunity to express themselves, and some-
times it looks a little odd for the Prime Minis-
ter of a new country to come in with a pistol in
his hand and arrest an American Charge
d'Affaires.

But that does happen, and we have to be
prepared for those developments and trj' to
understand them and try to provide leadership
that will keep us from getting in deeper water
or more trouble, and that is what we are doing.
Sometimes our people become very impatient.
They cut the water off on us in Cuba, and I
have got a good many recommendations from
all over the country as to how to act very
quickly. Some of them have said- — some of the
men have even wanted me to run in the Marines,
send them in immediately.

Well, upon reflection, evaluation, and study,
realizing not many people want more war and
none of them really want more appeasement,
you have to find a course that you can chart

that will preserve your dignity and 8elf-res|)ect
and still bring about the action that is nex^es-
sary. So instead of si-nding in the Marines
to turn the water on, we sent one admiral in to
cut it off and arrange to make our own water,
anil we think things worke-d out the best they
could under those circumstances.

Hut there are going to be these demands from
time to time, people who feel that all we need
to do is mash a button and determine every-
body's foreign policy. But we are not living
in that kind of world any more. They are
going to determine it for themselves, and that
is the way it should be. And we are going to
have to come and reason with them and try to
lead them instead of force them. And I
think^ — I have no doubt but what for centuries
to come we will be a leading force in molding
the opinion of the world, and I think the better
they know us the more they will like us.

Mr. Lawrence: Is there anj' progress, Mr.
President, in the deadlock over Panama and
the absence of diplomatic relations with that
country ?

The President: We have been very close to
agreement several times. I have no doubt but
what agreement will l)e reached that will, in
effect, provide for sitting down with Panama-
nian authorities and discussing the problems
that exist between us, and being guided only
by what is fair and what is right and what is
just, and ti-ying to resolve those problems.
Xow, when that will come about, I don't know.
We are anxious and willing and eager to do it
any time its suits their convenience.

Mr. Lnurrence : '\Miat is the hitch right now,
Mr. President?

The President: I think, first, they have an
election on, and I think, translating our lan-
guage into their language, that some of the
agreements that we have to discuss these mat-
ters, they perhaps feel that they would want
stronger language than we are willing to agre«
to and we want a different expression from
what they want. It is largely a matter of try-
ing to agree on the kind of language that will
meet their problems and that we can honestly,
sincerely agree to. We are not going to agree
to any preconditions to negotiate a new treaty
without Imowing what is going to be in that

APRIL, 6, 1964

527

treaty and without sitting down and working
it out on the basis of equity. We thuik that
that language can be resolved and will be re-
solved in due time.

Mr. BrinkUy: ilr. President, what is your
assessment now of General de Gaulle's be-
havior in the last year or two I "\Miat do you
think about it ?

The President: "Well, it is not for me to pass
judgment on —

Mr. Brinkley: In relation to us, sir?
The President: — on General de Gaulle's con-
duct. My conversations with liim have been
very pleasant, and I would like to see him more
in agreement on matters with us than he is, such
as recognizing Red China. We did not think
that was wise for France or for others or for
the free world. But that is France's foreign
policy. Tliat is not ours, and in his wisdom
he decided he would follow that course, and
that is a matter for him to determine.

Mr. Laiirrence : Wliat do you hear from tlie
people at the United Nations, Mr. President?
Has the fact of French recognition now in-
creased the prospect that the Red Chinese may
be voted into membership at the U.N. ?

The President: The situation changes from
time to time, but we don't think that they will
be voted into membership and we hope not.
I don't believe they will.

Mr. Lawrence: Wliat would be our reaction
vis-a-vis the U.N. if they were admitted ?

The President: Well, we will have to cross
that bridge. I don't want to admit that they
are going to be admitted and don't think they
will.

Mr. Lawrence: Senator Goldwater, for ex-
ample, has argued that we should withdraw at
once if the Red Chinese are admitted.

The President: Well, that is Senator Gold-
water's view, and I don't tliink they're going to
be admitted, and I don't think we will have to
face that question.

Foreign Aid and the Alliance for Progress

Mr. Brinkley: One you do have to face soon,
Mr. I'resident, is to say something to Congress
about foreign aid. That seems to have reached
a peak of opposition. It seems to have reached

some kind of peak last year. AYliat do you
think the future of it is?

The President: I think it is going to be very
touffh to get a sood foreign aid measure

CO*— *—

through the Congress this year. Last year
President Kennedy asked for ^.900,000.000.
He later had that request carefully studied and
reduced it to §4.500,000,000. We got a $3 bil-
lion appropriation after I came to office. I
signed the bill, and there was reappropriated
about $400 million unexpended balances —
$3,400,000,000. Now. I have conferred with the
leaders in the House and Senate on that matter,
and they all admit it is going to be more difficult
this year than it ever has been before, although
I don't think that is justified. Nevertheless, I
request — we are not going to pad our request.
We got $3,400,000,000 this year, and we will ask
for something in the neighborhood of that for
next year, and we will ask only what we need,
and we hope we get what we ask, but it will be
appreciably under what was asked last year and
approximately the same that we got this year.*
We think that we are justified in spending
three or four cents of our tax dollar to protect
the million men who are in uniform, our men,
scattered throughout the world, and to keep
them from going into combat, and this is the
best weapon that I have.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, is there any one
root cause for the apparent slowness of the
Alliance for Progress?

The President : Yes. It is very difficult to get
21 nations to all agree and get their systems
changed and their refonns efl'ected and to blend
into their governmental philosophy the mod-
ernization that is going to be required to make
the Alliance for Progress a success.

We are distressed that it hasn't been more
successful, but we haven't lost faith.

We are having a meeting ]\Ionday with all of
the ambassadors from the Organization of
American States. We are having a meeting
Monday with all the ambassadors from the
Western IIiMuisphcre. AVe are calling in all of
our own aml)assadoi-s, and the tliree groups are
gomg to meet, and we are going to point out

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on foreign aid, dated Mar. 19, see p. 518.

528

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BUUJ5TIN

the weaknesses, and the slowness of certain re-
forms that are re<]uinHK ami tlio i'0()|uMalion
tJiat we must liave fi-om tlu>ir count rios, Un-ause
there is no use of niakinjj bij; investments ami
takinj; our taxpayei-s' funds unless theso re-
forms are etl'iH-tive.

Ami we aiv jj^iin^ to nuvke an appeal for a
united attack tliat will i:;i\c new life to the
Alliance for Pri><;rcss, and we have hopi>s that
it will be successfid.

The View From the Inside

.1/r. Ldinyncc: Mr. President, yoxi have now
been President for sometliinjx over 100 days.
You have been around Wasiiinjiton for more
than 30 years. How is the view from the inside
as compai-ed with tlie view from the outside?

T/ie President: Well, it is a much toufjhor
job from the inside than 1 lhon<;lit it was from
the outside.

I have watclicd it since Mr. Hoover's days,
and I realized the ix>sponsibilities it carried, and
the obliirations of leadei-ship that were tliere,
and the decisions that had to be maile, and the
awesome responsibilities of the oflice.

But I must say tiiat, when I started havinir
to make those decisions and started hcariiifj;
from the Congress, the Presidency looked a little
dilTerent wlien you are in the Presidency tlian
it did wiien you are in the Congress, and vice
versa.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, Tliomas Jef-
ferson referred to the oflice as a splendid misery.
Harry Truman used to talk about it as if it
were a prison cell. Do you like it?

The Presidenf: I am doing the best I I'an in
it, and I am enjoying wliat 1 am doing.

Thomas Jeffei-son said the second oflice of the
land was an honorable and easy one. The
Presidency was a s])len(lid misery. But I
found great interest in .serving in l)otii oflices,
and it carries terrific and tremendous and awe-

some itvsponsibilities, but 1 am proud of tins
nation and I am so grateful timl 1 could liave
an opportunity that 1 have iiad ii» .Vmerica tliat
1 want to give my life seeing (hat the oppor-
timily is {)erpet Mated for othei-s.

1 am so proud of our system of government,
of our fn>e enterprise, where our incentive .sys-
tem and our n\en who head our big industries
aiv willing to gi>t up at dayiiglit and gel to \m\
at midnight to oll'er employment ami civale new
jobs for people, wheiv our men working theiv
will try to get decent wages but will sit a<'ross
the table and not act like cannilml.s, but will
negotiate and reason things out together.

1 am so hai)py to be a part of a system where
the average per capita income is in exctvss of
$•200 per month, when tliere are only si.\ na-
tions in I lie entire world that have as much
as $80 per month, and while the Soviet Union
has three times as many tillable acres of land
as we have and a population that's in excess
of GUI'S and a great many resources that we
don't have, that if properly developed would
exceed our potential in water and oil and .so
forth, nevertheless we have one thing they don't
have and that is our system of private enter-
prise, free enterprise, where the employer, hop-
ing to make a little profit, tlu' laborer, hoping
to justify his wages, can get togetiier and make
a better mousetrap.

They ha\e develo[)ed this into liii< most pow-
erful and leading nation in the world, and I
want to see it preserved. And T have an op-
portunity to do sonictliingalK)ut it as I 'resilient.

And I may not lie a great President, but as
long as 1 am here, I am going to try to be a
good President and do my dead-le\'el best, to
see this system pi-eserved, because when the
linal chips niv down it. is not. going to be the
number of people we have or the number of
acres or tlu^ ninnbcr of resources I hat win; the
thing that is going to make us win is our sys-
tem of government.

Mr. Brhikley: Thiudt you, Mr. Prosiilent.

APRIL 6, 1964

529

The Toilsome Path to Peace

Address by Secretary Busk ^

The first objective of our foreign policy is,
in the words of the preamble to our Constitu-
tion, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity." The "Blessings of
Liberty" lie at the heart of the world struggle
in which we are engaged. The central issue
in that struggle is coercion versus free choice,
tyranny versus freedom. And the most power-
ful assets we have in this struggle are the ideas
out of which this nation was bom and has
grown. For these ideas and ideals are shared
by most of mankind, including, I am convinced,
a majority of those behind the Iron and Bam-
boo Curtains.

As I said elsewhere last month,'' I believe that
every American boy and girl should be familiar
with the American system of government and
the ideas out of which it developed. I believe
that each of our young should know that the
priceless liberties which we enjoy did not spring
into being overnight, that they were worked
for and developed and defended — often with
blood — over the generations, that they should
never be taken for granted, that they can be
preserved only by exercising them and by our
vigilance and dedication.

Tonight I should like to look with you at the
world around us and appraise where we are in
the struggle between tyranny and freedom. Be-
yond question, this is a dangerous and turbulent
world — a world of rapid change, of ever-accel-
erating scientific and technological advance, of

^ Made before a joint meeting of the Western Politi-
cal Science Association and the International Studies
Association at Salt Lake City, Utah, on Mar. 19 (press
release 126).

" Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 358.

transition from old empires to new nations, of
the rise of former colonial peoples to independ-
ence and equality, of urgent demand for social
and economic progress, for a better life for all.
It is a noisy and disputatious world. It gives
us in your State Department plenty of work to
do.

It is quite true that other nations don't al-
ways talk or act as we would prefer. President
Johnson reminded us a few days ago that we
are living in a world of 120 foreign policies.
We don't give orders to other nations — we don't
believe in the kind of world in which any gov-
ernment takes its orders from others. As Presi-
dent Jolinson said,^ there are

. . . people who feel that all we need to do Is mash
a button and determine everybody's foreign policy.
But we are not living in that kind of world any more.
They are going to determine it for themselves, and
that is the way it should be. And we are going to
have to come and reason with them and try to lead
them instead of force them.

Bilateral Issues

Let me try to put our problems in perspective.
Koughly, there are four different kinds of inter-
national problems with which we have to deal.

In the first category are strictly bilateral is-
sues between us and other governments. These
usually have to do with trade or the protection
of American nationals or property. They
rarely involve dangerous issues. At present,
we do have a painful dispute with our friends
in Panama. Formally, it is a bilateral dispute.
But because the Panama Canal is an important
international convenience, the dispute affects

' See p. 523.

530

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

a great iiuiny other countries, especially those
in this hemisphere. The Organization of
American States has been trying to help move
this dispute toward the conference table. Wo
look forward hopefully to tlie restoration of
relations between Panama and the United
States ami to friendly discussions and adjust-
ments of our common problems and interests.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist States

A second group of problems involves directly
the central struggle between international com-
munism and the free world. These include
such dangerous and explosive issues sxs Berlin
and Germany, Viet-Nam and Laos, and Cuba.
In these issues we do and must play a leading
role.

Nobody need tell us in the State Department,
or in our sister departments or agencies, that
this world struggle is for keeps. Knowing what
the Communists are up to and imderstanding
their varied teclmiques are a major order of
business in the State Department. We are fully
aware that Moscow, as well as Peiping, remains
committed to the Communist world revolu-
tion— and that, although they may diifer over
current tactics, both are determined to "bury"
us and are prepared to try to expedite our de-
mise by whatever means they think are effective
within the levels of tolerable risk to themselves.

The first objective of our policy toward the
Communist states is to prevent them from ex-
tending their domains — and to make it costly,
dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so.
To that end we maintain a nuclear deterrent
of almost unimaginable power, and large,
varied, and mobile conventional forces. We
have also improved our capacity to deal with
guerrilla warfare.

Not since Korea has the Commimist world
attempted to expand by frontal assault. We
and other free nations must be determined to
put an end also to indirect aggi*ession — to the
filtering of men and arms across the frontiers,
whether in Southeast Asia, Latin iimerica, or
anywhere else.

We also combat Commimist imperialism by
helping the developing comitries to make eco-
nomic and social progress.

In the main, the world struggle is going well

from our viewpoint. West lierlin remains free
and prosperous. So does Western Europe as
a whole. So does Japan. Many of the less
developed nations have jnoved ahejid impre,«-
sively. And almost all of them, old and new
nations alike, are stubbornly defending theii
independence.

Meanwhile, the Communist world is not only
torn by disjjutes but beset with economic diffi-
culties. The standard of living in mainland
China is even lower than it was in 1957, before
the "great leap" backward. The Soviet Union
has done somewhat better but lias encountered
a slowdown in growth rates and critical prob-
lems of resource allocation. The smaller Com
munist countries of Eastern Europe lag far be-
hind Western Europe. Even with massive
Soviet support, Cuba's economy is limping
badly. And nearly all the Communist coun-
tries have large and conspicuous difliculties in
producing food. The notion that communism
is a shortcut to the future for developing nations
has been proved false.

A\1iile we curb Communist imperialism, we
seek agreements with our adversaries to reduce
the dangers of a devastating war. The Soviets
appear to recognize that they have a common
interest with us in preventing a thermonuclear
exchange. We and they have reached a few
limited agreements. These do not yet consti-
tute a detente. We shall continue to search for
further agreements. But in the field of dis-
armament not much progress can be made until
the Soviets are prepared to accept reliable veri-
fication and inspection of arms retained. And
on many vital issues Moscow's views and the
West's remain far apart.

Beyond curbing Commimist imperialism and
trying to achieve specific agreements to reduce
the danger of a great war, there is a third ele-
ment in our policy toward the Communist states.
This is to encourage the trends within the Com-
munist world toward national independence,
peaceful cooperation, and open societies. These
trends are visible in various degrees in different
parts of the Communist world. Our capacity
to encourage them is very limited. But we
may be able to influence them somewhat.

We believe that we can best further our ob-
jectives by adjusting our policies to the differ-

APRIL C, 1964

531

ing behavior of different Communist states — or
to the clianging behavior of the same state.

U.S. Concern About Free-World Disputes

A third category of problems miglit be labeled
"other people's quarrels." The postwar explo-
sion in the number of new states has multiplied
disputes about boundaries, some old and some
new. These are sometimes accentuated by
racial, religious, and tribal frictions whose ori-
gins precede the discovery of America. And
we are learning that small countries, too, can
fear small neighbors.

Then, there are internal outbreaks of violence
and coups which add to the headlines, and often
to our headaches. In 1963 there were 12 forci-
ble overturns of governments.

Passions are flammable, and all too often the
fuse is dangerously short. Ambition and guns
seem to be in ready supply. Eesponsibility and
public order are too often in short supply.

Two questions therefore arise — understand-
ably. One is: Does the United States really
have to be concerned about all of these quarrels ?
This question is asked frequently in the Depart-
ment of State when a new dispute within the
free world arises or an old one flares again.
And the answer almost always turns out to be :
Yes, we do.

Remote and complex as some of these quarrels
may be, the reasons for our interest are direct
and simple. Unless they are quickly settled
through other channels, most of them come to
the United Nations, where we have to take a
position. The U.N. Security Council is pres-
ently seized with 61 matters, of which 57 are
disputes. Fortunately, some of these disputes
are no longer active. But many are. As a
responsible member of the U.N. we could not
avoid some involvement in these disputes even
if we felt little real concern about them.

Usually, however, we do feel real concern.
Disputes within the free world often give the
Communists opportunities to cause more serious
trouble. And there is often the danger that
dispute will lead to crisis, crisis to skirmish,
skirmish to local war, and local war with con-
ventional weapons to a confrontation, delib-
erate or by suction, of the nuclear powers. As
long as that possibility exists, the United States

has a fundamental national security interest in
the peaceful settlement of such disputes.

Then, too, disputes within the free world
dissipate energies and resources which are
needed for constructive purposes. We have an
enduring long-term interest in building the
strength of the free world. And we have a
dollars-and-cents interest in the most effective
use of the aid we provide to the developing
nations. If India and Pakistan would settle
their quarrels and cooperate with each other
in the common defense of the South Asian sub-
continent, not only would that part of the world
be more secure, but both countries could im-
prove the living standards of their peoples more
rapidly and at less cost, overall, to themselves
and to the nations which are assisting them.

Finally, we simply are too big to hide: We
happen to be the most powerful nation in the
world. Parties to any dispute like to have
strong friends on their respective sides of the
barricades.

I do not recall an international dispute of the
last 3 years in which each party has not so-
licited our support and suggested what we
should do to bring our weight to bear against
its opponent. Much as we may dislike it, tliis,
of course, often puts us in the middle. But
it is from the middle that influence for a peace-
ful solution can often be exerted.

In this process we obviously cannot agree
witli all the parties, nor can we usually agree
100 percent with either party. So, to the extent
that we are drawn in, we usually leave both
sides somewhat dissatisfied and, on occasion, a
bit angry with us. The role of the peacemaker
is usually thankless, at least on the part of the
parties to the dispute. But it is a responsibility
we dare not shirk.

Sharing Peacelteeping Responsibilities

Does this mean that the United States must
be the policeman — and the judge — for the en-
tire free world ? That is the second of the two
general questions about our role in "other peo-
ple's quarrels." The answer is no. It is imprac-
ticable and would be presumptuous for one na-
tion to try to patrol every "beat" in the free
world.

There are other — and better — ways of making

532

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and keeping peace. Tliese lie in the activities
of groups of nations cither informal or orga-
nized. The advantages are perhaps obvious.
But, as the late Justice Oliver "Woiulell Holmes
once said: "We need education in the obvious
more than investigation of the obscure."

In some cases, a few important neighbors
or other friends may be helpful. In others,
regional organizations, such as the Organization
of American States and the Organization of
African Unity, may be useful. In still otliers,
the United Nations may be the most effective
instrument.

An international organization is often more
acceptable politically than any of its members
acting individually. The flag of the United
Nations is the emblem of a vrorld community.
It can be flown in places where the flag of an-
other sovereign nation would be considered an
affront.

"When we act in concert with others, the re-
sponsibility for success — or failure — is shared.
And when we contribute to international peace-
keeping missions, the costs also are shared.

There has been some suggestion that the
United States has carried somewhat more than
its fair share of the financial load, wliile other
nations have carried less than their share or
none at all.

Of course we think that all nations should
carry their fair share at all times. But not all
nations have agreed with us; some have been
opposed to keeping or restoring the peace be-
cause they believed their interests would be
served by conflict.

If we have carried a substantial share of the
load, it has been because we considered it in
our national interest to do so. That was the case
in the Congo. President Eisenhower passed
up a request from the Government of the Congo
to intervene directly and turned, instead, to the
United Nations. Wlien President Kemiedy
took office, he reviewed the situation and de-
cided to adhere to that policy. Eventually we
bore something more than our normal share of
the cost of this United Nations operation, but
the expense to us was unquestionably much less
than that of alternative ways of restoring order
and keeping the Communists from establishing
a base in this potentially rich coimtry in the
heart of Africa.

Now the United Nations has undertaken to
restore order and peace in Cyprus and to medi-
ate the dispute between Cypriots of Greek and
Turkish descent. Tiie settlement of this dis-
pute involving two of our NATO allies and the
security of NATO's southeastern flank is of
vital interest to us and all the free world.

It is in our national interest, and in the
national interest of all peaceful countries, to
help create, train, and finance workable and
effective international police machinery — to
share our own capacity to act in the service of
peace and to share responsibility for keeping
the peace.

We applaud the decisions taken by the Nor-
dic countries and by Canada and Holland to
earmark and train special units to be on call
for peacekeeping duties with the United Na-
tions. We therefore shall continue to work
for a much more reliable system of financing
such operations : The thought that the issue of
peace or war might turn on the availabilitj^ of
relatively small amounts of money is an offense
to mind and morals.

But I do not want to place all the emphasis
on a police force ready to rush out after dis-
putes have broken -into violence. The first
order of business is to seek a resolution before
violence occurs. xVnd tliis, of course, means
early recourse to negotiation, mediation, arbi-
tration, and any techniques of factfinding and
observation that can help to clarify and de-fuse
incipient threats to the peace.

If this can be done through regional organi-
zations without recoui"se to the United Nations,
so much the better. If it can be done directly —
or with the assistance of an impartial third
party — better still. But, the world being what
it is, more and more of these disputes are likely,
in one form or another, to come before the
United Nations.

The United Nations is an imperfect organiza-
tion ; no one knows that better than the policy-
makers and policy executors who work in it and
through it. The need for various improvements
in the United Nations machinery has become
increasingly clear. And not all of these require
amendment of the chai'ter. Recently I sug-
gested the consideration of several steps to im-
prove the procedures of the General Assem-
bly— steps designed to limit irresponsible talk

APRIL C, 1964

725-386—64-

533

and symbolic resolutions and to promote re-
sponsible decisions and recommendations, de-
cisions and recommendations which will have
the support of the nations which supply the
TJ.N. with resources and have the capacity to
act.*

Despite the difficulties which it has obviously
experienced, the United Nations commands our
continuing support. As President Johnson said
to the General Assembly last December 17 : ^

. . . more than ever we support the United Nations
as the best instrument yet devised to promote the
peace of the world and to promote the well-being of
mankind.

Building a Decent World Order

Improving and strengthening the United Na-
tions is an important part — but only a part — of
our greatest task : the building of a decent world
order. Today our nation and our way of life
can be safe only if our worldwide environment
is safe. By worldwide I mean not only the land,
waters, and air of the earth but the adjacent
areas of space, as far as man can maintain in-
struments capable of affecting life on earth.
Our worldwide environment will be perma-
nently safe only if mankind succeeds in estab-
lishing a decent world order.

An enormous part of our work in the State
Department has to do with building, bit by bit,
a decent world order. This receives relatively
little attention in the headlines, but it goes on,
day after day, around the clock. It includes
hundreds of international conferences a year,
many of them on teclmical areas of interna-
tional cooperation and understanding, such as
the control of narcotics, commercial aviation,
postal services, et cetera.

Tliis vast, constructive task is the heart of
all we are doing to develop closer ties between
ourselves and other countries of the free world.
It imderlies our efforts to build imder the um-
brella of the NATO alliance an effective Atlan-
tic community and to achieve closer unitj' with
our friends in the Pacific. It underlies our ef-
forts to execute the grand design of an Alliance
for Progress among the nations of this hemi-

* Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112.
' Ibid., Jan. C, 1904, p. 2.

sphere. It underlies our efforts to create an
effective partnership between the economically
advanced countries and those that are newly
developing.

This vast, constructive task involves the low-
ering of barriers to world trade. It involves
our foreign aid programs, which support the
independence and the economic and social prog-
ress of tlie developing countries. It involves
all that we do to promote cultural and other
exchanges with other nations.

We do not — and must not — allow the drum-
fire of crises in the headlines to cause us to
neglect the building of a decent world order,
the kind of world set forth in the preamble and
articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations. We are working toward :

— a world free of aggression — aggression by
whatever means;

• — a world of independent nations, each with
the institutions of its own choice but cooper-
ating with one another to their mutual
advantage ;

— a world of economic and social advance for
all peoples;

— a world which provides sure and equitable
means for the peaceful settlement of disputes
and which moves steadily toward a rule of law ;

—a world in which the powers of the state
over the individual are limited by law and cus-
tom, in which the personal freedoms essential
to the dignity of man are secure ;

— a world free of hate and discrimination
based on race, or nationality, or color, or eco-
nomic or social status, or religious beliefs;

— and a world of equal rights and equal op-
portunities for the entire human race.

We believe that is the kind of world which
most of the peoples of the world want. That
is the goal toward which we are working, tena-
ciously and untiringly. And we are making
headway. If we persevere, we shall eventually
reach our goal : a world in which the "Blessings
of Liberty" are secure for all mankind. We
dare not falter. For unless the world is made
safe for freedom, our own freedom cannot
survive.

There are those who would quit the struggle
by letting down our defenses, by gutting our
foreign aid programs, by leaving the United

534

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Nations. They would abandon the field to our
adverearics. That is, of course, what tlie Com-
munists want most. It is no accident that their
favorite slogan is "Yanks, go home." Insofar
as anybody here or abroad pays attention to
tlie quitters, they are lending aid and comfort

to our enemies. I feci certain that the Ameri-
can people will reject the quitters, with their
prescription for retreat and defeat. I believe
that the American people have the will and the
stamina to push on along the toilsome path to
peace.

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

Address hy President Johnson^

Thirty-one years ago this month Franklin
Eoosevelt proclaimed the policy of the Good
Neighbor. Tliree years ago this month John
Kenned}' called for an Alliance for Progress
among the American Republics.- Today my
country rededicates itself to these principles
and renews its commitment to the partnership
of the hemisphere to carry them forward.

We meet as fellow citizens of a remarkable
hemisphere. Here, a century and a half ago,
we began the movement for national independ-
ence and freedom from foreign rule which is
still the most powerful force in all the world.
Here, despite occasional conflict, we have peace-
fully shared our hemisphere to a degree un-
matched by any nation, anywhere.

Here, and in this very room, we have helped
create a system of international cooperation
which Franklin Roosevelt called "the oldest
and the most successful association of sovereigii
governments anywhere in tlie world." Here
are 20 nations who, sharing the traditions and
values of Western civilization, are bound to-

'Made at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16 on
the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de
Santamaria as chairman of the Inter-American Com-
mittee on the Alliance for Progress (White House press
release; as-delivered text).

' Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

gether by a common belief in the dignity of
man. Here are 20 nations who have no desire
to imjwse a single ideology or system on any-
one else, who believe that each country must
follow its own path to fulfillment with freedom,
who take strength from the richness of their
diversity.

So it is on this — this history and this accom-
plishment, these common values and this com-
mon restraint — that we base our hope for our
future. Today these hopes center largely on
the Alliance for Progress that you are all so
interested in.

John F. Kennedy has been taken from us.
The alliance remains a source for our faith and
a cliallenge to our capacity. The Alliance for
Progress owes much to the vision of President
Kennedy. But he imderstood that it flows
from the desires and ideas of those in each of
our countries who seek progress with freedom.
In its councils, all nations sit as eqiuils. This
is the special significance of CIAP [Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for
Progress] — the organization that we honor
today. Througli it, the alliance will now be
guided by the advice and wisdom of men from
throughout the hemisphere.

It needs and is getting the best leadership our

APRIL G, 1904

535

continents have to offer. It has such leader-
ship in Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, one of our
most distinguislied Americans.

Basic Principles of the Alliance

In the last 3 years we have built a structure
of common effort designed to endure for many
years. In those years much has been accom-
plished. Throughout Latin America new
schools and factories, housing and hospitals
have opened new opportunities. Nations have
instituted new measures of land and tax reform,
educational expansion, and economic stimulus
and discipline.

We are proud of these achievements. But as
we take pride in what has thus far been done,
our minds turn to the great unfinished business.
Only by facing these shortcomings, only by
fighting to overcome them, can we make our
alliance succeed in the years ahead.

Let me make clear what I believe in. They
are not failures of principle or failures of belief.
The alliance's basic principles of economic de-
velopment, of social justice, of human freedom,
are not only the right path; they are the only
path for tliose who believe that botli the wel-
fare and the dignity of man can advance side
by side. To those who prize freedom, there
just simply is no alternative.

There is no magic formula to avoid the com-
plex and the sometimes painful and difficult
task of basic social reform and economic ad-
vance. There is no simple trick that will trans-
form despair into hope, that will turn misery
and disease into abundance and health. Those
who think that the path of progress in this
hemisphere will be easy or painless are arousing
false hopes and are inviting disappointment.

Tha criticism which can give us new vigor
and which must guide us is of those who share
our beliefs but offer us better ways to move
toward better goals. We have learned much
about the difficulties and tlie flaws of our
alliance in the past 3 years. We must today
profit from this experience. With faith in our
principles, with pride in our achievements, with
tlie help of candid and constructive criticism,
we are now prepared to move ahead with re-
newed effort and renewed confidence.

Need for Increased Cooperation

Tlie first area of emphasis is increased co-
operation— among ourselves, with other na-
tions, with private and public institutions. We
will continue our efforts to protect producing
nations against disastrous price changes so
harmful to their economies, and consumers
against short supply and unfair price rises.
We will intensify our cooperation in the use
of our resources in the process of development.
CIAP itself is an important step in that direc-
tion, and CIAP has our full support.

But other institutions as well — the Inter-
American and World Banks, the private foun-
dations and cooperatives, the savings institu-
tions and sources of agricultural credit — must
in every coimtry focus their energies on the
efforts to overcome the massive difficulties of
capital shortage and hunger and lack of ade-
quate educational facilities.

So that ray own country's participation in
this cooperation might receive needed leader-
ship and direction, I have given Secretary
Mann, who enjoys my highest confidence, broad
responsibility for our role in the alliance.^ His
appointment reflects my complete determina-
tion to meet all the commitments of the United
States to the alliance.

Our pledge of substantial external help has
been met in the past, and my administration
will spare no effort to meet it in the future, and
my confidence is reinforced by my knowledge
that the people of the United States also sup-
port that commitment to our fellow Americans.

We urge and we welcome the constructive
contribution of developed nations outside this
hemisphere. We believe in diversity in the
modern world. We can all learn from one
anotlier. Capital, teclmical know-how, access
to markets, fair prices for basic commodities —
all of these will contribute to the rapid develop-
ment which is the goal of all of us.

But public funds are not enough. We must
work together to insure the maximum use of

'Thomas C. Mann is Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, Special Assistant to the
President, and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance
for ProRress. For text of a letter of Dec. 1."), 1963,
from President Johnson to Mr. Mann at the time of
his appointment, see ibid., .Tan. C, 1964, p. 9.

536

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

private capital, domestic and foreign: witiiout
it, {jrowtli will certainly fall far behind. Such
capital will respond to a stable prospect of fair
earnings and a chance to create badly needed
industry and business on a responsible and safe
and sound basis. Those who destroy the confi-
dence of risk capital, or deny it a chance to
offer its enertry and talent, endanger the hopes
of their people for a more abundant life, be-
cause our abundant life flows from that energy
and from that talent that wo have given a
chance.

The Area of Self-Help

The second area of emphasis is the area of
self-help. Progress cannot be created by form-
ing international organizations. Progress can-
not be imposed by foreign countries. Progress
cannot be purchased with large amounts of
money or even with large amounts of good will.

Progress in each coimtry depends upon the
willingness of that country to mobilize its own
resources, to inspire its own people, to create
the conditions in which growth can and will
flourish, for although help can come from with-
out, success must come only from within. Those
who are not willing to do that which is un-
popular and that which is difficult will not
achieve that which is needed or that which
will be lasting. This is as true of my own coun-
try's fight against poverty and racial injustice
as it is of the fight of others against hunger
and disease and illiteracy — the ancient enemies
of all mankind.

By broadening education, we can liberate new
talents and energy, freeing millions from the
bonds of illiteracy. Through land reform
aimed at increased production, taking different
forms in each country, we can provide those
who till the soil with self-respect and increased
income, and each country with increased pro-
duction to feed the hungry and to strengthen
their economy.

Fair and progressive taxes, effectively col-
lected, can provide the resources that are needed
to improve education and public-health condi-
tions and the social structure that is needed
for economic growth. Measures ranging from
control of inflation and encouragement of ex-

ports to the elimination of deficits in public
enterprises can help provide the basis of eco-
nomic stability and growth on which our alli-
ance can flourish.

The Pursuit of Social Justice

The third area of emphasis is the pursuit
of social justice. Development and material
progress are not ends in themselves. They are
means to a better life and means to an increased
opportunity for us all. They are the means for
each to contribute his best talents and each to
contribute his best desires. They are tlie means
to the full dignity of man, for the Alliance for
Progress is a recognition that the claims of the
poor and the oppressed are just claims. It is
an effort to fulfill those claims while at the same
time strengthening democratic society and
maintaining the liberty of man.

So, no matter how great our progress, it will
lack meaning unless every American from the
Indian of the Andes to the impoverished farmer
of Appalachia can share in the fruits of change
and growth. Land reform, tax changes, edu-
cation expansion, the fight against disease all
contribute to this end. Everything else that we
must do must be shaped by these guiding prin-
ciples. In these areas — cooperation, self-help,
social justice — new emphasis can bring us
closer to success.

At the same time we must protect the alliance
against the efforts of communism to tear down
all that we are building. The recent proof of
Cuban aggression in Venezuela is only the lat-
est evidence of those intentions. We will soon
discuss how best we can meet these threats to
the independence of us all. But I now, today,
assure you that the full power of the United
States is ready to assist any country whose
freedom is threatened by forces dictated from
beyond the shores of this continent.

The United States and Panama

Let me now depart for a moment from my
main theme to speak of the differences that
have developed between Panama and the United
States.

Our own position is clear, and it has been
from the first hour that we learned of the dis-

APRIL 6, 1964

537

turbances. The United States will meet with
Panama any time, anywhere, to discuss any-
thing, to work together, to cooperate with each
other, to reason with one another, to review and
to consider all of our problems together, to tell
each other all our opinions, all our desires, and
all our concerns, and to aim at solutions and
answers that are fair and just and equitable
without regard to the size or the strength or
the wealth of either nation.

We don't ask Panama to make any precom-
mitments before we meet, and we intend to
make none. Of course, we cannot begin on
this work until diplomatic relations are re-
sumed, but the United States is ready today,
if Panama is ready. As of this moment, I do
not believe that there has been a genuine meet-
ing of the miiads between the two Presidents of
the two countries involved.

Press reports indicate that the Government
of Panama feels that the language which has
been under consideration for many days com-
mits the United States to a rewriting and to
a revision of the 1903 treaty. We have made
no such commitment, and we would not think
of doing so before diplomatic relations are re-
sumed and miless a fair and satisfactory adjust-
ment is agreed upon.

Faith in tlie Power of Freedom

Those of us who have gathered here today
must realize that we are the principal guardians
of the Alliance for Progress. But the alliance
is not here, and it is not in office buildings; it
is not in meeting rooms in presidential man-
sions throughout the hemisphere. The alliance
is in the aspirations of millions of farmers and
workers, of men without education, of men
without hope, of poverty-stricken families
whose homes are the villages and the cities of an
entire continent.

They ask simply the opportunity to enter
Into the M'orld of progress and to share in the
growth of the land. From their leaders, from
us, they demand concern and compassion and
dedicated leadership and dedicated labor.

I am confident that in the days to come we
will be able to meet those needs. It will not
be an easy task. The barriers are huge. Tlie
enemies of our freedom seek to harass us at

every turn. We are engaged in a struggle for
the destiny of the American Republics, but it
was a great poet, William Butler Yeats, who
reminded us that there was doubt if any nation
can become prosperous unless it has national
faith. Our alliance will prosper because, I be-
lieve, we do have that faith. It is not idle
hope but the same faith that enabled us to
nourish a new civilization in these spacious con-
tinents, and in that new world we will carry
forward our Alliance for Progress in such a
way that men in all lands will marvel at the
power of freedom to achieve the betterment of
man.

Letters of Credence

Honduras

The newly appointed Ambassador of Hon-
duras, Heman Corrales Padilla, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on March 16.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 118 dated March 16.

U.S. Prepared To Review
Differences With Panama

Statement hy President Johnson ^

The present inability to resolve our differ-
ences with Panama is a source of deep regret.

Our two countries are not Imked by only a
single agreement or a single interest. We are
bound together in an inter-American system
whose objective is, in the words of the charter,
". . . through their mutual understanding and
respect for the sovereignty of each one, to pro-
vide for the betterment of all . . . ."

Under the many treaties and declarations
which form the fabric of that system, we have
long been allies in the struggle to strengthen
democracy and enhance the welfare of our
people.

' Read to news correspondents by President Johnson
on Mar. 21 (White House press release).

538

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Our history is witness to this essential unity
of interest and belief. Panama has unhesitat-
ingly come to our side, twice in this century,
when we were threatened by aggression. On
December 7, 1941, Panama declared war on our
attackers even before our own Congress had
time to act. Since tluit war, Panama has whole-
heartedly joined with us, and our sister Repub-
lics, in shaping the agreements and goals of this
continent.

AVe have also had a special relationship with
Panama, for they have shared with us the bene-
fits, the burdens and trust of maintaining the
Panama Canal as a lifeline of defense and a
keystone of hemispheric prosperity. All free
nations are grateful for the effort they have
given to this task.

As circumstances change, as history shapes
new attitudes and expectations, we have re-
viewed periodically this special relationship.

We are well aware that the claims of the Gov-
ernment of Panama, and of the majority of the
Panamanian people, do not spring from malice
or hatred of America. They are based on a
deepl}' felt sense of the honest and fair needs of
Panama. It is, therefore, our obligation as al-
lies and partners to re^aew these claims and to
meet them, when meeting them is both just and
possible.

We are ready to do this.

We are prepared to review every issue which
now divides us, and every problem which the
Panama Government wishes to raise.

We are prepared to do this at any time and
at any place.

As soon as he is invited by the Government of
Panama, our Ambassador will be on his way.
We shall also designate a special representative.
He will arrive with full authority to discuss
every difficulty. He will be charged with the
responsibility of seeking a solution which recog-
nizes the fair claims of Panama and protects
the interests of all the American nations in the
canal. We cannot determine, even before our
meeting, what form that solution might best
take. But his instructions will not prohibit any
solution which is fair, and subject to the appro-
priate constitutional processes of both our
Governments.

I hope that on this basis we can begin to re-

solve our problems and move ahead to confront
the real enemies of this hemisphere — the ene-
mies of hunger and ignorance, disea.se and in-
justice. I know President Chiari shares this
hope. For, despite today's disagreements, the
common values and interests which unite us are
far stronger and more enduring than the differ-
ences which now divide us.

United States and Norway Extend
Educational Exchange Program

Press release 113 dated March 10

Secretary Eusk and Norwegian Foreign Min-
ister Halvard M. Lange signed at Washington
on March 16 an agreement extending the bi-
national progi'am of educational exchanges un-
der the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. The
amended agreement provides for the first time
for the program to be jointly financed by Nor-
way and the United States. Under the same
act, similar joint financing agreements have
been entered into with the Federal Eepublic of
Germany, Austria, and Sweden.

It is the intention of the U.S. Government,
subject to appropriation of funds, to contribute
the equivalent in Norwegian kroner of $1 mil-
lion to the financing of this program. The
Eoyal Norwegian Government plans a contribu-
tion of 500,000 kroner ($70,000) . The program
level for the 196J^65 academic year has been
established at the equivalent in kroner of $214,-
000, of which $200,000 will be contributed by the
U.S. Government and $14,000 by the Govern-
ment of Norway.

The original U.S. educational exchange
agreement with Norway was signed on May 25,
1949.^ It is noteworthy that Mr. Lange signed
for Norway on that occasion and has also signed
all three of the intervening amended agree-
ments ^ between the United States and Norway.

Since the initiation of the program in 1949
the U.S. Educational Foundation in Norway
has administered grants to 1,394 Norwegian citi-
zens who have traveled to the United States,
and to 478 U.S. citizens who have gone to
Norwav-

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2000.
' TIAS 3118, 3282, and 4503.

539

Ambassadors and AID IVIission
Chiefs in Latin America Meet

Tlie Department of State announced on
March 18 (press release 125) that on that day
U.S. ambassadors and AID mission chiefs in
Latin America had completed 3 days of joint
consultations with senior officials in the Depart-
ment of State and other agencies of the Govern-
ment. President Johnson met with tlie ambas-
sadors and other Department officials at the
conclusion of their sessions.

On March 16 the President, the ambassadors,
the AID mission chiefs, the Latin American
ambassadors in the United States, and State
Department officials participated in ceremonies
held at the Pan American Union to install
Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as chairman of the
newly created Inter-American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress.^

The joint consultations on overall U.S. policy
in the hemisphere were arranged to give officials
from the field an opportmaity to engage in a
full exchange of views with those in Washing-
ton responsible for formulating U.S. policy in
Latin America, particularly in relation to Alli-
ance for Progress operations. The exchange
of views included a discussion of the reorgani-
zation of the Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs.^

The meeting afforded an opportunity to hold
a country-by-country review of political, eco-
nomic, and social conditions in Latin America.
The meeting also provided an opportunity to
discuss programs of all other Government
agencies whose activities have foreign policy
implications besides those directly involved,
namely State, AID, USIA, and the Peace
Corps.

Officials from the State Department who par-
ticipated in the meetings included Secretary
Eusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary
Harriman, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, and
Assistant Secretary Johnson, as well as AID
Administrator Bell and Assistant Secretary
Mann.

Carl T. Rowan, Director of USIA, Agricul-
ture Secretary Orville L. Freeman, Commerce

Secretary Luther H. Hodges, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, and
Treasury Assistant Secretary John C. Bullitt
also participated in the meetings.

Representatives from Congress and from out-
side the Government also participated in the
meeting. Senators Wayne Morse and Hubert
H. Humphrey addressed the ambassadors and
discussed with them congressional attitudes af-
fecting U.S. foreign policy. AFL-CIO Presi-
dent George Meany also addressed the meeting
in a discussion of labor conditions in Latin
America.

' See p. f>35.

' Following is the text of a statement read to news
correspondents on Mar. 16 by Richard I. Phillips, Direc-
tor of the Office of News :

"Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State and
United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Prog-
ress, will be responsible for the policy direction of
U.S. economic assistance programs in Latin America
that are within the broad framework of the Agency for
International Development. The new arrangement
will help carry out President Johnson's call for the
United States to speak with one voice on Latin Amer-
ican affairs. It also reflects the President's instruction
that the Alliance for Progress receive priority in all
AID operations.

"In December the President appointed Mr. Mann as
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
and announced that he would have broad authority
over all Latin American activities of the U.S. Govern-
ment. With the approval of Secretary Rusk, David
E. Bell, Administrator of AID, has delegated to Mr.
Mann the authorities of an AID Assistant Administra-
tor with respect to loans, grants, and extended risk
guaranties, as well as the selection and assignment of
AID Latin American personnel in Washington and
overseas missions. Exercise of this authority in cases
of exceptional magnitude, significant departures from
general AID policies, and in appointments to top-level
jobs will be subject to Mr. Bell's concurrence.

"The new arrangement will assure more closely com-
bined operation of the geographic 'desks' in the De-
partment of State's Bureau of Inter-Auierican Affairs
and AID'S Bureau for Latin America. Under the ar-
rangement the number of office directors will be in-
creased from six to ten, the functional offices in the
AID Bureau for Latin America will be retained, and
the staff offices will continue to give advisory and
supporting services to the alliance operations.

"Mr. William D. Rogers, who is Deputy U.S. Co-
ordinator for the Alliance for Progress, will serve as
Mr. Mann's deputy for AID matters."

540

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Journalism and Foreign Affairs

by Robert J. Manning

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^

One in my line of government work, when
he faces an audience of journalists, has the diffi-
cult choice of talking directly about his own
work or dabbling more generally in foreign
affairs.

The second alternative is probably easier, and
cert<ainly less risky. But I would prefer to
talk tonight mostly about our business — journal-
ism and foreign affairs. I think there is much
we can discuss ; so I'll take the risk that before
the night is out, I'll have proved myself akin
to the ilark Twainian Daniel whom God, as the
story goes "ordered forth into the lion's den,
but he slipped and came in tenth."

Information gaps are probablj' inevitable in
the best informed societies, and ours is no ex-
ception, however clearly defined the issues of
foreign policy may be. Wliat I have been
struck by in the past few years are the special
reasons for such a gap today — and the special
peril it holds.

The reasons lie, of course, in the nature of
our world. "We live at the floodtide of change
in all the continents. We are confronted with
a totalitarian ideology that seeks our destruc-
tion. And we are riding the crest of a revolu-
tion in science and teclmology.

Each of the challenges we face would tax the
wisdom, the ingenuity, and the patience of any
generation of Americans. Together they pose
a test greater than any our nation has con-
fronted. Most acutely, they pose a test of
public understanding.

This is a test made difficult by our history.
We Americans are the product of a century of
precious isolation. We developed our nation

behind the protective shield of great oceans.
In the mid-19th century Alexis de Tocqueville
wrote that the American system of government
was the best ever invented by man. He pre-
dicted it would be adequate to meet the needs
of our society for many generations, unless the
United States became actively involved in
foreign affairs. The perceptive Frenchman
did not try to predict wliat would happen in
that eventuality because he considered it un-
likely. Needless to say, it has happened, and
with a vengeance.

Since World War II we have catapulted to
a position of world leadership and full world
responsibility. Yet our training as a nation
for such leadership and responsibility has been
minimal. The great and complex problems of
this age are difficult enough for our policy-
makers to comprehend. How then are they to
be adequately explained to and contributed to
by the general public ?

This Republic is in great peril when the pub-
lic is inadequately informed. We see in many
parts of our country today the results of public
confusion on questions of foreign policy — a
growing sense of frustration, among some
groups, that has given rise to extremism; a
quest for easy, quick "answers"; a search for
scapegoats; a demand for such contradictory
"solutions" as smaller budgets and "total vic-
tory," higher tariffs and freer trade, cheap
securitv and reckless venturesomeness.

' Address made before the third annual government
relations workshop of the National Editorial Associa-
tion at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 13 (press release
109).

APRIL 6, 1064

541

Without question, the subject matter of
foreign policy is growing more complex. A
great deal is happening all the time in foreign
affairs all around our planet and, with the ad-
vent of rockets, in outer space as well.

We have our own national interest, our own
set of foreign policies and foreign crises.
These are diverse and complicated to a degree
that frequently agonizes the most knowledge-
able experts. But ours is a world of 120 other
countries, of 120 other foreign policies, of 120
other sets of national goals or national appe-
tites. Keeping track of what is going on, and
translating it into terms luiderstandable by
large numbers of citizens, is a task that
challenges both the press and the government
departments concerned with foreign policy,
primarily, of course, the Department of State
and the Wliite House.

Altering the "Adversary Relationship"

The i-elationship of you, the press, and us
in government in our open society is not a
simple thing. It is at least as variegated as
human nature, and vulnerable to human
frailty. The traditional stance of the press
confronting government is the adversary rela-
tionship; its lieraldic sign is crossed swords
witli bar sinister on a field of spilled ink. In
domestic political matters excessive coziness
between any element of the press and a reigning
political group quickly and properly draws
criticism.

In foreign affairs, however, I question
whether the old-fashioned adversary relation-
ship is sufficient to the delicate task our nation
faces these days on the world scene. Wlicn
you print the news, to an important extent
you make the larger facts. Wliat the press
chooses to emphasize frequently becomes the
postulates of public o])inion (though I have
some reservations on this point) and as such
can become an important ingredient of policy.
In such a situation is the public interest best
served when tlie press and government stand
on separate pedestals and snipe at each other
across a mythical abyss? I think you will
agree tliat tlie answer is no — and that journal-
ism as well as government is aware of the need
for something more. I suggest that accurate

reporting perhaps requires a closer relationship
than may have been traditional, perhaps a
closer one than some here tonight would con-
sider wise or possible.

On the basis of long experience in journal-
ism and 2 years' experience in government, I
suggest a direct cross-fertilization between
American journalism and American govern-
ment. Let me be as precise as possible, so as
to avoid misunderstanding: The separation of
journalism and government is as basic and as
advisable as separation of church and state.
Government intrusion into the functioning of
journalism — whether by censorship, by regu-
latory controls, by economic penetration, or
political manipulation — would represent serious
jeopardy to our political system.

That accepted, there is more to be said about
the subject. Countless times in these last 2
years I have wished that officials in govern-
ment knew more about journalism, its needs, its
practices, its uses, and its shortcomings. Even
more convinced am I that journalists — most of
them — need to know more, much more, about
government, how it works, why it works and,
sometimes, does not work; how decisions are
made and how they are not made; what are
the facts as against the myths and miscon-
ceptions.

There is one direct way to accomplish this.
Journalism should encourage some of its top
established hands, and some of its more prom-
ising new hands, to take leave for intervals
of a year or two in government service. The
government would profit from the infusion of
versatility, energy, and enterprise that makes
a good newspaperman. The newspaperman
would become a wiser and more valuable crafts-
man. On his return, the newspaper reader
would be better served and better informed.

The opportunities for newspapermen in gov-
ernment are not by any means confined to in-
formation work (which in many ways is the
least demanding and least rewarding of the
many activities for which a competent news-
man is fitted). The governmental careers of
men like Carl Rowan, William Attwood, and
John Bartlow Martin, to name a few, suggest
tlie high quality of service and imagination that
a journalistic background can pix)duce.

542

DEl'ARTSrENT OF STATE BULLETIN"

I suppose there are still some editors and pub-
lishers who, while sipping at the I'Jth hole with
leaders of industry, banking, and commerce, will
shake their heads and maintain that a news-
paperman who enters into public service some-
how taints himself for further journalism. It
seems unfortunate that such thinking shoidd
survive the kerosene lamp and the automobile
crank. I can think literallj' of no activity that
has been more educational to me as a journalist
than these past "2 yeare in government. In a
time when, as H. G. Wells says, "human history
becomes more and more a race between education
and catastrophe," I heartily recommend a few
semesters in Washington or at an embassy
overseas.

Whatever steps might be taken to alter or
improve the old adversary relationship, one
point must be emphasized from the outset: It
should neither suggest nor require any abdica-
tion of the critical faculties of the reporter and
editor. Quite the contrary, the more tliorough
knowledge which skilled reporters today ac-
cumulate about what is happening in foreign
atl'airs serves to invigorate, not weaken, the
function of responsible criticism. On a subject
like South Viet-Xam — unquestionably one of the
most diflicult and sensitive issues confronting
us — the access to information within tlie govern-
ment that has been available to the press has
provided the basis for the considerable number
of well-informed and critical editorials that
have appeared in recent weeks.

Irresponsible criticism is, of course, a dilTer-
ent matter, but there is a very high correlation
between misinformation, or lack of information,
and the kind of wild criticism that graces the
"hate sheets" of the right and reveals itself in
the latent paranoia of a few newspapers and
correspondents aroimd the country. The reck-
less charges that pass for comment in these
forums cannot survive exposure to information.
It is no coincidence that with rare exceptions
the -writers (I hesitate to dignify them, and
besmirch the craft, by calling them reporters)
■who regularly produce the most startling ac-
cusations about the State Department do not call
my office or any other section of the Department
to ask questions or check conclusions. Appar-
ently they feel their concoctions will clang more
loudly if not muted by the facts.

"A House With Many Window*"

Leaving aside this category — in which, by the
way, I place none of the regular State Depart-
ment correspondents — it does seem to me that
on the whole the job of communicating informa-
tion about foreign policy is one that the press
and the government have in common, not one
in which our interests are opposed. The basic
elements of my present job are remarkably sim-
ilar to that of a repoiler : to get out the news —
fast, accurate, and as complete as possible.
Nearly always my associates — several of whom
are also former newsmen — and I are in the po-
sition of working with, not against, the report-
ers who cover foreign news and call us daily,
if not hourly.

Information flows from the State Department
in many ways. In testimony last year before
Congressman [John E.] Moss's subcommittee
on government information, James Reston of
the New York Times described the Department
as a "gabby outfit." Ours is a house with many
windows, and its daily information output is
enormous. Anyone who, as I have, has served
as a correspondent in a foreign capital will
vouch for the truth of the statement that no-
where in the w'orld are reporters given such
complete and unfettered access to the makers
and shapers of foreign policy. As a practical
matter, every State Department reporter has
a government telephone directory which tells
him what every officer in the Department does
and who's in charge of what desk, area, or sec-
tion. A reporter is not confined to a few known
sources. ^AHiatever the subject that arises, he
can quickly pinpoint the individuals with re-
sponsibility and can call them directly, by di-
rect dial, without having to filter through a
central switchboard. Even home telephone
niunbers are provided — and are regularly used
by reporters with late-breaking deadlines. The
newsmen assigned to the State Department
make wide use of this access-by-telephone every
day. It is a source of information at least as
important as the regular press briefings by the
Department spokesman and the Secretary of
State. Naturally, as in any area, he has to
build his own network of sources who are able
and willing to sen-e him. But the sources are
there to be cultivated.

APRIL 6, 1964

543

In addition, considerable use is made of back-
ground briefings. This is tlie device, treasured
by reporters everywhere, whereby a high official
will discuss subjects but not for direct quotation
and not for attribution. The stories that result
are generally authoritative and accurate, and
they contribute greatly to the supply of infor-
mation publicly available about United States
foreign relations. They provide important
guidance on the government's thinking on a
given topic.

I have listened to a lot of nonsense about the
so-called iniquity of the backgroimd briefing,
but most of it comes from distant critics who
make me agree with Josh Billings that "it is
better to know nothing than to know what ain't
so." Anybody with experience in reporting
knows two things. One is that a reporter is
only as good as his ability to separate fact from
fancy, bogus from real. Another is that there
is no such thing as goldfish-bowl diplomacy.
Show me a businessman who conducts his busi-
ness in a high-pitched voice at noon on Main
Street, and I'll show you a diplomat who does
his work by talking out loud on the front page
of the Washington Post.

Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty in nu-
clear physics has a close analogy in foreign
relations: It is usually not possible to describe
a diplomatic situation publicly, however ac-
curately, without changing it and making it
different. The public comment itself becomes
part of the situation. An on-the-record state-
ment by the Secretary of State, be it a prepared
speech or a response to a question, is instantly
filmed, recorded, printed, and otherwise com-
municated, with all the speed of modern tele-
communications, to a mixed audience of friends,
partners, skeptics, and enemies all aroimd the
globe. Many are ready to seize on a single ill-
considered word and blow it up for propaganda
purposes. As a consequence, important com-
ments issued formally on the record by high
officials often must be planned as carefully as a
surgical operation so that no listeners anywhere
can have reason to misunderstand or abuse what
is said.

That is why most newsmen highly value the
backgroimd device, which permits a policy of-
ficer to speak freely and informally to let re-

porters in on his thinking without giving our
cold-war adversaries the same access. At the
briefing conferences conducted twice a year at
the Department for the press and other media
a mixture of on-record and background discus-
sions have been used. After the most recent
conference, we asked the participants to com-
ment on this point ; the 800 replies we received
favored background briefuigs by four to one.

In a sense the background rule makes it pos-
sible for the government to take a reporter into
its confidence. This calls for good faith on
both sides, and it is nearly always present. The
exceptions are happily infrequent, though no
less irritating when they occur. It is a proce-
dure that can be abused. It is an abuse, for
example, for the government to use this method
to float trial balloons, as a way to sample public
opinion without choosing sides in advance, or
in any way to mislead or misinform. It can be
abused by reporters who fail to maintain the
distinction between it and on-the-record brief-
ings. But despite these pitfalls, its overall
utility is great. The fact that a knife can be
used to kill is no reason to eat with our fingers.
The best safeguard against misuse of back-
grounders lies in the skill and integrity of the
reporters themselves. Wliat is said on back-
ground or not for quotation is subject to the
same acid tests of accuracy and relevancy as
any other government pronouncement, and
rightly so.

Joint Responsibility in "Areas of Nondisclosure"

Let me examine another aspect of the govern-
ment-press relationship. It is frequently
argued that it is the government's responsibility
to keep secrets, the responsibility of the press
to get them and print them. "The press lives
by disclosure," opined the Times of London in
1851. If a foreign agent came into the State
Department and managed to procure secret in-
formation, he would be liable to prosecution
and a heavy sentence. When a reporter does
the same thing, ho wins praise from his editor
and gets nominated for prizes. The story is
printed, and either way our enemies can read
it.

In the year 1964 I think that this simplified,
traditional view of the role of the government

SM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ami (he role of the press is out of date. I j)refer
to think that the responsibility both for inform-
ing; tiie imblic and for niaintaininn; certain areas
of nondisclosure is one which is siiared by the
press and the govemmejit. To be sure, the
press's responsibility is heavily weiphted to-
ward full disclosure: I would not wish it other-
wise. But I believe, and I think I speak for
the majority of reportere, that we would lose
an important ingreilient of the relationship of
trust that is basic to how the press gets along
witli government if the press did not recognize
its responsibility in circumstances of great na-
tional impoi'tnnce to help us keep some secrets.
I feel that I am on solid ground when I say
this because I know from my experience in the
past year that with rare exceptions the report-
ers who regularly cover the Department of
State do recognize this responsibility. I know
one reportei', for example, who is still sitting
on a dramatic first-person story of his involve-
ment in a rerent great international crisis.
Many othei*s have happened upon or other-
wise uncovered information which if immedi-
ately divulged would have caused us serious
difliculties. They did not immediately rush it
into print, recognizing that to do so would not
serve their own interests as responsible journal-
ists seeking to report the news accurately and
fully, and might seriously prejudice American
foreign policy objectives or national security.

Thirst for Foreign Policy Information Rising

The responsibility for getting the news out
is also one that we share. A great many things
happen each day, only a few of which come to
public attention— not because they are kept se-
cret but because they are not considered news.
The press itself is higlily selective. Only a
fraction of the information that pours into a
typical city room survives the cutting and par-
ing process called editing and makas its way
into print. Douglass Cater has written that
the power of the press :

. . . stems from Its ability to select — to define what
is news and what isn't. In Washington on an average
day, a good many hundreds of thousands of words are
spoken, tens of dozens of "events" occur. The pres.s
decides which of those words and events shall receive
the prompt attention of millions and which, like tim-

lH>r fallinK In a de»>i) and unlnliablled forest, Kball
crash silently to the ground.

Several independent studies show that an av-
erage of ;5 to 8 percent of general news space
in American newspapers is devoted to foreign
affairs items. The average daily newspaper
content of foreign news is 4 to 8 colunms. For-
eign news actually sent by the A.s.sociate(l Press
on its main ticker averages 2'2,000 words per
day, or 27 columns. If nonduplicating items
from other wire services plus special reports are ■
included, it can be calculated that the average
American daily newspaper provides its readers
with well under 20 percent of the foreign news
actually reported each day. I simply do not
think that is enough.

The problem of making manageable the vast
outpouring of news on foreign policy that be-
comes available each day challenges journalism
in many ways. The press often still practices
methods of makeup, construction, and play that
were in use half a century ago. As a result,
editors often seem to be overwhelmed by the
torrent of events and their readers have served
up to them a daily collection of fragments.
That approach to foreign affairs may have
made sense when the United States was in-
volved in only one crisis at a time. It no
longer suffices today, when we are participants
or ringside spectators to 15 to 20 crises at a
time. The frequent result is that each day's
news on each topic is apt to be so brief, so frag-
mentary, as to be more misleading than no news
at all. Too often, each day's fragment remains
a fragment. As a restdt, in the words of the
late Joe Liebling :

Our present news situation, in the United States, is
bn^aking down to something like the system of water
distribution in the Casbah, where i)eddlers wander
about with goatskins of water on small donkeys, and
the inhabitants send down an oil tin and a couple of
pennies when they feel thirst.

Ironically this comes at a time when the na-
tional thirst for foreign policy information is
rising. The American people want to know
what is happening, how it affects them, what
we are doing about it. By any indication, in-
cluding public opinion polls, more people are
concerned about foreign policy than at any time
in our history. Still one hears editors insisting

APRIL 6, 1964

545

that "the people" don't want to read a lot of
foreign affairs guff. I do not believe it.

The inability of the daily media to keep
abreast of this rising level of interest is reflected
in the success of other enterprises, particularly
magazines, which give at least the impression
of providing a fuller, connected account of for-
eign news. Volume of information is not the
problem; what is needed rather is a more re-
flective approach to foreign news which relates
the snippets to one another, which locates an
event in history as well as geography, and which
takes more profound account of the fact that
other people's domestic politics often influence
their foreign policies.

Some Words of Criticism

I do not want to abuse your hospitality, and
I therefore hope that some words of criticism
will not be taken amiss ; they come from a deep
sense of involvement in the profession of jour-
nalism and a desire to see improvements. I do
not presume to tell you how to behave — for I
recognize that tliere is no mightier potentate
than the proprietor of an independent news-
paper. Many of you, I know, are editors or
publishers of weekly newspapers, and I under-
stand there is solid backing to the claim that
weeklies are more extensively and carefully
read than many dailies. I understand also that
in many cases the weekly is the only newspaper
its readers i"ead. On both these counts, there-
fore, it is depressing to know that so many edi-
tors of weeklies disdain to provide their readers
with much coverage of national and foreign
affairs. I realize there are staffing and money
problems, but in this age of communications
wizardi-y, joint efforts, and speedy travel, the
weekly community could easily and cheaply
build up a service providing solid, well-written,
and well-thought-out material on the big world
issues.

Another more general characteristic of jour-
nalism today should cause more concern than
it seems to be causing. The press today suffers
from a bad case of complacency and self -right-
eousness, and is noteworthy among all fraterni-
ties that perform public services for its lack of
self-criticism.

Our press today is keenly, sometimes even

stridently, assertive of its rights and preroga-
tives, but it has a bad case of laryngitis when
it is time to talk about its responsibilities. If
Congressman Moss will excuse me, I would like
to say that the intellectual quality of a great
deal of the testimony delivered to his subcom-
mittee after the Cuban crisis was so low as to
remind some of us of the old description of the
Platte River in midsummer — 2 inches deep and
a mile wide at the mouth.

When it comes to actual performance, I think
the press in this coimtry can be described as
not only the freest and most imaginative but
also the most responsible and best in the world.
(One could make some reservations; for ex-
ample, I would say tliat the vei-y best in British
journalism surpasses most of the best in ours.)
But we cannot afford to stop where we are and
be satisfied. There is still too much tendency
among editors to operate on the old-fashioned
presumption that the reader has the IQ of a
12-year-old child. There is still that ancient
reflex that is mindful of the old Chicago city
editor who once in anger called his staff to-
gether and said, "What this newspaper needs
is some new cliches." There is great truth in
the indictment that the press is generally too
greatly preoccupied by entertainment, by what
it takes to reach the easier side of reader in-
terest.

I have the impression that journalism is not
doing enough to recruit and properly train top-
level people. I have been struck in years since
the war to find that newspapers and magazines,
even some very good ones, have to go out and
cajole people into journalism. The tendency
to call it a profession and pay as if it weren't
is still strong, once you get away from the
metropolitan areas.

As for the long vaunted "power of the press,"
where does that stand today? I confess that
I am in a somewhat ambiguous state of mind;
there are moments when I believe too many in
government attach too much power or influence
to the press; then there are mornings when I
question that this is so. I think we have to
concede that the power is indeed very great but
that in general the press today is powerful more
as an exciter than a provoker, and for the most
part a channeler of other people's ideas and
arguments. There has been a vast increase in

546

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BITLLETIN

analytical ami interpretive report in<r since tiie
war, but still not a great deal of political, in-
tellectual, tlie()l<)<;ical, or philosophical inspira-
tion comes with the avera<;e newspajier in
America.

So the power of the press directly to influ-
ence is in <;rejit part a negative power, as it is
exerted today; it sterns in large part from
othei"s' ideas. This is also related to the power
of omission that comes from the fact that e^ich
day the writers and the editors have to choose
which large segments of a very large news
Imdget they arc not going to pass on to the pub-
lic. I don't mean to suggest that there is not
still in our press the power to do great good
(and bad) — great power to make or break ca-
reei"s or ideas — but it is clearly limited, and the
chief limit is set by the ability and the willing-
ness of the possessors of this power to use it.

Handling of Foreign Policy News

Coming back to my home ground, the han-
dling of foreign policy news, I would like to
comment, if I ma}-, on two other tendencies that
seem to me to create pi-oblems for all three
elements — the newspapers, the readers, and the
government.

One is the newspapers" feverish preoccupa-
tion not with what has happened but what is
going to happen tomorrow. I know State De-
partment correspondents who spend literally
hours trying to learn the names of new ambas-
sadorial or other appointees before candidates
have even been selected. One prestigious news-
paper over a period of several months had two
separate "exclusive" stories reporting that a
certain official had been picked as ambassador
to two different capitals. The diplomat did not
go to any one of those posts, and when he was
actually appointed to his present post the news-
paper neglected to report it. This overpreoccu-
pation with getting ahead of events, to be the
first to report what is going to happen, results
in a lot of wasted motion, a lot of incorrect or
highly premature stories, and any number of
woes for government officials. More than that,
however, it takes journalism's eye off the big
part of the game — what has happened, what
does it mean — to the detriment of us all.

Even the best writers and reporters — and I

believe that the corps that covers the Depart-
ment of State and foreign affairs in Washing-
ton is by and large the most diligent and most
talented group in journali.sm — are not always
able to rise above the mixture of bugaboo and
custom that dictates the structure and the play
of stories. They are seriously handicapped by
their eilitors' assmnption that it is still i>ossible
to report the world's major convolutions as if
they are innings in a ball game. This fre-
quently leads to the scorecard wrap-up of a
number of otherwise unrelated episodes in for-
eign affairs, a device that few reporters like but
one that many editors cannot resist. Usually
the attempt is made to summarize a series of
events around the world as "victories" or "de-
feats" for U.S. policy.

Nothing is easier, and few things are more
misleading, than to chart, the tides of foreign
relations with a limited set of phrases taken
from the vocabulary of the sports page. The
relations of nations in the world arena are not
like a ball game; victory and defeiit are not de-
termined by the number of times a ball goes
out of the park. Evaluating progress in the
cold war — forward, backward, sideways, up or
down — is a subtle process, one which the most
penetrating analysts usually avoid. They see
all too clearly the folly of trying to pick out
who's ahead from day to day or week to week.

In a world where ideology confronts ideol-
ogy, and both face the quickening tides of
nationalism; where foreign policy pronoimce-
ments by the leader of a nonalined state may be
motivated by his domestic politics, and may in
fact conflict with firm private assurances to the
contrary — and are understood as such by all
concerned; where aromid the globe nations and
peoples above all are seeking their own form of
development, their own definitions of progress;
where Communist states swap insults and plot
their own, nationally oriented paths m foreign
and domestic policy; where our own alliances
experience the natural retrenchments that must
occur in a changing world — in such a world
"victory"' and "defeat'' are usually no more than
words to be played with.

One of the occupational hazards of trying to
keep score in foreign affairs is that it sometimes
makes the practitioner look silly. Not even on

APRIL 6, 1964

547

the AP's weekly top-ten listings do teams
plunge from victory to defeat and back again
with the erratic swiftness ascribed to U.S.
policy.

About 3 months ago a prominent weekly pub-
lication put together a scorecard roundup
which opened with the sentence: "Russia, the
facts are showing, has lost the cold war." Two
months later it printed a similar wrap-up which
began : "Troubles of the world look somewhat
less alarming than at any time in many years."
A third installment, 4 weeks later, was summed
up with tliis opening sentence: "America is
going from defeat to defeat in almost every cor-
ner of the world." It even carried a map pin-
pointing the "defeats." Surely this must liave
strained the credulity of some of the magazine's
readers. I venture to suggest that the world
has not changed that much in 3 months, and to
deal with the matter in such a sophomoric man-
ner verges on insult. The cold war goes on,
neither won nor lost, but invariably changing
in its manifestation. America is not "going
from defeat to defeat" (nor does a globe have
comers).

A reporter must always guard against re-
porting the plausible as the actual, and this is
certainly tnie in foreign affairs. What is likely
or logical does not always happen in foreign
policy; reporting likelihoods as facts before
they come true is not far removed, it seems to
me, from other kinds of misreporting.

There is an important difference, it seems to
me, between the right of a reporter to pursue
information about foreign policy, or any other
subject, and the responsibility of his newspaper
to print all the data thus uncovered. The right
of the reporter to try to find out what is hap-
pening is limited only by his enterprise. I do
not think any check beyond present security
restrictions should be placed on a reporter's
right to cover the news, which should be limited
solely by liis enterprise. But the obligation to
disclose by publication is not so absolute.

Tlie press discloses in tlie name of the pub-
lic's right to know. But the public also has a
right to have its interests defended and ad-
vanced in the field of foreign policy and nation-
al security. These two rights may come in
conflict, and when they do, the public may well

prefer success to disclosure. There have been
many ei:)isodes in the past 2 years — of which the
Cuban missile crisis was the most dramatic — ■
where the success of American policy depended
very directly on the presentation of a period of
privacy during which the policy could be for-
mulated and carried out, where disclosure
would have spelled defeat.

Where in these cases does the public interest
lie? The public, I submit, has a right not to
know when knowledge can gravely compromise
our security or damage our foreign policy.
Many reporters, among them the most able, re-
spect both these rights. But their responsi-
bility is less great than that of their editors, who
are the ones who finally select what is printed —
and is thus disseminated to the world at large,
as well as the American people. It is not an
easy responsibility to live with; it raises ques-
tions to which no single answer is riglit.

It is not for a government official to presume
the right or the wisdom to settle this problem ;
it is journalism's to contemplate, and I am sure
that many of you have pondered it.

Partnership Between Journalism and Government

I have devoted mudi time to criticism be-
cause I have assumed that you share with me a
belief that healthy criticism is always needed
among those who labor in the world of ideas.
I have not taken pains to reiterate the obvious —
that the American press today is indeed the
"fourth brancli of government," in some ways
the branch that is least captive of custom and
least fearful to tread where the timid fear to
enter.

A revelation of government service has been
the discovery that this great partnership be-
tween responsible journalism and responsible
government — wary, sometimes abrasive, some-
times argumentative — works, and it works for
the country.

A great nation devoid of intelligence, wrote
Horace Mann, is "an obscene giant," destined
despite its power and capacities, to "rush with
the speed of a whirlwind to an ignominious
end." We are together in striving to assure that
this does not become our epitaph.

The perils we live with today are jierhaps
more subtle than those of World War II or

548

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN"

the early days of the cold war. But they are
no less real ami i)rol)al)ly more pernicious.
Undeclannl warfare backed by (lie clialleuge of
thermonuclear weapons is a greater danger than
we e\er faced in the pa,st. These are problems
for ail of us in press and government. To a
very real extent we are partners in adversity.

Department To Hold Conference
for Editors and Broadcasters

Tiie Department of State announced on
March 20 (press release 1"27) that it would liold
a national foreign policy conference for editors
and broadcastei-s on April 20 and 21 at Wash-
ington. Invitations have been extended by Sec-
retary' Rusk to editors and commentators of the
daily and periodical press and the broadcasting
industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the conference.
Among other officials expected to participate
are Robert S. JMcXamara, Secretary' of Defense ;
W. W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of
State and Chairman of the Policy Planning
Council; David E. Bell, Administrator of the
Agency for International Development; Carl
T. Rowan, Director of the U..S. Information
Agency ; Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter- American Affairs ; Robert J.
Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Pub-
lic Affairs; and G. Mennen Williams, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs.

A new program feature this year will be a
series of concurrent roundtable discussions, to
be held on April 20, covering Africa, Eastern
Europe, Sino-Soviet relations, Southeast- Asia,
the Near East, the Western alliance, disarma-
ment, and trade.

The conference will be held under the "back-
ground only" ground rule. Plenaiy sessions
will meet in the West Auditorium of the De-
partment of State.

This will be the eighth in a series of national
foreign policy conferences for editors and
broadcasters. The conference program, begun

in April 1961, is intended to assist the informa-
tion media in making availal)l(> to the American
public the maxinuim possiljje information in
depth on cun-ent foreign policy issues.

To evaluate the effectiveness of these ccmfer-
ences, the Bureau of Pul)lic Affairs iTcently
circulated a questionnaire to more than 2,000
persons wlio have attended one or more of the
programs since 19G1. Thirty-eight percent re-
sponded; approximately 800 questionnaires
were received in time to be evaluated. A clear
majority approved the conferences and evalu-
ated them as "excellent." Well over 600 ap-
proved the format of the programs as held in
the past. A recurring comment emphasized
the need for "greater depth" in the program.
Tlie inclusion of roundtal)]e discussions in the
curi'ent conference is an effort to meet tiiis need.

United States and New Zealand
Hold Civil Aviation Talks

Press release 104 dated March 11

Delegations of New Zealand and the United
States held civil aviation consultations at
Washington from February 25 through March
11, 1964. The discussions were held pursuant
to the bilateral air transport agreement of
1946 ^ and were concluded to the mutual satis-
faction of both parties.

Agreement was reached on an od refei'endum
basis to replace the existing 1946 agi'eement
with a more modern version and to incorporate
in the new agreement certain amendments to
the routes exchanged in 1946.

The chaimian of the New Zealand delegation
was Bruce Rae, Air Secretary. The U.S. dele-
gation was headed by Henry T. Snowdon, chief
of the Aviation Negotiations Division, Depart-
ment of State. "Whitney Gillilland, member of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, represented that
agency.

1 Treaties and OUier International Acts Series 1573,
4&45, 4789, 5085, and 5374.

APRIL 6, 1004

549

The Requisites of Abundance

hy Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^

As we finish our nourishing lunch, I do not
have to remind you that at this very moment
about one out of every two people in this world
is hungry or malnourished. You know that.
That's why you are here.

Nor, I imagine, do I have to persuade you
that a world still half hungry is an appalling
fact, an intolerable statistic, a sliocking com-
mentary on the human condition, and a politi-
cal danger of the first water. You all agree
with this — or you would be doing something else
this noontime.

We know the nature and the magnitude of
the problem. I shall therefore address my
speculations to the nature and magnitude of the
solution.

Do we dare speak of a "solution," or the
actual accomplishment of our freedom-from-
hunger goal? Of course we do. Our moral
outrage at a half-hungry world is validated
precisely by the fact that we have all the tech-
nical answers needed to produce enougli food to
give all of the people of this teeming planet a
decent daily diet.

President Kennedy said it to the World Food
Congress last summer : '^ "We have the ability
. . . we have the means, we have the capac-
ity, to eliminate hunger from the face of the
earth. . . . We need only the will."

And President Johnson reconunitted this
nation to freedom from hunger in his address

^ Address made before the third annual trustees
meeting of the American Freedom-From-Hunger Foun-
dation at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 9 (press release
102).

' Bulletin of .Tuly 8. 1063. p. .58.

to the U.N. last year: ^ "The United States," he
said, "wants to cooperate with all the members
of this organization to conquer everywhere the
ancient enemies of mankind — hunger, and dis-
ease, and ignorance."

The trouble, of course, is that world hunger
is not just a technical problem — or even a clus-
ter of technical problems. My business with
you this day is to suggest just how complex
and ramified the solutions must be, what a
range of talents and disciplines and people and
organizations, including the Freedom-From-
Hunger Foundation, must be mobilized in the
service of the noble ends we profess.

Sharing Our Abundance

The most obvious fact about world food is
the drama of glut in the midst of want. This
is the product of the technological revolution in
American agriculture of recent decades — a
revolution which is spreading rapidly through
the Western World. Some agricultural scien-
tists are persuaded that we are only on the
thresliold of that revolution. They point, for
example, to new vistas opened up by isotopic
research, to the prospect of manufacturing syn-
thetic proteins, to new ways of bringing sweet
water to dried-out land.

Yet even as things stand right now, with
present knowledge and practice, the facts are
.staggering: A single American farmer now
produces enougli food for 2!) consumers — i of
them overseas; agricultural output lias gone
up 140 percent since tlio end of the Second

" Ihid.. .Tan. 0. 19(H. p. 2.

550

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

World Wax — three times the rate of industrial
growtli; and tlio farm population hascoiitinuod
to drop — the latest li<i;ure beinfr just over 7 per-
cent of tJie total jx)pulation.

So we have been foiv«d by circumstance,
and pushed by our own sense of justice, to share
our abundance. In little more than a decade
we have shared some $1."^ billion worth of food
with jjerhaps 400 million people in llii coun-
tries. This includes school lunch programs,
which now reach about 40 million children, not
only improviiifr their diets but helping to lure
tliem into learning.

This is surely the humane and sensible thing
to do. And in some cases the distribution of
foot! serves as well to help maintain social sta-
bility as a basis for peaceful reform. Ameri-
can food has provided a minimal diet for the
past 18 months for most of the unemployed of
Constantine — and these unemployed, in this
third largest city in Algeria, are about 50 per-
cent of the whole working force. W^e will
doubtless be doing more of this, not less, as time
goes on.

Yet we know that this kind of thing is at
best a valuable stopgap — a way to buy a little
more time while more basic solutions are sought.
If there were practical ways to take our whole
abundance and spread it around evenly in the
places where it is needed, diets would be raised
to tolerable levels everywhere — for about 3 or
4 weeks. Then the food would be gone and the
himger would be back.

Transferring Farming Techniques

More recently, we have begun to experiment
with the more sophisticated idea of employing
surplus food as a kind of development capital.
This is to say that it is used as part payment
for workers engaged in labor — intensive public
works projects — land clearing, dam building,
roadmaking, well digging, tree planting, and
the like. Both the U.S. Food for Peace pro-
gram and, on a small experimental scale, the
joint U.N.-FAO World Food Program are busy
along these lines in North Africa and elsewhere.
A hundred schools are being built in Bolivia
today under a food-for-work program.

Thus can abundance serve multiple purposes
beyond the immediate relief of hunger.

But still this does not do much to produce
more food on the spot, near where it is going
to be eaten. For each of the world's malnour-
ished peoples, freedom from hunger will be
aihieved mostly by gi'owing more food for
themselves.

And that, of course, requires the transfer not
only of food but of knowlexlge, the export not
only of surpluses but of techniques. A great
deal has been done about this too, since the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations was set up two decades ago, and
especially since 1949, when President Truman
launched the Point Four program of technical
assistance.

There are two major parts of this task. The
first is the gathering of data, the exchange of
information, the sharing of experience, the
pooling of the fruits of research, and the co-
ordination of future research. For some years
this was the major activity of the FAO. It is
a continuing job and will remain one: 95 of the
500-odd international conferences to which the
U.S. sent delegations last yeiir were concerned
with some aspect of food and agriculture.

The second — and even more important — part
of the task is the transfer and adaptation of
farming techniques from one cultural soil to
another. And this has turned out to be vastly
more complicated than was imagined at first.
Wliat works in one place does not necessarily
work in another, as most of you well know
from experience.

Nevertheless, the various technical assistance
programs— operated by the U.N. family of
agencies, by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and other countries' foreign aid
programs, and by private organizations here
and abroad — clearly are aimed at tlie heart of
the matter: the technical capacity to grow a
bigger crop on an acre of ground.

A word of caution is needed here. There is a
tendency, especially in the less developed coun-
tries, to invest the words "science and tex-h-
nology'' with the connotation of modern magic.
Impatient for progress, frustrated by obstacles,
too many people have seized upon the rich prom-
ise of science and technology', torn it from a
meaningful context, and pinned their hopes on
an abstraction. There is nothing miraculous in

APRIL 6. 1964

551

science until competent technicians, working
with real-life farmers, pvit it to work on real-
life farms.

Modern Farming Requires Fertilizers, Water

But the problem of hunger and malnutrition
does not begin or end on the farm. Nor will the
solution be found on the farm alone.

Modern agriculture, for example, requires
discriminating use of chemical fertilizers. But
it is not enough to know that. Indeed, it is
worse than useless to know that — unless there
is fertilizer to be had. Fertilizer can be had
for liard-earned foreign exchange. Or it can
be had by production at home, which may also
require foreign exchange to build the plant.
And that in turn may require the education, at
home or abroad, of chemical engineers.

Knowing about fertilizer is also worse than
useless if the fertilizer, once produced, is not
applied on the farm. Last fall that ebullient
promoter of modern farming, Nikita Khru-
shchev, spent much of a long speech in Kras-
nodar urging the virtues of chemical fertilizer
and pouring scorn on communities that waste
the precious stuff.

"Shameful things occur in practice," he said.
"An enterprise is allocated mineral fertilizer;
it is sent from the plant to the railroad station
and thrown from the freight car directly onto
a side slope, and these riches lie there for
months and lose their value. . . . Mountains
of fertilizers accumulate," he said, "they are
covered with snow and children use these moim-
tains for tobogganing. . . . We are being
criticized in the bourgeois press for this mis-
management, which is absolutely fair." "The
distribution of fertilizers," said Chairman
Khrushchev later on in the same speech, "is
a big political issue."

It is indeed a big political issue, not only in
the Soviet Union but increasingly in the world
at large. If, as we all believe, it is virtuous
to distribute food abundance to our friends and
neighbors around the world, it is positively
angelic to promote the use of modern fertilizers.

Beyond fertilizers, modern farming requires
water, lots of water. Here there is much we
don't yet know — about the economical desalt-
ing of water and about how to iise the great

resources of ground water that may still lie
midiscovered mider the bare feet of mal-
nourished millions in the world's developing
southlands.

If modern techniques can locate the vast lake
wliicli, some say, lies beneath the Sahara, what
a change that would make in the geography
books of the future! If — or perhaps I should
say when — sweet water can be readily produced
from the seas or from brackish inland sources,
the chance to produce irrigated crops will radi-
cally change the destiny of hungry people in
many a dusty land.

Education, Institutions, Production Incentives

Beyond fertilizer and water, modern farm-
ing requires education — a stream of young
scientists and engineers coming out of schools
and colleges, a network of experiment stations,
a web of extension services reaching out to every
farm.

It is not enough to have the technology; it
has to be taught to millions upon millions of
sometimes suspicious, often stubborn, and
always tradition-bound members of this ornery
human race of ours.

Every department of agriculture in the world
has learned the hard way how tough it is to
persuade the people who work the land to try
something new.

The chief obstacle to food production in
nearly every developing country is the gag line
of that oldest of all county agent jokes : "Why
teach me anything more? I ain't farming now
as well as I know how." But modern education
stresses the application of science to the farm.
The first principle of development is this: In
a really productive economy there is no such
thing as an uneducated farmer.

Beyond fertilizer and water and education,
modern farming demands complex institutions
to serve the farmer — marketing and distribu-
tion services, storage and preservation systems,
rural credit banks, co-ops for buying and sell-
ing, companies and co-ops for machinery and
electric power. Modern farming also rests on
viable farming units — and tiiat means each de-
veloping country has to plunge into the tangled
laws of inheritance, the forbidding mysteries
of tax structure and interest rates, and that

552

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

thorny political thicket called land tenure
reform.

Beyond fertilizer and water and education
and complex institutions, freedom from hunger
requires incentives for the producers.

The Communists for a time pretended this
was not so — and thus converted into food-
deticit areas tlio Communist-held areas we all
learned in scliool to cull tlio "breadbasket of
Europe." Now the cumbersome machinery of
Soviet propaganda is being turned around, to
promote better income for harder work by
Soviet farmei-s. "It is important to materially
interest the people . . . to . . . introduce a more
rational . . . remuneration of labor." That's
what Chairman Khrushchev said in that same
speech in Krasnodar. Then he went on, dump-
ing overboard in carload lots the traditional
theories of Marxism : "The question of the
remuneration is very important. I would even
say that it [the remuneration of labor] is one of
the most basic questions in economic manage-
ment." That is quite an admission for a Com-
munist leader to make in a public speech.

In another speech in tlie Kremlin last month,
Chairman Khrushchev took up the theme again.
"It takes more tlian just a Communist Party
program and Marxist-Leninist theory," he said,
to make sure that "he who does not work does
not eat." ""We cannot ignore the material fac-
tor, we have no right to be visionaries divorced
from life. . . . People who achieve high pro-
duction results should not simply be listed on a
roll of honor; they must be rewarded materially
in every way. . . . We must fight against
egalitarianism."

It has taken half a century for the Commu-
nist leaders to learn the basic lesson of produc-
tion incentives — an education provided at
enormous expense by the peoples under Com-
munist rule. Maybe now, at long last, gradua-
tion is in sight.

Agricultural Success in a Free Society

Finally, beyond fertilizer and water and edu-
cation and complex institutions and material in-
centives, the achievement of freedom from
hunger requires freedom. The positive evidence
is the spectacular success of American agricul-
ture in the 20th century. The negative proof

lies in nearly half a century of food failures in
Communist countries.

The record fairly shouts the conclusion : In-
dividual farmers in a police state will stub-
bornly refuse to produce much more than they
need for themselves. As a conse^juence, tliere
is not a single Communist country that is not
in deep trouble in the countryside — with the
partial exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia,
which have had the good sense not to pursue
collective agriculture to its bitter, unproductive
end.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the new
look in Soviet agriculture, as proclaimed again
by Chairman Khrushchev last month, put the
emphasis on personal incentive as the key to
raising output per acre.

Marx coukhrt be expected to understand the
problem; he was a city boy, after all. But his
modern interpreters are beginning to learn
about productivity, not from looking backward
at the teachings of Marx and Lenin but from
looking across the world at what a democratic
agricultural system can accomplish in a free
society.

It may well be that some other system of
agriculture can be made to work in other cul-
tural environments. Certainly we are not try-
ing to sell everybody the family-size farm or the
commercial farm, both of which have worked
so well for us.

But we do hope that the leaders of independ-
ent nations — who may still be bemused with
Marxist slogans but are perhaps less familiar
witli the recent pressures within the Soviet bloc
itself for the practical modification of Marxist
theories — will not repeat that costly, fundamen-
tal miscalculation the Communists made: the
attempt to raise output on the farms without
raising incentives to farmers.

Police state methods just won't work for
agriculture. There simply are not enough cops
to go around to police the farmers of any coun-
try. And if there were enougli cops, they would
succeed only in reducing the farmers' incentive
to produce food. Productivity on the farm is
the sum of a hundred small decisions a day:
If the farmer is not making each decision in
such a way as to maximize his output per acre,
no police force in the world can make him do so.

APRIL 6, 1964

553

But a system that rewards him and his family
for high productivity can — and in our own free
society does in fact — produce abundance.

The Population Problem

If you dare to work for world food abun-
dance, you have to face a double dare as well :
the gi'owing abundance of moutlis to be fed.

I do not intend here to rehearse those fright-
ening boxcar figures and repeat those statisti-
cal extrapolations with which the demographers
regularly try to raise the hair on our heads. I
do want to mention, however, one piece of good
news: In the very recent past the "population
explosion'' has become a respectable subject of
discussion — precisely because the demographers
made their hair-raising forecasts and insisted
that other people begin to pay some attention
to them.

So now at long last the taboo has been lifted
from the subject of population gi'owth. We are
past the point when the mention of the popula-
tion problem brought a smirk to the face of the
listener, as tliough the subject were dirty or
funny or both. The way is clear now for serious
discussion of a trend which, if uncontrolled,
would commit the search for freedom from
hunger to a perpetual treadmill or a chronic
failure.

A few years ago it was considered politically
impossible to inscribe the subject of population
control on a U.N. agenda for rational debate.
But a little more than a year ago the General
Assembly passed an eminently .sensible resolu-
tion * on the subject which offended nobody yet
opened the way for much-needed research and
for further U.N. work on the subject.

In that process everyone discovered, to the
surprise of most, that the only disagreement is
on the outside fringes of a very large subject,
and in between there is a wide area of common
ground on which intelligent men from evei-y
culture and every religious tradition can con-
verge for dispassionate discourse and coopera-
tive action.

No one can hazard even an educated guess as
to when or how the population growth rate may

' For back^ouud and text of resolution, see ibid.
.Tan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

be brought within manageable limits. Birth
rates in industrialized countries have eventually,
but slowly, declined without much encourage-
ment from governments. Now several coun-
tries, notably India, Pakistan, Korea, and the
United Arab Kepublic, are launched on active
government programs to reduce explosive popu-
lation growth rates. But by and large, when
it comes to population control, there are no de-
veloped and imderdeveloped countries.

Unlike agriculture or industry or public
health or almost any other subject, there is no
place to go to learn how somebody else did it
first. So in the population field international
technical assistance starts from scratch, with
little national experience to go on. And that
is all the more reason for serious professional
attention to the matter.

Role of the Foundation

I Iiave been trying to suggest that there is
need for every kind of skill and insight in the
complex, difficult, and stimulating task of wip-
ing hunger from the face of the earth. Most
especially, there is need for this foundation.

The people who work on the projects you
adopt will be dealing not so much with global
figures or abstract techniques or social theory
but with that ultimate obstacle to freedom from
himger — the man who needs to know but who
does not yet know that he needs to know, and
does not yet use what he already knows.

You bring to this daring endeavor what is
crucially important — your own experience in
building the private institutions on which all
modem, free societies depend. You provide
leadership to the Freedom-From-Hunger Cam-
paign throughout the United States. The
quality of that leadership is indicated by the
fact that your new president, Mr. [Herbert. J.]
Sugden, has agreed to take on this job and that
he plans to devote a large part of his time and
talent and energy to active direction of your
work. The kind of interest and devotion you
can command is attested by the fact that Mr.
Weitz [Charles F. Weitz, FAO Coordinator of
the Freedom -From -Hunger Campaign] flew
over from Rome to attend this meeting.

"Freedom from hunger" is a slogan and a
symbol. We can take it as words, or we can

554

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tako it us !i call to action — a moral oblisiation,
a politi«il necossity, and a tocimiwil inipt'rative
t liat demands the best from all of us.

I know you tjike it seriously, and so does your
Goveniinent. We neetl you ius allies, as col-
leasxues, as coworkers. We look forward to
worUiuiT with you for the remainder of this
campaijjn — and beyond.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Cuban Hefuirtv rnihlcui. Ilearins bofore tbe Subcom-
mittee To InvfstiKate Problems ("ouneotMl With
Refugees juul Escapees of the Senate Committee ou
the .Tudiciary. Part .S — Minneapolis, Miun. Novem-
ber !», ISKi;}. m pp.

U.S.-Owneil Forei^ru Currencies. Hearings before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
jnent Operations. November l»-20, 1963. 260 pp.

88th Congress, 2d Session

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Hearing be-
fore the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R.
iMMie. January 31 — February li, 1!)64. 215 pp.

Implementation of the Cargo Preference Laws by the
Administrative Departments and Agencies. Report
of the Senate Committee on Commerce supplement-
ing its report of October 8. 1962, covering activities
undertaken for the purixtse of achieving more gen-
eral compliauee with the several congressional acts
which reserve certain Government-aid and Govern-
ment-financed cargoes to U.S. -flag commercial
vessels. S. Rept. 871. February 10, 1964. 31 pp.

Message from the President of the United States trans-
mitting the sixth annual report covering United
States participation in the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency for the year 1962. H. Doc. 226. Feb-
ruary 10, 1964. 27 pp.

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Re-
port to accompany S. 2136. S. Rept. 875. February
21, 1964. 29 pp.

Peat-e Cori)s .\ct Amendments. Hearing before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2455.
February 24, 1964. 53 pp.

Coffee. Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Finance on H.R. 8864, an act to carry out the obliga-
tions of the United States under the International
Coffee Agreement, 1962. February 25-27, 1964.
204 pp.

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to ac-
company S. !)44. S. Rept. 880. February 26, 19(^4.
4 PI).

Peac-e Corps Act Amendments. Report to accomi)any
S. 24.55. S. Rept. 881. February 27, 1964. 6 pp.

Use of Foreign Currencies. Report to accompany S.
2115. S. Rept. 932. March 3. 1964. 7 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Senate
Committee on the .Judiciary made by its Subcommit-
tee on Immigration and Naturalization pursuant to
S. Res. 60, 88th Congre.ss, l.st session, as extended.
S. Rept. 933. March 3, 1964. 6 pp.

Compliance With Convention on the Chamlzal. Report
to accompany S. Sl'M. H. ItepU 12;«. Mareh 11,
1SH14. 10 pp.

Providing for the Re<^'f»guition and Kndorsement of the
17tli Inleniatioual Publishers Congress. Report to
aecom|«iny S..T. Res. 120. H. Rept. 121*4. March 11,
19(M. 4 i»p.

TREATY INFORIVIATiON

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights
in aircraft. Done at Geneva .lune 19, 1!)48. En-
tered into force September 17, 19.")3. TIAS 2847.
Ratification drpoxitcil : France, February 27, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear wesipon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
JIoscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October
10, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, Mareh 13, 1964.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of
certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London
February 20, 1962.'
Ratified ttii tlie President: March 16, 1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
19.59) (TIAS 4893), Willi annexes and additional
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.'
Ratified by the President: March 16, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement supplementing the agreement of September
23, 19.")5 (TIAS 3404), so as to provide for additional
investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legis-
lation. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz
March 4, 1964. Entered into force March 4, 1964.

Norway

Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1949.
as amended (TIAS 2000, 3118, .3282, 4.503), for
financing certain educational exchange programs.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, March
10, 1964. Entered into force March 16, 1964.

Sudan

Agreement supplementing the agreement of March 17.
1959 (TI.\S 4201), so as to provide for additional
investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legis-
lation. Effected by exchange ()f notes at Khartoum
.March 2, 1964. Entered into force March 2. 1964.

'Not in force.

APRIL 6, 1964

555

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings '

Scheduled April Through June 1964

Caribbean Organization Telecommunications Meeting San Juan Apr. 1-

U.N. ECE Working Group on Public Sector Statistics Geneva Apr. 6-

International Coffee Council and Executive Board London Apr. 6-

ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 2d Meeting Montreal Apr. 6-

ITU Administrative Council: 19th Session Geneva Apr. 6-

FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America Montevideo Apr. 10-

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 16th Meeting Washington Apr. 13-

SEATO Council of Ministers: 9th Meeting Manila Apr. 13-

IAEA Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage .... Vienna Apr. 13-

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 19th Session Geneva Apr. 13-

IMCO Group on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: 4th Session . . . London Apr. 14-

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Paris Apr. 15-

Growth).

OECD Ad Hoc Drafting Group for the Energy Report Paris Apr. 16-

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 23d Plenary Meeting .... New Delhi Apr. 16-

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 8th Session London Apr. 20-

ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel: 1st Meeting Montreal Apr. 27-

CENTO Ministerial Council: 12th Meeting Washington Apr. 28-

17th International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 29-

6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva May 4-

ICEM E.xecutive Committee: 23d Session Geneva May 4-

IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of London May 4-

Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session.

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea London May 4-

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session Geneva May 4-

UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session Paris May 4-

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 5-

IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session London May 11-

U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics Geneva May 11-

ICAO Airworthiness Cominittee: 6th Session Montreal May 11-

ICEM Council: 21st Session Geneva Mav 11-

NATO Mini.sterial Council The Hague May 12-

FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session Rome May 14-

International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting Tokyo May 18-

E.xecutive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Geneva May 18-

Refugees: 11th Session.

BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement Geneva May 20-

IMCO Council: 1 1th Session London May 25-

ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study groups) . Geneva May 2o-

Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress Vienna May 29-

WHO Executive Board: 34th Session Geneva May

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May

3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty . . . Brussels June 1-

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 25th Session . Washington June 2-

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session , . Paris June 10-

U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session The Hague June 15-

U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations Mexico, D.F June 15-

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Geneva June 22-

Productivitv Statistics.

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 10, 1964. Following is a li.st of abbreviations:
BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comit6
consultatif international t^Mgraphique et t^Wphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; EGA, Economic
Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO,
Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International .Aitomic
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele-
communication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treatv Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

556 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1964 — Continued

International Labor Coiiferpnce: 4Sth Session Geneva Juno 17-

International Wlieat Council: 3(Hh Session London Juno 2:1-

Htli International Film Festival Berlin June 26-

U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial ICstatos Addis Ababa June 29-

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designations and Rome June

Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 7th Session.

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

The Department of State announced on
March 17 (press release 122) that Under Secre-
tary of State George AY. Ball will head the
U.S. delegation at the opening of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 23,
1964. Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson will head
the delegation after Mr. Ball returns to Wash-
ington late in March. Mr. Jolinson will be
chairman of tlie delegation and one of four U.S.
Representatives accredited to the Conference,
which is scheduled to conclude on June 15, 1964.

The other three U.S. Representatives accred-
ited to the Conference, who will serve as vice
chairmen of the delegation, will be Ben H.
Brown, Jr., American consul general, Istan-
bul; Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organiza-
tion Affairs, who will attend the Conference
May 4- June 14; and Walter M. Kotsclmig,
Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council, who will
attend the Conference March 23-May 3. The
Alternate U.S. Representative will be Roger W.
Tubby, U.S. Representative to the European
Office of the United Nations and Other Inter-
national Organizations, Geneva.

The delegation will include four congres-
sional advisers: Senator George A. Smathers,
Senator James B. Pearson, Representative Cecil
R. King, and Representative Victor A. Knox.

There also will be several public advisers
who have not yet been designated.

The delegation also will include members of

the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, tlie
Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of
the Treasury, as well as consulting advisers.^

This United Nations meeting will be the
largest trade conference ever called and the
first general U.N. conference on trade since the
Habana Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment in 1947-48. More than 1,500 persons,
representing some 122 member countries of the
United Nations and its specialized agencies,
are expected to participate.

The Conference has been scheduled as part
of the program to implement the United Na-
tions Development Decade, as the 1960"s have
been proclaimed by the United Nations. The
purpose of the Conference is to examine ways
in which international trade can be made a
more effective instrument in promoting the
development of the less developed coimtries and
thus facilitate progress toward international
stability and well-being.

The provisional agenda for the Conference
was drawn up by a 32-nation Preparatory
Committee in the course of three sessions last-
ing a total of 10 weeks. It covers virtually all
subjects relating to the need of tlie developing
countries to increase their foreign exchange
earnings, primarily tlirough trade. The agenda
will be considered by five main committees
which will deal with the following subjects :

1. International commodity problems;

2. Trade in manufactures and semimanu-
factures ;

3. Improvement of invisible trade of develop-
ing countries and financing for an expansion of
international trade;

' For names of the other members of the U.S. dele-
gation, see press release 122 dated Mar. 17.

APRIL 6, 19G4

557

4. Institutional arrangements, methods, and
machinery to implement measures relating to
the expansion of international trade, and

5. Expansion of international trade and its
significance for economic development and
imi^lications of regional economic groupings.

The Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations made the decision to hold the
conference at its 34th session in the summer
of 1962. The U.N. General Assembly passed
a resolution in December 1962 requesting the
Secretary-General to invite all members of the
U.N., the specialized agencies, and the Inter-
national Atomic Energj' Agency to the Confer-
ence, to appoint a Secretary General of the
Conference, and to assist the Preparatory
Committee.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, u-hieh
may be obtained from the Offlce of Media Services,
Department of State. Wa.fhington, D.C., 20520.

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy
Agency — Report by the President to the Congress for
the Year 1962. Pub. 7622. International Organiza-
tion and Conference Series 47. 23 pp. Limited dis-
tribution.

Foreign Visitor Programs. A description of the short-
term cultural exchange programs and their objectives.
This pamphlet, prepared by the Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, points
up the many areas of volunteer activities in which the
private citizen may play a vital role. Pub. 7631. In-
ternational Information and Cultural Series 86. 11 pp.
15(#.

Sample Questions From the Examination for Foreign
Service Officer or Foreign Service Career Reserve
OflBcer. Pub. 7640. Department and Foreign Service
Series 123. 52 pp. Limited distribution.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of the Confxo. Signed at L^opoldville February
23, 1963. Entered into force February 23, 1963. With
exchange of notes and aide memoire. TIAS 5461. 11
pp. 100.

Inter-American Highway. Agreement with Guatemala.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Guatemala September

25 and October 3, 1963. Entered into force October 3,
1963. TIAS 5463. 14 pp. lOp.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Tanganyilja.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Dar es Salaam November
14, 1963. Entered into force November 14, 1963. TIAS
5465. 4 pp. 50.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Senegal. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Dakar January 10 and 17,
1963. Entered into force January 17, 1963. TIAS 5467.
5 pp. 50.

Maritime Matters — Use of Belgian Ports and Waters
by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Belgium —
Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Entered into force
November 27, 1963. TIAS 5466. 10 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Brazil —
Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 11, 1963. Entered
into force September 11, 1963. With agreed minutes
and exchanges of notes. TIAS 5471. 21 pp. 15^.

Boundary Waters — Pilotage Services on the Great
Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Agreement-s with
Canada, amending the agreement of May 5, 1961, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
August 23 and September 10, 1963. Entered into force
September 10, 1963. Operative April 29, 1963. And
exchange of notes — Signed at Washington November

19 and December 4, 1963. Entered into force Decem-
ber 4, 1963. Operative August 1, 1903. TIAS 5468.
10 pp. 100.

Consular Convention. Convention with the Republic
of Korea — Signed at Seoul January 8. 1963. Entered
into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5469. 30 pp. 15<t.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sierra Leone,
relating to the agreement of May 16 and 19, 1961.

Exchange of notes — Signed at Freetown Decemtjer 28,

1962, and November 13, 196:i. Entered into force No-
vember 13, 1963. TIAS 5470. 2 pp. 50.

Whaling. Amendments to the schetlule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention signed at Washington on
December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Fifteenth Meeting
of the International Whaling Comrai.ssion, London,
July 5, 1963. Entered into force October 9, l!)63. TIAS
5472. 2 pp. 50.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with the Malagasy Re-
public. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tananarive Oc-
tober 7, 1963. Entered into force October 7, 1963.
TIAS .5473. 9 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title FV.

Agreement with Iraq, amending the agreement of Au-
gust 27, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at Baghdad
December 5, 1963. Entered into force December 5,

1963. TIAS 5475. 3 pp. 50.

Extradition. Convention with Israel — Signed at Wash-
ington December 10, 1962. Entered into force Decem-
ber 5, 1963. TIAS 5476. 17 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Bolivia, auieiuling the agreement of
February 4. 1963, as amended. Exchange of note.'; —
Signed at I.a Paz June 24. 1!)<53. Entere<l int« force
June 24, 19<i;!. And exchange of notes — Signed at La
I'az November 20. 1963. Entered into force Novem-
ber 20, 1963. TIAS 5479. 7 pp. 100.

.Aviation — Air TraflSc Control. Agreement with Can-
ada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa December

20 and 27, 196;i. Entered into force Deceml>er 27, 1963.
TIAS 5480. 2 pp. 50.

558

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIX

INDEX April 6, J964 Vol. L, No. 1293

Agriculture. The Reiiuisites of Abundance

(CU'velanil) •''>r.O

American Republics

Ambassadors and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin

Anicrica Meet •^••lO

President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . 52:?
Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

(Johnson) •'>3i)

Aviation. ITnited Stiites and New Zealand Hold

Civil Aviation Talljs 549

Communism. The Toilsome Path to Peace

(Husk) ii."$0

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 555

Foreign Aid (text of President's message) . . 518

Department and Foreign Service. Ambassadors
and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin America
Meet 540

Economic Affairs. U.N. Conference on Trade

and Development (delegation) 557

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Unitetl
States and Norway Extend Educational Ex-
change Program 539

Foreign Aid

.\mbas.<yidors and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin

America Meet 540

Foreign Aid (text of President's message) . . 518
President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . 523
Third .\nniversary of the Alliance for Progress

(Johnson) 535

Honduras. letters of Credence (Corrales

Padilla) 538

International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and

Meetings 556

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

(delegation) 5.57

Military Affairs. U.S. To Increase Economic and
Military Aid to Viet-Nam (White House state-
ment) 522

New Zealand. United States and New Zealand

Hold Civil Aviation Talks 549

Norway. United States and Norway Extend

Educational Exchange Program 539

Panama

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

(Johnson) 535

U.S. Prepared To Review Differences With

Panama (Johnson) 538

Presidential Documents

Foreign Aid 518

President Johnson Discu.sses the Presidency . 523
Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Prog-
ress 535

U.S. Prepared To Review Differences With
Panama 538

Public Affairs

Department To Hold Conference for Editors

and Broadcasters 549

Journalism and Foreign Affairs (Manning) . . 541

Publications. Recent Releases 558

Treaty Information

Current Actions 555

United States and New Zealand Hold Civil Avia-
tion Talks 549

l'nite«l Stales and Norway Extend Educational

Exchange I'rogram fiJM)

U.S.S.R. President Johnson Discusses the Presi-
dency 523

United Nations

The Toilsome Path to Peace (Rusk) .... 5;$0
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

(delegation) 5.57

Viet-Nam

President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . . 523
U.S. To Increase Economic and Military Aid to

Viet-Nam (White Hou.so statement) .... 522

yame Index

Cleveland. Harlan 550

Corrales Padilla. Hernau 538

Johnson, President 518,523,53.5,538

Manning, Robert .1 541

Rusk, Secretary 530

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to March 10 which ai>-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 102
of March 9, 104 of March 11, and 109 of March 13.

No. Date Subject

113 3/16 Educational exchange program
with Norway.

*114 3/16 Martin sworn in as Ambassador to
Argentina (biographic details).

*115 3/16 U.S. participation in inteniational
conferences.

*116 3/16 Bundy sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for Far Eastern Affairs
(biographic details).

*117 3/16 Conference on etjual employment
opportunity.
118 3/16 Honduras credentials (rewrite).

*11!) 3/17 Cultural exchange (Far East).

tl20 3/16 Rusk : conference on equal employ-
ment opportunity.

*121 3/17 Harriman : National Farmers
Union (excerpts).
122 3/17 Delegation to U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development (re-
write).

*123 3/17 Mathews sworn in as .\mbassador
to Nigeria (biographic details).

tl24 3/17 Tyler: "The United States and a
Changing Europe."

125 3/lS Meeting of ambassadors and chiefs

of AID missions to Latin
America.

126 3/19 Rusk: "The Toilsome Path to

Peace."

127 3/20 Foreign policy conference for edi-

tors and broadcasters (rewrite).
1128 3/20 Cleveland : "T h e Thirteenth
Alarm."

♦Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

U.5. GOVEnKHENT pniNTINC OFFICC119C4

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, VSOO

lOPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Making of Foreign Policy

This 33-page pamphlet is a transcript of an inlterview of Secretary of Stat© Dean Rusk by Professor
Eric Frederick Goldman of Princeton University, newly appointed consultant to President Jolinson. The
interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television progi-am "The Open Mind."

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a number of different aspects of the foreign policy
process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationsliip of politics to foreign policy, the
problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of
public opinion on foreign policy.

PUBLICATION 7658 20 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7658 20 cents

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE

Please send me copies of The Making of Foreign Policy

NAME

WASHINGTON, D.C 20402

ADDRESS

Enclosed And $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Supt of Dociunents)

CITY, STATE

THE OFFTCTAL AVEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLU V

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 12H

April 13, 196Jt

UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET-NAil

6y Secretai'y of Defense Robert S. McNamara 562

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 27 570

THE ATLANTIC AGENDA
hy W. W. Eostow, Coumelor 578

THE UNITED STATES AND A CHANGING EUROPE

hy Assistant Secretary Tyler 587

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Statement hy Secretary Rusk 595

For index see inside back cover

United States Policy in Viet-Nam

hy Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense ^

In South Viet-Nam, as you well know, the in-
dependence of a nation and the freedom of its
people are being threatened by Communist ag-
gression and terrorism. In response to requests
from the Government of South Viet-Nam the
United States since 1954 has been providing as-
sistance to the Vietnamese in their struggle to
maintain their independence.

My purpose this evening is threefold. After
recalling some facts about Viet-Nam and its
history, I want :

— First, to explain our stake and objectives in
South Viet-Nam ;

— Second, to review for you the current situa-
tion there as General [Maxwell D.] Taylor and
I found it on our recent trip ;

— And finally, to outline in broad terms the
plans which have been worked out with General

' Address made before the James Forrestal Memorial
Awards dinner of the National Security Industrial As-
sociation at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 26.

Ivlianh for achieving our mutual objectives in
South Viet-Nam.

Description and History

Let me begin by reminding you of some de-
tails about South Viet-Nam, that narrow strip
of ricli coastal mountain and delta lands run-
ning 900 miles in the tropics along the South
China Sea to the Gulf of Siam. It contains the
mouth of the Mekong Eiver, the main artery of
Southeast Asia. It has a population of about
14 million — almost that of California — in an
area slightly larger than England and Wales.
South Viet-Nam does not exist by itself. Main-
land Southeast Asia includes Laos, Cambodia,
and the two Viet-Nams, together comprising
former French Indochina. It also includes
Thailand, Burma, and part of Malaysia. The
Southeast Asian peninsula is a richly en-
dowed land area of over 800,000 square miles,
roughly the size of the United States east of the
Mississippi, and containing almost 100 million

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1294 PUBLICATION 7674 APRIL 13, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
aKencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Peicb : 52 Issues, domestic $8.50,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy. 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

562

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

people. And immediately beyond to the east,
are the Philippines ; not fax- to the west is India,
to the north is Communist China, and to the
south is what the Chinese Communists may con-
sider the greatest prize of all — Indonesia's re-
sources, territory, and the world's fifth largest
population, wliose strategic location straddles
and dominates the giiteway to the Indian Ocean.

The Vietnamese lost the independence they
had enjoyed since the 15th century when, a hun-
dred years ago, the French assumed control in
what is now Viet-Xam. A quarter century ago,
during the Second "World "War, the Vichy i-e-
gime yielded French Indochina to the Japanese.
In the power vacuum of the war's end, the Com-
munist Viet Minh moved rapidly to enhance
their position and to build their bases for a
power grab in North Viet-Xam.

The attempt by the French, following "World
"V\''ar II, to restore their rule — to buck the trend
toward independence as shown in Burma, In-
dia, and the Philippines — failed. The return-
ing French encoimtered a strong military re-
sistance movement which gradually fell more
and more under Communist control. For 8
years France sought to control the country
while at the same time gradually gi-anting in-
creasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnam-
ese. Such actions, however, were not enough.
In 1954, after the fall of the French stronghold
at Dien Bien Pliu on May 7, the Geneva agree-
ments of July 20 were signed, ending the hos-
tilities and ending French rule in Indocliina.
The country was rouglily cut in half at the
I7th parallel, creating the Communist regime
of Ho Clii Slinli in the north and a non-
Commvmist state in the south. Although the
United States was not a party to those Geneva
agreements, the U.S. unilaterally declared that
it would not violate them and that it would re-
gard any violation by other parties as a serious
threat to international peace and security.

Under the Geneva agreements, it was hoped
that South Viet-Nam would have an opportu-
nity to build a free nation in peace — unalined
and set apai-t from the global power struggle.
But the problems confronting the new govern-
ment were staggering: 900,000 refugees who
had fled their homes in the north at the time
of partition in order to escape Commimist
rule; a long-term military threat from the

north, which had emerged from the war with
largo military forces; a government nearly
paralyzed by 8 years of war and lacking suffi-
cient trained officials for efToctive self-govern-
ment; acute economic dislocation and lack of
government revenues; and persisting pockets
of southern territory that had long been held
by Coimnunists and other dissident groups. In
the face of such problems hopes were not high
for the survival of the fledging Republic.

That autumn, a decade ago. President X'^go
Dinh Diem of the Republic of Viet-Nam
turned to the United States for economic as-
sistance. President Eisenhower understood the
gravity of the situation, and he determined to
give direct American aid to the new govern-
ment to enable its survival. He wrote to Presi-
dent Diem on October 1, 1954 : ^

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government
of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong,
viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion
or aggression through military means.

The U.S. therefore provided help — largely
economic.

On the basis of this assistance and the brave,
sustained efforts of the South Vietnamese peo-
ple, the 5 years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete
evidence that South Viet-Nam was becoming
a success story. By the end of this period,
140,000 landless peasant families had been given
land imder an agrarian reform program; the
transportation system had been almost entirely
rebuilt; rice production had reached the pre-
war annual average of 3.5 million metric tons —
and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber
production had exceeded prewar totals; and
construction was imder way on several medium-
size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the
development of a base for industrial growth.

In addition to such economic progress, school
enrollments had tripled, the number of pri-
mary school teachers had increased from 30,000
to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medical aid stations
and maternity clinics had been established
throughout the country. And the South
Vietnamese Government had gone far toward
creating an effective apparatus for the admin-
istration of the nation. A National Institute of
Administration had been established with our

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

APRIL 13, 1964

563

technical and financial assistance — a center for
the training of a new generation of civil serv-
ants oriented toward careers of public service
as opposed to the colonial concept of public
rule.

For South Viet-Nam the horizon was bright.
Its success stood in marked contrast to develop-
ment in the north. Desjiite the vastly larger
industrial plant inherited by Hanoi when Viet-
Nam was partitioned, gross national product
was considerably larger in the south — estimated
at $110 per person in the south and $70 in the
north. Wliile per capita food production in the
north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had
been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the
south.

It is ironical that free Viet-Nam's very
achievements in these 5 years brought severe
new problems. For the Communists in North
Viet-Nam, like many others, had believed that
South Viet-Nam would ultimately collapse and
fall under Hanoi's control like ripe f iiiit from a
tree. But by the end of 1959, South Viet-Nam
was succeeding, despite all predictions ; and the
Communist leaders evidently concluded that
they would have to increase pressure on the
South to make the fruit fall.

At the Third National Congress of the Lao
Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, September
1960, North Viet-Nam's belligerency was made
explicit. Ho Chi Minh stated, "The North is
becoming more and more consolidated and
transformed into a firm base for the struggle for
national reunification." At the same congress
it was announced that the party's new task was
"to liberate the South from the atrocious rule
of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen."
In brief, Hanoi was about to embark upon a
program of wholesale violations of the Geneva
agi-eements in order to wrest control of South
Viet-Nam from its legitimate government.

To the Communists, "liberation" meant sab-
otage, terror, and assassination : attacks on in-
nocent hamlets and villages and the coldblooded
murder of thousands of schoolteachers, health
workers, and local officials who had the mis-
fortune to oppose the Communist version of
"liberation." In 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000
South Vietnamese civilians in and out of gov-
ernment were assassinated and another 2,500
were kidnaped. The Communists even assas-

sinated the colonel who served as liaison officer
to the International Control Commission.

This aggression against South Viet-Nam was
a major Communist effort, meticulously planned
and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the
government in Hanoi. In 1961 the Kepublic
of Viet-Nam, unable to contain the menace
by itself, appealed to the United States to honor
its unilateral declaration of 1954. President
Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively
by sending to that country additional American
advisers, arms, and aid.'

U.S. Objectives

I turn now to a consideration of United
States objectives in South Viet-Nam. The
United States has no designs whatever on the
resources or territory of the area. Our na-
tional interests do not require that South Viet-
Nam serve as a Western base or as a member
of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold.

First, and most important, is the simple fact
that South Viet-Nam, a member of the free-
world family, is striving to preserve its inde-
pendence from Communist attack. The Viet-
namese have asked our help. We have given it.
We shall continue to give it.

We do so in their mterest; and we do so in
our own clear self-interest. For basic to the
principles of freedom and self-determination
which have sustained our country for almost
two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere
to live and develop in peace. Our o\vn security
is strengthened by the determination of others
to remain free, and by our commitment to assist
them. We will not let this member of our fam-
ily down, regardless of its distance from our
shores.

The ultimate goal of the United States in
Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to
help maintain free and independent nations
whicli can develop politically, economically, and
socially and which can be responsible members
of the world community. In this region and
elsewhere many peoples share our sense of the
value of such freedom and independence. They
have taken the risks and made the sacrifices

" For an exrhange of messages between President
Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see ibid., Jan.
1, 1962, p. 13.

564

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

linked to the commitment to membership in the
family of the free world. They have done this
ill the belief that we would buck up our pledges
to help defend them. It is not right or even
expedient — nor is it in our nature — to abandon
them when the going is difficult.

Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic
significance in the forward defense of the
ITnited States. Its location across east-west air
and sea lanes Hanks the Indian subcontinent on
one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the
Philippines on the other and dominates the
gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In Communist hands this area would pose a
most serious threat to the security of the United
States and to the family of free-world nations
to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia,
we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam.

And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for
the new Commiuiist strategy. Let me examine
for a moment the nature of this strategy.

Just as the Kennedy administration was
coming into office in January 1961, Chairman
Ivlirushchev made one of the most important
speeches on Communist strategy of recent
decades. In his report on a party conference
entitled "For New Victories of the World Com-
munist Slovement," Khrushchev stated: "In
modern conditions, the following categories of
wars should be distinguished : world wars, local
wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings."
He ruled out what he called "world wars" and
"local wars" as being too dangerous for profit-
able indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons.
But with regard to what he called "liberation
wars," he referred specifically to Viet-Nam. He
said, "It is a sacred war. We recognize such
wars. . . ."

I have pointed out on other occasions the
enormous strategic nuclear power which the
United States has developed to cope with the
first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; deter-
rence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack
seems as assured as it can be. With respect to
our general-purpose forces designed especially
for local wars, within the past 3 years we have
increased the number of our combat-ready
Army divisions by about 45 percent, tactical
air squadrons by 30 percent, airlift capabilities
by 75 percent, with a 100-percent increase in

ship construction luid conversion. In conjunc-
tion with the forces of our allies our global pos-
ture for deterrence and defense is still not all
that it should be, but it is good.

President Kennedy and President Jolmson
have recognized, however, that our forces for
the first two types of wars might not be appli-
cable or effective against what the Communists
call "wars of liberation," or what is properly
called covert aggression or insurgency. We
have therefore undertaken and continue to press
a variety of programs to develop skilled special-
ists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to
help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

Communist interest in insurgency techniques
did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that
matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full
of tactical instructions, which were adapted very
successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writ-
ings on guerrilla warfare have become classic
references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true
heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the
worldwide victory of communism. The North
Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's
book — as well as Moscow's — and added some of
their own.

Thus today in Viet-Nam we are not dealing
with factional disputes or the remnants of a
colonial struggle against the French but rather
with a major test case of commimism's new
strategy. That strategy has so far been pur-
sued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and
failed in Malaya and the Philippines only be-
cause of a long and arduous struggle by the
people of these countries with assistance pro-
vided by the British and the United States.

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken
full advantage of geography — the proximity to
the Communist base of operations and the rug-
ged, remote, and heavily foliated character of
the border regions. They have utilized the
diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings
and exploited factionalism and legitimate as-
pirations wherever possible. And, as I said
earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terror-
ism, and assassination on an unprecedented
scale.

Wlio is the responsible party — the prime ag-
gressor? First and foremost, without doubt,
the prime aggressor is North Viet-Nam, whose

APRIL 13, 1964

565

leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy
the independence of the South. To be sure,
Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by
Communist China. But Peiping's interest is
hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

For Hanoi, the immediate objective is
limited: conquest of the South and national
unification, perhaps coupled with control of
Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory
would be only a first step toward eventual
Chinese hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and
Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the
new strategy in other parts of the world.

Communist China's interests are clear : It has
publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the
revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have
sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized
the United States as a paper tiger and has in-
sisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liber-
ation and unification" of Viet-Nam could be
conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling
under the nuclear and the conventional defense
of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel
that it has a large stake in demonstrating the
new strategy, using Viet-Nam as a test case.
Success in Viet-Nam would be regarded by
Peiping as vindication for China's views in the
worldwide ideological struggle.

Taking into account the relationship of Viet-
Nam to Indochina — and of both to Southeast
Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a
whole — five U.S. Presidents have acted to pre-
serve free- world strategic interests in the area.
President Eoosevelt opposed Japanese penetra-
tion in Indochina; President Truman resisted
Communist aggression in Korea; President
Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South
Viet-Nam and undertook to defend Taiwan;
President Kennedy stepped up our counter-
insurgency effort in Viet-Nam; and President
Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week
that the United States will furnish assistance
and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as
it is required to bring Communist aggression
and terrorism under control,* has approved the

* For a White House statement Issued on Mar. 17 at
the close of a meeting of the National Security Council
at which Secretar.v McNamara and General Taylor
reported to the President and the Council on their in-
spection trip to the Republic of Viet-Nam, see ibid.,
Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522.

program that I shall describe in a few minutes.
The U.S. role in South Viet-Nam, then, is:
first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese,
a member nation of our free-world family, to
help them save their country for themselves;
second, to Iielp prevent the strategic danger
which would exist if communism absorbed
Southeast Asia's people and resources; and
third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that
the free world can cope with Conmiunist "wars
of liberation" as we have coped successfully with
Communist aggression at other levels.

The Current Situation

I referred earlier to the progress in South
Viet-Nam durmg 1954^1959. In our concern
over the seriousness of the Viet Cong insur-
gency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a
favorable comparison still exists between prog-
ress in the South — notwithstanding nearly 15
years of bitter warfare — and the relative stag-
nation in North Viet-Nam.

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam," with a greater population than the South
and only a marginally smaller area, appears to
be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most
prominent of which is its agricultural failure.
Mismanagement, some poor weather, and a lack
of fertilizers and insecticides have led to a seri-
ous rice shortage. The 1963 per capita output
of rice was about 20 percent lower than 1960.
Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards
will probably decline further in the cities, and
critical food shortages may appear in some of
the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the
June rice crops are not bright.

The internal transportation system remains
primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas
establislied for hea\'y industry. As for the
people, they appear to be generally apathetic to
what the party considers the needs of the state,
and the peasantry has shown considerable in-
genuity in frustrating the policies of the Gov-
ernment.

In contrast, in the Republic of Viet-Nam,
despite Communist attempts to control or in-
hibit every aspect of the domestic economy, out-
put continued to rise. In 196.3 South Viet-Nam
was once more able to export- some 300,000 tons
of rice. Add to this the ja re- 1960 record : up to

566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDX.LETIN

1960, significant production incrcnses in rice,
rubber, sugar, textiles, and electric power, a 20-
percent rise in per capita income, threefold ex-
pansion of schools, and restoration of the trans-
portation system. One cannot but conclude
that, given stability and lack of subversive dis-
ruption, South Vict-Nam would dramatically
outstrip its northern neighbor and could become
a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the
well-being of the Far East as a whole.

But, as we have seen, the Communists — be-
cause South Viet-Nam is not theirs — are out to
deny any such bright prospects.

In the years inunediately following the sign-
ing of the 1954 Geneva accords, the Communists
in North Viet-Nam gave first priority to build-
ing armed forces far larger tlian those of any
other Southeast Asian coimtry. They did this
to establish iron control over their own popula-
tion and to insure a secure base for subversion in
South Viet-Nam and Laos. In South Viet-
Nam, instead of withdrawing fully, the
Communists maintained a holding guerrilla
operation, and they left behind cadres of men
and large caches of weapons for later use.

Beginning in 1959, as we have seen, the Com-
mimists realized that they were losing the game
and intensified their subvereive attack. In
June 1962 a special report on Viet-Nam was is-
sued by the International Control Commission,^
a unit created by the Geneva conference and
composed of a Canadian, an Indian, and a Pole.
Though it received little publicity at the time,
this report presented evidence of Hanoi's sub-
versive activities in South Viet-Nam and spe-
cifically fomid Hanoi guilty of violating the
Geneva accords.

Since then, the illegal campaign of terror,
violence, and subversion conducted by the Viet
Cong and directed and supported from the
north has greatly expanded. Military men,
specialists, and secret agents continue to infil-
trate into South Viet-Nam both directly from
the north and through Laos and Cambodia.
The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, par-
ticularly those of large caliber, has increased.
These include Chinese 75 mm. recoilless rifles
and heavy macliineguns. Tons of explosive-

producing chemicals snniggled in for use by the
Viet Cong have been intercepted along with
many munitions manufactured in Ked China
and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the Commu-
nist bloc. In December 1903 a Government
force attacked a Viet Cong stronghold in Dinh
Tuong Province and seized a large cache of
equipment, some of which was of Chinese Com-
munist manufacture. The Chinese equipment
included a 90 mm. rocket launcher, 00 mm.
mortars, carbines, TNT, and hundreds of thou-
sands of roimds of various kinds of ammuni-
tion. Some of the ammunition was manufac-
tured as recently as 1902.

When President Diem appealed to President
Kennedy at the end of 1901, the South Viet-
namese were quite plainly losing their fight
against tlie Communists, and we promptly
agreed to increase our assistance.

Fourteen months later, in early 1963, Presi-
dent Kemiedy w^as able to report to the nation
that "The spearpoint of aggression has been
blunted in South Viet-Nam." " It was evident
that the Government had seized the initiative
in most areas from the insurgents. But this
progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political
crises arising from troubles between the Gov-
ernment and the Buddliists, students, and other
non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem
lost the confidence and loyalty of his people;
there were accusations of maladministration
and injustice. There were two changes of gov-
ernment within 3 months. The fabric of gov-
ernment was torn. The political control
structure extending from Saigon down into the
hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 in-
cumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last
year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had
three chiefs in 3 months; one province had four.
Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost
all major military commands changed hands
twice. Tlie confidence of the peasants was
inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leader-
ship and the loss of physical security. Army
and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and
the morale of the hamlet militia — the "Minute-
men" — fell. In many areas power vacuums

"^ For a Department statement regarding the report,
see ibid., July 16, 1962, p. 109.

* For excerpts from President Kennedy's state of the
Union message of Jan. 14, 1963, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963,
p. 159.

APRIL 13, 19G4

567

developed causing confusion among the people
and a rising rate of rural disorders.

The Viet Cong fully exploited the resultant
organizational turmoil and regained the initia-
tive in the struggle. For example, in the second
week following the November coup, Viet Cong
incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking
at 1,021 per week, while Goverimient casualties
rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended ham-
lets have been overrun or severely damaged.
The January change in government produced a
similar reaction.

In short, the situation in South Viet- Nam has
unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall.

The picture is admittedly not an easy one
to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and
the kind of war, information is not always
available or reliable. The areas imder Com-
munist control vary from daytime to nighttime,
from one week to another, according to seasonal
and weather factors. Ajid, of course, in vari-
ous areas the degree and importance of control
differ. Although we estimate that in South
Viet-Nam's 14 million population there are
only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Viet Cong
guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from
among the South Vietnamese an irregular force
of from 60,000 to 80,000 — mainly by coercion
and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising
material and political rewards. The loyalties
of the hard coi'e have been cemented by years
of fighting, first against the Japanese, tlien
against the French, and, since 1954, against the
fledgling government of South Viet-Nam. The
young men joining them have been attracted by
the excitement of the guerrilla life and then
held by bonds of loyalty to their new comrades-
in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only be-
ginning to extend beyond the family or the
clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by
systematic indoctrination and by the example
of what happens to infoiTnere and deserters.

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction,
and support from North Viet-Nam is a critical
factor in the strength of the Viet Cong move-
ment. But the large indigenous support that
the Viet Oong receives means that solutions
must be as political and economic as military.
Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely
"military" solution to tlie war in South Viet-
Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam prefer inde-
pendence and freedom. But they will not ex-
ercise their choice for freedom and commit
themselves to it in the face of the high personal
risk of Communist retaliation — a kidnaped son,
a burned home, a ravaged crop — unless they
can have confidence in the ultimate outcome.
Much therefore depends on the new govern-
ment under General Khanh, for which we have
high hopes.

Today the government of General Khanh is
vigorously rebuilding the machinery of admin-
istration and reshaping plans to carry the war
to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic
leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the
basic elements — political, economic, and psy-
chological, as well as military — required to de-
feat the Viet Cong. He is planning a program
of economic and social advances for the wel-
fare of his people. He has brought into sup-
port of the Government representatives of key
groups previously excluded. He and his col-
leagues have developed plans for systematic
liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong
duress and for mobilization of all available
Vietnamese resources in the defense of the
homeland.

At the same time, General Khanh has under-
stood the need to improve South Viet-Nam's
relations with its neighbors, Cambodia and
Laos; he has taken steps toward conciliation,
and he has been quick and forthright in ex-
pressing his Government's regret over the re-
cent Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's bor-
ders. In short, he has demonstrated the energy,
comprehension, and decision required by the
difficult circumstances that he faces.

A Program To Meet Our Objectives

Before describing the means by which we
hope to assist the South Vietnamese to succeed
in their undertaking, let me point out the op-
tions that President Johnson had before him
when he received General Taylor's and my re-
port last week.

Some critics of our present policy have sug-
gested one option — that wo simply withdraw.
This the United States totally rejects for rea-
sons I have stated.

Other critics have called for a second and

568

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

similar option — a "neutralization" of Viet- Nam.
This, however, is (lie game of "wiiat's mine is
mine, and wliat's yours is negotiable." No one
seriously Iwlieves the Communists would agree
to neutralization of North Viet-Nam. And, so
far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, we have
learned from the past that the Comnumists
rarely honor the kind of treaty that rmis coun-
ter to their compulsion to expand.

Under the shadow of Communist power,
neutralization would in reality be an interim
device to permit Communist consolidation and
eventual takeover. When General Taylor and
I were in Hue, at the north end of South Viet-
Nam, 2 weeks ago, several Vietnamese students
carried posters which showed their recognition
of the reality of neutralization. The signs
read : "Neutralize today, communize tomorrow."

Neutralization of South Viet-Nam, which is
today under unprovoked subversive attack,
would not be in any sense an achievement of
the objectives I have outlined. As we tried to
convey in Laos, we have no objection in prin-
ciple to neutrality in the sense of nonalinement.
But even there vre are learning lessons. Com-
munist abuse of the Geneva accords, by treating
the Laos corridor as a sanctuary for infiltra-
tion, constantly threatens the precarious neu-
trality. "Neutralization of South Viet-Nam" —
an ambiguous phrase at best — was therefore
rejected.

The third option before the President was
initiation of military actions outside South
Viet-Nam, particularly against North Viet-
Nam, in order to supplement the counterinsur-
gency program in South Viet-Nam. This course
of action — its implications and ways of carry-
ing it out — has been carefully studied.

Wliatever ultimate course of action may be
forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that
actions under this option would be only a sup-
plement to, not a substitute for, progress with-
in South Viet-Nam's own borders.

The fourth course of action was to concen-
trate on helping the South Vietnamese win the
battle in their own country. This, all agree,
is essential no matter what else is done.

The President therefore approved the 12
recommendations that General Taylor and I
made relating to this option.

"We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South

Viet-Nam's Government and pledgetl economic
assistance and military training and logistical
support for as long as it takes to bring the in-
surgency under control.

"We will support the Government of South
Viet-Nam in carrying out its anti-insurgency
plan. Under that plan. Prime Minister Khanh
intends to implement a national mobilization
program to mobilize all national resources in
the struggle. This means improving the qual-
ity of the strategic hamlets, building them sys-
tematically outward from secure areas, and cor-
recting previous overextension. The security
forces of Viet-Nam will be increased by at least
50,000 men. They will be consolidated, and
their efTectiveness and conditions of service will
be improved. They will press the campaign
with increased intensity. "We will provide re-
quired additional materiel. This will include
strengthening of the Vietnamese Air Force with
better aircraft and improving the mobility of
tlie ground forces.

A broad national program is to be carried out,
giving top priority to rural needs. The pro-
gram includes land reform, loans to tenant farm-
ers, health and welfare measures, economic de-
velopment, and improved status for ethnic mi-
norities and paramilitary troops.

A Civil Administrative Corps will be estab-
lished to bring better public services to the peo-
ple. This will include teachers, health tech-
nicians, agricultural workers, and other tech-
nicians. The initial goal during 1964 will be
at least 7,500 additional persons; ultimately
there will be at least 40,000 men for more than
8,000 hamlets, in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces.

Farm productivity will be increased through
doubled use of fertilizers to provide immediate
and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas
and to increase both their earnings and the
nation's export earnings.

"We have learned that in Viet-Nam political
and economic progress are the sine qua non of
military success and that military security is
equally a prerequisite of internal progress. Our
future joint efforts with the Vietnamese are
going to apply these lessons.

To conclude : Let me reiterate that our goal
is peace and stability, both in Viet-Nam and
Southeast Asia. But we have learned that
"peace at any price" is not practical in the long

APRIL 13, 1964

569

run and that the cost of defending freedom
must be borne if we are to have it at all.

The road ahead in Viet-Nam is going to be
long, difficult, and frustrating. It will take
work, courage, imagination, and — perhaps more
than anytliing else — patience to bear the burden
of what President Kennedy called a "long twi-
light struggle." In Viet-Nam, it has not been
finished in the first hundred days of President

Johnson's administration, and it may not be
fhiished in the first 1,000 days; but, in coopera-
tion with General Khanh's government, we have
made a beginning. When the day comes that
we can safely withdraw, we expect to leave an
independent and stable South Viet-Nam, rich
with resources and bright with prospects for
contributing to the peace and prosperity of
Southeast Asia and of the world.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27

Press release 135 dated March 27

Secretary Rusk : I see the ranks are a bit thin
this afternoon. I trust I have not intruded
miduly into what I hope will be a long weekend
for you. If your boss asks you, I see no particu-
lar reason why you need to spend an inordinate
amount of time around this department this
weekend, but that could change without notice.

I am ready for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, rather than get involved in
a philosophical question about myths and reali-
ties, I ask you more directly your observations
on Senator [J. TF.] Fulbrighfs comment that
the administration'' s current policy toward Cuba
is somewhat less than successful and that Castro
is really an unpleasant nuisance rather than an
intolerable danger.

A. Well, Senator Fulbright, as he has done
often in the past, has come forward with a
thoughtful and a thought-provoking statement.
He has made it clear that he was not speaking
for the administration, he was speaking for
himself; he was not floating a trial balloon for
the administration. And we don't have time,
and I think it would be inappropriate for me to
take up his speech on a paragraph-by-para-
graph basis.

There are a number of things in it with which
I fully agree. We are in a period of change.
I have indicated to you on a number of oc-
casions that we are on the front edge of im-
portant changes in the world situation. Things

are in motion. And it is very important, there-
fore, for us to try to understand what those
changes mean and how United States interests
are related to those changes and how they bear
upon the great issue of freedom in the world.

I mean, for example. Senator Fulbright
referred to changes in the Communist world.
I myself spoke to that point before the Electri-
cal Workers not long ago and tried to outline
why we treat different Communist countries
differently.^

You know that the legislative branch, through
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
executive branch and private groups are taking
a look at this question of East- West trade. Al-
though there are severe limitations on tlie extent
to which such trade in any event might develop,
it is a matter that is worth further examination
after the events of the last several years.

There are other points with which I would
not agree. I think that Castro is more than a
nuisance. He is a threat to this hemisphere.
In the case of Venezuela there was a very direct
threat through arms, through a plan, through
an attempt to take over that constitutional and
democratic Government by violent means at the
time of their recent election.

Mr. Castro knows and has known for a long

' For text of Secretary Rusk's address before the In-
tornational Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 25, see Bul-
letin of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 390.

570

DEPARTJIENT OF ST.\TE BULLETIN

time that his military and political connection
witli Moscow and his attempt to interfere in
the allairs of otlier countries in tiiis hemispiiere
are insuperable obstacles to anything like nor-
mal relations between himself and the rest of
this hemisj)here. And whether ho himself could
survive a change in those two points is a matter
that rests more in Cuba than outside.

But, neverthelciis, when a country like Vene-
zuela— when other countries of this hemisphere
find themselves under pressure from Castro
througli agents or fimds or subversion of any
sort, then it is up to the United States to join
with those countries to see that this threat is
met and dealt with.

Now, it is true that economic isolation of
Cuba has not been complete, but it has been
very substantial. There has been a very sharp
reduction in Cuba's trade with the free world,
a very sharp reduction in free-world shipping,
a very sharp reduction in free-world travel with
Cuba.

Now, these are important and limiting
Castro's ability to work his mischief outside
of his own frontiers and to demonstrate both in
Cuba and outside that this particular course
is not the path of the future.

Now, in Panama, I don't want to get into
that very much because we are very close on
that, and it may be that we can work out a way
to get back to the table without too much delay
and get to a frank discussion of any differences
that might exist between us. We have had to
be concerned about the problem of the type of
precommitment, precondition, which would
simply postpone for a time a charge of bad
faith and possibly erode the validity of exist-
ing arrangements through treaties and a num-
ber of other agreements which regidate our
relations with that country. But I think it is
quite clear from the statements made by the
two Presidents of the two countries that the
common interest here is recognized and that we
do hope that we can find a way back to the
conference table without undue delay.

I don't want to go into other matters in
specific relation to Senator Fulbright's speech,
but we travel on a main highway of policy on
which there are soft shouldere on either side
and our great task is to try to understand real-
istically what is going on in the world, what

the present situation is, what the prospects can
be, and avoid the myths that are involved in
the soft slioulders in eitiier direction.

On the one side, to avoid illusions that blind
us to the actual changes that are going on, try
to keei> ourselves fully informed and related
to those changes. On the other side, the myths
that might develop under the impression that
changes have already occurred that are much
more far-reaching than in fact they are because
we do have dangerous and difficult problems in
front of us.

And so, I do think that his statement was a
contribution to a discussion that is worth while
in this country because the people of this coun-
try determine our policy and its main lines in
the long run. But I think that perhaps I ought
not to try to take it up on detailed paragraph-
by-paragraph basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary .1 Senator Fulbrighfs main
point was not that the economic isolation of
Cuba xoas incomplete, as you have put it, but
that the economic blocJmde has failed and that
to continue it at the risk of alienating our Eu-
ropean friends is just going to lead to more and
more trouble. Do you agree?

A. I think that would underestimate the ex-
tent of cooperation which countries in this
hemisphere have had from other free-world
countries in just this field. There have been cer-
tain exceptions, as you know. There have been
some buses and there have been some other con-
tracts discussed, but there has been a very sub-
stantial amoimt of cooperation with the atti-
tudes of this hemisphere and the needs of this
hemisphere with respect to this particular type
of security threat so that I would think I would
not in the first place characterize it as a failure.
I think that there is a pretty broad understand-
ing among our allies generally as to the nature
of this problem.

Problems of Cambodia

Q. Mr. Secretary, both the Soviet Union and
France have asked the United States to accede
to an international conference to guarantee the
neutrality and territorial integrity of Cam-
bodia. Could you say what our policy is now
toward that?

APRIL 13, 1964

571

A. Well, I think that today I would re-
mind you that we have a great interest in the
independence, the neutrality, the territorial in-
tegrity of Cambodia. We have no special na-
tional interest there except in a Cambodia which
can play its proper role as an independent mem-
ber of a family of nations.

Now, its problems apparently are related to
its own immediate neighbors, Viet-Nam and
Thailand. These problems are of long dura-
tion, have deep liistorical roots, and we feel that
since there are signs that these problems can
be worked out between Plinom Penh and its
two immediate neighbors, that those processes
ought to have a chance to find solutions.

I would not want to make a categorical state-
ment today about a conference, but in any event
a conference needs the kind of preparation that
would be involved in a meeting of the minds
between Cambodia and its nearest neighbors.
We think that this is a real possibility, and that
if pursued with understanding and diligence
on all sides this could be achieved, and that
that would go a long way toward meeting the
needs which Cambodia had in mind when a
Geneva conference was proposed.

But we are hopeful that this matter can be
prepared, can be worked on in the area among
those most unmediately concerned to see
whether a solution of these problems can't be
foimd.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the New York
papers this morning reported that you had
asJced Russia for additional information on Lee
Oswald. Can you confirm, that, please, for us?

A. Yes. The Soviet Union, as perhaps you
know, did furnish us with some information
about Mr. Oswald and certain communications
between him and their consular officers at one
stage of his life. We have been requested by
the President's Commission to obtain certain
additional information, and we have trans-
mitted that request to the Soviet Union. This
has happened in the last few days, and of
course there has been no sign of any reply, but
this would be a matter for the President's
Commission.

Q. Mr. Secretary, wlien the congressional
wool delegation left your office about 10 days

ago. Senator [John 0.] Pastore said that you
said you would contact — or that the Depart-
ment would contact — the embassies of export-
ing countries, wool-exporting countries, and
then report back to the delegation. Have you
done this?

A. We have had some discussions on that
subject, but we are not in a position today —
perhaps we can next week — to make a report
back on that subject. We have not done so.

Regional Relationships

Q. Mr. Secretary, you menti-oned the other
day the shortcomings of SEATO [Southeast
Asia Treaty Organisation], and you seemed to
feel that some regional groupings anumg th^e
countries concerned in the region — / wondered
if you would care to amplify that and exactly
what you had in mir\d?

A. I til ink perhaps I might have said — and I
am not certain on just which occasion you are
referring, because I talk a good deal, I find,
these days —

Q. — the Foreign Affairs Committee —

A. Beg pardon? Oh, yes. Wliat I had in
mind there was that SEATO is not the com-
plete answer to the problems of that area, that
it would be a very constructive thing if the
countries in the area could find a way to build
on their own relations among themselves. You
are familiar, for example, with the ASA [As-
sociation of Southeast Asia] relationship
among the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand.
You are familiar with the discussions, still
somewhat painful, among the Philippines, In-
donesia, and Malaysia with respect to the pos-
sibility of a Maphilindo. We think that these
relationships within the area, without regard
to the formal structure of a treaty arrange-
ment, such as SEATO, can be a very construc-
tive relationship in terms of strengthening
their own mutual interests in each other's inde-
pendence and security and well-being. That
was the chief point that I had in mind, that
over and above these regional security arrange-
ments, there ought to be added the closest co-
operation in the regions among the members of
the region, including those that are in an alli-

572

DEPARTJIENT OF STATE BT7LLETIN

anco as well as those who call tliemselves non-
alined.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was the release of the two
American -flyers today in any way contingent
upon public assurances on the part of the United
States that there would be no longer any over-
flights over Communist territories?

A. Well, it is not a continfjency because that
does not lend itself to a condition. We have
already indicated that we recognize that this
piano was where it was not supposed to be, and
we have also indic^ited that we have taken addi-
tional measures to try to prevent this kind of
straying in the future. But this is not a condi-
tion in any sense. Tliey were released because
the Soviet Union looked at the matter and de-
cided to release tliem, and I don't know of any
conditions or any deals of that sort that were
made.

Q. Would you comment, Mr. Secretary, on
the Soviet use of the word "expelled" flyers?

A. No. I suppose we sometimes have sent
people home, and we call it "deporting." I
wouldn't attach any importance to that. We are
glad to get them home.

Present Facts About Communist China

Q. Sir, m discussing Senator Fulbrighfs
speech, you mentioned trade, Cuba, and Pana-
ma. Do you have any thoughts on his remarks
on CommAinist China's relations?

A. Well, I want to say that, because I picked
out certain points there, the fact that I did
not allude to other points on either side of
the ledger should not be taken as significant.
In other words, don't go down the speech para-
graph by paragraph and say that, because I
didn't mention this, therefore you derive some-
thing from it. I think that — well. Senator
Fulbright himself pointed out that he would
not be disposed to recognize Commimist China
or to admit it to the United Nations.

Now, here is a situation where we are not
dealing with myths, but it is present facts —
present facts. It is a fact that within the last
2 years mainland China attacked India. It is
a present fact that mainland China is giving aid
and assistance to the effort to take over South

Viet-Nam. It is a present fact, confirmed re-
peatedly in our discussions in Warsaw, that they
refuse to renounce force in the Formosa Strait
and that any improvement of relationships is
conditioned upon the surrender of Formosa to
the mainland. It is a present fact that main-
land China is engaging in various activities of
mischief in continents like Africa and South
America. It is a present fact that they are
pressing a policy of militancy and aggression
in a debate even within the Communist bloc
itself. So that these are not. — these problems
don't arise through any fixed turn of mind of
15, 17 years ago, but they are problems that are
operational today and we have to deal with
them ; and I think that his speech indicated that
there are some major obstacles to any change of
policy in that respect.

Responsibility of Leadership

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the main thrusts of
the Fulbright speech was not so much, I don't
suppose, that the administration does not realize
or recognize some of these changes but that the
American public and the politically expressive
parts of that public do not recognize them. To
what extent is this true and to what extent is
failure, if there is such a failure, to actually in-
hibit your ahility to adjust American policy to
that, because, as you know, at the very end he
accused you of rather chronic caution and so
forth?

A. Well, I referred to his statement as a
thoughtful and thought-provoking statement.
It is important that these matters be discussed.
We ought not to have what he referred to as
"unthinkable thoughts" in the American scene.
There ought to be a vigorous and lively debate
about these matters.

We have foimd, for example, that there has
been — there has been considerable reluctance
here to deal with different Communist coim-
tries on a different basis, depending upon de-
velopments and the possibilities of relationships
with these countries. But I think it is our obli-
gation in the executive, in the administration, to
base our attitudes on reality and on facts and
upon the national interest, and to put our con-
clusions to the country and to the Congress
based upon that, and not to anticipate what is

APRIL 13, 1964

573

possible or what the national reaction might be
in the absence of leadership. I thmk we have
responsibility of leadership, and this point came
out in his statement.

Q. Mr. Secrefaiy, are tue to attach any sig-
nificance to the fact that you used the expression
'■'■mainland ChincC'' instead of Communist China.,
and "Formosa"''' instead of Nationalist China?

A. No, no, no. Those — (Laughter.) None
whatever. None whatever. I was just trying
to talk about those people over there — (Laugh-
ter.) on the other side of the sea. No, we
recognize the Nationalist Government of China,
as do more than a majority of the members of
the U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen reports
within the last few days that you have already
made up your mind to retire at the end of Presi-
dent Johnson\ term. Now, I think you have
denied that once hefore, hut you may want to
deny it again. {Laughter.)

A. Well, with due respect to my colleagues
back there, I have put this on cameras twice. I
don't think I need to do it again. (Laughter.)

Yes?

Q. Mr. Secretary, hack on the flyers, could you
comment on why it took so long — a week — to get
them hack? And also what about the Russian
claim that they have evidence that the flyers
were spying? What about that?

A. Well, the answer to the first part of your
question is I just don't know. I have been in
touch with — we have been in touch with the
Soviet Government several times in this period.
I have no explanation at the present time for
any delay that might have occurred.

On the second point, we are ourselves con-
vinced, because we know what their instructions
were, their flight plans were, their reporting
was. We know that they were lost, that they
were not engaged upon any mission over East
Germany.

Now, it is true this was a tactical reconnais-
sance aircraft as a member of a tactical recon-
naissance squadron. It had certain equipment
on board. And I suppose the Russians looked
at this pretty hard. But I think I will just
leave it at that, until we have a chance to talk

with these flyers and find out exactly what hap-
pened, because it is, quite frankly, a little mys-
terious as to how they could be that far off
course. And we are going to do our best to find
out why.

U.S. Policy on Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate a stiijt oj
our policy in trade toioard Cuba — from no trade
with Cuba to one of gradual reestablishment of
trade with Cuba?

A. No, no, not unless they move to deal with
these two utterly fundamental points announced
by President Kennedy about 3 years ago and
pursued by us and other members of the hemi-
sphere since that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to clarify whatever
differences may exist on Cuba, are we as a gov-
ernment still committed to bringing down
Castro as the leader of Cuba on the grounds
that he does not represent the Cuban people and
on the grounds that he has a military connec-
tion with Moscow and on the grounds he is
seeking to export revolution?

A. I think tl\ose tliree things all add up to
the fact that this present regime in Cuba shows
no signs of being able to make itself compatible
with this hemisphere, as described and spelled
out by the hemisphere at Punta del Este. So
that I think all those things add up to the notion
that Castro in Cuba doesn't mean normal rela-
tions with the rest of the hemisphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned two points
that Castro would have to satisfy in order to
bring back normal relations or trade with Cuba.
In the first point, about the military connection
with the Soviet Union, what would you feel
would constitute a break in this military con-
nection— just simply the withdraxoal of troops,
or sending back the guns that it received from,
Russia to Russia, or what would you say would
be the answer to that?

A. I think the removal of the Soviet military
pressure and any implications that the Soviet
Union has a military or political commitment
to Cuba with respect to its relations with the
rest of the hemisphere.

Yes, sir?

574

DEPARTJEENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN

NATO Multilateral Force

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the
situation is at the moment with regard to the
political consideration of the MLF force as
regards the various countries in Western Eu-
rope with lohom you are consulting on that
subject?

A. Yes. The two committees liave been
working very well on that — the Military Com-
mittee and the Political Consultation Commit-
tee. We shall be having their reports very
shortly and will be discussing with other
governments.

As you know, a number of governments have
elected to t-ake part in the experimental multi-
manned missile destroyer to test out some of the
operational and practical questions involved,
and partly as a demonstration. But I wouldn't
want to try to be precise about the attitude of
other governments, particularly on this matter.
We have been very much encouraged with the
way the discussions have been going, and I think
we will expect to see that forward movement
continued. But I think you will be hearing
more about that in the next month or so as
these reports come in.

Q. Well, now, do you anticipate, Mr. Secre-
tary—

A. Excuse me.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up hy this:
Can you anticipate then, as things are going
now, that the multilateral force will come about
ultimately?

A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I am very much as-
sured of that and very much encouraged by
what has developed in the course of our con-
sultations in the last several weeks on that.

SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, your amnwvmced trip to the
SEATO Ministerial' Council meeting in Manila,
and the after trip to Taiioan — could you explain
the purpose of that a little, in the light of your
earlier answer that the members of the alliances
should form, closer relationships am-ong them-
selves. Is this a death hnell for SEA TO ?

A. Not at all. This is a stated meeting of

SEATO. It is normal for the foreign ministers
to meet at least once a year. This has been
planned for some time. I think it is the 10th an-
niversary of SPLVTO, actually, in Manila. Ma-
nila was the actual location of the original
signature. So I am going out there for that
meeting. And I think that SEATO has shown
that — the regional members particularly, as well
as the other members — this arrangement, this
mutual assurance has been of great importance
to the security of the members of that organiza-
tion. But there is nothing very special about
the fact that I am going. I think it would be
rather news if I were not going, in fact, under
the circumstances.

Q. Tlianh you.

Security in Department of State

Q. Mr. Secretary, there ha/ve been a number
of assertions in recent weeks to the effect that
the charges by a Polish defector named Gole-
niewshi have been covered up, and tliat a se-
curity investigation is under way in the State
Department. Do you have any comment on
those?

A. Yes. I would be glad to comment. I
haven't had this question in some time. I would
be glad to comment on this question of security
in the Department of State, because it does need
better miderstanding and better public tinder-
standing.

Every important Foreign Office, and that in-
cludes the Department of State, is subject to
attempts at penetration by foreign governments.
These attempts are jjursued by technical means
— for example, you may recall the Great Seal
of the United States that Ambassador [Henry
Cabot] Lodge displayed once in the U.N. Secu-
rity Council - — and also pursued through the
element of human frailty. This goes on all the
time. And it requires an unrelenting effort to
meet these attempts at penetration.

Now, we here in the Department of State have
almost all of our jobs classified as sensitive
jobs — I suppose 97 percent or 98 percent of
them. We leave out certain people in the ware-
houses, and things of that sort. The general
average around government is 5 percent to 10

'For background, see ibid., June 13, 1960, p. 955.

APRIL 13, 1964

575

percent. Therefore, because of the nature of
our business, we have to expect, and we do in
fact obtain, a very high standard of conduct
on the part of our people. And I am very proud
of the way in wliich our people live up to these
high standards of conduct.

Now, this business of security is never end-
ing— never ending. One can't relax on it, be-
cause of the efforts that are being made to
penetrate. This means that we bring our secu-
rity clearances up to date when there is a promo-
tion, or when there is an assignment to a signif-
icant position, or, where this does not occur on
a regular and periodic basis, we renew tliese
security clearances by periodic investigations
and reinvestigations. This goes on regularly.

But, on the other hand, we are going to use a
sense of justice and common sense in determin-
ing what are security cases and what are prob-
lems for us in this field.

I have seen some discussion of this phrase
"derogatory remarks" or "derogatory informa-
tion." This is something which really requires
a good deal of just plain, old-fashioned com-
mon sense.

I don't want to make light over a matter that
is serious, but some years ago I was asked to be
a consultant, and in filling out one of these se-
curity blanks the question came "Has any mem-
ber of your family ever tried to overthrow the
Government of the United States by force and
violence?" And I said "Yes." And the next
question was: "If the answer is 'Yes,' who?"
And I named both my grandfathers. (Laugh-
ter.) Well, things went along until the inter-
rogators came back and said, "About your
grandfathers. ..." I said, "I thought one of
them was at Gettysburg." (Laughter.)

Well, I suppose 3 or 4 years from now it is
entirely possible that this will be solemnly put
down as a derogatory comment — you see? — in
this field. (Laughter.)

Now, I have very important duties in this re-
spect as Secretary of State. We are going to
pursue those duties to insure the security of this
Department. But I have duties also because I
am the American Secretary of State. And we
are going to do it in the way that is consistent
with our standards here in our constitutional
society. But we are not going to play around
with this element of security; it is far too im-

portant. But we are not going to lose our heads
in the process.

Now, I have heard some discussion lately
about things that happened 10 years ago, that
my predecessors got into, resolved, acted upon.
People working in this Department have secu-
rity clearance ; and it is going to stay that way.
But we are not going to lose our heads about it.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The Hope for Reasoned Agreement

Bemarks by President Johnson ^

Before I conclude, for a moment, if I may, I
would just like to simply talk to you about your
family and mine, about their future and their
country.

Last Sunday, Palm Sunday, as I sat in
church, I thought about all of the problems that
faced this world — ancient feuds and recent quar-
rels that have disturbed widely separated parts
of the earth. You have seen five or six different
quarrels appearing on the front page of your
morning newspaper, and you have heard about
our foreign policy.

The world has changed and so has the method
of dealing with disiiiptions of the peace. There
may have been a time when a Commander in
Chief would order soldiers to march the very
moment a disturbance occurred, although re-
straint and fairness are not new to the American
tradition. As a matter of fact, some people
urged me to hurry in the Marines when the
air became a little hot on a particular occasion
recently.

But the world as it was and the world as it is
are not the same any more. Once upon a time
even large-scale wars could be waged without
risking the end of civilization, but wliat was
once upon a time is no longer so — because gen-
eral war is impossible. In a matter of mo-
ments, you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million
of our adversaries, or they can, in the same

' Made at the conclusion of an address before the
national legislative conference of the building and
construction trades at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 24
(White House press release; as-dellvered text).

576

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

amount of time, wipe out 50 million or 100 mil-
lion of our people, taking half of our land,
tiikinj; half of our i)opulation in a matter
of an hour. So general war is impossible, and
some alternatives are essential. The people of
the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to
ready attack. That is why we must follow the
prophet Isaiah many, many times before we
send the Marines and say, "Come now, and let
lis reason together." And this is our objective :
the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war.

In this nuclear world, in this world of a hun-
dred new nations, we must offer the outstretched
arm that tries to help instead of an arm's-length
sword that helps to kill.

In every troubled spot in the world, this hope
for reasoned agreement instead of rash retalia-
tion can bear f niit. Agreement is being sought
and we hope and believe soon will be worked out
with our Panamanian friends. The United Na-
tions peacekeeping machinery is already on its
merciful mission in Cyprus and a mediator is
being selected.

The water problem that disturbed us at Guan-
tanamo was solved not by a battalion of Marines
bayoneting their way in to turn on the water,
but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off.
I can say to you that our base is self-sufficient.
By lean readiness, a source of danger and dis-
agreement has been removed.

In Viet-Nam divergent voices cry out with
suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some
for more appeasement, some even for retreat.
"We do not criticize them or demean them. We
consider fully their suggestions.

But today finds us where President Eisen-
hower found himself 10 years ago. The posi-
tion he took with Viet-Nam then in a letter that
he sent to the then President ' is one that I could
take in complete honesty today, and that is that
we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve
their independence and retain their freedom and
keep from being enveloped by communism.

We, the most powerful nation in the world,
can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength
is clear, and it is well known to those who would
be our adversaries, but let's bo reminded that
power brings obligation. The people in this
country have more blessed hopes than bitter
victory. The people of this country and the
world expect more from their leaders than just
a show of brute force. So our hope and our
purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead
of ready aggression ; to preserve our honor with-
out a world in ruins ; to substitute, if we can, un-
derstanding for retaliation.

My most fervent prayer is to be a President
who can make it possible for every boy in this
land to grow to manhood by loving his coun-
try— loving his country instead of dying for it.

Secretary Rusk Heads Delegation
to SEATO Council Meeting

The Department of State announced on
March 26 (press release 132) that Secretary
Rusk would leave Washington April 10 to at-
tend the ninth meeting of the Council of Min-
isters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion (SEATO), which will be held at Manila
April 13-15.^

After the meeting the Secretary will visit
Taipei April 16-17 to consult with officials of
the Government of the Republic of China.

Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member
countries are scheduled to attend the meeting,
where they will exchange views on matters
affecting the treaty area, as well as review the
military and nonmilitary activities of the or-
ganization.

The member countries of SEATO are Austra-
lia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zea-
land, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.

* For text, see Bitlletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

'For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation,
see press release 132.

APRIL 13, 19G4
72ft-082— 64-

577

The Atlantic Agenda

hy TF. TF. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^

Ten montlis ago I had the privilege of talking
in Brussels on the subject of the Atlantic com-
munity.^ At that time I tried to explain the
historical roots of American support for the
concepts of European integration and Atlantic
partnership. I concluded that, so far as we in
Washington could perceive, the character of
likely changes on the world scene over the fore-
seeable future would continue to make European
integration and the Atlantic partnership^ the
appropriate foundations for policy in the West.
Shortly thereafter, as you will recall, President
Kennedy authoritatively restated our policy in
his Frankfurt speech of June 25, 1963 ; ^ and
President Johnson has subsequently reaffirmed
in words and deeds the continuity of a policy
which, indeed, reaches back almost a generation
in American political and diplomatic life.

The events of recent months have, I believe,
strengthened our commitment to this policy,
while posing for the West an agenda somewhat
different in its balance and emphasis than that
with which we had become familiar in earlier
years. In considering these matters with you
tonight I should like to begin by trying to de-
scribe the character of the changes going for-
ward on the world scene and then turn to their
consequences for the content of the Atlantic
agenda.

^ Address made before the American Chamber of Com-
merce at Brussels, Belgium, on Mar. IG (press release
110 dated Mar. 13).

° For an address made by Mr. Rostow before the
Belgo-American Association on May 9, 1963, see Bul-
letin of June 3, 1963. p. 85.").

' Ihid., July 22, 1963, p. 118.

Present Situation

It is increasingl}' clear that the Cuba missile
crisis of October 1962 ended one phase in post-
war history and began another. It brought to
a halt what might be described as the post-
Sputnik offensive.

In the v,-ake of the first Sputnik — and heart-
ened by that powerful symbolic event — a toler-
ably unified Communist bloc launched against
the free world a major offensive. The confident
mood throTighout the Communist world was
caught by Mao Tse-tung's post-Sputnik state-
ment: "The east wind is prevailing over the
west wind."

It was in 1958 that the ultimatum on Berlin
was launched by Moscow; Ho Chi Minh, in
violation of the 1954 Geneva agi'eements, began
to press down hard in South Viet-Nam and into
central Laos. At the end of 1958 Castro took
over in Cuba and began to press out into the
Caribbean. The Commimists vigorously sought
to exploit the aftermath of independence in the
Congo, as well as opportunities in Indonesia
and elsewhere in the developing areas. This
post-Sputnik offensive aimed to gain ground in
Europe by the application of nuclear black-
mail against the West over the question of Ber-
lin, and in the developing areas by a mixture of
subversion and guerrilla warfare, aid and trade,
and the projected image of communism as the
wave of the future.

Although this offensive was set back in two
areas — by the Lebanon-Jordan and Quemoy-
Matsu crises of 1958— it had real momentimi
when President Kennedy came into office. The

578

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIIf

fii-st task of his administration was to deal
with it.

Rouglily between May of 1961 and October
1962, uiulcr President Kennedy's leadership,
this oll'ensive was halted. Dangerous Commu-
nist actions by no means ceased, but the mo-
mentum of the post-Sputnik offensive drained
away. And Moscow confronted at home, and
in its relations with Communist China and
Eastern Europe, a set of searching and funda-
mental problems.

Sensing this historic interval of opportunity,
President Kennedy in June 1963, in his Ameri-
can University speech,* moved from the position
of equilibrium and strength, which had been
created under his leadership, in the direction of
peace.

My theme tonight is simply this : Whether, in
fact, the turning point of 1961-63 becomes a
watershed in human history, in which the cold
war gradually gives way to the organization
of a peaceful and progressive community of
nations, or whether it leads merely to a paren-
thesis between two Communist offensives, de-
pends primarily on what we in the free world
make of this interval.

It is evident — in Southeast Asia and in the
Caribbean, for example — that the Communist
danger remains acute. Peace has not broken
out. Our understandings with the Soviet Un-
ion cover an exceedingly narrow range. We
evidently face danger as well as opportunity.
And we confront new problems within the free
world as well as in our relations with the Com-
munist nations.

Nevertheless, the initiative is in our hands if
we have the will and the vision to seize it; if
we deal with present problems in a way that
strengthens the Atlantic partnership, both in-
ternally and in its ties with less developed areas
to the south ; and, above all, if we command the
capacity to remain together at a time when the
most obvious and imifying of the postwar
threats — the threat to Berlin — has abated.

In deciding what actions should be taken to
these ends, we need to look at main trends in the
world about us.

At the moment, as I say, tlie threat to West-
ern Europe on the central front has sub.sided;
East-West trade is expanding; certain limited
East-West agreements have l)een made; West
Berlin is quiet, confident, and vital. On the
other hand, the Soviet nuclear missile force is
still expanding and remains targeted on West-
ern Europe and tlie United States, and massive
conventional forces remain at Moscow's
command.

Within the Atlantic alliance we are moving
toward promising trade negotiations; we have
made quiet progress in improving consultation
about nuclear matters, about our economic aid
to developing areas, and about our political
moves toward other nations. On the other
hand, there are still important problems ahead
in the field of Atlantic trade; the question of
how to share nuclear responsibility within the
alliance remains with us; and we have much
work to do in improving our programs of aid
to less developed areas and in developing effec-
tive techniques of political consultation.

Meanwhile, two forces converge elsewhere in
the world scene to produce considerable politi-
cal turbulence.

First, there is what might be called the nat-
ural nationalism of the emerging nations of
Asia, the Sliddle East, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica. A desire for increased national dignity
and stature on the world scene, in the face of
technically more advanced nations, is a funda-
mental motive for the modernization of under-
developed areas now, as it was in the 19th cen-
tury. In the past year this tendency has,
perhaps, been heightened to a degree in some
areas by a sense that the cold-war threats have
diminished and that it is possible and rational
to pursue more vigorously narrow national ob-
jectives. This tendency within the free world
is, of course, systematically exploited by
Communists.

Second, as President Johnson noted in his
state of the Union message,^ we have seen sys-
tematic and purposeful efforts by Communist
regimes to destroy the independence of other
states by the illegal entry of arms and men
across international frontiers to foment sub-
version. I refer, of course, to the actions un-

♦ Ihid., July 1, 1963, p. 2.

• Ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

APRIL 13, 19Gt

579

dertaken by the regimes in Hanoi and Habana
and to the general doctrines proclaimed from
Peiping, which would assert the legitimacy of
support for movements of Communist insur-
rection conducted across international frontiers.
The combination of the low cost to the Com-
munists of doing damage, plus the technical
difficulty of interception, has made subversion
and guerrilla warfare the most durable Com-
munist technique of the cold war.

Thus, while in the main theater of Central
Europe the cold war has at least temporarily
abated, and wliile there are gi'ounds for great
confidence about the long trend in the East-
West balance, we observe problems, as well as
opportunities, within the Atlantic partnership ;
and we see a rolling succession of crises in the
rest of the world compounded, as I say, of exu-
berant nationalism, heightened by systematic
Communist exploitation, plus the sinister and
dangerous exercises being conducted by Ho Chi
Minh and Castro in Southeast Asia and in the
Caribbean.

Our Agenda

In the face of this situation our agenda in the
Atlantic alliance has three broad dimensions:

First, here in the northern part of tlie free
world, to maintain and strengthen the cohesion
of the free, industrialized countries as Europe
gradually moves toward unity.

Second, to work with the great southern areas
of Asia, the Middle East, Afi'ica, and Latin
America so as to accelerate their economic
development.

Third, while frustrating conununism where
it still thrusts out against us, to refine our
methods of political consultation so we can work
together in helping other free nations to pro-
tect their independence, while exploring such
possibilities as may emerge of moving toward
more peaceful and stable East-West relations.

I turn now to each of these three points.

Strengthening the North

Witliin the north there are two great practical
tasks before us in 1964: going ahead in the
trade negotiations and continuing to work awav
at the problem of more effective sharing of nu-
clear responsibility.

So far as the trade negotiations are con-
cerned— here in a city filled with so much tech-
nical exjDertise — I will confine myself to one
brief observation.

Every nation will, evidently, bring to those
negotiations strongly felt special interests,
charged with f)olitical meanmg. This will be
true of the United States as well as of our
European negotiating partners. Under these
circumstances, it will be necessary for all the
participants to bear in mind the large conunon
interests involved in their success. No coun-
try is going to be able to get all that it would
like; but the vital economic interests of many
nations will have to be respected in bringing
the negotiations to successful completion. We
can expect hard bargaining. The greatest
stake in these negotiations, however, will not
lie in this or that disadvantage avoided. It
will lie in creating a general world environ-
ment of lowered barriers to trade.

I make this observation not merely as an
official of the Department of State but as a
professional economist. Trade negotiations
are one of the few ways that government offi-
cials can, so to speak, lay their hands on the
economy. The fate of a nation's international
trade position and its foreign balance is deter-
mined by a great many factors, domestic and
foreign, of which the level of tariffs is only
one. A certain breadth of economic, as well as
political, vision should, evidently, be brought
to these important negotiations. For example,
the ability of all nations involved to accept a
world of lower tariffs would be inci-eased by a
strengthening of measures for international
monetary cooperation.

So far as sharing of responsibility for nuclear
deterrence is concerned, it has been clear for
some time that the Atlantic alliance faces three
broad alternatives.

First: To retain responsibility solely in
United States hands, while strengthening nu-
clear consultation within the alliance. There
is undoubtedly a need for ever closer consulta-
tion on nuclear matters, and all of our countries
should be constantly seeking for better ways of
meeting this need. This is a necessary and im-
portant part of any approach to tlie nuclear
problem. But it may not fully meet the long-
term desire of a strong and prosperous Europe

I

580

DEPARTMEXT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

to play wliat it would consider a self-respecting
role in strategic deterrence. Major European
countries have made clear their view that nu-
clear consultation, alone, does not accord them
such a role. That consultation may, further-
more, not achieve optinuim etTectiveness, or
fully grip the participants, if those taking part
lack the knowledge and sense of responsibility
that comes from sharing in the costs, owner-
ship, and operation of strategic weapons.

Second: Operational responsibility for stra-
tegic deterrence might be shared more fidly
with Europe on a national basis. When last
here, I spoke of the divisions and tensions
which such a coui"se would create in the Atlan-
tic alliance. This course would also evidently
make it more difKcult to build a cohesive Euro-
pean community. For it would either divide
this community into fii-st- and second-class citi-
zens by sharing with some but not others, or
it would lead to nuclear sharing with all major
members of the community, thus extending and
embedding in concrete the very notion of na-
tional self-sufficiency which the community
seeks to erode.

And it would evidently be difficult, on the
basis of thus strengthening and extending inde-
pendent national forces, to progress toward a
genuinely integrated European or Atlantic
nuclear effort. In the absence of thus sharing
nuclear power on a national basis, on the other
hand, the chances of integration may be en-
hanced by the costs and difficulty of making
an independent effort succeed. The obstacles
to creating a delivery sj'stem which can actu-
ally penetrate sophisticated Soviet defenses are
not trivial, and give some reason to believe that
continuing national nuclear proliferation is far
from inevitable if we can develop promising
alternatives.

If we are neither to hoard sole responsibility
for strategic deterrence in the United States
nor disperse it nationally within the Atlantic
alliance, this brings us to the third alternative:
some pro^^sion for multilateral sharing which
is consistent with the concepts of European in-
tegration and Atlantic partnership.

One possible approach to this need is repre-
sented by the proposed missile fleet: the MLF
[multilateral force].

In its military aspects the MLF could pro-
vide Europe with an increased share in effective
coverage of Soviet weapons systems threatening
Europe, such as airlields and missile sites.
There would be more than enough such military
installations, to which tiie yield and accuracy
of MLF missiles would be suited, to absorb
fully the MLF's projected strength. The
NATO international military authorities have
made clear their view that it would be militarily
more advantageous to have these military in-
stallations covei-ed by a mix of e.xternal and of
theater forces, including sea-based MHBM's
[medium-range ballistic missiles], than by
external forces alone. The United States is
sufficiently convinced of the MLF's military ef-
fectiveness so that it would, as Secretary [of
Defense Robert S.] McXamara said at the last
NATO meeting, be prepared to substitute the
MLF for increased United States missile forces
which it would otherwise have to build to meet
important military needs.

In its political aspects the MLF would pro-
vide an enlarged role for Europe in the owner-
ship, operation, and control of strategic nuclear
power. The major participants would play a
key role in MLF planning and thus in control
of a force far larger and more effective than
any which could be created by independent na-
tional effort in Europe. That role could grow
as Europe unified. President Johnson said, in
speaking of this proposed missile fleet's ci-ea-
tion, here on November 8 : "^

The movement to Atlantic jiartnership makes this
possible. The movement to European unity makes this
desirable — as a first step toward a greater European
voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile
fleet toward Euroiiean control, as Europe marches to-
ward unity, is by no means excluded.

This evolution would, of course, hinge, among
other things, on a greater consensus — a genuine
consensus, freely arrived at — among the poten-
tial major European members of MLF than
now exists about this matter. In dealing witli
this question of nuclear control we must be care-
ful not to consider as differences between the
United States and Europe what are actually, in
gootl part, unresolved issues among the Euro-
pean nations themselves. These are complex

• For text, see ihii., Dec. 2, 19C3, p. 852.

APRIL 13. 1964

581

and difficult questions ; European agreement on
them may well depend on progress toward
European unity.

Because the MLF could provide European
nations with a solid share in strategic deter-
rence, it would also enhance the effectiveness of
nuclear consultation. IMLF participants — par-
ticularly major members — would be taking
part in that consultation as responsible part-
nere, rather than as bystanders. They would
bring to it a background of information and a
sense of responsibility wliich would enable them
to play a more meaningful part in the process.
And they would be responding to a clear opera-
tional need to coordinate powerful strategic
forces, which would lend heightened urgency
and importance to the task.

Improved nuclear consultation and creation
of a multilateral force — two of the three courses
of action I outlined — can thus be viewed not as
alternatives but rather as mutually reinforcing
steps to the same end — to be taken within the
same time frame. The one may well enliance
the other's effectiveness ; together, they may pro-
vide the framework for an mcreasingly effec-
tive approach to the problem of nuclear
sharing.

Such an approach must, of course, be consist-
ent with our disarmament efforts. A joint mis-
sile fleet would be even more proof against na-
tional dissemination than existing arrangements
for deploying missiles to allied forces, i.e., the
arrangements which were used for past IRBM
[intermediate-range ballistic missile] deploy-
ments to Europe. For the MLF missiles would
be under mixed multilateral manning and
ownership, instead of under the national man-
ning and ownership called for by present ar-
rangements ; and the warheads would be imder
multilateral control, instead of imder the bi-
lateral control called for by present arrange-
ments. It would thus be a step away from —
not toward — national proliferation.

The MLF evidently depends on both our
interested European partners and the LTnited
States. It is for each of us to consider the
possible courses of action and decide how the
important problem of nuclear sharing is to be
approached. Our own careful studies, since the
MLF was first put forward by the Eisenhower

admmistration, have not indicated any alterna-
tive approach which would be more effective in
reconciling the needs of European integration
and Atlantic defense.

We believe that these two concepts, European
integration and Atlantic defense, should sup-
port and reinforce — not contradict — each other.
Effective Atlantic defense helps to create a se-
cure and cohesive military environment in
which progress toward European integration is
more likely to take place. European unity, in
turn, helps to reinforce Atlantic defense by
creating a stronger European partner in build-
ing that defense. That is why the United
States has always paralleled its efforts for At-
lantic defense with steadfast support and en-
couragement for the cause of European integra-
tion— in the political as well as the economic
area.

The issue is thus not whether to seek Atlantic
defense or European integration; it is how to
seek toth these goals.

This trend toward mutual confidence and
interdependence within the Atlantic alliance
is one of the great achievements of modern his-
tory. After the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1961-
62, I do not believe there are many in Europe
who really doubt the American commitment to
defend Europe's frontiers as our own, or the
American commitment to risk New York for
Brussels, or Washington for Paris, or Detroit
for Ankara. Certainly no one in Moscow does.
This commitment does not rest only on senti-
ment. As President Kennedy pointed out at
Frankfurt,

. . . war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years,
destroys peace in America. . . . That is why no admin-
istration ... in Washington can fail to respond to such
a threat — not merely from good will but from necessity.

That is why we cannot wait imtil an aggressor
has bitten deep into Europe before throwing our
full strength, nuclear as well as nonnuclear,
against Mm.

We have seen, over the postwar years, how
firmly the alliance knits together at moments of
acute danger and crisis. The United States and
Europe can and should go forward and build
on this confidence, not destroy it. They should
approach the nuclear problem with this end in
view.

582

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

North-South Economic Ties

Turning to the second item on our agenda,
north-south affairs, our first common task is to
consider with our friends from tiie developing
areas, at the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development,' what measures of
trade and aid we can moimt together to accel-
erate their development.

It would be inappropriate for me to discuss
the various proposals which may shortly be con-
sidered at Geneva ; but it is clear that the more
industrialized nations of the free world bear a
common responsibility, rooted in enlightened
self-interest, steadily to maintain over the years
ahead a flow of capital and technical assistance
to the nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
and Latin America; and we have an equal in-
terest in their developing an ability to earn by
their own efforts an enlarged flow of foreign
exchange.

If these nations are to maintain their inde-
pendence, move toward political stability, and
assimie on the world scene roles of increased
importance and responsibility, they must mod-
ernize their societies and provide for their citi-
zens an environment of regular growth in wel-
fare. That is a job which they must, mainly,
do for themselves. But the margin of assist-
ance which we of the Atlantic world and Japan
can provide, through aid and trade, is a criti-
cal margin.

"We have been much heartened to see in recent
years the expansion in the contribution of West-
em Europe and Japan to this enterprise, but
much remains to be done in several major
respects.

First, there is the question of the volume of
aid. The assistance provided by nations other
than the United States has doubled over the past
7 years. So has that of the United. States.
Nevertheless the requirements continue to be
large. More needs to be done.

Second, there is the type of aid to be pro-
vided. The fact that many of the loans ini-
tially granted to the developing nations from
Europe were relatively short-term has resulted
in a buildup in their requirement for repay-
ment which is likely to strain excessively the

balance of payments of some of the developing
nations in the years ahead. We shall have to
provide longer term financing if we are not to
risk frustrating the momentum of their
development.

Third, there is the question of where our aid
goes. The willingness and the ability of Euro-
pean nations to continue to render assistance to
new nations formerly linked by colonial ties
is a heartening and constructive fact on the
world scene — for example, the continuing con-
tribution of talent and funds provided by Bel-
gium in the Congo. But with the passage of
time we can and should expect Europe to widen
its portfolio, to engage in constructive enter-
prises with the developing nations in every
quarter of the globe.

As I imderlined in a talk in London last
Tuesday* — on the Alliance for Progress — we
believe it would, for example, be strengthening
to the whole of the West if Europe would en-
gage itself more deeply in the many construc-
tive enterprises going forward in Latin jiVmer-
ica; for, while our ties within the Western
Hemisphere are close and deeply rooted, Latin
America is also boimd to Western Europe by
ties of conmierce and culture, religion and his-
tory. For Europe now to share in the great
adventure of modernization going forward in
Latin America would give these old ties new
meaning and draw Latin .America increasingly
into the Atlantic world, of which it is so natural
a component.

Fourth, there is the question of coordination.
Building on the increasing vitality of the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee of the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], and through consortium ar-
rangements of the IBRD [International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development], we must
increasingly concert our development efforts.
And the International Development Associa-
tion of the IBRD offers an effective channel
for increasingly multilateral provision of aid
in some cases.

Behind this need to work together is a politi-
cal fact : To the extent that we work together
in these enterprises, the political task faced by

' For background, see ihid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 557.

• rbid.. Mar. 30, 1964, p. 496.

APRIL 13, 1964

583

our governments is rendered easier, as they
confront their Parliaments and the Congress,
and as they confront the citizens to -whom they
are ultimately responsible. In democratic so-
cieties, where citizens have many legitimate
claims on the public revenues, it is not a sim-
ple matter to persuade elected representatives
of the wisdom of voting or otherwise granting
assistance to the citizens of other nations. The
case must be made with lucidity and convic-
tion year after year. But to the extent that it
is better known and understood by our peoples
that our assistance to developing nations is an
equitably shared common venture of the ad-
vanced democracies — in the pursuit of large
common interests — we increase the likelihood
and the stability of public support.

Private citizens have a major role to jilay
in generating tliat support. I would hope that
interested citizens on both sides of the Atlantic
could find ways of working ever more closely
together to this end. The concept of Atlantic
partnership should find expression in such pri-
vate, as well as governmental, efforts.

Fifth, and finally, there is the question of
the role of private enterprise.

In the field of economic development there
are, I believe, new opportunities for private en-
terprise. In the first postwar generation of
development there have emerged in many na-
tions the beginnings of a vital private enter-
prise sector. Thus far its efforts have been
mainly focused in the large cities and on the
production of import substitution goods for a
relatively small upper middle-class market.
The time is coming when private enterprise
can begin to assume in developing areas the
great social function it has come to perform in
Western Europe, North America, and Japan,
that is, to produce and to market efficiently the
goods which the poor want and would buy if
prices were lower and which they would work
harder to acquire if they were cheaply and
efficiently available. The problem is to pro-
duce that widening of the market which Adam
Smith correctly identified as the basis for ef-
ficient industrialization almost two centuries
ago.

In this widening out of the markets within
tlie developing areas, the local private enter-

prise sectors must take the lead ; but there exists
also a great opportunity for foreign private
enterprise to assist on the basis of knowledge
and experience gained in the more advanced
parts of the world, as well as with respect to
capital.

Political Consultation

Our north-south problems evidently trans-
cend the question of economic development. As
I suggested earlier, the inherent dynamics of
the transition to modernization is compounded
by Communist efforts to exploit difficult and
dangerous regional problems in every quarter of
the globe. Some of these are deeply rooted in
histoiy ; others are the product of frictions aris-
ing from postcolonial settlements.

Some nations in the Atlantic community are
inevitably drawn into these regional conflicts
by past or current ties. We in the United
States, because of our woi'ld role, tend to be-
come involved even though we have no long
historical connections with many of these
problems.

It is evidently not appropriate for all of us
in the North Atlantic community to engage our-
selves directly in all efforts to maintain sta-
bility and to seek peaceful solutions. It is ap-
propriate, however, for all of us to understand
with sympathy the character of the problems
involved and to be helpful where it is possible.
The fate of all of us in the West is involved,
in some degree, in the pacific resolution of each
of these regional tensions. It is not enough for
lis each to stand back in those cases where we
are not directly involved and be grateful that
the burdens are carried by others in the Atlantic
partnei-ship.

The political consultative machinery of
NATO should be used more intensively to ex-
change information about these problems and
to produce an understanding of their complex-
ity and of the common interests involved where
active collaboration and engagement by all of
us is not appropriate.

We must try to move toward a common per-
spective, not merely on the inner problems of
the north but also toward common perspec-
tives on problems throughout tlie world. Tliere
must evidently be, within the Atlantic partner-

584

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ship, liciphtcned attention to political consulta-
tion in ;ill its dimensions.

This perspective must also extend to East>-
AVest problems.

With respect to these problems, it will be im-
portant, I believe, over coming months that all
of us in the Atlantic alliance focus our minds
clearly on the problem posed for the free world
by the purposeful shipment of arms and men
across frontiers by the Communists in support
of insurrectional movements.

Illegal crossing of frontiers poses a special
problem, in view of the economics of guerrilla
warfare and other forms of subversion. A rela-
tively small number of men and volume of arms
can throw a heavy direct burden on a weak
society, quite aside from the catalytic role of
this kind of subversive activity, which Castro
accurately described in his speech of Decem-
ber 1961 as "the match you throw in the
haystack."

At the moment, Moscow appears somewhat
less involved in these aggressive enterprises
than other Communist regimes. Nevertheless
they could lead to major confrontations which
would affect all of us in the Atlantic alliance.

Communist regimes must not be encouraged
to believe that the enlarged commercial or other
contacts wliich are being created in the present
international situation provide them with li-
cense to foment insurrection by illegal means in
other nations. Specifically, it is important that
the Communists in Asia imdei-stand well that
the West is not ready to turn over Southeast
Asia to Communist rule, either directly or
through a process of neutralization which the
Commimists and others would understand as
tantamount to Communist hegemony.

Our interest is the continued independence of
the nations of Southeast Asia.

On the Caribbean it is important for our
friends in the Atlantic commimity to recall that
during the Punta del Este conference of Jan-
uary 22-31, 1962, important resolutions were
passed by an overwhelming majority of the
membei-s of the Organization of American
States, which defined the Communist offensive
in America; affirmed that tlie principles of com-
munism were incompatible with the principles
of the inter- American system ; and urged mem-

ber states to take those .steps that they may con-
sider appropriate for tiieir individual or col-
lective self-defense and to cooperate, as may bo
necessary or desirable, to strengthen their ca-
pacity to counteract threats or acts of aggres-
sion, subvereion, or other dangers to peace and
security resulting from the continued interven-
tion in the Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet
powers.^ We would hope that these resolutions,
rooted in the same principle of regional self-
defense on which NATO itself is based, would
be undei-stood fully in Europe.

We intend to consult fully witli our allies
about the continuing problems tliat must be
faced in combating Communist aggi-ession in
Southeast Asia and the Caril)bcan. We hope
that European nations will approiich this con-
sultation with the same desire for full and frank
discourse that we do.

Aside from the problems in Southeast Asia
and the Caribbean, we face a searching
challenge in exploiting together the possibilities
of moving toward a position of greater stability
and reduced tension between Eastern and West-
ern Europe and in the field of arms control. In
this enterprise, which requires once again inten-
sified political consultation within the alliance,
we should be conscious that the Soviet Union
has up to the present set very naiTow limits on
the possible scope of negotiations. Tliere is no
indication that Moscow is prepared to contem-
plate the applic^ition of the principles of self-
determination to East Germany. And thus far
the Soviet Union has made clear that it will not
contemplate arms control measures which in-
volve effective international inspection in the
Soviet Union as well as in the West. Clearly,
then, the key problems of the cold war remain
far from solution.

Nevertheless, there are a good many specific
limited issues affecting East-West relations
under discussion. In dealing with them the
interests of all membei-s of the alliance must be
taken into account. In none of these fields will
any move be taken without fullest and most
extensive consultation with interested allies.
This is the time for the alliance to learn how to
work as closely together on problems of negotia-

• For background and texts of resolutions, see ibid.,
Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

APRIL 13, 1904

585

tioii with the Soviet Union as we have learned
in the past to deal with problems of the common
defense. It is good to know that there has been
significant progress in this direction within the
North Atlantic Council. My comitry liopes to
join its partners in seeking further progress
toward effective consultation.

Movement toward European integration
should be conducive to this progress. For
there is no doubt we can consult more readily
with a single strong European entity than with
a number of separate and weaker partners. I
cannot do better on this point than to quote
what the present President of the United States
said in Paris nearly 3 years ago." In the po-
litical field, he said, the need

... is to discover and act on the most basic of the
various Alliance interests that are at stake and thus
increase the Alliance's capacity to influence events in
the world at large constructively.

Progress toward an integrated European community
will help to enhance that capacity and thus to
strengthen the Atlantic Community. A more cohesive
and powerful Europe within a developing Atlantic
Community is needed to undertake the large tasks
which lie ahead. The essentially national and loosely
coordinated efforts of the past will no longer sufiice.

That is one reason we support the movement
toward European integration. The goals that
Europe and the United States shared when they
first set out down this road, with the original
United States loan to the Coal and Steel Com-
munity, stiU seem to us valid, necessary, and
feasible. We look to continued progress to-
ward their attainment. There will, of course,
be obstacles and delays. But there should be
no doubt of the outcome, if we stay the course.

Facing the Future With Confidence

As I suggested earlier, the common character-
istic of the current Atlantic agenda is that it re-
quires the nations of Europe to take increasing
responsibility for issues which transcend the
NATO area itself. But this, after all, is what
we in the United States and our European
friends hoped and expected would happen.
Wlien the Marshall Plan was launched, the
revival of Europe was begun, and we all threw

' Ihid., Apr. 24, 1061, p. 581.

our weight behind the concept of European
integration. That early postwar commitment
was an act of faith — faith that the ultimate
logic of the Atlantic connection, already tested
in two world wars and then under a third test
by Stalin, would prevail and that an integrated
Europe would build its policy on the funda-
mental overlap in our respective interests, not
on the potential cross-purposes and divergen-
cies— which were, and are, evident enough.

As we look out on the problems before us —
almost a generation later — we believe that ini-
tial postwar judgment was wise. The simple
truth about the world in which we live is tliis :
Neither its military technology, its communi-
cations, its economic relations, nor its politics
make it rational for any one of us to go it
alone. The scale of the problems and the inti-
macy of our interdependence leave us only one
sensible course — to work, both within Europe
and across the Atlantic, toward higlier degrees
of concert in our international policies.

If we can do this — if we can avoid lapsing
back to comfortable but outmoded patterns of
narrow nationalism — those of us who bear
within our societies the stream of Western civi-
lization and the responsibility for its continuity
can face the future with confidence. We have
every reason to believe that the principles in
which our societies are rooted are historically
viable: that the combination of personal free-
dom and personal responsibility on which suc-
cessful democracies are erected is valid for the
second half of the 20th century as it has been
in the past; that we have the opportunity to
weave together a great partnership, stretching
from Japan to Berlin, which would combine the
diverse resources, energies, and moral commit-
ment of the advanced nations of the free world;
and that, from such a base, we can patiently
and confidently search for a peaceful resolu-
tion to the cold war on terms which would en-
large the areas of human freedom and national
independence.

None of this will happen automatically —
without great public and private effort. There
may well be dangerous crises still to surmount.
There will certainly be long, difficult tasks of
construction to carry forward stubbornly, in

586

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

buikling an integrated Europeiin eonmuinity
and a coliesive Atlantic partnci-ship, day after
day, nioiitli after month, year after year. But
I deeply believe that it lies within the grasp
of this generation to make the years 19G1-19G3

the hinge of history in the second half of this
century — the interval of intense crisis, sur-
mounted with strength and moderation, which
opened the way to jjeaceful victoi-y for the
forces of diversity and freedom.

The United States and a Changing Europe

&y WiUiam R. Tyler

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^

I'm very glad to be with you this evening,
and I thank you sincerely for having invited me.
I told Mr. Duti'y that I have no Irish blood
in me and thus am not entitled to wear the green
on St. Patrick's Day. And yet, perhaps I may
lay claim to being allowed to do so : I have been
three times to Ireland in the last 2 years. The
last time was with President Kennedy, and
that experience convinced me that any Ameri-
can's heart belongs in part to Ireland.

Well, it is a ver\' different world today from
the times of St. Patrick, or 100 years ago, or
even 25 years ago. We are living in a world
of change. The pace of history is not even,
like that of a river. Its course is marked by
periods of sudden intensity in the varying fields
of human endeavor, whether it be in the arts,
in literature, or in the sciences. The keynote
of our times is change. All coimtries and all
continents are experiencing in some degree the
impact of new forces, generated partly from
within themselves and partly by the experience
of others.

I was thinking the other day that we will
shortly be marking the 15th anniversary of the
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Let's
take a brief look at Europe as it was then, com-
pared with the situation todaj'. Such a com-

'■ Address made before the Uibernian Society of Balti-
more at Baltimore, Md., on Mar. 17 Cpress release 124).

parison may serve to make us feel that, in spite
of the problems we still face, the record gives
us cause for some legitimate satisfaction at what
has been achieved and averted, and for some
hope that further progress is within our reach,
that our efforts have not been in vain, and that
many of the changes that are occurring are
working for us.

Europe Today

In 1949 the economy of Europe lay in ruins.

Today the member countries of NATO ac-
count for 62 percent of the world's gross na-
tional product, as against 21 percent for the
Soviet bloc.

In 1949 Europe lay defenseless but for us,
under the direct threat of Soviet military ag-
gression.

Today the members of NATO combined have
more men mider arms and greater oA'erall mili-
tary capability than the Soviet Union and her
allies.

In 1949 Europe was a mosaic of prostrate
national units.

Today, thanks to our massive assistance under
the Marshall Plan and thanks to the efforts of
the Europeans themselves, Europe is becoming
increasingly integrated, economically, commer-
cially, and teclmologically.

National boundaries are diminishing in im-

APRIL 13, 19G4

587

portance. National responsibilities are being
increasingly subordinated to common responsi-
bilities. The vision of enlightened Europeans
after the war — such as Jean Monnet and Kobert
Schuman of France, Konrad Adenauer of Ger-
many, and Alcide de Gasperi of Italy — has
given impetus to a new conception of the role
and the destinies of Europe which, a quarter
of a century ago, would have been dismissed as
lunacy.

"We are witnessing today the emergence of
conditions which will surely result in the estab-
lishment of a partnership between the two sides
of the Atlantic. Neither temporary setbacks
nor hesitations can obscure the fact that com-
mon considerations of interest, of security, of
x-esponsibility toward the less developed coun-
tries of the world, are pressing the United
States and Europe forward along the converg-
ing lines of a common purpose and toward a
shared goal.

We are about to engage in negotiations with
60 other nations to reduce further the tariffs
which inhibit trade between nations. If the
free world is to benefit from the efficient use
of resources, and from a more open trading
system, this requires agi-eement in the first in-
stance between the United States and the Euro-
pean Common Market, for together we conduct
90 percent of free- world trade.

If there is to be an international financial
system capable of supporting an increased flow
of goods, tliis requires cooperation between our-
selves and Europe.

If there is to be an adequate flow of capital
to meet the needs of less developed countries,
it must come from North America and "West-
em Europe, for there are no other major
sources.

Differences of view within the Western alli-
ance should not blind us to the fact that there
is complete and unhesitating unity on the basic
issue of the defense of the West. This was
clearly demonstrated at the time of the Cuban
crisis in 1962 and of the attempts by the Soviet
Union to test the unity of the alliance by cre-
ating incidents on the Berlin autobahn last fall.

In other words, the essential political unity
within NATO in terms of the East-West
struggle, the prosperity of our free societies,
and the strength of our defense — all this makes

it possible for us to air certain differences in
public without impairing the foundations of our
association.

A true alliance between free peoples must be
evolutionary in cliaracter. We face new
challenges and new opportunities in our world
of change.

I do not wish to sound Pollyannish to you.
I do not underestimate the disappomtments and
difficulties ahead of us. But I would not be
speaking frankly if I did not express to you my
conviction that, in the long run, the road before
the free world runs forward and upward.

Changes in Eastern Europe

Now let us look for a few minutes at the
changes which are taking place in Eastern
Europe. There we see peoples who also have
kindred ties with us but who were cut off from
their share in European liberation and revival
by the outcome of the war. In Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Kuma-
nia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Stalin
envisaged a sphere of Soviet domination as a
base for ultimate expansion over the rest of
Europe.

The Eastern European peoples were sealed
off from the West and held down by Soviet-
patterned police apparatuses. Their widely
varying economies and national institutions
were forced into a single Communist mold,
through which the resources of the entire area
were put at the disposal of tlie Soviet Union.
Polish coal, Rumanian oil, Czechoslovak urani-
um were drained off for Soviet use. The peas-
ant agi'iculture of Eastern Europe was thrown
into chaos and its productivity virtually killed
by collectivization, to fit Stalin's blueprint of
uniformity. AVlien even native Communist
leaders balked at the disregard for differing
national needs, Stalin had them eliminated.
To all appearances he had succeeded in reduc-
ing the Eastern European countries to identical
satellites, only a step removed from disappear-
ance by absorption into the Soviet Union.
They formed the westward protrusion of a
seemingly monolithic bloc, threatening the
security of the rest of Europe from which they
had been involuntarily cut off.

But this monolith endured only as long as

I

588

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN

Stalin was tliero to impose it ; after liim it bejian
to crack. Actually its weaknesses had begun
to show already in Stalin's last years, when, in
1948, tlie Yugoslav Communists rejected his
interference and made tlieir country independ-
ent. Since tiieii Poland, Hungary, Albania,
and Rumania in diiTering ways have challenged
Soviet control, and throughout Eastern Europe
the pattern imposed by Stalin has eroded away.
AA'e can see many reasons why this has
happened :

1. Stalin's successors, struggling for his
power, lacked his relentless grip. Further-
more, they saw that changes were unavoidable
to rule Eastern Europe successfully; but in
ronndiating Stalin's methods they opened the
gates to the forces of change.

2. Economic difficulties, popular misery, and
mounting national resentment over the years
have exerted irresistible pressure on the Eastern
European Communist regimes for change.

3. The Sino-Soviet split in the world Com-
munist movement has encouraged the Eastern
European regimes to act more independently
and to trj' to solve their own pressing problems,
as the differing circumstances of each country
may dictate.

4. The strength and dynamism of the West,
and Western economic and cultural magnetism,
exerted on Eastern Europe at its very doorstep,
liave exerted a strong pull on the Eastern
European Communist governments toward ties
with the West.

5. The example of the front-runner in
change — "revisionist" Yugoslavia — has encour-
aged some of the Eastern European members
of the Soviet camp to follow a more independ-
ent course both in relation to Moscow and in
programs at home.

All of these factoi-s played a part in the rise
of strong nationalist and reformist factions in
the Polish and Hungarian parties in particular,
and in the outbreak of the great crises of 1956.
In Poland they led to reforms that, for Com-
munists, were drastic : abolition of collectiviza-
tion, withdrawal of direct Soviet control over
the armed forces, a grant of considerable free-
dom to the churcli, a turning to the West for
economic support. In Hungary they caused
the historic uprising that pushed the Com-

munists to the point of asserting full in(Ic[)i'ri(l-
enco from Moscow, until the Soviets sui)presseil
this move by armed force.

The military crushing of the Hungarian in-
dependence movement, howeviM-, arre^sl^d the
tides of change only momentarily. These tides
are the same forces of nationalism, economic
need, demand for more freedom, and Western
attraction as before. The measures of Yugo-
slavia and of Gomulka's Poland have strength-
ened the hand of those in other Eastern Euro-
pean regimes who want to seek similarly
unorthodox ways of making socialism work
better in their own countries. More recently,
the Chinese Communist challenge to Moscow's
authority, apart, from attracting tlie hard-shell
Albanian leaders into sliifting their allegiance
to Peiping, has given added impulse to the inde-
pendent tendencies of other Eastern Eurojiean
rulers. As a result, a quiet revolution is going
forward — at an uneven pace among the differ-
ent Eastern European countries, it is true, but
with effects that seem boimd to change all of
them in the long run.

Take Rumania as a leading example. Its
leaders have recently revealed their intention
of building up the Rumanian industrial system
on a national plan of their own, in opposition
to proposals of Moscow to subordinate Ru-
mania to a scheme of Soviet-Eastern Eurojiean
joint development. They are turning to the
West for the needed equipment. Meanwhile
they have been further identifying their regime
with the Rumanian nation by a new emphasis
on the national culture and by some down-
grading of things Russian.

In Poland the posture of equality with Mos-
cow assumed by the Gomulka regime in 1956
has been maintained, as have generally Go-
mulka's unorthodox experiments with more
freedom, individual farming, and close eco-
nomic ties with the West. In trade, the Poles
have recently even entered a far-reaching ac-
cord with their principal wartime foe, the West
Germans.

In Hungary the Government has been stead-
ily easing restrictions and opening jobs and
education to non-Communists in an effort to
conciliate the peoples; and, to spur output, it
is resorting to such unorthodox steps as encour-

589

aging private production by peasants on collec-
tive farms. It recently stopped jamming
Western broadcasts, and it now permits Hun-
garians, by the thousands, freely to travel to
the West. It is trying to shift more of Him-
gary's trade to the West, as well.

Czechoslovakia is tardily and only gradually
discarding some of its leaders and trappings
of the Stalin era. It has lightened its travel
restrictions and is seeking improved relations
with the West, including the United States.
For the first time in years there are no Ameri-
can citizens in Czechoslovak prisons.

In Bulgaria a spy trial was recently staged
to warn the population against contacts with
Americans. But the Government needs and
seeks Western ties ; it has settled United States
claims, for example, and it invites us to exhibit
at its trade fair. Though a strict police regime,
it is also showing a novel flexibility in some of
its economic policies, such as promotion of pri-
vate production on peasant household plots.

In Soviet-occupied East Germany even the
Stalinist regime of Ulbricht, stained with the
shame of the Berlin wall, is attempting to de-
vise ways of remedying its failures by borrow-
ing capitalist-type incentives to help its ailing
economy. There are other indications that the
winds of change now blowing in Eastern Eu-
rope are beginning to be felt in East Germany.
The time will surely come when the people of
Germany will be reunited with each other in
freedom and when the heroism and steadfast-
ness of the people of West Berlin will thus be
vindicated.

These shifts and changes in the Eastern Euro-
pean scene have important meaning for the
United States, in view of our stake in a united
and peaceful Europe. If the forces of history,
geography, and change are tending to pull this
or that Eastern European country back into
more normal contact witli European life despite
Communist control, it is to our interest to assist
as we can. To do this, it is essential for the
American public to keep abreast witli the evolv-
ing realities in the eastern half of Europe and
to realize that this area is not now a solid bloc

of nations, as Stalin tried to make it, or merely
a group of satellites of the Soviet Union. The
present trend presents a challenge to us and our
Western European friends to rebuild our con-
tacts with the Eastern European peoples on a
broad scale, through exchanges, trade, and other
natural means.

To sum up, we are today engaged in new and
changing relations with both Western and East-
em Europe.

The larger, long-range objectives of the
United States with respect to Europe are con-
stant: We want Europe to be unified, secure,
strong, free, and prosperous.

As conditions in Europe change, so the means
that the United States uses to work toward the
attainment of its objectives must also necessar-
ily change and evolve as the times require.

The further implication of this truth is that
the attitude of the American people toward the
phenomenon of change must itself take into
account the march of events. In this way we
will be in a position to devise and support those
policies which are best calculated to serve our
own broad interests.

Secretary of Interior Named
to Export Expansion Committee

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Designating the Secretary of the Interior as a
Member op the Interagency Committee on Export
Expansion

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President
of the United States, Section 1(a) of Executive Order
No. 11132 ■ of December 12, 1963, is hereby amended
by inserting "the Secretary of the Interior;" immedi-
ately after "the Secretary of Defense ;".

LyvJUJl4/(t«wC^«

The White House,
March 23, 1964.

' No. 11148 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 3695.

° For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.5.

690

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETIN

Foreign Policy and the Individual: Identity in Diversity

hy Mrs. Katie Louchheim,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Advisory Services *

I appreciate that the theme of your confer-
once is ''Profiress Toward a World of Law and
Order." While talking on this in general
temis, perhaps von will allow me to relate the
progress I hope to see with the individuals Mho
must bring it about. In a world of some chaos
and great diversity let us keep our eye on the
individuals who, by a quickened sense of respon-
sibility and perceptive analysis of issues, have
the strength to move us forward.

Let me quickly add that the other speakers on
the program and this audience represent the
best example of the individuals I have in mind.

In thinking over the awesome conference sub-
ject it was apparent that the most reasonable
approacli to a world of order, in one of disorder,
is through a world of law and the role of the
individual in living by it.

We know there are disorders in the world.
Look at events, even at the surface level of news
bulletins and weekly developments in Cyprus,
Cuba, Panama, the Congo, Kaslunir, Laos, and
Viet-Nam. We also admit of differences of
opinion within the Atlantic community and
profound divisions between the power centers
of Moscow and Peiping. But these divisions,
differences, and disorders are facts of life we
are getting used to living with in a rapidly
changing, turbulent, and complicated world.
We would have more to worry about if the
factors of cliange and turbulence were not
present — if, for example, the great colonial
revolutions that have doubled U.N". member-

' Address made before a World Affairs Conference
at the University of Nortli Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.,
on Mar. 12 (press release 105 dated Mar. 11).

ship within two decades had not taken place.
We are, after all, talking about progress to-
ward law and order and not the precise arrival
time of the millennium.

Despite the crash of daily headlines it is
important to understand that, in perspective,
the 20th century, as the late 15th and early
16th centuries, may well be one of the water-
sheds of history. The Middle Ages saw the
rise of capitalism in the form of nation-states
built on the decay of feudalism; the 16th cen-
tury released the individual from the corporate
life of the Middle Ages and flowered in the
humanism of the Renaissance and the revolu-
tionary expansion of man's horizon.

Today, with the infinite horizons of the nu-
clear age and voyages of discovery in outer
space upon us, we again look to the individual
in our midst. We ask whether man's intellect
and energy, striving always for a perfect world
of law, will insure equality for all citizens of
the new society.

With the world expanding — in terms of
people, nations, and possible points of friction —
at an alarming rate, we must take a hard look at
the pace and quality of progress if our mood of
cautious optimism is to be justified. We would
be well advised to discard what President
Kennedy once referred to as the "comfort of
opinion" for the "discomfort of thought."

The Pattern of Change

The pattern of change — revolutionary
change — is so undisputable a fact of interna-
tional life that it takes a good deal of thought
just to keep up with developments. But since

APRIL 13, 1904

591

our focus is on the world of law, our best
register of progress is through the United
Nations and a system of some 77 international
organizations and programs, including the
World Court, the elder statesman of law and
order. Most of you, I believe, are well aware
of this because of the fact that, for many
teclmical and political reasons, international
organizations are a plain necessity of our times.

Some statistics are perhaps of interest:

The United States is a member of 51 inter-
national organizations and a contributor to 26
international operating programs.

At its last session the U.N. General Assembly
took action on 125 separate matters, and more
than 14,000 votes were cast in which we had a
substantial interest, in addition to all the pre-
liminary work in committees. Its 111 members
were increased to 113.

Our State Department receives approxi-
mately 1,300 cables every working day and
sends out approximately 1,000 cabled replies, as
well as 600 bags of daily mail.

Last year alone, the U.S. Government at-
tended 547 international conferences.

All together, this represents a prodigious ef-
fort on the part of men to build the common
law of mankind — the accepted practices, pro-
grams, and principles which cannot automati-
cally guarantee but consistently build the
stnicture of peace.

But, going beyond statistics, you perhaps ask
what we mean by peace and the objectives of
foreign policy. One begins to answer by quot-
ing the preamble to the Constitution, "to secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."

If you ask how we relate this to the United
Nations, I would refer to the kind of world de-
scribed in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of
the U.N. Charter — ratified by an overwhelming
show of bipartisan support at the end of a great
war which had purged us of much of our paro-
chial thinking and had taught us the lesson of
interdependence.

Let me be specific. The kind of world we are
working toward would be :

— free of aggression — aggression by whatever
means ;

— a world of independent nations, each with

the institutions of its own choice, but coop-
erating with one another to their mutual
advantage;

— a world of economic and social advance for
all peoples ;

— a world which provides certain and equi-
table means for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, and which moves steadily toward a rule
of law ;

— a world in which the powers of the state
over the individual are limited by law and cus-
tom, in which the personal freedom essential to
the dignity of men is secure ;

— a world free of hate and discrimination
based on race, or nationality, or color, or eco-
nomic or social status ;

— and a world of equal rights and equal re-
sponsibilities for the entire human race.

Individual Involvement in Community Life

But the approach to such a world — a world
of law and order — however great our depend-
ence on international institutions, must rely on
the individual : people who are deeply involved
in the issues of their times.

"\'\niether we are physicists or farmers, doc-
tors or divines, housewives or horticulturists,
we must be involved in the quality of life around
us. Our understanding is sharpened by in-
volvement. As we participate, we are fulfilled.
If our kind of world is to succeed and if the
spirit of democracy is to flourish in the land,
we cannot withdraw into our professions, we
cannot seclude ourselves completely in special-
ization. We must watch many horizons, expect-
ing to see a few falling stars.

As a contemporary philosopher, Scott Bu-
chanan, said : "Tlie hiunan individual is respon-
sible for injustice anywhere in the imiverse."
Crisis comes with the morning coffee ; concern is
a lengthening shadow ; change and challenge are
our birtliright.

Mr. Buchanan's remarks should not be taken
to mean that each of us is responsible for in-
justice anywhere but that ever}^ one of us has
the responsibility for dealing with these
injustices.

To set the universe as the limits of our re-
sponsibility may seem to you to be exaggerating
the case. But if we were to ask that each indi-

592

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

vidual assume responsibility for dealing with
injustice in his own community, there would
undoubtedly be acceptance of the proposition.
A reasonable assignment^ — but if we ask, "Wliat
can one individual do?" let us rompinber the
attorney Charles Morgan, whose statement of
conscience last fall answere<l the question of
who was to blame for the death of four children.
He said : "We all did it. Every last one of us
is condemned for that crime and the bombing
before it, and the ones last month, last year, a
decade ago. We all did it."

Wlio's to blame ? All of us, to the extent that
as individuals we are empty of inner voice or too
full of material possessions.

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at
the other limits of the globe. But the world is
now the kind of place where events in our own
community affect our standing at the other ends
of the earth. Through the mediating mecha-
nism of TV, films, radio, and press, the small
print in our own commimity can now be read
at the farthest ends of the globe.

And so, for the informed, involved, partici-
pating citizen, the educated man and woman,
the community expands. It is not only his or
her town or city. It is Rome, Cairo, and Coun-
cil Bluffs, U.S.A., as well as Eome, Cairo, and
Capetown in the world outside.

To be effective as a citizen does not mean that
you have to be a member of the State legisla-
ture or a delegate to the United Nations. "Wliat
you do and say on a local committee to clear
urban slums, to save national parks, or to guar-
antee equal opportimity to all citizens may make
the difference between orderly progress and the
often imperceptible decline of free institutions.

We justify our heritage only by becoming
involved in the life of our community and
nation.

The Challenge of America

The life of Jolm Kennedy is a case in point.
He was a young man, impatient with the im-
perfections of the world, who used his anger to
give him strength. Although he recognized
the realities of the world — cruelty, injustice,
and disease — \\e worked ceaselessly, always
through the orderly process of law, slow as this
must have seemed, for the people and principles

in which he believed. His life reminds us of
cliallonges to every sector of American life —
city, State, Federal, and the local community —
which await our action.

And it is tliese same princijiles which Presi-
dent Johnson laid down so eloquently in his
state of the Union address. The administra-
tion's plans for a concerted and cohesive war
against poverty put our problems into even
sharper focus.

We must all awake to the challenge of Amer-
ica, for jioverty is neither a spur to progress
nor some heavenly ordained penalty for failure
or error. But it is of our making, our neglect,
and nuist be repaired. We are determined that
those who cannot .satisfy minimum needs, who
"live on the outskirts of hope," isolated from
the mainstream of American life and alienated
from its values, must be restored to health if
the fabric of a free society is to be strong.

A free society has no easy options, no escape
either into rigidity or into anarchy. It must
survive the endless clash, which is what makes
it both the most precarious and the most adapt-
able social order ever worked out by men.

As we turn to the war on poverty we know
the needed refonns are not easy. They require
multiple and radical changes. It is not simply
the disabilities under which millions of our
citizens have accepted defeat, but the stark fact
that perhaps 20 percent of our people, including
11 million children, live below the poverty line;
that urban decay, linked with this poverty and
exacerbated by racial tension, is eating out the
heart of our great cities; that automation is de-
manding higher skills just as a new flood of
postwar children, all too unskilled, begin their
search for work.

We shall not exorcise these problems by the
politics of verbal violence. We shall not exor-
cise the violence by turning our backs on the
problems themselves. We have to brace our-
selves for a social effort as great, perhaps, as the
waging of war itself if the promise of a free
society is to be made good.

I say this because we all must know that our
ability to influence the course of events abroad
is dependent tremendously on the quality of
progress at home. A United States which fails
to deal properly with its problems of race rela-

APRIL 13, 1964

593

tions, education, urban renewal, unemployment,
and old age is unlikely to win acceptance for
long as a leader on the world scene.

The Role of the "Uncommon Man"

In facing up to these problems I think it is
healthy to appreciate that although we fre-
quently talk about the "universality and
brotherhood of man," we should pay more at-
tention to the valuable and interesting differ-
ences that distinguish all brothers, whether 30
or 3,000 miles apart.

In a world of overpopulation, high produc-
tion, and mass consumption we have almost lost
the sense of man as an individual. We have
surely lost the noble, lieroic view of man that
used to be called humanistic — the view that ex-
isted in the Eenaissance — the view that was
portrayed in Shakespeare's heroes and in
Michelangelo's gi'eat frescoes.

If we are to be sure of our identity in a world
of diversity, we are going to have to lean more
heavily on the "uncommon man" than on many
of the stereotypes presently in circulation.

As believers in freedom of speecli, we all re-
spect the independent view, the original cast of
mind. We must, however, be troubled by the
expressions of fanatic intolerance which are still
heard in the land and, more distressing, the ap-
athy, the silent indifference of so many en-
lightened men and women. In their hearts they
condemn fanaticism, but they neither speak out
to rebuke it or take action to repress it.

Part of the answer to this problem may well
be that, as a result of the nuclear age, the his-
torical release of popular emotion and tension
through war, fortunately, is no longer possible.
However, we see in the nostalgic quest for war
the perfect catharsis and the simple solution to
complex issues in demands for "total victory."
The truth is tliat the era of peace through mu-
tual terror creates a new environment character-
ized by a policy of nuclear restraint on the part
of the more sophisticated world powers.

There is a great opportimity here, for we
must appreciate that, apart from tlie issue of
human survival, the greatest goal being pui-sued
within the framework of the United Nations is
the steady extension of human rights.

Wlien President Johnson addressed the
United Nations in December he said,^

All that we have built In the wealth of nations, and
all that we plan to do toward a better life for all, will
be in vain if our feet should slip, or our vision falter,
and our hopes end in another worldwide war.

We look, he said, for "a peaceful revolution in
the world, through a recommitment of all our
members, rich and poor, and strong and weak,
whatever their location or their ideology, to the
basic principles of human welfare and of human
dignity."

Here is a challenge to which we must all re-
spond— a challenge, in a world of greater di-
vereity than disorder, by which individuals can
reaffirm the peculiar talent, genius, and adven-
ture of the American spirit.

This spirit of adventure is dramatically ex-
pressed in Catherine Drinker Bowen's biogi-a-
phy of Francis Bacon. In describing the
temper of the times, she says, "People spoke of
America as today we speak of the moon, yet far
more fruitfully." In Francis Bacon's own
words we were "That great wind blowing from
the west . . . the breath of life which blows on
us from that New Continent." "Columbus,"
Bacon said, "has made hope reasonable."

It is reasonable to be hopeful today — but only
if America is still fresh with the breath of life,
brincins: new men and ideas to the service of
society.

King Hussein of Jordan
Visits United States

The Department of State announced on
March 26 (press release 134) that arrangements
were being completed for the visit of His Maj-
esty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan, who will visit the United States
April 13-23 at the invitation of President John-
son.

His Majesty will arrive at Washington, D.C.,
from Philadelphia, Pa., on April 14 for a 2-day
visit. On April 16 His Majesty will depart for
New York City and a trip to other areas in the
United States.

• BuiXETiN of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

694

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

THE CONGRESS

The Foreign Assistance Program

Statement by Secretary Rusk ^

Mr. Chairman and members of the commit-
tee : Thank you veiy much for the opportunity
of appearing before you to make tlie initial
presentation to the Congress of tlie mutual
defense and development programs for fiscal
year 1965.

This committee has been dealing with our
foreign assistance program for many years.
You have been generous in your support and
frank m your advice. The experienced judg-
ment of the committee will continue to be of
great assistance to us in making the program
more effective, and we look forward to a pro-
ductive review this year.

This bill before you will provide authority for
continuing a basic instriunent of U.S. foreign
policy — foreign aid.

The goal of this progi-am is simple and bears
repeating: to provide assistance and encourage-
ment to nations so that they can grow in in-
dependence, security, and freedom. We seek no
satellites; we seek no domination; we are not
trying to buy friends.

America is working to make the world safe
for freedom. For I believe an important lesson
has been learned in the postwar world — that as
all people grow in freedom and independence,
so the security of the U.S. is strengthened; and
as others grow in economic strength, so the U.S.
will continue to prosper.

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs on Mar. 23 (press release 129) .

Foreign aid can only do a small part of the
job. American private enterprise must bear a
heavier burden of investment in the underde-
veloped world; our prospering allies must do
more; and most of all the recipient nations must
do their share — through self-help and reinvest-
ment in their own economies.

It is important to view the aid program in
perspective. We have made a commitment to
the free world. It is a long-term commitment,
not made in anticipation of quick or dramatic
results. We are dealing with nations striving
to solve in a matter of years problems which
took many decades to overcome in what we now
regard as the developed countries.

We should expect neither too much nor too
little. Foreign aid should not be expected to
win support from each recipient for our view
on every international issue. And let us not
levy on the mutual defense and development
programs our disappointment in j-esterday's
coup, or tomorrow's vote in the United Nations.
The forces at work run deep. Let us expect,
instead, to see in the years to come the growth
of an international community in which the ac-
tions of nations are not based on insecurity, fear,
or frustration, but on basic independence of out-
look and confidence in the future.

II.

This committee is being asked to provide $917
million in new authorization for fiscal year 1965
for the economic assistance program. No new

APRIL 13, 1964

595

authority is needed for development lending
or for the Alliance for Progress.

This committee is also being asked to provide
a continuing authorization for the military as-
sistance program.

We are requesting, under the new and the
existing authority, a total appropriation of $3.4
billion— $2.4 billion for economic assistance and
$1 billion for military assistance.

Secretary [of Defense Kobert S.] McNamara,
Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator of the
Agency for International Development], and
witnesses from the State and Defense Depart-
ments will deal with these requests in greater
detail. However, I should like to emphasize
the need for providing the full amounts re-
quested by President Johnson for fiscal year
1965.2 In keeping with the President's instruc-
tion that all budgetary requests be at minimum
amoimts, this year's program is a tight, real-
istic one. In previous years, the practice has
been to plan the foreign aid program according
to estimates of the best performance that could
be expected by recipient nations. We are, of
coui-se, still hopeful that the nations we are
assisting will come forward with the necessary
self-help and refonn measures. But we have
learned it is unrealistic to expect them all to
do so and we have budgeted accordingly.

On the other hand the 1965 budget does not
allow for sudden opportunities that sometimes
present themselves in international economic
affairs. We must be able to take advantage of
opportunities in which swift action can advance
us dramatically along the road to free-world
cooperation and prosperity. Should such op-
portunities arise, we will request prompt action
by the Congress to provide any additional funds
needed to meet emerging requirements.

III.

I should like to take this opportunity to ex-
press my strong support for the military assist-
ance program.

In spite of recent hopeful developments, the
Sino-Soviet threat continues. It is a direct
military threat against the countries on the
periphery of the bloc, and an indirect one— in

" For text of the President's message to the Congress
on foreign aid, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1064, p. 518.

the form of subversion and guerrilla war—
against many of the underdeveloped countries
of the world.

Our military assistance often has made it pos-
sible for these nations to survive. It is essen-
tial to their continued security and is vital to
our own security as well. It is the key to the
maintenance of more than 3.5 million men under
arms. These men are an effective deterrent to
aggression; and, moreover, without them our
own defense costs would be much higher and
more U.S. troops would have to be in the line.
Military assistance helps to forge a vital link
in our mutual defense.

IV.
In fiscal year 1965, the foreign aid program
will be even more concentrated than in the past.
Two-thirds of all development lending funds
are planned for seven countries— Chile, Colom-
bia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and
Timisia. Two-thirds of all military assistance
funds will go to 11 countries along the Sino-
Soviet periphery. Four-fifths of supporting
assistance funds will go to four countries:
Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Jordan.

We intend to provide major development as-
sistance only in cases where the countries them-
selves are willing to make a substantial effort.
For one of the clear lessons of recent history
has been that unless a nation is willing to carry
the major burden— in terms of reinvesting sav-
ings, enacting tax reform, land reform, and
other necessary legislation, and in terms of care-
ful management of its own resources— no
amount of outside assistance, whether from the
U.S. or others, will have the necessary impact.
We will continue to be strict in the disburse-
ment of funds, in order to assure the greatest
possible return from the taxpayers' money.

During the coming fiscal year, there will be
a speedup in the transition from reliance on aid
to economic self-support for a number of coun-
tries. Fourteen countries are now approaching
the point where they will no longer need soft
economic loans and grants. In 17 nations the
transition has been completed and economic aid

ended.

We have a solid record of success in these
countries and many others. The quiet, slow,
yet very real progress being made around the

596

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

world is too often obscured in the day-to-day
news of crisis and turmoil. A rejil revolution is
taking place in the underdeveloped world as
more and more people are acquiring the skills
and the means for moving into the modem world
and taking their place beside otiier free and in-
dependent peoples. We have played a major
role in this effort — a role of which we can be
proud.

V.

A central element of the fiscal year 1965 pro-
gram is improved coordination of our assistance
with the stcppcd-up efforts of other prosperous
nations to help all of us improve our programs.
The DAC agreement of April 19C3 was a ma-
jor step in this direction and is already showing
results. The appointment of your former col-
league, Mr. Frank Coffin, as U.S. representative
to the Development Assistance Committee of
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development] should greatly
strengthen our efforts to have other DxVC mem-
bers bear a greater part of the burden.

In the past year, the British and the Ca-
nadians have announced new policies calling
for both increased aid programs and liberalized
lending terms. France, which already devotes
a higher percentage of GNP to aid than do we,
has recently released an official report pointing
toward a continued increase of aid in the fu-
ture. Germany's bilateral aid program has
grown steadily for 3 years and its loan terms
have been progressively liberalized, reaching an
average of 20 years' maturity in 1963.

However, the desired balance among donors
in both amoimts and terms has not yet been
reached. Recent reports from Europe have cast
some doubt on the size of the increases that can
be expected from others ; certainly a serious re-
duction in our eflFort would be reflected else-
where.

We hope to make increased use of interna-
tional lending agencies in the years ahead.
Under matching formulas, U.S. dollars pro-
vided to these organizations are supplemented
by substantial contributions from other coun-
tries. One of the most effective of thase instru-
ments is the International Development Asso-
ciation— an affiliate of the World Bank. I
strongly urge House approval of U.S. partici-

pation in replenishing the resources of this
organization.

VI.

I should like to turn, if I may, to a brief dis-
cussion of some key problem areas where U.S.
aid is a factor. Witnesses from the State and
Defense Departments and AID will be prepared
to discuss these matters in detail.

South Vietnam. This troubled part of the
world is, of course, of major concern to all
Americans. As this committee knows. Secre-
tary INIcNamara and Administrator Bell have
just returned from an on-the-spot appraisal of
the situation and have reported to the Presi-
dent.'

South Vietnam is and will continue to be a
major recipient of U.S. assistance. We are pro-
viding direct support for the anti-insurgent mil-
itary activities, while at the same time supplying
needed key commodities for both defense and
economic development of the country. As the
Congress knows, this assistance has played a
crucial role in the war against the Communists
and must be maintained if this war is to be won.
I share Secretary McNamara's concern that the
fullest possible support be provided to the new
Government.

Africa. In the past few months we have seen
a series of flareups in some of the new nations
on the continent of Africa. The U.S. is, of
course, concerned about such instability.

However, these recent events should not ob-
scure the real progress toward independence and
African unity that has been made. And it is
most encouraging that where troubles have
erupted the African nations collectively are tak-
ing steps to reach peaceful solutions.

In several nations, the frustrations of poverty
and difficulties inherent in the early years of in-
dependence have resulted in instability and have
also provided possibilities for Communist pene-
tration and exploitation. However, most are
those where the Western Europeans bear pri-
mary responsibility for supporting stability and
growth and U.S. assistance is quite limited.
We hope that with increased experience and
with the inflow of training and capital from the
Europeans and ourselves, the new nations of

•/6i(f., p. 522.

APRIl, 13, 1964

597

Africa can overcome the strains of their post-
independence periods and attain the stability
and unity required for sustamed economic de-
velopment.

Cyprus. The present crisis on the island of
Cyprus is a matter of grave concern to the
United States. Not only is the future of an is-
land involved, but the relations between two of
our stanch allies and two major recipients of
U.S. foreign assistance — Greece and Turkey.
As long as the issue continues to poison the at-
mosphere between these two nations and as long
as the peoj^le of Cyprus live in terror, the free
world is endangered.

We are encouraged by the decision of the
United Nations ^ to assist in restoring order and
hope that this will lead to solution of the prob-
lems which divide the island. As this commit-
tee knows, the U.S. has committed itself to pro-
viding fimds for support of the Emergency
Force. Mr. Cleveland [Harlan Cleveland, As-
sistant Secretary for International Organiza-
tion Affairs] will discuss this request in detail
with you in subsequent hearmgs.

Indonesia. Another major area of concern
in Southeast Asia is Indonesia. This commit-
te« is familiar with the situation and with the
efforts of the American Government to promote
peaceful relations between Indonesia and neigh-
boring Malaysia.^ It is our strong hope that
negotiations will continue and prove successful.
There is no persuasive reason why the countries
of this area cannot live in peace. There is much
to be done in terms of internal development,
particularly in the case of Indonesia. It is the
fifth largest and potentially one of the richest
countries in the world. In recent years, how-
ever, there has been little economic progress.
The present situation in Indonesia is not con-
ducive to effective economic stabilization which
would provide a basis for development. The
U.S. and other Western nations discontinued
their efforts to help Indonesian stabilization last
September when Indonesia intensified its "con-
frontation" policy toward Malaysia. Since
then the U.S. has initiated no new aid projects
in Indonesia.

' For text of resolution, see ibid.. Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466.
"For background, see iUA., Feb. 19, 1964, p. 239.

Last year, the Congress enacted a new sub-
section (j) of section 620 of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act relating to assistance to Indonesia.
This subsection requires a determination by the
President that it is in the U.S. national mterest
to extend assistance to Indonesia under the act.
The President, in considermg whether to make
this determination, has awaited the outcome of
negotiations among Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the Philippines which should indicate the pros-
pects for peace in that area. Meanwhile, only
limited established programs of technical as-
sistance, education, and malaria eradication
have been continued with new funds.

Arab-Israeli Relations. The U.S. has con-
tinued to provide assistance both to Israel and
to a number of the Arab states. These nations
have a history of conflict and animosity. The
U.S. will continue to work for a settlement of
the disputes between Israel and her neighbors
and for a general settlement in the Near East.
There are resources and potential in the area
sufficient to provide all peoples with a better
standard of living. Resources which are di-
verted from the job of providing economic
growth and used to build armaments are a re-
grettable waste.

Last year the Congi-ess enacted a subsection
(i) of section 620 of the assistance act, pro-
hibiting assistance to any country which the
President determines is engaging in or pre-
paring for aggression. The activities of all
recipient countries — including those in the Mid-
dle East and Asia — are under continual exam-
ination by this coimtry but no determination
has been made under the provisions enacted
last year. I can assure you that careful study
is being given in every instance to detennine the
application of the amendment.

Cuba Shipping. Another amendment which
was added to the Foreign Assistance Act last
year was designed to cut off shipping of ma-
terials to the island of Cuba. As this com-
mittee knows, section 620(a)(3) went into
effect on February 14, 196-1. Under the terms
of the amendment, small amounts of assistance
were terminated, involving the United King-
dom, France, and Yugoslavia. We will con-
tinue to monitor shipments to the island and
examine the application in each situation of the
congressional directive to us.

598

DEPARTJIENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VII.

Last week tlie nations of this hemisphere
marked tlio third annivereary of President
Kennedy's annoimcement of the Alliance for
Proofress. It has been a fruitful 3 years — a
period of victories and of some disappoint-
ments.

As President Johnson said in his address
marking this amiivei-sary : "

Today my country rededlcates itself to these prin-
ciples and renews its commitment to the partnership
of the hemisphere to curry them forward. . . .

With faith in our princijiles. with pride in our
achievements, with the help of candid and constructive
criticism, we are now prepared to move ahead with
renewed effort and renewed confidence.

The United States and the members of the al-
liance pledged themselves to a decade or more
of effort. Altliough less than one-third of the
period has passed, mucii has been done. Mil-
lions of children are being fed and educated;
hundreds of thousands of new homes have been
built; millions are free from the scourge of
diseases. And, perhaps most important of all,
the Latin American Continent looks to the fu-
ture with hope.

Tlie period of planning and initial commit-
ment is over. The alliance is building momen-
tum. Several of the members are making very
satisfactory progi'ess; the Central American
economic integration movement is growing
faster than was expected ; tax laws passed since
the inception of the alliance are having their
effect.

The appointment of Thomas Mann to be
Special Assistant to the President as well
as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
America — to have firm policy control over all
aspects of our activities in the area — is an
indication of the prime concern of the ad-
ministration.

The recent apix)intment of Ambassador
[Teodoro] Moscoso to be our representative to
the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance
for Progress — which will provide better co-
operation among all member nations — is a most
encouraging step.

In sum, in spite of numerous shortrun prob-
lems and crises — and these will continue — the

• Hid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 535.

long-range prospects are jjromising. It will be
a long, tougli battle again.st poverty, illiteracy,
and disease, but it is one that all Americans —
in both our continents— working together — can
win.

VIII.

The bill before this committee rex[uests a total
of $225 million in new authority for technical
cooperation and development grants. In addi-
tion, up to $85 million is being requested imder
the Alliance for Progress technical cooperation
program.

This request underscores the reliance we place
on these programs as a prime element in the
development process. This request is only a
small part of our total aid program— about
one-tenth— but it is a vital part. For this is the
seed money ; these are the funds that get things
moving in the underdeveloped nations.

Three aspects of the teclinical cooperation
program bear emphasizing :

First, it is an area in which Americans are
uniquely qualified, for we have skills, training,
and experience that are needed in the under-
developed countries.

Only decades ago, many of what are now
prosperous areas of our country could liave
been termed "underdeveloped." But through
our agricultural extension services, rural elec-
tric cooperatives, trade schools, land-grant col-
leges, knowledge was applied to the problems of
development and the U.S. economy grew. The
old saying that "knowledge is power" might
be amended to read "knowledge is prosperity."

This experience and these skills can be put
to use in other lands, and teclinical cooperation
is an effective means of transmitting them.

Second, teclmical cooperation is one of the
most effective means of demonstrating what
kind of people we are and of giving direct evi-
dence of our interest in the welfare of others.
There is a great reservoir of good will toward
America in the underdeveloped world. A ma-
jor reason has been the people-to-people efforts
of both government and private groups — our
technical assistance. Point 4, the Peace Corps,
CARE, our missionaries, worldwide charities,
our great foundations and imiversities. The
doctor with his mobile health unit, the tech-
nician who frees a village from malaria, the

APRIL 13, 1964

599

agricultural specialist, and the teacher are to
millions of people in the world the symbol of
America.

Third, teclmical cooperation focuses on the
present need of many coimtries. The basic fac-
tor in economic development is, of course,
people — healthy, well-trained people. With-
out citizens who can work hard and effectively,
no coimtry can grow — no matter how much
capital is pumped into the economy from the
outside.

By concentrating on the most basic needs —
education and health for example — our teclmi-
cal cooperation program enables other nations
to take the first steps toward eventual self-
sustaining economic growth.

I urge the full authorization for this pro-
gram in the coming fiscal year. I know of no
program which brings greater dividends.

IX.

In his message of March 19 — on the mutual
defense and development programs — President
Johnson said:

We must do more to utilize private initiative in the
United States — and in tlie developing countries — to
promote economic development abroad.

Five elements of the 1965 program are es-
pecially designed to carry out this purpose:

1. Tax Credit. The President will send to
the Congress an amendment to the Internal
Kevenue Code providing a special tax credit
incentive to encourage private investment in
less developed countries.' Under this legisla-
tion, a tax credit would be granted to a U.S.
taxpayer against total tax liability on income
from all sources equal to 30 percent of the new
investment in selected types of business activity.
It would be available when there was either new
direct investment or when over 50 percent of the
profits were retained in an underdeveloped coun-
try for investment. I urge congressional ap-
proval of this important legislation.

2. Advisory Committee. A nine-man advis-
ory committee on private enterprise in foreign
aid will soon be appointed as authorized by
last year's foreign aid bill. This committee will
make a detailed study of the role of private

' For text, see H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

resources and recommend ways in which this
role can be increased and strengthened. We
look forward to their report.

3. Investment Gvurcmties. The past year has
seen a major increase in activity in the invest-
ment guaranty program and this trend is ex-
pected to continue during the coming fiscal year.
This is one of the most important direct efforts
of the U.S. Government at encouraging private
investment. A total of $1,125 million in guar-
anties is now outstanding, an increase of $362
million in calendar 1963.

In addition, we are requesting authority for a
final installment of the pilot program for guar-
anteeing U.S. housing investments in Latin
America.

4. Use of Private Firms. AID will also
place increased emphasis on contracting with
private firms and organizations in providing
technical assistance. Virtually all capital proj-
ects are already carried out under private con-
tract. In this way, the best possible utilization
will be made of the skills and knowledge in the
private sector — skills and knowledge not avail-
able to the Government.

5. Executive Service Corps. We fully sup-
port the efforts of private industry to organize
an Executive Service Corps. This corps, to be
composed of men of experience in private busi-
ness, would help to channel the knowledge and
tecliniques of American private business to
underdeveloped countries.

X.

As I said at the beginning of my statement,
it is the firm hope of the administration that
this year's review will be a frank and fruitful
one, based on the facts and the program.

The facts are clear :

— aid is highly concentrated; two-thirds of
development lending goes to 7 countries, and
two- thirds of military assistance goes to 11
coimtries;

— three-fifths of economic aid is now in the
form of dollar repayable loans ;

— 80 percent of foreign assistance funds is
spent in this country ;

— development assistance is provided under
strict criteria and the self-help efforts of re-
cipient nations are carefully assessed ;

GOO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

— our allies are doing moro ;

— tliis year's aid request is $1.1 billion less
than last year's; it represents less than 4 cents
out of every tnx dollar;

— we are mobilizing increased participation
of U.S. and recipient country private resources.

There have been mistakes, and I oirmot guar-
antee tliiit there will not be others. A program
of this magnitude and difficulty run by human
beings cannot avoid some waste. We are in-
volved in a highly complicated process, perhaps
the most complex social and economic under-
taking in the history of nations — the develop-
ment of modern societies and economies. In
the past 177 years of our own economic develop-
ment we made mistakes, had successes and fail-
ures, experimented, and often were inefficient
and wasteful. We cannot expect perfection
from others.

I can assure this committee that under the
leadership of Mr. Bell we have the best run,
best administered program since the days of the
Marshall Plan.

The basic organizational structure — estab-
lished in 1961 and tested in action — will be
maintained. But operations will be increas-
ingly efficient, the number of employees re-
duced by 1,200 by the end of fiscal year 1965,
and overseas missions consolidated with em-
bassies wherever possible.

AVorking together, the Congress and the exec-
utive branch can assure the most prudent and
effective use of foreign assistance in the years
ahead.

XL

The foreign aid program of the 1960's — as it
was in the 1940"s and 1950's — is planned and
administered to serve the vital interests of the
U.S. It is a prime instrument of U.S. foreign
policy. U.S. foreign policy and U.S. security
would be in great jeopardy without the aid pro-
gram. As Mr. Bell and the regional witnesses
will demonstrate in later testimony, U.S. as-
sistance fits into a carefully planned pattern
based on a study of each country and an anal-
ysis of U.S. interest.

The program which we are presenting for
1965 is a tight, realistic one. It represents our
minimum expectation. I strongly urge that

this commitLee authorize the full amount
requested.

AVo often hear talk about what we are doing
to future generations of Americans and about
the legacy which we give to our grandchildren.
I would certainly not want mine to grow up
in a world where the richest nation — having
nearly half tlie worlds wealth — ignored for
decades the needs of two-thirds of the people,
who lived in poverty, disease, and hunger. It
would surely not be a very safe or stable world.
And even more, it would not bo a very great
heritage or tradition to pass on.

We would want to help others to move for-
ward even if there were no such thing as Com-
munist imperialism. But the Communist threat
converts what we would want to do anyway
into a vital necessity, a matter of the survival
of freedom.

The economically advanced countries are too
strong and too healthy to be taken over either
by force or by subversion. Few would dispute
that this was one of the great achievements of
the Marshall Plan and our postwar diplomacy.

But the Sino-Soviet efforts have not ceased.
Their drive is now centered on the less developed
areas. If they can take these over, they could
hope eventually to strangle the economically
advanced part of the free world.

Aid is a vital tool in this struggle.

There are no easy answers; and it is wrong
to expect the foreign aid program to solve all
our problems. But without it the field would
be left to our adversaries — not only 20th-century
communism but the age-old enemies of man:
ignorance, disease, and poverty.

We are seeing results.

The quiet victory is being won.

This is not the time to quit.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban
Proposals and Related Matters. Hearings before the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee. Part 1, May 7-
August 9, 196.3, 540 pp. ; part 2, with index, August
12-27, 19G3, 4.->5 pp.

APRIL. 13, 1964

601

88th Congress, 2d Session

Winning the Cold War : The U.S. Ideological Offensive.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. Part VI, U.S. Government Agen-
cies and Programs (Department of State, U.S. In-
formation Agency). January 13- February 20, 1964.
126 pp.

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Part I, Recent Trends
in Soviet and East European Literature, Arts, Hu-
man Rights (Law and Religion), and the Younger
Generation. January 27-30, 1964. 173 pp.

Fishing in U.S. Territorial Waters. Hearings before
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
on S. 19S8, H.R. 79.54, H.R. 8296, H.R. 9957, H.R.
10028, and H.R. 10040. February 19-26. 1964. 208 pp.

Compliance With the Convention on the Chamizal.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
S. 2394. February 26-27, 1964. 61 pp.

Second Transisthmian Canal. Hearings before the
Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2428, a bill to
authorize a study of means of increasing the capacity
and security of the Panama Canal, and for other
purposes, and S. 2497, a bill to provide for an investi-
gation and study to determine a site for the construc-
tion of a sea-level interoceanic canal through the
American isthmus. March 3—4, 1964. 79 pp.

International Coffee Agreement Act of 1963. Report,
together with minority and individual views, to ac-
company H.R. 8864. S. Rept. 941. March 12, 1964.
56 pp.

The United States Balance of Payments. Report of
the Joint Economic Committee, with additional
views. S. Rept. 965. March 19, 1964. 30 pp.

Foreign Assistance. Message from the President trans-
mitting recommendations relative to foreign assist-
ance. H. Doe. 2.50. March 19, 1964. 44 pp.

Amendments to the Request for Appropriations for
Foreign Assistance — Economic and Military Assist-
ance. Communication from the President transmit-
ting amendments to the request for appropriations
transmitted in the budget for 1965 for foreign assist-
ance— economic and military assistance. H. Doc.
285. March 24, 1964. 2 pp.

Exportation of Aircraft Engines as Working Parts of
Aircraft. Report to accompany H.R. 1608. H. Rept.
1268. March 24, 1964. 4 pp.

Antiques Which May Be Imported Free of Duty. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 2330. H. Rept. 1269.
March 24. 1964. 3 pp.

Free Importation of Instant Coffee. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 4198. H. Rept. 1272. March 24, 1964.
4 pp.

Providing for the Free Entry of One Mass Spectrom-
eter for Oregon State University and One Mass
Spectrometer for Wayne State University. Report
to accompany H.R. 4364. H. Rept. 1273. March 24,
1904. 2 pp.

Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to ac-
company H.R. 7480. H. Rept. 1274. March 24, 1964.
3 pp.

Prevention of Double Taxation in Case of Certain To-
bacco Products. Report to accompany H.R. 8268.
H. Rept. 1275. March 24, 1964. 4 pp.

Tariff Classification of Certain Particleboard. Report
to accompany H.R. 8975. H. Rept. 1277. March 24,
1964. 2 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. En-
tered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 25, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February 8,
1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at
Washington July 15, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: Iceland, March 23, 1964.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at
United Nations Headquarters, New York, December
10, 1902. '

Signatures: Cuba, October 17, 1963; Czechoslovakia,
October 8, 1963; Denmark (with reservation), Oc-
tober 31, 1963 ; Italy, December 20, 1963 ; New Zea-
land, December 23, 19(53 ; Rumania, December 27,
1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa-
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS
511.5.

Accession deposited: Belgium and Luxembourg,
March 10, 1964.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense
as.sistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS
2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels
February 6, and March 11, 1964. Entered into force
March 11, 1964.

Korea

Agricultural conmiodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701-
1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Seoul
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.

* Not in force.

602

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX ^U»''^ 13, J964 Vol Z, No. 12H

American Principles

Foreign rolii-j- nntl the ludiviilual : Identity in

Diversity (Louehlieim) 591

The IIoix? for Reasoned Agreement (Johnson) . r>76

Asia. Seorctiiry Rusk Heads Delegation to

SKATO Council Meeting 577

Cambodia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference

of March 27 570

China, Communist. Secretary Rusk's News Con-
ference of March 27 570

Communism. The United States and a Changing

Euroiie (Tyler) 587

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy COl

The Foreign Assistance Program (Rusk) . . . 595
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570
Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of

March 27 570

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary

Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . . . 570

Economic Affairs

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578

Secretary of Interior Named to Export Expan-
sion Committee (text of Executive order) . . 590
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570

Europe

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578

The United States and a Changing Europe

(Tyler) 587

Foreign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program

(Rusk) 595

Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan Visits United

States 594

Military Affairs

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578

United States Policy in Viet-Nam (McNamara) . 562

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570

Presidential Documents

The Hope for Reasoned Agreement 576

Secretary of Interior Named to Export Expan-
sion Committee 590

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy and the Individual:
Identity in Diversity (Louchheim) .... 591

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secretary Rusk Heads Delegation to SEATO

Council Meeting 577

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 602

Viet-Nam. United States Policy in Viet-Nani

(McNamara) 5G2

Name Index

Johnson, President 576, 590

Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 591

McNamara, Robert S , . 562

Rostow, W. W 578

Rusk, Secretary 570,595

Tyler, WiUiam R 587

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of .News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to March 23 which ap-
pear in this issue of the BuLurriN are Nos. KX)
of March 11, 110 of March 13, and 124 of
Slarch 17.
No. Date Subject

129 3/23 Rusk : House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.

*130 3/23 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

*131 3/25 Wilkins to be designated Inspector
General of Foreign Service (bio-
graphic details).
132 3/26 Delegation to 9th SEATO Council
meeting (rewrite).

tl33 3/25 Ball : U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development.

134 3/26 Itinerary for visit of King of Jordan

(rewrite).

135 3/27 Rusk : news conference of March 27.
♦136 3/28 Cultural exchange (Central Amer-
ica).

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

U.S. GOVCRNHENT PRINTING 0FFICE:I9«4

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C., 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, »300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Making of Foreign Policy

This 33-page pamplilet is a transcript of an interview of Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Professor
Eric Frederick Goldman of Primceton University, newly appointed consultant to President Jolinson. The
interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television progi-am "The Open Mind."

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a niunber of different aspects of the foreign policy
process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationship of politics to foreign policy, the
problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of
public opinion on foreign policy.

PUBLICATION 7658 20 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7658 20 cents

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20402

Please send me copies of The Making oj Foreign Policy

NAME

ADDRESS

Enclosed And | _

(cash, check, or mouey order pay-
able to Sapt. of Documents)

CITT, STATE

THE OFFICTAT. WKKKTA' RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POTJCY

S

^ -}

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Yol. L, No, 1295

April 20, 1964.

NATO, A GROWING PARTNERSHIP

Remarks by President Johnson 606

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL 3 608

THE ANATOMY OF WORLD LEADERSHIP

hy Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 615

THE THIRTEENTH ALARM

by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 622

COMMON PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Statement by Under Secretary Ball 63Jf.

For index see inside back cover

NATO, a Growing Partnership

Remarks hy President Johnson ^

Fifteen years ago tomorrow, here in Wash-
ington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.^
Less than 5 months later, after due constitu-
tional process in all the signing coimtries, the
treaty entered into force. From that time to
this, the treaty has served the peace of the
world.

Tliis short treaty commits its parties to meet
an armed attack on any of them in Europe or
North America as "an attack against them all."
For 15 years it has prevented any such attack.
Created in response to Stalin's Iron Curtain
and the loss of Czechoslovakian freedom, tliis
treaty has lived through war in Korea, the
threat of war over Berlin, and a crisis without
precedent in Cuba. Each great event has

'Made at the White House on Apr. 3 (White House
press release) at a ceremony in observance of the 15th
anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty on Apr. 4, 1049.

' For text of treaty, see Btilletin of Mar. 20, 1949,
p. 339 ; for texts of remarks made at the signing cere-
mony and an address by President Truman, see ihid.,
Apr. 17, 1949, p. 471.

tested NATO, and from each test we have
gained increased strength.

We began as 12 countries; today we are 15.
Those we have gamed are among our most
determined partners: Greece, Turkey, and the
Federal Republic of Germany.

What began as a treaty soon became a com-
mand and then a great international organiza-
tion. The number of ready divisions, includ-
ing 6 ivom. the United States, has multiplied by
5. The number of modern aircraft has multi-
plied by 10 — all more effective by far than any
were in 1949. So the alliance is real. Its
forces operate. Its strength is knovm. Its
weapons cover tlie full range of power, from
small arms to nuclear missiles of the most
modern design.

From the beginning, this treaty has aimed
not simply at defense but has aimed at the co-
operative progress of all its members. On the
day of its signing back there 15 years ago.
President Truman described it as a "bulwark
which will permit us to get on with the real

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1295 PUBLICATION 7677 APRIL 20, 19S4

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government ■with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest

Publications of the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents. U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C..
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $8.50.
foreign $12.25 ; single cop.v, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source wUl be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

606

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

business of government and society, the busi-
ness of acliieving a fuller and happier life for
our citizens." This treaty, in fact, C4vnie 2 years
after we and other friends had begun our
historic enterprise of economic recovery under
the Marshall Plan. Our "real business" was
already pretty well advanced.

The IT) years since 1940 have seen the longest
upward surge of economic growth that our At-
lantic world has ever known. Our jiroduction
and trade have more than doubled; our popu-
lation has grown by more than a hundred mil-
lion; the income of the average man has grown
by more than 50 percent. Our inward peace
and our outward confidence have gi'own steadily
more secure. The internal threat of communism
has shriveled in repeated failure. A new gen-
eration, strong and free and healthy, walks our
streets and rides in our care. Yes, we have
done well.

Danger has receded, but it has not disap-
peared. The tsxsk of building our defenses is
never really done. The temptation to relax
must always be resisted. Our own Atlantic
agenda has changed, but it is not short.

Our first common task, therefore, is to move
onward to that closer partnership which is so
plainly in our common interest. The United
States, for one, has learned much from 15 years
of danger and achievement. In 1949 the sol-
emn commitment of this treaty was for us an
historic departure from isolation, and we have
many great men, some among us and some away
today, to thank for their leadership.

Now it is a tested and recognized foundation
stone of America's foreign policy. Wliat Rob-
ert Schuman said for France in 1949 I repeat
for my country today :

Nations are more and more convinced that their
fates are closely bound together ; their salvation and
their welfare can no longer be based upon an egotistical
and aggressive nationalism, but must rest upon the
progressive application of human solidarity-

The ways of our growing partnership are not
eas}' . Though the union of Europe is her man-
ifest destiny, the building of that unity is a long,
hard job. But we, for our part, will never
turn back to separatetl insecurity. We welcome
the new strength of our transatlantic allies.
We find no contradiction between national self-

respect and interdepeiulent nmtual reliance.
We are eager to share with the new Europe at
every level of power and responsibility. We
aim to share the lead in the search for new and
stronger patterns of cooperation.

We believe in the alliance because in our own
interest we must, because in the common interest
it works, and because in the world's interest it
is right.

We have other duties and opportunities.
Our trade with one another and the world is
not yet free and not yet broad enough to serve
both us and others as it should. Our monetary
systems have grown stronger, but they still too
often limit us, when they should be, instead, a
source of energy and growth.

In ever-growing measure we have set our-
selves and others free from the burden of colo-
nialism. We have also set new precedents of
generous concern for those that are less pros-
perous than we. But our connection to the less
developed nations is not yet what it should be
and must be. This is not a one-way street, but
we must work to do our full pai't to make it
straight and make it broad.

We remain vigilant in defending our liberties,
but we must be alert to any hope of stable
settlement with those who have made vigilance
necessary and essential. In particular, we must
be alive to the new spirit of diversity that is
now abroad in Eastern Europe. We did not
make the Iron Curtain. We did not build
the wall. Gaps in the Curtain are welcome,
and so are holes in the wall, whenever they are
not hedged by traps. We continue to believe
that the peace of all Europe requires the reuni-
fication of the German people in freedom. We
will be firm, but we will always be fair. Our
guard is up, but our hand is out.

We must build on our tradition of determined
support for the United Nations. We are
pledged to this purpose by the very articles of
our treaty, and we have kept our pledge. The
members of NATO provide most of the re-
sources of the United Nations and most of its
ability to help in keeping peace. Wlien we
began, we promised that our treaty was con-
sistent with the charter. Today we know that
the charter and the treatj' are indispensable to
one another. Neither can keep the peace alone.

APRIL 20, 1G64

607

We need them both, in full effectiveness, for as
many years ahead as any of us can see.

The Atlantic peoples have a magnificent his-
tory, but they have known too much war. It
is the splendor of this great alliance that, in
keeping peace with its opponents, it has kept

the road clear for a worldwide upward march
toward the good life for free people. Proven
in danger, strengthened in freedom, and resolute
in purpose, we will go on, with God's help, to
serve not only our own people but to serve the
bright future of all mankind.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 3

Press release 143 dated April 3

Secretary Rush: This — what is for me an
early morning press conference — was not a con-
spiracy against those of you who attended the
Wliite House photographers' dinner last night,
but I was asked to vary as between morning
and afternoon for the benefit of the afternoon
papers and some of our European friends. So
I will have some in the morning and some in the
afternoon.

I am ready for your questions.

Change of Government in Brazil

Q. Mr. Secretary., do you see any improve-
ment in relatione and any expansion of United
States aid to Brazil as a result of the change in
government there?

A. Well, I think that we are ready, as we have
been before, to work very closely with Brazil to
enable them to get on with their great problems
of economic and social development. We, as a
matter of fact, thought we had an agreement
about a year and a half — 2 years — ago by which
we under the Alliance for Progress program
would provide very important assistance for
Brazil in relation to steps which we hoped that
they would be taking in their own behalf. Un-
fortunately that plan did not work out because
the agreements we had worked out with Fi-
nance Minister [San Tiago] Dantes did not
prove acceptable in Brazil. They did not pro-
ceed with them.

But, of course, we are deeply interested in the
economic vitality of that great country. It is a

great sister Republic in this hemisphere, as large
as the United States, with 75 or 80 million peo-
ple, and we should be in closest touch with them
about how we might be able to assist them in
their necessities in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that
the establishment of a new government or the
succession of a new leader would improve Bra-
ziVs cooperation with the other nations of the
hemisphere on prohlems such as Castro Cuba?

A. Well, I am sure you understand my reti-
cence in commenting m detail about what has
happened internally in Brazil — again, that
great sister Republic. We have had the im-
pression that in the past several weeks consid-
erable concern developed within the Congress
and among the Governors of the principal
States, in the Armed Forces, and among large
segments of the people, that the basic constitu-
tional structure of Brazil was under threat and
that Congress, the Governors, the Armed
Forces, moved to insure the continuity of con-
stitutional government in that country.

Now, part of the concern is expressed by lead-
ing Brazilians, and a conceni, which we shared,
was that extremist elements were having more
and more influence in the administration of
President [Joao] Goulart. One does not have
to say that independently. One can quote the
concern about that expressed by many moderate
and forwai'd-looking Brazilians.

I would suppose that the new administration
would, I think, mark time for the moment until
the election of a new President by the Congress

608

DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

within this SO-diiy period provided under their
constitution. Butl would also suppose that the
deep conunitment of all those who have been
workiufi on this problem in Brazil to constitu-
tional government and to representative democ-
racy would mean that Brazil would take a lead-
ing pai't in the hemisphere and in the OAS on
this issue of totalitarian regimes and particu-
larly this threat from the extreme left.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since Brazil is so large a
country and so important a cou7ifry in the Latin
American scene, do you feel that the method of
this change of government, since it was forced
largely hy the military, could conceivably have
an adverse effect on the democratic movements
in the hemisphere?

A. I would not think so. I think that in the
first place it has been demonstrated over the last
several years tliat the Armed Forces of Brazil
basically are committed to constitutional gov-
ernment in thal^/country and that this action did
not occur until there were many signs that Presi-
dent Goulart seemed to be moving to change the
constitutional arrangements and to move to-
ward some sort of authoritarian regime.

This is a matter of controversy in Brazil and
outside, but this was the fear that the basic, the
moderate, democratic elements in that country
had in their mind. I think this is also a matter
on whicli millions of the people have testified
in the streets in the last day or two in their dem-
onstrations in support of what has been done
there.

But I want to emphasize that what has hap-
pened has not resolved all of the problems by
any means. Brazil has been in the process of
dynamic development for as long as I can re-
member— since childhood — a country with great
resources, a country which has been moving with
great vitality in its economic development. But
in that process there are problems. There have
been problems of inflation, problems of invest-
ment, problems of external debt, some of the
problems that we ourselves have known at a
certain point of our history when we were in
that process of almost dramatic development
in respect to national resources.

So that I would not suppose that what has
happened in Brazil would suggest to people in
other parts of Latin America that the tradi-

President Sends Good Wishes
to New President of Brazil

Following is the text of a message of April ^
from President Johnson to Ranicri Mazzilli,
President of the United States of Brazil.

Wblte House press release dated AprU 2

Please accept my wannest good wislics on your
instaUation as President of tbe United States of
Brazil. The American people have watched
with anxiety the political and economic difficul-
ties through which your great nation has been
passing, and have admired the resolute will of
the Brazilian community to resolve these diffi-
culties within a frauieworli of constitutional
democracy and without civil strife.

The relations of friendship and cooperation
between our two governments and peoples are a
great historical legacy for us both and a precious
asset in the interests of peace and prosperity and
liberty in this hemisphere and in the whole
world. I looli forward to the continued strength-
ening of those relations and to our intensified co-
operation in the interests of economic progress
and social justice for all and of hemispheric and
world peace.

tional kind of golpe is any solution, because this
is not that kind of situation in Brazil. This is
a matter of where a much broader spectrum of
the political, economic, social life of the country
expressed itself in support of constitutional
government.

U.S. Commitment to Constitutional Process

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you are on that
theme, I don't think you have ever addressed
yourself to the controversy that flared around
Washington a few weeks ago about the alleged
remarks of Mr. Mann [Assistant Secretary of
State Thomas C. Mann] on this subject. Could
you from your point of view suggest whether
there has been even a subtle change of attitude
here, not connected necessarily tvith the change
of Presidents but whether ive felt that Peru,
Dominican Republic, and so on, should not be a
rule of thumb any more?

A. Well, that controversy, if there was one,
flared outside the Department of State and not
inside. We have committed ourselves in this
hemisphere to the strong and vigorous support
of democratic and constitutional institutions.

APRIL 20, 19C4

609

As a matter of fact, the inner purpose of the
Alliance for Progress was to make it possible
for the necessary changes to occur within the
structure of democratic and constitutional proc-
ess, and we have affirmed very strongly with
other countries of this hemisphere in places like
Punta del Este a little more than 2 years ago ^
that commitment of the hemisphere to demo-
cratic and constitutional process.

Now, if unhappily in a particular situation, in
a particular country, there is a disturbance —
there might be a military takeover — this does
not present us with a situation which we can
simply walk away from because we and other
members of this hemisphere necessarily have an
interest in what happens in that situation.
Therefore we have to continue to live with it,
work with it, try to assist a particular country
in coming back to constitutional process. This
happened in Peru; it has happened in other
countries. So that we stop short of saying
that we simply lost interest in a country the
moment it might depart from the constitu-
tional path because our interest is in assisting
that country in getting back to the constitu-
tional path, finding its way back to the commit-
ments of the hemisphere.

So I don't know of any diilerence in the De-
partment of State on this matter. There was,
I think, a fragmentary report out of context
of the particular discussion which alleged some
speculation on this matter, but I think this was
entirely beside the point and missed the main
issues involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, how loovZd
you describe the policy of this Government on
the matter of recognition? This has been — the
United States has had different attitudes on this
over the years. Do we recognize governments
simply because they control the country, or do
we taJce some other standard?

A. Well, I don't believe that there is a single
rule, a single formula, by which you can answer
this question in relation to some 114 countries
witli which we have relations. In many situa-
tions we consult others who are directly and
immediately concerned with the problem, to

'For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962,
p. 270.

see whether we ought to move with them in
concert with regard to a particular situation.
Wlien it is in Africa, it is with African coun-
tries; when it is in Latin America, it is with
Latin American countries.

I would think that recognition is basically a
political act which normally, in the usual cir-
cmnstance, applies where a government is in
control of the country and accepts its interna-
tional responsibilities, but this will vary from
time to time because as a political act it needs
to be taken alongside of the other interests of
the LTnited States in a particular situation, in-
cluding our interest in moving jointly with
others whenever possible in a concert of policy.

Now, m the case of Brazil, of course, this
matter does not arise because the succession
there occuiTed as foreseen by the constitution
and we would assume that recognition is not
involved in that particular issue or point.

Q. Well, in fact, you are saying we still do
use some of Woodrow Wilson's touchstone on
this, that there is something beyond the actual
control of the country by the government of that
country?

A. I think so, I think so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is going to happen
noio to those Brazilian external debt negotia-
tions that I believe began a couple of months
ago?

A. Well, I think that those conversations will
of course be resumed, perhaps in a new frame-
work. There are some important problems for
the Government of Brazil to deal with, such as
external debt, problems of inflation, problems of
investments, but we would hope that the new
government would turn its attention to these
matters promptly and that we should go ahead
in an effort to deal with these critical problems
that any government of Brazil will have before
it in the next several months.

Castro and Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, the debate that Senator
\_J. TF.] Fulbright set off in foreign policy seems
to be continuing and the latest yesterday was a
speech by Senator \_Thomns /.] Dodd in which
he predicted that eventually there would be a
revolution in Cuba which would sweep out Gas-

610

DEPARTirENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tro. Do you see any signs of such a revolution
building up now?

A. If I were speaking of the next weeks and
nwnths ahead, I would say that I do not see
any immediate prospect tluit internal forces in
Cuba would be able to unseat the apparatus of
police control that Castro has fastened on that
island. ^^Hiat happens in the longer rim is of
course for the future, but I see no immediate
prospect of that.

Q. In that connection, sir, there has re-
cently been a political trial in Cuba \chich
seemed to demonstrate som^ degree of division
within the Communist apparatus in Cuba.
What is the State Departments assessment of
the degree of factional disputes between the
Communist groups in Cuba?

A. "Well, quite frankly, I haven't made or
haven't had before me a detailed analysis of
that particular trial or the evidence that was
devised there, but I do have the impression that
there has been some discussion inside Cuba
among the leadership for some time, with per-
haps three main trends expressed in one way
or another: one, those who feel closer to Mos-
cow ; and some, apparently a lesser number, who
feel interested in Peiping's approach to these
matters; and once in a while there are comments
or suggestions that sound as though some Tito-
ist kind of policy might be for Cuba's future.

But so far as I know there has not been any
serious discussion among the leadership in Cuba
about the basis on which Cuba might find its
way back to the hemisphere and rejoin the
hemisphere on a basis of compatibility. But
this internal discussion within the Cuban lead-
ership is something on which we only get frag-
mentary reports. I just can't answer you very
specifically on that.

Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Geneva there now has
been public confirmation that there has been a
series of U.S.-Soviet talks on nondissemination
of nuclear weapons. Does it appear to you that
that has come to a dead end at this point, or is
there some further course of progress that you
anticipate?

A. I would hope that it is not at a dead end,

and as a matter of fact I don't really believe
that it is, because this is a subject on which all
of the nuclear powei-s necessarily liave an inter-
est. It is true that we have from time to time
discussed this matter with the Soviets. I was
a little surprised to have it appear that this was
something new. I would suppose that every-
one had assumed that we have been talking
about this with the Soviets. I have had some
talks with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Andrei A. Gromyko] about it, there have
been talks with the Ambassador [Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin], there have been talks in Geneva.

Now, it is not going to be easy to bring this
question of nondissemination of nuclear weap-
ons to a formal agreement. On their side the
Soviets have raised objections about our pro-
posals for a multilateral force. Now, we know
ourselves that the multilateral force will not
involve the dissemination of nuclear weapons
to other national nuclear capability or to other
national armed forces, and from that point of
view it is some protection against the further
spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis.
But I think that one would have to be fair and
say that, until we have completed our discus-
sions of the multilateral force and make those
arrangements or prospective arrangements
public, the Soviets themselves can't know that.
They can hear me say it. They can hear our
announced policy on the matter. But they
won't be able to make their own assessment until
the arrangements of the multilateral force can
be completed and made public.

I would hope that at that time they would
themselves understand that the multilateral
force has nothing to do with the dissemination
of nuclear weapons to additional national nu-
clear forces.

Now, on our side wo have a very substantial
interest in the nondissemination idea as it ap-
plies to Peiping, but there is no evidence what-
ever that Peiping would engage in the kind of
agreement that wc have been talking with other
eovemments about, and so at least some of our
sense of urgency diminishes if it is clear that
Peiping will not take part.

But I would like to add this further note.
The fact that it might be difficult to bring
this question to a formal agreement is not the
whole story. It is my impression that Moscow,

APRIL 20, 1964

611

Paris, London, Washington have a certain co-
incidence of policy on this matter, that no one
of these four governments is now in the process
of distributing nuclear weapons to national
forces — to additional national forces — and that
this coincidence of policy is at least a part of the
problem, and that if these four govei-nments
adliere to that policy, then at least some of the
problem is resolved without agreement on the
basis of the nature of nuclear weapons and the
nature of the interests which any nuclear power
has in not having these weapons distributed
indefinitely around the earth.

Q. But would you say —

A. Excuse me. Go ahead.

Q. Would you say then, sir, in your view you
believe that there is at present a de facto, a tacit
understanding not to disseminate nuclear
weapons?

A. No. I specifically said that there is no
agreement and there is no understanding. This
is not in the picture. There is nothing — no one
has, that I know of, has said among these four
governments that we now agree that, or we now
understand that. I am simply referring to our
estimate with respect to a coincidence of policy.
I do not have the impression, for example, to
be very specific about it, that the Soviet Govern-
ment is furnishing assistance to the Chinese in
the development of nuclear weapons, and it is
my impression that the other three nuclear
powers are following the same policy with re-
spect to other national nuclear forces.

But this is a question that is not now in
motion. That is, we are not making much
headway on it, but I would hope that this is a
question which is not closed, because we may
come to a point at a somewhat later date when
we can find a more formal agreement on this
matter.

Viet-Nam and Laos

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen interesting
reports from Southeast Asia saying thai Gen-
eral Khanh \Nguyen Khanh, President of tlie
Republic of Viet-Nam] has been meeting ivith
Phoumi [Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos] and
that they Jiave an agreement for hot pursuit in
chasing the Viet Cong into Laos. Noio, the

question is, lohere does the Premier, lohich is
Souvanna [Phounia], come into this act? Has
he been contacted? Do you believe that this
report is correct?

A. Oh, I don't have details on any such dis-
cussion as has been reported. It is well known
that we are concerned about the violations of
the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos, which in-
clude the use of Laotian territory for the in-
filtration of assistance to the Viet Cong from
North Viet-Nam. And what happened along
that border is a matter of gi'eat interest, I
thmk, both to Laos, which has a stake in the
Geneva accords of '62, and to South Viet-Nam,
who suffers from any violations of those
accords.

But I don't have any information about any
arrangements. And Souvanna Phouma, the
Premier — we keep in close touch with him on
this — on this type of problem, and he, too,
knows of our concern about these possible sub-
terranean violations of the accords of '62 and
the infringement of Laotian neutrality that
results from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we heard, out of Bonn,
that Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard is coming to
the United States in June and is going to see
President Johnson. Would you tell us what is
on the mind of the Americans — what subject
xoould the Americans like to discuss with the
Chancellor?

A. Oh, I think that — my understanding is
that he is coming here on a private visit. Of
course, while he is here, President Johnson will
be delighted to see him. But I should imagine
that in tenns of what subjects would be dis-
cussed you could make your own list and it
would be very accurate. (Laughter.)

Q. Sir, the Indian Defense Minister \Y . B.
Chavan] is supposed to be coming here in the
near future. I was icondering lohether you
could tell us tcliat this signifies? And, sec-
ondly, under what political frameioork would
these talks take place between India and the
U.S.A.?

A. Well, we have had discussions with the
Government of India for some time now about
the nature of the threat which is posed against
India from tlie north, the problem of their own

612

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

security, and tlio assistance whicii we and
Britain have been giving to India in this
regard. I tliink tliis is a continuation of those
discussions. I thinlv there is no significant or
important change in any political structure or
basis on which these talks would occur. These
have been going on all the time. Often they
occur in Xew Delhi, whenever one or another of
our high officials go out there. We are glad to
have them come liere so we can pursue those
talks here.

Q. Mr. Seci'etary, Ambassador {Charles E.'\
Bohlen saw President de Gaulle yesterday.
My colleagues in Paris are distressed because
they can't find out what has happened. Could
you tell me?

Q. Can't hear the question.

A. I wouldn't want to embarrass your col-
leagues in Paris by giving you sometliing
which they couldn't get over there. ( Laughter. )
It was a general review of the situation. The
Ambassador had not seen President de Gaulle
for some time. A number of questions did
come up. I think, again, perhaps you could
make your own list and it might not be too
inaccurate.

Q. Could you say anything at this time about
the Panama situation, Mr. Secretary?

A. Well, I am very hopeful that we can bring
this matter back to the conference table. I
think that the statements of President Jolinson
and President Chiari have indicated that there
is a recognition on both sides that our interests
on both sides require us to bring our differences,
such as they are, to the conference table in or-
der that we can find an answer to them. I
think we are very close; we are getting closer.
The Organization of American States has
played a very constructive and helpful role in
this matter, and I would hope that we can move
on this without too much delay.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you feel the publi-
cation of this Suslov letter ^ marks some hind
of new stage in the Sino-Soviet dispute which
raises new policy questions for the West?

'A. report by Soviet Presidium member M. A. Suslov
to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, dated Feb. 14, 1964,
and released for publication on Apr. 2.

A. No. I think this is a matter of some im-
portance in that it is a Soviet response to what
was a very vigorous presentation of the Chinese
point of view. I am a little reluct^int to com-
ment from the bleachers on this matter.

AVe will be studying, of course, that statement
with greiit care. And although we do have con-
siderable interest in the outcome of the discus-
sion, as between militancy and coexistence, we
are not inclined ourselves to try to intervene in
that discussion in any significant way. I think
we will just have to let that go forward and see
what happens on it.

Aid to Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, when this —

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible we will have
to reevaluate our aid program, to India, rather,
Indonesia, in light of some of President Su-
kamo''s recent comments about it?

A. Well, I did not myself interpret his recent
remark as an intergovernmental communica-
tion. (Laughter.)

We have a very limited aid program there at
the present time. Some of it is of great im-
portance almost regardless of any particular
political situation. For instance, the antima-
larial program. This is the kind of thing that
must not be allowed to lapse, because, if it lapses,
then a large investment of some $30-40 million
or more of effort goes down the drain and neigh-
boring countries then become the victims of the
failure of an antimalarial campaign in a place
like Indonesia. So there is some aid progress.

But, on the other hand, questions of future
aid and enlargement of aid turn very much on
not only the measures that Indonesia is pre-
pared to take inside the country but also the ad-
justment of their relations with their own im-
mediate neighbors. We hope this can move
forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week you said' you
might have a report from Congress this tceek on
the chances for an international wool agreement.
Can you tell us whether you have made this re-
port yet and what the chances are?

A. Yes, my report is that we will see them
next week. (Laughter.)

• Bulletin of Apr. 13, 1964, p. 570.

APRIL 20, 1964

613

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been another
flareup in Anglo-U.S. relations over shipping,
and the charge has been made in Britain in the
last few days that new regulations lohich came
into force today — by these regulations, being
United States regulations — infringe the sov-
ereignty of shipping, other shipping nations.
Would you like to comment, please?

A. Well, I have looked into this more than
once and in some detail, and I think that I am
well enough informed about it to know that
there isn't much that I can say that can be help-
ful today.

It is true that we have the Bonner bill, which
is aimed at dual pricing and shipping rates.
That bill has been on the books for almost 3
years now. We have deferred the application
of that bill in respect to these dual rates for
more than a year, in order to try to find a way
to work out this matter with friendly maritime
governments.

The Maritime Commission here is doing what
it is required to do imder the law. Now, this
creates some problems, and we will of course be
in touch with other governments concerned and
will try to find some answers to the problems.
But it's a highly technical matter, and it's not
something that can be dismissed with a slogan
about sovereignty or interference, and that sort
of thing. There are serious problems in both
directions, and we hope that we can find some
solution. But the problem is not new. It has
been there for almost 3 years, and the applica-
tion of these regulations has been deferred in an
effort to find a solution. But the Maritime
Commission is under a very severe mandate of
law in this matter, and we will have to see where
we go from here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cuhan newspaper Hoy
has charged that the Brazilian revolution was
prepared, ordered, and paid for in the United
States. Would you care to comment?

A. That is — did you hear the question ?

Q. No. No.

A. That the Brazilian revolution was pre-
pared, ordered, and paid for in the United
States, according to Cuban newspapers, was it?

Q. That's right.

A. Or a broadcast. Well, there is just not
one iota of truth in tliis. It's just not so in any
way, shape, or form.

Status of East-West Issues

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the time of the test ban
last sum/mer, some people at least thought it was
related to a new stage in the Sino-Soviet quar-
rel. Since the temperature has been going up
again, have you noticed any further breaking of
the ice on any East-West issues? Are the Rus-
sians showing any increased interest?

A. I think that there is at present, except for
one or two bilateral things, such as the consular
agreement — at present there is not great move-
ment. I suspect that part of it is because of
the Moscow-Peiping dialog and the preoccupa-
tion of the Communist world with that dif-
ference.

I do believe that, quite apart from ideological
questions, the Soviet Union, the Russian people,
as Russians, are concerned about the prospect
of living next door to 800 million Chinese by
1970, armed with nuclear weapons. And I
think that their interest in the test ban treaty,
and our common interest in such things as the
nondissemination of nuclear weapons, is based
upon some miderstanding of the future dangers
of a continued nuclear arms race among those
who now have them and the further spread of
these weapons among those who don't have
them.

But I don't see this leading to major dramatic
developments, to new questions on which we and
the Soviet Union, or the West and the Soviet
Union, could agree in the next few weeks.

We do continue to work at these disarmament
questions in Geneva. We do, not because we
think that we are going to get miraculous an-
swers next week but because we just cannot af-
ford to stop the effort. We have got to keep
trying, because the alternatives are not very
inviting. And it's the duty of diplomacy to
keep working at these things, to see whethei
we can make some headway, even though it may
be small, at particular points, at particular mo-
ments, to keep working at it.

Q. Thank you, sir.

614

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Anatomy of World Leadership

hy Adlai E. Stevenson

VJS. Representative to the United Nations *

I do not have to tell you that next year San
Francisco will be host to a commemorative meet-
ing of the General Assembly to mark the 20th
annivei-sary of the signing of the Charter of the
United Nations. But I can report to you that
the members of the United Nations in general
and the Secretariat in particular are more than
grateful for the interest and generosity of San
Francisco and the State of California which will
make this meeting possible.

In the twilight of the war and the dawn of a
new era, the charter was born here in San Fran-
cisco. For those of us who were involved in
that historic conference — and there are still
some of us around — the memories are still there.

And this brings me to what Beardsley Ruml
said about the U.N. in 1945. It was one of the
better prophecies of our age, and it goes like
this:

At the end of five years you will think the UN Is
the greatest vision ever realized by man.

At the end of ten years you will find doubts within
yourself and all through the world.

At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN
cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds
are against its ultimate life and success.

It will only be when the UN is twenty years old
that ... we will know that the UN is the only alterna-
tive to the demolition of the world.

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing
that turned out to be !

And I think by now — 19 years later — a great
many people have arrived at the fourth stage
in Ruml's 20-year prophecy — that stage where

' Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco, Calif., on Apr. 3 (press release 142 dated
Apr. 2).

we know that "the UN is the only alternative
to the demolition of the world."

Improving Machinery of Peaceful Settlement

Let me be emphatic: This is not said in any
rhetorical sense. It is said in a very down-to-
earth sense. The world abounds in conflicts
between nations — some old and some new —
some silly, some serious — some minor and some
potentially climactic. A few of these conflicts
may be de-fused by direct negotiation, or by
agreement to settle for the status quo, or even
by the attrition of time. But many of them
will require some changes — in boundaries or
people or resources or leaders, or in claims,
practices, procedures, positions, or attitudes.

If change is not to be efl'ected by the institu-
tion of war, which has been the great instru-
ment of change through the ages, then it must
be eifected by institutions for peaceful settle-
ment and peaceful change — meaning, inescap-
ably, by international organizations at the re-
gional and global level. The only alternative
to the disaster of war is the machinery of peace,
because there is no way to exorcise conflict from
the himian breast or the politics of nations.
And international machinery for the peaceful
resolution of conflict already has a better record
than many people seem to realize.

During the past decade and a half there have
been some 20 occasions when the armed forces
of two or more nations engaged in active hos-
tilities. In only one case did the fighting end
the way wars have ended traditionally — by the
surrender of one side to the other. On at least

APRIL 20, 1964

615

20 other occasions there has been muior fight-
ing on disputed frontiei-s, or armed revoUs in
the outcome of wliicli otlier states liad a na-
tional interest. In no case has the fighting
spread to international warfare.

Fifty-seven international disputes are now on
the agenda of the Security Council of the
United Nations. Some are settled, others dor-
mant— and some are hardy perennials. One
thing is clear about the 57 varieties of postwar
disputes: Far less blood has been shed than
would have been shed if the disputes had not
found their way onto the agenda of the U.N.
Security Council.

The Organization of American States and,
more recently, the Organization of African
Unity have also dealt successfully with violence
in their areas.

Hostilities have been opened with gunfire
and closed with cease-fires in the Far East, in
the Western Pacific, in Southeast Asia, in the
Middle East, in the Mediterranean, and in
Africa— in some areas more than once since the
end of the Second World War.

And in the Caribbean, a year and a half ago,
a nuclear giant got on — and then got off — a nu-
clear collision course.

Meanwhile, the most massive political trans-
formation in history took place as the British,
French, Belgian, and Dutch empires were dis-
solved and the trust territories of the United
Nations shifted from tutelage to independ-
ence— with astonishingly little bloodshed all
around. The world has never seen such a
spectacle of peaceful change.

But there are too many nviclear and conven-
tional arms to doubt that grave danger to peace
in our times still persists. There have been too
many confrontations, too many close calls, too
many pullbacks in the nick of time, too many
rescue operations at one minute before midnight.

Yet, if the record so far is no guarantee of
peace, it offers the hope that if hostilities break
out somewhere tomorrow, the next step will not
be the sound of trumi^ets but the call to cease-
fire. That hope can be hardened if we and
other members of the United Nations have tlie
sense and the will to improve the machinery
of peaceful settlement and cultivate the pro-
fession of peacemaking.

Changes in World Relationships

In recent weelcs and montlis there has been a
lively ferment about U.S. foreign policy in some
of the scholarly and popular publications, in
some of the columns and commentaries, and
from some of the public platforms in Wasliing-
ton and elsewhere.

Conditions in the world are changing, we
are told. I could not agree more. The Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, and others have
noted the point moi-e than once in botli general
and specific terms. Indeed, I was speaking my-
self just last week at Princeton^ about the ex-
traordinary change in world affairs and inter-
national relationships in the 3 short years since
Dag Hammarskjold was killed — some of which
have been discernible only since the resolution
of the crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba.

'\^^ien President Kennedy took office, a global
stalemate, which was the logical outcome of the
cold war, was virtually complete but still being
tested to see whether steel was backed by nerves.
In the less than 3 years that were given to him,
President Kennedy had to show force on three
occasions.

First, he called up the reserves to convince
the Soviets we would no more give in to a third
ultimatum on Berlin than we would on the
previous two ^ — though his first words in office
included an offer to "those nations who would
make themselves our adversary" to "begm anew
the quest for peace." *

Second, he was forced to resume nuclear test-
ing in the atmosphere because the Soviets broke
a moratorium in the futile search for an elusive
nuclear superiority — though in that very an-
nouncement he insisted that ". . . in the long
run, the only real security in this age of nuclear
peril rests not in armament but in disarma-
ment." °

And, third, President Kennedy was forced to
throw an armored noose around Cuba to prevent
a clandestine shift of the balance of power in

' For text, see U.S.AJ-N. press release 4374 dated
Mnr. 23.

" For text of a report to the X.Ttion by President
Kennedy on the Berlin crisis, see Bulletin of Aug. 14,
1961, p. 207.

* For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address,
see ibid., Feb. 6, 19C.1, p. 175.

" For text, see ibid.. Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

616

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Soviet, fsxvor — tliougli in doing so he simulta-
neously mobilized the peiicekeepiup macliincry
of the Western Hemisphere and tlie United
Nations."

Yet now, in the early months of President
Johnson's administration, we can see a much
different and a much more complex and a some-
what more hopeful world emerging:

— a world which is no longer simply bipolar
but in which multiple centers of power and in-
fluence have come into beiiig:

— a world in which the most extreme forms
of power are the least likely to be used ;

— a world in which realities are eroding rigid
political dogmas;

— a world in which there can be no ideological
agreement but where there can be agreement on
mutual survival :

— a world in which imperialism is dying, and
paternalism is dving too;

— a world in which old trading systems, mon-
etary systems, market systems, and other ele-
ments of the conventional wisdom are being
challenged and changed ;

— and finally, a world in which fundamental
issues of human rights, which have been hidden
in closets down the long corridor of history, are
out in the open and high on the agenda of hu-
man affairs.

We can see, in short, that the world was never
as bipolar as it looked and that a misleading im-
pression was created by the temporary weakness
of other powers and by the challenge of Stalin-
ist ambitions in the first postwar years.

But let us recall that there was nothing myth-
ical about the physical annexation of occupied
states in the Soviet empire, nor about the mili-
tary pressures, the insurrections, the infiltrations
and coercion and blackmail and propaganda
that Stalin launched in the postwar world, nor
about the more recent attempts at nuclear black-
mail and power politics.

Let us agree that a cold war — unlike a hot
one — does not have a sharp beginning and a
sharp end : It is better understood as a state of
affairs — a world condition.

T>et us also agree that the changes we just
noted, fundamental as they are, are not events

• For background, see iiid., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-746.

but trends. They may continue in the same di-
rection; they may become stalled; they might
even be reversed for reasons beyond our control.
And if the present leaders of the Soviet Union
have come to see that expansion by anned force
is irrational in the nuclear age, the leaders of
Communist China have gone to spectacular enda
to make clear that they still live in the age of
Stalin — with what dangers to all of us we can
scarcely discern.

WHiile we're at it, let me point out that it takes
two to make a detente. We on cur side may be
encumbered by some myths but not by meta-
physical dialectics. We may suffer from tired
cliches but not from fixed dogma. We may
conform to conventional wisdom, but we are
not bound to secular scriptures. I mention this
not to score propaganda points but to suggest
that if we have trouble adapting to new
realities, think of the difficulties of men who
have been taught the "iron laws" of liistory
and the "inevitability" of events which stub-
bornly refuse to happen.

No Shift Required in U.S. Aims

So our task is twofold.

On the one hand, let us by all means discard
any obsolete labels — especially the black-and-
white labels ; let us try to be sure that the spade
we still call a spade has not rusted away while
our eyes were avei'ted. On the other hand —
and at the same time — let us be sure to get a
firm grip on our sense of direction in the world
that is changing about us.

Let me say here and now that there has been
a clear sense of positive direction at the base of
our policies.

We recall that United States support helped
Turkey stand up to Stalin's threats — and tend to
forget that the main function of that aid was to
help build up a Turkish economy overtaxed by
its own defense requirements.

We recall that our aid helped the beleaguered
Greeks to put down a Communist insurrec-
tion— and tend to forget that most of that aid
was economic.

We recall that the Marshall Plan made it
possible for Europe to rearm and help build up
NATO — and tend to forget that its purpose
was directed "not against any country or doc-

APRIL 20, 1964

617

trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation,
and chaos." '

And so it goes, for the Point 4 program and
all the rest. The positive, constructive, pro-
gressive, and hopeful dri\ang force of our post-
war foreign policy has been obscured by the
confrontation of military alliances, by the anns
race, and by recurrent crises.

Our consistent and forthcoming contribu-
tions to the work of the whole United Nations
family of agencies, which seek to build better
lives for the undernourished two-thirds of
himianity, has been overveiled by political
wrangling in the Security Coimcil.

Our steady encouragement of the growth of
regional organizations and institutions for eco-
nomic and social and technical progress has
been half-hidden because we also were con-
cerned with the physical security of the same
areas.

Now we have reason to hope that with the
test ban treaty, the resolution banning weapons
of mass destruction in outer space, the installa-
tion of the "hot line" between Moscow and
Washington, the first halting steps toward
U.S.-Soviet cooperation in exploring the uni-
verse, and, above all, the hardening conviction
about a mutual interest in survival — we have
reason to hope, as I say, that the end of the cold
war, in the particular form in which we have
known it, may now be possible. Other rival-
ries may take its place in time, rivalries that
will require a revision of tactics. But between
the two thermonuclear powers we have reason
to hope that additional areas of common inter-
est can be identified and further agreements
reached — until this particular cold war fades
into history. One of the imperatives of our
foreign policy is to hasten that day.

But my point here is this : To adjust to a world
of lesser tensions from different directions does
not require the painful discovery of shiny new
policies, nor a sharp shift in our aims, nor a re-
examination of our motives. Our policies will,
as they have in the past, seek :

— to help build up the capacity of the United
Nations to effect peaceful resolution of con-
flict and change ;

' For remarks by Secretary Marshall on June 5,
1947, see ibiii., June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

— to similarly support the growing capacity M
of regional organizations to handle their own ■
family problems and move toward unity in the
economic, social, and technical spheres ;

— to step up the flow of resources and tech-
nology from the industrialized to the newly de-
veloping countries ;

— to offer cooperation in such exciting new
ventures as creating a "World Weather Watch, a
global system of satellite communications, the
exploration of the imiverse, and in a thousand
less spectacular jobs;

— to keep everlastingly at the search for the
next safe steps toward arms control and dis-
armament ;

— to insure the defensive strength of free
and peaceful societies while the quest for peace
continues ;

— to hammer away at the manifold and some-
times tedious task of creating a world — in Presi-
dent Kennedy's phrase — that is "safe for di- ,
versity" because it rests on consent and not ^
coercion.

Certainly we shall have to be adaptive and
flexible, and even imaginative and inventive, as
we pursue these ends. But there is nothing new
in the ends. They are the ends we have pursued
for better than a decade and a half. They are
good ends, and no degree of complexity — no
evolution in world affairs — should be allowed to
obscure them or to divert us from their pursuit.
But to take full advantage of the real muta-
tions in power and influence will require us to be
even clearer in our heads and even faster on our
feet than we have been so far.

As realists we must see the world as it is,
not as we might like it to be. And what do we
see ? We see the world as a neighborhood — in-
terdependent in space, interdependent in com-
munications, interdependent in economic life,
and overshadowed by a fantastic Wagnerian
possibility of instantaneous annihilation. We
cannot conceal these fundamental facts. We
dare not behave as though they did not exist.
This is the reality science and technology have
thrust upon us.

And when we look back and ask ourselves,
how have we hitherto dealt with the realities of
our century? the answer is, I must confess, a
little cheerless. Through two world wars and

618

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

a ciitaclysiuic economic (lo{)ix>ssion, wo, the self-
styled realists, produced a I'ecord of disaster.
"WHiile every day tlie facts of interdependence
were drawing our nations into closer and more
vulnerable i)roximitj', we marched with a sover-
eign illusion of state power boldly into shatter-
ing catastrophe.

I often think no war had been as tragic as that
of 1939, for, in retrospect, it seems almost a
precise, sleepwalking repetition of the war of
1914 — the same actors, the same pressures, the
same causes and provocations. And all this
for the reason that in 1919 the victors left intact
virtually all the causes of violent nationalism
and irresfwusible sovereignty that had sparked
the first conflict. America withdrew into an im-
possible isolationism. The League, the ancestor
of the U.N., was crippled at its birth. The con-
cert of Europe broke down. The old, uneasy,
unstable balance of power returned.

Even so, the powers might perhaps have
evaded the final tragedy if Europe and America
had not also been compelled to act out on the
economic stage the full consequences of sep-
arate, isolated nationalism.

But this is not the place to go into the multiple
causes of the Great Depression, out of which
sprang so many of the evils of Hitlerism, the
demoralization of Europe, and the inevitable
drift to war.

Nature of Leadership in the Postwar World

I make no apology for this brief excursion
into our not-very-distant history, for, as George
Santayana remarked : "Those who will not learn
from history are destined to repeat it." And be-
lieve me, the world cannot afford to repeat its
history from 1914 to 1945. In the nuclear age
total, unabridged national sovereignty, operat-
ing blindly in the new era of growing inter-
dependence, can produce the final lethal catas-
trophe. If there is any realism in politics, any
realism in economics, it must be to insure that
such follies, such excesses, such disasters never
reoccur.

Is this too big an order? Must men always
behave in their individual interest in such a way
that their collective interests invariably suffer?
Of course not. And that brings me to some
concluding words about the anatomy of world

leadership. For the nature of leadership in a
world safe for diversity— there's a subject on
which some careful and perhaps painful re-
thinking will be needed in the years ahead, and
not only here at home.

We have heard a great deal about leadership
in the postwar world — leadership of the two
contending blocs engaged in a struggle described
as cold war. It is a simple statement of histori-
cal fact to say that for a number of years one
side was led unquestionably by the Soviet Union
and the other side was led unquestionably by the
United States of America.

There was a fundamental difference in the
character of the two leaderships : One was im-
posed by the leader and his Red Army ; the other
was imposed upon us by our resources and our
capacity to act in a war-torn world. We have
no apologies to make about our acceptance and
performance of that role; indeed, we can be
deeply proud of both.

But the days of unquestioned and unchal-
lenged leadership are past. The fear of exter-
nal threat, which is the cement of alliances, has
subsided somewhat — and some of the followers
have grown strong enough to strike out on their
own.

And again there is a fundamental difference
in the change that has occurred on the two sides.
Communist China has broken away violently
from the leadership of the Soviet Union in a
split of unprecedented bitterness. There is
hardly a Communist party anywhere in the
world which has not felt the divisive repercus-
sions of that schism. Meanwhile, the other
members of the old Soviet bloc twist and turn
and maneuver to put a bit more daylight be-
tween them and the old leader. That is just
about the last thing that the Soviet leaders
wanted to happen — and they have done their
best to prevent it.

On our side an old friend within the alliance
now sometimes declines to see things the way we
see them for reasons which sometimes seem
quite obscure to us from where we sit. Other
old friends occasionally disagree — as we do with
them — though very often, when we talk things
out, we find our way to common ground.

But our differences, even when they persist,
do not set us at each other's throats in alleys
and villages aroimd the world. A basic pur-

APRIL 20, 1964

619

pose of our whole postwar policy has been to
help Europe get back on its feet, stand up on its
own, and look us in the eye as equals. If we
sometimes do not like what they say when they
look us in the eye, let us not forget that we know
something the Communists don't know : Lasting
unity can be attained only among nations that
are not dominated by any member of the group.
Lasting unity is created not by the overlordship
of the strong but by leadership of the strong in
a community in wliich every member is equal
because he is free.

As the world of the two great blocs and the
unalined states is breaking into a pluralism of
power and prestige, the most powerful nation
in the world still camiot throw up its hands
and resign from a job which it never sought
anyway. Leadership always will be needed;
leadership always will be welcomed — provided
it is the right kind of leadership in the right
places at the right time.

Wliat is the right kind of leadership in a
world in which the prevailing political passion
is national independence? What is the right
way to exercise national power in an age when
the most powerful nations cannot use their most
powerful weapons?

There is diplomacy, of course. There is joint
military planning with close allies. There is
common trade policy and development policy.
There is technical cooperation and the export of
science. There is information and cultural ex-
change. All these — and other tangible things —
come to mind.

But what I have in mind is something less
tangible than the spending of money and the
organizing of resources. Wliat I have in mind
is leadership by attitude — and by example.

A wise Asian said not long ago that, in our
time, his people would expect Americans to
make a great effort to understand them, without
themselves making a. great effort to understand
the Americans. It is not easy for Americans to
get used to a world in which they have to try
hard to understand the sentiments and feelings
and prides and prejudices of others — and then
find that those others continue to cherish un-
fair, false, even outrageous opinions about the
purposes and motives of the United States of
America.

Put it this way : A man who serves as a leader
in his community has to accustom himself to
the fact that individual citizens and special-
interest groups will often berate him for his
actions because they have not considered all
the angles the leader must consider before he
acts. Much of this criticism the leader will
think unfair; j'et, while he never can give way
to pressure merely because it comes from the
weak, neither can he give way to the tempta-
tion of responding in kind, of lashing out at his
adversaries, of talking or acting as irrespon-
sibly as his less powerful but noisier critics.
He has to do what he thinks is best — consulting
all the elements of the community, but consult-
ing his own independent best judgment as well.
His patience, his restraint, his self-control, his
magnanimity, his compassion — in a word, his
maturity — will be often and sorely tried. But
this is the price of power. He either learns
that simple lesson, or he stops trying to be a
leader among his fellow men.

So it is with the leadership of a nation,
among its fellow nations in a world not yet safe
for diversity. We are, quite simply, too strong
to react in kind to every ugly street cry, every
student placard, every irresponsible act. In
this kind of world, wielding our kind of power,
real touglmess is not bluster but maturity. If
we want to know how to act in such a world,
we could do worse than to reread Kipling's //.

Alongside the mature attitudes of the power-
ful leader, I would place the impact of example
as an instrument of leadersliip in the world that
is emerging. And this leads me directly to two
issues before our society right now : civil rights
and the war against poverty.

There was a time when some people lamented
the exposure of racial discrimination in this
country only because Communist propagandists
could use it against us around the world. This
was a mean and shallow view, an unworthy way
to relate civil rights to foreign policy.

Then, when an aroused nation at last decided
to do something definitive about equality for
all our people, it was quite properl}' said that
this was not being done to please a foreign audi-
ence but to cleanse our own conscience, to make
our own. society whole at last, to elevate the
quality of our domestic life.

620

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

And so it is. But civil riglits — tlio equality
of and dignity of the individual human being —
is a universal issue, whatever form it may take
within domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, after
peace and war, it is the ultimate issue in almost
all societies, the gut issue of the modern world.
It is, I suppose, one of the things that makes the
modern world modem.

So when we in this nation, tending our own
business, make a reality of the bright promise of
equal rights for all, when we break down the
artificial and ignorant barriers that limit the
lives of a minority race, when we put an end to
intolerance and open our schools ami our neigh-
borhoods and our hearts to fellow humans re-
gardless of race or other distinction, we are,
willy-nilly, exercising leadership in world af-
fairs. We set an example for all to see — and in
doing so we add immeasurably to the prestige
and influence of our voice aroimd the world,
whether that was intended or not. We add to
our stature in all things because we have added
to the quality of our own life. Those societies
which fully enfranchise all their members are
also the most productive and stable — bright evi-
dence that justice and morality constitute the
most enlightened form of self-interest.

Much the same thing can be said about Presi-
dent Johnson's war on poverty. When the rich-
est nation on the face of the earth, when the so-
ciety which has produced the highest standard
of living in history, turns as a matter of na-
tional priority to the needs of the underprivi-
leged 20 percent, we likewise are indulging in
world leadersliip. We are showing that no level
of social accomplisliment satisfies the free hu-
man spirit.

And poverty in nations, as President Johnson
pointed out last week, is like poverty in fami-
lies. Our foreign aid program is not a matter
of doles and handouts. Wliether the war on
poverty is waged at home or abroad, the aim is
the same : the creation of opportunity, the trans-

fer of skills, and the investment of capital to
help others to help themselves. Here again we
are showing that it is up to the great and power-
ful to lead the way.

For in this new world of diversity that is
shaping up, the true leader is not the one who
gives orders but the one who shows the way.

The true leader is not the one who embraces
agreeable myths but who faces the facts even
when they are ugly.

The true leader is not the one who expects fol-
lowers but who welcomes the company of all
who wish to join him.

The true leader is not one who insists that his
way is the only way but who is ready to share
his own experience for what it is worth to others.

These, it seems to me, are some of the parts of
the anatomy of leadership that will be needed
in a world which, indeed, is changing rapidly
but which is concerned to the last with building
a good society. The nation which leads the way
to the good society need never fear for its in-
fluence in this world, for that nation will be set-
ting the pace for all others.

I believe the emerging world society in which
we have to operate offers us possibilities for cre-
ative improvement at home and for creative di-
plomacy and initiative abroad. That world is
more plastic, more open to influence, than ever
before. Hence it is our duty and our oppor-
tunity to work in this new society for the gi-eat
purposes that have always lain at the roots of
America's domestic experiment : for a world in
which life is held secure against arbitrary vio-
lence, in which the pursuit of happiness is not
crippled by lack of education and the lack of
skill, in which men can find the ultimate lib-
erty— to seek truth as they see it and to express
their infinite diversity, imified through brother-
hood, not fear.

And that, it seems to me, brings world affairs
into everyone's front parlor and everyone's
backyard.

AFBH, 20, 1964

727-107—64 3

621

The Thirteenth Alarm

hy Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs'^

Just a week ago the United Nations answered
the peacekeeping firebell for the 13th time.
This time the alarm came from a troubled
island in the Mediterranean Sea: one island
with two warring ethnic commimities. As a
result, two of our friends and NATO allies
found themselves locked in an ever-tightening
spiral of tension — closer to serious armed con-
flict than most Americans would believe.

Even before the fighting began last Christ-
mastime, the issues were touchy in the extreme.
Cyprus got its independence as part of a com-
plex treaty structure which left British, Greek,
and Turkish troops on the island, and a consti-
tution that required both Turk and Greek
Cypriots to agree on acts of the independent
government. Now the first task became to break
the vicious and lengthening chain in which in-
cident begat incident and violence spawned
violence. The second was to work out an agreed
solution that would go to the root of the trouble.

Talks among North Atlantic allies produced
no workable answer. A regional peace force
linked to the U.N. was agreed in principle but
not in practice. Meanwhile, arms flowed in and
local fighting infected first one village and then
another. The Communists, everywhere the
scavengers of independence, began to work to
turn the situation to their advantage. And a
few thousand harassed, heroic British soldiers
tried to keep the island from exploding again
in communal strife.

And so the Cyprus issue came to the United

' Address made before the Midwest Model United
Nations at St. Louis, Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 128
dated Mar. 20).

Nations — for peacekeeping and peacemaking
is the U.N.'s major business. Once again the
United Nations Security Council had to listen
to acrid debate and then agree to call up volun-
teers for an international bucket brigade. For
in Cyprus, as in 12 other cases, Shakespeare's
wisdom well applies :

A little fire is quickly trodden out ;

Whicli, being suffered, rivers cannot quench.

Beginning with Greece in 1947, the U.N.'s
record of on-the-spot peacekeeping operations
rims through Palestine, Kaslmair, Indonesia,
Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo,
West New Guinea, Yemen, and now Cyprus.
Some of these once-ominous problems still per-
sist, but none of them seriously endangers world
peace or threatens to mvolve the great powers
in catastropluc contest. The United Nations has
succeeded in moving them away from the bat-
tlefields and barricades into the chambers and
corridors where peace is made by lengthy and
tedious talk. Solutions may not follow quickly
or easily, but the guns are checked outside the
conference halls. And that is what counts when
the issue is peace or war.

Now that the world has lived through a
baker's dozen of these traumatic near-wars, we
have a right to ask what progress we are making
in keeping the peace. And the real test of prog-
resfs, of course, is not whether emergencies stop
occurring — because in this higlily flammable
world there are quite a few oily rags lying
around and too many careless people with
matches.

The real test is whether we are better able

622

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to cope with crises when they do occur than we
were, say, a decade ago. Is the world profiting
from its ticklish experience, or are the peace-
makers still plaj'ing each crisis by ear — on the
same primitive instruments? What does the
record show ?

Diversity of Solutions

The record so far tells us at least five things
worth telling:

First, threats to the peace can, and do, break
out almost anywhere. Over the past 17 years,
peacekeeping operations have been undertaken
by the U.N. four times in the Middle East,
twice in Southern Europe, twice in Southeast
Asia, and once in the Far East, the Western
Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and now in the
Mediterranean. And while action was in every
case left to the Organization of American
States, the Security Council has had on its
docket 13 crises in the Western Hemisphere. As
of tonight the Security Council still has 57 large
and small disputes listed on its agenda — some
of which have been settled long since and some
of which are dangerous enough still to require
a watching brief by the Council.

Second, the record tells us that each of these
disputes — being different — has required dif-
ferent kinds of peacekeeping machinery. In
the Korean operation, uniquely large and
uniquely destructive of young lives, the United
Nations defended a nation against outside Com-
munist aggression. In the Congo a major mili-
tary police force was attacked and had to
defend itself. In the Middle East and in Kash-
mir the need was for armed peacekeepers to
patrol armistice lines. In other cases observa-
tion teams, factfinders, and mediators have
filled the bill.

Wliat's more, the weaponry, the political
sponsorship, the racial composition, and the fi-
nancing arrangements have all been different —
each tailored to the necessities of the case.

In retrospect this diversity of solutions makes
the original idea of a standing U.N. army look
rather naive and simplistic. But there was no
experience to go on when the founders of the
U.N. were trying to figure out, on paper, how
to organize for peace in an unpredictable
postwar world.

The Congo Experience

Third, our experience in the U.N. demon-
strates that an international police force, once
on the ground, has a mission unlike most na-
tional military missions — because it's much less
national and often less military.

Members of U.N. peacekeeping forces are
soldiers from the military establishments of the
nations contributing units. They are com-
manded by professional militaiy officers. They
wear uniforms and carry guns. They sleep in
tents or barracks and eat military rations.

But once they put on the blue beret or, if need
be, the blue helmet, they find they are supposed
to be soldiers without enemies, fighters without
rancor, members of an armed force without a
military objective — their mission not to start
shooting but to stop it, not to win a battle but
to see to it there is no battle to be won or lost.

The implications that flow from this strange
state of affairs for soldiers-tumed-peacemakers
are large and fascinating — and were seen most
clearly in the Congo experience. Having spent
some time talking about these things with U.N.
officers during the tough days of the Congo
operation, I should like to dwell for a moment
on what was learned there.

In a remote section of the Congo I visited
with a brigadier general from Malaysia, com-
manding a Malayan U.N. brigade. In a real
war, he said, he would be merely commanding
a brigade, but with the U.N. force he had to
command each platoon. His point was that the
smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol
can easily become a major political issue. In
the jungles of Malaya the Commimists that had
been shooting at these same soldiers were clearly
the enemy — no doubt about it. "But here," said
the bi'igadier, "if somebody shoots at our sol-
diers, it is a political question whether they
should even shoot back."

The point was clear enough in the case of
Indian troops manning a checkpoint who were
attacked by a howling mob of several thousand
women organized by seces.sionists under Moise
Tshombe. The women kicked, spat, slapped,
ripped shirts, and tore insignia from the stoic
Gurkhas who had been ordered not to fight even
in self-defense. As the mob began to tire of this
one-sided fight, the Indians fired exactly nine

APRIL 20, 1964

rounds of ammunition over the heads of the
crowd and advanced to disperse the mob, using
only their batons. The Indian officer in charge
told me that an army unit brought in to put
down such an outbreak under what he called a
"normal situation" could readily have caused
dozens or scores of civilian deaths.

One commander in the Congo told me that
when opposing troops run from a police force,
the "no enemy" principle may require the U.N.
force to let them get away. But curiously
enough, he did not think this is necessarily a
military disadvantage: "If a man has to rim
away from you," he said, "he will deliberately
exaggerate the size and effectiveness of your
force, in order to look better in the eyes of his
own people."

If the rank and file of a peacekeeping force
has to make a difficult adjustment, so do the
officers. The commander of a peace force often
must go out ahead of his troojos. This used to
be a standard operating practice back in the
Middle Ages, when a cormnander would ride out
to parley with the opposing commander, to see
whether things could be settled without any-
body getting hurt. In more modern warfare
the commanding officer doesn't spend much time
in no man's land. But in this sense, U.N. peace-
keeping has brought the sensible Middle Ages
up to date — for the object, once again, is to
pacify.

The brigadier commanding the Indian bri-
gade in the Congo made a regular and successful
practice of going out ahead of his troops and
persuading hostile local forces to return stolen
helicopters, retire gracefully from the field
without battle, and even to give up cities. It is
remarkable, this officer reported, how well this
sort of thing works in situations where the other
side is not quite sure of itself or its orders. "If
you do something that looks deliberately stupid,
it is sometimes so surprising to others that you
get away with it."

A final distinction between an international
peace force and a conventional military one is
that a peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped
area is often drawn deeply into the civil life of
the community. U.N. units in the Congo found
themselves providing leadership, supplies,
transportation, and other services to local gov-
ernments and sometimes to private firms in an

effort to help the economy get moving again.
The U.N. force even had to develop a scale of
charges by which businesses could be billed for
hauling goods to market in U.N. military
vehicles.

Soldiers vdthout enemies operating on behalf
of the world community are a new kind of
people doing a new kind of work. Their doc-
trine, their mandate, their training manuals, are
still first drafts — and not yet ready for final
printing.

Let me return to the record of U.N. peace-
keeping so far and what it tells us about this
imprecedented, pragmatic, and fateful business.

Further Record of U.N. Peacekeeping

Fourth^ the record shows clearly that the
United Nations peacekeeping machinery is not
an alternative to regional organizations or to
direct diplomacy. All three are essential — to
be employed separately or in some combination
depending upon the task at hand.

Issues directly involving basic national in-
terests of the major powers will be settled be-
tween them or not at all. Regional disputes
are handled preferably within the framework
of regional organizations — like the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Organization
of African Unity— when they are up to the job.
In others, the United Nations must play the
leading role — and in all disputes the United
Nations by the terms of its charter is the
last resort, the peacemaker in reserve.

The best example of combined use of nation-
al, regional, and world facilities was the fateful
crisis over Soviet installation of missile sites in
Cuba. Our response to that effort to change
the world's power balance brought into action —
at one and the same time — national power, the
OAS, and the United Nations. Each played
a mutually supporting role in a textbook case of
crisis diplomacy. The Cyprus case is another
fascinating study in irony and paradox: Here
the United Nations, by keeping the peace on the
island, can prevent the southern flank of NATO
from bursting into flames.

Fifth, and finally, the record shows that the
peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations
has operated in the national interests of the
United States, as well as in the interest of every

624

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

other nation that cares about the peace of the
world. And that sfwuld include every respon-
sible government in the world, regardless of its
political, social, or economic structure.

For there is a nuclear seed lurking somewhere
in almost any open conflict anywhere today.
Even where major power interests do not ap-
pear to be directly and immediately involved,
there is the danger that organized fighting at
any level, and with any kind of arms, could
eventually engage the interests or prestige of
major powers and drag us into a nuclear war
that nobody wanted. As long as nuclear arms
exist, the threat exists that an armed skirmish
can wind up in a mushroom cloud.

So what serves peace anywhere serves our
interests everywhere. This is one all-important
area where we share common interests with the
Soviet Union. And there is some reason to hope
that the Soviet leaders agree.

Maybe that is why Chairman Khrushchev, in
his New Year's Day message,^ put the case for
settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful
means, including recourse to the United Nations.
We are still dubious whether concrete policies
will follow this general declaration; but it is
the task of our diplomacy to find out — and to
keep on seeking agreement on how to back the
doctrine with effective machinery for peaceful
settlement.

Reassessing U.N.'s Capacity To Act for Peace

Thus, the record of the peacekeeping experi-
ence of the United Nations to date shows :

— that threats to the peace can and do arise
almost anywhere;

— that every peacekeeping operation is likely
to require a different kind of peace force than
has ever been needed before ;

— that the conduct of peacekeeping forces
must be drawn more from the police books than
from the military manuals ;

— that when crisis comes, national, regional,
and world action are not mutually exclusive
but mutually reinforcing; and

— that the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace
has a lot to do with our national interests and.

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1964, p. Ii38.

indeed, our pereonal chances of survival in the
age of the ultimate weapons.

But does that mean the peacekeeping ma-
chinery of the United Nations is all that it
should be — that it is up to such an awesome
assignment? It does not, and it is not.

We can take some comfort in the fact that the
U.N.'s peacekeeping performance to date has
been heartening in most instances and brilliant
in some.

We can all be grateful that the Secretary-
General is able to assemble a force of a few thou-
sand men for Cyprus ; though if the British had
not been holding the fort and had not then con-
tributed half of the manpower, it would have
been enormously difficult to mount the peace-
keeping mission in Cyprus at all.

We can be grateful, too, that the Canadians
and the Nordic countries and Holland have
agreed to earmark forces for future emergency
duty with the United Nations.

But there is something eerie about the spec-
tacle of the United Nations having to plead and
scrounge and cajole to help tack together a mini-
mal peacekeeping force in the nick of time.
There is something nightmarish about the
notion that in a world which spends some $120
billion a year in the name of defense and keeps
some 20 million men under arms, peace could
hang on tlie overnight availability of a few
thousand men and a few million dollars.

In short, the performance of the world com-
munity is not yet nearly good enough. There
will need to be many more earmarked imits
from every continent, from a variety of nations,
large and small — contingents always on the
alert for prompt assignment in an emergency —
so that once a peacekeeping mission has been
authorized, the right mix of forces can be put
together, if need be, in a matter of days, not
weeks.

We are entitled to hope that U.N. members
will search their souls, reexamine their atti-
tudes, and reassess their own national interests
to make sure that the United Nations never
wants for men or money to act in the interests
of peace. We are entitled to hope that acquies-
cence will give way to enthusiasm, that re-
luctance will give way to responsibility, that
service with the United Nations will be seen not

APRIL 20, 1964

625

as a burden but as an honor worthy of some of
each nation's best men with the best training
and talent and experience.

And I speak not only of soldiers called to
service as -peacekeepers but of statesmen called
to serve as Tpencemakers. I see no reason why
the United Nations should not have available
a distinguished mternational panel of peace-
makers— and should not be able to reach into
any public or private institution and command
the finest talents in tlie world to sen^e as fact-
finders or observers or mediators or arbitrators
to disputes which tear at the fragile fabric of
world peace. The very difficulty the Secretary-
General has been having this week in locating
a mediator for Cyprus on whom all concerned
can agree illustrates the need for more of this
kind of talent already at the service of the world
community.

Meanwhile, the prickly problem of financing
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and
the Congo has produced a situation in which the
United Nations is deeply in debt, a large num-
ber of nations are in arrears on their peacekeep-
ing assessments, the Soviet Union and others
are headed toward collision with the dictum laid
down in article 19 of the charter which says that
any member owing more than 2 years of assess-
ments "shall have no vote in the General As-
sembly," and a shattering constitutional crisis
could be in the making.

Apart from the difficulties of cleaning up the
past, there is the very likely prospect that the
United Nations will be called upon again and
again to restore the peace, to keep the peace, and
to build at last a dynamic system of world order
which will permit peaceful change in a world
which will endure the status quo only until some-
thing blows up.

Will the members of the United Nations have
the wit and the will to pro\'ide the United Na-
tions with enough resources to do the jobs it is
likely to be asked to do? The returns are not
in, and nobody can say for sure. But I think
the U.N.'s members will endow the U.N. with
the capacity to act for peace, simply because it's
there and it's badly needed. Nations, like
people, seldom do things that require decisions,
especially expensive decisions, until the need for
action is obvious and compelling. And most
learning is by doing.

Tlie margin between success and failure in
getting a peacekeepmg mission on the island of
Cyprus was all too narrow for comfort. But
I suspect that this has been noticed by others as
well. I suspect that the service of the United
Nations ia response to 13 fire alarms and scores
of other warning signals is being reassessed in
more than one capital around this globe. And,
bit by bit, I suspect the world community is be-
ing drawn by events into an unspoken consen-
sus : Now, in these perilous years of our days, we
cannot afford to be without effective, reliable,
and operational machinery for peace.

Trade Benefits To Be Continued
to Poland and Yugoslavia

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 144 dated April 3

By direction of the President, the Secretary
of State on April 3 reported to the Congress,
as i-equired by section 231(b) of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, as amended, that a de-
termination has been made to continue the ex-
tension of the benefits of trade agreement
concessions made by the United States to prod-
ucts of Poland and Yugoslavia.

MEMORANDUM FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'

Mauch 26, 1964

Memorandum foe

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

Subject: Determination under Section 231(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended,
Permitting Continuation of Nondiscrimina-
tory Trade Treatment for Poland and
Yugoslavia

Pursuant to section 231(b) of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, as amended, I hereby deter-
mine that extending the benefits of trade agree-
ment concessions made by the United States to
products, whether imported directly or indi-

• 29 Fed. Reg. 4851.

626

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

rectly, of tlie Polisli People's Republic and the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both
of which were receiving trade concessions on
December 16, 1963, will be important to the na-
tional interest and will promote the independ-
ence of these two countries from domination or
control by international communism. The
reasons for this determuiation are contained in
the attached statement.

The Secretary of State is directed to report
this determination and the reasons therefor to
the Congress, as required by section 231(b) of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.

The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to
inform the Commissioner of Customs of this
determination.

Lyndon B. Johnson

TEXT OF STATEMENT

Subject: Determination under Section 231(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended,
Permitting Continuation of Non-Discrimina-
tory Trade Treatment for Poland and
Yugoslavia.

The principal objective of United States policy in
Eastern Europe is to encourage peaceful efforts tovs-ard
loosening of control from Moscow. Both Yugoslavia
and Poland have demonstrated that they are prepared
to undertake considerable risks to maintain and in-
crease their independence. Trade with the free world,
and in particular with the United States, is one of the
basic ways in which these countries can resist Soviet
control. Depriving them of the opportunity to trade
on competitive terms with the United States would be
a sure way to reverse the trend in Eastern Europe and
to increase the power and influence of the Soviets in
Eastern Europe.

A. Yugoslavia

Although Yugoslavia is a communist country, its
determination to maintain its independence from
Soviet bloc domination has been demonstrated over the
past fifteen years. The Yugoslav Government has en-
couraged a broad range of contacts between Yugo-
slavia and the West and has made Yugoslavia acces-
sible to people, ideas, and information coming from the
West

Yugoslavia is not a member of the Warsaw Pact nor
of the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CEMA). On the other hand, Yugoslavia has
long been associated with all of the major free world
economic organizations, including the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the OECD [Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development] and the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In
addition, it has been seeking the opiwrtunity to discuss
trade arrnngemeuts with the EEC [European Eco-
nomic Community]. More than 707c of Yugoslavia's
foreign trade is with the free world, and Yugoslavia
has undertaken imiwrtant reforms in its foreign trade
system to bring it more into line with Western
practices.

Since lOIS, when Yugoslavia's refusal to submit to
domination by the USSR cau.sed its expulsion from the
Soviet Bloc, the United States has followed a jwlicy of
supporting Yugoslavia's desire to make its way as an
independent state. This policy has served the national
interest of the United States in important ways.
Yugoslavia's assertion of indei)endence greatly weak-
ened the strategic threat of Soviet-controlled military
power in I^astern Europe. Indeed, the final victory
over communist guerrillas in Greece was made pos.sible
by the closing of the Yugoslav border against them.
Yugoslav self assertion began the destruction of the
image of monolithic communist solidarity, and it
showed that a country can successfully refuse to sub-
mit to domination by the Soviet Union.

These considerations are slill valid and remain Im-
portant to United States national interest today. The
significance of Yugoslavia's independence has not di-
minished. As long as its exami)le exists, the pressures
on other communist parties and governments to seek
similar advantageous solutions based on the exercise
of national independence will grow.

The continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treat-
ment of Yugoslavia by the United States is of funda-
mental importance in supporting the independence of
Yugoslavia. Such trade relations with the United
States demonstrate to th-.> Yugoslav leadership and peo-
ple, as well as to the other nations of Eastern Europe,
that the United States will permit normal trading pos-
sibilities to countries which assert their independence
from domination by international communism.

Nondiscriminatory trade is also essential to enable
Yugoslavia to maintain its exports to the United States
so that it can import from us and earn the dollars re-
quired to meet its debt repayment obligations to the
United States. Yugoslavia's payments on dollar re-
payable obligations will be well over .$10 million in
each of the next several years.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet
bloc are now, once again, making a concentrated effort
to improve economic and other relations with Yugo-
slavia. United States failure to continue nondiscrimi-
natory trade treatment would contribute to forcing
Yugoslavia into greater dependence upon the Soviet-
controlled communist countries and thus undermine
our efforts to assist Yugoslavia to pursue an inde-
pendent, unaligned policy.

B. Poland

Poland has not achieved the degree of independence
from Moscow that Yugoslavia has. Nevertheless, since
the events of 19156, Poland has attained a large measure

APRIL 20, 1904

627

of autonomy both in internal affairs and in foreign
relations.

After 1956, Poland reversed its policy toward collec-
tivization of agriculture. Today, 87% of the arable
land of Poland is privately held.

A far greater degree of freedom of speech has been
permitted in Poland since 1956, and intellectual activ-
ity remains stimulating and lively. Poland has dis-
continued jamming broadcasts of the Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe and has participated in certain
USIA programs by which American books and period-
icals have been made available to the people of Poland.
Poland has also permitted relatively free emigration to
the West and has regularly permitted Poles to come to
the United States to visit.

Finally, basic freedom of worship is possible in
Poland today- Poland permits religious education for
children as well as a Catholic university and semi-
naries. A number of religious holy days are observed
as national holidays. While religion remains anath-
ema to the Communists, and the Gomulka regime
has probed for ways of bringing the Church under
some control, Catholicism in Poland remains a potent
force and an obstacle to complete communist domi-
nation. The regime, well aware that an all-out attack
on the Church would prejudice its beneficial relation-
ship with the West, must show restraint so long as
there is anything to gain in Poland's relation with the
West.

The United States and Poland have made good
progress in resolving outstanding financial and eco-
nomic problems. Over the past seven years the voliime
of trade has grown and there are good prospects for
steady growth in the future.

Nondiscriminatory treatment for Poland products
permits that country to earn dollars with which it can
buy American goods and meet its substantial financial
obligations to the United States Government and to
private American citizens. Poland's payments on these
obligations have reached almost $11 million annually
and will increase to over .$20 million in 1967. These
debts include, among others, the obligations arising
from the settlement of claims of United States nation-
als whose properties were nationalized in Poland, and
the obligations to repay in dollars for previous pur-
chases of surplus agricultural commodities under PL
480. Cutting ofC trade on the present nondiscrimina-
tory basis would impair Poland's ability to meet these
obligations.

As a consequence of the Polish events of 1956.
Secretary of State Dulles determined, for purposes of
section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (PL 480), that
Poland was not a nation dominated or controlled by
the foreign government or foreign organization con-
trolling the world communist movement. Since that
determination the United States has kept the Polish
situation under close and continuing scrutiny. In
November 1961 Secretary of State Rusk reaflirmed the
determination of 1956. This is still our judgment
today.

Conclusion

Continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treatment
for the products of Yugoslavia and Poland is important
to our national interest. The maintenance of com-
mercial trade relations between the United States and
these countries will further the objective of encourag-
ing and promoting their independence from domina-
tion or control by international communism.

United States and Italy Discuss
Air Relations

Joint Communique ^

Delegations representing the Governments of
the United States of America and of Italy met
in Rome from March 9 to March 20, 1964, to
consult on problems of mutual concern relating
to air relations between the two countries and to
interpretation of the Air Transport Services
Agreement between the two countries. The
United States Delegation was under the chair-
manship of Mr. Allen Ferguson, Coordinator
for International Aviation, Department of
State, and the Italian Delegation was under the
chairmanship of General Felice Santini, Direc-
tor General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of
Transport and Civil Aviation.

The two Delegations confirmed their confi-
dence in the development of air relations be-
tween the United States and Italy and in the
continued growth of air traffic between the two
countries. To this end each Delegation noted
the suggestions expressed by the other and each
agreed to submit them to its respective Govern-
ment for the purpose of reaching resolution at
an early date.

With respect to all-cargo services, the United
States Delegation expressed its imderstanding
that such services are governed by the Air
Transport Agreement between the two coim-
tries, and the Italian Delegation expressed its
understanding that all-cargo services are not
included in that Agreement. Both Delegations
agreed that the question was one of fundamen-
tal importance. Following the proposal of the
United States Delegation, the Italian Delega-
tion agreed to submit the question to arbitra-

' Released at Rome on Mar. 23.

628

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tion, as provided in Article 12 of the Air Trans-
port Agreement. The two Delegations agreed
to an interim arrangement for prompt com-
mencement of sclieduled all-cjxrgo jet services
pending the outcome of tlie arbitration, to be
operated through eight jet all-cargo services per
week, of whicli up to four may bo operated by
the designated airlines of the United States and
up to four by the designated airline of Italy.

The two Delegations expressed their appre-
ciation of the usefulness of their full, free and
friendly exchange of views on mattere of com-
mon concern in the civil aviation field, and
looked forward to a further meeting in the near
future.

Equal Employment Opportunity

Remarks hy Secretary Rusk ^

Once again it is my pleasure to welcome you
to the Department and to see a considerable
nmnber of friends among you. A great many
changes have taken place in the 2i/^ years since
we last met in this room. A courageous Presi-
dent has passed from our midst, and another
President has taken the reins and is pushing
ahead with our hopes and aspirations and estab-
lished policies in the entire field of civil rights
and fair employment.

Abroad we have faced and continue to face
the enemies of peace and freedom. At home
we are closer to a civil rights bill than ever
seemed possible even a year ago. And we hope
that with the passage of this civil rights bill our
Negro citizens will come closer to their full
heritage guaranteed them vmder our Constitu-
tion. I continue to say to my friends in the
Congress that the most important single thing
that they can do to assist us in foreign policy
is to pass that civil rights bill that is now before
them — although that is not the principal reason
why that bill should be passed.

You may recall that 2^2 years ago I said that

' Made at a conference on equal employment oppor-
tunity at the Department of State on Mar. 12 (press
release 120 dated Mar. 16). For a report on the meet-
ing, see press release 117 dated Mar. 16.

the biggest single burden we carry on our backs
in our foreign relations in the 1960's is this
problem of discrimination here at home, and
today I would have to say again that discrimi-
nation at home is still our biggest burden.

In July I appeared before the Senate Com-
merce Committee - and had an opportunity to
speak of the relationship of discrimination at
home to our foreign policy. I said that "racial
discrimination . . . has important effects on
our foreign relations. . . . the United States is
widely regarded as the home of democracy and
the leader of the struggle for freedom, for hu-
man rights, for human dignity. We are ex-
pected to be the model — no higher compliment
could be paid to us."

In a way, the Department of State bears an
even greater responsibility than any other
agency of government to practice at home what
it preaches to the world. We have been trying
to live up to this responsibility.

Let us take a look at the picture here in the
Department. Wliat progress can we report to
you over the past 2i/^ years? How have we
carried out the recommendations you made to
us on your last visit here ?

You know, as well as I do, that you can do
almost anything with statistics. For example,
I could tell you that, since January 1961, there
has been a 130-percent increase in the number
of Negro Foreign Service officers. And there
has been a 112 percent increase in Negro civil
servants at the GS-9 to -18 level. Looking at
percentages, we may look good, but the actual
figures show a different correlation when they
are put side by side against total employment
in the Department. For example, in January
1961, there were 20 Negro Foreign Service offi-
cers. Today there are 50 against a total figure
of some 3,800 Foreign Ser^dce officers, and about
the same is true on the civil service side. In
1961, there were 25 Negi-o officers, grades 9 to
18. Today there are 58, but against a total
figure of 1,750.

One important indication is the increasing
number of higher level positions being held by
Negro officers. Two and one-half years ago
when we met, there were two Negro ambas-

' Bulletin of July 29, 1963, p. 154.

APRIL 20, 1964

629

sadors. We gained one, as you know, since then,
and recently lost him to the United States In-
formation Agency. I wish I could give you
the names of the Negro ambassadors and other
high-level Negroes who are being considered for
appointment by President Johnson, but I can-
not do so at this time. I also wish I could give
you the names of some of those who were invited
to serve but felt unable to do so. There are
now two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, one
Deputy Chief of Mission, a principal ofEcer in
charge of a consulate, two lawyers (both of
whom are women), two security officers, plus
many more, but this will give you at least some
idea of the progress in this area.

But going back to comparative statistics, I
can tell you that there are more Negro officers
in higher pajdng positions in the Department
of State than in any other agency of the govern-
ment. But, quite frankly, that isn't itself good
enough. There are now 10 Negro officers at the
GS-16 level and above. Our closest competitor
in this is our sister agency, the Agency for In-
ternational Development.

You will recall that I told you at our last
meeting how important personal contact is, how
important it is for a "circle of gossip" to pass
along the names of candidates for the foreign
affairs field. We still need this kind of help
if we are to show greater intake at the middle
and senior levels.

We also have to keep in mind the timelag be-
tween finding peoj^le who are able and willing
to take jobs in the foreign affairs field — and I
emphasize both able and wRling — and their ac-
tual entrance on duty. Tlie selection, process-
ing, and placement functions all take time, but
I do believe we are well along in our campaign
to increase the intake of top Negroes into the
Department. It is relevant in this matter of
timelag, for example, for you to laiow that
every post in the Department of State is rated
a sensitive post. This is because every impor-
tant foreign office is a target for penetration by
other governments. Now, the general average
of sensitive posts around government is between
5 and 10 percent. Here we are 100 percent.
Now, that means that we have to have the
fullest background investigation, and this
means delays of several months sometimes be-

tween our desire to appoint someone and their
actual entry on duty, and that applies of course
to all of our employees and not just to any one
particular group.

Now let us look at the intake at the entrant
level into the Foreign Service. In the past 12
months, three young Negro Foreign Service ca-
reer officers have entered on duty. One of them
is our second Negro woman in the Foreign Serv-
ice. As our examining panels are in the field
right now, we don't know yet how many Negro
officers may enter the career corps this year as
a result of the 1963 examination. We have
been, as you know, trying to increase our re-
cruitment, but we do have the problem of suc-
cessful completion of the examination.

One of our main problems has been that the
number of Negroes seeking positions in the
State Department by means of the Foreign
Service entrance examination is relatively small.
Out of 3,815 candidates who took the exam in
1961, only 119 of these were Negroes. In 1962,
110 Negroes took the exam out of almost 3,000
candidates.

I am concerned that many young Negroes
with potential for outstanding Foreign Ser\nce
careers, who might well welcome the chance to
serve their countiy abroad, do not seek entrance
to the State Department by means of this open,
competitive examination. And one of the
things that you could do that would be very
helpful to us is to help us overcome the relative
lack of attraction of the Foreign Service for
able young Negroes. If equal opportimity is to
mean fair representation at all levels of the
Department, it is essential that more Negroes
apply for positions in this way.

As you know, we have great hopes for the
success of the Foreign Affairs Scholars Pro-
gram which is under way now with a grant of
$600,000 from the Ford Foundation.' I see
Dr. Vincent Browne here, and I know he plans
to give you a full report on tlie progress he is
making. But briefly I want to say that, out of
this program, some 160 mmority group young-
sters will be benefited by the experience of a
summer internship in one of the foreign affairs
agencies, and we hope that a high percentage

' For background, see ihid., Oct. 28, 1963, p. 684.

630

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of the 100 receiving gi-aduate training will
enter the foreign affairs agencies. We will not
of course know the full effects of this program
inunediately, but the Department, and the gov-
ernment service, and the public, all stand to
gain very substantially from it, and we would
be very much interested in your comments on
this program as it will be discussed during your
meeting.

Among tlie briefing materials given you is a
report on progi-ess made on your reconmienda-
tions of 21/^ yeai-s ago. Your cooperation has
been splendid. We could not possibly have
achieved these results without your help and
your constant encouragement. I am sure you
will all have some comments to make during
the discussion on these recommendations.

Now, what more should we be doing to bring
about better representation ? We know we have
not exhausted the talent available to us, but
somehow we are not connecting with all of it.
I hope j'ou are going to be able to help us today
in this area.

Let me say just a few words on equal employ-
ment opportunity for another group that has
been called a minority group, although they are
very much the majority, and that is the women.
As you know, President Johnson has directed
that steps be taken in every department and
agency to open doors for the appointment of
women, especially to higher level positions. It
is a source of satisfaction to us — though not
complacency — that the State Department, in-
cluding the Foreign Service, has the highest
number of women in the top grades of any
agency of our government. We are eager to
increase the number of women Foreign Service
officers and to that end are encouraging more
women to take the Foreign Service entrance
examination. We lose a good many of them,
chiefly to men, but nevertheless we have some
very distinguished members of the Foreign
Service who are women and the opportunities
there are very large. In the last 21^ years, of
the 473 junior officers brought into the Foreign
Service, 10 percent were women. It is my
hope — although I am fearful of any numerical
quotas for anyone — it is my hope that in the
coming years the percentage of Negro and other

minority group candidates who are appointed
will be at least as good.

In suminar}', I want j'ou to know how pleased
we are to have you here in the Department once
again. I hope you will be completely frank in
your convei-sations today. And I want you to
know that we welcome your comments and your
criticisms and your suggestions. I am sorry
that I can't spend the rest of the day with you.
But this morning I must go to a requiem mass
for the King of Greece. I know that Under
Secretary Ball is going to speak at your lunch-
eon today and that Mr. Crockett [William J.
Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Admin-
istration] will be with you during the course of
the day.

So we want to close by expressing apprecia-
tion to you for the time you are giving us and
to assure you that we have the liveliest and
keenest interest in equal employment oppor-
tunity in the Department of State, that we are
constantly on the search for talent and that we
know that talent can come from any quarter,
that we have the most demanding jobs to offer
that one can find, I suspect, anywhere in the
world, that the stakes of success in our business
are very high, and that there are great satisfac-
tions in that service for young people who want
to dedicate themselves to their country and de-
rive some sense of contributing in the most
fundamental way to the well-being of mankind
and to the success and the prosperity of our
own and other peoples.

So thank you very much for coming, and I
will be watching with the greatest of interest
the results of your conversations and will cer-
tainly take into the fullest possible account the
suggestions and recommendations which you
make in the course of your discussions.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Duty on Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany
H.R. 9.311. H. Kept. 1278. March 24, 1964. 3 pp.

Tax on Light Bulbs Imported In Sets. Report to ac-
company H.R. 2855. H. Rept. 1291. March 24, 19fr4.
3 pp.

APRIL 20, 1964

631

Foreign Policy Needs People — Including You

Remarks iy William J. Crockett

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration^

However perplexing the problems of foreign pol-
icy, whatever our goals may be, whatever the party
in power, our policy cannot succeed without Involv-
ing the efforts of capable, dedicated people.

It takes such people to put a policy into effect,
to judge its success, to assess its weakness, to alert
us to pitfalls ahead, to evaluate the intentions of
our friends as well as our enemies, and to make
recommendations as to what policy will best serve
America. This kind of responsibility takes good
people — trained people, courageous people, loyal
people, people who hold the United States interest
above all else.

The men and women who serve you around the
world in your Foreign Service Corps are among
the best in the world. They are representative of
our country — geographically, socially, culturally,
educationally, ethnically, and economically.

We strive to attract to this service the best young
men that our society produces. Our entrance stand-
ards are tough — tough intellectually, tough phys-
ically, and tough by moral standards. From more
than 8,000 applicants this year we shall finally take
less than 200 into the service of your country. We
are selective.

We want people who can speak languages, who
have the knack of getting along with other kinds of
people, and who will represent America faithfully —
often in strange and even unfriendly lands, with
risks to health and to life itself. We do not want
security risks or persons disloyal to America. We
have a rigorous security program designed to insure
that your national interests are in safe hands. You
are being well served — ably served, loyally served —
by the finest and most dedicated corps of men and
women ever assembled in one group.

Finally there is you, the American citizen. How
can you help with our foreign policy problems?
What can one man or one community do?

We are a government "of the people, by the
people, for the people." This means that all de-
cisions ultimately must pass the test of public ac-
ceptance. You elect a House of Representatives
and one-third of the Senate every 2 years, and a
President every 4. Exercise your responsibilities
as citizens. Be well informed — accurately in-
formed— and then vote for the candidates of your

' Made at the conclusion of an address before the
1964 Greater Hastings Dinner at Hastings, Nebr.,
on Jan. 20.

choice; but do it to serve one simple purpose —
what is best for America !

Although the President and his executive branch
are the initiators and negotiators of policy, they can
go only so far as you will.

There is an even more intimate involvement be-
tween the individual citizen and foreign policy. It
has been said that how we dispose of our affairs at
home can decide elections, but how we dispose of
our relations with the rest of the world can decide
the survival of mankind. In a larger sense, how we
as individual citizens dispose of our affairs at home
will also decide how the world will dispose of its
problems — including the survival of mankind.

As we look about our great country with its beau-
tiful cities, its wonderful highways, its productive
farms, its mountains and forests and rivers, its edu-
cational institutions, we can be justly proud. But if
we look closer, we see widespread unemployment,
young people dropping out of school before they have
acquired the skills vpith which to earn a decent liv-
ing, juvenile delinquency, and dismal slums. We see
polluted streams and other natural resources ruined
forever by our greed. We see a whole people — a
people of a different color — who have been denied
the fruits of the democracy and justice we proclaim
so loudly. No, we don't believe in segregation,
but-
Each day we hear, or see in print, words of hatred
and bigotry and half-truth that cast doubt upon the
honesty, the loyalty, and the competence of those
who represent us in positions of leadership. "The
Congress is no good" — "the executive branch can't
be trusted"— "the Supreme Court has betrayed us."
So runs the evil theme. Ah yes, America has many
unsolved problems !

What does all this have to do with foreign policy?
Why do we have to insure the proper settling of
these problems to insure the final victory over com-
munism ?

Because a strong America is the only kind that
can survive and influence the affairs of the world.
The world's judgment of America is as harsh as the
judgment of your own conscience. Every American
citizen must personally assume resiwnsibility for
making America really what we proclaim it to be.

Working on these problems, personally and as a
part of the community, is what you can do for your
country. It places you shoulder to shoulder with
the men and women who are working for American
Interests around the world.

632

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar off International Confferences and Meetings >

Adjourned During March 1964

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 20th Session .

UN Economic Commission for Africa: 0th Session ....

u!n. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-
tion: 13th Session.

lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Latin American Coor-
dination.

GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session

IAEA Board of Governors .•;.•:• ^

U N ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of
Science and Technology to Development.

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel

International Coffee Council: Executive Board ......

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 4th Session .

U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 20th

U.N." ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 4th

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . .

UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee of the
Major Project on the E.xtension and Improvement of
Primary Education in Latin America: 5th Session.

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 5th Meeting .

FAO Working Parties on Rice Production and Protection;
on Rice Soils, Water, and Fertilizer Practices; and on
Agricultural Engineering Aspects of Rice Production,
Storage, and Processing.

17th World Health Assembly , • ^' ' '• •

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Orgamza-

U.N. Ad Hoc Tungsten Committee: Technical Worlsing

UNESCO Conference on the Planning and Organization of
Literacy Programs in Africa. ^ „ t i

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal
Subcommittee.

OECD Pulp and Paper Committee: Statistical Working

Party. _, ,. .. ■

Caribbean Organization: 4th Meeting of Standing Advisory
Committee of the Caribbean Plan.

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee . ••-,:,• • • •

U N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles. . .

Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 9th Meet-
ing of Technical Advisory Council, and 3d Meetmg of
Board of Directors. .■ c

UNESCO Governmental Experts on the Preparation of a
Draft Recommendation Concerning the International
Standardization of Statistics Relating to Book and Period-
ical Production.

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee .....

G4.TT Trade Negotiations Committee: Group on Cereals . .

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of African
Countries. ^ . . ,.., . ,

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: 16th Annual

Meeting.

New York Feb. 17-Mar. 18

Addis Ababa Feb. 19- Mar. 2

Geneva Feb. 24- Mar. 4

Alta Gracia, Argentina

Feb. 24-Mar. 7

Geneva Feb. 24-Mar. 20

Vienna Feb. 25-Mar. 6

New York Feb. 25-Mar. 6

Paris Mar. 2 (1 day)

London Mar. 2-5

London Mar. 2-6

Tehran Mar. 2-17

New York Mar. 2-19

Paris Mar. 3-6

Brasilia Mar. 3-6

Valparaiso Mar. 3-7

Manila Mar. 3-14

Geneva Mar. 3-21

New York Mar. 9 (1 day)

New York Mar. 9-10

Abidjan Mar. 9-14

Geneva Mar. 9-26

Paris Mar. 16-17

St. Thomas Mar. 16-18

Paris Mar. 16-18

Geneva Mar. 16-20

Montevideo Mar. 16-22

Paris Mar. 16-25

Paris Mar. 17-19

Geneva Mar. 17-20

Abidjan Mar. 17-24

San Diego Mar. 18-19

■ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 2, 1964 FoUowing is a list of abbreviations: ECE,
■ir„„„^min rnmmi^^inn for FuroDe- ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organi-
luon GA?T Gen rS Agreema'it on Tar^s and Trade IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ; IA-ECO§0C,
zaiion , vj.-i i i , yc c p a„„i„i r„„.,pil- TMCO. Intereovernmcntal Maritime Consultative Organization

APEIL 20, 1964

633

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued

Adjourned During March 1964 — Continued

OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Mar. 19-20

OECD Committee for Agriculture: Working Party I (Agri- Paris Mar. 19-21

cultural Policies).

U.N. Ad Hoc Tungsten Committee New Yorls Mar. 23-25

GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Geneva Mar. 23-25

Agriculture.

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris Mar. 23-25

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV Paris Mar. 23-25

(Expert Group).
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 31st Session (and Ad Hoc Geneva Mar. 23-26

Group of Experts on the Competitive Use of Steel).
UNESCO Executive Committee for the Preservation of the Paris Mar. 23-27

Nubian Monuments.
FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and- Rome Mar. 24-26

Mouth Disease: 11th Session.
OECD Ad Hoc Committee on Social Sciences Paris Mar. 25 (1 day)

In Session as of March 31, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development .

Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

Geneva Mar. 23, 1964-

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing Countries

Statement by Under Secretary Ball ^

Within the past few years the world has fo-
cused great attention on the relations between
wliat we have come to call the developed and the
developing nations. There has been a wide ac-
ceptance of the proposition that 20th-century
concepts of humanity require that all the world's
peoples have the oi^portunity to secure a decent
standard of living. There has also been rec-
ognition of the fact that, vmtil this goal is se-
cured, the world will not attain the stability
essential to the maintenance of peace.

The tasks of development are familiar to all
nations, no matter what may be their average

^ Made before the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development at Geneva, Switzerland, on
Mar. 25 (press release 133). For an announcement of
the U.S. delegation to the Conference, which convened
at Geneva on Mar. 23, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1964, p.
5.57; for an address by Assistant Secretary G. Griffith
Johnson entitled "A Perspective on the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development," see ibid., Mar.
16, 19C4, p. 410.

levels of income. In the United States, for ex-
ample, within this generation we have seen the
development of a substantial part of our South,
many of whose problems approximated those of
the developing nations. And, as j'ou know.
President Jolmson has launched a comprehen-
sive program to push back the margins of
poverty which still remain in the United States.
But it is a major achievement of the postwar
years that we have all come to accept the prob-
lem of economic development as a matter of
international interest and obligation.

We have had many conferences to discuss
separate aspects of this general subject. This
Conference is, I think, unique. It is organized
on a world scale, and it is addressed to the whole
problem in its full dimensions.

Tlie general frame of our discussions in the
next few weeks must inevitably be the relations
between the industrial and the developing coun-
tries, but this Confei-ence should reduce those

634

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

relations to practical terms. It should consider
till of the means by which the developing coun-
tries can obtain capital — and particularly for-
eign exchange — necessaiy for develoi)mcnt,
whether through the transfer of public resources
in the form of foreign aid, through external
private investment, through the enlargement of
internal markets, or through the expansion of
external trade. And all of these questions must
be considered in the context of a world environ-
ment that is compatible with our larger objec-
tives.

In the careful and imaginative papers that
have been drafted in preparation for this Con-
ference, the problem facing the developing
countries has been expressed in terms of a trade
gap. I think none of us — least of all, our dis-
tinguished Secretary General [Raiil Pre-
bisch] — believes in a mechanistic approach to
this question. I am sure he would agree with
me that the trade gap should be regai'ded not so
much as an arithmetical statement but as a fig-
ure of speech broadly suggesting the scale and
the challenge of the problem of development.

I know he would agree also that there are no
single or easy or even independent solutions to
this problem. It is the responsibility of this
Conference to consider all the feasible ways of
expanding our efforts in all relevant fields.

Of necessity, therefore, the Conference must
grapple with a series of interdependent issues.
It is altogether proper that the major focus for
this Conference should be on the means for mak-
ing trade a more effective instrument for de-
velopment. But these possibilities cannot be
considered in isolation. We must also explore
the means of increasing and making more effec-
tive use of the flow of foreign capital and teclini-
cal assistance — both public and private; the
economic merits of forming or expanding re-
gional economic groupings; and generally the
full range of internal policies that are critical
to the mobilization and use of capital and that
will necessarily shape the contribution that the
external environment can make to development.

Given the magnitude of the development
problem, there is ample room for imagination
and fresh ideas. At the same time, we must
be wary of approaches that do not closely
reflect the economic or political realities — ap-

proaches that begin and end in discussion and
tluis obscure the actions really needed for
progress.

The representatives of my country are here
to participate in the full and responsible dis-
cussion of all the relevant problems, problem
by problem and policy by policy. Since the
end of World War II, we Americans have been
greatly preoccupied with the task of creating
better economic conditions in the world. This
preoccupation has been nuvnifest in our trade
policies, in our economic and technical assist-
ance programs, in our Food for Pe<ace program,
and in the Peace Corps.

I am not here, however, to point out the
merits of the policies my Government has fol-
lowed. We have a great deal of business to do
together in the weeks ahead, and I hope that
we will all set aside the temptation to file self-
serving briefs that consume the time of the
Conference without advancing its objectives.
Our problems lie ahead of us — not behind us.

It is in this spirit that I wish to comment
briefly on the broad questions before the Con-
ference— not as separate issues but in terms of
how they fit into the requirements for an effec-
tive development strategy.

Responsibilities of Industrial Countries

I shall begin with the central assumption of
this meeting — an assumption in which, I am
sure, we all concur — that if the developing
countries are to achieve self-sustaining growth,
they must be able to earn a growing volume
of foreign exchange in world markets. To do
this, they must develop expanding markets for
their raw materials at reasonably stable and
equitable prices. They must also find gi-owing
world outlets for the products of their nascent
manufacturing industries. This will not hap-
pen automatically. The expansion of trading
opportunities involves difficult problems of
policy and decision for both the industrial
countries and the developing countries.

Let me begin by reviewing the contributions
that the industrial countries can make to the
trade prospects of the developing countries and,
at the same time, to the more effective use of
world resources which expanding trade can
promote.

APRIL 20, 1964

635

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation
in Task of Economic Improvement

Message From Prcsiilent Johnson'^

White House press release dated March 25

The great task of our time is to bring the fruits
of economic well-being to all peoples in a \Yorlcl
of peace and freedom. The nations of the world
have gathered in Geneva for the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development to discuss
together how to move ahead in accomplishing
this task. On behalf of the people and Govern-
ment of the United States of America, I hereby
pledge our strongest cooperation in this great
joint endeavor.

' Read before the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development at Geneva on Mar. 25 by Under
Secretary of State George W. Ball.

First, and in my view most important, is the
need for industrial countries to achieve and
maintain full employment and a high rate of
economic growth. These conditions will im-
prove both demand and prices for the exports
of the developing countries. For example,
sustained economic recovery in the United
States and Canada and continued high growth
in Western Europe and Japan were largely
responsible for the recent sharp turnaround in
prices for industrial materials. They also con-
tributed to a stronger market for some tropical
products. This improvement in demand and
prices, if sustained, will make a difference of
at least $1 billion on an annual basis in the
export earnings of the developing countries.

Full employment in the industrial countries
is also necessary to create a favorable climate
for the structiiral readjustments that accom-
pany trade liberalization. We must devise ways
and means of cushioning sudden and sharp
disruptions in the markets of importing coun-
tries. On the basic issues, however, we in the
industrial countries need more education in
trade — both to deflate the mythology that still
surrounds competition from the so-called low-
wage countries and to produce a better under-
standing of the large potential for gains from
freer trade. Such education can best be con-
ducted in an atmosphere of full employment.

Second, the industrial countries as a group
must be prepared to reduce tariffs and other
barriers to the imports of primary products,
semiprocessed materials, and manufactured
goods of special interest to the developing
countries. The industrial countries have done
much in recent years to reduce these barriers.
More can be achieved by deep, across-the-board
tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round, and we are
prepared to have these benefits accorded to the
developing coimtries without asking reciprocity.
Such tariff cuts can be of immediate help to the
developing countries. But even more impor-
tant, they can provide an environment that will
make it possible for them to build productive
export industries. It is at this point that the
present Conference and the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Conference,
which is to follow, so strongly complement each
other.

Third, the industrial countries should be pre-
pared to cooperate, wherever and whenever
feasible, in perfecting arrangements that would
reduce instabilities associated with trade in
commodities and thus enhance development.

We have made some progress in cusliioning
the effects of fluctuations in commodity prices
through the new drawing rights in the Inter-
national Monetaiy Fund.

We also support efforts to stabilize prices of
specific commodities in chronic oversupply at
levels consistent both with market forces and
development requirements. These problems can
be usefully approached only on a commodity-
by-commodity basis, and the arrangements we
work out must be designed both to deal with the
imderlying supply imbalances and to promote
development. There is no grand design for the
myriad of individual commodity situations and
problems. We should frankly recognize that
such agreements, important as they may be for
some commodities, are feasible for only a small
nmnber.

Principles of Nondiscriminatory Trade

These lines of action all stem from the re-
sponsibilities and obligations of a multilateral
and nondiscriminatory trading system. We
have worked throughout the postwar period to
try to build such an open trading society in the

636

DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

conviction that it would jiromote a rational and
iirective use of the world's resources, that it
would benefit all participants in world trade,
and that it would be most fully responsive to the
constantly changing conditions of a djuiamic
trading world.

We still hold this conviction. We believe that
the principle of nondiscrimination has great
inherent values, that proposals to depart from
that principle should be rigorously scrutinized,
and that we should encourage such departures
only where the case for doing so is strong and
fully proven.

During the period of preparation for this
Conference, there has been considerable discus-
sion of various forms of preferential tariff ar-
rangements designed to benefit the developing
nations. Proposals have also been put forward
for the organization of regional or global mar-
kets for the products of these countries. As I
mentioned earlier, the United States believes
that we should objectively examine any pro-
posals that might contribute to development.
But we must all be quite sure that proposals
are defined with sufficient precision so that there
is no misunderstanding as to their meaning.
This is essential if their implications are to be
fully comprehended and thoughtfully con-
sidered.

We must be sure also that such proposals will
not create more problems than they solve. In
other words, we must satisfy ourselves that they
will produce significant economic benefits for at
least some coimtries and that those benefits will
outweigh the costs to all countries of depart-
ing from the principles of nondiscriminatory
trade.

With respect to preferential arrangements,
for example, we must be clear whether a pro-
posal is global or regional in character —
whether it contemplates an application to all
countries or only to specific countries or groups
of countries.

In the postwar world there have been two
competing concepts as to how the industrial and
developing countries might most usefully or-
ganize their relations. In principle, my Gov-
ernment has assumed that all industrial
countries should accept a responsibility to ad-
vance the economic well-being of all developing

countries. But the view has also been ad-
vanced— sometimes more by way of emphasis
than as an assertion of discrete principle — that
it would be better to organize these relationships
on the basis of special responsibilities between
individual industrial countries or groups of
countries and individual developing countries
or groups of countries.

I do not think that we can fully resolve this
major conceptual question in the coui-se of this
Conference. But I do feel that, in discussing
proposals for special trading relationships be-
tween the industrial and developing countries,
we must be quite clear whether they fall within
one pattern or the other. Moreover, we should
conduct our discussions during the coming
weeks in full awareness that special trading ar-
rangements have historically evolved in the con-
text of special political relationships and that
special responsibilities in the area of trade are
likely to carry with them special responsibilities
in the areas of politics and even of defense.

I do not make these points to support either
one approach or the other but rather to point
out that serious departures from the principles
of nondiscriminatorj^ trade — particularly in re-
lation to trading arrangements between the in-
dustrial and the developing countries — inevita-
bly involve the question as to how key relations
among nations should be organized.

Improving Home Markets

I have mentioned certain measures that in-
dustrial countries can take to improve access to
their markets and to expand their demand for
imports from the developing countries. Simply
stated, the more access, the more trade — and the
United States strongly favors lower tariffs and
greater market access.

But tariffs have become less of a barrier to
exports, and this will be true all the more after
the Kennedy Round. To exploit the opportuni-
ties that stem from greater market access for
their manufactures, the developing countries
must be able to compete not merely with other
exporting countries but with the domestic in-
dustries of the importuig countries.

It is essential, therefore, for the developing
countries to market their manufactures on a
competitive basis. This, in turn, will often de-

APRIL 20, 1964

637

pend on their ability to develop mass national
markets — or, where necessary, regional markets.

It is in such markets that the economies of
scale originate. This f imdamental point is well
documented in the history of countries going
through the process of development. Apart
from a very few special cases, manufactures
have been sold massively abroad only after they
have been produced for an extensive market at
home.

Under these circumstances, we might all give
more consideration and support to ways of ex-
panding internal markets in the developing
countries. In most cases this will require ac-
tions in both the rural and urban areas and the
use, in combination, of private and public capi-
tal— domestic and foreign.

In rural areas higher priority might well be
accorded to raising agricultural productivity
and modernizing systems of marketing. In
urban areas more could be done to break away
from the traditional and restrictive marketing
patterns that characterize many of the narrowly
based industries in the developing comitries and
to aim at larger scale and lower cost production
for the home market.

These two lines of action could reinforce each
other and result in a rise in productivity, a re-
duction in costs, and an increase in demand. In
these ways production for a large domestic mar-
ket could help the developing countries produce
and sell manufactured goods competitively on
the world market.

Economic Cooperation on Regional Basis

Many coimtries, of course, are too small to
provide domestic mass markets. The benefits
of such a market may be achieved by economic
cooperation on a regional basis.

Unquestionably the postwar dismantling of
colonial arrangements and the birth of 51 new
countries has involved some serious economic
costs. As our Secretary General has pointed
out, nearly 100 of the nations represented at this
Conference have populations of less than 15
million. Of these, two-thirds have popula-
tions of less than 5 million.

The integration of national markets into
regional markets offers possibilities for recoup-
ing these economic costs — and much more.

Manufacturing industries based on the larger
internal needs of a regional market will reach a
competitive position in international markets
much earlier and much more effectively.

The United States supports further efforts
in this field. We favor changing the GATT
rules to give developing countries more flexibil-
ity to pursue various forms of economic inte-
gration— partial or comprehensive. But the
industrial countries should continue to be sub-
ject to strict standards in this regard.

This is, in other words, a case where special
trade preferences among groups of developing
countries could make a contribution to economic
growth large enough to outweigh the costs of
a departure from nondiscriminatory trading
principles.

But let us have no illusions as to the under-
lying requirement for real progress through
integration. The economic advantages of such
a course depend on the degi-ee to which competi-
tive principles are permitted to guide the use
and movement of labor, capital, and materials
within an economic union or trading group.
This requires that the participating nations put
aside considerations of political prestige and
advantage and that they commit themselves
from the outset to a full line of action. Thus,
each step forward will make it that much more
difficult to reverse the entire process.

Need for Private Foreign Investment

Wlien we talk of a development gap, we are
talking in large measure of the need of the
developing countries to be able to draw on
greater capital resources for investment. Part
of these capital resources must be used to fi-
nance the import of equipment and other mate-
rials from abroad. All these cajjital resources
are required to enable a nation to use its human
and material resources more effectively and to
gain access to the benefits of the constantly
widening revolution in technology.

Private foreign investment can itself provide
a major source of such capital. In addition, it
can stimulate the mobilization of domestic
capital in the developing countries. Finally,
it normally brings with it teclinological skills
and a knowledge of foreign markets that can

638

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

facilitate the efforts of developing countries
to expand tlieir export industries.

However, the data on the flow of private
investment in recent years are vei-y disturbing.
In 1956 the net flow of private capital from all
member countries of the Development Assist-
ance Conunittee to the developing countries
amounted to $2.4 billion, or 43 percent of the
total flow of foreign capital moving to those
countries. By 1962 the contribution of private
capital was still $2.4 billion, but it represented
only 29 percent of the total capital flow.

Over the past two or three decades standards
of conduct in international business have under-
gone drastic change for the better. Yet many
developing countries are, I fear, still influenced
by the cliches of the past. Would it not be use-
ful to examine carefully the experience of coun-
tries that have been attracting a flow of private
foreign investment? "Would it not also be use-
ful to study the new techniques, new attitudes,
and new procedures that have arisen in this
field in response to the conditions of this cen-
tury?

In raising these questions I do not wish to be
misunderstood. My countiy, while itself com-
mitted to free enterprise, does not seek to dictate
the form or shape of the economic systems of
others. I recognize that there are internal po-
litical and emotional pressures that may create
opposition to the investment of external capital
in many countries. I am well aware of differ-
ences in conditions and outlook among the na-
tions of the world that require diversity in
business as well as in other forms of social orga-
nization. I am aware also that even the facili-
ties and organizational modes for providing
such capital require adjustment to changing
conditions. They have evolved in the past, and
further evolution is in progress.

But nations must make their choices of na-
tional policy with full awareness of inescapable
economic facts. Nations that elect to pursue
policies that tend to eliminate the private sector
or discriminate against outside investment
should be aware that they are denying them-
selves a source of capital that could otherwise
greatly speed their ovm economic development.

I suggest, therefore, that in the course of these
proceedings we reexamine the possibilities of

expanding the flow of external private invest-
ment capital.

Private capital admittedly cannot be more
than one element in an interrelated approach to
development. Yet, witli regard to this question
as to so many others, the developing countries
have it within their own hands to determine how
fast they will move in achieving growth. Their
attitudes and their laws and their procedures
will, in most cases, determine whether the flow
of external private capital and technology takes
place. Experience gives us no limits on how far
the process can carry.

Role of Foreign Aid

I turn finally to the question of foreign aid —
bilateral and multilateral. Clearly this is
neither the least important nor the residual ele-
ment in the package. But economic assistance
is made more — or less — effective by what hap-
pens in the other fields we have discussed.

My Government believes that foreign aid
should assist developing countries with a sup-
plemental source of capital. Tliis capital can
contribute to development in the following spe-
cific ways :

First, as a supplemental source of long-term
capital for certain projects that will not produce
immediate returns but which are a necessary
base for other projects and a stimulant to the
development process as a whole;

Second, as a source of capital to finance im-
ports of materials and equipment that could
otherwise become serious production bottlenecks
in a situation of foreign exchange stringency ;

Third, as a source of seed capital that can
stimulate the mobilization and effective use of
capital from internal sources.

We believe, in short, that foreign aid will
play an essential role if it exercises the catalytic
effect it is designed to produce. This, in turn,
will depend on cooperation between donor and
recipient coimtries.

We are looking forward to an extensive and
frank discussion at the Conference of the re-
quirements for aid and the functions aid can
perform. At this point such a discussion could
serve a healthy purpose. Almost without excep-
tion the industrial countries now conrmiand the
resources that enable them to participate in

APRIL 20, 1964

639

supplying foreign assistance. Yet more and
more of the donor countries are becoming con-
cerned over whether their eiforts are producing
the results for which they had hoped. In al-
locating capital assistance they sometimes find
a shortage of what they consider to be soundly
conceived projects. The developing countries,
on the other hand, have now acquired the ex-
perience to speak with some assurance on how
they themselves can contribute to the process.
A constructive exchange of views can resolve
misunderstanding. It can lead to the time when
industrial countries, in speaking of the need for
self-help, and developing coimtries, in em-
phasizing their requirements for foreign capi-
tal, will not be talking at cross purposes. In
fact, at the working level where development
decisions are made from day to day, there is
already a wider common basis of concepts,
vocabulary, and experience than is generally
understood. I believe this Conference can en-
large these understandings among us.

Collective Obligations and Responsibilities

There are, it seems to me, a few general com-
ments that we should bear in mind during our
discussions.

First, the economic growth of any nation is a
mixture of interrelated elements. We can em-
phasize one element or another at this Confer-
ence, but it would be unwise for us to focus on
any single element to the exclusion of the others.

Second, economic development should not be
studied simply in terms of aggregates. It is a
phenomenon of individual coimtries. It is not
the summation on a world basis of unrequited
needs but the reflection of individual country
programs, carefully drawn up, faithfully ex-
ecuted, and reflecting a national purpose.

Third, economic development is an intricate
and difficult process. It has proved difficult
for the industrial countries who have gone
through it in the past, and it will be so for the
newer countries that are going through it now.
The developing countries of today, however,
have the advantages of today's technology and
of close international cooperation. These ad-
vantages can accelerate the process of growth.

These three propositions could, I think, set
the tone for the Conference. After all, this is

no adversary proceeding between the industrial
and developing countries. The distinction be-
tween the two groups is not a clear one, and the
differences within the two groups are very large.

We are here to solve problems we accept as
common problems — not to debate. We are here
to draw nations standing at different points
along the historic paths of growth closer to-
gether— not to divide them.

The progress of the developing countries re-
quires the cooperation of all, and it is futile to
test proposals on the assumption that what one
gains the other must necessarily lose.

All of us — the industrial and developing
countries — have unfilled aspirations at home.
But we are also part of an interdependent world
with collective obligations and responsibilities.
We each have vested interests in the other's
welfare.

My comitry believes strongly in this kind of
interdependence and in these kinds of vested
interests. We have been, and continue to be,
committed to help those who wish to help them-
selves, and we undertake this commitment, as
President Kennedy said in his inaugural ad-
dress, for one reason only : "because it is right." ^

Advisers Named to Delegation
to U.N. Trade Conference

The Department of State announced on April
2 (press release 141) the designation of the fol-
lowing four public advisers to the U.S. delega-
tion to the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development :

Nathaniel Goldfinger, director of the Department of
Research, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Claire Giannlni Hoffman, director of the Bank
of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion, San Francisco, Calif.

Orin Lehman, board chairman, Colgreen Broadcast-
ing Group, and executive director of the Eleanor
Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, New York, N.Y.

Bertrand Seidman, European economic representa-
tive of the AFL-CIO, Paris.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development opened at Geneva, Switzerland,
March 23 and is scheduled to conclude on June
15.

"/ftW., Feb. 6,1961, p. 175.

640

DEPARTIilENT OF STATE BULLETIN

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peaceful
Nuclear Activities and for Bomber Destruction

Following are statements made before the
Conference of the 18-Natioti Committee on Dis-
armament at Geneva by Adrian S. Fisher, Dep-
uty Director of the UjS. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 5

At present only a few countries can produce
nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all
the world that their number not be increased.

An increasingly large number of countries
have peaceful nuclear programs. It is in the
interest of all that their number continue to
increase.

However, without effective safeguards, the
materials and teclmology wliich are acquired
for peacefid uses of nuclear energy may be di-
verted to produce nuclear weapons. Unless ef-
fective safeguards are applied, what started
out as a use of the atom for peace may turn into
the development of the atom for war. Should
this happen, the benefits to mankind which we
liope to obtain by the wide uses of nuclear en-
ergy for peaceful purposes may be far over-
shadowed by the dangers resulting from the
increase in the nimiber of nations having the
capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It is,
therefore, of great importance that we create
effective safeguards against this. To do so is
not easy, but it is possible.

It is in that light that I should like to discuss
today two of the proposals contained in the fifth
point of President Jolmson's message to this
Conference.^

The fifth point of the President's message
calls for an agreement :

. . . that all transfers of nuclear materials for
peaceful purposes take place under effective interna-
tional safeguards. . . .

It also calls upon the major nuclear powers to :

. . . accept in an increasing number of their peace-
ful nuclear activities the same inspection they recom-
mend for other states. . . .

I should like, first, to review the major in-
ternational activities and policies of the United
States in the field of atomic energy. Against
that background, I shall then develop further
those two proposals in the President's message
for international safeguards.

A series of agreements for cooperation pro-
vides the basic framework within which the
United States participates in peaceful nuclear
activities with other countries and international
organizations. These include agreements with
the International Atomic Energy Agency and
with various regional organizations active in
the field. They also include bilateral agree-
ments for cooperation with some 35 countries.

The nuclear materials which we have dis-
tributed abroad under agreements for coopera-
tion are valued at approximately $82.5 million.
Eeactors and critical assemblies supplied by the
United States are located in 24 countries. Each
is subject to safeguards to insure against di-
version of the materials or equipment to mili-
tary uses. The system of safeguards applied
bilaterally by the United States Government is
administered by the United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission.

The United States has also given its strong
support to the development of an effective sys-
tem of international safeguards by the Inter-

^For text, see Bctxetin of Feb. 10, 10C4, p. 224;
for a statement made by William C. Foster on Jan. 31
on President Johnson's proposal of a "verified freeze on
the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear
offensive and defensive vehicles," see i&irf.. Mar. 2. 1964,
p. 350; for a statement made by Mr. Fo.ster on Feb. 6
on the President's proposal to curb the spread of
nuclear weapons, see ihid.. Mar. 9, 1064, p. 376.

APRIL 20, 1964

641

national Atomic Enerofj' Agency. Tlie United
States bilateral system is fully consistent with
that IAEA system.

In recent years the IAEA has made signifi-
cant progress toward the development of a
comprehensive system of international safe-
guards. Agency safeguards for small reactors
of less than 100,000 thermal kilowatts were
adopted on 31 January 1961. Final action ex-
tending the system to large reactors of 100,000
thermal kilowatts or more was taken on 26
February 1964. That final decision of the
Board of Governors of the IAEA was unani-
mous. In particular we welcome the coopera-
tion of the Soviet Union in extending the
Agency safeguards system.

We hope that m the future the IAEA wiU
extend further its system of safeguards to cover
fuel fabrication and chemical reprocessing fa-
cilities.

It is the policy of the United States to trans-
fer the administration of safeguards under its
existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as
rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this pol-
icy, the United States and Japan, for instance,
have recently transferred to the IAEA respon-
sibility for administering safeguards under
their existing agreement for cooperation. The
United States is currently negotiating addition-
al transfers with a number of its other bilateral
partners.

Some 2 years ago, the IAEA was also in-
vited by the United States to apply Agency
safeguards to several of its own smaller re-
search and power reactors. Three reactors in
the United States are at present being inspected
by the IAEA. Two are research reactors lo-
cated at Brookhaven, New York ; the third is a
45,500-thermal-kilowatt power reactor located
in Ohio. The opening of these facilities to
IAEA inspection has, we believe, been a step
in developing the principle of safeguarding
the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has also
assisted the IAEA in gaining practical experi-
ence in field-testing inspection tecliniques.

The United States does not believe that the
opening of these reactors to international in-
spection is a derogation of its national sover-
eignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous.
It involves recordkeeping, reporting, and in-

spection— the same kind of controls as prudent
management would naturally set up internally.
For the purposes of a safeguard system, such
controls must be checked and inspected by an
external agency.

For the necessai-y external check, we prefer
international to bilateral safeguards. There is
little reason for any country to doubt the ob-
jectivity of inspections conducted by an inter-
national inspectorate in which nationals of a
variety of coimtries participate.

I should now like to develop further the
United States proposals regarding internation-
al safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

First, the United States proposes that aU
future transfers of nuclear materials for peace-
ful purposes take place under effective interna-
tional safeguards. We believe that this pro-
posal could be implemented by appropriate
agreements, which would grow out of this Con-
ference, covering all such future transfers.
Fissionable materials or raw materials or equip-
ment essential to the production of fissionable
materials would be covered. Suppliers would
agree to transfer materials and equipment only
under IAEA safeguards or similar arrange-
ments. Recipients would agree to receive ma-
terials or equipment only under such safe-
guarded arrangements. Provisions relating to
open teclinology and authorized visits by scien-
tists for study and observation might also be
included.

We believe that the agreement regarding
transfers should, in addition, provide for the
extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an
increasing number of the peaceful-use facilities
of all states receiving assistance.

Second, the United States proposes that the
major nuclear powers accept in an increasing
number of their own peaceful nuclear activities
the same inspection as recommended for other
states.

As a first step in that direction, the United
States has already accepted IAEA safeguards
on certain of its peaceful-use facilities, as I
have described previously.

As a second step, the United States will in-
vite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large
power reactor in the United States. The
Yankee power reactor at Kowe, Massachusetts,

642

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

has been selected for this purpose. This pri-
vately owned reactor, which is rated at a power
level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the
largest nuclear power reactors in operation in
the United States. In 1963 it produced over 1
billion electrical kilowatt hours.

We are otFering the Yankee reactor for
IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it
will assist the IAEA further in developing and
demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection
tecliniques for large reactor facilities. Second,
we intend it as an example to other nuclear
powers. We hope that other states will join
us in this step and invite the application of
IAEA safeguards on some of their large civil
reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in par-
ticular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so.

Progress toward development of an effective
system of international safeguards for peaceful
nuclear activities is an important objective in
itself. Therefore the United States will invite
IAEA inspection of the Yankee reactor
whether or not other states reciprocate. But,
as I have said, we urge the Soviet Union in
particular to reciprocate. If it should do so,
we could then discuss the possibility that we
might both place additional peaceful atomic
energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

Some members of the Committee may wonder
about the significance of these proposals as re-
gards a slowing down of the arms race. Today
I have talked about IAEA safeguards, not gen-
eral and complete disarmament. I have talked
of inspection of peaceful nuclear reactors in-
stead of the destruction of armaments. Yet I
believe that the proposals which the United
States has put forward this morning could, if
acted upon, produce one of the most significant
developments of this Conference.

In the future, atomic energy will become an
increasingly important resource for fulfilling
man's daily needs. As that happens, transfers
of nuclear materials between states for peace-
ful purposes will increase both in frequency and
in size. Participation in atomic energy re-
search and civil power programs will become
more and more widespread.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to
take the steps which will insure that these
peaceful atomic energy activities are not di-

verted to military purposes. It is essential to
build up the international safeguards which
will keep that from happening.

If we do not, wo shall find that in extending
the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses we have not sown a field with choice seed
which will ripen into a field of grain for the
benefit of all mankind. We may find instead
that we have sown the field with dragons' teeth
and, when harvest comes, it will bristle with
nuclear weapons. What the United States pro-
poses are practical steps to keep that from hap-
pening.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 19

In our search for measures of common in-
terest the United States has presented to this
Conference a series of proposals which would
in the first instance prevent the acceleration or
extension of the arms race and would result
eventually in a reversal of its course. Pro-
posals such as those for a freeze of offensive and
defensive strategic nuclear vehicles and a cutoff
of the production of fissionable materials for
use in nuclear weapons embody this approach.

Today I should like to present to the Com-
mittee a proposal for the physical destruction
of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy
are of real significance. They are bomber air-
craft wliich can carry weapons of immense
destructive capability. Agreement on and im-
plementation of this measiu-e would present a
graphic example of armament reduction to the
entire world.

The United States proposes destruction by the
United States and the Soviet Union of an equal
number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We pro-
pose that tliis destruction be carried out at the
rate of 20 per month on each side, the bombers
to be taken from the operational inventory. We
are prepared to continue destruction of these
bombers at this rate for a period of 2 years.
In addition, we are prepared to increase the
total number destroyed by adding to the
monthly quota an additional agreed number to
be taken from bombers stored and preserved for
emergency mobilization.

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in
which this destruction will be verified. The
verification should be relatively simple. It

APRIL 20, 1964

643

should include no more than the observation
of the destruction of the montlily quota of
agreed bombers from each country at designated
depots.

The B^7 bomber, which we are ready to de-
stroy as our part of this agreement, is a truly
formidable weapon. The B-47 is a six-engine
jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles with-
out refueling. With in-flight refueling, it is
an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a
multimegaton bomb load. AVe can gather some
measure of the danger of our times by noting
that the explosive yield from the bomb load of
one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs
dropped by all bombers in the Second World
War.

As long as such bombers remain in existence
in the hands of the nuclear powers — whether ac-
tually flying or stored so that they can easily
be rendered flyable — they remain a substantial
factor of military power. In the hands of non-
nuclear powers — and used without nuclear
weapons — these planes are no less a factor of
military power. The B^7 is superior in many
respects to any other bomber outside the forces
of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr.
[Semyon K.] Tsarapkin, summed it up last
Thursday when he said of bomber aircraft:
"They still are a powerful means for attack."

The United States and the Soviet Union are
the possessors of the world's gi-eatest military
arsenals. That is particularly true with regard
to nuclear delivery vehicles.

The B-47 and TU-16 bombers are logical
armaments with which to start the process of
physical destruction of arms. The United
States and the Soviet Union possess roughly
comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two
types of aircraft have been assigned generally
similar strategic roles. Thus, the balance in the
overall force structure of the two sides would be
maintained at the reduced levels resulting from
their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping
with the fifth principle in the Joint Statement
of Agreed Principles : = that measures of this
kind should be balanced so that no state or
group of states should gain a military advan-

' For text, see ihid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

tage and that security should be insured equally
for all.

The verification required would be simple. It
would not involve areas of great sensitivity.

Some may argue that the destruction of B^7
and TU-16 bombers makes no real difference
because the United States plans to phase out the
B^7. The United States does have plans to
phase B-47's out of its battle-ready forces. I
assume the Soviet Union also has phaseout
plans for the TU-16. But the phasing out of
aircraft does not mean destmction. Bombers
in storage can be flying again in short order.

Wliat the United States is now proposing is
to negotiate a rate of destruction which, if im-
mediately implemented, would be significantly
faster than the recent destruction rate. More-
over, phaseout plans are subject to reconsidera-
tion in the light of changing international cir-
cumstances. That has happened in the past;
it could happen again. The United States is
now proposing the actual physical destruction
of an equal number of bombers on each side.
Once actual physical destruction has been ac-
complished, the aircraft can no longer be re-
turned to operational status.

I have already explained that the B^7 bomb-
er is a truly fonnidable weapon. It makes a
great deal of difference whether these bombers
and the TU-16's are physically destroyed, as the
United States proposes, or are retained in active
forces, preserved for emergency mobilization,
or transferred to third countries.

TJie United States, in the proposal which we
are discussing today, and the Soviet Union, in
its proposal of 28 January, have both dealt with
the destruction of bomber aircraft. We should,
therefore, be able to follow the directions given
us by the eighth principle of the Joint State-
ment of Agreed Principles and work out the
widest possible area of agreement between us
at the earliest possible date.

From the position which the Soviet Union has
thus far put forward at this Conference we are
not yet able to determine the extent and nature
of the destruction of bombers it envisages; but
that should be no obstacle to agreement on the
United States proposal. Agreeuient on our pro-
posal can be reached now, without involving us
in the highly difficult issuer raised by an all-en-
compassing plan.

644

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

An agreement for the destruction of all bomb-
er aircraft would raise a series of complex ques-
tions. For cxam})lc, there is the question of the
participating nations, not all of which might be
able to agree to eliminate their bombers in the
absence of altornat ive means of protecting them-
selves. Again, there is the matter of coverage:
What would constitute a bomber for the pur-
poses of such an agreement? There are many
types of aircraft, both civil and militiiry, which
might be capable of carrying bombs, although
we would not consider them as bombers and
could not reasonably be expected to agree to
their destruction. Perhaps the most serious
question is the imbalance which would result
from such a proposal. There are great differ-
ences among nations in the size, mission, and
strategic role of the bomber fleet of each, and
consequently great differences in the effects
which the elimination of all bombers would have
on national security.

The proposal of the United States makes it
possible to get on promptly with the objective
of the Soviet proposal — the physical destruc-
tion of bombers — without having to deal with
those vexatious problems. The aircraft we pro-
pose to destroy would be included within any
possible interpretation of the Soviet plan.
Therefore the nations have everything to gain
and nothing to lose by agreeing promptly to our
proposal and by promptly putting the agree-
ment into effect.

The proposal to destroy an equal number of
B-^7's and TU-16"s, if acted upon, could be of
real significance to this Conference.

First, it would provide a tangible reduction in
one important category of the world's inventory
of weapons. Tlie advantages of that can be
seen in relation to such broad measures as a
freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, where a re-
duction in bombers would mean freezing at an
even lower level than would otherwise be pos-
sible.

Second, it would insure that the bombers de-
stroyed covdd not be transferred to the arma-
ment inventories of other nations. That would
impose an important restraint on the prolifera-
tion of highly sophisticated weapon systems.
It would insure that the resources of other na-
tions would not be diverted from the task of na-

tional development to maintaining and operat-
ing these costly weapons.

To sunmiarize briefly what I have said, we
propose that the United States and the Soviet
Union agree to destroy an equal number of B^7
and TU-16 bombers on a one-for-one basis, at
an agreed rate, with simple verification.

This proposal is only a step toward solving
the problem of disarmament; but by taking it
we can begin to reduce tlie destructive capabil-
ity present in the world and lessen the dangers
of its proliferation. We can take one more step
toward reducing the nuclear threat which hangs
over all mankind.

For those reasons we should surely carry on
with this proposal and do so right away.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed beloiv) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letters regarding the Somali-Ethiopian border dispute :

Representative of Somalia to the President of the
Security Council requesting that the Security
Council be convened. S/5536. February 10, 1964.
1 p.

Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the
Security Council, transmitting tests of messages
sent on February 10 by Chairman Khrushchev to
the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Prime Minister
of Somalia. S/5538 and S/5539. February 13,
1964. 3 pp. each.

Representative of Somalia to the President of the
Security Council, transmitting a cable dated Feb-
ruary 13, 1964, from the Prime Minister of So-
malia, superseding the request for conveniug of
the Security Council pending action by the Orga-
nization of African Unity. S/o542. February 14,
1964. 2 pp.

Representative of Somalia to the President of the
Security Council, transmitting maps showing areas
allegedly under Ethiopian attack. 8/55.57. Feb-
ruary 20, 1964. 5 pp.

Representative of Somalia to the President of the
Security Council, transmitting the text of a reso-
lution adopted on February 14, 1964, by the Ex-
traordinary Session of the OAtJ Council of Minis-
ters. S/5.'.58. February 20, 1964. 2 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the organization

and operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping

Force in Cyprus. S/5593, March 12, 1964, 10 pp.,

and Add. 1, March 12, 1964, 1 p.

APRIL 20, 19C4

645

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on temporary importation of pri-
vate road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservation), Oc-
tober 31, 1963.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservations),
October 31, 1963.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963 ; '

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, March
4, 1964.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien-
tific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at
Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force
May 21, 1952."

Extension to: Cook Islands (including Niue), Feb-
ruary 28, 1964.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation
of commercial samples and advertising material.
Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into
force November 20, 1955; for the United States Oc-
tober 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.
Accessio7i deposited: France, February 7, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations concerning compulsory settlement of dis-
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.'
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Febru-
ary 13, 1964.

Health

Constitution of tJie World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered
into force April 7, 1948 ; for the United States June
21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Zanzibar, February 29, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: Uganda, April 2, 1964; Yugo-
slavia, April 3, 1964.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25,
1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force
March 9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929.
46 Stat 2183.
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 12, 1964.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners

of war ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950 ; for the United States Feb-
ruary 2, 19.56. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365,
respectively.
Accession deposited: Nepal, February 7, 19&4.

Women — Political Rights

Convention on political rights of women. Done at
New York March 21, 1953. Entered into force July
7, 1954."
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 12, 1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the winter maintenance of the
Haines-Fairbanks pipeline. Effected by exchange of
notes at Ottawa March 6, 1964. Entered into force
March 6, 1964.

ivory Coast

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701-
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan
March 10, 1964. Entered into force March 10, 1964.

Jamaica

Agreement concerning United States defense areas In
the Federation of The West Indies, with annexes,
memorandum of understanding, agreed minute and
exchanges of notes. Signed at Port of Spain Febru-
ary 10, 1961. Entered into force February 10, 1961.
TIAS 4734.
Terminated with respect to Jamaica: March 19, 1964,

Spain

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
progran>s. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid,
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.

Agreement providing for the financing of certain educa-
tional exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 4120,
4612) . Signed at Madrid October 16, 1958.
Terminated: March 18, 1964 (superseded by agree-
ment of March 18, 1964, supra).

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat 454; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at
Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered Into force March
2, 1964.

646

DEPARTMEN'T OF STATE BULLETIK

INDEX Apt^il £0, J 964. Vol L, No. ie9S

American Principles

The Anatomy of World Leadership (Steven-
son) 615

Foreiiin Policy Needs People — Including Tou

(Crockett) 632

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of April 3 608

Atomic Energ^r

Secretary Husk's News Conference of April 3 . 608

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peace-
ful Nuclear Activities and for Bomber De-
struction (Fisher) 641

Aviation. United States and Italy Discuss Air
Relations (joint communique) 628

Brazil

President Sends Good Wishes to New President

of Brazil (text of message) 609

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 3 . 608
Congo. TheThirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) . . 622

Congress. Congressional Docimients Relating
to Foreign Policy 631

Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
April 3 608

Cyprus. The Thirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) . 622

Department and Foreign Service

Equal Employment Opportunity (Rusk) . . . 629

Foreign Policy Needs People — Including You

(Crockett) 632

Disarmament. U.S. Makes Proposals for Safe-
guards for Peaceful Nuclear Activities and
for Bomber Destruction (Fisher) .... 641

Economic Affairs

Advisers Named to Delegation to U.N. Trade

Conference 640

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing

Countries (Ball) 634

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of

World Economic Improvement 636

Trade Benefits To Be Continued to Poland and

Yugoslavia 626

Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference

of AprU 3 608

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 633

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peace-
ful Nuclear Activities and for Bomber De-
struction (Fisher) 641

Italy. United States and Italy Discuss Air Re-
lations (joint communique) 628

Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of

April 3 608

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, a

Growing Partnership (Johnson) 606

Panama. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
April 3 608

Poland. Trade Benefits To Be Continued to
Poland and Yugoslavia 626

Presidential Documents

NATO, a Growing Partnership 606

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of

World Economic Improvement 636

President Sends Good Wishes to New President

of Brazil 609

Trade Benefits To Be Contlnuetl to Poland and

Yugoslavia 626

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Needs People —

Including You (Crockett) 632

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 646

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
April 3 608

United Nations

Advisers Named to Delegation to U.N. Trade
Conference 640

The Anatomy of World Leadership (Steven-
son) 615

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing
Countries (Ball) 634

Current U.N. Documents 645

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of

World Economic Improvement 636

TheThirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) 622

Yugoslavia. Trade Benefits To Be Continued to
Poland and Yugoslavia 626

Xame Index

Ball, George W 634

Cleveland, Harlan 622

Crockett, William J 632

Fisher, Adrian S 641

Johnson, President 606, 609, 626, 636

Rusk, Secretary 608, 629

Stevenson, Adlai E 615

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 30-April 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Oflice
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to March 30 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 120 of
March 16, 128 of March 20, and 133 of March 25.

No. Date Subject

*137 3/30 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

tl38 3/31 Williams: "New Patterns of Afri-
can Trade."

tl39 4/1 Schwartz : "Foreign and Domestic
Implications of U.S. Immigration
Laws."

•140 4/1 Parking regulations for foreign dip-
lomats.

141 4/2 Public advisers named to delegation

to U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (rewrite).

142 4/2 Stevenson : "The Anatomy of World

Leadership."

143 4/3 Rusk : news conference of April 3.

144 4/3 Continuation of trade concessions

to Poland and Yugoslavia.

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Buixetin.

U.S SOVCRnilEaT rRimiHS OFFICEjI9<4

COPLtV SQUAR-
BOSTON MASS OcHT

.^> I UN, D.C. 20402

OFFIL.-

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. S30O

(SPO)

f

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Third Anniversary of tiie Alliance for Progress

This 12-page pamphlet is the text of an address by President Joluison at the Pan American Union
on March 16, 1964, on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as Chairman of
the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.

President Jolinson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various
areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success.

PUBLICATION 7669 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

TO:

SUPT. OP DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Enclosed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documents)

PUBLICATION 7669 15 cents

Please send me copies of Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Propreu

N.VME

ADDUESS

CITY, 8TATE

"a CI?

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol L, No. 1296

AprU 27, 1964

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Address by Secretary Rusk 650

THE OPEN SYSTEM IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

by Under Secretary Ball 667

NEW PATTERNS OF AFRICAN TRADE

by Assistant Secretary Williams 664

THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN TRADE EXPANSION
by Christian A. Herter 671

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS

hy Abba P. Schwartz 676

For index see inside back cover

The Atlantic Alliance

Address hy Secretary Rush ^

Sixteen years ago last Friday, the Economic
Cooperation Act, authorizing the Marshall
Plan, became law. Fifteen years ago last Satur-
day, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

You will recall the circumstances which led
to these undertakings: the economic chaos in
Europe resulting from the Second World War
and the military threat resulting from Stalin's
aggressive actions.

Having learned from painful experience the
price of failing to act together, and in good
time, to curb aggression, the free nations of the
North Atlantic decided to concert their re-
sources and their policies for their common
welfare and protection. Both of these
great enterprises accomplished their primary
purposes.

The economic recovery of Europe has been
achieved; present levels of productivity and
prosperity are unprecedented in Europe's
history.

' Made before the Overseas Press Club of America at
New Tork, N.X., on Apr. 7 (press release 148).

The territorial integrity of every member of
NATO has been preserved. And there has been
no great war.

The NATO nations contain half a billion
people, with the great skills accumulated over
a long history. Their total output has
about doubled in 15 years and now exceeds
$1,100,000,000,000.

The members of NATO, together with the
other economically advanced countries of the
free world, account for rouglily 60 percent of
the world's total production. This is almost
21/^ times the total production at the disposal of
all the Commimist nations. The average per
capita income of these free-world nations is four
times that of the Communist world.

Within this framework of security and pros-
perity, free Europe has moved toward unity.
The ancient quarrel between Germany and
France, which cost their peoples and the world
so much in blood and treasure, has been mended.
Three European Communities have been built,
and their executives are being merged this year.
Thus, new concepts of integration and new in-
stitutions have replaced the separate national

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1296 PUBLICATION 7680 APRIL 27, 1964

The Department ot State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau ot Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
forelcn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the ForelRU
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forelcn policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other ofBcers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest

Publications ot the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Ig for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 62 Issues, domestic $8.60,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of th»
Department ot State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Keaders' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

650

DEP.iETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

actions and loose and ephemeral alliances of
the past.

These are accomplisliments which are some-
times so much taken for granted that their im-
portance is underrated. Let's not forget where
we stood 15 years ago, where we might well be
today but for the Marshall Plan and NATO
and the European Communities — or where we
might be tomorrow should NATO relax its
vigilance and the North Atlantic nations aban-
don the principle of collective action in facing
new tasks.

As President Johnson said last Friday,- the
North Atlantic alliance, "From the beginning
. . . has aimed not simply at defense but . . .
at the cooperative progress of all its members."
Therefore, he said, we must "move onward to
that closer partnership which is so plainly in
our common interest."

Tonight I should like to discuss some of the
specific tasks to which we think the North At-
lantic nations should address their eflForts.

Security in a Changing Environment

The first of these tasks is to maintain security
in a changing environment. Dangerous issues
between the Commxmist and free worlds remain
unresolved. Although the Central European
front remains quiet, massive Soviet ground and
nuclear forces are still arrayed against Europe.
In the absence of assured arrangements for the
mutual reduction of arms, it would be foolhardy
to dismantle the military strength of NATO.
The task is rather to adapt that strength to a
changing political and military environment.
This means two things :

First : While maintaining our efforts to deter
or defeat deliberate attack with every needed
weapon, we should continue also to increase
NATO's capability to cope with lesser forms
of conflict — effectively and without automatic
escalation to the type of conflict no one can
rationally seek.

Second : There is a need to respond, in ways
consistent with nonproliferation, to European
desires for a responsible role in strategic nu-
clear deterrence.

Several hundred Soviet medium- and inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles are aimed at

" Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 606.

free Europe — many more missiles than are
aimed at tiie United States. To cover some of
these targets which threaten Europe, two suc-
cessive NATO Supreme Commanders have pro-
posed that MRBM's be deployed to the Euro-
pean area.

We believe that it makes more sense to put
JklEBM's thus deployed to the European area
at sea, instead of in heavily populated European
areas. One way of deploying sea-based
MRBM s would be under procedures involving
national Allied manning and ownership of the
missile and bilateral United States-Allied con-
trol over the warhead's use. New nationally
owned and manned strategic missile forces
could, however, be divisive within the alliance
and unsettling in terms of East-West relations.

If Allied forces are to participate in MRBM
deployment, but not under national manning
and ownership, the only remaining possibility is
mixed manning and ownership.

These conclusions suggested the need for an
imaginative breakthrough to a new pattern of
ownership and control of medium-range nuclear
weapons — a new pattern involving a greater de-
gree of Allied integration than anything yet
attempted.

This is the origin of the so-called multilateral
missile fleet — or MLF [multilateral force].
Eight nations are now discussing this concept
in a working group at Paris, where substantial
and encouraging progress has been made.

The MLF will effectively discharge the task
to which it is addressed. General [Lyman L.]
Lemnitzer has said that its 200 well -protected
MRBM's would be effective in covering some
of the airfields and missiles threatening Europe.
Indeed, its capabilities will be taken into full
account in the development of future American
forces, because we consider it a reliable compo-
nent of overall NATO defense.

The MLF plan also would permit nations in-
terested in this specific problem to move ahead,
without requiring the participation of nations
which do not wish to take part.

Furthermore, the plan follows the classic pat-
tern of Atlantic partnership : The United States
will be in the venture from the start, but the
concept and structure of the force is such that
Europe's role and influence can grow as more

APRIL 27

1964

651

European countries join and as Europe moves
toward unity.

The MLF is, of course, not the end of the
process of bringing our allies closer together in
the field of nuclear defense. From this first
step, much could flow.

First, this truly integrated force will provide
practical experience suggesting perhaps further
applications — and even new ventures in Atlan-
tic partnership.

Second, this venture is bound to give the par-
ticipants a deeper insight into the responsibility
and the problems that go with strategic nuclear
weapons. In so doing, it should make possible
improved interallied consultation about the use
of strategic forces, toward which a good start
was made in the arrangements agreed to at
Ottawa last year.^ And it should contribute
to a common approach to the problems of
disarmament.

Third, military integration may have impor-
tant nonmilitary implications. Countries which
join in owning, manning, and managing a major
nuclear force are likely to find themselves drawn
into increasingly intimate relations in a wide
variety of ways.

Finally, let me emphasize this : We do not see
security for anybody in a world of proliferating
national weapons systems. The detailed ar-
rangements for the IVILF will include mutually
agreed strong and enduring safeguards against
any one nation's securing control of any of the
MLF weapons. We believe that when the
Soviet Government understands this, it will
recognize that the MLF does not constitute a
proliferation of national nuclear systems but,
on the contrary, is an alternative to it.

These are important reasons why support for
the MI^F is the firm policy of President John-
son's administration, as it was of two previous
U.S. administrations. They are reasons why
we expect to move ahead vigorously with other
interested countries in its execution. As Pres-
ident Johnson said at Brussels last November : *

Tlie movement to Atlantic i)artnersliip makes this

' For text of a communique adopted by the North At-
lantic Council on May 24, 1963, see ibid., June 10, 1063,
p. 805.

' Ibid., Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

possible. The movement to European unity makes this
desirable — as a first step toward a greater European
voice in nuclear matters.

Political Consultation Within NATO

We have never, however, considered the North
Atlantic partnership as purely military — or as
temporary or static.

The great goal of our foreign policy is a
world in which both peace and freedom are
secure. We regard the nations of free Europe
as senior partners in tliis vast effort.

For various tasks, new patterns of collective
action will be needed.

In the political field we have increasmgly
recognized the need for consultation about poli-
cies both toward the Communist nations and in
other areas.

We continuously review together the changes
that are occurring within the Communist
world — the dispute between Peiping and
Moscow, the trends toward more autonomy in
Eastern Europe, the economic troubles of the
Commvmist countries, the modest signs here and
there of yearnings for more individual freedom.
We must remain alert to opportunities for con-
structive action growing out of these changes.

We should not forget that the division of
Germany is a continuing obstacle to permanent
peace in Central Europe. A major task of our
diplomacy should be to mitigate and eventually
to eliminate this danger by moving toward Ger-
man self-determination and unification. We
believe that this can be done under terms which
meet the legitimate security concerns of the
Soviet Union and the smaller states of Eastern
Europe.

We must try unceasingly to abate the perils
of the arms race. We hope that the Soviet
Union will agree to various safeguards against
war from miscalculation or accident. We
should like to see real progress in reducing
armaments. We hope that the Soviets will
make that possible by modifying their opposi-
tion to effective verification and inspection.

The North Atlantic nations should also deal
cooperatively and effectively with Communist
aggression and subversive threats — in Asia,
Latin America, and Africa. I have in mind

652

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

especially such countries as Laos and South
Viet-Nani, which are tai'gets of aggression by
Hanoi, with the support of the Chinese Com-
munists; and Cuba, which is engaged in the
export of arms, subversive agents, and guerrilla
leadei-s to other Latin American nations. We
believe that the North Atlantic nations should
recognize a conunon interest in seeing that these
aggressions are brought to an end. They should
also contribute, where they can, to the settlement
of disputes within the non-Communist world.

I do not intend to lay out here a precise blue-
print for improved political consultation within
NATO. A great deal has been accomplislied in
that direction in the last 3 years. But more can
be done to the mutual benefit of all concerned.
I would suggest a few broad guidelines, which
we are trying increasingly to follow.

Consultation should focus on specific prob-
lems and should include the countries most inter-
ested in joint action on these problems, while
insuring that all the Atlantic allies are kept
closely informed about concerted actions.

Officials who bear responsibility for these
problems in their own governments should be
intimately involved. This expedites agi-eement
and makes it possible for those who do agree to
move ahead in concert.

The means of fulfilling these principles will
vary. Continuing discussions of Cuba in the
North Atlantic Council, the latest involving
Under Secretary Ball,^ have improved under-
standing of the purj^ose and effectiveness of re-
strictions on trade with Cuba. Consultation
about Berlin and Germany in the "Washington
quadripartite group [France, Federal Republic
of Germany, U.K., U.S.] has resulted in agreed
Western positions. It is not generally realized
that the NATO permanent representatives con-
tinually carry on consultations regarding a
broad range of political subjects. These include
not only problems within the NATO treaty area
but outside as well. In the past year the United
States has initiated consultation or exchange of
information in NATO on approximately 30
Lssues of significance.

°Mr. Ball attended a meeting of the X.\T(1 Council
at Paris on Mar. 27.

In addition to the regular consideration of
current political problems, geographic experts
from the NATO countries meet in Paris twice
a year to exchange views and prepare reports on
the various areas of the world — such as Africa,
the Middle East, and Far East. These reports
are considered by the NATO ministers at their
spring and winter meetings. The NATO Coun-
cil also benefits from the periodic meetings of
the Atlantic Political Advisory Group
(APAG), NATO's long-range planning arm,
whose members seek to anticipate problems or
crises around the world.

Tliere is particularly close consultation within
NATO on disarmament issues and questions of
European security. Approximately eveiy 2
weeks, for example, a senior representative of
one of the four Western Powers at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference visits Paris to brief
the NATO Permanent Council on developments
in the disarmament talks. And before any
major United States initiative in the disarma-
ment field is put forward at Geneva, it is sub-
jected to close consultation with our allies to
insure that it does not adversely affect their
interests.

Our political consultations are, of course, not
confined to NATO. We have other allies and
friends. We consult intimately with many
other countries in all parts of the world about
problems of common interest, including some
of those which are discussed in NATO. And
our NATO allies do the same.

We intend to go forward pragmatically and
flexibly in political consultation within NATO,
adapting the procedure in each case to the end
in view. And we sliall bear in mind, as we do,
the possible need for evolution in these pro-
cedures as Europe moves toward unity. As
President Jolmson said at Brussels last year :

If the European nations agree on how the voice of a
uniting Europe should be heard more effectively in
political consultations, we will consider their pro-
posals sympathetically.

But this is a matter in which we must wait
for our European friends to come to a common
view.

We support European unity, but the future of
Europe is for the free peoples of Europe to

APRIL

653

determine. We have been consistently unwill-
ing to try to settle Europe's future in bilateral
dealings with individual European govern-
ments. For that reason, we have not been pre-
pared to provide additional help to the develop-
ment of national nuclear capabilities or to accept
proposals for a directorate of a self-chosen few
to manage the affairs of the West. These are
not issues in bilateral relations with individual
European countries. They are issues which af-
fect the interests of, and must be settled by, the
Atlantic allies together. But let no one mistake
the free discussion of these issues which goes on
within the alliance for disimity on the prime
question of mutual defense ; the Cuban crisis of
October 1962 demonstrated again how quickly
NATO closes ranks in the face of an external
threat.

Concerted Action Needed in Economic Field

New tasks also confront us in the economic
field. There are three main areas in which con-
certed action is needed.

First, there is trade. The acliievement of a
truly integrated European Economic Com-
munity has created large opportunities here.

We cannot afford to lose sight of the basic
goal of trade liberalization that motivates the
Common Market and that led our Congress to
enact the Trade Expansion Act. Liberaliza-
tion must apply to both industrial and agricul-
tural trade. The inherent difficulties in easing
restrictions on trade can be overcome, and the
Kennedy Round can succeed, only if the nego-
tiations are approached on both sides of the
Atlantic with statesmanship and mutual under-
standing. It is essential that we keep in mind
that the reductions in tariffs resulting from
these negotiations will be to the mutual ad-
vantage of all the participants and will serve
to strengthen the foundation of the free world.

At present in Geneva the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development is high-
lighting the vast needs of the developing coun-
tries for expanded export markets.^ These
countries depend in part for their growth on

° For a statement by Under Secretary Ball, see
Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. G34.

enlarging trade with Europe and the United
States. The Kennedy Round negotiations,
which will follow immediately upon this con-
ference, should and will offer concrete and
tangible progress toward this end.

Joint economic action is also needed in the
field of monetary and financial policy. For a
considerable period after the war, when the
United States and the United Kingdom dis-
posed of almost all the West's international re-
serve assets, full and multilateral consultation
was not as essential as it is now. The large ac-
cumulation of gold and foreign exchange assets
on the Continent in the last several years has
necessitated a more general pattern of Atlantic
cooperation.

Such cooperation is well advanced in insuring
orderly conditions in foreign exchange markets.
Further steps are needed to ease the interna-
tional flow of capital and to make sure that
liquidity can expand as the volume of trade ex-
pands. We must seek arrangements through
which the Atlantic nations can work out their
temporary balance-of-payments problems in an
orderly fashion, without hampering the larger
ends of Atlantic policy. The countries of the
European Economic Community have special
responsibilities, under the Treaty of Rome, for
helping each other to this end. We are con-
fident that progress toward both European and
Atlantic cooperation will continue in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.

Finally, joint action is needed in aid to de-
veloping countries. The time when it was fitting
for the United States to provide the lion's share
is past. It is essential that all the economically
advanced countries act together to help the de-
veloping countries expand their economies and
improve their welfare.

The members of the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD, which include Japan,
have increased materially the flow of resources
to the developing countries. From 1958 to 1962
the total flow of governmental aid from the
DAC countries to the developing countries in-
creased from $4,300,000,000 to $6,000,000,000.
Aid from DAC countries other than the United
States rose from $1,900,000,000 to $2,400,000,-

654

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

000. Members of this Committee have also been
seeking to improve consultation on important
aid problems and to achieve better coordination
of their individual aid programs. "We must ex-
pect needs in this respect to grow, rather than
to diminish.

In each of these economic fields, therefore,
closer concert is necessary — and is being sought
with increasing effect.

"The Time Is Now Ripe for Wider Tasks"

My theme, as you have seen, is simply this :

NATO is an alliance of free men determined
to remain free, in full knowledge that peace and
security are indivisible.

It has performed the central task for which
it was created. It remains essential for the pro-
tection of its members and the security of the
free world. The time is now ripe for wider
tasks — in sharing responsibility for nuclear
power; in concerting policies toward Commu-
nist nations and the settlement of disputes with-
in the free world ; and in cooperating more close-
ly on worldwide problems of aid, trade, and
monetary policy.

These new tasks can be fulfilled only by de-
veloping new forms of common action.

We are moving ahead to do just this — joining
with those nations which wish to cooperate, leav-
ing the door open for others and for a larger
European role as Europe moves toward unity.

So let us proceed with quiet determination,
avoiding both the drag of inertia and outmoded
concepts and the seduction of sloganeering and
apparent shortcuts, seizing the opportunities
for more cohesive action with vigorous and open
minds. In so doing we will demonstrate anew
the vitality of the North Atlantic alliance in
meeting the needs of the time.

As far ahead as any of us can perceive, the
preservation of the values and ideals of the West
requires that the parties to this partnership
work with increasing intimacy.

As Carl Schurz reminds us : "Ideals are like
stars; you will not succeed in touching them
with your hands. But like the seafaring man on
the desert of waters, you choose them as your
guides, and following them you will reach your
destiny."

United States and Panama
Reestablish Diplomatic Relations

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
APRIL 3>

White Hoase press release dated April 3

Your Excellencies, Members of the Congress :
Today's agreement is both a beginning and a re-
newal. It provides that we will reestablish
diplomatic relations; we will immediately ap-
point special ambassadors with sufficient powers
to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of
conflict between the two countries without limi-
tations or preconditions of any kind.

I have already talked to the distinguished
President of Panama and informed him that
the United States has selected the former dis-
tinguished Secretary of the Treasury, a great
law professor, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, to be
our Ambassador to carry on these discussions.

We will also send the regular Ambassador to
Panama's name to the Senate as soon as we have
received approval from the Panamanian Gov-
ernment.^

We are thus embarking upon the solution of
our problems without preconditions or limita-
tions of any kind, believing that a lasting agree-
ment depends upon the utmost freedom and the
utmost flexibility of approach. We will now
immediately renew relations, appoint special
ambassadors, and begin a process which aims at
a final resolution of our difficulties.

Arrival at this agreement in the presence of
understandable but intense emotions and con-
victions is a tribute to our essential unity of
interest. We share much history. We share a
commitment to the liberty that we have achieved
in the past and to the progress that we intend
for the future. We can now proceed not only
to solve today's difficulties but toward the in-
creased welfare of all the people of the Americas
under the Alliance for Progress.

So, gentlemen, let us approach our search for

' Made in the Cabinet Room at the White House fol-
lowing a meeting of the National Security Council.

' The Senate on Apr. 7 confirmed the nomination of
Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama.

APRIL 27, 1964

655

a solution with the openness and the generosity
of those who seek only the strengthening of
friendship. Let us meet as sovereign nations,
as allies, and as equal partners in the inter-
American system.

Panama can be confident, as we are confident,
that we each desire an agreement which pro-
tects the interests and recognizes the needs of
both our nations.

I would also like on this occasion to especially
and particularly thank the OAS for its very
important role. This is further proof of the
immatched effectiveness of the inter- American
system. For decades disputes between the
American nations have been settled at the con-
ference table. This achievement in this hemi-
sphere offers a hopeful model for all those who
pursue peace in every continent. This is truly
a great day for America, for Panama, for all the
people of the Western Hemisphere, and for all
freedom-loving people everywhere.

We welcome you to the Wliite House. We
thank you for having come. We greet espe-
cially the ambassadors who are here and the
members of the National Security Coimcil, who
only a few moments ago approved this agree-
ment.

Thank you very much.

OAS ANNOUNCEMENT, APRIL 3

The Chairman of the General Committee of
the Council of the Organization of American
States acting provisionally as Organ of Con-
sultation is pleased to announce that the duly
authorized Representatives of the governments
of the Republic of Panama and of the United
States of America have agreed, on behalf of
their governments, to a Joint Declaration which
in the English and Spanish languages reads as
follows :

Joint Declaration

In accordance with the friendly declarations of the
Presidents of the United States of America and of the
Republic of Panama of tiie 21st and 24th of March, 1964,
respectively, annexed hereto," which are in agreement
in a sincere desire to resolve favorably all the differ-
ences between the two countries ;

Meeting under the Chairmanship of the President of
the Council and reeogiiizins the important cooperation
offered by the Organization of American States through

the Inter-American Peace Committee and the Delega-
tion of the General Committee of the Organ of Consul-
tation, the Representatives of both governments have
agreed:

1. To re-establish diplomatic relations.

2. To designate without delay Special Ambassadors
with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of
the causes of conflict between the two countries, with-
out limitations or preconditions of any kind.

3. That therefore, the Ambassadors designated will
begin immediately the necessary procedures with the
objective of reaching a just and fair agreement which
would be subject to the constitutional processes of each
country.

Washington, D.C.,
April 3, 1964

Declaraci6n Conjunta

De conformidad con las amistosas declaraciones de
los Presidentes de los Estados Unidos de America y de
la Republica de Panama del 21 y 24 de marzo de 1964,
respectivamente, adjuntas a la presente, que coinciden
en un sincero deseo de resolver favorablemente todas
las diferencias de los dos paises :

Reunidos bajo la Presidencia del senor Presidente del
Consejo y luego de reconocer la vallosa cooperaci6n
prestada por la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos
a trav6s de la Comisi6n Interamericana de Paz y de
la Delegaci6n de la Comision General del Organo de
Consulta, los Representantes de ambos gobiernos ban
acordado :

1. Restablecer relaciones diplom&ticas.

2. Designar sin demora Embajadores Especiales con
poderes suficientes para procurar la pronta eliminaci6n
de las causas de conflicto entre los dos paises, sin limita-
ciones ni preeondiciones de ninguna clase.

3. En eonsecuencia, los Embajadores designados ini-
ciari'in de inmediato los procedimientos necesarios con
el objeto de llegar a un convenio justo y equitativo que
estaria sujeto a los procedimientos constitucionales de
cada pais.

Washington, D.C,
3 de abril de 1964

The Chairman of the General Committee of
the Council of the Organization of American
States acting provisionally as Organ of Con-
sultation records that the parties agree that
both texts are equally authentic and that the
words "agreement" in the English version and
"convenio" in the Spanish version cover all
possible forms of international engagements.

W-ASHINGTON, D.C.

Api'il3,1964.

' Not printed here ; for text of President Johnson's
statement of Mar. 21, see Bullbxin of Apr. 6, 19C4, p.
038.

656

DEPART3IENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Open System in North-South Relations

hy Under Secretary Ball *

You have been addressing yourselves during
this past week to the general theme of "National
Security and the Aims of a Free Society." I
understand that I am supposed to talk -with you
on "Values and the Individual." While nor-
mally I am very obedient to the terms of any
mandate I may be given, I intend tonight to
take some liberties.

I am encouraged in this audacity by the free-
dom you yourselves have been showing during
the past week in challenging some of the fixed
positions of American policy. I find this heart-
ening. Those of us who spend our days and
nights as active practitioners of foreign affairs
are fully persuaded that there is no American
policy that should be regarded as sacrosanct, no
position or attitude that should not be con-
stantly reviewed and scrutinized to make sure
that it accords with the realities of the day.

For the one unchallengeable fact about the
time in which we live — this mid-20th century —
is that it is a time of change, one of those fas-
cinating periods in history when cataclysmic
forces are at work giving a new shape and form
to the world.

During such a time, debate, skepticism, even
iconoclasra are not only useful but essential.
Yet, if they are to lead us to the right decisions,
challenges to our existing policy must be based
on a full recognition of the meaning of Amer-
ica's strength and preeminence — and of the re-
sponsibilities that go with it. Nothing could be
more sterile or harmful than for this country
to occupy itself with the invention of rational-

izations to justify the abandonment of our re-
sponsibilities. We are in the midstream of
events. We cannot resign from history.

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

I emphasize this theme tonight because I have
only recently returned from an extraordinary
meeting that has given me a new sense of the
reality of America's leadership and power. I
refer to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, now imder way in
Geneva.^

That Conference can well be a landmark in
the relations between the peoples and govern-
ments of the rich industrial nations and the bil-
lion individuals who live in what we have come
to call the less developed comitries.

The remarkable aspect of this Conference is
not merely its size — 122 nations are represented
and there are more than 2,000 delegates — nor its
length — for it will continue for 3 months — but
rather that it is a conference of, and for, the
less developed countries. It is the leaders of
those countries who have given the Conference
its drive and impetus and provided its intellec-
tual guidance.

The Conference is pervaded by a sense of ur-
gency, a sense of impatience. One can discern
in the rhetoric of the representatives of the de-
veloping countries the beginnings of a common
and strident doctrine. As one delegate put it:

In this conference we all should seek to advance the
attainment of collective economic security under which
developiiiK countries can fully exercise their rights
to devplop.

' Address made before the North Carolina University
Symposium at Chapel Hill, N.C., on Apr. 9 (press re-
lease 156).

" For a statement made by Mr. Ball at Geneva on
Mar. 25, see BuiximN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

APRIL 27, 1964

657

And then he added :

If, to this day, these rights have in fact been denied
ns, it is due, to a large extent, to the actions and omis-
sion of the developed countries.

Structural Relations Between North and South

"We have, of course, talked a great deal in the
United States about the less developed coun-
tries, the new nations that have been rather ro-
mantically referred to as the Third World. But
I fear that too often we have tended to discuss
the problems of these nations in rather too nar-
row terms. TVe have talked about foreign aid,
or we have talked about commodity agree-
ments. But we have not thought or talked
enough about the great structural relationships
that must be established between the handful
of industrial nations located almost entirely in
the Temperate Zone, in which 90 percent of the
world's industrial development is concentrated,
and that billion people who have in the last 20
years made the fateful progress from coloni-
alism to juridical independence.

These structural relations cannot be ignored.
After all, we must not overlook the fact that
there is not one division in the world but two.
There is the horizontal division between East
and West which has been the constant preoccu-
pation of our Western governments for the last
20 years. There is also a vertical division be-
tween the industrialized North and the impover-
ished South. Lord Franks called attention to
this division 5 years ago in referring to "the
relationship of the industrialized nations of the
North to the under-developed and developing
countries that lie to the South of them, whether
in Central or South America, in Africa or the
Middle East, in South Asia or in the great island
archipelagoes of the Pacific."

In my remarks to you tonight I intend to talk
about the nature of the relationships that must
be established between the North and Souths
and I refer to Lord Franks' definition rather
than to the domestic one with which we are more
familiar. I intend also to mention the problems
that this poses for the United States as the one
Western nation organized on a scale commensu-
rate with world responsibilities. Finally, I shall
touch briefly on the relevance of the North-

South division to the division between the East
and West.

The Third World

The billion people in the developing countries
are a constant preoccupation of chancelleries
and Foreign Offices. The shift in status of this
vast population from colonial dependence to
juridical independence has added a new dimen-
sion to foreign policy — an additional element in
an already complex and crowded equation.

From the point of view of the United States,
the creation of 48 new nations since the war has
required a substantial reorganization of the
whole apparatus of our foreign policy. Even as
late as 20 years ago, the United States could do
the bulk of its business around the world
through embassies in a handful of industrial
countries. But today we recognize 114 coun-
tries and maintain 274 foreign posts. Our
affairs with the billion newly independent
people are no longer conducted indirectly
through the Foreign Offices of Europe. Today
we deal directly with the governments of the
new states.

These billion people and the new states they
have created are by no means homogeneous.
The Third World is marked by a wide diversity.
The new states range all the way from loosely
knit agglomerations of tribes to peoples with
ancient cultures and deep sophistication.

Wliat unites them is the common bond of
poverty. More accurately, it is not so much
poverty as the awareness of poverty. This
awareness, this refusal to accept poverty as
something preordained and unalterable, is a
new phenomenon.

It is not that, over the centuries, these peoples
have grown poorer — for the most part, they are
better off than were their ancestors. (And re-
member that even Imperial Rome by today's
standards would be a less developed country.)
Wliat has created their impatience and discon-
tent is that in the past century and a half, fol-
lowing the Industrial Revolution, a handful of
states, composed mostly of white populations
living in the Temperate Zone, have grown fab-
ulously rich.

The peoples living outside the Temperate
area began to recognize about two decades ago

658

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

that their poverty was not an irrevocable judg-
ment of fate. Tliis realization came about
wlien tlie cumulative impact of two world wars
shook tlie underpinnings of colonial structures.
It was given added impetus as fast transport
and communications spread far and wide that
most dangerous agent ■provocateur — the idea of
nationalism. Nationalism meant for the co-
lonial peoples political independence. Political
independence was identified with a better mate-
rial life, a share of the ample fruits of modern
technology.

Today these billion people — this Third
World — are driven by a sense of purpose that
tends to give a special political character to
their activities.

It tends also to bind together disparate peo-
ples who would otherwise have little in common.
The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations,
for example, is an extraordinary alliance mo-
bilized under the banner of anticolonialism.
That banner, that slogan, has intense symbolic
significance. It means much more than the
dismantling of colonial empires. It is an
amalgam of memories, resentments, and aspira-
tions— the insistence on a place in the sun, the
demand for equality, the hope for improvement
in economic well-being.

Need for Mutual Confidence and Understanding

The complete absorption of the less developed
countries with their own immediate problems of
survival and growth has often led to a lack of
understanding on the part of the industrial
world. Flying the flag of nonalinement, many
of the less developed countries have been in-
different to the contest between East and West.
They have withheld commitment from the
larger power struggle, which they have re-
garded as lacking relevance to their own in-
sistent concerns.

This difficulty of understanding is but one
of the elements that must be counted in the
establishment of an effective relationship be-
tween North and South. Obviously, such re-
lations must be of a different character from
those among industrial nations. The main com-
ponent must be a conscious and systematic effort
on the part of the industrial coimtries to help
the less developed countries progress toward

economic, social, and political betterment.
There must be a redressing of the balance of ad-
vantage. This requires more than money or
equipment. It means technical help and ad-
vice, commercial relations that will contribute
to stability in the markets for their products,
military assistance — more often than not some
form of assurance that their vital interests will
be protected from the aggression of their
neighbors.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it
requires a high degree of mutual confidence and
understanding — the creation of an environment
in which both sides can work together toward
a common purpose.

Open System Versus Closed

How are the relations between North and
South, between the industrialized and develop-
ing countries, to be organized in such a manner
as to create this environment ?

Throughout the postwar period there have
been two competing approaches to the organiza-
tion of these relations. One approach is that of
an open system. The other is that of a series of
closed systems.

Under the open system all free-world indus-
trial countries would accept responsibility for
the economic, commercial, and political well-
being of all developing countries without dis-
crimination. They would, through systematic
consultation, concert their efforts to acliieve this
objective.

Under the closed system specific industrial
countries or groups of countries in the North
would maintain special relations with selected
developing comitries or groups of countries in
the South — and would establish preferential
and discriminatory arrangements for cari-ying
this out. This is the situation, for example, that
exists with regard to the African states of the
French Community and, to a lesser degree,
within the British Commonwealth.

During the postwar period, these two systems
have operated alongside one another. But I
think the time may well be approaching when
all of us together — industrial and developing
countries alike — may need to make a conscious
choice as to the direction in which our relations
should evolve.

APRU, 27, 1964

659

The United States has been the leading propo-
nent of the open system. Under the onslaught
of a tidal wave of nationalism, the war-weak-
ened European colonial powers were forced to
retreat first from one and then another overseas
possession. To fill the vacuimis thus created
and to prevent them from being filled by Com-
munist power, the United States progressively
extended its responsibilities.

In moving to assist and defend these coun-
tries we were not influenced by considerations
of specific national interest or historic ties, since
we carried no baggage of colonial liistory. We
were simply the only free-world power capable
of providing the strength and resources that
were urgently required. In most of these situ-
ations we operated on a postulate of general
responsibility for stability and peace.

We have, for example, no national interest of
trade or investment in Viet-Nam, where we are
providing the material assistance for a shooting
war; nor do we have any discriminatory com-
mercial preferences in Latin America, where we
are joined in the Alliance for Progress.

It is this willingness to accept world respon-
sibilities unrelated to specific national interests
that is America's unique contribution to the
postwar world. This is most clearly seen in the
context of foreign aid. There is nothing new
about foreign aid per se. Subsidies between
princes are as old as recorded history, and grants
and loans between modern states in the 19th
century were regarded as quite normal. But
such transactions were historically related either
to alliances or imperialism.

Wliere the United States has brolvcn the pat-
tern is in the diversity of its assistance pro-
grams; we have not confined our assistance to
countries with which we had special relation-
ships or to situations in which we might expect
a quid pro quo of special favors — and today we
provide some form of assistance to 100 countries.

In many of these cases we have acted in pur-
suance of a generalized purpose — that the less
developed nations as a whole should have the
chance for a better life. We have pursued this
purpose out of the conviction that only in this
way can world peace and stability be assured.

Consistent with our belief that there should be
equality of opportunity for free-world growth.

we have remained faithful to the most-favored-
nation prmciple in our commercial relations.
While we participate in special regional agen-
cies for political consultation and action, such
as the Organization of American States, we have
sought no privileged markets for our products
and we trade with all the world on a nondis-
criminatory basis.

Ties Deriving From Colonial Past

Other Western nations in organizing their
affairs with the developmg countries liave em-
phasized closed systems. They have created
special and discriminatory relations. They have
preferred to direct their contributions to the
improvement of the lot of the developing coim-
tries on a selective basis and within the frame-
work of ties that derive from a colonial past.
These special relations have involved not merely
the provision of assistance but special financial
arrangements and special trading concessions
under which products of the specific overseas
countries have been given preferential access to
metropolitan markets and where, quite fre-
quently, reciprocal preferences have also been
accorded.

Obviously, in assisting their former colonies,
these Western nations are contributing — in
many cases substantially contributing — to the
advancement of the developing world. And in
many cases, in addition to supporting these spe-
cial arrangements, they are, through contribu-
tions to international organizations, assisting
the developing nations on a more generalized
basis.

But, without intending any disparaging im-
plications, it is nonetheless tnie that, in the gen-
eral pattern of their relationships with the
Third World, the principal Western nations
have tended to direct their efforts more to the
advancement of specific national interests than
to the discharge of generalized world responsi-
bilities.

The choice between these competing concepts
for organizing relations between Nortli and
South is a difficult one for tlie industrial coun-
tries. For quite different reasons, it is also diffi-
cult for the less developed countries.

Struggling new nations now enjoying posi-
tions of preference and discrimination in metro-

660

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

l>olitan nmrkots may find it hard to cjivc them
up. Vet most of these nations are aware tliat
special trading; i-elations are likely to carry with
tliem special political, financial, and economic
relations tliat will impair tlicir freedom of
choice or action. Given tlie brooding fear of
what is loosely called "neocolonialism," special
ties of this kind may be too suggestive of
"spheres of influence" to be wholly comfortable.

Need for More Equitable Balance

How this issue is decided can have a particu-
lar importance for the United States. For it
bears directly on the achievement of a more
equitable allocation of responsibilities among
the industrial nations. This is one of the ma-
jor pieces of unfinished business of the postwar
period.

For the last 20 years the United States has
been expanding its responsibilities around the
world as the European powers, weakened by
war, have withdrawn before the impact of the
anticolonial wave. Fortunately, our resources
were equal to the task, and in absolute terms they
have expanded in pace with our expanded re-
sponsibilities. Today we are stronger than ever
before.

At the same time, however, our allies in Eu-
rope have also grown strong. So has Japan in
the Far East. Yet, for a period of time until
the colonial chapter is finally closed, it is likely
tliat our responsibilities will continue to expand
as our allies complete their withdrawal from
outmoded colonial positions. In other words,
we find ourselves today, and may continue to
find ourselves for some time, in a period when
our responsibilities will be still expanding while
our relative strength vis-a-vis other free-world
industrial powers is diminishing.

In the face of these facts we must, of necessity,
search for the means of working out a more
equitable balance of responsibilities with other
free-world industrial powers. This means, of
course, that the European metropolitan powers
must, more and more, move back into tlie world
in order to assume responsibilities commensu-
rate with their growing resources.

This process relates directly to the question
of how North-South relations are organized.
The question is this : Through what means will

the oilier industrialized powers turn their
strength and resources toward our common task
in the less developed areas ?

At the moment this question remains unan-
swered. Certainly we can see great advantages
in trying to build a world in which the free
industrial powers unite in a common effort for
the developing nations as a whole. Tiiis would
not, of coui-se, preclude special bonds of friend-
ship and intimacy between industrial and de-
veloping nations, nor even some distribution of
tasks among industrial nations on a geograph-
ical basis. But there is a major difference be-
tween ties based on cultural friendship or mili-
tary necessity and ties predicated upon special
financial or commercial regimes that are dis-
criminatory in character. Discriminatory re-
gimes tend not only to result in a poor use of
world resources, but they also limit the possibili-
ties for effective cooperation among nations,
both in the North and South.

European Unity and the Open System

In principle, therefore, we should much pre-
fer to see all the industrial nations work toward
a kind of collective responsibility for all of the
less developed countries — or, in other words, to-
ward an open system. But this is on the as-
sumption that the other industrial nations
would be prepared to join wholeheartedly in
such an effort. Would they, in other words, put
forward the same or gi'eater exertions to assist
the developing nations under a regime of gen-
eralized responsibility as under the present se-
lective relationships?

Time alone can answer that question. The
habits of nations for centuries have been to re-
late action to national interest — usually, in a
rather narrow sense. The attainment of a
minimum size or scale — the possession of a
minimum volume of resources, of material, of
technology, of manpower — has proved a key
element in detemiining the role, and the atti-
tude, of nations. The willingness to identify
national interest with a generalized world re-
sponsibility may, in today's world, be possible
only for very large nations — only for nations
such as the United States, which command re-
sources on a scale adequate to the requirements
for leadership in the 20th century.

APRIL

19C4

661

If this assumption be right, there is probably
a direct correlation between the willingness of
European nations to accept world responsibility
and the speed with which they move toward
economic and political unity. The European
leaders who have worked to unify Europe have
long believed that only by unity can Europe
achieve the scale requisite for an effective
leadership role in the modern world. Only m
this way can the peoples of Europe contribute
the full measure of their capacity to the building
and maintenance of a free and stable world.

This proposition has long been a postulate of
American policy. In supporting European
unity we have acted on the assumption that a
luiited Europe, as an equal partner, would be
willing to undertake major world responsibili-
ties that did not reflect narrow national inter-
ests. We continue to regard that assumption as
sound. There is an underlying harmony, in
other words, between our support for European
unity and our support for the open system.

Bearing on East-West Problems

In my remarks so far I have talked solely
about relations between the North and South
without discussing their bearing on the familiar
East- West problems. It is significant that the
Soviet Union, in spite of its efforts to appear as
the sympathetic companion of the less devel-
oped nations, has been clearly marked as an in-
dustrial power at the United Nations Confer-
ence.

In its own North-South relations the Soviet
Union clearly pursues the policy of seeking to
establish relationships of dominance through
the tactics of bribes, threats, and subversion. It
has made the Third World an arena of conten-
tion in the East-West struggle.

When Lord Franks first identified the prob-
lem, he suggested that the relationships between
the North and South might ultimately become as
important as those between East and West.
That time, in our judgment, is rapidly ap-
proaching.

The problem for us is how we can conduct
our North-South relations in a manner that
■will best serve the needs of the less developed
countries while at the same time advancing the
interests of the free world.

For this purpose it seems clear to us that the
open system has many advantages. It would,
in President Johnson's words, best help the
poorer countries of the world to "find a path
to development through freedom — and freedom
through development." ^ It would banish the
specter of colonialism and tutelage. It would
provide that chance of diversity which is the
mark of freedom.

Letters of Credence

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of Haiti,
Andre Theard, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on April 8. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release

152 dated April 8.

Iraq

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Iraq, Nasir al-Hani, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on April 8.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 154 dated April 8.

Kenya

The newly appointed Ambassador of Kenya,
Burudi Nabwera, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on April 8. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release

153 dated April 8.

Portugal

The newly appointed Ambassador of Portu-
gal, Vasco Vieira Garin, presented his creden-
tials to President Johnson on April 8. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 149 dated April 8.

Tunisia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Tunisia,
Rachid Driss, presented his credentials to Presi-

' For an excerpt from the Economic Report of the
President, see ibid.. Feb. 10. 1964, p. 222.

662

T)F,PARTltENT OF STATE BULLETIN

dent Johnson on April 8. For texts of tlie
Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 150
dated April 8.

Export Expansion and
Balance of Payments

Remarks by President Johnson ^

Secretary [of Commerce Luther H.] Hodges,
members of the Cabinet, ladies and gentlemen : I
guess once a businessman, always a businessman.
Luther is one of the great prides and products of
our free enterprise sj'stem, but I did not say we
had everything straightened out last Saturday.
And don't ever mistake a temporary recognition
of a partial job well done for anything like you
said.

I made the statement that I had been in-
formed, I hope reliably, that our exports are
going at a rate of about $7 billion a year; that
was the balance in our favor; that I interpreted
that as something that we could take some pride
in; that I did not anticipate that that would
necessarily be a permanent situation, but it is a
very fine thing to observe. I should like to com-
mend all those who have, along with the Secre-
tary of Commerce, been engaged in this mission
to expand the exports of the United States. I
think there are few tasks that are more impor-
tant or closer to my own concerns for the future
of this country.

An increase in our overseas trade, as all of us
are aware, brings great benefits to every single
sector of our American life. They benefit busi-
ness by providing increased markets for our pro-
duction. It will benefit the strength of the dol-
lar by improving our balance of payments, and
because I observed, Mr. Secretary, that our bal-
ance of payments for the first quarter — not nec-
essarily the last quarter — look good, that didn't

' Made at the 'White House on Apr. 7 before the Inter-
agency Committee on Export Expansion (White Honse
press release). For text of an Executive order estab-
lishing the Committee, see Bih-letin of Jan. 6, 1964,
p. 25.

mean that I underwrote everything that might
happen during your tenure of office !

It will benefit labor and help in the war
against poverty, since every billion dollars by
which we increase exports 100,000 new jobs will
be created. It will increase our world responsi-
bilities by establisliing closer commercial rela-
tions with industrialized countries in providing
for the developing world the trade which can
make them flourish and progress. That is why
I am so happy to see so many of the various de-
partments and agencies of Government inter-
ested in this particular field here this morning.

Through much of our history we have spent
most of our etTort on expanding and satisfying
the vigorous domestic market. We have con-
centrated our production, our salesmanship, and
our trade on a vast common market which spans
the continent and embraces 200 million people.
Our success in doing this has raised us to our
present high level of prosperity here at home.
But the very opportunities which this market
provided often left us to neglect the opportu-
nities for trade abroad, and neglected them we
have.

Other countries, forced to trade in order to
survive, did develop sharper tools, more so-
phisticated techniques for penetrating other
markets. Our own share of the world trade has
not been proportional to our capacity to produce
goods that are needed and wanted by other
lands. At this point in our own history, in
world history, we can no longer afford to
neglect opportunities for overseas trade. We
cannot let those opportunities pass for lack of
knowledge, or for lack of appropriate Govern-
ment assistance. The prosperity of Europe and
Japan, which we helped create, means not only
larger markets for our goods but sharply
increased competition for world markets.

The rise of new nations in the developing
world offers a large prospect for increased com-
merce, and it has placed on us a national respon-
sibility to provide a solid commercial basis
for their development and their stability.
Our commitment to the defense of freedom
around the world means that exports must sub-
stantially exceed imports if we are to keep our
currency sound, as we intend to do. I took a
great deal of pride last Saturday in making

APRIL,

1964

663

that observation, and I hope that we can take
the examijle we have set and continue that very
fine pace.

We have the same productive genius and in-
genuity which built tliis nation. So let us now
apply those same qualities that we have applied
here at home to increasing commerce with the
world. Last September at the "VVliite House
Conference 300 businessmen met and discussed
problems and framed recommendations.- This
Committee has now been established to act on
these recommendations and to press forward the
export drive on every front. Such action is
imperative.

I await your decisions; I await your actions.
I have designated Mr. [Daniel L.] Goldy, who
has just been sworn in, as the National Export
Expansion Coordinator. He will help assure
that the decisions of this Coramittee are imple-
mented through the Government m order that
we miss no opportunity to increase export trade.
He has my highest confidence. If your efforts

are successful, as I hope they will be and as I
would like to encourage them to be, future gen-
erations will recognize what you have accom-
plished as one of the gi'eat cornerstones of our
national strength and the well-being of our
people.

I know of no subject that intensely interests
me more. I know of nothing that I will be
prouder of than to see the record that you ring
vip. I hope that you can continue the very fine
balance that now exists and expand it in the
days to come. I thank each agency represented
here and each person who is participating in
this meeting. Any encouragement I can give
you, I want to do. Any help that I can extend,
I want to do. I congratulate the Secretary for
the leadership he has taken in this field and say
to the Secretary of Commerce, I hope when I
have another Saturday news conference that I
can increase that $7 billion figure and that I can
have as optimistic a report next quarter on bal-
ance of payments as I did this quarter.

New Patterns of African Trade

6y G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '■

It gives me great pleasure to meet today with
a group of businessmen interested in expand-
ing American economic relations with Afi'ica.
We are in a period when new patterns of trade
are beginning to reshape the African market
of the future. It is an especially good time to
embark upon new business ventures on that
continent.

Frankly, I am optimistic about Africa's fu-
ture. My optimism is based on the years of
intimate contact I have had with the African

' For background, see ibUL, Oct. 14, 1963, p. 595.

'Address made before the International Executives
Convention at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 1 (press release
138 dated Mar. 31).

peoples and their leaders, for whom I have great
respect. Africa's nations — both old and new —
are seeking to develop themselves as rapidly as
possible, and they are working arduously to
build modem economies. In these efforts they
are encouraging foreign investors to help them
create modem, independent societies, and they
are anxious to increase their import and export
trade with the United States. To these goals
we can onl}- give our hearty concurrence and
encouragement.

There are many reasons why we can be opti-
mistic about the economic future of Africa, and
there are many reasons why American business

664

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

should take a closer look at the opportunities
offered by Africa's developing nations.

The riclmess of Africa's mineral resources is
well known, and the importance of these re-
sources to the United States is substantial.
Africa is a major world supplier of gold and
diamonds, of cobalt and chrome, of copper, of
manganese, of antimony. Eecently, large de-
posits of petroleum, iron ore, and bauxite have
begun to be developed, in many cases with sub-
stantial U.S. investment. Yet much of the
continent has not been fully explored by U.S.
businessmen. Undoubtedly many new oppor-
tunities await the more enterprising firms.

Prospects also are favorable in other re-
sources. There is generally little, if any, pop-
ulation pressure in Africa, and m some areas
there is even unused agricultural land to
be made finiitful. Electric energy potential
abounds in many areas — among them, the
Congo Eiver basin alone is estimated to have
one-third of the total world hydroelectric gen-
erating capacity.

Then there are social factors favorable to eco-
nomic growth. There is no highly rigid caste
or class structure, as in other areas of the world,
and there are few land tenure patterns which
restrict mobility. The more enterprising Afri-
can is able to move to the city and rise quickly
in business or the professions when he has the
necessary skills and capital.

At the same time there are drawbacks and
hazards in expanded American business rela-
tionships with Africa, and I tliink we must rec-
ognize such risks frankly.

There are a number of factors which seri-
ously limit progress in Africa: a low level of
education ; the lack of a substantial number of
upper- and middle-level administrators, tech-
nicians, and professional people; low produc-
tivity rates; a shortage of entrepreneurs and
indigenous capital ; and an inadequate network
of transportation, communications, and other
services. It would be difficult for Africa to
overcome those conditions with its own re-
sources, and it is in those areas that foreign
trade, aid, and investment can make important
contributions to African progress.

On another plane, there have been severe
political disturbances in many parts of the

continent in recent months, and it is likely that
there will be more unrest as long as aspirations
remain unfulfilled. There is no need for me
to catalog recent troubles ; they have been widely
reported in the American press. Those serious
matters cannot be dismissed lightly, but we
should, nevertheless, view such disturbances in
perspective. Most of the current conflicts and
crises are typical of the trouble newly independ-
ent countries encounter on the road to nation-
hood. The problems spring from the frustra-
tions created by poverty and the lack of swift
progress, from the inevitable struggles between
the old and the new, from the problems of
societies moving from rural to urban life.

Our concern with those troubles, however,
should not lead us to lose sight of the quiet,
steady progress being made throughout the
African Continent. Increases in gross national
product, rising electric power production, or
improved secondary schools cannot compete in
the headlines with news about an army mutiny.
Yet in terms of human involvement, the quiet
progress is really the big news in Africa, and it
is far more widespread and lasting than Africa's
troubles.

A third problem that American businessmen
should be aware of is found in the artificial bar-
riers to trade and investment which arose during
Africa's colonial era. This is a system which
tended to bind, almost inextricably, the economy
of a colony to that of a colonial power. Al-
though much of Africa — and, indeed, the most
populated part of the continent — is relatively
open to American trade and investment, there
are some areas, such as the Spanish and
Portuguese territories and some former French
territories in tropical Africa, in which it is
difficult for American and other foreign busi-
ness to trade. Through such devices as prefer-
ential tariffs, bilateral trading arrangements,
licensing systems, and exchange controls, na-
tionals of the present and former metropolitan
powers protect a predominant influence in the
economies of those areas by sharply limiting
conamodity exchanges with third countries. At
the same time, however, the European powers
are providing significant amounts of aid and
related public funds to those areas, and main-
tenance of their commercial privileges there is
often defended on that basis.

APKIL 27, 1964

727-708 — 64-

665

Wliile the United States recognizes the de-
sirability of encouraging the European nations
to continue to provide a high level of aid to
Africa, vre do not feel we should be precluded
from efforts to improve the U.S. business posi-
tion. We feel that a broadening of our trading
relations in these areas is not only in our own
interest but m the interest of the African areas
and of the European nations themselves. For
that reason vre have studied with interest the
recent Jeamieney report, which recommended
that France diversify its assistance programs
to embrace areas of Southeast Asia and Latin
America. And we have noted President
de Gaulle's overture to Mexico only 2 weeks
ago, when he encouraged Mexicans to rely on
more than one source for their economic as-
sociations. "We hope that such diversification
of economic interests will also occur in those
parts of Africa which now have trade relations
with one predominant source.

Continent-Wide Cooperation

Xow let me hasten to assure you that, despite
the hazards and problems I have mentioned,
there is a great deal of progress being made in
Africa. There is much going well on that con-
tinent, both politically and economically.

One instrumentality that is contributing
much to Africa's progress is the Organization of
African Unity, which came into bemg last May
at the historic African heads-of-state conference
at Addis Ababa. It is now a 34-member,
Africa-wide organization, embracing all inde-
pendent states except South Africa. The OAU
already has begun to function as a veliicle of
continental political, economic, social, and cul-
tural cooperation. It has made an impressive
record for itself in the 10 months of its exist-
ence— notably in encouraging a cease-fire and
then a settlement of the Moroccan-Algerian
border dispute. Last week it plaj-ed a similar
role in bringing Ethiopia and Somalia together
for talks aimed at arranging a cease-fire and at
ending the sporadic border clashes between
those two nations.

Another Africa-wide body making an im-
portant contribution to Africa's growth is the
Economic C!ommission for Africa, a U.N. body

operating under able African leadership. Tlie
EGA has begun to play a vital role in Africa's
economic planning. In particular, it is build-
ing a philosophy of regional economic integra-
tion and a program of regional projects to real-
ize economies from large-scale enterprises and
to avoid the duplication and competition inher-
ent in basing development on a large number
of small economic units in Africa.

At its most recent meeting at Addis Ababa
last month, the Economic Commission for Afri-
ca marked an unportant milestone in the efforts
of the African states to achieve economic in-
tegration.^ That conference reflected a greater
determination among African nations to find
a common approach to the wide range of prob-
lems impeding Africa's economic development.

In addition there was a growing a'nareness
that the existing fragmented markets of the con-
tinent restrict Africa's efforts to develop. Pre-
vailing economic units, it was argued, are too
small to permit the use of the most up-to-date
technology and mass market techniques. For
these and related reasons, Africans showed an
increasing desire to enlarge the size of their
markets to enable them to realize the benefits
that can be derived from large-scale operations.
In this respect, EGA missions have' been work-
ing in East, North, and West Africa to explore
the possibilities of setting up such industries as
iron and steel complexes and chemical opera-
tions, to be located at sites considered optimum
for natural resources and markets.

One important result of all of these efforts by
the Economic Gommission for Africa will be
the expansion of opportunities for foreign trade
and investment in many parts of the continent.

U. S. Aid in Africa

For its own part the United States Govern-
ment is encouraging the growth of a climate in
Africa which will be conducive to an expansion
of U.S. trade and investment. This is a co-
ordinated effort in which the principal instru-
ments are the Department of Commerce, the

' For texts of a message from President Johnson and
a statement made before the Commission on Feb. 25 by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Af-
fairs J. Wayne Fredericks, see Bulletin of Mar. 30,
1964, p. 509.

666

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Department of State and its African posts, the
A<j;ency for International Development, tiie De-
partment of Agriculture, and the Export-Im-
port Bank.

At this time of year I am particularly con-
cerned with the United States AID program.
In a few days I will appear before Congress to
explain why I think AID is an essential element
of our African foreign policy. I am well aware
that our AID program has critics — and I con-
cede that constructive criticism is needed to keep
the program healthy. However, I do believe
that .some of the dissatisfaction with AID is due
to misconceptions about its nature and its goals.

The true purpose of AID is to encourage and
enable countries to develop and preserve their
independence and stability. "We believe that
economic and social well-being and progress are
integral parts of true independence and stabil-
ity. While we recognize the importance of ef-
forts undertaken by Africans themselves — and
our AID program is geared to encourage Afri-
cans to help themselves — it is in the best Ameri-
can tradition to assist where we are able and
where our aid is desired.

All Americans have an important interest in
the economic growth and betterment of life in
Africa because of the long-range bearing these
factors have on world peace and order. You
as businessmen, however, have an even more
direct stake in foreign aid. United States
economic aid programs in Africa provide many
opportunities for U.S. exporters and investors.
These opportunities stem from the present re-
quirement that aid dollars be spent for U.S.
goods and services and from the inducements
offered by AID to encourage United States in-
vestment abroad. Combined with the growth
of African markets resulting from an accelerat-
ing pace of economic development, our AID
efforts provide a wide variety of business oppor-
tunities.

So successful have these efforts been that Far-
rell Lines African News Digest has written :

Because of A.I.D., the entrepreneur of today, if his
ideas are truly worthwhile, stands less risk than at any
other time in our commercial history. The potential
of American investment and interest in Africa is there-
fore dependent upon the creativity and imagination of
American businessmen.

Altliough not the largest single donor in
Africa, the U.S. Government in fiscal year 1962
and again in fiscal year 19C3 provided about $500
million in economic assistance to 34 African
countries. Surplus food and fiber, under the
Food for Peace program, accounted for nearly
half of this amount. In contrast, other free-
world governments provided $1,200 million, and
the Sino-Soviet bloc extended $200-250 million
in credits. Thus the United States contributed
roughly one-fourth of Africa's $2 billion in
external economic assistance from government
sources. In addition, important contributions
are made by U.S. private foundations, religious
organizations, and other nongovernment groups.

In carrying out our AID program, we strive
in various ways to encourage the fullest par-
ticipation of U.S. private concerns in African
operations. Wliile we are naturally interested
in having American business take advantage of
all opportunities for profitable new business
ventures, we also are interested in the participa-
tion of United States concerns because of the
entrepreneurial skills which American business
can help transfer to Africa. A good example of
such participation is the new Education Center
at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, which
was opened only 2 weeks ago by IBM World
Trade Corporation to help English-speaking
Africans acquire basic and technical education
in such fields as data processing, accounting,
government, economics, and mathematics. Next
year, in Dakar, Senegal, IBM will open a second
such center for French-speaking Africans.

One part of our program that stands in direct
support of American business is a series of in-
vestment guaranties which have been arranged
between the United States and 20 African coim-
tries. Through these agreements, U.S. investors
in Africa are protected against the risks of
inconvertibility of currency and expropriation.
In addition, 17 of these agreements cover war
risk and 14 of them cover extended-risk guar-
anties and guaranties against loss caused by
revolution and insurrection.

Even before deciding to invest in Africa, how-
ever, an Ajnerican firm may be able to obtain
financial assistance from AID to make a feasi-
bility study to determine whether a proposed

APRIL 27, 1964

667

African business venture is sound. Three such
inrestment suTTey grants have been made in
Africa, and five applications for grants are
being processed.

There are also the so-called Cooley loans
available in Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and Tuni-
sia. These loans are made from local currency
accounts that have been built up by the AID
program and are available to United States
firms getting established in those countries —
particularly to businesses which yn\l increase
sales of U.S. farm products.

Even if you are not immediately interested
in establishing a plant or sales operation in
Africa, you should be aware of the stake of
American business in our AID program. Be-
tween 80 and 90 percent of our economic aid
expenditures, for example, are for U.S. goods
and services. The approximately $500 million
spent last year on African aid provided jobs,
income, profits, and service contracts for tens of
thousands of workers and farmers, and hun-
dreds of U.S. factories, universities, engineers,
building contractors, and many others.

AID estimates that 550,000 nongovernment
jobs in the United States were provided by our
worldwide aid expenditures in 1962. In New
York State alone, major AID contracts amount-
ed to more than $30 million in 1962 and some
$45 million in 1963. And between 1960 and
1963 AID-administered cargoes on American-
flag cargo liners rose from just over $40 mil-
lion to approximately $108 million.

When our AID program provides a bull-
dozer, telecommunication equipment, or a ship-
load of wheat from our farm surplus, the story
does not end at that point. The first shipment
may be paid for by a grant or loan provided
by the U.S. taxpayer. But bulldozers need spare
parts and must be replaced one day, and tele-
communication networks are often extended.
Even dietary habits may change through in-
creased use of American food products. New
tastes and needs for American products can lead
to new commercial sales, and this development
can be an important end result of our AID pro-
gram around the world. But unless the coun-
tries of Africa are helped to grow out of their
low-level economies at an early date, they may
not become important markets for our products.

Growrth of U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa

In addition to United States aid, both trade
and investment with Africa have been of
rapidly growing importance to America in re-
cent years. Total direct investment by United
States firms grew fourfold in Africa from 1950
to 1962, far more than our rate of increase of
foreign investment in any other continent. In
1962 United States investments in Africa
totaled nearly $1.25 billion, an increase of
$200 million over 1961. This increase was
spread throughout Africa. In a similar man-
ner, our total exports to Africa have more than
doubled in value since 1950. In 1962 these
exports amounted to almost $1 biUion. Our
imports from Africa came to $750 million in
1962 and were about 50 percent above the 1950
level.

Thus it is clear to me that many American
businessmen are betting; on Africa as a good
place to do business, to invest, and to make a
profit.

The largest African markets for U.S. prod-
ucts are the United Arab Republic, South
Africa, Congo (Leopoldville), Liberia, Mo-
rocco, and Nigeria. Nigeria, with a growing
economy, the largest population in Africa, and
a central location, bears careful consideration
as a place for exports, a place to set up a
regional sales office, or a place to build a branch
plant. The Arthur D. Little Company of Bos-
ton, on a contract with the Nigerian Govern-
ment, has been seeking out investment oppor-
timities for foreign firms in Nigeria for several
years. There has been a remarkable increase
in U.S. business activity in that country since
it became independent in 1960. In these 4
years U.S. firms in Nigeria have increased from
9 to 72, including 3 banks, 6 petroleum com-
panies, 13 manufacturing and assembly plants,
and 20 service companies.

Regional, rather than national, markets also
bear watching, as closer relations develop
among African nations. In terms of regional
cooperation, the East African nations of Kenya,
Tanganyika, and Uganda provide a well-
developed example of how sovereign nations
can work together in harmony. Through the
East African Common Services Organiza-
tion— a multinational body — the area's 25

668

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTN

million people share a common currency, com-
mon communications and transportation facil-
ities, common tax administration, common re-
search facilities, and common customs and
tari/Ts. And outside of the framework of the
EACSO, they have pooled their intellectual
resources in the University of East Africa.

All of these joint efforts make those three
countries one of the world's advanced areas in
cooperation and provide the area's people with
services of a (]uality that would be difficult for
individual nations to match. In addition, the
effectiveness of such international cooperation
makes a significant contribution to the area's
overall stability. A further factor is that this
cooperation has helped to make foreign assist-
ance more effective in the area. Although U.S.
efforts are primarily directed to individual
countries, there are some programs we conduct
on an East African regional basis.

Throughout the continent there is a whole
range of immediate opportunities open to
American private business. There is room for
export and import businesses, large and small.
Transportation and communication facilities
are also among the very highest priorities of
African leaders. In addition, opportunities in-
clude such areas as insurance, banking and loan
associations, hotels and low-cost housing.

There will be many sales opportunities in
Africa as that continent's purchasing power
rises and its population grows. Africa already
is a significant market for a variety of U.S.
products. In 19G2 the most important of these
products were foodstuffs, which accounted for
$178 million. Other products and their value
were textile fibers and manufactures, $72
million; industrial machinery, $140 million;
tractors, $53 million; and chemicals, $46
million.

There also are opportunities for purchasing
in Africa that I want to touch upon. Ad-
mittedly, the range of goods available for such
purchases is not as great as the range of oppor-
tunities for investment and sales, but some do
exist and others can be sought and foimd.

Most of our principal imports from Africa —
minerals, cocoa, coffee, and precious stones —
are accounted for by American firms that have
invested in extractive and production facilities

in Africa. But there are some purchasing
opportunities and markets for such products as
African handicrafts and art objects, which are
exotic and profitable items in this country.
There are also various raw materials of a
specialized nature that are available to Amer-
ican purchasers, such as spices, sisal, and scarce
minerals needed for technological research and
development.

A relatively unexplored and growing field
for purchasers is that of processed and semi-
processed goods. As Africa's economic devel-
opment progresses, there is increasing interest
among the nations of Africa to process their
raw materials domestically for export to for-
eign markets. Thus, sisal is being exported as
twine, as well as a raw material. Another ex-
ample is iron, which is being sold not only as
ore but as ferromanganese or ferrochrome.
This is a trend which will accelerate in the
future, and it opens up many possibilities for
American buyers.

Five Steps for American Businessmen

In conclusion, there are five steps I would
suggest to businessmen interested in looking
into the African market :

1. Make a serious survey of the African mar-
ket. Talks with banks and with other Ameri-
can firms experienced in African business
would enable you to get a view of what the con-
tinent has to offer and what are some of the
special problems of operations there. You
should become acquainted with the Agency for
International Development and with the De-
partment of Commerce Field Office in New
York, or wherever you operate, to be fully
aware of the services the U.S. Government
offers to the foreign trader and investor. The
foreign trade publications of the Commerce
Department can be especially helpful to you.
In the last 13 months alone, the Commerce
Department in Washington had 2,174 confer-
ences with businessmen and processed 2,671
written inquiries on trade or investment in
Africa.

2. Make a survey trip to Africa to look over
opportunities on the spot. Here again you
can enlist the services of the Department of

APRIL 27, 1964

669

Commerce, and the Department of State can
advise its embassies in Africa and their staffs,
particularly the commercial officers, of your
visit. Thus, when you arrive in, say, Lagos,
Dar-es-Salaam, or Tunis, the U.S. Embassy
will be prepared to assist you in understanding
the area and making important contacts there.
The number of our commercial officers in
Africa has risen from 4 in 1959 to 13 in 1964, to
give you an idea of our increasing desire to
provide services in Africa to American busi-
nessmen. In addition to these special com-
mercial officers, there are economic officers at
every post who are ready to help you.

3. To give the African market a fair chance,
I would recommend the following procedure.
Allow enough time in visiting a country to learn
about it ; no one can adequately survey a market
in a day or two. Sales representatives and
sales literature should use the commercial
language of the country, and prices should be
quoted in local currency. Businessmen have
often had difficulties in French-speaking Africa
in particular because they were unable to use
that language.

4. Most important in any business operation
in Africa, in my view, is the need to make a busi-
ness venture a cooperative venture involving
Africans in all phases. This is not only good
politics but good business as well, because it
means sharing American business know-how
and developing Africans for more sophisticated
work. Much attention should be given to the
training and upgrading of Africans into in-
creasingly responsible positions. It should be
readily apparent that costs will be much lower
if you employ Africans instead of sending
Americans and their families abroad.

5. Finally, gear your products and sales to
the needs of the market. Some businessmen
rather quickly decide that the African capacity
to buy expensive or sophisticated products is too
limited to be worth the trouble. If you should
so decide, perhaps you should consider Afi'ican
or U.S. manufacture of special products more
suited to the current stage of development in
Africa and gradually develop a market for more
complex or more costly items.

The principal fact to remember is that you are
dealing with a changing market. Past patterns

of production and trade are being radically al-
tered in Africa. New urban communities are
coming into being. Large-scale mining, indus-
trial, and agricultural projects are under way
in many parts of the continent. Purchasing
power is rising.

In some instances there are promising pros-
pects for immediate opportunities for mar-
keting and investment. In other cases the
prospects are for the long term.

In any event, the future of Africa is in Afri-
can hands, and American business can assist
those hands as they approach their tasks of na-
tion building. From such joint efforts, Afri-
cans and Americans alike have much to gain.

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee
To Meet at Ottawa

Press release 157 dated April 9

The ninth annual meetmg of the Jomt United
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs will be held m Ottawa, April
29-30.

Eepresenting the United States will be the
Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the
Honorable W. Walton Butterworth, United
States Ambassador to Canada; the Honorable
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury ; the
Honorable Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the
Interior; the Honorable Orville Freeman, Sec-
retary of Agriculture ; the Honorable Christian
A. Herter, President's Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations ; the Honorable George
W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; and the
Honorable Walter W. Heller, Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. Secretary Rusk will attend
the meeting on April 30.

The Government of Canada will be repre-
sented by the Honorable Paul INIartin, Secretary
of State for External Affairs; the Honorable
Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance: the Hon-
orable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and
Commerce; the Honorable Harry Hays, Minis-
ter of Agriculture; the Honorable Charles M.
Drury, Minister of Industry; Mr. Norman A.
Robertson, Chief Negotiator for the Govern-
ment of Canada on Trade Negotiations; Mr.
Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of

670

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BUULETIN

Canada ; Mr. A. 1). P. Ilceney, Canadian Chair-
man of the International Joint Commission;
anil Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
to tiie United States.

The Joint Committee was inaugurated in 1953
to provide an opportunity for Cabinet oflicers of
botli governments to consult and examine eco-
nomic and trade matters of common intci'ost and

concern to the two countries. Meetings have
been held approximately once a year, alternately
in Ottawa and in Washington. Tlie last meet-
ing of the Joint Committee was held in Wash-
ington, September 20-21, 19G3.>

' For text of n comnmnique issued at the close of the
meeting, see Buixktin of Oct. 7, 1903, p. 548.

The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion

hy Christian A. Herter

Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations ^

Trade is front and center on the international
stage this year. The U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development got under way in Geneva last
week,- as you know. And the sixth round — the
Kennedy Round, as it is widely called — of nego-
tiations under the auspices of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, for short)
will open in the same city May 4.

It is the Kennedy Round for which my office
is responsible and which I shall discuss today ;
but I hope you will follow the course of the
U.N. Conference in j'our newspapers, for it will
have a considerable bearing on the GATT nego-
tiations, particularly as they relate to the less
developed countries.

It was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which
made the Kennedy Round possible. Because
the European Common Market was often men-
tioned in the course of the debates leading to
the enactment of this historic legislation, there
is still in many quarters, I believe, a tendency to
think that these negotiations amount to a duet —
sometimes harmonious, sometimes sounding less
so — between the European Economic Commu-
nity (the EEC) and ourselves.

' Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit
at Detroit, Mich., on Mar. 30.

' For a statement by Under Secretary Ball at Geneva
on Mar. 25, see Bulletin of Apr. 20, 19G4, p. 634.

Here in Detroit, where you export with vigor,
ingenuity, and enterprise to the whole wide
world, you take a broader view. Our biggest
single market — Canada — is just a tunnel's
length away. Taking exports and imports to-
gether, total U.S. trade with our northern neigh-
bor adds up to almost $8 billion a year, whereas
the total with the Common Market is $6.5 bil-
lion. Indeed, our trade with the rest of Europe
(mainly Britain and her fellow members of the
European Free Trade Association, the so-called
Outer Seven ^) is $5.4 billion a year, almost as
much as with the Common Market. Our trade
with Asia, Australia, and New Zealand amounts
to $9 billion, 36 percent of it with Japan alone,
and our trade with Latin America $7.6 billion.

Thus, the Common Market is not in fact our
principal trading partner — -nor are we theirs.
The Common Market does almost $20 billion
worth of trade with the rest of Europe, includ-
ing the Soviet bloc — three times what they do
with us. With EFTA alone, they do $14 billion
worth of business, over twice what they do with
us. Their trade with Asia, Australia, and New
Zealand is $7 billion and with Africa $6.6 bil-
lion, both slightly more than with the United
States.

' Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the U.K. comprise the Outer Seven.

APRIL 27, 1964

671

I cite these figures not to imply in any way
that our trade with the Common Market is
not important ; it is, and it should expand with
the dynamic gi-owth of this new and vigorous
trading entity. I cite these figures rather to
show that, great as our stake and that of the
EEC is in trade with each other, the stake each
of us has in the general expansion of world
trade is much greater. And it is the overall
expansion of world trade which is the goal of
the coming GATT negotiations. If all of us
could match the pace set by the European Free
Trade Association, wliich, per capita, does
roughly double the amount of external trade
that either the Common Market or the United
States does, we would all be better off.

Obviously, this is easier said than done. This
thought comes to mind when I am asked, as I
sometimes am, what we have been doing in the
17 months that have passed since the Trade Ex-
pansion Act was enacted. The answer is that
we have been hard at work — both on our own
preparations here at home and in many consul-
tations, multilateral and bilateral, with our ne-
gotiating partners abroad. Preparing for ne-
gotiations like these, involving so many nations
and so many diverse interests, is somewhat like
launching a new model of automobile — only W
times as complicated and time consuming.

As we go into the home stretch, 5 weeks before
the negotiations formally open, we have identi-
fied five problems as of major importance : tariff
disparities, exceptions from the negotiations,
nontariff barriers, the role of the less developed
countries, and trade in agricultural products.

The Problem of Plenty

The most difficult and complex of the prob-
lems that face us is that of trade in agricultural
products.* I make no apologies for stressing
this, here in one of the major capitals of Ameri-
can industry. Agriculture and industry are
interwoven at every point in our economy.
Farmers buy a great many of your products, and
farmers are more dependent upon export mar-
kets than any other major segment of the Amer-
ican producers. The crops on 1 out of every

* For an address on "Policy Problems in Interna-
tional Trade of Agricultural Products" by Clarence W.
Nichols, see Bulletin of Mar. IC, 1964. p. 416.

5 acres cultivated here are shipped abroad.
Farmers derive 15 percent of their income from
exports, whereas the United States as a whole
exports only 3.8 percent of its gross national
product. Moreover, total farm exports, nm-
ning at $5.6 billion a year, amount to 27 percent
of our exports as a whole.

This is not a one-way street. Other nations
benefit greatly from access to our reasonably
priced and wholesome food. This is an im-
portant factor in restraining inflation, which
is currently giving a number of governments
cause for serious concern.

The problem of agriculture is, basically,
the problem of plenty. Modem agricultural
methods have, like the sorcerer's apprentice,
opened the floodgates to abundance. The agri-
cultural revolution of the mid-20th century is
as dramatic a leap forward as the achievement
of mass production here in Detroit a half-
century ago. It began here, and it is now in
full flood in Europe.

A new element has been introduced into an
already complex situation by the effort of the
European Economic Community to establish a
common agricultural policy for its six member
nations — an essential step in progress toward
the unification of Europe. The implementa-
tion of this policy is a matter of major impor-
tance to us, for we export over a billion dollars'
worth of farm products annually to the EEC.
It is our biggest single cash market for agri-
cultural products.

We have made our view clear that the com-
mon agricultural policy should be designed so
as to preserve the opportunity of efficient sup-
pliers to compete in the EEC market, ilore-
over, we believe that the Community's agricul-
tural policies, like our own, must be negotiable
in GATT. This, indeed, was the consensus of
the GATT ministers when they met in Geneva
last May and adopted a unanimous resolution
calling for "the creation of acceptable condi-
tions of access to world markets for agricul-
tural products in furtherance of a significant
development and expansion of world trade in
such products." ^

We had a sharp warning last year of pro-

•For statements by Jlr. Herter at the GATT minis-
terial meeting and text of a resolution adopted on May
21, 1963, see ihid., June 24, 1963, p. 990.

672

DEFAltTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

tectionist tendencies in the EEC The imple-
inontiition with respect to poultry of the com-
mon agricultural policy " had the elfect of
triplinir the import charges on tlie poultry we
shipped to Germany and sharply raising the
pric« to German consumers. After patient and
persistent eti'orts over manj' months had faileti
to secure any significant easement of these
onerous charges, we were compelled, at the be-
ginning of this year, to raise tarilfs upon items
involving an equivalent volume of EEC exports
to the U.S/ We regretted doing this, but we
felt we had to make the point — and make it
forcofidly — that the Connnon Market, in put-
ting its agricultural policy into effect, cannot
with impunity ignore the interests of its out-
side suppliers.

High Level of Proposed Grain Prices

Meanwhile, the EEC came forward in Decem-
ber with two highly important proposals in the
field of agriculture.

The first deals with the fixing of wheat and
feed grain prices at a common level within the
EEC, a step required for a common agricul-
tural policy. Presently, there is a wide range
of grain prices within the EEC, with Germany
having the highest and France the lowest. The
EEC proposed that the common prices be fixed
at levels between these extremes — levels which
are, however, far above world prices.

"Without going into details, I can say that we
think that these proposed prices are too high.
They will artificially stimulate increased grain
production, particularly in France. They will
tend to make the European Economic Com-
munity more dependent upon uneconomic pro-
duction and hence threaten the markets which
we and other efficient farm products exporters
presently enjoy there.

Here again, European interests are affected as
well as ours. The price of grain is a basic ele-
ment in the cost of living. In particular, the
proposed high prices for feed grains will lead to
higher prices for meat and milk, which are in-
creasingly important in the European diet as
standards of living go up.

" For statements by Mr. Herter. see ibid., June 24,
196.3, p. 996, and Oct. 14, 1963, p. 605.

' For text of Proclamation 3564, see ibid., Dec. 23,
1963, p. 969.

Many of the problems we see developing in
agriculture trade and in the negotiations stem
from the high level of grain prices the EEC is
now considering. A decision to unify grain
prices at substantially lower levels would make
an important contribution to the Kennedy
Round. I cannot stress too strongly the effect
of the grain prices finally adopted by the EEC
on the outcome of the whole trade negotiations.

EEC Agricultural Negotiating Plan

The second EEC proposal concerns the frame-
work within which the agricultural negotiations
in general should be carried on. This proposal
has been described as one to bind the level of
agricultural protection. Actually, it is pro-
posed that all the major trading nations — food
exporters and importers alike — make commit-
ments with regard to their various present sys-
tems of agricultural subsidies and/or price sup-
ports— but there appear to be so many loopholes
in this proposal that the commitments would
not, in fact, be meaningful.

The concept is simple at first sight, but its im-
plementation would be immensely complicated.
I shan't discuss it in detail here, but I will
summarize our reactions.

First, we cannot reconcile the Commission's
proposals with decisions of GATT ministers
which stated that there should be a significant
liberalization of world trade and that the nego-
tiations should cover all classes of products, in-
cluding agriculture. The Community's nego-
tiating plan for agriculture seems to establish as
the objective of the negotiations the binding of
increased levels of protection rather than re-
ductions in trade barriers and expansion of
trade.

Second, the plan not only fails to provide for
any reductions in barriers; it would introduce
new restrictions by eliminating existing tariff
bindings, including zero bindings, and create the
possibility of increased protection on all agri-
cultural tariff items. It would halt any further
development of trade based upon comparative
advantage or changes in relative efficiency. In
our view the point of departure of the negotia-
tions must be existing concessions, and the pur-
pose of the negotiations must be to achieve a
further liberalization of trade.

APRIL 27, 1964

673

Third, there would be no stability of agricul-
tural concessions, since the whole system under
the Community's proposal terminates and has to
be renegotiated every 3 years. A country which
is a major exporter of agricultural products
would have difficulty in assessing the balance of
its advantages and disadvantages at the conclu-
sion of the negotiations and would face the need
for making a reassessment at the end of 3 years.

For these and other reasons, the proposed
EEC agricultural negotiating plan is neither ac-
ceptable nor workable as a general negotiating
formula.

U.S. Approach to Agricultural Trade

Our approach to agricultural trade is prag-
matic rather than dogmatic. Indeed, we have
come to the conclusion that the spectrum of
products and problems is so wide that no single
formula will work.

Two weeks ago in Geneva we made certain
procedural suggestions as to how we might get
started on practical sector-by-sector work, to see
which negotiating methods appear to offer the
best prospects for success for each particular
sector.

We see the possibility of grouping together
certain agricultural products by the nature of
the products themselves. Another useful
grouping appears to be according to the nature
of the protection in force. The following ma-
jor groups seem to be susceptible to this prag-
matic approach.

We would start with the basic principle that
all the existing zero duty bindings, such as those
on cotton and soy beans, will be retained. There
are many other commodities, such as fresh fruit
and processed fruits, for which fixed tariffs con-
stitute the sole or major form of protection.
For these commodities, we would seek to obtain
as advantageous tariff cuts as possible. For
items protected by a combination of measures,
such as poultry and rice, we would seek arrange-
ments to assure market access and the oppor-
tunity for growth. We would also seek the re-
moval or reduction of nontariff barriers where
they exist.

For some of the major agricultural products,
the GATT ministers decided last May that ne-
gotiations should be undertaken to establish

worldwide commodity arrangements. These
are grains, meat, and possibly dairy products.
It is for these products and these commodity
arrangements that the EEC proposals for meas-
uring and freezing levels of protection may have
application— but only when combined with pro-
visions for assuring continued access to the
market equal to the levels of a recent representa-
tive period and opportunity to share in future
growth. For us, the primary objective of a
commodity arrangement is that set forth by the
GATT ministers — the creation of acceptable
conditions of access to world markets.

This is a practicable and reasonable goal.
Indeed, it has been incorporated in the agree-
ments in principle which we and other major
suppliers of grain to the United Kingdom have
recently concluded with the British Govern-
ment. Moreover, we are willing to practice what
we preach — and we have shown that we are.
The recent voluntary agreements to limit beef
and veal exports to the United States which we
negotiated last month with Australia, New Zea-
land, and Ireland * assure them of a reasonable
opportunity to compete for a share in our mar-
ket and of participation in its growth. We be-
lieve that these are sound principles for nego-
tiating worldwide grains or meat arrangements.

The negotiation of a world grains arrange-
ment is an ambitious undertaking. While these
negotiations will be lengthy, they must move
along in phase with the industrial aspects of the
Kennedy Round.

I have said we are pragmatic. The overall
result is what counts for us. We must obtain
from these negotiations arrangements that in-
sure, broadly speaking, achievement of the ob-
jective established by the GATT ministers —
"acceptable conditions of access to world mar-
kets for agricultural products in furtherance of
a significant development and expansion of
world trade in such products."

Its achievement would serve the interests of
everyone— producers and consumers, exporting
and importing countries. The benefits of in-
creased trade, based upon relative efficiency, can
be as great in agriculture as they have proven
to be in industry. We cannot expect to move

■ For texts, see ibid.. Mar. 9, 1964, p. 381, and Mar.
23, 1964, p. 468.

674

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

toward freer trade in industrial jiroducts if we
at the same time leave agricultiiro stagnating
in a morass of protectionism, or even sinking
deeper into it. That is why I have said, often
and emphatically, that the United States will
enter into no ultimate agreement unless sig-
nificant progress is registered toward trade lib-
eralization in agricultural as well as in in-
dustrial products.
I said at the beginning of my talk that trade

seems to dominate the international stage this
year. That is partly because the danger of war
has receded. And if the sounds emanating
from trade negotiations sometimes remind us
of the haggling at an oriental bazaar, they are
nevertheless infinitely preferable to the thunder
of guns. Moreover, in trade negotiations, unlike
war, there need be no victors and no vanquished.
As President Kennedy liked to say, a rising tide
lifts all the boats.

Foreign and Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws

by Abba P. Schwartz

Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs^

It is most gratifying to me to have the oppor-
tunity to respond to your invitation to present
to you this morning some observations on the
foreign and domestic implications of our immi-
gration laws and of our assistance to migrants
and refugees abroad.

As I entered this chapel today, I was shown
the window which briefly depicts the historical
origin of St. Olaf College. As you, and I, and
others who are privileged to attend or visit this
college become absorbed in the present beauty of
the campus, impressed by the structures which
have been built on this hill, aware of the aca-
demic standards and the scholarly achievements
of those who have studied and taught here, and
familiar with the nationally known names of
Eolvaag and Christiansen — as all of this con-
fronts us, we cannot help but be overwhelmed by
the significance of the contribution a small
group of Norwegian immigrants has made to
our American way of life. This institution is
one more example — and a good example — of
what is possible when a country opens its doors
to immigrants.

' Address made at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn.,
on Apr. 3 (press release 139 dated Apr. 1).

We in the Department of State who have the
responsibility for developing and applying
United States policies in this area feel that the
opportunities to discuss these matters with the
public come all too infrequently, particularly in
communities west of our eastern seaboard.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was
always mindful and proud of his Dutch herit-
age, reminded us on several occasions that "we
are all immigrants" and that the contributions
which first-generation immigrants have made
to the cultural and economic life of our country
is in no small measure responsible for our
greatness.

Because of our heritage and the fact that the
United States since the end of the Second
World War has been placed in a role of critical
leadership in a troubled and constantly chang-
ing world, we are concerned to see to it that
our immigration laws reflect our real charac-
ter and objectives and maintain for us tlie image
of ourselves as Americans that we would like to
achieve abroad. The nature of this image
plays an important role in the achievement of
our foreign policies generally.

Someplace in American history, Americans,

APRIL 27, 1964

675

who were immigrants themselves, began to be-
lieve that the geographical and national origin
of a man determined his suitability as an immi-
grant. Subsequently this was codified into law
and became our national immigration policy.
At the same time in American history, however,
Americans themselves learned to judge their
fellow Americans on the basis of ability, indus-
triousness, intelligence, integrity, and all the
other factors which truly determine a man's
value to society. In most laws of our nation
we recognize this, except in our immigration
laws, where we continue to imply judgment of
a man on the basis of his national and geo-
graphical origin.

It is not hard to imagine, therefore, the impli-
cation of this policy when it is interpreted to
a man from a geographical area or of a national
origin which is not "favored" by our present
laws. Wliether an individual wants to come to
the United States or not, he is left with the im-
pression that our standards of judgment are
not based on the merits of the individual — as
we claim to judge men — but rather on an as-
sumption which can be interpreted as bias and
prejudice.

Thus, inasmuch as our immigration laws are
interpreted as the basis of how we evaluate
others around the world, it is not difficult to
understand the impact this has on people
abroad and its effect on our foreign relations.
Therefore, if for no other reason than to tell
people aromid the world the basis on which
we actually judge ourselves and others— not to
speak of the contributions all immigrant cul-
tures and traditions have made to our way of
life — a revision of our immigration laws is fully
justified. We have the same concern with re-
spect to reactions to our assistance abroad since
World War II to migrants, refugees, displaced
persons, and uprooted persons generally.

The history of irmnigration to the United
States is really the liistory of this country.
The foundations of this nation were laid by peo-
ple escaping oppression. The Puritans, the
Huguenots, the Quakers, the Scotch-Irish, and
the Spanish-Portuguese Jews were all refugees
in their time.

As far back as 1644 people speaking 18 dif-
ferent languages were living side by side peace-

fully in the town of New Amsterdam on Man-
hattan Island. New York continued to wel-
come the oppressed of every nation of Europe.
This miion of diverse cultures and skills helped
that State to attain its unique position in manu-
facturing, conmierce, finance, and government.
A roster of pioneers in the organization of
many of our industries would fill many pages.
Among them :

— John Jacob Astor, a German immigrant,
was the great pioneer in the fur industry ;

— Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish immigrant
boy, founded the American steel industry ;

— Joseph Pulitzer, a Himgarian immigrant,
made a great contribution to journalism;

— Michael Cudahy, Irish, was one of the most
successful figures in the development of the
meatpacking industry ;

■ — Joseph Bulova, Czech — the watch indus-
try;

— David Sarnoff, Russian — radio ;

— Charles L. Fleischmann, Hungarian — the
yeast industry ;

—Frederick Weyerhaeuser, German — the
lumber industry ;

— William S. Knudsen, Dane — the automo-
bile industry.

And behind these eminent names are hundreds
of thousands of nameless men and women who
brought other important industries to this coxm-
try. Our clothing industry was developed by
German, Austrian, Russian, and Italian immi-
grants and in recent years has been sustained
by "migrants" from Puerto Rico and new immi-
grants from other parts of the world. Our
watchmaking industry was developed by French
and Swiss immigrants; our pottei-y and china-
ware industry by German immigrants; and the
cheese industry by Germans and Swiss.

Equally revealing are the many immigrants
whose inventions formed the basis for American-
bom entrepreneurs to develop our great indus-
trial base. To mention only a few : Ole Evin-
rude (Norwegian) — who invented the outboard
motor; John Ericsson (Swedish) — the ironclad
ship; David Lindquist (Swedish) — the electric
elevator; Conrad Huber (Russian) — the flash-
light; Michael Pupin (Serbian) — great discov-
eries in electricity; David Thomas (Welsh-
man)— the hot blast furnace; Alexander

676

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETTN

Graham licll (Scotsman), who invented the
telephone.

Many of these immiprunts entered our coun-
trj- as children — young and unknown. They
attended our schools and our laboratories.
Their drive, their imagination, their desire to
"prove themselves" helped to make United
States industry the greatest in the world and
our standard of living the highest.

Many of the refugees who fled from Hitler's
tyranny, such as Albert Einstein, were persons
of great distinction who contributed immeas-
urably to our scientific and cultural develop-
ment, but others were small children, who fled
with their families to this country for safety.
Today they are working with other young sci-
entists in our laboratories, helping to conquer
space. The spirit that is so typically Ameri-
can— the welcoming of people of all back-
grounds and the freedom of opportunity — has
helped the immigrant and the refiigee, who, in
turn, have helped the United States.

History of U.S. Immigration Policy

The Federal Government at the outset of our
history established a liberal immigration policy.
The Constitution embodies civil rights provi-
sions and a liberal attitude toward religious and
ethnic differences. Ours was the first national
state to proclaim the principle that there should
be no religious test for office holding. And only
the President of the United States must be native
bom. All other officerholders may be natural-
ized citizens.

The Federal Government utilized the princi-
ple of religious freedom to stimulate immigra-
tion. After the adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution in 1789 Congress passed the first Fed-
eral legislation on immigration, which included
a naturalization and a quarantine law.

During the 1830's there was a large influx
of immigrants from famine-stricken Ireland.
Between 1841 and 1850 there was substantial
refugee emigration from Germany. The com-
bined German and Irish immigration was 1,713,-
000 for the decade. Immigration for the next
decade to 1860 increased to 2,598,000. The
Scandinavians began to arrive after the Civil
"War and settled in the Midwest.

In the 1880's appreciable numbers of immi-

grants entered for (he first time from Eastern
and Southern Europe. They were the "new"
immigrants. They came from the Ralkans,
Central Europe, from Russia, and from Italy.
Between 1882 and 1889 large numbers of Jews
fled persecution from czarist terrors in Russia
and began to enter the United States. Between
1897 and 1914 our average immigration ex-
ceeded a million a year. The new immigrants
numbered 10 million, as against approximately
3 million during the earlier period.

With the development of urban society and
huge industries in the cities, sociological changes
took place. The problems of unplanned growth
were blamed on the immigrant. The "new" im-
migrants were represented as unwanted people
in contrast with the "old," who in retrospect
were glamourized as highly selected, adventur-
ous, and specially trained. People forgot that
the "old" were sometimes indentured servants,
persons who had been imprisoned for debts. In
reality, each new wave of immigrants had cre-
ated fears in the "old." So the Irish and Ger-
mans were accused of creating economic prob-
lems.

This "fear of the stranger" played an impor-
tant role in the restrictive immigration policies
which developed. Labor itself, fearing for its
jobs, was anti-immigration in that period. The
immigrants were blamed for the industrial
panics.

The restriction against Asiatics began with
the barring of Chinese in 1882. It was the
beginning of the use of racialism as a basis for
restrictive immigration. The Japanese were
next, and in 1917 the Asiatic Barred Zone was
created. This act was passed despite President
Wilson's veto and excluded persons from parts
of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malaya
states, the Asian part of Russia, part of Arabia,
part of Afghanistan, most of the Polynesian Is-
lands, and the East Indian Islands. As you can
see, this represents a large part of the world. It
was the progenitor of the Asia-Pacific Triangle,
which I shall describe later, and of the 1924 act
whicli used the national-origins quota system as
the basis for allocating visas.

Under the national-origins quota sj^stem
which is embodied in our current immigration
law each country outside of the Western Ilemi-

APRIL 2 7, 1964

677

sphere is allotted a specific number (a quota)
of immigrants who may be admitted to the
United States each year. This allocation is
based on a proportion of a total equal to the
proportion of the population in the United
States in 1920 whose national origins, including
ancestry, could be attributed to that particular
country. The 1924 Immigration Act limited
quota immigration to 150,000 and lessened the
possibility of large-scale immigration from
Eastern and Southern Europe because the basic
formula resulted in disproportionate quotas to
Northern European countries.

In 1952 the immigration and nationality laws
were codified and revised by Congress, and that
law governs our basic immigration policies to-
day. The 1952 act retained the national-origins
principle as the basis for a quota system and in-
stead of the Asiatic Barred Zone substituted the
Asia-Pacific Triangle. While many of the pro-
visions of this law modernized procedures, and
granted important powers to the Attorney Gen-
eral to admit persons in emergent circumstances,
it retained many of the late 19th-century and
early 20th-century antagonisms.

Under the current law 157,000 quota visas are
authorized annually. But they are never fully
utilized because of the manner of the allocation.
Thousands upon thousands of persons, otherwise
qualified for admission, await their turn on the
quota lists.

A mother born in Ireland could join her son
in the United States immediately, I am glad to
say, because tlie Irish quota is large and never
fully used. But a mother of an American citi-
zen may not be able to join her son in this coun-
try if she was born in Greece or Turkey, which
have small quotas. Under the present law a
parent of an American citizen is entitled to what
is known as "second preference" and the law
judges the parent's admissibility to join his child
upon the place where the parent was born. But
if the parent has more than 50-percent Asian
blood, he is chargeable to the quota assigned to
the Asian area from which he originally derived
his Asian origin.

Persons born in Great Britain are permitted
65,361 quota numbers, but only about 40 percent
are used. The unused are not available to na-
tionals of other coimtries who desire to emigrate

and whose skills and talents may be highly
sought by us. Greece has a quota of 308, Hun-
gary 865, Italy 5,666, all of which are oversub-
scribed.

Persons born in the Western Hemisphere are
admitted nonquota. This provision of the law
is based on our foreign policy of hemisphere
friendship and solidarity. However, it does not
apply to persons born in dependent colonies in
the Western Hemisphere or to the inhabitants
of former colonies — ^now independent — of Ja-
maica, Trinidad, and Tobago. Wliether by
accident or by design, this obviously does not
serve United States foreign policy interests.

Displaced Persons and Refugees

Because the quotas based on national origin
severely limit admissibility of persons of certain
origins, it has been necessary for Congress to
enact special legislation from time to time to
take care of displaced persons and refugees from
various forms of man's inhumanity to man. At
this point I would like to digress from a discus-
sion of our immigration laws to present a brief
summary of what the United States has done
since World War II in assisting uprooted per-
sons not only to come to the United States but
to find places of resettlement in other countries.
The United States took the leadership in orga-
nizing the United Nations Relief and Rehabili-
tation Administration (UNRRA), which pro-
vided immediate assistance to countries devas-
tated by the Second World War and to several
million persons who had been displaced. This
organization was followed by the International
Refugee Organization (IRO), a specialized
agency established by the General Assembly of
the United Nations. The IRO moved over
1,400,000 displaced persons, principally from
Europe to resettlement in countries overseas.
Upon the termination of the IRO, the United
States took the leadership again in organizing
the Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration (ICEM) in 1951. ICEM, with head-
quarters in Geneva, Switzerland, has moved
in the succeeding years 1,260,000 persons, in-
cluding some 556,000 refugees from Europe and
from mainland China through Hong Kong.
Supported by our Government and 28 other
member governments of the free world, that or-

678

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN

ganization continues today to move and re-
settle refugees and migrants to new homes over-
seas.

It is relevant to cite some of the dollar ex-
penditures by the United States in these efforts.
In 1945 and 194G the United States Army pro-
vided assistance to disphiced persons apart from
the assistance administered through UNRRA
in the amount of $^00 million, while UNRRA
accounted for some $'20 million of United States
contributions in special assistance to refugees.
The United States contribution to IRO between
1948 and 1952 totaled $237 million. $93 mil-
lion was spent through the United Nations Ko-
rean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to re-
settle displaced families who fled from North
Korea during the Korean war. $90 million
was provided for refugees from North Viet-
Nam. Some $300 million to Palestine refugees
has been channeled by us through the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees, approximately $10 million
through the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees to assist other refu-
gees. $53 million has been spent through the
Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration, $47 million through the United
States Escapee Program, a direct unilateral ef-
fort by the United States Government to assist
postwar escapees from communism. With other
expenditures in assistance to refugees, including
grants of our surplus foods to various areas
throughout the world, the total United States
contribution from the end of World War II
to the present for these purposes has been con-
servatively estimated at over $1.3 billion. Such
assistance is continuing currently at a rate of
approximately $40 million annually.

All of these current and past expenditures
were public funds supplied by United States
citizens. They do not include funds contributed
by the American public through the well-orga-
nized channels of voluntary effort. It is esti-
mated that the American voluntary agencies
themselves have contributed $1.2 billion in cash
and commodities to assist refugees abroad since
World War II. This is an impressive total and
must be recorded in appraising the magnitude
of the efforts of the United States Government
and the Aonerican people in assisting those up-

rooted by economic and political pressures and
changes. This is a creditable chapter in our
history and speaks well for the sense of resjion-
sibility of all our citizens and our (Jovernment.

Of equal importance, I believe, is the fact that
since World War II, in response to specific
refugee situations, the United States Govern-
ment has admitted under different procedures
over 1 million refugees from racial, religious,
and political oppression. 42,000 were admitted
under President Truman's directive of 1945;
405,000 under the Displaced Persons Act of
June 1948; 196,000 under the Refugee Relief
Act of 1953, including 6,000 orphans; 38,000
Hungarian refugees were admitted on parole
under the discretionary authority granted to
the Attorney General in the 1952 immigration
law, immediately following the Hungarian up-
rising in 1956. Some 150,000 refugees have
been admitted under quota provisions of the
regular immigration law, and since Castro took
over Cuba we have admitted some 200,000 Cuban
refugees.

In response to the sudden influx of over
100,000 Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in May
1962, the Attorney General admitted some Chi-
nese refugees on parole. Some 10,000 have ar-
rived, and applications are still being consid-
ered. This action promoted our foreign policy
interest by demonstrating the humanitarian
concern and friendship of the American people
toward the Chinese people.

As a result of varied experience under these
special legislative acts benefiting refugees, the
Congress enacted legislation in 1960 establish-
ing the so-called "fair share" principle, under
which we accept under parole 25 percent of all
the refugees accepted collectively by all coun-
tries of immigration in a preceding 6 montlis'
period. To date some 13,025 refugees have been
so accepted.

You are probably much more familiar with
the hospitality which the United States has
afforded in recent years to over 200,000 refugees
from Cuba, most of whom arrived in Florida
but are gradually being relocated throughout
the country. This was the first instance in
experience in which the United States became
a country of first asylum for refugees.

The contributions of the United States Gov-

AFRIL 27, 1964

679

ernment and of the ^ynerican people in receiv-
ing refugees and in providing funds and serv-
ices for their relief abroad have played an im-
portant role in our foreign policies. Our
generous and quick responses to refugee situa-
tions have characterized our function of leader-
ship in a disturbed -world and stimulated similar
actions by other governments.

Proposals for Revision of Present Law

The foregoing telescopic treatment of the
past, although admittedly incomplete in many
details, lays the groundwork for our considera-
tion of the problem at present.

We believe that American immigration policy
as expressed in our laws is important both to
our foreign policy and the domestic welfare of
the United States. The national-origins quota
system does not truly reflect the real character
of the American people, but it does give a false
image of our thinking to the world. Its effect
is that a Greek is not as welcome as a Pole,
and a Pole is not as welcome as a German.
And it is based not on what you may be today
but on where you were born.

The present law grants priorities (prefer-
ences) to certain family members and to persons
with certain skills. But why should parents
of American citizens be given only "second
preference" in the quota, if their children want
them? Wliy shoidd there be any quota at all
for a parent of a United States citizen? And
why should the parent of a legally resident alien
not even be given a preference ?

According to present law, a person whose
services are detennined to be needed in the
country because of education, technical training,
specialized experience, or exceptional ability is
entitled to "first preference." This is in the
self-interest of the United States, since we bene-
fit from all the education and experience. But
even before such a preference is granted, an
employer must produce a job, often to an un-
known person and without any assurance that a
petition for a preference will be granted. This
is just one aspect of a complicated system which
leaves some quotas filled and others unfilled.
Does this add to our image of knowing how to
do things well ? We should certainly te able to
devise something better.

Leaders of religious, civic, labor, and social
service agencies have been calling for a change
in the present system of allocating visas. They
have endorsed strongly the historic step taken
by the lat« President Kennedy in calling for
the elimination of the national-origins quota
system. In a special message to the Congress,^
President Kennedy on July 23, 1963, said:

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am
recommending relates to the national origins system
of selecting Immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used
to determine the number of quota immigrants per-
mitted to enter the United States each year. Ac-
cordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting
deals with many problems which require remedial
action, it concentrates attention primarily upon re-
vision of our quota immigration system. The en-
actment of this legislation will not resolve all of our
important problems in the field of immigration law.
It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which
we can build in developing an immigration law that
serves the national interest and reflects in every de-
tail the principles of equality and human dignity to
which our nation subscribe.?.

President Johnson in January 1964, in liis
remarks at the White House to representatives
of organizations interested in immigration and
refugee matters,' stated :

We have met for the purpose of pointing up the
fact that we have very serious problems In trying to
get a fair immigration law. There is now before the
Congress a bill that, I hope, can be supported by a
majority of the Members of the Congress.

This bill applies new tests and new standards which
we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer
specifically to : What is the training and qualification
of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind
of a citizen would he make, if he were admitted?
What is his relationship to persons in the United
States? And what is the time of his application?
These are rules that are full of common sense, com-
mon decency, which operate for the common good.

That is why in my state of the Union message last
Wednesday * I said that I hoped that in establishing
preferences a nation that was really built by im-
migrants— immigrants from all lands — could ask those
who seek to Immigrate now : What can you do for
our country? But we ought to never ask: In what
country were you born?

Before I elaborate on the position of the
administration on immigration policy as ex-
pressed by President Kennedy and President

^ For text, see Bitlletin of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.
3 For text, see if)i<!.. Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211.
* Ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

680

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Johnson antl on tlieir proposals for a revision
of the law, I should like to comment on two
other topics at issue in any reconsideration of
iVmerican immigration policy.

Policy on Asian Immigration

One is the ai)proac-h (o Asian immigration
reflected in our immigration laws, which I men-
tioned earlier. Concern about the effect of the
large number of Chinese and Japanese immi-
grants in the latter part of the 19th century
led eventually to the enactment of the so-called
Chinese Exclusion Acts and of other laws prac-
tically closing our doors to Japanese and other
Asian immigrants. A reversal of this policy
was initiated by President Franklin D. Roose-
velt when he urged the Congress to eliminate
the Chinese Exclusion Act and to astablish a
quota for Cliinese persons. Congress complied
with the President's request in 1943 and passed
a similar law on behalf of Indian immigrants
in 19-16. These acts, however, permitted only
a token immigration of Chinese and Indian
immigrants, since the entire volume of immi-
gration from these two countries was governed
by the small quotas set up for them, 105 for
Chinese and 100 for Indians. In other words,
no provisions were made to permit Chinese or
Indian wives or children of United States citi-
zens to join their husbands and parents without
quota restrictions as in the case of non-Asian
immigrants. The need for a more humane pol-
icy toward Asian immigrants became apparent
when an increasing number of our service-
men during and after the Second World War
married girls of various Asian ancestry. The
Congress, after first responding to this situa-
tion by the passage of special legislation, placed
Asian spouses and children of United States
citizens on equal footing with non-Asian
spouses and children when it enacted the Im-
migration and Nationality Act in 1952. This
was a major development which in the heat of
debate about the merits and demerits of
our Immigration Act has frequently been
overlooked.

While the 1952 law took this step forvvard,
it continued to treat Asian immigrants differ-
ently from non-Asians. It requires that an
Asian person bom outside of the Asian area

be charged to the quota of his ethnic origin,
rather than to the quota of his place of birtli.
On the other hand, Asians have benefited from
the special displaced persons and refugee legis-
lation and also from the special laws passed by
the Congress to remove pressures from heavily
overeubscribed quotas.

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

jVnother area of concern in our immigration
policy is the limitation of our good-neighbor
policy to those coimtries of the Western Hemi-
sphere which were independent at the time of
the enactment of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act in 1952. Countries in the Caribbean
area which have gained their independence
since 1952 are treated as quota areas. They
are Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, each
having an annual quota of 100. Since Con-
gress first imposed quotas in 1921 on the volume
of immigration, it has always exempted persons
bom in any independent country of this hemi-
sphere. It is hoped that the Congress will
adhere to tliis policy with respect to newly in-
dependent countries when it reconsiders our
immigration policy and thus make our hemi-
spheric policy consistent.

Wliat is the outlook for a congressional re-
view of immigration policy, and what is the
stand the executive branch has taken on tlus
issue ?

President Kennedy submitted to the Congress
in July of 1963 a request for a revision of our
immigration laws, urging specifically that the
Congress, over a period of 5 yeai-s, eliminate
the national-origins system and that it imme-
diately place Asians on the same footing with
all other immigrants and give nonquota status
to all persons bom in independent countries of
the Western Hemisphere. Bills reflecting the
President's proposals have been introduced in
the House by Representative Emanuel Celler
of New York and in the Senate by Philip Hart
of Michigan. Senators Hubert H. Humphrey
and Eugene J. McCarthy have cosponsored the
bill. Earlier this year the Senate held some
hearings on the administration bill. After the
Congress has taken final action on the pending
civil rights bill, it is expected that it will con-
sider President Kennedy's and President John-

APRIL

1904

681

son's request for a revision of the immigration
laws.

WHaen Congi-ess deliberates the recommenda-
tions of the achninistration, an important fac-
tor vrill be the recognition that the changes
proposed, M'liich may appear far-reaching to
the superficial reader of our laws, are not dras-
tic departures from our present policies.
Rather they would reconcile the letter of our
general law with the immigration jDolicy of the
United States as it has developed during the
last 10 years as a result of refugee and other
special legislation enacted by the Congress. A
recognition of this fact sliould be a persuasive
factor in the considerations of the Congress.

No one in the brief time allotted for this pres-
entation can do justice to the subject. I can
only hope that I may have convinced you that it
is important that our immigration laws reflect
our national character and objectives more ac-
curately. Surely our concern is not for the ac-
cident of place of birth but for the inherent
moral worth of the individual who seeks to come
to our shores.

I also hope that you will be stimulated to help
our Government and voluntary groups to do
more in meeting the needs of those who must
seek new opportunities for dignity and self-
dependence through emigration to another
country.

THE CONGRESS

Communications Satellite Program
and the Department of State

Statement hy Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser^

Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss on behalf
of the Department of State some of the inter-
national aspects of the communications satellite
program. It would perliaps be helpful if I
identify and comment briefly on three areas of
particular interest to the Department.

First: Policy statements l)y the President -
and llu". Communications Satellite Act itself
establish broad national objectives in the for-
eign policy field. In particular, it is the
announced policy of the T"fnited States to
favor the creation of a single global communica-
tions satellite system with opportunities open
to all nations to particijiate thcicin, (mOhm- as

'Made before tlie Military Ojieratioii.s Subfoniniittee
of the Ilou.se ("Dimnittee on Goveniiiieiit ()|icratioiis on
Apr. 8 (iircHS release l.'il).

'For texts, see IUji.lktin of .\iik. 11, VMM, \\. L'T.'J ;
Sept. 21, 1!M;2, p. 4G7; and Dec. !l, 1!)(!.'}, p. 1)04.

coowners or lessees of capacity in the system.
Access to the system is to be nondiscriminatory,
and care and attention are to be directed toward
providing communication satellite services to
economically less developed countries and areas
as well as those more highly developed.

As you loiow, a number of preliminary talks
with future foreign partners of the corporation
liave been held over the past year in preparation
for the negotiation of international arrange-
ments to set up the structure of the global sys-
tem. In the preparation and conduct of these
talks the corporation and the Department have
enjoyed cjccellent working relations character-
ized by close and effective collaboration, and we
continue to do so. In this way the Department
has been discharging its responsibilities in the
imjilementation of the foreign policy objectives
I have already- mentioned.

Second : Tiie Department is closely involved
witli the preparation of United States positions
and conduct of negotiations relating to the allo-
calion of radio frequencies for the various com-
munication .'services. It sliould be noted that
section 102(b) of the Connnunications Satellite

082

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Act directs that care and attention be given to
eflScient and economical use of the electro-
magnetic frequency spectrum. I am pleased to
confirm that a major milestone in this Held was
successfully passed last fall at the Extraor-
dinary Administrative Eadio Conference on
Space Communications of the International
Telecommunication Union.' Satisfactory allo-
cations of frequencies were made by the Confer-
ence, and agreement was reached on procedures
for their notification and use. The Department
has a continuing interest in the international
aspects of frequency management generally
and as it affects the communications satellite
program. Lieutenant Colonel [Seymour]
Stearns of the Telecommunications Division of
the Department is with me today and is pre-
pared to respond in detail to any questions you
may have on this phase of the Department's
activities.

Tliird : The Department is itself a major user
of telecommmiication services, and its facilities
are part of the National Communications Sys-
tem. The Department expects to benefit as a
user from the further development of that sys-
tem. Mr. [John W.] Coffey, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Communications, will answer any
questions in this area.

Against this background it can readily be
appreciated that the Department has followed
with interest the discussions between the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation and the Sec-
retary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the
National Communications System, relating to
the possibility of shared use by the United
States Government of the global commercial
communications satellite system to be brought
into existence by the corporation and its future
foreign partners.

The Department has been kept fully informed
of the progress of these discussions by repre-
sentatives of both the Department of Defense
and the corporation and has participated in
them as appropriate. To date, the discussions
have not resulted in any agreed basis for shared
use. We are hopeful that a shared use of the
global system can be worked out without in any
way jeopardizing the policy objectives set forth
in the act. But we do not believe it possible to

say in the abstract whether or not this can be
accomplished. When the current discussions
result in a basis of agreement it will liave to be
explained to and reviewed with the corporation's
future partners.

Finally, the Department of State is satisfied
that all parties to the present discussions fully
recognize the necessity that any specific arrange-
ments for governmental use of the system sliould
not impair the successful implementation of the
national objectives to which I have referred.
Final decisions, therefore, will be made in the
light of the results of discussion with future for-
eign partners of a specific program which must
first be defined to the mutual satisfaction of the
corporation and the Executive Agent of the Na-
tional Communications System. The Depart-
ment of State will, of course, actively participate
in this process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes
my prepared statement. I will be glad to an-
swer any questions you and your colleagues may
have.

President Reports to Congress
on Food for Peace Program

White House press release dated April 3

President Johnson reported to the Congress
on April 3 that $1.6 billion worth of Food for
Peace commodities were shipped overseas dur-
ing 1963 as the United States set a new export
record for farm products.

The 19th semiannual report on activities un-
der Public Law 480 ^ showed that total U.S.
agricultural exports for the 1963 calendar year
reached $5.6 billion, a 12-percent jump over the
$5 billion volume in 1962.

In a memorandum to the President accom-
panying the July-December 1963 report, Rich-
ard W. Renter, Director of Food for Peace, said
that P.L. 480 "provides a ladder by which de-
veloping nations climb to full trade partnership
with the United States." He added: "It is
significant that while $1.6 billion worth of Food
for Peace commodities were being shipped over-
seas during the 1963 calendar year, U.S. com-

• For background, see ibid., Nov. 25, 1963, p. 835.

' H. Doc. 294, 88th Cong., 2d sees.

APRIL 27, 1964

683

mercial exports of agricultural coromodities
reached a record high of $4 billion."

Noting tliat P.L. 480 will be 10 years old next
July 10, Mr. Reuter advised the President that
from a modest beginning, the program lias
grown until, at the end of 1963, a total of $11.4
billion worth of Food for Peace commodities
had been delivered overseas.

"Whereas only a few ships per month were
required during those early days, today an
average of five 10,000 ton ships leave American
ports every day carrying Food for Peace car-
goes to the hmigry of the world," Mr. Eeuter
said. "Hundreds of millions of people a year
now receive food — otherwise unavailable to
them — from this sharing of the abundance of
our farms."

The President's report on the overeeas use of
our food resources highlighted the following:

— The Alliance for Progress project "Opera-
tion Niilos" is now providing supplemental food
daily to 10 million children and by the end of
tliis year should reach 12 million — one out of
every three school-age children in Latin Amer-
ica. Cooperating alliance coimtries are them-
selves contributing $13 million in equipment,
supplies, and services to this massive education-
nutrition effort.

— -In country after coimtiy around the world,
there is a shift from family relief feeding pro-
grams to food-for-work and other "bootstrap"
community development programs. Seven
hundred thousand workers in 22 countries are
earning food for their families — an estimated
4 million persons — in part payment for their
labor on projects ranging from scliool and road
construction to land reclamation, irrigation, and
reforestation.

— Food for Peace sales programs continue to
encourage other nations to shift from food pur-
chases with their own currencies to dollar-credit
and cash purchases as their economies improve.
In the past 21/^ years, 33 agreements for food
purchases for long-term dollar credit (title IV)
were entered into with 17 countries. In gen-
eral, these new agreements represented a shift
from purchases using only foreign currency
(title I) to purchases for long-temi dollar credit
or a dollar credit-foreign currency combination.

— The first dollar repayments were made by

foreign governments of credit extended under
earlier title IV agreements, with receipts to the
U.S. totaling $2.3 million.

— Foreign currencies received by the United
States from title I sales were increasingly used
to pay U.S. overseas expenses, preventing a dol-
lar outflow equivalent to $253.3 million during
the year.

"I am convinced that the Food for Peace
program in the short run can effectively and
economically meet human needs and in the long
run can contribute significantly to the expansion
of trade and the development of new world
markets," Mr. Eeuter smnmed up the report to
the President. "Public Law 480 has proven a
most effective way to help close the 'food gap'
that exists between the 'have' and the 'have not'
nations of the world."

The Food for Peace program is a mult i agency
United States effort supervised and coordinated
by the Food for Peace office in the Wliite House
and administered primarily by the Department
of Agriculture and the Agency for International
Development of the Department of State.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 7 confirmed the following nomi-
nations :

Henry L. T. Koren to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Congo (Brazzaville). (For biographic details, see
White House press release dated March 20.)

Rutherford II. Poats to be Assistant Administrator
for the Far East, Agency for International Develoi>-
ment. (For biographic details, see White House press
release dated JIareh 8.)

Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 1G2 dated April 13.)

Mrs. Katharine Ellius White to be Ambassador to
Denmark. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated March 20.)

Appointments

Jlrs. Lee Walsh as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Evaluations, effective April li. ( For biographic details,

684

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

sw Iippiirlim'Ul
ApriHi.)

of State press release 14.") dated

TREATY INFORMATION

Canada Continues Suspension
of Welland Canal Toils

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on April
9 (press release 155) an exchange of notes with
the Government of Canada regarding the sus-
pension of tolls on the Welland Canal. The
tolls, which were suspended as of Julj' 18, 1962,
and were to be reimposed April 1, 1964, will
continue to be suspended.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

Ottawa, March 31, 1'JGi.
No. 291

KxiKi.i.KNCY : I have the honor to refer to your note
No. 4(> datiHl March ,S1, 1!»04 in wliieh you refer to the
intergovernmental agreement Ity excliange of notes
dated December 19 and 2(), IOCS, regarding the rcim-
position of tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1,
l!>r>4, at the rates and tinder the terms In effect im-
mediately prior to the suspension of these tolls in 1962.

You state that upon re-examination of this matter
the Canadian Government has concluded that it would
be preferable not to reimpose the tolls on the Welland
Canal at the present time. I have been instructed by
my Government to Inform you that the proposal not to
reimpose tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964
is at'cei>table.

Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute
an agreement between our two Governments to continue
in force, beyond April 1, 19G4, the agreement recorded
in (he exchange of notes of July 3 and 13, 19C2 in re-
lation to the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.

Ivan B. AVhite
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

Ottawa, March SI, 1964.
No. 46

Excellency, I have the honotir to refer to Note No.
198 of December 19, 1963 ' to you from the Secretary
of State for External Affairs and to your reply in Note
202 of December 20, 1963 ' regarding the intention of
the Government of Canada to reimpose tolls on the
Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964 at the rates and under
the terms existing immediately prior to the suspen-
sion of these tolls in 1962.

The Canadian Government has now re-examined this
matter and has come to the conclusion that it would
be preferable not to reimpose tolls on the Welland
Canal at the present time.

Accordingly I have the honour to propose that this
Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement be-
tween our two Governments to continue in force be-
yond April 1, 1964, the Agreement recorded in the Ex-
change of Notes of July 3 and 13, 1962 - in relation to
the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.

Paul Mabtin
Secretary of State for External Affairs

' For text, see Bct.letin of Jan. 13, 1964, p. 68.
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 255.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.

Done at New York June 4. 1954. Entered into force

September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Accessions deposited: Cuba (with reservation), Octo-
ber 23, 1963; Hungary (with reservation), October
29, 1963.

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963.'

Signatures: Portugal, March 11, 1964; Venezuela {ad
referendum), March 13, 1964.

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February

9. 1957 (TIAS 3948), on conservation of North Pa-
cific fur seals. Done at Washington Octolier S, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Japan, April 10. 1904.
Entered into force: April 10, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty bannini; nuclear weapon test.s in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October

10. 1963. TIAS 5433.

notification deposited: Mauritania, April 6, 1964.

' Not in force.

APRIL 27, 1964

685

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of
certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London Feb-
ruary 20, 1962.'
Acceptance deposited: United States, April 3, 1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4893), with annexes and additional
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.'
Ratifications deposited: United States, Territories of
the United States, April 3, 1964.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa-
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part 1 and parts
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS
5115.
Accession deposited: Japan, AprU. 10, 1964.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Taipei October 19, 1963.
Entered into force October 19, 1963. With exchange of
letters— Signed at Taipei October 21, 1963. TIAS 5482.
13 pp. 100.

Telecommunication — Radio Communications Between
Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. Agree-
ment with Colombia. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Bogotd November 16 and 29, 1963. Entered into force
December 29, 1963. TIAS 5483. 4 pp. 50.

Weather Stations — Cooperative Program on Guade-
loupe Island. Agreement with France, extending the
agreement of March 23, 1956, as supplemented and ex-
tended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Paris August
13 and November 25, 1963. Entered into force Novem-
ber 25, 1963. Operative July 1, 1962. TIAS 5485. 4
pp. 50.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement to continue in force beyond April 1, 1964,
the agreement of July 3 and 13, 1962 (TIAS 5117),
providing for the suspension of tolls on the Welland
Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa
March 31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964.

China

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade In
cotton textiles of October 19, 1963 (TIAS 5482), by
revising agreed levels for categories 50 (trousers,
slacks, and shorts) and 26 (cotton duck). Effected
by exchange of notes at Taiwan February 3 and
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.

Portugal

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Ef-
fected by exchanges of notes at Lisbon March 12,
1964. Entered into force March 12, 1964.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of November 28, 1961, as amended (TIAS
4904, 5392). Effected by exchange of notes at Lis-
bon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered into force
April 3, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V.8.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.G., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, which
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Reimposi-
tion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa Decem-
ber 19 and 20, 1963. Entered into force December 20,
1963. TIAS 5481. 2 pp. 5<t.

* Not in force.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 6-12

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.

Releases issued prior to April 6 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 138 of
March 31 and 139 of April 1.

No. Date Subject

*145 4/6 Mrs. Walsh sworn in as Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Evaluations
( biographic details ) .

*146 4/6 Rusk : death of General MacArthur.

*147 4/6 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

148 4/7 Rusk : "The Atlantic Alliance."

149 4/8 Portugal credentials (rewrite).

150 4/8 Tunisia credentials (rewrite).

151 4/8 Chayes : statement on communica-

tions satellite program, Military
Operations Subcommittee, House
Committee on Government Oper-
ations.

152 4/8 Haiti credentials (rewrite).

153 4/8 Kenya credentials (rewrite).

154 4/8 Iraq credentials (rewrite).

155 4/9 Continued suspension of WeUand

Canal tolls.

156 4/9 Ball : "The Open System in North-

South Relations."

157 4/9 Meeting of Joint U.S.-Canadian

Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs.

♦158 4/9 Cleveland: "The Strategy of Edu-
cational Development."

*159 4/9 Itinerary for visit of King of Jor-
dan.

tl60 4/10 Williams : "Diplomatic Rapport Be-
tween Africa and the United
States."

*161 4/10 Mcllvaine designated coordinator,
FSl National Interdepartmental
Seminar (biographic details).

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

686

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX April 27, 1964. Vol. L, No. 1296

Africa. New Patterns of African Trade ( Wil-
liams) 604

Agriculture

Presideut Reports to Congress on Food for Peace
Program 683

The Hole of Agriculture in Trade Expansion

(Herter) 671

American Republics. United States and Panama
Reestablish Diplomatic Relations (Johnson,
OAS announcement, joint declaration) . . . 655

Canada

Canada Continues Suspension of TVelland Canal
Tolls (Martin, White) 685

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at

Ottawa 670

Congo (Brazzaville). Koren confirmed as Am-
bassador 684

Congress

Communications Satellite Program and the De-
partment of State (Chayes) 682

Confirmations (Koren, Poats, Vaughn, White) . 684

President Reports to Congress on Food for Peace
Program 683

Denmark. Mrs. White confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 684

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Walsh) 684

Confirmations (Koren, Poats, Vaughn, White) . 684

Economic Affairs

The Atlantic Alliance (Rusk) 650

Canada Continues Suspension of Welland Canal

Tolls (Martin, White) 685

Export Expansion and Balance of Payments

(Johnson) 663

New Patterns of African Trade (Williams) . . 664

The Open System in North-SouUi Relations

(Ball) 657

The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion

(Herter) 671

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at
Ottawa 670

Foreign Aid

New Patterns of African Trade (Williams) . . 664

The Open System in North-South Relations

(Ball) 657

Poats confirmed as Assistant Administrator for

the Far East, AID 684

President Reports to Congress on Food for Peace
Program 683

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Th^ard) .... 662

Immigration and Naturalization. Foreign and
Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration
Laws (Schwartz) 675

International Organizations and Conferences.
United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo-
matic Relations (Johnson, OAS announce-
ment, joint declaration) 655

Iraq. Letters of Credence (al-Hanl) 662

Kenya. Letters of Credence (Nabwera) . . . 662
Military Affairs. The Atlantic Alliance (Rusk) . 650
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The At-
lantic AUiance (Rusk) 650

Panama

United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo-
matic Relations (Johnson, OAS announce-
ment, joint declaration) 655

Vaughn confirmed as Ambassador 684

Portugal. Letters of Credence (Garin) . . , . 662
Presidential Documents

Export Expansion and Balance of Payments . . 663
United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo-
matic Relations 655

Publications. Recent Releases 686

Refugees. Foreign and Domestic Implications

of U.S. Immigration Laws (Schwartz) . . . 675

Science. Communications Satellite Program

and the Department of State (Chayes) . . . 682

Treaty Information

Canada Continues Suspension of Welland Canal

Tolls (Martin, White) 685

Current Actions 685

Tunisia. Letters of Credence (Driss) .... 662
United Nations. The Open System in North-
South Relations (Ball) 657

Name Index

Ball, George W 657

Chayes, Abram 682

Driss, Rachid 662

Garin, Vasco Vieira 662

al-Hani, Nasir 662

Herter, Christian A 671

Johnson, President 655, 663

Koren, Henry L. T 684

Martin, Paul 685

Nabwera, Burudi 662

Poats, Rutherford M 684

Rusk, Secretary 650

Schwartz, Abba P 675

Th^ard, Andr6 662

Vaughn, Jack Hood 684

Walsh, Mrs. Lee 684

White, Ivan B 685

White, Mrs. Katherine Elkus 684

Williams, G. Mennen 664

U.S. COVERNUENT FRIHTINC OFFICKiIftll

u.

DSB etc G

PUBLIC LIBRARY- lie

COPLEY SQUARE

BOSTON MASS 02 t*^ ^^

r»F XS OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. a 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. S300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

This 12-page pamphlet is the text of an address by President Johnson at the Pan American Union
on March 16, 1964, on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as Chairman of
the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.

President Jolinson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various
areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success.

PUBIilCATION 7669 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7669 15 cents

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Please send me copies of Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

!

NAME

ADDRESS

Enclosed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documents)

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL ^VEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

V oh L,N 0.1297

May 4, 196^

SEATO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS AT MANILA

Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Conwiunique 690

DIPLOAL\TIC RAPPORT BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

by Assistant Secretary Williams 698

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAAI FOR 1965
Statement by Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara 705

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTER-.\3IERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon 717

For index see inside back cover

SEATO CounciB of Ministers iVSeets at fVianiia

The ninth meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
was held at Manila, April 13-15. Following
are texts of a statement made hy Secretary Rusk
at the opening session on April 13 and a com-
munique issued at the close of the meeting on
April 15.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

It is most fitting indeed that the SEATO
Council meeting should be held this year in
Manila, imder the distinguished cliairmanship
of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines, for it was here, 10 years ago, that
the Manila Pact,^ which created the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, was signed by eight
nations from both hemispheres who shared the
determination to remain free.

I am also gladdened, Mr. Chairman, by the
glorious welcome with which we liave been re-
ceived by your President and his stimulating

' For text, see Buluetin of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

words to us here today and the welcome of your
Government and your people.

The situation facing us in the treaty area in
1954 was fraught with peril and with severe
problems. As you will recall, in 1954 Viet-
Nam had just been partitioned and the pros-
f)ects for the fledgling Republic of South Viet-
Nam were far from promising. Laos was an
arena of guerrilla war which had spilled over
from the struggle in Viet-Nam between the
French and Vietnamese forces and their Com-
munist-led adversaries. The Communist in-
surgency in Malaya had not then been brought
under control by Malayan and British Com-
monwealth jungle fighters. Throughout the
area, economic problems — to a great extent a
legacy of the damage wrought by World War
II — loomed very large.

Some of the same problems still persist. In
Laos, despite the Geneva agreements of 1962,
the situation remains unsettled and the pro-
Communist Pathet Lao forces are continuing
their military pressures against the neutralist
and conservative forces. North Viet-Nam con-
tinues to maintain troops in Laos, to supply

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1297 PUBLICATION 7685 MAY 4, ISM

The Department of State BulIeUn, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
forelfm relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International aff.-Jrs and
the functions of the Department, Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. OoTern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402, Price : 52 Issues, domestic $8.50.
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

690

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUULETIN

military equipment to the Pathet Lao, and to
infiltrate Viet Cong through Laos into Soutli
Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva agree-
ments of 1962.

South Viet-Nam is the target of a continuing
aggi'ession directed, supported, and supplied
from Hanoi. The Communists have increased
their attacks. But the Govermnent and people
of South Viet-Nam are moving witli firm de-
termination to defeat this aggression.

My country has been encouraged by the vig-
orous reaction of General [Nguyen] Khanh
and his government to the campaign of Com-
munist terror and subversion, as well as by the
Vietnamese Government's clear recognition
that this war will not be won by militarj' action
alone but that there must be economic and so-
cial progress among all elements of the Viet-
namese people.

We tend to be preoccupied with our own
problems in the free world. But let us not lose
sight of the serious difficulties within the Com-
munist world. These stem in part from the
economic failures of communism, in part from
divergent views and interests among Commu-
nist leaders and states, including historic na-
tional differences. These internal quarrels
limit the grave capabilities of the Communist
world. And the boast that commimism was the
economic shortcut to the future for developing
coimtries has been proved clearly false.

The inefficiencies of Communist agricultural
production have become increasingly conspicu-
ous. Industrial growth, even in the Soviet
Union, has slowed down sharply. Here in the
Western Pacific the economic plight of Com-
mimist China and North Viet-Nam contrast
dramatically with the progress of the free coim-
tries of the area, including the regional mem-
bers of SEATO.

We welcomed in the United States the forma-
tion of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, and
we continue to regard it as a positive and pro-
gressive development.'' We are seriously con-
cerned by external threats to the security and
integrity of Malaysia and hope that a solution
can be found to this problem which will con-

' For a Department statement of Sept. 14, 1963, see
ibid., Oct 7, 1963, p. 542.

tribute to the stability and progress of the en-
lire treaty area.

While serious economic problems continue to
confront South and Southeast Asia, encourag-
ing progress has been made toward their solu-
tion. SEATO's skilled-labor training projects
provide a good example of what is being done
in the economic field.

Looking at this 10-year period in its broadest
aspect, it is apparent that we are living in a
period of tremendous change. In the economic,
scientific, and social sphere this is indeed a revo-
lutionary age. This being so, it is extremely
important that we understand what these
changes mean for us, how they are related to
our interests, and how they affect the issue with
which we are so deeply concerned — that is the
issue of freedom in the world.

Our comprehension of these changes will en-
able us to move with the times, to work more
effectively within the SEATO framework to
achieve a better and safer community of nations
and peoples.

I would like on this occasion, Mr. Chairman,
to pay tribute on behalf of my country to a
person whose skill and dedication in behalf of
SEATO would be difficult to match. I refer,
of course, to Mr. Pote Sarasin, SEATO Sec-
retary General until his resignation last De-
cember, who had served this organization since
1957. We are fortunate to have the services
of his worthy successor, Mr. Konthi Supha-
mongkhon. We also wish to express our deep
appreciation to the outgoing Deputy Secretary
General, Mr. William Worth, who has served
SEATO so effectively and loyally during the
past 6 years.

In the days ahead we shall be examining im-
portant questions concerning the treaty area.
My delegation and I look forward to hearing
the views of the other member nations and to
studying with you the best means of meeting
our common problems.

We have important work to do. SEATO's
mission — the preservation and strengthening
of peace and security in the treaty area — is as
relevant today, indeed, as critical today, as it
was in 1954. This is a time to rededicate our-
selves to this mission, as my country now does.

MAT 4, 1964

691

"With the "Manila spirit" to guide us, we look
forward to the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, for
serious and intimate discussions with our
SEATO colleagues.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 166 dated April 15

1. The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Orga-
nization held its ninth meeting in Manila from April
13 to 15, 1964, under the chairmanship of the Honour-
able Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the Thilippines. The inaugural ad-
dress was delivered by the Honourable Diosdado
Maeapagal, President of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines.

General Observations

2. The Council discussed the international situa-
tion with particular attention to the conditions exist-
ing in the treaty area at the close of SEATO's first
decade. It was agreed that SEATO has had, and con-
tinues to have, a most important stabilizing influence
in South-East Asia.

3. The Council noted that, while the member nations
of the alliance have continued over the past year to
enjoy peaceful progress and national security, the
Communist threat remains. The Council studied the
various manifestations of this threat in the treaty
area and the means required to combat them. Despite
the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, world
domination remains the aim of communism and thus
vigilance must not be relaxed. In addition to meas-
ures to deter overt aggression and active insurgency,
there should continue to be emphasis on the develop-
ment of economic and social conditions which
strengthen national resistance to subversion.

4. Re-affirming that the determination of national
policy rests with individual governments, the Council
declared that material support and encouragement
should be given to those nations vrhich, in defending
themselves, need and request such support.

Republic of Vietnam

5. The Council (see paragraph 10 regarding the
position of France) surveyed with special attention
the situation in Vietnam. It noted the efforts made
there to check increasing subversive and aggressive
activities and expressed its continuing deep interest
and sympathy for the Government and people of Viet-
nam in their struggle.

6. The Council expressed grave concern about the
continuing Communist aggression against the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, a protocol state under the terms of
the Manila Pact. Documentary and material evidence
continues to show that this organized campaign is
directed, supplied and supported by the Communist
regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

7. The Government and people of the Republic of
Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their de-
termination to fight for their country. The Council
affirmed its confidence that the program of political
and administrative reform, military action, pacifica-
tion, and economic and social development recently
instituted by the Government of the Republic of Viet-
nam, together with the support it is receiving from
member nations of SEATO and from other nations
in the free world, will greatly enhance the ability of
the Vietnamese people to defeat the Communist cam-
paign and will at the same time improve their pros-
pects for a better life.

8. The Council agreed that the members of SEATO
should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further
concrete steps within their respective capabilities in
fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty.

9. The Council agreed that the defeat of the Com-
munist campaign is essential not only to the security
of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East
Asia. It will also be convincing proof that Communist
expansion by such tactics will not be permitted.

10. The French Council member, while expressing
the sympathy and friendship of France for the Viet-
namese people, who for such a long time have been
undergoing such severe trials and who aspire towards
real independence, stated that under the present seri-
ous circumstances it was wise to abstain from any
declaration.

Laos

11. The Council expressed concern that the achieve-
ment of a neutral and independent government of na-
tional union in Laos is being jeopardized by repeated
violations of the Geneva Agreement of 1962, particu-
larly by North Vietnamese military assistance and
intervention and by repeated Pathet Lao attacks. It
is urged that the International Control Commission
be accorded the necessary facilities to fulfill its duty,
under the provisions of that agreement, of investigat-
ing violations in all parts of the kingdom. It is agreed
to keep the situation under close scrutiny.

Counter-Subversion

12. The Council noted that regional members of the
alliance continue to be prime targets for Communist
subversion, but that effective counter-measures are
being taken by the respective governments to prevent
the exploitation of vulnerable areas. SEATO has as-
sisted in the co-ordination of material and other aid
provided at the request of member countries.

Interests of Member States

13. The Council noted the anxiety expressed by cer-
tain member countries for due consideration of their
individual problems in the context of the region as a
wliole. keeping in view (he provisions of the Manila
Pact. In this connection, the Council noted tlie ob-
servation of the President of the Philippines that the
interests of member states should not be placed at a

692

DEPAKTSrENT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN

disiKlvjiiiliiKt' ill rt'laliim to tlioso of iion-iiu'inber states.

14. Till" CouiK'il Iioaril full rt'iiorts from its various
iiioiiiluTs about iirobloius of intiTost to members In-
volving their relations with non-member states.

Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation

ITi. The rouiicil reviewed the progress made by
existing; SEATO civil projects, and aKrecd that other
propo.sals should be examined through which SKATO
might make similar contributions to the welfare of
the region.

1(5. The SEATO General Medical Research Labora-
tory in Hangkok. the SEATO Clinical Uesearch Centre
in Bangkok, and the SEATO Cholera Uesearch Lab-
oratory in Dacca are investigating and imblisliing the
causes, treatment and control of diseases.

17. The SEATO Regional Community Development
Technical Assistance Centre in T'bol, Thailand, is de-
veloping techniques and disseminating information on
economic self-help and local development.

15. The SEATO Graduate School of Engineering in
Bangkok plays an important part in tlie development
of trained personnel needed in the region. The Coun-
cil directed that a study should be made of the financ-
ing of the school so as to ensure its future as a regional
institution of higher learning.

19. The skilled labour projects in the Asian member
countries are helping to provide skilled manpower for
the developing industrial plants of the Asian member
nations.

20. The Council also reviewed the program for cul-
tural co-operation and agreed that the established
practice of awarding research fellowships, post-grad-
uate and undergraduate scholarships and professor-
ships is contributing to the advancement of knowledge
and to international cultural relations.

Military Planning and Exercises

1:1. The Council recorded its conviction that ade-
quate defences, individual and collective, are essential
to the maintenance of .security. The experience gained
from regular and systematic military planning among
the eight member nations and from the conduct of
military exercises, of which 2.") have been held to date,
is one of the most important and valuable assets of
the Alliance.

22. The Council commended the conduct of the mili-
tary defence exercises held during the past year, in-
cluding the civic action programs which were of direct
benefit to the local population.

23. The Council approved the report of the military
advisers, and noted with satisfaction that the Mili-
tary Planning Oifice had revised and refined defence
plans in the light of changing or anticipated situations.

Staff Changes

24. The Council expressed its deep appreciation to
His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin, who served as Sec-

retary-General from the creation of that position in
PJ.">7 until his resignallon In December 1!)<;;! upon his
appointment as a member of the Cabinet of Thailand.
The Council took especial recognition of his skill and
untiring efforts in improving and strengthening the
organization aiul of the eminent contribution he made
to the cause of collective security.

2."). The Council conveyed its gratitude to Mr. Wil-
liam Worth, whose tenure of office as Deputy Secre-
tary-General and Chairman of the Permanent Working
Group ends shortly after the conclusion of the Council
meeting. It commended him for his outstanding and
dedicated service during the seven years he has held
those positions.

2C. The Council welcomed the incumbent Secretary-
General, His Excellency Mr. Konllii Suphamongkhon,
who was appointed in Fel)ruary of this year. It al.so
welcomed Mr. David A. Wraight, who has been ap-
pointed to succeed Mr. Worth.

Secretariat-General

27. The Council expressed its warm appreciation to
the staff of the organization for their valuable services.

Next Meeting

28. The Council accepted with pleasure the invita-
tion of Her Majesty's Government in the t'nited King-
dom to hold its next meeting in Loudon in 190.5.

Expression of Gratitude

29. The Council exi)ressed its gratitude to the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines for its hos-
pitality and the excellent arrangements made for the
conference. The meeting voted warm thanks to the
Chairman, the Honourable Mr. Salvador P. Lopez.

Leaders of National Delegations

30. The leaders of the national delegations to the
Council meeting were:

The Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for
External Affairs of Australia

His Excellency Jlr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of France

The Right Honourable Keith Hoiyoake, Prime Min-
ister and Minister of External Affairs of New
Zealand

His Excellency Dr. A. M. Malik, Ambassador of
Pakistan to the Philippines

The Honourable Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines

His Excellency Mr. Tbanat Kboinan, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand

The Right Honourable Lord Carringtnn, Minister
Without Portfolio, United Kingdom

The Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of
the United States

MAY 4, 19G4

693

U.S. Reaffirms Comsriitrraents
to Taiwan and Viet-Nam

At the conclusion of the meeting of the
SEATO Council of Ministers at Manila,^ Sec-
retary Rush -fleio to Taiwan for a visit loith
Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Eepublic of
China, and then to the Republic of Viet-Nam.
Following are texts of statements made by Mr.
Rusk on his arrival at Taipei April 16 and at
Saigon April 17, together with a statement made
at the White House upon his retiirn to Wash-
ington April 20.

ARRIVAL AT TAIPEI, APRIL 16

I greatly welcome this opportunity to visit
Taiwan. I bring you warmest greetings from
the President of the United States, Lyndon B.
Johnson, and the American people.

The United States Government and the
American people are associated with you in a
Treaty of Mutual Defense. I wish to reaffirm
our dedication to the commitments in this
treaty, our support of the Republic of China
as the Government of China, and our opposi-
tion to any proposal to deprive the Republic of
China of its rightful place in the United Na-
tions and to seat the Chinese Communists in its
place.

The Conmiunist regime on the mainland of
China calls itself revolutionary and boasts of
progress, despite the fact that its policies have
inflicted terrible setbacks on the people of the
mainland. It is the Government and people of
the Republic of China who have been carrying
out successfully progressive programs which re-
flect the true revolutionary inheritance of the
Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
These forward-looking programs continue to
improve the well-being of the people of the
Republic of China.

I salute tliB resolute will and positive achieve-
ment of the Republic of China under the leader-
ship of President Cliiang Kai-shek. The
American people have always regarded the
Chinese people with admiration. We value you

as stalwart comrades in the struggle to secure a
more prosperous, just, and satisfying life for all
free men everywhere, and a peace safe from the
threats of aggression. I look forward to dis-
cussions with your leaders on the major prob-
lems facing free men today. May the friend-
ship and close understanding between our two
peoples, as your own phrase puts it, live 10,000
years !

' See p. 690 .

ARRIVAL AT SAIGON, APRIL 17

I bring the greetings of President Jolmson
and the American people to the valiant govern-
ment and valiant people of the Republic of Viet-
Nam. Your independence, security, and well-
being are at the center of our deep commitment
to you in your present struggle. I am very
pleased to have this chance to get acquainted
personally with General [Nguyen] Klianh and
his colleagues and to learn firsthand about your
action to defeat aggression from the north and
to improve the living conditions of the people
of Viet-Nam.

Earlier this week in Manila, I attended the
meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation. You can take heart from the degree of
solidarity achieved there among both your close
neighbors and your strong friends. We were
fully aware of the eloquent testimony which
your Government and people have given to your
determinatioii to fight for your country.

We agreed that the defeat of the Communist
campaign is essential not only to the security
of the Republic of Viet-Nam but to that of
Southeast Asia.

We agreed that the members of SEATO
should remain prepared, if necessary, to take
further concrete steps within their respective
capabilities to fulfill their obligations under the
treaty.

You will have peace here in this beautiful
country when Hanoi and Peiping have been
taught to leave their neighbors alone. You
and those of us who are at your side must defeat
their effort to impose their own misery upon
you. That this will be done I have not the
slightest doubt, and I am here to make clear
once again that we shall help you do it.

694

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUULETIN

RETURN TO WASHINGTON, APRIL 20

President Johnson

Secretary Knsk has just made a very interest-
ing and infornmtive report on his meeting witli
SEATO and with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek and with Ambassador [Henry Cabot]
Lodge in Saigon. Secretary [of Defense Robert
S.] McNamara and Mr. [George W.] Ball and
Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy and myself heard with
great interest some reconunendations tlie Secre-
tary made, together with his observations and
conclusions in connection with the effort of
South Viet-Nam. The Secretary will be glad
to make a statement to you at this time.

Secretary Rusk

Tliunk you, Mr. President.

I do feel that this trip to the Philippines and
to the Republic of China and to Saigon was
veiy important for me and was very helpful to
our conmion effort. At the SEATO meeting
it was quite apparent that those members of the
free world do look upon the security of South
Viet-Nam as utterly vital to the security of
Southeast Asia and that the security of South-
east Asia in turn is vital to the entire free
world. There was no one at the SEATO meet-
ing who did not hope that this effort succeeds,
and all of them but one made it very clear in
our public declaration that this was so and that
they were putting their full effort behind it.
We talked about further measures that could
be taken to support the present Government of
South Viet-Nam with a good deal of unity and
solidarity of purpose, and I came away from
that meeting very much encouraged by the at-
titude of those who are in the area and those
who are making a major effort in the area.

Over in Taiwan I had some very interesting
discussions with President Chiang Kai-shek.
The people on Taiwan have done a remarkable
job in building up a thriving economy and im-
proving the social standards of that island.
They are now sending technical assistance per-
sonnel to the other countries who are in a devel-
oping process and who need to borrow from the
Republic of China some of the experience of
success which has occurred on that island, and

that is one of the very important developments
of the last year or two.

I had a chance to go over with President
Chiang Kai-shek the full security situation in
the Pacific Ocean area. I reported to him on
the SEATO meeting and assured him of our
continued support for the international position
of the Republic of China in the United States
and elsewhere.

In Saigon I was much interested to get a de-
tailed report on a province-by-province basis
of the course of the struggle in that comitry.
I was encouraged to discover that there were a
considerable number of provinces where pacifi-
cation is moving ahead, and in those provinces
where there is peace, good progress is being
made on the economic and social development
of the country.

I must say the overwhelming impression I
got in South Viet-Nam was that that country
could be a gleaming coimtry if only it had
peace; that is the missing element. It has re-
sources, it has a lively and intelligent popula-
tion, it has some trained leadership of very con-
siderable capacity, an important geographic po-
sition; it is favored by nature. If it could con-
tinue now, as we think it will, to finish up its
pacification progi'am, there is a country that
can play an imjaortant, strong, active role
among the free nations of Southeast Asia.

There are provinces there where the situa-
tion is still critical, and the plans that have been
laid down by General Khanh and his colleagues
and by our own Ambassador and General [Paul
D.] Harkins seem to be well devised to deal with
the situation in those critical provinces; but it
will take some further time, some further effort
by the South Vietnamese and by us. Also, I
think that South Viet-Nam will be calling for
more assistance of a political sort, an economic
sort, and perhaps in other respects from other
free-world countries who have demonstrated
their interest in that country. We know that
there are those who are prepared to provide
personnel and to provide economic resources
and whatever assistance might be needed to get
on with this job.

General Khanh himself is an impressive man.
He shows great vigor and understanding. He is
trying now to invigorate the administration of
the country following the political uncertainties

MAY 4, 19C4

695

since last November. He is on the right track,
and he is making good progress. We believe
that the prospect there is that there can be
steady improvement in those critical provinces
and that we can go ahead now and exploit and
profit from the peace which has been estab-
lished in others.

So I came back encouraged from my trip,
without any misunderstanding about the diffi-
culty of the job still ahead and without any lack
of resolve about the necessity for getting on
with it, because that covmtry deserves peace and
the security of the free world requires that
Southeast Asia and South Viet-Nam be secure.

Thank you very much.

Question-and-Answer Period

Q. The President said that he had heard with
great interest recommendations that you had
brought hack. Would you he at liherty, sir., to
tell Its what some of these recommendations are?

A. Well, I would not want to go into detail
about a number of recommendations that I have
brouglit back to add to those which Secretary
McNamara brought back on his recent trip.=
Mine, as you would expect, lie more largely in
the political field. I do think that South Viet-
Nam, for example, has perhaps during the po-
litical difficulties of the last 3 or 4 months al-
lowed its international diplomatic effort to drop
off somewhat and that they should go ahead
now and move with considerable vigor and
activity in explaining their case to the rest of the
world and enlisting the political support of the
free world in their struggle, and I am sure tliey
will be doing that now that they have settled
down and are getting on with the job.

I think also that it has been indicated that
there are other countries who are prepared to
be helpful in resources in South Viet-Nam, and
we must now move to pull that together and see
that all those who wish to contribute have a
chance to do so and that the total is coordinated
into a consistent effort to win this struggle at
the earliest possible moment.

Q. What countries are these?

'For a White House statement dated Mar. 17, see
Bulletin of Apr. 0, 1964, p. .522.

A. I think some of the SEATO countries, for
example, and there are some non-SEATO coun-
tries that have indicated a willingness to help.
One thing, for example, that I can mention is
tliat tliere is at the moment a critical fertilizer
shortage in South Viet-Nam just at the begin-
ning of the planting season. It has been a little
difficult to find sources nearby to get there in
time. Both the Philippines and the Eepublic of
China have offered fertilizer to meet this situa-
tion. These are very substantial quantities, and
we are pleased that they have come forward.
This may seem to be a rather small thing,
but a combination of small things make up large
things ; so we are going to be trying to pull these
together.

Q. Toti 7nentwned peace. Mr. Rusk. Do you
have any impression among the leadership of
South Viet-Nam at the present time that they
would he loilling now or in the near future to
negotiate with North Viet-Nam?

A. Oh, no. I think that that is not in their
minds at all because there is no known question,
at least no question that I know about, on which
negotiations would appear to be successful. The
answer there is a very simple one : If those in
the North in Hanoi and Peiping would leave
their neighbors to the South alone, there would
be peace and there would be no need for an
American military presence in that area. We
have never asked for bases in South Viet-Nam.
Our 15,000 or 16,000 men are there as a direct
result of these pressures from the North and the
infiltration of cadres and weapons and political
control into the Viet Cong insurrection in the
South. So I do not see the basis for a nego-
tiation.

We have got two agreements affecting that
part of the world whicli were negotiated, which
represent solemn commitments on the part of
Peiping and Hanoi. Those are the Geneva
agreements of 1954 and 1962. They have
treated those agreements with contempt. There
is no occasion as far as I can see that peace is
going to come about by an agreement which
would simply represent a piece of paper on the
other sitic while tliey go ahead with tlieir mis-
chievous activities in the South. Now, we need
peace through action, peace througli demonstra-
tion by the North that they are leaving their

69G

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

neifrhbors alone, and that could come about by
decision in Hanoi and Peiping. If they make
tiiat decision, tlu'ii peace could be restored very
quickly out there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you. said that other nations
had offered help and that one of the things
was to get all this help together.

A. Yes.

Q. Did that help involve anything in a mili-
tary— ?

A. Well, there are a few military personnel
already in South Viet-Nam from other coun-
tries. I think there may be some technical
people and some specialists. I do not myself
envision organized combat units at the present
moment from other countries. Thank you.

Q. Military advisers from, other countries?

A. There are some there now, and I think
there miofht well be a good use for some more.
Thank you.

Q. Thank you.

President Calls for Review
of Tariffs on Glass Products

White House press release dated April 15

President Jolinson has requested the Tariff
Commission to begin an inv^estigation for the
purpose of advising him on the probable eco-
nomic effects of reducing or terminating the
special temporary tariff protection on cylinder,
crown, and sheet glass.

Increased tariffs on these glass products were
imposed on March 19, 19G2,' after an escape-
clause investigation established the need for
such temporarj' protection. The situation in
the industry must, under the law, be reviewed
each year by the Commission. The first annual
review was completed last autumn under the
provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
That act also provides, in section 351(d)(2),
that the President may call for a full-scale re-
view of the case by the Tariff Commission in
order to advise him of the probable economic

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1962, p.
649.

effect of modifying the special escape-clause
restrictions.

The annual Tariff Commission report on this
case was reviewed by the Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations, Christian A. Her-
ter, and the interagency committees responsible
to Governor Herter s oflice.

President Johnson Holds Talks
With King Hussein of Jordan

Ilis Majesty Hussein /, King of the Hash-
emite Kingdojn of Jordan, visited the United
States April 13-24- (^^ t^^^ invitation of President
Johnson. His Majesty arrived at Philadelphia
April 13 and was in Washington April H-16.
where he met with President Johnson and other
Government officials. King Hussein and his
party left Washington on the afternoon of
April 16 for New York City and on the folloio-
ing day departed for visits to Cape Kennedy
and West Palm Beach, Fla., April 18-19, and
Houston, Tex., April 20-21, returning to New
York City April 22, where the official portion
of the visit was completed April 2^. Thereaf-
ter, His Majesty visited San Francisco, Calif.,
Denver and Colorado Springs, Colo., and
Chicago, III., and departed the United States
April 29. Following is the text of a joint com-
munique released at Washington April 15 at
the conclusion of discussions held by President
Johnson and King Hussein April 11^ and 15.

White House press release dated April 15

King Hussein of Jordan and President Jolin-
son have completed two days of discussions on
matters of mutual interest and concern. Both
welcomed the opportunity presented by the
King's visit at the invitation of the President
for a full exchange of views.

The President presented the views of the
United States on various world problems, in-
cluding those of the Middle East. He empha-
sized the strong desire of the United States for
friendly relations with all Arab states, and its
devotion to peace in the area. King Hussein
put forward the views of Jordan and tlie other
Arab states on various Middle East problems
and their impact on relations between the two

MAT 4. 1904

697

nations. Cordiality, good will and candor
marked the discussions. A common concern
for preserving and strengthening a just peace
in the area was evident throughout the talks.
The two leaders declared their firm determi-
nation to make every effort to increase the broad
area of understanding which already exists be-
tween Jordan and the United States and agreed

that His Majesty's visit advanced this objective.

The President expressed the intention of the
Government of the United States to continue
to support Jordanian efforts to attain a viable
and self-sustaining economy.

His Majesty and his party will spend a few
days travelling in the United States before re-
turning home.

Diplomatic Rapport Between Africa and the United States

by G. Mennen Williatns

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

In 1y92 a newly emerging, underdeveloped
country called the United States of America
struggled to convert a vast wilderness into a
viable nation. Although our population in
those days was a sparse 4 million people, such
cities as Philadelphia, with its nearly 43,000
people, faced difficulties with urban expansion.

In addition to such domestic problems, we
also were concerned with survival in a world
in which we had few friends. Having lost the
protection of the British Fleet when we came
to independence, one of the earliest diplomatic
tasks of the infant United States was to mini-
mize the harsh treatment American ships were
receiving at the hands of the older, more estab-
lished nations of North Africa. Consequently
we set up the first American consulate in Africa
at Algiers on June 7, 1792. Before the end of
the 18th century, we also had established posts
at Tripoli (1795), Tunis (1795), and Tangier
(1797) in North Africa, and at Cape Town
(1799) in Africa's southernmost nation.

North Africa's political climate in those early
days of relations between the governments of
that area and the fledglmg United States was

'Address made before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on
Apr. 10 (press release ICO).

not conducive to the development of diplomatic
rapport, however. American shipping was fair
game and a new source of revenue for the Afri-
cans, and we were forced to make substantial
tribute payments to the four North African
powers. Nor was this all. In 1798 the Ameri-
can frigate George Washington, after deliver-
ing 26 barrels of silver dollars in tribute to the
Dey of Algiers, was forced at gunpoint to trans-
jjort an Algerian mission to Constantinople.
Perhaps even more humiliating was the fact
that, upon arrival, the Turkish port officer in-
formed the ship's crew that his Government had
never heard of a country called the United
States.

Obviously, good diplomatic rapport was not
a characteristic of early relations between
Africa and the United States.

Througliout the 19th and into tlie earlj' 20th
century, we had relatively few diplomatic con-
tacts with Africa, although this was a great
jjeriod of missionary activity on the continent.
In that century and a half, however, wo did
increase the number of U.S. posts concerned
with trade and consular matters throughout
Africa. Thus it Mas we entered Portugal's
African territories (1853), Liberia (1863), the
Congo (18S4), Ethiopia (1903), Nigeria
(1916), and Kenya (1918) and increased the

698

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

number of American posts in Morocco and
Soutli Africa. "We also l\ad a consulate on Zan-
zibar from 1837 to 1915 to serve American
traders and whaling ships tliat used the port
for supplies.

World War II and After

"With the coming of World "War II, Africa
took on new importance. In 1!)40 wo opened
a post at Dakar, Senegal, then the capital of
French "West Africa and the African port of
entrj- for much of our wartime transatlantic
shipping and air transport. During the war
3'ears, the emphasis our posts had given to trade
and consular affairs was replaced by a new con-
cern with political and economic reporting —
the former because the United States in this
period had a number of important military fa-
cilities in Africa, and many significant military
operations were conducted in African terri-
tories; and the latter because Africa's extensive
natural resources included many strategic ma-
terials needed for the Allied war effort.

Africa's rise to prominence during the war
years also led to the ultimate development of a
Bureau of African Affairs as a separate Depart-
ment of Stat© entity to deal with African mat-
ters. Although responsibility for much of
Africa was transferred from what was then
the Division of European Affairs to the Near
Eastern Division in 1937, practically all sub-
stantive decisions concerning Africa continued
to be made in the Division of European Affairs.
The bulk of the African Continent was con-
trolled at that time by European colonial pow-
ers. Egypt was then, as it is today, the respon-
sibility of Near Eastern Affairs. It was not
tmtil 1943 that a small African Section was set
up within the Near Eastern Division.

A trend toward a more unified approach to
Africa began to take place in the postwar years.
In 1956 responsibility for South Africa and
Jiladagascar was transferred from the Bureau
of European Affairs to the Bureau of Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

In that same year, 1956, the importance of
Africa was further recognized by a reorganiza-
tion in the Near Eastern Bureau which led to
the creation of the post of Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs and two Offices —

one for Northern Africa and one for Southern
Africa. In view of the rapid progress of most
of the continent toward independence in the
late 1950's, the next logical step — the creation
of a separate Bureau of African Affairs for all
of Africa except Egypt — was taken in 1958. My
predecessor, Joseph Satterthwaite, now our Am-
bassador to South Africa, was the first
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

It IS interesting also to nolo the changes that
have taken place in our operations in Africa
during the last quarter century. In 1939, on
the eve of World War II, we had no embassies
in Africa but we did have 4 legations, 3 consul-
ates general, 8 consulates, and 1 consular
agency — a total of 16 posts. Today we have
nearlj' four times that many posts. There are
now 58, exclusive of Egypt, of which 34 are
embassies, 7 are consulates general, 14 are con-
sulates, 1 is a consular agency, and 2 are em-
bassy branch offices. Perhaps these figures
dramatize better than any other measure the
rapid increase in Africa's importance to the
United States.

Recognition of Africa's Potential

Although the swiftness with which most of
Africa achieved independent status was not an-
ticipated by many people, tho Department was
fortunate enough to have had a nucleus of For-
eign Service officers with a particular interest
in Africa. From about 1940 on, this group,
which recognized Africa's great potential, be-
gan to giv'e the U.S. Government a better under-
standing of the likely course of Africa's postwar
development. This small band of men laid
the foundations for the high degree of diplo-
matic rapport that exists between Africa and
the United States today, and several of them,
I am happy to say, still serve their Government
in high jjosts in "Washington and Africa.

The principal contribution of these early
African specialists was a recognition that it
was in the interests of the United States to
stand forthrightly on the side of self-determi-
nation in Africa and to express our support
of the legitimate aspirations of Africa's de-
pendent people. To establish an American
presence in Africa and to demonstrate what
the people of Africa were capable of achieving.

MAT 4, 1964

699

a pilot assistance program was set up in Liberia
(1942-43) — one of the two independent coun-
tries under the African Division's jurisdiction
at that time. This program, I might point
out, was implemented even before President
Truman's Point 4 program was announced in
1949. Looking ahead to commercial use, lend-
lease authority was used to build Liberia's Free
Port at Monrovia and to improve the facilities
at that country's major airport, Eobertsfield.
From the remnants of the World War II Office
of War Information's program, faint begin-
nings were made toward establishing a U.S.
information program in Africa.

All of this was done by about 1950, and the
men and women of the African Division who
did it had very little support for their eiforts.
You will recall that this was the 2:)eriGd when
we were concentrating on Europe's reconstruc-
tion, and the principal problem areas in foreign
affairs were in the Middle and Far East. Con-
sequently, Africa had a lower priority and re-
ceived a relatively small amount of attention
until the true nature of the continent's rebirth
in independence became broadly Icnown in the
latter part of the 1950's.

Wlien it was cleai-ly seen that forces at work
on the African Continent were moving at a
vastly accelerated rate, it became possible for
the African Bureau to move toward meeting
the many diplomatic challenges the new situa-
tion presented. For example, we adopted a
policy of recognizing newly independent gov-
ernments at once. In many cases the United
States has been the first foreign country to ex-
tend diplomatic recognition to the new African
nations. The promptness with which we have
welcomed new nations to the world connnunity
has had a great deal to do with the development
of diplomatic rapport between ourselves and
Africans.

Examples of Diplomatic Rapport

There are many interesting stories that can
be told about the outstanding efforts Foreign
Service officers have made to be prompt in estab-
lishing diplomatic relations with new African
governments. The establishment in 19G0 of
our first consulate at Bamako, Mali, is a case in
point. Mali, as you know, came to independ-

ence with Senegal in the Mali Federation. As
our principal post in the Federation was at
Dakar, opening the consulate at Bamako was
not at that time an urgent matter. The officer
who was assigned to open the consulate at Ba-
mako, Jolin Dean, previously had established
our first post at Lome, Togo, in 1959 and was
taking a brief leave in Switzerland with his
family before reporting to his new position at
Bamako. However, when lie heard a i\adio
statement that Mali and Senegal had dissolved
the Federation, he knew this meant that inde-
pendent Mali would be without U.S. representa-
tion and he immediately took a train to Geneva
and cabled Washington for instructions.
Within 24 hours Dean was instructed to pro-
ceed to Bamako at once and open a U.S. con-
sulate. Two hours after receiving his instinic-
tions, he had packed his bags and was on his
way. He stopped at the U.S. Embassy in Paris
and picked up two American flags, a typewriter.
Government stationery, and code equipment
and was on a plane to Bamako the same evening.
On August 26, 1960, at 7 a.m., Dean landed
at Bamako. He went straight to a hotel, got
two rooms to use as an office, a flagpole for the
American flag, and a car for transportation.
By noon he liad rented a post office box and
established a telegraphic address for the Ameri-
can consulate — but only after he had convinced
the local postmaster that the U.S. Govermnent
should be billed monthly rather than each time
he sent a cable. He next sent his first message
to Washington — the traditional "Assumed
charge." In the afternoon he visited the Mali
Chief of Protocol to tell him the American con-
sulate was open, and he met with American
missionaries and businessmen representing
American interests to obtain bilingual office
help. By sundown the consulate was in busi-
ness. That night, and for 2 months thereafter,
Dean took his code equipment to bed with him
to safeguard it. In one day the United States
liad opened its post in I\lali, and ^Malians have
not forgotten that the first foreign represen-
tative in their country was an American named
John Dean. This is the type of swift response
to a fast-breaking situation that lias helped
build diplomatic rapport between Africa and
the United States.

700

DEPARTMEXT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN

The development of rapport is also a question
of doing what has to be done with whatever is
available to do the job. In this respect, a
young Foreign Service officer, Roger Proven-
cher, arrived at Ouagadougou, Upper Volt a,
on Thanksgiving Day, 1960, to establish our
diplomatic mission there. He could find no
hotel room in that city of 11,000 suddenly
turned into a national capital; so he made do
with an unused cot and a mosquito not in the
local customs office. After 3 nights there, ho
persuaded the Central Hotel to give him a
room — but he got it only on the condition that
he vacate it on Sundays for occupants who had
reserved the room on an annual basis. On
Smidays, however, the hotel gave Provencher
space in a former chickenhouse on the hotel
grounds which had been redecorated in pink
and green.

Such difficulties abroad, while inconvenient
at the time, can always be looked upon in retro-
spect with good humor. But African diplo-
mats encounter difficulties in this country, too,
and many of these difficulties are not of the
laughing variety. Particularly, I am thinking
about the series of incidents in which African
diplomats have been barred from restaurants
and other public establishments in tliis coun-
try. Xeedless to saj', these incidents have
stramed the diplomatic rapport between Africa
and the United States, and it is largely because
of the imderstanding and restraint of our
African guests that much of our rapport has
not been dissipated.

Rapport between Africans and Americans
also has developed through extracurricular ac-
tivities of American diplomats and their fam-
ilies in Africa. There are, for example, the
activities of Ambassador Mercer Cook, the for-
mer Howard University professor and authority
on African literature who represents us in Ni-
ger, and his wife. Mrs. Cook, who was a social
worker, organized the sending of $30,000 worth
of medicines to the people of Niger and is very
active with women's organizations throughout
the country.

Another type of American who has done much
to develop African-American rappoi't is the
technical specialist, of whom a good example is
Frank Pinder, a graduate of Florida A. & M.
College, who recently was promoted to Deputy

Director of (he U.S. AID Mission to Ghana.
Now a legend in many parts of West Africa,
Pinder has, over the last 16 years, introduced
fundamental changes into the agricultural sys-
tems of Liberia and Ghana. He is as welcome
in the homes of farmers in some of the most re-
mote areas of those two countries as he is in
their capitals. His work has been praised by
President [William V. S.] Tubman of Liberia
and by Foreign Minister [Kojo] Botsio of
Ghana, and, when he left Liberia for Ghana in
1958, he was offered but had to decline a decora-
tion from the Government of Liberia.

And, of course, the outstanding performances
of U.S. ambassadors in Africa have been the
foundation on which rapport between Africa
and the United States has been built. To name
just a few, there is Edmund Gullion, who has
just left the Congo and whose consummate skill
and jiatienco contributed much to the reunifica-
tion of that country; William Attwood, whose
work in Guinea despite sizable obstacles helped
markedly to develop a strong bond of friend-
ship between the United States and that coun-
try ; Joseph Palmer, who served with great dis-
tinction in Nigeria and developed a knowledge
of the counti-y that few people can match
through his visits by car and riverboat to Nige-
rians in every one of that country's 31 provinces ;
and William Porter, who headed our mission in
Algeria in a time of extreme mirest and personal
danger — subsequent to which he became Ambas-
sador— and who was able to maintain effectively
the interests of the United States through satis-
factory relations with both the French authori-
ties and the emerging Algerian authorities.
This was a remarkable demonstration of effec-
tive diplomacy in a difficult and chaotic transi-
tion period.

Let me also mention a remarkable American
who was a tower of strength in East Africa —
William "Red" Duggan, our consul general in
Dar-es-Salaam from 1958 to 1961, M-ho serv-ed
in Tanganyika during the period in which that
country moved toward independence. Duggan 's
devotion to duty cost him his sight, but it won
him the friendship of the people of Tanganyika
and their President, Julius Nyerere, who invited
Duggan to be his personal guest at Tanganyika's
independence ceremonies.

MAT 4, 1964

roi

Impact of U.S. Presidents

It is impossible to describe diplomatic rapport
between Africa and the United States without
mentioning the impact of three of our Presi-
dents with great interest in that continent.

Franklin D. Eoosevelt is well known through-
out North Africa for the impact he made in
1943 in Casablanca upon Morocco's Sultan, who,
at independence, became King Mohammed V.

John F. Kennedy established rapport with
freedom-loving Africans everywhere with his
1957 Senate speech analyzing the Algerian sit-
uation and prescribing independence as the only
answer. During his Presidency, he so linked
United States and African aspirations that
Kennedy is a truly respected name throughout
Africa.

Senegalese remember President Lyndon B.
Jolmson's attendance at their country's first an-
niversaiy of independence in 1961. His warm,
infonnal diplomacy convinced Africans of the
sincerity of American efforts to establish mean-
ingful friendship with the new nation, and the
cordiality with which he was received was de-
monstrable evidence that genuine rapport was
established by his visit.

Foundations of Diplomatic Rapport

Individual rapport between Africans and
Americans, official or private, has generally
benefited from important common personal
characteristics. By and large, Africans and
Americans both admire and respond to frank-
ness and openness in personal and official deal-
ings and share a well-developed sense of humor
and enjoyment of life.

Africans and Americans enjoy such a sub-
stantial individual rapport not simply because
of shared common and sympathetic character-
istics but basically because we — as people and
as nations — cherish common objectives and
beliefs.

Africans and Americans want freedom and
independence and the right to control their
own destinies. These goals inspired the Dec-
laration of Independence of our young Repub-
lic, and they have brought 31 new nations to
freedom in Africa in the last dozen years.

Africans and Americans today insist on per-
sonal and national dignity for themselves and

for all men. American history, like modem
African history, provides demonstrable evi-
dence of our belief in this principle.

Africans and Americans have a common in-
terest in improving their daily living conditions.
We share a desire to reduce the burdens created
by poverty, disease, malnutrition, and illiteracy
as quickly as possible.

This mutuality of aspirations has won us
many friends on that continent. The combined
efforts of both public and private organizations
and individuals to speed the attaimnent of those
objectives have assured many Africans that the
United States is indeed mterested in the future
of Africa, and this broad-based interest has
made the development of diplomatic rapport
easier.

The American people traditionally have had a
deep and sincere interest in the progress of other
peoples and a genuine concern with assisting
those less favored materially than oureelves.
This humanitarian interest is expressed in
Africa in the work of U.S. missionary groups,
in the African activities of private foundations,
in the African programs of labor organizations,
colleges, and universities. It is reflected also
in the work of the Peace Corps, of our AID
missions, our information offices, and our For-
eign Service.

Our presence in Africa also is motivated by
national self-interest. We have learned that
peace is indivisible. We know that our peace
and security is best assured in a world where
nations are genuinely free and and progressing
toward greater economic and social well-being.
We know that there can be no real security and
peace for us or for our children in any part
of the world that is troubled by instability or
disorder. We have a strong self-interest, there-
fore, in helping Africa to find a place in a world
in which all of us — the people of Africa and the
people of the United States — can live in greater
security and abundance.

A century ago, Abraham Lincoln asked:
"What constitutes the bulwark of our own lib-
erty and independence?" And he answered:
"It is not our frowning battlements, our bris-
tling sea coasts, the guns of our war steamers,
or the strength of our gallant and disciplined
army. These are not our reliance against a re-

702

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

sumption of tynxmiy in our fair land. All of
tliem may be turned against our liberties, with-
out making us stronger or weaker for the strug-
gle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which
God has planted in our bosoms. Our defense
is in the preservation of the spirit which prizes
liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands,
every where."

These words — and the actions we take in sup-
port of them — are the true basis of diplomatic
rapport between Africa and the United States.
If we continue to chait our course by the funda-
mental principles on which this nation was
founded, I am confident that the rapport which
today exists between Africa and the United
States will characterize our relations through-
out the foreseeable future.

U.S. Reaffirms Support
of Royal Lao Government

Department Statement^

We are maintaining a close watch on develop-
ments in Laos and are in touch with our Em-
bassy there. The U.S. Government has fully
supported, and we continue fully to support,
the Geneva agreements of 1902 and the Royal
Government of National Union.

We are therefore categorically opposed to any
seizure of power and are urging immediate re-
lease of the neutralists as a first step toward
restoring the situation.

Ignacio Lozano Named Adviser
on Cultural Exchange Program

The Department of State announced on
April 17 (press release 168) that Ignacio E.
Lozano, Jr., a Los Angeles industrialist and
publisher of La Opinion, a Spanish-language
daily newspaper, had on that day been sworn in

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 19 by Richard
I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News, in response
to information from Vientiane that a group of Laotian
military leaders had attempted to overthrow the Royal
Government of National Union.

as a consultant to Lucius D. Battle, Assistant
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs.
Mr. Lozano will assist the cultural exchange
program as an adviser on Latin American
activities.

United States and United Kingdom
Conclude Grains Agreement

Following is a statement released at Wash-
ington on April 16 by Christian A. Herter, the
Presidents /Special Rejn-csentative for Trade
Negotiations, regarding a grains agreement
concluded at London on April 15 hy an ex-
change of notes between U.S. Ambassador
David K. E. Bruce and the Earl of Dundee,
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

The United States and the United Kingdom
have entered into an agreement on grains im-
ports into Britain which has major implica-
tions for the Kennedy Eound of international
trade negotiations in the field of agricultural
products.^ Through this agreement, American
grain farmers will have the opportunity to
maintain at least their present level of grains
exports to the U.K. and will have the addi-
tional opportunity to sell more grains as that
market grows. The products covered by the
agreement include wheat, wheat flour, and
major feed grains.

The U.K. is introducing important changes
in her domestic gi-ains policies to insure that a
fair and reasonable balance is maintained be-
tween domestic grains production on the one
hand and grains imports into the U.K. on the
other, broadly based on present supplies to the
U.K. market and providing that both domestic
producers and overseas suppliers shall have the
opportunity to share in any future growth in
the U.K. market on a fair and reasonable basis.

A significant provision of the agreement is
that the U.K. Government will take effective
corrective action at the earliest practicable time
if total grains imports fall appreciably below

' For an address by Mr. Herter on "The Role of
Agriculture in Trade Expansion," see Bulletin of
Apr. 27, 19&4, p. 671.

MAT 4, 1964

703

the average level of the last 3 years. Further,
the U.K. has agreed to review annually with its
major overseas suppliers the operation of its
domestic grains policies in light of the objective
of sharing its market between domestic pro-
ducers and overseas suppliers in a fair and
reasonable way.

A similar agi-eement has been concluded be-
tween the U.K. and each of her other major
cereals suppliers, Australia and Canada.

Under tlie agreements, the U.K.'s overseas
suppliers will cooperate in helping the U.K.
assure that grain prices in that market do not
fall below prescribed minimum prices. Today
world grains prices are above those prescribed
as minimum in the agreement. If they should
fall below the minimum, the exporter may take
steps to insure that grains sell in the U.K. at
the prescribed price or the U.K. may enforce a
levy to raise the imported price to the agreed
minimum.

For a number of years, the U.K. has provided
her producers with guaranteed returns on
grains production at levels substantially above
world prices. This has been achieved by mak-
ing grains available to British consumers at
world price levels and using direct payments to
British farmers equal to the difference between
actual market price levels and the guaranteed
price. The effect has been to make overseas
producers residual suppliers in the U.K. mar-
ket, since British farmers were assured the guar-
anteed return on all the grains they produced.
British grains production has expanded
sharply under this program, and the proportion
of total consumption supplied by imports has
declined substantially over the years.

Under the new system, British farmers -wiU
be paid a guaranteed return based on "standard
quantity." The "standard quantity"' will be
based on present levels of production. The in-
troduction of a "standard quantity" provides
for a lower per unit return to farmers if pro-
duction exceeds this "standard quantity." For
example, if it developed that the "standard
quantity" were 90 percent of production, then

the per unit deficiency jjayment would be 10
percent less than that which would have been
paid if the "standard quantity" had not been
employed.

The U.S. considers this arrangement an im-
portant precedent for the negotiation of accept-
able conditions of access to world markets for
major agi'icultural products in the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations, which is just get-
ting under way. Discussions have already be-
gun on a world grains arrangement as a part
of the Kennedy Round. The U.K. is one of the
world's major grains importers and the com-
mitment she has undertaken to take effective
corrective action if imports show an appreciable
decline below the average volume during the 3
years preceding July 1, 1964, is an important
contribution to the successful outcome of a
world grains arrangement. The present bilat-
eral agreements between the U.K. and its prin-
cipal overseas grains suppliers may be replaced
by a world grains arrangement when present
negotiations are successfully concluded.

United States and France Discuss
Air Cargo Operations

Department Announcement

Press release 167 dated April 17

Representatives of the United States and
France will meet in Washington begmning on
April 20 for an exchange of views concerning
air cargo operations between the United States
and France. The consultations will take place
at the request of the French Government. Con-
sideration will be given to questions relating to
the routing and capacity of air cargo service.

The chairman of the French delegtition will
be Mr. Augustin Jordan, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The chairman of the U.S. delegation
will be INIr. Henry T. Snowdon, Chief of the
xVviation Negotiations Division, Department of
State.

704

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

THE CONGRESS

The Military Assistance Program for 1965

Statement by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense '

ilr. Chairman, members of the committee:
I greatly welcome this opportmiity to appear
before you in support of the fiscal year 1965
military assistance program. In my considered
judgment, this program, and the foreign aid
program generally, has now become the most
critical element of our overall national security
effort.

It has long been recognized that the Com-
mimist threat to our security and the security
of the entire free world is not only military but
involves every area of human endeavor — it is
political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is
scientific, and it extends even into the cultural
spheres. In such a struggle, great strategic
nuclear power alone is not enough. Indeed,
even great strategic nuclear power comple-
mented by great conventional power alone
is not enough. As Chairman Kiirushchev
warned us more than 3 years ago, the Com-
munists, while rejecting global nuclear wars
and even local wars, fully support the so-called
"wars of national liberation" which we know
from bitter experience as guerrilla wars and in-
surrections. The Chinese Communists are
even more militant in their support of armed
aggression as an instrimaent of foreign policy.
Indeed, one of the major differences in outlook
between these two Communist powers is the

' Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on Mar. 25.

degree of risk which each believes should be
taken in pressing their expansionist policies.

We believe that the actions we have taken to
strengthen, protect, and make more ready our
strategic nuclear forces have convinced at least
the Soviet Union that a nuclear attack against
us or our allies could not end in other than dis-
aster for them. We believe the measures we
have taken to expand, modernize, and supply
more adequately our limited-war forces have
discouraged at least the Soviet Union from risk-
ing even a conventional war against the U.S.
and its allies. But if we are to meet the avowed
Communist threat across the entire spectrum of
conflict, then we must also be ready to take
whatever measures are necessary to counter
their efforts to promote guerrilla wars and in-
surrections. And much of this task can be
accomplished only by the assistance, both mili-
tary and economic, we give our less prosperous
allies.

Moreover, our global military strategy since
the end of World War II, particularly in the
limited-war area, has always assumed the avail-
ability of allied forces. In other words, our
strategy has long been based on the concept of
the collective defense of the free world. And
this means that our own security requires that
we have strong allies around the world. We do
in fact have strong allies, particularly in West-
ern Europe. Indeed, the great and growing
strength of our NATO allies in that region
stands as a monument to the success of our

MAT 4, 1964

728-427—64-

705

foreign aid programs in the post-World War II
period.

But many of our friends and allies in other
areas of the free world have not yet succeeded
in building up their economic strength to the
point where they can make their full contribu-
tion to the collective defense. These nations
still need our help, in some cases not only in the
form of military assistance but economic assist-
ance as well. The development of their eco-
nomise and military strength in the context of
the collective defense of the free world is ob-
viously in our own national interests. Wlio can
deny that the military strength of Greece and
Turkey, the southern bastion of NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization], is important to
our own security? "Wlio can say that the mili-
tary strength of South Korea, the Republic of
China, and South Vietnam is not essential to our
position in the far Pacific ? Wlio can deny that
the survival of these nations as independent
states on the very periphery of Communist
power is vital to our own national secvirity
objective of preventing the further spread of
communism, whether by overt or covert aggres-
sion ? If these nations were to succumb to Com-
munist aggression, would not the security of
the entire free world be weakened, including
our own ?

In my opinion, it makes no sense whatsoever
to spend $50 billion a year on our own military
forces and refuse to spend a mere 2 percent of
that amoxmt to provide that critical margin of
assistance required to insure the military effec-
tiveness of the forces of our allies who stand
beside us in the collective defense of the free
world. It is surely ironic that at the very time
the Communists are increasing tlieir efforts in
this new arena of the struggle — guerrilla war-
fare, insurrection, and covert aggression — we
should want to diminish our efforts in this same
arena. Certainly, it must be clear to all Ameri-
cans that if we fail to support those free na-
tions which need and want our help in main-
taining their independence, we will have to use
our own forces if we are to prevent the expan-
sion of communism through overt or covert
armed aggression. As President Johnson re-
cently stated,^ the foi-eign aid program is the

' For text of President Johnson's message to Congress
on foreign aid, see BurLEXiN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

best weapon we have to insure that our own men
in uniform need not go into combat.

We are well aware that the Congress, and
perhaps the people of this country, are growing
weary of the continued burden of the foreign
aid progi'am. President Johnson stated frankly
that ". . . it is going to be very tough to get a
good foreign aid measure througli the Congress
this year," but, lae added, ". . . we are not going
to pad our request ... we will ask only what
we need, and we hope we get what we
ask. . . ." ^ This is the approach the Depart-
ment of Defense has taken in formulating the
military assistance program we are presenting
liere today. We are asking for a total of $1
billion in new obligational authority, the same
amount appropriated for this purpose last year.
We are asking the reappropriation of $25 mil-
lion, the amount of presently available funds
which we estimate will remain unobligated at
the end of the current fiscal year. In addition,
we believe we can recoup, in FY 1965, $135 mil-
lion of prior year funds which have been re-
served but not expended as a result of price
changes, cancellations, and slippages in prior
year programs. These three sources together
would provide a total military assistance pro-
gram of $1,160 million for FY 1965 compared
with a program of $1,200 million in FY 1964
and about $1,600 million in FY 1963, as shown
on tlie third from the last line of the table at-
tached to this statement.

Last year when I appeared before this com-
mittee I stated that we hoped to reduce the mil-
itary assistance program to about $1 billion a
year by 1968. But neither I nor the Clay
Committee (The President's Committee To
Strengthen the Security of the Free World)
believed that our security could be properly
protected by such a low level of appropriation
in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. We are present-
ing a request of only $1 billion for FY 1965
solely because the Congress has made it crystal
clear to the executive branch that it is unwilling
to appropriate a larger amomit.

There should be no illusions that the differ-
ence between what we consider the optimmn
program and the program we are requesting can
be made up by increased recoupments, by living

' lUd., p. 523.

706

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

off the pipeline, or by a greater use of excess
materiel.

With regard to recoupments, the $135 million
already reflected in our 1005 estimate is all wo
can expect to generate in the next fiscal year.
In FY 1964 we estimated recoupments of $125
million, and it now appears that the actual
amount "recouped" will be within 3 percent of
our estimate. In fiscal yeare 1962 and 1963, as
a result of an intensive effort to "shake out"' the
program, we "recouped" a total of $490 million.
I am satisfied that we have "shaken out" about
all we can.

With regard to financing future year pro-
gi'ams by drawing down the so-called "pipe-
line," I can assure you that such a course would
simply result in "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
These imexpended balances, popularly called
the "pipeline," represent funds which have been
obligated for goods and services which have not
yet been delivered. Fimds must be available to
pay for these goods and services when they are
delivered. Moreover, this unexpended balance
for militai-y assistance is shrinking. At the end
of FY 1962, the unexpended balance, for grant
aid and credit assistance combined, was $2,784
million. At the end of FY 1963, the balance
had been reduced to $2,422 million. By the end
of the current fiscal year we expect the balance
to declme to $2,087 million. In FY 1965, as-
suming the budget request of $1 billion in new
obligational authority is appropriated and
assuming our estimates of collections and ex-
penditures for that year are realized, the un-
expended balance will decline to about $1.9
billion — a total reduction of almost $900 million
since the end of FY 1962.

Finally, with regard to the use of excess
stocks, let me assure you that little relief can be
expected from that source. We had originally
anticipated using about $48 million of excess
stocks for the current fiscal year program; it
now appears that only $28 million of such stocks
will be available. The remainder of the require-
ment will have to be met from new procurement
or not met at all.

Thus, the future strength and combat effec-
tiveness of the forces of our allies, forces upon
which we depend to fight alongside our own in
the event of war, will be determined by the ac-

tions of this committee and this Congi-ess on our
1965 military assistance budget request.

Now, what will our 1965 military assistance
program provide and why is it needed? We
have tried during the last year to develop a more
meaningful format for the presentation of the
military assistance program to the Congress and
the Nation — a format which shows more
directly the relationship between the individual
country programs and our own national se-
curity objectives. Accordingly, we have di-
vided the country programs into six major cate-
gories : Forward Defense ; Alliance for Progress
Security; Military Base Rights; Grant Aid
Phaseout; Free-World Orientation; and U.S.
Force Support and Military Assistance Pro-
gram Administration.

The first category, "Forward Defense," com-
prises the grant aid military assistance pro-
grams for 11 nations stretching along the south-
ern and eastern perimeters of the Communist
bloc — from Greece and Turkey in the Eastern
Mediterranean to Korea in the Western Pacific.
These 11 countries — Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the
Philippines, the Republic of China, and
Korea — maintain more than 31^ million men un-
der arms and account for $745 million, or two-
thirds of the total FY 1965 military assistance
program. These nations, plus NATO in West-
ern Europe, and Japan in the Western Pacific,
are truly the free world's and our own nation's
frontline of defense against Soviet and Chinese
Communist expansion through military aggres-
sion.

The next grouping, "Alliance for Progress
Security," consisting in FY 1965 of 15 Latin
American nations, accounts for $66.2 million,
less than 6 percent of the total 1965 military
assistance program. Our primary objective
here is, of course, to insure the security of the
Western Hemisphere against Communist pene-
tration.

The third category, "Military Base Rights,"
for which $24.4 million is proposed, includes
4 countries in each of which we have important
base rights.

The fourth category, "Grant Aid Phaseout,"
includes, in the FY 1965 program, only 3 coun-
tries— Denmark, Japan, and Norway — com-

3IAY 4, 1904

707

pared with 12 countries in FY 1963. These 3
country programs will be phased out when our
present commitments are completed. This cate-
gory accounts for $53 million of the FY 1965
military assistance program, or less than 5 per-
cent.

The fifth category, "Free-World Orienta-
tion,"' includes, in FY 1965, 7 countries whose
continued independence and stability we believe
is of great value to our own national interests.
Altogether they account for only $15.2 million,
or a little more than 1 percent of the total 1965
military assistance program.

The final category, "U.S. Force Support and
MAP Administration," is essentially the "all
other" category and accounts for $256.2 million,
or 22 percent, of the total 1965 militaiy assist-
ance program. However, about $76 million of
this amoimt, for "Infrastructure" and "Inter-
national Military Headquarters," actually rep-
resent costs of U.S. military forces which by
long-established custom have been funded in the
military assistance program. Also included in
this category is $50 million for credit assistance
which we expect will eventually be paid back
to the United States. No contingency fund has
been included in the 1965 military assistance
budget request.

Other Defense witnesses who are scheduled to
appear before this committee are prepared to
discuss the military assistance progi-am at what-
ever level of detail you desire. What I would
like to do at this time is to highlight, in terms
of the six categories I have described, some of
the major problems we face.

Forward Defense Programs

This, as I pointed out, is the most important
category and accoimts for about two-thirds of
the total FY 1965 military assistance program.
The Zyo million men under arms supported by
the 11 countries in this category represent an in-
crement of defensive strength which is essential
to the success of our overall military strategy".
These forces relieve us of the tremendous bur-
den, in dollars and in manpower, which we
would otherwise have to assume, either by de-
ploying additional U.S. forces overseas or by
holding additional forces in a central reserve in
the United States and providing for the neces-

sary airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equip-
ment.

In all of our contingency plannmg involving
the areas of the world where these countries are
located, we take into full account the availabil-
ity of these indigenous forces. Moreover, the
existence of reasonably adequate military forces
in these nations on the periphery of Communist
power, by eliminatmg the hope of a quick, easy,
and cheap victory, reduces the likelihood of
Communist attack. Perhaps even more impor-
tant, the ability of the indigenous forces to
respond promptly to local aggression greatly
reduces the risk of subsequent direct U.S. in-
volvement in fulfillment of its mutual defense
commitments and thereby the risk of escalation
into larger wars. These commitments are em-
bodied in a series of treaties with many of the
countries which form the free-world defensive
peruneter against aggi'ession from the Commu-
nists. Of the 11 countries included in this cate-
gory, Greece and Turkey are members of
XATO. Turkey is also a member of CENTO
[Central Treaty Organization] together with
Iran and Pakistan and is thus the link between
NATO and CENTO. Pakistan is also a mem-
ber of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation] together with Thailand and the Philip-
pines and is thus the link between CENTO and
SEATO.

The U.S. also has bilateral defense agreements
with the Philippines, Korea, and the Republic
of Chma, and we are presentlj' engaged in assist-
ing the people of South A'ietnam in combating
the covert Communist aggression in that coun-
try. We are also supporting the Government
of Laos where the Pathet Lao are taking every
opportunity to sabotage the coalition govern-
ment. Finally, we are assisting the Govenmient
of India in strengthening its military forces
against the threat of Chinese Communist attack
from the north.

The $745 million we have proposed in the FY
1965 military assistance program for these 11
countries is far short of what would be required
if we were to attempt to raise the modernization
of these forces to the levels called for by JCS
[Joint Chiefs of Staff] planning. A recent
study by the Department of Defense of 7 of
these countries on the Communist peripliery in-
dicates that the total requirement for major

708

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

etiuipiiRuit alone would call for ;?7U0 inillioii
more throu<i;h I'JGS) than what would be available
under a continuing $1 billion a year program.
Operating costs alone are estimated to be on the
order of $300 million per year for these 7 coun-
tries. Since a $1 billion military assistance pro-
gram will j)ermit the allocation of only about
$500 million to these 7 countries, only about $200
million will be available for force moderniza-
tion, including major equipment, compared with
the computed requirement of almost $400 mil-
lion per year for major ecjuipment alone.

The inqjact of this problem can best be under-
stood in terms of individual country progi'ams.

Greece and Turkey

As I indicated earlier, Greek and Turkish
militarj- forces form the southern bastion of
XATO, complemented by the United States Gth
Fleet in the Mediterranean. NATO depends
heavily on these two nations to hold the soutliern
flank. Greece is faced by relativelj' well-armed
Bulgarian forces and Turkey by both Bulgarian
and Soviet forces.

Both Turkey and Greece face serious prob-
lems in maintaining their current levels of de-
fense expenditures. Both will continue to need
financial assistance from other members of
NATO, and, m this connection. Secretary Rusk
at the NATO ministerial meeting last December
strongly urged our NATO allies, who have made
a small start in providing financial assistance to
Greece and Turkey, to expand their effort
greatly. But the United States will continue to
have to make up the critical margin of support
if these two NATO comitries are to be expected
to carry out their roles under present NATO
military planning.

As shown on the attached table we have again
been forced to reduce military assistance to the
"Forward Defense" nations, including both
Greece and Turkey. We hope that the other
NATO allies will help to offset part of this cut.
but I would be less than candid if I did not tell
you that the situation on the southern flank of
NATO is serious.

Last year I received from General [Lyman
L.] Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, a cable in which he expressed liis serious
concern with the deterioration of the military
capabilities of the Greek and Turkish forces in

the face of inqjroving Connuunist capabilities
across their borders. General Lenmitzer
pointed out that the problem was not in the
lighting caliber of the forces of either of these
two countries but rather in eciuipment delicien-
cies which the countries themselves could clearly
not afford to correct.

Recently I received another communication
from General Lemnitzer, which I would like to
discuss with this committee in executive session.
In this communication, he again expresses his
concern with the situation on the southern flank
with regard to equipment deficiencies whicii
have been caused by reductions in military as-
sistance funds. All I can tell General Lem-
nitzer is what I am telling you. namely, that we
are allocating to Greece and Turkey all that is
feasible within a military assistance program
budget of a billion dollars in new obligational
authority. Of the amount which we have in-
cluded for Greece in the 1965 program, only
about one-third will be available for investment
and practically all of that will be used for the
Air Force. Accordingly, significant moderni-
zation of the groimd forces must be deferred.

The Turkish armed forces are in the same
straits. Alore than 60 percent of the 1965 pro-
gram for Turkey will be required for operating
costs, leaving less than 40 percent of a reduced
amount for investment. In order to provide
minimum army force improvements in the FY
19G5 program, it will be necessary to defer some
spare parts, training ammunition, and attrition
replacement. As in the case of Greece, much
of the equipment in the Turkish ground forces
is of World War II vintage, repair parts are
no longer available, and maintenance costs have
been prohibitive.

The present difficulties between Greece and
Turkey over Cyprus should not be permitted to
obscure the fact that both of these countries are
loyal and dedicated members of NATO and the
continued military strength of both is essential
to the execution of NATO military strategy.

Iran, Pakistan, and iTuUa

Iran, Pakistan, and India are on the frontline
of the free world's defense against Communist
encroachment in the Near East and South Asia.
The Chinese Communists' attack on the north-
ern provinces of India in October of 1962 pro-

SX.\T 4. 1804

709

vided a classic example of the danger of mili-
tary weakness in the nations bordering Com-
munist China. Here, again, was clear proof
that military weakness tempts Communist ag-
gression and that neither neutrality nor at-
tempts at political acconmiodation insures
security against the Communist threat.

This attack brought home to the Government
of India the importance of maintaining strong
military forces along their northern borders.
The United States and the British Common-
wealth nations responded to India's urgent re-
quest for assistance with a program of $120
million, of which the U.S. provided half. In
FY 1964 we programed another increment, as
you know, and we have included an additional
amount in the FY 1965 program. We are also
providing in the 1964 program some excess
stocks, including some radar and communica-
tions equipment. We plan to continue the
modernization of a number of moimtain divi-
sions and to provide certain other assistance.
We believe that the U.K. and the Common-
wealth countries will also continue their sup-
port of the Indian armed forces.

Our military assistance to India has deeply
troubled Pakistan, as you are well aware.
Nevertheless, it is important to the entire free
world, including Pakistan, that India be able
to defend itself against Chinese Communist
aggression. The Unit<>d States has taken great
pains to assure the Government of Pakistan
that our aid to India will not be at the expense
of Pakistan's security, to which we are commit-
ted under our mutual defense agreements.
General [Maxwell C] Taylor, in his recent
visit, again endeavored to reassure Pakistan of
our continued interest in, and support of, its
national integrity. An additional increment of
equipment and training is provided for Pakistan
in the FY 1965 military assistance program.
While much has been done to improve the capa-
bilities of the Pakistan army, equipment de-
ficiencies still exist. To meet some of these
deficiencies, the FY 1965 program emphasizes
ground-force improvements.

With respect to Iran, our objective has been
to help build up its military forces to the point
where they can insure internal security and
provide at least an initial defense against an
overt Soviet attack. Although the Iranian

military forces, with our aid, have improved
significantly during the last decade, they are
still not, and never can be, a match for Soviet
forces presently deployed along the Iranian
borders, even though the terrain favors the
defense.

Despite its strategic vulnerability, it seems
quite unlikely that the Soviet Union would, in
view of our mutual cooperation agreement with
Iran, deliberately undei'take a major aggression
against that country in tlie near future. The
more likely contingency is a covert or ambiguous
aggression using dissident elements in Iran or
neighboring nations to pave the way for ulti-
mate Communist takeover. In Iran, as else-
where in the world, the best defense against the
spread of communism is a steady improvement
in economic and social conditions, which is the
primary aim of our economic assistance eflorts.
In this connection, the assurance of a continued
substantial level of military assistance support
has enabled the Shah to concentrate on reforms
leading to economic and social progress
tlu'oughout the country.

The FY 1965 military assistance program
provides funds to continue improvement of
Iran's air defense capabilities and to support the
reorganization of the Iranian gi'ound forces
which is now underway. This reorganization is
designed to provide a smaller but more mobile
and better trained army.

Southeast Asia

Included in the Forward Defense category are
three Southeast Asian countries — Vietnam,
Thailand, and Laos. The continued independ-
ence of Vietnam is essential to the defense of
Southeast Asia. There is a serious question in
my mind as to whether the amount provided for
Vietnam in the 1965 program will be sufficienL
Since we have not included a contingency fund
in our 1965 military assistance budget request,
any increase in the Vietnam program — and I am
reasonably sure an increase will be required —
will have to be made at the expense of other
country programs, or will have to be provided
by transfer from economic aid. This is the case
in the current year's program for which we are
anticipating a $50 million transfer of economic
aid funds under section 610 of the law.

Last week a statement was issued by the

710

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

White House,* suninmrizing Goncral Tiiylor's
and my report to the President and the Nut ioniil
Security Council on the situation in Vietnam.
But I want to emphasize again that we intend
to provide whatever amounts of economic aid,
military training, and logistics support are re-
quired to maintain the independence of the Re-
public of Vietnam. In all of the millions of
words that have been written and spoken in
recent months on the subject of Vietnam, one
issue stands out above all others, and that is —
can a nation maintain its independence in the
face of Comminiist-supported armed insur-
gency? Can a free government supported by
other free- world nations succeed in suppressing
such armed insurgency supported by its neigh-
bors? This is the crucial question, not only in
Vietnam, but in all of the newly emerging and
weaker nations of the world. This is the issue
which must be resolved in South Vietnam by the
people of South Vietnam, with our economic,
training, and logistics support.

"We must demonstrate to both friend and foe
alike that an independent people, given the will
to remain independent and given the will to
fight and struggle and sacrifice for their inde-
pendence, can, with the economic, technical,
training, and logistics support from other free-
world countries, sustain their independence and
suppress armed insurgency, even if supported
from the outside. As I stated at the outset.
Chairman Klnnishchev put us on notice 3 years
ago that the kind of struggle now taking place
in Vietnam is precisely the kind of war the
Communists favor and will strongly support in
the future. Either we confront this problem in
Vietnam and prove to the Communists that this
type of armed aggression will also fail, or we
will have to face the same problem increasingly
in other areas. And it cannot be avoided so long
as the Communists continue to view this kind of
aggression as the key to their policy of expan-
sion.

Our military assistance objectives with re-
spect to Thailand are closely related to those for
South Vietnam. The loss of either country to
the Chinese Communists would endanger the
independence of neighboring nations and seri-
ously jeopardize U.S. security interests. The

' Ibid., p. 522.

1905 program is designed to help sustain the
armed forces of tliat country.

The U.S. is continuing to provide military
assistance to the Koyal Lao Government at that
Government's request and thus in fidl accord
with the Geneva agreements. This military
assistance is designed to maintain neutralist and
conservative forces loyal to Prime Minister Sou-
vanna Phouma at the minimum level necessary
to prevent the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese
forces from advancing into non-Communist ter-
ritory. The 1965 program has been designed to
provide minimum operating essentials for the
neutralist and conservative forces.

The Philippines

Both the strategic location of the Philippines
and our long history of close cooperation and
mutual good will make that nation a key ally
associated with us in the common defense, not
only bilaterally but also as a member of
SEATO. The objective of our 1965 military
assistance program for the Philippines is to en-
hance the capabilities of its military and para-
military forces to prevent or defeat Communist
insurgencies and to help develop forces deploy-
able within the SEATO area for mutual de-
fense tasks. Attainment of these objectives and
continuing close association between the U.S.
and the Philippines in collective security under-
takings are very much in our national interest.

Rejmhlic of Korea and the Republic of China

Two other key countries on the Communist
periphery which complete the arc of free- world
forward defense — Republic of Korea and the
Republic of China — are directly exposed to the
threat of Communist aggression. Although
Red forces in the Far East do not yet have the
full range of capabilities of the Soviet military
machine, their very number and expendability
represent massive power subject to the will of
an avowedly belligerent adversary. To deter
the exercise of that power against our security
interests and those of our allies in the area, we
count heavily upon the combat effectiveness of
the sizable forces maintained by the Republics
of China and Korea.

Adequate military assistance to the armed
forces of South Korea and the Republic of
China not only helps to protect our security

MAY 4, 1964

711

interests in the Far East, but far more itupor-
tant, it substantially reduces the risk of an
emergency requirement for direct intervention
by the United States. In this comiection, it is
pertinent to note that our FY 1965 program for
Korea is less than 1 percent of the direct mili-
tary costs we incurred in the Korean conflict in
1950-53. The cost in terms of American casual-
ties suffered in that conflict cannot, of course, be
reduced to dollars and cents. The 1965 program
for the Eepublic of China is also quite modest
considering the forces that nation is maintain-
ing. It would be highly imprudent of us not
to insure that the troops on the free-world side of
the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Straits have
conventional weapons at least as effective as
those of their opponents.

As members of this committee are aware, the
Chinese Communists have never given up their
goal to add Taiwan to their empire. They can
be prevented from achieving this goal only by
a combination of the strength of United States
and Eepublic of China forces defending the
Taiwan Straits — a course of action to which the
U.S. is conunitted by treaty with the Republic
of China. Military assistance to the Eepublic
of Cliina has already greatly strengthened those
forces, but additional military assistance ex-
penditures are required if this capability is to
be maintained. Nearly two-thirds of the value
of the FY 1965 program will be required to
maintain these forces, leaving only a small
amount for equipment and training.

Alliance for Progress Security Program

This important category accounts for less than
6 percent of the total 1965 military assistance
program — $66.2 million divided among 15 coun-
tries, compared with $65.4 million divided
among 20 countries in FY 1963. Of the $66.2
million, 52 percent is for internal security pro-
grams, 24 percent for naval defense, 15 percent
for civic action, and the remaining 9 percent for
general training and programs which have not
j'et been developed in detail.

The military assistance program for Latin
America is an integral part of the entire
Alliance for Progress effort. As the recent
experience of Venezuela so clearly demonstrates,
internal security is essential to llie development

of democratic govermnent m Latin America.
In the light of the avowed objectives of Com-
munist policy, we can expect that the attempts
made in Venezuela to overthrow the legitimate
government by subversion and armed insurrec-
tion will be repeated elsewhere in Latin Amer-
ica. While military assistance alone is cer-
tainly not the whole solution to the problem of
stable govermnent and economic development
in Latin America, it does make a very important
contribution toward that goal.

Military Base Program

This category includes only 4 countries, in all
of wliich we have facilities used by our own
forces. The total amoimt of money involved is
relatively qxiite small, $24.4 million, or about 2
percent of the total 1965 program. In Spain
we have valuable naval and air bases mcluding
the new Polaris base at E-ota. In the case of
Portugal, we have the air facilities in the Azores
wliich are important to our transatlantic airlift
operations. In Libya we have the "Wheelus Air
Base, which is used both for air transport and
for the training of certain of our forces in
Europe. The formal agreement permitting the
LTnited States to use the facility in the Azores
has expired, but we continue to operate there
on an informal basis, pending renegotiation of
the agreement with Portugal.

Grant Aid Phaseout Program

In consonance with our policy to phase out
of the military assistance grant aid program
all of those recipient countries which have
achieved adequate levels of economic strength,
the number of countries in this categorv has
been reduced from 12 as late as FY 1963 to
only 3 in the program now before j'ou. ilili-
tary assistance to these 3 remaining countries is
limited to the fulfillment of prior-year commit-
ments and to training associated therewith.
These commitments take the form of United
States participation in cost-sharing undertak-
ings which generate increases in the recipient
nations' defense budgets and thus contribute to
the strengthening of the common defense as
well as increases in purchases from the United
States. The total amount proposed for FY
1965 to fulfill these commitments is $53 million,

712

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BT7LLETIN

or iiboiit ;") pi'ireiit of the total projiiiuii. No
new commitments will be made to these coun-
t rii's, and they luive been so informed.

Free-World Orientation Program

Sliiilitly more tlian 1 percent of the total pro-
posed military assistance program is designed
to proiliule or niininiize Coniminust bloc inllu-
ence in 7 countries. These programs provide
modest amounts of military assistance to uiider-
deveU)ped and emerging nations where it is im-
portant to the security interests of the United
States and the common defense of tlic free
world to preserve and encoui'age resistance to
the extension of Communist influence. In some
cases, programs are designed to establish or
maintain a friendly United States relationsliip
with the military forces — often a potentially
important factor in tlie local situation. In
ot her cases, the amount of United States mili-
tary assistance furnished to uncommitted na-
tions is considerably smaller than that provided
by the Soviet Union. These programs repre-
sent, in many cases, a calculated risk in that
they may not succeed in their main objective.
But the amoimts are so small and the potential
for gains to the cause of freedom is so large
that the risk seems well worth taking.

United States Force Support and Military Assist-
ance Program Administration

As I have indicated earlier we have continued
to include m the military assistance program the
costs for the XATO Infrastructure and Inter-
national Military Headquarters which, al-
though they could more properly be considered
costs of the U.S. forces, have traditionally been
funded in this progi-am. Accordingly, had
there not been a military assistance program,
these costs would have had to be borne in the
regular defense budget.

Another item included here, for want of a
better place to put it, is the $r)0 million for credit
assistance which we anticipate will eventually
be repaid to the United States Treasuiy. Other
Defense witnesses will discuss with you supply
operations and regional costs for which we have
included in the 19G.5 progi-am $84.7 million and
$22.1 million, respectively ; but I would like to
discuss very briefly the $23.5 million included

for program administration. You will notice
on the attached table that we have reduced pro-
gram administration costs from $24.9 million
in FY 1U03 to $24 million in FY 1964. Now we
are reducing it another one-half million dollars,
notwithstanding the fact that salary scales have
increased. In part, the reduction in program
administration costs over the FY'' 1963-65 period
reflects our eilort to reduce civilian employment
in the Department of Defense, which, as you
may know, will be brought below the 1 million
level for the first time since 1950. The number
of militai-y personnel assigned to military assist-
ance activities is also being reduced, with result-
ant savings to this program in travel costs, etc.

Supporting Assistance

Although supporting assistance is not prop-
erly a part of the military assistance program
and is included in the economic assistance re-
quest, I would like to emphasize that the $335
million included for this purpose in the Presi-
dent's 1965 budget is of great importance to the
success of the military assistance program. Of
the total program, $240 million is being re-
quested for Vietnam, Korea, and Laos alone.
This assistance is essential to the maintenance
of the military forces and also provides some of
the economic support required to underpin the
military efTort in those countries. Vietnam
alone will consume over one-third of the total
supporting assistance requested in the 1965
budget, and I can personally testify that at least
that amount of funds is absolutely essential to
our effort in that country.

Legislative Changes

Before I conclude my statement, there are a
number of legislative changes I would like to
touch on.

Section 507 - Military Sales

As presently written, this section requires
governments making purchases from the U.S.
under dependable undertakings to make pay-
ment no later than the time the T Tnited States is
required to pay its contractors. This require-
ment has caused considerable difTiculty for coun-
tries whose laws prohibit payment until the
items purchased are actually delivered. The

MAY 4, 1964

713

proposed amendment would authorize the pur-
chaser to make payment under dependable
vmdertakings within 120 days of delivery of the
Defense articles or the performance of Defense
services, when the President determines that
such an arrangement is in the national interest.
The Department of Defense would use available
appropriations to meet its payments to U.S.
suppliers under the terms of the contract.
These appropriations would be reimbursed in
full from payments made by the purchasing
government. We are confident that the author-
ity provided by tliis amendment would consid-
erably enhance our ability to compete for mili-
tary sales throughout tlie world, without any
risk of loss to the United States Government.

The sale of military equipment, supplies, and
sei*vices to other countries is of considerable
importance to the United States at this time.
First, it contributes to our economic well-being
by providing jobs in this country; second, the
receipts from these sales help to reduce our
adverse balance of payments ; and third, the use

Department of Defense
Military Assistance Program

(* Millions)

Fiscal Year

1963
Actual

Forward Defense
Alliance for Progress
Military Base
Grant Aid Phaseout
Free-World Orientation
U.S. Force Support and
MAP Administration

Infrastructure

International Military
Headquarters

S\ipply Operations

Regional Costs

Program Administration

Credit Assistance

Subtotal

Total Obligational Au-
thority 1, 599. 2
Less: Recoupments and

Reappropriations 274. 2

New Obligational Author-
ity 1, 325. 0

1965
Proposed

379. 8

* Includes Operation and Maintenance of the MAP
Installations and Storage and Maintenance of M.\P
Stockpiles which are shown as Supply Operations costs
in FY 1903 and FY 1904.

•■ Anticipates $50 million transfer from economic aid
funds.

of common equipment, supplies, and services
helps to promote the continuing cooperation of
U.S. and allied forces.

Section 503 - General Authority

We are also requesting an amendment to
section 503 which would permit the more exten-
sive participation of private credit agencies in
the financing of military sales. We estimate
that in the current fiscal year a total of $213
million of military sales will be financed through
private institutions and the Export-Import
Bank. I think we can all agree that this is a
highly desirable way to finance such sales.
However, the political situation in certain coun-
tries which may be potential purchasers of U.S.
military equipment has made private lenders
reluctant to extend credit at the going rates
under tlie existing law. Accordingly, we are
proposing an amendment to section 503 which
would provide for military sales a guaranty
similar to that provided in the investment guar-
anty program. Under the proposed provision,
a fractional reserve of 25 percent of the amount
guaranteed wouhl be required.

Section 620 (m) - "Church Amendment'''

The training proviso to section 620 (m) ex-
pires at the end of FY 1964 and in our judgment
should be extended. This is the provision
which authorizes the Department of Defense to
furnish military training assistance to eco-
nomically developed nations. We believe that
the furnishing of this type of training to sucli
nations is a fruitful source of potential sales of
U.S. military equipment, since it exposes mili-
tary personnel of other countries to U.S. doc-
trine and equipment. We propose, however,
tliat tlie limitation on the amount of training
which may be furnished to anj' one country be
reduced from $1 million to $500,000 per year.

Section 510 - Draw-Down Authoritxj

This section, which gives the President au-
thority to draw down Defense stocks for mili-
tary assistance when he finds such action vital
to tlie security of the United States, also expires
on June 30, 1964. Altliough we have not made
use of this autliority because we believe it
sliould be invoked only as a last resort, we
strongly urge that it be renewed. As I have

714

DEP/UITMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

already stated, the fiscal year 1965 military as-
sistance program is so tight that little or no
flexibility exists to meet unanticipated emer-
gencies. Accordingly, this special aiitliority
may be of vital importance to us during the next
fiscal year. The military departments whose
stocks are drawn down must, of course, be re-
imbursed from subsequent military assistance
appropriations.

Continuing Authorization

We believe the present practice of requiring
an annual authorization for the military as-
sistance program is not conducive to sound,
long-term planning, either by ourselves or by
the recipient nations. Military assistance is
clearly one of the essential tools of U.S. foreign
policy, and we should be willing to acknowledge
tiiat fact by providing a continuing authoriza-
tion for that essential program. The Defense
Department, of course, would continue to ap-
pear before the authorizing committees each
year, as we have in the past, to report on our
problems and progress and to present the pro-
gram proposed for the forthcoming fiscal year,
and the bill proposed by the President expressly
requires such presentations.

Conclusion

Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan and members
of the committee, I believe that with this FY
1965 military assistance program we have come
to a critical decision point. Unless we are as-
sured of at least a billion dollars a year for
military assistance over the next several years,
the military strength we have helped to build
up around the periphery of the Communist
bloc will quickly melt away. Even with a bil-
lion dollars a year we will have to consider care-
fully the advisability of proposing a reduction
in the size of the forces and military personnel
strengths supported by the military assistance
program. Tliis may well be necessary in order
to achieve a better balance between the size of
the forces and the quality of their equipment.
Combat effectiveness as j-ou well know is not
only a function of numbers of men but of their
equipping and training as well.

Anything less than $1 billion a year in new
militarj' assistance funds will inevitably require

a reassessment of our entire policy of depending
on indigenous forces in preparing our own con-
tingency war plans and, accordingly, of the size
and character of our own military forces. I
believe it is obvious to all of us that any at-
tempt to offset the loss of combat effectiveness
in those allied forces supported by the military
assistance program by increases in our own
forces is bound to cost far more for the same
amount of combat capability. Yet if we are
to provide adequately for our national security
and the collective defense of the free world, we
will have to make these additional expenditures.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I appeal to you and
to your colleagues on this committee to give our
FY 1965 military assistance program your full
and unequivocal support, not only in the com-
mittee but on the floor of the House. The
security of our nation demands it.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Winning the Cold War ; The U.S. Ideological Offensive.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Part VII (appendixes to
part VI) : A. The Cold War Since 19C0, B. Research
Studies of U.S. Information Agency, January 1964,
123 pp. ; part VIII, U.S. Government Agencies and
Programs (Agency for International Development,
Department of Defense), January I.t-10, 10G4, 145 pp.

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Part II : Economic
Developments, Political Trends and Party Faction-
alism, Distribution of American Publications, Impli-
cations for U.S. Foreign Policy, State Department
Views. February 18-March 10, 1964. IIC pp.

International Development Association Act Amend-
ment. Hearings before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 2214. March 23-24,
1964. 104 pp.

Authorizing the President To Appoint a Commission To
Study the Feasibility of, and Most Suitable Site for,
the Second Interoceanic Canal Connecting the At-
lantic and Pacific Oceans. Report to accompany
S. 2701. S. Rept. 008. March 20, 1904. 11 pp.

Small Business and Foreign Trade. A report of the
House Select Committee on Small Business pursuant
to II. Res. 13. II. Rept. 1303. April 6, 1!)04. 46 pp.

Amendment to International Development Association
Act. Report to accompany S. 2214. H. Rept. 1312.
April 9, 1964. 16 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Shoe Lathes.
Report to accompany U.R. 10468. H. Rept. 1325.
April 15, 19C4. 2 pp.

MAT 4, 1964

715

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

CaEendar of International Conferences and iV9eetings>

Scheduled May Through July 1964

ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: Geneva May 4-

7th Session.

6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva May 4-

ICEM Executive Committee: 23d Session Geneva May 4-

IMCO Worliing Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Sta- London May 4r-

bility of Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session.

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea . . London May 4-

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session . . . Geneva Mav 4-

UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session Paris Mav 4-

FAO/WHO Code of Principles Committee for Milk and Milk Rome May 4-

Products.

FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: Rome May 4-

8th Session.

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 5-

IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session . . . London May 11-

U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics Geneva May 11-

ICEM Council: 21st Session Geneva May 11-

NATO Ministerial Council The Hague May 12-

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission The Hague May 12-

OECD Energy Committee: Special Committee for Oil Paris Mav 12-

OECD Working Party III (Balance of Payments) Paris May 14-

OECD Energy Committee Paris May 14-

OECD Ministerial Meeting on Science: Interim Committee . . . Paris May 14-

FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session Rome May 14-

International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting Tokyo May 18-

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program Geneva May 18-

for Refugees: 11th Session.

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session New York May 20-

BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement Geneva May 20-

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session New York May 20-

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical Sub- Geneva May 22-

committee.

IMCO Council: 11th Session London May 25-

ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study Geneva May 25-

groups).

OECD Industry Committee Paris May 26-

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . . Paris May 27-

Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress Vienna May 29-

WHO Executive Board: 34th Session Geneva May

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May

1st International Short Film Festival Cracow, Poland June 1-

3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty . Brussels June 1-

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning: 25th Washington June 2-

Session.

FAO International Meeting on Dairy Education Paris June 2-

OECD Pulp and Paper Committee Paris June 9-

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Ses- Paris June 10-

sion.

'Prepared in the Office of International Conferences. Apr. 14, V.H'A. Following is a list of abbreviations:
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BlltPI, United International Bureaus
for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property ; CCITT, Comity consultatif international ti'Idgraphique
et tcK'phonique ; EUA, Economic Commission for Africa: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East ; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council ; FAO. Food and Asri-
oulturc Orgiinization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Intor-.Vmerican Efonomic
and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM. Intergovernmental ('(inimittee
for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization; ITU, International Tolecomumnication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEP, I'nlted Nations Children's Fimd;
WHO, World Health Organization.

716

DEPARTBIENT OF STATE BULLETIN

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee

I'. N. Special Fund GovcrniiiK Council: 12tli Session

U.N. Special Comnnttce on Frientlly Kclalions

International Labor Conference: 48th Session

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee

U.N. ECE Working Group on Productivity Statistics

International Wlioat Council: :i'.)th Session

14tli International Tilm Festival

FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 9th Session

U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial Estates

1C.\0 .\irworthiness Conunittee: 0th Session

International Sugar Council: 17th Session

UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs .\dministration : 4th Ses-
sion.

14th International Film Festival

FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program .

27th International Conference on Public Education

ANZUS Council

I MCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session

IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Ses-
sion.

lA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d
Meeting.

South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commis-
sion.

Vienna June 15-

The Hague Juw 15-

M6xico, D.F June 15-

Geneva June 17-

Geneva June 22

Geneva lune 22-

London Iuih^ 23-

Berlin June 26-

Ilome June 29-

Addis Abalia June 29-

Paris June

London June

NewYork June

Bangkok July 1-

Karlovy Vary, Czeehoslovalda . July 4-

Genevii July 6-

Geneva July 6-

Washington July 13-

London luly 13-

Geneva July 13-

London July 20-

Santiago July

Wellington July

Achievements of the I titer- American Development Bank

Statement by Douglas Dillon
Secretary of the Treasury ^

It is particularly fitting that -we are holding
our fiftli annual meeting of the Bank's Gov-
ernors today, which is being observed in my
country as Pan American Day. There could
be no more fitting place for today's meeting
than tliis honored and historic city, which
Bolivar chose for the first Inter-American Con-
ference, the Congress of Panama.

This is the 140th year since Bolivar prophe-
sied proudly and boldly that "a hundred cen-
turies hence, posterity, searching for the origin
of our public law and recalling the compacts
that solidified its destiny, will touch with re-
spect the protocols of the Isthmus. In them
will be found the plan of our first alliances that

• Made before the annual meeting of the Governors
of the Inter-American Development Bank at Panama
on Apr. 14. Mr. Dillon is U.S. Governor of the Bank.

will have marked the begimiing of our relation
with the universe."

The Bank, then, could not be more "at home"
than here in Panama, where inter-American
meetings first were launched, for the Bank in
the best inter-American tradition is a strong
and progressive force in the social and economic
development of the hemisphere.

In 1963 the Inter-American Development
Bank completed its third full year of operations
and once again compiled an impressive record
of achievement.

To support the economic and social develop-
ment of its Latin American members, the Bunk
last year authorized 56 new loans, for a total of
$259 million. Its lifetime loan approvals at
the end of the year liad reached the impressive
figure of $875 million, and activity under these
loans is proceeding at a sharply accelerated

MAT 4, 1964

717

pace. Total disbursements at the end of 1963
were $206 million — more than three times larger
than disbursements at the end of 1962.

Impressive as they are, these statistics can
give us only a limited appreciation of the truly
remarkable work which the Bank's dedicated
management and staff have accomplished in the
past 3 years. Each loan, for example, reflects
weeks and months of careful scrutiny and plan-
ning. Behind each loan, moreover, lie several
additional applications for projects found
wanting or not yet ready for execution but
which nonetheless required — and merited — time
and effort to review.

The Bank has also continued its efforts to
mobilize private capital for Latin American
development in the highly industrialized free
countries. Last year the Bank was able to sell
a total of $7.4 million in additional participa-
tion— without any guaranty — in the United
States, Canada, and Western Europe. As you
know, the Bank has just floated its third suc-
cessful bond issue — the second in the United
States — in the amount of $50 million. In addi-
tion, the Bank is actively negotiating for fur-
ther flotations in various Western European
countries. I am confident that these efforts will
soon bear fruit. Additional external capital
has also been mobilized by the Bank through
arrangements for the joint financing of projects.
As stated in the annual report, five of the Bank's
ordinary capital loans last year were made in
association with other external sources of
capital.

Equally important — although perhaps less
immediately evident in our usual review of the
Bank's activities — is the fact that the Bank's
lending policies have stimulated the mobiliza-
tion of very large amounts of domestic capital
in its member countries. The total cost of proj-
ects financed by the $875 million of the Bank's
loans amounts to nearly $2.5 billion. Most of
the additional cost — some $1.5 billion of it — •
represents the direct participation of local
interests — governments, firms, and individ-
uals— and their provision of the domestic capital
required.

In directing the Bank's lending policies,
President [Felipe] Herrera has increasingly
emphasized the encouragement of regional

integTation. It seems to me all to the good that
the Bank should give priority to loans having
a "regional integration component," for re-
gional integration is essential if an adequate
rate of economic growth is to be achieved in
Latin America. I note that in the pursuit of
these policies the Bank has extended a $6 mil-
lion line of credit to the Central American Bank
for Economic Integration and has made a $3
million loan to the national universities of the
five Central American countries in order to in-
sure technical progress within the framework
of that area's vigorous movement toward
regional integration.

During the past year the Bank moved to im-
plement the export credits program which the
Governors approved in Caracas. The Bank has
given specific form to the general directive laid
down by the Governors and has completed the
detailed regulations to govern tliis new activity.
The $30 million of ordinary capital resources
allocated to this program has now been put to
work by the grant of lines of credit to several
member countries. I am sure we will all watch
with great interest and expectation the impor-
tant role this export financing program can play
in the development of capital goods production,
export diversification, reduced trade barriers,
and regional integration.

Increase in Lendable Resources

The pace of the Bank's activities required
some time ago that the Govemore consider an
increase in the Bank's lendable resources. The
process begun 2 years ago in Buenos Aires has
now been completed and the authorized ordinary
capital of the Bank now stands at the equivalent
of an imposing $2.15 billion, of which $475 mil-
lion is the authorized paid-in capital stock and
$1,675 million is callable capital. Our Congress
in January authorized United States participa-
tion in this increase to the extent of $411.8 mil-
lion in callable capital, which will be subscribed
in two installments — this year and next — along
with the subscription of the Bank's other mem-
bers. With the Bank's demonstrated success in
raising funds in private capital markets, the in-
creased authorized capital provides ample assur-
ance of adequate resources for projects on stand-
ard "bankable" terms for several years to come.

718

DEPARTSrENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Wo have nt the moment no such assurance on
the avaihvbility of Bank funds for so-called
"soft" loans — loans designed to supplement
those made on ordinan- hankiiitr tonus. Agree-
ment was reached earlier this year on an increase
of $73.2 million in the Fund for Special Opera-
tions, of whicli $50 million will ho paid in by
my Government on Ajiril 28. This will bring
the total capital of the Fund for Special Opera-
tions to the equivalent of $210.5 million, of
which $150 million will have been paid in by
the United States. In addition, our Congress
last year appropriated an additional $131 mil-
lion to increase the Social Progress Trust Fund
administered by the Bank. Tliese additional
fimds for loans on easj* repayment terms will
sufBce for loss than 1 year of lending operations
at an adequate rate. It is urgent, therefore,
that the Governors address themselves once
again to the future of the Bank's lending activ-
ities on soft terms and begin action to obtain the
requisite f imds.

Proposal To Enlarge Special Operations Fund

At our last meeting in Caracas, and again in
the report on this matter which is now before
you, my Government has expressed its view that
the Bank would be strengthened if at this point
in its life — and at this juncture of the Alliance
for Progress — the lending windows to which
the United States and other member coimtries
provide funds were reduced from the existing
three to two. "We have, therefore, proposed that
there be no further replenishment of the Social
Progress Trust Fund and that, instead, there be
a substantial enlargement of the Fund for Spe-
cial Operations.

The Social Progress Trust Fund, as you know,
grew directly from the Act of Bogota, and the
emphasis which at that time we all agreed to
place on social development in Latin America.
It was unfortunately all too true that social
progress in the hemisphere had been sadly ne-
glected, and therefore it was both essential and
proper that the Act of Bogota call attention to
the priority needs of the social sector.

The Act of Bogota, as we all know, was soon
succeeded by the great milestone of hemi-
spheric dedication and cooperation, the Charter
of Punta del Este. That charter gave formal

recognition to the fact that soi'iul and economic
progress arc mutually reinforcing objectives.
It also called for comprehensive planning of
the path to progress — planning that would
make it necessary to reduce or remove any shari)
distinction between economic and social proj-
ects. The mark of well-prepared plans — which,
happily, are now well advanced in a number
of countries — is the rational allocation of avail-
able lesources between the economic and social
sectors, taking full account of their interde-
pendence. We can expect, therefore, that the
Bank, in deciding upon particular projects for
financing, will increasingly take into account
both economic and social considerations and
not just one or the other. With this approach,
only two sources of financing, one hard, one
soft, seem necessary — the choice between them
to be determined not necessarily just by the
nature of the project but also by the situation
of the borrower or other special circumstances.
In the context of these considerations, I hope
that we can agree at this meeting to seek the
commitment of our governments to a 3-year
program to enlarge the Fund for Special Op-
erations by an amomit equal to $300 million per
annum, of which the United States would con-
tribute $250 million, and the other members of
the Bank, $50 million, all in our own national
currencies.

This enlargement, which would enable the
Fund to make loans on special terms for the
purposes currently being financed by both the
Fund and the Social Progress Trust Fund,
can be accomplished without any change in the
agreement establishing the Inter-American
Development Bank. This would simplify the
legislative problems of the member govern-
ments. This is particularly desirable as far as
the United States is concerned. In view of our
forthcoming national election, the United
States Congress can be expected to adjourn
some^vhat earlier in the year than has recently
been the case. Delay in reaching agreement on
this matter or the introduction of complexities
involving basic changes in the Bank's charter
would greatly increase our difficulty in obtain-
ing congressional approval this year — as can
be attested by the Members of the United States
Congress who have come here from Washing-

MAT 4, 1964

119

ton to attend this meeting as members of our
delegation.

The Alliance for Progress

We look for the Bank to continue and expand
its role as the "Bank of the Alliance." During
the past year the Bank has assumed new duties
as financial agent in the mobilization of ex-
ternal resources for national development pro-
grams, in filling a special advisory role M-ith
various entities concerned with the provision
of external development financing, and, finally,
as technical adviser to the newly established
Inter-American Alliance for Progress Com-
mittee (known as CIAP). In connection es-
pecially with the latter body, it seems
appropriate for the Bank to assume a more
active role in the programing of development
assistance and in directing its activities toward
the support of well-designed national and re-
gional programs.

Turning to the Alliance for Progress, in
which the Bank plays such an important role,
I think we must, in honesty, acknowledge that
the present moment is one characterized by
skepticism and doubt, both in Latin America
and in the United States. Unquestionably, we
still have a long way to go before we achieve
the objectives envisioned in the Charter of
Punta del Este. But while we face that fact,
let it not obscure the equally important fact
that, by every realistic measure, we have come
a long way.

First, in the recent creation of the Inter-
American Alliance for Progress Committee,
CIAP, we have established a sound mechanism
for hemispheric coordination and guidance
within the framework of the alliance. Our
appointment of Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso
as United States representative has made clear
that the United States wishes to play an active
role in this Committee, to which President
Johnson has pledged "our full support." "

Second, we should not lose sight of the fact
that 11 of the 19 Latin American member
countries have been achieving the minimum 2^^
percent per capita growth target set at Punta

• For text of an address made by President Johnson
at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16, see Bitlletin
of Apr. 6, 19(34, p. 535.

del Este. Equallj' important, perhaps, is tlie
fact that throughout the hemisphere we have
witnessed in the past 2 j'ears the creation of new
institutions vital to the pace of future gi'owth.
The Bank itself has participated in the estab-
lishment or reform of a variety of intermediate
credit institutions — development banks, agri-
cultural credit banks, savings and loan and
housing fuiance institutions — all critical in the
process of domestic resource mobilization. In-
tense efforts are being devoted to the reform of
tax structures, improved tax collection, a more
equitable and productive distribution of land,
and improved facilities in the fields of health
and education.

These are the very sinews of growth, and the
attention and activity focused in these areas in
the past 2 years has far surpassed anything
ever before witnessed in the hemisphere. The
fruits of endeavors such as these will not
miraculously ripen overnight; on the contrary,
progress will be difficult and even hazardous.
But without these efforts, progress simply will
not occur. "We therefore have a clear choice
before us :

— Shall we hold timorously back, afraid to
move because we might stir up waters that
could become troubled ?

— Or shall we venture forth on new paths —
but always within a framework of free and
democratic institutions — that will offer all of
our peoples a fair share in the gradually ripen-
ing fruit of our mutual endeavors ?

On behalf of my country, I urge that we
move without timidity and with confidence.

So far as external funds are concerned, tak-
ing into full acount the self-help measures of the
various comitries of Latin America in connec-
tion with their commitments imder the Charter
of Punta del Este, the Laiited States continues
to be prepared to provide public assistance in
the order of magnitude suggested by the char-
ter. As our AID [Agency for International
Development] Administrator, Mr. David Bell,
emphasized in his address to the Governors last
year, the pace at which aid can be provided must
depend upon a series of preparatory and corre-
lated actions. Careful advance planning and
sound project implementation takes time, and
there will be inevitable laijs between conmiit-

720

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

nu'iit ;uul (lisbui'sement of funds. I have
pointetl out tlic close attention tlie liank has
given to the problem of project execution and
loan disbursements durin<j the past year and
wish to assure you that our own linancing insti-
tutions have also made every etl'ort — consistent
with the overriding requirements of sound proj-
ect implementation — to expedite disbursement.

Among the disappointments of the past 2
years, I might note that the commitment of ex-
ternal funds from lOurope has thus far been less
than had been hoped. Recently there has been
new evidence of European interest in Latin
America symbolized by the recent visits of Pres-
ident de Gaulle and President Liiebke. The
United States wholeheartedly welcomes these
renewed signs of European interest and hopes
that the interest will be clearly manifested in
an increase in the kinds of low-interest, long-
term development loans so badly needed by
Latin America. In addition to liberal terms, we
■would hope that European assistance to Latin
America would be carefully related to the over-
all planning effort and to the system of pri-
orities established within the context of the
Alliance for Progress. The proposal of the
Governor for Argentina raises interesting pos-
sibilities in this respect, and I can state that mj'
delegation is in full accord with the objectives
underlying his proposal.

I should like once again to emphasize in the
strongest terms the need for the Latin American
countries themselves to be on guard against
terms of assistance from any source which
would create an unacceptable burden for the
future. The indiscriminate and mirestrained
acceptance of short- and medium-term suppliers
credits, in cases where longer term development
loans are the real need, all too often simply
creates an miwieldy and mimanageable prob-
lem which can veiy quickJj' assume crisis pro-
portions leading to a slowdown in the pace of
development.

Mobilizing Private Investment

The field of private investment is another
area where flows of external capital have proved
disappointing. In this comiection, we must
constantly bear in mind the fact that the foreign
investor always has alternative possibilities for

investment of his capital. Given the high levels
of current economic activity in the United
States and Europe, the opportunities for profit-
able investment at home in both areas are rela-
tively great. In order to attract private fimds
from the United States or Europe, or to induce
the inv-jstment of local private capital, a coun-
try— whether already industrialized or devel-
oping— must maintain an investment climate
which offers a reasonable prospect thiit a sound
project will yield a return commensurate with
the risk involved. The choice is for each coun-
try to make. The results will depend, to a very
great extent, upon that choice.

In (ho United States over the past 3 years we
have adopted a series of tax measures to increase
the relative attractiveness of investment at home
as compared with investment in other free, in-
dustrialized countries. Countries that deliber-
ately hamper the investment of private capital,
or fail to provide a hospitable climate, should be
aware of the fact that they are forgoing sources
of financing and teclmical knowledge of great
importance to their future growth and to the
strength of their international position —
sources which cannot possibly be replaced by
public funds.

An important corollary of a favorable "in-
vestment climate" is a country's ability to raise
capital abroad. In this connection the recent
experience of Mexico comes to mind: Mexico
has been able to float two highly successful
bond issues in the capital markets of the United
States — one last year and a second just 2 weeks
ago — for a total of $65 million. It goes without
saying that these Mexican issues were very wel-
come, and we hope that other Latin American
countries will be able to follow this example in
mobilizing private external funds for their de-
velopment. I should mention here that the
interest equalization tax on foreign securities
wliich has been proposed to the United States
Congress by my Government ^ is not designed
to apply to the securities of the Latin American
comitries.

Finally, I cannot let this occasion pass with-
out mention of the world trade and develop-
ment conference now under way in Geneva.^ I

' For background, see ibid., Mar. 23, 1064, p. 464.
' For background, see ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

MAT 4, 1964

r2i

am aware of the intense interest which your
Governments have in this conference and in its
purpose of helping to ease the problem facing
the developing world. That endeavor is, of
course, one in which the United States has long
taken the lead, and I would simply like to em-
phasize my country's determination to continue
its efforts, in every feasible way, to serve that
purpose.

Mr. Chairman, the tangible evidence of the
Bank's progress placed before us at this meet-
ing symbolizes the activity, movement, and
forward progress being accomplished through-
out Latin America under the guidance of the
Charter of Punta del Este. I am confident that
at our meeting next year, and in the years ahead,
we will find ourselves increasingly able to meet
the needs of Latin America and of Western
Hemisphere solidarity.

TREATY INFORMATDON

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4,
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS
3943.

Ratification deposited: Cuba (with reservation), No-
vember 20, 1963.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for
the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, April 16, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Designations

Vienna April 18, 1961.'

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (with reservation and declaration), March
25, 1964.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem-
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945.
TIAS 1501.
Notification of tcithdrawal: Cuba, April 2, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS
2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at
Washington July 15, 1963.'

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, April 13, 1964.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention, 1959
(TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959.
Entered into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4S93.
Notification of approval: Mexico, March 7, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La
Paz March 25, 1964. Entered into force March 25,
1964.

Tanganyika

Agreement for the continued application to Tanganyika
of the provisions of the agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom for technical coop-
eration (TIAS 2281). Effected by exchange of notes
at Dar-es-Salaam, December 9, 1963. Entered into
force December 9, 1963.

Yugoslavia

Agreement for the abolition of all nonimmigrant visa
fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade,
December 30, 1963, and March 27 and April 4, 1964.
Entered into force April 15, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force.

Robinson Mcllvaine as Coordinator of the National
Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute,
effective April 13. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 161 dated April 10.)

722

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 4, 196!^ Vol. L, No. 1S97

Africa. Diplomatic Rapport Between Afric-a
and the United States (Williams) .... 698

American Republics

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Kaiik (Dillon) 717

Ignacio Ixizano Xamed Adviser on Cultural Ex-
change Program "03

Asia. SE.\TO Council of Ministers Meets at
Manila (Rusk, text of communique) . . . COO

Aviation. United States and France Discuss

Air Cargo Operations 704

China. U.S. Reaffirms Commitments to Taiwan

and Viet-Xam (Rusk) C94

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 715

The Military Assistance Program for 1965

(McNamara) 705

Department and Foreign Service. Designations

(Mcllvaine) 722

Diplomacy. Diplomatic Rapport Between Af-
rica and the United States (Williams) . . . 698

Economic Affairs

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (Dillon) 717

President Calls for Review of Tariffs on Glass

Products 697

United States and United Kingdom Conclude

Grains Agreement (Ilerter) 703

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Ignacio
Lozano Named Adviser on Cultural Exchange
Program 703

Foreign Aid. The Military Assistance Program
for 1965 (McNamara) 705

France. United States and France Discuss Air
Cargo Operations 704

International Organizations and Conferences

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (Dillon) 717

Calendar of International Conferences and

Meetings 716

Jordan. President Johnson Holds Talks With
King Hussein of Jordan (text of joint com-
munique) 697

Laos. U.S. Reaffirms Support of Royal Lao
Government 703

Military Affairs. The Military Assistance Pro-
gram for 1965 (McNamara) 705

Presidential Documents. President Johnson

Holds Talks With King Hussein of Jordan . 697

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO
Council of Ministers Meets at Manila (Rusk,
text of communique) 690

Treaty Information

Current Actions 722

United States and United Kingdom Conclude

Grains AKieenient (Ilorter) 703

United Kingdom. United States and United
Kingdom Conclude Grains Agreement
(Ilerter) 703

Viet-Nam. U.S. Reaffirms Commitments to
Taiwan and Viet-Nam (Rusk) 694

Name Indcie

Dillon, Douglas 717

Herter, Christian A 703

King Hussein I 697

Johnson, President 697

Lozano, Ignacio E., Jr 703

Mcllvaine, Robinson 722

McNamara, Robert S 705

Rusk, Secretary 690,694

Williams, G. Mennen 698

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Release issued prior to April 13 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 160 of April
10.

No. Date Subject

*1G2 4/13 Vaughn sworn in as Ambassador to

Panama (biographic details).
*163 4/13 Dr. Ferebee sworn in as consultant

to Medical Division (biographic

details).
*1(54 4/13 U.S. participation in international

conferences.
•165 4/14 Itinerary for visit of King of

Jordan.
16G 4/15 SEATO communique.

167 4/17 Talks with France on air cargo

operations.

168 4/17 Lozano named consultant to Assist-

ant Secretary Battle (rewrite).
*169 4/17 Barnett: "China and the Chinese."
tl70 4/17 Williams : "African Issues at the

United Nations."

♦Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEi1964

DSB etc G

PUBLIC LIBRARY- lie
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02117

SUPERINTEi-.ucii 1 v^i- L^wv^uivitiN I 3

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. S300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Policy Briefs

Foreign Policy Briefs, a fortnightly digest streamlined for the busy reader, is designed to provide
broad, timely, and authoritative coverage on the foreign relations activities of the entire executive brancli.
All articles are based on oilicial statements, reports, and announcements released by the Department of
State, the White House, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and other Government agencies.

Foreign Policy Briefs is printed on a large, easy-to-read single page particularly suitable for posting
and easy referral. It is available by subscription from tlie Superintendent of Docmnents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 20402, for $1 a year within the United States and $2 a year if
mailed to a foreign address.

ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to Foreign Policy Briefs for IQ, 20, or 3Q

TO:

years at $1.00 a yeai- ; $1.00 additional for foreign mailing.

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

ji

GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE

1

WASHINGTON, D.C. 2(M02

NAMK 1

KncliwtKl find $

ADDRESS

(cash, check, or money order pay-

able to Snpt. of Documents)

CITS, STATE

<r-'

^'^^K^

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

AMERICA AS A GREAT POWER

Address by President Johnson 726

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Remarks hy President Johnson tJfi

THE SITUATION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Address hy Secretary Rusk 732

AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

by Assistant Secretary WUliams 751

PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA
by Under Secretary Ball 738

For index see inside hack cover

America as a Great Power

Address ty President Johnson ^

The world has changed many times since
General Wasliington comiseled his new and
weak coimtry to "observe good faith and justice
toward all nations." Great empires have risen
and dissolved. Great heroes have made their
entrances and have left the stage. And Amer-
ica has slowly, often reluctantly, grown to be a
great power and a leading member of world
society.

So we seek today, as we did in Washington's
time, to protect the life of our nation, to
preserve the liberty of our citizens, and to pur-
sue the happiness of our people. This is the
touchstone of our world policy.

Thus we seek to add no territory to our do-
minion, no satellites to our orbit, no slavish
followers to our policies. The most impressive
witness to this restraint is that for a century our
own frontiers have stood quiet and stood un-
armed. But we have also learned in this cen-
tury, and we have learned it at painful and

' Made before the Associated Press at New York,
N.Y., on Apr. 20 (White House press release; as-
delivered text).

bloody cost, that our own freedom depends on
the freedom of others, that our own protection
I'equires that we help protect others, that we
draw increased strength from the strength of
others.

Thus, to allies we are the most dependable
and enduring of friends, for our own safety
depends upon the strength of that friendship.
To enemies we are the most steadfast and de-
termined of foes, for we know that surrender
anywhere threatens defeat everywhere. For a
generation, without regard to party or region
or class, our coimtry has been united in a basic
foreign policy that grows from this inescapable
teaching.

Tested Principles of Foreign Policy

The principles of this foreign policy have
been shaped in battle, have been tested in dan-
ger, have been sustained in achievement. They
have endured imder four Presidents of the
United States, because they reflect the realities
of our world and they reflect the aims of our
country.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1298 PUBLICATION 7687 MAY U, 1964

The Department of State Balletln, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are Hated currently.

The Bulletin U for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb : 62 Issues, domestic IS.BO,
foreign $12. 2Q ; single copy, 26 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

726

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Particular actions must change as events
change conditions. We must be alert to shifting
realities, to emerging opportunities, and always
alert to any fresh dangers. But we must not
mistake day-to-day changes for fundamental
movements in the course of history. It often
requires greater courage and resolution to main-
tain a policy which time has tested than to
change it in the face of the moment's pressures.
Our foreign policy rests on very tested
principles.

First, since Korea, we have labored to build
a military strength of unmatched might. We
have succeeded. If the threat of war has les-
sened, it is largely because our opponents realize
attack would bring destruction. This effort has
been costly. But the costs of weakness are far
greater than the costs of strength, and the pay-
ment far more painful. That is why, in the
last 3 years, your Goverimient has strengthened
the whole range of America's defenses.

We have increased defense spending in these
3 years by approximately $6 billion over the
last year of the Eisenliower administration, and
tliis year we are spending approximately $8
billion more on defense than we were during
that last year.

Second, we have strongly resisted Communist
efforts to extend their dominion and expand
their power. We have taken the risks and we
have used the power which this principle de-
manded. We have avoided purposeless provo-
cation and needless adventure. The Berlin
airlift, the Korean war, the defense of For-
mosa, the Cuba crisis, the struggle in Viet-Nam,
prove our determination to resist aggression
and prove our ability to adapt particular re-
sponse to particular challenge.

Third, we have worked for tlie revival of
strength among our allies, initially, to oppose
Commvmist encroachment on war-weakened na-
tions; in the long run, because our own future
rests on the vitality and the unity of the West-
em society to which we belong.

Fourth, we have encouraged the independ-
ence and the progress of developing countries.
We are safer and we are more comfortable in a
world where all people can govern themselves
in their own way, and where all nations have
the inner strength to resist external domination.

Fifth, we have pursued every hope of a last-

ing peace. From the Baruch Plan, named after
that noble resident of this city, to the test ban
treaty, we have sought and welcomed agree-
ments which decrease danger without decreas-
ing security. In that pursuit, for 20 years we
have been the leading power in the support of
the United Nations. In that pursuit, this year
as in every year, we will work to reach agree-
ment on measures to reduce armament and
lessen the chance of war.

Today we apply these same principles in a
world that is much changed since 1945. Europe
seeks a new role for strength rather than con-
tenting itself with protection for weakness.
The unity of commimism is being eroded by the
insistent forces of nationalism and diverging
interest. A whole new group of societies is
painfully struggling toward the modern world.

Our basic principles are adequate to this
slxifting world.

But foreign policy is more than just a set of
general principles. It is the changing appli-
cation of those principles to specific dangers
and to specific opportunities. It involves knowl-
edge of strengths and awareness of limitations
in each new situation.

The presence of offensive missiles in Cuba
was a fact. The presence of fallout in the at-
mosphere has been a fact. The presence of
guerrillas in Viet-Nam, at this hour, is a fact.

Such facts cannot be dealt with simply by
historical judgments or general precepts. They
require concrete acts of courage, and wisdom,
and often restraint. These qualities of endur-
ance and innovation, these qualities of continu-
ity and change are at work in at least six major
areas of continuing concern to you.

Relations With the Soviet Union

First is our relationship with the Soviet
Union, the center of our concern for peace.
Communists, using force and intrigue, seek to
bring about a Conmiunist-dominated world.
Our convictions, our interests, our life as a
nation, demand that we resolutely oppose, with
all of our might, that effort to dominate the
world. This activity, and this alone, is the cause
of the cold war between us.

For the United States has nothing to fear
from peaceful competition. We welcome it,
and we will win it. It is our system which

MAT 11, 1964

727

flourishes and grows stronger in a world free
from the threat of war. And in such a com-
petition all people, eveiywhere, will be the
gainers. Today there are new pressures, new
realities, which make it permissible to hope that
the pursuit of peace is in the interests of the
Soviet Union as it is in ours.

And our own restraint may be convincing the
Soviet leaders of the reality that we, in Ajnerica,
seek neither war nor the destruction of the
Soviet Union. Thus I am very hopeful that we
can take important steps toward the day when
in the words of the Old Testament, "nation
shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more."

We must remember that peace will not come
suddenly. It will not emei-ge dramatically from
a single agreement or a single meetmg. It will
be advanced by concrete and limited accommo-
dations, by the gradual growth of common in-
terests, by the increased awareness of shifting
dangers and alinements, and by the develop-
ment of trust in a good faith based on a reasoned
view of the world.

Our own position is clear. We will discuss
any problem, we will listen to any proposal,
we will pursue any agreement, we will take any
action which might lessen the chance of war
without sacrificing the interests of our allies
or our own ability to defend the alliance against
attack. In other words, our guard is up but
our hand is out.

I am taking two actions today which reflect
both our desire to reduce tensions and our un-
willingness to risk weakness. I have ordered
a further substantial reduction in our produc-
tion of enriched uranium, to be carried out over
a 4-year period. Wlien added to previous re-
ductions, this will mean an overall decrease in
the production of plutonium by 20 percent, and
of enriclied uranium by 40 percent. By bring-
ing production in line with need — and the chart
shows now that our production is here [gestur-
inff], and our need is here, and our reduction
today will bring it here — we think we will re-
duce tension while we maintain all the necessary
power.

We must not operate a WPA nuclear project,
just to provide employment, when our needs
have been met. And in reaching these decisions,

I have been in close consultation with Prime
Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with
my amiouncement now. Chairman IClirushchev
is releasing a statement in Moscow, at 2 o'clock
our time, in which he makes definite commit-
ments to steps toward a more peaceful world.
He agrees to discontinue the construction of two
big new atomic reactors for the production of
plutonium over the next several years, to reduce
substantially the production of U-235 for nu-
clear weapons, and to allocate more fissionable
material for peaceful uses.

This is not disarmament. Tliis is not a dec-
lai-ation of peace. But it is a hopeful sign,
and it is a step forward which we welcome
and which we can take in hope that the world
may yet, one day, live without the fear of war.
At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safe-
guards against weakening our nuclear strength
which we adopted at the time of the test ban
treaty.

The Atlantic Partnership

The second area of continuing effort is the
development of Atlantic partnership with a
stronger and more unified Europe. Having be-
gun this policy when peril was great, we will not
now abandon it as success moves closer. We
worked for a stronger and more prosperous
Europe, and Europe is strong and prosperous
today because of our work and beyond our
expectation.

We have supported a close partnership with
a more unified Europe, and in the past 15 years
more peaceful steps have been taken in tliis di-
rection than have been taken at any time in our
history. The pursuit of this goal, like the pur-
suit of any large and worthy cause, will not be
easy or imtroubled. But the realities of the
modern world teach that increased greatness
and prosperity demand increased unity and
partnership. The underlying forces of Euro-
pean life are eroding old barriers, and they are
dissolving old suspicions. Common institu-
tions are expanding common interest.

National boundaries continue to fade imder
the impact of travel and commerce and com-
munication. A new generation is coming of
age, unscarred by old hostilities or old ambi-

728

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions, tliinking of themselves as Europeans,
tlieir values shaped hy a common Western cul-
ture. Tiieso forces, and the steadfast etVort of
all who share common goals, will shape the
future. And luiity based on hope will ulti-
mately prove stron<rer than unity based on fear.

AVe realize that sharing the burden of leader-
ship requires us to share the responsibilities of
power. As a step in this direction we support
the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force
composed of those nations which desire to par-
ticipate. We also welcome agreed new mecha-
nisms for political consultation on mutual in-
terests throughout the world with whatever
changes in organization are necessary to make
such consultation rapid and effective.

The experience of two world ware has taught
us that the fundamental security interests of the
T^nited States and of Europe are the same.
AMiat we learned in time of war, we mu.st not
now forget in time of peace. For more than
a decade we have sought to enlarge the independ-
ence and ease the rigors of tlie people of Eastern
Europe. We have used the tools of peaceful
exchange in goods, in persons, and in ideas, to
open up communication with these restless na-
tions that Mr. Khrushchev refers to sometimes
as "children who are grown up too big to spank."
We have used limited direct assistance where the
needs of our security have allowed us to follow
the demands of our compassion.

In that spirit within the last month I have
exercised the power granted the President by the
Congress and I have reaffirmed the right of open
trade with Poland and Yugoslavia.-

Latin America

In the third area of continuing concern, Latin
America, we have renewed our commitment to
the Alliance for Progress, we have sought peace-
ful settlement of disputes among the American
nations, and we have supported the OAS effort
to isolate Communist-controlled Cuba. The
Alliance for Progress is the central task today
of this hemisphere. That task is going ahead
successfully .

But that alliance means more than economic
assistance or investment. It requires us to en-

' Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 626.

courage and to support those democratic polit-
ical forces which seek essential change within
the framework of constitutional government.
It means preference for rapid evolution as the
only real alternative to violent revolution. To
struggle to stand still in Latin America is just
to "throw the sand against the wind."

We must, of course, always be on guard
against Communist subversion. But anticom-
numism alone will never suffice, to insure our
liberty or fulfill our dreams. That is going to
take leadership, leadership that is dedicated to
economic progi-ess without uneconomic priv-
ilege, to social change which enhances social
justice, to political reform which widens human
freedom.

The resumption of relations with Panama^
proves once again the unmatched ability of our
inter-American system to resolve these disputes
among our good neighbors. At the outset of
that dispute with Panama, the first morning I
stated to the President of Panama by telephone
our willingness to seek a solution to all prob-
lems without conditions of any kind. And I told
him that our negotiators would meet theire
anywhere, anytime, to discuss anything, and we
would do what was fair, just, and right. We
never departed from that willingness. And on
that basis, the dispute was settled.

We now move toward solution with the
generosity of friends who realize, as Woodrow
Wilson once said, "You cannot be friends on any
other terms than upon the terms of equality."

The use of Cuba as a base for subversion and
terror is an obstacle to our hopes for the West-
ern Hemisphere. Our first task must be, as
it has been, to isolate Cuba from the inter-
American system, to frustrate its efforts to de-
stroy free governments, and to expose the weak-
ness of communism so that all can see. That
policy is in effect, and that policy is working.
The problems of this hemisphere would be far
more serious if Castro today sat at the councils
of the Organization of American States dis-
rupting debates and blocking decision, if Castro
had open channels of trade and communication
along which subversion and terror could flow,
if his economy had been a successful model

' lUd., Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655.

MAY 11, 1964

729

rather than a dismal waniing to all of lus
neighbors.

The effectiveness of our policy is more than
a matter of trade statistics. It has increased
awareness of difference and danger, it has re-
vealed the brutal nature of the Cuban regime,
it has lessened opportunities for subversion, it
has reduced the number of Castro's followers,
and it has drained the resources of our adver-
saries, who are spending more than $1 million
a day. "We will continue this policy with every
peacefid means at our command.

The Far East

A fourth area of continuity and change is the
battle for freedom in the Far East. In the
last 20 years, in two wars, millions of Americans
have fought to prevent the armed conquest of
free Asia. Having invested so heavily in the
past, we will not weaken in the present. The
first American diplomatic mission to the Far
East was instructed to inform all countries that
"we will never make conquests, or ask any na-
tion to let us establish ourselves in their
coimtries."

That was our policy in 1832. That is our
policy in 1964. Our conquering forces left Asia
after World War II with less territory under
our flag than ever before. But if we have de-
sired no conquest for ourselves, we have also
steadfastly opposed it for others. The inde-
pendence of Asian nations is a link in our own
freedom.

In Korea we proved the futility of direct ag-
gression. In Viet-Nam the Communists today
try the more insidious, but equally dangerous,
methods of subversion, terror, and guerrilla
warfare. They conduct a campaign organized,
directed, supplied, and supported from Hanoi.
This, too, we will prove futile. Armed Com-
munist attack on Viet-Nam is a reality. The
fighting spirit of South Viet-Nam is a reality,
as Secretary Rusk told us from there yesterday.
The request of a friend for our help in this
terrible moment is a reality.

The statement of the SEATO allies that
Communist defeat is "essential" is a reality.*
To fail to respond to these realities would re-

* For text of communique of Apr. 15, see ibid.. May 4,
19C4, p. C92.

fleet on our honor as a nation, would undermine
worldwide confidence in our courage, would
convince every nation in South Asia that it
must now bow to Communist terms to survive.
The situation in Viet-Nam is difficult. But
there is an old American saying that "when
the going gets tough, the tough get going." So
let no one doubt that we are in this battle as
long as South Viet-Nam wants our support
and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.
I have already ordered measures to step up
the fighting capacity of the South Vietnamese
forces, to help improve the welfare and the
morale of their civilian population, to keep our
forces at whatever level continued independence
and freedom require. No negotiated settlement
in Viet-Nam is possible, as long as the Com-
munists hope to achieve victory by force.

Once war seems hopeless, then peace may be
possible. The door is always open to any settle-
ment which assures the independence of South
Viet-Nam and its freedom to seek help for its
protection.

In Laos we continue to support the Geneva
agreements which offer what we think is the
best hope of peace and independence for that
strife-torn land. At mj' instruction yesterday
Assistant Secretary of State William Bimdy
went to Laos, and he has already arrived there
for a firsthand examination of the developments,
developments that have come in the last 48
hours. At the moment we are encouraged by
reports of progress toward the reestablislmient
of orderly, legal government.

As for China itself, so long as the Commu-
nist Chinese pursue conflict and preach violence,
there can be and will be no easing of relation-
ships. There are some who prophesy that these
policies will change. But America must base
its acts on present realities and not on future
hopes. It is not we who must reexamine our
view of China. It is the Chinese Communists
who mixst reexamine their view of the world.

Nor can anyone doubt our unalterable com-
mitment to the defense and liberty of free China.
Meanwhile, we will say to our historic friends,
the talented and courageous Chinese people on
the mainland, that just as we opposed aggression
against them, we must oppose aggression by
their rulers and for the same reasons.

780

DEPiUlTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The New Nations of Africa and Asia

Fifth is our concern with tlie new nations of
Africa and Asia. We welcome their emergence,
for their goals flow from hopes like our own.
We began the revolt from colonial rule which is
now reshaping continents and which is now
creating new nations. Our mastery of tcch-
nologj- has heliicd men to learn that poverty is
not inevitable, that disease and hunger are not
laws of nature. Having helped create hopes,
we must now help satisfy them, or we will wit-
ness a rising discontent which may ultimately
menace our own welfare.

Wliat we desire for the developing nations
is what we desire for ourselves — economic prog-
ress which will permit them to shape their own
institutions, and the independence which will
allow them to take a dignified place in the world
community.

Let there be no mistake about our intention to
win the war against poverty at home, and let
there be no mistake about our intention to fight
that war around the world. This battle will not
be easy and it will not be swift. It takes time to
educate young minds and shape the structure
of a modern economy. But the world must not
be di%'ided into rich nations and poor nations, or
white nations and colored nations. In such di-
vision. I know you must realize, are the seeds of
terrible discord and danger in decades to come.
For the wall between rich and poor is a wall
of glass through which all can see.

We recognize the need for more stable prices
for raw materials, for broader opportunity for
trade among nations. We are ready to help
meet these claims, as we have already done, for
example, with the negotiation of the interna-
tional coffee agreement, and as we will do in
the weeks ahead in the Kennedy Round. We
will continue with the direct economic assist-
ance whicli has been a vital part of our policy
for 20 years.

Foreign Aid

Last year the Congress reduced foreign aid
from $4.9 billion — later modified by General
Clay's committee to $4.5 billion — and Congress
reduced that to a total of $3.4 billion that they
appropriated to me to deal with the problems

of 120 nations. This year I ordered that our
request be cut to the absolute minimum consist-
ent with our commitments and our .security,
allowing for no cushions or no padding, and
tliat was done.

Every dollar cut from that request for $3.4
billion will directly diminish the security of the
United States. And if, in spite of this clear
need and this clear warning, substantial cuts
are made again this year in either military or
economic funds, I want to sound a warning that
it will be my solemn duty as President to submit
supplemental requests for additional amounts
until the necessary funds of $3.4 billion are
appropriated.

In these areas, and in other areas of concern,
we remain faithful to tested principle and deep
conviction while shaping our actions to shifting
dangers and to fresh opportunity. This year is
an election year in the United States. And in
this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad
mistake growing discussion for growing dis-
sension, conflict over programs for conflict over
principles, or political division for political
paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been
made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of
our adversaries.

Now let those at home, who share in the great
democratic struggle, remember that the world
is their audience and that attack and opposition
to old policies must not be just for opposition's
sake, that it requires responsible presentation
of new choices, that in the protection of our
security — the protection of American security —
partisan politics must always yield to national
need.

I recognize that those who seek to discuss
great public issues in this election year must
be informed on those issues. Therefore I have
today instructed the Departments of State and
Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency
to be prepared and to provide all major candi-
dates for the office of President with all possible
information helpful to their discussion of
American policy. I hope candidates will ac-
cept this offer in the spirit in which it is made,
the encouragement of the responsible discussion
which is the touchstone of the democratic
process.

MAT 11, 1964

731

In the past 20 years we have gradually be-
come aware that America is forever bomid up
in the affairs of the whole world. Our own fu-
ture is linked to the future of all. In great
capitals and in tiny villages, in the councils of
great powers and in the rooms of unknown
planners, events are being set in motion which
will continually call upon our attention and our
resources.

Prophecy is always unsure. But if anything
is certain, it is that tliis nation can never again
retreat from world responsibility. You must
know, and we must realize, that we will be
involved in the world for the rest of our history.
We must accustom ourselves to working for

liberty in the community of nations as we have
pursued it in our commmiity of States.

The struggle is not merely long. The strug-
gle is imending. For it is part of man's ancient
effort to master the passions of his mind, the
demands of Ms spirit, the cruelties of nature.
Yes, we have entered a new arena. The door
has closed behind us, and the old stage has
passed into history.

Dangers will replace dangers, challenges will
take the place of challenges, new hopes will
come as old hopes fade. There is no turning
from a course which will require wisdom and
much endurance so long as the name of America
still sounds in this land and around the world.

The Situation in tiie Western Pacific

Address hy Secretary Rush ^

It is a great pleasure for me to be once more
in. Indiana and to be here at Valparaiso Uni-
versity in company with my friend from across
the aisle. Congressman Charles Halleck. One
who has been deeply concerned for many years
with foreign policy must pay I'espect to the
indelible imprint which he made upon the his-
tory of our times while serving his country as
majority leader in the 80th Congress at a time
when we were picking up once more, on a bi-
partisan basis, our heavy responsibilities for the
maintenance of peace through such measures
as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan,
and the beginnings of NATO. It was a special
pleasure for me to respond to your kind invita-
tion because it was so strongly endorsed by this
distinguished public servant.

Please accept my warmest congratulations
and best wishes as you dedicate this Law School,

' Made at the dedication of a new building for the
School of Law at Valparaiso University, Valparaiso,
Ind., on Apr. 2.5 (pre.S8 release 186).

an occasion made celebrated by the presence
of one of the greatest of our legal statesmen,
the Chief Justice of the United States. It was
my own personal aspiration to become a lawyer,
but a world war intervened. I have continued
to marvel at the role of law in enlarging the
freedom of those who are within its compass.
I have long felt that the nature of our legal
order has been much too much neglected in the
education of the ordinary citizen. One can only
express some measure of astonisliment, for ex-
ample, that the most pervasive and compelling
aspect of our social enviroimient is given so
little attention in undergraduate or liberal arts
education.

In our relations with the rest of the world, the
building of a decent world order is our prin-
cipal preoccupation — the subject of most of our
effort, the content of most of our cables, the
commitment of all of our representatives abroad.
Little by little that decent world order is coming
into being, and law is being given its chance to

732

DEP^VRTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lay ii healing liiiiul upon ilisi)utcs and to enlarge
the area of freedom by allowing more conlident
preiliction about what others will do. There-
fore it is a very special pleasure for me to be a
part of this dedication event.

U.S. Security Interests in the Western Pacific

There are many aspects of our foreign policy
which 1 migiit discuss with you. But 1 shall
make my talk tonight primarily a report on a
10-day trip across the Pacitic, from which I re-
turned Monday evening.-

The security of the United States — and of the
free world as a whole — is deeply involved in
the 'Western Pacitic. The vital contribution to
freedom being made by Japan, the Eepublic of
Korea, and the Republic of China is, I believe,
generally recognized in the United States. We
have a defensive alliance with each of those
nations. All three were ratified overwhelm-
ingly by the United States Senate. Only two
Senators voted against the mutual security pact
with Japan and only six agamst the security
pacts with the Republics of Korea and Cliina.
Southeast Asia also is vital to our security.
Including the island countries off its shores, it
has more than 200 million jjeople. It contains
rich agricidtural lands and valuable mineral
resources. Parts of it are relatively lightly
populated. Standing at the crossroads between
two oceans and two contments, it is a region of
great strategic importance, not only to all the
people who live in the great arc from Karaclii
to Tokyo but to the free world as a whole.

Our interest in the defense of that region is
recognized through tliree defensive alliances:
our direct mutual security pact with the Re-
public of the Philippines, AXZUS (our defen-
sive alliance with Australia and New Zealand),
and SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Orga-
nization. All three of these treaties were rati-
fied overwhelmingly by the Senate.

The Communists are eager to take over South-
east Asia. They are trying hard to do so by
means short of the overt type of aggression they

' For statements made by Secretary Rusk at Taipei
and Saigon Apr. 16 and 17 and on liis return to Wash-
ington Apr. 20, see Buxletin of May 4, 1964. p. 694.

attempted in Korea 14 years ago. They are
atteiiii)tiiig to win by subversion — and, in S()\ith
Viet-Nam, by acts of terror and guerrilla war-
fare.

This assault on tiie Republic of Viet-Nam was
organized and is directed, supported, and sup-
plied by the Nortli Vietnamese Communist re-
gime in Hanoi. Hanoi also directed and con-
tinues to support the Communist threat to Laos,
where there is presently an uncertain "peace."
The North Vietnamese spearheads of aggres-
sion are supported by the Communist regime in
Peiping, which rules some 700 million people.
And the assault on Viet-Nam is supported at
least verbally by Moscow. For, in the upside-
down jargon of the Communists, this is a so-
called "war of national liberation" — and a form
of aggression which has the blessing of the
Soviet as well as the Chinese Conununists.

Fourteen years ago the Commmiists launched
an open aggression against the Republic of
Korea. Had that aggression been allowed to
succeed, Japan would have come imder a more
direct threat and the psychological effects of an
unchallenged Conmiunist aggression would have
been felt all over the world. Probably most of
the free comitries on the periphery of the Com-
munist world in Asia would have felt it neces-
sary to submit to Commmiist domination.

Since the Korea war, no Communist state has
again ventured an aU-out direct aggression.
But they have not abandoned the technique of
aggression tlirough guerrilla warfare, sustained
by infiltrating trained men and arms across na-
tional frontiers. That is the technique they are
using in Southeast Asia.

If the Commimists were to succeed in their
assault on South Viet-Nam, the consequences to
us, and to the free world as a whole, would be
very serious. The rest of Southeast Asia would
be in jeopardy, and saving it would be more
costly, in blood and treasure, than defeating the
aggression in South Viet-Nam. And the loss of
Southeast Asia as a whole to the Communists
would bring about a major shift in the balance
of power. The South Asian subcontinent would
be flanked, and Australia would be directly
threatened. Such an immense victory for the
Communists might well undermine the will of

MAT 11. 1964

733

free peoples on other continents to defend them-
selves.

These, very briefly, are the reasons why Pres-
ident Eisenhower decided to assist the Eepublic
of South Viet-Nam; why, when the Communists
stepped up their assault, President Kennedy de-
cided to increase our assistance ; and wliy Presi-
dent Jolmson has increased it further and has
promised that we will continue to help the
Eepublic of Viet-Nam until this aggression
against it is defeated.

The SEATO Council Meeting

Tlie threat to Southeast Asia was, of course,
the principal subject before the meeting of the
SEATO Council of Ministers, which I attended
in Manila last week.^ This defensive alliance
was signed in Manila nearly 10 years ago, fol-
lowing the Geneva accords, which brought to a
close the war in Indochina in which France had
been engaged. The purpose of the Manila Pact
was to curb further Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia, and by a protocol the protec-
tion of SEATO was extended to the three non-
Communist states of former Indochina, should
they request it. Cambodia and Laos have re-
nounced that option. South Viet-Nam has not
requested assistance from SEATO but is re-
ceiving help not only from the United States
but, on a small scale, from other individual
SEATO members.

At the meeting in Manila last week, the eight
SEATO members considered all aspects of the
attack on South Viet-Nam. None suggested
that the free nations should turn their back and
walk — or run — away from this aggression.
France was already committed to what it calls
a "political solution"— that is, to some form of
so-called "neutralization." But it did not sub-
mit any specific proposal along that line. The
consensus of the other members was that so-
called "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam
would be only a device for turning it over to
the Communists.

Indeed, seven of tlie eight members of
SEATO had little difficulty in arriving at some

'For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk
at the SEATO meeting on Apr. 13 and a eommuuique
released on Apr. 15, see ihid., p. GOO.

clear-cut pronouncements concerning the assault
on the Eepublic of Viet-Nam.

They agreed that it is an "aggression" and
that it is "directed, supplied and supported by
the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in
flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954
and 1962."

They agreed that "the defeat of the Com-
munist campaign is essential not only to the
security of the Eepublic of Vietnam, but to that
of South-East Asia" and that "it will also be
convincing proof that Communist expansion by
such tactics will not be permitted."

They also agreed that "the members of
SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary,
to take furtlier concrete steps within their
respective capabilities of fulfillment of their
obligations under the treaty."

It should be noted that the seven members
who agreed on these and related declarations
ai'e the regional members — Thailand, the Phil-
ippines, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zea-
land— and the two others which maintain
military forces in the area : Great Britain and
the United States.

The communique adopted at Manila was by
far the strongest ever issued by a SEATO
Council. It demonstrated that SEATO is far
from moribund. It is a warning which Hanoi
and Peij^ing would do well to heed.

The Philippines

While in the Pliilippines I had the oppor-
tunity to talk at length with President [Dios-
dado] Macapagal and his colleagues in the
Philippine Government.

Tlie Eepublic of the Philippines is a vigor-
ous, thriving democracy, committed to consti-
tutional procedures, combining political sta-
bility with economic and social progress.
Under President Macapagal's strong leadership,
it is shouldering increasing responsibilities for
preserving peace in Southeast Asia.

The Philippine people have not forgotten
Bataan and Corregidor, and General Mac-
Arthur's return to the Philippines. They re-
member that Filipinos and Americans fought
side by side. Tliey know that freedom does not
come cheap but is for the strong in spirit.

734

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

We Americans are rightfully proud of our
association with the Government and people of
the Philippines, who share so fully with us a
dedication to democracy ajid human rights.

The Republic of China

At Taipei I had the opportunity to discuss
with President Chiang Kai-shek and the mem-
bers of his government a wide range of matters
of common interest. The Republic of China
is a rampart of freedom in the "Western Pacific.
We support it as the Government of China, and
we remain firmly opposed to any proposal to
deprive it of its riglitful place in the United
Nations and to seat the Cliinese Communists in
its place.

The Republic of China continues to make re-
markable economic and social progress. Its
land reform and programs for rural develop-
ment have been among the most successful in
the world. Its citizens have achieved levels of
well-being which contrast dramatically with
the misery of their kinsmen on the mainland.

Many developing countries could profit from
study of the programs of economic and social
improvement which have been applied success-
fully on Taiwan. Also, the Republic of China
is educating and training increasing numbers
of men and women in various professions and
skills which are in short supply in most parts
of the world. These provide an expanding
reservoir of technical advice and assistance on
which other free nations are increasingly draw-
ing.

In the people of the Republic of Cluna, we
have talented, vigorous, and resolute allies dedi-
cated to freedom.

U.S. Role in Viet-Nam

In Viet-Nam, I talked at length with General
[Nguyen] Khanh and his colleagues, as well as
with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, Geii-
eral [Paul D.] Harkins, and other members of
our American team. These talks reinforced
my confidence in the will and the ability of the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to
lead the people of that country to victory and
a better life.

Our policy is to assist the Government and

people of South Viet-Nam in achieving those
objectives. As President Johnson said in New
York Monday : *

The statement of the SEATO allies that Ck)ininu-
nist defeat is "essential" is a reality. To fail to re-
spond . . . would reflect on our honor as a nation,
would undermine worldwide confidence in our cour-
age, would convince every nation in South Asia that
it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.

... So let no one doubt that we are in this battle
as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and
needs our assistance to protect its freedom.

Our appraisal of the morale and capabilities
of the Government and people of South Viet-
Nam is not exclusively American. Seven mem-
bers of SEATO — all of whom have represent-
atives in South Viet-Nam — joined in saying:

The Government and people of the Republic of
Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their
determination to fight for their country.

The SEATO Coimcil also expressed its con-
fidence in the "program of political and
administrative reform, military action, pacifi-
cation, and economic and social development
recently instituted by the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam. . . ." That favorable
judgment was further reinforced in my own
mind by what I saw and heard in Viet-Nam.
General Khanh has both vigor and breadth of
view. He believes that defeating the Com-
munists requires a combination of military,
political, economic, and social programs. His
objective is not only to root out the Communists
but to improve the living standards of the
Vietnamese people.

Actually, between the end of the Indochinese
war in 1954 and 1959, South Viet-Nam made
great economic and social progress. Its
achievements left the vaunted Communist para-
dise m North Viet-Nam far behind. Almost
certainly that is why Hanoi reactivated the as-
sault on South Viet-Nam in 1959.

The Communist campaign has, of course, held
back South Viet-Nam's overall economic devel-
opment. But I saw at firsthand that progress
continues even in the midst of war. I visited
a modern synthetic textile plant and a modern
papcrmaking plant near Saigon. About 200

' See p. 726.

MAY 11, 1964

735

miles northeast of Saigon I visited a "New
Life" hamlet. This is m a relatively secure
province— and one which General Khanh de-
scribed as a "pilot province," an example of
what can and will be done elsewhere as the
Communists are rooted out. I visited also a
large dam and hydroelectric installation built
by*the Japanese as part of their reparations
ao-reement. This installation will also provide

to

water for irrigation.

I believe that economic and social develop-
ment should be accelerated in the relatively
secure areas of the country. I discussed with
General Klianh and his colleagues various ways
in which our aid program might be improved
and in which other free nations might provide
useful assistance, both military and civilian.
There is need for more people of several profes-
sions and vocations— not least, for more physi-
cians. I believe that several free nations are
prepared to send more help, both in people and
in critical materiel.

The Viet Cong have scored some gains in the
last few months. They took advantage of two
successive coups and the resultant turnovers in
•South Vietnamese administrative personnel to
increase their efforts. They recaptured some
of the more exposed strategic hamlets. They
have managed to launch a few rather large-scale
attacks, although they continue to rely chiefly
on assassinations and small assaults.

General Khanh's objective is not only to
"clear" but to "hold." With American assist-
ance, he is moving ahead with training and
equipping of local self-defense forces for vil-
lages and hamlets in the less exposed areas, thus
"releasing regular troops for offensive actions
"against the Viet Cong. He is increasing his
security forces by some 50,000 men. I believe
that his efforts are beginning to show results.

We can all take deep pride in the perform-
ance of the American military men who are
training and supporting the South Vietnamese.
We should take pride also in our civilian offi-
cials and their families, who work amid danger.
The Vietnamese people are energetic, intelli-
gent, and quick to learn. They have a great
economic potential. "Wlien they have won the
peace and security which they are fighting for,
and so fully deserve, they can become, I believe,

one of the most prosperous people in that part
of the world.

Communist Activities in Laos

In Laos, we support the Geneva agreements
of 1962 calling for a neutral, independent coun-
try. We continue to support a Government of
National Union with Prince Souvanna Phouma
as Premier. However, we recognize that the
Communist Pathet Lao and their North Viet-
namese allies have not honored the Geneva
agreements. There are still North Vietnamese
military personnel in Laos in violation of those
agreements; and they assist the Pathet Lao in
attacks on Government forces. The Commu-
nists exclude the National Government from the
areas which they control and refuse to allow
the International Control Commission to per-
form its peace supei' vision functions m those
areas. The Communists also are actively at
work trying to subvert areas mider non-Com-
munist control. And they still move men,
weapons, and other supplies from North Viet-
Nam to South Viet-Nam over the "Ho Chi Minh
trail" through Laos, in violation of the Geneva
agreements.

There could be peace in Laos and throughout
Southeast Asia if Hanoi and Peiping would
comply with existing agreements to which they
solemnly subscribed. The issue of peace is just
that simple.

Economic Failures of Communism

Everywhere that I went on this trip to South-
east Asia, my heart was wanned by the mani-
festations of friendship for the United States.
And I have had the same experience durmg the
two visits I have paid to Japan and Korea as
Secretai-y of State.

Also I have found in the Western Pacific
countries widespread recognition of the eco-
nomic failures of communism. The notion that
communism is a shortcut to the future for de-
veloping countries has been shattered by expe-
rience. Communism in China and North Viet-
Nam is not only brutal but an abysmal economic
faihire. The Soviets have done better, but their
growth rate has dropped below that of West-
ern Europe and the United States, not to men-
tion Japan. And they have developed serious

736

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

difliculties in feeding themselves. Indeed,
Conuuunist methods are a sure-fire means of
reducing farm production.

"While (\>ninuinist China and North Viet-
Xam are boggetl down in a morass of misery,
most of tlie nations of the Western Pacific con-
tinue to advance economically and socially.
Japan, which had a large industrial base be-
fore the Second World War, keeps on forging
ahead in production and living standards and
is making increasingly significant contributions
to the technical and economic advancement of
other free Asian countries. Australia and
New Zealand enjoy high living standards, of
course, and are contributing positively to both
the security and the well-being of countries to
their "Far North." The Philippines, Thai-
land, the Republic of China, and Malaysia have
made noteworthy economic progress and, as
they continue to surge forward, are able to
increase their assistance to other countries.

Despite their economic failures — indeed, per-
haps all the more because of these failures —
the Asian Communists remain dangerous.
Desperation might lead them to deeds which
rational men would shim.

The dispute between Moscow and Peiping is
partly about the means of promoting the Com-
munist world revolution. The free world must
take care not to let any Communists anywhere
suppose that they can profit from aggression
or militancy.

Most of the leaders and peoples of free Asia
know that the free nations are far stronger
than the Communist nations. In particular,
they realize the power of the United States.
What they are not always certain about is the
resolve of the free world, including the United
States, to deter or defeat aggression. They
know that the foremost Communist objective
is to get the Yankees to go home. They some-
times fear that we may, in fact, go home.

Our armed forces west of Alaska and Hawaii
number in the range of 200,000 men. We have
them there for the same reason that we have
military forces in Western Europe and else-
where: to protect the security of the United
States, which is inseparable from that of the
free world as a whole.

Our programs of military and economic as-
sistance to the free nations of Asia serve the
same end. We must take care that they are
strong enough, well enough financed, to do the
job.

On the trip from which I just returned, I
gave renewed assurances that the United States
has no intention of accommodating the Com-
munists— of assisting their campaigns for world
domination — by bringing the Yanks home. I
said that we are in the Western Pacific to stay
until that part of the world is safe for freedom.

U.S. and Japan To Exchange Data
on Use of Natural Resources

Press release 183 dated AprU 24

Secretary Rusk announced on April 24 that
Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr
will visit Japan next month to inaugurate an
exchange of information on applied science and
engineering as it relates to improved use of
natural resources.

The joint Cabinet meeting held at Tokyo last
January ^ determined that such an exchange,
proposed for the United States by Under Sec-
retary Carr, would have definite mutual
advantages.

Under Secretary Carr will meet with Vice
Minister Taro Hisada of the Japanese Science
and Technology Agency on May 12-13 at
Tokyo. Among the topics to be discussed in
this initial exchange are: (1) blending of coal
for the steel industry; (2) diversified sources
of energy, including liquefied petroleum gas
from Alaska, and solar energy; and (3) air
and water pollution.

Under Secretary Carr will be accompanied
by assistants from the Department of State,
the Department of Coimnerce, and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.

^ For test of a joint communique of the third meet-
ing of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs, see BtrLLETiN of Feb. 17,
1964, p. 235.

MAT 11, 1964

737

Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba

hy Under Secretary Ball ^

Foreign policies are rarely bom full-armed
like Minerva. More often they evolve in re-
sponse to events and circumstances.

In such cases there is a danger that the as-
sumptions on which policies are foimded may
become obscured.

This has, I think, happened to some extent
with regard to our policy toward the present
govermnent of Cuba. Some of the public dis-
cussion that has surroimded that policy has in-
volved misapprehensions on a number of
fronts — misapprehensions as to the nature of the
danger posed by the present and potential ac-
tivities of the Castro government, misapprehen-
sions as to the range of policies available to
counter that danger, and misapprehensions as
to the objectives that we can expect to accom-
plish by the policies employed.

In my observations to you this evening, I
shall try to answer some of the questions that
have arisen with regard to our Cuba policy and
shall try to clarify some of the confusion that
has been apparent in the public debate.

The Nature of the Threat

First, what is the nature of the threat imposed
by existence of a Communist regime in Cuba ?

It is not, in our judgment, a military threat to
the United States. We shall never permit it to
menace our own strategic power, as our actions
in October 1962 demonstrated. We are taking
constant and effective measures to insure that
such a threat does not occur again — and we shall
continue to take those measures.

' Address made before a convention of the Omicron
Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va., on Apr. 23 (press
release 180).

Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military
threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed
forces are large and equipped with modern
weaponry. They are by all odds the most
powerful military establishment in Latin Amer-
ica. But Cuba does not possess air- and sealift
sufficient to permit it to take offensive action
against its neighbors, and, in any event, we
maintain overwhelming military forces in the
area to prevent Cuba from attacking other
American Eepublics.

The menace of Castro communism to Latin
America is of a different and— perhaps I might
say — a more modern kind. It is the menace of
subversion, the undermining of existing govern-
ments, the arming of organized Communist mi-
norities, and the moimting of campaigns of
sabotage and terror.

Latin America, Tempting Target for Communism

Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly
vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is
greatest where social injustice is widely preva-
lent, where anachronistic societies remain dom-
inated by small elites — tight little oligarchies
that control the bulk of the productive wealth.
In some places these oligarchies have only re-
cently— and reluctantly — begun to make con-
cessions to the insistent demands of the millions
of economically submerged peoples for a meas-
ure of social justice and a decent standard of
living.

For Latin America, as has been frequently
remarked, is in the throes of a great transforma-
tion from a continent of backward societies to
a continent of new, modern nations. During
tliis period of change and tension, it offers a

788

DEP^VRTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tempting target for the Communists. They
are at least as conscious as we of the importance
jiiul woaUnpss of the area. They are at least
as deteriuined as we to see that the brew pro-
duced by the Latin American ferment is to their
liking. They have, therefore, I'egarded the es-
tablishment of a Communist government in
Cuba — a Communist Latin American state at
the very doorstep of the United States — as a
major asset for coimuunism.

Cuba, a Base for Subversion

In tlieir determination to establish a center
of subversion for Latin America in Cuba, the
Communists have found a natural lieutenant in
Fidel Castro. Castro regards himself as the
"liberator" of all Latin jVmerica. A born revo-
lutionary, driven by a hunger for power and
prestige, he looks upon the southern half of
the American Continent as a proper field for the
fulfillment of his ambitions. He seeks a revo-
lutionary millennium in which the example of
Cuba will have swept the continent, and his po-
sition of liberator and leader — not of the small
island of Cuba, but of all Latin America — will
have been assured.

This vision springs from his psychological
and political needs. It is necessary to the man
and equally to his followers, whose revolution-
ary enthusiasm must be constantly fed on the
prospect of further advance beyond the confines
of the island — an island which they look upon
as the base from which the continent-wide rev-
olution will be propagated by word and deed.

That Castro intends to extend Communist
power, and that he is actively seeking to do so,
have been clearly shown. The most recent and
dramatic evidence is the three tons of arms sent
from Cuba to Venezuelan Castroist insurgents.
As you know, an investigating committee of the
Organization of American States (OAS) was
appointed to study all aspects of this case. It
found that the evidence clearly substantiated
the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban
intervention and aggression. The committee's
report provides the basis for further collective
OAS action against Cuba, and the members
are consulting now among themselves to de-
termine the collective measures which should
be taken.

Two Principal Lines of U.S. Strategy

The United States, as the strongest nation in
the AVestern Ilemispliere, is faced with a dif-
ficult but practical problem. With the exist-
ence of a Communist center in Latin America,
how do we and our Latin American allies pre-
vent that center from being used as an active
center for Communist infection?

The most obvious and direct way to elimi-
nate the Castro regime in Cuba would be by
direct military action designed to replace the
present government by a non-Communist gov-
ernment friendly to the West. Less direct ac-
tion might take the form of an enforced block-
ade— which would still be an act of war.

At the other end of the spectrum from mili-
tary action is a policy of trying to negotiate
with Castro. Taking account of the decisions
reached within the American system, notably at
Punta del Este in January 1962 ^ and later in
October 1962,' we have consistently maintained
that two elements in the Cuban situation are not
negotiable. First, Castro's political, economic,
and military dependence upon the Soviets ; and,
second, the continuance of Castro's subversive
activities in Latin America.

We see no present evidence that Castro is pre-
pared to eliminate these two conditions — and,
in fact, the evidence thus far is all the other
way.

The limits in which we must erect a Cuban
policy are, therefore, well defined and narrow.
If, on the one hand, we do not wish to adopt
policies that involve an act of war — and even
the most vigorous critics of our Cuban policy
have rejected this course of action — and, on the
other, there seems little sign of a possibility of
serious negotiation with the present regime, we
are left with two principal lines of strategy for
dealing with the menace of Castro's Cuba to
Latin America.

First, we must take all possible measures to
strengthen the Latin American nations so that
they may, through individual and collective
means, resist Communist subversion.

Second, we must employ all available instru-

' For background, see Bdij,etin of Feb. 19, 1962,
p. 270.
'For backgrround, see ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

MAT 11, 1964

739

ments of power less than acts of war to limit
or reduce the ability of the Cuban government
to advance the Communist cause in Latin Amer-
ica through propaganda, sabotage, and subver-

sion.

Cooperative Actions of American States

To the greatest extent possible, we ai-e pur-
suing both these lines of strategy within the
framework of the inter- American system. We
have sought to make clear to our Latin Ameri-
can friends that the problem of protecting the
continent against the menace of Castro commu-
nism must be tackled by the American states as
a collective undertaking. The Organization
of American States is tlie principal instrumen-
tality for this puqiose, but we are also employ-
ing other multilateral groupings within the
inter-American family.

In January 1962, the foreign ministers of
the OAS formally found the Castro regime to
be incompatible with the inter-American sys-
tem and excluded it from further participation
in that system. The foreign ministers also ap-
proved the immediate suspension of trade with
Cuba in arms and war material.

In early October 1962, the foreign ministers
of the OAS informally met to consider the
problems arising from growing Sino-Soviet
intervention in Cuba, particularly the attempt
to convert the island into an amied base for
Communist subversive penetration of the hem-
isphere. In their conclusions, the foreign min-
isters pointed out:

1. The need for the American Republics and
all other independent countries to review their
policies on trade with Cuba, including the use
of their ships in the Cuban trade ;

2. The importance of intensifying measures
against Communist subversion;

3. The desirability of keeping a careful check
on the delivery of arms to Cuba ; and

4. The need for special studies of the transfer
of funds for subversive purposes, the flow of
subversive propaganda, and the utilization of
Cuba as a base for training in subversive tech-
niques.

The Council of the OAS subsequently di-
rected the preparation of a special study on

measures for controlling funds, propaganda,
and training for subversive purposes. The
Council sent the report, incorporating specific
and general recommendations in these three
fields, to member governments in July 1963
urging that the recommended measures be car-
ried out promptly.

Meanwhile, in April 1963, the five Central
American Republics, together with Panama and
the United States, undertook a cooperative ef-
fort to safeguard the Caribbean area against
Cuban subversive activities.^ At that meeting,
and at a subsequent second meeting in January
1964, the cooperating coimtries agreed on a se-
ries of measures to increase the security of the
countries of the area. The program includes
the control of subversive travel, funds, and
propaganda, the strengthening of security or-
ganizations, and tlie improvement of communi-
cations between national security agencies.

Following its own investigation of the re-
cently discovered Venezuelan arms cache, the
OAS is now studying additional measures for
dealing with Cuba as a base of subversion and
for policing Cuban-supported activities in
Latin America.

These cooperative actions by the American
states have shown considerable success. In
order to control movement to and from Cuba for
subversive purposes, many Latin American gov-
ernments have instituted procedures for restrict-
ing travel by their nationals to Cuba. As a
result of these measures only 50 percent as many
Latin Americans were able to travel to Cuba
during 1963 as during the preceding year.

We continue to work with individual govern-
ments to help them improve the ability of their
police and armed forces to deal with terrorism
and insurgency. The United States and Latin
American governments are also cooperating
with increasing efi'ectiveness in exchanging in-
telligence on Castroist subversion activities and
in improving communications between their
security services.

In the long run, however, Latin America will
be rendered immune to Communist infection
only by an amelioi-ation of the conditions —
political, ecoiioinic, and social — in which sub-

* Ihith. Alay 6. mo.'^. p. 719.

740

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

vei-sion flourishos. The United States and the
froe nations of Latin America have, (iierefore,
tlirongh the Alliance for Progress, uiulertalcen
a major colUvtive oH'ort. It is diriu'ted at the
amhitious target of transforming tlie structure
and productive capacity of tlie Latin American
nations so as to bring about not merely an in-
crease but a more equitable distribution of re-
sources. Given the magnitude of this under-
taking, it will be yeai-s before major results can
be acliieved. But until such a transformation is
accomplisiied, Latin America will remain a fer-
tile seedbed for Communist subversion.

Program of Economic Denial

By strengthening the Latin American nations
through collective political, economic, and mili-
tary measures we are increasing their ability to
resist subversion. But at the same time we must
actively pursue measures against Cuba to limit
its ability to subvert.

In tliis effort we are exploiting the propa-
ganda potential to the fullest. But an informa-
tion program must be regarded primarily as a
supplement to substantive policies. Given the
present limits of action, we must rely, as our
major instrument, on a systematic program of
economic denial.

This is the only policy — short of the use of
force — that gives promise of having a signifi-
cant impact on Cuba and its continuance as a
Communist base in the Western Hemisphere.
Such a program, in our judgment, can and does
work effectively to achieve objectives that are
in the manifest interest not only of the United
States and Latin America but of other free-
world nations.

Objectives of Economic Deniai Program

In discussing the effectiveness of this pro-
gram, let me make one point quite clear. We
have never contended that a program of eco-
nomic denial — short of an act of war such as
a military blockade that would cut off bloc as
well as free-world trade — is likely hy itself to
bring down the present Cuban regime. The
objectives which this program can accomplish
are more limited. They are four in number :

First, to reduce the will and ability of tlie
present Cuban regime to e.xport subversion and
violence to the other American states;

Second, to make ])lain to tlie people of Cuba
and to elements of the power structure of the
regime that the present regime cannot serve
their interests;

Third, to demon.strate to the peoples of the
American Republics that communism has no
future in the Western Hemisphere; and

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet
Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in
the Western Hemisphere.

Those are the objectives which we seek to
achieve by a program of economic denial against
Cuba. That program reflects the purpose of
the Organization of American States. In our
opinion, it is realistically designed to accom-
plish the limited but nonetheless important ob-
jectives toward which it is directed.

Cuba Vuinerable to Economic Pressure

Kconomic denial is a weapon that must be
used with great selectivity. It can never be
more effective than the economic circumstances
of the target country. A program of general
economic denial against the Soviet Union, for
example, would in the long run make little
sense, since the Soviet Union imports from the
free world only about one-half of 1 percent of
its gross national product. But Cuba presents
a wholly different situation. It is a small island
with meager natural resources and a low level of
industrial development. Prior to the Castro
regime, its imports from the free world — prin-
cipally the United States — represented more
than 30 percent of its gross national product.

Those imports were the vital elements of its
economic prosperity. They consisted princi-
pally of industrial goods and equipment, fuel,
raw materials, and foodstuff's.

Cuba's industrial installations, its power
plants, its sugar mills, its transportation equip-
ment are all of Western origin. After 5 years
Cuba's industrial plant is obsolete and rapidly
deteriorating. With no continuing supply of
spare parts, it has resorted to cannibalizing its
existing equipment.

MAT 11, 1964

729-173—64-

741

In addition, Cuba has become far more ex-
posed and vubierable to economic pressure be-
cause Castro's internal policies have driven into
exile several himdred thousand Cubans — the
managerial and professional elite. Tliere is now
a great shortage of skills, and much of the
equipment in the industrial plant is mishan-
dled. This situation has been further aggra-
vated by management decisions taken on ideo-
logical, rather than economic, grounds.

Cuba is, therefore, vulnerable to a policy of
economic denial. The proof of its vulnerability
is well illustrated by what has happened to the
Cuban economy since trade with the West was
first restricted. Today the Cuban standard of
living is some 20 percent below pre-Castro
levels. Such statistics, of course, do not tell
the complete story because many essential items
are rationed and many imported items, such as
fresh fruits and canned goods, have almost dis-
appeared. The Cuban people are allowed, for
example, two bars of soap per person per month,
three pounds of meat per person per month,
and six oimces of coffee per person per month —
when they can get them.

Industrial output, which accounts for less
than 25 percent of the gross national product,
has remained stagnant. Quality has frequently
been sacrificed to maintain the volume of pro-
duction. In many industries output is shoddy,
centralized operations inefficient, and labor
productivity extremely low, in large part be-
cause of lack of morale and incentive. Plants
and machinery are often idle owing to a lack
of spare parts or raw materials, and break-
downs in water, power, and transport exacer-
bate the general disorganization.

Cuban sugar production — the basis of the
entire economy — has fallen drastically. Last
year's production of 3.8 million tons was the
lowest since the early 1940's, and the crop for
this year will probably be near the same figure.

With the curtailment of free-world trade,
exports have fallen drastically — from more
than $800 million in 1958 to less than $500 mil-
lion in 1963. The lines of trade have been com-
pletely redrawn. In 1958, substantially all im-
ports came from free- world sources; last year,
85 percent came from the bloc. It is perhaps
pertinent to point out that Cuban exports to
Latin America fell from $24 million in 1953 to

an estimated $8 million in 1962, while Latin
American exports to Cuba fell from $78 million
in 1958 to an estimated $6.7 million in 1962.

Restrictions on Shipping and on Vital Goods

In order to exploit Cuba's economic vulnera-
bility we have developed programs of common
action on two levels :

First, to restrict the availability of free-
world shipping to Cuba ;

Second, to limit the categories of goods that
may be available to Cuba.

In order to make these policies effective, we
have sought the cooperation of the other major
industrialized coxmtries of the free world, and
particularly our NATO allies. We have ob-
tained considerable, although not complete,
cooperation.

For example, the number of calls by free-
world vessels at Cuban ports dropped 60 per-
cent in 1963 as compared to 1962, and there are
reasonable prospects that, over 1964 as a whole,
there will be a further drop.

Realistically, we must recognize that the re-
striction of free- world shipping, while useful, is
of only limited utility. Shipping under the
control of the bloc could transport the goods
that Cuba requires, although at the cost of a
considerable reorganization and disruption of
schedules and charters.

Much more important is the denial of those
categories of goods that are most vital to the
opei-ation of the Cuban economy. This in-
cludes industrial goods, transport equipment,
and critical materials. Not only is Cuba wholly
dependent on a large and continuing import of
consumer goods if it is to maintain more than
a subsistence economy, but its limited industrial
plant, including the sugar industry, is based on
Western equipment that is rajiidly becoming
worn out and obsolete and on Western trans-
port equipment that is rapidly falling apart. It
is important, therefore, that the West sliould
not bolster the economy by providing spare
parts and replacements.

This was the reason, for example, tliat the
administration took sucli a strong position
against the recent sale of 450 buses to the Castro
government- — 400 of wliicli are to be used in
Habana. Those 400 additional buses will al-

742

DEP^UITMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

most double available public transport in the
city that dominates Cuba's economic life.
Without those buses the efficiency of the Cuban
economy and the level of Cuban morale would
bo further impaired.

The sale of Western locomotives to Cuba, for
instance, would have an even {j:reater impact.
Movement of su<?ar to Cuban ports is almost
entirely by rail, and the motive power of the
Cuban railroad system is presently in a critical
state of disrepair. In a late 1963 description
of the "desperate state" of the railroad system,
a Cuban official organ estimated that only one-
quarter as many locomotives were then in op-
erating condition as in 1959. To replace even
a part of this equipment would be a very big
boon to the Cuban economy.

The position of our Government in seeking
to prevent the sale of such heavy equipment to
the Cuban regime has, unfortunately, not al-
ways been fully understood either in the United
States or by some of our friends abroad. The
question has frequently been confused by the
curious contention that the sale of United States
wheat to the Soviet Union somehow justifies the
sale of critical supplies to Cuba. Such an argu-
ment betrays a misunderstanding of the nature
and objectives of the program of economic de-
nial which I have attempted to describe tliis
evening.

As I mentioned earlier, the continent-wide
economy of the Soviet Union, which in many
ways approaches self-sufficiency, is far less vul-
nerable to economic denial than that of Cuba.
There would be no point in trying to influence
Soviet strength or Soviet policy by a general
effort to deny exports to that country. All that
has ever been attempted is a selective program
of denying access primarily to strategic goods.

The United States has long had a modest
trade in agricultural products with the Soviet
Union. The special aspect of the wheat sale
was its unusual size and character. The Soviet
Union has been traditionally an exporter of
wheat, and before approaching the United
States it had already contracted the bulk of its
wheat import requirements from Canada and
Australia. Purchases from United States were,
from the Soviet point of view, marginal. Even
the 214 million tons originally discussed would

have totaled only about 3i^ percent of normal
Soviet bread grain production.

Under these circumstances it is quite clear
that the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in-
volved considerations quit« unrelated to those
involved in tlie denial of economic goods and
other capital equipment to Cuba. Thus any
sale of wheat to the Soviet Union was not of
great importance to the Soviet economy and of
slight importance to the food stocks of the
Soviet people. But our denial of industrial and
transport equipment and spare parts to Cuba
can mean a serious impairment in the state of
the Cuban economy.

Oddly enough, these two quite distinct ques-
tions have been confused — sometimes, I fear,
deliberately — by people holding quite disparate
views — by those in Europe who would like to
find an excuse to sell heavy equipment to Cuba
and by those in America who would like to find
a basis for attacking the wheat sale. An ob-
jective comparison of these two situations re-
veals the emptiness of the argument.

Cuban Economic Failure

In the course of my observations this eve-
ning, I have tried to spell out for you the bases
for our policy toward Cuba and to explain par-
ticularly the reasons why we are seeking — and
shall continue to seek — to limit the supply of
critical goods to the Cuban economy.

This program is directed at the present Cuban
government. It will be continued so long as
that government persists in its efforts to subvert
and undermine the free societies of Latin
America.

Within recent weeks it has become more than
ever apparent that our program is succeeding.
Cuba under communism is providing a spectacle
of economic failure for all to see. Far from of-
fering a better life for the Cuban people, com-
munism is bringing only depression and want.

Today the Cuban economy is in a mess — a
mess produced by incompetent management,
ideological interference, and the refusal of the
United States and many other Western socie-
ties to deal with a government that is seeking
to undermine its neighbors.

The magnitude of the Cuban economic failure
is clearly apparent in the constant complaints of
the present Cuban leaders.

MAT 11, 1964

743

But if our program of economic denial is
helping to accentuate the failures of the Cuban
economy, let me make it quite clear that it is
not aimed at the Cuban people. The United
States has no quarrel with the people of Cuba.
It feels no animosity, only sympathy and sor-
row. We have shown our good will by exempt-
ins food and medicines from tlie restrictions im-
posed on our trade with Cuba. "We have never
sought in any way to starve the Cuban people.

For we are confident that the people of Cuba
will not always be compelled to suffer under
Communist tyranny.

Given freedom and democracy, Cuba could
develop its high potential for economic and
social progress. The Cuban people should not
be forced to serve as a vehicle for the intrusion
into this hemisphere of an alien way of life that
can bring them neither progress nor liberty.
Let one final point be clear. We oppose the
present Cuban regime not just because its am-
bitions menace our hemispheric neighbors. We
oppose it, above all, because its standards of
conduct and its tyrannical practices condemn
the people of Cuba to misery and fear.

The people of Cuba deserve better than that.

Second, I would point out that the surveil-
lance flights are thoroughly based on the resolu-
tion approved by the OAS [Organization of
American States] on October 23, 1962.^

Tliird, I would remind you of the various
statements made by the late President Kennedy
and by Secretary Rusk during the past 15
months on this subject, making it unmistakably
clear that we regard the overflights as a neces-
sity to avoid the deception which was practiced
against us in 1962.

Fourth, I would recall that Secretary Rusk
said, in March a year ago : "If there were any
interruption with our surveillance . . . that
could create a very dangerous situation." ^

Our publicly expressed position on this ques-
tion remains unchanged.

Statement by President Johnson, April 21

I do think that it is essential that we main-
tain surveillance and know whether any mis-
siles are being shipped into Cuba. We will
have to maintain our reconnaissance and our
overflights. Any action on their part to stop
that would be a very serious action. We have
so informed them and informed their friends.

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba
Remains Unchanged

Following is a statement Tnade l>y Rieh/ird I.
Phillips, Director of the Office of News, on
AfHl 20 in response to a query from a news
correspondent regarding surveillance flights
over Cuba, together with a statement mxide hy
President Johnson on the following day dur-
ing a question-and-answer period at a meeting
at the White House with a group of editors and
hroadcasters}

Statement by Mr. Phillips, April 20

First, I would recall that the overflights are
a substitute for the on-site inspection agreed to
by the Soviets in October 1962, but which Fidel
Castro refused to permit.

' For an excerpt from remarks made by the Presi-
dent to the editors and broadcasters on Apr. 21, see p.
746.

Defense, AEC Report to President
on Test Ban Treaty Safeguards

White House press releas* dated April 20
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The White House today [April 20] released
the text of a letter from Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara and Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg,
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
reporting their conclusions following a joint
review conducted by the Department of Defense
and the Atomic Energy Commission of the
status of progress during the past 8 months
on the implementalion of the limited test ban
treaty safeguards recommended by the Joint

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722.
"/6ief., Apr. 1,1963, p. 467.

744

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Chiefs of Staff, and approved by the late Pres-
ident Kennedy.

In releasing this letter, the President reem-
phasizcd the statement ho made today in a
speech before the Associated Press ^ that his
administration is committed to tlie policy first
expressed in the four points in President Ken-
nedy's letter to Senators [Mike] Mansfield and
[Everett M.] Dirksen on September 11, 1963.=
These four points were restated in the McNa-
mara-Seaborg letter released today.

The President also pointed out that while
an adequate underground testing program is.
under present circumstances, essential to our
national security, the United States continues
to be alert to possibilities for the relaxation of
tensions and the building of a permanent peace.
Although we are testing nuclear weapons as
now permitted by the limited test ban treaty,
we still support a complete cessation of all test-
ing of nuclear weapons accompanied by an ade-
quate system of inspection to insure both sides
against violations. The United States Gov-
ernment is ready at any time to negotiate a
treaty providing for such a comprehensive test
ban.

TEXT OF DEFENSE-AEC LETTER

Apeil 16, 1964

Deab Mb. President: The Department of Defense
and the Atomic Energy Commission have reviewed the
status of our joint progress on the implementation
of the limited test ban treaty safeguards recommended
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President
Kennedy.

The status of implementation of the safeguards is
as follows :

Safeguard 1

"The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and
continuing underground nuclear test programs de-
signed to add to our knowledge and improve our
weapons in all areas of significance to our military
posture for the future."

In the eight months since the signing of the lim-
ited test ban treaty, the United States has announced
a total of 20 underground detonations. The test pro-
gram has in fact been more extensive than this since
it has been and will continue to be the policy that the

' See p. 726.

" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496.

AEG will not announce all detonations at the Nevada
Test Site.

Important information has been obtained on new
weapons designs and weapons effects. The hlRhest
yield nuclear device ever detonated in the continental
United States was lired underground ut the Nevada
Test Site. Weapons effects tests have been carried
out underground and others are being planned and
prepared.

Safeguard 2

"The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory
facilities and programs in theoretical and explora-
tory nuclear technology whicli will attract, retain
and insure the continued application of our human
scientific resources to these programs on which con-
tinued progress in nuclear technology deiwnds."

During Fiscal Year 1964, the AEG and DoD will

spend about $350 million on weapons development and
effects laboratory research. During this period, over
$25 million will be expended on improvements of AEG
nuclear laboratory facilities. Technical programs are
being maintained at a high level to meet military re-
quirements and increased effort is being placed on re-
search and development programs to gain more
fundamental knowledge in nuclear weapons technology.
Program adjustments are underway in the Depart-
ment of Defense weapons effects laboratories. These
adjustments are designed to emphasize development
of improved laboratory simxilation and analytical ap-
proaches to weapons effects problems, as well as full
exploitation of underground testing.

Safeguard S

"The maintenance of the facilities and resources
necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the
atmosphere should they be deemed es.sential to our
national security or should the treaty or any of its
terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union."

The DoD and AEG are proceeding, on schedule,
with the development of a capability "to institute
promptly nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere"
on minimum reaction times. As of January 1, 1965,
the United States will have the capability to proceed
with: (a) tests to verify designs of stockpile weapons
within two months ; (b) tests of entire nuclear weapons
systems, including delivery vehicles, missile and nu-
clear warhead proof tests within two months; (c)
tests of experimental devices designed to explore new
concepts of nuclear weapons technology within three
months; and (d) tests relating to military effects of
nuclear detonations within a period of six to nine
months.

Safeguard 4

"The improvement of our capability, within feasi-
ble and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the
treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our
knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabili-
ties, and achievements."

MAT 11, 1964

745

The Atomic Energy Detection System is being aug-
mented to improve our capability to monitor at-
mosplierie tests by other countries and to improve
our identification ability at higher altitudes. Studies
are continuing in ways and means to improve detec-
tion techniques and systems for both underground and
space shots. The detonations at the Nevada Test Site
are providing valuable information to Improve tech-
niques for detection of underground nuclear shots. A
nuclear experiment designed specifically to provide
data for improvement of underground detection sys-
tems was executed on October 26, 1963, near Fallon,
Nevada. Construction is proceeding for other experi-

ments designed to investigate the phenomenology of
underground detonations. In mid-October 1963 an
Atlas Agena rocket successfully placed into orbit two
instrumented satellites designed for the detection of
nuclear explosions in deep space. Work is continuing
on ground based detectors of nuclear explosions in
space.

We will be pleased to discuss any aspects of these
programs at your convenience.
Respectfully yours,

RoBEBT S. McNamaba, Secretary of Defence
Glenn T. Seabobq, Chairman, Atomic Etn-
ergy Commission

The Local Community and World Affairs

Remarks by President Johnson. '

I would like to talk to you about one area in
which Me can see with some cei-tainty the shape
of things to come. That is the fight against
poverty around the world. We are waging an
all-out war against poverty here at home. We
are committed to pursue that war to final vic-
tory. But we are also engaged in that same
battle on 100 different fronts around the world,
in 100 or more nations.

We do this for two reasons: First, for the
first time in history, man has the real power to
overcome poverty. We have proved that by
the wise application of modern teclinology.
The determined labor of skilled men and women
can ultimately produce enough food and cloth-
ing and shelter for all mankind. The possession
of new abilities gives us new responsibilities,
and we want to live up to those responsibilities.
That is our Christian duty.

Second, we now know that the progress which

' Excerpt from remarks made by the President on
Apr. 21 in the flower garden at the White House be-
fore a group of editors and broadcasters attending a
2-day foreign policy conference at the Department of
State. For complete text, see White House press re-
lease dated Apr. 21.

others make in satisfying their own desire for
a better life will ultimately affect our o^vn fu-
ture and our own prospects, for we are now a
part of a single world community and you no
longer can confine your activities or your in-
fluence to your local county seat. Names such
as Saigon, Rio, and the Congo once stirred only
thoughts of romantic adventure and great,
mysterious distance, but today, as we meet here,
we follow the events of those capitals with a
close concern based on the knowledge that what
happens there today will surely affect our action
and our hopes here tomorrow.

That is whj' you and I have a special respon-
sibility to explain the problems of the develop-
ing world abroad to the American people at
home. We must do better than we have done
in explaining why our children's welfare and
the welfare of our country may well depend on
the wisdom and the foresiglit that we show in
working with the people of other lands. To
do this, we must first understand clearly how
most of the people of the world live.

I discussed in New York yesterday ^ — and it
took me 41 minutes to complete it — just a brief

' See p. 726.

746

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

description of the problems that exist in cer-
tain areas of the world. Only by doing so can
we truly understand the marvel of our own
•rood fortune in this country.
1 On three continents, in dozens of countries,
hundreds of millions of people stniggle to exist
on incomes of little more than a dollar a week.
In the 112 or more nations, only C of them
liave an income of as much as $80 a month:
Sweden and Switzerland, Australia and New
Zealand, Canada and the United States. Here
we ought to get down on our knees every night
and thank the good Lord for our blessings,
that our income can be more than $200 a month,
when more than two-tliirds of the people of
the world have less than $8 a month. These
people have less to spend each day on food and
on shelter and on clothing, on medicine, on all
of their needs, than the average American
spends at his comer drugstore for a package of
cigarettes. They live in rundown country
shacks of tar paper. They live in city slums.
They live without heat, water, or sanitation of
any kind.

Their children have no schools to go to.
They have no doctors or hospitals to attend.
Their life expectancy is somewhere between
35 and 40 years of age. Worst of all, many of
them live without any hope at all. They see no
escape from the ancient cycle of misery and
despair.

These are not new conditions. Poverty, hun-
ger, and disease are afflictions as old as man
himself. But in our time and in this age there
lias been a change. The change is not so much
in the realities of life but in the hopes and the
expectations of the future. If a peaceful revo-
lution in these areas is impossible, a violent
revolution is inevitable.

We who stand here in peace and security
and prosperity must realize that we are greatly
outnumbered in this world, more than 17 to 1
in population, in area, in race, in religion, in
color. You take any criteria and measure your-
self by that standard, and you will find that we
are in a very small minority.

I sat here the other day and talked to a
most prosperous American. He came to tell
nie of the successes in this country whei-e he owns
more than a million acres of land, to discuss

the 100,000- acre ranch that he once owned in
Cuba — that he once owned in Cuba. So to-
day, as we meet here, we must realize that these
young, teeming masses are determined to have
some of the better things of life. I stood in
an African hut on another continent not many
months ago, and I saw a mother with a baby
on her breast, one in her stomach, and one on
her back, and eight on the floor, in this adobe
hut. I thought of my own mother and the trials
that she had raising her family. As I looked
into this African mother's eyes, I saw the same
look in that mother's eyes that I saw in my
own mother's eyes when she was determined
that her children would have food, clothes, and
an education.

You hear me when I tell you that in the world
we are outnumbered 17 to 1, but these numbers,
these masses of humanity, are either going to
make a peaceful revolution possible or they are
going to make a violent revolution inevitable.
All you have to do is turn on the television and
see the young student riots in nation after na-
tion. So the television and the radio sets, the
wonders of communication, to us are delightful
instruments of pleasure, and to some of us they
are important aids to business. But they have
become the instruments of revolution in the rest
of the world.

The shrinking of distances, the ready access
to information about other countries and other
people, have made these folks aware that a bet-
ter life may be within their grasp, and a better
life is possible. They now know that the condi-
tions that their fathers accepted with weary
resignation are no longer inevitable. They
know now that depression and despair are not
the ordained lot of man.

This knowledge has helped create the world-
wide boom of vast portent which we know as
the revolution of rising expectations. The
meaning of this revolution is very simple: It
means that people in the rest of the world want
for themselves the same things that you and I
want for our loved ones, for our friends, and
for our children, and that most of us already
have. They intend that their families shall live
a decent life and that they have a job that gives
them survival and dignity. They intend that
their children shall be taught to read and to
write. They intend that the himgry shall be

MAT 11, 1964

747

fed and the sick shall be treated. Thev intend
to take their place in the great movement of
modern society, to take their sliare in the benefits
of that society.

These just desires, once unleaslied, can never
again be stifled. The people of the developing
world are on the march, and we want to be be-
side them on that march.

I can think of nothing that would give me
more satisfaction than the knowledge that I
could beUeve that you wielders of the pen and
you molders of opinion, you leaders in public
life, could take your stand this morning on the
side of preserA-ing humanity and uplifting it
throughout the world.

Our gross national product in this, the rich-
est of all nations, this quarter, is running at the
rate of 860S.5 billion— $60S billion. We are ask-
ing to distribute m the form of help, aid, and
military assistance to aU the nations who want
to have fi'eedom less than one-half of 1 percent
of that amount — $3.4 billion. But because
of what we call it, and because of how it has
been administered, and because it is far away,
we don't realize that tliis investment is not only
one of the most Christian acts that this great,
powerful, rich coimtry coidd do but it is an
act of necessity if we are to preserve our image
in the world and our leadership in the world
and, most of all, our society.

Oh, how I would like to feel that we could,
here in this rose garden today, laimch a new
movement to develop a gi'eater society, a better
society in all the world, not only by driving
poverty from our midst here at home — it was
one-third of the ill-fed, iD-clad, and ill-housed
when Mr. Eoosevelt was here, and today we
have it down to one-fifth — but that we could
drive that one-fifth into the basements and pull
a better cover over the land, and we could also
make some steps to developing taxpayers in-
stead of just tax e;\ters, and helping others help
themselves, following the Golden Rule not only
at home but abroad, saying to these 112 nations,
"We are going to do unto you as we would have
you do unto us if our positions were reversed."

We must help developing countries because
our own welfare demands it. It takes no great
gift of foresight to realize that unless there is
progress and unless there is growmg satisfac-

tion of just desires, there will be discontent and
there will be restlessness. The developing
world would soon become a cauldron of violence,
hatred, and revolution without some assistance.
How would you feel if you were a member of
a family whose total income was less than $80
per year? Yet a majority of the people of
the world have incomes of less than $S0 a year.
Under such conditions, commmiism, with its
false and easy promises of a magic formula,
might well be able to transform these popular
desires into an instrument of revolution. That
is wliy every American who is concerned about
the future of his comitry must also be concerned
about the future of Africa, Asia, and our old
friends in Latin America.

Xo President who looks beyond the immedi-
ate problems which crowd liis desk can fail to
extend the hand and the heart of this country
to those who are struggling elsewhere. We
help these cotmtries in many ways, tlirough
trade and raw materials and manufactures,
with the Peace Corps now workmg in more
than -10 of them, through programs of economic
assistance, through the exchange of scholars
and students and ideas.

We know that we have much to gain from
them. We know that we can learn from their
cultures, from their arts, from their traditions,
for many of them are as rich in spiritual treas-
ure as they are poor in material goods. These
are government programs, but it is also im-
portant for cities and towns, for private orga-
nizations and private individuals, to become
interested and involved in the affairs of the
world.

So I hope you will make this one of your first
orders of business when you return to your
homes. You can do this in many ways. Your
communities can establish direct contact with
commimities in other countries. You can ar-
range for exchange of visits. You can arninge
for help to schools and hospitals in a similar
conmiimity, in a sister country, in a developing
land. You can try and establish scholarships
to bring deserving students to your local col-
lege or to your local high school for education.
You can arrange programs of study and discus-
sion about the problems of these other countries
that a good manv of vour folks have not read

748

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BXTLLETIS

about or studied about. You can conduct ex-
hibits or perfonuiinces of tlie arts and music,
folklore, of others.

These are just a few examples of the multi-
tude of ix)ssibilities which are open to those
who are willing to assume a personal responsi-
bilit}' for America's interest in the rest of the
world. We must never forget that concern and
sympathy are often as important as material
assistance. This must not be a patronizing
concern, but it must be the concern of equal for
equal, the concern of brother for brother.

As you all know from our own experience,
people everj'where are as hungrj- for respect
as they are hungry for bread. I hope you will
explain this to your people, and, as leaders
of local opinion, I hope you can begin to shape
in your local communities a fruitful collabora-
tion between your people and the peoples of
the lands. You are a part of the world. You
are going to live in it. There are societies in
other lands that are now venturing to take the
same step that your colonial forefathers took,
your revolutionary forefathers took, when they
brought into existence this, the most powerful
of all nations.

America's great strength in world affairs is
not in Washington. It rests on dedicated la-
bor of the private institutions. It rests on or-
ganizations and local governments. It rests on
the leaders and molders of public opinion, of
wliich you are a substantial part. If we can
summon that strength to our relations with the
developing world, then we will have a weapon
which our adversaries cannot ever hope to
match. Then, and only then, will all Ameri-
cans be proudly joined in a great adventure
which unites the highest of our national ideals
and the most important of our national needs.

If I can leave one hope and one wish with
you, it would be as a result of your visit here
and of your study and application of what you
have learned in your discussions, that upon
your return home you could put the spotlight
of j-our own community on the spotlight of
other communities in the world, and somewhere
out yonder you could lend a helping hand to lift
up and to lead a people who are not as fortunate
as we are. I believe that that would give you
and your commimity a satisfaction that will
never come from a paycheck.

I think fhat. if you can provide that leader-
ship, America will not only contiinie to l)e the
leader of the world but we will be justified in
being the leader of the world. But if we sit
here just enjoying our material resources, if we
are content to become fat and flabby at 50, and
let the rest of the world go by, the time will not
be far away when we will be hearing a knock
on our door in the middle of the night and we
will be hearing voices clamoring for freedom,
independence, food, and shelter, just as our rev-
olutionary forefathers clamored for it.

President Greets Public Advisory
Committee for Trade Negotiations

Remarks by President Johnson '

Governor Herter, ladies and gentlemen:
Wlien Governor Herter explained this meeting
to me and asked that we schedule it, he kept
assuring me that his party would be small, and
I was tempted to tell the Governor that, next
to seeing him personally, few things would make
me happier than to be sure that his party really
was small — his Republican Party.

I am sure that all of you appreciate, as I do,
that you are privileged to work with one of the
most able and respected public men of our time,
in the person of Christian Herter.^ He is set-
ting an inspiring example of imselfish devotion
to duty in his present labors, as he has ever since
I have known him, and that has been a good
many years.

The country is no less in the debt of each of
you for your own public-spirited participation
in this undertaking which is so much in our na-
tional interest and which I think is so much in
the interest of the free world. As a legislator
long before I became a public executive, I am
always mindful of the wisdom of a great Eng-
lislunan's observation, and that observation was

' Made in the flower garden at the White House on
Apr. 21 CWhite House pres-s release) ; for an Execu-
tive order establishing the Committee, see Bclletin
of Mar. .30. 1964, p. .506 ; for names of the Committee
members, see White House press relea.se dated Mar. 2.

' Mr. Herter is the President's Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations.

MAY 11, 1964

749

that free trade, one of the greatest blessings
which a government can confer upon a people,
is in almost every country unpopular.

I know, and I think you know, how far we in
the United States have come toward a mature
and toward a rational understanding of the op-
portunities which trade presents for the build-
ing of the kind of a world that men want. The
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will endure as one
of the greatest monuments to President Ken-
nedy's leadership — and how difficult it was to
pass that act, and how long and faithfully he
worked on it ! But it will also stand as a mile-
stone to the progress of popular understanding
among business, labor, and agriculture.

I hope that our friends in other lands will
neither underestimate nor undervalue the
strength of American sujiport for success of
the trade negotiations that we have entered.
That act 2 years ago was made possible by the
kind of unselfish and nonpartisan public sup-
port that you are providing again now. We
are going to greatly need your advice and your
counsel and, most of all, your real help. The
negotiations will be lengthy, and, of course, they
will be complex. They will be difficult at all
times. But as we believe the cause is worthy,
we know that the gains can be great.

I look forward with a certain amount of
prudent optimism to the round of negotiations
which the 1962 act by our Congress has made
possible. Of course, we will need to be patient
and persistent. We will need at all times, of
course, to be firm. We are willing to offer our
free-world friends access to American markets,
but we expect and we must have access to their
markets also. Tliat applies to our agricultural
as well as our industrial exports.

The United States will enter into no ultimate
agreement unless progress is registered toward
trade liberalization on the products of our farms
as well as our factories. These negotiations are
not the kind in which some nations need lose
because others gain. Their success will be to
the advantage of all. The opportunity, there-
fore, is here to build a partnership for progress
among the free-world industrial nations and

then between them and the developing nations.
We mean to fully explore that opportunity,
and we mean to fully pursue it.

At home we are moving to eliminate the causes
of poverty among all Americans. In the world
we believe that a long step can be taken toward
a victory over that poverty everywhere if free
nations will only work together for a victory
over the obstacles to free trade.

This morning it is somewhat dampened by the
atmosphere, but let me say to each of you, and
to Governor Herter in particular, that I express
the gratitude of the American people to you for
lending your hand to the laying of this most im-
portant cornerstone for what we all hope in the
days to come will be a much better world, a
world where peace endures and where prosperity
is present.

I am sorry that we have inclement weather.
I would like to %asit with you longer. But 1
do want you to know from the bottom of my
heart that we feel deeply in your debt for the
contribution j'ou have made. We look forward
with great anticipation to the fruits of your
efforts.

Thank you.

Private Committee To Help Find
Embassy Sites in Washington

The Department of State announced on
April 20 (press release 175) that the Depart-
ment and the D.C. Board of Commissioners
have asked Garfield I. Kass, a Washington
builder and developer, to form a committee ^
to assist in finding sites in the Nation's Capital
where foreign government chanceries and other
foreign government offices may be established
in the future without legal impediments or pub-
lic controversy. The Department will main-
tain liaison with the private committee through
Pedro A. Sanjuan, Director of Special Repre-
sentational Services.

' For names of the members of the committee, see
Department of State press release 1S5 dated Apr. 24.

760

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

African Issues at the United Nations

hy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretanj for African Affairs ^

Almost exactly 1 j-ear ago, I spoke to the
Collegiate Council for the United Nations at
the University of Maryland. In that talk, I
listed six principal African aspirations:

1. freedom and independence from colonial
rule ;

2. personal and national dignity on the same
basis as other peoples of the -vvorld ;

3. improved standards of living;

4. African imity ;

5. nonalinement in the confrontation of great
powers ; and

6. an increasingly important African role in
the United Nations.

These remain the chief African aspirations.
Much still remains to be done before they can be
satisfactorily realized. But in even so short
a period as a year, significant progress has been
made toward their attainment.

During the past year two more African na-
tions, Kenya and Zanzibar, achieved independ-
ence and became members of the United Nations,
raising the total African membership to 35.
Two other nations, Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia (to be known as Malawi and Zambia) ,
are scheduled to become independent later this
year. Thus there has been and continues to be
progress toward the overriding African goal of
independence for all African peoples. There
remain, however, several territories, mainly in
southern Africa, where the path to self-determi-
nation for the majority of the population is

' Address made before the fourth annual leadership
institute of the Collegiate Council for the United Na-
tions at Chicago, 111., on Apr. 18 (press release 170
dated Apr. 17).

strewn with difficulties, where race relations
are increasingly embittered, and where the fu-
ture is obscure.

It is harder to measure progress toward the
second African goal of personal and national
dignity. However, the increasingly active role
African leaders are playing in the councils of
the world suggests that there may have been
more progress in this field than we generally
realize. This new African prominence in
world affairs is focusing on areas of resistance
to progress in human relations. Thus, for the
Africans, any sense of progress on the world
stage is marred by the ever harsher application
of the doctrine of apartheid to their brothers
in South Africa. In fact, the shadow of this
problem falls on those who believe in human
dignity everywhere.

The improvement of living standards is a
long-term process and involves ever-rising ex-
pectations. "Wliile we do not have adequate fig-
ures yet for 19G3, there has been a generally
rising trend in the indications of economic
progress in Africa for the past few years. Afri-
can exports, for example, rose by 42 percent be-
tween 1952 and 1961. Between 1957 and 1961
the gross national product of Liberia rose an-
nually by 5.3 percent, of Ethiopia by 4.8 per-
cent, of Sudan by 4.5 percent, and of Nigeria
by 3.8 percent. Technical assistance and eco-
nomic aid projects that are contributing or will
contribute to better living for many Africans
could be cited in practically every African coim-
try. But the gap between living standards in the
developed and less developed countries remains
enormous.

MAY 11, 1964

751

Both we. and the Africans must do all we can
to reduce this gap. Moreover, such U.N. instru-
mentalities as the World Health Organization,
the Economic Commission for Africa, the Spe-
cial Fund, and the U.N. Technical Assistance
Progi-am have a continuing significant contri-
bution to make.

Organization of African Unity

Africans are keenly aware that their needs
are great and their individual resources are
small. They know that only by combining their
efforts and working together will they achieve
the best jiossible rate of progress and security.
Visible progress toward this desirable goal of
African unity clearly was made during the past
year. This is not to say it is around the corner.
But there have been some truly remarkable
accomplishments recently in the field of inter-
African cooperation. The continent-wide Orga-
nization of African Unity, formed only last
May, has successfully weathered its first serious
tests. OAU has played a prominent role in set-
tling disputes between Algeria and Morocco
and between Ethiopia and Somalia, although
the latter is not yet fully resolved. The im-
portant point, however, is that these disputes
have been dealt with by Africans themselves
tlirough their own organization. They have de-
veloped political machinery which has helped
to dampen down threatening international con-
flicts and which provides hope for negotiated
solutions without extracontinental interven-
tion.

Progress toward the African goal of non-
alinement is somewhat more difficult to evalu-
ate, particularly for an American. But in the
sense of remaining free from outside domina-
tion, this aspiration generally has been achieved
in Africa. There are threats — occasionally
serious threats — to the preservation of this kind
of freedom in some African areas. Overall,
however, there is a growing awareness of such
threats and a general determination to safe-
guard new-found freedoms from foreign ideolo-
gies.

The sixth goal I listed last year was Africa's
desire to play an increasingly active role in a
strong and efficacious United Nations. Here,
too, there lias been progress in the past 12

months. Anyone who has observed recent ses-
sions of the U.N. General Assembly in action
has no doubt about the important part being
played by Africans. For example, they played a
key role in obtaining a 6-month extension of
U.N. forces in the Congo on a satisfactory basis.
In addition, the majority of African states op-
posed the Soviets' troika proposals for reor-
ganizing and weakening the U.N. Secretariat.
A majority also voted against replacing the
representatives of the Republic of China with
those of the Chinese Communist regime in the
United Nations.

Their prominence is not merely a question of
numbers, although African states now comprise
almost one-tliird of U.N. membership — 35 of 113
members. Nor is it simply a question of their
being active and vocal, although they are fre-
quently both. Rather, it is a question of their
faith in the United Nations as an effective in-
strument for peaceful change. They are con-
vinced that the United Nations is important to
world progress, and they seek to make maximum
use of the U.N. to achieve their aspirations. It
is, in fact, a measure of their responsibility that
they place major emphasis on petitioning the
world organization to bring about changes they
feel deeply about. This is one of the many rea-
sons why the United States is one of the strong-
est supporters of the United Nations.

Southern Rhodesia; Portuguese Territories

At the same time, I would not suggest that
we always see eye to eye with Africans in the
U.N. On the basic goals of self-determination
and human dignity, we are in agreement. On
matters of method and timing, we sometimes
differ. The global range of our interests and re-
sponsibilities makes the formulation of our
policy on any matter a complex process — a proc-
ess in which we must find the best possible ac-
commodation among our differing and even con-
flicting national interests, the interests of our
friends, and those of our opponents.

Take the Southern Rhodesia question, for ex-
ample. The African nations are gravely con-
cerned about the situation there and its poten-
tial for severe trouble. Britain, too, is greatly
disturbed by the trouble inlierent in the Southern
Rhodesia problem. And so is t he United States.

752

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The possibility of anotlicr indopoiuleiit country
in soutliern Africa controlitHl by a relatively
small white minority, in which the overwhelm-
ing African majority is without adequate rep-
i-esentation, legitimately arouses ilie apprehen-
sions of everyone concerned with the peaceful
and harmonious development of that ]);irt. of
the world.

But tlie Southern Rhodesian question is
clearly the kind of problem that is best solved
by the principals themselves. There is a need
for agreement to be reached among the various
elements of the Southern Khodesian population
through consultation, negotiation, and agree-
ment.

But what can and should the U.X. do about it?
Should the U.N. call for an immediate con-
stitutional conference in Southern Rhodesia to
arrange for majority rule based on miiversal
adult suffrage and tix an early date for inde-
pendence? Or might such a categorical blue-
print actually prevent European and African
leaders from getting together to talk about
their political future? As U.S. Ambassador
Sidney Yates said recently in the U.N.'s coloni-
alism committee: - "We are all in favor of con-
stitutional changes; the question is how best
to get them." Ambassador Yates went on to
suggest "exploratory conversations" between the
parties as a practical step forward. The com-
mittee majority, however, preferred to press
for an immediate constitutional conference, and
the United States had to abstain on the conmiit-
te«'s resolution. Clearly, this approach does
not attempt to reconcile the conflicting inter-
ests that should work together to give the
people of Southern Rhodesia the kind of gov-
ernment to which they are entitled.

The Portuguese territories in southern Africa,
where there is both potential and actual trou-
ble, are another difficult problem. Africans in
those areas feel increasingly frustrated in their
efforts to achieve political expression. The
United Nations says these people should have
the right to self-determination. The United

' For text of a statement made by Mr. Yates on Mar.
12, 1964. before the Special Committee on the Situation
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declara-
tion on the GrantinK of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, see U.S./U.N. press release 4372.

States fully agrees. And, in its own particidar
way, so does Portugal. Then what is the prob-
lem i

In those territories the problem is a little more
complex than differences on method and timing.
It is also a question of an agreed definition of
the goal. In principle, of course, self-determi-
nation is simply a people's free choice of political
institutions. The African nations recognize this
principle but cannot conceive of any choice by
the people of the Portuguese territories other
than complete independence. It may be that
this is what the people will choose. The Por-
tuguese, however, while recognizing the prin-
ciple of self-determination, believe that there
are options which the people may choose other
than independence.

Last year there was a briefly encouraging de-
velopment toward a solution to the Portuguese-
African problem, when discussions between Por-
tugal's Foreign Minister and the representa-
tives of several African countries were held im-
der the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General.
Unfortunately these talks were discontinued
owing to inability to agree on a definition of self-
determination. The Secretary-General has been
asked to continue his efforts, however.

Now, where can the United Nations go from
here? What kind of U.N. efforts should the
United States support ? We sincerely hope that
both the Portuguese and the Africans will agree
to start talking again.

Problems of South Africa and South-West Africa

The most intractable problems in southern
Africa are the race relations of South Africa
and South Africa's administration of the for-
mer German colony of South-West Africa.
Since the United Nations' inception, some 27
resolutions regarding South Africa's racial poli-
cies have been passed by the U.N. General As-
sembly and the Security Council. In that same
period the General Assembly has passed over
70 resolutions about South-West Africa alone !
The International Court of Justice has ren-
dered advisory opinions regarding South-West
Africa three times. In recent months South
African and South-West African issues have
been before various U.N. bodies and have caused
controversy in several associated agencies. In

MAY 11, 1964

753

tlie next few weeks and months U.N. committees
and other U.N. bodies will be further consider-
ing these and associated issues.

As you know, South Africa's mandate over
South-West Africa, which was assigned by the
League of Nations after World War I, is cur-
rently the subject of a contentious case before
the International Court of Justice. Two Afri-
can countries that were members of the League
of Nations — Ethiopia and Liberia — have asked
the Court to judge whether the Mandatory has
lived up to its obligations. The mandate agree-
ment stipulates that the Mandatory should de-
velop "to tlie utmost" the "material and moral
well-being and social progress of the inhabit-
ants." The Court's judgment is not expected
until next year. The previous applications to
the Court on South-West African issues have
been for advisory opinions, which the parties
were free to accept or disregard. In the cur-
rent litigation, however, the parties are obli-
gated to respect the Court's judgment.

The South African Government's Commis-
sion of Inquiry into development plans for
South-West Africa, the Odendaal Commission,
has proposed that the Territory be divided into
a white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands."
Each homeland would have its own "citizen-
ship" and legislature and, the Commission rec-
ommends, become increasingly independent of
the others. The Commission also advocates
large-scale incorporation of the Territory's ad-
ministrative structure into the Republic's gov-
ernmental departments. Spokesmen of the
South African Government have endorsed
broad principles of the Odendaal Commission's
report, including proposals for large expendi-
tures on roads, water resources, a large hydro-
electric project, and other development; but
the Government has not yet committed itself
formally to any specific implementation. If
it implemented the controversial proposals of
the Commission before the judgment of the
Court was rendered, the ICJ might be peti-
tioned for an interim order to halt such action,
which could precipitate an early crisis in the
United Nations.

We believe it would be in the best interest of
everyone that no action be taken by South
Africa that would complicate the ICJ case on

South-West Africa. At the same time, we hope
that other African govermnents will not press
for action by the United Nations before the
ICJ decision is reached. It is our view that
action with respect to this international terri-
tory, whether by the Mandatory or by inter-
national bodies, should proceed and could pro-
ceed more effectively on a sound legal basis.
No one should act in a way prejudicial to the
Court's consideration of the problem. Court
procedures may be slow compared with the
swift pace of modern Africa. However, the
United States believes not only that there is no
other responsible course but also that proceed-
ing under Court authority is likely to be the
only effective way of dealing with this matter.

Tlie most difficult problem of all is to reach
definite conclusions about what the United Na-
tions can effectively do about apartheid in the
Republic of South Africa itself. This is a
tragic problem involving both whites and non-
whites whose families have lived in the area for
centuries, building up one of the highest stand-
ards of living in Africa. Both sides have equi-
ties, but apartheid is intolerable for black
Africans.

Here are some examples. A black African:

1. cannot vote in national and provincial
elections ;

2. camiot serve in Parliament ;

3. cannot attend the university of his choice ;

4. cannot remain in any urban area over 72
hours unless he satisfies certain long-term resi-
dence or employment standards (and, under
a bill passed a few days ago by the South Afri-
can House of Assembly, even these rights are
to be taken away) ;

5. cannot strike or bargain collectively ;

6. cannot fill positions in industry or com-
merce reserved for whites by Govermnent reg-
ulations ;

7. camiot serve on a jury ;

8. cannot, when detained under certain laws,
seek legal advice or have recourse to the courts ;
and

9. camiot demonstrate against existing laws.

There is a growing body of security laws.
Under the 1950 Suppression of Communism
Act, as extended, a Communist can include one
who advocates such objects as bringing about

764

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

political, industrial, social, or economic change
by picket inj; or similar peaceful action. As a
result, a number of non-Communists, and, in-
deed, anti-Conuiiuixists, have been convicted or
restricted under this act.

Under a 1963 law, a police officer may without
warrant arrest and detain for successive 90-day
periods persons wiio might have information
about or who might intend to commit specific
types of political offenses, as well as persons
actually suspected of committing such offenses.
Such arrest and confinement is instantly renew-
able, and without notification to lawyer or fam-
ily. Pei-sons serving sentences of imprisonment
under several national security laws may be
kejit indefinitely in prison after completion of
their sentences if the Minister of Justice be-
lieves the individual, on release, might further
the achievement of any of the statutory objects
of communism. Thus, Kobert Sobukwe, anti-
Communist President of the Pan-Africanist
Congress, was jailed in May 1963, immediately
on completion of his 3-year term for incitement,
and is still imprisoned on Robben Island in Ta-
ble Bay near Cape Town.

This year and next, the several major issues
regarding South Africa and the Territory of
South- West Africa appear to be heading toward
a climax. The litigation concerning the man-
date before the Court, the report of the Com-
mittee of Experts on South Africa, considera-
tion by U.N. bodies of the issues of political
trials and other repression of dissent, pressures
for sanctions — all appear to be converging in
an accelerated wa3^

In and outside the United Nations, men of
good will must be determined and imaginative
to find peaceful solutions to the heavy problems
that confront Africa.

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate
on Aid Programs for Ryukyus

Press release 184 dated AprU 24

In ceremonies held at Tokyo at 10:30 a.m.,
April 25, 19G-1 (Tokyo time), the United States
and Japan concluded an agreement to est;iblish
a Consultative Committee and a Technical
Committee to facilitate cooperation between

the two Governments in programs of economic
and t*.'chnical assistance in the Ryukyu Islands.
The new agreement was concluded in accord-
ance with the policy announced by the late
President Kennedy on March 19, 1962, calling
for a cooperative relationship between the
United States and Japan in programs of assist-
ance to the Ryukyuan people.

The first meeting of the Consultative Com-
mittee was held immediately after the signing
of the exchange of notes ^ between the two Gov-
ernments. It is expected that the Technical
Committee, with a representative of the U.S.
High Conmiissioner of the Ryulcyu Islands
serving as chairman and with participation by
representatives of the Governments of Japan
and the Ryukyu Islands, will commence its
functions in connection with carrying out the
agreement in the near future.

U.S. and China Agree To Extend
Educational Exchange Program

Press release 182 dated April 24

The Governments of the Republic of China
and the United States on April 23 signed at
Taipei a revised agreement extending the pro-
gram of educational exchanges between the two
countries begun in 1947.

The current agreement is the latest in a series
renewed in various participating countries
under the broader authority of the Fulbright-
Hays Act of 1961. It was signed by Foreign
]Minister Shen Chang-huan and American
Ambassador Jerauld Wright.

The new agreement will enable the U.S. Edu-
cational Foundation in the Republic of Cliina
to carry out a wider range of educational and
cultural programs, including facilitation of
private exchange programs between the two
countries. It also permits funding of the foun-
dation's activities in U.S. and other currencies
as well as in Chinese currency. Another provi-
sion authorizes the foundation to accept contri-
butions for its programs from other sources.

' Not printed here.

MAT 11, 1964

755

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Proposal
in Disarmament Committee

Statement by Adrian S. Fisher ^

During the past few years this Conference
has been living within the lengthening shadow
of an arms race. Our task has been to shed
the liglit whicli will wipe out this sliadow.

During that time this Conference has been
working in the face of a paradox — the paradox
of increasing armaments on botli sides, paid
for in spiraling costs, resulting in increased
danger to both sides rather than increased
security.

The President of the United States, in his
message to the Conference of 21 January of
this year,^ offered a program to stop what
would otherwise become an inexorable buildup
of more and more weapons of greater and
greater destructive power. In putting this
program forward the President emphasized:

. . . we must first endeavor to halt further increases
in strategic armaments now.

Because it could halt further increases in
strategic armaments now, tlie most significant
and potentially far-reaching measure which the
President of the United States put before this
Conference is that dealing with a verified freeze
of the number and characteristics of strategic
offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles. It is
this measure which the United States would
like to explore further in this Committee.

^ Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 16.
Mr. Fisher is Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency. For statements made
before the Conference by William C. Foster on Jan. 1
and Feb. 6, see Buixetin of Mar. 2, 1964, p. S.'jO, and
Mar. 9, 1964, p. 3,H\ ; for statements made by Mr. Fisher
on Mar. 5 and 19, see ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

" For text, see ihid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

We have all heard the awesome figures deal-
ing with the number of nuclear delivery velii-
cles now plamied to be built during the next
few years. Chairman Khrushchev has stated
the intentions of the Soviet Union graphically.
He has talked of rockets being produced like

sausages.

The United States has recently indicated that
its force now contains more than 750 operational
long-range ballistic missiles. The United
States has aimounced that that number will rise,
under present plans, to more than 1,700 during
the next few years.

During the period when this Conference has
been going on — while we have been discussing
at this table the means of reducing arms — stra-
tegic armaments have been increasing at a rapid
rate. The figui-es that I will give are applicable
to the United States, but it is clear that, in the
absence of an agreement, the forces of the Soviet
Union will also increase rapidly.

This Conference began in 1962. In 1963 the
inventory of operational vehicles in the United
States increased by approximately 200 percent
ovev the 1962 level. In 1964 it is increasing by
550 percent. By 1965 it will have grown to
an aggregate increase of 750 percent over the
1962 level. As I indicated a moment ago, we
must assume that the Soviet Union is increas-
ing its missiles at a similar rate.

I do not set forth those figures in order to
engage in hindsight. It is useless for us to spec-
ulate upon what results this Conference might
have achieved had we concentrated first on meas-
ures to hold constant the numbers of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles. It is useless to specu-
late whether we could have a^-oided a situation
in which both sides substantially increased their
strategic nuclear vehicles while arguing how
best to reduce them.

It is of no utility for this Conference to con-
sider what might have been the effects of some-

756

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

thing we did not do 2 yeai"s ajro upon our situa-
tion today. It is, iio\vi>vi>r, of tlu> frn-atcst
utility for this Conference to consider the edVct
of wiint we can do today upon our situation 2, 3,
and many more years from today. The fre^'ze
of the number of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles will have a decisive impact on the pro-
gram to build more of these armaments — pro-
grams which will go forward if no agreement
of this type is reached. If this measure were
agreed upon and implemented, it would accom-
plish more practical results during the next
several years — in terms of actual inventories of
weapons of mass destruction — than any collat-
eral measure put before this Conference.

The freeze would keep many hundreds of the
deadliest weapons ever devised by naan out of
the arsenals of the future and would halt all
progress on e\'en more deadly ones now being
developed. Moreover, as President Jolmson
has stated, the measure we are now discussing,
by preventing the further expansion of the
deadly and costly arms race, can open the path
to reductions in all types of forces from present
levels.

The freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, par-
ticularly in conjunction with the cutoff of pro-
duction of fissionable materials for use in
nuclear weapons, would have a stabilizing effect
on the military' environment. It would, as I
have just pointed out, curb the nuclear arms
race. Moreover, it would facilitate progress
toward general disarmament, although it is, of
course, not linked with the conclusion of a treaty
on general disarmament. It is our belief, there-
fore, that the freeze and the cutoff could usefully
be explored in parallel as companion measures.

Description of Vehicles To Be Frozen

On the instructions of President Johnson, I
would now like to present further details con-
cerning the elements of the strategic nuclear
vehicle freeze. These details should answer a
number of the questions which have been asked
in the Committee about this measure. We also
hope that they will serve as a stimulus for fur-
ther exploration of the freeze on strategic nu-
clear vehicles by the Conference.

Under the agreement which the United States
proposes to explore, the numbers and character-

istics of the following strategic nuclear vehicles
would be frozen :

Fii-st, ground-based surface-to-surface mis-
siles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or
greater, together with their asscK-iated launch-
ing facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface
missiles having a range of 100 kilometers
or greater, together with their associated
launchers;

Second, strategic bombers having an empty
weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together
with any associated air-to-surface missiles hav-
ing a range of 100 kilometers or greater;

Third, ground-based surface-to-surface mis-
siles ha\'ing a range of between 1,000 kilometers
and 5,000 kilometers, together with their asso-
ciated launching facilities;

Fourth, strategic bombers having an empty
weight of between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000
kilograms, together witli any associated air-to-
surfaco missiles having a range of 100 kilome-
ters or greater ;

Fifth, strategic anti-missile-missile systems,
together with their associated launching facili-
ties. In connection with this type of armament,
further teclmical discussions will be required in
order to formulate a workable and acceptable
definition of "anti-missile-missile systems."

Limitations on Production and Testing

Let me turn now to the limitations on produc-
tion and testing.

The production of new types of armaments
that fall within the listing I have outlined would
be prohibited. The production of all existing
types of armaments within this listing, and of
specified major subassemblies of these arma-
ments, would be halted, except for production
required to cover the maintenance of the vehi-
cles, their accidental loss, and the expenditure
of missiles within agreed annual quotas for con-
fidence and training firings.

Replacement would be on a one-for-one basis
of the same type. Production for authorized
replacements would not be permitted to exceed
agreed annual nmnbers which would, in effect,
amount to a small percentage of the inventories
of armaments existing in the hands of the re-
spective sides at tlie effective date of the freeze
agreement. Verification of inventories would

MAT 11, 19G4

757

not be involved. The agreed replacement num-
bers would be subject to periodic review.

With respect to replacement of armaments
no longer in production, the parties would seek
to agree upon acceptable substitutes from among
weapons in production. In the absence of such
an agreement on items out of production the
party concerned could reopen production lines
for one-f or-one replacement.

Control over the number of missile launchers
is an essential element of the program. Limita-
tions would also be imposed on the construction
and improvement of launchers and launching
facilities, commensurate with the spirit of the
production limitations.

Production of boosters for use in space pro-
grams would be permitted even though such ve-
hicles are equivalent to the boosters used for
armaments, but would be limited to the quantity
needed to meet the announced use of the boosters
for such space programs.

Limitations on testing would be applied under
the program. Certain types of tests and firings
would, however, be permitted. Confidence and
training firings of existing affected missiles
would be limited to an agreed annual number
for each type of missile, subject to periodic re-
view, as I indicated earlier. Tests of new mis-
siles and aircraft systems would be permitted
to continue, subject to verification, as far as
required for allowed space and civil air pro-
grams and for development of nonstrategic
types of weapons not affected by the freeze.
Limitation on research and development testing
would be the subject of teclinical discussions.

Verification

How would the freeze be verified ? As a point
of departure, the parties to the agreement would
have to make a complete declaration of all pro-
duction and testing facilities relevant to the
agreement. Declarations would be made after
the conclusion but before the implementation
of the agreement. Included would be facilities
producing — or which were recently utilized in
producing — completed armaments and specified
major subassemblies of aniiaments affected by
the freeze. Facilities producing, or recently in-
volved in the production of, vehicles for space
or aeronautical programs and their major sub-

assemblies— these vehicles being equivalent to
the boosters used for affected armaments —
would also be included. All installations used
for space lamichings and sites to be used for
all allowed missile firings would also be de-
clared. Declarations would have to be kept up
to date if new facilities were used.

The verification arrangements wliich we have
in mind for the freeze would concentrate on
monitoring critical production steps, replace-
ments, and launchings. A verification system
sufficient to provide adequate assurance of com-
pliance would of course be required. Such a
system could include the following:

(1) continuing inspection of declared facili-
ties;

(2) a specified number of inspections per
year to check undeclared locations for possible
prohibited activities such as armament produc-
tion or launching-site construction ;

(3) the stationmg of observers to verify all
space launchings and all allowed missile firings
in order that stated requirements for replace-
ment missiles could be verified and the laimch-
ing of prohibited types of missiles detected;

(4) observation of the destruction of — or, in
the case of accidents, other confirmation of —
vehicles and laimchers being replaced.

Further details of the verification system re-
ciuired will be developed on the basis of further
study. It is clear, however, that the verifica-
tion system for the measure wliich we are now
exploring would be less extensive than that re-
quired for general and complete disarmament.
It would not involve verification of the levels
or the deployment of existing armaments.

To formalize an agi-eement on the freeze, we
would propose embodying it in a treaty which
would enter into force within an agreed interval
after signature and ratification by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and such other states
as might be agreed. "We believe that such a
treaty should contain a withdrawal clause simi-
lar to that contained in the partial test ban
treaty,^ with which I know the chainuan is
familiar. The freeze agreement should also
contain a provision that a conference would be
liold, periodically or at the call of any party,
to consider whether the treaty should be con-

" For text, see ihid., Aug. 12, 1903, p. 239.

I

758

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tinued or modified. It should he further pro-
vided tliat lifter such a conference any party
could consider whether to exercise its right
under the withdrawal clause on the basis of the
results of the conference.

this important mesisure. With aj^reement on
this measure, we shall have stopped on a plateau
from wliich we could begin the descent from
danger.

Significance of Freeze Proposal

1 have deseribed the essential elements of the
I'nited States proposal to explore a verified
freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles. We have
put forward this concept for serious exploration
by the Soviet Union, the United States, and
their respective allies. As a result of such con-
tinuing exploration, the United States may
wish, therefore, to review the outline of the ele-
ments of the freeze concept which I have just
presented.

The freeze provides a practical means to halt
the most costly and potentially destructive seg-
ment of the amis race. The suggestion for a
freeze deals with the areas of the arms race
which are of the greatest danger and with the
arms which are most easily controlled. This
suggestion is designed to affect those armaments
which are the most significant in halting the
arms race and wliich are, at the same time, the
simplest to verify in regard to limitations on
production and testing.

Agreement on this measure, especially if
coupled with its companion measure — the cutoff
of production of fissionable materials for use in
nuclear weapons — would provdde an excellent
point of departure for major arms reductions
to follow. It would slow dovsTi what is now an
ever-mounting spiral of armaments and by so
doing greatly facilitate progress toward disarm-
ament.

We ask all members of this Conference to
examine with care the measure we have set
forth here this morning. We particularly ask
the Soviet Union, as one of the states primarily
affected by this measure, to give the details care-
ful attention. This is a measure dealing with
a complex problem. We hope and expect that
governments will look at this measure care-
fully and thoughtfully before indicating their
reaction.

We ask that this Committee explore the freeze
in the spirit in which it is proposed. We hope
that that will lead to a fruitful exploration of

U.S. Proposes Town-Centered
Planning for Asia

The 20th session of the U. N. Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far Ea^t was held at
Tehran, Iran, March 2-17. Following is a
statement made before the Com,mission on
March If. by Kenneth T. Young, V.S. repre-
sentative.

Mr. Chairman [Ali Naghi Alikliani of Iran] :
I join my colleagues in warmly welcoming your
election as chairman of ECAFE's 20th session
and the election of His Excellency Dr. [Abdul
Hakim] Tabibi of Afghanistan as our first vice
chairman and The Honorable Deputy Prime
Minister, Mr. [J. R.] Marshall, of New Zealand
as our second vice chairman. Under your
guidance, sir, our meeting has already been pro-
ductive and efficient. It should mark another
milestone in the constructive record of ECAFE.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great
interest to the statements of our distinguished
Executive Secretary [U Nyun] and previous
speakers. They form a significant and, I think,
remarkable analysis of this region's complexi-
ties. Yet, Mr. Chairman, I have the impres-
sion that a single and simple theme underlies
this meeting: action for progress in bettering
the conditions of Asia's people. May I direct
a few observations to this worthy theme.

First, contmued economic improvement per-
mitted the United States to increase its foreign
purchases in 1963 in the ECAFE region as else-
where. Of the $17 billion of goods bought by
the United States in lOG-'i, some $3 billion came
from this region. This was an increase of $280
million over 1962. With the U.S. economy con-
tmuing to expand and with an anticipated gross
national product of almost $625 billion in 1964,
U.S. demand for products of the ECAFE coxm-
tries should continue to rise, particularly if cur-
rent efforts to reduce obstacles to international
trade are successful.

SLVT 11, 1964

759

Secondlj', President Johnson will present a
message to the Congress on assistance for eco-
nomic progress and political stability.^ One of
the interesting and encouraging developments
in the ECAFE region is the expanding ex-
change of assistance among the countries repre-
sented here.

Thirdly, discussion and actions of various
kinds are needed to expand markets. The
movement in the ECAFE region toward en-
largement of markets through regional arrange-
ments offei-s promise for diversification of
industry and eventually the expansion of both
intraregional and extraregional trade. Con-
sideration of export potential in national de-
velopment plans is a constructive trend,
supplementing continuing efforts toward import
substitution. We are interested in useful meas-
ures for regional cooperation in the ECAFE
area, as described in the survey.

Fourthly, the Kennedy Round of trade nego-
tiations under the GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade], scheduled to begin in
late spring of this year,= can result in major
reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers.
This can open markets for the goods of the
developing countries. The GATT Contracting
Parties have agreed that full reciprocity in
tariff reductions will not be expected from the
developing countries. The very fonn of the
negotiations — across-the-board cuts instead of
the former method of item-by-item bargain-
ing— ^ill itself be advantageous to the develop-
ing countries. We intend to use our negotiating
authority under the Trade Expansion Act to
the fullest possible extent to secure tariff reduc-
tions on products of chief interest to the de-
veloping countries. These negotiations offer
our best immediate opportmaity for widespread
reduction of trade barriers which may other-
wise frustrate the export potential of the de-
veloping countries.

Fifthly, the forthcoming United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development will ap-

' For text of President Johnson's mes-sage on foreign
aifl, transmitted to the Congress on Mar. 19, see Bul-
ij.;tin of Apr. G, 10G4, p. .518.

"For an address on "The Role of Agriculture in
Trade Expansion" by Christian A. Herter, see ibid.,
Apr. 27, 1964, p. 671.

propriately consider a wide range of pro-
posals.' At a press conference held on February
29, President Jolmson expressed his attitude
toward development of world trade as follows :

We are very interested in that conference. We are
going to participate in it and malie every contribution
we can. We thinli it is essential in the interest of the
peoples of the world that trade barriers be pulled
down. We are going to contribute everything we can
to that end.

Sixthly, the secretariat's very able Economic
Survey for 1963 has highlighted the principal
problem for action, namely, that lagging devel-
opment of agriculture threatens the general eco-
nomic progress of the area. We too are partic-
ularly concerned over the fact that population
growth continues to outpace increases in na-
tional production. More people means more
young people m every country. The growing
youth majority deserves more attention and
higher priority in action for development.
Food production must be increased considerably
to meet the needs of increasing populations and
to assure healthy economic growth for peo-
ple in the ECAFE area. For the well-being of
Asian peoples, the United States delegation
joins in the view that more attention and action
should now be directed to rural improvement
and agricultural progress in Asia.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, in my final ob-
servation, may I suggest that perhaps we should
be searching for some new technique to stimu-
late rural productivity, create more public serv-
ices and better markets, and synthesize a mod-
em but satisfactory rural way of life.

I wonder if we might not look for a break-
through to quicker rural progress in a concept
of town-centered planning of all phases of de-
velopment. This concept could be described as
a teclinologically progressive, politically inte-
grated, but geographically decentralized society
organized along town-centered lines. This
would mean a new emphasis to meet the needs
of rapidly expanding rural populations which
are experiencing low standards of living, under-
employment, underconsumption, and migration
of increasing numbers of people unprepared to
live and find work in already sprawling cities.

'For a statement made before the U.N. Conference
on liar. 25 by Under Secretary Ball, see ibid., Apr. 20,
1964, p. 634.

reo

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Between the extremes of urban bigness and
village sraallness, a town-building prugnini
could interject a eonibination of public services,
a market environment, and the ili^^pei-sal of in-
dustry. Better tlian the small village, the town
could provide centralized training institutions,
public works, agricultural extension services,
medical care, specialized trade production, and
credit facilities and adequate markets. Better
than the huge metropolis, the new town would
be able to provide an acceptable way of life for
mideremployed farm families. It could do this
by fostering new opi)ortunities for training and
employment, particularly in light industries,
and by alfording its residents with adequate so-
cial services. Town building would center de-
velopment in a cluster of villages close to rural
people. It is as important to avoid the uproot-
ing disintegration of their waj- of life as it is to
prevent tlie rootless combustion of superurban-
ization.

The service-market environment of rural
towns could provide incentives for the cultiva-
tors and family heads, who are the decisive indi-
viduals in rural areas. In such towns they
would have markets for selling their crops and
stores for buying their family needs. There
are many who are now convinced that a market
environment in rural areas is crucial to national
development and industrialization in particular.

So I wonder if perhaps the most important
task now for developing nations is not to find
new ways to expand domestic markets. Wliat is
needed is the local manufacture both of inex-
pensive agricultural equipment and the kinds of
consumer goods which will create incentives for
rural people to adopt modem methods of rais-
ing agricultural productivity.

Town-centered planning would require inte-
grated programs of the many social, economic,
and political factors involved, as well as the
purely technical design and layout of new or
modernized conununities. The establislunent
of such commimities cannot be successful unless
all of these market factors plus the social and
human factors are put together in regional
planning.

In particular, application of the latest tech-
nological knowledge in town-centered planning

can make really hopeful changeis for individ-
uals and fauulies, es^Jecially young people.
For example, our current i-esearch indicates that
low-cost plastic rooling may be tlie solution to
the most costly feature of tropicjil housing fur
millions of iWan peoples — the roof over their
heads.

Some precedents and experience are available
already in Asian countries along the lines of
area development. If regional fornuilation of
a general concejit for town-centered planning
has any merit, Mr. Chairman, my delegation
would bo glad to join with others in further
discussions of its feasibility. Tliere are several
specific aspects of this approach which we
would like to explore with our colleagues here.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation makes
these observations, mindful of His Imperial
Majesty's farsighted mandate to us for social
justice and i-eform and mindful of President
Kemiedy's active interest m this Decade of De-
velopment and a pattern of partnership be-
tween countries, as in ECAFE.

President Jolmson continues this determina-
tion to win mankind's battle against poverty,
disease, and ignorance. At the recent session
of the United Nations General Assembly he
stated : *

"Every nation must do its share. All United
Nations members can do better. We can act
more often together. We can build together a
much better world."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April
4, 1SM7. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Yemen Arab Republic, April
17, 1964.

' Ibid., Jan. 0, 1964, p. 2.

MAT 11, 1964

761

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into
force October 14, 1962. TIAS 51S4.
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, March 16, 1964.
Declaration giving effect to provisions of article X\l
(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Entered into
force November 14, 1962. TIAS .5227.
Signature: Japan, March 31, 1964.
ProcSs-verbal extending and amending declaration of
provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of Novem-
ber 8 1961. Done at Geneva December 8. 1961. i!-n-
terod into force for the United States January 9,
1962. TIAS 4937. ^. ^^ -,■, laeu.

Acceptances deposited: Niger, February 17, 1964,
Senegal, March 16, 1964.
Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6,
1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249.
Signature: Malaysia, March 17, 1964.
Proces-verbal extending period of validity of declara-
tion on provisional accession of Argentina to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of Novem-
ber 18, 1960 (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva Novem-
ber 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963.
TIAS .5266.

Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany (subject
to ratification), March 31, 1964; Niger, Feb-
ruary 17, 1964 ; Pakistan, March 7, 1964 ; Senegal,
March 16, 1964.
Declaration on provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962.
Entered into force for the United States May 3, 1963.
TIAS 5309.

Signatures: Denmark, March 11, 1964; Malaysia,
March 17, 1964 ; Niger, February 17, 1964 ; Senegal,
March 16, 1964.
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
embodying results of 1960-61 tariff conference.
Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for
the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.
Signatures: Chile (subject to ratification), February
25, 1964 ; South Africa, March 23, 1964.
Proc&s-verbal extending declaration on provisional ac-
cession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498) .
Done at Geneva December 12, 1963.'
Signatures: India, February 28, 1964; Japan, Janu-
ary 31, 1964; Kenya, February 17, 1964; Mada-
gascar, January 20, 1964 ; Niger and Pakistan,
February 17, 1964; Senegal, March 16, 1964;
United Kingdom, February 10, 1964.

BILATERAL

Belgium and Luxembourg

Agreement amending the agreement of October 8, 1948,
as amended (TIAS 1860, 3940), between the United
States, Belgium, and Luxembourg, for the financing
of a cultural and educational program. Effected by
exchange of notes at Brussels and Luxembourg,
March 12 and April 2, 1904. Entered into force
April 2, 1964.

Japan

Protocol amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, as
amended (TIAS 4133, 4172), for cooperation con-

cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at
Washington August 7, 1963.
Entered into force: April 21, 1964.

Tunisia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701-
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Tunis
April 7, 1964. Entered into force April 7, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of January 9, 1964 ( TIAS 5514 ) . Effected
by exchange of notes at Saigon April 14, 1964.
Entered into force April 14, 1964.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 2(>-26

Press releases may be obtained from the OfiBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Release issued prior to April 20 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 170 of
April 17.

No. Date

tl71 4/20

tl72 4/20

♦173 4/20

*174 4/20

175 4/20

*176 4/22

' Not in force.

*177

tl78

tl79

180

♦181

182

183

184

♦185

186

tlS7

4/21
4/22
4/23
4/23
4/24
4/24
4/24
4/24
4/24
4/25
4/25

tl88 4/25

Sabject

Air talks with Canada (rewrite).

Meeker: "Can the United Nations

Keep World Peace in the 1960's?"

U.S. participation in international

conferences.
Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister

of Trinidad and Tobago.
Private committee to help find

embassy sites in Washington (re-
write).
Koreu sworn in as Ambassador to

Congo (Brazzaville) (biographic

details).
Battle: 400th anniversary of St.

Augustine. Fla.
Smith: "The Nuclear Defense of

NATO."
Manning: "The Citizen's Role in

Foreign Policy Legislation."
Ball : "Principles of Our Policy

Toward Cuba."
Harriman : American Society of

International Law (excerpts).
Educational exchange agreement

with Cliina.
Exchange of scientific and technical

information with Japan.
Aid agreement with Japan for

Ryukyu Islands.
Members named for committee to

help find embassy sites.
Rusk : "The Situation in the West-
ern Pacific."
Tyler: "The Atlantic Alliance:

Constant Objectives in a Context

of Change."
Ball : "Interdependence — The Basis

of U.S. -Canada Relations."

• Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

762

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIN

INDEX May 11, 1964 Vol. L, No. 1S98

Africa. African Issues at the United N'ntions

(Williams) 751

American Republics

America as a Great Power (Johnson) . . . 726

Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba (Ball) . 738

Asia

America as a Great Power (Johnson) . . . 726
U.S. Proposes Town-Centered Planning for

Asia (Young) 759

Atomic Energy

Defense, AKC Report to President on Test Ban
Treaty Safeguards (McNamara, Seaborg) . . 744

U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Proposal in Disarma-
ment Committee (Fisher) 756

China

The Situation in the Western Pacifle (Rusk) . 732

U.S. and China Agree To Extend Educational

Exchange Program 755

Communism. The Situation in the Western Pa-
cific (Rusk) 732

Cuba

Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba (Ball) . 738

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba Remains Un-
changed (Johnson, Phillips) 744

Diplomacy. Private Committee To Help Find

Embassy Sites in Washington 750

Disarmament. U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Propos-
al in Disarmament Committee (Fisher) . . 756

Economic Afifairs

President Greets Public Advisory Committee for
Trade Negotiations 749

Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba (Ball) . 738

U.S. and Japan To Exchange Data on Use of
Natural Resources 737

U.S. Proposes Town-Centered Planning for

Asia (Young) 759

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and
China Agree To Extend Educational Exchange
Program 755

Europe. America as a Great Power (Johnson) . 726

Foreign Aid

America as a Great Power (Johnson) . . . 726

The Local Commimity and World Affairs (John-
son) 746

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate on Aid Programs
for Ryukyus 755

International Organizations and Conferences

U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Proposal in Disarma-
ment Committee (Fisher) 756

U.S. Proposes Town-Centered Planning for

Asia (Young) 759

Japan

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate on Aid Programs

for Ryukyus 755

U.S. and Japan To Exchange Data on Use of

Natural Resources 737

Laos. The Situation In the Western Pacific
(Rusk) 782

Military Affairs

Defense, AEC Report to President on Test Ban
Treaty Safeguards (McNamara, Seaborg) . 744

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba Remains Un-
changed (Johnson, Phillips) 744

Non-Self-Governing Territories. African Is-
sues at the United Nations (Williams) . . 751

Philippines. The Situation in the Western Pa-
cific (Rusk) 732

Presidential Documents

America as a Great Power 726

The Local Community and World Affairs . . 746

President Greets Public Advisory Committee

for Trade Negotiations 749

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba Remains Un-
changed 744

Public Affairs. The Local Community and
W'orld Affairs (Johnson) 746

Ryukyu Islands. U.S. and Japan To Cooperate

on Aid Programs for Ryukyus 755

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The Sit-
uation in the Western Pacific (Rusk) . . . 732

Treaty Information

Current Actions 761

U.S. and China Agree To Extend Educational

Exchange Program 755

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate on Aid Programs

for Ryukyus 755

U.S.S.R. America as a Great Power (Johnson) . 726
United Nations. African Issues at tie United

Nations (Williams) 751

Viet-Nam

America as a Great Power (Johnson) . . . 726

The Situation in the Western Pacific (Rusk) . 732

Name Index

Ball, George W . . . . 738

Fisher, Adrian S 756

Johnson, President 726, 744, 746, 749

McNamara, Robert S 744

Phillips, Richard I 744

Rusk, Secretary 732

Seaborg, Glenn T 744

Williams, G. Mennen 751

Young, Kenneth T 759

l.l. 60VERNHEHT fRINTINfi 0PriCCit»e4

SUPERINTE
U.S. GOVERN

WASH IN

COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02 \ 1 .

PENALTY FOR PFSIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, »300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL. BUSINESS

I

Foreign Policy Briefs

Foreign Policy Briefs, a fortnightly digest streamlined for the busy reader, is designed to provide
broad, timely, and authoritative coverage on the foreign relations activities of the entire executive branch.
All articles are based on official statements, reports, and announcements released by the Department of
State, the White House, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and other Government agencies.

Foreign Policy Briefs is printed on a large, easy -to-read single page particularly suitable for posting
and easy referral. It is available by subscription from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for $1 a year within the United States and $2 a year if
mailed to a foreign address.

ORDER FORM

TO:

SDPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Bncloeed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Sapt of DocTunents)

Please enter my subscriptioD to Foreign Policy Briefs for iD, 2D, or SG
years at $1.00 a year ; $1.00 additional for foreign mailing. I

NAME

ADDEESS

CITY, STATE

'D d5 S<

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol L, No. 1299

May 18, 196^.

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION MEETS AT WASHINGTON

Address by Secretary Rusk and Text of Comrmmique 766

INTERDEPENDENCE— THE BASIS OF U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS
by Under Secretary Ball 770

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: CONSTANT OBJECTIVES IN A CONTEXT OF CHANGE

by Assistant Secretary Tyler 776

THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF NATO

by Gerard C. Smith 783

THE CITIZEN'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATION

by Assistant Secretary Manning 791

For index see inside back cover

Central Treaty Organization IVIeets at Washington

TJie 12th session of the Ministerial Council of
the Central Treaty Organization was held at
Washington April 28 and 29. Following are
texts of the opening address made hy Secretary
Rusk on April 28 and a final communique is-
sued at the close of the m,eeting.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 190 dated April 28

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed colleagues,
Your Excellencies, and distinguished guests:
It is with a sense of deep personal satisfaction
and pleasure that I welcome the Ministerial
Council of the Central Treaty Organization to
Wasliington. The Council last met here in
1959. Since that time, my predecessors and I
have experienced the warmth of your hospital-
ity as guests in your several capitals. It is in-
deed a privilege for me to act as your host for
this session and thus to make a token return of
that hospitality.

President Johnson has charged me with the
pleasant duty of extending on behalf of the
American people, the United States Govern-
ment, and in his own name, a most sincere and
heartfelt welcome to our country. The Presi-
dent looks forward to extending liis personal

greetings to my colleagues, the distinguished
heads of delegation, at the Wliite House to-
morrow morning.

You come to us not as strangers to a strange
land but as proven friends and close allies. Al-
though the United States is not a member of
CENTO, we are bound to each of you by other
defense agreements and are intimately in-
volved in the work of CENTO itself. We are
glad you are here and hope that you will feel
truly at home during your stay.

CENTO is now in its 10th year of existence.
This would seem, therefore, to be an appropriate
time for us to reexamine the reasons for its for-
mation, the course it has taken, and the purposes
it serves.

Some 10 years ago the nations here repre-
sented recognized that the threat of Communist
aggression in the region of the Middle East was
real, pervasive, and continuing. They further
recognized the mutuality of their interests, as
free peoples, in preserving their freedom and
independence. Moreover, they recognized that
freedom and independence can best be mam-
tained through collective action.

And so the CENTO countries determined to
declare their recognition of these basic princi-
ples, to make clear their intention to friend and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1299 PUBLICATION 7689 MAY 18, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
aRcndes of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on varl-
0D8 phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currenOy.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $8.50,
foreign $12.25 : single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

766

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

foe alike. Tlie Pact of Mutual Cooperation
which tho}' signed in 1955 proclaims the es-
sence of that intent in its first article :

Consistent with article 51 of the Unitod Nations
Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate
for their security and defence.

By that declaration a shield was raised
against the tlueat of aggression. Because the
United States recognized the vital importance
of that shield, it has taken part in the work of
the principal committees of CENTO and, by
your invitation, attends these Council meetings.

So long as the Communist threat of aggres-
sion persists, there will be need for the CENTO
shield. ^\jid, my friends, that threat has not
been removed.

The Council of SEATO, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, met this month in Ma-
nila.' SEATO is currently confronted with the
brutal fact of continuing Commimist aggres-
sion. Just a few days ago I visited South Viet-
Nam, where warfare still rages because Commu-
nist aggressors persist in their attempt to im-
pose their will on a free people. The fact that
we have not experienced such conflict in the
CENTO region is, at least in part, attributable
to the existence of this defensive shield.

But a shield is not an offensive weapon — and
thus no nation which wants peace need fear its
existence. As President Jolmson said last
week : ^

We will discnss any problem, we will listen to any
proposal, we wdll pursue any agreement, we will take
any action which might lessen the chance of war with-
out sacrificing the interests of our allies or our own
ability to defend the alliance against attack. In other
words, our guard is up but our hand is out.

Constructing Machinery for Cooperation

As we have worked together to strengthen
CENTO, we have found that it has become both
a symbol and a veliicle for our common aspira-
tions and objectives.

During these first 10 years we have been en-
gaged in constructing machinery for coopera-
tion. We found that the first essential is com-
munication. Together, we first established the

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk and the text of
a communique, see BTn,ij;TiN of May 4, 1964, p. 690.
' Hid., May 11, 1964, p. 726.

various forums of CENTO for this purpose —
the Council, the conuuittees, and the specialized
working groups. An impressive volume of com-
munication and interchange has already taken
place through these channels. Not only diplo-
mats but educators, scientists, experts, and
professionals in many fields have met together,
exclianged ideas and skills, and have developed
valuable habits of cooperation. The benefits of
their endeavors are already evident throughout
the region and, I am confident, will continue to
increase in the future.

"We also found a need for physical commimi-
cations facilities for efTective cooperation in
defense and economic development. The tan-
gible evidences of CENTO's achievements in
this field are a source of great satisfaction to all
of us:

— New and modern systems of telecommuni-
cations link the treaty area. The CENTO
microwave system linking the three capital
cities will be the longest in the world upon its
completion in the near future ;

— Great ports have been modernized and im-
proved; CENTO highways now traverse
friendly frontiers;

— The CENTO railway project to join the
Turkish and Iranian railway systems is now on
its way to completion. CENTO has long recog-
nized the significant contribution which this
project will make to both the security and the
economic needs of the region. The United
States is pleased to have been able to assist in the
completion of this worthy project.

Thus these first years of CENTO may fairly
be characterized as a period of solid and wortli-
wliile beginnings.

Wliat, then, of the future? I think that we
can face it with an increasing degree of con-
fidence. Across the face of our National
Archives Building on Pennsylvania Avenue are
emblazoned these words from Shakespeare,
"What is past is prologue." Our past in
CENTO is a constructive decade of learning,
organizing, and building. We have created the
institutions and facilities which make our co-
operation fruitful, and our peoples are already
benefiting therefrom. Within the CENTO
partnership, there is today a growing conscious-
ness of the mutuality of our goals and a growing
sense of community.

MAT IS, 19C4

767

There has been clear evidence of tliis in the
accomplishments of the higlily successful eco-
nomic meeting in Ankara last month and of the
Military Committee meeting which has just con-
cluded here in "Washington.

It is not for me to predict the decisions of this
Council session. But I would hope that as a
result of this meeting and of subsequent meet-
ings of our colleagues and deputies CENTO
would:

— strengthen its institutional structure;

— complete the extensive capital projects
which provide the communication network for
the area;

— improve and expand cooperative associa-
tion in developmental and technical assistance
activities; and

— maintain the defensive shield by effective
military cooperation.

Building a Decent World Order

In a larger sense, also, I believe we have
reason for confidence. We in the free world
have our problems. But when we look across
the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, we see that the
Communist world has far-reaching problems to
which solutions have not yet been found.

Let us not forget that the leaders of both the
principal Communist nations proclaim world
domination as the ultimate Commimist goal.
And we must take particular care not to let any
Communists anywhere think that they can gain
from a policy of militancy.

The notion that communism is a shortcut to
the future for developing nations has been shat-
tered by actual Communist performance. In
terms of economic strength, the free world con-
tinues to widen its advantage over the Com-
munist world, both relatively and absolutely.

And, despite opposition or lack of cooperation
from the Communists, we are moving ahead
with the great task of building a decent world
order — the kind of world outlined in the pre-
amble and articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations.

The members of CENTO, like other free
nations, have a common interest in working
toward these goals:

— a world free of aggression — aggression by
whatever means;

— a world of independent nations, each with
the institutions of its own choice but cooperat-
ing with one another to their mutual advantage ;

— a world of economic and social advance for
all peoples;

— a world which provides sure and equitable
means for the peaceful settlement of disputes
and which moves steadily toward a rule of law ;

— a world in which the powers of the state
over the individual are limited by law and cus-
tom, in which the personal freedoms essential to
the dignity of man are secure.

If we persevere, we shall eventually reach that
goal: a world in wliich freedom is secure for
all mankind.

We of the United States delegation once again
extend to you a warm welcome and pledge to
you our unstinted cooperation as we work to-
gether toward our mutual objectives.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Council of
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held
in Washington on April 28 and April 29, 1964. The
delegates from the five countries participating in this
meeting were led by :

(

H. E. Mr. Abbas Aram
H. E. Mr. Zulfikar All

Foreign Minister of Iran
Foreign Minister of Paki-

Bhutto Stan

H. E. Mr. Feridun Camal Foreign Minister of Tur-

Erliin key

The Rt. Honourable R. A. Secretary of State for
Butler Foreign Affairs, United

Kingdom
The Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State, United

States of America

The Secretary of State of the United States, as host,
was in the chair. In his opening address. Secretary
Rusk welcomed the delegations on behalf of Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Council of Ministers expressed deep regret at the
tragic death of John F. Kennedy, the late President of
the United States, and paid warm tribute to his out-
standing qualities as a statesman and to his wise and
valiant contributions to the cause of world peace.

The Council welcomed Mr. Butler to his first CENTO
Ministerial Meeting since becoming Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

In the traditional frank atmosphere of CENTO, the
Council reviewed international developments since it
last met in Karachi.' The Ministers particularly ex-

' Ibid., May 27, 1963, p. 841.

7C8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

changed views on recent developments In the Reneral
area of the Middle East and dlsoussed tlie iuipUcatlons
of these events for the CENTO alliance.

The Council expressed its deep concern over the vio-
lence which has occurred in Cyprus since December
1903 and in particular over the recent deterioration
which has created a dangerous situation with grave
implications for peace and security In the whole area.
The Council declared its earnest desire that the violence
should be brought to an immediate end in accordance
with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions.

^^^^ile welcoming the reduction in world tension
which had occurred, the Foreign Ministers recognized
that serious dangers to the peace and security of the
Free World continue to exist. Specifically, they noted
that the danger from subversive activities remains
acute.

The Ministers reaffirmed their objective of seeking
peace and security through world disarmament under
adequate safeguards, while maintaining a posture of
constant vigilance. They noted with satisfaction that
the Test Ban Treaty constituted a valuable first step
on the road to disarmament.

The Ministers observed the distinctive contribution
of CENTO as a deterrent to aggression in the treaty
area. They noted with satisfaction that, behind the
defensive shield of the Organization, the regional coun-
tries were making noteworthy social, economic and
political progress.

The Council expressed pleasure at the continuing
progress of CENTO in the economic sphere, noting
the extensive activities of the Organization in wide-
ranging technical fields and the beneficial develoi)-
ments that are occurring on the CENTO communica-
tion projects. The microwave and high frequency tele-
communication projects linking the region will be in
operation by the end of 1064. In addition, work Is
forging ahead on the Turkey-Iran and Iran-Pakistan
highway projects ; development work has been com-
pleted on the port of Trabzon and has begun on the
port of Iskenderun ; and the current pace of activity
on the CENTO Airway will bring this valuable proj-
ect to completion in 19G.j. The Council noted with
particular pleasure the United States decision to help
finance through long-term loans the CENTO railway
project which will link the existing railway systems
In Iran and Turkey, and the Intention of the United
Kingdom to increase their financial contribution to the
economic activities of the Organization.

The Council agreed that the contributions of the

CENTO technical cooiH'rallon programmes and of the
CENTO cultural relations programme are of value
to the process of economic and B(K-iul development in
the region and have led to closer relations and im-
proved understanding among the peoples of the mem-
ber countries.

The Council reviewed the report of the CENTO
Military Committee and discussed suggestions for
further cooiHjration in the military sphere di'sigucd to
strengthen the defence potential of the alliance. They
also reviewed reports on CENTO military exercises,
particularly the recent CENTO-sponsored air, land
and sea operation "DELAWAR" in Iran, and the ear-
lier "MIDLINK" naval and "SHAHBAZ" air defence
exercises.

The Foreign Ministers found their discussions of
great value in achieving common understanding on
world and regional problems and in planning the
continuing work of the alliance.

The Council expressed warm appreciation of the
work of Dr. Abbas All Khalatbary during his current
term of oflice as Secretary General. Ills appointment
was extended for an additional three years.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Minis-
terial Council will be held in Tehran in the Spring of
1965.

Mr. Anderson, Mr. Newbegin Named
To Represent U.S. in Panama Talks

The White House announced on April 25 that
President Jolinson has appointed Robert B.
Anderson as the representative of the United
States, with the rank of Special Ambassador, to
carry out the objectives of the joint declaration
by the United States and Panama which was
signed at Washington on April 3.^

The President has also appointed Robert
Newbegin as alternate representative of the
United States, with the personal rank of Am-
bassador, to accompany Mr. Anderson.

' For a statement by President Johnson and text of
the joint declaration, see Bulletin of Apr. 27, 1964,
p. 655.

M.\Y 18, 1964

769

Interdependence— The Basis of U.S.-Canada Relations

hy Under Secretary Ball^

During the past 4 days you have undertaken
a difficult exercise in analysis. You have
sought to probe, identify, examine, and dissect
the interests and attitudes of the peoples and
the Governments of Canada and the United
States as they affect relations between these two
great countries. You have sought also to de-
termine how those interests and attitudes came
into being and how they are likely to develop.

Relations between governments and peoples
are never simple. They are even more com-
plicated when two nations live side by side.
Then there is an impingement of interests at
every level of activity. And, in the case of
Canada and America, disparity in size is a
highly important added element. One can
never lose sight of the fact that the population
of the United States is 10 times that of Canada
or that its gross national product is 14 times as
large.

Relations might be easier to sort out if each
coimtry had a simple and completely homogene-
ous society. But today Canada is preoccupied
with the problems and pressures of a bilingual
society in which the minority is anxious to pre-
serve its identity. We, on the other hand, are
preoccupied with the tensions of a multiracial
society in which an important minority is trying
to establish its equality.

Each of our two nations is young in years.
Yet each is greatly influenced by its own short
history. Each has a well-defined body of tra-
dition and principle to wliich it must be faithful
if it is to maintain its own soul. And each has

' Address made before the 25th American Assembly,
Arden House, Harrlman, N.Y., on Apr. 25 (press re-
lease 188).

its own fixations and powerful memories from
the past, its special sensitivities not always well
communicated or imderstood abroad, its own
areas of irrationality, its own neuroses.

Each nation is governed by a democratic gov-
ernment. Here again, however, the appearance
of similarity is greater than the reality, for the
framers of Canadian confederation designed it
to avoid what they, rightly or wrongly, saw as
the flaws in the architecture of our own constitu-
tional system. Yet the veiy fact that each is a
democracy means that each Government must
follow lines of policy that reflect a synthesis of
the views of its people. This is a significant
element in the relations between our two Gov-
ernments ; it at once both simplifies and compli-
cates the compromise of differences.

Your effort here has been primarily one of
diagnosis — to try to find out why Canadians
and Americans think and act as they do with
regard to one another's affaii-s. What is even
more difficult is to translate the answers into
national policies — policies that can facilitate
harmonious coexistence on a single continent
and that can enable our two nations to combine
their energies in pursuit of common objectives
in the world at large.

This translation of principles into policy
needs to be carefully approached ; otherwise the
relations between our countries will be marred
by a constant succession of petty quarrels.

Such petty quarrels as arise must be resolved
by agreement, for we are denied the ultimate
arbitrament of force. Obviously we are never
going to make war on one another. But better
yet, such quarrels should be avoided; problems
should be solved before they become trouble-

770

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

some, and this can be done only if we each de-
sign policies that take into account the other's
attitudes and interests.

This is easier to achieve in some areas of
policy than in others. Tonight I wish to indi-
cate some of our mutual interests and problems
with regard to defense, to cultural affairs, and
particularly to economic relations — and then to
suggest possible means for reconciling difficul-
ties in United States-Canadian relations in the
future.

Joint Defense Programs

There should be no serious differences between
United States and Canadian defense policies.
Neither country can afford differences in this
field, for in a modern nuclear age defense is
indivisible. Certainly the defense of North
America is indivisible, and Canada lies directly
athwart the shortest route between the principal
center of Commimist power and the United
States.

The United States and Canada cooperated
closely during the war, and in 1947 we decided
to continue our joint arrangements. The Per-
manent Joint Board on Defense, which Presi-
dent Koosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie
King established in 1940, is still an effective in-
strument in defense coordination.

In the same spirit, early in the 1950's, the two
countries agreed to set up a joint North Amer-
ican air defense system. Together we have de-
veloped a continent- wide radar warning net-
work. As a further step, in 1958 we agreed to
integrate our air defense systems under one
conmiand, the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) with headquarters at
Colorado Springs.^

Cooperation on military matters today is ex-
cellent and virtually constant among the services
of the two countries. To insure close liaison
between the two defense forces, a Canadian
Joint Staff is maintained in Washington and
the United States Air Force has a Coordination
Staff in Ottawa.

United States-Canadian joint defense pro-
grams have provided a variety of modern weap-
ons for Canada. They insure Canadian in-
dustry an opportunity to participate in the
production of up-to-date military equipment.

We were happy to reach agreement last year
to provide nuclear weapons for Canadian
forces.' AAHiile the United States retains phys-
ical custody of these weapons, the agreements
provide for joint United States-Canadian con-
trol over their use. Witii these arrangements,
we are in greater harmony in our joint defense
efforts than we have been for a number of years.

Cultural Relations

But if we can cooperate in our common de-
fense, neither should we have any insoluble dif-
ficulties between us so far as cultural relations
are concerned.

I am aware of the apprehensions in some cir-
cles that Canada risks being culturally over-
whelmed by the United States. We Americans
are a vocal — sometimes a rather noisy — people,
and the development of radio and television has
extended exposure to American cultural in-
fluence beyond the written to the spoken word.

The concern in some sectors of Canadian opin-
ion, as I understand it, is that the very volume
and high decibel count of American expression
tends to challenge the lower key expressions of
Canadian life. But the Canadians, like our-
selves, are freedom-loving people who do not
censure books or jam broadcasts. In open so-
cieties such as those of our two nations, there
can be no private dialogs, and we and our Cana-
dian friends live in adjoining houses with wide-
open windows between us.

Anxiety to preserve intact the special values
of Canadian culture has led to proposals for
governmental action, notably in the protection
of Canadian periodicals. The specific meas-
ures in question have been directed at discourag-
ing the support of American magazines by
Canadian advertisers.

We Americans can understand the desire to
protect journals of fact and opinion that pro-
vide expression for Canadian ideas and for the
discussion of Canadian problems. But publica-
tions fall in an area of special sensitivity involv-
ing the most fundamental aspects of our com-
mon cultural tradition. I cannot believe that

' For an exchange of notes, see Bulletin of June 9,
1958. p. 979.
• For background, see ibid., Feb. 18, 1963, p. 243.

KAY 18, 1964

771

the unique values of Canada's culture will be
advanced or encouraged by any measures that
may impede competition in the field of ideas.
I would hope that, however the Canadian Gov-
ernment may ultimately resolve tliis question,
it will not act in such a manner as to inhibit the
free flow of thought across our borders.

Commercial and Economic Policies

The areas of greatest complexity and difficulty
between our two nations lie in the range of our
commercial and economic policies. It is one of
the cliches of American-Canadian relations that
we are each other's most important trading
partners. Last year Canada accounted for 20
percent of our total exports and the same per-
centage of our total imports, while America
accounted for 68 percent of Canadian imports
and 62 percent of Canadian exports. The
United States draws heavily upon Canadian
raw materials for her industrial requirements,
while we have poured over $20 billion of our
capital into the development of the Canadian
economy.

To a considerable extent — without any con-
scious decision to do so — we have regarded the
North American Continent as an economic
whole and have allowed free movement of cer-
tain of the key factors of production. Capital
has moved almost without restriction and in
both directions. As might be expected, the net
capital flow has been overwhelmingly toward
Canada. But what is often forgotten is that on
a per capita basis Canadians have invested al-
most twice as much in the United States as
Americans have in Canada.

Labor also has moved with relative freedom.
Indeed, until 1930, the movement of labor was
practically unimpeded by any governmental
restrictions. Today both countries follow lib-
eral immigration policies toward one another.
The free flow of people who live on each side of
the border makes an accepted contribution to
the seasonal or local employment needs in each
coimtry.

The freedom that exists with regard to capital
and labor does not apply to the movement of
goods. Here substantial barriers have been
erected. Today wo treat Canada as we treat our
other trading partners — on a most-favored-

nation basis. The Canadians extend us most-
favored-nation treatment but qualified for the
preferences it accords, within the framework of
the Ottawa agreements of 1932, to the United
Ivingdom and other members of the Common-
wealth.

Over the years, the barriers between us have
been gi-adually reduced by a succession of trade
agreements. In fact, the first trade agreement
we negotiated under our reciprocal trade agree-
ments legislation of 1934 was with Canada.

From the point of view of economic prin-
ciples, there is no doubt that Canada and the
United States could employ the resources of
North America most efficiently by developing
the continent as a single great market. The
tastes of the Canadian and American people are
sufficiently similar to permit that standardiza-
tion and specialization of production that form
the basis for the economies of scale. And the
European experience in recent years has fully
demonstrated that, when national markets are
combined into a common market, opportunities
are created for the rationalization of industry
that can result in a greatly heightened produc-
tivity for all concerned.

But no modern peoples are likely to permit
their destinies to be shaped purely by economic
facts. Wliile both Canada and America have
been moving toward commercial liberalization
during the last 30 years — and hopefully will
move even farther in that direction with the
forthcoming Kennedy Round of trade negotia-
tions—both have drawn back, for political rea-
sons, from the ultimate logic of the single
market.

Quite obviously, the Canadians have had the
greater stake in this decision since the intimate
linking of the economies of the two nations
would make a proportionately bigger impact on
their lives than on ours. Yet it must be ac-
knowledged tlmt, while we Americans have
never had to face this question in the same terms,
such a development would cause problems for us
as well.

Canadian policy is firmly committed to the
preservation of an independent and separate
national economy. So far as the United States
is concerned, this is a decision of the Canadian
Government and of the Canadian people. It is
a decision we respect.

772

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

One can expect to find some elemcJit of eco-
nomic nationalism in the policies of almost every
government, including our own, involving vary-
inf degrees of economic cost to the nation im-
mediately concerned and to other nations. If
such policies are pursued with moderation and
with due regard for the interests of others, there
is no reason why they should not be susceptible
of mutual adjustment in the relations between
nations.

But difficulties necessarily arise when the anx-
iety to avoid economic interdependence leads
to policies that are discriminatory and inequi-
table. This is particularly the case with close
neighbors, such as the United States and Can-
ada, where the degree of intertwining of eco-
nomic affairs is so great and the volume of trade
so large that any change in existing ground
rules can have immediate and substantial reper-
cussions. Measures by governments designed to
induce a change in the character of investment
from equity to debt, for example, or to refuse
national treatment to capital that had earlier
been welcomed, or to bring about the transfer
of production from one country to another can
be seriously disruptive.

The obligation to be sensitive to the existmg
high state of interdependence rests on both Gov-
ernments. America gave recognition to the fact
that our economies are closely tied when it im-
mediately concurred in Canada's request for an
exemption from the interest equalization tax.^
Canada, on its part, has been willing to main-
tain a high proportion of dollars in its monetary
reserves in acknowledgment of its participa-
tion in a closely interlinked monetary system.

Trend Toward Economic Interdependence

The desire of our Canadian friends to safe-
guard the identity of their national market ap-
parently stems from the belief that the nation
and people may lose something of their national
political independence if their economy is too
closely meshed with that of other nations, and
particularly the United States.

The maintenance of political independence,
however, depends more on the state of the na-
tional will than on economic relationships. Cer-

' For text of a joint statement issued on July 21, 1963,
see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 256.

tainly, neither Canada nor the United States
is interested in yielding or compromising its
own freedom of political decision. In fact, on
both sides of the border there is a fierce desire
to resist any steps in that direction. I do not
believe, therefore, that as between Canada and
the United States there is any basis for assum-
ing an automatic and parallel relation between
increased economic interdependence and a loss
of independence in political life.

This point is a relevant one, for it seems likely
that, for better or worse, natural trends will
lead in the direction of greater economic inter-
dependence. With more complex tools both of
production and of management, the optimum
standards for efficiency are increasing. The re-
quirements of scale in industrial output are
expressed in larger and larger figures. Capital
needs are more demanding. Corporate imits are
growing in size. Left to natural market forces,
these trends should lead toward a progressively
hisher degree of economic involvement between

_

our two countries and the rest of the world.
Canada will become increasingly important to
the United States and the United States to
Canada.

I offer this thesis tonight not as an expres-
sion of United States Government policy but as
a prediction of the natural evolution of eco-
nomic forces in a time of vaulting technological
advance. I do not doubt that either the United
States or Canada has the ability, by political
means, to interpose measures of economic na-
tionalism that can check or interrupt those
forces. But the cost to both countries of meas-
ures toward that end is almost certain to rise to
prohibitive levels as the pressures for realizing
the benefits of scale are intensified by economic
progress throughout the world.

Need To Avoid Divergent Economic Policies

I suggest, therefore, that the effort of our two
countries be focused not on measures of eco-
nomic nationalism but on appropriate steps that
may be taken to permit the normal and healthy
development of our economies toward an in-
creasing economic interdependence that is
viewed not so much in bilateral terms as in terms
of its relation to an expanding world economy.

To achieve this will require, of course, a con-

KAT 18, 1964

778

siderable measure of agreement between the
Canadian and American Governments on a basic
pliilosophical approach to the purposes that
should govern our relations. The opportunity
for the formulation of such an agreement has
been provided by a decision taken last January
between President Johnson and Prime Minister
Pearson during their meeting in "Washington.
In the language of the communique which
followed that meeting,'

The Prime Minister and the President discussed at
some length the practicability and desirability of work-
ing out acceptable principles which would make it
easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other
policies of interest to each other. They appreciated
that any such principles would have to take full account
of the interests of other countries and of existing inter-
national arrangements.

In order to examine the possibility for de-
veloping such a set of jDrinciples, it was agreed
by these two leaders that a working group would
be established at a senior level to study this
problem. For this purpose the two Govern-
ments have appointed distinguished diplomats
of long experience in Canadian-American rela-
tions— Ambassador Livingston Merchant for
the United States and Ambassador Arnold
Heeney for Canada. These two gentlemen are
now engaged in the preliminary work required
of their task and will submit a report for study
by our Govermnents before many months.

Intergovernmental Consultations

Once our two Governments agree upon a com-
mon set of principles to govern our relations,
the smooth evolution of those relations will re-
quire constant intergovernmental consultation
within the framework of those principles.

There are already a number of institutional
arrangements for the conduct of those consulta-
tions, such as the joint working group on energy,
the joint working group on the balance of pay-
ments, facilities for quarterly grains consulta-
tions, the Cabinet cx)mmittee on defense, the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the Inter-
national Joint Commission, and the U.S.-Cana-
dian interparliamentary committee.

Finally, in the economic field, there is the
Joint United States-Canadian Committee on

Trade and Economic Affairs. This Committee,
established in 1953 at the Cabmet level, nor-
mally meets once a year. The last meeting was
in September 1963 in Washington.^ The Com-
mittee will meet again next week in Ottawa.
Its discussions cover a wide range of current
problems.

Consistent with the habits of two nations that
share a common tradition of pragmatism, we
have not sought to carry institutional arrange-
ments for consultation beyond their present in-
formal char act er. Given the desire on both sides
to preserve freedom of political decision, neither
nation is pressing for any experiments in supra-
nationality. Instead the relations between our
Governments rest on a mutual respect for each
other's sovereignty.

But as separate sovereign powers with a will
to live harmoniously in a spacious continent,
there is no reason why we cannot work out pro-
gressively more effective mechanisms for set-
tling our mutual affairs. This will involve, of ^
course, not merely the conventional recognition '
of our national similarities but also a grownup
awareness of our differences.

Yet, in the final analysis there is one jK)int on
which I think we can agree without question —
that there is in each nation a deep reservoir of
good will for the other. And granted that good
will, there is no reason why we cannot face such
problems as may come and find solutions com-
patible with our individual needs and our com- ■
mon requirements.

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee
Concludes Ninth Meeting

The ninth meeting of the Joint United States-
Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic
Affairs was Iield at Ottawa April 29 and SO.
Following is a joint communique released at the
conclusion of the meeting.

The Ninth Meeting of the Joint United
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco-

" For text, see ibid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.

' For text of a joint communique, see ibid., Oct. 7,
1963, p. 548.

774

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

nomic Affairs was held in Ottawa April 20-30,
r.)64. Tiie Committee noted with satisfaction
the prop:ress which had been made in matters
of interest to both countries and the general im-
provement in relations between them.

The Committee received from Mr. Arnold
Heeney, on behalf of himself and Afr. Living-
ston T. Merchant, their interim report of prog-
ress on their joint study of United States-
Canadian relations. They were appointed by
President Jolmson and Prime Minister [Lest«r
B.] Pearson to examine the desirability and
practicability of developing acceptable prin-
ciples which would facilitate cooperation in eco-
nomic and other policies.^ Their report, noted
agreement on method of procedure and states
that preliminary investigations have been ini-
tiated.

The Committee noted that economic activity
in Canada and the United States had continued
to expand and that another favorable year was
anticipated for 1964. They agreed that the
two countries should continue to follow policies
designed to stimulate economic growth and em-
ployment in the context of economic stability.
They noted that trade between the United States
and Canada was running at record levels. The
Committee discussed policies which each country
was following to improve its balance of pay-
ments. The United States members expressed
agreement with Canada's desire to improve its
current account through an expansion of ex-
ports, and stressed the importance of adliering
to the principles of non-discrimination in
achieving this objective. The Committee also
noted the recent improvement in the United
States balance of payments position and ex-
pressed the expectation that this improvement
would continue.

The members of the Committee looked for-
ward to the opening of the GATT tariff and
trade negotiations in Geneva, in which both
coimtries would be participating actively, for
the reduction of trade barriers and the expan-
sion of trade in both industrial and agricultural
products between the two countries and with the
rest of the world. They took note also of the
progress at the current United Nations Confer-

'For background, see Bixlletin of Mar. 23, 1964,
p. 448.

ence on Trade and De\ clopment and agreed on
the importance of continuing international co-
operative efforts to assist the less developed
countries to expand their trading opportunities
and facilitate their economic development.

The Committee discussed the trade in auto-
mobiles and automobile parts between Canada
and the United States. United States members
stressed their concern over the possible adverse
effects of the Canadian automotive programme
on certain United States parts producers.
Canadian members emphasized that the pro-
gramme is designed to promote increased spe-
cialization and lower production costs in the
Canadian automotive industry.

The Committee examined problems affecting
trade between the two countries. Canadian
Ministers expressed concern about increases in
levels of certain United States tariffs arising
from the recent reclassification of the U.S. tar-
iff, including rates on parts and components.
They urged that the U.S. Government take ac-
tion to correct this situation. They requested
that action should be taken to remove long
standing U.S. restrictions on imports from
Canada of lead and zinc, and cheese. The
United States members expressed their concern
over possible Canadian measures which might
adversely affect certain U.S. publications. A
number of other matters were discussed includ-
ing Great Lakes water levels, tourist customs
privileges, and the trade in softwood lumber
and coal.

The Committee discussed the energy resources
and energy problems of both coimtries and
their relationship to economic efficiency. There
was general agreement that U.S.-Canadian
cooperation should be encouraged in areas
where such cooperation serves the long-term
mutual advantage of both nations. They estab-
lished a joint working group to prepare a pro-
gramme of studies relating to trade in all kinds
of energj' between the United States and
Canada.

The meeting concluded with a general review
of the international situation by Mr. Rusk and
Mr. Martin.

The Canadian Delegation included Mr. Paul
Martin, Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs ; Mr. Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance ;

MAT 18, 1904

775

Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and
Commerce ; Mr. Harry Ilays, Minister of Agri-
culture; Mr. C. M. Drury, Minister of Indus-
try; the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr.
L. Rasminsky; Mr. Xorman Roljertson, the
Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator; the Cana-
dian Ambas.sador to the United States, Mr.
C. S. A. Eitchie; and other advisers.

The United States Delegation mcluded Mr.
Dean Kusk, Secretary of State; ^Mr. Douglas

Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Stuart
Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Luther
H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; Mr. Or-
ville L. Freeman, Secretary of x\griculture ; Mr.
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Mr.
Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's
Council of Economic Ad\-isers; Mr. William M.
Roth, Deputy Special Trade Representative;
the United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr.
W. W. Butterworth; and other advisere.

The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Objectives in a Context of Change

ly WnUrmi R. Tyler

As.vatdnt Secretary for European Affairs '

I am very appreciative of your invitation to
speak to you and welcome this opportunity to
discuss with you some of the broad aspects of
the Atlantic partnership. You will recall that
Secfctaiy Rusk spoke about the alliance to the
Overseas Press Club in New York on April 7."
He pointed out that the central task of main-
taining the security of the free world has been
perfoniii'd, and NATO remains essential for
this; and tiic time is now ripe for wider tasks —
in sharing ros])onsil>ility for nuclear power, in
conceiting policies toward Communist nations
and tlie settlement of disputes in the free world,
and in coojterating more closely on the prob-
lems of aid. ti'adc, and economic policy.

I should like today ciiielly to discuss some of
tliesc wider (asks. The accomplishments of the
Atlantic alliance thus far are su])Stantial ; tin-
opportunities before it may be greater still.
We live in a revolutionary and fast-moving

' Adilriss iiukIc before the Economic Club of Detroit
at Del roil. Midi., on Apr. 27 (press release 1S7 (lilted
Apr. M).

' I'or text, see liiii.i.KTi.N of Apr. 27, liltil, j). O.'iO.

period of history. And the United States and
its Canadian and European partners have joined
their effort to maintain the security and advance
the well-being of the free world. These objec-
tives remain constant. I believe that we shall
move forward toward them.

President Kennedy once said tliat although
the processes of history are fitful, halting, and
aggravating, if we look beyond passing excite-
ments and at the profound tendencies that shape
the ftiture, we can then discern something in the
nature of a grand design, from which we can
derive both encouragement and a sense of pur-
pose. I believe we .'should view the Atlantic
alliance in t liiss))irit.

'I'lie nature of relations between the T"'nited
States and Western I'hirope is changing. Some
of the assumptions and priorities of the postwar
era have already been discarded; others are be-
ing quest if)ned. Neither we nor the Europeans
can all'ord to ignore our changing relations or
the dynamic forces inducing them. It is the
task of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to
a.^sess the quality and scale of the changes and

DEPARTJIENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to relate them to the Instinn; objectives of our
partnership. We need to distinguish between
tlie transitory and the permanent.

European Economic Recovery

In the immediate postwar period transatlan-
tic relations were characterized primarily by
Western European dependence on the United
States.

In the wake of war, millions of Europeans lay
dead. Of those who survived, many were
weary and dispirited. Administrative ma-
chinery was disorganized. Means of produc-
t ion and dist ribution were disrupted. Financial
resources had been consumed. The European
economy had collapsed, and the European ca-
pability for defense was nonexistent.

Many Americans fell in battle also. But the
United States emerged from the war with pro-
digious economic and military strength. The
United States had a monopoly of nuclear weap-
ons. The American economy produced goods
enough to satisfy demand in the United States
and to provide enormous material assistance
to Europe.

Europe was utterly dependent on the United
States for its economic welfare and defense.
The influence of the United States upon Europe
was immense.

This abnormal state of affairs could not and
did not last. With astonishing resilience, and
with massive assistance from America, the Eu-
ropeans threw their talent and energy into the
task of reconstruction. They rebuilt their econ-
omy and restored defense capabilities in an
amazingly short time. In a little more than 10
years after the beginning of the Marshall Plan,
European production had greatly exceeded the
prewar level, restrictions on the movement of
goods and services had been markedly reduced,
financial reserves had been increased many
times, and a high rate of economic expansion
had been achieved. The Europeans now have
greater wealth at their disposal than at any
time in their history. The European capability
for defense is now large, and European forces
stand side by side with Americans in the com-
mon defense of Western Europe and North
America.

Movement Toward Political Unification

European resurgence is everywhere evident —
in the plants, m the fields, in the body politic.
A quickening sense of energy, power, and pur-
pose permeates European life; it is evoked by a
high level of economic activity long sustained, a
growth of military capability, and, above all,
a new political purpose.

Tlie development of the European Economic
Community and progress toward political uni-
fication are expanding European economic hori-
zons and creating new political goals.

The European Economic Community has as
its economic objective the creation of a single
economic area where the people of the six
member countries can buy goods and services
unrestrained by artificial restrictions, freely in-
vest savings anywhere in the Common Market,
and choose their places of work without regard
to national boundaries. In the 7 years since
tJie signature of the Treaty of Rome, consider-
able progress has been made toward the dis-
mantling of national obstacles and the estab-
lislunent of common external economic policies.
Europeans are confident that their goal of com-
plete customs union will be reached by 1970 — in
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of
Rome.

The impact of this developing area on eco-
nomic activity has been and will continue to be
great. The ultimate political consequences are
likely to be even more profound.

The movement toward political unification
has attracted the interest and excited the imag-
ination of many Europeans. They see in a
uniting Europe the hope of eliminating the na-
tional rivalries that within the last 50 years re-
sulted in two catastrophic wars. They feel the
powerful pull of participation in a great con-
structive task. They are caught up in a broader
sense of identity. The prospect and process
of unification absorb their energies and attract
their loyalties.

The attitudes of other Europeans, less active-
ly involved in tasks of unification, undoubtedly
will be affected deeply by the creation of a
single economic entity. When a Frenchman
sells in Belgium, buys from the Netherlands,
hires workers from Italy, invests in Germany,
and travels in Luxembourg as freely and as

UAT 18, 1964

777

easily as he would in France, his perspective is
likely to be broadened, his sense of identity
and loyalty enlarged.

A vital economy, greater military strength,
and an absorbing new political purpose have
given the Europeans a revived feeling of power
and a renewed sense of destiny.

Transatlantic Partnership

European resurgence also has caused a funda-
mental change in relations between Western
Europe and the United States. Western Eu-
rope is no longer dependent on the United
States; and tlie United States is not immune
to the effects of Western European policies. A
better balance has been reached. Today trans-
atlantic relations are characterized primarily by
interdependence.

The forces pushing us toward interdepend-
ence have been at work for some time. Natu-
rally, however, the renewed sense of European
power and destiny has set up new strains in the
partnership between Europeans and ourselves,
and national policies and attitudes have so far
responded only partially to the tasks of partner-
ship. This is true on our side of the Atlantic
as well as theirs ; there is need for reassessment
on both sides.

We Americans sometimes tend to expect of
our allies that they should implement policy
objectives we have unilaterally formulated, or
accept uncritically solutions we have devised.
On occasion we forget that the cohesiveness and
strength of the alliance depends primarily on
the extent to which members agree on policy
objectives. We have not always been willing
to devote tlie time and patience required to build
a true consensus. We need to remember that our
allies will make greater efforts in common tasks
in proportion as they are fully satisfied that
these efforts are in pursuit of objectives they
have formulated in concert with us and which
they accept as valid, in terms of their own
interests.

On the other side of the Atlantic, our Euro-
pean partners — frequently with our encourage-
ment or acquiescence — have sought for many
years to solve some of their problems mainly
within a European framework. Now that the
European economy is restored and vibrant.

European defense capabilities have increased,
and progress toward a full economic union has
passed the point of no return, the opportunity
exists for Europeans once more to raise their
vision and view their problems in the context
of both the European integration movement and
of the Atlantic partnership. Harmonious devel-
opment of policies around the Atlantic basin
will benefit alike Western Europe, North Amer-
ica, and tlie rest of the world.

Much depends on whether Americans and
Europeans have really come to imderstand the
fundamental reality of interdependence and
whether we can muster the courage to act on
the basis of that reality. Progress for each of us
in Western Europe and North America has
come to depend more than ever on our ability
to learn to think and act in terms of the com-
mon welfare and not just in terms of the benefits I
that can accrue to any one nation. We can pro- "
mote the common welfare and meet our world-
wide responsibilities to the extent that we regard
our problems as indivisible and seek joint solu-
tions.

Underlying Forces of Interdependence

In this developing partnership, what are the
governing principles that remain constant ? In
what areas of our national activities are we
fundamentally dependent on each other ?

There are three basic spheres where the well-
being of each member of the alliance is inti-
mately interrelated with the well-being of the
other members : (1) defense against external at-
tack, (2) relationships with the Communist
countries and with the rest of the world, and
(3) improvement of our standard of life. Fun-
damentally involved in our own well-being,
moreover, is the assistance which we extend to
poorer countries. The success of our efforts
in these spheres depends in large measure upon
the extent to which members of the Atlantic al-
liance work together.

Let us look at the meaning of interdependence
in each of these areas of activity.

Defense of the Atlantic Area

The indivisibility of the defense of the At-
lantic area is based on the common assessment
that neither Western Europe nor North Amer-

778

DEPAHTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

icii could for lon<i maintain its way of life if
the other were defeated by a hostile power. It
also emanates from the continuation of a power-
ful external threat, the nature of defense re-
quirements, and the enormous amount of re-
sources required for adequate defense.

The fundamental commitment that the mem-
bers of the alliance have made to each other
arises from the conviction that armed aggres-
sion against any one member of the alliance
would place all the others in mortal danger. In
article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty all the
members of the alliance have pledged themselves
to consider an armed attack against one or more
of them as an attack against them all.

This solemn obligation has no terminal date.
Contrary to views that have occasionally been
expressed recentlj', the treaty neither lapses
nor comes up for renewal in 1969. It will, how-
ever, be possible after that time for any sig-
natory to give notice that it intends to withdraw
from NATO 1 year after its notice of denuncia-
tion.

However, as long as the danger of armed
aggression exists, it is highly improbable that
any member of the alliance will choose to ex-
ercise tliis option. Those who would oppose
us should make no mistake about the meaning
of debate within the alliance. Differences of
emphasis on secondary issues should not be
interpreted as weakening our determination to
stand together in our common defense.

A number of factors suggest that the threat of
premeditated Soviet armed aggression against
Western Europe is less immediate today than
previously. The Soviet Union is deeply in-
volved in a fundamental struggle with Com-
mimist China for the leadership of international
communism. The comitries of Eastern Europe
are begimiing to follow, in varying degrees and
extent, independent policies. TVithin the Soviet
Union itself there are some signs of loosening
of totalitarian control. However, the strength
of the "Western armed forces committed to
NATO and the overwhelming power of the
American thermonuclear deterrent — and the in-
stitution of NATO itself — are by far the most
important reasons why the danger of armed at-
tack is less imminent.

However, we should not allow the success of
our common defense to deceive us into thinking

that the danger of attack has disappeared. The
Soviet military capability is great and is con-
stantly being modernized. Powerful Soviet
armed forces and many hundreds of Soviet mis-
siles are still arrayed against the Atlantic na-
tions.

To permit our combined power to dwindle
would increase the probability of miscalcula-
tion about our basic resolve to defend ourselves
and, thus, increase the danger of armed ag-
gression and nuclear war. There is no escape
from the need to maintain and enhance the mili-
taiy strength of the Atlantic alliance for de-
fensive purposes.

The defense of North America and Western
Europe requires the maintenance of strong nu-
clear and conventional forces.

To deter major aggression, the United States
maintains nuclear capability of enormous
power. To increase and further disperse the
nuclear forces for the defense of the alliance,
we are now working on the establishment of a
multilateral nuclear force.^ Tliis is a serious
effort to strengthen our common defense and to
meet the legitimate interests of the members of
the alliance in nuclear defense without further
proliferating national nuclear forces.

In addition, we need strong and flexible ca-
pability to keep the strategic options open. The
members of NATO have deployed powerful con-
ventional forces to counter limited attacks ef-
fectively and to avoid the necessity of instan-
taneous choice between retreat or nuclear re-
taliation.

Effective defense consumes a stupendous
amount of resources. No one country— even
one as wealthy as the United States — can pro-
vide the equipment and manpower required for
the defense of North America and Western
Europe without great sacrifice. The magnitude
of the task, as well as fundamental principles
of policy, requires that the members of the al-
liance regard their defense as indivisible. Since
common defense benefits all in accordance with
the nature and degree of the total effort, it is
essential that all members bear an equitable
share of the burden.

The United States has consistently devoted
a much larger percentage of gi'oss national

' See p. 783.

MAY 18, 1964

779

product to defense than have the other NATO
members. We tliink that the other members
of the alliance could and should contribute more
to the joint defense effort. Our conmion defense
requires interdependence in effort as well as
in benefit.

Coordinating National Policies

In matters of overall national policies the
members of the alliance are similarly dependent
upon the actions of each other and need simi-
larly to concert together. NATO is not a fed-
eral structure, and there is no "Government of
NATO." The sovereign members act together
by common consent. Yet the common interest
which binds them together is real and recog-
nized. The process of concerting policies, and
the results, may not always be so spectacular,
or at least self-evident, as in the more strictly
military or economic fields. A common con-
sensus is often inherently more difficult to
achieve. But the partners do consult together,
patiently and continuously, and common or co-
ordinated policies have been achieved— as, for
example, in bringing Germany, pending the
reunification of the German people in peace
and freedom, as a responsible and respected
member into the community of free nations ; or
in efforts to bring the arms race under control ;
or in dealing with the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries. Disputes among partners
have been settled peaceably— as, let us hope,
will be done in the present dispute over Cyprus.
Obviously, this process must be extended and
strengthened; we must constantly work to make
the interdependence of members a realistic force
for the common good.

Improving the Standard of Life

As the industrialized nations seek to improve
their standard of life, they are finding it in-
creasingly necessary to formulate their national
policies with full regard to the interdependence
of their economies. This is especially true now
that governments seek to maintain high levels
of economic activity by following counter-
cyclical policies and by efforts to avoid adverse
effects on their economies of inflationary or
deflationary trends abroad. Powerful forces
are at work making national economic boimd-

aries less and less relevant. The innovations of
scientists and industiy and the vision of states-
men have made economic interdependence a
reality.

We now accept as ordinary instantaneous
communication between North Ajnerica and
Europe. We no longer marvel at transatlantic
flights just below the speed of sound. We take
for granted the availability of a broad range
of Em-opean goods in America and American
goods in Europe. Technological advance and
the universal desire for increased economic well-
being are exerting inexorable pressures in the
direction of further interdependence.

With interdependence comes increased inter-
action among national economies. Events in
one economy rapidly transmit shock waves-—
for better or worse — to other economies. This
presents policymakers with new challenges and
responsibilities. Policy formulation must take
into account the international impact of do-
mestic decision.

Out of this need has evolved an Atlantic con-
sultative process which is less well known than
it deserves to be. Since 1961, senior officials
from the capitals of 20 Western European and
North American countries have come together
regularly and frequently in Paris for meetings
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). They will soon
be j oined by representatives from Japan. Their
purpose is to consult about their national eco-
nomic policies so that they may develop in
harmony with each other.

In the past 3 years we have witnessed the de-
velopment of increasingly frank consultation
and close collaboration on matters of economic
growth, fiscal and monetary policy, and balance
of payments. The consultative process has
made it possible to compare alternative ap-
proaches to common problems and to explore
the interaction of programs and expectations
in different countries. It has yielded sharpened
awareness of the international impact of do-
mestic policy and of means for insulating others
from possible adverse effects of change in policy.
It is making possible more timely and more
symmetrical adjustments to changes in the bal-
ance of payments, with surplus countries shar-
ing the burden of adjustment.
The experience thus far with consultation in

780

DEPARTSTENT OF STATE BUIXETIN

the OECD indicatcii quite cleuily that the most
fruitful results are obtained when consultation
is frequent and is directed toward alternative
approaches to policy still in the niakinfj;.

Cooperation in the OECD is not usually aimed
at the development of uniform national policies.
The consultative process leaves ample room for
differences in policies stenuning from varying
emphasis of national objectives and nmltiplicity
of national circvmistances. The primary aim of
policy coordination in the OECD is to insure
that national policies develop in step with each
other.

The increasing interdependence of the econo-
mies of the industrialized countries makes it im-
perative that North America, "Western Europe,
and Japan act on the basis of their common in-
terests and avoid the damage that can follow
from imrestrained pursuit of narrow national
objectives. Economic growth and financial sta-
bility of the OECD countries depend in no small
measure on the understanding of and confidence
in each other's policies.

Shortly after the OECD came into being, the
members set a common economic growth target.
All OECD governments agreed to follow delib-
erate policies to increase the aggregate gross
national product by 50 percent before the end of
1970. To reach this goal without creating finan-
cial instability or balance-of-payments disequi-
librium, national policymakers are finding it
necessary to coordinate monetary and fiscal
policies. In the consultative process in the
OECD, senior policy officials from capitals ex-
amine together actions that each might take to
stimulate or — if inflationary pressures are
high — to restrain demand by means that will
minimize international repercussions.

One example of how we used this consultative
process may be of interest. Wliile considering
its tax cut proposals, the administration dis-
cussed and jointly examined the American eco-
nomic situation and prospects with our partners
in the OECD. Prior to these discussions there
had been widespread belief that foreign busi-
nessmen and private and central bankers would
be frightened by expansionary fiscal policies
and budget deficits in the United States. Fears
of inflation, it was said, might lead to a flight
from the dollar. As a result of extensive discus-
sions, however, the OECD recommended that

the United States take vigorous fiscal action to
stimulate its economic growth and reduce un-
employment and idle resources. The adminis-
tration was then able to proceed with its pro-
gram in the knowledge that it was understood
and entlorsed by our OECD partners.

The rapid movement of the European Eco-
nomic Comnmnity membci-s toward full eco-
nomic union at a time when the economic
interdependence of all the OECD coimtries is
expanding and deepening creates special i)rob-
lems and imposes new policy requirements. The
constancy of American support for the Euro-
pean integration movement needs no reaffirma-
tion. The record speaks for itself. The stead-
fastness of our backing for the European
Economic Conmiunity permits us to point to
problems that concern us without fear of mis-
understanding.

As the EEC forges integrated policies, it is
essential for the common welfare that the EEC
and the other OECD countries develop their
policies in harmony. The process of policy in-
tegration of the EEC countries involves prob-
lems of greater intensity and magnitude than
the process of policy coordination among the
OECD countries. But this important differ-
ence should not obscure the need for the develop-
ment of consonant economic policies among all
the industrialized countries. Otherwise the di-
vei'gence of policies between the EEC and the
other major industrialized countries will create
harmful tensions. To minimize the damage
that can be done and to further the connnon
welfare, all of the OECD countries — including
the United States — should make deliberate ef-
forts to consider the repercussions of their ac-
tions on the interests of others. The develop-
ment of harmonious policies in the OECD will
benefit both European integration and Atlantic
partnership, which are compatible, not con-
flicting, goals.

The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade affords a major occasion to move coop-
eratively aliead in an international forum in
which more than 60 countries around the world
participate. In tlie GATT negotiations, we will
have an opportunity to bring about the largest
mutual reduction of trade barriers in history.
The benefits from such a lowering of obstacles

UAT 18, 1964
729-82

781

to the movement of goods among nations would
be enoi-mous. Greater economic specialization
and more efficient utilization of resources would
permit more and higher quality products to be
made available to more people at lower prices.
We all stand to gain. It is the task of statesmen
and leaders throughout the industrialized coun-
tries to keep our common objectives rather than
our separate pioblems foremost in our minds
during the negotiations.

Common Responsibilities to Developing Nations

In working together to improve our security
and economic welfare, we — the rich and power-
ful nations — cannot ati'ord to ignore the nature
of the world we live in or to slight our common
responsibilities toward the less developed coun-
tries. Our well-being will be profoundly af-
fected by how we exercise our responsibilities
toward them.

Many of these countries are in the middle of
political revolution as tliey attempt to establish
themselves as viable political entities free from
the former colonial dependencies. More are in
the process of social revolution as they try to
create modern societies. Virtually all of them
are undergoing economic revolution as they
realize for the first time that poverty is not pre-
ordained and unalterable. Some are enmeshed
in all three revolutions at the same time.
Change — frequent, sudden, and far-reaching
change — pervades the less developed countries.
Social customs, political institutions, economic
activity, and personal values are being trans-
formed abruptly. The frequency of violence
and warfare is high.

The primary causes are political and social
and must be dealt with by the developing coun-
tries themselves. Only they can create the so-
cial structures and political institutions capable
of transforming revolutionary change into evo-
lutionary, stabilizing development. However,
we can help them if we attune ourselves to their
political and social efforts and if we help them
expand their economies. And it is in our own
interest to do so. Unless they do begin to
achieve their objectives, the cost of their failures
will surely be shared by us.

This is a herculean task, one requiring the
combined strength of the Atlantic partnership.

We need to act together to open further our
markets to the exports of the less developed
countries and to increase the flow of develop-
ment assistance to those coimtries.

A large reduction of trade barriers, as a re-
sult of success in the GATT trade negotiations,
would be of immense value to the developing
countries. In tliis comiection, I should point
out that the United States is prepared to reduce
its tariffs in these negotiations without requir-
ing reciprocity from the developing countries.
We should regard the participation of the de-
veloping countries in the trade negotiations as
a means to contribute to their development needs
rather than in terms of exchanges of concessions.

In the last 5 years, the aid extended each year
to the less developed countries by the members
of the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD has increased from a little over $4 bil-
lion to about $6 billion. The average duration
of development loans has lengthened measur-
ably, and the average yearly cost of these loans
has dropped considerably. Technical assistance
has increased markedly.

However, we should not allow such progi'ess
as has been made to blind us to the great unful-
filled needs of the less developed countries. The
gap between the development requirements of
these countries and the amomit of resources
available remains huge. There is a large and
continuing need for goods and skills that can be
provided only by the rich countries.

All the members of the Development Assist-
ance Committee — including the United States —
need to shoulder additional burdens. In ap-
praising our aid effort, we Americans too often
overlook the amount of assistance being ex-
tended to the less developed countries by the
other industrialized countries. Aid of the other
DAC countries, averaged over the 3 years from
1960 to 1962, amoimted to about .62 percent of
gross national product. Over tlie same period,
American aid came to approximately .63 per-
cent of gross national product. Thus, what we
are now doing and what we need to do falls with
i-elative equality on the United States and the
other major industrialized countries.

In all of these areas, the Atlantic nations are
being propelled toward partnership. The un-
derlying forces of interdependence are more
powerful and lasting than the forces that would

782

DEPAKTMENT OP 8TATB BUIXETTN

divide us. If we iijnoro <ho reality of our in-
terdependence and approach our problems in
terms of parochial interests, surely none of us
will prosper. If, however, we can perceive our
problems in the broader perspective of the com-
mon welfare, the benefits to all will be many
and great.

There may be times when we seem to hesitate
or falter. We may not always succeed in achiev-
ing full participation in common programs by

all the partners. The alliance may even on the
surface appear to be in "disarray."' But the in-
terests of its members in increasingly closer ties
between Europe and North America far out-
distance any disrupt ive tendencies. The United
States will cooperate with all those who wish to
move forward. As we face the challenges be-
fore us, let it not be recorded that our vision
was so limited that we failed to act together
for the conunon good.

The Nuclear Defense of NATO

by Gerard C. Smith

Special Adviser to the Secretary of State *

Admiral Minter, distinguished guests, dele-
gates, faculty, midshipmen : I am honored to be
here to join with you in opening the fourth
Xaval Academy Foreign AiJairs Conference,
attended by outstanding young men and women
from all over the United States.

This year's conference considers "Problems of
United States Foreign Policy in the European
Community."

I would like to discuss with you tonight a
project which is designed to meet one of the
most pressing of these problems : How can the
United States share strategic deterrent respon-
sibilities with its NATO allies without promot-
ing independent national nuclear forces?

The solution we propose to this problem has
much to do with the sea; naval officers have
contributed greatly to it. I speak of the MLF —
the multilateral force — the proposed missile
fleet for NATO.

' Address made before the U.S. Naval Academy For-
eign Affairs Conference at Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 22
(press release 178).

The Setting

First, let us look briefly at the problem to
which this MLF project is addressed.

Since the war, we have been trying to create
a working partnership between a uniting West-
ern Europe and North America. That partner-
ship, though not yet fully realized, has been
more successful than we once dared to hope.

The reconstruction of Europe under the Mar-
shall Plan, the development of NATO, the cre-
ation of three European Communities — the Coal
and Steel Community, the Common Market,
and Euratom — have all contributed to this suc-
cess. They have helped European countries to
draw closer — to each other and to North Amer-
ica— and to progress further toward higher
levels of economic and social well-being, more
stable and promising relations with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
and a somewhat more durable peace.

Obstacles to continuing progress, of course,
exist. The road ahead — the continuing move-

MAT 18, 1964

783

ment toward European integration and Atlantic
partnership — will not be smooth. The long-
term prospect is favorable, but the inevitable
only comes to pass, as Justice Holmes wisely ob-
served, through human effort.

I am told that a British Army manual used
to advise that the best way to avoid mortar fire
is by going forward. By the same token, the
way for Europeans and Americans to avoid be-
ing sidetracked or blocked by the obstacles to
European integration and Atlantic partnership
is by going forward in new joint programs :

— For Europeans : in programs which follow
the classic pattern of European integi'ation, af-
fording eveiy interested country an opportunity
to join on a basis of equality, without any sug-
gestion of first- or second-class membership.

— For Europeans and Americans: in pro-
grams which follow the classic pattern of At-
lantic partnership — close association with the
U.S. while leaving open the opportunity for an
ever-larger European role as Europe moves to-
ward political unity.

Such new joint ventures are needed just as
much in defense as in other fields. Neither
European integration nor Atlantic partnership
will rest on a solid basis if they extend only to
the economic area.

A relapse into nationalism would be particu-
larly disruptive in the field of nuclear weapons.
If each industrially qualified ally should build
its own nuclear weapons, a harvest of division
and allied friction would result, weakening the
Atlantic alliance, seriously prejudicing the ef-
ficiency of the alliance nuclear deterrent, and
adding complications in the field of arms con-
trol. Alternatively, if the European Com-
munity were to be divided into first- and second-
class citizens, with some countries claiming
special status by reason of national nuclear
programs which other countries lack, this would
not be conducive to a cohesive community.

The Problem

Against this background, we now face the
question of how best to respond to European
nuclear concerns.

Over the past 7 years the Soviet Union has

been deploying hundreds of rockets aimed at
Western Europe. This array is still growing.
Although programed U.S. forces would be ade-
quate to meet the threat, there is a good case for
replacing some of these programed forces with
medium-range missiles. On military grounds,
two successive NATO Supreme Commanders,
Generals [Lauris] Norstad and [Lyman L.]
Lemnitzer, have urged deployment of such mis-
siles to help cover Soviet forces directly threat-
ening Europe.

Broader political and psychological consider-
ations are also involved. The Soviet leaders
have not hesitated to put their rockets to politi-
cal use. They have reminded European coun-
tries from time to time how easily the U.S.S.K.
could destroy the Acropolis or the orange groves
of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or
France. Nuclear blackmail addressed to
Euroije lay at the heart of Moscow's pressure
on Berlin over the period 1958-62.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Europeans
living so near this Soviet nuclear power have
been anxious to have a larger role in long-range
strategic deterrence, to complement their ex-
isting manning, ownership, and share in con-
trol of shorter range missiles.

Criteria Governing an Effective Response

For years leaders of the alliance have been
seeking to devise an effective response to this
European concern. There is a good measure of
agreement on the criteria which any response
should meet :

First: It should achieve its immediate politi-
cal purpose. It should respond to the con-
cerns of our European friends.

Second: It should achieve its military pur-
pose. It should be a credible and substantial
component of the alliance nuclear deterrent.

Third: It should be a stable and responsible
form of deployment. It should not add to the
complex disarmament problem or make it more
difficult to bring the arms race under interna-
tional safeguarded restraints.

Fourth: It should be financially manageable.
It should not retard needed economic growth,
social reform, or buildup of conventional mili-
tary forces.

784

DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN

Fifth: It sliouUl strens^then the prospects for
European unity and transatlantic partnei-sliip.

Alternative Responses

Three ixissible responses to the European nu-
elear/MRBM problem have heen considered:

1. Stratef!:ic nuclear weapons needed to cover
the direct threat to NATO Europe could be pro-
vided by T^.S. forces, vrith the Europeans hav-
ing a larger consultative role about their use.

2. The I^.S. could supply medium-range mis-
siles to allied forces for imfianal manning and
ownership.

3. The U.S. and interested allies could jointly
ovra, man, and control medium-range missiles
deployed to the European theater.

The first course — virtually exclusive U.S.
coverage of the threat — does not seem likely to
respond fully to European concerns. It would
not provide medium-range missiles close at
hand to offset Soviet rockets, unless such mis-
siles were deployed to U.S. forces only. We
would be hard put, in this case, to explain to
our allies why we proposed to deny them any
role in ownership, manning, and control of such
missiles. This kind of discrimination could not
fail to be politically divisive.

Some people believe that increased consulta-
tion between the U.S. and its allies about the
use of U.S. strategic power would constitute
an adequate response to this problem. Discus-
sion and exchange of information about stra-
tegic forces is, indeed, now taking place within
the NATO framework. This process has in-
creased in pace within the last year, and we
favor continuing efforts to extend such consul-
tation. Improved arrangements for doing so
were agreed upon at the Ottawa NATO meet-
ing only last year.^

If consultation about alliance strategic forces
remains imperfect, it is not for lack of good
will or machinery. Rather it is because the
consultation is one-sided. So long as consulta-
tion means other countries advising the U.S.
about what to do with American strategic
power, to which they have made little contri-

' For text of a communique, see Botxetin of June 10,
1963, p. 895.

bution, I have the feeling that it will, while
useful, remain limited in effect. T\\f effective-
ness of consultation is apt to be in direct pro-
portion to the degree of participation by the
consulting nations in the operation (hey are
consulting about.

^[oreover, participation in nuclear matters
within Europe is uneciual. Some countries al-
ready have national nuclear weapons programs.
The nonnuclear powers in Europe may not be
prepared to accept indefinitely this inequality
in participation. Improved nuclear consulta-
tion will not cure that inequality.

For all these reasons, European leaders are
likely to find nuclear consultation with the
United States an inadequate substitute for a
role of active participation in operation of stra-
tegic weapons.

I turn now to the second course of action:
deployment of medium-range missiles to allied
national forces.

We followed this course in deploying first-
generation IRB]\rs to the maritime flank areas
of NATO Europe: U.K., Italy, and Turkey.
Under this system the missile was nationally
owned and manned by the allied country in
question. Any wartime decision to fire the mis-
sile would have required the agreement of the
U.S. and the owning country, under the so-
called "two key" system. These first-genera-
tion missiles were highly vulnerable to attack
and therefore have been phased out as obso-
lescent.

In deploying new medium-range missiles it
has seemed to us, as well as to some of our
European partners, that this pattern of na-
tional deployment should not be extended to
new strategic weapons. New Tiationally owned
and manned strategic missile forces could be
divisive within the alliance and unsettling in
terms of East-West relations. We ought rather
to be moving toward forms of ever-closer inte-
gration in the ownership, manning, and control
of such weapons.

If the answer lies neither in a near monopoly
of U.S. responsibility in the strategic field, even
with improved consultation, nor in U.S. bi-
lateral sharing with other national forces of
the alliance, what is left?

MAY 18, 19G4

785

The creative answer that has emerged, and
is beginning to assume concrete form, is the
MLF.

MLF: The Preferred Response

Here is our present concept of the MLF. It
is, of course, subject to refinement in the process
of arriving at an international agreement. It
M-ould be a fleet of surface warships, armed
with Polaris missiles, owned, controlled, and
manned jointly by a number of NATO nations.
The force would be under the military com-
mand of an allied officer and under the general
policy direction of a board of high officials of
the participating nations. The force would be
open to any NATO member willing to assume
a fair share of the costs and responsibilities.
No nation's share could exceed 40 percent.

The force would be manned by a mix of offi-
cers and crews from participating nations.
Each ship would be manned by nationals of at
least three countries, with no nation providing
more than 40 percent of the personnel in any
ship.

Major participants — that is, those countries
imderwriting a significant percentage of the
costs — would undoubtedly enjoy a position of
special influence, not only on control but on
such other matters as budgets, size, and future
developments of the force.

Firing of the missiles in wartime would be
by decision of an agreed number of partici-
pants, including the United States.

In the longer term, as President Johnson said
at Brussels last November,' "Evolution . . .
toward European control, as Europe marches
toward unity, is by no means excluded." Any
change in the control formula would, of course,
require the approval of all the participants. It
would hinge not only on European unity but
also on sufficiently wide European participa-
tion so that no single country could play a
dominant role. All this would not come about
quickly. In the case of the United States, par-
ticipation in the force as well as any change in
the control formula would require congres-
sional consent.
Tlie concept of a multilateral force was first

suggested by then Secretary of State Hert«r,
with the approval of President Eisenhower, at
the NATO Council meeting in December igeo."
It was reaffirmed by President Kennedy in a
speech at Ottawa the following year.^ Since
then it has generated increasing interest.

A working group representing the U.S.,
Italy, Germany, the U.K., Belgium, Holland,
Greece, and Turkey has been meeting in Paris
since October 1963. Its aim is to reach general
understanding of what the MLF would involve
and of its technical and political feasibility.
Encouraging progress is being made. There
seem to be no insuperable difficulties.

A naval demonstration of mixed manning is
about to start on a United States guided missile
destroyer, U.S.S. Biddle. Persomiel from the
United States, Germany, Italy, the U.K., the
Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey will take part.
In about a month's time European officers and
men will start to take over about half the ship's
billets. It is good to be able to report that the
officers and men of the Biddle are deeply inter-
ested and confident of success in working out
this promising possible prototype of future
allied cooperation.

It long has been standard practice to have
crews of many nationalities on merchant ships.
Crews of a nimiber of European allied nations
manned some British ships in World War II.
And mixed manning has been successfully car-
ried out for prolonged periods in the turnover of
U.S. naval vessels to foreign navies. Our Navy
and all allied naval experts who liave examined
the problem have concluded that, with skillful
training and good motivation, efficient and
happy ships can be jointly manned by crews
made up of men from allied navies.

European Interests

Let us now look at the IMLF against the cri-
teria which, as I mentioned earlier, must govern
any response to the European missile problem.

To take the political criterion first: Would
the MLF respond to European concerns?

We believe that it would do so in several
ways:

" Ihid., Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

* For background nnd text of a conmiutiique, see
iftirf., .Tan. 9, 1961, p. 39.
" For text, see ihid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.

786

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

First: It would deploy medium-range mis-
siles to tlie European area. European countries
which agree with Gciicrnl Lemnitzer, the Su-
preme ^yiied Conmiander in Europe, in favor-
ing such deployment would be encouraged.
They would expect these missiles' presence to
help not only to deter aggression but also to
frustrate attempts at ballistic blackmail.

Second: It would, as a high European de-
fense official said recently, be "a clamp holding
the U.S. and Europe together. . . ." Because
the force would be jointly owned, it should fur-
ther strengthen the profound U.S. commitment
to the common defense of Europe symbolized
and given substance by the presence of our
forces in Berlin, in Germany, and elsewhere in
Europe.

Third: It would narrow the present gap be-
tween nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Eu-
rope. All members of the MLF would share in
ownership, managing, and manning of the force.

Fourth : It would increase the effectiveness of
consultation about use of alliance nuclear forces.
MLF would afford its members the knowledge,
sense of responsibility, and participation needed
to make nuclear consultation effective. The
mere existence of MLF and the need for deci-
sions about its targeting, deployment, and fu-
ture evolution are boimd to improve the depth
and significance of such consultation. Far from
being an alternative to improved allied nuclear
consultation, MLF may well be an essential
component to a more meaningful form of con-
sultation.

Fifth : It would be a nuclear defense program
in which Europe's role and influence could grow
as Europe moved toward unity. The eventual
possibility of such a larger European role is an
important element in making the MLF a viable
alternative to national nuclear weapons pro-
grams.

Obviously, MT^F does not offer what national
nuclear programs purport to do: national nu-
clear status. It is intended to move in exactly
the opposite direction. It offers a collective
approach to the nuclear weapons problem.

While the present appeal of MLF is thus
largely to major nonnuclear European powers,
we can hope that in the long run countries now
having programs of their own may also come to
see the merits of the MTvF.

Military Questions

I turn now to the second criterion against
which any proposed response to the European
missile problem must bo tested : What about the
military utility of MI^F?

The U.S. Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Secretary of Defense, after close study, have
concluded that MTjF would be militarily effec-
tive and a useful element of NATO's strategic
deterrent forces. General Lemnitzer has
stated he would welcome MLF because it would
help to meet his military requirement.

As presently planned, the MLF would have
Polaris A-3 missiles of great penetration capac-
ity. These missiles would be usable for all
the purposes of deterrence and defense of
Europe for which the weapons of U.S. Polaris
submarines are capable. They would be effec-
tive against many missile sites, airfields, and
other targets threatening European nations of
the NATO alliance. These missiles would be
assigned to NATO and placed under the opera-
tional control of SACEUR [Supreme Allied
Commander Europe] . They would be targeted
by SACEUR and be included in NATO stra-
tegic plans.

The U.S. Navy has studied the survivability
of the MIjF from the standpoint of possible
surveillance and attack on MLF warships by
submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, and
missiles. It conducted this study under con-
tingencies of cold war, limited war, and general
war. It concluded that MLF's survivability
would be high — more than sufficient to insure
its effectiveness as a deterrent, an operating
force, and a reliable second-strike retaliatory
system.

MLF warships would be almost indistinguish-
able from thousands of other ships in the same
area; they would, in peacetime, be lost in 3 to
4 million square miles of Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean waters surrounding NATO territory;
they would be able to outrun most trailing
vessels and able to "scrape off" shadowing sub-
marines in friendly coastal waters too shallow
for submarine operation; they would operate
behind the shield of the NATO landmass over
which attacking planes could not fly unopposed ;
they would benefit from protection by NATO
air and surface forces during hostilities; and

MAT 18, 1964

787

they could exploit the blanketing effect of
islands and restricted passages for protection
from radar detection and tracking.

The fact that the United States is prepared
to devote resources and manpower to MLF is
the best evidence of our confidence in its invul-
nerability and military effectiveness.

A question may arise as to the relation of the
MLF to the level of existing and progi-amed
U.S. forces.

Certainly, the United States now has stra-
tegic forces of immense power. But future in-
creases in U.S. missile strength are bemg pro-
gramed for two reasons :

First: Present U.S. strategic delivery systems
rely to a large degree on manned bombers. As
some of these bombers become obsolescent, they
must be replaced.

Second: Tlie Soviet rocket inventory is not
static — it continues to grow. If effective deter-
rence is to be maintained, NATO forces must
keep pace until safeguarded international arms
control arrangements are achieved.

As I indicated earlier, the increased "Western
missile strength that is needed could be made
up either of wholly U.S. forces or a mix of U.S.
and allied forces. If the latter coui'se is fol-
lowed, the MLF could substitute for some of the
presently programed U.S. forces. At the De-
cember meeting of the North Atlantic Council,
Secretary McNamara said :

If the members of the alliance should wish, we
are prepared to join other interested Allies in substi-
tuting sea-based, medium-range missiles for some of
the longer range systems now included in our pro-
gram. In that event, we believe that this force should
take the form of the multilateral surface ship force
now under discussion. . . .

The MLF could thus not be a net addition
to, but a substitution for, some of the increased
strength the U.S. now plans to build.

Would the MLF be a credible part of NATO's
deterrent to war ?

As a strategic weapon system with a high
degree of survivability, the MLF is likely to
be fired by the participating governments,
which would have to act at the highest level,
only in one of two circumstances :

First: In response to Soviet nonnuclear at-
tack so strong tliat it could not be contained by

nomiuclcar forces. The NATO governments
have already agreed on guidelines for such cir-
cumstances.

Second: Under second-strike conditions, af-
ter a Soviet nuclear attack. In this event,
the prior fact of Soviet nuclear attack should,
in effect, make the decision. Nuclear war would
already have begun.

Their decision would be facilitated by experi-
ence in working together in the MI^F. The
process of continuous consultation and planning
which will be required for peacetime operation
of the MLF should widen the area of agreement
among MLF members about strategic matters.
It would thus permit them to decide more read-
ily on the wartime conditions under which these
missiles would be fired.

There is thus little doubt that Moscow will
regard the MLF as a credible component of
Western nuclear armament.

Effect on East-West Relations

I turn now to the third criterion : A strategic
missile deployment to the European theater
should not have a damaging effect on the
chances for disarmament and for improving
relations with the Soviet bloc.

A central and persisting security problem of
the alliance is how to build and maintain an
effective defense posture in such a way as to
reinforce, rather than weaken, efforts to bring
militai-y power under safeguarded international
control.

While prosecuting our defense programs, we
must stay alert to any opportunities for realistic
arms control arrangements. Especially when
dealing with nuclear weapons systems of un-
imaginable destructive potential, we must resist
the natural mental callousness that tends to ac-
cumulate in those who have to deal for long
periods with awful but necessary things.

I can assure you that these considerations
weigh heavily on the planners who are putting
together the program to carry out the MLF
concept.

It is fair to say that the MLF would consti-
tute the first weapons system in historj- especial-
ly designed with arms control considerations
in mind. It is especially designed not to result

788

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

in tlic iiatiomil proliferation of nnclcnr weapons.
Kecentiy Secretary Kusk pointed out that,"

The detailed arraugemeiits for the MLF will include
mutually agreed strong and enduring safeguards
against any one nation's securing control of any of the
MLF weapons. We believe that when the Soviet Gov-
ernment understands this, it will recognize that the
MLF does not constitute a proliferation of national
nuclear systems but. on the contrary, is an alternative
to it.

Let me be more specitic :

The missiles in the MLF will be manned,
owned, and controlled multilaterally, rather
than nationally as was the case with earlier
model stratejiic missiles deployed in Europe.
The MLF will thus not involve nuclear missiles
in the hands of any individual state.

Any wai-time decision to lire the missiles
would be by multilateral agreement, rather than
by bilateral agreement as in the case of these
earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus
increase the number of states with a finger on
the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear
trigger.

There would be no increase of risk of com-
promise of weapons design data under MLF.
Multilateral custodial procedures would assure
that individual countries had no greater access
to information about how to design and manu-
facture weapons than at present under the
NATO atomic stockpile. Stringent protec-
tion against espionage and sabotage will also be
provided.

All of this is not to say that MLF will be
welcomed by the U.S.S.R. It will do its best
by propaganda and diplomacy to forestall MLF.
This must be expected because MLF would not
only constitute an offset to Soviet rockets op-
posing Europe, but would also evidence a new
degree of Atlantic unity, which Soviet policy
has long sought to prevent.

Nevertheless, it is clear that it is in the interest
of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. not to pursue a
policy of proliferation, whatever may or may
not be recorded in formal agreements on this
subject. And the MLF, by offering a viable
alternative to national nuclear weapons pro-
grams, should improve the chances for limita-
tion of national weapons-producing centers.

'Ibid., Apr. 27. 1964, p. 650.

Even tliough the MLF would not result in
proliferation of nuclear weapons, a question is
sometimes put as to whether it is sensible to con-
tinue with a major now weapons system while
negotiating about disarmament. The answer is
simple: The U.S.S.R. continues to strengthen
its missile arsenal targeted on Western Europe.
So long as these hundreds of Soviet rockets are
arrayed against Europe, effective European par-
ticipation in strategic deterrence should not be
precluded.

This participation need not, moreover, in-
crease the presently planned level of Western
missile strength. For, as I have already indi-
cated, the MLF could substitute for some of the
now programed U.S. weapons. This is one
reason the U.S. Government has said publicly
that the MLF would be consistent with a missile
freeze.

This European participation could, moreover,
be helpful in efforts to bring nuclear armaments
under international control. For the MLF
would not only give its members, as coowners of
significant nuclear power, a good claim to pai"-
ticipate in disarmament negotiations; it would
also give them the strategic understanding re-
quired to play an effective role in such nego-
tiations.

And now a special word about the relation of
the MLF to recently announced fissionable ma-
terial cutbacks.' These cutbacks are welcome
steps. But, as President Johnson and Premier
Khrushchev have said, this is not disarmament.
The U.S. cutback is designed to bring produc-
tion in line with need and to reduce tension
while maintaining necessary power. President
Johnson has reaffirmed all the safeguards
against weakening our nuclear strength which
we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty.*
The cutbacks do not ease the specific problem
MLF is designed to meet.

Cost

Another important criterion is that the costs
of a missile force should be economically man-
ajreable. It should not retard economic and

' For an address by President Johnson before the
Associated Press on Apr. 20, see ibid.. May 11, 1964,
p. 726.

»/6id., p. 744.

MAY 18, 1964

789

social progress or the development of needed
conventional forces.

During the first 5 years of construction of the
force we estimate that the average annual costs
to European nations becoming major partici-
pants m tlie MLF would be between 1 percent
and 4 percent of their average annual defense
expenditures. The cost to the smaller countries
would be an even smaller percentage of their
defense budgets. In later years the annual cost
would be very much less for all these countries.

These are costs well below those of other ma-
jor military programs being carried out by these
NATO countries. They seem well within the
margin of adjustment in the defense budgets
and the national economies involved.

European Unity and Atlantic Partnership

The last of the criteria that I mentioned is
that any approach to the European missile
problem should contribute to our political
goals: Atlantic partnership and European
unity.

Political and military cooperation in NATO
has been a good start toward the Atlantic part-
nership. Economic cooperation in OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] and increased trade opportunities
now being sought in the Kennedy Round will,
we trust, constitute a second functional base.
MLF offers the nucleus of a transatlantic nu-
clear defense association which could be an ad-
ditional political-military underpinning for a
concrete Atlantic partnership.

The MLF would also contribute to European
integration. It would do so in three major
ways:

1. It should reduce the attraction and ap-
parent rewards of national nuclear programs,
thus diminishing the likelihood that such po-
litically divisive programs will spread.

2. It would narrow the present gap between

nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Europe, a
gap which cannot fail to impede the European
Community's progress toward unity.

3. It would require joint European work and
create a venture in which European countries
would find it advantageous to concert conunon
positions.

European unity will thus be furthered by the
need for the European nations to come to-
gether in order to achieve specific jjurposes.
The common control of nuclear energy for de-
terrence, sought under the shadow of a threat
peculiarly addressed to Europe, is such a
purpose.

If MLF can reduce the obstacles to European
integration and Atlantic partnership that nu-
clear weapons nationalism is causing, it would
be well worth its costs many times over.

We must go forward toward European and
Atlantic unity on a broad front if we are to
achieve our goals. The MLF can be one part
of this broad movement.

Moving Into Changing Times

These are the important reasons why Presi-
dent Johnson said in his speech at the Asso-
ciated Press luncheon on April 20 :

We realize that sharing the burden of leadership
requires us to share the responsibilities of power. As
a step in this direction we support the establishment
of a multilateral nuclear force composed of those na-
tions which desire to participate.

The MLF is a new concept. It is designed
to meet a new need : closer integration within
the alliance in the strategic nuclear field, ac-
complished in a way that will not hinder prog-
ress toward arms control.

Because it is a new concept, a wrench to ac-
customed ways of thinking will be needed to
bring it about. But we are moving into chang-
ing times. Bold innovation is needed in these
times. We must seize the opportunities open
to us with vigor and courage.

790

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Citizen's Role In Foreign Policy Legislation

by Robert J. Manning

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs '

We are living in a turbulent world. The
history of our era relentlessly marches on, and
week by week — sometimes day by day — it con-
fronts us with new events, new problems, new
challenges, and new opportunities. In such a
period as this it takes the best efforts of all
Americans to think through the implications
and the ramifications of the role which history
has thrust upon our country in the field of world
affairs.

It is for this reason that I am exceptionally
glad today to meet with this very active Foreign
Policy Legislation Clearing House of the World
Affairs Council of Philadelphia. We are con-
cerned in foreign affairs today with the per-
petuation and development of the freedoms for
which our forefathers fought. In the preamble
of that great document which was drafted here
in Philadelphia in 1787, our Founding Fathers
said that they were concerned to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos-
terity." The basis of the foreign policy of the
I'nited States has never been expressed moi'e
eloquently.

I would like to come back to this concept
later. First, I want to take a few minutes to
tell you that I have Ijeen most impressed with
what I have learned about the work of this
Clearing House. I understand that its purpose
is to keep your membership closely and accu-
rately informed on the status of foreign affairs
legislation under consideration in the Congress

' Address made before the Foreign Policy Leffislation
Clearing House of the World Affairs Council of Phila-
delphia at Philadelphia, Pa., on .\pr. 23 (press release
179).

— that great lawmaking body in which you
Philadelphians have a special reason to be in-
terested, for it was here that it had its begin-
nings. I have read the March issue of your
Clearing House Newsletter with admiration. I
note that you not only seek to inform your mem-
bers but that you encourage them to write to
their representatives in Congress and to express
their views. I am sure that you will do this
freely and frankly, soberly and responsibly.
It is an admirable program, and I wish you
great success with it.

Foreign policy is everyone's business because
it affects everyone. All too often, the pressures
that are brought on the Congress for or against
legislation are based on individual self-interest.
But in the case of this Clearing House, and
your concern with foreign affairs legislation, I
am sure that individual self-interest is the last
thing by which you would be motivated. In
this organization you come together because of
your deep sense of public responsibility. You
inform yourselves, you discuss the issues, you
make up your minds about what is required by
the public good, and you take action to insure
that your views are made known where it
counts. That is responsible citizenship.

It is my understanding that you wish me to-
day to report, to you on some of the legislation
which is now before the Congress in wloich the
Department of State has a deep interest. This
I shall be glad to do, but not in detail. As I am
sure you are aware, it is not I who represents
the Department in its relations with Congress
and who is particularly concerned witli our
legislative program in foreign affairs. That

MAT 18, 1964

791

person is my colleague Frederick G. Dutton,
who addressed you last year. I want to put my
emphasis today not on legislation, despite your
very specific and fully justified interest in it,
but on the broader field of the citizen's role in
foreign affairs.

Pending Legislation

So let me report to you briefly on some of the
legislation now before Congress and some of
the fields in which the Department very urgently
needs the imderstanding and support of the
Congress.

In making a brief report I hope I shall not be
too brief for your taste. I am reminded here
of an old newspaper story about the cub reporter
who went to work on a New York morning news-
paper. His first night on the job, the city editor
sent him out to cover an immigrant wedding on
New York's then turbulent East Side, the idea
being to give the youngster a chance to try his
hand at writing a mild color story.

At midnight the young reporter rushed into
the newsroom, his eyes glittering with excite-
ment, flung himself at his typewriter, and clat-
tered away on the keys. Presently the night city
editor, puf&ng on his pipe, looked up and took in
what was going on. He strolled over to the
youngster, put a fatherly hand on his shoulder,
and said, "Ease up, son. There's no space to-
night. Hold it down to two paragraphs."

"Two paragraphs?" the youngster cried out
in anguish.

"Yes, two paragraphs. And make them
short."

"Well, okay, if that's the way you want it,"
grumbled the reporter. And here is what he
wrote :

"There was a colorful wedding last night in
East Side New York. Fourteen bodies have
been taken to the City Morgue. The dead are as
follows. ..."

I do not want to take all the color out of my
story. But let me give you a capsule report.

" BtTLi-ETiN of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.

* For an address on "Foreign and Domestic Implica-
tions of U.S. Immigration Laws" by Abba P. Schwartz,
see ibid., Apr. 27, 1964, p. 675.

* For an excerpt from President Johnson's state of the
Union message, see ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

Some of the bills in which the Department is
especially interested at this session of the Con-
gress are as follows :

/. Amendments to the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act

What we are trying to do in this field is to
change the basis for the selection of immigrants
to be admitted into the United States. The
legislation now before Congress, which was pro-
posed last year by President Kennedy ^ and has
the full support of President Jolmson, would
abolish the national-origins system which has
been in effect since 1924.' Over a 5-year period,
the new amendments would provide that our
present national quotas would be phased out,
20 percent each year. The national quotas would
be incorporated into a single worldwide quota,
which could be used more rationally and flexibly
than is possible under present laws. Our selec-
tion of immigrants would no longer be based on
ethnic and nationality considerations. Instead,
preferences would be given to applicants who
have valuable skills to offer the American econ-
omy, or who have close relatives in the United
States and want to be rejoined with their fami-
lies.

This legislation represents less of a change of
practice than you might think, since we have
been admitting large numbers of persons under
special refugee legislation. But it does repre-
sent a restatement of our immigration philos-
ophy, and it would enable us to eliminate many
of the discriminatory features of our present
laws, especially as they relate to Asians and
Africans and to southern Europeans.

As President Johnson said in January,* this
nation which was built by immigrants should
ask those who seek to immigrate here not where
were they born but what kind of citizens they
would make and what they are prepared to do
for this coimtry. I am sure that you realize that
our jjresent immigration laws do very much
complicate our effort to maintain good rela-
tions with the less developed nations of the
world, and they cloud our image overseas. It
is time for a policy more in accord with the
true spirit of this Republic.

The status of the present amendments, by the
way, is that bills have been introduced into both
Houses of Congress and the Senate has held

792

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

some hearings. It is hoped that the Congress
can consider them after it has taken final action
on the civil rights bill.

g. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs

I mention this important bill because I un-
deretand you requested a report. Mr. Dutton
talked to you about it last year; so I do not need
to go into detail at this time. The proposal is
to establish a high-level, interdepartmental in-
stitution to be known as the National Academy
of Foreign AlTairs.' It would serve all Federal
departments and agencies, providing advanced
instruction to government personnel in the fields
of foreign languages, foreign cultures, and for-
eign affairs. It would also house facilities for
important research. Outstanding authorities
from all over the counti-j' would be drawn into
the Academy's programs, and the academic re-
sources of the Nation would be linked more
directly to government operations and responsi-
bilities.

At present the legislation is in committee in
both Houses of Congress, but only the Senate
has held hearings. A number of top officials of
the Department have testified in favor of this
proposal, which grew out of the recommenda-
tions of the Herter committee in 1962. We
attach great importance to the proposed Na-
tional Academy, which we feel would have a
profound effect in heightening the skills and ca-
pabilities of our personnel. In the meantime,
we are already carrying on a rich program of
instruction with our present facilities, doing
as much as we can do under existing legislation.

3. Foreign Aid

"We need first authorizing legislation and then
an actual appropriation. The foreign aid
legislation now before Congress would provide
for sufficient new authority to cover the adminis-
tration's appropriation requests for $3.4 billion.
Of this total, $2.4 billion has been requested for
economic assistance and $1 billion for military
assistance.

The Presidents foreign aid request this year
is an extremely tight and realistic one.^ He is
asking for the same amount which the Congress
recently voted for the 1964 fiscal year. There

is no leeway at all in this request; it represents
the bare minimum of aid funds which this ad-
ministration feels tiiat it must have in order
adequately to protect and promote the security
of the United States. In the interest of the
authorizing legislation and the appropriations
requested. Secretary Rusk has already made
two appearances at hearings in the House, and
David Bell, Administrator of AID [Agency
for International Development], and Secretary
of Defense [Robert S.] McNamara ' are back-
ing him up with more detailed testimony. They
are being followed by a series of other witnesses
who will support the details of the requests.

There has already been talk on the Hill of
slashing the aid appropriations far below the
level of the President's request. Ladies and
gentlemen, the United States cannot risk this
folly. We need this program. It is vital.
We cannot hope to swing our proper weight in
the world and carry out our national purposes
without spending money. Without an ade-
quate foreign aid program we could not support
our effort in Viet-Nam, we could not hold the
bloody ground we fought to defend in Korea,
we could not save India and Pakistan from the
pressures on their northern borders, we could
not protect the investment in security we have
made in Greece and Turkey, and we could not
implement the Alliance for Progress. I ask
you, with all the urgency I can muster, are we
to slide into indifference and impotence all over
the world for lack of willingness to spend a sum
amounting to only 3.5 percent of our annual
budget and only six-tenths of 1 percent of our
annual gross national product ?

There are a lot of misunderstandings of our
foreign aid program. One is that it constitutes
a major drain on our balance of payments.
This is just not true. Tlie latest analyses of
how our aid money is spent show that 84 per-
cent of it is spent right here in the United
States, on American goods, American ma-
chinery, American equipment, American tech-
nical skills. I have no doubt that a considerable
amount is spent right here in greater Philadel-

• For background, see ibid.. Mar. 25, 1963, p. 427.
' For text, see ibid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

■ For statements made before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 23 and
by Secretary McNamara on Mar. 25, see ibid., Apr. 13,
1964, p. 595. and May 4, 1964, p. 705.

MAT 18, 1964

793

phia, that it is providing jobs and corporate
earnings and corporate profits to the people of
this important industrial center. And don't
forget that when American equipment goes
overseas, it is the forerunner of future exports
to nations which come to have familiarity with
our products and desire to keep importing them
in years to come.

Another misunderstanding is that we provide
the overwhelming proportion of the foreign
assistance which goes to the developing coun-
tries and that other advanced nations are con-
tributing far less than their share. Certainly
this was once true, but the situation is improv-
ing. Other advanced countries of the free
world are increasing their aid to the developing
countries more rapidly than we are. Of the 12
countries which make up the DAC, which is to
say the Development Assistance Conmiittee of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the other 11 combined are now
providing a higher percentage of their per
capita income than we are — 71 cents per capita
against our 66 cents. These coimtries in 1961
provided $2.5 billion in development funds, and
the amount is increasing annually.

Still another misunderstanding is that the
United States is scattering its aid too widely
and not concentrating it where it will do the
most good. The fact is that two-thirds of de-
velopment aid is now going to 7 countries —
Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan,
India, and Tunisia. Two-thirds of military as-
sistance is going to 11 countries along the Sino-
Soviet pei-iphery. And four-fifths of support-
ing assistance funds — aid which is used to back
up military assistance — is going to 4 countries,
Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Jordan.

A great many people speak of foreign aid as
if it were money sent down a rathole, without
results, which is making client countries perma-
nent economic dependencies of the United
States. This also is not true. In 17 countries
which once were receiving aid from us, eco-
nomic development has proceeded to the point
where they no longer need grants and soft loans
from us. Our aid program in those countries
has been terminated. In 14 additional coun-
tries, making .31 in all, economic assistance is
now being phased out, and the transition is be-

ing made to a status where they will be able to
obtain their capital needs from hard loans and
from private investment.

Still another misconception is that the foreign
aid program is unacceptable to the American
people. A 1963 Gallup Poll showed that 58
percent of the sample polled were in favor of
continuing foreign aid, while 30 percent were
opposed and 12 percent had no opinion. The
Research Corporation of America polled 1,500
business leaders in all parts of the United States
on this same subject and reported that 75 per-
cent of those asked said, "Don't discontinue for-
eign aid," while only 15 percent thought it
should be stopped and 10 percent had no opin-
ion. In other words, five out of six business
leaders who had opinions on foreign aid thought
it sliould be continued.

I think we are justified in concluding, on the
basis of these figures, that the American people
genuinely desire to continue the foreign aid pro-
gram. Naturally they want to have the money
properly expended and the progi-am efficiently
administered. Certainly there were mistakes
during the early, expei'imental years, when our
aid personnel were learning what could and
what could not be done effectively. And any
program of the magnitude and difficulty of ours
is bound to include a certain amount of waste
and himian error. But today, as Secretary
Rusk told the House Foreign Affairs Committee
last month, the program, under the able leader-
ship of David E. Bell, is the best run, best ad-
ministered, we have had since the days of the
Marshall Plan.

Before I leave foreign aid, I want to mention
a legislative proposal which the President has
sent to Congress.* It would encourage U.S.
private investment in the less developed coun-
tries by providing a tax credit to American
individuals or corporations investing in them.
This tax credit would amount to 30 percent of
the investment made, subject to certain restric-
tions to protect our balance-of-payments posi-
tion. It would have the effect of greatly in-
creasing the rate of yield on investment and

' For a draft of a bill "To amend the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 19.'>4 to allow a credit ajjaiust tax for cer-
tain investment in less developed countries, and for
other purposes," see H. Doc. 250, 8Sth Cong., 2d sess.

794

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

thus acting as an incentive. It has tlio full
support of the State Department and merits
your careful study and cousidoration.

So much for the legislation pending. I just
want to say what I am sure all of you hare
gathered by now, that we in the Department of
State are most ui'gently concerned over the
authorizing legislation and the appropriations
for tlie various parts of oiir pending foreign aid
pi'ogram — our mutual defense and development
programs, to give you the official nomenclature.
"We have come a long way in foreign aid in the
last two decades. We have every right to be
proud of what has already been accomplished.
We should all be deeply concerned as to what
we can accomplish in the future.

Defining American Foreign Policy

Let us turn for a moment to my other sub-
ject— the citizen's role in foreign affairs. We
in the Department of State are, after all, work-
ing for you. We are your representatives in
the urgently important field of American rela-
tions with the rest of the world. We owe you
an accounting of what we are doing and what
we are trying to do. And you, as citizens, as
taxpayers, as voters, as leaders in public opin-
ion, should consider whether we are on the right
track and are entitled to your support.

Let me first try to give you a definition of
American foreign policy. I spoke a while ago
of the phrase from the Founding Fathers, that
what we are after is to secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But let
me put this another way. The basic purpose
of American foreign policy is to assure the
continuation of the American people's experi-
ment with democracy. That is to say, we want
to survive as a people in a threatening world ;
but we also want to survive on our own terms,
as a nation with certain ideals, certain beliefs,
certain values, a certain philosophy of human
relationships and individual fulfillment that has
come down to us from our forefathers. And
we want to preserve the way of life that we
have developed and enjoy the privileges that
it has brought us.

But if we are to survive as a people and to
realize our national aspirations, we must take
into consideration the international environ-

ment. Wo cannot control that environment, for
there are 120 other recognized sovereignties on
this planet and some of them liave aspirations
and policies and programs which are seriously
in conflict with our own. Nevertheless, we can
profoundly influence our world environment.
We can reduce the threats from powers hostile
to us ; we can tighten the bonds of cooperation
with the powers friendly to us; and we can de-
velop the capabilities of those uncertain and
wavering comitrics who are neither hostile nor
friendly but desperately need lielp and will go
where they think they can find it.

Our program for influencing our world envi-
ronment, to make it less threatening and more
benevolent, is our foreign policy. There was a
period, a few years back, when the threat of
world communism was so immediate, so over-
whelming, so all-pervading, that all of Ameri-
can foreign policy seemed to be swallowed up
in the one great objective of turning back that
threat. The threat is still with us, and very
critically so in some world areas, but unless we
read the signs wrongly, it has diminished. The
bipolarized world of two superpowers which
existed a decade ago is gradually modifying its
character. We seem to be heading into a new
period of multinational pluralism, in which
alliances are becoming more flexible and many
countries are operating more independently.
Wliere a few years ago a public official might
have thought twice about defying the dogmatic
emotions of the cold war by quoting Palmerston,
he today may find himself pointing out that,
like the England Palmerston described, the
United States has no eternal enemies or perpet-
ual allies but only perpetual interests which its
leaders are bound to defend.

In the altered world situation the tasks of our
diplomacy are clear in outline but difficult in
detail. In the interest of our own security
and the security of those nations whose freedom
and well-being are vital to us, we must maintain
sufficient military strength and readiness to de-
ter or defeat aggression at any level. This is
what we call the "security through strength"
goal of American policy.

Secondly, we seek to tighten our bonds of
friendship and cooperation with the other ad-
vanced nations of the free world by a variety of
constructive arrangements — political, economic,

MAT 18, 1964

795

cultural — which will be as indispensable to
them as to us. This is "progress through
partnership."

Thirdly, we must help the less developed
areas of the world carry through their revolu-
tion of modernization without sacrificing their
independence or their pursuit of democracy.
We refer to this policy goal as the "revolution
of freedom."

Fourthly, we must assist in the gradual emer-
gence of a genuine world community, based on
cooperation and law, tlirough the establishment
and development of such organs as the United
Nations, the "World Court, the World Bank and
Monetary Fund, and other global and regional
organizations. This is the goal of "community
under law."

And fifthly, we must seek tirelessly to modify
the arms race and reduce the risk of war, to
narrow the areas of conflict with the Commmiist
coimtries, and to continue to spin the infinity of
threads that bind nations peacefully together.
We call this policy goal "peace through
perseverance."

As I have said, these tasks are clear in out-
line but difBcult to realize in concrete detail.

Nevertheless, we have certain assets on our
side. Most of the other 120 coimtries want the
same kind of world that we do. We believe
that the interests of the United States will be
best served by having as many nations as pos-
sible truly free and independent; most other
nations want this for themselves. We want to
see other countries of the world with govern-
ments based on the consent of the governed;
most other nations want this too, and no doubt
all would if their populations could be freely
consulted. We want other nations to be eco-
nomically developed and prosperous, with
higher standards of living; there is no nation
which does not want this.

In carrying out our policies we have in gen-
eral three categories of means. We can employ
military strength, which is the use of military
means. We can employ our economic wealth,
which is the use of economic means. And we
can employ our ideals, our values, our intel-
lectual capacities, our ability to persuade;
that is the use of psychological means —
or persuasion.

We have these three classes of means. I
cannot think of others which do not fall into
one of these three categories. When people
think of the Department of State, they usually
do not think of us as using military means, and
they are reluctant to have us use our economic
means. But persuasion by itself, without the
use of strength and wealth, is a rather insub-
stantial sort of tool. Diplomacy is the use of
persuasion to gain one's ends, but effective diplo-
macy has to be the use of persuasion backed
with strength and wealth.

Effectiveness of Organized Citizen Groups

Wliere the citizen can be effective in this
process is in informing himself as completely
as possible and then making his influence felt.
It is not enough for the citizen to understand
the problems facing our country in foreign
affaire, although that is an important portion
of his responsibility. Wliat is additionally
necessary is for him to understand the resources
and methods available to his national policy-
makers and conductors of foreign relations.

The citizen can study the issues and make up
his mind what should be done. Then he can
say that his government should do this and this
and that in the field of foreign affairs. My
point here is that he must also understand that
bricks cannot be made without straw. We
cannot have a strong defense policy unless the
people of the United States are willing to sup-
port an effective Military Establisliment and to
serve in it personally when called upon to do so.
And we cannot have a strong diplomacy unless
the people are similarly willing to provide the
Department of State with the resources it needs
and to give it their thoughtful support.

The role of the citizen in our democracy
should never be a passive one with relation to
foreign affairs. Foreign policy is everyone's
immediate concern, and the responsible citizen
should not only support and not only criticize;
he should also take the initiative on occasion
and become an activist. In foreign policy, as in
most issues of public policy, it is the organized
groups who are heard most clearly, and most
insistently, by the Congress and by the execu-
tive branch.

There are some Congressmen who don't like

796

DBTARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'

to hear executive branch officials telling the
public to support given policies or legislative
programs, but if the official lets tliis displeasure
scare hini, he neglects one important part of his
responsibility. If he is accountable to the pub-
lic for explaining policies and clarifying gov-
ernment actions, then the government official is
responsible, too, for pressing for the approval
of legislation and funds for those projects he
thinks are vital to the conduct of his work.

I hope, therefore, tliat this Foreign Policy
Legislation Clearing House will study with
great care the foreign alTairs legislation pend-
ing before the Congress, and that you will com-
municate your views not only to the Depart-
ment of State but also to your representatives
in the Capitol. I hope even more that you will
study the appropriations requests wliich the

President has made and which the Department
is bonding its energies to support. For if you
want us to be fully effective, you must be will-
ing for us to spend some realistic portion of
your tax dollar on the tasks of diplomacy.

But most of all I encourage you to continue
to carry out j'our responsibilities as a superior
and tiioughtful organization, to play a leading
role in the formation of public opinion on for-
eign affairs. It is difficult for the unorganized
public to develop views or to make those views
heard. But you are in a far more favorable,
and therefore a far more responsible, position.
I am sure that you recognize the importsince of
the role you are playing, and I wish you great
success, with all my heart, in carrj'ing out the
tasks in foreign policy formulation which you
have undertaken.

Can the United Nations Keep World Peace in the 1960's?

hy Leonard C. Meeker
Deputy Legal Adviser *

"Wlien we ask this question, we obviously
should not be thinking of the United Nations
as a separate and independent power in the
world, with its own resources, its own military
units, its own will, its own faculties of decision
and action. Despite the fears of some, and to
the disappointment of others, the United Na-
tions is not a sovereign; it is not a superstate
or world government.

The United Nations is, among other things, a
continuing diplomatic conference. In its vari-
ous bodies and meetings tlie delegates are rep-
resentatives of the governments of United
Nations members. "What the delegates say and
what they do is on instruction from their re-

' Address made before the Dade County Bar Associa-
tion at Miami, Fla., on Apr. 20 (press release 172).

spective governments. What a United Nations
body does, therefore, is what the member gov-
ernments are desirous or willing that it shall
do.

The operation and the effectiveness of the
United Nations quite evidently reflect, and are
governed by, the state of relations among the
nations of the world. The original conception,
held by the founders of the United Nations,
that unanimity among the great powers would
assure the Security Council's ability to keep
world peace was from the beginning nullified by
the absence of agreement and by the outbreak of
cold war. Tlie world organization had to adapt
to these facts, and it did. When the Soviet
boycott of the Security Council ended in August
1950 and the Soviet veto paralyzed the Council
from further action on Korea, the General As-

mat 18, 19G4

797

sembly took over, pursuant to residual charter
po-svers belonginfr to the Assembly.

During the 8 years while Dag Ilanunarskjold
■was Secretary-General, large responsibilities
■were carried by liini. He engaged in worldwide
peacemaking diplomacy, often under the broad
authority given to the Secretary-General by the
United Xations Charter. He also directed
major peacekeeping operations — involvmg siz-
able military' forces — in the Middle East and in
tlie Congo. This enlarged role of the Secretar^'-
General filled the vacuum which liad been
created by tlie relative iiiefi'ectiveness of the Se-
curity Council and wliich the General Assembly
had been unable fully to supply because of the
Assemljly's unwieldy size.

Hammai-slcjold's tragic death in September
19G1 was the end of another era in the life of
the United Nations. One immediate result was
a constitutional crisis over the choice of his suc-
cessor as Secretary-Gentnal. A year earlier.
Premier Ivlirushchev liad proposed to the Gen-
eral Assembly that the SecretarA'-General be
replaced by a triumvirate, or troika, composed
of Western, Communist, and nonalined figures.
His proposal followed a bitter attack on Ham-
marskjold for liis conduct of the Congo opera-
tion. During lytio and 1!)61 Communist efforts
to inliltrate and take over the Congo had been
fliwai'ted. and the young Republic was being
guided by the Ignited Nations on a course of in-
dependence and national unity. Now the So-
viets had a practical opportunity to press their
troika proposal, and they had a veto in the
Security Council to hhick the election of amj
successor to Hammai-slcjold.

Many weeks of liard discussions followed.
Not oidy the United States and countries of the
West, stood firm against the Soviet plan. The
uncommitted countries also were unwilling to
see the office of Secretary-General jiaralyzed and
nullified by iiiti-oduction of the X'cto ])i-iiici])le.
Under the Soviet plan, all three members of the
troika would ha\e to agree before any decision
could be made or action taken.

In the course of discussion the U.S.S.Iv. be-
gan to modify its projwsal and next asked that
a new Secretary-General have a troika of three
under secretaries to advise him. Finally the
Soviets dropped their insistence on the troika

scheme and acquiesced in the election of a dis-
tinguished diplomat of Burma — U Thant — to
the office of Secretai-y-General.

Those events occurred 2% years ago. They
came in the aftermath of the U-2 incident of
1960, Ivhi'ushehev's torpedoing of the Paris
smiunit meeting, his angi-y and tempestuous ap-
pearance for a month at the General Assembly,
and the Berlin crisis of 19G1 which culminated
in the erection of the wall. As we ponder the
United Nations and its prospects today, we are
aware of the changes that have taken place in
the world during these 214 years. The changes,
of coui-se, have a heavy beariiig on the future
of international organization and etl'orts to keep
the peace.

Since 1961 IT.S. defenses have beeii greatly
strengthened in the U)iited States and through
the deployment of Polaris submarines on the
oceans. Our national effoi't in s]:)ace programs
has been stepped up, and very substantial suc-
cesses have been scored. In 19G2 came the
Cuban missile crisis, and with it perhaps one of
the watersheds of history was crossed. Months
later, when the Soviet leadershiji had digested
the results of the crisis, they accepted last sum-
mer the earlier Ajnerican and British proposal
for a limited nuclear test ban treaty. This was
followed in October 1963 by agreement on a
General Assembly resolution designed to keep
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction from being stationed in outer space.
At the end of the year, there was unanimous
agreement in the ITnited Nations on a declara-
tion of legal princi])les governing the activities
of states in the exploration and use of outer
space.

Rift Between Moscow and Pciping

During the same jjeriod the rift between Mos-
cow and I'eiping widened and deepened. Some
of the sharpest Soviet thrusts came to bo re-
served for Coinnnmist China, while the views
of We.stei-n leaders on the large (juest ions of
war and peace began to be characterized as
"reasonable." Two weeks ago Cliairmim
Khrushchev said in Iliiiigai-y:

Till' ("liiiicsc IcMdcrs tell us: If tlicro is war — so
wliat '.■' Supposo oiu'-lialf of maiikiiul will bo doslro.vod.
'l^lic (ilhcr half will remain. Time will jiass, woinon

79s

Dr.i'AiiT:MKNr or st.vte iu'ixf.tin

will ngain bear children and nianliind will be the same
miiuber as before.

lu uiy opinion it is not from an excess of brains
but from an absence of them that jKJople say such
things.

During the same trip in Hungary Khrushchev
gave this statement on Soviet, aims in a Com-
munist society :

Some say that when the economy is growing, when
the riches of the i)eople are increasing, a kind of petty-
bourgeois transformation sets in. If so, we are proud
of it.

We made the revolution for the transformation of
the i)eople — to make people well provided for and to
assure them both their material and spiritual neetls.

The Chinese Communists, for their part, now
regard Khrushchev as such a renegade that tliey
accused him last winter of Bible reading and
psalm singing, of prayers and incen.se burning.

These developments in the Commmiist world
would have been startling a few years ago.
They deserve our close attention today. The
course of the Sino-Soviet conflict may be largely
beyond the power of the United States to in-
fluence. It behooves us nevertheless to watch
with care the unfolding of this conflict. The
nations of the "West and of all the free world,
as well as the Communist countries, have a
strong interest, and indeed a stake, in the out-
come.

The fact that this great split has occurred in
the Commimist world has by no means brought
a solution of the problems faced by the United
States in its relations with the Soviet Union.
This year's session of the Disarmament Con-
ference in Geneva has produced no agree-
ments— not even agreement on an agenda of
subjects to be discussed. Wide East-West
differences remain over Germany and Berlin,
and there is the ever-present possibility of dan-
gerous incidents between the armed forces that
face each other in Germany. Within the
U.S.S.R. narrowly- restrictive measures continue
to be taken regarding the movement of for-
eigners, including official representatives.

It is probably reasonable to guess that the
Soviet Government is sensitive to the pressure
of Chinese Communist propaganda and feels
that it must in some respects tailor Soviet ac-
tions with the Chinese position in mind. The
appeal of the hard line of Peiping to some

Communists in other countries has to be taken
into account by Moscow.

Events within the United Nations clearly
reflect the reality that large problems between
East and West remain. They have not been
solved or banished by conflict within the Com-
numist world. The capacity of the world orga-
nization to do its job in keeping the peace is
clearly affected by political issues dividing the
principal powers.

Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus

The recent Cyprus case illustrates very well
some of the main problems of peacekeeping that
confront the United Nat ions. On that troubled
island in the eastern Mediterranean, two com-
munities were engaged in progressively widen-
ing hostilities. The toll of dead, injured, and
suffering mounted from day to day. The effect
of communal violence on the island's economy
was ruinous. An adequate military force was
urgently needed to restore peace and order and
to allow efforts to be undertaken toward a ne-
gotiated settlement. The United Nations Se-
curity Council took up the case. Days and
weeks were consumed in negotiations leading up
to the creation of a United Nations force in
Cyprus. There was the problem of where the
forces would come from. There was the prob-
lem of how the whole operation would be paid
for.

Following adoption of the Council's resolu-
tion on March 4,^ it took 3 weeks to organize the
force and land the first United Nations contin-
gents on Cyprus. Had it not been for the
presence of British troops dispatched earlier at
the request of the Cypriot Government, the sit-
uation might have gone beyond repair and
ended in armed conflict between two members
of NATO— Greece and Turkey. Secretary-
General U Thant secured the agreement of
Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden to fur-
nish troops, in addition to the British forces.
Commitments to contribute funds were secured
from Britain, the United States,^ and 15 other

' For background and text of resolution, see
Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 405.

' For a Department statement regarding the U.S.
ofCer, see ibid., Mar. 30, 1964, p. 484.

MAT 18, 1964

799

countries— the Security Council having recom-
mended voluntary financing. Finally, in ac-
cordance with another recommendation of the
Council, the Secretary-General designated a
mediator to promote an agreed peaceful settle-
ment on Cyprus. T, J +^
In this precarious situation remedies had to
be improvised. They were slow in being orga-
nized and brought to bear. The problem of
financmg was a serious one, and the expedient
finally resorted to was one that would scarcely
serve in a large peacekeeping operation. Why
were such difficulties encountered? Why was
it not possible for the United Nations to pro-
ceed as expeditiously as in the Suez crisis ot
1956 or the Congo breakdown of I960?

It took time to get countries to agree to com-
mit their forces. The financial crisis wliich
confronts the United Nations was also a signifi-
cant factor. Jtlembers of the organization now
owe it $125 million in assessments that are
overdue. $92 million of this amount is owed
by members which do not allege inability to pay
but instead assert they have no obligation to
pay. This is more than a financial crisis; it is
a political and constitutional crisis.

Significance of U.N. Financial Crisis

The crisis arises from two of the most impor-
tant peacekeeping operations undertaken by the
United Nations in its nearly 20-year history.
The United Nations Emergency Force in the
Middle East and, to an even larger extent, the
United Nations Operation in the Congo have
been financially costly enterprises, especially
when judged by United Nations budgetary
standards. To date, the United Nations has
appropriated just over $500 million for these
two peacekeeping operations.

The Communist bloc in the United Nations,
led by the U.S.S.R., has maintained that there
is no legal obligation to pay assessments attrib-
utable to the two operations, on the ground
that the financing of them was not approved by
the Security Council. In other words, the So-
viet Union has wanted to introduce the veto into
United Nations financing, although the charter,
in article 17, plainly gives the financial author-
ity of the organization to the General Assembly

acting by a vote of two-thirds. France is an-
other principal United Nations member which
denies an obligation to pay peacekeeping assess-
ments. _ .
When the issue became clear in 1961 and it
was evident that serious fiinancial problems
loomed before the organization, one of the steps
which the General Assembly took was to ask the
International Court of Justice for an advisory
opinion whether the peacekeeping assessments
for the Middle East and Congo forces were
legally binding. Twenty countries, mcluding
tlie Soviet Union and the United States, filed
briefs. Nine countries, including the United
States and, for the first time in history, the
Soviet Union, presented oral argument.*

In July 1962 the Court ruled that the ex-
penditures authorized by the General Assembly
for Middle East and Congo peacekeeping were
"expenses of the Organization" within the
meaning of article 17 of the charter and that
the corresponding assessments were binding on
member states. Thereafter, the General Assem-
bly voted, by a very large margin, to accept the
Court's opinion. No valid argument is now left
that the Assembly's assessments for peacekeep-
ing are other than binding.

Since the Court gave its opinion, 34 countries
which had paid nothing on their Middle East
and Congo assessments have made payments
totaling $7.6 million on their arrears. Apart
from the moral suasion of international law as
declared by the Court and accepted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, what sanction is available to
induce payment? The charter itself contains a
sanction in article 19, which provides that a
member "shall have no vote in the General As-
sembly if the amount of its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount of the contributions due
from it for the preceding two full years."

In the interval since the Court's opinion, 13
member nations temporarily went over this J
2-year limit. But in each case--including two '
Communist states, Cuba and Hungary— the 13
made sufficient payments to forestall the appli-
cation of article 19 at the next succeeding Gen-
eral Assembly session. In one instance the de-

* For text of a U.S. statement, see ibid., July 2, 1962,
p. 30.

800

DKPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

linquent member had not made its pajTnent
before tlie session and absented itself from meet-
ings pending payment. The President of the
General Assembly said that he would have an-
nounced the member in question had lost its
vote if any vote had taken place and a repre-
sentative of the member luid been present.

At present, in the calendar year 1964, 17
United Nations members, including the
U.S.S.R., are in arrears by an amount more
than 2 years' contributions. If, by the time the
Assembly next meets, they have not made pay-
ments so as to reduce their arrears below the
critical level, they will have no vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly. As Ambassador Stevenson said
on this matter at Princeton University a month
ago,° "the charter must be applied in accordance
with its terms and without fear or favor." It
is the hope of the United States that members
now in arrears will make payments before this
year's session of the Assembly. We will con-
tinue to bend all our efforts to this end.

Only last week, the United Arab Republic,
whose \4ews and actions often carry consider-
able weight with the nonalined countries, paid
nearly all of its overdue Congo assessments.
The new action by the Government in Cairo
has increased the isolation of the group of
United Nations members declining to pay their
peacekeeping assessments. Yugoslavia had
earlier moved to pay part of its Congo assess-
ments. Today it is principally the Soviet bloc
and France that deny an obligation to pay these
peacekeeping costs.

Steps To Improve U.N. Peacekeeping Processes

The impact of the United Nations financial
crisis on the peacekeeping activities of the
organization is not theoretical or to be spoken
of in the future tense. It has become actual.
I have already noted that Cyprus was a close
call. On two other occasions in the last 2
years the United Nations has launched peace-
keeping operations in which the costs were
to be defrayed otherwise than through com-
pulsory assessment of the membership. In the

•For text, see U.S./O.N. press release 4374 dated
Mar. 23.

instances of West New Guinea and Yemen the
countries most immediately concerned agreed
to pay the costs.

Recent experience thus points up the need
for getting the United Nations better organized
to deal with brush fires in the modem world.
There are several steps that are worth taking.

First, on the question of peacekeeping forces,
we need to provide a means of supplying
quickly the military units frequently needed, in
larger or smaller numbers, for keeping the peace.
Very likely the United Nations does not want
and should not incur the expense of a standing
army sizable enough to be useful in all the kinds
of contingencies that may be foreseen. But
there is great merit in the plan under which
United Nations members earmark national mili-
tary units, equipment, and logistic support for
peacekeeping service.

Canada, the Nordic countries, and the Nether-
lands have already proceeded to do some ear-
marking in their national military establish-
ments. It is to be hoped that other United
Nations members will do likewise. Specialized
training for the units would be in order, for
the tasks of keeping the peace are different
from usual military assignments. The mem-
bers of peacekeeping forces are soldiers with-
out enemies. They need often to exercise diplo-
macy in carrying out their mission.

Earmarking of military forces by national
governments should be accompanied by the
development of a, permanent military staff in
the United Nations. This staff could consult
with governments on organi2ation and training,
advise the Secretary-General, and prepare plans
and procedures for a variety of possible peace-
keeping operations.

Second, there is the question of financing
future peacekeeping. Improvisation in an
emergency is not the best we can do when there
is time to plan ahead. A dependable system
of financing is required, particularly for opera-
tions of any substantial size. Later this year
a working group of 21 countries will meet at
United Nations headquarters to discuss the
problem of financing. As one means of deal-
ing with the problem, the group will consider
a special scale of assessment for peacekeeping
costs.

MAY 18, 1964

801

Third, and perhaps most basically, there is
the question of how a United Nations peace-
keeping operation is to be authorized and how
political control over it is to be exercised. We
have seen from the earlier history of the United
Nations that the organization cannot work if
such decisions are placed exclusively in the
Security Council, where the veto can frustrate
all action. After Korea, the alternative of
General Assembly debate and recommendation
was developed.

In the intervening years the United Nations
lias imdergone a great expansion. A 1045
membership of 51 has grown to 11. '5 members
today, with the prospect of a total of 125 to 1-30
during the next decade. This may require
some adaptation of procedures if the United
Nations is to remain relevant to tlie real world
and effective in it. Theoretically, a two-thirds
majority of tlie General Assembly could now be
formed by nations with only 10 percent of the
world's population, or which contribute, al-
together, 5 percent of the assessed budget. In
practice, tliis does not happen, and it would
be unduly alarmist to fear that the Assembly
will be taken over by "swirling majorities."

Nevertlielcss, even the theoretical possibility
that a two-thirds majority, made up primarily
of smiiller states, could recommend a course of
action for which other nations would bear the
primaiy responsibility and burden requires our
careful attention. As Secretary of State Eusk
said in his Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture in
New Vfjrk last January' 10 : "

TIip [ilain fart of the ninttor is that the United Na-
tions simply cannot talie significant action witliout the
sni)i>ort of (lie momlicrs who supply it witli resources
and liave tlio capacity to act.

It is unlikely that any scheme of weighted
voting will provide an answer. Among many
sucli schemes that have been devised aiul even
tested with computers, not one has been found
which would have been better from the view-
point of the United States. Moreover, the ])iin-
ciple of "sovereign equality"' and its deriva-
tive— "one state, one vote" — are probably so
firmly embedded in tlie Ignited Nations Charter

' Iti-M.KTi.N- of .Tan. 27. VMrl. p. 112.

and in the thinking of the international com-
mimity that any formal departure from them
may not be feasible.

Other methods are available for rationalizing
the decisionmaking processes of the United Na-
tions in regard to peacekeeping. Two measures
now under discussion could be instituted without
requiring charter amendment. One of these
would provide that the General Assembly would
initiate a peacekeeping operation only after the
operation had been discussed in the Security
Council and the Council had been unable to
take action on it. The other would require that
the financing of peacekeeping operations be first
recommended to the General Assembly — before
the Assembly adopts budgetary action — by an
Assembly committee that includes adequate
representation of United Nations members that
are large financial contributoi-s.

Adapting to a New Environment

I have sought to sketch out this afternoon
some of the problems that confront the United
Nations today in its role of peacemaker and
peacekeeper for the world. Over the years the
efforts of the United Nations have taken new
shajies and have been pursued along new paths
as changes of circumstance required. In look-
ing l)aek over the history since World War II,
we are impressed by the flux of events and by
the fluid and plastic quality of the arrange-
ments which governments have devised to try to
keep world jieace. As conditions altered, na-
tions which saw it in their intei-est to ])romote
the survival and effective working of the United
Nations adapted the measuivs of (he world com-
munity to coi)o with a new enviroinnent.

The world organization has already nego-
t iated succe.ssfully several phases and transitions
in its history. As we consider its prospects for
future peacekeeping, we can take encourage-
ment- from a record of intelligent adai)tal)ilit\\

The United Nations is a young organism. It
cont iinies to grow and to change. The serious
difliculties that confront it in an uncertain and
still dangerous world are evident. But the
possibilities for constructive thought and action
in building the structure of peace are unlimited.
1 believe we may have good ho[)e of the future.

802

DEPAOT'MENT OF STATE RULLETIN

United Nations Day, 1964

A X' R O C L A M A T I O N '

WiiKREAs the United Nations is dedicated to the same
noble principles that have made our Declaration of
IndeiK-ndence and our Constitution a constant beacon
of hoi)e and inspiration for nil mankind; and

Whereas tlie United Nations has for 19 years re-
peatedly and decisively proved to be an increasingly
effective and rosiH'cted action agency for world peace,
progress, and prosiierity ; and

Whereas the United Nations, through its efforts and
through those of its si)eciallzed agencies, has greatly
benefited the United States and each of its other
members, individually and collectively ; and

Whereas the United Nations has Ijindlod an ever-
increasing recognition and practice throughout the
world of those humanitarian principles to which this
country has long been dedicated ; and

Whereas the United Nations has earned, and is
entitled to receive an affirmative expression of, the
respect and recognition of this Nation, and of each
of Us other members, for its inestimable contribu-
tions to international peace, justice, and imderstand-
ing; and

Whereas it is essential that the United Nations be
supported, both morally and materially, by us and by
all of its other members; and

Whereas intelligent public support of the United
Nations by the people of this Nation depends in large
measure upon a wide dissemination to our people of
significant and accurate information concerning the
United Nations ; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the
anniversary of the coming into force of the United
Nations Charter, should be dedicated each year to
making known the purposes, principles, and accom-
plishments of the United Nations :

Now, thebb:fore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States of America, do hereby urge the
citizens of this Nation to observe Saturday, October
24, 1964, as United Nations Day by means of com-
munity programs which will demonstrate their faith
in the United Nations and contribute to a fuller under-
standing of its aims, problems, and accomplishments.

I also call upon the officials of the Federal and
State Governments and upon local officials to en-
courage citizen groups and agencies of the press, radio,
television, and motion pictures to engage in appro-
priate observance of United Nations Day throughout
the land in cooperation with the United States Com-
mittee for the United Nations and other organizations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this thirtieth day
of April in the year of our Uord nineteen hun-
[SEAL] dred and sixty-four, and of the Indeitendence
of the United States of America the one hun-
dred and eighty-eighth.

LyvJUJl4A4*vl-*

' No. 3590 ; 29 Fed,. Reg. 5939.

By the President:

Geobob W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

Italian Government Provides
Vaiont Dam Disaster Relief

Press release 196 dated April 29

The Department of State was informed on
April 23 by the American Embassy at Kome
that the Italian Parliament enacted law No.
1457, effective November 9, 1963, to provide re-
lief and rehabilitation to persons who sustained
property and personal losses in the Vaiont Dam
disaster of October 9, 1963. American citizens
are eligible to receive the benefits provided by
this law, according to the Italian Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Interior.

The law provides payments for :

(1) the reconstruction or repair of privately
owned buildings of any kind in the localities
affected by the disaster— applications for grants
for this type of work are to be made to the
Kegional Superintendent of Public Works
(Provveditore Regionale alle Opere Pubbliche)
at Venice for the Province of Bellimo, and at
Trieste for the Province of Udine ;

(2) loss of clothing, household linens, and
furniture — applications for payments for this
kind of loss should be made to the Provincial
Prefecture (Prefettura) at Belluno or Udine,
depending on the place of loss ;

(3) loss of business enterprises (industrial,
commercial, or artisan in nature) — applications
for grants to reestablish the business enterprise
should be made to tlie Prefect (Prefetto) for
either the Province of Belluno or Udine, de-
pending on the location of the business ;

(4) farm losses of fields, livestock, machinery,
roadways, canals, and seeds— applications for
compensation should be made by May 9, 1964,

MAT 18, 1964

803

to the Provincial Inspector of Agriculture
(Ispettorati Provinciali dell'Agricoltura) and
District Inspector of Forests (Ispettorati
Eipartunentali delle Foreste) either at Belluno
or Udine, depending on place of loss. Other
benefits are provided in the law in the form of
tax relief and suspension of certain types of
payments.

Law No. 1457 specifically provides that the
rights of the state and of third parties for re-
dress against persons or entities who may in the
future be determined to have been responsible
for the disaster remain unprejudiced. Persons
having claims for damages, in addition to ap-
plying for the relief provided in law No. 1457,
may also record their claims at the present time
with the prefecture of the province in which the
loss was sustained and also with ENEL (Ente
Nazionale per I'Energia Elettrica), Via del
Tritone 181, Kome.

All claims should be presented in the Italian
language; no specific form or application has
been prescribed. No deadline for the filing of
claims has been established, with the exception
of farm losses, (4) above.

New legislation is currently under considera-
tion in the Italian Senate, having already passed
the Chamber of Deputies, which would broaden
the types of compensation to claimants who sus-
tained losses in Belluno and Udine Provinces as
a result of the disaster.

Foreign Investment Task Force
Reports to President

The "VYhite House annoimced on April 27
that the President had that day received the
report of a 13-man task force on promoting in-
creased foreign investment in U.S. corporate
securities and increased foreign financing for
U.S. corporations operating abroad.

The group, which was originally appointed
by President Kennedy on October 2, 1963,^
called on the President at the "Wiiite House, ac-
companied by Treasury Secretary Douglas
Dillon.

' For background and names of the members of the
task force, see Bolijitin of Nov. 11, 1963, p. 752.

The President expressed his gratitude to the
task force members for the time and effort they
devoted to the preparation of their report on
an important phase of the program to improve
the U.S. balance of payments. He hailed the
task force — composed of representatives of gov-
ernment, industry, and the financial commu-
nity— as a significant demonstration of private-
public cooperation in the drive to surmount U.S.
balance-of-payments difficulties.

The President assured the task force mem-
bers that their findings and recommendations
would receive his closest attention and consid-
eration. He requested the Secretary of the
Treasury to distribute copies of the task force
report to interested government departments
and agencies for their reaction and comment,
and directed him to report back to the
President.

The group was originally charged with devel-
oping programs in the following areas :

A broad and intensive effort by the U.S.
financial commimity to market securities of
U.S. private companies to foreign investors
and to increase the availability of foreign
financing for U.S. business operating abroad;

A review of U.S. Government and private
activities which adversely affect foreign pur-
chase of the securities of U.S. private com-
panies; and

The identification and critical appraisal of
the legal, administrative, and institutional re-
strictions remaining in the capital markets of
other industrial nations of the free world which
prevent the purchase of American securities and
hamper U.S. companies in financing their op-
erations abroad from non-U.S. sources.

The report of the task force includes 39 spe-
cific recommendations for action in four main
areas :

First, the U.S. financial communitj' ; that is,
investment banking and brokerage firms, com-
mercial banks, investment companies, and se-
curities exchanges;

Second, U.S. industrial corporations with
substantial operations overseas;

Third, U.S. taxation of foreign investors in
U.S. securities and clarification of questions
which have arisen in connection with the ad-

804

DEPARTSrENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ministration of the Federal securities laws;
and

Fourth, the reduction — or elimination, where
circumstances permit — of monetary, legal, ad-
ministrative, and institutional restrictions
abroad which inhibit investment bj- foreigners
in the securities of U.S. corporations and which
hamper U.S. companies in financing their over-
seas operations from foreign sources.

industrial proixTty of Mnrch 30, 1K83, revlsi-d at
Hrussels December 14, 11)00, at WnsliiriKton June 2,
mil, at The HnKue November 0, li)li.5, at London
June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done
at Lisbon, October 31, 1958. Entered into force Jan-
uary 4, 19<i2. TIAS4931.

.4rf/icrcnccs deposited: Cameroon, Mexico, Norway,
-Vpril 10, 19(>4.

Telecoinniunlcations

International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Signed at Geneva December 21, 1959.
Entered into force January 1, 1901 ; for the United
States October 23. 1961. TIAS 4892.
Accession deposited: Kenya, April 11, 1964.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961.
Entered into force: April 24, 1964.'

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February
9, 1957 (TIAS 3948), on the conservation of North
Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington October 8,
1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964.
Proclaimed hy the President; April 22, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, April 29, 1964.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Ratifications deposited: Laos, January 24, 1964;
Venezuela, February 28, 1964."

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as re-
vised, for the protection of industrial property.
Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into
force June 1, 1928 ; for the United States March 6,
1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Cameroon,
February 10, 1964.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of

BILATERAL
Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5220, 5490) . Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington April 27, 1964. Entered Into force April 27,
1964.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of October 8, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5179, 5440). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo
April 20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force for the United States.
* With a reservation.

Conflrmations

The Senate on AprU 29 confirmed the following nomi-
nations :

Taylor G. Belcher to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Cyprus.

Covey T. Oliver to be Ambassador to Colombia. ( For
biographic details, see White House press release dated
April 2.)

Pauline Tompkins to be a member of the U.S. Ad-
visory Commission on International Bducational and
Cultural Affairs.

Designations

Gerard C. Smith as Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State for Multilateral Force Negotiations, with the
personal rank of Ambassador, effective April 22. ( For
biographic details, see White House press release dated
April 27.)

Chester C. Carter as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effec-
tive May 1. (For biographic details, see Department
of State press release 197 dated April 30.)

UAT 18, 1964

805

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases Volume
of Documents for 1960

Press release 195 dated April 29

The Department of State released on April 29
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1960. This volume contains all the major docu-
ments portraying United States policy (reports,
statements, resolutions, notes, treaties, and
agreements) that have been previously re-
leased for the year 1960. The material is ar-
ranged imder 14 headings, which cover the
organization and functions of the Department
of State, the principles of United States policy,
the activities of the United Nations, and the
conduct of United States foreign relations with
respect to particular problems, countries, and
regional organizations.

The volume, which rims to 1034 pages, con-
tams a complete list of documents and a com-
prehensive index. Lengthy documents already
printed in readily available official sources are
not reprinted, but they are included in the list,
together with citations to the sources in which
they may be f oimd.

The volume is issued in continuation of the
series which began with A Decade of American
Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1.941-1949,
published as Senate Document 123, 81st Con-
gress, 1st session. The succeeding 6 years were
covered by two volumes published by the De-
partment of State under the title American
Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents.
Aimual volumes under the title American For-
eign Policy: Current Documents, have been
issued by the Department of State, beginning
with the year 1956. The volumes in this se-
ries are compiled by the Historical Office and
are edited and indexed in the Division of Pub-
lishing Services.

The volume for 1960 (Department of State
publication 7624) may be obtained from the
Superintendent of Docmnents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402,
at $3.50 per copy.

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington, B.C., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the cuse of free publications, which
may he obtained from, the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea,
amending the agreement of May 22, 1963. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Conakry November 2, 1963. En-
tered into force November 2, 1963. TIAS 5487. 3 pp.
5«!.

Agricultural Commodities — Barter and Exchange of
Commodities under Title III. Agreement with India,
amending the agreement of June 27, 1963. Exchange
of notes— Dated at Washington December 9 and 20,
1963. Entered into force December 20, 1963. TIAS
5488. 2 pp. 50.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel,
amending the agreement of December 6, 1962. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington December 24
and 30, 1963. Entered into force December 30, 1963.
TIAS 5490. 2 pp. 50.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem
November 5 and 22, 1963. Entered into force Novem-
ber 22, 1963. Operative October 1, 1963. TIAS 5491.
8 pp. 100.

Migratory Workers — Mexican Agricultural Workers.

Agreement with Mexico, extending the agreement of
August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Mexico December 20. 1963. En-
tered into force December 20, 1963. TIAS 5492. 3
pp. 50.

Extradition. Convention and Protocol with Sweden —
Signed at Washington October 24, 1961. Entered into
force December 3, 1963. TIAS 5496. 19 pp. 150.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic — Signed at
Damascus November 18, 1963. Entered into force
November 18, 1963. With exchange of notes. And
amending agreement — Exchange of notes — Dated at
Damascus December 28, 1963. Entered into force De-
cember 28, 1963. TIAS 5497. 14 pp. 100.

Education — Commission for Educational Exchange and
Financing of Programs. Agreement with Tunisia —
Signed at Tunis November 18, 1963. Entered into
force November 18, 1963. TIAS 5499. 8 pp. 10(J.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement vrith the United
Arab Republic. Exchange of notes — Signed at Cairo
December 4, 1963. Entered into force December 4,
1963. Operative October 1, 1963. TIAS 5500. 10 pp.
lOfS.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vlet-Nam,
amending the agreement of November 21, 1962, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon No-
vember 8, 1963. Entered into force November 8, 1963.
TIAS 5503. 3 pp. 5((. ,

Aviation — Transport Services. Agreement with Bo- f
livia — Signed at La Paz September 2t>, 1948. Entered
into force November 4, 1948. TIAS 5.507. 11 pp. 10((.

Boundary — Solution of the Problem of Chamizal. Con-
vention with Mexico — Signed at Mexico City .\ugu.st
20, 1963. Entered into force January 14, 1964. With
exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico City August 29,
19G3. TIAS 5515. map, 19 pp. 30(J.

806

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 18, 19G4 Vol L, No. 1299

Canada

Interdependence — The Basis of U.S.-Canada

Kelations (itall) 770

U.S.-Canada Kconomlc Committee Concludes

Ninth Meeting (text of joint communique) . . 774

Claims and Property. Italian Government Pro-
vides Vaiont Dam Disaster Relief 803

Colombia. Oliver conflriued as Ambassador . . 805

Congress. Confirmations (Belcher, Oliver,
Tompkins) 805

Cyprus. Belcher confirmed as Ambassador . . 805

Department and Foreign Service

The Citizen's Hole in Foreign Policy Legislation

(Manning) 791

Confirmations (Belcher, Oliver, Tompkins) . . 805

Designations (Carter, Smith) 805

Economic Afifairs

The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Objectives in
a Context of Change (Tyler) 776

Foreign Investment Task Force Reports to
President 804

Interdependence — The Basis of U.S.-Canada
Relations (BaU) 770

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Concludes
Xinth Meeting (text of joint communique) . . 774

Educational and Cultural Afifairs. Miss Tomp-
kins confirmed as member of advisory commis-
sion 805

Europe. The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Ob-
jectives in a Context of Change (Tyler) . . . 776

Foreign Aid

The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Objectives in

a Context of Change (Tyler) 776

The Citizen's Role in Foreign Policy Legislation

(Manning) 791

Immigration and Naturalization. The Citizen's
Role In Foreign Policy legislation (Manning) . 791

International Organizations and Conferences.
Central Treaty Organization Meets at Wash-
ington (Rusk, text of communique) .... 766

Italy. Italian Government Provides Vaiont Dam

Disaster Relief 803

Middle East. Ontral Treaty Organization
Meets at Washington (Rusk, text of com-
munique) 766

Military Afifairs

Interdependence — The Basis of U.S.-Canada Re-
lations (Ball) 770

The Nuclear Defense of NATO (Smith) ... 783

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Atlantic Alliance : Constant Objectives in a

Context of Change (Tyler) 776

TheNuclearDefenseof NATO (Smith) . . . . 783
Smith designated Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State for Miiltilateral Force Negotia-
tions 805

Panama. Mr. Anderson, Mr. Newbegin Named
To Represent U.S. in Panama Talks .... 769

Presidential Documents. United Nations Day,

1964 803

Protocol. Designations (Carter) 805

Public .Affairs. The Citizen's Role in Foreign
Policy Legislation (Manning) 791

Publications

Department Releases Volume of Documents for

I960 806

Recent Releases 806

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 805
United Nations

Can the United Nations Keep World Peace In

the 1960's? (Meeker) 797

United Nations Day, 1964 (text of proclama-
tion) 803

name Index

Anderson, Robert B 769

Ball, George W 770

Belcher, Taylor G 805

Carter, Chester C 805

Johnson, President 803

Manning, Robert J 791

Meeker, Leonard C 797

Newbegin, Robert 769

Oliver, Covey T 805

Rusk, Secretary 766

Smith, Gerard C 783, 805

Tompkins, Pauline 805

Tyler, William R 776

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 27-IVIay 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.

Releases Issued prior to April 27 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 172 of
April 20, 178 of April 22, 179 of April 23, and
187 and 188 of April 25.

No. Date Subject

•189 4/27 U.S. participation in international

conferences.
190 4/28 Rusk : CENTO ministerial meeting.
tl91 4/28 Rusk: statement on Department
budget before Senate appropria-
tions subcommittee.
*192 4/28 Joint U.S.-Canada Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs.
Williams : NAACP, Pittsburgh.
Cultural exchange ( Latin America ) .
American Foreign Poliey: Current

Documents, 1960.
Italy provides Vaiont Dam disaster

relief.
Carter designated Deputy Chief of

Protocol (biographic details).
New York office of Chief of Protocol

moved to Fair grounds.
Cleveland : "Switch on the Lights."
Louchheim: Brooklyn Chapter, Na-
tional Association of Negro Busi-
ness and Professional Women's
Clubs.
t201 5/2 Air talks with Canada concluded.

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

193
194
195

4/29
4/29
4/29

196

4/29

197

4/30

198

4/30

199
200

4/30
5/1

U.S. 60VERHHEHT PftlNTINC OrFlCetl9S4

CSB etc G
PUBLIC LIBRARY- HC
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 0211?

Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

IGPOI

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

America as a Great Power

This 22-page pamphlet is based on an address made by President Lyndon B. Johnson before the
Associated Press at New York City on April 20, 1964.

President Johnson reviews the time-tested principles on which our foreign policy rests but stresses
that "particular actions must change as events change conditions." The President then discusses six
areas of particular concern : U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, the Atlantic partnership, Latin America and the
Alliance for Progress, freedom in the Far East, the new nations of Africa and Asia, and foreign aid.

PUBLICATION 7688 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7688 15 cents

TO:

SDPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Enclosed find $

(cash, cbeck, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documents)

Please send me copies of America <u a Oreat Power

NAME

ADDRESS

crrr, state

^69

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

^^f-^ 5^. I /N

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

^.c-

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1300

May 25, 1964

ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN UNITY

Address hy Secretary Ruak 810

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUDGET REQUESTS FOR FISCAL 1965
Statement hy Secretary Rusk 836

FOREIGN AID TODAY
hy David E. Bell 831

NATO AND WORLD RESPONSIBILITIES
hy Under Secretary Ball 823

For index see inside hack cover

Atlantic and European Unity

Address hy Secretary Busk ^

It is a privilege for me to be here. In this
place — in Belgium, the home of two of the tliree
European Communities — it seems especially ap-
propriate to remind ourselves how man can em-
ploy liis talents to improve his condition, how
he can rise above both liis recent history and the
vast complexities of this industrial and nuclear
age.

It was the Benelux nations which took the
first step to change old national patterns — even
before the end of the greatest and most destruc-
tive of wars. The customs union of three
nations opened the way for the European Com-
munity of Six.

Among the many lessons of Benelux, one that
retains its pertinence is the need to be wary of
prophets of doom. In 1951, according to your
great Ambassador to Washington, Ambassador
[Louis] Scheyven, wages in Belgium stood at
164 percent of the Dutch level. Consequently,

'■ Made before a luncheon of Belgian- American
organizations at Brussels, Belgium, on May 9 (press
release 219 dated May 8; as-delivered text).

some Belgian businessmen feared an influx of
labor-intensive Dutch goods as the customs
union went into effect. In point of fact, pro-
tests and fears subsided, and the net result
turned out to be a trade surplus for Belgium.
The evidence then, first with Benelux and later
with the Community of Six, is that these
changes have brought to the member states not
economic dislocation, which some feared, but
mirivaled progi-ess and plenty.

If we attempt to sift tlirough the dreams and
the real and fancied problems of this great post-
war period in Western Europe, what are the
major achievements that stand out ? And what
are the lessons to be drawn ?

I suggest that this period has produced three
great achievements. First, there has been the
discovery and consolidation of common inter-
ests. Second, the practice of orderly and orga-
nized communication has matured. Third, we
have established the importance of institutional
creativity in our Western affairs. I shall deal
briefly with each of these points.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1300 PUBLICATION 7694 MAY 25, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
aRencles of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
forelRn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreisn
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forelRn policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is Included concerning treaties
and International aRreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currenUy.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Prick ; 52 Issues, domestic $8.50,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1061).

NOTE : Contents of this publication arc
not copyrighted and items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

810

DEPAHTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Consolidation of Common Interests

First, the Atlantic nations realized what they
all should have known before, that they have
strong conunon interests. Then they translated
this realization into an operatinfj hypothesis
that tlie security of each nation could he assured
only through collective defense — a defense de-
signed, first of all, to prevent another devastat-
ing war. Then the consensus developed that
this is not an alliance in the pattern of transi-
tory ententes of the past but that the security
and well-being of the North Atlantic nations
re<|uire an enduring and expandmg common
efl'ort.

This perception derives from more than an
aversion to the horrors of armed conflict — more
even than the burial of the ancient enmities
witliin the West itself. It comes from the
knowledge that the interdependent interests of
the North Atlantic nations are deep, complex,
and abiding. This conviction is so firm and
pervasive that we tend to overlook what a major
step forward it is in the ordering of man's
affaii-s — because this is significant in terms of
500 years and not just a decade.

Communication Among Nations

Second, and growing out of this community
of interest, there has developed a sense of the
importance of orderly communication among
our nations — of consultation on our military,
political, and economic affairs. In the wake
of an intellectual appreciation of this fact, the
desire to discuss and consult one another has
now matured into a habit. The habit is now so
ingrained that departure from it becomes a mat-
ter of public attention and recrimination.
Rather tlian note the strength of the rule, we
are prone to exaggerate the exception.

I am in Brussels today as a part of this proc-
ess. Fifteen NATO foreign ministers will
have their semiannual meeting at The Hague
next week. The political, military, and eco-
nomic leaders of our governments, within the
framework of your European Community, or of
NATO, or of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, are in regular
and systematic contact to a degree that would
have seemed literally impossible a few years
ago.

This easy and inforinal contact is bringing
about fundamental changes in the international
community. Today, as contrasted with previ-
ous periods, sucli national action as a significant
change in one nation's interest rate is considered
in terms of its elTects on others. Not very long
ago it would have been thought novel to sug-
gest that one nation should consult others on
the effects on them of a national action of that
sort.

Our peoples see quite clearly now tliat the
interests they cherish, which once national sov-
ereignty was presumed to preserve, are better
assured through collective action. We know,
and our peoples know, that no such thing as
absolute sovereignty is to be had in today's
world. For compelling and practical reasons
the notion of national independence each day
gives more ground to the principle of inter-
dependence. At least as it appears to us in the
United States, we have never been less sover-
eign, less independent in our history, because
our freedom of action is rigorously circum-
scribed by our responsibilities and the interest
of others in what we do or we do not do. And
so we're coming to the point where we almost
cannot understand the revival of the notion of
independence in dealing with the affairs of the
free world, because we have almost none of it
ourselves.

Institutional Creativity

This brings me to my third point: the new
awareness of the capabilities of international
institutions. M. [Paul-Henri] Spaak, drawing
on his exceptional experience as President of the
U.N. General Assembly, as an engineer of the
Treaty of Rome, and as the Secret ai-y General
of NATO, spoke to the point in an informal talk
at the University of Brussels on February 27.
He stressed the crucial importance of institu-
tions to the development of the European Com-
munity, and of the willingness of countries to
"adapt themselves to the normal play of democ-
racy, that is to say, to accept the rule of the
majority and to respect that rule. . . ."

Beginning almost 15 years ago, the Commu-
nity of Six first devised and then has been
learning to operate a new type of political ar-
rangement. In this system, institutions have

MAT 25, 1964

811

played a vital role in steadily enlarging the
European Community interest while at the
same time preserving essential national
interests.

The strength of these institutions and their
recognized importance can be seen in the de-
cision reached by the Community's Council of
Ministers on February 25. By the end of this
year, the Conmiunity executives should be
merged. And a target has been set for fusing
the three Communities — the European Eco-
nomic Community, the European Coal and
Steel Community, and the European Atomic
Energy Community — through an agreement
now intended to become effective by early 1967.

Those of us who have watched with hope and
sympathy the process of European integration
are impressed today by the interest it holds for
the youtli of Europe. We are impressed as well
by the attention being given in Europe to ways
of strengthening the democratic base of the
Community, through such measures as enlarg-
ing the powers of the European parliament and
the direct election of its members.

Nor is it lost on Americans that the distin-
guished men who have devoted their energies
to the process of European integration are the
same men who support with vigor the parallel
policy of strengthening our North Atlantic
partnership. As for the United States, wliich
has rejected in these postwar years a long tradi-
tion of isolation, we are participating fully in
North Atlantic institutions and are prejiared to
move ahead in step with our North Atlantic
partners.

Shaping the Future of the Free World

Together, we have made progress in improv-
ing the manner and the institutions through
which we handle our North Atlantic affairs.
Wliat does the future hold for us, and what
can we do to shape it to our agreed purpose?

First, we Americans wish you well in your
continued quest for European economic and
political unity. You have had our support
from the beginnings in 1950; you have it now.
But this is a European task, and it must con-
tinue to be led and carried out by Europeans.

Second, the common security of the members
of NATO continues to require the ability to

prevent or turn back armed aggression. From
our position of combined strength we have
been able to see, hopefully, some prospect of
easing tensions in relations with Eastern
Europe. But as yet only a few very limited
agreements have been achieved. These, let me
emphasize, do not yet assure the peace. In
discussions with the Soviets we should seek to
avoid illusion and naivete. But equally, we
should — and will — explore patiently every
possibility of reaching further useful agree-
ments. The reality is that large and dangerous
issues remain unresolved. There can be no
stable peace in Central Europe while Germany
and Berlin remain divided. The situation in
the Caribbean is fraught with danger — and
not only for the "Western Hemisphere. In Asia
our differences with tlie Communist adversary
remain acute.

The leaders of the principal Communist na-
tions are quarreling with each other. But it
is far from certain that their dispute will en-
hance the security of the free world. No major
progress has been made in reducing arma-
ments— and it is difficult to see how much can be
until the Soviets agree to effective verification of
arms to be retained. Tliey maintain a vast
conventional and nuclear military establish-
ment facing Western Europe, and these forces
are constantly being modernized.

Soviet leaders speak of peaceful coexistence.
There is every reason to think that they have
a healthy respect for the military capabilities of
the West. But they have not renounced their
aims of world revolution, and we are still a
long way from the concrete agreements which
permit a real easing of tensions. In short, there
is no justification for relaxing the common ef-
fort that has so far preserved the security of
the North Atlantic nations.

Nor do we intend to relax. Several of the
NATO nations are now well advanced in de-
veloping the concept and the practical possibili-
ties of a multilateral nuclear force. The ISILF
will be the means of helping to meet collectively,
and without the dangers of proliferation of na-
tional nuclear forces, the military need for in-
creased Western missile strength in the Euro-
pean area.

The multilateral force is an imaginative way
of sharing more widely among the members of

«12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

NATO the responsibility for detorrence and de-
fense. If the MLF becomes a fact, which I am
contidcnt it will, the participants will perforce
play an incrcasinjily important role in arms
control negotiations. In fact, the MLF should
be seen as an important step towaid partner-
sliijj — toward the prajrinatic but etlective shar-
ing of responsibility between the United States
and Europe in this vital field.

Increases in NATO's conventional forces also
are needed. While maintaining our capacity to
deter a deliberate all-out attack, we should im-
prove NATO's means of coping with lesser de-
grees of conflict — eti'ectively and without auto-
matic escalation to thermonuclear war. The
United States has six divisions in Germany. As
I said in Frankfurt 6 months ago,-

We intend to maintain these division.s liere as long
as there i.s need for them — and under present circum-
stances there is no doubt that they will continue to
be needed.

Thirds I would hope that the membere of
NATO would increasingly coordinate their pol-
icies and efforts outside the North Atlantic area.
The Commmiists know that the North Atlantic
conimunity is too strong — militarily, econom-
ically, and socially — for them to take over by
either direct assault or subversion. They are
concentrating their expansionist efforts on the
less developed areas of the world. "Were they to
succeed, they would be in a position to squeeze
and eventually to strangle industrially ad-
vanced nations. The security and well-being of
free Asia, Africa, and Latin America are of
vital interest to all the members of the North
Atlantic community.

I would here like to pay special tribute to the
role which Belgium is playing in contributing
to the maintenance of peace and the creation of
prosperity in the Congo. This task is of major
importance, and a task which only Belgium can
uniquely play. The efforts which Belgimn is
making represent a great contribution to the
cause of freedom and stability not only in Af-
rica but right around the globe.

In Southeast Asia the Kepublic of Viet-Nam
is resisting an aggression organized, directed,
and supplied by Communist North Viet-Nam,
with the backing of the Chinese Communist re-

gime and at least political support from the
Soviet Union. The United States is assisting
the Government and pef)ple of Soutli Viet-Xam.
Seven of the eight members of the Council of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization re-
cently declared that tlie defeat of this aggression
is "essential." ^ We hope that free nations will
demonstrate their solidarity with these people
who are struggling to preserve their freedom by
oirering them the varieties of help which are
needed in many fields.

Next door, in Laos, the North VietnamevSe
Communists and their Patliet Lao subsidiary
continue to violate the Geneva accords of 1962
providing for an independent and neutral Laos.

The Chinese Communist threat hangs over all
of South and East Asia. And Peiping continues
to demand the surrender of 12 million free peo-
ple on Taiwan as the nine qua non of any im-
provement in relations with the United States.

We think the entire free world has an im-
portant stake in halting Communist aggression
in Asia — whether by direct assault or by infil-
trating trained men and arms across national
frontiers. We believe that all free nations
should take care to avoid actions which make
curbing aggression more difficult or may en-
courage Communists somewhere to think that
they can profit from militancy'.

We believe that the entire free world has an
interest also in preventing the use of Cuba as
a base for subversion and guerrilla operations.
With the help of arms from Cuba, the Commu-
nists recently made desperate efforts to prevent
a free election in Venezuela. They failed. But,
with active Cuban help, they are trying hard to
undermine other legitimate governments — at
least six in the hemisphere today.

The Organization of American States has
unanimously declared the Castro regime to be
incompatible with the Western Hemisphere
system. It has taken measures to isolate that
regime and to reduce its capacity for mischief.
And I assure you these measures are having
their effect. Certainly we coidd not recommend
Cuba to a friend as a good credit risk. Its econ-
omy is in bad condition. W^e think free nations
serve their own best interests when they refuse

' Bulletin of Nov. 11, 19C3, p. 72C.

' For text of a communique issued at Manila on Apr.
15, see ihiiL, May 4, WKA, p. 0'.)2.

MAY 25, 1964

813

to sell to Castro items of critical importance to
the Cuban economy — and thereby cooperate
with the Republics of the "Western Hemisphere,
which have the primary responsibility for deal-
ing with this threat to democracy.

If we have a rather special view of this in the
United States, these problems in other parts of
the world, I hope that you will not consider
me presumptuous if I just remind you that,
since World War II, the American people have
received 160,000 casualties all over the world in
this struggle against communism, and that we
are today receiving casualties every week.
Therefore I hope you'll try to understand the
concern we feel about imposing limitations upon
those who will not leave their neighbors alone.

We must recognize also that the North Atlan-
tic nations and Japan are the main sources of
capital for meeting the growing needs of the
less developed countries. The Development As-
sistance Committee of the OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] is an instniment for mobilizing this capi-
tal and coordinating its use. We in the United
States appreciate the increasing contributions
of Western Europe and Japan to development
assistance, and we hope that this trend will
continue.

Fourth, we have a related common responsi-
bility to create a trading environment that will
permit the efficient develojjraent of our own
great Atlantic resources. Never before have
our nations had more reason for optimism about
the prospect of a trading system with govern-
ment restrictions on the movement of goods
reduced to the minimum. Perhaps you on this
side of the Atlantic might have underestimated
the revolutionary character of the Trade Expan-
sion Act which President Kennedy obtained
from the Congress with great public support.
It is the most amazing piece of trade legislation
which we have had in more than 30 years.

In devising your Common Market you oper-
ated on the premise that the removal of protec-
tive devices within a changing and expanding
economic society would further and not harm
the individual interests of workers and industry,
of consumers and nations. The European Com-
munity has proved beyond doubt that eliminat-
ing trade barriers produces solid mutual
benefits.

This week the Kennedy Round negotiations
have begim in Geneva. The success of this
major onslaught on trade barriers will depend
in substantial part on the roles played by the
United States and the Common ^larket. If,
as partners, we keep in mind and in perspective
our obligation as leaders in the fight for a better
free-world trading system, these negotiations
will succeed.

In our common approach to the negotiations
we would do well to try to re-create the atmos-
phere that led to the remarkable progress of
European integration. You have prospered in
your enterprise through willingness to change
the established order, to seek the larger interest,
and not to insist at each stage on striking an
exact balance of advantage.

You in Europe assumed, correctly, that an
evolving economic community would benefit all
and that advantages and costs would even out.
Tlie same set of optimistic assumptions should
apply to the Kennedy Round. We expect of
course that negotiators will negotiate. But the
question is — to what end? If it is to be a
ruthless drive for separate national advantages,
no country will be the gainer; if it is to achieve
the broadest collective but balanced agreement,
then the free world as a whole will profit. As
stable and prosperous nations we also have a
special obligation to provide access to our large
and expanding market to the less developed
countries — to help a billion less fortunate fellow
citizens of the free world to make their way
toward abetter life.

Wliile the European Commmiity has been
concerned with creating an economic union of
six nations, the political goals of this process
have never been lost. "Wlien we deal with
tariffs and coimnercial policy in the Geneva
negotiations, we must not forget the political
implications of our actions. Unavoidably this
will be seen as a test of the Atlantic partner-
ship— and of our sense of responsibility to the
rest of the world.

The Next Steps in Atlantic Partnership

On April 20 President Jolmson rededicated
America to "the development of Atlantic part-
nership with a stronger and more unified Eu-

814

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTN

rope."* In tliis he reafliniicd a policy con-
sistently supported by Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy, a policy that has no
partisan flavor in our national political life.
President Johnson noted that "The underlying
forces of European life are eroding old barriers,
and they are dissolving old suspicions," and that
"Common institutions are expanding common
interest."

TVliile we should be aware of the many un-
solved problems in our Atlantic partnership,
there is neither need nor time for dismay. Ac-
cording to Communist doctrine, the European
Community could not succeed : but it does. Ac-
cording to the same doctrine, the association of
Eastern European Communist nations (CEMA
or COMECON ') should be a model of effective
economic cooperation ; but it is not. According
to Communist doctrine, the industrial nations
of the free world, especially those which for-
merly had colonial possessions, should be suffer-
ing from economic recessions and fighting one
another over dwindling markets. Instead they
have surged upward to ever higher levels of
production and well-being. In the last 10 years
they have widened their advantage in produc-
tion and living standards over the Conmiunist
states of Europe. In Asia, Communist China
and North Viet-Nam are floundering in misery.
One conclusion we should draw from com-
paring our world with the Communist world
is that we should press ahead all the more
vigorously with the constructive tasks of At-
lantic partnership. Solid foundations have
been laid. In Europe governments and peoples
seem to us to be convinced that more, not less,
imity is needed and that it should be achieved
through new institutions subject to the control
of democratic processes. In both Europe and
America the question is not whether we should
•work together but how to do it better. On both
sides of the Atlantic there is impatience to move
ahead.

* For an address made by President Johnson before
the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., see ihid.,
May 11, 19C4, p. 726.

'Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA),
popularly known as the Communist Economic Council
(COMECON).

I am convinced that diligent attention to the
next steps— perfecting and enlarging your own
European Economic Community, imaginative
use of NATO and the OECD, creation of the
multilateral force, and the successful conclusion
of the Kennedy Round— will be seen by free
men everywhere as genuine progress toward the
kind of world which is the central object of our
policy and the guiding light of our aspiration.
In conclusion, I would just like to add a per-
sonal word to each one of you as though you and
I were speaking in your own drawing room.
You Belgians have had a deep personal, as well
as national, commitment to freedom. Your
history is filled with that commitment. And we
in our country invented institutions to give us
the structure of freedom. You and we are a
part of a great historical process, at least 2,000
years old, through which men have been grop-
ing for the essential decency of public life in
relation to the individual. The imposition of
moral restraints upon the exercise of all power,
safety from the knock on the door at midnight,
opportunity to develop one's family with some
reasonable prospect for a good life ahead, se-
curity from the marauder who appears at our
borders — now these are not just Belgian, not
just American, commitments. These are uni-
versal commitments shared by ordinary men
and women right around the world, in every
country, including ordinary men and women
beliind the so-called Iron Curtain. You and we
participate in the unfinished business of the
great humane tradition of the human race.

We have enormous unfinished business in our
own society. We are facing up to the greatest
piece of that unfinished business now this year,
after a century : to resolve once and for all the
great civil rights issues of our society. I'm
sure you feel you have some imfinished business
in Europe. But that is not the point. The
point is that these tasks shall be addressed in
freedom. And as you and we move together on
these simple human commitments which we
share, we need not worry about allies. We shall
find allies wherever we go throughout the world.
And we shall not need to fear about confidence,
because we can walk the earth in confidence as
a part of the great historical tradition of
freedom.

MAY 25, 1964

815

Secretary Rusk Interviewed

on BBC's "Encounter" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rush for the British Broadcast-
ing Corporation television program ^^Encoun-
ter" which loas broadcast over the BBC on
May 10. Participating were James Mossm,an,
BBC com7nentator, Richard Neustadt., profes-
sor at Columbia University , and Vwe Kitzinger,
Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford University.

Press release 222 dated May 8

Mr. Mossman: Mr. Secretary, you helped to
make American foreign policy under Presidents
Tnmian, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and now John-
son. What do you think were the most critical
and decisive events in the world since the war ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Mossman, let me
say first how happy I am to be on "Encounter"
with you. During these past two decades, I
think we've seen some far-reaching events, no
one of which could be pointed to as a critical
watershed but which together may very well
shape the history of the world for many decades
to come. I would suggest, for example, that the
basic decision made by the American people at
the end of the war to turn away from a tradition
of isolation was a matter of greatest importance.
And that was done on a national basis, on a
bipartisan basis. And I have no doubt that
that decision will endure.

I think we perhaps have tended to forget the
importance of Mr. Stalin's decision after the
war to take up again the cold war and to return
to the promotion of world revolution. I re-
member at the time that the United Nations was
organized how hopeful all of us were about it.
And to use the expression of the soldier, I think
we almost had it made, and had that one govern-
ment committed itself to its commitments un-
der the charter, and worked faithfully on those
commitments, I think the shape of this postwar
world would be much different.

The takeover of mainland China by com-
munism was a matter of the greatest possible
importance. It meant that this issue between
the free world and the world of coercion was no
longer just a problem in the Russian scene but
was now a worldwide confrontation, involving
many, many countries.

The organization of NATO, the recognition
that the defense of the Western World is in-
divisible, and in the process, the permanent
reconciliation of agelong differences within the
West. One doesn't think any more about the
possibility of a war between France and Ger-
many, for example. Now that's something
that's important in terms of centuries, not just
decades.

Then we've seen some explosive qualities in ■
this postwar period, the explosion of states.
We're dealing with 114 governments ourselves.
I think you are too — about the same number.
That means many opportunities for quarrels
that would not have been there before. It means
a great increase in business. We get about
1,300 cables a day in the Department of State on
every working day, and we send out about 1,000
a day. That means 10,000 votes in every meet-
ing of the General Assembly. But it injects a
turbulence into the world scene which we had
not had quite in the same way.

The revolution of rising expectations, so-
called. People all over the world now know
that these great ills of mankind are not there
because of Providence. They're there because
men have failed to do things that are within -
their reach to do. So they're demanding some- f
thing be done about it.

The explosion of conmiimications, which you
people on television know a lot about. People
everywhere now hear about, learn about, events
in other parts of the world and react to them
very quickly. The pace of events has stepped
up, almost beyond management in some situa-
tions.

I think also that, particularly m the last
decade, something really new has come into the
world scene and that is the practical possibility
of a full nuclear exchange. That happened in
about the midfifties. For the first time a full
nuclear exchange is an operational problem be-
fore governments. This was brought out in the
Cuban missile crisis, where this really became
operational for tlie first time as a possibility.
And that reminds us that it's too late to be
primitive. We've got to think and work hard
at our problems. Otherwise, the very existence
of life in the Northern Hemisphere is at stake.

Underneath all these events I think is some-
thing else we need to notice, and that is that

816

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

there lias been emerginjj, without imicli atten-
tion, what mifjlit be called a common law of
mankind. We in tiio United States, for ex-
ample, attend almost GOO intergovernmental
meetings each year, conferences of some sort,
working at dealing with the daily order of
business before governments, trying to find com-
mon interests and finding answers to them.
This is a very encouraging and very construc-
tive development. And we think that there is
great strength beneath the level of controversy
in these determined efforts to solve practical
problems alTecting the daily lives of men and
•women in the most effective way.

In summary, I'd say we've come to tlie point
where history is not going to be determined by
phrases or sudden inspiration or daslies at one
problem or another but is going to be re-solved
by many governments working very hard, pa-
tiently, week in and week out, to reduce crises
and tensions, trying to forestall them if pos-
sible, but where they arise to try to find an-
swers to them. This sounds undramatic, but
the stakes are very high, and I think the com-
mon interests that are emerging are a source
of great confidence in the world.

America's View of the World Today

Mr. Kifzlnger: You mentioned the last dec-
ade. How far, in fact, has the world picture,
in the view of the American Government,
changed since the days, say, of John Foster
Dulles?

Secretary Rusk.- Well, I think, as far as
policy is concerned, one shouldn't look for dra-
matic changes in that period of time. Foreign
policy turns on the nature and the character and
the position of a particular country and the
shape of the world around it. And the basic
character and the aspirations and the objectives
of the American people have not clianged all
that quickly, and the shape of the world scene
has not changed all that fundamentally. I
would think that perhaps one could say that,
whereas in the first part of the decade of the
fifties we were building alliances, at the present
time I would say that we are more concerned
now about the genuine independence and secu-
rity of all states, whether independent or un-
alined, if j-ou like, or allied. Because if every

member of the United Nations were genuinely
secure, there would be very little for, say, us and
for the Soviet Union to liglit about. Our prob-
lems with tiie Soviet Union have to do with
what might happen to somebody else. They're
not strictly bilateral in character. So we've
emphasized the importance of the independence
and security of each state, imalined as well as
allied.

I think also that we've had to give, and we
quite readily and willingly give, much more
attention to the revolution of rising expecta-
tions. Pi'essures for economic and social devel-
opment are moving very fast, and we need to get
on witii that great job.

Mr. Mossman: Mr. Secretary, how far,
though, have you moved from the position of
John Foster Dulles in saying to yourselves per-
haps that here is a Communist system over a
large area of the world which has just got to be
lived with and got on with, even at the risk of
perhaps helping it to gather strength and
confidence?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't think that we
in our country have changed our minds about
the difference in quality between a free system
and the Communist system. But I also think
that we believe that the changes that might oc-
cur in those systems must come from within,
primarily, that it's up to the peoples of those
coimtries, and that, as these governments can
come to the point of taking up the unfinished
business of their o^vn people, this itself will
bring about changes both in their internal policy
and in their external policy. Now that was a
hope that was expressed, I think at times, by
Mr. Dulles himself. And I think we see a good
deal of movement inside the Communist world.
We're beginning to find events pointing to such
movement, rather than simply expressing them
as an aspiration.

Mr. Mossman: You're not more tolerant of
communism ?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think not at all in that
sense. I mean, the basic commitments of free-
dom in our country are very, very strong indeed
and are fundamental in our notions. But we're
not ourselves saying that everyone else shares
them to the same degree. We know what the
answers are from our point of view. But we
think others are also groping their way toward

MAY 25, 1904

8ir

their own answers. And we'll see how it comes
out.

Professor Neustadt : As the groping proceeds,
Mr. Secretary, do you foresee that there will be
less emphasis from the Commimist countries on
what you've characterized as Stalin's deter-
mination to export his revolution?

Secretary Rush: Well, that remains to be
seen. Indeed that is one of the critical issues
we have in front of us today. To some extent
this is the issue which is being debated between
Peiping and Moscow — that is, how to proceed
with the world revolution. I have no doubt
that all of the Communist countries remain
committed to the world revolution. Mr.
Khrushchev has said that there is no ideological
coexistence. But questions of tactics are them-
selves important. And I would suppose that
over and above that is the question, what are
these societies going to do for their own people?
And to the extent that goulash and the second
pair of trousers and questions of that sort be-
come more important in the Soviet Union, I
think to that extent a moderating influence has
come into the present scene.

U.S. Assessment of Chinese Communists

Mr. Kitzinger: I suppose it won't be long be-
fore you are outnumbered in the United Nations
on the question of the admission of China, which
is the second big counti-y where perhaps this
development may come about. Now in view of
what you've just said, what precisely are you
hoping to gain by delaying recognition of the
regime there and by delaying the admission of
China to the United Nations ?

Secretary Rttsk: Well, there are several rea-
sons. In the first place we are concerned about
the doctrine and the course of conduct of Pei-
ping in its present situation. They are not only
preaching the doctrine of militancy; they are
giving it effect as a practical matter on the
ground in Asia. There are pressures in South-
east Asia. Chinese arms are arriving in South
Viet- Nam. They did attack India. They have
not renounced force in the Formosa Strait. We
know of mischief that tliey are up to in conti-
nents like Africa and Latin America. Now,
the point is that we would think it would be
very unwise to indicate to Peiping tliat that

policy of militancy is profitable, pays dividends,
is the course of the future. As you know, we've
had contacts though our respective ambassa-
dors in Warsaw for a number of years. And
time and time again it becomes clear there that
the way for any improvement of relations or
attitudes, from their point of view, is tlie sur-
render of 11 million people on Formosa to
Peiping. And this we don't believe can be
allowed to happen.

Mr. Mossnian: On the other hand, is there any
possibility of a settlement in Southeast Asia
about anything without Chinese consent? I
mean, in a sense, is it Formosa that's blocking
settlement in Southeast Asia?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the problem there is
that Chinese consent was already given in the
most solemn documents affecting that area in
this postwar period — in the Geneva accords of
1954 and in the Geneva accord of 1962 on Laos.
Their contempt for their own commitments,
solemnly registered on those two documents, is
the cause of the problem. There would be no
problem in Southeast Asia if Hanoi and Pei-
ping were simply to leave their neighbors alone.
As far as we're concerned, we're not interested
in any bases or special military position in that
area. All we want is that these people in South-
east Asia have a chance to develop their own
national lives, free from these threats from the
north.

Mr. Mossman: But can you go on ignoring
the existence of the government of the largest
and most populous nation in the world, particu-
larly if the issue is an area wliich that vast
nation overshadows?

Secretary Rush: Well, we're not ignoring it
at all. It's a very important reality in tlie scene
out there. But I don't quite see the profit in
having them give just another bad promise in
lieu of the bad promise we've already had from
them with respect to the safety of Southeast
Asia.

Professor Ncvstadt: Have you had indica-
tions, Mr. Secretary, that they want recogni-
tion, seek it or pay a price for it ?

Secretary Rush: Tliis hasn't been taken up
with us in these talks. The question of relation-
ships always begins with the demand that we
surrender 11 million people on Formosa. In
the first place they're not ours to surrender. In

I

818

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the second plnce we don't think tliat it's u result
that anyone could accept. Ancl at (hat point
the conversation then goes into the record-
playing business.

The Defense of Europe

Mr. Mossman: Can we turn to Europe then
and get out of the groove ? Putting it like this,
say that, during the time that you were out of
the range of Russian missiles, your deterrent
in the eyes of Europe was absolutely valid, your
promise to protect them absolutely valid. Now
that Russia can exterminate you as easily as
you them, how are you going to deal with Euro-
l)oan fears that your deterrent is no longer of
the same value to them, that your ability, or
willingness, to defend, if it means your suicide,
may not be quite so strong?

Secretary Rxtsk: "Well, I don't believe that
European nervousness about the United States
should be any more pronounced than American
nervousness about Western Europe. We have
no problem on that side, as far as we're con-
cerned. The point is that we are in Europe.
We are the strongest European military power.
We have a very large commitment in Europe.
It is inconceivable that from a purely national,
selfish — the harshest terms of self-interest —
we could ourselves accept a major attack on
Western Europe coming from the East. Our
own most vital security is involved in that
question. And we think the same is true as
between Western Europe and ourselves when
you look at us. I don't think we ought to think
that these commitments in the security field
are in any sense weak reeds to lean upon. They
go to the life and death of nations, and the
notion that our defense is literally indivisible,
I think is fundamental both in military and
political terms.

Mr. Kitzinger: How do you make President
de Gaulle, for example, understand this or con-
vince President de Gaulle that the Russians
understand this ?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think that President
de Gaulle doesn't really have any doubt about
the unity of the alliance in the face of a threat
from the East. I think that the issues involved
there have to do more with the shape of the
future, the structure of Europe and the struc-

ture of tlie Atlantic community for tiic future,
and do not really bear upon tlic fundamental
and underlying security commitments of the
alliance.

Mr. Kitzinger: Well, if I may take you up on
this future structure of NATO, at the moment
you've got the monopoly of effective nuclear
power, and some of your allies look as if they're
feeling rather inferior. How far can you sus-
tain an alliance in those conditions? Is there
anything you feel ought to be done about this
before long?

Secretary Rusk: Well, tliere have been some
differences of view within the alliance, as you
know, about how these weapons ought to be
organized. We have ourselves recognized that,
when Western Europe is living under the threat
of Soviet missiles and large numbers of Soviet
missiles, the governments of Western Eu-
rope would want to have an opportunity to take
a more responsible and operational part in the
deterrents to Soviet nuclear strength. We have
done this in several ways: joint targeting,
jointly agreed guidelines for the use of nuclear
weapons in NATO. The proposed multilateral
force, we think, will be a major addition on this
problem because there a number of members of
the alliance — those who elect to do so — will have
a chance to participate in the owning and the
control and the manning and the operations and
the targeting of such a force. We think that
that will bring them into an operational rela-
tionship without getting into the dissemination
of nuclear weapons to those who do not now
have them. We'll give them an operational re-
lationship to the problem that they have not had
before and that will go a long way toward
meeting some of the need that you talked about.

Mr. Kitzinger: But the multilateral force
still gives you the hand on the trigger and on
the safety catch.

Secretary Rusk : Well, ours wiU be one of the
hands, but I can't imagine that, if there are
seven or eight countries, for example, in the
force, any one counti-y would make the deci-
sions for that force. All we're saying is that,
since there are several countries that are going
to make that decision, we should be one of them.

Mr. Kitzinger: Does that mean you are will-
ing to give up a veto on the use of the multi-
lateral force?

KAT 25, 1964

819

Secretary Rmk: Well, the fact that we are
among those who would make the decision is
not something I would just call a veto, because
the others who would have to be in on the
decision will also have that share of that
decision.

Mr. Kitzinger: But you always have the op-
portunity of using the national force if you're
vetoed on the multilateral force. You have it
both ways.

Secretary Rusk: Oh yes, it may be some day
that, if Europe achieves a degree of unity so
that there is a European organization and a
European structure which would support a Eu-
ropean nuclear force, this is something that
the future may develop. But I don't think
Europe is in that position today.

Mr. Mossman: So you would be willing one
day to see a separate European force?

Secretary Rush: This is a question for the
future. Since Europe hasn't committed itself
to being that kind of Europe, I see no reason for
my commenting on other contingencies.

Mr. Mossman: But you wouldn't want to bar
that solution?

Secretary Rush: We're not barring that at
all. No, we've said that repeatedly, that this
can develop.

Mr. Blossiruxn: Do you think it's a realistic
idea ? Do you think it will develop ?

Secretary Rush: Well, I think the first ques-
tion is whether Europe will, in fact, move to-
ward a much higher degree of political integra-
tion. I think that's an even more important,
and sometimes more difficult, question than
strictly the weapons question.

Professor Neustadt: But you put that ques-
tion first. If they can evolve, then the question
of their kinds of force is open to change as far
as you're concerned ?

Secretary Rush: Yes. But I would think
that until tlien we have a multinational sort of
an arrangement whereby national governments
join on an agreed basis to work together on
these matters.

Professor Neustadt: Now, this leaves us, of
course, with also our own strategic force, which
is incommensurately greater than that of the
individual European governments. So it
leaves us always open to the charge that we
have something our allies do not and that

there's no real equality. What does one answer
to this?

Secretary Rush: I would say it's true. I
don't think there's any gainsaying that. Also |
there go along with that, however, very large ■'
responsibilities in other parts of the world,
which are not shared equally by our allies in
NATO. Remember that the Pacific Ocean
area is a very important problem for the United
States. During World War II we agreed to
make the European theater the first-priority
theater. But tlie second-priority theater in the
Pacific defeated Japan without any significant
redeployment from Europe. In other words,
that was a very large second priority. So tliat
we have commitments elsewhere, which go be-
yond the commitments of NATO. And we, of
course, have to be able to deal with those
commitments in other parts of the world.

Differences in Approach to World Problem Areas

Mr. Mossman: Your commitments, one might
say, in the broadest sense, are regional ones
instead of perhaps just Western allied ones, and
quite often your allies' assessments of their
importance — I'm not talking now of the Pacific,
obviously — your allies' assessments in detail
may differ from yours. Take Cuba, as an
example. The British can't for the life of them
see why you're trying to blockade Castro
economically.

Secretary Rush: Well, I think that there are
differences in emphasis and differences of shade
in attitudes toward problems in different parts
of the world. I don't think this is a large ques-
tion as between ourselves and Britain, because
both Britain and tlie United States are involved
in many, many questions all over the world and
are working very closely together on almost all
of them. Now, I think on the Cuban ques- j
tion — I think our approach differs primarily in |
this respect : that to you this, broadly speaking,
looks like a question of trade policy. To us
this is a problem of a security threat to the
Western Hemisphere. And therefore we feel
that anything that can be done to limit the ca-
pacity of Castro to engage in the mischief that
we know he's engaging in in this liemisphere —
in the Western Hemisphere — should be done.

Mr. Mossman: In Latin America ?

820

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIN

Secretary Rusk: Particularly in Latin Amer-
ica.

Mr. Mossman: But supposing we say it's our
liberty and right, liistoric^illy, to trade with
whomsoever we like, and our assessment of Cas-
tro is not quite as serious as yours? We sa}'
a happy, well-fed Communist is a happy and
contented one.

Mr. Kitzinger: You sell wheat to Russia.
Why shouldn't we sell buses to Cuba ?

Secretary RitJik: Well, the wheat to Russia
is about one-tenth of Western Europe's exports
to Russia for the same period. In other words,
we are far behind Western Europe in that par-
ticular regard in terms of trade. But, no, I
think there would be differences of policy that
are reflected in differences of a sense of involve-
ment and concern. I will, however, comment
that for a year before the missile crisis of '62
we discussed Cuba at some length in NATO,
frequently, and found relatively little interest
in the problem. But in October 1962 it became
a matter of some importance for NATO.

Mr. Kitzinger: Of coui-se, there are people in
Britain who say, why should we back you on
Cuba to that extent when you don't back us on
Nasser?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in the first
place that is based upon lack of information
about the degree of difference on both these
questions, to the extent that there is one. We
have a strong interest in the British and the
Western position in the Persian Gulf and access
to the resources of that area. Britain has an
important interest in the security of the West-
em Hemisphere. Now, there may be differ-
ences, I think, rather tactical and minor in
character, about when and under what con-
ditions particular efforts should be made and
particular moves might be made. But in any
event, bear in mind that Britain and the United
States are involved with each other in dozens
and dozens of questions right around the
globe. In most of them we're working very
closely together. I would not think that, be-
cause one can find one where there might be
a shade of difference and another where there
is another shade of difference, this is a sort of
a tit for tat, when we have so many problems
on our common agenda.

Mr. Kitzinger: But would you think the
Aden base was as important to the alliance as
it is to Britain, in terms of oil ?

Secretary R-usk: Oh, I would think that's
true, yes.

U.S. -British Relationship

Mr. Kitzinger: There's still a lot of talk in
Britain about the special relationship of
Britain with the United States. Do you feel
it's in the British interest to think a great deal
about this one?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's in our in-
terest to recall that Britain and tlie United
States have the most far-reaching common com-
mitments. We share a great tradition. The
Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights belong to us
just as much as they do to you. They're part
of our own heritage. We were associated in
combat together. And I think any American
in uniform would say tliat if he's in a fight he'd
like to have a Tommy in the foxhole with him.
There are historical and political — sentimen-
tal— reasons why we are aiming at the same
goals and purposes. But that is a special re-
lationship which is not invidious in any sense
to full cooperation and the closest relationships
with otlier members of the alliance. I think
this association between Britain and the United
States is there to stay. And I think what we
ought to do is for both of us to try to build
comparable relationships with other members
of the great Western alliance.

Mr. MossTTvan: But isn't it bad for Britain to
feel that she has this sort of a — it's like a hand-
icap in golf, isn't it? The others have a
handicap and you haven't. Isn't it bad for
us psychologically ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, you'll have to assess
that. I'm not sure that I could assess that.
But I would think that the frankness, as well
as the friendliness of our exchanges, and our
ability to agree most of the time but disagree
when we have to — ^all that is rather wholesome.
I don't believe that either one of us is leaning
in any special way or in any unwholesome way
on this tiling called special relationsliip. It's
one that has to be earned all the time with any
ally.

Mr. Kitzinger : Can I call on your frankness ?

MAT 25, 1964

821

How far do you agree with [Dean] Acheson
that Britain has lost an empire but not yet
found a new role ?

Secretary Rusk : Well, I don't agree with that
very much because, when I look around the
world these days at Cyprus and East Africa
and the Persian Gulf and Malaysia and the
Caribbean, I find a Britain that is bearing a
very large share of the burden these days in
trying to bring about a peace and maintain tlie
peace. When you add to that Britain's role in
the U.N., in NATO, in the OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] , and other things, I think there's no prob-
lem about finding a role. There's a very large
role to be carried out and heavy burdens to be
borne.

Mr. Kitzinger: But would you be relieved if
Britain abandoned the nuclear deterrent of her
own and followed what are clearly your pref-
erences, which are that she should perform a
rather more limited function and not try and
do everything at once ?

Secretary Rush: I don't know where you
would get the notion that we would prefer the
more limited role. After all, in 1958 the United
States resumed a very active relationship with
Britain in the nuclear field ; so that doesn't give
us any pain.

Professor Neustadt: Do you foresee some
new common tasks, Mr. Secretary ?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think there are very
large tasks still on the agenda for both our
countries and for other members of the West,
chiefly in assistance to the great under-
developed countries throughout the world.
There is where the battleground is to be foimd
in terms of what kind of world order are we
going to have. Is it going to be the one de-
scribed in the United Nations Charter? Or is
it going to be the one mapped out by the world
revolution? And I think there's an unlimited
role to be played there, and that everyone who
can play a part not only has an opportunity
but an obligation to play it.

New York World's Fair

A PROCLAMATION'

Whereas many foreign governments and overseas
private organizations are active participants In and
exhibitors at the New York World's Fair ; and

Whereas the Fair will attract a great number of
visitors from those exhibiting countries and other
parts of the world ; and

Whereas the Government of the United States and
the governments of many of the several States of the
United States are also active participants in and
exhibitors at the Fair ; and

Whereas the Congress, by Senate Concurrent Reso-
lution 80, agreed to April 21, 1964, requested the Presi-
dent, in the name of the people of the United States, to
welcome all who come to the United States to visit the
Fair ; to extend official recognition to the Fair ; and to
call upon officials and agencies of the Government to
lend such cooperation as may be appropriate for those
purposes :

Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President of
the United States of America, in recognition of the
value of the New York World's Fair as an effective
instrument for the promotion of international under-
standing, good will, tourism, and trade, do hereby
extend the welcome of the people of the United States
to those persons who come to our country to visit the
New York World's Fair, and express the hope that
they will take this opportunity to enjoy the hospitality
of other parts of our Nation.

I also urge Federal, State, and local officials, and the
people of the United States, generally, to assist in
making our overseas visitors welcome and in further-
ing their enjoyment of their visit to our country.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this thirtieth

day of April in the year of our Lord

[seal] nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the

Independence of the United States of America

the one hundred and eighty-eighth.

By the President :

George W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

' No. 3588 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 5935.

822

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

NATO and World Responsibilities

hy Under Secretary Ball '

Alliances have rarely had a good reputation.
As an institution they need the services of a
diligent press agent. Napoleon's rude remarks
on the wealcness of alliances are a part of his
legend. Bismarck's comments were less quot-
able but equally scornful.

But contempt for alliances was not invented
in the 19th century. Pericles said it all — and
said it better — long before, when, according to
Thucydides, he observed that, within the classi-
cal alliance,

The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on
some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save
their own pocliet. Slow in assembling, they devote a
very small fraction of the time to the consideration of
any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their
own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm
will come of his neglect, and that it is the business of
somebody else to look after this or that for him ; and so,
by the same notion being entertained by all separately,
the common cause imperceptibly decays.

Pericles' prediction as to the inevitability of
decay of the classical alliance is not applicable
to NATO, since NATO is not — or, at least, not
merely — a classical alliance. "We should never
forget that it is something more, sometliing
quite different.

And so tonight I should like to recall some
elemental facts about this Atlantic institution
that you have been discussing throughout the
day, an institution with a name that, in Prime
Minister [of Canada Lester B.] Pearson's
words, soimds like a new breakfast food, but an
institution that has nevertheless served us well

'Address made before the Center for Strategic
Studies of Georgetown University, at Washington,
D.C., on May 7 (press release 215).

as the central structural framework for the
defense of the free world.

NATO was born in a time of crisis. It de-
veloped its present shape and form during a
sustained period of tension. Today the fact —
or at least the appearance — of relaxation be-
tween East and West is subjecting it to a new
strain and test.

In today's relaxed environment there is dan-
ger that NATO may gradually lose some of its
vitality through apathy and a kind of inter-
national wishful thinking. The present gener-
ally good state of economic health on both sides
of the ocean has produced a pervasive sense of
well-being, almost of euphoria. The Atlantic
world feels increasingly strong and confident of
the future. There is danger that, if this happy
state persists for long, some may be tempted to
regard the obligations of a massive enterprise
such as NATO as unnecessarily heavy, and some
of our European friends, out of a sense of new-
found confidence, may be led to consider NATO
as too much an American show — there is al-
ready an apparent trend that way.

Character and Meaning of NATO

No hmnan institution is ever perfect, and over
time we should continue to improve further the
present NATO alliance. But at the same time
we must be extremely wary of any suggestion
that the alliance is, of course, a good thing but
that the NATO structure is a bad idea. Such
a suggestion, if seriously regarded, could do
great harm. For it might reduce NATO to the
status of a classical alliance — an alliance inac-
tive in peace and impotent in war.

Let me recall certain obvious facts about the

MAT 25, 1964

823

character and meaning of NATO — facts that
we sometimes overlook but which we can never
afford to take for granted.

The first rehates to the nature of NATO as we
now know it. If NATO is not just a classical
alliance, what is it?

I suppose it can be accurately described as a
full-fledged collective defense arrangement of
an unprecedented kind. Obviously, the foim-
dation stone of NATO is the common commit-
ment of the member states that an armed attack
against one shall be considered an armed attack
against all. But NATO rests on far more than
that basic assurance.

NATO expresses the indivisible nature of
Western defense. Within its structure the
member states have created a unified force of
great power and dimensions operating imder a
unified command. This command, in turn, is
subject to a Council of permanent representa-
tives that sei-ves as a conduit for political guid-
ance from the member states.

Development of an Effective Unified Command

This is NATO today, but we sometimes forget
that it was not born full-armed. As first estab-
lished in 1949, it was little more than the
Comicil and a collection of committees. In
fact, there was a saying in those days that,
"Before we established NATO the Eussians
could march to the Pyrenees in a fortnight. It
will take them much longer now ; they will have
to walk through all those committees."

Stalin was the author of NATO's present
structure. It was only after the Korean in-
vasion, when the West first fully comprehended
the magnitude of the Communist danger, that
the member nations created a Supreme High
Command under General Eisenhower and re-
vamped NATO to make it an effective instru-
ment for collective defense.

The road by which the Western World
arrived at this point was long and bloody.

Any illusions as to the virtues of an old-
fashioned alliance will be dispelled if one re-
calls the early years of the First World War.
We must never forget the events of 1914 to
1918 — nor will we be pei-mitted to do so if one
can judge by the spate of books presently being
written about that period.

The story of those years is a tragic chronicle
of unnecessary slaughter. In 1914, 1915, 1916,
and even 1917 the two principal allies — France
and Great Britam — worked largely at cross-
purposes. There was little joint preparation
and management. Planning was only hap-
hazardly coordinated. Strategies, more often
than not, were divergent and self-defeating.
In fact, it was not until April of 1918 — and
then only through the efforts of a great French
statesman, Georges Clemenceau— that the En-
tente Powers fiinally pooled their resources
under the strategic command of General Foch,
as Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies
in France. Soon thereafter — out of disarray —
came unity and victory.

Thanks to Sir Jolin Slessor, I need not point
out that in the Second World War the same
Allies once again went into battle without ade-
quate coordination. In his stimulating paper he
describes quite vividly the lack of contact be-
tween the British and French staffs that pre-
vailed up to 6 months before the outbreak of the
war. Again there was no common policy and
no combined strategic planning.

But we have profited — and with good sense
we can continue to profit— from all that. Today
we have achieved what has never before been
possible in peacetime — an effective imified com-
mand. This we must cherish and preserve. It
is an invaluable resource of the free world. Let
us not assess it too cheaply. For if the lack of
a unified command proved tragic in 1914, it
would be even more catastrophic today. This
nuclear age would permit no war of attrition
but only of destruction, and we would not have
4 years — or even 4 days — to organize a unified
command.

NATO's Unflnislied Business

It is not enough, however, merely to safe-
guard what we have. Like any living orga-
nism, NATO must grow and change in order to
survive. Several of the papers submitted to
this co7iference emphasize two major pieces of
unfinished business:

First, we must develop ways and means for
managing the nuclear deterrent power of the
West in a manner that will take account of the
aspirations for participation by member states

824

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

not now possessing atomic weapons. At the
same time we must avoid the manifest dangers
of proliferation.

Second, we must continue to perfect NATO
as an instrument by which the member nations
can concert policies with respect to problems
that arise not merely within the NATO area
but elsewhere in the world.

Each of these pieces of unfinished business is,
in my view, complicated by the same central
difficulty — that most of the nation-states which
form the membership of NATO are not large
enough by themselves to play roles commensu-
rate with the requirements of the present age.

Management and Control of a Nuclear Deterrent

Clearly this is true with regard to atomic
weapons. The defense of the West requires not
merely that an individual nation have the abil-
ity to mobilize vast resources of men, money,
material, industrial plant, and technology but
also that there be imity of control of the life-
or-death decision of nuclear destruction.

I am sure that no one here favors nuclear pro-
liferation as an objective of policy. Its dangers
are manifest. For first one country, then an-
otlier, to develop a national nuclear system
could not help but heighten feelings of distrust
within the Western alliance, while at the same
time increasing tensions between the free world
and the bloc. The multiplication of national
deterrents would increase the danger that a
nuclear holocaust might be triggered through
accident or miscalculation. At the same time it
would multiply the chance that — at some
point — nuclear weapons might fall under the
control of an irresponsible individual or gov-
ernment. And finally, it would render pro-
gressively more difficult the achievement of an
ultimate agreement to control or limit nuclear
armament.

But the road toward proliferation has no
logical ending, and as we start down that road
there are no logical stopping points other than
the limits which nations impose on themselves
or the limits imposed by the availability of re-
sources or technology.

The renunciation of proliferation as a general
principle is clearly not good enough. Such
a solemn pronouncement is unlikely to influ-

ence the decisions of individual governments.
Unless we can produce woi-kuble alternatives,
proliferation will almost certainly occur
whether we like it or not.

Here is where the political organization of
Europe becomes relevant. If Europe were suf-
ficiently far advanced toward political unity
that it could by itself manage and control an
atomic deterrent, we could hopefully look for-
ward to an effective and integrated Atlantic
defense founded on a true nuclear partnership.
But this is not the case today, nor is it likely to
be for some time. Effective nuclear control
means the delegation to a central executive of
the power of life or death involved in the use
of atomic weapons. Obviously this presupposes
a very high degree of political unity — a degree
that far transcends anything immediately in
contemplation.

Meanwhile, time will not stand still. Wliat-
ever the situation today — and the evidence on
the point is confusing — we would delude our-
selves if we assumed that the gifted and vigor-
ous people in several of the countries of West-
em Europe would not sooner or later insist on
playing an effective role in their own nuclear
defense. If we provide no opportunity for even
partial fulfillment of this quite natural desire,
the consequences are easily foreseeable. Politi-
cal pressures for the multiplication of national
nuclear deterrents will accumulate, and gov-
ernments will yield to them. The process, more-
over, will feed on itself; the decision of one
country to build a nuclear deterrent will almost
certainly increase pressures for similar deci-
sions in others.

Tlie dilemma we face cannot, therefore, be
safely brushed aside. If we regard the pro-
liferation of national deterrent systems as un-
desirable and if we consider that the present
exclusion of a large part of the members of the
Western alliance from nuclear management is
not likely to last, what other options do we
have?

It is our attempt to answer this question that
led us in 1960 to propose the creation of a multi-
lateral nuclear force. I recognize that this
force has become a subject of some controversy
not merely among you cognoscenti in this con-
ference but in similar discussions elsewhere.

HAT 25, 1964

730-610—64-

825

Yet, as I see it, those who challenge the wisdom
or effectiveness of such a force are j-et to sug-
gest an adequate alternative.

The Multilateral Nuclear Force

The multilateral force we are proposing
would be organized within the framework of
the Western alliance. To constitute a truly in-
ternational force, we have felt that it should
meet four conditions :

First, it should be assigned to NATO by all
countries participating in the force. To meet
this condition, we propose that it be collectively
owned by the participants and that all partici-
pating nations share in the costs of creating,
maintaining, and operating it.

Second, it should not be predominantly based
on the soil of any one nation. To meet this
condition, we are proposing a sea-based force
consisting of Polaris-type missiles mounted on
surface warships. Tliis force, deployed on the
high seas, would operate outside the national
limits of any state.

Third, it should be managed and operated by
nationals of all participating countries under
such conditions that it could not be withdrawn
from the alliance to serve the national uses of
any participating government. To meet this
requirement, we propose that the ships them-
selves be manned by mixed crews of nationals
of the participating nations.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense have concluded that
an efficient first-class force can be created in this
fashion. SACEUE [Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe] has stated he would welcome
the force as a significant addition to NATO's
deterrent forces.

Fourth, the decision to fire the Polaris weap-
ons should be a collective decision of the par-
ticipating nations. One proposal is that po-
litical control be exercised through an executive
body representing the participating nations.
Obviously this control question is tlie heart of
the matter. We are confident it can be solved.

In an ideal world we could no doubt devise
less elaborate means for managing nuclear
weapons. But we must work within the limita-
tions of existing political arrangements. Those
limitations arise from the fact that Western

political institutions have not evolved in pace
with the march of our technology. Until the
West has achieved a far greater political unity
than it possesses today, we believe that the de-
velopment of a multilateral force is the best
available course to pursue.

Not only does it offer the most effective means
of dealing with the nuclear problem in the pres-
ent political framework; it can also make pos-
sible a gradual and constructive evolution
within that framework. The multilateral force
would provide a new opportunity for working
toward a greater imity in Europe and a closer
partnersliip between the two sides of the At-
lantic.

For the striking progress that has been
achieved toward these goals in the past decade
and a half has, to a considerable extent, come
about from necessity — from the fact that gov-
ernments have been compelled to cope with
specific and immediate problems in Europe and
the Atlantic area. And, as we seek to cope with
the problem of nuclear management, I have no
doubt that we shall — of necessity — make fur-
ther strides toward a greater political unity in
the years ahead.

Over the long pull, it will not be abstract
principle but importunate necessity — the urgent
need to get hard things done in order that we
may survive and flourish — that will move us
toward the attainment of the ultimate objective
of imity and partnership.

Unequal Allocation of Responsibility

If the lack of political unity in Europe com-
plicates the management of nuclear weapons
systems within the NATO alliance, it also limits
the development of NATO as an instrument
for effective political consultation.

This question of consultation has been a fa-
vorite subject for discussions in conferences such
as you have been having here today. A strong
case can be made — and is frequently made — for
greater consultation among NATO members,
particularly with regard to world problems that
lie outside the scope of the alliance.

The logic of this is clear enough. The mem-
ber nations of NATO represent 90 percent of
the industrial strength of the free world. They
are, in Dean Acheson's words, "the central

826

DKPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

power which will support — if it is to bp sup-
portetl at all — a non-Comimmist world system."

I do not mean to suggest that, in the modem
decentralized world, it woulil innke sense to
reserve the management of worlil atlairs to an
exclusive board of directors drawn solely from
the NATO nations. Such a proi)osal would be
an affront to friendly nations tlie worlil over
that are playing responsible roles in their own
areas. The United States, for example, has
military alliances with 28 countries in addition
to its NATO partnere. At the same time it is
clear that unity of policy among the members
of NATO is an essential component of free-
world power. To quote Mr. Acheson again : "If
the center is not solid, relations with the pe-
riphery will not provide strength."

Unity of policy should presumably be ham-
mered out through consultation. But consulta-
tion— essential though it be — can be fruitful
only if all powers concerned are determined to
make it so. It can i^roduce little, for example,
in the face of rigid pliilosophical differences
such as those we have encomitered in attempting
to develop a common economic policy toward
Cuba. It will also produce little when the con-
sulting parties hold widely differing concepts of
responsibility for world problems.

It is this latter point that imposes the most
severe limit on the efficacy of consultation today.

Until the Second World War the metropoli-
tan nations of Europe spread their dominance
over vast areas of the world tlirough colonial
arrangements. But with the crimibling of the
great colonial systems and the emergence in
their stead of half a himdred new states during
the turbulent years since the war, world power
relation.ships have had to be vastly re^dsed.

During this period the world interests of
European states have greatly altered; at the
same time America has had to devise new con-
cepts of world responsibility.

I mention this dichotomy between interests
and responsibility for it is, I think, f imdamental
to the question of consultation. We Americans
have few national interests — in the narrow
sense — outside our own territory, but we have
assumed vast world responsibility.

The result is an imequal allocation among the
Atlantic nations both of responsibility and of

the burden of decision that goes with it. This
imbalance derives from (lie imperatives of his-
toi-y — not from deliberate American choice.
We are aware that policy and responsibility
must not be divorcetl. A\'e recognize that no
nation can be expected to share one without the
other.

The United States today is quite prepared to
share both with its NATO partners. So far,
however, such sharing has been severely limited
by differences of attitude within the NATO
alliance. The willingness to accept world re-
sponsibility— as distinct from the preservation
of national interests — is, in our observation and
experience, not universal among the NATO
membership.

Hopefully this is a passing phenomenon.
For the past decade and a half most European
nations have been preoccupied with pressing
postwar business — the liquidation of colonial
arrangements and the building of strong domes-
tic economies. Now tliis business is largely
finished.

Yet this alone will not solve the problem.
The problem will never be fully solved imtil
Europe gets on further with the achievement of
its own unity, mitil it organizes itself on a scale
commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The
undertaking of world responsibility requires a
world view. The discharge of such responsi-
bility under postcolonial conditions must be
based on the command of vast resources for
defense and foreign aid — and on the will to use
them. Western Europe collectively has more
than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe
cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a
common effort and a common view.

The existing stinicture of Europe, therefore,
sets limits to the effective sharing both of re-
sponsibility and decision. But this does not
mean that — within the limits thus imposed —
we should not continue to improve the present
imperfect allocation. In fact, the United States
is quite ready to go forward in sharing its re-
sponsibilities around the world wherever there
is a will on the part of its European partners
to share — and this includes a willingness to
provide resources to make that sharing effective.

It was this thought which miderlay President

UAT 26, 1964

827

Jolinson's comment in his recent speech to the
Associated Press in New York when he said,
in speaking of our Atlantic relations : *

We also welcome agreed new mechanisms for polit-
ical consultation on mutual interests throughout the
world with whatever changes in organization are neces-
sary to make such consultation rapid and eflfective.

The Ultimate Goal of NATO

I approach the end of my observations to-
night with three general conclusions :

The first is that NATO as it exists today —
an Atlantic alliance with a unified force in be-
ing under a unified command — is an extraordi-
nary peacetime achievement, a platform of ac-
complishment on which we should continue to
build. And we should be wary, indeed, of any
actions that might reduce its full effectiveness.

The second is that we cannot safely ignore the
problem of widening participation in the man-
agement of our atomic defense, complicated as
it may be by the fragmented structure of West-
ern Europe. And unless you gentlemen are
able, out of the collected wisdom represented
here, to come up with a better solution than the
multilateral force, I strongly urge your support
for that proposal.

Finally, if NATO is to fulfill its purpose as
the central arrangement for the defense of the
free world, it must gradually extend its concern
to the larger questions of free- world policy.
Here again the limitations that obtain are not
hard to isolate. They do not derive from any
fault in the institutional structure of NATO
but rather from the limited sense of world re-
sponsibility— as distinct from national inter-
ests— felt by many of our NATO partners.

These, then, are some of the problems for
which we must find solutions over the coming
months and years. Effective solutions will not
be achieved merely by tinkering with the NATO
structure but rather by progress in achieving a
greater cohesion in relations among the member
nations. This, it seems to me, is already in
process. It has already produced substantial
results, but there is much more to be done.

NATO, therefore, should not be regarded as
an end in itself. It should be thought of as one

" Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 726.

of the pillars in a more comprehensive Atlantic
relationship — an Atlantic relationship we must
achieve in due course if we are to gain that ul-
timate goal of which Woodrow Wilson spoke
with such prophetic passion — the "universal do-
minion of right by such a concert of free peoples
as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and
make the world itself at last free."

Assistant Secretary Williams
Visits West and Central Africa

Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams
visited five West and Central African countries
May 8-20. Following is a statement he made
on May 8 upon his departure from Washington.

Press release 221 dated May 8

This is the second African mission I have
undertaken at President Johnson's request be-
cause of his deep and continuing interest in that
continent. Tliis trip will take me to five West
and Central African countries — Senegal, Mali,
Ghana, and the two Congos.

The purpose of the visits is to discuss various
aspects of American policy with African gov-
ernmental and political leaders and to acquire
additional firsthand knowledge of current Af-
rican developments. Also, I plan to consult
with the United States Ambassadors in the five
countries, as well as with American business-
men and other United States citizens living
there.

The first stop will be tomorrow morning at
Dakar, Senegal, where President and Mrs.
Johnson represented the United States at cere-
monies marking the first anniversary of that
country's independence in 1961. I hope to meet
with President [Leopold] Senghor while in
Senegal.

From there I go to Bamako, Mali, where I
expect to meet with President Modibo Keita
and other Malian officials.

Tlie third stop will be Accra, Ghana. In ad-
dition to talks there with President Kwame
Nkrmnah, Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, and
other Cabinet ministers, I plan to see the latest
developments at the Volta Dam and to go to

828

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BCTLLETIN

western Ghana, wlieie I expect to see something
of the economic, educational, and social develop-
ment taking place there.

In Congo (Brazzaville) I also plan to go into
the comitryside. This will be my first visit to
Congo (Brazzaville) since a new government
came to power last December. I hope to meet
with President Alphonse Massamba-Debat,
whom I had the pleasure of meeting when ho
was in the United States, Prime Minister Pascal
Lissouba, and Foreign Minister Charles Ganao.

The last stop on this trip will be Congo (Leo-
poldville), where I will meet with the Congolese
leaders and get their current assessments of the
outlook for the Congo on the eve of the sched-
uled U.N. troop withdrawal next month.

President Johnson Determines
immigration Quota for Kenya

A PROCLAMATION'

Whereas under the provisions of section 202(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, each independent
country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory,
and territory under the international trusteeship
system of the United Nations, other than independent
countries of North, Central, and South America, is
entitled to be treated as a separate quota area when
approved by the Secretary of State ; and

Whbibeas under the provisions of section 201(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney
General, jointly, are required to determine the annual
quota of any quota area established pursuant to the
provisions of section 202(a) of the said Act, and to
report to the President the quota of each quota area so
determined ; and

Whereas under the provisions of section 202(e) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney
General, jointly, are required to revise the quotas,
whenever necessary, to provide for any political
changes requiring a change in the list of quota areas ;
and

Whereas, on December 12, 1963, the former Colony
and Protectorate of Kenya was granted its independ-
ence by the Government of the United Kingdom ; and

Whereas the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Attorney General have jointly de-
termined and reported to me the immigration quota
hereinafter set forth :

Now, THEREFORE, I, Lyndon B. JOHNSON, President of
the United States of America, acting under and by
virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid
Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim and make known
that the annual imniigrntion quota of the quota area
hereinafter designated has been determined in ac-
cordance with the law to be, and shall be, as follows :

Quota area
Kenya ..

Quota
100

The establishment of an immigration quota for any
quota area is solely for the purpose of compliance
with the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and
N'atioiiality Act and is not to be considered as having
any significance extraneous to such purpose.

Proclamation No. 3298 of June 3, 1959,' as amended,
entitled "Immigration Quotas," is further amended by
the addition of the quota for Kenya.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of
April in the year of our Lord nineteen
[SEAL] hundred and sixty-four and of the Independ-
ence of the United States of America the one
hundred and eighty-eighth.

VT~

By the President :

George W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

U.S. and Liberia Sign Agreements
on Free Port and Cultural Program

Joint Announcement

Press release 220 dated May 8

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic
of Liberia have signed agreements providing
for the transfer of the Free Port of Monrovia
to the Government of Liberia, and for the ex-
pansion of educational and cultural programs
between the two countries by the establishment
of an Educational and Cultural Foimdation.

The Port was built imder lend-lease agree-
ment during World War II. In connection
with this present transfer, Liberia agrees to pay
the United States, over a period of 35 years,

• No. 3587 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 5933.

' For text, see Bulletin of July 6, 1959, p. 19.

MAT 25, 1964

829

approximately $19 million, which is the original
cost of the Port.

Under the terms of the agreements, the foun-
dation will be financed by the annual payments
received from Liberia in settlement of the lend-
lease debt, subject to the availability of appro-
priations when required by the laws of the
United States.

The two Governments welcome the conclu-
sion of these agreements in this year that marks
the centenary of the exchange of diplomatic
representatives between our two coimtries.

Secretary Comments on Korean
Exchange Rate System Reform

Statement hy Seci^etary Rusk ^

I have been informed that on May 3, 1964,
the Government of the Republic of Korea un-
dertook a major reform of its exchange rate
system, initiating a unitary, flexible exchange
rate. I imderstand this action was taken in
agreement with the International Monetary
Fund.

I am pleased to note this important step to-
ward the strengthening of Korea's foreign ex-
change earning capability and the establish-
ment of equilibrium in her external accounts.
The new flexible rate will be an effective means
to achieve these purposes.

The United States will continue to cooperate
with the Government of the Eepublic of Korea
toward the success of the 1964 stabilization pro-
gram and toward the solution of the country's
balance-of-payments problems.

A new basis now is being laid for investment
in industry, expansion of exports, rising em-
ployment, and the broad economic and social
progress which Korea's energetic and capable
people can achieve, with government and pri-
vate financial assistance from the United States
and from other countries. The United States
looks forward to expanding its development
lending program in support of sustained Ko-
rean efforts.

' Read to news correspondents on May 3 by Robert
J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, Office of News.

U.S. Adds North Viet-Nam
to List of Blocked Countries

The Treasury Department announced on
May 5 that it had added North Viet-Nam to the
list of blocked countries in the Foreign Assets
Control Eegulations, effective tliat day. This
action was taken at the recommendation of the
Department of State, in the light of the coty-
tinued Viet Cong Communist aggression in
Viet-Nam. The effect of the action is to freeze
any North Vietnamese assets which might exist
in the United States and to prohibit all financial
and commercial transactions by Americans
with North Viet-Nam.

Since the so-called "National Liberation
Front of South Viet-Nam" was created by the
Communist regime of North Viet-Nam and is
based in and controlled by North Viet-Nam,
this blocking action applies equally to all
transactions with that puppet organization.

Letters of Credence

Mauritania

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Almied Baba
Ould Alimed INIiske, presented his credentials
to President Johnson on May 6. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Deparment of State press release 211
dated May 6.

Panama

The newly appointed Ambassador of Pan-
ama, Miguel J. Moreno, Jr., presented his cre-
dentials to President Jolmson on May 6. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State
press release 212 dated May 6.

Rwanda

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Rwanda, Celestin Kabanda, pre-
sented his credentials to President Jolinson on
May 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release 210 dated May 6.

830

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Foreign Aid Today

hy David E. Bell

Administrator, Agency for International Development *

It is a privilege for me to speak here this
evening, to a group which has such a distin-
guished record of concern for United States
foreign policy.

Our foreign assistance program has played a
fundamental role in American foreign policy
since the end of World War II. It has been a
major weapon in our eifort to build up the mili-
tary strength of the non-Communist world. It
is a part of American international economic
policy, directly involved in financing exports
and in the development of markets. Finally,
economic assistance programs are the major
factor in the international war on poverty, a
war which may well decide whether or not this
planet remains a fit place either to do business
or to live on.

Tonight I would like to emphasize especially
the ways in which the foreign aid program has
changed over these last two decades and what
it has become today.

It is fitting that we meet here tonight on the
80th birthday of President Harry Truman.
Aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan,
the Point 4 program, were all among the series
of practical innovations, designed to meet the
realities of the postwar world, which distin-
guished Mr. Truman's administration.

You could say that our assistance programs
began with the passage of the Greek-Turkish
aid bill in May of 1947, just 17 years ago this
month. The Marshall Plan began in April of

' Address made before the Asilomar Conference of
the World Affairs Council of Northern California,
Asilomar Beach State Park, Calif., on May 1.

the following year. Seventeen years is not a
very long time, but even today it is hard to re-
member how serious matters were and how far
we have come since then.

Western Europe and Japan were then still in
ruins. Greece was torn by civil war, and Com-
munist guerrillas, at one point, were fighting in
the suburbs of Athens. After two bad harvests,
rations in France were down to two slices of
bread daily and meat once a week, if you could
find it. West Germany was trying to support
its own people and 10 million refugees with less
than a third of its prewar industrial plant.
Strong Communist parties were close to win-
ning power in both France and Italy.

These were our allies just 17 years ago, facing
a Soviet Union that had not disarmed and that
threatened to take by aggression what did not
fall through internal subversion.

The rest of the world was a tinderbox. Co-
lonial empires were crimibling, and no one knew
what would take their place. But there were
plenty of danger signs. The Communist-led
Huk rebellion was spreading in the Philippines,
Communist guerrillas threatened much of Ma-
laya, traditional regimes were falling in the
Middle East, and India and Pakistan were bom
in a partition marked by nearly a year of
violence in which millions lost their lives.

It is easy to forget today that, just 17 years
ago, there were some who really believed com-
munism might be "the wave of the future" — by
sheer brute force in Europe and by its promise
of order, discipline, and an abundant future for
the underdeveloped countries.

MAY 25, 1964

831

The United States did not stand by and
watch. Through successive foreign assistance
programs we helped our neighbors in Europe
get back on their feet economically and build the
defensive shield of NATO. In the emerging
nations we began to provide the added margin of
skilled people and capital they needed to break
out of the vicious circle of poverty, ignorance,
disease, and poverty.

In the years since 1947 we have not acliieved
the millennium. But we have achieved more
than many thought possible after World
War II.

Perhaps the figures that tell the story most
simply are these. Seventeen countries have
moved from the need for external aid to self-
support ; our economic aid programs have done
their work and have been ended in 15 European
countries, Japan, and Lebanon.

In 14 more countries in Asia, Latin America,
and Africa the transition to economic self-
support is under way and the need for U.S.
foreign aid is drawing to a close. These 14 in-
clude such dramatic cases of successful eco-
nomic progress as Greece, Israel, and free China
(Taiwan).

Shift in Emphasis of U.S. Assistance

With the recovery of Europe completed and
the buildup of the free world's military strength
well underway, our economic assistance pro-
grams have changed a great deal. Our aid now
goes entirely to the less developed countries,
and it is highly concentrated. Of our proposed
economic assistance program for the next fiscal
year, about 2 percent would go to the 14 coun-
tries I have mentioned as being in the transi-
tional stage approaching self-support. Eighty-
eight percent of the total would go to 25
countries where we have major programs. The
remaining 10 percent would go to 37 countries
where we conduct quite limited programs —
often consisting only of teclinical assistance.

This high degree of concentration is not an
accident. The development of the poorer na-
tions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a
very different problem from the recovery of
developed countries like those in Western Eu-
rope and Japan. In the decade or so since the
emphasis of our assistance shifted from aid for

recovery and reconstruction over to aid for
economic development from the ground up, we
have learned a few things about how to go
about it.

To begin with, we are not working with as
large amounts of money, relative either to our
own resources or to the population of the re-
cipient countries, as we did during the Marshall
Plan. In 1949 U.S. foreign aid amounted to
about 2 percent of our gross national product
and 12 percent of the Federal budget. Today
foreign aid accounts for well under 1 percent of
the GNP and under 5 percent of the budget. In
terms of the burden on U.S. resources today's
foreign aid is much less than half as costly as
was the case 15 years ago.

In terms of the recipient countries our aid
was relatively much larger then than now.
During the height of the Marshall Plan our aid
amounted to as much as $20 per European per
year. Today the region where our aid is larg-
est per capita is Latin America, where it
amounts to about $2.50 per year per person. In
Africa and Asia our aid amounts to little over
$1 per capita. The contrast with the Marshall
Plan reflects, of course, the difference in the
problem then and now : Then we were restoring
advanced economies which could absorb large
amounts of capital ; today we are helping devel-
oping countries where everything — skills, insti-
tutions, and capital investment — necessarily
grows more slowly.

Another important change in our foreign aid
program is the greater emphasis on Latin Amer-
ica. During the 12 years from 1948 to 1960
U.S. aid to Latin America amounted to about
2 percent of our total assistance effort. Now,
with the emphasis on the Alliance for Progress,
Latin America receives nearly one-fourth of our
teclinical and capital assistance.

We have learned to make self-help a condi-
tion of our assistance. Our help is not "free."
In providing equipment, materials, or experts
from the LTnited States we expect the recipient
comitries to share the costs of development proj-
ects. We also expect them to take steps to use
their own resources better through improved
administration, sound fiscal policies, fairer tax
laws, and the like.

Today's foi-eign aid program is distinguished
also by the extent to which it is varied and

832

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

adiipted to tlie particular circumstances in each
country. Let me give you tliree or four
examples.

In Viet-Xam, where sheer survival of a coun-
try outside the Iron Curtain is at stake, the eco-
nomic aid program directly supports the mili-
tary effort, and it does this in two ways. First,
we help to finance commodity imports to keep
the Vietnamese economy afloat. Second, AID
technicians work directly in the villages pro-
viding first aid, distributing improved seeds,
fertilizer, and rat poison, helping the peasants
rhig their villages with barricades of bamboo
stakes and American barbed wire, and install-
ing simple radio sets to summon help if the Viet
Cong attack.

Obviously, Viet-Nam will need a good many
more things if it is ever to start down the road
to development. It will need an effective agri-
cultural extension service, more teacher-train-
ing institutions, more power, better transport
and communications as the foundation for in-
dustrial growth, development banks to spur
private enterprise, and so on. These are the
main kinds of things our aid is supporting in
other countries. But not in Viet-Nam— now.
The immediate problem there is survival, and
we are putting first things first. The weight of
our aid program goes into direct economic sup-
port for the war effort. For the time being
development must be subordinated.

We see another kind of problem entirely in
Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa.
Nigeria has good leadership, a development
plan the World Bank has termed "an excellent
beginning," and a stable, hospitable climate for
private investment. But, like so many other
African countries, Nigeria is short of trained
people competent to translate its promise into
progress. Nigeria not only needs more schools ;
it needs an educational system that can turn out
graduates at every level of competence, from
clerks, typists, and foremen to business manag-
ers and government administrators.

In Nigeria more than 40 percent of total U.S.
assistance goes into a single field — education.
We are engaged, with the Nigerians, in an at-
tempt to transform an educational system for
the few into a comprehensive school system
equipped to meet Nigeria's massive need for

trained manpower at every level. To carry this
out, w-e rely heavily on American colleges and
universities. We have contracts witli nine dif-
ferent American univei-sities for technical as-
sistance in teacher training, business adminis-
tration, agricultural re~search and training, vo-
cational education, and public administration.
Included, incidentally, is a 13-man team from
the University of California at IjOS Angeles,
working both to expand vocational education in
Nigeria's Eastern llegion and to help Nigeria's
Federal Advanced Teacher Training College
meet the national goal of 3,000 graduate teach-
ers annually by 1970.

Still another pattern of aid can be seen in
India and Pakistan, Colombia and Chile.
These are coinitries where major de\eloiiment
programs are imder way. Wliile they have
great need for more education, they have now
a substantial number of trained and experienced
leaders in both public and private activities, and
they can make use of significant amomits of
capital investment. They are mobilizing their
own resources through taxes and savings. They
have strong and thriving private sectors in their
economies and are attracting increasing amounts
of foreign private investment.

These are countries, in short, where we can
concentrate U.S. aid resources with confidence
that they will contribute to solid and lastmg
progress. Their problems are far from solved.
It will be years before India, for example, could
hope to reach the point of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth. But the right kind of effort is
under way, and the right kind of progress is
being made.

Finally, let me mention the Republic of
China on Taiwan, where we have a still differ-
ent pattern of U.S. assistance. A decade ago
Taiwan was as heavily dependent on U.S. aid
to stay afloat as Viet-Nam is today. But not
any longer. With our help, it has conducted
one of the most successful land reforms in Asia
and achieved an exceptional record of growth
in both agriculture and industry. Taiwan
today is very near economic self-support, and
for the past year AID has concentrated heavily
on technical assistance to Taiwan's booming
private sector. We are engaged now chiefly in
financing short-term consultants from U.S. in-

MAT 25, 3 9G4

833

dustry to help solve specific production, mar-
keting, or management problems. The major
share of Taiwan's needs for technical and capi-
tal assistance can already be met through nor-
mal commercial channels, including substantial
U.S. private investment in an economy that is
now clearly a going concern and an attractive
market. Taiwan is definitely in transition, and
the end of the need for economic aid is in sight.

Aid From Other Free-World Donors Increasing

Another major change that has taken place
over these past 17 years has been the steady
transformation of free-world aid recipients
into aid donors who share with us the burden
and the challenge of helping the poorer coim-
tries develop.

Wlien President Truman signed the Greek-
Turkish aid bill in May 1947, the United States
was tlie only country in the non-Communist
world able to provide any substantial help to
anyone else. Today many free-world coun-
tries other than the United States provide sub-
stantial aid to the less developed nations, and
more are undertaking aid programs.

Eleven of these other donors — Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and
the United Kingdom — are membei-s, with the
United States, in the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development] in
Europe, the Committee that has become the
center for free-world aid coordination. These
11 countries account for about 95 percent of the
bilateral aid from sources other than the
United States. The other 5 percent comes
from 6 other countries: Australia, Austria,
Kuwait, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzer-
land.

More aid recipients are becoming donors
today. For example, Israel, the Eepublic of
China on Taiwan, and Mexico now provide
technical assistance to nations less developed
than themselves.

We have also seen the rise of international
agencies equipped to provide technical and
capital assistance to the less developed world,
agencies sucli as the World Bank, the Inter-
national Development Association, the Euro-

pean Development Fund, and the Inter- Amer-
ican Development Bank. Ten years ago the
World Bank was the only multilateral source
of capital for this purpose.

Since 1956, the other developed free-world
countries have invested more than $13 billion
in aid to the less developed world — about what
the United States invested in the recovery of
Western Europe through the Marshall Plan
between 1948 and 1952.

The aid programs of others are increasing
steadily in size. By 1960, the total volume of
all free- world aid commitments had climbed to
$6.5 billion, of which 40 percent, or $2.6 billion,
came either from multilateral agencies or other
countries. By 1962, the total volume of free-
world aid had increased to $8.5 billion, of
which 44 percent, or $3.7 billion, was provided
outside the United States bilateral aid pro-
grams.

A decade ago, what assistance the European
countries were able to provide went exclusively
to colonies. Today, less than 10 percent does,
although, of course, much French, British, Bel-
gian, Dutch, and Italian aid does go to former
colonies that are now independent states. This,
of course, does not make it less helpful from our
point of view. It means, among other things,
that some two-thirds of all development assist-
ance in Africa today is now provided by the
Western European nations.

At the same time, France has made sizable aid
commitments to Mexico and Greece; Britain is
enlarging its technical assistance program in
Latin America; and France, the Netherlands,
and Italy are all important contributors to the
development of India and Pakistan through aid
consortia sponsored by the World Bank.

Three of the major donors — Germany, Can-
ada, and Japan — have no colonial connections.
Germany has a worldwide program, and in the
past 3 years has made loan pledges to 65 less
developed countries and provided technical as-
sistance to 70. Canada's assistance ranges
through the British Commonwealth countries
and Latin America. Japan provides aid in
much of Asia and in Latin America.

Tlie other countries do the same kinds of
things in their aid programs that we do and
conduct them in close cooperation with us. In
Thailand, for example, many otiier countries

834

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

liave joineil the United States in rural develop-
ment projirams desij^iied to counter a serious
threat of Coninuinist insurgency in the north-
east provinces. The United States is lielpin<; to
build connecting roads and train Tliai Govern-
ment oilicials who will build schools and hos-
pitals and cany out community development
programs. New Zealand is helping to establish
an agricultural university in the northeast,
which will provide a training base for an active
agricvdtural extension service. Denmark has
established a demonstration daiiy farm and is
helping to introduce a modem daily industry.
Japan assists a virus research institute, and
the United Kingdom is carrying out agricul-
tural projects to improve the output of cotton,
rubber, tea, and tobacco.

Some of the newest additions to the list of
fi-ee-world aid donoi-s are doing some of the
most interesting work. Teams of Chinese ex-
perts from Taiwan are showing nine African
countries how to increase rice output with the in-
tensive cultivation methods that liave made
Taiwan agriculture one of the most productive
in the world. You may have read recent news-
paper accounts of the results in Liberia, where
the first Chinese team went 2 years ago and pro-
duced rice crops five times the norm for that
West African country. In arid Libya, at a site
deep in the Sahara desert, a 15-man Chinese
team has succeeded in raising large rice crops
for the first time using piped water from oasis
wells to supplement the annual average rainfall
of two-fifths of an inch. Despite locusts, salty
soil, and temperatures over 100 degrees, they
have produced yields of more than 4,000 pounds
of rice per acre.

"We Have Come an Amazing Distance"

To summarize what I have said this evening
very briefly, it seems to me we have come an
amazing distance in a very short time. I do
not minimize the risks of the present world we
live in or the size of the problems that remain.
The outcome of the struggle in Southeast Asia
is by no means certain. Dangerous tensions

remain in South Asia and tlie Middle East.
The new nations of Africa are just starting
down the road toward stability and economic
growth. Latin America's attempt to attack the
historic problems under the Alliance for Prog-
ress is barely 3 years old.

Seventeen years of economic assistance has
not relieved us of the need to make difficult
foreign policy choices, the need to maintain
our defenses, or the need to work out new pat-
terns of trade policy and international order.
The world remains a difficult place.

Rut we no longer face tlie challenge alone, or
with impoverislied allies, or witliout precedent
or example in the orderly development of the
free world's poor nations. With 17 nations on
their feet and self-supporting; with 14 others
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America fast ap-
proacliing that point; with solid growth under
way in countries like India, Colombia, Turkey,
and Nigeria; with other advanced countries
helping to meet the cliallenge of development —
with all these, I see no reason to falter, no rea-
son to assume that the patient, persistent build-
ing of a world fit to live in is beyond our re-
sources or our ingenuity. I believe we're on the
right path. Let us go forward in confidence.

Mr. Timberlake Named Deputy
for Disarmament Talks

President Jolinson announced on May 6
(White House press release) the appointment
of Clare H. Timberlake as the U.S. Deputy
Representative to the 18-Nation Committee on
Disarmament. The Committee has been meet-
ing at Geneva, Switzerland, since March 1962.
Mr. Timberlake, a career Foreign Service
officer, will hold the personal rank of
Ambassador.

Mr. Timberlake has been serving as chair-
man of the Disarmament Advisory Staff in
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. He will assume his new duties when
the Committee resumes its work on June 9.

MAY 25, 1964

835

THE CONGRESS

Department of State Budget Requests for Fiscal 1965

Statement hy Secretary Rusk ^

Mr. Chairman and members of the commit-
tee : I am ghxd to have the opportunity to meet
with you again to discuss the budget requests
of the Department of State. With your per-
mission, in this open session I shoukl like to re-
view some of our administrative problems and
accomplisliments and comment on the budget
requests. Later I hope the committee will al-
low me to meet with you in executive session to
discuss the current international scene.

With me today are my two principal subor-
dinates concerned with the administration of
the Department. You all know Mr. William J.
Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Admin-
istration. I would like to introduce Mr.
Dwight J. Porter, who assumed the duties of
Assistant Secretary for Administration last
October. These two gentlemen, as well as the
Assistant Secretaries and other officers, will dis-
cuss the details of the budget estimates during
the course of the hearings.

The House has not yet acted on our appix)-
priation bill. Therefore, we shall be reviewing
with this committee the full budget requests for
fiscal year 1965. This is a departure from pre-
vious years, when our presentation to you has
been based largely on the difference between
our original estimates and amounts already ap-

proved by the House. It is my understanding
that the committee will also want to consider
the pending 1964 supplemental requests.

In his address to the Congress on Novem-
ber 27,^ President Jolmson said :

... I pledge that the expenditures of your Govern-
ment will be administered with the utmost thrift and
frugality. I ask your help. I will insist that the
Government get a dollar's value for a dollar spent.
The Government will set an example of prudence and
economy. This does not mean that we will not meet
our unfilled needs or that we will not honor our com-
mitments. We vrill do both.

I believe the budget requests before you re-
flect the spirit of economy and prudence pledged
by the President. Our preliminary' 1965 esti-
mates were I'eviewed in early December at the
specific direction of the President with a view
toward making reductions wherever possible.
The budget submitted to the Congress in Janu-
ary ^ reflected the results of that review.

Amendments submitted by the President in
March ■• further reduced the January estimates.
Those reductions result from revised cost esti-
mates for activities of certain international
bodies to which this Government contributes.
They also reflect a downward adjustment in
personnel to be hired, in accordance with the

' Made before the Subeommittee on the Departments
of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies of the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations on Apr. 28 (press release 191).

' Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1963, p. 910.
"H. Doc. 20."'>, Part 1, S8th Cong., 2d sess. ; for ex-
ceri>ts, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.
* H. Doc. 240, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

836

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President's policy to restrict Federal employ-
ment. Our presentation to this committee is
based on the revised requests.

We are not asking for any additional posi-
tions beyond the 131 for communications in our
supplemental request for the current fiscal year.
I have asked all the Assistant Secretaries to
hold the line.

Improved Use of Personnel

I believe that one of the most effective ways
to save money is to improve the quality of per-
sonnel. A smaller number of hard-workinj;
first-class people can carry the same workload
as a larger number of mediocre or less energetic
people — and do a better job. When I returned
to the State Department in 1961 after 10 years
in private life, I made up my mind that I would
not approve increases in personnel unless they
were clearly necessary to meet new responsi-
bilities or increased workloads. For 3 years
I have pressed my colleagues to examine indi-
vidual workloads, to eliminate unnecessary jobs
wherever possible, and to do all within tlieir
power to improve the quality of our personnel.

I believe that we now have, on the whole, a
lean organization. I know at firsthand how
dedicated and hard-working my principal col-
leagues in the Department are. They and their
staffs work long days and long weeks — normally
6 days and sometimes 7. I doubt that there is
another organization anywhere in Government
or in the business world which receives so much
unpaid overtime work. Indeed, I am concerned
about the numbers who are working at a pace
which cannot be sustained over a protracted
period.

Before discussing the budget in greater detail,
I would like to review some of the administra-
tive actions taken during the past year. We
have continued to assess priorities, to eliminate
the marginal, and to achieve cost reductions.
We have held to our desire for economy, effi-
ciency, and good management. At the same
time we have tried to strengthen our leadership
in foreign affairs.

We have found many ways to economize in
the conduct of the Department's business.
These help us to do more at less cost — to get "a

dollar's value for a dollar spent," to use Presi-
dent Johnson's words. Let me cite a few
examples :

Fifteen consular posts have been closed or
changed in status, reducing costs by $500,000 a
year.

The use of economy accommodations for air
travel has been extended to all flights — world-
wide. We hope to achieve cost reductions of
$4.57,000 in international travel, and we have
trinnned the 1965 recjuest accordingly.

Better methods of handling truck and ocean
freight shipments have made it possible to move
the same volume for $50,000 less.

The method of production of the Biographic
Register and the Foreign Service List was re-
vised to cut publication costs by $30,000.

Thei-e were other economies, but these illus-
trate our efforts. Together they help to keep
our budget within reasonable limits and to meet
new needs or higher costs within the funds made
available to us.

We have increased our efficiency in the use of
manpower. During the past 2 years the De-
partment has conducted steadily increasing
diplomatic and consular activities throughout
the world without increasing its total position
strength. To achieve this, we have streamlined
procedures, reduced reporting requirements,
closed marginal consulates, and eliminated low-
priority functions. The manpower reductions
achieved have enabled us to assign additional
personnel to the crisis areas of the world, to new
or expanding activities, to new consulates and
embassies and to meet increased consular and
other workloads.

A few examples will illustrate what we have
done:

Visa work has been improved by reducing the
number of mandatory visa opinions referred to
Washington, by having posts abroad submit di-
rectly to the field offices of the Immigration
Service requests for routine waivers, by merging
the Visa Lookout Books of the Department and
the Immigration Service using machine meth-
ods, and by reducing consular reports from posts
abroad by 30,000 documents annually. All
these will result in more visas issued per em-
ployee and will help to meet greater demands
for visa services.

MAY 25, 1964

837

The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs abolished
24 lower priority positions to meet urgent new
requirements at posts in the Far East.

The Bureau of European Affairs curtailed
political reporting from posts in Germany and
abolished seven officer positions which were used
for higher priority needs at other posts.

The Passport Office issued or renewed
1,018,000 passports in fiscal year 1963 compared
with 867,000 in 1962 and increased production
per man-year by about 10 percent.

In the long run better utilization of personnel
will result from better supervision. We are
giving greater emphasis to good supervision.
Specifically, we are stepping up our training of
firstline and middle-level supervisors so they
will do a better job of managing those who re-
port to them.

These are indicative of our search to find ways
of doing things better and our efforts to employ
our personnel usefully on the work of highest
priority. The search will continue, so that we
can hold the line on employment and still meet
new demands we know will come.

We have taken a number of steps to improve
the quality of the Department's personnel and
facilities and to strengthen its capacity for
leadership in foreign affairs.

An Interagency Council on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs has been es-
tablished under the chairmanship of the De-
partment's Assistant Secretary for Cultural Af-
fairs. Its purpose is to strengthen the coordi-
nation of all Government programs of interna-
tional exchanges.

Our program to contract with persons of out-
standing competence from our colleges to pro-
duce policy research studies has continued to
augment at minimal expense the research and
analysis which we must do within the Depart-
ment to back up foreign policy formulation.

A new Office of International Aviation has
been established in the Bureau of Economic Af-
fairs to give Government-wide leadership in
making and carrying out U.S. international
aviation policy. The whole international air
transport picture has changed since World AVar
II with the strong competition of foreign car-
riers. Protection and promotion of U.S. inter-
ests require special attention to the develop-

ment of U.S. policy in this field and conveying
it persuasively to other governments.

We have taken action on recommendations
of the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs
Personnel. We have made progress in estab-
lishing a joint recruitment program for junior
officers for State, USIA [U.S. Information
Agency], and AID [Agency for International
Development], a lateral entry program geared
to our manpower requirements, and a stronger
program of career management to develop the
high-quality specialists that today's diplomacy
requires.

Public Information Programs

Today, foreign policy is the concern of every
American. We are making a particular effort
to improve communication with the public
through more effective public information pro-
grams. We provide speakers and conduct for-
eign policy conferences throughout the country,
we are improving the quality of our written and
printed replies to requests for mformation, and
we are assisting the press and mass media in
their efforts to ascertain the facts. Conversely,
we are striving to improve channels through
which we can obtain the views and desires of
the general public on America's role in world
affairs.

We have endeavored to meet the demands
upon State Department leadership in the area
of foreign operations.

We are completing the laborious, but essen-
tial, job of writing standardized administrative
regulations for the Department, AID, and
USIA. This includes the drafting of revised
rules and joint instructions on travel, pay allot-
inent, titles and rank, rest and recuperation,
local employee compensation, security, and re-
lated subjects.

In cooperation with the Defense Department
and Budget Bureau, we have begun a study of
Defense representation abroad. We will re-
view military attache, MAAG [Military As-
sistance Advisoiy Group], and U.S. training
missions in selected countries. I expect that
this will result in reduction of the total number
of such Defense personnel overseas. We are
working with the Budget Bureau to establish

838

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

guidelines for otlier Federal iigcncics in staffing
oversea operations.

During the past year wo have developed,
tested, and installed in selected embassies a com-
prehensive country programing system. This
system is designed to provide our ambassadors
and top management in Washington with an
overview of the complex, multiagency programs
which we are undertaking abroad in this era
of operational diplomacy. It provides a means
for planning and using total U.S. resources to
achieve our objectives.

Leadership requires investment. It is not
cheap. "We must attract and compensate the
finest minds and the keenest talent for our for-
eign operations. AVe must acquire the staff
mobility necessary to a tough and flexible world-
wide service.

I would like to turn now to a more detailed
discussion of the budget estimates.

Budget Summary

The original request of the Department of
State totaled $365.8 million for fiscal year 1965.
Amendments submitted by the President in
March and contained in House Document 240
reduced the total by $6.5 million. The revised
request is $359.3 million, an increase of $18.2
million above 1964 appropriations.

The increase is composed of the following :
$12.9 million in salaries and expenses for
fixed-cost increases, commimications facilities,
and improved support of existing personnel.

$7.5 million in the foreign buildings appro-
priations for construction or acquisition of real
])roperty. $4.1 million of this increase is in the
regular ai)propriat ion for projects as authorized
by Public Law 88-94. Utilizing the remaining
$3.4 million in U.S.-owned foreign currencies
puts to tangible use excess moneys owned by the
Government.

$2.4 million in appropriations for the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission, pri-
marily for construction of the Amistad Dam on
the Kio Grande.

$5.1 million in mutual educational and cul-
tural exchange activities. This increase in ap-
propriated fmids is largely to offset decreases
in foreign currency carryover and other non-
appropriated funds. The request will provide
continuance of the total program at approxi-
mately the current year level.

$3.8 million for all other activities. The larg-
est items in this category are $1.1 million for in-
ternational tariff negotiations, $0.7 million for
missions to international organizations, $0.8
million for international conferences and con-
tingencies, and $0.7 million for the Center for
Cultural and Technical Interchange Between
East and West in Hawaii.

In other appropriations there is a net reduc-
tion of $13.4 million, primarily because of a
nonrecurring contribution to the U.N. Congo
force.

A complete summary by appropriation is
shown in the following table :

Salaries and expenses

Representation allowances

Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad

Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad (spe-
cial foreign currency program)

Emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service

Contributions to international organizations

Missions to international organizations

International conferences and contingencies

International tariff negotiations

International Boundary and Water Commission

American sections

International fisheries commissions

Mutual educational and cultural exchange activities

Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and

West

Rama Road, Nicaragua

Total

1966

1964

revised

appropriations

request

Increase

$153, 000, 000

$165, 850, 000

$12, 850, 000

973, 000

1, 025, 000

52, 000

18, 125, 000

22, 257, 000

4, 132, 000

2, 750, 000

6, 143, 000

3, 393, 000

1, 500, 000

1, 600, 000

100, 000

99, 679, 000

87, 168, 000

-12,511,000

2, 500, 000

3, 238, 000

738, 000

1, 943, 000

2, 778, 000

835, 000

365, 000

1, .500, 000

1, 135, 000

9, 230, 000

11, 629,000

2, 399, 000

430, 000

474, 000

44, 000

2, 000, 000

2, 139, 000

139, 000

42, 625, 000

47, 679, 000

5, 054, 000

5, 100, 000

5, 832, 000

732, 000

850, 000

— 850,000

341, 070, 000

359, 312, 000

+ 18, 242, 000

MAT 25, 1964

839

The budget reflects an increase of 112 posi-
tions above the number the Congress has thus
far approved for the current fiscal year. Ex-
cept for the 131 positions in the 1964 supple-
mental for communications personnel, however,
our 1965 request is for 19 fewer positions.

Salaries and Expenses

The salaries and expenses appropriation is
the Department's principal operating accoimt.
The budget request is $165.9 million, an increase
of $12.9 million above the 1964 appropriation.
The requested increase is in three main cate-
gories :

About $5 million in mandatory costs to con-
tinue operations at this year's level. This in-
cludes annualization of the pay increase effec-
tive January 5, 1964, increases in wages of local
employees and rising costs of supplies and serv-
ices purchased overseas, and within-grade sal-
ary costs.

About $4.5 million to continue the communi-
cations improvement program initiated last
fiscal year.

About $5.4 million for improved support of
existing personnel, providing funds for addi-
tional travel, equipment replacement, security
equipment, printing, and other nonsalary items.

The increases are offset in part by transfers
and nonrecurring costs of about $2 million.

The Department's conmiunications capabili-
ties continue to be a matter of major concern.
Tlirough the assistance of the Congress, par-
ticularly in providing funds in the fiscal year
1963 supplemental, the Department was able
to order a considerable amoimt of badly needed
equipment, primarily cryjatographic in charac-
ter. A few items of this equipment have al-
ready been received.

Because of uncertainties regarding the De-
partment's role in communications when the
regular fiscal year 1964 budget was submitted,
items for major communications improvements
were excluded. A 1964 supplemental request of
$5 million is pending before the Congress.
Funds for 131 positions and other commmiica-
tions requirements which are reflected in the
1965 budget as an increase are in fact a continu-
ance of the program for which we are asking
congressional approval in this current fiscal

year. Approximately one-third of the $4.5
million increase is for continuing costs of the
communications personnel requested in the sup-
plemental.

The Department was f ortimately able to pro-
vide better communications support during the
more recent crises than had been true in earlier
years and particularly during the latter part of
calendar year 1962.

By an interagency arrangement additional .„
facilities were created during the last fiscal year. ^|
Much more remains to be done. During the bal-
ance of fiscal year 1964 and in 1965, the De-
partment expects to replace throughout the
world equipment which has become dangerously
outmoded.

The Department in today's fast-moving world
must have a modern worldwide communications
capability. Your favorable action on our fiscal
year 1964 supplemental request and the request
contained in this budget for communications
will enable us to achieve much-needed improve-
ments.

There are several items in the category of im-
proved support of which I would like to take
special note.

The budget requests of the various bureaus
contain increased amounts for equipment total-
ing $1.7 million. Nearly $0.6 million is for
security requirements, largely to provide se-
curity support to the worldwide communications
system about which I have already spoken. The
remainder is for replacement of equipment and
furniture. I make a special appeal for these
funds this year.

Another major increase is $2.6 million for
travel and transportation. About $1.8 million
is needed for home leave and transfer trips. The
remainder is for regional conferences of chiefs
of mission and commercial attaches, rest and re-
cuperation trips for personnel stationed at hard-
ship posts, and consultation travel of officers
located in Washington and at posts abroad.

I would like to mention briefly a few other
appropriation items :

Acquisition, Operation, and Maintenance
of Buildings Abroad

Legislation authorizing appropriations of
$49.8 million for a 2-year program was passed

840

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

by the Conjrrf-''s durini;; tlio last session. The

1964 appropriation for the regular proj^rani was
$18.1 million, leaving $31.7 million in the au-
thorization. The appropriation request for

1965 is $22.3 million.

By reducing administrative expenses, it has
been possible to hold total operating costs to
approximately the same figure as in I'JUt, despite
the increased amounts needed for maintenance
and operation of buildings. Regional offices
have been further reduced from 10 to 3, and 18
positions have been eliminated.

Funds are requested for consti-uction of an
office building on a Government-owned site in
Montevideo, an office building annex in Ankara,
purchase of an office building site in Paris, and
for a number of the most urgently needed proj-
ects in Africa.

Lack of authorizing legislation for fiscal years
1961 through 19G3 brought the acquisition and
construction portion of this program to a virtual
standstill, and it is imperative that we move it
forward now to provide the office space and liv-
ing quarters essential to our operations abroad.

In the special foreign currency program the
request is $6.1 million, an increase of $3.4 mil-
lion. Projects are planned in India, Israel,
Pakistan. Nepal, and the United Arab Republic.
Major ones are an office building at Madras,
India, and an annex to the Embassy building in
Cairo. As you kaow, this appropriation finances
the purchase or construction of oversea proper-
ties through the use of excess foreign currencies
owned by the Government.

International Organizations and Conferences

Funds for U.S. participation in the activities
of international organizations are contained in
four appropriations, which comprise more than
one-fourth of our budget.

Contrlhutions to International Organizations

The estimate for 1965 is $87.2 million, a de-
crease of $12.5 million below the 1964 appropri-
ation. Nonrecurring 1964 requirements of $20.1
million for the United Nations Congo force and
working capital fund are offset by increases of
$7.6 million, as follows :

$4.3 million is our contribution to the United
Nations and its specialized agencies. Major

items are: (1) the United Nations Emergency
Force in the Middle East, which covers a full
12-month period rather than 6 months as in
1964, and (2) expanded activities of the World
Health Organization and the inclusion in its
program of the third increment of the malaria
eradication budget.

$1.4 million for inter-American organizations.
Most of this increase is for Alliance for Prog-
ress activities of the Organization of American
States, accelerated programs of the Pan Ameri-
can Health Organization, and increased serv-
ices to member countries of the Inter-American
Institute of Agricultural Sciences designed to
raise their agricultural productivity.

$1.7 million for regional organizations, mostly
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development.

$0.2 million for otiier organizations, prin-
cipally the International Coffee Organization
and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Missions to International Organisations

The request is $3.2 million, an increase of
$0.7 million above the 1964 appropriation.
However, $0.5 million is the transfer to this ac-
count of certain expenses previously budgeted
in the salaries and expenses appropriation.
Aside from mandatory increases due to pay act
costs and other factors, the remaining $0.2 mil-
lion is largely to improve the facilities of our
mission in Geneva.

Intern/itionaZ Conferences and Contingencies

The request is $2.8 million, an increase of
$0.8 million above 1964. The Third U.N. Con-
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
and the Disarmament Conference require ap-
proximately $0.4 million. The rest of the in-
crease is to permit this appropriation to cover
the full cost of participation in international
conferences, part of which is now financed by
appropriations of other agencies.

International Tariff Negotiations

The request is $1.5 million, an increase of
$1.1 million above 1964. Although preliminary
work for the Kennedy Round under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been
proceeding, the detailed negotiations are sched-

HAY 25, 19G4

841

uled to begin in Geneva in May 1964. Funds
are required to pay the travel, allowance, and
per diem costs of the U.S. delegation, which will
be in Geneva for most of the 1965 fiscal year.

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange

For these activities we are requesting an ap-
propriation for fiscal year 1965 of $47.7 million,
an increase of $5.1 million over the 1964 appro-
priation. The Department's mutual educa-
tional and cultural exchange activities are fi-
nanced from several sources of fimds, the major
source being the annual appropriation before
this subcommittee. All sources taken together,
the total program in fiscal year 1964 is $56.6 mil-
lion. For fiscal year 1966, again taking into
account all funding sources, the appropriation
request before this subconunittee will permit a
total program of $57 million, or only $0.4 mil-
lion larger than in 1964. Although there are
some shifts among activities, the major cause of
the increased request in the annual appropria-
tion is the declining availability of funds from
the several other sources.

This program is a big user of foreign curren-
cies owned by the United States and has a very
good record in minimizing the outflow of U.S.
dollars. In fiscal year 1965 approximately 48
percent of the total program will be financed
with foreign currencies. Of the $5.1 million
increase requested in the appropriation, it is
planned that not less than $3.5 million will be
used to purchase foreign currencies from the
U.S. Treasury.

We have come to count increasingly on the
contributions which educational and cultural
exchanges make in our relations with almost
every part of the world.

We cannot, however, expect to build founda-
tions for an enduring peace on any sliort time
schedule. Such peace will come only through
perseverance. One of the most hopeful activ-
ities in which to persevere and to press forward
is educational and cultural exchange.

Exchange has been a formal, governmental
activity only a relatively short time — for about
a quarter century. In less than 20 years since
World War II we have seen exchanges become
a powerful, although quiet, element in our
foreign policy.

In the passage of the Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 Congress clearly
confirmed the importance of this activity and
sought to strengthen it. At the same time, in
this act Congress asked that a report on the ef-
fectiveness of the Department's programs be
made by the United States Advisory Commis-
sion on International Educational and Cultural
Affairs. This report, by distinguished citizens
who founded their conclusions on extensive re-
search here and overseas, provides a soimd basis
for confidence in exchanges as a path to peace
we should pursue.'

Our system of exchanges has behind it some
of the strongest assets of our open, democratic
society. Our colleges and universities — nearly
2,000 of them — give great strength to our total
national exchange effort. Nongovernmental
organizations and private citizens in great num-
bers assist the total effort by home and com-
munity services. This international activity
has developed to a point — as the Commission
noted — of unexampled public approval and par-
ticipation. The record confirms the confidence
Congress has placed in this activity.

I urge approval of the full appropriation re-
quested to enable us to maintain and improve
this activity. The sixties may well prove a
time when the steady pursuit of understanding
through exchanges carried us all measurably
forward in the pursuit of peace.

1964 Supplemental Requests

I would like to mention briefly the 1964 sup-
plemental requests. They total $42.4 million,
of which $37 million is for the purchase of for-
eign currencies owned by the United States.
The breakdown of the total request is as follows :

Appropriation Amount

Salaries and expenses, Department of
State $5,000,000

Emergencies in the diplomatic and con-
sular service 400, 000

Preservation of ancient Nubian monu-
ments 12, 000, 000

Educational and cultural exchange with

Japan 25, 000, OOP

Total 42, 400. 000

' A limited number of copies of the report, A Beacon
of Hope: The Exclian(je-of-Perftons Program, are avail-
able upon request from the U.S. Advisory Commission
on International Educational and Cultural Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20.520.

842

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILI.ETIN

I have already roforrod to tlie salaries and ex-
penses request, which is solely for improving
our worldwide conununications facilities.

The $12 million for preservation of ancient
Nubian monuments is for purchase from the
Treasury of excess U.S.-owned foreign cur-
rencies as a contribution to the UNESCO
[United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization] project to preserve the
two ancient temples of Abu Simbel. These
temples will be submerged by the waters of the
Aswan Dam Basin. An engineering plan has
been approved b}- UNESCO to dismantle and
remove the temples to higher gi-ound. This
work has already begun under a contract signed
last fall by the United Arab Republic. Pledges
by 47 countries total $28.8 million, including the
provisional pledge of the United States.

The request of $25 million for educational and
cultural exchange with Japan is for purchase
from the Treasury of yen which have accrued
from payments by the Japanese Government for
postwar economic assistance. Under the terms
of the settlement agreement, $25 million in yen
can be used only for educational and cultural ex-
change between the two countries. We propose
that this appropriation be used for a one-time
purchase of yen from the Treasury. The for-
eign currency will then be made available to
a new binational foundation to be created. In-
vestment of the principal and use of accruing
interest will finance a continuing program of
exchanges designed to strengthen our relations
with Japan.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Extension of Public Law 480 — Titles I and II. Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural
Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture.
Serial LL. February 18-28, 1964. 188 pp.

Administration of VM'.i Fishery Amendment to Public
Law 480. Hearing before the Subcommittee on For-
eign Agricultural Operations of the House Committee
on Agriculture. Serial MM. February 27, 1964.
31pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1904. Hearings before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502.
Part I. March 23-25, 1964. 119 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

ICEM Council

The Department of State announced on May
5 (press release 207) tliat the U.S. Government
would be represented by the following delega-
tion at the 21st session of the Intergovernmental
Committee for European Migration (ICEM),
meeting at Geneva May 11-15.

Delegate

Abba P. Schwartz, Administrator, Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, Department of State

Alternate Delegate

George L. Warren, Sr., Adviser to the Administrator,
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Depart-
ment of State

Congressional Advisers

Emanuel Celler, U.S. House of Representatives
Arch A. Moore, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives
Peter W. Rodlno, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives
Garner E. Shriver, U.S. House of Representatives

Advisers

James L. Carlin, Refugee-Migration OflScer, U.S.

Mission, Geneva
Elmer M. Falk, Director, Office of Refugee and

Migration Affairs, Department of State
Alva L. Pilliod, European Supervisor, Immigration

and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice,

Frankfurt
Walter M. Besterman, Committee on the Judiciary,

U.S. House of Representatives

This will be a regular biannual meeting of the
Council. The principal items for discussion
are : ( 1 ) Report of the Director on the work of
the Committee for 1963; (2) Plan of Opera-
tions and Budget and Plan of Expenditures for
1964: Revised Estimates.

international Rubber Study Group

The Department of State announced on May
4 (press release 204) that the U.S. Government
would be represented by the following delega-
tion at the I7th meeting of the International

MAY 25, 1964

843

Kubber Study Group (lESG) at Tokyo May
18-22.

Delegate

Edmund B. Getzin, chief, Industrial and Strategic
Materials Division, Department of State

Alternate Delegates

J. Bruce Hamilton, Industrial and Strategic Materials

Division, Department of State
James Higgins, chief of rubber branch. Business and

Defense Services Administration, Department of

Commerce

Advisers

Robert A. Badenhop, president, Robert Badenhop Cor-
poration

J. S. Cornell, president, J. S. Cornell Company

Earle S. Ebers, vice president. United States Rubber
Company

Bancroft W. Henderson, managing director. Interna-
tional Institute of Synthetic Rubber Producers, Inc.

J. W. Keener, president, B. F. Goodrich Company

W. E. Klippert, vice president, Goodyear Tire and Rub-
ber Company

James G. Paterson, president, H. A. Astlett and Com-
pany

Leonard A. Wohler, manager of rubber purchases, Fire-
stone Tire and Rubber Company

The International Rubber Study Group pro-
vides a forum for consultation among princi-
pal producing and consuming countries on ques-
tions i-elating to production, consumption, and
international trade in rubber. It collects and
publishes statistics and other information on
production, consumption, and trade. The
United States is one of the founders of IRSG,
and the first meeting was held at Washington
in January 1945.

One of the important items to be discussed at
this session will be the current and prospective
developments in tlie use of natural rubber and
of synthetic rubber.

TREATY INFORMATION

Designations

Charlotte Moton Hubbard as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs. (For biographic details,
see Department of State press release 214 dated May
7.)

United States and Canada Hold
Civil Air Transport Talks

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS

The Department of State annotmced on
April 20 (press release 171) that delegations
representing the United States and Canadian
Governments would commence negotiations at
Washington on April 27 to revise the United
States-Canadian Air Transport Services Agree-
ment of 1949.1

The Canadian delegation will be headed
by Frederick T. Wood, Cliairman of the
Air Transport Board of Canada, and will
include also officials from the Department of
External Affairs, the Department of Transport,
and the Air Transport Board. The U.S. dele-
gation will be under the chairmanship of Allen
R. Ferguson, Coordinator of International Avi-
ation Affairs, Department of State. The U.S.
delegation will also include Chan Gurney, mem-
ber of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and mem-
bers of the staffs of the Board and the
Department of State.

Civil air transport questions were discussed
by Prime Minister [Lester B.] Pearson and the
late President Kennedy at their meeting in Hy-
annis Port in ilay 1963.^ At that time it was
agreed that discussions would be initiated to
study air travel arrangements between the two
countries from the {joint of view of the travel-
ing public and the airlines concerned. Subse-
quently President Kennedy requested Profes-
sor Jolm Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard to
study this question. During August of 1963
Professor Galbraith held extensive discussions
in Washington and Ottawa with government

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1934,
345(5, and 4213.

■ For text of joint communique, see Bulletin of
May 27, 1963, p. 815.

844

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

officials and rcpreseutiUivcs of the airlines of
both countries.

In his report to President Kennedy, Profes-
sor Galbraith expressed the view that the pres-
ent agreement in several instances imposes
patterns of service inconvenient for the ti'avel-
ing public and inefficient for the airlines
operating the routes. Professor Galbraith rec-
ommended that new arrangements be negotiated
■which would: (a) as nearly as possible accom-
modate the travel habits of the people of the
two countries with a minimum of artificial re-
straint arising from the international frontier;

(b) provide opportimity for the carriers to
make optimum use of modern equipment; and

(c) provide for equitable access to tlie traffic
between the two countries by the airlines of the
two countries.

Professor Galbraith's report was discussed
with and received the concurrence of the agen-
cies of the U.S. Government most closely con-
cerned with these questions. After having been
submitted to the President it was made avail-
able to the Canadian Government. The two
Governments subsequently agreed to enter into
negotiations for revision of the agreement
taking into account Professor Galbraith's
recommendations.

President Jolinson and Prime Minister Pear-
son at their meeting in Washington in January
1964 ' agreed that negotiations should begin in
the near future.

Air Transport Services Agreement
Signed With U.A.R.

Press release 206 dated May S

The United Arab Republic and the United
States signed at Cairo on May 5 a bilateral Air
Transport Services Agreement, which was
initialed ad referendum February 4, 1963.^
The agreement was signed on behalf of their
Governments by Alimad Seif, Director General
for Civil Aviation of the U.A.Il., and John S.
Badeau, U.S. Ambassador to the U.A.R.

The agreement is a revision of the 1946 Air
Transport Agreement between the United
States and Egypt.^ It is a more modern vereion
of the standard air transport agreement and as
such contains articles on rates and capacity
which are in conformity with those included
in most of the present agreements of the United
States. The agreement defines the routes to
the United States which a carrier designated by
the U.A.R. will be permitted to serve. The
1946 agreement granted such a route or routes,
but left their specific designation to be deter-
mined at a later date. Subsequent to issuance
by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board of a for-
eign air-carrier permit, the carrier designated
by the U.A.R. will be permitted to fly to New
York via (a) Greece, Italy, Switzerland,
France, and Ireland, and (b) Greece, Italy,
Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Ireland.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

Press release 201 dated May 2

The United States and Canadian delegations
concluded in Washington on Friday, May 1,
1964, the first round of discussions regarding
the renegotiation of the Canada-United States
bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement.
It was agreed that there had been a fruitful
exchange of views, and that the second round
of these negotiations would begin on July 13,
1964. In the interval work related to the
second session vrill go forward in a number
of joint working groups.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago Deccmtier 7, 1944. Entered into force
April 4, 1947. TIAS l.")91.
Adherence deposited: Kenya, May 1, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living re-
sources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29,
19.08."

• Ibid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.

' Bulletin of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 297.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1727.

' Not in force.

MAT 25, 1964

845

Notification that it considers itself bound: Jamaica,
April 16, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Octo-
ber 10, 1963. TIAS 0433.

Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, May 6, 1964; Iran,
May 5, 1964.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) an-
nexed to the international telecommunication con-
vention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with
appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva
November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1,
1960. TIAS 4390.
Notification of approval: Indonesia, March 14, 1964.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the
international telecommunication convention of De-
cember 21, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva
December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961 ;
for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Indonesia, March 14, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended (TIAS
5292, 5323, 5479). Effected by exchange of notes at
La Paz April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27,
1964.

China

Agreement for the financing of certain educational and
cultural exchange programs. Signed at Taipei
April 23, 1964. Entered into force April 23, 1964.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
programs, as amended (TIAS 3957, 4713). Signed
at Nanking November 10, 1947. Entered into force
November 10, 1947. TIAS 1687.
Terminated: April 23, 1964 (superseded by agree-
ment of April 23, 1964, supra.)

Congo (Leopoldville)

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at
L6opoldville April 28, 1964. Entered into force
April 28, 1964.

India

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effect-
ed by exchange of notes at Washington April 15,
1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of November 26, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5225, 5317, 5424). Effected by exchange of notes at
New Delhi April 17, 1964. Entered into force
April 17, M&i.

Jamaica

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in
cotton textiles of October 1, 1963 (TIAS 5435). Ef-

fected by exchange of notes at Washington March 31
and April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964.

United Arab Republic

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Cairo
May 5, 1964. Entered into force provisionally May 5,
1964. Will enter into force definitively 30 days
after the United Arab Republic notifies the United
States that its constitutional requirements have
been comiJleted.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.

Releases issued prior to May 4 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 171 of
April 20, 191 of April 28, and 201 of May 2.

No.
t202

*203
204

t205

Date

5/4

5/4
5/4

5/4

*1S6-A 5/5

206

5/5

Subject

Manning : Massachusetts Joint
Bar-Press Symposium.

U.S. particiijation in international
conferences.

Delegation to International Rub-
ber Study Group, Tokyo (re-
write).

Delegation to NATO Council
(rewrite).

Rusk : additional remarks at Val-
paraiso University, April 25.

Air transport services agree-
ment with U.A.R.

Delegation to ICEM (rewrite).

Harriman : University of Virginia
Law School (excerpts).

Rusk : message to OECD welcom-
ing Japanese membership.

Rwanda credentials (rewrite).

Mauritania credentials (rewrite).

Panama credentials (rewrite).

Cultural exchange (Balkans).

Mrs. Hubbard designated Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs (biographic details).

Ball : "NATO and World Respon-
sibilities."

Rostow : "A Perspective on the
Tasks of the 1960's."

Cleveland : Peace Corps plaque.
University of Michigan.

U.S. -Indian cotton textile agree-
ment.

Rusk : "Atlantic and European
Unity" (as-delivered text).

U.S.-Liberian agreements on Free
Port and on cultural program.

Williams : departure for Africa.

Rusk : BBC interview.

Talks with Rumania.

♦Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

207

*208

5/5
5/5

t209

5/5

210

211

212

*213

*214

5/6
5/6
5/6
5/6
5/7

215

5/7

t216

5/8

*217

5/8

t218

5/8

219

5/8

220

5/8

221
222

t224

5/8
5/8
5/9

846

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 25, 1964 Vol. L, No. ISOO

Aviation

Air Trausport Services Agreement Signed With

U.A.R 845

United States and Canada Hold Civil Air Trans-
port TallJs 844

Canada. United States and Canada Hold Civil

Air Trausport Talks 844

China. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on BBC's
"Encounter" Program (Kltzinger, Mossuian,
Neustadt, Rusk) 816

Communism. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on
BBC's "Encounter" Program (Kitzinger, Moss-
man, Neustadt, Kusk) 816

Congo (Brazzaville). Assistant Secretary Wil-
liams Visits West and Central Africa (de-
parture statement) 828

Congo (Leopoldville). Assistant Secretary Wil-
liams Visits West and Central Africa (de-
parture statement) 828

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 843

Department of State Budget Requests for Fiscal

1965 (Rusk) 836

Cuba. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on BBC's
"Encounter" Program (Kitzinger, Mossman,
Neustadt, Rusk) 816

Department and Foreign Service

Department of State Budget Requests for Fiscal

19G5 (Rusk) 836

Designations (Hubbard) 844

Disarmament. Mr. Timberlake Named Deputy

for Disarmament Talks 835

Economic Affairs

Atlantic and European Unity (Rusk) .... 810
International Rubber Study Group (delegation) . 843
New York World's Fair (text of proclamation) . 822
Secretary Comments on Korean Exchange Rate

Reform 830

U.S. Adds North Viet-Nam to List of Blocked

Countries 830

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and
Liberia Sign Agreements on Free Port and
Cultural Program 829

Europe. Atlantic and European Unity (Rusk) . 810

Foreign Aid

Foreign Aid Today (Bell) 831

Secretary Comments on Korean Exchange Rate
Reform 830

Ghana. Assistant Secretary Williams Visits
West and Central Africa (departure state-
ment) 828

Immigration and Naturalization. President
Johnson Determines Immigration Quota for

Kenya (text of proclamation) 829

International Organizations and Conferences

ICEM Council (delegation) 843

International Rubber Study Group (delegation) . 843
Mr. Timberlake Named Deputy for Disarmament
Talks 835

Kenya. President Johnson Determines Immigra-
tion Quota for Kenya (text of proclamation) . 829

Korea. Secretary Comments on Korean Ex-
change Rate Reform 830

Liberia. U.S. and Liberia Sign Agreements on

Free Port and Cultural Program 829

Mali. Assistant Secretary Williams Visits West

and Central Africa (departure statement) . . 828

Mauritania. Letters of Credence (Miske) . .. . 830

Military Affairs

NATO and World Responsibilities (Ball) ... 823
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on BBC's "En-
counter" Program (Kitzinger, Mossman, Neu-
stadt, Rusk) 816

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic and European Unity (Rusk) .... 810
NATO and World Responsibilities (Ball) ... 823
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on BBC's "En-
couuter" Program (Kitzinger, Mossman, Neu-
stadt, Ru.sk) 810

Panama. Letters of Credence (Moreno) . . . 830
Presidential Documents

New York World's Fair 822

President Johnson Determines Immigration

Quota for Kenya 829

Public Affairs. Mrs. Hubbard designated Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary 844

Refugees. ICEM Council (delegation) .... 843
Rwanda. Letters of Credence (Kabanda) . . . 830
Senegal. Assistant Secretary Williams Visits
West and Central Africa (departure state-
ment) 828

Treaty Information

Air Transport Services Agreement Signed With

U.A.R 845

Current Actions 845

United States and Canada Hold Civil Air Trans-
port Talks 844

U.S. and Liberia Sign Agreements on Free Port

and Cultural Program 829

United Arab Republic. Air Transport Services

Agreement Signed With U.A.R 845

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on BBC's "Encounter" Program (Kitzinger,

Mossman, Neustadt, Rusk) 816

Viet-Nam. U.S. Adds North Viet-Nam to List of

Blocked Countries 830

Name Index

Ball, George W 823

Bell, David E 831

Hubbard, Mrs. Charlotte Moton 844

Johnson, President 822, 829

Kabanda, Celestin 830

Kitzinger, Uwe 816

Miske, Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed 830

Moreno, Miguel J., Jr 830

Mossman, James 816

Neustadt, Richard 816

Rusk, Secretary 810, 816, 830, 836

Timberlake. Clare H 835

Williams, G. Mennen 828

'-HC

Superintendent of Docume
u.s. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. Z0402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

(GPOl

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

America as a Great Power

This 22-page pamphlet is based on an address made by Pi-esident Lyndon B. Johnson before the
Associated Press at New York City on April 20, 1964.

President Johnson reviews the time-tested principles on which our foreign policy rests but stresses
that "particular actions must change as events change conditions." The President then discusses six
areas of particular concern: U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, the Atlantic partnership, Latin America and the
Alliance for Progress, freedom in the Far East, the new nations of Africa and Asia, and foreign aid.

PUBLICATION 7688 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7688 15 cents

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PUINTINQ OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Enclosed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documents)

Please send me copies of America as a Great Power

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL ^VEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. Z, No. 1301

June 1, 1964.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETS AT THE HAGUE
Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Communique 850

PRESIDENT JOHNSON PLEDGES REDOUBLED EFFORTS
TO ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 854

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

J}y Assistant Secretary Mann 857

A PERSPECTIVE ON THE TASKS OF THE 1960's
by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 864

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW

by Assistant Secretary Manning 868

For index see inside back cover

North Atlantic Council Meets at The Hague

The North Atlantic Council held its regular
spring ministerial meeting at The Hague May
12-H. Following are texts of a statement made
by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on
May 12 and a communique issued on May 14-,
together with a list of the members of the U.S.
delegation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, MAY 12

It is my high privilege, as this year's honor-
ary President of the NATO Council, to open
the spring meeting of the NATO ministers.
And, on behalf of all members of the North
Atlantic alliance, it gives me particular pleas-
ure to thank the Government of the Nether-
lands for their warm -welcome and the excellent
arrangements they have made for us. All of
us have looked forward with keen anticipation
to our meeting at The Hague, both because of
its beauty as a city and because of the stanch
support which the Government of the Nether-
lands and the Dutch people have given to
NATO.

At a risk of repeating some of the thoughts
of my distinguished Dutch colleague and host,

Dr. [J. M. A. H.] Luns, I should like to reflect
for a few moments upon the fact that NATO is
15 years old this spring. Fifteen years are not
long in the life of mankind, but they are long
when compared with the lives of some of the
transitory alliances of convenience of the past.
These 15 years have witnessed great cooperative
achievements. NATO's accomplishments are
especially noteworthy when weighed against
the situation facing the countries of the West
when NATO was founded.

Beyond question, NATO has been a funda-
mental success :

— since its creation, no part of NATO terri-
tory has fallen to the Communists ;

— in terms of the basic purpose for which it
was foimded — the defense of the West — there
has been complete NATO unity, in the face of
hostile threats or pressure ;

— NATO has provided the shield behind
which the countries of the Atlantic world have
attained unparalleled economic well-being and
political stability ;

— finally, continuing NATO strength and
cohesion give the Western Powers a solid base
from wliich to attempt to solve East-West prob-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1301 PUBLICATION 7695 JUNE 1, 1964

The Department of State Bnlletln, a
weekly publication Issned by the Office
of Media ServlceB. Barean of Pnbllc Af-
fairs, provides the pnbllc and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bnlletln Inclndes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issned
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International aifalrs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concernlnp treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Qovern-

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb : 52 Issues, domestic $8.60,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961),

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bnlletln
Is Indexed In the Readers' Oolde to
Periodical Literature.

850

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BtrLLETTN

lems looking toward a more stable and secure
•world.

It is not, I think, an exaggeration to say that
NATO's first 15 years liave been among the
most constructive in the history of human
freedom. And, for this, NATO deserves no
small part of the credit.

We should not, however, let NATO's success
blind us to current dangers. Certain of these
dangers seem to have diminished; but they can
reappear suddenly and without warning. The
need for a strong alliance uf North Atlantic
nations remains essential so long as basic Com-
munist aims remain unchanged.

Consequently, we must continue to maintain
NATO's basic militarj' strength as we look to
the future. Without letting down our guard,
we must adapt NATO to the current interna-
tional environment — to a period in which cer-
tain tensions in Europe appear to have been
somewhat relaxed and Communist tactics have
been modified to meet new requirements, but in
which Communist objectives continue to pose a
direct threat to the free world.

In short, since NATO continues as a funda-
mental instriunent of collective endeavor for
the countries of the North Atlantic, it must
adapt itself to a situation in which the Com-
munist threat takes more diversified and more
sophisticated forms; to a situation in which
the cohesive element in this alliance must de-
pend upon something more than an imminent
military threat. How well we succeed in ad-
justing to these new requirements will be the
critical test for the alliance in the years ahead.

The tasks of democracy are never finished.
All of us have a stake in every part of the un-
finished business of himian freedom. We in the
United States are facing up to our own biggest
piece of unfinished business — in trying to es-
tablish once and for all full equality of rights
in our complex society.

Just as it is within each of our nations, so it
is with our alliance. It is natural for us, as
free men, not to dwell on what we have achieved
but to think about next steps. Because all of
us have the habit of paying attention to the
future, we are interested in suggestions for im-
provements in NATO.

We in the United States look upon the North

Atlantic alliance as an expression of an endur-
ing conununity of interests and of abiding com-
mon commitments to great humane traditions.
We are prepared to move ahead with our
NATO partners in strengthening the institu-
tions of the North Atlantic community.

We must better develop the process of po-
litical consultation so that, as a matter of agreed
practice, each of us consults his partners in
advance on those policy decisions directly af-
fecting the interest of NATO as a whole.

We must recognize also that NATO's success
has somewhat deflected the Communist threat
against Europe itself. The Communists are
concentrating their expansionist efi'orts on other
areas of the world.

It is essential to the security of the free world
that aggression be eradicated — aggression
everywhere by wliatever means, including sub-
version, terror, infiltration of arms and trained
men, and guerrilla warfare. It is essential that
Commmiists everywhere learn that they cannot
expect to gain from a policy of militancy.

The North Atlantic community and Japan
are also the principal sources of capital and
teclinical assistance for the developing coun-
tries. Men everywhere know that the}' are no
longer sentenced by Nature to starvation or bare
existence. They know that modem technology
makes possible a decent life. And they are
determined to achieve a better life for them-
selves and their children. There can be neither
stability nor enduring prosperity for anybody
in a world divided between haves and have-
nots. All of the industrially advanced nations
of the free world have a long-term vital inter-
est in the economic and social advance of less
developed nations.

Let me conclude these brief remarks with a
word of appreciation and gratitude to our de-
voted Secretary General, Dr. Dirk Stikker, wlio
has indicated his desire to relinquish the duties
and burdens of office which he has carried in
such a distinguished fashion for the past 3
years. All of us are sorry to see Dr. Stikker
go. In his career and in his basic philosophy,
no man has better personified the time meaning
of NATO. And I think it is most appropriate
that he should preside over his last ministerial
meeting in The Hague, the seat of the govem-

JUNE 1, 1964

851

ment of the country which he has served so long
and so well.

A short time ago President Johnson ^ ex-
pressed our heartfelt feeling of warmth and
appreciation for Dr. Stikker in these words :

As its Secretary General he has effectively and
imaginatively guided NATO's activities so as to develop
the strength of the alliance while seeliing to adjust
its role to the changing world situation.

He has courageously and impartially championed
measures which he considered essential to the growth
and integrity of NATO. A wise, distinguished, and
exi)erienced international servant, he has recognized
that if the ultimate strength of the alliance depends
on the collective will of its members, its Secretary
General could through vigorous leadership and skill-
ful diplomacy contribute significantly to NATO's co-
hesion and effectiveness.

I am certain that all of us would echo these
sentiments. And I know that I speak for all
who are present — indeed, for all those who have
contributed to the work of NATO — in saluting
our esteemed Secretary General and in wishing
him many years of happiness and fulfillment.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, MAY 14

Press release 237 dated May 15

The North Atlantic Council held its Spring Minis-
terial Meeting at The Hague from 12th to 14th May,
1964.

The Ministers reviewed the international situation.
They discussed the annual political appraisal of the
state of the Alliance presented by the Secretary-
General. They emphasized the role of the Atlantic
Alliance as the indispensable guardian of security and
peace, and thus as the prerequisite for social and eco-
nomic progress.

The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to
achieve a genuine relaxation of tension in inter-
national relations. Although in recent months no seri-
ous crises have arisen in Europe, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics has nevertheless continued to try
to exert different forms of pressure. The Communist
countries continue their various efforts to extend their
system to the whole world. The fundamental causes
of tension in the world therefore persist.

In particular, no solution has yet been found for
the problems of Germany and Berlin. Tlie Council
reaffirmed that a just and peaceful solution to the
problem of Germany can be reached only on the basis
of the right of self-determination, and agreed that

every suitable opportunity should be taken to bring
nearer to realization the wish of the German people
for reunification in freedom, and thereby ensure an
enduriug peace in Central EuroiJe. This problem will
continue to be examined. The Council also reaffirmed
that the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is the only German Government freely and
legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to
speak for Germany as the Representative of the Ger-
man people in international affairs. With regard to
Berlin, the Alliance stands by the terms of its Declara-
tion of 16th December, 1958.^

The Ministers noted with satisfaction that limited
steps had recently been taken towards arresting the
arms race. They reiterated their desire to bring
about a settlement of the basic problems of disarma-
ment, but noted that such a prospect would remain
remote as long as the Soviet Union refused to accept
effective measures of control and inspection.

In present circumstances, the members of the Al-
liance are in duty bound to improve their overall defen-
sive capability. They will strengthen their unity by
extending and deepening their political consultation.
They will intensify their economic effort in order to
raise living standards, whether of their own peoples or
in developing countries.

The Ministers, referring to the previous resolution
concerning the study of the military and economic prob-
lems of the defense of the Southeastern region of
NATO," expressed the wish that the conclusions of
this study be submitted at the next Ministerial Meeting.

The Ministers expressed their concern at the situa-
tion in this region arising from the continuing dis-
orders in Cyprus. They reaffirmed the full support of
their governments for the action decided on by the
United Nations Organization with a view to restoring
law and order, and for the efforts of the mediator
appointed by the United Nations to seek an agreed
solution of the problem.

The Ministers expressed their deep regret at the
impending departure of Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, who had
announced his intention of retiring from the Secretary-
Generalship of the Organization. In their tributes to
Mr. Stikker, who was one of those who signed the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Ministers expressed
their profound appreciation of his outstanding services
to the Alliance.

The Council invited Signer Maulio Brosio, former
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister in the
Italian Government and at present Italian Ambassador
in Paris, to become Secretary-General of the Organi-
zation in succession to Mr. Stikker as from 1 August,
1964. Signor Brosio has informed the Council of his
acceptance of this invitation.

The next Ministerial Meeting will be held in Paris
in December 1964.

' In a telegram to Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter
dated Apr. 2.

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 19.'i9, p. 4.
" For text of a communique dated Dec. 18, 1963, see
ma.. Jan. 6, 1964, p. 30.

852

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on May
4 (press release 205) that the following wouUl
be members of the U.S. delegation to the annual
spring meeting of foreign ministei-s of the North
Atlantic Council at The Hague May 12-14 :

United States Representative

Dean Rusk, chairman. Secretary of State

United States Representative on the Xorth Atlantic
Council

Tbomas K. Flnletter

Advisers

John W. Auchincloss, Deputy Director, Otfice of Politi-
cal Affairs, U.S. Mis.sion to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and European Regional Organizations,
Paris

Elbridge Durbrow. Deputy U.S. Representative on the
Xorth Atlantic Council

I'hilip .T, Farley, Director, Office of Political Affairs,
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Brig. Gen. J. T. Folda, .Jr., USA. Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Edward S. Little. Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

David H. Popper, deputy coordinator. Director, Office
of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Depart-
ment of State

.Tohn S. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands

Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security Affairs

J. Robert Schaetzel, coordinator. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European .\ffairs

J. Harold Shullaw, Director, Office of British Common-
wealth and Northern European Affairs, Department
of State

Ronald I. Spiers. Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic
Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations

Llewellyn E. Thompson. Ambassador at Large, Depart-
ment of State

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs

Christopher Van Hollen, Office of Atlantic Political
and Military Affairs, Department of State.

U.S. Welcomes Japanese
Membership in OECD

Message From Secretary liwik ^

I would like on this significant occasion to ex-
press the great pleasure of the people and Gov-
ernment of the United States that Japan has
become a full member of the OECD.^ Even
before this organization was established,
Japan's role as a contributor of economic assist-
ance to the developing countries merited her
membership in the Development Assistance
Group. The United States has always believed
that the effectiveness of the OECD as one of the
major instruments of free-world economic co-
operation required the participation of Japan
in all OECD activities. The reasons for this
are clear: The size of Japan's economy, its dra-
matic postwar economic growth under condi-
tions of freedom, the significant place of Japan
in international trade and economic relations —
all underline the importance of broad-scale
economic cooperation between this key area of
the Far East and the other members of the
OECD. With Japan as a full and willing
partner in the OECD this vital institution will
be better able to meet the economic challenges
of today.

Letters of Credence

Ireland

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ireland,
William P. Fay, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on May 15. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of Stat© press release 235
dat«d May 15.

' Read to the Council of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development at Paris on May
5 by John M. Leddy, U.S. Representative to the OECD
(press release 209).

'Japan deposited its instrument of ratification on
Apr. 28.

JUNE 1, 1964

853

President Johnson Pledges Redoubled Efforts
to Alliance for Progress

On May 11 the ambassadors of the Latin
American nations met with President Johnson
at the White House for an informal review of
the Alliance for Progress and the signing of

12 Alliance for Progress agreements involving

13 countries. Following are remarks mnde hy
the President at the signing ceremony.

White House press release ; aa-dellvered text

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to welcome
you to the Wliite House this evening. I am
slightly tardy because we have just completed
an informal review of the Alliance for Progress
problems with all of the ambassadors and the
distinguished head of CIAP [Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress] . This
kind of exchange, we think, strengthens our
common aim and our combined ability to ad-
vance the alliance.

So this afternoon I asked all of the ambassa-
dors to meet with me in the Cabinet Koom. I
am not sure I didn't have a better Cabinet to-
day than I normally have. We talked about
our mutual problems, and then I asked them
to give me their frank, candid criticisms, sug-
gestions on the problems that face us both, and
they were quit© helpful.

I learned much that will be very helpful in
the days ahead — some of the weaker points that
they pointed out, some of the bureaucracy that
exists in all government, not just in our govern-
ment but in their governments as well.

I look forward to further meetings of this
kind in the days ahead, and I have asked the
Secretary of State to make plans to have the
ambassadors in from time to time to have a very
frank and open exchange with them. Senator
[Wayne] Morse taught me back in the Senate
that you could always deal with a fellow across

the table easier than you could if you tried to
deal with him by correspondence.

On November 18th President Kennedy spoke
once again to the hemisphere,^ and he quoted
Eobert Frost, saying that "Nothing is true ex-
cept a man or men adhere to it — to live for it, to
spend themselves on it, to die for it." Within
a week after that statement was made, his life,
consecrated to this cause, had been tragically
ended. It is for us, the living, to insure that
the hopes that he raised are rewarded.

To that purpose, I said last November, let
us make the Alliance for Progress President
Kennedy's living memorial.^

Today's agreements are part of our pledge.
The United States will provide almost $40 mil-
lion— the countries of Latin America will pro-
vide $60 million — for projects that we are
beginning in 13 countries. These projects will
help eliminate malaria in Brazil. They will
help train farmers in Bolivia. They will estab-
lish for the first time three mral electric co-
operatives serving 10,000 homes and farms in
the countryside of Colombia. They will bring
credit and assistance to 21,000 small farms in
the land reform and colonization areas of Peru.
They will touch the lives and ease the struggles
of 23 million people across our hemisphere.

These are only the latest steps in 6 months of
very extraordinary effort since I became Presi-
dent. Since last December the United States
has extended more than $130 million in assist-
ance. In that 6-month period, we have, by
working together, completed more than 52,000
homes, 7,000 new classrooms. We have pro-
duced more than a million and a half school-

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 9, 1963, p. 900.
" Ihia., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.

854

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

books. "We Imve made more than 25,000 loans
to farmere. Wo have put into operation liealth
programs to care for 4 million people and Food
for Peace programs to feed more than 10 million
of our fellow Americans. We have built more
than 500 miles of roads. We have trained more
than 10,000 teachers. We have trained more
than 1,000 public administrators. Wo have es-
tablished already more than 200 credit miions.
If any of you want the address after the meet-
ing, I will be glad to supply it to you. AVe have
300 water systems that will benefit 10 million
people.

In the months to come, we intend to more than
double the pace of this action. For this is the
time and this is the day and this is an adminis-
tration of action.

Development, Diversity, and Democracy

Our help is only a small proportion of the
resources for growth and the reforms for justice
contributed by all of you — you, the countries of
Latin America. These are the tangible tokens
of the constancy of our cause since the signing
of the Charter of Punta del Este. Wliat -we
believed in then — I should not have to repeat —
we stand for now. What we agreed to then, we
support now. What we sought and looked for-
ward to then, we seek now.

Tliis is as it must be. Our programs and our
policies are not founded on the shifting sands
of momentary concern or the passing opinions
of any one official or any present official. They
are the inescapable issue of the events of our
past and the hazards of our present.

When President Kennedy made his first
statement to the ambassadors in the dining room
of this house on the Alliance for Progress, he
said we are going to wage a war on the ancient
enemies of mankind — poverty, illiteracy, and
disease. We say now, if a peaceful revolution is
impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable.

These things are rooted in our devotion to our
democratic birthright and dedication to our
spiritual values. They are, I want you to know,
in short, the only objectives possible to men that
seek to retain freedom and protect moral values
while pursuing progress in a world that is on
the march.

Keal problems require realistic solutions.
Helping to reshape an entire hemisphere re-
quires practical priorities and concrete deeds.
But no action, no judgment, no statement will
advance our alliance unless it is guided by firm
and resolute regard to principles. Those prin-
ciples must not yield either to immediate ex-
pedient or to any present danger.

So we come here today to renew, as we do in
the acts of every day, our dedication to the
principles of development, of diversity, and of
democracy.

Franklin Roosevelt, a man whom I served
and a man whom I loved, a man whose precepts
I follow, said, and I quote, "Through demo-
cratic processes we can strive to achieve for the
Americas the highest possible living standards
for all of our people." So I pledge to you to-
day that we will continue to pursue that goal
imtil every campesino, every worker, is freed
from the crushing weight of poverty, disease,
and illiteracy and ignorance.

I have asked the Congress for the funds
necessary to meet our obligation under the Al-
liance for Progress.' I will fight for those
funds with every resource of my Government.
Furthermore, I intend to ask for $250 million
this year to replenish the Bank's Fund for
Special Operations in accordance with the
unanimous vote of the Panama meeting of the
Inter- American Bank.* That Bank, supported
first by President Eisenhower, has become a
beacon of hope to the oppressed of our lands.

The principle of diversity stems from Presi-
dent Roosevelt's policy of the Good Neighbor.
Within the loose and ample frame of the inter-
American system there is room for each nation
to order its institutions and to organize its
economy so long as it respects the rights of its
neighbors. In the councils of the alliance we
must guide each other toward the most reward-
ing course of progress. We do not confuse
that duty and that responsibility with any de-
sire or any right to impose those views on un-
willing neighbors.

* For text of I'resident Johnson's foreiKn aid mes-
sage of Mar. 19, see ibid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 578.

' For a statement made by Secretary of the Treasury
Douglas Dillon before the Governors of the Inter-
American Development Bank at Panamfl, on Apr. 14,
see ibid.. May 4, 1964, p. 717.

JUNE 1, 1964

855

In devotion to democracy, we are guided by
the command of Bolivar that we must fear-
lessly lay the foundations of South American
liberty : To hesitate is destruction.

Our charter charges each American country
to seek and to strengthen representative democ-
racy. Without that democracy and without
the freedom that it nourishes, material progress
is an aimless enterprise, destroying the dignity
of the spirit that it is really meant to liberate.
So we will continue to join with you to encour-
age democracy until we build a hemisphere of
free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the
Arctic Circle.

A New Hemisphere

But the charter of the alliance is not confmed
to political democracy. It commands a peace-
ful, democratic, social revolution across the
hemisphere. It calls upon us to throw open
the gates of opportunity to the landless and the
despised, to throw open the gates of oppor-
tunity to the poor and to the oppressed. It
asks that unjust privilege be ended and that un-
fair power be curbed.

The United States signed that charter. We
are fulfilling that commitment. We have al-
ready begim an all-out war on poverty in this
country, for a just country cannot permit a class
of forsaken in the midst of the affluent and the
fortunate. We are also marching forward in
our struggle to eliminate racial injustice, to
permit every man of every race, of every color,
of every belief, to share fully in America's
national life.

In the same way we will join with those
forces across the hemisphere who seek to ad-
vance their own democratic revolution. We
are finding in the United States that it is not
easy to change the customs of centuries. Some
seek to halt reform and change. Others seek to
impose terror and tyranny. But Bolivar's wis-
dom is our warning: To hesitate is destruction.

I know my country's policies and my coun-
try's help are very important to the Alliance
for Progress. But in 1961 a new hemisphere
began to be bom. In that hemisphere, success
or failure does not hinge on testing each sliift-
ing wind or each new word which comes from

our neighbors. Rather, it depends on the cour-
age and the leadership that we can bring to our
own people in our own land. I am doing my
dead-level best to provide that leadership in my
country now.

The Alliance for Progress, true, is a most
complex task. It has many dimensions and
many directions. But it does rest on the hopes
of people much like those that I have seen in
my recent trips through the poverty areas of
the United States.

In the last 13 days I have personally met the
people in 13 States.

Across this hemisphere there are millions of
despairing men and women that I hope to meet
when I can get away from Washington. They
come to birth, they toil, and they die, never
knowing a day without hunger. They never
feel the joy of rewarded achievement. They
never feel the pride that comes from providing
for those they love. They struggle for their
self-respect, for their dignity as one of the chil-
dren of God, against those who exploit them in
a world wliich is closed to their hopes. Faces
bent and backs bowed, they see ahead of them
only that darkness in which they walk.

Well, we work for these men and women not
because we have to. We work because morality
commands it, and I said in Atlanta the other
morning justice requires it and our own dignity
as men depends on it. We work not because we
fear the unjust wrath of an enemy — because we
do fear the just wrath of God.

The path ahead, I can tell you, is long and
the way is hard. There will be many editorials
written about us, and there will be many com-
plaints spoken of us. But we must, in the words
of the prophet, "Moimt up on the wings of
eagles, rmi and not grow weary."

We have reached a turning point.

The foimdations have been laid. The time
calls for more action and not just more words.
In the next year there will be twice as much
action, twice as much accomplished as in any
previous year in this program. I can say that
today with confidence, and I can say that our
Alliance for Progress will succeed. The suc-
cess of our effort — the efforts of your coimtries
and my country — will indicate to those who

856

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN

come after us the vision of tliose who set us on
this path.

Toda}', in tliis room, you have not only tlie
great amhixssjidors and spokesmen of the great
Republics which are part of this worthy en-
deavor, but you have the leaders in tlie Congress
of both parties whose first concern is humanity,
wherever it exists, and who dedicate their lives
and their talents and their energies to seeing
that their country does her part, and more, in

driving the ancient enemies of mankind from
this hemisphere."

'At the conclusion of the signing ceremony, Presi-
dent Johnson announced that the United States was
proposing W. W. Rostow to be the U.S. Represent-
ative on the Inter-American Committee on tie Alliance
for Progress, succeeding Teodoro Moscoso. Mr. Ros-
tow, he said, would hold this office in addition to his
present appointment as Counselor of the Department
of State.

The Alliance for Progress

by Thomas C. Mann

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^

The ultimate purpose of the Alliance for
Progress is to help the people — all of the peo-
ple— of the hemisphere to achieve a better life
in freedom. Both the Bogota and Pimta del
Este charters speak not only about economic
growth but about social ju.stice and the dignity
and freedom of the individual.

All of this is consistent with our tradition.
As a nation and as individuals we have always
been deeply concerned with the well-being of
people in other lands as well as for those in our
own. This is the concern of the good neighbor.

Being a good neighbor not only reflects our
national character but also serves our national
interests. Our Latin American policy has as
its principal objective the achievement of an
American family of democratic, dynamic, pros-
perous, free nations, each capable of playing its
role in a healthy and ixjaceful world com-
munity. This objective cannot be achieved in a

hemisphere of frustration, stagnation, and
hopelessness.

The Issue of Change

There are those who oppose any and all
change — who seek to preserve archaic practices
and attitudes which are the legacy of an age
already past.

This group is few in number. Their influence
on government policies throughout the hemi-
sphere is diminishing with each passing day.
As President Johnson said the other day : ^

To struggle to stand still in Latin America is just to
"throw the sand against the wind."

I should like to state in the very beginning —
and to say it very clearly — that the Government
and people of the United States do not forget
that their own nation was born in revolution.
Nor can we forget that the process of social.

' Address made before the Washington Institute of
Foreign Affairs at Washington, D.C., on May 13 (press
release 227).

• For text of an address made by President Johnson
before the Associated Press at New York on Apr. 20,
see Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 726.

JUNE 1, 1964

857

economic, and political change in our country
has been continuous since 1776. It still goes on.
We still seek that kind of change wliicli will
bring about the greatest good for the greatest
number of our people.

We therefore have a natural sympathy and
affinity for those governments who seek change
and progress. Those governments which insti-
tute bold, soundly conceived programs of reform
designed to acliieve

national and individual freedom,
a high and sustained level of economic growth,
a greater degree of social justice, and
equal opportunity for all to rise as high in
society as their talents and efforts will take them,

will find warmhearted sympathy in Washing-
ton. Those who seek to portray the United
States as the defender of the status quo are de-
luding themselves. For as President Johnson
has said, we, as a nation, are dedicated to "the
principles of development, of diversity, and of
democracy." This dedication commands change.
We are seeking, as the President also said, "to
retain freedom and protect moral values while
pursuing progress in a world that is on the
march." ^

There is another group, equally small in num-
ber, who seem to favor any and all change with-
out adequate thought as to whether it brings in
its train

the destruction of freedom, national and in-
dividual, political as well as economic ;

the destruction, root and branch, of estab-
lished orders — of the good as well as the bad in
existing political, economic, and social systems;

the creation of a new, privileged class and in-
equality of opportunity instead of social justice ;

economic retrogression instead of progress.

At the same time our Government began, the
French Revolution was temporarily diverted
from its noble design into a reign of terror and
chaos. In his analysis of how this came about,
De Tocqueville reminds us :

When we closely study the French Revolution we
find that it was conducted in precisely the same spirit
as that which gave rise to so many hooks expounding
theories of government in tlie abstract. Our rcvolu-

* See p. 854.

tionaries had the same fondness for broad generaliza-
tions, cut-and-dried legislative systems, and a pedantic
symmetry ; the same contempt for hard facts ; — the
same desire to reconstruct the entire constitution ac-
cording to the rules of logic and a preconceived system
instead of trying to rectify its faulty parts. The result
was nothing short of disastrous. . . .

We need to ask ourselves whether it is really
true that the basic tenets of independence, equal-
ity, and freedom in which the peoples of our
New World placed their trust are too "slow" and
too "evolutionary"' for our time. And as we
do this, we need to ask for clearer definitions of
terms, for greater specificity, for more detail
and concreteness, about the other paths that are
said to lead more quickly to progress.

I do not share the despair about change that
I hear expressed in some quarters.

More and more responsible leaders of or-
ganized labor are emerging better able to par-
ticipate in progress;

An ever-increasing niunber of hard-working
men of conscience from industry, from com-
merce, from the professional groups, and from
agriculture are striving for reform and im-
provement in the established order ;

The church, in many areas, is providing
leadership in the fight for progress in freedom ;

The military establishments are demonstrat-
ing an ever greater degree of social conscious-
ness and political responsibility ;

The number of qualified and experienced civil
servants capable of coping with the complex
economic and social problems of our time is
rapidly growing ;

Many schools and universities are striving
for a higher standard of academic excellence.
While our attention is more often drawn to
irresponsible acts of a well-organized and noisy
minority, the great majority of Latin Ameri-
can students are seriously working to acquire
the skills and education necessary to improve
themselves and their societies.

Our task is to work with all in every country
who work for economic progress and for social
justice — to work for unity ratlicr than to en-
courage divisive hatreds — to help build a better
hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress is more than a
statement of high resolve. It provides a pro-

858

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

gram for progress consisting of specific, identi-
fiable parts. One of tliese is agniriun reform.

The Farmer

More than 50 percent of Latin America's
population lives in rural areas. Tlie alliance,
therefore, very properly gives a high priority
to helping the farmer help himself. It seeks
to do this by helping him to increase his pro-
duction because this is the only way, under any
economic system, to increase his income and
tlie income of the society as a whole.

We seek, therefore, a technological revolu-
tion in Latin American agriculture such as the
one that has taken place in many countries,
including the United States. Supervised agri-
cultural credit, various kinds of cooperatives,
land improvement programs, technical assist-
ance to farmers, agricultural research pro-
grams, diversification of product, wider use of
fertilizers, better storage facilities, rural educa-
tion, community development programs, farm-
to-market roads, are some of the components
of soundly conceived agrarian reform programs.

Improved land tenure systems aimed at giv-
ing more farmers titles to the land they work,
and hence greater security and dignity as well
as an incentive to produce, are also essential in-
gredients. In some countries land distribution
programs are underway or have already taken
place on a large scale; others have long had
equitable and efficient land tenure systems.
Some are now actively engaged in large-scale
settlement of farmers in undeveloped portions
of their countries in the general pattern of the
western movement of farms in our country;
fortimately, most countries have large public
domains available for settlement and distribu-
tion.

Much has been said about the problems of
lutifundia. But we know from bitter experience
that farms can be too small as well as too big.
Minifundia — farms too small to be economically
viable — also limit the ability of the farmer
to earn an adequate income. Land distribu-
tion, as well as other facets of land reform
programs, should have, as a principal objec-
tive, increased production, which is the only
path to higher levels of farmer income.

And helping the individual fanner also helps
the nation. Increased purchasing power of the
largo farming segment of the population is
essential to the creation of adequate domestic
markets for the products of domestic industry.

The Worker

The alliance is as concerned about the worker
as it is about the farmer. The alliance cannot
succeed unless it develops a labor force of
growing skills and increasing ability to produce
in a modern society.

Free trade-union organizations throughout
the hemisphere work to insure that labor re-
ceives its fair share of increased productivity.
As in agrarian reform, these etiorts to achieve
a better life for the worker also help expand the
purchasing power of the people and hence con-
tribute to the ability of domestic markets to
support growing industries.

And tlie free labor movement has always had
as one of its prime objectives the protection and
enhancement of the dignity of the individual
working man. As his education and standard
of living improve, the worker is enabled to
make his full contribution to his country's
future.

The Need for Capital

Another major factor in the alliance is the
need for capital for development both from
internal and external sources.

The population of Latin America will, say
the demographers, double in about 20 years.
This is a fact of outstanding importance.

It means that jobs and food production must
be increased at an extraordinary rate, or imem-
ployment and hunger will increase. It means
that educational and health and all the other
facilities required by civilized man today in our
age of rising expectations must be built at the
same rapid rate. It means that governments
must also promptly provide additional infra-
structure required by their growing agricul-
ture and industry. Never in our history have
political and economic systems been required to
meet so many needs in such a short period of
time.

If nations are to meet this challenge, their

jrCTNE 1, 1964

859

economies must obviously have very large
amounts of capital for development.

Tax Reform

One way to mobilize capital is, of course, to
increase tax revenues substantially. In most
countries tax systems still do not bring in suf-
ficient revenue for governments to meet their
social and economic responsibilities?

The Charter of Punta del Este* speaks of
the need to reform tax laws so that those who
can afford it will shoulder more of the burden.
It calls for the elimination of tax evasion and
recognizes that taxes which impede growth
must be discouraged. There is, I believe, gen-
eral agreement that reforms in tax administra-
tion are essential so that effective tax collection
can be achieved with all taxpayers meeting their
obligations.

It is encouraging that many governments are
already taking concrete steps to improve col-
lection of taxes already on the books. Good ini-
tial results have been achieved in several coun-
tries. But these efforts must be continued and
the techniques of collection constantly im-
proved.

As the cliarter makes clear, tax policy, as well
as administration, is in need of reform. We
have no preconceived notions of how quickly it
is feasible to reform tax policy. Each country
has its own peculiar problems.

Each country must decide for itself what tax
system and tax rate can best provide the largest
revenue possible without destroying incentives
and without impeding a high and sustained
rate of growth. Nearly everyone would agree,
for example, that developing countries which
need to attract capital for investment in produc-
tive enterprise should not have tax rates as high
as those of countries which are in an advanced
stage of industrialization.

Increased revenues from tax reforms must be
accompanied by administrative reforms to as-
sure that those revenues are used wisely for de-
velopment and progress. If tlie confidence and
cooperation of the taxpayers are to be earned,
swollen bureaucracies, misuse of public funds,
and deficits in public enterprises must be re-

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961. p. 4G3.

placed by efficiency, probity, and soimd fiscal
practice.

Persons with large incomes serve their own
interests by helping to bring about changes
necessary if governments are to meet their grow-
ing responsibilities to their expanding popula-
tions. The middle and professional classes
must also bear their fair share of the tax burden.

AID Program

If a greater effort is required of Latin Amer-
ican taxpayers, it is equally essential that our
country continue to meet its commitment to sup-
ply, through our foreign aid program, that
vital margin of resources for development. We
shall continue to meet our obligations under the
Charter of Punta del Este.

At the same time we must continue to do what
we can to encourage other capital-exporting na-
tions to provide a larger volume of capital for
Latin America not merely in export credits but
in long- and medium-term loans for develop-
ment.

Loans and, in appropriate cases, grants from
foreign governments are an essential ingredient
of progress. But they can supply only a frac-
tion of the capital needed. Unless they are ac-
companied by adequate self-help measures on
the part of the developing country itself, the al-
liance goals will not be achieved. We therefore
must continue to relate the amount of our finan-
cial assistance to the efforts of the developing
country to create conditions propitious for eco-
nomic growth and social progress.

International Trade

We must also address ourselves to the poten-
tialities of trade as a major source of develop-
ment capital.

We have entered the Kennedy Kound of tariff
negotiations^ within the GxiTT framework,
which will, we hope, further reduce United
States tariff barriers to Latin American exports.
Meanwhile developing nations are meeting at
Geneva, under the auspices of the United Na-
tions, to advance proposals of their own for
increasing trade, for broadening their access to

" See p. 878.

860

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

markets in tlie industrial countries. Some of
the proposals have been supported by the United
States for some time. Others are new and will
require stud}'. The Under Secretary of State,
Mr. Ball, recently discussed some of the com-
plex considerations which must be taken into
account.* We are participating in the confer-
ence with a sincere desire to search for sound,
fair, and con.structive ways to help Latin
America acquire foreign exchange needed for
development.

In order to expand exports from Latin Amer-
ica greater attention needs to be paid to devel-
oping mass national markets and in some cases
regional markets, for the test of ability to com-
pete in international trade is the ability to de-
velop extensive markets for manufactures at
home. This is one reason why high priority is
being given to raising productivity and income
in rural areas and to modernizing systems of
marketing. It is also a reason why Latin
America should aim at larger scale and lower
cost production of manufactured goods.

A source of great encouragement in the field
of regional trade has been the successful begin-
ning of the Central American Common Market.
The breakdown of trade barriers within that
region is creating a larger market and thus pro-
viding the necessary incentive to greater invest-
ment and production.

Similarly, LAFTA [Latin American Free
Trade Association] provides an opportunity for
greater regional integration and trade.

This hemisphere offers an ever-expanding
market, and the development of trade within
the hemisphere deserves and will receive our
urgent attention.

Coffee

Any mention of trade would be incomplete
without specific reference to coffee, which is of
such importance to so many Latin American
economies.

Unfortunately the achievement of an Inter-
national Coffee Agreement, after years of ef-

* For text of a statement made by Mr. Ball before
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment at Geneva on Mar. 25, see Bulletin of Apr. 20,
1964, p. 634.

fort, was accompanied by acts of nature which
destroyed production and created a temporary
imbalance in world supply and demand which,
in turn, brought about rapid and sharp in-
creases in coffee prices.

The agreement did not bring about the recent
fluctuations in price. Once fully operative, it
is expected to prevent violent price swings
which historically have plagued the world coffee
industry, at times have harmed the consumers,
and at other times have plunged various Latin
American economies into economic stagnation
and recession.

Given a fair chance to prove its value to con-
sumer and producer alilve, and given the kind of
cooperation and fair play we have the right to
expect from both producing and consuming na-
tions, this agreement can be an important factor
for progress. We shall continue to support it.

Domestic Private Capital

Most industry and agriculture in Latin Amer-
ica is privately and domestically owned. About
90 percent of private-sector capital investment
in expanding industry and agriculture is domes-
tic, not foreign. If this hemisphere is to achieve
and maintain the high and sustained rate of
economic growth so urgently needed to meet
rising expectations and to keep pace with the
population increase, the role and responsibilities
of domestic private capital in the development
process need to be better understood.

Clearly the tax revenues of governments, even
when they are substantially increased, as they
must be, will be inadequate to finance industrial
and agricultural exj^ansion ; a large part of do-
mestic public-sector funds must be invested in
economic infrastructure, education, health, and
social projects, which the private sector cannot
finance. It is equally clear that public- and
private-sector funds of foreign, capital-export-
ing nations, including the United States, can
supply only a small part of the capital required
to finance the rapid expansion needed to pre-
vent rising unemployment and hunger.

Great dependence must therefore be placed
on the domestic private sector.

If the domestic private sector is to play its
vital role, it must be more venturesome, more

861

imaginative, and more -willing than it has been
in the past to risk its capital in job-producing
industries which can supply the goods needed
by their peoples.

Governments have a heavy responsibility in
this regard. They must create the conditions
favorable for expansion, growth, and prosper-
ity by giving to their own people a sense of faith
and confidence ; by following the fiscal and mon-
etary policies which make large-scale domestic
savings and private investments feasible; by
giving leadership and direction to the develop-
ment process; and by discouraging too much in-
vestment in real estate and other investments
which are marginal from the standpoint of eco-
nomic development.

How many times have we seen governments,
in order to gain an imagined short-term polit-
ical advantage, destroy confidence that the
legitimate rights of their own private capital,
and even the government's contracts, will be
respected ? How many times have we seen gov-
ernments fail, for some imagined political ad-
vantage, to prevent runaway inflation? How
many times have we seen governments destroy
the confidence of their own people by openly
collaborating with Communist political groups
as if they believed tyranny rather than freedom
is the "wave of the future," by issuing dema-
gogic statements, by professing exotic doc-
trines, and by promoting class hatred ?

The result is always the same. Domestic
capital takes flight to foreign countries. Do-
mestic capital already abroad is not repatriated.
Domestic capital which remains in the country
is not invested in expansion and new enter-
prises. Economic growth rates decline. Bal-
ance-of -payments deficits grow. Confidence in
the stability of currencies is undermined.

Neither economic nor social progress is pos-
sible when these conditions prevail.

Foreign Private Capital

The foreign private investor contributes only
about 10 percent of the total private-sector in-
vestment in growth. But because the foreign
investor brings -with him his own capital, the
benefits of research, advanced technology, and
know-how, he makes a much greater contribu-
tion than the percentage suggests.

Contraiy to some assertions, the United
States has no internal economic reason to urge
its private investors on any foreign covmtry.
Any sovereign government has a right to decide
for itself whether or not it will accept foreign
investors. And we prefer that our investors
go only where they are welcome even though
this may mean a reduction in the rate of growth
of those which reject it.

In our country we have reason to be proud
of the modern role of our private sector. As
our capital moves abroad, investors must be
alert to the needs and aspirations of the coun-
tries in which they are to invest and work. Tlie
social consciousness of the foreign investor,
his role in labor relations, and his attitudes to-
ward the host country need continual review by
the investor to assure that his investment will
make a successful contribution to development.

We do believe, however, that when United
States investors are invited to participate in
the economic development of other countries
they are entitled not to privileged but to fair,
nondiscriminatory, and nonconfiscatory treat-
ment.

For those countries which welcome United
States private investors, we offer, and will con-
tinue to support, investment guaranties and
other incentives to encourage growth-producing
private investment in this hemisphere.

Social Justice

Economic growth is not, of course, the only
goal of the Alliance for Progress. We place
equal emphasis on social justice, for rising na-
tional incomes are not the only measure of the
well-being of societies and the individuals that
compose them. We seek societies based on social
justice in which the fruits of production are
widely and fairly shared, in which the farmer
owns his own land and the worker benefits
fairly from his labor, in which educational and
health facilities are available to all, in which
equal opportunity and individual dignity have
real meaning in the life of all the people.

Each nation of tlie alliance has its own prob-
lems in reaching the goal of social justice.
Each must seek its national way. Neither con-
formity nor uniformity is desirable or feasible.

The experience of the United States has rele-

I

862

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN

vance. We have used our tax system, for ex-
ample, as an instrument for achieving social
justice, by plncinj]: the burden on those best able
to bear it, by reducing excessive disparities in
the income of our people, and by using the
revenues from that system to provide for edu-
cation, health facilities, and other services
needed by the people, while at the same time
maintaining the incentives of individuals and
business to save and invest — to contribute, in a
word, to national growth.

In the United States we still have far to go
in eliminating poverty and assuring equal
rights and opportunity for all. But it is also
true that we have achieved a great deal. We
need not apologize for our social and economic
systems. Through our tax systems, our judi-
cial systems, and a variety of other means, the
record of social achievement in the United
States has been impressive. This country has
experienced a continuously rising curve of in-
dividual productivity and unmatched domestic
purchasing power. No economic system in the
■world pays so well its workers in the factories
and on the farms, its teachers, and its profes-
sional people — all of those who produce goods
or render services. And under no other system
has there been more success in achieving an
equitable distribution of the national product
and in preventing the exploitation of man by
man. We have, under our system, achieved a
large degree of social justice — and we have the
framework under which more progress is made
each day.

The Future

Finally, I should like to say a few words
about the spirit of the alliance and the hope
which it inspired in the hearts of men through-
out the hemisphere.

Hope and spirit are not only important ; they
are essential to the success of the alliance. But
in the long run the best way to nourish hope is
by solid achievement. And the way to get solid
achievement is to identify the obstacles in the
way of progress and then to cooperate in their
removal.

There is no quick, easy, cheap way to success.

The road is long, and our task will require cour-
age, steady nerves, and sacrifice by all the peo-
ples of the hemisphere.

I do not think wo should arouse false hopes
in this complex and dangerous world we live
in. Nor do I think that the alliance is on the
road to failure.

Great progress has been made in the last few
years. Many countries are marching forward
in the quest for progress under the alliance.
Others unfortunately face internal problems
at the moment, some serious and some less for-
midable.

But the nations of the hemisphere have dem-
onstrated their firm intention of dealing with
their problems and of trying to meet the chal-
lenges of the coming years. By common
agreement, an Inter-American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress has been established
under the leadership of a distinguished hemi-
sphere statesman, Sr. Carlos Sanz de Santa-
maria. Its task is to provide leadership,
guidance, and assistance to all the signers of
the Charter of Pmita del Este in the formula-
tion and implementation of social and economic
policies designed to bring a better life to all the
peoples of the continent.

What is needed today is a rededication by all
the American peoples, from the Great Lakes
to the Straits of Magellan, to the noblest of all
alliances: an alliance not to prepare for war
but to make the blessings of peace available
to all ; not to defend what is bad in the estab-
lished order but to defend freedom and pro-
duce what we need; not to deny opportunity
to anyone but to make the circle large enough
for everyone. Let us, through this alliance,
make the Americas one great community, where
every man, woman, and child is free, equal, and
as prosperous as enterprise and talent allow.

This is the dream of Simon Bolivar and
Thomas Jefferson.

The United States is fully and irrevocably
committed to this program. Our pledge to co-
operate with the nations of Latin America in
making it succeed is secure. Our dedication
has not slackened. The dream will come true.
How soon will depend on our collective wisdom,
our will, and our courage.

JUNE 1, 1064

863

A Perspective on the Tasks of the 1960's

6y W. W. Rostow

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^

The world of government, as you know, is a
world of practical, concrete tasks. Every step
taken in foreign policy, in military policy, or
in policy here at home requires that an enor-
mous number of factors be taken mto accoimt.
Legitimate interests, domestic and foreign ; the
limits and possibilities of our democratic pro-
cedures ; a wide array of hard, teclmical facts —
all this and more must be woven into the mak-
ing of national policy or the design and passage
of a piece of legislation.

The tasks of government lie, as it were, in
the domain of engineering and art, not pure
science or abstract ideas, although, as with en-
gineering and art, science and ideas are a fim-
damental part of government.

It was with some awareness of this inescap-
able characteristic of government — derived
from an experience reaching back to the sum-
mer of 1941 — that I pasted in the back of one
of the two books I brought with me to Wash-
ington in January 1961 the following quotation
from Jolin Maynard Keynes :

Words ought to be a little wild, for they are an as-
sault of thought upon the unthinliing. But when the
seats of power and authority have been attained, there
should be no more poetic licence. . . . When a doc-
trinaire proceeds to action, he must, so to speak, forget
his doctrine. For those who in action remember the
letter will probably lose what they are seeking.

On the other hand, there is another dictum
from an even more relevant British source —
these words of Winston Churchill :

Those who are possessed of a definite body of doe-
trine and of deeply rooted convictions upon It will be

' Address made at Kenyon College, Gambler, Ohio,
on May 11 (press release 216 dated May 8).

in a much better position to deal with the shifts and
surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely
taking short views, and indulging their natural im-
pulses as they are evoked by what they read from
day to day.

I do not intend this morning to arbitrate
between a great academic's warning against
doctrinaires in goverimaent and a great states-
man's plea for doctrine in the making of public
policy, but I should like to talk — not about a
doctrine — but about a perspective on the period
through wliich we are passing, which, I believe,
does illuminate a little where we are in the sweep
of liistory, the character of our tasks, and the
way we are most likely to succeed in prosecut-
ing them. "N^Hiile the tasks we face are com-
plex and their unfolding may be irregular —
or even erratic — there is a broad shape in them
and a clear-cut sense of direction which derives
not merely from the character of the problems
themselves but from the very roots of our
society, its history, and its ultimate objectives
on the world scene.

Moving Steadily Toward Large Objectives

Tlie perspective I would suggest on the
1960's differs from that which has governed
some of our judgments of the past.

American historians and political scientists
have tended to rate as "great" periods in our
political life the administrations of Lincoln,
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin
Roosevelt. Closer still, and pcrhajis somewhat
more debatable, I would add the administra-
tion of President Truman.

Lincoln's period inevitably falls in this cate-
gory. He saw us through a civil war which

864

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

maintained the unity of this nation and over-
came the tragic divisions wliich boiled up in the
1850's and which Buohiuuiii coukl not master.

In this century we generally think of "great"
periods under two sets of circumstances.

The fii"st were intervals in domestic policy
when there occurred a sudden outpouring of
major new legislation, with permanent con-
sequences for the organization of our society.
Since 1900 there were two such intervals: the
legislative execution of Wilson's concept of the
"Xew Freedom" during his first term, and the
vast flow of New Deal legislation in Franklin
Eoosevelt's first term.

Theodore Roosevelt's administrations belong,
I believe, on the list of great periods, although
new legislation actually passed in his time was
limited and there were no great international
crises to be overcome. He nevertheless laid the
groundwork for new attitudes and policies, at
home and abroad, which foreshadowed many
fundamental later developments.

The second phases of greatness in the 20th
century were occasions of desperate crisis on
the international scene. Theodore Eoosevelt's
effort to educate the Nation to the vistas of
world power and responsibility had not suffi-
ciently siicceeded. In 1917 the United States
had to go to war to avoid the passage of power
in "Western Europe and in the Atlantic to forces
hostile to the United States and its way of life.
Thus we undid our previous commitment to
isolationism.

In 194:1, with the passage of lend-lease and
then our full engagement after Pearl Harbor,
we again had to salvage vital American in-
terests by engaging in a world conflict, undoing
a prior, costly return to isolationism.

In 1947 we had to reverse the course of im-
mediate postwar policy in order to salvage and
protect Western Europe and the balance of
world power, having weakened our position
by hasty and drastic demobilization. In June
1950 we had to go to war in Korea to meet a
major act of Communist aggression and repair
the weakness of our conventional military estab-
lishment in the Far East, which, in turn, re-
sulted from our relatively low postwar mili-
tary budgets.

The great periods in executive leadership in
this century have, thus, been periods where radi-

cal action was taken at home to correct previous
distortions in our domestic affairs or to cope
with desperate crises abroad.

In the 1960's it is clear that we have faced
and still face both at home and abroad issues
and challenges which, by any standard of the
past, are great. Basic characteristics of our
domestic society are at stake as well as life-and-
death issues on the world scene.

By any standards of the past they require of
us great performance, both in our government
and in our society at large. But there is a dif-
ference. In a nuclear age we cannot afford to
let matters slide away from us — as they did in
the yeai-s before 1917, 1941, and even 1947— to
the point where a massive, convulsive response
is required to overcome the danger and redress
the balance.

At home we face — in race relations, in our
balance-of-payments position, in the need to
achieve and maintain the full and regular use
of our human and material resources, in over-
coming serious margins of poverty in our soci-
ety, in developing an educational system ade-
quate to the needs of our society, and in other
directions as well — truly great tasks. But here,
too, it would be unwise for us to permit any of
these problems to become so massive that they
yielded a domestic crisis of the kind which in the
past was generally required to yield national
consensus and a massive, vigorous response.

My theme today is, then, simply this: The
task of American leadership in the 1960's —
and the task of our society at large — is to bring
about movement toward large objectives by
small increments over considerable periods of
time. It is no longer safe for public policy in
the United States to oscillate m the classic
rhythm of our past : between periods of relative
passivity, in the face of mounting problems, and
periods of heroic but convulsive and sometimes
bloody endeavor. To protect the Nation's es-
sential values and interests, our style in public
life must be steadier, more regularly active and
forward-moving, than it has tended to be in the
long sweep of our history.

It is something like this vision which has gov-
erned national policy since President Kennedy's
inaugural in January 1961.^ In the wake of a

' For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address,
see Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

JUNE 1, 1964

731-422—64-

865

narrow victory at tlie polls, he, nevertheless,
called on the Nation to "begin anew."

Problems Confronting President Kennedy

In domestic policy he set out to lead the Nation
toward higher but steadily maintained levels of
employment and overall growth; toward the
correction of our balance-of-payments deficits;
toward a new justice in race relations; toward
the reduction of the margins of poverty in our
society; toward a strengthening through Fed-
eral action of the educational foundations of
our society ; toward the acceptance of collective
responsibility for the medical care of the aged.
None of these were problems which yielded,
either technically or politically, to immediate
definitive solution. But all of them were moved
forward in his time in a series of limited steps.
Each step required clarity and determination
about the objective, but it also required realism,
care, and often caution about the extent to
which progress was possible as of the moment
of forward movement. For example, historians
will, I believe, find fascinating and perhaps
somewhat surprising the intimacy with which
Pi'esident Kennedy personally guided the deli-
cate but essential effort to move simultaneously
toward sustained business expansion and toward
balance-of-payments equilibrium.

Picking up from the day he assumed respon-
sibility. President Joluison in 6 montlis has
moved forward on all these fronts with the
vigor which is his mark, leaving already his
strong imprint on the march down these long
roads of domestic progress.

In foreign policy, where I am more directly
involved, much the same is true.

In 1961 President Kennedy faced two mas-
sive tasks.

First, he had to deal with a series of danger-
ous and degenerative crises. These took their
origins from the period after the first Sputnik
was launched in October 1957. The Communist
world was swept by a wave of confidence and
aggressive enterprise. It was m 1958 that
Khrushchev laid down his ultimatum on Berlin
and the Communists began to press hard in
Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Second, President Kennedy had to define a

set of longrun positive objectives and begin to
devise policies which would move toward them,
step by step.

With respect to Western Europe and Japan,
he held up the vision of a partnership in world
affairs that would replace the acute dependence
on the United States, which had marked the
early postwar years. With respect to Latin
America — and the other developing areas — ^he
alined the United States firmly with those who
were committed to reshape their societies so as
to reconcile economic growth, social equity, and
the development of democratic political insti-
tutions.

With respect to the Commmiist world, he rad-
ically increased our military strength but simul-
taneously set the Government to work with a
new intensity to find the means to start — even
in small ways — down the long road to arms con-
trol and disarmament.

This is not the occasion to detail how these en-
terprises were carried forward. But between
May 1961 and October 1962 Khrushchev's post-
Sputnik offensive was painstakingly defused.
This was done not by war. It was accomplished
by a series of military and political moves, each
difficult and protracted, each involving moments
of hazard, climaxed, of course, by the Cuba mis-
sile crisis.

As President Johnson has underlined, from
his state of the Union message ^ on, our cold- war
problems have by no means ended. We face, in
particular, the task of dealing in Southeast Asia
and the Caribbean with those who would foment
Communist insurrection by the illegal infiltra-
tion of arms and men across international
frontiers.

But we have seen in these 3 years one of the
most dramatic shifts in the balance of power
in modern history.

From the latter days of January 1961, how-
ever— amidst the unrelenting pressure of mul-
tiple crises — the constructive enterprises were
nevertheless launched and carried forward.

The arrival of Ambassador [Edwin O.]
Reischauer in Japan and the visit of Prime
Minister [Hayato] Ikeda to Washington
launched a new phase of more profound asso-

■■■ For the foreign policy portion of President John-
son's message, see ihid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

866

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ciation in our relations with Japan and also set
in njotion forces wliich have drawn Japan
deeply into the nonniilitary aiTaii-s of the North
Atlantic community.

In the (ields of trade, monetary affairs, polit-
ical consultation, and nuclear cooperation, en-
terprises were launched which moved the At-
lantic connnunity forward on new linens, despite
some evident frustration and even setback.
Above all, the Atlantic community proved its
essential vitality and unity in t]>e Berlin and
Cuban crises.

We set out on the Alliance for Prog^ress with
a decade as the initial working horizon, and
despite wliat may appear a slow start, substan-
tial progress has been made. Elsewhere, in
the developing areas— in Africa, the Middle
East, and Asia — new efforts were launched both
to help protect the independence of the develop-
ing societies and to strengthen the underpin-
nings of that independence by programs of de-
velopment assistance.

And, choosing his moment in the wake of
the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy, in
his American University speech of June 1963 ■*
found the occasion to begin to move forward
on the path of arms control he had defined so
vividly in his inaugural more than 2 years ear-
lier. The atmospheric test ban agreement ^ and
President Johnson's initiative in cutting back
production of fissionable material ® are first
steps along the way.

Our Ultimate Task on the World Scene

Beliind all these ventures is a vision of our
ultimate task on the world scene. That task is
to help build an orderly and peaceful world
community to supplant the world system which
was shattered in 1914 and never replaced. This
is the grand purpose which suffuses the effort
to build a great partnership in the north stretch-
ing from Tokyo east to Berlin, to build a new
north-south relationship between the more de-
veloped and developing nations of the free
world. This is our ultimate objective in East-

* For text, see ibid., July 1, 1963, p. 2.
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.
" Ibid., Feb. 10. 1964, p. 223.

West relations, where we aim not merely to
frustrate Communist aggression but to draw the
nations now under Communist rule into an or-
derly and peaceful world comnmnity, for the
struggle with communism is ultimately a strug-
gle about how this small planet shall be orga-
nized.

In talking about our foreign policy we are
talking about the biggest piece of architecture
ever undertaken at a time of peace. None of
the lines of action we have launched is yet com-
plete. But, while final results have not been
reached, these have not been pajier programs nor
policies of rhetoric. We have moved some dis-
tance down long roads: toward a binding up
into partnership of the more advanced nations
of the free world, across the Atlantic and the
Pacific; toward new relations of dignity and
collaboration within the free world between
the advanced nations of the north and the devel-
oping nations to the south ; toward a definitive
frustration of the Communist thrust; and to-
ward controlling the dangers posed for human-
ity by the existence of nuclear weapons.

Wliat is required both within the Government
and in our country as a whole is the will and
the capacity to persist. We need steadiness,
patience, and a stubborn sense of direction. In
all conscience, the world is complicated and
dangerous enough to insure that cri.ses will arise.
But our objectives will prove attainable if we
bring to them the mood of the old schoolyard
game of Indian wrestling, where victory went
to him who summoned the extra moment of en-
durance.

The frontiers of the past were probed, ex-
plored, and consolidated by stubborn, protracted
enterprise, not by the convulsive reaction to
crisis ; and this is the way it is — and should be —
with the new frontiers of the 1960"s.

I am deeply convinced that, if we in the
United States do a job that lies wholly within
our capacity and if the free world maintains a
reasonable degree of unity and common purpose,
the events, decisions, and initiatives launched
in recent years could mark the beginning of the
end of the cold war.

The Cuba missile crisis of 1962 could emerge
as the Gettysburg of that global civil conflict.
We owe it to all free men to labor to make it so.

JTJNE 1, igci

867

Foreign Policy and the People's Right To Know

hy Robert J. Manning

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^

As a newspapennan of many years' experience
I naturally have a familiarity — one might call
it a longstanding familiarity — with the combi-
nation of press and bar. The particular combi-
nation represented here today is not the kind I
refer to, but I can readily see the great value of
such a joint meetuag. I am sure that much
could be accomplished in the public interest if
this effort at cooperation and mutual explora-
tion by the press and the bar were dui^licated in
other parts of the United States.

Besides disputing which of the two profes-
sions is the more ancient, lawyers and newsmen
plainly have many other matters to ponder in
common. To begin with, both deal with people
and language, in that order. A reporter might
argue that with him words come first, but I think
a close examination of the case (to use the lan-
guage of the bar) will show that both profes-
sions deal in the first instance with people —
their deeds, their foibles, their ideas, and their
artifacts — and secondly with describing people
and their conduct in language understandable
to judge, jury, or reading public.

The professions are related, too, in that each
asks of its practitioners what by ordinary stand-
ards is a complex ethical way of life. A lawyer
must be devoted to his client, the law, truth, and
justice, as well as to his own personal need for
income. Each must have its due; all must re-
main in proportion. Similarly, a journalist is
called iipon to balance the conflicting demands
of friendship, the truth, a sense of relevance and

' Address made before the Massachusetts Joint Bar-
Press Symposium at Boston, Mass., on May 5 (press
release 202 dated May 4).

importance, and a devotion to the standards of
his craft, to say nothing of the easy temptations
to sloppiness, the personal quirks of his editor,
and his publisher's motive for profit. Both pro-
fessions have problems of conscience as well as
of teclinique. Members of each are from time
to time called upon to carry water on both
shoulders. And the amazing tiling is that so
many in each profession do it so well, achieving
a proper balance without visible signs of strain.

"WTien I speak of the press or of journalism in
these remarks I address myself not just to the
print media, which fell such vast areas of Cana-
dian spruce each day, but also to their brethren
in daily communication : radio and television.
Tlie differences between the print and electronic
media are very real and often important. In
most courtrooms one is permitted, the other not.
But for purposes of purveying information on
foreign jwlicy — the subject that most concerns
me in my present job — the differing media are
related means to similar ends.

A study published in a I'ecent issue of Daeda-
lus, the journal of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, shows that television and
newspapers are more complementary than com-
petitive. During television's years of rapid
growth, newspaper circulation in the United
States has continued to increase both in absolute
terms and relative to population, to the present
alltime high of 60 million copies sold each day.
The publisher of a Midwest newspaper recently
commented : "Television whets the appetite, and
people want to read more and better reports in
the newspapers." Both media have their short-
comings, about which I will have something to

868

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

say later, but let us agree tliere is more to be
si^id in defense of television tiiun the case stated
by one of its most skilled practitioners, David
Brinkley, wlio recently said : "At least tele-
vision is punctual — its always on time."

Protecting the Rights of the Individual

Do the people liave a riglit to know? It
seems an odd question to ask here in Boston,
where press freedom has a long and noble
heritajre. Yet the fact that so many of you
have assembled here to discuss this question
suggests that perhaps its answer is not as
simple as sometimes supposed — a suggestion
which I heartily share.

Plainly, a large part of your deliberations
at this conference concern the question posed in
one of your panel discussions: "Free Press vs.
Fair Trial: AVhat is the people's right to
know?" Under our system of government the
fair trial is a cornerstone of individual liberty
and rights. A degree of privacy is often
necessary to insure that a trial will in fact be
fair. Concern is often expressed— and I am
sure has been expressed at this conference —
alx)ut the damage tliat can be done to the
private rights of individual Americans by news
stories, photographs, radio, and television.
Many articles in recent weeks, prompted in
part by the Ruby trial, argue this question pro
and con. The articles ask: Are the rights of
an individual charged with crime adequately
protected against the hurt that can be done by
publicity? It is an important question, and
at this conference I am sure it is receiving
sober consideration.

Tliere are, of course, many procedures now in
use designed to protect individual rights against
damage by publicity. Jurors are examined to
make sure their judgment has not been
warped by news accounts. Cameras are ex-
cluded from courtrooms in virtually all
jurisdictions. Underage wrongdoers are given
the additional benefit of a private trial; if they
are tried openly, the press frequently re-
frains from printing their names. In the
courtroom itself there are rules of evidence to
guard against irrelevance, error, and second-
hand testimony. Change of venue may be
considered if local hostility to the defendant

lias developed to the extent that a fair trial
is impossible. In a variety of ways a defendant
has his rights defended, be it before Congress
or in court.

Protecting the National Security

I should like to turn the searchlight you
are throwing on this important subject into
another, somewliat less discussed area. First,
an analogy : What if the "defendant" in a diffi-
cult and delicate proceeding is U.S. foreign
policy in a sensitive area? This is a subject
about which I have had ample occasion to specu-
late in my present position, having come to it
with a legacy of some 2G years spent in journal-
ism. Here are some of the points that have
occurred to me.

Concern about the plight of an individual
defendant disarmed by the cruel hand of pub-
licitj' is widely expressed. Sometimes it forms
an important part of an advocate's argument.
But similar concern is rarely focused on the
damage which can be done to our national
security as a result of publicity in the press
regarding a subject or policy knowledge of
which could greatly assist our adversaries. Yet
the damage done to this "defendant" can injure
much more than just a single individual.

The apparent lack of concern in the press
about this problem is in itself a cause for con-
cern. That is why it is impressive to see the
profession of journalism, as represented in the
membership of the Massachusetts Bar-Press
Committee, willing to accept that there is indeed
a question mark about "the people's right to
know."

It is not an easy question for a government
official to tackle for two reasons. One is obvi-
ously that there is no simple solution, no single
answer to the problems that pose the question.
Second, among the more superficial spokesmen
for journalism (and these seem characteristi-
cally to include the most vocal) the very raising
of the question brings forth such cries of out-
rage, of heresy, of treason, that the poor chap
who raised the question may find himself forced
to choose between self-imposed exile to a peace-
ful place like Cyprus or the Mekong Delta
and public boiling in a vat of hot linotype lead.

This conditioned reflex of outrage comes

JUNE 1, 1964

8G9

forth, in my opinion, from a confusion about
just who are custodians of the people's right to
know and what are the obligations of this cus-
todianship. Tliis in turn lies close to the ques-
tion of who is to judge what the people want to
know and, more important, what they should
and should not be told. Having ventured into
this treacherous ground, I may as well plod
along the trails of my personal (as against ofH-
cial) thoughts and prejudices in the hope
at least of illimiinating some vital questions
even though not providing the answers to them.

Broad Outlines vs. Specific Details

Certainly there is a public interest implicit
in the people's right to know. But it can also
be said (and here is when the signal is usually
given to start boiling the linotype lead) that the
people have the right not to laiow when that
knowledge can gravely compromise our defense
or foreign policy. The press on the whole
wants to know a great deal more than do the
people in whose name it acts. That is under-
standable. The history of freedom is decorated
with the special cases of those who were more
zealous than the norm in pursuit of their rights
and liberties. But the freedom of the press to
print without fear or reprisal, a freedom so
basic in our nation that it is singled out for
protection in our Constitution, can, if improp-
erly or imwisely used, run contrary to an
equally basic part of the public interest and gen-
eral welfare, namely, the ability of the govern-
ment to carry out the people's business of de-
fending our interests abroad and guarding the
Nation's security. There is a real dilemma
here, and it is silly to ignore it. Let's look at
some cases.

Not long ago one leading newspaper by dint
of shrewd reportorial enterprise was able to
describe some of the proposals the United States
was soon to advance in the Geneva disarmament
talks. This had two obvious consequences:
(1) American citizens interested in this im-
portant but rather technical subject were able
to find out somewhat sooner than would other-
wise have been the case what proposals we were
going to make, with an indication of which ones
we considered most important and which ones

we might be willing to yield on. (2) It told the
higUy expert Soviet negotiating team at Ge-
neva what we were going to say and gave them
important clues as to the order of priority in
which we ranked our proposals.

Now let's look at this episode in the light of
the two goals of public interest which I suggest
may come into conflict. First, the public's
right to know was indeed generously served —
for most Americans, perhaps more generously
than necessary, since they do not feel a need to
be informed on the details of our disarmament
negotiation position. But second, what of the
public interest in having our security and for-
eign policy successfully advanced? Here a
minus must go up on the scoreboard. It doesn't
take much of a poker player to know the im-
portance of keeping certain cards face down
until the right time to play them. Wlien a hole
card is inadvertently displayed in poker, it fre-
quently shapes the outcome. Wlien that hap-
pens the hand is often tossed in and played over.
In the case of the disarmament talks, some im-
portant cards were displayed prematurely to our
negotiating adversaries, with an indication of
how we were planning to play them.

But we can't toss in the cards and play the
hand over at international confrontations of this
kind. Rather, our negotiators had to pursue
the goals they had come to Geneva to seek,
tinkering here and there with their strategy to
offset the damage done by publicity, taking into
account the fact that their opposite numbers
knew quite accurately what they planned to do,
but remaining themselves unamied with similar
information about Soviet proposals or inten-
tions.

I cite this example not because it is dramatic,
not because it seriously crippled our diplomacy
at Geneva, but as an almost everyday example
of the problems that constantly beset govern-
ment officials and newsmen alike as they go
about their differing tasks. And let me be em-
phatically clear on a central point: The ques-
tions I am raising about disclosure of informa-
tion in this case concern the specific details, not
the broad outlines of our policy. The public's
right to know should always be served, and
fully, with regard to the basic premises and

870

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

pui'poses of our undertakings in foreign affaii-s.
In disarmament, to take the present example,
there is not just a right but a need to mako sure
tliat the aims of the negotiations are undei-stood.
There must be ample time for debate, in Con-
gress, on editorial pages, and in the country at
large. Our govermnent courts disaster if it
embarks on an important policy purpose with-
out making certain first that a large body of
Americans is informed about them and has had
opportmiity to discuss them.

In the disarmament field we seek effective,
enforcible means toward arms reduction and
control; we seek to prevent proliferation of
nuclear and other advanced weapons; we seek
new means to prevent accidental war. Broad-
ranging public discussion about these aims, and
the meiins that can be adopted to achieve them,
has appeared in the press and elsewhere. This
is absolutely essential for the future success of
steps that may be taken in this field. I assure
you that much of my own work, and that of the
entire Department of State, is devoted to making
sure that in this and other fields the public
right and need to know is satisfied.

Exposure for Exposure's Sake

Informed discussion and debate on foreign
policy — which have their most visible expression
in Congress and in the press — are a basic part
of our strength as an open society. We consider
ourselves a leading world nation, the leader, in
fact, of the free world. But that leadership
does not reside entirely in our military and eco-
nomic strength. Our inheritance of liberty, and
the way we practice it, enable us to lead by
example. (That is why our civil rights short-
comings can hurt us in our foreign policy under-
takings.) The fact that what we do and what
we are is open to the world to see is probably
our greatest single strength as a nation. It
should not be minimized for even an instant.

But this important truth should not be al-
lowed to obscure another important fact, and
that is that we are often handicapped when it
comes to the detailed execution of a foreign
policy undertaking. And it is here — in matters
of tactics, not the broad sweep of policy — that
the occasionally mindless devotion of the press

to exposure for exposure's sake can put us at a
disadvantage. This is especially so in the sen-
sitive area where military and political con-
siderations merge.

Let me document the kind of disadvantage I
have in mind by reviewing the Cuban missile
crisis of October 1962, an event which is con-
sidered by many to mark a turning point in the
cold war. If liard cases make bad law, this is
an example which should give rise to sound
principles, since its outcome was on the whole
satisfactory — though en route a lot of nerves
were stnmg very taut and properly so, for this
was the world's first direct nuclear confron-
tation.

As you know, the U.S. Government obtained
the first evidence of the Soviet offensive missiles
in Cuba by means of aerial reconnaissance one
afternoon in mid-October. In the week that
followed extraordinary efforts were made to
keep the U.S. planning and preparations wholly
secret. The small cluster of top-level leaders
around President Kennedy gave secrecy the
highest order of priority.

On the whole, the precautions worked. There
were exceptions. Two days before the Presi-
dent spoke a suspicious Washington press corps
knew something was up. Some headlines were
very near the truth ; the wire services were ac-
curately reporting the movements of troops and
certain equipment; and several reporters had at
least a glimmering of what the crisis was all
about.

But on the whole, the interval of privacy nec-
essary to analyze the intelligence evidence, to
consider appropriate responses, and to make the
detailed preparations needed to carry out the
chosen course of action, was preserved and
maintained. It took a telephone call from the
President to the editor of at least one leading
paper to keep the story out of the news in the
final 24 hours, but nevertheless it worked. For
approximately 1 full week it was possible, in
circumstances of the utmost gravity and na-
tional peril, to avoid the compromise of vital
information and plans through disclosure in the
press and other media. We should not under-
estimate the importance of this achievement nor
overlook the cooperation and good judgment of
reporters and editors that made it possible.

JUNE 1, 1964

871

But before drawing conclusions, let us look at
this crisis from another point of view— that of
the Soviet Union. In this case we deal not with
a period of 1 scant week but with a time interval
of some months, perhaps half a year, going back
to an unknown date when the Soviet Union
decided that Cuba provided a hospitable site
for medium- and intermediate-range missiles.

Consider for a moment what then had to be
accomplished to bring about the situation that
was finally photographed from our highflying
reconnaissance plane in mid-October. Large
numbers of specialists and teclmicians had to be
gathered and prepared for their mission to a
Spanish-speakmg island 6,000 sea miles away.
The missiles had to be assembled, taken to ports,
loaded on ships which had to be specially fitted
and their crews trained. Communications links
between Moscow and Cuba had to be prepared,
to say nothing of the planning and discussions
that must have accompanied every phase of the
venture. My point is not to document this side
of the story with any accuracy or detail but only
to suggest that on the Soviet side of this crisis
it was possible to conduct a logistic exercise of
enormous scope over a period of at least several
months in conditions of extreme secrecy. It
illustrates the observation by Sir William Hay-
ter, former British Ambassador to Moscow, who
said of the Soviet Union that :

It is true of them, as of no other government, that
every public action in their own country can be made,
if desired, to conform to their diplomatic needs.

The difference between the tightly sealed,
closed society of the Soviet Union and our own
open society, as shown by the Cuban crisis, is so
obvious that it tends to be taken for granted.
It may be argued, as it was by some critics, that
our intelligence community should have had
earlier inklings of what the Soviets had set in
motion. Tliis argument — and there are points
to be made on each side — tends to obscure the
much larger significance of this crisis ; namely,
that it was possible for one side to mount an
undertaking of impressive scale over a period
of months without leaving any footmarks or fin-
gerprints, while the other side was able to carve
out a brief week for essential deliberations only
by dint of near superhuman effort directed at
keeping the subject out of the papers.

Deceptively Easy Solutions

There are several deceptively easy distinc-
tions that are often introduced into the argu-
ment at this stage. They are popular with
editors and publishers, and they have the con-
venience of appearing to be simple to apply.
But appearances can be deceptive; so let me
discuss them and tell you why I do not think
they go very far toward solving the problem I
have outlined.

1. The first distinction is that between facts
and policy or, putting it another way, between
things you can count and decisions about those
things. Tlie former are in the category of
traditional military secrets and include such
data as the size and shape of military hardware,
the numbers of troops and weapons moving
from A to B, and so forth. Wliile my col-
leagues at the Pentagon could probably over-
whelm me with exceptions, it is my impression
that as a rule, and on the whole, the press recog-
nizes its share of responsibility for keeping
information of this kind out of print when to
publish it might materially assist our adver-
saries.

In testimony last year before Congressman
John IMoss's Subcommittee on Government
Information editors and publishers unani-
mously stated their -"new that military secrets of
this kind — namely, specific, quantitative data
about equipment and personnel — should not be
printed if tliis would violate military security.
But it was argued with equal vigor that almost
all other information was fair game for the press
and that government spokesmen who sought to
keep it from the minions of the Fourth Estate
deserved at best a fair trial before being hanged.

I do not think the matter is anywhere near
that simple. As the examples I liave already
mentioned sliow, information about our inten-
tions, about the extent of our own knowledge,
and about our policies can be at least as valuable
to a potential enemy as the performance char-
acteristics of a new piece of liardware. If an
adversary laiows within narrow limits what we
plan to do with a pnrticular piece of equip-
ment, this information may be more valuable
than the device itself. Another brief example :
During the Cuban missile crisis, reporters asked
dailv whether the United States intended to fly

872

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

a reconimissiince mission tluit day over Cuban
territory. They were not told on the perfectly
sound grounds that the success of the mission,
the life of the pilot, the rights of the pilot's
family, and, intleed, the United States interest
should not be jeopardized by advance notifica-
tion to Russian :ind Cuban antiaircraft
batteries.

Some of the most important intelligence
"finds" disclose almost no information about
the gadget ry of modern warfare. But they
are considered enormously valuable by analysts
and policymakers for the clues they provide to
the behavior of a potential enemy. For ex-
ample : A collection of documents on the struc-
ture of government and the military in Com-
munist China recently came into the possession
of U.S. intelligence authorities. The signifi-
cance of this information — which was hailed as
a major intelligence find — was to provide new
knowledge not of military hardware but of the
probable behavior of the Chinese Communist
leadership.

It has often been shown that the U.S. press
does provide an enormous amount of informa-
tion of a kind that could help an actual or
potential enemy. There are few mysteries
about a government that operates in a goldfish
bowl.

One experienced Washington newsman who
regularly lunches with a member of the Soviet
Embassy staff suggested to us not long ago that
we should take pains to point out to the
Russians when a particular story in the Amer-
ican press is wrong. The reporter said there
are certain columnists and reporters whose arti-
cles the Soviets take as gospel concerning the
views of our government. What makes this
story disturbing is that at least one of the
writers mentioned is often far from accurate in
describing U.S. policy.

My point is surely not that thorough discus-
sion of U.S. policy should not appear in our
press. Far from that. Such discussions are
an essential part of our democratic decision-
making process and should be encouraged.
But some descriptions of policy which are not
essential to a proper imderstanding by U.S.
citizens of what our foreign policy is all about,
and which do give our adversaries specific, use-
ful information on what we plan to do, sliould,

it seems to me, be evaluated with an eye to the
public interest that resides in nondisclosure
where national security and foreign policy
goals are at stake.

A lot of information about policy can and
should be published that now isn't. But equally,
a certain amount that gets in print would leave
the public's right to know very little the worse
for being omitted.

In the movie "Dr. Strangelove" the Soviet
Ambassador announces that his country had
built a Doomsday Device, rigged to destroy the
earth, after learning that the U.S. was planning
to construct one. Where had they gotten that
idea? His reply, in a heavy Russian accent:
"We read it in the New York Times." Here
both sides' weaknesses with regai'd to publicity
were revealed. Tlie Soviets had built the
weapon but hadn't told anyone about it; so it
hadn't entered into American calculations. The
U.S. had not built one, but a newspaper said
we would and the other side acted on that in-
formation. It was not — let me stress— facts
and figures about the device that mattered. Its
technology, according to Dr. Strangelove, was
"Zimjile." In this fictional case it was a story
about a policy decision, false as it turned out,
that brought about the end of the world, not
with a whimper but with a bang.

2. A second easy distinction that is often
used to cut a trail through the difficult choices
I have described is the one drawn between peace
and war. In time of war, the argument goes, a
code of conduct including censorship procedures
would be quite acceptable. Such codes have
sometimes been prepared voluntarily by the
press. In addition, press and other media rep-
resentatives have cooperated with Federal agen-
cies to draw up an official code, on a standby
basis. These are then put on a high shelf where
they will gather dust until they are vaporized
by the nuclear explosion that will indicate that
we are in fact at war.

In our present time of continuing crisis an
old-fashioned thimib-rule distinction between
war and nonwar is no longer a useful way of
dealing with this problem. Waiting for a dec-
laration of war is a way to avoid the problem,
not solve it. Using a definition of "serious crisis
short of war" is slightly more realistic, but
this too fails to confront the issue head on.

JUNE 1, 1964

873

Some crises which look serious may not be as
important as others which are barely risible.
Let me give two examples of nearly invisible
crises that could have very grave consequences
for U.S. policy. One would be a decision by
the government of Communist China to pursue
a stepped-up militant policy of foreign ven-
tures; another would be a decision by Moscow
that no arms control plan incorporating inspec-
tion and safeguards against surprise attack will
ever be acceptable. In the mid-1960's either of
these events would have far-reaching and crit-
ical consequences for the United States. Both
would call for special alertness and special cau-
tion. Yet by no definition that I have ever seen
would either of these crises bring into effect any
official or voluntary code of press conduct.

The problem is little easier in the case of
a "visible" crisis short of war. When the of-
fensive missiles were spotted in Cuba, there was
no way to tell the press to observe a censorship
code without giving the whole show away. The
government had to use its own resources to
keep the crucial information to itself. Even
after the President's speech, events moved too
fast for a code to be put into effect. There is
no reason to think that future crises will present
themselves tidily packaged to permit adoption
of standby procedures essentially dating from
a previous era, when events as well as com-
munications moved more slowly and it was pos-
sible to distinguish with some realism between
peace and war.

3. There is a third approach to the problem
that I think offers an even less satisfactory solu-
tion. This is the view that it is the govern-
ment's job to keep secrets and the job of the
press to pry them loose and print them. I ex-
pect there are many editors and reporters who
apply this dictum to the county courthouse and
city hall, where it may make sense, but who also
apply it to foreign policy and national security,
where, I submit, it does not.

Fortunately, this is a point well understood by
the best correspondents, among whom I would
count many who make tlie State Department
their regular beat. These men know the value
of getting information "off the record" or on
background. Such information, which may in-
clude highly sensitive intelligence data and pol-
icy judgments, strengthens the reporter by en-

abling him to write a piece on the record with A
a solid footing in all the relevant facts. "

The individual reporter is clearly the key-
man in this process. His integrity permits high
officials to trust him with information that could
greatly embarrass our purposes abroad if it
were released but which is essential to a full
understanding of a matter that is the proper
subject of a news report. His writing skill per-
mits him to use the information without com-
promising it. And his background as an
experienced reporter enables him to apply acid
tests for truth and relevance to what he is told.
He can separate the real from the bogus and can
give an accurate account without unnecessarily
dispensing ladlefuls of sensitive information.

Of the better reporters who cover foreign
affairs, few would entirely agree, I am con-
vinced, that it's the government's job to keep
secrets, theirs to pry them loose. If that really
were the prevailing philosophy, I can assure
you the government could do a much more
thorough job of keeping information to itself.

Mutual Obligations of Government and Press

As I see it, a relationship of trust and mutual
respect is essential in a democratic society for
the press and foreign policy to coexist success-
fully. On the government side certain stand-
ards are basic. Tliere can be no effort to
mislead; background and off-the-record brief-
ings should not be misused to try to float trial
balloons; at all times, truth and accuracy are
essential. A government information officer
who violates these standards soon loses his
effectiveness as well as — if I have any say in
the matter — his job.

The press too brings obligations to this dia-
log. Without exception the reporters who pro-
vide the most accurate and complete accounts
of foreign policy and national security matters
live up to those obligations. If there was a
time when the State Department and the work-
ing reporters assigned to cover it occupied
themselves chiefly with tilting lances at one
another, it was before my arrival. From the
point of view of the reporter himself, an old-
fashioned, simple-minded "adversary relation-
ship" does not yield the best kind of foreign
affairs reporting.

874

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

John ITiphtowpr, the senior Associated Press
correspondent at the State Department, wlio
for 20 j-ears has covered the Department — and
eight successive Secretaries — recently made a
similar point somewhat more tartly when he
wrote :

The real Interests of journalists and policymakers
generate a love-hate relationship. What the two
proups must accept is that both are necessary to the
functioning of a democracy.

I think that a trend in this direction is both
inevitable and necessary. Government on the
national level today, particularly that part of it
occupied with foreign policy and national
security, is too complex and too vast for a re-
porter to take his stance outside and aloof as
an independent critic. To get any adequate
idea of what is going on a reporter must enter
into a fairly close relationship with his sources.

The Exercise of Judgment

All that we have covered up to now, while it
may contain debatable points, can, I submit,
survive logical scrutiny. Now we come to the
difficult part. Every development that is or
purports to be news is subject to judgment. The
judgment of those who possess the facts as to
whether and how to reveal them. The judgment
of reporters as to whether and how to report
them. The judgment of editors as to whether
and how to print them. The judgment of read-
ers as to whether to read them and how to use
them.

For the vast bulk of news, the judgment as
to how much gets into print and the notoriety
it receives is left to journalism. Every day in
every way journalism exercises swiftly, some-
times precisely, sometimes with bias, sometimes
without, almost always arbitrarily, this neces-
sary exercise of judgment. Every front page
is an annoimcement of the editor's judgment,
a daily symbol of his effectiveness as a manager
of news. Every newspaper and magazine is
transitory monument to the judgment of its
editors or owners.

It is the daily judgment of editors of the
Washington Post, for example, that its readers
need or want approximately five pages of comic
strips; it is the judgment of editors of the New
York Times that its readers do not need or

want any. It is the judgment one week of the
Press section of Time Magazine that the news-
men covering the situation in Viet-Nam are
prejudiced incompetents — and the judgment of
the Press section of Newsweek that they are, in
one canonized heap, this year's candidates for
the Pulitzer Prize.

Day after day, hour after hour, journalists
swim the torrent of more events than they have
discovered how to handle and stay afloat. For
every item they print, they throw away a dozen
or more. The average American daily prints
about one-fourth of the foreign news carried on
the Associated Press main wire each day — not
to mention news from other sotirces. The news
managers in the city rooms and broadcasting
studios nm the show. They cut. They blue-
pencil. The compose headlines. They consign
one item to the bright exposure of page one, an-
other to the back-page limbo of the laxative
ads. And, to a tremendous degree, they omit.
What to throw away ? That is, alas, one of the
most demanding problems today's journalist
confronts each day.

In most respects the vast and demanding
responsibility of judging what the people of our
free and open society are to be told is entrusted
de facto to journalism, with its great resources,
its constitutional freedoms, and its broad dedi-
cation to the business objective of staying sol-
vent and making a profit. Another long speech
could be devoted solely to the question of
whether this responsibility is being adequately
carried out by our journalism in a time when
foreign affairs are growing greater in number
and complexity and when a growing segment
of the American public wants more and better
coverage of such affairs. As much as we ought
to be concerned about the shortcomings, we
should also be concerned about the high degree
of complacency and self-satisfaction with which
so much of journalism regards its performance.

But I would prefer to examine briefly another,
more intricate aspect of this matter of custo-
dianship and the application of judgment. In
addition to the Fourth Estate, two other ele-
ments of our society also carry certain responsi-
bilities and enjoy certain rights in this regard.
One is the government, which is made up to a
great extent either of elected officials or of offi-

JITXE 1, 1964

875

cials appointed to office by elected officials. The
other is, of course, the public itself.

Most times the questions of access to and pub-
lication of information are put as if the argu-
ment, when there is one, is between the press and
public on the one hand and the government on
the other. Too often there is implicit in debate
of news questions the notion that the govern-
ment official's obligation to the press and public
are the same, that in obliging the demands or
needs of the press the official is synonymously
serving the public.

We all know that in many instances, perhaps
most instances, the synonym applies. If tliis
were to be accepted as the invariable rule, how-
ever, the government and public would jointly
be in the position of vacating completely to the
press the hour-by-hour, day-by-day judgment
of what ought to become public knowledge.

If it were possible to reveal everytlung to the
light of day and if — this is a very big "if" —
journalism had the talent and will fully to con-
vey everything, then we would have no problem
to discuss here today. But we all know that
such is not and cannot be the case. Like the
press, officials in government must constantly
make judgments about the timing and content
of disclosures. I refer not only to those who,
like myself, are primarily in information work
but to a broad variety of officials right up to the
top. All of them, as a normal part of their
operations in this open society, have frequent
contact with press and public. Indeed, in
Washington, a very large part of the high offi-
cial's time is devoted to public business —
speechmaking, press conferences, background
interviews with correspondents, congressional
testimony, TV interviews. If you doubt it,
merely look at a typical week's calendar of the
Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense.
Or drop into the White House rose garden and
see for yourself.

On the average day, Washington officials push
into the public domain appreciably more intelli-
gence, more facts, more "news" than journalism
in its collective judgment is able or willing to
pass on to its audience. Admittedly this flow
frequently does not include some of the infor-
mation the press may be pressing for. A gov-
ernment that loses sight of its obligation to use

this power with enlightenment and fullest loy-
alty to the democratic process could do great
harm to the public weal.

The issue, then, is not whether government
officials have such power but how they use it.

One of the greatest services the press can per-
form is in its constant examination of the way
government employs such power. For that
reason, it is proper and inevitable that a con-
tinuing attitude of skepticism — a posture of
guerrilla warfare, if you will — should charac-
terize relations between press and government
in this country (just as a steady infusion of
skepticism and dissatisfaction in the public's
attitude toward journalism is good for the
health of journalism) .

It is milikely in our society that there will
ever be a unanimously accepted answer to the
crucial question : Wlio is to judge what needs to
be public and what needs to be private ? But if,
through gatherings such as this and through
the many avenues of discussion that are open
to us, we can push the debate of the question to
a level of substance and intelligence; if we can
reach above the cliches and the self-serving
banalities, we will find, I think, that the Repub-
lic has at its service something similar to the
system of checks and balances provided by the
three branches of government. The pendulum
swing of the interests of the public toward those
of the press in one case, toward those of govern-
ment in another, is quite capable of keeping the
clockwork of democracy in good order.

For the system to perform at its best in this
time of tortuously complex and highly explo-
sive world events, we must demand more effort
and higher performance from each part of the
system.

Government needs to understand more about
the processes of information, the needs of the
public, and, in particular, the workings and re-^
quirements of modern-day journalism. Many
in government have a fine instinctive sense of
good public relations, and most, I can assure
you, have a healthy respect for the subject of
this seminar, the people's right and need to
know. But there remains in the diplomatic
profession a fair-sized remnant of the elderly
notion that the requirements of negotiation and
the requirements of public knowledge are

876

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

always locked in total conflict. Too many
instances still occur where, oecause of timidity,
undue attachment to privacy, or both, our gov-
ernment fails to make its case publicly and so
exposes our position to aimless speculations or
to the public relations artifices of other govern-
ments. I can assure you that my own ofGce de-
votes a great deal of time and eii'ort to dealing
with this problem.

Journalism needs to know more about the
workings of government. My time in govern-
ment hasn't been long, but I am convinced that
it has made me a far better reporter. As Yogi
Berra once said, "You obsei"ve a lot by watch-
ing." The news profession would be strength-
ened if more newsmen had direct experience of
government. It would make good sense to estab-
lish a program to make it ^wssible for slcilled,
experienced reportei-s to serve for a year or two
in government.

Lastly, the public must constantly promote
its own interest. As Louis Lyons, curator of
journalism's Nieman Foundation, noted in a re-
cent article, "Communication is a two-way
street." Many editors and publishers excuse
their product with the claim that they are giv-
ing the public only what it wants. There is
some justice in the claim, and many will con-
tinue to use it to justify inadequate journalism
or, for that matter, inadequate government.
Unquestionably the public appetite for more
and better coverage of serious affairs has grown
in this country. In 1940 half our teenagers
finished high school, and of these 12 percent
went on to higher education. In 1962, 70 per-
cent completed far more sophisticated high
school courses, and of these 53 percent went on
to college. Only by making known its rising
standards, by rejecting the bogus and ridiculing
the oversimplicities, can the public get what it
needs and, let us hope, deserves.

The relationship we are discussing today, of
government and press, raises hard questions and
eludes easy answers. It is a subject that has
furrowed intelligent brows in the past and, we
all must hope, will continue to do so for a long
time to come. I congratulate you for tackling it
afresh in this conference and welcome this op-
portunity to join your deliberations.

Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held
for Nongovernmental Organizations

The Department of State amiounced on
May 15 (press release 2158) that its annual Na-
tional Foreign Policy Conference for Nongov-
ernmental Organizations would be held on
May 19 and 20.

The purpose of the conference is to provide
opportunity for discussion of international af-
fairs between leaders of nongovernmental orga-
nizations and senior Government ofEcials. By
means of these conferences the membership of
nongoverrunental organizations, and through
them a much broader public, gain deeper un-
derstanding of international issues.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Committee
Confers on Exchanges

The Department of State aimounced on
ilay 14 (press release 230) that motion picture
officials of the United States and the Soviet
Union will meet this month for the third time
in 6 years as joint members of the Standing
Committee on Cinematography, as provided
for in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges agreement.^

Frank G. Siscoe, director of the Depart-
ment's Soviet and Eastern European Ex-
changes Staff, will serve as the U.S. representa-
tive and chairman of delegation and will arrive
in Moscow May 17. He will be joined there by
three American motion picture executives for
a meeting with Soviet officials beginning May
19 to discuss the further implementation of the
motion picture section of the exchanges agree-
ment as it concerns the purchase and sale of
feature films in both countries.

The U.S. motion picture industry member
of the Standing Committee for this meeting
will be Arnold Picker, executive vice president
of the United Artists Corporation. He will be
assisted by Kenneth Clark, vice president of the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
and Lya Lopert, vice president and European
manager of United Artists.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5112.

JtTNE 1, 19C4

877

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

GATT Ministers Open Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations

The Trade Negotiations Committee of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for-
WAilly ofened the sixth round of GATT trade
negotiations — pojmlarly known as the Ken-
nedy Round — at a ministerial meeting held at
Geneva May I1.-6. The TNC^ which is comprised
of representatives of countries participating in
the Kennedy Round, was established by the
GATT ministers in May 1963 to formulate
negotiating rules and supervise the conduct of
the negotiations. Following are remarks made
by Christian A. Herter, the President'' s Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, at the
opening public session on May ^ and the text of
a declaration adopted unanimously by the
GATT ministers on May 6.

REMARKS BY MR. HERTER, MAY 4

Before beginning my own remarks, Mr.
Ciiairman, may I read a message from the
President of the United States.

Upon the opening of this meeting of GATT, an
important and effective instrument for the expansion
of world trade, I should lilie to send you best wishes
for success from the people of the United States. Your
meetings, universally known as the Kennedy Round,
exemplify the hope and commitment of our late Pres-
ident to bring together the nations of the world in
peaceful pursuits. I believe, as he did, in the necessity
of success in your work.

We in the United States look upon these negotia-
tions as an important opening to a better world. If
we act together with dedication and purpose, all can
gain and none need lose. Not only the major com-
mercial nations, but all the countries of this shrinking
world — poor and rich alike — have the right to expect
success from our endeavors.

For the United States, I can assure you that we
shall spare no effort in seeking to help bring this meet-
ing, and the meetings which will follow, to a happy and
fruitful conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, in 17 years of practical ex-
perience the GATT has proven itself to be the

world's most successful vehicle for reducing the
obstacles to the flow of international trade and
promoting its expansion. This sixth round of
GATT negotiations, which we are formally
opening today, can be the most comprehensive
and productive in its history. Building upon
its solid record of success — and taking into ac-
coimt the changes in the world and particularly
the importance of the developing nations' play-
ing a greater role in international trade — GATT
can move forward into new and wider areas of
service. It was just a year ago that we met to
lay the groundwork for these negotiations. The
resolution that we adopted set out the principles
by which our work should be guided :

— that we should achieve a significant liberali-
zation of world trade.

— that the negotiations shall include all
classes of products and shall deal not only with
tariffs but also with nontariff barriers. In the
case of agricultural products, the negotiations
should provide for acceptable conditions of ac-
cess to world markets.

— that the negotiations should proceed on
the basis of substantial linear tariff reductions
with a bare minimum of exceptions and special
rules of general and automatic application to
govern cases where there are significant dis-
parities in tariff levels.

— and that every effort should be made to re-
duce trade barriers to exports of the less de-
veloped countries, though the latter cannot be
expected to provide reciprocity.

Mr. Chairman, these are ambitious objectives,
but in the months of negotiations that lie
ahead we — and the GATT — will be measured by
them. In living up to them, as we must, it will
be necessary for all countries to reach a balanced
agreement at a maximum rather than a mini-
mum level. After all, we should never lose

878

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

sight of tho fact tlmt trade liberalization is good
for all. It is good :

— because our peoples as consumers will
gain readier access, at reasonable prices, to a
wider variety of goods.

— because our businessmen and industrialists
will have a clear picture of the new challenges
and new opportunities in international trade and
will be stimulated to respond to them.

— because producers and consumers alike will
benefit from an increased international flow of
an abundant supply of reasonably priced food.

— because the developing countries will gain
wider opportunities to earn through exports the
funds needed for their development programs.
These negotiations — and GATT itself — can pro-
mote the expansion of their trade on a practical
and workable basis.

In addition to adopting a set of principles at
the meeting last year, we established procedures
for putting them into effect.^ The Trade Nego-
tiations Conunittee was formed in order to work
out a negotiating plan to be adopted before the
start of the conference. It is now time to take
stock of what has been accomplished.

We are agreed, as we were a year ago, that
there should be a bare minimum of exceptions
and tliat they should be subject to confrontation
and justification. We are now also agreed that
the negotiations should be based on offers of
linear tariff reductions of 50 percent.

We are conditionally agreed on some elements
of the "special rules of general and automatic
application" on disparities, but all elements of
this formula have still not fallen into place.
We have, unfortunately, made little progress on
agriculture. We have not yet come to grips
with the problem of nontariff barriers. While
considerable achievements have been made on
rules and procedures relating to less developed
countries, we have a good deal more ground to
cover.

It is now our joint responsibility to move
ahead, more rapidly and successfully than in the
past, to fin the remaining gaps. The longer
the rules are left open, the longer we procrasti-
nate in setting the formulas by which these

' For statements made by Mr. Herter and text of a
resolution adopted on May 21, 1963, see Bulletin
of June 24, 1963. p. 990.

negotiations will proceed, the more we risk tho
success of the entire trade negotiations. Let us
use this meeting to dedicate ourselves and our
governments to prompt, effective efforts to set-
tle these issues quickly.

Gentlemen, I have been brief — because time
is pressing. We have in GATT an unequaled
instrument for trade expansion. We are break-
ing new ground in the worldwide attack on trade
barriers through negotiations of unparalleled
complexity. In this difficult but essential task
we have the invaluable assistance of GATT's
Executive Secretary [Eric Wyndham White],
to whose skilled and selfless services all of us
owe so much. Wliat we can and must con-
tribute is the determination to get on with the
job.

DECLARATION OF GATT TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, MAY 6

A. Tariffs

1. The Trade Negotiations Committee in opening the
trade negotiations, notes that :

(1) The rate of 50 per cent has been agreed as a
working hypothesis for the determination of the gen-
eral rate of linear reduction provided for in paragraph
4 of the Resolution of 21 May 1963 ;

(ii) the ultimate agreement on tariff reductions in
accordance with the application of this hypothesis is
linked with the solution of other problems arising in
the negotiations, for example, tariff disparities, agricul-
tural problems, exceptions and non-tariff problems, and,
in general, with the achievement of reciprocity ;

(iii) it is the intention of the participants to cooper-
ate to solve these problems.

2. The Trade Negotiations Committee decides that
exceptions lists will be tabled on the basis of the hy-
pothesis of a 50 per cent linear reduction.

It is recognized that nothing in the negotiating rules
would preclude any participant from making a larger
reduction in, or completely eliminating, duties on par-
ticular products.

3. The Trade Negotiations Committee notes the prog-
ress made towards solving the problems relating to the
question of disparities.

4. The Trade Negotiations Committee recalls that it
was agreed, on 21 May 1963, that there should be a bare
minimum of exceptions which should be subject to con-
frontation and justification.

It decides that the method to be followed for such
confrontation and justification shall be elaborated as
rapidly as possible and that the study of that method
shall be undertaken immediately. The method shall
take account of the need to safeguard the confidential
nature of the negotiations.

It decides also that exceptions lists shall be tabled on

JUNE 1, 1964

879

10 September 1964, such exceptions to be necessitated
only by reasons of overriding national interest."

B. Agriculture

The Committee, while reaffirming that the trade
negotiations shall provide for acceptable conditions of
access to world markets for agricultural products in
furtherance of a significant development and expansion
of world trade in such products, notes that it has not
yet been possible to formulate agreed rules to govern,
and methods to be employed in, the negotiations. In
view of the importance of this subject to the success of
the negotiations, the necessary rules and procedures
shall be established at an early date.

The Committee notes that negotiations have been
initiated with a view to the formulation of general
arrangements on certain products. The negotiations
have so far related to cereals and meat, and prepara-
tions have been made for the early initiation of such
negotiations on dairy products.

C. Non-tariff harriers

The Committee recalls that the trade negotiations
must relate not only to tariffs but also to non-tariff
barriers.

It notes that many participants have already indi-
cated the measures on which they wish to negotiate,
and that others will shortly do so. In view of the
importance for the full success of the negotiations of
solving these problems, the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee shall, at an early date, draw up the necessary
procedures.

D. Participation of less-developed countries

The Committee reaffirms that in the trade negotia-
tions every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to
exports of less-developed countries and agrees that
this consideration should be borne particularly in mind
in the approach to the question of exceptions.

The Committee notes with satisfaction that all par-
ticipants are prepared to consider the possibility of
taking such steps as are open to them to make cuts
deeper than 50 per cent in. or to eliminate completely,
duties on products of special interest to less-developed
countries.

The Committee also notes with satisfaction the in-
tention to entrust to a special body the ta.sk of exam-
ining and calling attention to any problems arising in
the negotiations which are of special interest to the
less-developed countries and of action as a focal point
for bringing together all issues of interest to these
countries.

The Committee agreed that it would pursue further
the question of trade in tropical products with a view

' These exceptions are distinct from any modification
of its offers which, as agreed by the Ministers at their
meeting in May 19G.3, it shall be open to each country
to make in the course of the negotiations, where this
Is necessary to obtain an over-all balance of advan-
tages between it and the other participants. [Footnote
In original.]

to working out arrangements and procedures for their
treatment in the negotiations.

The Committee recalls the decision of the Ministers
that developed countries cannot expect to receive rec-
iprocity from the less-developed countries. It agrees
that the contribution of the less-developed countries
to the overall objective of trade liberalization should
be considered in the light of the development and
trade needs of these countries.'

E. The problem of countries with a very low average
level of tariffs or a special economic or trade struc-
ture such that equal linear tariff reductions may
not provide an adequate balance of advantages

(a) Countries with a very low average level of
tariffs

The Committee notes that the countries concerned
reserve the right to submit proposals in this connec-
tion at a later date.

(b) Countries loith a special economic or trade
structure

1. The Committee agrees that Canada falls in the
category of countries with a special economic or trade
structure such that equal linear tariff reductions may
not provide an adequate balance of advantages.

2. The Committee further agrees that Australia.
New Zealand and South Africa are countries which
have a very large dependence on exports of agricul-
tural and other primary products and therefore, by
virtue of the understanding reached at the Ministerial
Meeting in May 190.3, also fall in the category of coun-
tries referred to in 1 above.

3. The Committee reaffirms that the objective in the
case of all these countries should be the negotiation
of a balance of advantages ha.sed on trade concessions
by them of equivalent value.

4. The Committee notes that appropriate procedures
in pursuance of this objective have been agreed.

5. The Committee notes with satisfaction that Greece
and Portugal have indicated their intention to partici-
pate actively in the negotiations and will be submitting
proposals at a later date on the basis for their partici-
pation.

F. Participation of Poland in the trade negotiations
The Committee notes that there has been under con-
sideration for some time the question of ways and
means of Poland's participation in the Kennedy Round.
This consideration has taken place on the basis of the
Polish proposals listed and explained in TN.64/NTB/
15. The interest of Poland in participating actively in
the trade negotiations is warmly welcomed and there
is general agreement that it should be feasible to work
out a practical arrangement. The Committee recom-
mends that these discussions should be actively pursued
to an early conclusion.

"Argentina and Brazil accejited this paragraph on
the understanding that the phrase "development and
trade needs" covers the requirements of the current
financial situation. [Footnote in original.]

880

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^

In Session as of May 15, 1964

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Geneva Mar. 23-

6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva May 4-

UNESCO PJxecutive Board: 67th Session Paris May 4-

In Recess as of May 15, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

Apr. 28, 1964, untU June 9, 1964).

Scheduled June Through August 1964

U.N. KC.\FK Seminar on National Accounts Bangl<ok June 1-

1st International Short Film Festival Cracow, Poland .... June 1-

3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty . . Brussels June 1-

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 25th Ses- Washington June 2-

sion.

OPXD Pulp and Paper Committee Paris June 9-

UNESCO International Ocoanographic Commission: 3d Session . . Paris June 10-

ICAO Limited European- Mediterranean Communications Regional Paris June 15-

Air Navigation Meeting.

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee Vienna June 15-

U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session The Hague June 15-

U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations Mexico, D.F June 15-

International Labor Conference: 48th Session Geneva June 17-

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee Geneva June 22-

U.N. ECE Working Group on Productivity Statistics Geneva June 22-

International Wheat Council: 39th Session London June 23-

14th International Film Festival Berlin June 26-

FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 9th Session Rome June 29-

U.N. EC.Al Seminar on Industrial Estates Addis Ababa June 29-

International Sugar Council: 17th Session London June

UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee New York June

U.N. EC.\FE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Session. Bangkok July 1-

14th International Film Festival Karlovy Vary, July 4-

Czechoslovakia.

BIRPI Industrial Property Seminar for Latin America Bogotd July 6-

FAG Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program . . Geneva July 6-

27th International Conference on Public Education Geneva July 6-

ANZUS CouncU Washington July 13-

IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session London July 13-

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session Geneva July 13-

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris July 15-

IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Session. London July 20-

17th International Film Festival Locarno July 22-

lA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Santiago July

Meeting.

South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of the Com- Wellington July

mission.

8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Viiia del Mar, Chile . . Aug. 1-

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th London Aug. 4-

Session.

UNESCO International Conference on Youth Grenoble Aug. 23-

3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Geneva Aug. 31-

Energy.

Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the Ottawa Aug. 31-

North Pacific Ocean.

17th .\nrnial Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh August

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 15, 19G4. Following is a list of abbreviations :
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for
the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property ; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa ; ECAFE, Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East ; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe ; ECOSOC, Economic and
Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council ; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ;
IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization ; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; U.X., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund.

JUNE 1, 1964 881

TREATY INFORMATJON

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the
convention on international civil aviation (TIAS
1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of
the International Civil Aviation Organization shall
be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annu-
ally. Done at Montreal June 14, 1945. Entered
Into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, October 18, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters,
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.
Entered Into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Japan, April 6, 1964.

Finance

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Septem-
ber 19, 1960 ( TIAS 4671 ) , relating to the Indus Basin
Development Fund. Open for signature at Washing-
ton from March 31 until April 8, 1964. Enters into
force when it has been signed on behalf of all the
parties.

Signatures: United States and International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, March 31,
1964; Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand,
Pakistan, and United Kingdom, April 6, 1964.
Entered into force: April 6, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 11,

1964.
Enters into force: June 10, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention of February
8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at
Washington July 15, 1963.'

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 8,
1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement for a Joint program of ionospheric research
by means of satellites. Effected by exchange of notes
at Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6,
1964.

IVIexico

Agreement concerning the level of future exiwrts of
beef and veal from Mexico to the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May
14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; U.S.C. 1731-
1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade
April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; U.S.C. 1731-
1736). Signed at Belgrade April 28, 1964. Entered
into force April 28, 1961.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume on Near East
and Africa, 1943, Published

Press release 226 dated May 11, for release May 17

The Department of State released on May 17 Foreign
Relations of the United States, 19^i3, Volume IV, The
Near East and Africa. Volumes already released for
1943 cover the conferences at Cairo and Tehran ; ' gen-
eral problems ; ' the British Commonwealth, Eastern
Europe, the Far East ; ' and China.'

In this volume there is documentation on the rela-
tions of the United States with 15 countries ar-
ranged alphabetically. Most of the content relates
to wartime problems, particularly the defense of the
Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or at-
tack. Among the compilations of particular interest
are those on U.S. policy regarding the postwar political
organization of Greece, the problems of coalition war-
fare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the
United States toward the entry of Turkey into the
war and toward the future status of Palestine.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
Volume IV, The Near East and Africa (viii, 1,188 pp. ;
publication 7665) may be obtained from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 20102, for $4.00 each.

' Not in force.

' Department of State publication 7187.
' Department of State publication 7585.
' Department of State publication 7601.
* Department of State publication 6459.

882

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETIN

INDEX June 1, 196i, Vol. L, No. 1301

Africa. Foreign Relations Volume on Near East

and Africa, 1943. Published 882

American Principles. A Perspective on the
Tasks of the 1960's (Rostow) 864

American Republics

The Alliance for Progress (Mann) 857

President Johnson Pledges Redoubled Efforts to

Alliance for Progress 854

Communism. A Perspective on the Tasks of the
1960's (Rostow) 8(54

Economic Affairs

The Alliance for Prog^ress (Mann) 857

GATT Ministers Open Kennedy Round of Trade

Negotiations (Herter, text of declaration) . . 878

U.S. Welcomes Japanese Membership in OECD

(Rusk) 853

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Film Committee Confers on Exchanges . . . 877

Europe. U.S. Welcomes Japanese Membership

In OECD (Rusk) 853

Foreign .4id

The Alliance for Progress (Mann) 857

President Johnson Pledges Redoubled Efforts

to Alliance for Progress 854

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 881

GATT Ministers Open Kennedy Round of Trade
Negotiations (Herter, text of declaration) . . 878

U.S. Welcomes Japanese Membership in OECD
(Rusk) 853

Ireland. Letters of Credence (Fay) 853

Japan. U.S. Welcomes Japanese Membership in

OECD (Rusk) 853

Middle East. Foreign Relations Volume on Near
East and Africa, 1943, PubUshed 882

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North At-
lantic Council Meets at The Hague (Rusk,
text of communique) 850

Presidential Documents. President Johnson
Pledges Redoubled Efforts to Alliance for
Progress 854

Public Affairs

Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held for Non-
governmental Organizations 877

Foreign Policy and the People's Right To Know

(Manning) 868

Publications. Foreign Relations Volume on
Near East and Africa, 1943, Published ... 882

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 882
U.S.S.R. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Committee Confers

on Exchanges 877

Name Index

Fay. William P 853

Herter, Christian A 878

Johnson, President 854

Mann, Thomas C 857

Manning, Robert J 868

Rostow, W. W 864

Rusk, Secretary 850, 853

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 11-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl3ce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to May 11 which appear
in this issue of the Buxletin are Nos. 202 and
205 of May 4 ; 209 of May 5 ; and 216 of May 8.

Subject

U.S. participation In international
conferences.

Japan liberalizes Imports of U.S.
lemons.

Foreign Relations of the United
States, 19!,3, Vol. IV, The Near
East and Africa published.

Mann : "The Alliance for Progress."

ICEM, 25th session.

Harriman : "Developments in the
Sino-Soviet Conflict" (excerpts).

U.S.-Soviet film committee confers
on exchanges.

Meat agreement with Mexico.

Cultural exchange (Poland).

Chayes: "The U.N. Charter, the
Purse, and the Peace."

Program for visit of President of
Ireland.

Ireland credentials (rewrite).

Harriman : Indonesian Pavilion,
New York World's Fair.

NATO communique.

Foreign policy conference for non-
governmental organizations (re-
write).

Shipping talks concluded.

Harriman : "The United States and
the Development of African Lead-
ers" (excerpts).

•Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

No.

Date

•223

5/11

1225

5/13

226

5/11

227
»228
*229

5/13
5/13
5/13

230

5/14

t231
•232
t?-S3

5A4
5/14
5/15

•234

5/15

235
•236

5/15
5/15

237

238

5A5
5/15

t239
•241

5A5
5/16

U.S. «OVEnNHENT PRINTIN« 0PriCEil9f4

Superintendent of D
u.s. government prinl
washington. d.c.

OFFICIAU BUSINESS

i<»LTV FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, *300
IGPO)

American Foreign Policy

Current Documents, 1960

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents is an annual, one- volume collection of the principal
messages, addresses, statements, reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exclianged and treaties
made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy
of the United States.

As was time with resjject to the earlier volumes in the series, the 1960 compilation includes some
documents issued by other governments and by regional international organizations of which the United
States is not a member where the pronouncements or settlements revealed in them were of major concern
to the United States in the formulation of its own policies.

The 1960 volume departs from its predecessors in that, in a number of instances, the title only of a
document is provided, together with information as to where its official text may readily be foimd. These
titles are included in the list of documents, and their substance is carried in the index.

Copies of Ainerican Foreign Policy : Current Documents^ 1960 may be obtained from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 20402, for $3.50 each.

PUBLICATION 7624 $3.50

ORDER FORM

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Enclosed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Slipt. of Documents)

PUBLICATION 7624 $3.50

Please send me
ments, I960.

NAME

copies of American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE

ryc^;>z

/

TTTE OFFICIAL AVEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1302

June 8, 1964

LAOS AND VIETNAM— A PRESCRIPTU6'^''F0R PEACE
Address by Secretary/ Rusk \8^

U.S. CAJXS FOR FRONTIER PATROL TO HELP PREVENT BORDER INCIDENTS

BETWEEN CAJIBODIA AND VIETNAM

Statement hy Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 907

THE U.N. CHiVRTER, THE PURSE, AND THE PEACE

by Ahram, Chayes, Legal Adviser 900

THE DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 893

For index see inside book cover

Laos and Viet-Nam — A Prescription for Peace

Address hy Secretary Rush ^

I appreciate very much indeed your invita-
tion to speak to tliis distinguished institute —
all the more so because I suppose I might be re-
garded as a poacher on a traditional lawyers'
preserve. I am informed that of the 52 men
who have served as Secretary of State I am one
of 7 who have not been lawyers. No doubt more
than one conclusion might be drawn from that
small statistic. But I must confess that at one
time I aspired to join you. So intent was I that
it required a world war to stop me.

I am glad to recall that, in a prior incarnation,
I was associated with the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, which has had long and friendly relations
with the American Law Institute. Over the
years this collaboration has been mutually satis-
fying and beneficial. Your most recent work
on the restatement of the foreign relations law
of the United States is a significant contribu-
tion to the rule of law in a world scene of con-
siderable turbulence.

' Made before the American Law Institute at Wash-
ington, D.C., on May 22 ( press release 251 ) .

I should like both to salute and to solicit the
continuing creativeness of the legal profession.
We frequently hear of the great contributions
which science and technology have made to the
transformation of the human condition. We
seldom are reminded that these vast contribu-
tions could have amounted to little had they not
been accompanied by legal, constitutional, and
social invention by those who devise the law.
The breathtaking pace of science and teclinol-
ogy requires that social and legal invention keep
pace if the capacity of man at his best is to be
protected from the appetites of man at his worst.
The legal has a never-ending responsibility to
address itself to the emerging problems on the
near and far horizons of human affairs to insure
that the rule of law can maintain the essentials
of order as well as progress.

I was tempted to talk tonight about the
further evolution of international law — as seen
by a nonlawyer — and the steady development
of what one of your colleagues has called "the
common law of mankind." But several of my

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1302 PUBLICATION 7698 JUNE 8, 19S4

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
aRencles of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
forelffn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Forelprn
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forelRn policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international aCfalrs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation la Included concerning treaties
and International asreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department. United
Notions documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbice : 52 issues, domestic $8.60,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is Indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

886

DEPARTKENT OF STATE BULLETIN

collea^es, especially tlie lawyers, strongly
urged me not to do so. I am not sure whether
they were thinking of your welfare or of mine.
But I accepted their advice, at least in part, and
shall comment tonight upon one or two of the
tempestuous problems which threaten the peace
and remind us that basic divergence of purpose
camiot be reconciled by words and phrases.

The Rule of Law Among Nations

It can be said quite simply that the notion of
the rule of law is deeply embedded in the ob-
jectives of our foreign policy. We have learned
through much experience that law enlarges the
area of freedom and curbs the use of raw power.
The United States is now party to some 4,100
international agreements — agreements intended
to enlarge our opportunities and protect us
from the arbitrary conduct of others.

Unfortunately, one cannot yet speak of a con-
sensus among governments about the role or the
rule of law. There are still those who think
that sovereignty remains unbridled by solemn
agreement. There remains the schism between
those who look upon agreement as commitment
and those who look upon agreement as a tactic.
The pervasive crisis of our period of history
turns on just this point.

The great majority of governments of the
world are committed to the structure of a world
commimity outlined in the opening sections of
the United Nations Charter. But there is a
large minority, and I am speaking of the Com-
munist world, committed to the destruction of
that community and the substitution of what
they call their world revolution. The ideologi-
cal gap is very wide. Tlie problem is not trans-
lation ; the problem is how to find words, in any
language, which represent a meeting of minds
among those whose purposes are so basically at
odds. "Understanding" is fleeting, "agree-
ment" is contingent or illusory, "commitment"
is unreliable, and "predictability" becomes
impossible.

If once the international rule of law could be
discussed with a certain condescension as a
Utopian ideal, today it becomes an elementary
practical necessity. Pacta sunt servanda now
becomes the basis of survival. It is in this con-
text, therefore, that I wish to speak of threats

to the peace at a time when it is too late to be
primitive and too dangerous to be unfaithful.

Laos — the Issues Today

Let me speak lirst of Laos. Wlien such a
problem reappears on the front page, we tend
to look upon it as something new and rivet our
attention upon what it means for the days and
weeks ahead. We tend to forget that such prob-
lems have roots and that solutions have to take
into account what has gone before. I hope,
therefore, you will pause with me to recall how
that situation developed in order to understand
a little better just what the issues are today.

Laos is a landlocked country about three-
fifths the size of California, much of it covered
by dense jungle and rugged mountains. Its
population is estimated to be between 2 and 3
million. Geography gives it special impor-
tance. It has six neighbors, two of which are
Communist. It has about 260 miles of com-
mon border with Commimist China, more than
800 with Communist North Viet-Nam (approxi-
mately the distance from New York City to
Charleston, South Carolina). It shares 300
miles with South Viet-Nam, almost 300 with
Cambodia, more than 1,000 with Thailand, and
about 150 with Burma.

In 1949 accords were reached with the French
which gave Laos independence witliin the
French Union. We recognized its government,
but our legation in Vientiane was served by our
Minister-Resident in Saigon until 1954.

During the Indochinese war there was minor
guerrilla activity in Laos but no major military
campaigns until the spring of 1953, when Com-
mimist Vietnamese forces attacked northern and
central Laos. These Viet Minh troops were ac-
companied by Lao Communists — Pathet Lao —
trained and equipped in North Viet-Nam.
Wlien the Indochinese war was brought to a
close by the Geneva agreements of 1954,^ the
Communists controlled two provinces in Laos.
But under those agreements, which were signed
by the Commimist regimes of mainland China
and North Viet-Nam, among others, Laos was
to be one country and the Pathet Lao forces

' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State publi-
cation 6446) , p. 750.

JUXE 8, 1964

887

were to be integrated into the Royal Lao Army.
Those agreements also prescribed that all for-
eign military forces were to be withdrawn from
Laos, excepting limited forces and two bases
permitted to France.

The Lao Communists were slow in complying
with the Geneva agreements. They did not
accept reintegration, even in principle, until the
end of 1957. By early 1959 their hopes of
taking over Laos from within were plainly
withering — the Lao Government had launched
progi-ams of reform, civic action, and economic
development. One of the two Pathet Lao bat-
talions which theoretically had been integrated
into the Lao National Army mutinied and, with
active Viet Minh help, soon started guerrilla
action. In September 1959 the Royal Lao Gov-
ernment appealed to the United Nations on the
ground that North Viet-Nam was committing
aggression against Lao territory. A United
Nations presence in Laos temporarily quieted
things down. But infighting — first political,
then military — among non-Conomunist groups
in Laos opened the door to further violence.
The Soviet Union airlifted arms and ammvini-
tion from Hanoi to neutralist and Pathet Lao
forces in northeast Laos ; the United States sup-
ported the Government forces established in the
Mekong Valley. Early in January 1961, neu-
tralist and Pathet Lao forces, with the help of
Viet Minh advisers and cadres from North Viet-
Nam, seized the strategic Plaine des Jarres.

This was the situation which President Ken-
nedy faced at the end of January 1961. There
were three main options. One was to turn
away from the problem and let the Communists
move further into Southeast Asia, with conse-
quences which were very clear — and unaccept-
able. A second was to make Laos a major
battleground and subject its peace-loving people
to the misery and suffering of war, or to carry
the war elsewhere and multiply the suffering
manyfold. A third was to find some way to
leave the Laotians alone, by all sides, and not
catch them up in the vast contending forces be-
yond their borders. Laos left alone would
threaten no one; no one needed bases there for
their own security. Objectively considered, it
seemed that it ought to be possible to give the
Laotians their chance to work out their own
future for themselves.

The Soviet Union indicated that it favored an
independent and neutral Laos. We had no
wish beyond a free Laos wliich could live at
peace with its neighbors. We agreed, there-
fore— subject to a cease-fire — to attend a
conference on Laos, the purpose of which would
be to insure Laotian independence and neutral-
ity and that its people be left alone. The con-
ference met in Geneva in May 1961.

In June in Vienna President Kennedy and
Chairman Klirushchev discussed the matter at
some length and jointly stated that they "re-
affirmed their support of a neutral and inde-
pendent Laos under a government chosen by the
Laotians themselves, and of international agree-
ments for insuring that neutrality and inde-
pendence, and in this connection they have
recognized the importance of an effective cease-
fire." ^

Agreement for a Neutral Laos

It was more than a year, however, before
agreement was achieved at Geneva. Part of the
difiiculty lay in persuading the different factions
in Laos to combine in a new national govern-
ment under Prince Souvanna Phouma.

A Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and
an accompanying protocol were signed in July
1962.* The heart of these commitments was
simply this : The people of Laos were to be per-
mitted to live in their own country without
interference or pressures from the outside.

Laos was to be independent and neutral. All
foreign troops, regular or irregular, and mili-
tary personnel were to be withdrawn from Laos
within 75 days — excepting a limited number of
French instructors as requested by the Lao
Government. No arms were to be introduced
into Laos except at the request of the Lao Gov-
ernment. The signatories agreed to respect the
territorial integrity and to refrain "from all
direct or indirect interference in the internal
affairs" of Laos.

They promised also not to use Lao territory
to interfere in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries. This stipulation plainly barred the pas-
sage of men and arms from North Viet-Nam to

* For text of a Joint communique, see Buixetin of
June 26, 1961, p. 999.

* For test, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

888

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Soutli Viet-Nam by way of Laos — over the so-
called "Ho Chi Mmh trail" which the Commu-
nists had been using since 1959.

An International Control Commission of
three — Canada, India, and Poland — was set up
to assure compliance with the agreements. The
cochairmen of the Geneva Conference (the
Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and the
Soviet Union) were to exercise general super-
vision over the agreements. And all the signa-
tories promised to support a three-faction coali-
tion government under Prince Souvanna
Phoiuna.

These were among the principal pledges made
at Geneva by 14 governments, including Com-
munist China, Communist North Viet-Nam, and
Poland, as well as the Soviet Union.

Communist Violations of Accords

"^Yliat happened? The non-Communist ele-
ments have complied with and supported the
accords; the Communist elements have per-
sistently undercut and frustrated them.

We withdrew all 600 of our military advisory
personnel from Laos. The Pathet Lao allowed
several thousand North Vietnamese military
combat men to remain — these are the backbone
of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Later,
additional North Vietnamese troops returned
to Laos — many of them in organized battalions.
The North Vietnamese have continued to use
the corridor through Laos to reinforce and sup-
ply the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. And
they have improved commmiications through
that corridor.

The Royal Lao Government opened the areas
under its control to access by all Lao factions
and by the International Control Commission.
The Communists have denied access to the areas
they control, not only to other Lao groups, in-
cluding the Prime Minister, but to the Inter-
national Control Commission. They have fired
repeatedly at personnel and aircraft on legiti-
mate missions under the authority of the Royal
Lao Government.

In negotiations with other Lao factions the
Pathet Lao have persistently demanded uni-
lateral concessions and have used threats and
armed attacks to erode the basic accords.
After innumerable attempts to achieve a com-

pi-omise. Prince Souvanna went to Hanoi and
Peiping in April. He received promises of
support. But the Communists deliberately
broke up a tripartite meeting at the Plaine des
Jarres by insisting their demands be accepted
without further discussion.

Faced with this act of bad faith. Prince Sou-
vamia announced his intention to resign. This
precipitated an attempted seizure of power by
a group of military leaders of the conservative
forces in Vientiane. We deplored this seizure
and called for the restoration of the conditions
required by the Geneva accords. We pledged
our support for Prince Souvanna Phouma and
all aspects of the Geneva agreement."

A few weeks later the Communists started a
series of militai-y attacks, including a heavy as-
sault on the neutralist forces of General Kong
Le on the Plaine des Jarres, driving him and
his troops off the Plaine where they had been
since 1961.

In these persistent and increasingly flagrant
violations of the Geneva accords, the Pathet Lao
have had active assistance from North Viet-
Nam. Indeed the Pathet Lao seems to be no
more than a puppet subsidiary of Hanoi.
Peiping has consistently supported these viola-
tions. Poland has consistently opposed effec-
tive action by the International Control Com-
mission, although the representatives of India
and Canada have acted with courage and vigor
to caiTy out their responsibilities. The Soviet
Union, while contmuing to declare its support
for the Geneva accords, has been either unwill-
ing or unable to bring effective weight to bear
to support them.

Obviously the situation in Laos raises the
gravest questions. Clearly a Communist take-
over of Laos would be an unacceptable answer
for Laos and for Southeast Asia. The use of
Laos as a corridor for aggression against South
Viet-Nam must cease. Beyond that the people
of Laos are entitled to the freedom from outside
intervention, to the opportimity for the tran-
quillity they were solemnly promised. In his
efforts to secure compliance wnth the Geneva
agreements and preserve the independence of
his country. Prince Souvanna has been patient
almost to the limits of endurance.

■Ihid., May 4, 1964, p. 703.

JUNE 8, 1964

889

The Communist assault on South Viet-Nam
involves the larger question of whether the Com-
munists are to be permitted to succeed in aggres-
sion by terror, guerrilla warfare, and the infil-
tration of arms and military personnel across
national frontiers. These are more than viola-
tions of solemn contracts ; these are criminal acts
against neighbors.

Aggression in South Viet-Nam

Next door to Laos, in South Viet-Nam, a
major aggression is under way. I say "aggres-
sion" deliberately. Some of the pertinent evi-
dence was summarized at the Security Council
yesterday [May 21] by Ambassador Stevenson."
Beyond question this aggression was initiated
and is directed by Hanoi. It is led by cadres
trained in the north by Hanoi and, in significant
part, is equipped and supplied by Hanoi — the
same Hanoi which directs and conducts the ag-
gression in Laos.

Hanoi in turn has been guided and, in mate-
rial ways, assisted by Peiping. Arms made in
Communist China have been captured in South
Viet-Nam. And the Soviet Union lends polit-
ical support to the aggression against South
Viet-Nam, although we think it may perhaps
understand better than Peiping and Hanoi the
danger that hostilities of this type may develop
into larger and more destructive wars.

The renewed Commvmist assault on South
Viet-Nam was decided upon and, in 1960, was
publicly proclaimed by Hanoi with the support
of Peiping. This decision was simply the open
avowal of a Communist plan which had been
pursued since the partition of the country in
1954. The decision to intensify the assault,
however, may well have been influenced by the
remarkable economic and social progress of
South Viet-Nam, which cast into a dark shadow
the Communist "paradise" in North Viet-Nam.
Certainly progress in the south had dashed
Communist hopes of taking over that country
from within.

With impetus provided by this major effort,
the Communist campaign of terror and outrage
against the South Vietnamese people mounted
to serious proportions by the end of 1961. Pres-
ident Kennedy substantially increased United

° See p. 907.

States assistance to check this increased threat
to the freedom of South Viet-Nam. Combined
efforts brought about a gradual improvement
that continued until the late spring of last year.
At that time deep divisions appeared among
the South Vietnamese people as a result of im-
fortunate decisions by President [Ngo Dinh]
Diem's government. That government was re-
placed in early November 1963, and still another
change occurred in January of this year. These
abrupt changes caused dislocations in the gov-
ernment's administrative structure and military
organization and effort. The Commimists were
quick to take advantage of the resultant con-
fusion to step up their attempts to seize control.
As a result both time and ground were lost.
Today the situation in South Viet-Nam is se-
rious. But General [Nguyen] Khanh is an
energetic and impressive leader. He fully rec-
ognizes that the first imperative for his govern-
ment is to obtain the full confidence of the
Vietnamese people and to give them assurance
that his government will protect them and offer
them opportimities for a better life. To this
end he has initiated administrative reforms and
new economic and social programs. At the
same time he is taking vigorous steps to
strengthen his military forces and to make ef-
fective a military strategy designed to counter
the tactics of Conmiunist insurgency.

Four Alternatives In Viet-Nam

You are all aware of the four principal al-
ternatives in South Viet-Nam which have been
referred to in recent discussion. The first would
be to withdraw and forget about Southeast Asia.
That would mean not only grievous losses to the
free world in Southeast and southern Asia but
a drastic loss of confidence in the will and ca-
pacity of the free world to oppose aggression.
It would also bring us much closer to a major
conflagration. Surely we have learned, in the
course of the last 35 years, that a course of ag-
gression means war and that the place to stop it
is at its beginning.

A second alternative is to give the South Viet-
namese Government and people every jx)ssible
assistance to defeat the attacks against them
and to build their society as they themselves
would have it. This is the course we have fol-

890

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN

lowed for the past 10 years. The tactical ad-
vantage of the elusive guerrilla is considerable:
He caji destroy, but ho caiuiot build; ho can as-
sassinate schoolteachers and health workers,
but he cannot sei-ve the people ; ho can use terror
in the villages to demand assistance; and he can
make things diflicult for the far larger security
forces whose object is to maintain order.

A third choice would be to expand the war.
This can be the result if tlie Communists persist
in their course of aggression.

Fourth, there has been talk of a new political
settlement of one sort or another. We have
heard the word "neutralization." A new po-
litical settlement? Political settlements were
reached, after painful negotiation, in 1954 and
1962. "Neutralization"? Tlie Geneva accords
of 1962 were precisely agreements to neutralize
Laos. Before the ink on them was dry the Com-
munists began to flout them. What new agree-
ments are required ? Wliat is needed is not new
agreements but compliance, not new underta,k-
ings but good faith.

All that is needed to restore peace in Laos and
Viet-Xara is for the Communists to live up to
the agreements they have already made. All
that is needed is for the Communists to stop
their aggressions, to go home, to leave their
neighbors alone. "When they stop their aggres-
sions and the freedom of mainland Southeast
Asia is assured, there will be no further need
for any American military presence. We have
never sought and we do not desire today any
base or other military position in South Viet-
Nam — or Laos or Cambodia. Our forces in
Southeast Asia are there solely in response to
the threat and reality of aggression from the
north.

At the meeting of the Coimcil of the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization in Manila last
month,^ seven of the eight members joined in
declaring the defeat of the aggression against
South Viet-Nam to be "essential not only to the
security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that
of South-East Asia." And, they said, its defeat
"will also be convincing proof that Communist
expansion by such tactics will not be permitted."

' For a statement made by Secretary Rusk and text
of a joint communique, see Botxetin of May 4, 1964,
p. 690.

It is not my purpose this evening to anticipate
decisions which may lie ahead and on which
governments are in consultation. I wanted to
review for you some of the background of to-
day's headlines, some of the experience which
lies behind them, and some of the issues which
are now before us. The timing of these re-
marks this evening in relation to the events
themselves makes it unwise for me to do more.

I hope that the Security Coimcil will be able
to resolve the border problems between South
Viet-Nam and Cambodia, and we are encour-
aged to know that both these countries desire
a solution. This would add a building block
to the structure of peace in Southeast Asia.

The prescription for peace in Laos is there in
the Geneva accords of 1962.

We have made it clear that we are not going
to abandon people who are trying to preserve
their independence and freedom. This is the
signal which must be read with the greatest care
in other capitals, and especially in Hanoi and
Peiping.

Both in Laos and in Viet-Nam there is a
simple prescription for peace: Leave your
neighbors alone.

President Johnson Urges Congress
To Increase U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam

Message of the President to the Congress^

The White House, May 18, 1964..
To the Congress of the United States:

Last January, in my budget message to the
Congress,^ I pointed out that this budget made
no provision for any major new requirements
that might emerge later for our mutual defense
and development program. I stated then that
if such requirements should arise I would re-
quest prompt action by the Congress to provide
additional funds.

That need has emerged in Vietnam. I now
request that the Congress provide $125 million
in addition to the $3.4 billion already proposed

' H. Doc. 307, 88th Cong., 2d sess.
' H. Doe. 265, Part 1, 88th Cong., 2d sess. ; for ex-
cerpts, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.

JUNE 8, 1964

891

for foreign assistance ; ^ $70 million is required
for economic and $55 million for military uses
in Vietnam.

Since the 1965 budget was prepared, two ma-
jor changes have occurred in Vietnam :

First, the Viet Cong guerrillas, under orders
from their Communist masters in the north,
have intensified terrorist actions against the
peaceful people of South Vietnam. This in-
creased terrorism requires increased response.

Second, a new government under Prime Mui-
ister [Nguyen] Khanh has come to power,
bringmg new energy and leadership and new
hope for effective action. I share with Ambas-
sador [Henry Cabot] Lodge the conviction that
this new government can mount a successful
campaign against the Communists.

In March, Prime Mmister Khanh declared
his intention to mobilize his nation. This in-
tention has now been confirmed by his new and
enlarged budget for 1964. It provides for:

Expanding the Vietnamese Army, Civil
Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and police forces,
and integrating their operations with politi-
cal, economic, and social measures in a sys-
tematic clear-and-hold campaign.

Greatly expanding and upgrading the
Vietnamese civil administrative corps to in-
crease the Government's effectiveness and
services at the village, district, and Province
level. Local government capacity, respon-
siveness to popular needs, and initiatives are
to be strengthened.

Better pay scales for the men and adequate
budgets for the organizations engaged in this
struggle of many fronts.

Manifold expansion of training programs,
to provide teachers, health workers, agricul-
tural, financial, and administrative staffs for
the rural areas.

These and other measures, if promptly car-
ried out, will require an increase of about 40
percent in Vietnam's domestic budget expendi-
tures over the 1963 level— a far greater expan-
sion of Vietnamese effort than was assumed in
the assistance plans submitted m January. Un-
der present circumstances, Vietnam's domestic

• For text of the President's message to the Congress
on foreign aid, see ibid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

revenues cannot be increased proportionately.
Severe inflation resulting from a budget deficit
would endanger political as well as economic
stability, unless offsetting financial actions are
taken. We expect the Vietnamese Government
to take aU possible self-help measures to deal
with this problem internally, but substantial in-
creases in economic assistance also will be re-
quired. We must share the increased costs of
the greatly intensified Vietnamese effort.

Our more direct support of the expanded Vi-
etnamese military and civil operations also must
keep pace with the intensified Vietnamese effort.
On the civil side — through AID's [Agency for
International Development] counterinsurgency
program — ^this means more fertilizer, medical
supplies and services, repair parts and replace-
ments for war-damaged railway rolling stock,
school supplies and buildmg materials, weU-
drilling equipment and teams to bring fresh
water to the villagers, and enlarged advisory
staffs in the Provinces.

On the military and paramilitary side, addi-
tional equipment, ammunition, training, and
supplies will be needed as the organization and
f imctioning of the armed forces improves. Ad-
ditional aircraft, pilot training for the Viet-
namese, and airfield improvements are required.
Increased activity will require additional am-
munition. Additional support equipment is re-
quired for all forces.

The vigorous decisions taken by the new
Government of Vietnam to mobilize the full
resources of the country merit our strongest
support. Increased Communist terror requires
it.

By our words and deeds in a decade of deter-
mined effort, we are pledged before all the
world to stand with the free people of Vietnam.
Sixteen thousand Americans are serving our
country and the people of Vietnam. Daily they
face danger in the cause of freedom. Duty re-
quires, and the American people demand, that
we give them the fullest measure of support.

We have reviewed the entire budget for mu-
tual defense and development programs once
again to determine whetlier we can accommo-
date within it the-se added requirements. We
cannot. In fact, recent events in Brazil and else-
where may add to the economic programs origi-
nally plamied. Military programs have alreiidy

892

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

been cut to the bare minimum. We cannot re-
spond to the new situation in Vietnam within
the limits of tlie original budget proposal with-
out unacceptable danger to our other basic
security interests.

I am today forwarding to the Speaker of the
House of Ecpresentatives amendments to my
1965 budget increasing my request for appro-
priations for supporting assistance from $335
million to $405 million, and for military assist-
ance from $1 billion to $1,055 billion.* Both of
tliese increases are covered by the budget's al-

lowance for contingencies, so that they will not
affect overall budget totals.

I ask the Congress to enact authorization for
supporting assistance and military assistance
sufficient to permit appropriations in these
amounts.

I strongly urge the Congress to provide this
additional $125 million to Vietnam, and to ap-
propriate the full $3,517 million now required
for our mutual defense and development pro-
grams.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Defense of the Free World

hy Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense ^

For more than 15 years, one of the founda-
tion stones upon which the United States has
built its foreign policy has been the program of
economic and military assistance to friendly
nations. The fact that this policy has held
communism in check and has helped many of
our allies and other nations of the free world
toward self-sustaining growth is proof of its
success.

Yet this program is under fire.

Many Americans are disturbed because, al-
though President after President has requested
funds annually to support armed forces and
economic development in countries far from our
shores, the Congress seems to reduce the requests
as a standard practice. Many of the questions
raised in the Congress, by the press, and among
our citizens reveal misimderstanding of the pro-
gram, including the military assistance part
of it.

Last year, for example, the military assist-
ance program submitted to the Congress by

President Kennedy called for $1.4 billion in
appropriations.'' Tlie Congress, halfway
through the fiscal year in which the money was
to be spent, cut that amount to $1 billion. This
was a severely disrupting reduction of almost
30 percent. In January this year President
Jolinson, after taking accoimt of the mood of
the Congress and the public, as well as of the
minimum need, requested just $1 billion for the
fiscal year beginning July 1.^

It is against this backgroimd that I would
like to talk to you tonight about military assist-
ance. I shall not discuss economic assistance
in detail because it does not fall within the area
of my immediate responsibility. However, as
a citizen and as one who has been close to the
issues, I assure you that strong and plentiful
plowshares are as important as sharp swords
in the complex equation that produces national
security. And I assure you further that the

' H. Doc. 305, 88th Cong., 2d sess.
' Address made before the National Industrial Con-
ference Board at New York, N.Y., on May 21.

' For excerpts from President Kennedy's budget mes-
sage of Jan. 17, 1963, see Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1963, p.
224.

' For excerpts from President Johnson's budget mes-
sage of Jan. 21, 1964, see ihid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.

JUNE 8, 1964

President's program for economic aid deserves
your full support.

My theme tonight is that the defense of the
free world and of the vital interests of the
United States are dependent upon the strength
of the entire free world and not merely upon the
strength of the United States alone. Although
the United States is the central power source in
the free-world struggle for national independ-
ence, integrity, and economic progress, the
United States, by itself, cannot be everywhere
at once, doing everything best. Only with
stanch friends, well armed and ready, can we
provide the integrated balance of forces and the
options necessary in a nuclear world.

The military assistance program is designed to
help achieve that integrated balance. It helps
support military forces that complement our
own armed forces.

What the Military Assistance Program Has Done

Let me remind you, first, of the past of the
military assistance program.

The year 1945 found the American people
proud of victory but weary of war. Our men
returned to civil life. Our industries shifted
to meet demands long denied by war.

While we demobilized, the Soviets main-
tained enough of their wartime strength to pur-
sue an aggressive policy in Europe. The war
legacy of poverty, destruction, and political
disruption left no European nation or group of
European nations capable of resisting the
power of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Com-
munist system was imposed on Eastern Euro-
pean states occupied by Soviet forces.

In the Far East, the Chinese Communists
spread from the base areas they had developed
in the war against Japan over all of mainland
China. By 1949 they were in physical control.

Communist movements, generally directed
from Moscow, were dangerously close to seizing
power in Greece, Italy, the Philippines, Ma-
laya, and, many feared, in scores of other
countries. Commimist military pressures
mounted against those nations on tlie peripheiy
of the Communist bloc, particularly against
Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The erosion of freedom and independence
throughout the world could be stopped effec-

tively only if the United States gave leadership.
No other free country then had sufficient re-
sources. Our response was in the American
tradition. It was humanitarian and utilitarian.

The Marshall Plan provided the basis for the
recovery of economic strength in Europe. Both
military assistance and economic aid were pro-
vided to assist Greece, Turkey, and the Philip-
pines in their struggles against Communists.
These programs, and the warning given to the
Soviets to withdraw from northern Iran, sig-
naled the beginning of our efforts to meet the
rapidly growing Communist threat in all
corners of the world.

The United States assumed this leadership
in its own self-interest. In a shrinking, in-
creasingly interdependent world we could no
longer wear the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
as blinders.

The Berlin blockade in 1948^9 and the attack
on South Korea in 1950 merely confirmed that
we were faced in faraway places with major
challenges to our security. Our response was to
increase our own military strength. At the
same time we made appropriations five times as
large as today's for programs of military assist-
ance to free nations throughout the world whose
security was vital to the United States and who
could not fully support their own requirements.

Wliat was accomplished with these resources?

Most of the funds appropriated during the
early 1950's were used as a matter of priority
to build the forces of our European allies.
Neither the United States alone nor our Euro-
pean allies alone could provide forces enough
to meet a Soviet threat in Europe. Further-
more, our European allies could not recover
economically and at the same time train and
equip the forces thej' needed. Therefore a com-
bination of U.S. forces on the one hand and U.S.
equipment and training for European forces on
the other helped create the needed military
strength in Western Europe.

The policy worked.

The Soviets were deterre-d from moving
against this strength. Indeed, by the late
fifties, recovery in Europe had advanced
markedly and this crucial focus of Allied power
became better able to support its owni military
forces. One of the first steps which President
Kennedy took in 1961, therefore, was to direct

894

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the closing out of our military assistance pro-
fl^rams to the Europejin NATO nations, except
for Greece, Turkey, and rortugal. In the case
of two other countries, Norway and Denmark,
we are completing jirior commitments.

During tiie buildup in Europe there was a
strenuous eifort toward buildup in the Pacific as
a result of the confrontation with Communist
China in Korea. Foremost in our concern were
the Republics of Korea and of China, whose
combined forces reached more than 1 million
men.

Here, too, the program worked. Communist
Chinese aggression against these two outposts
has been deterred.

At the peak of our military assistance pro-
gram during the midfifties, the United States
was contributing to the development and equip-
ment of a free- world strength of 200 divisions
of friendly military forces — forces with some
27,000 aircraft and 2,500 naval vessels.

The great accomplishments of the foreign
economic and military assistance programs in
the past, particularly in Western Europe, have
not by any means eliminated the need for a
sizable level of effort to promote free-world
security in the present and in the future. The
Communist threat that we and our allies con-
tinue to face is great, and it is complex. At
one end of the spectrum there is the possibility
of nuclear war. At the other end there is the
threat of subversion and terrorism. In between
the extremes are the threats of major conven-
tional attack, local probes, and logistics and
manpower support across borders. This entire
spectrum remains relevant, and the threats must
be dealt with where they cast their shadow.

Unfortunately we shall not have time this
evening to discuss three of the smaller portions
of the President's request for military assistance
funds. One of these elements, accounting for
14 percent of the funds requested, provides for
the small but very important militai-y assistance
programs for the 15 coimtries in Latin America ;
the aid for the 3 countries where we have mili-
tary base rights; the projects for the emerging
nations where resistance to the extension of
Commiuiist influence is critical to our national
interests; and tlie programs for the 3 coun-
tries— Denmark, Norway, and Japan — where
our aid is being phased out.

A second of these elements includes the highly
inflexible 11 percent of the budget figure which
must go to cover administrative and support ex-
penses of the militai-y assistance program.

And the third, accounting for 11 percent of
the budget, includes funds to finance military
sales or to cover the U.S. share of the cost of
facilities and activities which are essential to
effective overseas deployment of United States
military strength.

The "Forward Defense" Nations

Our military assistance program today is ori-
ented mainly toward those countries on the
periphery of the major Communist nations
where the threats are greatest and in which the
indigenous resources are least. In the fiscal
year 1965 program now before the Congress,^
about two-thirds of the total amount is sched-
uled to go to the 11 nations on the southern and
eastern perimeters of the Soviet and Red Chi-
nese blocs. These sentinels of the free world, in
a sense, are in double jeopardy from potential
military aggression from without and from at-
tempted subversion from within. These coun-
tries are imder the Red shadow. They face the
major threat, and they are the ones most affected
by the modernization of Communist forces.
For this group we requested $745 million in
military assistance. They best illustrate the
points I want to make.

Imagine a globe, if you will, and on that globe
the Sino-Soviet bloc. The bloc is contained at
the north by the Arctic. To the west are the re-
vitalized nations of Western Europe. But
across the south and to the east you find the 11
"forward defense" nations — Greece, Turkey,
Iran, Pakistan, India, Laos, Thailand, South
Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and the Republics
of China and Korea. These nations, together
with stretches of the Pacific Ocean bearing the
U.S. Fleet, describe an arc along which the
free world draws its f rontlines of defense.

The frontlines are there in the interests of
those 11 nations; the lines are there also in the
interests of the United States and the rest of
the free world. The areas which this 11-nation
arc protects are of obvious strategic importance

'For President Johnson's message on foreign aid,
see Hid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 520.

JXTNE 8, 1964

895

to tHe United States. More significant, how-
ever, is the importance of the arc to the princi-
ple that nations have a right to be independ-
ent—a right to develop in peace, in freedom,
and according to the principle of self-determi-
nation. United States support of these rights
at the frontiers thickens the blood of the free-
world family; it strengthens our security at
home.

We must recognize, however, that the United
States does not have the resources to maintain a
credible force by itself along all of this great
arc of forward positions. Such a strategy
would be unbearably costly to us in both money
and human resources. The United States main-
tains major combat units ashore in forward po-
sitions only in Europe and in parts of the Far
East. Such deployments are costly and hurt
our balance-of -payments position. We do not
now contemplate additional semipermanent de-
ployments of forces abroad.

On the other hand, the free world cannot
leave long stretches of that arc imdefended.
The answer to the problem, of course, is a mix of
forces — of local forces deployed in their home-
lands and of U.S. and other defense treaty
forces ready for rapid deployment in the event
of attack wherever and whenever it might come.

The United States part of the mix has grown
greatly in strength and flexibility :

Since 1981 the U.S. has made great strides
in developing strategic retaliatory forces.
These bomber and missile forces, which stand
ready at all times, are a powerful deterrent to
nuclear war in particular and, indeed, to major
war of any sort. They are one of the great
U.S. contributions to the free-world defense
posture.

We are making dramatic increases in strategic
airlift.

We have organized the United States Strike
Command, which comprises a powerful array of
forces that can be deployed rapidly abroad.

Our improved amphibious lift, together with
modernized Marine forces, provides us with the
ability to keep forces just over the horizon, so
to speak, from any threatened spot and to com-
mit these forces quickly where and when needed
and to support them over a sustained period of
time.

896

Local Forces, First Line of Resistance

No matter how much we spend and no matter
what advances are made in militai-y transporta-
tion or in the weapons available to the United
States to provide the vital and mobile reserve
behind the local forces, the requirement for
local forces — forces on the spot — as the first line
of resistance remains. To make the strategy
effective, these forces must both appear to be
able and actually be able to force external ag-
gression to be vmambiguous, to hold vital ter-
rain long enough for reinforcement, and to fight
and win m concert with other free- world forces.
In this mix, it should be noted, local forces some-
times have important advantages over U.S.
forces. They are more familiar with local ter-
rain and conditions. In the main, thoy can get
much of their support locally ; they are defend-
ing their own homelands.

The 11 "forward defense" nations contribute
more than 3i/^ million men to the defense of
freedom. Together, they maintain more men
under arms than does the United States. A
completely fair cost comparison is impossible.
But it should be noted that the estimated aver-
age annual cost of each United States soldier
overseas — just for his pay, allowances, subsist-
ence, and individual clothing — is almost $4,000.
The average cost of the 31^ million men under
arms in the 11 "forward defense" countries
ranges from $200 to $750 per soldier — a cost
fully borne in all but three cases by the nation
itself. For the United States to replace the
contribution in manpower that these countries
make would require a completely unacceptable
level of conscription in this country. And the
cost would be enormous.

Let me come at this point from another
direction.

Wliy do we have a military budget exceeding
$50 billion, exclusive of military assistance?
We do not need that much to maintain tlie forces
required at this moment in time to defend the
territorial limits of the 50 United States. A
large fraction of the $50 billion is spent on
things designed to insure that aggression is
stopped at the outer limits of the free world, far
from our territory. Such insurance necessarily
implies close cooperation, and allocation of
functions, among the nations of the free world.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Just as we do our best to allocate our resources
sensibly within the U.S. military budget, so
must we allocate our resources sensibly in the
larijor context. The United States has advan-
tages in technology and wealth over the coun-
tries at the frontier. But the nations at the
frontier have advantages, too — in manpower,
proximity, and familiarity with local condi-
tions. If they tried to do for themselves wliat
we can do best, there would be enormous waste
and frustration.

Similarly, if we tried to do for ourself what
they ain do best, the cost in men and other re-
sources could increase by a factor of 5, 10, or 20,
if we could do it at all. Therefore, just as a
given number of dollars spent on the U.S. Navy
would make no sense if disproportionately few
dollars were invested in the U.S. Army and U.S.
Air Force, so it is that $50 billion spent on the
U.S. component of the free-world mix of forces
makes no sense if disproportionately few re-
sources are invested in the components which
our allies and friends can best provide.

It is nonsense to forge a strong horseshoe
without strong horseshoe nails.

But how can the local-force element of the
mix be achieved ? Most of our friends along the
Communist periphery are poor — some very
poor. The annual per capita gross national
product in these countries ranges from $440 in
Greece to $80 in India. By way of comparison,
our per capita gross national product is almost
$3,000. It is as unrealistic to expect them to
equip their own units adequately as it is to ex-
pect the United States to provide the manpower.
With proper training, their men can use modern
equipment well, and they have a profound
awareness of the threat they face.

The answer is : They must have U.S. military
assistance.

Viet-Nam

To give you an idea of the situation that now
exists in the "forward defense" countries, I am
going to talk about three examples — Viet-Nam,
Greece, and Turkey. In two of these there is no
major effort being made at subversion. The
third — Viet-Nam — is the country of the for-
ward group which now faces the most serious

and direct armed action. Let me say a few
words about that special case first.

In Viet-Nam, as I reported fully after my
March trip,"* wo are faced with active and im-
prov'oked externally supplied and directed in-
surgency. Our military assistance — equipment,
training, advice — is vital there not only to an-
swer the call of the South Vietnamese and to
help prevent the danger of Conmiunist expan-
sion throughout that part of the world but also
to prove that the free world can cope with "wars
of liberation" as we have been able to cope with
Communist aggression at other levels.

I was in Viet-Nam again last week, as you
know. I foimd some progress in the fight
there — progress toward "bottoming out" the
difliculties caused by the recent double change
in government — but the journey ahead will still
be long, difficult, and frustrating. We have
agreed with the Vietnamese Government that
their regular military and paramilitary forces
must be increased substantially and soon. We
are now strengthening the Vietnamese Air
Force with 100 A-1 aircraft, and the niunber of
Vietnamese combat pilots is being doubled.
The A-1 aircraft are suited to the changed type
of war being fought today and to the capabili-
ties of the Vietnamese to fly and maintain them.
To meet these and other special requirements,
the President this week asked the Congress to
add $55 million in military assistance for Viet-
Nam to the 1965 budget request.*

Greece and Turkey

Now let me turn to Greece and Turkey.

The Turks and the Greeks cannot forget that
their territory has been the target of Russian
aggressive intentions that long predate the
Communist revolution. They remember that
the Russians asked for territorial concessions
from Turkey after the Second World War.
The Turks are aware that their control of the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles puts them astride
a gateway of great strategic importance to Rus-
sia. The Greeks well remember the Red-in-
spired civil war.

' For background, see ibid., p. 522.
■ See p. 891.

JUNE 8, 1964

897

Opposing these two countries are the Soviet
Union and Bulgaria, which have been modern-
izing their forces. Improvements in U.S.
forces have generally kept pace with the
U.S.S.R. and her satellites, but this has not been
possible in the case of Greece and Turkey.
Equipment of several types is rapidly becom-
ing obsolete. This obsolescence, particularly in
the face of modernization on the other side,
could create a dangerous feeling of weakness
among our allies and could invite adventurous
sorties by their Communist neighbors.

Consider what has happened in Bulgaria.
The Bulgarian army structure since 1959 has
changed from one consisting of 10 rifle divisions
with limited defensive strength to one consist-
ing of 7 motorized and 3 tank divisions with
strong offensive capabilities.

The increased mobility of Bulgarian forces
has not been matched by improvements in
Greek and Turkish equipment. Bulgarian
forces, for example, are now equipped with
Russian T-54 and T-55 tanks, which are first-
line mediiun tanks equipped with the 100-mm.
gun. In addition to the standard military
trucks which have been introduced to motorize
the infantry divisions, the Bulgarians have re-
ceived the newest Russian eight-wheeled ar-
mored personnel carrier. Bulgaria also pos-
sesses relatively large quantities of self-pro-
pelled guns, howitzers, and antiaircraft guns,
as well as the various communications, mainte-
nance, and support equipment required by a
modern army.

This impressive record of modernization and
improvement has not been matched by equiva-
lent progress in the Greek and Turkish armed
forces. In almost all categories of equipment
the Greeks and Turks are either seriously short
of equipment or are operating equipment which
is so old as to be of marginal usefulness. The
Greeks and Turks have the manpower, and they
have the will to defend themselves; the prob-
lem is that the necessary equipment is missing
and that Greece and Turkey, valiant as they are,
are simply too poor to purchase it on their own
account.

Now, how did this situation come about ?

Improved mobility, firepower, and communi-
cations for Greek and Tuili:ish forces could not

be provided in the fiscal year 1963 military
assistance program because of the combined
effect of a congressional reduction in the ad- i
ministration request and increased require- '
ments in Viet-Nam and India which had to be
funded within the overall total available.
Some of the most vital requirements could have
been met within the $1.4 billion request for
fiscal year 1964. However, the congressional
29-percent reduction to $1 billion forced cuts of
over 20 percent in the programs for botli Greece
and Turkey. These reductions, for example,
meant complete elimination of self-propelled
105-mm. howitzers and machineguns from the
programs for these countries and reductions in
the number of rockets and vehicle spares.

Maintaining an Adequate Level of Assistance

It is proper that the total level of military
aid has been reduced over the years. The ter-
mination of assistance to economically sufficient
countries of Europe justifies a reduction.
However, the reductions that have taken place
go well beyond those warranted by the world
situation. As cuts have continued, the execu-
tive branch has attempted to trim its planning
and its requests to a level which would permit
full congressional support and avoid the ad-
ministrative difficulties, inefficiency, and waste
that are inevitable when previously planned
programs are sharply reduced. The requests
for military assistance have been consistently
decreasing. President Johnson's request for
the fiscal year beginning July 1 is roughly half
of President Eisenhower's request for fiscal
year 1962. Despite these decreasing requests,
congressional budget cutting has continued un-
abated. The cuts have ranged from 10 percent
in 1961 to last, years 29 percent.

The prospects for the future are not bright.

General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has characterized the
1965 level for military assistance and the pro-
gram associated with it as "a holding operation
of borderline adequacy." He believes that we
camiot operate with that level in the next few
years "without a serious loss of military effec-
tiveness in many countries which it is in our
interest to support." I agree. But in light

898

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of public attitudes toward this program re-
flected in the reductions made each recent year
by the Congi-ess, I was unwillinji: to recommend
tliat tlie President request a higher figure.

Past appropriations by the Congress signifi-
cantly' below the level requc-sted by tlie execu-
tive branch have made a shambles out of the
military assistance plamiing process and have
caused waste. I would rather request and re-
ceive $1 billion than request a substantially
higher figure only to have the request sharply
cut after months of controversy and well into
the year in which the funds are to be committed.

If I am able to leave but one thought with
you this evening, it is this: It would be less
than wise — indeed, it would be foolhardy — for
the United States to spend $50 billion a year to
develop and maintain its own forces and at the
same time to refuse to help provide training
and equipment to the people in the frontlines
who must complement our forces and who are
the key to successful joint defense. To have a
strong U.S. Military Establishment, and at the
same time to neglect the allied forces who
■would fight alongside our own, is a shortsighted
and wasteful approach to our national security.
As I said earlier, it is nonsense to forge a strong
horseshoe without strong horseshoe nails. We
must maintain a balance, and that balance can
be maintained only by an adequate level of
military assistance.

Unwillingness to devote sufficient resources
to military assistance will weaken the national
forces of our friends and thereby weaken the
combined forces of the free world on which we
rely for defense and for the credibility needed
to prevent Communist miscalculation in
showdowns.

The alternatives are clear : If military assist-
ance is cut, the United States either must make
up for the reductions with U.S. forces or must
retrench its foreign policy.

The executive branch has stated that military
assistance must be kept at the necessary level.
The question now rests with you and the Con-
gress of the United States.

Letters of Credence

Spain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain,
Alfonso Merry del Val y Alzola, the Marques de
Merry del Val, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on May 19. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 244
dated May 19.

Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Cleveland

Press release 248 dated May 20

The Department of State will hold a foreign
policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June
18 cosponsored by the Adult Education Coimcil
of Greater Cleveland, the Cleveland Press, and
Western Eeserve University, Division of Gen-
eral Studies, Cleveland College. Forty-six
other Cleveland organizations are cooperating
in the conference.

Invitations will be extended throughout Ohio
to members of the press, radio, television, and
nongovernmental organizations concerned with
foreign policy, and to business and commimity
leaders.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring to-
gether citizen leaders and media representatives
with government officials responsible for formu-
lating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will
be George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State;
G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs; John T. McNaugh-
ton, Acting Assistant Secretaiy of Defense for
International Security Affairs; William H.
Sullivan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State for Viet-Nam Affairs; James L. Green-
field, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs; and Joseph J. Sisco, DefDuty
Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs.

JTTVE 8, 1964

899

The U.N. Charter, the Purse, and the Peace

hy Abram Ohayes
Legal Adviser ^

For most of February of this year vio-
lence on the island of Cyprus was headline
news. A pointblank clash between two NATO
allies threatened. Broader East-West issues
were inevitably involved. The urgent require-
ment was to restore the peace.

On February 15 the Governments of Cyprus
and the United Kingdom brought the issue be-
fore the United Nations Security Council.
Eighteen days later, on March 4, the Council
recommended "the creation, with the consent of
the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations
peacekeeping force in Cyprus." ^ The force
was to be under a U.N. commander appointed
by and reporting to the Secretary-General.
Following on the United Nations Emergency
Force in the Middle East and the United Na-
tions Operation in the Congo, it was the third
major U.N. peacekeepuig effort in less than a
decade.

Although the Council acted on March 4, the
first token contingents of the U.N. Force did
not arrive on the island until March 27, more
than 3 weeks later. The delay measurably in-
creased the risk of a major outbreak. By con-
trast, in 1960, 4,000 U.N. troops were on the
groimd in the Congo within 3 days after Se-
curity Council action. Wlien the peace is in the
balance, time is always of the essence. In Cy-
prus time came perOously close to running out.

'Address made before the International Law Asso-
ciation at Montreal, Quebec, Canada, on May 15 (press
release 233).

' For background and text of resolution, see Bulle-
tin of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 405.

Tlie delay was the work of a niunber of
factors. Member states had to be persuaded to
commit troops. Another important factor was
the uncertain arrangement for financing the
Force. The method employed is different from
that in the Congo and UNEF operations. For
both of tliese, the General Assembly levies as-
sessments under article 17 of the charter, which
grants the Assembly plenai-y authority over the
organization's finances. A like approach was
available in the Cyprus situation. The 1963
General Assembly made the customary pro-
vision for emergencies that might arise when it
was not in session. It authorized the Secre-
taiy-General to spend up to $2 million on his
own initiative for "unforeseen and extraordi-
nary expenses . . . relate [d] to the mainte-
nance of peace and security," and another $8
million with the concurrence of the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions.

Tliis authority was not employed. Instead,
the Secretary-General followed the Security
Council's recommendation, contained in the
resolution authorizing the Force, that the costs
of the operation should be met by the govern-
ments supplying troops or by other voluntary
contributions. Thus, he had not only to per-
suade member states to submit their forces to
the hazards of duty in Cyprus but also to go to
them hat in hand for the needed funds. Not
unnaturally, some governments asked to commit
troops were reluctant to do so until fimds were
assured.

In the end, the United States came forward

900

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUUJETIN

with $2 million of the estimated $6 million cost
of a 3 montlis' operation, and Britain, which is
contributing iialf the troops, had contributed $1
million besides. The Secretary-General has
managed to collect most of the remaining $3
million — enough to get the Force off the ground
and on to Cyprus. Today, like its ])redecessors
in the heat of the crisis in the Congo and the
Gaza Strip, it is dealing day by day with an
extremely delicate situation in an eifort to
maintain the peace.

There may be situations where voluntary con-
tribution is the best solution to the problem of
financing all or part of a particular U.X. oper-
ation. But m the Cyprus case, the choice was
not a matter of operational preference over
other methods. It was a reflection of the finan-
cial plight of the United Nations.

Financial Plight of the United Nations

The central fact of that plight is that the
United Nations is burdened with a deficit of
$125 million, mainly representing expenses in-
curred in earlier peacekeeping operations. But
bankruptcy is not the problem, at least not yet.
Most of these obligations run to member states
in the form of accounts payable by the United
Nations. These states thus far have not pressed
their claims to the point of precipitating an
immediate cash crisis.

The problem centers on the U.N. effort to
collect its accounts receivable — primarily the
assessments for peacekeeping in the Congo and
the Middle East that have been levied on mem-
bers in accordance with the regular fiscal pro-
cedures of the United Nations. A number of
members still fail or refuse to pay these assess-
ments, some of them, including the Soviet bloc
and France, on grounds of principle.

The chief formal sanction for enforcing pay-
ment of financial obligations is article 19 of the
United Nations Charter. It provides that a
member more than 2 years in arrears in its con-
tributions to the organization "shall have no
vote in the General Assembly." Eighteen mem-
bers, including the Soviet Union and several
Communist countries, have overpassed the limit.
Unless they make payments against their ar-
rearages to bring them under that ceiling before

the next General Assembly session, the charter
sanction will apply.

Thus far the Soviet Union has maintained
that it will not pay. So a constitutional battle
of major dimensions may ei-upt in the next meet-
ing of tlie Assembly. The shadow of that
coming battle is what "sicklied o'er" the action
of the Security Council on Cyprus. And as
the Cyprus case foreshadows, what is ultimately
at stalce is not the U.N.'s ability to pay its bills
but its ability to do its job.

The World Court's Opinion

A constitutional battle of momentous dimen-
sions means, of coui-se, a matt«r of high policy
and high politics. But in this case, in a way
that seems familiar to us in the United States
because of our constitutional system, it is also
veiy much a matter of law.

It is a matter of law, also, in a much more com-
fortable and conventional sense than is usual in
the international field. For this is not a situa-
tion where international law is nidimentary or
ill adapted to the situation. The legal issues
do not turn on the opinions of publicists or
hypothetical reasoning. The question of U.N.
finances brings into play a developed corpus of
law and legal materials. It was argued to a
court, and pronounced upon by judges. There-
fore, the way this question is finally resolved
will tell us a good deal about the state of the
rule of law in world affairs.

The United Nations went into the Middle
East in 1956 and the Congo in 1960 with near
mianimous consensus among its members on
what was to be done. The obligation to pay for
what was to be done was not initially challenged.
Nevertheless, when the Secretary-General first
pointed out that many members were increas-
ingly in arrears in paying their assessments for
these operations, some questioned their legal lia-
bility to pay. A number of grounds were ad-
vanced: that the operations themselves were
ultra vires or had not been properly authorized
by the organization; that the Assembly was
without power to compel money contributions in
support of such operations or, in any case, had
not intended to do so in its assessment resolu-
tions.

JUNE 8, 1964

732-197—64-

901

There was an obvious way to resolve these is-
sues. The charter provides in article 96 :

The General Assembly or the Security Council may
request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question.

Pursuant to this article, the General Assembly
put to the Court the question whether the ex-
penses authorized in the assessment resolutions
covering the U.N. operations in the Congo and
Middle East were "expenses of the Organiza-
tion" within the meaning of article 17 of the
charter so that, by virtue of article 17, they
"shall be borne by the members as apportioned
by the General Assembly."

Twenty countries made written submissions
in the case — more than in any other World
Court proceeding. They represented many
parts of the globe and all major legal systems.
Nine pleaded orally before the Court. Tlie
United Kingdom and Ireland were represented
by their Attorneys General; Australia by its
Solicitor General; Canada, the Netherlands,
Italy, Norway, and the United States sent the
Legal Advisers of their respective Foreign Of-
fices.^ The U.S.S.E. appeared in the Court, for
oral argument for the first time in history,
represented by the distinguished lawyer, Mr.
Grigory Timkin, former Chairman of the In-
ternational Law Commission and Director of
the Juridical-Treaty Department of the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On July 20, 1962, the Court, by a vote of 9 to
5, gave an affirmative answer to the question pre-
sented.* It held that the expenditures author-
ized in the financing resolutions were indeed
"expenses of the Organization" within the
meaning of article 17, with the consequence that
assessment of those expenses by the General
Assembly was binding on the members.

The opinion of the Court in a case like Cer-
tain Expenses of the United Nations is charac-
terized as "advisory." It cannot be "binding"
in a juridical sense because there are no parties
before the Court upon whom a judgment could
operate. But for all other purposes, I would

' For a statement made before the Court by Mr.
Chayes on May 21, 1962, see ihid., July 2, 1962, p. 30.

* For a Department statement on the Court's opinion,
see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

suppose that the opinion of the Court in an ad-
visory case properly before it is an authoritative
statement of tlie law. In the U.N. Expenses
case all the conditions were met. The case was
before the Court at the request of the General
Assembly under article 96 of the charter. The
issue was a narrowly defined question of legal
liability, fully matured and ripe for adjudica-
tion on concrete facts comprehensively devel-
oped before the tribunal.

But whether or not the opinion by its own
force establishes the law, the General Assembly
has removed any possible question about the
status of the Court's pronoimcement. The
opinion was transmitted to the General Assem-
bly at its I7th session. After consideration and
debate, both in appropriate committee and on
the floor, the Assembly, by a vote of 76 to 17,
with 8 abstentions, declared that it '■'■Accepts
the opinion of the International Court of Jus-
tice on the question submitted to it." "* Thus
this phase of the case came to a close.

History and Application of Article 19

Since the Court's decision, 27 countries which
had previously paid nothing on their Congo
and Middle East peacekeeping assessments,
have made payments of $7 million on these
arrears. Last year 10 — including some Com-
munist states (Cuba and Hmigary, for in-
stance)— went temporarily over the 2-year
limit. In each case, these states made a suffi-
cient payment in advance of the then forth-
coming session of the General Assembly to fore-
stall the application of article 19.

We are hopeful that all U.N. members now
in arrears will make adequate payment before
the next General Assembly session. What if
some do not ? It is our view that sucli a mem-
ber, by the mere fact of being more than 2 years
in arrears and without the need of any decision
of the General Assembly, has lost its right to
vote in the General Assembly.

The language of the charter provision leaves
little room for any other reading. Article 19
says members in arrears to the specified extent
"shall have no vote." The interpretation is
buttressed by the wording of the second sentence

' Ihid.. Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

902

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of article 19, which provides that the General
Assembly "may, nevertheless, pemiit such a
member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure
to pay is due to conditions beyond the control
of t ho member." The contrast between ( he per-
missive "may" of the second sentence and the
mandatory "shall" of the fii-st is clear.

The legislative liistory of article 19 confirms
the position. The records of the San Francisco
conference show that the framers intended the
first sentence of article 19 to apply automati-
cally. The report of the commission which
dealt with article 19 states that "a member
which has fallen two years in arrears on its
financial obligations to the Organization . . .
will not be allowed to vote except by special
decision of the Assembly." The "special de-
cision" must be taken to refer to exculpatory
action under the second sentence of the article,
for there is no other ground for a "special
decision."

Further, the practice of the U.N. persuasively
shows that no affirmative action is needed by the
General Assembly in applying the sanction of
article 19. As I said a moment ago, a number
of states have been more than 2 years in arrears
just prior t« recent sessions of the Assembly.
In every case but one, these coimtries made pay-
ments before — often just before — the opening
of the General Assembly in amounts sufficient —
often barely sufficient — to bring them under the
2-year limit. This is itself a cogent demonstra-
tion of their view of the force of article 19.

The one exception, where payment was not
made until after the session had begun, is even
more explicith' instructive. When last spring's
special session opened, the Secretary-General in-
formed the President of the Assembly that Haiti
was in arrears in an amount exceeding that
specified in article 19. The Assembly Presi-
dent that year was Sir Muhammad Zafrulla
Klian, a distinguished international lawyer who
had served a term as judge of the World Court.
In his reply to the Secretary-General's letter
the following day, he said :

I have received your letter of 14 May 1963, informing
me that, at the opening of the Fourth Special Session
of the General Assembly, Haiti was in arrears in the
payment of its financial contribution to the United
Nations within the terms of Article 19 of the Charter.
I would have made an announcement drawing the at-

tention of the Assembly to tho loss of voting rights in
the Assembly of the Member State just mentioned,
under the first sentence of Article 19, had a formal
count of vote taken place in the presence of a repre-
seutalive of that State at tlic (ii)eninK iilenary meeting.
As no such vote took place, and us the representative
of Haiti was not present, this announcement became
unnecessary.

Ten days later, Haiti paid an amount suffi-
cient to bring her under the ceiling and resumed
participation in the work of the Assembly.
Later, Sir Zafrulla amplified his views of the
required procedure in a television interview.
In response to the question whether he believed
the sanction of article 19 should be applied to
coimtries such as the Soviet Union, which were
likely to be in default in the near future, the
President replied :

The matter has nothing to do with my opinion or
belief. The article is perfectly clear. Article 19 of
the charter says that when that situation arises which
you have mentioned, that a member is in default up
to a certain point, it has no vote in the Assembly. . . .
It is not for me to decide whether it has or it hasn't

Finally, the constitutions of five of the U.N.
specialized agencies — the ILO [International
Labor Organization], tlie Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, UNESCO [United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion], the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency — all contain provisions
virtually identical to article 19. In each of
these agencies it is established by long and un-
broken practice that a member state in arrears
by the required amount, as computed by the
agency's secretariat acting ministerially, auto-
matically loses its vote.

Refuting the Soviet Argument

What then is the Soviet position? The
U.S.S.R. has argued that the General Assembly
must decide by vote to apply the article 19
sanction and that the decision must be taken by
a two-thirds majority. This is said to follow
from paragraph 2 of article 18, which provides
that among the "important questions" requir-
ing a two-thirds majority of the Assembly are
"the suspension of the rights and privileges of
membership" and the "expulsion of Members."
But this passage refers to articles 5 and 6, not to

JUNE 8, 1964

903

article 19. Indeed it tracks the language of
the former articles, specifying the circumstances
under which a member "may be suspended from
the exercise of the rights and privileges of
membership" (article 5) or "may be expelled
from the Organization" (article 6), in each case
"by the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council." In con-
trast, to these articles, with their use of the per-
missive "may" and their express requirement
of Assembly action, the self-executing state-
ment of article 19— that a member in the requi-
site arrears "shall have no vote in the General
Assembly" — leaves no room for the operation
of article 18. There is no decision to be taken,
whether by a vote of two-thirds or by simple
majority.

A second contention is that a General As-
sembly decision is required before the sanction
of ai-ticle 19 can be applied in order to confirm
the existence of the required 2 years' arrear-
ages. The arrearages, however, are calculated
aritlimetically. The process is governed by ac-
counting procedures laid down in the organi-
zation's Financial Kegulations and Rules,
already unanimously approved by the As-
sembly. Their execution is no more than a
ministerial act to be performed by the Secre-
tariat. And so it has uniformly been regarded
in the practice not only of the U.N. itself but
of the specialized agencies as well. The Gen-
eral Assembly cannot by its vote alter the rules
of addition and subtraction. And it does not
take a two-thirds majority of the nations of the
world to check the Secretary-General's
arithmetic.

Of course, if a member believes that a mis-
take has been made on the U.N.'s books, it may
seek an Assembly decision on the matter. A
member may assert, for example, that it is en-
titled to a setoff of its unpaid claims against the
organization for goods or services, and the xis-
sembly might have to decide this question.
Wliat the General Assembly may not lawfully
decide is whether a member 2 years in arrears
shall, absent conditions beyond its control, have
a vote in the Assembly. That question was de-
cided by the charter.

The U.S.S.R. also argues that arrears on as-
ses.sments for the peacekeeping operations in
the Congo and the Middle East should not be

included in calculating article 19 arrears.
These operations, it says, were illegally author-
ized ; peace and security, including the financial
aspects, are the sole province of the Security
Cotmcil. The Congo and UNEF operations,
involving General Assembly action, were thus
ultra vires, and the Assembly was without
power to make assessments binding on the
members to defray those costs.

The argument has a number of lacimae.

First, the Congo force, accounting for much
the greater part of tlie outstanding arrearages,
was initiated by Security Council resolution.
And the Soviet Union, which now complains
that the operation was a camouflage for a co-
lonialist adventure, was recorded as voting in
favor not only on the first Security Council
resolution of July 14, 1960, but, except for one
abstention, on each of the subsequent Covmcil
actions dealing with the operation from 1960
to date. «

Second, the Soviet argument overlooks ex-
press charter language. Article 11 authorizes
the Assembly to "discuss any questions relating
to the maintenance of international peace and
security brought before it by any Member . . .
and . . . make reconunendations with regard
to any such questions. . . ." And article 17 has
been held more than once by tlie International
Court to vest plenary authority in the Assembly
to assess members for the payment of
any and all expenses lawfully incurred by
the organization.

Third, and perhaps most important in an
assemblage of lawyers, this very contention was
made to the International Court of Justice in
the U.N. Expenses case and was explicitly re-
jected by it. After fully considering the con-
tention, ably and forcefully argued to the Court
by Mr. Tmildn, the Court held that article 11,
paragraph 2, "in its first sentence empowers the
General Assembly, by means of recommenda-
tions to States or to the Security Council, or to
both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at
the request, or with the consent, of the States
concerned." As I said a moment ago, this de-
cision was overwhelmingly accepted by the
General Assembly.

States may, of course, continue to persist in
their refusal to pay. But they cannot ask us to
accept that their refusal is based on legal

904

DEPAUTIVrENT OF STATE BULLETIN

grounds. When they argue for a result dill'er-
ent from that pronounced by the Court, they
assert the right to be judges in their own cjvse.

Confirming tlie Fiscal Authority of tlie U.N.

In essence, of course, the Soviet position is
not a legal one at all. The real basis on which
they hope to defeat our arguments can be seen
in the statement of a Soviet spokesman at the
U.N. : ". . . if there is any attempt to act along
these lines," he said, "we may be obliged to re-
consider our attitude towards United Nations
activities." The sentence sounds a wistful echo
of the childhood insistence that "imless I can
make the rules, I won't play." And it takes no
very perceptive newspaper reader to hear in it
other echoes — of the Soviet boycott of the Se-
curity Council in 1950 or the troika proposal of
2 or 3 years ago.

Seen in this perspective, the Russian refusal
to honor its financial obligations can be recog-
nized for what it is : not an East-West issue or
another cold-war alarum between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. It is one in the series
of repeated Soviet challenges to the United Na-
tions as an eflfective, functioning, operating
institution.

Indeed, if we look at the line of constitutional
growth in United Nations peacekeeping over
the last decade, we can see just how close this
Soviet thrust comes to a vital nerve. As we all
know, with the semiparalysis of the Security
Council, the center of peacekeeping activities
has become the General Assembly. The Assem-
bly, of course, can establish subsidiary organs,
like peacekeeping forces ; and it can give direc-
tives to the Secretary-General. But the only
binding requirement it can make on member
states is to pay assessments ; and the only sanc-
tion for that requirement is the application of
article 19.

Thus, if the Soviets by argument, cajolery, or
truculence can secure that the sanction is not
applied, they will have shattered the very foun-
dation for modem United Nations peacekeep-
ing, the financial authority of the General
Assembly.

In essence the Soviet position is designed to
vitiate the power of the General Assembly, as
its use of the veto vitiates the power of the

Security Council and as the troika proposal
would have vitiated the power of the Secretary-
General. Tlie target is the Assembly's capacity
to act, and the impact would be primarily on
those newer and smaller states whose voice in
world affairs is heard mainly through the
Assembly.

As in the case of those earlier challenges, a
certain amount of fainthearted counsel is to be
heard today. There are those who say we must
save the organization by abandoning the
charter.

It may be, of course, that, in the experience of
the past decade with large-scale U.N. peacekeep-
ing operations, we can find some pointers for
fairer or more effective exercise of the Assem-
bly's financial power in the future. The United
States has developed some proposals to this end.
As President Jolinson said in his New Year's
letter to Chairman Khrushchev,^ we are pre-
pared to discuss them with the U.S.S.R. as weU
as other interested governments in New York.
But such plans must be firmly gromided on the
Assembly's charter power to make binding as-
sessments and the members' charter obligation
to pay those assessments as made. As the Cy-
prus experience suggests, any other course holds
grave dangers for the U.N.'s capacity to keep
the peace.

I do not believe the nations of the world will
be so easily frightened into undermining what
has served them so well. The African states, for
example, will not readily be persuaded that the
U.N., in helping to establish a unified Congo
while keeping the cold war out of their con-
tinent, was really embarked on a colonialist
adventure. The coimtries that watched the
world tremble on the brink at Suez will not soon
be convinced that their safety lies in depriving
the United Nations of the capacity for effective
action in that kind of situation.

As debate and discussion proceed, the question
of article 19 will increasingly be perceived as
fundamentally a question going to the U.N.'s
capacity to act to preserve the peace. It will be
seen also as implicating the basic commitment
to the rule of law in world affairs.

Wlien these things are understood, I believe
that, as in the past, the nations will rally to the

• For text, see t6»d., Feb. 3, 1964, p. 157.

JTTXE 8, 1964

905

support of their charter. And when that pros-
pect becomes clear, the response of the Soviet
Union will not be, I predict, to take a walk.
Also running true to their past performance,
the Soviets will find some way to live with and
by the decision of the organization.

In thus confirming the fiscal authority of the
United Nations we will have taken another step
in fashioning from the words of the charter a
living organism to serve our world.

King of Burundi Calls
on President Johnson

The Wliite House announced on May 17 that
His Majesty Mwambutsa IV, King of Bunmdi,
would call on President Johnson on May 19.
Following his visit with the President, the King
met with Secretary of State Eusk and was the
guest of honor at a luncheon given by Under
Secretary of State Ball at the Department of
State.

The Burundi Cliief of State is in the United
States on a private visit to the New York
World's Fair.

emment agencies have continually urged
Germany and other foreign governments to
eliminate quantitative restrictions hindering
U.S. exports.

Japan Liberalizes imports
of U.S. Lemons

Press release 225 dated May 13

The Government of Japan has announced the
liberalization of imports of lemons from the
United States. This action was taken in con-
formity with Japan's obligations mider the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).

American citrus producers, who are Japan's
principal foreign suppliers, shipped approxi-
mately $11/^ million worth of fresh lemons to
Japan last year. It is expected that U.S. lemon
exports will expand significantly, now that
quantitative restrictions have been removed.

Japan first placed quantitative restrictions on
lemon imports in 1957. The Japanese action re-
moving these restrictions came after extended
discussion of the subject between the two
Governments.

Germany Completes Liberalization
of U.S. Industrial Exports

Press release 247 dated May 20

The Department of State has been informed
that the Federal Eepublic of Germany will
eliminate quantitative import restrictions on
neat, or bovine, leather at the end of May of this
year, effective June 1. This action was taken in
confonnity with Germany's obligations imder
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).

Neat leather was the last U.S. industrial item
subject to quantitative import restriction in
Germany. Germany has thus completed the
process of eliminating the wide range of restric-
tions on U.S. industrial products employed
during the postwar period.

The State Department and other U.S. Gov-

U.S.-Canada Defense Committee
To Meet at Washington

Press release 252 dated May 22

The Department of State announced on May
22 that the Canada-United States Ministerial
Committee on Joint Defense will meet at "Wash-
ington on June 25. The U.S. delegation at the
meeting will consist of Secretary of State Dean
Eusk, Secretary of Defense Eobert S. McNa-
mara, and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas
Dillon.

The Canadian delegation will consist of Sec-
retary of State for External Affairs Paul Mar-
tin, Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer,
Minister of Finance Walter Cordon, Minister
of Defence Production C. M. Drury, and Asso-

906

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

cinto Minister of National Defence Lucian
Cardin.

Prime Minister Pearson and President Ken-
nedy agreed at Hyannis Port last year' to
arrange more frequent consultations between
their two Governments on mattei-s of mutual
interest. Pursuant to this goal, the Prime Min-
ister and President Johnson decided during
their talks in January ll>C>i ' that the Minis-
terial Committee on Joint Defense should meet
during the fii-st half of 1964. Tlie United
States invited the Committee to convene at

Washington on June 25, and Canada has
accepted.

The Committee was set up in 1958 ' to con-
sult periodically on mattei-s aflecting tlie joint
defense of Canada and tlie United States and to
discuss any problems that may arise in order
to strengthen further the close and intimate co-
operation between the two Governments on joint
defense matters.

' Hulletin of May 27, 1903, p. 815.
' Ibid.. Feb. 10. 1964, p. 199.
'Ibid., Aug. 4, 1958, p. 208.

U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To Help Prevent Border Incidents
Between Cambodia and Viet-Nam

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

V.S. Representative in the Security Council ^

The facts about the incidents at issue are rela-
tively simple and clear.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam already has confirmed that, in the heat of
battle, forces of the Eepublic of Viet-Nam did,
in fact, mistakenly cross an ill-marked frontier
between their country and Cambodia in pursuit
of armed ten-orists on May 7 and May 8, and on
earlier occasions. That has been repeated and
acknowledged here again today by the repre-
sentative of Viet-Nam.

The Government of Viet-Nam has expressed

'Made in the Security Council on May 21 (press
release 249).

its regrets that these incidents occurred with
some tragic consequences. It has endeavored to
initiate bilateral discussions with the Cambo-
dian Government to remove the causes of these
incidents.

But these incidents can only be assessed intel-
ligently in the light of the surrounding facts:
namely, the armed conspiracy which seeks to de-
stroy not only the Government of Viet-Nam but
the vei-y society of Viet-Nam itself.

Mr. President, it is the people of the Republic
of Viet-Nam who are the major victims of armed
aggression. It is they who are fighting for
their independence against violence directed
f roui outside their bordere. It is they who suf-

JTJXE 8, 1964

907

fer day and night from the terror of the so-
called Viet Cong. The prime targets of the
Viet Cong for kidnaping, for torture, and for
murder have been local officials, schoolteachers,
medical workers, priests, agricultural special-
ists, and any others whose position, profession,
or other talents qualified them for service to the
people of Viet-Nam— plus, of course, the rela-
tives and children of citizens loyal to their
Government.

The chosen military objectives of the Viet
Cong — for gunfire or arson or pillage— have
been hospitals, schoolhouses, agricultural sta-
tions, and various improvement projects by
which the Government of Viet-Nam for many
years has been raising the living standards of
the people. The Government and people of
Viet-Nam have been struggling for survival,
struggling for years for survival in a war which
has been as wicked, as wanton, and as dirty as
any waged against an innocent and peaceful
people in the whole cruel history of warfare.
So there is something ironic in the fact that the
victims of this incessant terror are the accused
before this Council and are defending them-
selves in daylight while terrorists perform their
dark and dirty work by night throughout their
land.

Why the U.S. Is Involved in Viet-Nam

Mr. President, I camiot ignore the fact that
at the meeting of this Council 2 days ago, Am-
bassador [N. T.] Fedorenko, the distinguished
representative of the Soviet Union, digressed at
great length from the subject before the Council
to accuse the United States Government of or-
ganizing direct military action against the
people of the Indochinese peninsula.

For years — too many years — we have heard
these bold and unsupported accusations. I had
hoped that these fairy tales would be heard no
more. But since the subject has been broached
in so fanciful a way, let me set him straight on
my Government's policy with respect to South-
east Asia.

First, the United States has no, repeat no,
national military objective anywhere in South-
east Asia. United States policy for Southeast
Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of
peace so that the peoples of that area can go

about their own independent business in what-
ever associations they may freely choose for
themselves without interference from the
outside.

I trust my words have been clear enough on
this point.

Second, the United States Government
is currently mvolved in the affairs of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam for one reason and one
reason only : because the Republic of Viet-Nam
requested the help of the United States and of
other govermnents to defend itself against
armed attack fomented, equipped, and directed
from the outside.

This is not the first time that the United
States Government has come to the aid of
peoples prepared to fight for their freedom and
independence against armed aggression spon-
sored from outside their borders. Nor will it
be the last time unless the lesson is learned once
and for all by all aggressors that armed aggres-
sion does not pay — that it no longer works —
that it will not be tolerated.

The record of the past two decades makes it
clear that a nation with the will for self-preser-
vation can outlast and defeat overt or clandes-
tine aggression — even when that internal ag-
gression is heavily supported from the outside,
and even after significant early successes by the
aggressors. I would remind the members that
in 1947, after the aggressors had gained control
of most of the country, many people felt that
the cause of the Government of Greece was
hopelessly lost. But as long as the people of
Greece were prepared to fight for the life of
their own comitry, the United States was not
prepared to stand by while Greece was overrun.

This principle does not change with the geo-
graphical setting. Aggression is aggression;
organized violence is organized violence. Only
the scale and the scenery change; the point is
the same in Viet-Nam today as it was in Greece
in 1947 and in Korea in 1950. The Indochinese
Commim^ist Party, the parent of the present
Communist Party in North Viet-Nam, made it
abundantly clear as early as 1951 that the aim
of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to
take control of all of Indochina. This goal has
not changed — it is still clearly the objective of
the Vietnamese Communist leadership in
Hanoi.

908

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BITLLETIN

Hanoi seeks to accomplish this purpose in
South Viet-Nani throu^li subversive {juerrilla
warfare directed, controlled, and supplied by
North Viet-Nam. The Coninuinist leadership
in Hanoi has sought to pretend that the insur-
gency in South Viet-Nam is a civil war, but
Hanoi's hand shows very clearlj'. Public state-
ments by the Communist Party in North Viet-
Nam and its leaders have repeatedly demon-
strated Hanoi's direction of the struggle in
South Viet-Nam. For example, Le Duan, First
Secretary of the Party, stated on September 5,
1960, "At present our Party is facing [a] mo-
mentous task: ... to strive to complete . . .
revolution throughout the country. . . ." He
also said this: "The North is the common revo-
lutionary base of the whole country." Three
months after the Communist Party Congress in
Hanoi in September 19G0, the so-called "Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of South Viet-
Nam" was set up pursuant to plans outlined
publicly at that Congress.

The International Control Commission in
Viet-Nam, established by the Geneva accords of
1954,= stated in a special report which it issued
in June 1962 ^ that there is sufficient evidence to
show that North Viet-Nam has violated various
articles of the Geneva accords by its introduc-
tion of armed personnel, arms, munitions, and
other supplies from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam with the object of supporting, orga-
nizing, and carrying out hostile activities
against the Government and armed forces of
South Viet-Nam.

Infiltration of military personnel and sup-
plies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam
has been carried out steadily over the past sev-
eral years. The total number of military
cadres sent into South Viet-Nam via infiltra-
tion routes runs into the thousands. Such in-
filtration is well documented on the basis of
numerous defectors and prisoners taken by the
armed forces of South Viet-Nam.

Introduction of Communist weapons into
South Viet-Nam has also grown steadily. An

" For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-19r)5:
Basic Documents, vol. I, (Department of State publica-
tion 6446), p. 750.

'Reprints of the ICC report of June 2, 1962. are
available upon request from the Office of Media Serv-
ices, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

increasing amount of weapons and ammunition
captured from the Viet Cong has been proven to
be of Chinese Communist manufacture or ori-
gin. For example, in December 1903 a large
cache of Viet Cong equipment captured in one
of the Mekong Delta provinces in South Viet-
Nam included rccoilless rifles, rocket launchers,
carbines, and ammunition of Chinese Commu-
nist manufacture.

The United States cannot stand by while
Southeast Asia is oveiTun by armed aggressors.
As long as the peoples of that area are deter-
mined to preserve their own independence and
ask for our help in preserving it, we will extend
it. This, of course, is the meaning of President
Johnson's request a few days ago for additional
funds for more economic as well as military
assistance for Viet-Nam.*

And if anyone has the illusion that my Gov-
ernment will abandon the people of Viet-Nam —
or that we shall weary of the burden of support
that we are rendering thase people — it can only
be due to ignorance of the strength and the con-
viction of the American people.

Communist Violations of Political Settlement

We all know that Southeast Asia has been the
victim of almost incessant violence for more
than a decade and a half. Yet despite this fact,
it has been suggested that we should give up
helping the people of Viet-Nam to defend them-
selves and seek only a political solution. But
a political solution is just what we have already
had, and it is in defense — in support — of that
political solution that Viet-Nam is fighting to-
day. The United States has never been against
political solutions. Indeed, we have faithfully
supported the political solutions that were
agreed upon at Geneva in 1954 and again in
1962.° The threat to peace in the area stems
from the fact that others have not done likewise.

The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 were —
quite precisely — political agreements to stop the
fighting, to restore the peace, to secure the in-
dependence of Viet-Nam and Laos and Cam-
bodia, to guarantee the integrity of their fron-

* For text of the President's message to Congress,
see p. 891.

° For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos
and an accompanying protocol signed at Geneva on
July 23, 1962, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

JUNE 8, 1964

909

tiers, and to permit these much-abused peoples
to go about their own business in their own ways.
The United States, though not a signatory to
the 1954 accords, has sought to honor these
agreements in the hope that they would permit
these people to liv-e in peace and independence
from outside interference from any quarter and
for all time.

To this day there is only one major trouble
with the political agreements reached at Geneva
with respect to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos
in 1954 and again with respect to Laos in 1962.
It is this : The ink was hardly dry on the Geneva
accords in 1954 before North Viet-Nam began
to violate them systematically with comradely
assistance from the regime in Peiping. Nearly
a million people living in North Viet-Nam in
1954 exercised the right given to them under
the Geneva agreement to move south to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam. Even while this was going
on, units of the Viet Minh were hiding their
arms and settling down within the frontiers of
the Republic to form the nucleus of today's so-
called Viet Cong — to await the signal from out-
side their borders to rise and strike. In the
meantime they have been trained and supplied
in considerable measure from North Viet-
Nam — in violation of the Geneva agreement,
the political settlement. They have been rein-
forced by guerrilla forces moved into the Re-
public of Viet-Nam through Laos — in violation
of the Geneva agreement, the political settle-
ment.

This is the reason — and the only reason — why
there is fighting in Viet-Nam today. There is
fighting in Viet-Nam today only because the
political settlement for Viet-Nam reached at
Geneva in 1954 has been deliberately and fla-
grantly and systematically violated.

As I say, Mr. President, tliis is the reason why
my Government — and to a lesser extent other
governments — have come to the aid of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam as it fights
for its life against armed aggression directed
from outside its frontiers in contemptuous viola-
tion of binding agreements. If the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting
today, it is fighting to defend the Geneva agree-
ment which has proven undefendable by any
other means. If arms are being used in Viet-

Nam today, it is only because a political solution
has been violated cynically for years.

The Situation in Laos

The same disregard for the political settle-
ment reached at Geneva has been demon-
strated— by the same parties — in Laos. Viola-
tion has been followed by a period of quiet —
and then another violation. Limited aggres-
sion has been followed by a period of calm — and
then another limited aggression. Throughout
the period since July 1962, when the Laotian
settlement was concluded, the Prime Rlinister
of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has with
great patience and fortitude sought to main-
tain the neutrality and independence of his
country. He has made every effort to bring
about Pathet Lao cooperation in the Govern-
ment of National Union.

Now, in the past few days, we have seen a
massive, deliberate, armed attack against the
forces of the coalition government of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma. The attack was
mounted by a member of that coalition govern-
ment, with the military assistance of one of the
signatories of tlae Geneva accords. These vio-
lations are obviously aimed at increasing the
amount of Lao territory under Communist con-
trol.

The military offensive of recent days must be
seen as an outright attempt to destroy by vio-
lence what the whole structure of the Geneva ac-
cords was intended to preserve. Hanoi has per-
sistently refused to withdraw the Vietnamese
Communist forces from Laos despite repeated
demands by the Lao Prime IVIinister. Hanoi
has also consistently continued the use of Laos
as a corridor for infiltration of men and sup-
plies from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-
Nam.

It is quite clear that the Communists regard
the Geneva accords of 1962 as an instriunent
which in no way restrains the Communists from
pursuing their objective of taking over Laos as
well as South Viet-Nam.

The recent attempt to overthrow the consti-
tutional government headed by Prime Minister
Souvanna Phoimaa was in large part attribut-
able to the failure of the machinery set up with
the Geneva accords to function in resiwnso to

910

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

urgent requests by the Government of Laos.
This niiichinery has been ju'i-sistcntly sabotaged
by the Conununist member of the International
Control Commission, wliohas succeeded bj' mis-
use of tlio so-called veto power in paralyzing the
machinery designed to protect the peace in that
area and tJierebj' undermining support of the
Souvanna govenmient. Today, however, that
government which was created under the Ge-
neva agreements remains in full exercise of its
authority tis the legitimate government of a neu-
tral Laos.

The other Geneva signatories must live up to
their solemn commitments and support Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma in his efforts to
preserve the independence and neutrality which
the world thought had been won at Geneva.
These solemn obligations must not be betrayed.

"Let All Foreign Troops Withdraw"

Mr. President, my Government takes a very
grave view of these events. Those who are re-
sponsible have set foot upon an exceedingly
dangerous path.

As we look at world affairs in recent years, we
have reason to hope that this lesson has at last
been learned by all but those fanatics who cling
to the doctrine that they can further their am-
bitions by armed force.

Chairman Khrushchev said it well and clearly
in his New Year's Day message to other heads
of government around the world.* In that letter
he asked for "recognition of the fact that terri-
tories of states must not, even temporarily, be
the target of any kind of invasion, attack,
military occupation or other coercive measures,
directly or indirectly undertaken by other states
for any political, economic, strategic, boxmdary,
or other considerations, whatsoever."

There is not a member of this Council or a
member of this organization which does not
share a common interest in a final and total
renunciation — except in self-defense — of the use
of force as a means of pursuing national aims.
The doctrine of militant violence has been ren-
dered null and void by the technology of modern
weapons and the \Tilnerability of a world in
which the peace cannot be ruptured anywhere
without endangering the peace everywhere.

• For text, see ibid., Feb. 3, 1964, p. 158.

Finally, Mr. President, with respect to South-
east Asia in general, let me say this. There is a
very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia.
There is a very simple, safe way to bring about
the end of United States military aid to the
Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from T^aos.
Let all states in that area make and abide by the
simple decision to leave their neighbors alone.
Stop the secret subversion of other people's
independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal
transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of
revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop
the violations of the political agreements
reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast
Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

Wlien their neighbors decide to leave them
alone — as they must — ^there will be no fighting
in Southeast Asia and no need for American
advisers to leave their homes to help these people
resist aggression. Any time that decision can
be put in enforcible terms, my Government will
be only too happy to put down the burden that
we have been sharing with those determined to
preserve their independence. Until such assur-
ances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the
independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia
as we have elsewhere.

The Cambodia-Viet-Nam Frontier

Now, Mr. President, if we can return to the
more limited issue before this Council today:
the security of the frontier between Cambodia
and the Republic of Viet-Nam. My Govern-
ment is in complete sympathy with the concern
of the Government of Cambodia for the sanctity
of its borders and the security of its people. In-
deed, we have been guided for nearly a decade,
in this respect, by the words of the final declara-
tion of the Geneva conference of July 21, 1954 :

In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference under-
takes to respect the sovereignty, the indej>en{lence, the
unity and the territorial integrity of the abovemen-
tioned states, and to refrain from any interference In
their internal affairs.

With respect to the allegations now made

JXTKE 8, 1964

911

against my country/ 1 shall do no more than re-
itei-ate what Ambassador [Charles W.] Yost,
the United State delegate, said to this Council
on Tuesday morning : * The United States has
expressed regret officially for the tragic results
of the border incidents in wliich an American
adviser was present; our careful investigations
so far have failed to produce evidence that any
Americans were present in the inadvertent
crossing of the Cambodian frontier on May 7
and May 8 ; and there is, of course, no question
whatever of either aggression or aggressive in-
tent against Cambodia on the part of my
country.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that my
Government has the greatest regard for Cam-
bodia and its people and its Chief of State,
Prince Sihanouk, whom I have the privilege of
knowing. We believe he has done a great deal
for his people and for the independence of his
country. We have demonstrated our regard
for his effort on behalf of his people in very
practical ways over the past decade. We have
no doubt that he wants to assure conditions in
which his people can live in peace and security.
IMy Government associates itself explicitly with
this aim. If tlie people of Cambodia wish to
live in peace and security and independence —
and free from external alinement if they so
choose — then we want for them precisely what
they want for themselves. We have no quarrel
whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go
its own way.

The difficulty, Mr. President, has been that
Cambodia has not been in a position to carry
out, with its own unaided strength, its own de-
sire to live in peace and tranquillity. Others in
the area have not been prepared to leave the
people of Cambodia free to pursue their own
ends independently and peacefully. The re-
cent difficulties along the frontier which we
have been discussing here in tlie Council are
only superficially and accidentally related to the
Republic of Viet-Nam. They are deeply and
directly related to the fact that the leaders and
armed forces of North Viet-Nam, supported by

' For text of the Cambodian complaint, see U.N. doc.
S/5697 dated May 13.

'For text, see U.S.AJ.N. press release 4391 dated
May 19.

Communist China, have abused the right of
Cambodia to live m peace by using Cambodian
territory as a passageway, a source of supply,
and a sanctuary from counterattack by the
forces of South Viet-Nam, which is trying to
maintain its right to live in peace and go its
own way, too. Obviously Cambodia cannot be
secure, her territorial integrity cannot be as-
sured, her independence cannot be certain, as
long as outsiders direct massive violence within
the frontiers of her neighboring states. This
is the real reason for troubles on the Cambodian
border ; this is the real reason we are here today.

Now it is suggested that the way to restore
security on the Cambodian- Vietnamese border
is to reconvene the Geneva conference which 10
years ago reached the solemn agreement which
I just read to you.

Mr. President, we can surely do better than
that. There is no need for another such con-
ference. A Geneva conference on Cambodia
could not be expected to produce an agreement
any more effective than the agreements we al-
ready have. This Council is seized with a
specific issue. The Cambodians have brought a
specific complaint to this table. Let us deal
with it. There is no need to look elsewhere.

We can make, here and now, a constructive
decision to help meet the problem that has been
laid before us by the Government of Cam-
bodia— to help keep order on her frontier with
Viet-Nam and thus to help eliminate at least
one of the sources of tension and violence which
afflict the area as a whole.

Let me say, Mr. President, that my Govern-
ment endorses the statement made by the dis-
tinguished representative of Cambodia [Voeun-
sai Sonn] to the Council on Tuesday when lie
pointed out that states which are not members
of the United Nations are not thereby relieved
of responsibility for conducting their affairs in
line with the principles of the charter of this
organization. We could not agree more fully.
Yet the regimes of Peiping and Hanoi, which
are not members of this organization, are em-
ploying or supporting the use of force against
their neighbors. This is why the borders of
Cambodia have seen violence. And this is why
we are here today. And that is why the United
Nations has a duty to do what it can do to main-

912

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tain order along the frontier between Cambodia
and Viet -Nam — to help uphold the principles of
the charter in Southeast Asia.

As for the exact action which this Council
might t4ike, Mr. President, my Government is
prepared to consider several possibilities. We
are prepared to discuss any practical and con-
structive steps to meet the problem before us.

One cannot blame the Vietnamese for con-
chiding that the International Control Com-
mission cannot do an effective job of maintain-
ing frontier security. The "troika" principle
of the International Control Commission, which
is to say the requirement under article 42 of the
Geneva agreement on Viet-Nam that decisions
dealing with questions concerning violations
which might lead to resumption of hostilities
can be taken only by unanimous agreement, has
contributed to the frustration of the ICC.

The fact that the situation in South Viet-Nam
has reached the crisis stage is itself dramatic
testimony of the frustration to which the Inter-
national Control Commission has been reduced.
With the exception of the special report on June
2, 1962, to which I referred, condemning Com-
munist violations of the Geneva accords, the
Commission has taken no action with respect to
the Communist campaign of aggression and
guerrilla warfare against South Viet-Nam.

The representative of Cambodia has sug-
gested that a commission of inquiry investigate
whether the Viet Cong has used Cambodian
territory. We have no fundamental objection
to a committee of inquiry. But we do not be-
lieve it addresses itself to the basic problem that
exists along the Viet-Nam-Cambodian border.
More is needed in order to assure that problems
do not continue to arise.

Several practical steps for restoring stability
to the frontier have been suggested, and I shall
make brief and preliminary general remarks
about them. I should like to reiterate what
Ambassador Yost said, that we have never re-
jected any proposal for inspection of Cam-
bodian territory.

One suggestion is that the Council request the
two parties directly concerned to establish a
substantial military force on a bilateral basis to
observe and patrol the frontier and to report
to the Secretary-General.

Another suggestion is that such a bilateral

force be augmented by the addition of United
Nations observers and possibly be placed under
United Nations command to provide an impar-
tial third-party element representing the world
community. We also could see much merit in
this idea.

A third suggestion is to make it an all-United
Nations force. This might also bo effective.
It would involve somewhat larger U.N. expendi-
tures than the other alternatives. But if this
method should prove desirable to the members
of the Comicil, the United States will be pre-
pared to contribute.

We would suggest, Mr. President, that
whether one of these or some other practical
solution is agreed, it would be useful to ask the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to of-
fer assistance to Cambodia and the Republic of
Viet-Nam in clearly marking the frontiers be-
tween the two countries. One of the difficulties
is that there are places where one does not know
whether he stands on one side of the frontier or
the other. Certainly it would help reduce the
possibility of further incidents if tliis imcer-
tainty were to be removed.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me repeat
that I am prepared to discuss the policy and the
performance of my Government throughout
Southeast Asia. But the issue before us is the
security of the Cambodia- Viet-Nam border. I
have expressed my Government's views on that
subject. I hope other members of the Coimcil
also will express their views on that subject and
that the Council, which is the primary world
agency for peace and security, can quickly take
effective steps to remedy a situation wliich could
threaten peace and security.

U.S., Japan, and 10 European
Nations End Shipping Talks

Joint Announcement

Press release 239 dated May 15

Government officials representing ten Euro-
pean nations, Japan and the United States
today [Alay 15] concluded discussions at the
Department of State which began yesterday on
some aspects of the dual-rate shipping con-
tracts approved by the Federal Maritime Com-

JUNE 8, 1964

913

mission and made public on March 30, 1964.
The European nations represented in the dis-
cussions were Belgium, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.

The participants had a fruitful exchange of
views with respect to the jurisdictional aspects
of the contracts.

Mr. Jolm E. Chadwick, Commercial Minister
of the British Embassy in Washington, was
spokesman for the officials representing the

European nations and Japan at the meeting.
Mr. Richard Hankey of the Treasury Solici-
tor's Department, London, took part as legal
adviser.

Rear Admiral John Harllee (ret.). Chair-
man of the Federal Maritime Commission,
headed the United States representation, which
included Mr. Timothy May, Managing Direc-
tor of the Federal Maritime Commission. Mr.
Charles P. Nolan, Director of the Office of Tele-
communications and Maritime Aifairs, Depart-
ment of State, was chairman of the meeting.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and India Conclude
Cotton Textile Agreement

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and
India announced on May 8 (press release 218)
the conclusion of a bilateral agreement concern-
ing certain trade in cotton textiles between the
two countries for the 214 -year period from
April 1, 1964, to September 30, 1966. The
agreement was negotiated under article 4 of the
Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Interna-
tional Trade in Cotton Textiles, done at Geneva
on February 9, 1962,^ and was effected by an
exchange of diplomatic notes.

Tlie agreement, which is designed to promote
the orderly development and growth of cotton
textile exports from India to the United States,
is the culmination of bilateral talks held in
Washington in February between representa-
tives of the Government of India and a U.S.
delegation consisting of representatives of the
Departments of Commerce, Labor, and State.
During the talks, representatives of the two
Governments discussed the fact that India has

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

been concentrating and probably will continue
to concentrate its cotton textile exports to the
United States in five categories of fabrics and
one category of made-up goods.

The principal features of the agreement are
as follows :

1. It provides specific export ceilings for cate-
gory 9 — carded sheeting; categories 18/19 — ■
printcloth shirting; category 22 — carded twills
and sateens ; category 26 — fabrics not elsewhere
specified; and category 31 — other towels.

2. India's cotton textile exports to the United
States in the five principal fabric categories (9,
18/19, 22, and 26) are limited during the first 6
months to an aggregate level of 18.5 million
square yards increased by I14 percent. Tlie
annual aggregate level for these categories,
which is 37 million square yards, will be in-
creased by a growth factor of 2^/^ percent for
the next 12-month period and on a cumulative
basis by a growth factor of 5 percent for the
final 12-month period.

3. Each of the specific category ceilings is
also subject to the same increases that apply to
the aggregate ceilings.

4. The following table indicates the specific
and aggregate ceilings with the percentage in-
creases included :

914

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN

Ctttetory Vacrtplion

9 Sheeting, carded

18/19 Printcloth shirting

22 Twill and sateen, carded

26 Duck only

26 Fabrics, n.c.s., other than duck

Aggregate for categories 9, 18/19, 22, 26

31 Other towels

lal e moj. ^|l-

Islfutlvr.lO/HfH-

ti lull VT. 11)11 IBS-

Unit

9130/Oi

aisoiGS

aimino

Syds.

6, 075, 000

12, 300, 000

12, 915, 000

Syds.

3, 037, 500

6, 150, 000

6, 457, 500

Syds.

2, 278, 125

4, 612, 500

4, 843, 125

Svds.

1, 11.3,750

2, 255, 000

2, 367, 750

Syds.

8, 600, 250

17, 42.5, 000

18, 206, 250

Svds.

18, 731, 250

37, 92.5, 000

39, 821, 250

No.

1, 341, 562

2, 716, 250

2, 852, 062

5. The U.S. Government agreed not to request
restraint under article 3 of the Long-Term Ar-
rangement in respect of the above categories
which are subject to specific limits during the
term of the bilateral agreement.

6. The two Governments agreed to exchange
such statistical data as are required for the
eifective implementation of the agreement and
to consult on any questions arising in the im-
plementation of the agi'cement.

7. The Indian Government agreed to use its
best efforts to space evenly annual exports with-
in tlie categories covered by the agreement.

8. In a separate not«, the U.S. Government in-
formed the Indian Government that it was con-
cerned about the growth of exports of certain
types of cotton bedspreads (category 36) from
India to the United States late in 1963 and ad-
vised the Indian Government that if the rate
of growth continued to increase, it might be
required to request consultations under article
3 of the Long-Term Arrangement on cotton
bedspreads.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES EFFECTING THE
AGREEMENT

U.S. Note to Ambassador of India

April 15, 1964
ExcELiExcT : I have the honor to refer to recent
discussions in Washington between representatives of
the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of India concenung exports of cotton
textiles from India to the United States and to the
conclusions reached by the Cotton Textiles Committee
of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
at its meeting in December of 1963.

.\s a result of these discussions and in furtherance
of the conclusions of the GATT Cotton Textiles Com-
mittee, I have the honor to propose the following
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textile fabrics
and made-up goods between India and the United
States.

1. The Government of India shall limit exports in
Categories 9, 18, 19, 22 and 26 for the twelve-month
period beginning October 1, 19G4 to an aggregate limit
of 37 million square yards. Within this aggregate

limit the following speciflc ceilings shall apply :

MiUion

Category Square Yardt

9 12.0

18/19 6.0

22 4.6

26 (duck only) 2.2

26 (other than duck) 17.0

2. The Government of India shall limit exports in
Category 31 for the twelve-month period beginning
October 1, 1964 to 2.05 million pieces.

3. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any
available statistical data requested by the other Gov-
ernment. In particular, the Government of India shall
supply the most current export data to the Government
of the United States, and the Government of the United
States shall supply the most current import data to
the Government of India.

4. For the duration of this Agreement the Govern-
ment of the United States shall not exercise its rights
under Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regard-
ing International Trade in Cotton Textiles to request
restraints on the export of cotton textiles in Categories
9, 18, 19, 22, 26 and 31 from India to the United States.
All other relevant provisions of the Long-Term Ar-
rangement shall remain in effect between the two
Governments.

5. The levels specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 for the
twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1964 may be
increased by 2.5 percent.

6. The limitations on exports established in para-
graphs 1 and 2, as modified by paragraph 5, shall be
increased by 5 percent for the twelve-month period
beginning October 1, 1965.

7. The Governments agree to consult on any ques-
tions arising in the implementation of this Agreement.

8. The Government of India shall use its best efforts
to space evenly annual exports within each category
enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2.

9. In the implementation of this Agreement, the sys-
tem of categories and the rates of conversion into
square yard equivalents listed in the annex hereto shall
apply.

10. From April 1, 1964 until October 1, 1964, the
Government of India shall maintain exports from India
in Categories 9, 18, 19, 22, 26 and 31 within the follow-
ing levels :

Catenvm
9
18/19
22

26 (duck only)
26 (other than duck)
Aggregate ceiling, Cate-
gories 9, 18, 19, 22 and
26
31

Ceiling
million square yards

6
3

2.25
1.1

8.5
18.5

1.325 million pieces

JUNIE 8, 1964

915

11. The levels si)ecified in paragraph 10 for the
period from April 1, 1964 until October 1, 1964, may
be increased by 1.25 percent.

12. This Agreement shall continue through Septem-
ber 30, 1966, provided that either Government may pro-
pose revisions in the terms of this Agreement no later
than September 30, 1965, and provided, further, that
either Government may terminate this Agreement
effective September 30, 1965 by written notice to the
other Government given no later than June 30, 1965.

If these proposals are acceptable to your Govern-
ment, this note and Your Excellency's note of accept-
ance on behalf of the Government of India shall consti-
tute an agreement between our Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.

For the Acting Secretary of State:
Philip H. Tbezise

ANNEX

List OF Cotton Textile Categories and Conversion
Factors fob Fabrics and Made up Goods

Category
Number

Description

Conversion

Unit Factor

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq

yds

sq yds

Fabrics

5. Ginghams, carded yarn

6. Ginghams, combed yarn

7. Velveteens

8. Corduroy

9. Sheeting, carded yarn

10. Sheeting, combed yarn

11. Lawns, carded yarn

12. Lawns, combed yarn

13. Voiles, carded yarn

14. Voiles, combed yarn

15. Poplin and broadcloth,

carded yarn

16. Poplin and broadcloth,

combed yarn

17. Typewriter ribbon cloth sq yds

18. Print cloth, shirting type, sq yds

80 X 80 type, carded yarn

19. Print cloth, shirting type, sq yds

other than 80 x 80 type,
carded yarn

20. Shirting, carded yarn sq yds

21. Shirting, combed yarn sq yds

22. Twill and sateen, carded sq yds

yarn

23. Twill and sateen, combed sq yds

yarn

24. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., sq yds

carded yarn

25. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., sq yds

combed yarn

26. Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn sq yds

27. Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn sq yds

Made Up Ooodt

28. Pillowcases, plain,'i carded numbers 1. 084

yarn

29. Pillowcases, plain, combed numbers 1. 084

yarn

30. Dish towels numbers . 348

31. Towels, other tlian dish towels numbers .348

32. Handkerchiefs dozen 1. 66

33. Table damasks and manu- pounds 3. 17

factures

34. Sheets, carded yarn numbers 6. 2

35. Sheets, combed yarn numbers 6. 2

36. Bedspreads, including quilts numbers 6. 9

37. Braided and woven elastics pounds 4. 6

38. Fishing nets pounds 4. 6

Indian Reply

April 15, 1964.
Excellency : I have the honour to acknowledge re-
ceipt of your note of today's date concerning trade in
cotton textiles between India and the United States
which reads as follows :

[Text of U.S. note.]

I have the honour to confirm the foregoing under-
standings on behalf of the Government of India.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:
K. S. Sundara Kajan

His Excellency
George W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State of the United States of
America.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING
CATEGORY 36 EXPORTS

U.S. Note

April 15, 1964.

Dear Mr. Ambassador : In the Agreement concluded
today by our two Governments concerning exports of
cotton fabrics and made-up goods from India to the
United States, no provisions were made concerning
exports in category 36 from India to the United States.
During the course of the discussions between repre-
sentatives of the two Governments, it was observed
that exports from India in this category have risen
gradually since 1958. However, for the year ending
December 1963, Indian exports expanded in excess of
this historical trend. While the United States does
not desire to request the Government of India to re-
strain the.se exports at this time, it wishes to advise
the Government of India of its concern over the rapid
expansion of imports in the latter part of 1963, and to
advise the Government of India that should the rate of
increase in these exports continue to increase sub-
stantially, the United States may request consultations
under Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement.

I would be grateful if you would confirm these under-
standings if they are acceptable to your Government.
Sincerely yours.

For the Acting Secretary of State :

Philip H. Trezise

Acting Assistant Secretary of State

for Economic Affairs

His Excellency
Braj Kumar Nehru,
Ambassador of India.

916

DEPARTaiENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Indian Reply

April 15. 1904
Deab Mh. Trezise : I acknowledge the receipt of your
note of April 15, 1964 which reads as follows :
[Textof U.S. note.)

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the
understandings set forth in the note quoted above.
Sincerely yours,

For the Ambassador :

K. S. SUNDARA RAJAN

Minister (Economic)

The Honorable

Phiup H. Trezise,

Actinij Assistant Secretary of State

for Economic Affairs,
Department of State.

Accesnions deposited: Algeria,
Rwanda, April 15. 1964.

April 14, 1964 ;

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase
membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at
Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17,
1962. TIAS .5170.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, November 19,
1963 ; Costa Rica. January 9, 1964 ; Jamaica, Octo-
ber 18, 196:5 ; Peru, March 12, 1964.
Protocol relating to amendment to convention on inter-
national civil aviation ( to increase number of parties
which may request holding an extraordinary meeting
of Assembly). Adopted by Assembly at Rome Sep-
tember 15. 1962.'

Ratifications deposited: Denmarli. October 30. 1963;
Indonesia, December 9, 1963 ; Malaysia, Jan-
uary 20, 1964; Pakistan, November 27, 1963;
Philippines, November 12, 1963; Switzerland,
February 3, 1964 : Venezuela, February 11, 1964 ;
Yugoslavia, November 5, 1963.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: Algeria, April 14, 1964.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in event

of armed conflict, and regulations of execution ;
Protocol for protection of cultural property in event of

armed conflict.

Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force
August 7, 1956."

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 25, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964.'

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty l)anning nuclear wenix»n tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: China, May 18, 1964 ; Liberia,
May 19, 1964.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21. 1959. En-
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Iraq, April 6, 1964.'

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement regarding the return of Austrian property,
rights and interests, with schedule and annex.
Signed at Washington January 30, 1959.
Entered into force: May 19, 1964.

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of September 27,
19G1 (TIAS 4859), relating to the continental air
defense system. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6, 1964.

Kenya

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Nairobi March 19 and April
20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964.

Norway

Agreement relating to the u.se of Norwegian jwrts and
territorial waters by the NS Savannah. Signed at
Oslo March 1, 1963.
Entered into force: May 8, 1964.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreements of January 5, 1955, November 3, 1956,
December 22, 1958, April 28, 1961. and December 28,
1961, as each has been amended. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Belgrade April 15, 1964. Entered
into force April 15, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

• With reservations made at time of signing.

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free puhlicaiions, ichich
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.O., 20520.

Experimental Communications Satellites — Interconti-

JtTNE 8, 1964

917

nental Testing. Agreement with Canada. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Washington August 13 and 23, 1963.
Entered into force August 23, 1963. TIAS 5474. 3 pp.
54.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan,
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Kabul November 9 and
17, 1963. Entered into force November 17, 1963. TIAS
5477. 3 pp. 5^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia,
amending the agreement of December 17, 1962. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at La Paz June 24, 1963.
Entered into force June 24, 1963. TIAS 5478. 3 pp.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of the Congo, amending the agreement of
February 23, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at
L6opoldville December 18 and 19, 1963. Entered into
force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5484. 8 pp. 10«i.

Education— Educational Foundation and Financing of
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Greece— Signed
at Athens December 13, 1963. Entered into force De-
cember 13, 1963. TIAS 5486. 14 pp. 10«f.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Indonesia.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Djakarta March 8 and
14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963. TIAS
5489. 5 pp. 54.

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Paraguay — Signed at Asuncion Sep-
tember 16, 1963. Entered into force September 16,
1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5493. 11 pp.
10<f.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Para-
guay— Signed at Asuncion November 14, 1963. Entered
into force November 14. 1963. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5494. 13 pp. 10(J.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan^
Signed at Khartoum January 31, 1963. Entered into
force January 31, 1963. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5495. 14 pp. 10«J.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia,
amending the Agreement of September 14, 1962, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tunis Decem-
ber 19, 1963. Entered into force December 19, 1963.
TIAS 5498. 3 pp. 54.

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Agreement with
United Kingdom, relating to the continued application
to Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasa-
land of convention of April 16, 1945, as modified. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington December 31,
1963. Entered into force December 31, 1963. TIAS
5501. 2 pp. 54.

Trade. Agreement with Venezuela, relating to United
States Schedule to the agreement of November 6, 1939,
as amended and supplemented. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Caracas July 15 and 23, 1963. Entered into
force July 2;j, 1963. TIAS 5502. 3 pp. 54.

Atomic Energy — Equipment for Use at La Plata Uni-
versity. Agreement with Argentina. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Buenos Aires November 8, 1962, and
November 30, 1963. Entered into force November 30,
1963. TIAS 5504. 4 pp. 54.

International Coffee Agreement, 1962. Agreement with
Other Governments, formulated at the United Nations
Coffee Conference at New York July-September 1962.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters
September 2S-November 30, 1962. Entered into force
December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 293 pp. $1.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with the Somali
Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and
February 4, 1961, as extended. Exchange of letters —
Signed at Mogadiscio December 24 and 29, 1963. En-
tered into force December 29, 1963. TIAS 5508. 2 pp.
54.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with China, re-
lating to the agreement of June 25, 1952, as amended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Taipei December 30,
1963. Entered into force December 30, 1963. TIAS
5509. 7 pp. 104.

Aerospace Disturbances — Research Program. Agree-
ment with Australia. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Canberra January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510. 3 pp. 54.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to May 18 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 218 of May
8, 225 of May 13, and 233 and 239 of May 15.

Subject

U.S. participation in international
conferences.

Program for visit of ECing of Bu-
rundi.

Dr. Tompkins sworn in as member
of Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs (biographic details).

Spain credentials (rewrite).

Oliver sworn in as Ambassador to
Colombia (biographic details).

Gentile : microphones found in
American Embassy at Moscow.

Germany completes liberalization of
U.S. industrial exports.

Foreign policy conference, Cleve-
land, June IS.

Stevenson : Cambodian complaint,
U.N. Security Council.

Ball : "Philadelphia in a World of
Change."

Rusk : American Law Institute.

U.S.-Canada Ministerial Committee
on Joint Defense.

• Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the BuixETUf.

No.

Date

*240

5/lS

*242

5/18

•243

5A8

244
*245

5/19
5/19

t246

5/19

247

5/20

248

5/20

249

5/21

•250

5/21

251
252

5/22
5/22

918

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX June 8, 1964. Tol U No. 1302

Asia. I'.S. Calls for Frontier I'atrol To Help
Prevent Border Incidents Between Cambodia
and Vlet-Nam (Stevenson) 907

Burundi. King of Burundi Calls on President

Joliuson 906

Cambodia. U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To
Help Prevent Border Incidents Between Cam-
bodia and Viet-Xam (Stevenson) 907

Canada. U.S. Canada Defense Committee To
Meet at Wasbiugton 906

Congress. President Johnson Urges Congress
To Increase U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam (text of
message) 891

Cyprus. The U.X. Charter, the Purse, and tie

Peace (Chnyes) 900

Economic Affairs

Germany Completes Liberalization of U.S. In-
dustrial Exports 906

Japan Liberalizes Imports of U.S. Lemons . . 906

United States and India Conclude Cotton Textile

Agreement (texts of notes) 914

U.S., Japan, and 10 European Nations End Ship-
ping Talks 913

Europe. U.S., Japan, and 10 European Nations

End Shipping Talks 913

Foreign Aid

The Defense of the Free World (McNamara) . 893
President Johnson Urges Congress To Increase
U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam (text of message) . . 891

Germany. Germany Completes Liberalization
of U.S. Industrial Exports 906

India. United States and India Conclude Cot-
ton Textile Agreement (texts of notes) . . . 914

International Law. The U.N. Charter, the

Purse, and the Peace (Chayes) 900

International Organizations and Conferences.
U.S., Japan, and 10 European Nations End
Shipping Talks 913

Japan

Japan Liberalizes Imports of U.S. Lemons . . 906
U.S., Japan, and 10 European Nations End Ship-
ping Talks 913

Laos

Laos and Viet-Nam — A Prescription for Peace

(Rusk) 886

U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To Help Prevent
Border Incidents Between Cambodia and Viet-
Xam (Stevenson) 907

Military Affairs

Tlie Defense of the Free World (McXaniara) . 893

U.S.-Canada Defense Committee To Meet at
Washington 906

Presidential Documents. President Johnson
Urges Congress To Increase U.S. Aid to
Viet-Xam 891

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To

Be Held at Cleveland 899

Publications. Recent Releases 917

Spain. Letters of Credence (Merry del Val y

.\lzola) 899

Treaty Information

Current Actions 917

United States and India C!oncl«de Cotton Textile
Agreement (texts of notes) 914

United Nations

The U.X. Charter, the Purse, and the Peace

(Chayes) 900

U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To Help Prevent
Border Incidents Between Cambodia and Viet-
Nam (Stevenson) 907

Viet-Nam

Laos and Viet-Nam — A Prescription for Peace

(Rusk) 886

President Johnson Urges Congress To Increase

U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam (text of message) . . . 891

U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To Help Prevent
Border Incidents Between Cambodia and Viet-
Nam (Stevenson) 907

Name Indem

Chayes, Abram 900

Johnson, President 891

McNamara, Robert S 893

Merry del Val y Alzola, Alfonso 899

Mwambutsa IV 906

Rusk, Secretary 886

Stevenson, Adlai E 907

U.S. GOVCRNUCHT PRINTIN6 0PriCCilSf4

DSB DEC G
PUBLIC LIBRARY- lie
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02117

SUPERINTL..— ^i-. I ^r i^x-x-ofviciN ft
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, CaOO

(GPOI

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

American Foreign Policy

Current Documents, 1960

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents is an annual, one- volume collection of the principal
messages, addresses, statements, reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties
made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy
of the United States.

As was time with respect to the earlier volumes in the series, the 1960 compilation includes some
documents issued by other governments and by regional international organizations of which the United
States is not a member where the pronouncements or settlements revealed in them were of major concern
to the United States in the formulation of its own policies.

The 1960 voliune departs from its predecessors in that, in a number of instances, the title only of a
document is provided, together with information as to where its official text may readily be found. These
titles are included in the list of documents, and their substance is carried in the index.

Copies of American Foreign Policy : Current Documents, 1960 may be obtained from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 20402, for $3.50 each.

PUBLICATION 7624 $3.50

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7624

Please send me

ments, 1960.

NAMB

$3.50

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

copies of American Foreign Policy: Current Docu

Enclosed find $

(cash, check, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documents)

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE

sa>-

TIII-: OFFTCTAL WEEKLY RE(^OT^T) OF TTNTTED STATES FORETOX POTJCY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1303

June 15, 196i

DEDICATION OF GEORGE C. MARSHALL RESEARCH LIBRARY

Remarks by President ■Johnson 922

PRESIDENT DE VALERA OF IKELAiND VISITS UNITED STATES 927

SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES DEBATE
ON C^VMBODIAN COMPLAINT

f>fr/fpments by Amhnssador Adhn E. Stevenson 937

UNITED STATES AND RUMANIA AGREE TO BROADEN MUTUAL RELATIONS 92i

For index see inside back cover

Dedication of George C. Marshall Research Library

Remarks hy President Johnson *

If George Marshall could see us here today,
this gathering would please him greatly, I
think. Here, in tribute, are men -whom his far-
seeing vision marked for far-reaching victories.

President Eisenhower, you were his most be-
loved and respected protege. It is a measure of
his stature that he selected you for that decisive
command which as a soldier he must have
deeply coveted. In that judgment he and his
superiors were vindicated and the world was
richly rewarded.

General Bradley, you were his cutting edge,
the field commander of more American fighting
troops than any commander in any era. On
your skiU rested much of his hope for victory
for our cause.

Here the captains and the companions of
George Marshall are in rendezvous, and I am
so proud and so honored to be at their side. No

' Made at the dedication of the George C. Marshall
Research Library at Virginia Military Institute, Lex-
ington, Va., on May 23 ( White House press release ; as-
delivered text).

word of mine can add to the eloquence of your
presence.

The name which can command your tribute
gains no luster from what I might say. It is
we and our country that are ennobled by tlois
ceremony. For the greatness of people can be
measured by the qualities of the men that they
honor. Great as he was, George Marshall does
not stand in towering isolation. He is part of
a long line of legendary captains who were more
than instruments to be hurled against the
enemy. To these men victory in war was im-
portant. But the fruits of that victory were
even more important. They did not shrink
from the blood of battle. But they knew that
blood would be spent in vain unless the sur-
vivors labored for a country where liberty was
safe in a nation of peace.

Listen to the roll of some of those great
names, warriors in war and apostles in peace,
names which ring across the centuries of
our history with that single theme: George
Washington, Andrew Jackson, Robert E. Lee,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1303 PUBLICATION 7700 JUNE 15, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
acencics of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on forelRn policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other ofBcers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $8.50,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Headers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

922

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Douglas MacArtluir, (ieorge MurshuU, UiiKir
Briulle\-, Dwight David Eiseiiliower.

Miuiy men have, as these men liad, tlie quali-
ties of greatness. But it is fortune's hazard
wiiether character can join with circumstance
to produce great deeds. For (Jeorge Marshall
the tragedy of war gave scope for his soldier's
art. The trials of a restless peJice gave shape
to his statesman's skill. He was picked for
snprenie command, over many of his seniors,
by a man of gresit vision, Franklin D. Koose-
velt. When he had helped guide us to victory,
he knew that peace, like victory, would go not
just to the rigliteous but to the skillful, not just
to the free but to the brave. He followed
Harry Tnunan's wise reminder tliat "Peace is
not a reward that comes automatically to those
who cherish it. It must be pursued, unceasingly
and unwaveringly, by every means at our
command." -

To this end, under President Trimian's direc-
tion, he proposed the Mai-shall Plan. "We know
how much our freedom, and the freedom of all
Western Europe, owes to that single stroke.
But that vision did not stop where Soviet con-
quest began. To General Marshall, permanent
peace depended upon rebuilding all European
civilization within its historic boundaries. The
Iron Curtain rang down upon that hope. But
the correctness of his conviction has not
changed. Today we work to cari-y on the vision
of the Mai-shall Plan. First, to strengthen the
ability of every European people to select and
shape its own society. Second, to bring every
European nation closer to its neighbors in the
relationships of peace. This will not be
achieved by sudden settlement or bj' dramatic
deed. But the nations of Eastern Europe are
beginning to reassert their own identity. There
is no longer a single Iron Curtain. There are
many. Each differs in strength and thickness —
in the light that can pass through it and the
hopes that can prosper behind it.

AVe do not know when all European nations
will become part of a single civilization. But
as President Eisenhower said in 1953 : "This we
do know : a world that begins to witness the re-

birth of trust among nations nm find its way
to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive." '

We will continue to build bridges across the
gulf which has divided us from Eiistem Europe.
They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas,
of visitors, and of humanitarian aid. We do
this for four rejisons : First, to open new rela-
tionships to countries seeking increased inde-
pendence yet unable to risk isolation. Second,
to open the minds of a new generation to the
values and the visions of the Western civiliza-
tion from which they come and to which they
belong. Third, to give freer play to the power-
ful forces of legitimate national pride — the
strongest barrier to the ambition of any country
to dominate another. Fourth, to demonstrate
that identity of interest and the prospects of
progress for Eastern Europe lie in a wider
relationship with the West.

We go forward within the framework of our
unalterable commitment to the defense of Eu-
rope and to the reunification of Germany. But
imder the leadership of President Truman and
President Eisenhower, and our late beloved
President Kennedy, America and Western Eu-
rope have achieved the strength and self-
confidence to follow a course based on hope
rather than hostility, based on opportunity
rather than fear. And it is also our belief that
wise and skillful development of relationships
with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed
the day when Germany will be reunited. We
are pledged to use every peaceful means to work
with friends and allies so that all of Europe
may be joined in a shared society of freedom.
In this way I predict the years to come wiU see
us draw closer to General Marshall's bold de-
sion than at any time since he stood at Harvard
and began to reshape the world.

It is a great man who can guide the course
of a great nation long after he has left the scene.
The men around me today on this platform are
such men. General Marshall was another. We
honor him not only for what he did but for what
he was. Had he lived unknown and unsimg,
his character would have illuminated the lives
of all who knew him. He was among the

' For text of an address made by President Truman
at Chicago. 111., on Apr. 6. 1946, see Bclletin of Apr.
14, 1M6, p. 022.

"For text of an address made by President Eisen-
hower on Apr. 16, 1953, before the American Society
of XewspaiJer Editors, see ibid., Apr. 27, 19.13. p. 599.

JUNE 1.'), 1904

923

noblest Americans of them all. Not only a
great soldier, not only a great statesman, he was
first and foremost a great man.

This institution is here to produce such men.
And so it is quite appropriate that the George
C. Marshall Kesearch Library is located here,
among these cadets. Before the battle of Chan-
cellorsville, Stonewall Jackson said, "The men
of Virginia Military Institute will be heard
from today." Throughout our history — our
long, glorious history — when the day was in
doubt and freedom seemed to falter, the voice
of VMI has always helped lead our nation to
victory.

The qualities forged here, and by your grad-
uates of a hundred battlegrounds, are the hard
fiber of this nation's national strength. You
and I are in the same service, the service of a
nation for which we are prepared to die but for
which we wish to live.

I welcome you to that service. I will go
back to my tasks with a heart knowing, as did
my predecessors, that the men of VTVII are at
my side in the service of our country.

United States and Rumania Agree
To Broaden Mutual Relations

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS

Press release 224 dated May 9

The United States and Rumania have agreed
to open discussions in Washington on May 18
on a number of items of interest to both Gov-
ernments. These talks will deal primarily with
economic subjects, especially trade, but will also
cover other matters wliich affect relations be-
tween the two countries.

The Rumanian delegation will be headed by
Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the State Planning Committee
Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and will include Min-
ister of the Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Mihail Florescu, First Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs George Macovescu, Deputy
Minister for Foreign Trade Mihai Petri, Ruma-
nian Minister to the United States Petre
Balaceanu, and technical advisers and experts.

The U.S. delegation will be led by Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs W.
Averell Harriman and will include U.S. Min-
ister to Rumania William A. Crawford ; Assist-
ant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and
International Business Jack N. Behrman ; Act-
ing Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Richard H. Davis; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Philip
H. Trezise; Director of the Bureau of Inter-
national Commerce, Department of Commerce,
Eugene M. Braderman; Assistant Legal Ad-
viser for Economic Affairs, Department of
State, Andreas F. Lowenf eld ; and Director of
the Office of Eastern European Affairs, De-
partment of State, Harold C. Vedeler; as well
as a number of experts from various agencies
in the U.S. Government.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 263 dated June 1

Representatives of the Governments of the
United States of America and of the Rumanian
People's Republic met in Washington from
May 18 to June 1, 1964 to discuss matters of
common interest, particularly economic and
trade matters. The Rumanian delegation was
headed by Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Vice-
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the State Planning Committee.
The LTnited States delegation was headed by W.
Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs.

In the course of the negotiations, the two dele-
gations noted the improvement in the relations
between the two countries following the agree-
ment of March 30, 1960 which provided for the
reciprocal settlement of claims and other finan-
cial questions.^ They noted in particular the
mutually beneficial results of the increased cul-
tural, educational, scientific, and other ex-
changes between the two countries in the past
several years.

The representatives of the two Governments
agreed that further steps should be taken to
carry forward the improvement in mutual re-

'■ For text, see Buixetin of Apr. 25, 1960, p. 671.

924

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lations. To this end they reached the follow-
ing understandings :

1. The United States Government agreed to
establish a General License procedure under
which most commodities may be exported to
Rumania without the necessity for individual
export license. In addition the United States
Government agreed to grant licenses for a num-
ber of particular industrial facilities in which
the Rumanian delegation expressed special
interest.

The Government of the Rumanian People's
Republic agreed to authorize enterprises and
institutes in Rumania to sell or license Ruma-
nian technology' to United States firms.

The two Governments agreed that products,
designs, and technology exported to Rumania
from the United States would not be trans-
shipped or re-exported without the prior con-
sent of the United States Government. They
agreed further that contracts between United
States firms and Rumanian state enterprises for
imports from Rumania could provide for limi-
tations on re-export or transshipments without
prior consent of the Rumanian supplier. The
two Governments will mutually facilitate the
exchange of information on the use and dis-
position of products, designs and teclinology
exported from one country to the other.

2. The two Governments also agreed on ar-
rangements for the mutual protection of indus-
trial property rights and processes. It was
agreed that commercial contracts between
United States firms and Rumanian state enter-
prises could provide for the settlement of com-
mercial differences and disputes by arbitration
in third countries or by appropriate inter-
national tribunals, as agreed by the parties to
the contracts.

3. The two Governments further agreed to
consult, at the request of either party, about any
other problems that might arise as the trade
between the two countries grows.

4. In order to promote trade between Ru-
mania and the United States, the representatives
of the Rumanian Government expressed their
desire to expand the activity of the New York
Trade Office of the Rumanian Mission in the
United States. The United States delegation
discussed plans for setting up in Bucharest a

trade promotion office of the United States Mis-
sion in Rumania. It was also understood that
tourist promotion offices could bo established in
the two countries.

5. Both Governments agreed to facilitate the
entry, travel and work of the representatives of
firms and enterprises, and of trade missions.
They also agreed to facilitate the exchange of
trade exhibits and the publication of trade
promotion materials.

6. Both delegations recognized that the devel-
opment of significant and durable trade rela-
tions between the two countries requires the
promotion of trade in both directions.

The Rumanian delegation emphasized that
Rumanian products cannot compete on an equal
basis in the United States market under the
tariff treatment accorded such products. It
stated that this factor could limit the expan-
sion of trade between the two countries. The
United States delegation took note of this con-
cern, and explained the applicable provisions
of United States law. The two delegations
agreed to give continuing consideration to
means of increasing trade between the United
States and Rumania.

7. The two delegations noted the forward
steps that had been taken in consular matters,
and on behalf of their Governments agreed that
further measures would be taken to facilitate
the mutual settlement of consular problems. In
the interest of further improvement of consular
relations, they agreed that representatives of the
two Governments would meet in Washington in
September 1964 to negotiate a new consular con-
vention between the two countries.

8. The delegations stated the intention of the
two Governments to expand the existing pro-
gram of cultural, educational, scientific, and
other exchanges between the United States and
Rumania.

9. The Governments of the United States of
America and of the Rumanian People's Repub-
lic today raised the level of their diplomatic
missions in Washington and Bucharest from
Legations to Embassies. Ambassadors will be
exchanged at an early date.

At the conclusion of the meetings, Under
Secretary Harriman and Vice-Chairman Gas-
ton-Marin expressed the hope on behalf of their

JTXNE 15, 1964

925

Govenmaents that progress in carrying out the
understandings reached would furnish the basis
for a fiirther broadening and improvement in
the relations between the United States and
Rumania.

President Expresses Grief at Death
of Prime Minister Nehru

JawaMrlal Nehru. Prime Minister of India,
died at New Delhi on May 27. Following is
the text of a message sent by President .John-
son to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. President
of the Republic of India.

White House press release dated May 27

Mat 27, 1964

Dear PKEsroENT Eadhakrishnan : Once
again we come together in grief over the death
of a great and beloved man — this time your
own leader, Prime Minister Nehru.

Words are inadequate to convey the deep
sense of loss which we in particular feel at his
passing. For so long we had comited on his
influence for good; it now seems impossible to
believe that he is no longer with us. Yet liis
spirit lives on. The rich heritage he left us,
his faith in his people and in humanity, will,
I know, serve to sustain you and yours as we
strive together to translate his ideals into
reality.

Hisfory has already recorded his monumental
contribution to the molding of a strong and
independent India. And yet, it is not just as
a leader of India that he has served humanity.
Perhaps more than any otlier world leader he
has given expression to man's yearning for
peace. This is tlie issue of our age. In his fear-
less pursuit of a world free from war he has
served all humanity.

As it was for Gandlii, peace was tlie ideal of
Jawaluirlal Nehru; it was his message to the
world. There could be no more fitting memo-

rial to him tlian a world without war. It is
my sincere belief that in his memory the states-
men of the world should dedicate themselves to
malving his ideal a reality. Our country is
pledged to tliis, and we renew our pledge today
in tribute to your great departed leader.
Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Meeting at Honolulu Reviews
Situation in Southeast Asia

White House Annowncement

White House press release dated May 28

Tlie President has asked a number of high
U.S. officials to meet in Honolulu on June 1 and
2 for discussions of the situation in Southeast
Asia. The meeting will be chaired bj^ Secre-
tary Rusk ^ and will include Secretary [of
Defense Robert S.] McXamara, General [Max-
well D.] Taylor, and other officials from Wash-
ington, together witli Ambassador [to the
Republic of Viet-Nam Henry Cabot] Lodge and
other high-ranking Americans stationed in
Southeast Asia. The purpose of the meeting
will be to review the situation in the entire area.

Letters of Credence

Chad

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Chad, Boukar Abdoul, presented his
credentials to President Jolmson on May 25.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 253 dated May 25.

' Secretary Rusk left Washington ou May 27 to at-
tend funeral services for Indian Prime Minister
.lawaliarlal Nehru, who died at New Delhi on that day.

926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President de Valera of Ireland Visits United States

Eamon de Valera, President of the Republic
of Ireland, visited the United States May 26
to 30. He met with President Johnson and
other Government officials at Washington May
27-29. On May 28 President de Valera ad-
dressed a joint session of Congress. Following
are the texts of exchanges of arrival remarks
and toasts with President Johnson and Presi-
dent de Valera's address to the Congress.

ARRIVAL REMARKS

White House press release dated May 27
President Johnson

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Mr.
President, I am very happy and proud to wel-
come you to the United States. We consider
tliis to be your second country, and you are
always welcome on this soil.

On your first trip 45 years ago, you came to
interest America in the cause of Irish freedom,
much as Benjamin Franklin, the envoy of the
American Revolution, visited Ireland in 1772.

Freedom for Ireland has been the driving,
mastering passion of your life, and America is
honored today to have back a native son who
has become Ireland's liberator, Ireland's senior
statesman, and Ireland's President.

There is one man who is not here with us
today who would especially be proud of this
moment — John Fitzgerald Kennedy. President
Kennedy loved Ireland, and he held for you,
Mr. President, personally the deepest affection.

T^Tien he returned from Ireland last summer,
we all knew how impressed he had been with
the great reception that had been given him
by the people of his ancestral land.

Now it is our turn and our privilege to greet
you, Mr. President. To no other Irish leader

do we owe a greater debt than you for the con-
tributions which Ireland has made — and is mak-
ing— to the building of a world community
under tiie rule of law.

This is the country of your birth, Mr. Presi-
dent. This will always be your home. You be-
long to us, Mr. President, just as in a very
special way John F. Kennedy belonged to you.

So this morning it gives me great pride and
pleasure on behalf of all of the American people
to welcome you home. We are glad that you
are here.

President de Valera

Thank you, Mr. President, for your very
gracious words of welcome. I am sure the
people of Ireland appreciate this gesture on
your part.

We all Imow that in your position with your
responsibilities it is not easy to find time for
occasions like this. We appreciate it, therefore,
all the more, and I am more than grateful that
you should be here in person to greet me and
also that Mrs. Jolinson should be good enough
to come down to meet me here.

As you have said, this is a great occasion — or
at least, as you have suggested, this is a great
occasion for me, and so it is. I was here 45
years ago, and in my work to interest the people
of America in Ireland's struggle at that time
for independence I traveled throughout the
whole of the United States, practically. I spoke
in all of your major cities; so truly I feel some-
what at home.

But 45 years is a long span in human life. It
has always been for me a great longing that I
should some day be able to return here to the
United States while in a representative capac-
ity and travel throughout the country and say
to the people in all of the large cities where

JITNE 15, 1964
732-837-

927

such favor has been shown to us back 45 years
ago and tell all the old friends there how much
their aid helped us at that time. Unfortunately,
if it were possible for me to go aroimd the coun-
try, not many of the old friends would still be
left.

Back 25 years ago I had planned such a visit.
I had intended traveling to all of the principal
centers where great demonstrations had shown
in what way the Irish people regarded Ireland's
rights at that time. Although all of the ar-
rangements were made, there was a threat of
conscription of people in six of our northeastern
counties and I had to cancel the visit. Mr.
[Sean T.] O'Kelly, my deputy at that time,
and later President, who had the pleasure of
being received here some 4 or 5 years ago, took
my place.

As I have said, I do not think that any other
Irisliman could find an occasion like this. I find
immense pleasure in coming back and being able
to speak here from the Capital of your nation to
all our friends throughout the country. How
deeply we appreciate and how well I remember
all the help that was given to us at that time!

I don't want to detain you, Mr. President,
but tliis morning I was taken by the good office
of Mr. [Carlisle H.] Humelsine to Williams-
burg. I was taken in a coach and pair to see the
old city and some of the houses in the old city,
the Governor's House, and so on. But I was
taken to the House of Assembly, and I was sit-
ting on the Speaker's chair and brought again to
the seat from which Patrick Henry spoke. Mr.
President, it was not the first time that I sat
on that chair or sat on that bench. I did it
45 years ago, because I was taken at that time
to all of the spots famous in American Revo-
lutionary history — to Lexington, to Concord,
to Bunker Hill, and so on — and I was, of course,
taken to the seat of the Revolution in Virginia.

Once more, Mr. President, I want to express
to you my very deep gratitude and on behalf of
the Irish people their gratitude.

In our own language, may I say : Is mor agam
na briathra failto a dubhairt tu. Taim an-
bhuioch diot as ucht do chinealtais. (Transla-
tion: I deeply appreciate your words of wel-
come. I am most grateful for your great
kindness.)

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated May 27

President Johnson

Mr. President, all of the pleasure of life is
a visit to Ireland. If that is not possible, the
second is to have Ireland visit us. So we are
happy, Mr. President, tonight that you have
come back to the country of your birth, home
to the people who claim you as one of their
own.

You and I have a great deal in common, Mr.
President, not the least of which is that a lot |{
of Irislmien vote for us — and occasionally vote I
against us. Furthermore, in our work we are
both surrounded by Irisltmen. I have heard it
said that there are more Irishmen in the White
House than people. I know that I have be-
come an Irislmian by osmosis.

Mr. President, this is your fifth trip to our
country, and I cannot help but compare it to
your first visit in 1919, when you were smuggled
ashore to outwit those who would thwart your
effoits to win support for Irish liberation.
Since then, Mr. President, you have become a
symbol of the contributions our two countries
have made to each other. In a real sense, Mr.
President, we gave you to Ireland in partial
payment for the thousands of Irish who came
to America to enrich our lives.

Foremost among those was John Fitzgerald
Kennedy, whose name will live forever as the
symbol of the ties that bind our countries to-
gether. His tragic and imtimely death left aU
our hearts deeply wounded, but we are all bet-
ter men for the life he lived while on this earth.

Few men, Mr. President, have had the satis-
faction that you have had. Not only did you
play a leading role in the birth of your nation,
but you have continued to exert great influence
long after Ireland became a significant force
in world aflairs.

In the United States, in the Congo, and in
Cyprus, the voice of Ireland is the symbol of
sanity and sage counsel and self-sacrifice, and
this is the story of De Valera — and that is the
story of Ireland.

I want to pay a very special tribute tonight
to your Minister of External Affairs, Mr.

928

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

[Frank] Aiken, for his very active role in the
United Nations; to Ambassador [AVilliam P.]
Fay, vr'ith wliom T want to cultivate very close
relationships; and to Mrs. de Valera, the First
Lady of Ireland, a woman of enormous talent
and keen spirit ; and, finally, to you, Mr. Presi-
dent, as a small expression of our a flection and
appreciation not only for your having come to
our country but for your havino; brought
Speaker [of the U.S. House of Representatives
John W.] McCormack and his wife to have
dinner with us for the first time.

So, as a small expression of our appreciation
and as a token of our profound respect for your
life and labors, I should like to ask those of you
who have joined us this evening, my colleagues
and my friends, to join with me in raising our
glasses in a toast to the President of Ireland —
a great Irislmian and a very great friend.

President de Valera

Mr. President, I have been accustomed to
speaking in the days when we did not have these
things, and I had to keep my eye on the farthest
man in the crowd to see whether he was listen-
ing to me or not or following what I said.

Mr. President, I do not know how I can ex-
press to you my thanks for your generous in-
vitation to be here and for the kind words
which you have said of me since I came here.

The trouble with me is that when I come to
the United States, there is a danger that I pre-
sume too far. I feel so much at home here, and
I think Americans coming to Ireland feel at
home also. I feel so much at home that I have
to be careful not to act as if I were an American.

There was a time when the phrase "hyphen-
ated American" was used — most of you people
are too young to remember those days — but there
was a certain sting in the phrase, and it hurt
our people; so, as a counter, I am 100 percent
American. When I was pronounced on one
occasion in an American assembly to be the 100
percent American in the room, it happened like
this. I had been accepted or made a chief of
the Cliippewa tribe. As a matter of fact, I have
been made a chief of two Indian tribes. But
this man speaking of me pronounced that I was
the 100 percent American in the room, that I

was born in America and I was an Indian chief.

Well, as I say, the danger I have in coming
to America is that I might presume too far
and do things which it would not be proper for
me, belonging to another country, to do.

Being in Washington, I should tell you a
story which may interest you. There was a
lady here when I was here — I think she has
passed away long ago so there won't be any
harm in mentioning her name, which I think
was Alice Paul — who played a very prominent
part in the Suflfragettes, as we called them and
as they used to be called in England — in the
"votes for women" campaign.

She was a great friend of ours, and she got
all of her organization to help us in our efforts
to get the American people to pronounce in
favor of recognition of the Irish Republic.
She never asked for any award of any kind
until one day she came to me and said, "Now,
you know we have all been working for you,
helping you. I want you to do something for

us.

She said, "There is one State left, and if we
get that State we will have won our campaign."
I think it is two-thirds — I forget the number
now — of the States have to vote in order to get
a change in the Constitution.

She said, "There is one State left, and in that
State we only want four votes to get it, and
there are four Irishmen against us. These four
Irishmen" — I won't mention the State; it is
not far from here — "and anything we say can-
not change their minds to get them to vote for
us. Would you be good enough to go down and
try to get these four men to change ?"

I had not interfered in American politics, al-
though some people said I had, because our
campaign was a campaign to ask America at
the time that if they were going to ratify the
Treaty of Versailles they put in some reserva-
tion at any rate which would not bind America
to helping England to maintain Ireland as a
part of British territory. I felt that I could
do that as an outsider. We were affected by
it, and America was going to take action which
I thought would be detrimental to us. There-
fore, I felt quite free, but otherwise I had noth-
ing to do with American politics.

JUNE 15, 1964

929

But this was a terrible temptation. So she
pressed very, very hard, and, being a woman, I
couldn't refuse. So I fell. I went down to this
State. I interviewed the four Irishmen. Do
you think they would stir? Not a bit — not a
bit. They were as firm in their opinions, and
they weren't going to listen to any outsider
suggest anything to them. I had only high
regard for them afterward because of the fact
that they had their own opinions in their own
country and it was best, although I did believe
that women deserved to vote.

Now, as I say, my danger in coming here is
that I should presume too far, but I do feel
always at home. Whenever I come to an
American city, I know that there are quite a
number of friends. A I said today, the older
friends have passed away. If you add 45 and
45 you get 90, and most of the people who were
active in our cause at that time were 45 years
of age or so; so most of them have passed to
their reward. But I know that their children
were there and that they were also taught by
their parents the right of the Irish to be free.
So, indeed, it is for me an occasion of deep
emotion, if I might say so, to come back here
and to come as President once more, as Presi-
dent of the Irish Republic, and to be received
here by the President of the United States and
by his good lady.

I have spoken personally because it is for the
moment particularly that aspect of it that comes
to my mind, but of course, as you said, Mr.
President, it is symbolic of the relations
that have been between our two countries for
centuries.

You mentioned, Mr. President, I think, Ben-
jamin Franklin today. He was back dealing
with the Colonial patriots of that particular
time, but the ideals that were held out by the
patriots here in America in the period of the
Revolution have been the ideals of the Irish
people. We are fundamentally democratic —
and I don't mean anything about parties. But,
simply, we believe in the right of the people
to choose their own governors, to choose those
who should rule them. We believe in the
equality and the dignity of the human person,
and we really believe in all the things that have
been put forward as the ideals of Americans

back along through the whole of the period in
which our two histories have run upon m a
certain sense pilot courses.

You have been a great nation, and you have
great things to do in the world today in the
leadership of the world, in striving to get for
himianity the peace as a foundation of progress.
You are doing that to the admiration, I think,
of right-thinking people, certainly to the admi-
ration of the people of Ireland. We in Ireland
are trying to do the same. We have a certain
freedom which you haven't got. As a smaller
nation, we are not suspect. A big power is
always suspect in its actions; no matter how
well-intentioned its actions may be, it is always
open to a certain amount of suspicion. A small
nation is not.

I have always hoped that our people would
keep clear of blocs of every kind so that at any
particular moment they would be able to ad-
vocate what they considered right and true.
Wlien we do it and say it, we are not suspect.
Therefore, we have complementary parts to
play, I think, in the world today.

It is a great joy for me as representative of
our people, Mr. President, to be here as your
guest and to assure you that that close relation-
ship between our countries which has existed
for centuries, insofar as one human foresight
can possibly measure, is likely to continue.

I don't know if it would be in order for me
to do so, but I ask j'ou all to raise your glass in
a toast to the President of the United States.

ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS'

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President pro tempore of
the Senate, Members of the Congress of the
United States, my first word to you must be to
thank you from my heart for the great privilege
you have granted me in permitting me to ap-
pear before you and to address you.

I was here some 45 years ago and I toured
throughout this great countr}'. You may re-
member that on the 21st of January 1919 the
National Assembly of Ireland — Dail Eireann —
declared Ireland independent and a republic,
just as the Second Continental Congress here

' Congressional Record of May 28, 1964, p. 11804.

930

DEPARTItENT OF STATE BULLETIN

declared the independence of America.

President Wilson during the First World
War had put the rights of people to self-
determination as a fundamental basis for peace.
We in Ireland took advantage of the fact that
that {)rinciple had been enunciated by the head
of tills gieat Nation. There was a general elec-
tion due at the time, and we took advantage of
that election to make it clear tliat the people
wanted independence. The elections were held
under British law and therefore there could be
no suggestion of any interference in our favor.
The results of the elections were such that it
would be impossible for anyone to deny what
was the status of the nation and what was the
form of government that the Irish people
desired.

I was sent here some months later — in June
of 1919. I have told you that our Declaration
of Independence was made on the 21st of Jan-
uary 1919. That is our Independence Day, as
July 4 is yours.

I was sent here to the United States with a
threefold mission. First, to ask for official
recognition of the independence, and the Re-
public that had been declared in Ireland in full
accordance with the principles of self-deter-
mination. I was sent here also to try to float
an external loan for the uses of that Republic.
And, finally, I was asked to plead with the
American people so that if the covenant of the
League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles,
which were imder discussion, were to be ratified,
the United States would make it clear that not-
withstanding article X of that covenant the
United States was not pledging itself to main-
tain Ireland as an integral part of British
territory.

Some weeks after we had declared our
independence — I think it was on March 4 — the
House of Representatives here passed a resolu-
tion, by something like 216 votes to 41, asking
the peace conference that was sitting in Paris
and passing judgment upon the rights of na-
tions to favorably consider Ireland's right to
self-determination.

A few months later, on June 6, your Senate
here passed a resolution earnestly requesting the
American Peace Commissioners, then in Paris,
to endeavor to secure that the representatives

who had been chosen in Ireland for the pur-
pose, would get a hearing at the peace confer-
ence in order that they might present Ireland's
case.

But the Senate went further. Nearly a year
later, when the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles was under discussion, it passed a
resolution which was intended to be a reserva-
tion to the treaty, if adopted, reaffirming its
adherence to the principles of self-determina-
tion and its previous vote of sympathy with the
aspirations of the Irish people for a govern-
ment of their own choice, and went further and
expressed the earnest hope that once Ireland
had got self-government it would be promptly
admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

You know that on account of articles in the
covenant and circumstances of the day the
treaty was not ratified.

But the resolutions here in Congress, sup-
ported as they were, and mirroring as they did
the attitude of the American people as a whole
were made manifest by immense demonstra-
tions in all the principal cities throughout the
United States. Recognition was given by the
mayors of your principal cities, by the gov-
ernors and legislatures of many of your States,
so that Congress here was expressing accurately
the will of the American people in regard to
Ireland.

It is not necessary for me to tell you how
heartened our people were by these expressions
of sympathy and friendship. We were in a
very difficult struggle, facing very great odds.
And it was a comfort and an earnest of ulti-
mate success that this great freedom-loving na-
tion of America and its people were behind our
efforts.

What was the gratitude of the Irish people
was clearly evident to anyone who saw the re-
ception that was given to your late President,
President Kennedy. He was welcomed not
merely because he was of Irish blood, not merely
because of his personal charm and his great
qualities of heart and mind, nor even because
of the great leadership which he was giving
to the world in critical moments; but he was
honored because he was regarded by our people
as the symbol of this great Nation, because he
was the elected President of this great people.

In honoring him they felt that they were in

JTjyrE 15, 1064

931

some small measure expressing their gratitude
to the people of the United States for the aid
that had been given to them.

The United States since the Declaration of
Independence has been looked upon by all free-
dom-loving peoples as the champion of human
liberty, the liberty of nations, and the liberty
of individuals. "\Ye in Ireland have constantly
looked to you as such a champion.

We all know that the former League of
Nations came into being as the result of Amer-
ican initiative — although, as I said, for reasons
which seemed good at the time to the American
people they did not ratify the treaty or become
members of the League. But the idea came
from America, in modem times, anyhow.

And the successor of the Leagu& — the United
Nations Organization — also came into being as
the result of American hifluence.

Most thinking people will admit that if we
are to look forward to peace, to anything like a
lasting peace in this world, it can only be se-
cured by the working of such an organization —
an organization that will purposely devote itself
to bringing about the rule of law and, where
other means have failed, judicial determination
of international disputes and enforcement of
peace when that becomes necessary.

Now, you all know that we are far from being
at that goal at present. But there is no one
who has read the speeches of President Ken-
nedy or the speeches of President Johnson or
the speeches and statements of your Secretary
of State or of the chairman of your Foreign
Relations Committee, but must be satisfied that
American leaders are thinking at the highest
level and that they are facing realistically the
complicated situations that confront tliem and
also the social evils that have to be remedied.

It is a great comfort to laiow that a nation
like yours is thinking at that level. And we
have the hope that as long as there is thinking
at tliat level and as long as this Nation is guided
by the Divine Spirit that ultimately the peace
and the conditions which we all wish for will
be realized.

But freedom and peace are but the founda-
tions. They are the necessary foundations.

The United States as a great nation and ours
as one of the smaller nations, working in our
complementary ways, are endeavoring to build.

to secure that these foundations will be well
laid.

But that is not all, of course. An Irish poet
thinking some 120 years ago of the role he
would wish his nation to play addressed us in
these words :

Oh, Ireland, be it thy high duty to teach the world
the might of moral beauty and stamp God's image
truly on the struggling soul.

President Kennedy in liis address at Amherst
College,^ thinking of the future that he would
wish and that he foresaw for America, said he
wished an America whose military strength
would be matched by its moral strength, the
moral strength of its people ; its wealth by their
wisdom; its power by their purpose — an
America that woidd not be afraid of grace and
beauty.

In short, he said, an America that would win
respect not merely because of its strength but
because of its culture. I am sure that is the
America that ultimately you would want, as it
is the Ireland that we would want.

But these things can only be secured by unde-
viating pursuit of the foundations that I have
mentioned and pursuit, ultimately, of the higher
ideals that mean the mental life, the full life of
the people.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to confess and con-
fess freely that tliis is an outstanding day in
my own life, to see recognized, as I have here
in full, the recognition of the rights of the Irish
people and the independence of the Irish people
in a way that was not at all possible 45 years ago.

I have longed to come back and say this to
you and through you to the people as a whole.

I would, indeed, be fully happy today were
there not one serious setback that had occurred
in these 45 years.

Wlien I was addressing you here in 1919 and
1920 our ancient nation, our ancient Ireland,
was undivided. Since then it has been divided
by a cruel partition.

As my predecessor, Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly,
when he was addressing you here said, partition
is one of our serious problems but, please God,
that, too, will be solved.

And I salute here, in prospect, the representa-

* For text, see White House press release dated
Oct. 26, 1963.

932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tive of Irelaiul who may be permitted to ad-
dress you as I luvve been permitted, and who
will be able with full heart jo^-fully to aimouncc
to you that our severed country has been re-
united and that the last source of enmity be-
tween the British and Irish peoples has disap-
peared and that at last we can be tnily friends.

And now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to renew
to j'ou and to the Members of Congress my
thanks for this great privilege — and, of course,
to the President of the United States, without
whose generous invitation I could not be here.
I am deeply grateful. I hope that the close ties
which have kept our countries together for cen-
turies will continue into the future.

And that representatives of Ireland may be
able to talk to the American people as close
friends, and representatives of the United States
to talk to the people of Ireland as their close
friends.

Ma}^ I pray in our own language, the Irish
language, that this may be so :

Go dtuga Dia gur mar sin a bheas, agus go
stiura an Spiorad Naomh na daoine a bheas
mar thereoraithe ar dr nda thir, agus taoisigh
an domliain fre cheile, ar bhealach na siochana
agus leasa an chine dhaonna. (Translation :
God grant that it be so, and may the Holy
Spirit guide the leaders of our two countries,
and those of the whole world, on the way of
peace and human betterment.)

can posts in Eastern Europe with listening
devices and microphones. Prior to this, over
130 listening devices of various types have been
locatetl and removed from American embassy
buildings in those countries by security oflicers
of the Department of State since 1949.

Protective measures against attempts at pen-
etration of our embassies are in continuous ef-
fect. For example. United States personnel at
many posts are instructed always to act on the
assumption that listening devices have been
mstalled in offices and residences. Special pre-
cautions, some of which remain highly classi-
fied, are taken with respect to the handling of
sensitive information. These include specially
constructed rooms inside certain embassy build-
ings where sensitive discussions can occur with-
out audio i^enetration.

The technicjil characteristics of the recently
discovered microphones and their presence deep
in the structural walls of the building indicate
that they were placed in the building prior to
its occupancy by the United States Govern-
ment in 1953. It must be assumed that at least
some of them were in operating condition when
discovered. A review is being made to deter-
mine whether there has been any significant com-
promise of sensitive information in light of the
measures taken for protection against such a
possibility.

U.S. Discovers Microphones
in Walls of Embassy at Moscow

Statement by G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

Press release 246 dated May 19

During the past month a network of micro-
phones has been found embedded in the walls
of the American Embassy in Moscow and has
been removed and destroyed. Today [May 19]
U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler delivered a formal
protest about this matter to the Soviet Govern-
ment.* This discovery is the most recent in-
stance of a continuing effort to penetrate Ameri-

' Not printed.

Dr. Wiesner Visits Soviet Union

The "\Miite House announced on May 20 that
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, formerly Special As-
sistant to the President for Science and Tech-
nology and Chairman of the President's Science
Advisory Committee, would arrive at Moscow
May 21 for a 10-day visit to the Soviet Union at
the invitation of the U.S.S.R. State Committee
for Scientific Research. Dr. Wiesner is pres-
ently a member of the President's Science Ad-
visory Committee and will be making the trip
in that capacity.

The 10-day trip to the U.S.S.R. is expected to
take Dr. Wiesner to Moscow, Leningrad, and
Novosibirsk, the "science city" in central Si-
beria.

JUNE 15. 1964

933

United States' Ends Grant Aid
to Republic of China

Statement hy Richard I. Phillips
Director, Office of News ^

Because of the healthy economic growth of
the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Agency
for International Development is planning to
terminate its programs there at the end of the
next fiscal year, that is June 1965.

The United States Government notes the in-
terest and willingness of industrial and finan-
cial institutions, private money markets, and
foreign private investments to provide an in-
creasing flow of development capital to Taiwan.

The United States will continue to encourage
this trend. Wliile the AID program in Tai-
wan will be ended, the United States will con-
tinue its military assistance program and the
sale of surplus agricultural commodities under
P.L. 480, that is the Food for Peace program.

At the same time, the effect of funds com-
mitted in prior years to development programs
on Taiwan will be felt for several years to come
as the development loans are drawn down.

The United States has shared with the Gov-
enunent of China its gratification over the
country's exceptional growth, which has been
due to successful accomplishments of an in-
dustrious and capable people, making good use
of large-scale U.S. assistance.

Since 1953 the country's gross national prod-
uct has increased at a rate of more than 6 per-
cent per year. Agricultural production has
increased 4 percent annually, and industrial
production between 10 and 12 percent annually.

Reflecting this outstanding growth, Taiwan's
export earnings rose 11 percent in 1962 and 50
percent in 1963. Since 1949 the United States
has provided Taiwan with $3.6 billion in mili-
tary and economic aid. This breaks down to
$2.2 billion in military aid, $205 million in Pub-
lic Law 480 agricultural commodities, and $1.2
billion from AID and predecessor agencies.

For the final year of its program in Taiwan,

'Read to news correspondents on May 28.

the AID appropriation request to Congress in-
cludes about $500,000 for advisory services in
industrial development.

United States and Greece
Sign Debt Settlement

Department Statement

Press release 258 dated May 28

Minister of Foreign Affairs Stavros Cos-
topoulos and American Ambassador Henry R.
Labouisse today [May 28] signed an agreement
for the refvmding of indebtedness due from
the Government of Greece to the United States
Treasury. The United States Government
welcomes this action by the Greek Government
in arranging to meet this old obligation and thus
giving further evidence of the progressive
strengthening of Greece's economy.

The debt arose from an interest-bearing $12,-
167,000 loan granted to Greece in 1929 by the
United States Government with congressional
authorization for the purpose of helping to fi-
nance the work of the Refugee Settlement Com-
mission, established under the League of Na-
tions auspices. Partial repayments were made
by the Greek Government until 1940, when the
World War II invasion of Greece occurred.

Under the new arrangement Greece has
agreed to repay a principal of $13,155,921. In-
terest will be payable at 2 percent from the date
of the settlement. Redemption of principal
will be accomplished through yearly sinking
fund payments. This settlement follows the
pattern of the agreement reached in October
1962 between the private United States bond-
holders and the Greek Government.

The Government of the United States has
agreed, subject to congressional approval, to
use all of the funds derived from this settlement
for financing a cultural and educational ex-
change program between Greece and the United
States. The signing of this agi'eement is re-
garded as a further sign of the cooperation and
friendship which continue to characterize
relations between the two countries.

984

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

World Trade Week, 1964

A PROCLAMATION"
Whebeas reciprocal world trade advances our prog-
ress toward global prosperity and abundance, freedom,
and well-being ; and

Whereas the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, which was opened in Geneva, Switzer-
land, on May -1,^ is designed to reduce international
trade barriers in order to expand marliet opportunities
for the benefit of both developed and developing coun-
tries of the world ; and

Whereas the expansion of United States export
trade is vital to the improvement of our balance of in-
ternational payments, to the continuing growth of
American industry, and to the fuller employment of
American workers ; and

Where:as the quickening pace of economic progress
in nations around tie world is enlarging the opportuni-
ties for our businessmen to sell American products
abroad ; and

Whereas the progressive opening of national mar-
kets everywhere to greater international competition
challenges American businessmen to participate more
vigorously in the exchange of goods and services among
nations and, thus, to provide an inspiring demonstra-
tion of the vigor and value of competitive private
enterprise :

Now, THEREFORE, I, Lyndoit B. Johnson, President
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
the week beginning May 17, 19G4, as World Trade
Week ; and I request the appropriate Federal, State,
and local officials to cooperate in the observance of
that week.

I also urge business, labor, agriculture, educational
and civic groups, as well as the people of the United
States generally, to observe World Trade Week with
gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other
appropriate activities designed to promote continuing
awareness of the importance of world trade to our
economy and our relations with other nations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this eighth day of
May in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[seal] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the one hun-
dred and eighty-eighth.

By the President :

George W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

THE CONGRESS

President Signs International
Development Association Bill

Ronarka by President Johnson'^

I am verj' proud to sign tliis bill to iiuthorize
our coimtry's continued participation in the
International Development Association.

This legislation makes it possible for the
United States to help an international institu-
tion which had its beginnings in the United
States, has made it possible for other industrial
nations to aid less developed countries, and is
now performing its duties efficiently and
successfully.

The United States Governors of the Associa-
tion will be authorized to vote for a proposed
$750 million increase in the As.sociation's re-
sources. Our share of $312 million will be
provided over a 3-year period. Other countries
will put up more than $1.40 for every dollar the
United States provides. This money will be
used for easy-term loans to important projects
which the development coimtries could not af-
ford at regular commercial terms.

Tliis action is one more milestone in our ef-
forts to enlist the cooperation of free-world
countries in the common task of helping less
fortunate nations to help themselves. It is also
another milestone in our historic commitment
to help other people lift from their weary
shoulders the burdens of poverty and disease,
illiteracy and hunger. We can no more accept
a world in which we are surrounded by poverty
than we can accept poverty within our own
borders.

This is international sharing at its best and a
victory for the American people, for an effec-
tive foreign policy, and for common sense in
our international relationships.

' No. 3591 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 6373.

* For background, see BtJLLETTN of June 1, 1964,
p. 878.

' Made on May 26 on the occasion of the signing of
S. 2214, the International Development Association bill
(White House press release).

JUNE 15, 1964

935

I want to thank each Member of the Congress
■who participated in successfully handling this
legislation. I want to congratulate the Mem-
bers of the Senate and the House who made
this ^^ctory possible. You will be proud of
this action in the days to come.

Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign
Vessels in U.S. Territorial Waters

Following is a statement made hy President
Johnson on May 20 when he signed S. 1988, to-
gether with a Department statement of the
8am,e date regarding tlie application of the legis-
lation to Japan.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated May 20

I have today [May 20] signed into law S.
1988, a bill which prohibits fishing by foreign
vessels in the territorial waters of the United
States. This law fills a longstanding need for
legislation to prevent foreign fishing vessels,
which in recent years have appeared off our
coast in increasing numbers, from fishing in our
territorial waters.

The new law will not establish any new rights
to the continental shelf. But it will make pos-
sible the enforcement of whatever rights now
exist or may be established. Since the waters
over the continental shelf are high seas, efforts
will be made to work out in advance with
foreign coimtries procedures for enforcement
there. In this connection, the United States
has assured Japan that in such consultations
with Japan full consideration will be given to
Japan's long-established king crab fishery.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

The Governments of Japan and the United
States have held a series of discussions in Wash-
ington on the effect of the U.S. legislation S.
1988, which was signed by President Johnson
today.

The Unit«d States Government has explained

to the Japanese Government that this legisla-
tion would not, of itself, constitute the asser-
tion of any right to jurisdiction over resources
that does not already exist and that it is con-
cerned primarily with providing meaningful
protection to such rights as now exist or which
might be acquired at some time in the future.

The position of the Government of Japan is
that it is not bound by the convention on the
continental shelf, to which Japan is not a party,
and that therefore the rights of the Government
of Japan will not be affected by the provisions
of S. 1988 relating to fishery resources of the
continental shelf. The Government of the
United States has taken note of this position.

The United States Government has assured
the Japanese Government that prior to im-
plementing this legislation with respect to
fishery resources of the continental shelf, the
United States Government will consult with
the Japanese Government and that in such con-
sultations full consideration will be given to
the views of the Japanese Government and to
Japan's long-established king crab fishery.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

International Commission for Supervision and Control
in Laos. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on S. 1627, a bill to enable the United
States to contribute its share of the expenses of the
International Commission as provided in article 18
of the protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos. September 24, 1963. 26 pp.

88th Congress, 2d Session

Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance
of Payments. Hearings before the Joint Economic
Committee. Part 4. March 25-26, 1964. 180 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 10502, to
amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, and for other purposes. Part II, April
6-9, 1964, 187 pp. ; Part III. April 10-15, 1964, 175 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Natural
Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 10537. H.
Rept. 1326. April 15. 1964. 3 pp.

Reduction of Oil Pollution in the St. Lawrence Seaway
and Adjacent Waters. Report to accompany H. Con.
Res. 45. II. Rept. 1345. April 27, 1964. 3 pp.

International Reciprocity for Amateur Radio Opera-
tors. Report to accompany S. 920. H. Rept. 1349.
April 27, 1964. 16 pp.

936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Continues Debate on Cambodian Complaint

Following are two statements Jtiade on May
26 in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Rep-
resentative Adlal E. Stevenson.

FIRST STATEMENT

U.S./O.N. press release 4398

I will not dwell on the repeated charges by
the representative of the Soviet Union of ag-
gression by the United States against Cambodia.
Such unsupported attacks and accusations have
been a stiindard fixture in the cold-war rhetoric
of the Soviet Government for many years.

But I must express my surprise at the i-epeti-
tion by Cambodia in this Council of imsubstan-
tiated charges of aggression by my Government.
The Council has so far met upon 3 days to con-
sider the Cambodian complaint. Each day my
Government has denied any aggressive actions
or intentions toward Cambodia. We have
specifically denied that Americans crossed the
border on the occasions about which Cambodia
has complained. Each day, however, the Cam-
bodian representative — most recently their dis-
tinguished Foreign Mmister [Huot Sambath] —
has reiterated these unfounded charges.

I remind the members of the Council that
long before these meetings commenced the
United States admitted that in one instance an
American had crossed into Cambodia and ex-
pressed its sincere regrets to the Cambodian
Government. It has, as I said, denied the other
charges. Nor has any evidence been introduced
to support them. Nevertheless, the distin-
guished representatives of Cambodia in this
Council have continued to repeat imprecise and

unsupported assertions implying that numerous
^Vmericans have violated Cambodian territory
on several occasions, specifically with regard to
the incidents of May 7 and 8. I hope we will
hear no more of such charges.

In the meantime — to remove any vestige of
doubt — let me repeat once more that the United
States has not committed any act against Cam-
bodia which could possibly be considered
aggression by any objective and reasonable on-
looker. Let me repeat again that, with the ex-
ception of the Chantrea incident, our investi-
gations show that no American personnel have
crossed into Cambodian territory. And, finally,
let me say that United States personnel assist-
ing the Vietnamese Army in its efforts to defend
its country are under strictest orders not to cross
the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

I also wish to add that as a result of the close
association my Government has had with Viet-
Nam, the United States is convinced that Viet-
Nam has no aggressive designs toward Cam-
bodia whatsoever and cannot be charged with
acts of calculated aggression against Cambodia.
The reasoned presentation of the Vietnamese
representative [Vu Van Mau] here yesterday
was further confirmation of the anxiety and
efforts of the Republic of Viet-Nam to re-
store good relations with its ancient neighbor,
Cambodia.

Indeed, it is almost ludicrous to suggest that
Viet-Nam — with all its energies concentrated on
a life-and-death struggle to defeat guerrilla
forces sponsored and supported from outside —
would choose to embark upon a policy of ag-
gression toward its neighbor. Border frictions
there have been. But this is hardly surprising

JUNE 15, 1904

937

when the nature of the border and difficulty
of controlling it, the mixed ethnic population
along it, and the Viet Cong activities there are
taken into account.

U.S. Would Welcome U.N. Border Control Force

Next, I must confess that I am unable to
understand the views of the Cambodian repre-
sentative concerning the role of the United
Nations in this complaint.

First, the Koyal Government of Cambodia
filed a complaint against Viet-Nam and the
United States* and, on May 13, asked for a
meeting of the Security Council as soon as pos-
sible.^ Next, the Cambodian representative
stressed the responsibility of the Security Coun-
cil to seek a solution in this matter. Last Tues-
day, for example, he stated in this Council that :

The Security Council, to which our organization
has entrusted the main responsibility for maintain-
ing international peace and security, has an undoubted
supervisory responsibility over a situation which seri-
ously threatens peace and security.

Last Thursday he said :

The main objective of the United Nations is the
maintenance of peace, and to this end our organiza-
tion must, in accordance with the terms of the Charter,
not only stop any acts of aggression but also try to
avoid a recurrence of such acts if they have taken
place.

However, almost at the same time the Cam-
bodian representative seems reluctant to con-
sider United Nations machinery to do precisely
what he requests. Specifically, on last Thurs-
day, he also told the Coimcil :

It has been suggested that a new and efficient
mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations
should be devised ; but we thinli such a new mechanism
would not be able to resolve the question in a definite
and permanent maimer.

I must confess to some bewilderment. A sit-
uation threatening peace and security is brought
to the United Nations with an urgent plea for
help, in accordance with the peacekeeping re-
sponsibilities of the charter, and then the com-
plainant argues that the solution lies outside
the United Nations. And the di.stinguished
representative of France [Roger Seydoux]

' U.N. doc. S/.-WCO.
* U.N. doc. S/5C&7.

yesterday said, if I understood him, that he
agrees that the solution lies outside the United
Nations.

I am perplexed — since there has been no ex-
planation why they believe the United Nations,
to which Cambodia has appealed for action,
cannot act quickly and decisively. The unsup-
ported conclusion that it cannot act quickly and
decisively escapes me entirely. It seems to me
that it certainly can do better on both points
than any other means. And if not, why was
the complaint filed in the Security Council ?

I believe all of us here will agree that the
United Nations has an admirable, albeit imper-
fect, record in dealing with problems equally
or more serious than the problem now before
the Council. I think most of us can also agree
that the United Nations' peacekeeping machin-
ery, whatever its shortcomings, stands up in
shining splendor in comparison with the frus-
trations, hesitancy, and inactivity which have
marked the record of machinery set up under
Geneva agreements — that is, the International
Control Commissions. Under these we have
endless war in Laos and Viet-Nam, and now
these charges of border violations in Cambodia.

The whole sad history of the International
Control Commissions — whether in Viet-Nam,
Cambodia, or Laos — makes it patently clear
that the Commissions, by the very nature of
their composition, are incapable of quick, de-
cisive action — the kind of action which will be
necessary to prevent a recurrence of the recent
unfortunate incidents along the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border. The present sad expe-
rience in Laos is certainly demonstrating for
all to see that the ICC can be prevented — by
the willful action of only one member, in clear
violation of the agreement establishing the
Commission — from performing even the most
routine duties assigned to it under that agree-
ment.

With this backgi-ound and experience in
mind, my Government is not prepared to agree
to the extension of the ICC system beyond its
present bounds to deal with the problems which
have arisen on the Cambodian-Vietnamese
border.

If the Royal Government of Cambodia truly
wishes effective control and protection of the
border between Cambodia and Viet-Nam, the

988

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

means are available here and now in this Coun-
cil. Cambodia lias appealed for assistance to
the world's primary agency for the maintenance
of peace and security — the Security Council.
The representative of Cambodia has called for
the Security Council to try to avoid a recur-
rence of the border incidents. Viet-Nam and
tiie United States, against whom the complaint
has been made, would welcome a United Nations
boi'der control force. They are prepared to
establish it here and now. We are also anxious
to have the border clearly marked. The Coun-
cil can act, and act effectively. The remedy is
available — if Cambodia wants what it asked
for.

Use of Cambodian Territory by Viet Cong

As I stated before the Council on May 21,*
my Government has an open mind toward sug-
gestions that the United Nations — in addition
to taking prompt action to establish a force for
supervising and controlling the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border — appoint a committee of in-
quiry to look into various aspects of the border
problem. The proceedings in the Council, how-
ever, make it clear that such a committee, to be
worth while, must be assigned a task more use-
ful than that of investigating alleged charges
that the Cambodian Government is guilty of
complicity with the Viet Cong.

Should the Council — in addition to establish-
ing a force — deem it advisable to establish a
committee of inquiry in response to the Cam-
bodian request, the committee must be given ac-
cess to all available information. It must be
given access to the terrain and population on
both sides of border spots which have been
troublesome in the past, as well as to prisoners
captured by either side, be they Vietnamese or
Viet Cong. To be useful, such a committee
should be empowered to make recommendations
to this Council concerning further steps to con-
tribute to stability in the region. It thus should
address itself to the question of how the Cam-
bodian-Vietnamese border can be made immime
from border violations emanating from any
source, and from either side of the border.

In short, if the cause of border incidents is to
be rooted out, the Vietnamese must be expected

• For text, see BuUuBtin of June 8, 1964, p. 907.

to refrain conscientiously from crossing into
Cambodian territory, and Cambodia must like-
wise be expected to insure that the Viet Cong
cannot and do not make use of Cambodian soil.

The Vietnamese representative has presented
impressive evidence to substantiate the fact that
the Viet Cong do, in fact, make use of Cam-
bodian territory. I have no desire to detain the
Council by reviewing this evidence again. Our
own evidence supports that of Viet-Nam. I
would point out also that the Cambodian repre-
sentative's statement that no Viet Cong has ever
moved into Cambodian territory is surprising,
to say the least, not only because of its sweeping
and categorical nature in an area where borders
are ill-marked and indifferently controlled but
also because it contradicts previous statements
from the Cambodians themselves.

As an example I wish to call to the Council's
attention an announcement by the Cambodian
General Staff on September 7, 1961. The an-
nouncement stated that armed units of the
Cambodian Government had engaged an armed
band of 100 "foreigners" at the border in Svay
Rieng (the Vietnamese border), taking pris-
oners and destroying "the entire encampment
consisting of about 50 shelters." One of the
prisoners, according to the announcement, ad-
mitted to being captain of a Viet Cong unit
which had been carrying on "combined exercises
on our (that is, Cambodian) territory since
August 1961" but was "regularly quartered
about one kilometer from the frontier in Viet-
namese territory."

Prince Sihanouk, himself, has admitted Viet
Cong use of his frontiers. In a signed article
published in the Jul}' 20, 1962, issue of Realites
Cambodgiennes Prince Sihanouk said that "as
for serving as a Viet Cong zone of passage in
spite of ourselves, it is strange that Laos which,
according to the American Wliite Paper (A
Threat to the Peace), is nine times more impor-
tant as a source of Viet Cong transit, has not
been punished as severely as ourselves. . . ."
"Wliat coimtry in the world," the Prince asked,
"is capable of sealing its frontiers against all
smugglers and spies? . . . How can we, with
29,000, do what South Viet Nam cannot accom-
plish with 300,000?"

The regrettable incidents of May 7 and 8 of
this year have produced further evidence that

JUNE 15, 1964

939

the Viet Cong continue to use Cambodiun tei-ri-
tory. During the operations of May 7 and 8,
the Vietnamese Army was successful in cap-
turing 13 Viet Cong prisoners. Interrogation
of three of these prisoners has produced state-
ments -which are of direct relevance at this
point. They stated that each time there is an
operation by the Vietnamese armed forces,
Viet Cong units normally run over into Cam-
bodian territory. From late 1963 until the time
of their capture, they stated, they had several
times run into Cambodian territorj' to avoid
operations of the Vietnamese Air Force. They
also stated that their Viet Cong units purchased
most of their food in Cambodia and, to this end,
every month sent two or three supply groups
of about 30 persons each from Viet-Nam into
Cambodia.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, let me
repeat that my purpose in bringing this evi-
dence to the attention of the Council is not to
charge or even imply that the Cambodian Gov-
ernment consciously assists the Viet Cong by
permitting them to use Cambodian territory.
My purpose, rather, is to demonstrate that both
Cambodian authorities and the Viet Cong
themselves admit that the Viet Cong have used
and continue to use Cambodian territory — obvi-
ously to the disadvantage of the Vietnamese in
their fight against an armed insurrection sup-
ported and directed from outside their borders.

The Task Before the Security Council

In conclusion, however, I would say this.
The Security Council should be less concerned
with faultfinding than with putting an end to
the causes of international discord and fric-
tion, and in this case with responding to the
complaint brought here by Cambodia.

We are told that the Government of Cam-
bodia seeks no more than the effective guaran-
tee of its territorial integrity and neutrality.
So far as the United States is concerned, we
believe that effective steps should be taken to-
ward this end by the Security Covmcil and that
in the course of taking the appropriate deci-
sions the Security Council would naturally
wish also to call on all states to respect Cam-
bodia's territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence, as well as that of Viet-Nam.

In most general terms the Security Council is
in a position to take concrete steps which would,
by fact and by word, provide what Cambodia
appears to seek. But this Council is not in a
position to provide the words without the prac-
tical steps; indeed it would be grossly mislead-
ing and irresponsible to seek through this
Council any paper guarantees of the sort which
are today being torn up in Laos.

Tliis Coimcil should respond to the justified
concerns which have been expressed here by the
representative of a member state. These inci-
dents, for the most part, have brought pain and
suffermg to the people of Cambodia itself. We
can assist in avoiding such incidents in the
future.

We, as members of the Security Council,
therefore have two tasks before us :

First, that of weighing the e\ndenc« and
reaching a careftil and balanced evaluation of
the full sources and origins of the incidents be-
tween Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-JsTam.

Second, deciding on practicable steps by
which the United Nations can use its peacekeep-
ing experience to meet the needs of a situation
which has been characterized by the Govern-
ment of Cambodia as "an extremely grave threat
to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia."

To sum up, Mr. President, Cambodia came to
the Council for the kind of help that only the
U.N. can provide — to stop the trouble on its
border with Viet-Nam. Let us provide that
help.

SECOND STATEMENT

U.S. /U.N. press release 4399

Evidently Ambassador [N. T.] Fedorenko,
speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, is not
very familiar with the political system that
exists in this free country. Briefly, let me in-
form you, Mr. Ambassador, that our Govern-
ment is divided into three branches: the legis-
lative, the executive, and the judicial. It is the
legislative branch that makes the laws. It is
Iho executive branch that executes them. It is
the judicial branch that interprets them. Sub-
ject to the laws, current policy of the United
States is made and executed by the executive

940

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

branch ami not by Senator Goldwater or any
other Senator.*

If I understood his sometimes obscure and
generally otfensive language, the Soviet repre-
sentative. Ambassador Fedorenko, has asked
me for a clear and unambiguous answer as to
whether the policy of the United States in
Southeast Asia is more peace or more war.
Well, I am very glad to answer his question by
repeating what I had said here in the Council
the other day. i\jid perhaps it would save us
time hereafter if my distinguished colleague
from the Soviet Union listened to what I said—
or I wonder if that, perhaps, would spoil the
effect of his rhetorical mythology. A wise man
once said in this country that there is nothing
more horrible to witness than the murder of a
beautiful myth by a horrible fact.

Well, this is what I said — I had not expected
to have to repeat it, but I welcome the chance.
I said here, speaking on May 21 :

. . . the United States has no, repeat no, national
military objective anywhere in Southeast Asia.
United States policy for Southeast Asia is very simple.
It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of
that area can go about their own independent business
in whatever associations they may freely choose for
themselves without interference from the outside.

I trust my words have been clear enough on this
point.

Second, the United States Government is currently
involved in the affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam
for one reason and one reason only : because the Re-
public of Viet-Nam requested the help of the United
States and of other governments to defend itself
against armed attaclc fomented, equipped, and directed
from the outside.

Now, let me, with apologies to all of you for
detaining you at this late hour, say something
else to the Security Council. The Soviet repre-
sentative has in the worst tradition of the cold
war which he has revived here laid before us
allegations concerning military measures which
the United States might in the future take in
Southeast Asia. He has not explained — and
we can hardly be surprised that he has not —
the military measures which the Hanoi regime,
with the assistance of its powerful Communist
allies, has for many years been taking inside the

* In a statement on May 26 Mr. Fedorenko said
that Senator Goldwater had appealed for the use of
atomic weapons in Viet-Xam.

territories of its neighbors, Laos and the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam. It is the outrageous, the per-
sistent military action of the Hanoi regime
which constitutes the longstanding threat to
the peace of Southeast Asia and to the teiri-
torial integrity of the other nations of that
region. That, and that only, is the cause of the
war in Southeast Asia.

Let tlie Communist powers cease their ag-
gressions, and it will no longer be necessary for
the United States to help those nations preserve
their independence and maintain the Geneva
accords. Unless and until they do cease their
aggression, the United States will, indeed, as
I assured the Council last week, help by what-
ever means are necessary the free nations of
Southeast Asia to remain free. I trust the po-
sition of the United States is clear, and clear
enough to satisfy the representative of the
Soviet Union.

U.S. and Euratom To Cooperate
on Fast Neutron Reactors

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 257 dated May 27

Secretary of State Dean Rusk on May 27
welcomed the understanding reached between
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and
the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) to engage in a comprehensive
program of cooperation in the development of
fast neutron reactors as "a concrete example of
Atlantic partnership at work."

Secretary Rusk expressed his great satisfac-
tion with the increasingly close relationship
that has come to exist between the United
States and EURATOM since the latter was
established in 1958. He emphasized that these
new cooperative arrangements held exceptional
promise for realizing our common long-term
objective of producing abundant and inexpen-
sive nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

As announced by Atomic Energy Commis-
sion Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, technologi-
cal progress with respect to fast reactors will
be facilitated by the full exchange of technical

JTJNE 15, 1964

941

information developed from complementary re-
search efforts. The exchange arrangements
which relate specifically to an initial period of
10 years anticipate continued cooperation be-
yond 1974.

During the next 5 years it is expected that the
United States will spend some $150 million to
$200 million on its research and development
program in the field of fast reactors. During
the same period, the Europeans plan to spend
an approximately equal amoimt on their fast-
reactor program.

AEC ANNOUNCEMENT

Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, aimounced on
May 27 completion of arrangements between the
European Atomic Energy Community (EUR-
ATOM) and the AEC for close teclinical co-
operation in the development of fast neutron
reactors. An agreement was signed on that day
by representatives of the United States and
EURATOM in Brussels. This cooperation
wDl take place in implementation of the Addi-
tional Agreement for Cooperation concluded
between the U.S. Government and EURATOM
on June 11, 1960.^

The cooperative effort provides for a detailed
exchange of information on fast reactors, as
well as for the AEC to supply to EURATOM,
at the Commission's regular charges, plutonium
and enriched uranium needed for the Commu-
nity's fast-reactor program.

The AEC carries out in the United States an
important research and development program
in the field of fast reactors, and EURATOM
conducts a similar effort in Europe mostly con-
centrated in contracts between the EURATOM
Commission and representatives of three of its
six member countries — the Commissariat a
I'Energie Atomique (CEA) in France, the
Gesellschaft fuer Kemforschimg in Germany,
and the Comitato Nazionale per le Energia Nu-
cleare(CNEN) in Italy.

The efforts of both the United States and
EURATOM have as a principal objective the
development of teclinically and economically
feasible nuclear power plants of the fast-

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4650.

breeder type (nuclear reactors which produce
as much or more fissionable material than they
consiune). It is expected that AEC and
EURATOM vmdertakings in the fast-reactor
field, for the period of 1963-67, will involve
comparable levels of effort.

Under the information exchange arrange-
ments, the AEC and EURATOM will exchange
information on all fast neutron reactor pro-
grams for civilian central power station
applications and applicable research and devel-
opment programs in this field in which the AEC
or EURATOM is now, or will be, participating
during the period of the agreement. The ex-
change arrangements define the areas of tech-
nology on which the AEC and EURATOM
will exchange detailed information. The agree-
ment also sets up procedures for this coopera-
tion and contains associated patent arrange-
ments. The term of the cooperation is initially
for 10 years.

In recent years, as a result of a growing in-
terest of both EURATOM and the AEC in the
fast-reactor field, there have been exchange
visits of technical teams between the Commu-
nity and the United States. These visits,
supplemented by staff discussions, culminated
in an exchange of letters last year between the
AEC and EURATOM in which it was agreed
that a comprehensive fast-reactor information
exchange would be developed, and which in-
cluded the guidelines for the detailed arrange-
ments to be negotiated.

In order to facilitate the information ex-
change, the cooperative arrangements provide
also for the United States to supply plutonium,
subject to appropriate statutory authorization,
and enriched uranium. As a result, the parties
have agreed to proceed with negotiation of a
contract under which EURATOM will pur-
chase approximately 350 kilograms of pluto-
nium from the AEC at the established U.S.
domestic base price at time of delivery, valued
at $15 million on the basis of current prices.
The plutonium will be for use in the Sneak and
Mazurka critical experiment facilities in Karls-
ruhe, Germany, and Cadarache, France, re-
spectively. A substantial portion of the mate-
rial may be used in both facilities at different
times.

942

DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BUUiETIN

Tlie AEC will also supply the U-235 needs
of the Coninuinity's fast -react or pi-oiiraiu, as
now forese<>n, under a combination of normal
and special short-term lease arrangements at
the prevailing I^.S. domestic use cliarge for
sucii material, which now is 4% percent. At
the end of the short-term lease period EUR-
ATOM will ha\'e an option to purchase the
material or return it to the United States.

Consortium To Aid India Pledges
$1 Billion for 1964-65

On May 26 the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development released the follow-
ing com7nunigtie.

The Consortium of governments and institu-
tions interested in development assistance to
India held its tenth meeting in Washington on
May '20, 1904, under the chairmanship of the
World Bank. The meeting was attended by
representatives of the Governments of Austria,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the United States and by representatives
of the World Bank and the International De-
velopment Association (IDA). The Interna-
tional Monet aiy Fund sent an observer.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss aid
for India during 1964/65, the fourth ye<ar of
India's Tliird Five- Year Plan. The Consor-
tium had held preliminary' discussions on the
same subject in Paris on March 17 and 18.

At the beginning of the Third Plan the Gov-

Aust ria

Belgium

Canada. _

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

Netherlands

United Kingdom

United States

World Bank and IDA.

Total.

ernment of India assessed the total requirement
of external assistance from all sources, includ-
ing non-Consortium countries and pri\ate for-
eign investment, at $5,460 million. Against
this, the members of (he Consortium lime al-
ready i)ledged $."5,417 million of aid to India
for the fii-st three yeare of the Third Plan. At
the meeting just concluded, they undcrt/wk lo
make additional aid available for conunitment
iluring tiie fourth year of the Plan in the
amount of about $1,028 million, subject iis ap-
propriate to legislative action or other neces-
sary authorisation. The new pledges for
1964/65 are as follows:

Countries
Austria ..

f/.S. $ million

ripiirn

'Irnt
1

Canada - _.

41

France

•?.o

CJernianv

'r>

Italv

.•?«

.Tapan _ .

CO

Xethcrlands

11

Uiiitpfl Kingdom.

«4

United States

435

Wiirld Blink and

IDA

1,

245

Total —

,028

Members of the Consortium considered it im-
portant that a substantial part of the aid to be
extended to India during the coming year
shoidd be in the form of non-project aid which
could be used to finance imports required for the
maintenance of the Indian economy. Approxi-
mately half of the aid pledged at the meeting
is expected to be in this form.

The following table sets out the aid pledges
made by membei-s of the Consortium in each
of the first four years of India's Third Five-
Year Plan:

($ million equivalent)

1961168 1962163 1963/64 1964/65

28

15

225

50

182
545
250

5

10

33

45

139

53

55

11

84

435

200

{
10

mi

20

mi

45

65

11

84
435
245

41
20
95
36
60
11
84
435
245

4-Year
Total

13
20

132}^
100
558Ji
134
230
33
434
1,850
940

1,295

1,070 1,052

1,028 4,445

It was agreed that the Consortium should meet again early in 1965.

JUNE 15, 1964

943

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Concludes Meat Agreement
With Mexico

Press release 231 dated May 14
STATE-AGRICULTURE ANNOUNCEMENT

The Government of Mexico has agreed to
limit beef and veal exports to the United States
this year to a level 9 percent below 1963, the
Departments of State and Agriculture an-
nounced on May 14.

The agreement with Mexico is along the same
lines as agreements the United States concluded
with Austria and New Zealand on February 17 ^
and with Ireland on February 25.^ It covers
beef and veal in all forms other than canned,
cured, and cooked meats and live cattle. The
four countries with which agreements have now
been concluded comprise all the principal sup-
pliers of U.S. imports of products covered by
the agreements. Together, they supply 90 per-
cent of U.S. imports of these products. Mexico
accounts for about 7 percent.

Mexico has agreed to limit its exports to the
United States in 1964 to 29,600 long tons (66.3
million pounds), in 1965 to 30,700 long tons
(68.8 million pounds), and in 1966 to 31,800
long tons (71.2 million pounds).

The United States has imported the following
quantities of beef and veal from Mexico in recent
years:

19.58
19.59
1900
1961
1962
1903

75. 0 million pounds

48.9

39.1

S3. 4

59.3

73.0

The limit specified for 1964 represents the
average level of U.S. imports of these products
from Mexico in 1962 and 1963. The 1964 limit
is 3,000 long tons (6.7 million pounds) below
U.S. imports in 1963, a reduction of more than

' Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 380.
* Ibid.. Mar. 23, 1964, p. 468.

9 percent. In the absence of an agreement, it
is estimated that beef and veal exports from
Mexico would have been at least as large as in
1963.

Mexico's exports to the United States in 1965
and 1966 will be allowed to grow by 3.7 percent
annually over the limit set for 1964, the rate at
which consumption is expected to grow in this
market. The agreement provides for triennial
review of this growth factor and adjustment as
appropriate for each succeeding period.

The agreement with Mexico provides that
Mexico will use its best efforts to keep the pro-
portion of fresh or chilled beef and veal from
increasing relative to frozen meat in its ship-
ments to the United States. The purpose of
this provision is to prevent significant shifts
from beef used for manufacturing to beef used
for direct consumption in retail and institu-
tional outlets.

The agreement is of indefinite duration but
may be terminated by either party upon at least
6 months' notice prior to the end of any cal-
endar year. The two Governments affirm that
they favor the negotiation of international ar-
rangements leading to expanding access of meat
exporting countries to world markets. The
agreement with Mexico could be incorporated
into such arrangements.

Although live cattle are not included in the
agreement, the subject of live cattle exports from
Mexico to the United States was discussed by
the representatives of the two countries. These
cattle are fattened and slaughtered in the United
States and add to the total meat supplies here.
For the first 6 months (September 1963-Febru-
ary 1964) of the current Mexican cattle year,
U.S. imports of cattle from Mexico were down
to 237,000 head compared to 528,000 head for
the like period of the preceding year. The total
of these imports during tlie whole of the 1963-64
cattle marketing year is expected to be well
below tlie 770,000 head imported durmg
1962-63.

944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

UNITED STATES NOTE

May 14. 1964.
Excellency : I liave the honor to refer to your note
of May 14. 1904. concerning trade in beef and veal be-
tween Mexico and the United States which reads in
translation as follows :

"I have the honor to refer to recent discussions In
Washington between representatives of the Govern-
ment of Mexico and the Government of the United
States with regard to the desire of the Government
of the United States to arrive at an understanding
concerning the level of future exports of beef and
veal from Mexico to the United States. As a result
of these discussions, I have the honor to proixise that
the following Agreement shall become effective
between our Governments :

The Governments of Mexico and the United States
have agreed to the following measures in the interest
of promoting the orderly development of trade in
beef and veal between Mexico and the United States.
In assuming the following obligations, the Govern-
ments of Mexico and the United States have agreed
on the desirability of preserving approximately the
present pattern of trade in these products between
the two countries.

1. Accordingly, the Government of Mexico agrees
to limit exports from Mexico to the United States
of beef and veal (in all forms except canned, cured
and cooked meat and live cattle), in accordance with
the following :

(a) Exijorts will be limited to a total of 29,600
long tons in calendar year 1964, 30,700 long tons in
calendar year 1965. and 31.800 long tons in calendar
year 1966. all in terms of product weight.

(b) In each succeeding calendar year there shall
be an increase, corresponding to the estimated rate
of increase in the total United States market for
these meats. This increase in the total United States
market is presently estimated to be 3.7 percent
annually.

(c) The purpose of the annual increase estal>-
lished in paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) is to secure to
Mexico a fair and reasonable share in the growth
of the United States market. There shall be a tri-
ennial review and, as appropriate, an adjustment
of this estimated rate of increase in consumption
to apply to the succeeding three-year period. The
first such review shall take place no later than
October 1, 1966.

(d) The Government of Mexico shall use its best
endeavors to limit exports from Mexico to the United
States of chilled or fresh beef and veal approxi-
mately to the percentage which chilled or fresh beef
and veal currently constitute of total annual exports
of beef and veal from Mexico to the United States.

2. The Government of Mexico shall limit exports
from Mexico to the United States upon the under-
standing that Mexico will not be adversely affected

by such liniitatiuns in relation to the position of
other substantial suppliers in the United States
market and so long as Mexico's access to the United
States market for beef and veal is not limited by an
Increase in the duties on these products.

3. The United States Government shall continue to
permit access each year into the United States for
beef and veal exported from Mexico up to the maxi-
mum quantity determined for tliat year in accord-
ance with the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and
1(b) of this Agreement.

4. The Governments favor the negotiation of inter-
national arrangements leading to expanding access
in meat importing countries.

5. Should such wider international arrangements
be reached, they could subsume this Agreement.

6. The Governments agree to consult, at the request
of either Government, on any questions arising on
the implementation of this Agreement.

7. Either Government may terminate this Agree-
ment, effective at the end of a calendar year, by writ-
ten notice given at least 180 days prior to the end of
that calendar year.

If these proposals are acceptable to your Govern-
ment this note and your note of acceptance shall
form an Agreement between our Governments."

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the United States that the Agreement pro-
posed in your note and set forth above is acceptable to
the United States Government and will govern trade
in beef and veal between Mexico and the United States.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.

Geoboe W. Ball
Acting Secretary of State

His Excellency

Antonio Carbillo Flores,

Ambassador of Mexico.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific,
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake
Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May
21, 1952."
Signature: Uruguay, April 27, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964."
Ratifications deposited: Holy See, April 17, 1964;

Liechtenstein. May 8, 1964.
Accession deposited: Gabon, April 2, 1964.

' Not In force for the United States.

JUXE 15, 1064

945

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations concerning compulsory settlement of dis-
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into
force April 24, 1964.'

Katiflcation deposited: Liechtenstein, May 8, 1964.
Accession deposited: Gabon, April 2, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958. Enters into force June 10, 1964.
Proclaimed by the President: May 25, 1964.

BILATERAL

programs. Signed at Monrovia
Entered into force May 8, 1964.

May 8, 1964.

Philippines

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C.
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Ma-
nila May 14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Consular convention. Signed at Moscovf June 1, 1964.
Enters into force on the 30th day following the day
ratifications are exchanged.

Austria

Agreement regarding the return of Austrian property,
rights and interests with schedule and annex.
Signe<l at Washington January 30, 1959. Entered
into force May 19. 1964.
Proclaimed hy the President: May 26, 1964.

Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of September 11, 1963 (TXAS 5471).
Effected by exchanges of notes and agreed minutes
at Rio de Janeiro May 15, 1964. Entered into force
May 15. 1964.

Cambodia

Agreement relating to direct military assistance, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom
Penh May 16, 1955. Entered into force May 16,
1955. TIAS 3240.

Xotification of termination: November 20, 1963,
effective May 20, 1964. except for paras. 3, 4, 5, 6,
and 7, which remain in force until their revision or
abrogation by a new agreement.

Canada

Agreement relating to the phaseout of certain radar
stations established under the agreement of August 1.
1951 (TIAS 3049), relating to the continental radar
defense system. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington May 25, 1964. Entered into force May
25, 1964.

Colombia

Agri-ement providing for the continuation of the rawin-
sonde observation stations on San Andres Island and
at BogoUi. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota
April 27 and May 13, 1;k>4. Entered into force
May 13, 1964.

Liberia

Agreement relating to the transfer of the Port of Mon-
rovia to Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Monrovia April 13 and 14, 1964. Entered into force
April 14, 1964.

Agreement relating to the construction of a port and
IX)rt works, with exchange of notes. Signed at
Monrovia December 31, 1943. Entered into force
December 31, 1943. .58 Stat. 1357.
Terminated: April 14, liHH.

Agreement relating to the designation of a i)ermaneut
free port area. Effected by exchange of notes at
Monrovia July 24 and 26, 1948. Entered into force
J uly 20, 1948. TIAS 2207.
Terminated: April 14, 1964.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange

' Not in force for the United States.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 28 confirmed the following
nominations :

William McCormack Blair, Jr., to be Ambassador
to the Philippines. ( For biographic details, see White
House press release dated March 26.)

William Witman II to be Ambassador to the Repub-
lic of Togo. (For biographic details, see White House
press relea.se dated May 19.)

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 25-31

Press releases may be obtained from the Oflice
of Xews, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Releases issued prior to May 25 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 224 of
May 9, 231 of May 14, and 246 of May 19.

Sabject

Chad credentials (rewrite).

U.S. participation in international
conferences.

Program for visit of Prime Minister
of Israel.

Program for visit of President of
Ireland.

Cooperation between U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission and EUR-
ATOM on comprehensive
program.

Debt settlement agreement with
(Jreece.

Delegation to 23d meeting of Inter-
national Cotton Advisory Com-
mittee (rewrite).

*Xot printed.

tUeld for later i.ssue of the Bulletin.

No.

Date

2.53
*254

5/25
5/25

*255

5/25

*256

5/25

257

5/27

258

5/28

t259

5/28

946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX June 15, 1961,. Vol. L, No. 1303

Asia. Meeting at Honolulu Reviews Situation

in Southeast Asia 920

Atomic Energy. U.S. and Euratom To Coop-
erate on Fast Neutron Reactors 041

Cambodia. Security Council Continues Debate

on Cambodian Complaint (Stevenson) . . . 937

Chad. I.etters of Credence (Abdoul) .... 926

China. United States Ends Grant Aid to Repub-
lic of China (Phillips) 934

Congress

Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign Vessels in U.S.
Territorial Waters (Johnson, Department
statement) 936

Confirmations (Blair, Witman) 946

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 936

President de Valera of Ireland Visits United

States (De Valera, Johnson) 927

President Signs International Development As-
sociation Bill (Johnson) 935

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Blair, Witman) 946

Economic Affairs

Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign Vessels In U.S.
Territorial Waters (Johnson, Department
statement) 936

Consortium To Aid India Pledges $1 Billion for

1964-65 943

United States and Rumania Agree To Broaden

Mutual Relations (joint communique) . . . 924

U.S. Concludes Meat Agreement With Mexico

(text of U.S. note) 944

World Trade Week, 1964 (text of proclama-
tion) 935

Europe

Dedication of George C. Marshall Research

Library (Johnson) . . . . , 922

U.S. and Euratom To Cooperate on Fast Neu-
tron Reactors . , 941

Foreign Aid

President Signs International Development As-
sociation Bill (Johnson) 935

United States Ends Grant Aid to Republic of

China (Phillips) 934

Greece. United States and Greece Sign Debt

Settlement 934

India

Consortium To Aid India Pledges $1 Billion for

1964-65 943

President Expresses Grief at Death of Prime

Minister Nehru (text of message) .... 926

International Organizations and Conferences

Consortium To Aid India Pledges $1 Billion for

1964-65 943

President Signs International Development As-
sociation Bill (Johnson) 935

U.S. and Euratom To Cooperate on Fast Neu-
tron Reactors ., 941

Ireland. President de Valera of Ireland Visits

United States (De Valera, Johnson) .... 927

Japan. Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign Ves-
sels in U.S. Territorial Waters (Johnson, De-
partment statement) 936

Mexico. U.S. Concludes Meat Agreement Witli

Mexico (text of U.S. note) 944

Philippines. Blair confirmed as Ambassador . 946

Presidential Documents

Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign Vessels in U.S.
Territorial Waters 936

Dedication of George C. Marshall Research

Library 922

President de Valera of Ireland Visits United

States . , 927

President Expresses Grief at Death of Prime
Minister Nehru 926

President Signs International Development As-
sociation Bill 935

World Trade Week, 1964 935

Rumania. United States and Rumania Agree To
Broaden Mutual Relations (joint communi-
que) 924

Science. Dr. Wiesner Visits Soviet Union . . 933

Togo. Witman confirmed as Ambassador . . 946

Treaty Information

Current Actions 945

U.S. and Euratom To Cooperate on Fast Neu-
tron Reactors 941

United States and Greece Sign Debt Settlement . 934
U.S. Concludes Meat Agreement With Mexico

(text of U.S. note) 944

U.S.S.R.

Dr. Wiesner Visits Soviet Union 933

U.S. Discovers Microphones In Walls of Embassy
at Moscow (Gentile) 933

United Nations. Security Council Continues
Debate on Cambodian Complaint (Stevenson) . 937

Viet-Nam. Security Council Continues Debate
on Cambodian Complaint (Stevenson) . . . 937

Name Indetn

Abdoul, Bonkar 926

Blair, William McCormack, Jr 946

De Valera, Eamon 927

Gentile, G. Marvin 933

Johnson, President 922,926,927,935,936

Phillips, Richard I 934

Stevenson, Adlai B . . . , 937

Wiesner, Jerome B 933

Witman, William, II 946

O.S. 60VCRHHCNT PRIKTIHC 0PriCCil»l4

Su

U.S.

CSB DEC G
PUBLIC LIBRARY- HC
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02 I W

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

■

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. »300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Tliis 22-[)ag6 pamphlet, based on an address by Under Secretary George W. Ball at Roanoke, Va.,
on Ai)ril 23, 1964, places Castro communism and United States policy toward it in perspective by
evaluating the tlireat of Castro and the present Cuban regime, by defining the two principal lines of
United States strategy in dealing with this menace, and by discussing the effectiveness of these policies.

PUBLICATION 7690 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBUCATION 7690 15 cents

TO:

SUl'T. OF DOCUMENTS
GOVT. I'UINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

Please send me copies of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.

NAME

l.iicii>->f(i iiiid s

I cilhIi. cliii-k, or niuuey order pay-
ible to Supt. of Docunieots)

ADDRDSS

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1304

June SS, 1964.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND WORLD RESPONSIBILITIES

Address by President Johnson 950

THE NATIONAL INTEREST— 1964
Address by Secretary Rusk 955

ON WORKING WITH HISTORY

by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 961

MEMBER OF THE PARISH

by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 971

STRENGTHENING THE MACHINERY FOR PEACE

by Ambassador Adlai E, Stevenson 966

For index see inside back cover

National Security and World Responsibilities

Address hy President Johnson ^

The official mission of the Coast Guard, which
hangs in each room of this Academy, places you
"in the service of [your] country and
humanity."

That mission, your mission, is also the mission
of your nation. For today we Americans share
responsibility not only for our own security
but for the security of all free nations, not
only for our own society but for an entire
civilization, not only for our own liberty but for
the hopes of all humanity.

In pursuit of such responsibilities national
security requires more than national strength.
It requires, first of all, a nation dedicated to
justice and to the improvement of life for its
own people. It requires a nation determined
to help others eliminate the despair and the
human degradation on which the enemies of
freedom feed. It requires a nation devoted.

' Made at the U.S. Ooast Guard Academy, New
London, Conn., on June 3 (White House press release;
as-delivered text).

through speech and deed, to showing those who
may grow weary of will, or fearful of the fu-
ture, that the cause of human dignity is on the
march, its shadow is lengthening, and victory
is moving nearer. But our hope for success in
the aims of peace rests also on the strength of
our arms.

As Winston Churcliill once said: "Civiliza-
tion will not last, freedom will not survive,
peace will not be kept, unless mankind unites
together to defend them and show themselves
possessed of a power before which barbaric
forces will stand in awe."

We, as well as our adversaries, must stand in
awe before the power our craft has created and
our wisdom must labor to control. In every
area of national strength America today is
stronger than it has ever been before. It is
stronger than any adversary or combination of
adversaries. It is stronger than the combined
miglit of all the nations in the history of the
world.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1304 PUBLICATION 7701 JUNE 22, 1964

The Deportment of State Bnlletin, a
weekly publication leaned by the Office
of Media Services. Bnrean of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
aKenclos of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
forelKn relations and on the work of the
Deportment of State and the Forelpn
BiTTlce, The Bulletin Includes selected
press release* on foreltm policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other oiBcers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special arHcles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concernlnK treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D,C.,
20402. Pbice : 62 issues, domestic 18.60,
foreign $12.26 ; single copy, 26 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pab-
llcatlon approved by the Director of the
Bureau of thie Badget (Jannary 18.
1961),

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bnlletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is indexed In the Headers' Onlde to
Periodical Literature.

950

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN

And I confidently predict that strength will
continue to grow more rapidly than the might
of all others.

Areas of U.S. Strength

The first area of this increasing strength is
our ability to deter atomic destruction. In the
past 3 years we have increased our nuclear
power on alert two and one-half times, and our
nuclear superiority will contmue to grow until
we reach agreement on arms control.

"We have more than 1,000 fully armed ICBIVTs
and Polaris missiles ready for retaliation. The
Soviet Union has far fewer, and none ready to
be launched beneath the seas. We have more
than 1,100 strategic bombers, many of which are
equipped with air-to-surface and decoy missiles
to help them reach almost any target. The
Soviet Union, we estimate, could with difficulty
send less than one-third of this number over
targets in the United States.

Against such force the combined destructive
power of every battle ever fought by man is
like a firecracker thrown against the sun.

The second area of increasing strength is our
ability to fight less than all-out war. In the past
3 years we have raised the number of combat-
ready divisions 45 percent. They can be moved
swiftly around the world by an airlift capacity
which has increased 75 percent. Supporting
tactical aircraft have been increased over 30
percent, and the number of tactical nuclear
warheads in Europe has been raised 60 percent.
We, and our NATO allies, now have 5 million
men under arms. In addition we are now ready
to mobilize large reserves in the event of con-
flict. Six divisions, with all supporting units,
can be moved into action in a few weeks.

And we are continuing to build our forces.
In a few years our airlift capacity will be five
times what it was in 1961. Advanced weap-
ons and equipment are flowing to our armies.
Our fleet is being modernized through a decade-
long shipbuilding program. And new tactical
aircraft are being built.

A third area of increasing strength is the
struggle against subversion. Our adversaries,
convinced that direct attack would be aimless,
today resort to terror, subversion, and guer-

rilla warfare. To meet this threat we began
a largo ellort to train special forces to fight
internal subversion. Since January 1901 we
have increased these specialized forces eight
times. We have trained more than 100,000
officers in these techniques. We have given
special emphasis to this form of warfare in the
training of all military units.

Our Army now has six Special Action Forces
on call around the world to assist our friendly
nations. They are skilled in the languages and
problems of the area in which they are sta-
tioned. The Navy and Air Force have several
thousand men whose abilities, training, equip-
ment, and mission are designed to combat
clandestine attack. And behind these groups
are five brigade-size backup forces ready to
move into instant action.

But just as subversion has many faces, our
responses must take many forms. We have
worked to increase and integrate all the re-
sources, political and social as well as military
and economic, needed to meet a threat which
tears at the entire fabric of a society.

But success in fighting subversion ultimately
rests on the skill of the soldiers of the threat-
ened country. We now have 344 teams at work
in 49 countries to train the local military in the
most advanced techniques of internal defense.

Subversive warfare is often difficult, dirty,
and deadly. Victory comes only to those with
the desire to protect their own freedom. But
such conflict requires weapons as well as will,
ability as well as aspiration. And we will con-
tinue to increase tlus strength until our adver-
saries are convinced that this course too will not
lead to conquest.

The fourth area of increasing strength is
in the development of new weapons for deter-
rence and defense. In the past several years
we have begun many important new weapons
systems. Minuteman II will have twice the
accuracy of the first Minuteman. Tlie new
Nike X, when its development is completed,
will give us the option to deploy, if national
security requires it, the best antiballistics mis-
sile available to any nation. We are develop-
ing a new aircraft, the F-III, with much
greater range, payload, and ability at air com-
bat than present tactical bombers or fighters.

JTTNE 22, 1964

961

The Lance missile, the EX-10 torpedo, the
ATA attack aircraft, a new main battle tank,
new antitank missile systems, are the emerging
products of development that we are carrying
on. And that effort is witliout parallel in all
the world.

"We will continue to carry forward new proj-
ects which offer hope of adding substantially
to our strength. I can assure the American
people that the United States is, and will re-
main, first in tlie use of science and technology
for the protection of the people.

The fifth area and the most important of
increasing strength is the ability of the Ameri-
can fighting man. However impressive or in-
genious, our weapons can be no better than the
men who man them. The complexities of mod-
ern weapons require men of high skill. Tlie
complexities of modern warfare require men of
great knowledge. The complexities of the
modern world require men of broad outlook.

Today 52 percent of our enlisted men are
under 25 and are high school graduates, com-
pared with 39 percent in the country as a whole
who are high school graduates. Sixty-five per-
cent of our commissioned officers are college
graduates today, compared with 7 percent in
the Nation. Twenty-five thousand officers hold
graduate degrees, and thousands more are
studying for such degrees.

In encampments across the world millions of
men and women have chosen to serve with low
pay and high hazard, with deep devotion and
silent sacrifice, so that their fellow Americans
might enjoy the rich legacy of liberty. They
stand the hard vigil that we may pursue the
high vision of flourisliing freedom in a world
at peace. These are the sources of the
strength we build, knowing, in the words of the
Bible, "When the strong man armed keepeth
his palace, his goods are in peace."

Tlie necessities of our strength are as varied
as the nature of our dangers. The response
must suit the threat. Those wlio would answer
every problem with nuclear weapons display
not bravery but bravado, not wisdom but a
wanton disregard for the survival of the world
and tlic future of the race.

No one can live daily, as I must do, witli the
dark realities of nuclear ruin, without seeking
the guidance of God to find the path of peace.

We have built this staggering strength that I
have told you about not to destroy but to save,
not to put an end to civilization but, rather, to
try to put an end to conflict.

Tangible Steps Toward Peace

Thus, in the past 3 years, as our strength
rose — and, in large part, as a consequence of that
rising strength — we have been able to take
more tangible steps toward peace than at any
time since the cold war began. We established
an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
We agreed with the Soviet Union on a statement
of disarmament principles. We signed a test
ban treaty. We established the "hot line." We
supported a U.N. resolution prohibiting the
orbiting of nuclear weapons. We cut back on
nuclear production while the Soviet Union did
the same. And we have just completed the
negotiation of a new consular agreement.^

And, as the Geneva conference reconvenes,
we have before it a series of proposals that I
submitted, designed to freeze strategic nuclear
delivery systems, to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, and to prohibit the use of force to
solve disputes. And we will welcome any other
proposal by any nation which promises realistic
progress toward peace.

In farflung corners of this strife-girdled
globe ambitious adversaries continually test our
tenacity and seek to erode our endurance.
American strength is engaged, and American
blood is being shed. It requires patience and
understanding to continue the search for peace
while our adversaries so beset us. But this is
what we must do. It is what, God willing, I
intend to do.

If we are successful in that search it will be
because you, and men like you, gave their lives
to duty that our children might live their lives
in freedom.

So let us hope that this nation can some day,
not too distant, lay aside its awesome power and
direct all its genius to the betterment of man.
Let us hope that we may soon be able to say,
"The night is far spent, the day is at hand : let
us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and
let us put on the armor of light."

' For text, see p. 979.

962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President Outlines Basic Themes
of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Statement by President Johnson ^

It may be helpful to outline four basic themes
that govern our policy in Southeast Asia.

First, America keeps her word.

Second, the issue is the future of Southeast
Asia as a whole.

Third, our purpose is peace.

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a
struggle for freedom on every front of human
activity.

On the point that America keeps her word,
we are steadfast in a policy which has been fol-
lowed for 10 years in three administrations.
That was begun by General Eisenhower, in a let-
ter of October 25, 1954,^ in which he said to
President [Ngo Dinh] Diem:

Dear Mr. President : I have been following with
great interest the course of developments in Viet-Xam,
particularly since the conclusion of the conference at
Geneva. The implications of the agreement concern-
ing Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the
future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial
military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting
war and faced with enemies without and by their sub-
versive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formida-
ble project of the movement of several hundred thou-
sand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which
are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology
which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that
the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian
effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit
our aid to Viet-Xam to be more effective and to make
a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of
the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, in-
structing the American Ambassador to Viet-Xam to
examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Govern-
ment, how an intelligent program of American aid
given directly to your Government can serve to assist
Viet-Xam in its present hour of trial, provided that
your Government is prepared to give assurances as to
the standards of performance it would be able to main-
tain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government
of Viet-Xam in developing and maintaining a strong,
viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion

' Read by the President at his news conference on
Jane 2.

*The letter was dated Oct. 1 and released by the
White House on Oct 25, 1954.

or aggression through nillllary mcauH. The Govi-m-
nicnt of the United States exiwcts that this aid will be
met by performance on the |>art of Hie Government of
Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hoix*
that such aid, combined with your own continuing ef-
forts, will contribute elTectively toward an Independent
Viet-Nani endowed willi a strong Kovcnunent. Such a
government would, I hope, be so resjionsivc to the na-
tionalist aspirations of it.s i)eiiple, so enllgblcned In
purpose and effective in iierformance, that it will be
respected both at home and abroad and discourage any
who might wish to impose a foreign Ideology on your
free people.

Sincerely,

DwioHT D. Eisenhower.

Now, that was a good letter then and it is a
good letter now, and we feel the same way.
Like a number of other nations, we are bound
by solemn commitments to help defend tliis area
against Conununist encroachment. "We will
Jvccp tliis commitment. In the case of Viet-
Nam, our commitment today is just the same as
the commitment made by President Eisenhower
to President Diem in 1954 — a commitment to
help these people help themselves.

Wo are concerned for a whole great geo-
graphic area, not simply for specific complex
problems in specific countries.

We have one single, central purpose in all
that we do in Southeast Asia, and that is to help
build a stable peace. It is others and not we
who have brought terror to small countries and
peaceful peasants. It is others, not we, who
have preached and practiced the use of force to
establish dictatorial control over their neigh-
bors. It is other, not we, who have refused to
honor international agreements that aim at rea-
sonable settlement of deep-seated dill'erences.
The United States cannot fail to do its full share
to meet the challenge which is posed by those
who disturb the peace of Southeast Asia, but
the purpose of America will not change. We
stand for peace.

Our soldiers are doing great work, but what
they are doing is only part of the job. The
issues are political as well as military, eco-
nomic as well as strategic. Our recent request
for additional assistance funds ^ is more than
half for economic help.

Wo are veiT grateful for the very fine action
taken by the House Foreign Affairs Committee,

* For text, see Bullettk of June 8, lOW, p. 891.

JUNE 22, 1964

953

and we hope to have prompt action on that re-
quest by the Congress.

The agenda in Honolulu* covers plans for
progress as well as programs against terror.
It is others -who make war, and we who seek
peace.

I should certainly say that the middle of the
Honolulu meeting is not an appropriate time
for the announcement of any additional specific
programs. I do think as a result of constant
reviews of our work in that area of the world
that we will try to improve our effectiveness
and our efficiency. Secretary McNamara and
Secretary Rusk will both have more detailed
reports when they return, and that is all I can
say about the conference at this time.

Pledge to Freedom Renewed
on 20th Anniversary of D-Day

Following are remarks made hy President
Johnson on June 3 to members of the U.S. dele-
gation to D-Day ceremonies to he held in
France on June 6 to commemorate the 20th an-
niversary of the Allied landing on the Nor-
mandy coast.

White House press release dated June 3

Ladies and gentlemen, I have a letter that
I am going to present to General [Omar]
Bradley, ask him to take it with him and to
read it at the ceremonies.

You are leaving tomorrow to cross in peace
an ocean hundreds of thousands of Americans
have twice crossed before in war. For each of
you this must be a mission of remembrance.
For your country it is a mission of resolve.
You remember, and will never forget, that 6th
of Juno 1944, when America's sons and those
of our gallant allies helped carry freedom back
to the continent where it was cradled.

Your country remembers and will never for-
get the resolve bom on that D-Day, that, so
long as we are able, and other men are willing

* For an announcement of a meeting of D.S. officials
at Honolulu June 1 and 2, see ihid., June 15, 1964, p. 926.

to stand together, we shall not permit the light
of freedom to be extinguished on any continent
again. In these last 20 years we and the world
have lived between the darkness of midnight
for civilization and the brightness of a new
dawn, for the rays of that dawn are piercing
through the shadows. For if the world is not
so safe as we would like it some day to be, we
can believe it is not so dangerous as we once
feared it must always be.

The beachlieads of Normandy have been
opened into beachheads of hope for us all —
hope for a world without tyranny, without war,
without aggression, without oppression. In
this, the central force for progress has been,
and continues to be, the unity and strength of
all nations of the Atlantic alliance. Out of
our alliance in adversity has grown a great
partnership for peace and prosperity. On the
success of that partnership rest the hopes of
men everywhere. We of America believe their
hopes will not be disappointed, because the suc-
cess of that partnership will not be frustrated.
Men and nations which have united among
themselves in grave moments of war must not
divide among themselves in hopeful hours of
peace.

So let all the world know that when this
nation has stood 2,000 years we shall not have
forgotten the lands where our sons lie buried
nor the cause for which our sons died. Wliere
we have commitments to the cause of freedom,
we shall honor them — today, tomorrow, and al-
ways. Freedom is not the cause of America
alone, however, nor the hope of Western man
alone. It is the one cause and the one hope
which xmites in spirit all men around the globe,
whatever their country or their color or their
creed. After these last 20 years we can believe
that freedom is the tide of history, and we of
the West stand astride that wave, confident of
what lies ahead.

On this anniversary the memory of yester-
day's battles in war only moves us all to fight
more valiantly today's battles for tomorrow's
peace.

I hope your journey will be a pleasant one.
I know it will bring back many memories. I
look forward to seeing you upon your return.
Thank you very much.

964

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The National Interest— 1964

Address hy Secretary Rusk '

I am deeply honored by your invitation.
Since I understand that I am the last obstacle
between you and your diploma, I shall be brief.
I am especially glad to be here because of my
personal bias toward women's colleges. I was
once a dean of a women's college — a valuable
part of my own liberal education. And as a
professor I was regularly disciplined by the
disconcerting candor of the woman student, a
discipline which has endured since one of my
students became my wife.

One of my personal assistants is a Smith
graduate. Many more of your graduates hold
other positions in the Department of State, in-
cluding nine of our career Foreign Service of-
ficers. The Peace Corps has 26 of you serving
in 16 countries. Still many others are in other
departments of our Government and in inter-
national organizations.

I was delighted to learn that about 100 of
you in the class of '64 have taken examinations
for Government service of one kind or another,
including the Foreign Service. I would add
the hope that still others will enter the Foreign
Service through the other doorway as well —
marriage — because I know of no other profes-
sion which the wife shares more fully than the
great profession of diplomacy.

There is something just a little presumptuous,
it seems to me, in commencement speeches to
graduating classes. T^et me start, therefore,
with a little person-to-person honesty. I con-
gratulate you most sincerely on the success of
your work for your degree. If you were to
ask me what the future will bring, I would have

' Made at commencement exercises at Smith College,
Northampton, Mass., on June 7 (press release 271).

to say I cannot tell you. Were you to ask me
for what you should be prepared, I would tell
you quite simply for whatever comes. This
modesty is a direct result of the combination of
complexity and pace in human affairs. I am
not so much interested in prediction, therefore,
as in direction. General Omar Bradley once
put it very well when he said that our age
requires us "to chart our course by the distant
stars and not by the light of each passing ship."

It was my impression as a professor that
students wished to move as quickly as possible
fi'om generalization to personal application.
"What does what you say mean to me, my home,
my community?" It is a highly relevant ques-
tion about foreign policy in the 1960's. For
the rest of the world intrudes into your home
and your community and affects your personal
lives in the most direct and inescapable ways.
And this will be true for as long ahead as many
of us can see.

This did not appear so much the case in my
own college days. The United States did not
consider — incorrectly as it turned out — that it
needed to have very much of a foreign policy
or a foreign involvement. We felt safe in our
continental home. Indeed, in 1934 an eminent
American historian, Charles A. Beard, pub-
lished a two- volume study of American policy
which concluded that our national interest
would be best served by leaving the rest of the
world strictly to its own devices and tending
our own "national garden." He said: "En-
throned between two oceans, with no historic
enemies on the north or south, the Republic can
be defended against any foes which such a
policy might raise up against it."

JXTNB 22, 1964

955

Many who did not lean toward isolation
nevertheless believed with another eminent his-
torian, Samuel Flagg Bemis, that "the conti-
nental position has always been the strength of
the United States in the world" and that when
we departed from it we were mistaken. Some
spoke in terms of a hemispheric policy. Many
realized that water alone could not protect us^
that we needed a strong navy. Some thought
we would eventually have to come to grips with
an aggressively militaristic Japan. Some felt
strongly our interest in keeping the western
shores of Europe in friendly hands. But
hardly anyone envisioned the radical change
in the problem of preserving our security which
was to occur within the next few years. Even
the disciples of Woodrow Wilson thought in
terms of preventing the frightful costs of an-
other world war, not of imminent peril to the
United States.

In due course we paid a heavy price for think-
ing that there was safety in continental isola-
tion and in military wealmess. But our errors
were not irretrievable. The aggi-essors were
not yet able to attack in force our continental
home. We had the time and space to muster
our strength.

The end of that margin of safety came with
the growing range of airplanes and rockets and
the unlocking of the atom. In his final bien-
nial report as Chief of Staff of the Army, in
1945, General Marshall said :

The technique of war has brought the United States,
Its homes and factories, into the front line of world
conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in
the Second World War. They would not in a third.

It no longer appears practical to continue what
we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satis-
factory basis for our security. We are now concerned
with the peace of the entire world.

Since General Marshall wrote that there have
appeared long-range rockets with thermonu-
clear warheads — in comparison with which the
fission bomb of 1945 seems almost primitive.
One megaton is 50 times Hiroshima.

The conduct of our foreign policy is no longer
a peripheral activity. It is not a game played
between "those people in Washington" and
other people in or from distant lands. It is as
close and important to you as your friends and
family, as your hopes and dreams, as every-

thing you cherish. For the central objective
of our — your — foreign policy is to protect and
promote our national interests properly con-
ceived. And the first of our national interests
is, of course, our survival as a people and nation.

It may seem obvious to say that our foreign
policy is designed to serve our national inter-
ests. But let us not forget that the foreign
policies of governments have sometimes been de-
sigiied to serve purposes other than national
interests — for example: the whim or ambition
of a prince, the defense or propagation of a par-
ticular ideology, the special interests or senti-
ments of an influential minority, inflamed emo-
tions, national honor. Indeed, the Hague
Conference of 1899 named "honor" ahead of
"vital interest" in specifying the sorts of
disputes it did not expect to be settled by
arbitration.

But the foreign policy of a government
chosen by the people obviously should be de-
signed to serve their interests, and these become
the national interest. And as a rule, our Presi-
dents, beginning with Washington, have sought
to justify their foreign policies primarily in
terms of national interest. But they and others
have defined the national interest in many dif-
ferent ways. At times the term was narrowly
construed, at times broadly. And doubtless,
even from a relatively detached viewpoint, the
national interest required different policies and
actions at different times.

Our Survival as a Nation

Let us explore briefly where our national in-
terest lies in the world of today. Probably
none would dispute that our national interest
requires, above all, the survival of our people
and way of life. Our first objective is to
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity."

We must defend our security. But we must
try to defend it without a major war if pos-
sible. For, while we have the power to oblit-
erate any enemy, we could not expect to emerge
from a thermonuclear exchange without the
gravest damage. Indeed, for the first time,
death in an afternoon is literally possible for
most of the northern hemisphere. The primary
purpose of the vast and complex military forces

966

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

which support our foreign policy is, and must
be, to prevent a major war— to protect our vital
interests without resort to catastrophic violence.

Our foreign policy also reflects our basic na-
tional traditions and ideals. Instinctively, we
try to act in harmony with these. We also seek
to promote a world environment in which tliese
can thrive. For, quite frankly, we believe that
these basic ideas and aspirations suggest the
kind of society which best serves both individ-
ual human dignity and the common good of the
human race.

In a very fundamental sense the United States
has no national interest that is clearly separable
from the welfare of the international commu-
nity at large. Our fate is inextricably bound
up in the fate of mankind. We can be secure
only to the extent that we can make the earth
secure — its land, water, and air, and the ad-
joining areas of space. We have a vital inter-
est in achieving the kind of world projected in
the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United
Nations Charter.

Policies Serving U.S. Interest

From these more general observations emerge
various objectives and rules of conduct which
serve our national interest.

We have a national interest in the decisive
repulse of aggression — everywhere and by what-
ever means. This world will remain a dan-
gerous place as long as any aggressor, whether
in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, or
elsewhere, thinks he can gain through aggres-
sion. For surely we have learned that such
appetites feed upon success and it is too late
for the world to depend upon satiation.

We have a national interest in the peaceful
settlement of disputes. War in the nuclear age
has become an increasingly irrational means of
achieving rational objectives. The flickering
flame of what appears to be a small dispute can
be fanned into large conflagration. We must,
therefore, pay respectful attention to small
flames, using and improving the machinery for
handling them, giving patience, persistence, and
prudence their fullest chance.

We are the most powerful nation on earth —
by a considerable margin. Our national in-
terest lies in the wise use of this power, not

only to deter war and defeat aggression but to
support tlie emergence of the kind of world
order we — and most other ordinary peoples —
want. Power requires responsibility. It is too
late in human history to guide its use by primi-
tive reactions. The use of power must bo ad-
justed to tlie character of tlie problem we are
trying to deal with; Pandora's box is not to be
opened every weekend.

Our national interest requires that, as a very
great power, we act in a spirit of rectitude since
our every act, or failure to act, has wide reper-
cussions. Wo must act as the trustees of free-
dom. We must hold the confidence of our asso-
ciates, and the respect of our adversaries, by
scrupulously living up to our commitments.
And wherever possible, we should use our
power with the approval and cooperation of our
friends and allies. A "decent respect to the
opinions of mankind" remains both an obliga-
tion and a source of strength in times of crisis.
Our national interest requires that other na-
tions honor their commitments to us and to
others in behalf of peace and friendly commerce
and cooperation. This does not mean a return
to "gunboat" diplomacy. But it does require
that we find appropriate means to reinforce the
notion : Pacta sunt servanda.

Our national interest requires a strategy of
peace, looking beyond the current nuclear im-
passe and the major divisive issues, searching
incessantly for means of moving away from
danger toward controlled disarmament and a
more stable peace.

As never before, we have a national interest
in the control and limitation of armaments —
with reliable inspection and verification. And,
as never before, our national interest requires
that we not disarm unilaterally, that, indeed,
we not reduce our military strength in any sig-
nificant way without corresponding reductions
by our adversaries.

We have a national interest in strengthening
the peacekeeping facilities of the United Nations
and other international organizations, such as
the Organization of American States. We have
a national interest in devising and promoting
all means for peaceful change where, in simple
justice, change is needed. Because we have a
national interest in the peaceful settlement of

JUNE 22, 1964

957

disputes and in building a world rule of law, we
must abide by the awards of international tri-
bunals, even when we don't agree with them.

We have a national interest in the economic
and social well-being of other peoples. For, in
the long run, there can be no stability in a world
containing a few who are well off and many
who are poor. We have a national interest in
the promotion of international trade. And we
know that if we expect to sell we must buy.

We have a national interest in the continuing
prosperity of the economically advanced coun-
tries of the free world and in the rise of the less
developed nations to decent standards of living.

Setting a "Gleaming Example"

We have a national interest in correcting the
defects in our own society — in eliminating pock-
ets of poverty, in wiping out our slums, rural
and urban, in achieving in full reality equal
rights for all, regardless of race, religion, color,
or national origin. We must strive untiringly
to build what President Johnson calls the
"great society." We owe it to ourselves, first
of all, to fulfill the American dream. As the
leader of the cause of liberty, we must do our
best to set a gleaming example.

We have a national interest in the spread of
the political institutions of freedom. This is
not because we want to impose the "American
way" on other peoples. On the contrary, we
favor the kind of world in which different
peoples can develop their own institutions and
cultures. We support a world of diversity.
But we are deeply committed to certain basic
propositions about the position of man as a free
individual and government by the consent of the
governed. We believe that these basic proposi-
tions have universal validity, and they are, in
fact, the aspirations of a great majority of men
everywhere, including behind the Iron and
Bamboo Curtains.

We have a national interest in encouraging
trends within the Communist world toward na-
tional independence, more personal freedom,
and more open societies.

Our deepest and, in the long run, most vital
interest lies in the building of a stable world
community. The present anarchic condition of

human affairs on this tiny planet is dangerously
precarious for everybody. We must work un-
tiringly toward a great society for all mankind.
Our most elemental national interest — the secu-
rity of our way of life — demands a world order
that provides peace, a rule of law, fraternal
cooperation, and progress for the entire human
race.

U.S. and Israel Exchange Views
on Matters of Mutual interest

Prime Minister Levi Eshhol of Israel and
Mrs. Eshkol visited the United States May 31
to June 11, 1964-. The Prime Minister met with
President Johnson and other U.S. officials dur-
ing his stay at Washington June 1-3. Follow-
ing is an exchange of greetings between Presi-
dent Johnson and Prime Minister Eshhol on
June 1 and the text of a joint cormnuniqy£
released on June 2.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated June 1
President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen : I
am very happy, Mr. Prime Minister, to welcome
you to our country. Your predecessors have
visited my country informally several times in
the past, but this is the first official visit by a
Prime Minister of Israel. We are pleased that
you have come. My coimtrymen greatly ad-
mire the progress made by your people. You
have met and mastered monumental problems
of economic survival. You have shown all the
world how to use science and teclmology to
improve man's life on the planet.

Today Israel is a vital, prosperous land, a
symbol of the courage and the strength of her
people. The United States is proud to have
assisted in this high enterprise. We are pre-
pared to continue our contributions to technical
advancement in Israel, particularly in the field
of desalinization of water. We are aware, Mr.
Prime Minister, of the problems of political

058

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

adjustment that Israel faces with her neigh-
bors. We know that you want to live in peace
witli those neigiibors, and we believe it not only
possible but imperative tliat those problems be
peacefully resolved, bringmg justice to all as
well as security for all.

We welcome this opportunity to exchange
views with you on matters of mutual interest.
We share many common objectives, Mr. Prime
Minister, chief of which is the building of a
better world, a world in which evei-y nation can
develop its resources and develop them in free-
dom and in peace. I am confident this visit will
result in increased imderstanding between us
and a strengthening of our already cordial
relations.

Mr. Prime Minister, it gives me great pleas-
ure to say, Shalom.

Prime Minister Eshkol

Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson: Mrs. Esh-
kol and I are deeply grateful for your kind
invitation and warm welcome. It is a privilege
to meet the statesman on whom destiny has laid
so vast and historic a responsibility.

In the short time since you, Mr. President,
assumed your exalted ofEce, your deep dedica-
tion to peace, to freedom, and to the welfare
of ordinary people has aroused hope and con-
fidence throughout the world.

The prophet Malachi, almost 3,000 years ago,
delivered this eternal message, and I will cite
it in Hebrew : Halo av echad lekvlanu? halo el
one echad hareinu? (Have we not all one
Father? hath not one God created us?)

In face of the danger to human survival in
our time, this lasting truth, and with it the sense
of common destiny, is cutting across the bar-
riers of hostility and ideology which divide
nations.

From Jerusalem, city of immortal prophecy
and peace, I bear with me the best wishes of the
people of Israel to you, Mr. President, the first
citizen of this great country. You fulfill the
injunction of our sages — to love peace and
pursue peace.

Mr. President, from this great center of gov-
ernment, here in Washington, symbol and re-
pository of democracy, there has constantly

gone forth a message of encouragement to na-
tions in their .struggle for liberty and the
aflirmation of human values. The aid and sym-
pathy tendered to us by successive United
States governments, and by the people of the
United States, are engraved for all time on the
tablets of our renewed nationhood.

Through you, Mr. President, I wish to con-
vey, from the people of Israel to the people of
the United States, a heartfelt message of good
will and of best wishes for their happiness and
welfare.

Mr. President, this moment will always re-
main with me. For me, it is symbolic of the
providential change which has taken place in
the fortunes of my people, of tlie transition
within so short a time from the tragedy which
only two decades ago engulfed one-third of my
people to the new epoch of independence and
construction which commenced with the rise of
Israel.

Only lasting faith in the fulfillment of proph-
ecy enabled us to survive tribulation down the
ages. In our time it has been given to us to
reaffirm in independence the ancient unbroken
link between the people of Israel and the land
of Israel. It is our belief that, just as the
prophecy of the restoration of Zion is being
fulfilled, so, too, will the prophecy of universal
peace be vindicated.

Mr. President, I thank you from the heart
for your friendship, which is a source of the
deepest encouragement to my people as it faces
the future with faith and hope.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated June 2

Prime Minister Eshkol and President John-
son have completed two days of discussions on
matters of mutual interest and concern. Both
welcomed the opportunity presented by the
Prime Minister's visit at the invitation of the
President for a full exchange of views.

The President presented the views of the
United States on various world problems, in-
cludmg those of the Near East. He empha-
sized the strong desire of the United States for
friendly relations with all nations of the Near

JTTNE 22, 1964

959

East, and its devotion to peace in the area and
to peaceful economic and social development of
all countries in the area. He congratulated
Prime Minister Eshkol on the progress made
by Israel since 1948 in the economic, teclinical,
social and cultural fields. He noted the exam-
ple provided by Israel in economic growth and
human development in conditions of freedom.

Prime Minister Eshkol expressed deep appre-
ciation for the consistent interest and sympathy
shown by the U.S. and for the generous eco-
nomic assistance rendered by the U.S. Govern-
ment and the American people to Israel over the
years. He was confident that Israel's develop-
ment would continue unabated towards the
rapid achievement of a self-sustaining economy.
It was his deep conviction that peace and the
maintenance of the territorial integrity and na-
tional independence of all countries in the Near
East is of vital interest to the region and to the
world.

The President welcomed assurances of Israel's
deep concern, which the United States shares,
for peace in the area. He reiterated to Prime
Minister Eshkol U.S. support for the terri-
torial integrity and political independence of
all countries in the Near East and emphasized
the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression
and the use of force or the threat of force against
any country. In this connection, both leaders
expressed their concern at the diversion of vi-
tally important resources from development to
armaments.

The two leaders declared their firm determi-
nation to make every effort to increase the broad
area of understanding which already exists be-
tween Israel and the United States and agreed
that the Prime Minister's visit advanced this
objective.

The agreement reached to undertake joint
studies on problems of desalting provided con-
crete evidence of the desire of the United States

to continue to assist Israel in its efforts to solve
remainmg economic problems. Both countries
view this as part of the world-wide cooperative
effort being undertaken to solve the problem of
scarcity of water and hope for rapid progress
toward large-scale desalting in Israel. The
knowledge and experience obtained from the
joint effort will be available to all countries with
water deficiencies.

In conclusion, the President and Prime Min-
ister expressed their conviction that their peo-
ples shared common values and were dedicated
to the advancement of man, to individual free-
dom, and to human dignity.

Prime Minister Sliastri Assured
of Continued U.S. Cooperation

Following is the text of a message from Presi-
dent Johnson to Lai Bahadur Shastri, Pnme
Minister of India.

White House press release dated June 2

June 2, 1964
I hasten to send my hearty congratulations
on the occasion of your election as Prime Min-
ister of India. The people and Government of
the United States look forward to working with
you and your countrymen in the same spirit of
friendshijD and understanding that marked the
relations between India and our country during
the time of your great predecessor. I send my
warmest personal good wishes for your success
in the great tasks you now undertake, and my
assurance of the reliable friendship and co-
operation of the United States. Our countries
are united in their pui-pose of peace, their effort
for economic progress, and their dedication to
human dignity.

960

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

On Working With History

hy W. W. Rostov}

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^

It is a grand custom that you have here at
Haverforcl -which requirCvS the graduation
speaker to spend some time with the senior class
before he writes his talk. I look back on the
schedule that was mounted here for me as a
kind of imposed filibuster. I cannot recall two
■working days when I did more talking. But I
also listened. iVnd when, back in Washington,
I took stock, I felt those questions centered on
two matters :

First, tliere was a desire to know, in broadest
terms, what the foreign policy of our Govern-
ment aims to achieve on the world scene. Wliat
are our objectives? Do they conform to the
basic principles and commitments which lie at
the base of our society here at home ?

Second, there was concern about certain ur-
gent, immediate, day-to-day problems, notably
in our relations with the developing nations of
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America.

As best I can in 20 minutes or so, I shall try
now to speak to those two questions.

Objectives of U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States is a great power on the
world scene; but the forces with which we must
deal are not putty in our hands. At our best,
we have achieved and we can achieve great
things; but we can achieve them only if we are
simultaneously true to the best that is in us
as a nation and if we work with, rather than
against, the grain of history.

* Address made at commencement exercises at
Haverford College. Haverford, Pa., on June 5 (press
release 269).

History always looks inevitable after the
event. But there are important margins which
depend on what nations do and on what indi-
viduals do. History is tolerant of men and na-
tions if they avoid the larger illusions of gi-an-
deur : The riglit stance is a balance between great
striving and an acceptance of the limits within
which we can affect the course of events.

Tlais means we must begin by imderstanding
and accepting the large forces at work on the
world scene which can be shaped and influenced
at the margins but cannot be suppressed or
eliminated by our wishing or ordering their
disappearance.

Specifically, we live in a world dominated by
four major historical forces, each interacting
with the other, each capable of yielding what,
from the point of view of the United States,
would be a good outcome or a bad outcome.

First, in the northern part of the free world,
from Japan east through Canada to West Ber-
lin, we can observe a thrust by nations and
peoples to reduce the degree of their immediate
postwar dependence on the United States and to
exert a larger control over their own destiny.
The basis for this thrust is one of the great
success stories of modern history. Japan and
Western Europe, beaten down by war, have not
merely recovered from wartime devastation;
they have moved on to what is, quite literally,
the greatest and most sustained interval of de-
velopment in the whole of their economic his-
tory. This has been accompanied by the re-
emergence of a vital social and political life and
a new confidence.

The question posed for us and for them by

JUNE 22, 1964

961

this phenomenon is whether this new-found
strength and confidence will yield a return to
old-fashioned nationalism or whether we can,
working together, construct an acceptable part-
nership in all the great affairs of the planet, not
merely in defense but also m trade and mone-
tai7 affairs, in assistance to the developing na-
tions, and in working together in the direction

of peace.

Thus the first task of American foreign policy
is to use our limited but real margin of influ-
ence to help shift our relations with these ad-
vanced nations of the north toward partnership
and to avoid that fragmentation which would
render our resources ineffective and which
could, indeed, place all our nations in mortal
danger in a nuclear age.

The second great historic fact we must face
is that the peoples in the whole southern half of
the world— Latin America, Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East— are swept by a compelling
impulse to modernize their societies in such
ways as to give them a role of national dignity
on the world scene and to bring to their peoples
what contemporary science and teclinology can
offer. This process touches every aspect of their
traditional life : economic, social, and political.
It brings about not merely new methods of pro-
duction but a new style of family life, new ties
between the villages and the cities, new func-
tions and methods in national politics, and new
relations to the world outside.

The Communists, sensing the vulnerability of
these societies in an interval of transition, seek
to disrupt them, to damage their relations with
the West, and ultimately to take them over. It
is the interest of the United States that this
process of modernization shall go forward in
such ways that truly independent nations
emerge on the world scene, each of which will be
permitted to fashion out of its own culture and
its own ambitions the kind of society it wants.

The same religious and philosophic beliefs
which demand that we respect the uniqueness
of each individual lead us to respect the unique-
ness of each national society. Moreover, we
are confident that, if the independence of these
societies can be maintained over the comins
years and decades, they will develop their own
version of what we would recognize as demo-
cratic, open societies.

Thus our second fundamental objective is to
mobilize the resources of the more advanced
northern part of the free world to help these
ardent modernizing societies in the south pro-
tect their independence at a vulnerable stage in
their history and to do what we can from the
outside to help them build the economic, social,
and political foundations for their own versions
of modern, democratic societies.

Third, we face the double fact of commu-
nism : a phenomenon committed by its creed to
expand its power to the point where it can orga-
nize the globe on a Communist basis — still im-
pelled by its institutions and habits to thrust
outward — but now confronted by inner frag-
mentation, by inner economic and social prob-
lems, and by external forces sufficient to guar-
antee, if they are well and wisely used, that the
vision of Communist world hegemony will
prove unattain.able.

Here our task is to frustrate those in the
world of communism who still thrust outward
against us while working constructively with
those emerging forces of nationalism and lib-
eralism which may, in time, lead the nations now
under Communist rule to join, like other nation-
states, in building a peaceful and stable world
community.

Simply put, our task is to help bring about,
by peaceful means, if possible, an end to com-
munism as we have known it.

Fourth, we face the historic fact of nuclear
weapons whose use we must contemplate in de-
fense of the free world but whose use could
bring tragic consequences for all humanity ; and
therefore we strive to protect our vital interests
in ways that would minimize the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will have to be invoked and
simultaneously to transform an uncontrolled
arms race into a world of arms control and dis-
armament, in ways which would increase, rather
than diminish, our own security and that of
others.

Taken all together, our task is to help build
an orderly and peaceful world community to
supplant the world system shattered in 1914
and never replaced. We have lived now for
half a century in a world at war, or in near
anarchy, latterly with a nuclear sword of
Damocles over our heads. The construction,
block by block, of a world community is the

962

DKPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTN'

grand purpose which suffuses the effort to build
a great partnership in the north, stretching from
Tokyo east to Berlin; to build a new north-
south relationship between the more developed
and developing nations of the free world. This
is our ultiinuto objective in East-West relations,
whei-e we aim not merely to frustrate Commu-
nist aggression but to draw the nations now un-
der Communist rule into an orderly and peace-
ful world comnuinity; for the struggle with
commmiism is ultimately a struggle about how
tliis small planet shall be organized.

The day-to-day foreign policy of your Gov-
ernment is designed to get us from here to there.
The large objectives I have stated are not ab-
stractions written down in policy papers and
forgotten, except when Jime rolls around and
we have to make graduation speeches. They are
the working guidelines which govern the daily
flow of cables, the actions of the missions repre-
senting the United States in every quarter of
the globe.

In looking at our tasks in these terms, we are,
of course, talking about the biggest piece of in-
ternational architecture ever undertaken in a
time of peace. None of the lines of action we
have launched in these directions is as yet com-
plete. But, looking back on almost a generation
of sustained labor since 1945, during which these
broad objectives have governed us, we have
moved some distance down long roads ; and we
have more reason for confidence today that
these objectives are attainable than at any
period in the past.

Policy Toward Guerrilla Warfare

I should now like to turn to a few of the more
specific and immediate questions which were
evidently on your minds in our weekend to-
gether. They tended to center on the north-
south dimension of our foreign policy; that is
to say, our relations with the developing nations
of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America.

Specifically, you raised three questions with
me.

"What about our policy toward guerrilla war-
fare, notably in Southeast Asia?

What is our stance toward political democ-
racy in the developing areas ?

What about our policy toward the economic
development of these regions ?

I should like to say a few words about each.

As President Johnson has often pointed out,
since his state of the Union message in January,
wo are confronted in Southeast Asia and the
Caribbean with a purposeful and thoroughly
professional effort by Communists outside cer-
tain nations to produce Communist insurrection
within them by training, arming, and financing
guerrilla forces; by introducing them illegally
across frontiers; and by guiding their efforts
from day to day from abroad.

This technique for Communist expansion is
difficult to deal with because it is so brutally
economical. Where insurrection has been es-
tablished, even in limited regions within a coun-
try, it takes something like 15 to 20 men on the
government side to control and defeat the ac-
tivities of one guerrilla. This fact arises be-
cause the task of a guerrilla force is to disrupt
and to destroy, while the government must build
and protect what it is building. Guerrilla war-
fare, moxmted from external bases, is a terrible
burden to carry for any government in a society
making its way toward modernization, as I
have had occasion personally to observe in both
Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.

This technique is perhaps the last still effec-
tive method of aggression open to the Commu-
nists, if the free world maintains its strength
and unity. Debate upon it lies at the center
of much of the controversy among the Com-
munist parties throughout the world. Some
Communists see it as the last, best hope of ex-
tending commimism on the world scene, in the
face of the strength and vitality of the free
world. Others are more skeptical. Our task is
to confirm the doubts of the Communist
skeptics.

Difficult as is the task, we must work with
those who would defend the independence of
their nations, to demonstrate that this form of
aggression cannot succeed any more than the
whole array of other methods of pressure and
aggression which the Communists have mounted
against us since Stalin decided early in 1946
that the postwar years were a time for Com-
munist expansion.

JTJNE 22, 1964

968

In South Viet-Nam, for example, the Viet
Cong consist of some 25,000 higlily organized
guerrillas. Their leaders are systematically
trained, infiltrated, and guided from outside
the borders of South Viet-Nam, in violation of
solemn international agreements. Their objec-
tive is to gain control of as much of the rural
population as possible, to produce frustration
and despair in the cities, and thus to take over
the country without an open confrontation like
that mounted in Korea in 1950.

We should be quite clear — and the interna-
tional community should be quite clear — that
the ability to mount a force of this kind is not
the equivalent of gaining power by a free elec-
tion. We should all be clear that we are facing
a form of systematic aggression quite as real as
that launched in Korea in June 1950. Indeed,
I find it difficult to imagine our moving forward
toward a world of arms control and disarma-
ment until this form of aggression is recognized
and sterilized by the international community.

Principle of Political Democracy

The second specific question we discussed is
whether the United States is or is not support-
ing the principle of political democracy — the
principle of government by consent of the gov-
erned— in the developing parts of the world.

The answer is, of course, that any govern-
ment representing this society must strongly
and steadily support the cause of political de-
mocracy. From our 18th-century commitments
as this nation was formed, we accepted a role
on the world scene as supporter of the demo-
cratic cause which never had more meaning and
vitality than it does today.

The problem lies in the fact that political de-
mocracy is a matter of direction and degree;
it is not an absolute. We in the United States,
for example, are now gripped of two major
problems which affect the dcgi'ee of democracy
in this society ; that is, the proportioning of con-
gressional representation and the voting rights
of the Negro in parts of the South.

The development of democratic processes is
at least as complex and time-consuming a busi-
ness as economic development. And we do not
have it in our power promptly to make all

nations into modem democracies by decisions
made in Washington, any more that we have it
in our power to raise their levels of per capita
income overnight from, say, $100 to $1,000.

What we can do and are doing are two things :
first., to encourage them to strive for the highest
degree of democratic practice of which their
societies are capable, at any period of time ; and,
second, to help them build the longer rim foun-
dations for a progressive refinement of demo-
cratic institutions, practices, and attitudes.

As we look at the trends in the developing
societies from this long perspective, we have
every reason for confidence. In Latin America,
for example, ov-er the past generation one can-
not doubt that the broad trend has been toward
the emergence of modem, democratic practice,
not away from it.

I do not doubt that democracy is the wave
of the future. Every culture has embedded
in it — and this includes Russian and Chinese
cultures — values and commitments which
would set limits to the power of the state over
the indi\'idual ; which would assert the ultimate
integrity of the individual while defining his
duty to the community; and which would de-
fine that government as good which reflects the
consent of the governed. I expect these ele-
ments in national cultures to assert themselves,
with the passage of time, where they are now
suppressed ; for there is nothing in the perform-
ance of totalitarian states — whatever their
present stage of development — ^that responsible
free men cannot surpass and are not surpassing
where they have set their minds and hearts to
the job.

I do not expect the kinds of democracies that
emerge to be identical with that of the United
States or those of Western Europe; but I do
expect men to create modem societies which
conform to their own versions of the democratic
norms.

Economic Development

Finally, a few words about economic develop-
ment. The past generation has seen in the de-
veloping areas a most significant forward
surge. There are, it is true, some cases of stag-
nation; but, by and large, the developing na-

964

DEPARTirENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN

tions have shown a capacity to produce rat«8
of inci-ease in output in excess of their popula-
tion increase. Moreover, many of them have
acquired in this jrencn\tion a wide range of in-
dustrial luid administrative skills.

There have been, however, three systematic
distortions in this first phase of industrializa-
tion.

First, there has been a general tendency to
neglect agriculture.

Second, industrialization has tended to con-
centrate on the production of manufactured
goods for a small upper middle-class market,
in substitution for imports. At the present
time there are in many developing nations sub-
stantial margins of idle industrial capacity,
sometimes very large margins.

Third, reflecting this overconcentration of ef-
fort in the cities, there has been an excessive
flow of people from the countryside to urban
slums, at a time when industry lacked the mar-
kets and the momentum to absorb these new-
comers in industrial work.

The central task in the decade and the gen-
eration ahead is to produce a reinforcing
agricultural and industrial expansion which
will modernize not merely a few cities in the
developing nations but the coimtryside and the
nation as a whole. Tliis will require not merely
increased attention to agricultural production
and more efficient methods of marketing agri-
cultural products in the cities but also the will-
ingness on the part of industry to produce and
to market the things the poorer folk want and
would buy at lower prices and work harder to
get.

The kind of projects we have launched in
the past decade — centered on schools, roads,
power stations, steel mills — must, of course,
continue to go forward; but there is a new
challenge: to harness the capacity and skills
that have been built to break down the barriers
that divide the city from the countryside in
most of the developing nations.

We are all conscious of the central impor-
tance of the relations between the richer and
poorer nations on the world scene; but an
equally critical problem is to narrow the gap
between the richer and the poorer parts of the
developing nations themselves.

Vitality of Western Heritage

Even these brief ol).st'rvations on three as-
pects of our north-south problems suggest
something of the complexity of our ta.sks on
the world scene. To play our part in dealing
with the Comnmnist guerrilla warfare threat;
to do what we can day by day to encourage
evolution in the direction of political democ-
racy; to work with our friends in the new and
unfolding tasks of economic development —
each constitutes an enormous challenge, strain-
ing our capacity to work with others m settings
which cannot be read otf automatically from
the experience of growing up in our own vital
but quite unique society.

Evidently, to get from here to there — to build
the kind of world community we seek — will
take time. Those of you now graduating from
American colleges will have, in your time of re-
sponsibility, an ample agenda to carry forward,
some of whose items we can foresee, some still
hidden in the mists.

As one who has been privileged to observe
and to participate in a small way in this genera-
tion's eilort to shape the world along these lines
since 1945, 1 believe that we all can go forward
with confidence. That confidence is rooted not
merely in simple national pride that our na-
tion, unwillingly drawn from isolation into
world responsibility, has, by and large, con-
ducted itself well. Our confidence can have an
even wider foundation.

As a nation we are rooted in values and tra-
ditions that reach back thousands of years into
the Mediterranean heritage. Here, in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, those values and
traditions are proving to have an abiding rele-
vance and vitality. "Wl^ile the tasks on this
planet are new — a planet rendered small and
vulnerable and intimate by modern weapons
and means of communications — the values that
we bring to the solution of these problems are
the oldest in our national life and, indeed, in
Western civilization. We have passed through
many tests, the most recent being the test posed
for us by the Communist offensive which took
shape in 1958, in the wake of the launching of
the first Sputnik, and which was brought to a
standstill, in certain critical dimensions, in the

JUNB 22, 1964
788-461—64-

965

18 months' effort climaxed by the Cuban missile
crisis of October 1962.

I am deeply convinced that, if Tre in the
United States do a job that lies wholly witliin
our capacity, and if the free world maintains
a reasonable degree of unity and common pur-
pose, the events, decisions, and initiatives
laimched in recent years could mark the begm-
ning of the end of the cold war.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 could emerge

as the Gettysburg of the global civil conflict.
To get from where we are, without war, to that
creative Appomattox, when a stable and peace-
ful world order has been established, will cer-
tainly take time and we shall certainly face
further hazards and crises. But, with respect
for the historical forces about us, with stub-
bornness, tougliness, and continued loyalty to
that great humane tradition of whicli we are a
part, I am confident we can make it.

Strengthening the IVlachinery for Peace

Tjy Adlai E. Stevenson

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

As you Imow, at the President's request I
recently cut short a mission to Europe in order
to participate in the current Security Council
session on Cambodia and Viet-Nam.- During
my stay abroad, however, I was attending meet-
ings and speaking in a number of European
capitals. I would like to i-eport some impres-
sions that may interest you — first, as Americans
and, second, as Democrats.

This trip abroad was my first since the dark
days of last November, when the shock of Presi-
dent Kemiedy's death was felt virtually every-
where in the world almost as keenly as it was
here in America.

Rarely in history did so many diverse peoples
experience a sense of personal loss. Anxiety
and uncertainty about the future was universal.
There is no better jilace to sense such attitudes
than under that great tent, the United Nations,
in New York, where the whole world meets,
and talks, and whispers.

' Address made before the Woman's National Demo-
cratic Club, Washington, D.C., on June 2 (press re-
lease 264).

' For statements made by Ambassador Stevenson in
the Secnrit.v Council on May 21 and 2C, see Bulletin
of June 8, 19G1, p. 907, and June l.";, 1904, p. 937.

Though the shock has not altogether worn off,
the key impression I brought home with me is
that, even as here in the United States, the early
fear and confusion has given way to sober con-
fidence that under Lyndon Jolinson there will
be no slackening in the effort to exjjlore every
path to jDeace and justice.

The lurking anxiety about jingoism and im-
patience in the United States is being dissipated
more rapidly than many people thought pos-
sible. The impression of President Johnson
as a finn, incisive, sure-footed, and energetic
man has grown with astonishing rapidity.
But — even more important — ^that he too is a
man of peace.

In my judgment tliis is the most impoi-tant
international political development to take
place in the first half of 1961. And I assure
you, I sjjeak here not of the politics of partisan-
ship but of the politics of humanity. Confi-
dence in the leadership of .iVmerica is an indis-
pensable ingredient for the achievement of real-
istic and workable solutions to the critical prob-
lems now confronting us in so many sectors of
the world.

Actually, though, the impression Mr. Johnson
has made abroad should come as no surprise to

960

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

us who know tliat his dedication to tlio princi-
ples of internationul cooperation is consistent
with the philosophy he voiced in the Senalo
and durinj; the jieriod he served as Vice Presi-
dent.

I believe I can say with confidence, after
talks with many people abroad, that President
Johnson is looked upon as a successor who will
carry on Mr. Kennedy's w'ork for peace and
security with resolution and iniafrination, while
charting his own road to the good society all of
us seek.

I happily confess that I had not realized how
quickly Mr. Johnson had convinced the world
that America had another great international-
ist and man of peace as Chief Executive. And
in Europe at least lie is rapidly and miracu-
lously becoming just about as popular as he is
here in America.

Preciselj- 2 weeks before he assumed the Pres-
idency, he delivered a speech in Brussels ^ that
summed up his position on the Atlantic alliance
and American commitments abroad. Tliis
statement by the then Vice President was not
reported widely, but it was significant reading
and worth recalling now.

". . . aggressors," he said, "have learned that
they must reckon with the Atlantic partnership
as a single miit. Before an aggressor could
reach Brussels he would have to strike at Bos-
ton— at Philadelpliia before Paris, at Tx)S An-
geles before London, at Chicago before Co-
logne. Our peril is indivisible. So also is our
prosperity."

I don't see how any President coidd make a
clearer commitment than that.

As you know, there are those who have sus-
pected that America might not be depended
upon in a pinch to fulfill its European obliga-
tions. But at the NATO Council meeting at
The Hague last month it seemed clear that this
anxiety was diminishing. And for that we can
thank not only Mr. Johnson's firm words about
the Atlantic alliance but the way he has recently
backed up our international commitments with
deeds.

For instance, when he recently presented his
foreign aid budget to Congress he said his esti-
mate was a rockbottom figure. Now our friends

abroad know he meant every word of this. It
would be dillicuU to overstate the impact, there-
fore, of the action taken just the other day by
the House Foreign AtVaii-s Committee in ap-
])roving the President's request just as he
made it.

I was in Europe when the committee acted,
and I would like to tell its cluiirnian. Dr. Tom
Morgan, that he would have felt well rewarded
for his able eilorls had he also Iteen present to
see the favorable reaction among our allies. If
only all our Congressmen realized as he does
how such responsible action fortifies our
position !

I was abroad, too, when Congi'ess recently
reversed itself and restored the appropriation
for the International Development Association
that it had earlier killed.* And the IDA, as you
know, is the key to a number of our foreign
undertakings, particularly our policy with
many of the newer and less developed nations.

The European reaction was very positive in-
deed. I myself felt like giving a cheer.

You recall when Congress originally made the
cut, the Pi-csident said he would fight to have
it restored. That is just what he did, and
you can be sure this was noticed abroad.

And while we're on the subject of foreign aid,
I think it is about time we stop thinking of
ourselves as Uncle Sap. The fact is that poorer
nations than the Unit€d States donate a larger
percentage of their total resources to foreign
aid than we do. Tlie French, British, Italian,
German, Belgian, and Israeli aid to Africa, for
e.xample, totals about twice the United States
aid to Africa, considerable as it is. The Rus-
sians have already poured $11/2 billion into the
U.A.R., and now Mr. Khrushchev has just
pledged another $227 million to Nasser. And
so it goes. Peking is making an immediate
grant of $3 million to Kenya to help that young
nation balance its budget.

Small potatoes, perhaps, but it's indicative
of the fact that, for all their belligerent sounds,
even the Red Chinese know the long-range im-
portance of economic aid.

The real question about foreign aid, it seems

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

'For text of remarks made by President Johnson
when he signed the International Development Asso-
ciation bill on May 26, see ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 935.

JTJNE 22, 1964

967

to me, is not whether we can afford it but
wliether we can afford not to give it. As for
those who argue that it's too expensive, let me
point out that the President's foreign aid
budget for the next fiscal year is about one-
sixteenth of our military budget, less than 4
percent of the Federal budget, less than three-
fifths of 1 percent of our gross national prod-
uct. All in all, if passed in full, its cost to each
American will be $17.80.

Fluid State of Contemporary Politics

Our postwar world has gradually turned into
one of diversity, with multiple centers of power
and mfluence. And this is true for the East
even as it is for the West. As a consequence
we tend to become overly fearful that the alli-
ance is breaking up. My recent journey, es-
pecially the NATO Council meeting in The
Hague, was in that respect very reassuring.

The difficulties and divisions are many, to be
sure. The conflict between Greece and Turkey
over Cyprus endangers the eastern flank of the
alliance. General de Gaulle's policies, while
quite understandable, do not advance the inte-
gration of Europe and the Atlantic community.
One could go on pointing to dilemmas both
East and West.

There is no need to underline the fluid state
of contemporary politics. Russia's fear of nu-
clear war and growing standards of living in
the Soviet Union have led to the split with
China, whose leaders accuse Mr. Khrushchev
of revisionism and retreat. Behind tliis split
there is not only a bid for ideological leader-
ship in a world whose poverty is much nearer
to the Chinese level than to growing 'Eussian
affluence. Tliero could also be very profound
divisions of national interest, since China might
claim that a large part of Asian Eussia has
been filched from the old Chinese Empire.

This division in the Communist world, like
the division in medieval Europe between Pope
and Emperor, is giving subordinate centers of
power now opportunities. This is the "poly-
centrism" which is certainly evndent in the
great variety of different domestic policies and
international attitudes now being pureued by
the European satellites.

All this fluidity does give the Western World,
in theory at least, new opportvmities. How-
ever, these opportimities are limited by a num-
ber of difficulties and divergences :

The chief cement of the old alliance was fear
of a imited Commimist bloc. The lessening of
Russian pressure in Europe has also lessened
a sense of cohesion in the alliance.

It may be that Russia, fearful of the exten-
sion of Chinese influence, will seek to modify
radical policies and to play down the cold war.
There are some signs that this is indeed the
case in parts of Latin America where Commu-
nists seem recently to have been less belligerent
than the Castroites. Equally, however, Russia
may feel that it cannot let the Chinese outbid
it for the support of the developing peoples.
They are poor, their frustrations are increasing,
their means of coping with them are now grow-
ing in a way that meets the steady increase in
population. In this condition, radicalism is
endemic and the Russians may feel that they
cannot be less strident than the Chinese in their
attacks on "imperialism." It is, therefore, very
likely that the problem of how to deal with
commimism outside Europe will continue to
trouble the alliance, and certainly it is an issue
upon which there is no sign of any unanimity
of opinion.

Bonds of Common Interest

With the twilight of empire, the emergence
of Communist China, the tidal wave of inde-
pendence— all on the heels of European eco-
nomic and military recovery — the rapidly
changing world has spawned a multitude of
other problems and external dangers involving
our allies and the United States with its world-
wide commitments. Britain is concerned with
Aden and Malaysia. We have Cuba and Viet-
Nam. France has its former African colonies.
And of course we don't all have the same priori-
ties of importance.

These all add to the diversity of our interests,
and the hazard for the alliance is not the diver-
sity of interests but that the diversities become
divisions.

Also, today, when the external dangers that
prompted the formation of NATO 15 years ago

968

DEP.^RTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

appear to have receded, the problems of Ger-
many and European security remain and many
more in distant places have been added.

More, not less, consultation and coordination
becomes necessary if we are all to avoid the
danger of falling back on purely national solu-
tions. But the Atlantic world dares not follow
that couree if it wishes to retain its influence
and authority. Its highest intei-est lies in en-
hanced interdependence to deal with the threats
to peace, not just in Europe but everywhere.
Moreover, it can lead, in the nonviolent era of
competition with Communist regimes that we
seem to have entered, only to closer cooperation.

I have no doubt as to the outcome of such a
contest — if we can strengthen the bonds of com-
mon interest linking North America and free
Europe. We are well embarked on ways of do-
ing so. Now it is up to all of us to develop the
opportunities we have created.

The U.N. Peacekeeper and Peacemaker

The accomplisliments of NATO have been
along lines sanctioned by the United Nations
Charter. As the President recently said," the
charter and the North Atlantic Treaty are in-
dispensable to one another, for neither can keep
the peace alone. And it is the fact that both
are indispensable that makes the best argument
for the continuity of NATO and, I hope, rapid
development of the U.N.'s capacity to cope with
the peacekeeping problems of the postwar world
that are dumped in its lap when there is no
other way to handle them.

If I were asked to sum up for you what the
U.N. has come to mean to the people of the
world, I could do no better than to recall some
words spoken by Beardsley Ruml shortly after
the charter was signed. It was one of the bet-
ter prophecies of our age and it goes like this :

At the end of fire years you will think the UN is
the greatest vision ever realized by man.

At the end of ten years you will find doubts within
yourself and all through the world.

At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN
cannot succeed. Tou will be certain that all the odds
are against its ultimate life and success.

It will only be when the UN is twenty years old

• For text of remarks made by President Johnson on
Apr. 3. 1964, see ihid., Apr. 20. 1964, p. 606.

that ... we will know that the UN Is the only alterna-
tive to the demolition of the world.

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing
that turned out to be !

By now, I think, most of us have arrived at
the fourth stage in Kuinrs 20-year prophecy —
that stage where we know that international
institutions for peace are "the only alternative
to the demolition of the world."

Peacekeeping is only one task of the United
Nations. But it is the one that gets most of
the headlines, and its record bus long since made
this international machinery indispensable. It
will get more so as the frictions and conflicts
mult iply. The danger is that it will get smoth-
ered by too many. As of tonight, it is in the
Congo, in Cyprus, in Yemen, in Gaza, in
Kashmir.

Scores of what used to be called "incidents"
have occurred around the world during the past
decade and a half, but they have occurred with-
out widespread hostilities or even ultimatums.
On at least 20 occasions formal fighting has
broken out between opposing armed forces.
But nearly every one of them — nearly every
war, partial Avar, incipient war, or threat of
■nrar — has been averted or halted by a cease-fire,
by adjourning to the conference table or by
referring the dispute to an hiternational insti-
tution for nonviolent solution.

This is one of tlie outstanding facts of con-
temporary international political life, the fact
that in most of these crises — these outbreaks of
violence — the restraining influence, the peace-
maker and peacekeeper, has been the United
Nations.

But there are things the United Nations can't
do either now or, I fear, for a long time to come.
Wliere the vital interests of the great powers are
engaged directly, only the great powere can ex-
tricate themselves. That's why we have to
maintain our defense establishments and the
shield provided by our alliance. Yet, even in
big-power confrontations, the U.N. can help by
internationalizing conflicts, by providing means
of extracting rather than escalating, by saving
face instead of risking war.

Until now the United Nations has been better
at peacekeeping than at peacemaking — nat-

JTJNE 22, 1964

969

urally enough. But it will become increasingly
essential for the United Nations to reinforce its
firefighting equipment with machinery designed
for enduring settlement. A cease-fire only re-
stores the status quo ante — wliich is to say the
condition which gave rise to the dispute m the
first place.

This, of course, is great and hopeful progress.
The United Nations has developed the capacity
to maintain some semblance of order to fill the
vacuum left when the order imposed by the
European empire system was voluntarily and
suddenly dismantled after the war.

But if we now are to progress beyond a sys-
tem capable of invoking cease-fires and prevent-
ing the outbreak of wars, if we are to build a
reliable system of order with the capacity to
induce peaceful change where change is needed,
if we are some day to begin to dismantle the
gargantuan defense establislunents which con-
sume the wealth of nations without producing
anything usable — then we shall need more and
better machinei-y to do it. Indeed, there is no
other road to significant disarmament.

For, successfid as the machinery has been up
to now, it has veiy definite weaknesses, grave
weaknesses that threaten to undo all the good.
The major weakness, I hasten to point out, is
more the implementation of the machinery of
peace than the machinery itself.

Wo see it most clearly today in Laos in the
operations of the International Control Com-
mission, which of course is not an organ of the
U.N. but which illustrates my point. The Com-
mission devised by the agreement of 1962 is a
troika affair which operates on the basis of
unanimity. Wlien fighting occurs, as it has
recently on the Plaines des Jarres, the Commis-
sion must meet and agree before it can even go
out and look. Its effectiveness has been per-
sistently sabotaged by the Commimist member
by misuse of the so-called "veto" power, thereby
undennining support to the Souvaniia govern-
ment. Today, however, that government, which
was created under the Geneva agreements, re-
mains in full exercise of its authority as the
legitimate government of a neutralized Laos.

The other Geneva signatories must live up
to their solemn commitments and support Prime
Minister Souvanna in his efforts to preserve

the independence and neutrality which the
world thought had been won at Geneva. As I
have told the Security Council, these solemn
obligations must not be betrayed.

The problem in Southeast Asia is that Hanoi
and Peiping won't leave their neighbors alone,
regardless of the Geneva agi-eements of 1954
and 1962. But the United States won't, as we
have made clear, sit idly by while Viet-Nam
and Laos are overrmi in criminal violation of
the Geneva agreements to neutralize these coim-
tries. As President Johnson said today:
". . . America keeps her word." ^

Laos, as I say, points up the deficiency of the
peacekeeping machinery contrived at Geneva.
But other developments m the same geogi'aph-
ical area show how the United Nations might
provide machinery that will be effective.

In response to the complaint of Cambodia
that its borders were being violated the United
States has proposed to send United Nations
observers or even a United Nations force to the
scene. For the United Nations, as I have
pointed out, has repeatedly demonstrated its
capacity in such cases.

The Search for Peace

In the light of all this we must understand
that the state of the world makes it more im-
perative than ever before that all of us, to-
gether, continue our painstaking search for
those interests which unite the nations, for
those international instrviments of law and
security, for those institutions of a stable, work-
ing world society.

In short, we must together strengthen the
machinery we have already built inside and out-
side the United Nations.

If we do, we will have reason to hope that
between the thermonuclear powers additional
areas of common groimd can be identified and
fuither agreements reached, until the cold war
truly fades into history. And if the cold war
does not fade into history, it will not be lie-
cause of any lack of effort or good will on the
part of the United States.

Consider if you will the peace-building rec-
ord of the 6 months since President Johnson
assumed the Presidency :

' See p. 953.

970

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

This has ninpwl from dii-ect corii'sjiondeiice
with Cliainium Khrushchev to specific pro-
posals both at the (iencva Disarmament Con-
ferenc« and in tlie forums of the United Na-
tions on how we propose to attain and keep (lie
peace; from an olTer to work with the Soviet
Union on a maimed lunar limdinj; to an agreeil
cutback in the production of lissionable materi-
als; fi-om a policy of encouraging the evolu-
tion now in progress in Communist Europe to
the actual working out of signiticant new agree-
ments with Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia
on such matters as trade and agi-iculture.

And, of course, tliere is the achievement of
important new agreements with Russia itself
on cultural exchange and the opening of new
consuhxtes."

There have been other steps, too, all geared to
the greatest possible flexibilitv in dealing with
the shifting trends of today.

What we have done in the past 6 months has
convinced both our friends and those who are
not our friends that this administration will act
with restraint, that it wants jx^aco, that it is
unafraid to negotiate where negotiati(m is ap-
propriate and equally unafraid to stand firm
where firnuiess is required. "Brinkmanship" is
outdated. Perhaps the word for today is
"thinkmanship" !

As I have pointed out before, the steps taken
by the President in the past G months may not
in themselves end the cold war; they may not
assure us of the peace we seek, but they bring
jieace that much closer. And they are convinc-
ing the world that the United States will neglect
no work of peace that is witliin our reach.

In doing so we reaflirm that peace is not
mei-ely the absence of war but a virtue, a state
of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confi-
dence, justice.

Member of the Parish

hy Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^

To join you here, to speak of the future of
our United Nations in this capital city of Can-
ada, is more than a privilege ; it's a puzzlement.
What grade of intellectual coking coal could
I bring to this Newcastle that wasn't first pro-
duced here? For in the short and remarkable
life of our United Nations, Canada has pre-
eminently served as a source of wisdom and
fount of courage.

Since 1948 Canada has assigned Canadians
to every jjeacekeeping operation of the U.N.
except West New Guinea — the only country
wliich has done so. Canadians have jounced in

' See p. 979.

' Addres-i made before the annual meeting of tlie
United Nations Association of Canada at Ottawa, Can-
ada, on June 6 (press release 270 dated June 5).

white jeeps along the sensitive borders of
Israel. Canadians have policed the tender armi-
stice line in Kashmir. Canadians have fought
and died for collective security in Korea. Ca-
nadians helped zip up the Sinai borders after
Suez; helped put out the fuse which could have
blown Lebanon apart 2 years later; helped sit
on the lid in the Congo 2 years after that ; and
3 years later again were assigned to the dusty
wastes of Arabia to observe the cease-fire in
Yemen.

And now, in Cyprus, you have sent your
famed Van Doos— the Royal 22d Regiment —
to account for one-sixth of the U.N. Force
which polices that tense and trouble-d island.
As often before, you, the Canadians, got there
first — and got there in your own planes. And

JTTXE 22, 1964

971

because Canadians know what tliey are doing
and do it well, your contingent has been as-
signed just about the hottest sectors on the is-
land, including Nicosia and the notorious
Kyrenia Pass.

And all this time you have been paying your
dues to the club of world community — and mak-
ing: the fifth largest contribution to the U.N.'s
Special Fund, the fourth largest contribution
to refugee relief, the third largest contribution
to technical aid and to the support of the Pales-
tine refugees.

You have given the U.N. your best — men of
quality and courage like General [Andrew]
McNaughton, who helped frame the Kashmir
cease-fire; General Howard Kennedy, who
brought the Palestine refugee program through
a difficult time; and General [E. L. M.] Burns,
who, after Suez, in that nervous winter of 1956
became the world's first commanding general
of a truly international peace force.

In that confused and curious process of multi-
lateral brokerage by which international dip-
lomats somehow try "to make a mesh of things,"
it is not easy to single out the man who invented
a great idea at a critical moment in a long nego-
tiation. But when the history of mankind's
best and most durable effort to build an inter-
national order is written down — by historians
who survived to write it because the generation
that split the atom apart discovered how to weld
the world together — they will surely identify
as the founding father of modern international
peacekeeping your own Prime Minister, Lester
Pearson.

Canada's Role in International Peacekeeping

Lester Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize
for inventing a peacekeeping device — a plan for
the rapid establishment, with the consent of the
nations concerned, of an emergency interna-
tional U.N. Force to secure and supervise the
cessation of hostilities in Suez in early Novem-
ber 1956. What he thus proposed in Canada's
name was a truly creative act — in its own way
quite as creative as the acts of Orville Wright or
Richard Arkwright or Enrico Fermi. Like
other great perceptions in the pellmell advance
of civilization, "Mike" Pearson's act was a kind

of miraculous amalgam — deep understanding of
great forces, combined with an intuitive sense of
the right moment to take the next step.

Canada, through Pearson, said that measur-
ing "aggression" and assessing blame was not
enough; that obtaining a cease-fire and with-
drawal of forces was also not enough to cope
with the root causes of the struggle. He pro-
posed that the Secretary-General be authorized
"to begin to make arrangements with member
states for a United Nations force large enough
to keep these borders at peace while a political
settlement is being worked out." And, he
added, "My own Government would be glad to
recommend Canadian participation in such a
United Nations force, a truly international
peace and police force."

This responsible and realistic peacemaker was
saying what we have all come to learn from
experience : that the intermediate stage of polit-
ical settlement, the condition precedent to
peaceful change, requires an international ex-
ecutive effectively represented at the very scene
of conflict; that it requires nations to provide
men and money and equipment as risk invest-
ment in the maintenance of peace ; and that it
requires above all a few leaders of at least a
few nations who are prepared to make the hard
decisions that peacekeeping entails — and then
stand by their decisions when the going gets
rough.

Everything we have learned since the agony
of the Second World War and the healing bonds
of the U.N. Charter drew us together in this
extraordinary adventure — everything we have
learned in Greece and the Middle East, in Kash-
mir and Korea, in the Congo and in Cyprus,
and in the deeply troubled peninsula of South-
east Asia — attests to the prophetic and prac-
tical quality of Canadian vision, Canadian will,
and Canadian followthrough.

This is why I say that, in the business of in-
ternational peacekeeping, Canada is a source
of wisdom and a fount of courage. A nation's
courage may be — I believe it usually is — directly
proportional to distance from the danger.
Canada therefore may have a certain advan-
tage, even in the age of jets, in its distance from
most of the world's most troublesome trouble

972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

spots. But wisciom is proportional to involve-
ment ; and precisely because Canada is far from
the ConjTo or the Giiza Strip, it is a tribute to
the quality of your perception that Canada has
felt so involved with other people's brushfires
and grudge fights halfway around the world.

Henri Bergson tells of a man in a parish
church who remains impassive while around
him the congregation is deeply moved by the
pageantry of worship and the brilliance of the
sermon. His neighbor in the pew asks him if
he lacks all emotion and feeling, to remain thus
unmoved, and the man replies: Maix, Mmuiieur,
je ne suis pas de la paroisse — "I'm not a member
of the parish."

Luckily for mankind, most of Canada's lead-
ers and most Canadians know that they are
members of a parish of planetary size.

The U.N.'s Capacity To Act

How much further can — or should — the U.N.
develop its peacekeeping capacity? It is a fair
question, but no answer today has much chance
of making sense tomorrow.

For the U.X. has whatever capacity its mem-
bers can agree to endow it with — at any given
time for any given purpose. As the Secretary-
General, U Thant, said in Ottawa the other
day, what he does on the executive side of the
organization is to be guided by the decisions of
the relevant U.N. bodies. Until one knows the
nature of a future emergency and then plumbs
the will of the U.N.'s majority to act in the face
of common danger, no man can say what the
"capacity" of the U.N. is to act in defense of
the peace.

The day before the Korean invasion, the day
before the Suez crisis, the day before the army
mutiny in the Congo, nobody would have
dreamed that the U.N. would take on the peace-
keeping tasks it did in fact assume. The capac-
ity of the U.N. is the sum of the wills of its
members to act together.

Dag Hammarskjold said it well, in remarks
which Prime Minister Pearson quoted in his
Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture here a month
ago:

The basic policy line for this Organization is that
the United Nations simply must respond to those de-

mands which must be made of It . . . the United Na-
tions should respond and should have confldence In its
strength and capacity to resiwnd.

Obviously, there is always the question of how
much of an administrative load can safely be
taken on. Obviously, too, there is the sticky
and contentious problem of finance, and the
always diflicult matter of getting first-rate peo-
ple capable of doing unprecedented jobs in a
fog of controversy and frustration. Obviously,
the U.N.'s small operations in Greece, Palestine,
and Kashmir helped put it in training to cliiiil)
what Hammarskjold called "the very steej) hill
of Suez" ; and in turn, the operation in the Gaza
Strip served as calisthenics for the Congo, and
what was learned in the Congo deeply affected
the mandate, the strategy, and the tactics of the
Cyprus operation.

Yet, if there is one lesson from the 13 alarms
to which the U.N. has responded — 14, if we in-
clude the very recent unpleasantness on the
Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border — the lesson
is that each peacekeeping task is unprecedented,
that the U.N.'s resources are never fixed or ex-
haustible, that being busy in one place must not
preclude getting busy in another place.

So the measure of the U.N.'s future actions
for peace, here and there around the world, is
not some predetermined quantum of "capacity
to act" but rather the complex circumstances
imder which the requisite majority of its mem-
bers can agree to pool their strength and act
together for the charter's purposes. This is the
real variable in the equation, not the age or the
experience of the organization, nor the state of
its bank account, nor the level of its current
workload.

I have been using the term "requisite majori-
ties." As you know, this may mean, in the
General Assembly, a two-thirds majority of
members present and voting. In the Security
Council it means 7 out of 11 votes, modified
by the veto of a permanent n:iember.

These are the technical facts of life about
U.N. majorities. But the political facts of life
in the U.N., as in other parliamentary bodies,
endow equal votes with unequal influence and
unequal responsibility for the consequences of
inaction. If political agreement can be reached
among the most influential members, the tech-

JTJNE

1064

973

nical majorities are more than likely to be
forthcoming.

This does not imply that the strongest mem-
bers lead the less strong around by the nose-
any more than the one-country, one-vote prin-
ciple subordinates the U.N.'s big-power minor-
ity to its small-power majority. It implies,
rather, that in a responsible organization the less
strong have the realism to know that the U.N.
depends upon the stronger members for most of
its capacity to act — and the good sense to kiiow
that when the most powerful members can
agree, the less powerful are protected by that
agreement.

All this is to say that the U.N. is a political
body, and anybody who has worked in a legis-
lature or a school board or even a student council
knows the limitations imposed by the politics of
consent.

Guidance for Policy in Southeast Asia

Now, you may well say : Assuming these ab-
stractions are valid, are they relevant? Do
they, for example, provide some guidance for
policy in Southeast Asia? I am frank to say
I do not know.

The essence of the problem in Southeast Asia
is all too simple : Ten years ago, at Geneva, the
new governments in the area and other coun-
tries with traditional interests or new ambitions
there, signed a series of agreements to leave
their neighbors alone.^ In those agreements a
three-member International Control Commis-
sion was to observe and maintain the agree-
ments. Yet, for most of the time since then,
the Communists of North Viet-Nam, supported
by the Chinese Communists from the north,
have systematically committed aggression
against Laos and South Viet-Nam, and the
peacekeeping commissions have been largely
paralyzed by obstruction of their Communist
members — despite the valiant efforts of Cana-
dians in all three Control Commissions to make
them work. So the problem is how to get the
Communists of the area to abide by their agree-
ments— and to develop peacekeeping machinery

to make it more difficult for aggressive-minded
countries to invade their weaker neighbors by
stealth.

In all this the question arises about a possible
role for the U.N. This possibility was quite de-
liberately opened for discussion by Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson in the Security Council just 2
weeks ago.' The U.N. is, of course, no stranger
to the area.

In 1959 the Security Council sent a commis-
sion to Laos which had a quieting effect on the
situation at that time.

A special representative of the Secretary-
General has been at work for some time on the
border problems between Cambodia and Thai-
land, with the welcome approval of both
countries.

In 1963 a U.N. commission tested the senti-
ment of the people of Sabah and Sarawak
toward union with Malaysia.

Last year the General Assembly also dis-
patched a mission of impartial inquiry into
alleged violations of human rights in Viet-Nam.

For several years the U.N.'s Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East has been lay-
ing development plans for the Lower Mekong
Basin, which could affect significantly the fu-
ture of Cambodia, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thai-
land.

And this week and last the Security Council
has been occupied with the border issue between
Cambodia and Viet-Nam.

"VVliat further the U.N. can do there is not
today in the realm of knowledge but of guess-
work— and mighty complicated guesswork it is.
But this is a time of trouble and war in South-
east Asia ; and the U.N. was built for trouble —
and for peace.

Of one thing, however, we can be sure: The
U.N. cannot take our problem off our hands
and let us go away and forget it. Maybe more
effective international machinery is needed to
make sure that the attractive peoples of South-
east Asia are left alone by their more powerful
neighbors. But even more certainly, our power
and determination are needed to persuade the
Commimists tliat it is in their interest to stop

• For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State pub-
Ucatlon6446),p. 750.

' For statements made by Ambassador Stevenson In
tbe Security Council on May 21 and 26, see Bulletin
of June 8, 1964, p. 907, and June 15, 1964, p. 937.

974

DEPAKTMKNT OF STATE BULLETIN

aggression, start keeping the promises they
made at Geneva in 1954 and 19G2, and to accept
effective international machinery to assure the
independence of their small neighbors.

Dangers of Vague Approval

We who live south of your border share not
only your continent but your will to build a
United Nations that works. We share with
you that devotion to peace, that commitment to
human dignity, and that lively interest in other
people's economic development which are best
expressed for our time in the first few pages of
the Charter of the United Nations. But per-
haps, where the U.N. is concerned, we both are
stalwart but vague.

In the United States the pollsters keep saying
that 83 percent to 87 percent of us think the
U.N. is a good thing and want to strengthen it.
In most constituencies political candidates who
seem to be opposed to the U.N. seem to suffer
on election day. Even the supposedly contro-
versial plan to buy United Nations bonds went
through our House of Representatives by a mar-
gin of two to one and through the Senate by a
margin of three to one.

But there is practical danger as well as misty
encouragement in this universal approbation.

One danger is that a warm feeling about an
institution is not a very dependable source of
support at moments of crises. I well remember
how shocked were some of the U.N.'s most
ardent supporters when they found that peace-
keeping in the Congo entailed the sacrifice of
blood and treasure and that soldiers on a peace-
keeping mission sometimes had to shoot back
at people who insisted on shooting at the peace-
keepers.

We have lived through the Congo, and now
the U.N. is in Cyprus. Here we begin to get
the hint of a second danger that comes from
being stalwart or vague about the U.N. If
it were not so serious a matter, we could better
appreciate the irony when editorial writers who
criticized the U.N. for being forceful in Ka-
tanga now demand indignantly that the U.N.
teach a forceful lesson to those who resist its
mandate in Cyprus. Having decided that it's
all right for peacekeepers to shoot, there are
those among us who forget that the essence of

peacekeeping is that soldiers without enemies
use force only with the greatest restraint. And
that's one of the hardest kinds of soldiering, as
some crack Canadian troops can testify.

Looking ahead, there is a furtlier danger:
that vague approval may suddenly, in a mo-
ment of crisis, become an unrealistic expecta-
tion that the United Nations can take on all
of a sudden a task which the requisite majority
of its members do not yet feel is theirs to tackle.

And so, as we tell each other over and again
that peace depends on an institution called the
U.N. to replace the institution of war, we had
better note two things about the organization of
which so many people so vaguely approve :

First, the U.N. is not a supergovcrnment but
an organization of governments. Its decisions
are based on the consent of governments, and
its actions are that most realistic of art forms,
the art of the possible.

Second, the U.N.'s resources are what its
members will contribute to a common effort —
dues voted by the General Assembly, plus vol-
untary contributions by its members. These
resources are no longer puny — the U.N. system
is spending more than half a billion dollars this
year.

The U.N. is not yet what our children would
call a "big deal." Yet the tasks ahead of us,
in the fields described by the charter, are big
enough to fill our imaginations to overflowing.
Atomic weapons are almost 20 years old, and
the problem of their control and proliferation
still escapes us. Conflicts between nations —
rooted in disputes about territory, economics,
ideas, and rivalries of race, religion, and tribe —
will be with us as far ahead as we can see — and
farther than that.

This is to say that the conditions which have
historically made for war persist in a world in
which major war is historically finished — or
had better be, else civilization is finished. In
this world, with 20 million men under arms and
annual militaiy budgets of $120 billion, the
peace turns more and more frequently on the
prompt availability of a few thousand men or
a few million dollars for international peace-
keeping.

There is something almost obscene in this
disproportion. No one who considers it soberly

JTJNB 22, 1984

975

for a moment can seriously conclude that the
Iknit to mtemational peacekeeping really is a
shortage of money or manpower.

The more and the sooner we develop the
capacity of the nations to act together under
the charter, the more and better chance we and
our children will have to reach those "better
standards ... in larger freedom" that are the
promise of the charter. Our actions together
had better contain the dangers we share— for
we all have to be brothers whether we like it or
not.

700 students, scholars, and trainees from 26
countries.

Tlie report included a number of recom-
mendations which are currently under favora-
ble consideration by the Government. Among
these is the establishment of a National Eeview
Board, composed of leaders in civic, educa-
tional, and business life to represent the national
interest in the Center. While the size and com-
position of this body have not been decided
upon, the President in releasing the report
designated Governor Bums to be its chairman.

Governor of Hawaii Confers
on East-West Center

Press release 266 dated June 3

Gov. John A. Burns of Hawaii, chairman-
designate of the proposed National Eeview
Board of the East- West Center in Honolulu,
met in Washington on June 3 with Assistant
Secretai-y of State for Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs Lucius D. Battle and Roy E. Lar-
sen of Time, Inc., to discuss implementation of
the recently completed Lai'sen-Davis survey of
the East- West Center. This report was ten-
dered in early May to the President, who ac-
cepted its recommendations in principle and
sent it on to the Secretary of State for action
on May 6.

The survey of the East- West Center was
undertaken last fall by the United States Ad-
visory Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs at the request of
Assistant Secretary Battle. Mr. Larsen, in his
capacity as vice chairman of the Advisory
Commission, was assisted by James M. Davis,
then director of the International Center of the
University of Michigan.

During its survey, the Larsen-Davis team in-
terviewed more than 150 persons and studied at
firsthand the operations of the Center, which
was established by Congress in 1060 to promote
imderstanding among the peoples of Asia, the
Pacific area, and the United States. Known
formally as the Center for Cultural and Tech-
nical Interchange Between East and West, it is
located at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu,
and presently operates programs for more than

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 19&4.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Depart-
ment Organization and Foreign Operations of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. 745 and
H.R. 10485. March 9-18, 1964. 45 pp.

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. Part I. March 13-
April 9, 1964. 362 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502,
a bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part IV,
April 16-22, 1964, 173 pp. ; Part V, April 23-27, 1964,
105 pp. ; Part VI, Apr. 29-May 4, 1964, 205 pp.

Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Second annual re-
port to the Congress (fiscal year 1963) prepared by
the Agency for International Development, Depart-
ment of State. S. Doc. 65. April 16, 1964. 47 pp.

Economic Policies and Practices : Paper No. 4, Private
Trade Barriers and the Atlantic Community. Mate-
rials prepared for the Joint Economic Committee.
Undated. 42 pp. [Joint Committee print]

Economic Policies and Practices : Paper No. 5, Unem-
ployment Programs in Sweden. Materials prepared
for the Joint Economic Committee. April 22, 1964.
51 pp. [Joint Committee print]

Ideological Operations and Foreign Policy. Report
No. 2 on Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological
Offensive, made by the Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1352. April 27,
1964. 19 pp.

Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Terri-
torial Waters of the United States. Report to ac-
company S. 1988. H. Rept. 1356. April 28, 1964.
20 pp.

Protecting Heads of Foreiini States. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 7651. H. Rept. 1360. April 28, 1964.
8 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To
Examine and Review the Administration of the
Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims
Act of 1948, together with individual views. S. Rept.
1014. April 30, 1964. 6 pp.

976

DEPARTJIENT OP STATE BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and
Planning

The Department of State announced on
June 1 (press release 260) that Kobert C.
Weaver, Administrator of the Housing; and
Home Finance Agency, would be the U.S. rep-
resentative at the 25th session of the Committee
on Housing, Building and Planning of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe at Washington
June 2-5. Mr. Weaver's alternate will be
James A. Moore, Assistant Administrator of
the Housing and Home Finance Agency.
Advisers will be Roy J. Burroughs, Housing
and Home Finance Agency; Burl Johnson,
chairman of the International Committee of
the National Association of Home Builders;
Roland Sawj'er, housing consultant of the
United Steel Workers of America; and George
Tesoro of the United States Mission to the
European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.

The Committee on Housing, Building and
Planning, one of 10 major committees of the
ECE, advises the Commission on housing prob-
lems and acts as a clearinghouse for housing
information.

The following countries were invited by the
Commission to participate in the meeting: Al-
bania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorus-
sian S.S.R., Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Himgary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., United
Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R., and Yugo-
slavia. In addition, the Commission invited
interested specialized agencies of the United
Nations and international nongovernmental or-
ganizations to attend. Other countries also
attend from time to time in a consultative
capacity.

Following the conference, appro.\imat«ly 45
to 50 delegates will tour various American
cities to observe U.S. progress in meeting hous-
ing and urban renewal problems. The tour was
arranged by the Housing and Homo Finance
Agency in collaboration with professional, busi-
ne.'w, and civic groups and housing authorities
throughout the country, and the Governmental
Affairs Institute. Funds to help finance the
tour were provided by the Ford Foundation.
The tour will begin with orientation meetings
at Washington and proceed to Chicago, Lafay-
ette, Ind., Cleveland, Philadelphia, New York,
and New Haven, Conn.

International Cotton Advisory Committee

The Department of State announced on May
28 (press release 259) that the U.S. Government
would be represented by the following delega-
tion at the 23d plenary meeting of the Inter-
national Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC)
at Frankfurt, Germany, June 1-10.

Delegate

Horace D. Godfrey, Administrator, Agricultural Sta-
bilization and Consen-atlon Service, Department of
Agriculture

Alternate Delegates

Stanley Nehmer, deputy director, OflBce of Interna-
tional Resources, Department of State

Robert C. Sherman, director. Cotton Division, Foreign
Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Oovernment Advisers

Paul G. Minneman, agricultural attach^, American
Embassy, Bonn

Joseph A. Moss, director, Cotton Policy Staff, Agricul-
tural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Depart-
ment of Agriculture

Claus W. Ruser, chief, Fibers and Textiles Division,
OflSce of International Resources, Department of
State

Joseph H. Stevenson, agricultural economist. Cotton
Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department
of Agriculture

Arthur C. Tendler, assistant to director. Office of Tex-
tiles, Business Defense Services Administration, De-
partment of Commerce

Billy M. Waddle, chief, Cotton and Cordage Fibers
Research Branch, Agricultural Research Service,
Doi)artment of Agriculture

Industry Advisers

Eric Catmur, Geo. H. McFadden & Bro., Inc., Memphis,

Tenn.
George C. Cortright, Rolling Fork, Misa

977

Read P. Dunn, Jr., executive director. Cotton Council
International, Brussels, Belgium

Robert C. Jackson, executive vice president, American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., Washington,
D.C.

W. Gordon McCabe, Jr., J. P. Stevens & Company,
Greenville, S.C.

P. Marion Rhodes, president. New York Cotton Ex-
change, Washington, D.C.

The function of the ICAC is to assemble and
analyze data on world cotton production, con-
sumption, trade stocks, and prices and to
observe and keep in close touch with develop-
ments in the world cotton market.

Forty governments are members of the ICAC.
They account for over 90 percent of free pro-
duction and consumption of cotton.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed helow) may 6e consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Coun-
cil on the functioning of the United Nations Yemen
Observation Mission and the implementation of the
terms of disengagement covering the period from 3
January to 3 March 1964. S/5572. March 3, 1964.
4 pp.

Letter dated March 4, 1964, from the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Organization of American States ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations transmitting a copy of an OAS report on
accusations made by Venezuela against Cuba.
S/5.086. March 9, 1964. 112 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the question of
military disengagement in the Congo. S/5428/Add.
2. March 16, 1964. 3 pp.

Reports, letters, and notes on the Cyprus dispute.
S/5.')93/Add. 2, March 17, 1964, 1 p.; S/5634 and
Corr. 1, March 31, 1964, 19 pp.; S/5653, April 11,
1964, 6 pp. ; S/5671 and Corr. 1, April 29, 1964, 11
pp. ; S/0679, May 2, 1964, 7 pp. ; S/5691, May 11, 1964,
1 p. ; S/,'3715, May 25, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5719, May 26.
1964, 2 pp.; S/5720, May 26, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5721,
May 27, 1964, 4 pp. ; S/5726, May 29, 1964, 2 pp.

Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa. S/.'')621, March 25, 1964, 88 pp.;
S/5717, May 25, 1964, 70 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the
Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its
1078th Meeting on December 4, 1903 (S/5471), con-
cerning apartheid in South Africa. S/5658, April 20,
1964. 43 pp. ; and Add. 1, April 21, 1964, 24 pp.

Letter dated May 22, 1961, from the permanent repre-
sentative of South Africa addressed to the President
of the Security Council concerning Council con-

sideration of the "serious situation existing in South
Africa." S/5723. May 28, 1964. 14 pp.

Letters on the Cambodia complaint against the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam. S/5666, April 22, 1964, 97 pp.;
S/5697, May 13, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5709, May 18, 1964,
2 pp.

Letter dated May 25 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council
transmitting the text of a resolution on the question
of South West Africa adopted by the Special Com-
mittee on the Situation with Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at
its 262d meeting. S/5722. May 27, 1964. 3 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the
resolution adopted by the Security Council at its
10S3d meeting on December 11, 1963, ( S/5481 ) , con-
cerning territories under Portuguese administration.
S/5727. May 29, 1964. 3 pp.

General Assembly

Depositary Practice in Relation to Reservations. Re-
port of the Secretary-General. A/5687. January
29, 1964. 113 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Information on space launchings : letter dated Feb-
ruary 19 from the U.S. representative, A/AC.105/
INF.58, February 27, 1964, 2 pp.; letter dated
February 20 from the U.S.S.R. representative,
A/AC.105/INF.59, February 26, 1964, 2 pp.

Question of South-West Africa. Note by the Secre-
tary-General. A/5690. February 28, 1964. 7 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
Report of the Ministerial Conference on Asian Eco-
nomic Co-Operation. E/CN.11/641. January 6,
1964. 188 pp.

Annual Report of the Committee for Co-Ordination
of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin to the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
for the period ending January 13, 1964. A/CN.ll/
646. January 16, 1964. 67 pp.

Report of the Governing Council of the Asian Institute
for Economic Development and Planning to the Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East
E/CN.11/650. January 29, 1964. 16 pp.

Report of the Committee on Trade (7th session) to
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East (20th session). E/CN.11/648. January 30,
1964. 36 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa :
African Timber Trends and Prospects. Preliminary
Report on Western Africa and Equatorial East
Africa. E/CN.14/272. January 14, 1964. 212 pp.
Implementation in Africa of United Nations Reso-
lutions on Land Reform With Special Reference
to EGA. E/CN.14/278. January 29, 1964. 51 pp.
Report on the Preparation of an African Telecom-
munication Network. E/CN.14/249. January 29,
1964. 23 pp.
Fertilizers in Africa. E/CN.14/271. January 30,
1964. 26 pp.

The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology
to Under-Developed Countries. Report by the
Secretary-General. E/3861. March 9, 1964. 179 pp.

Co-ordination of Technical Assistance Activities. Re-
port of the Ad Hoc Committee established under
Council Resolution 851. E/3862. March 10. 1964.
24 pp.

978

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Soviet Union Sign Consular Convention

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,

MAY 27

WUte House press release dated May 27

We have just concluded negotiations with
the Soviet Union on a consular convention.
Tlie agreement will be signed in Moscow on
June 1. I have authorized Ambassador [Foy
D.] Kohler to sign for the United States. I
undei-stand Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrei
A.] Gromyko will be signing for the Soviet
Union.

This treaty, which I will submit to the Senate
for its advice and consent, is a significant step
in our continuing efforts to increase contacts
and understanding between the Americ^m
people and the peoples of the Soviet Union.
It will make possible improved consular serv-
ices in both countries. American citizens visit-
ing the Soviet Union, either as tourists or for
business reasons, will have available to them a
greater degree of consular protection than ever
before. For example, Americans detained in
the Soviet Union for any reasons will be as-
sured of access without delay to American con-
sular officials. American businessmen and
shipping companies will be able to call on U.S.
consular services to assist in representing tlieir
interests. And the mechanics for dealing with
a whole range of legal problems from compli-
cated questions of inheritance to simply notary
sen-ices will be considerably eased.

It is my hope that this treaty — the first bi-
lateral treaty between the United States and
the Soviet Union — will be a step forward in
developing understanding between our two

countries, which is so important in the con-
tinuing struggle for peace.

TEXT OF CONVENTION, SIGNED JUNE 1

Press release 262 dated June 1, as corrected

CONSULAR CONTVENTION

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OP THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RE-
PUBLICS

The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,

Desiring to cooperate in strengthening friendly re-
lations and to regulate consular relations between both
states,

Have decided to conclude a consular convention and
for this purpose have agreed on the following :

DEFINITIONS

Aeticle 1
For the purpose of the present Convention, the
terms introduced hereunder have the following
meaning:

1) "Consular establishment" — means any consulate
general, consulate, vice consulate or consular agency;

2) "Consular district" — means the area assigned to
a consular establishment for the exercise of consular
functions ;

3) "Head of consular establishment" — means a con-
sul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent di-
recting the consular establishment ;

4) "Consular officer" — means any person, including
the head of the consular establishment, entrusted with
the exercise of consular functions. Also included in
the definition of "consular officer" are persons asslgrned
to the consular establishment for training In the con-
sular service.

5) "Employee of the consular establishment" —

JTJNE 22, 1964

979

means any person performing administrative, techni-
cal, or service functions in a consular establishment.

OPENING OF CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENTS,
APPOINTMENT OF CONSULAR OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES

Abticle 2

1. A consular establishment may be opened in the
territory of the receiving state only with that state's
consent.

2. The location of a consular establishment and the
limits of its consular district will be determined by
agreement between the sending and receiving states.

3. Prior to the appointment of a head of a consular
establishment, the sending state shall obtain the ap-
proval of the receiving state to such an appointment
through diplomatic channels.

4. The diplomatic mission of the sending state shall
transmit to the foreign affairs ministry of the receiv-
ing state a consular commission which shall contain
the full name of the head of the consular establish-
ment, his citizenship, his class, the consular district
assigned to him, and the seat of the consular estab-
lishment.

5. A head of a consular establishment may enter
upon the exercise of his duties only after having been
recognized in this capacity by the receiving state.
Such recognition after the presentation of the commis-
sion shall be in the form of an exequatur or in another
form and shall be free of charge.

6. The full name, function and class of all consular
officers other than the head of a consular establish-
ment, and the full name and function of employees of
the consular establishment shall be notified in advance
by the sending state to the receiving state.

The receiving state shall issue to each consular officer
an appropriate document confirming his right to carry
out consular functions in the territory of the receiving
state.

7. The receiving state may at any time, and without
having to explain its decision, notify the sending state
through diplomatic channels that any consular officer
is persona non grata or that any employee of the con-
sular establishment is unacceptable. In such a case
the sending state shall accordingly recall such officer
or employee of the consular establishment. If the
sending state refuses or fails within a reasonable time
to carry out its obligations under the present para-
graph, the receiving state may refuse to recognize the
officer or employee concerned as a member of the con-
sular establishment.

8. With the exception of members of the staff of the
diplomatic mission of the sending state, as defined in
paragraph e of Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, no national of the sending state
already present in the receiving state or in transit
thereto may be appointed as a consular officer or em-
ployee of the consular establishment.

Article 3

Consular officers may be nationals only of the send-
ing state.

Article 4

The receiving state shall take the necessary meas-
ures in order that a consular officer may carry out his
duties and enjoy the rights, privileges, and immunities
provided for in the present Convention and by the laws
of the receiving state.

Article 5

1. The receiving state shall either facilitate the ac-
quisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws
and regulations, by the sending state of premises
necessary for its consular establishment or assist the
latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way.

2. It shall also, where neces.sary, assist the sending
state in obtaining suitable accommodation for the per-
sonnel of its consular establishment.

Article 6

1. If the head of the consular establishment cannot
carry out his functions or if the position of head of
a consular establishment is vacant, the sending state
may empower a consular officer of the same or another
consular establishment, or one of the members of the
diplomatic staff of its diplomatic mission in the receiv-
ing state, to act temporarily as head of the consular
establishment. The full name of this person must be
transmitted in advance to the foreign affairs ministry
of the receiving state.

2. A person empowered to act as temporary head of
tlie consular establishment shall enjoy the rights,
privileges and immunities of the head of the consular
establishment.

3. When, in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1 of the present Article, a member of the diplo-
matic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending
state in the receiving state is designated by the sending
state as an acting head of the consular establishment,
he shall continue to enjoy dii)lomatic privileges and
immunities.

CONSULAR FUNCTIONS

Article 7

A con.sular officer shall be entitled within his con-
sular district to perform the following functions, and
for this purpose may apply orally or in writing to the
competent authorities of the consular district :

1) To protect the rights and interests of the sending
state and its nationals, both individuals and bodies
corporate ;

2) To further the development of commercial, eco-
nomic, cultural and scientific relations between the
sending state and the receiving state and otherwise
promote the development of friendly relations between
them;

980

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

3) To register nationals of the sending state, to Issue
or ninond passports and other certlllcales of identity,
and also to issue entry, exit, and transit visas;

4) To draw up and record certificates of birth and
death of citizens of the sending state taking place
in the receiving state, to record nmrringos an<l di-
vorces, if l)oth persons entering Into niarringe or di-
vorce are citizens of tlie sending state, and also to
receive such declarations pertaining to family re-
lationships of a national of the sending state as may
be required under the law of the sending state, unless
prohibited by the laws of the receiving state;

5) To draw up, certify, attest, authenticate, legalize
and talce other actions which might be necessary to
validate any act or document of a legal character, as
well as copies thereof, including commorcini docu-
ments, declarations, registrations, testamentary dis-
positions, and contracts, upon the application of a
national of the sending state, when such document
is intended for use outside the territory of the re-
ceiving state, and also for any person, when such
document is intended for use in the territory of the
sending state ;

6) To translate any acts and documents Into the
English and Russian languages and to certify to the
accuracy of the translations ;

7) To perform other ofiBcial consular functions en-
trusted to him by the sending state if they are not
contrary to the laws of the receiving state.

Article 8

1. The acts and documents specified in paragraph 5
of Article 7 of the present Convention which are
drawn up or certified by the consular officer with his
official seal affixed, as well as copies, extracts, and
translations of such acts and documents certified by
him with his official seal affixed, shall be receivable
in evidence in the receiving state as official or officially
certified acts, documents, copies, translations, or ex-
tracts, and shall have the same force and effect as
though they were drawn up or certified by the com-
petent authorities or officials of the receiving state;
provided that such documents shall have been drawn
and executed in conformity with the laws and regu-
lations of the country where they are designed to take
effect.

2. The acts, documents, copies, translations, or ex-
tracts, enumerated in paragraph 1 of the present
Article shall be authenticated if required by the laws
of the receiving state when they are presented to the
authorities of the receiving state.

Article 9

If the relevant information is available to the com-
petent authorities of the receiving state, such authori-
ties shall Inform the consular establishment of the
death of a national of the sending state.

Article 10
1. In the case of the death of a national of the
sending state in the territory of the receiving state,

without leaving in the territory of hia decease any
known heir or testamentary executor, the appropriate
local authorities of the receiving state shall as
promptly as possible Inform a con-iular officer of the
sending state.

2. A consular officer of the sending state may, within
the discretion of tlie a|)priiprlate judicial authorities
and if |)crmissible under then existing ai)plicablc local
law in the receiving state :

a) take provisional custody of the personal property
left by a deceased national of the sending state, pro-
vided that the decedent shall have left in the receiving
state no heir or testamentary executor appointed by
the decedent to take care of his per.ionnl estate; pro-
vided tliat such provisional custody shall be relin-
quished to a duly appointed administrator ;

b) administer the estate of a deceased national of
the sending state who is not a resident of the receiving
state at the time of his death, who leaves no testamen-
tary executor, and who leaves in the receiving state no
heir, provided that if authorized to administer the es-
tate, the consular officer shall relinquish such admin-
istration upon the appointment of another administra-
tor;

c) represent the interests of a national of the send-
ing state in an estate in the receiving state, provided
that such national is not a resident of the receiving
state, unless or until such national is otherwise repre-
sented : provided, however, that nothing herein shall
authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney at
law.

3. Unless prohibited by law, a consular officer may,
within the discretion of the court, agency, or person
making distribution, receive for transmission to a na-
tional of the sending state who is not a resident of the
receiving state any money or property to which such
national is entitled as a con.sequence of the death of
another person, including shares in an estate, payments
made pursuant to workmen's compensation law.s, i)en-
sion and social benefits systems in general, and pro-
ceeds of insurance policies.

The court, agency, or person making distribution may
require that a consular officer comply with conditions
laid down with regard to: (a) presenting a power of
attorney or other authorization from such non-resident
national, (b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the
receipt of such money or property by such national,
and (c) returning the money or property in the event
he is unable to furnish such evidence.

4. Whenever a consular officer shall perform the
functions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Ar-
ticle, he shall be subject, with respect to the exercise
of such functions, to the laws of the receiving state
and to the civil jurisdiction of the judicial and admin-
istrative authorities of the receiving state in the same
manner and to the same extent as a national of the
receiving state.

Article 11
A consular officer may recommend to the courts or to

jrrNE 22, 1964

981

other competent authorities of the receiving state ap-
propriate persons to act in the capacity of guardians
or trustees for citizens of the sending state or for the
property of such citizens when this property is left
without supervision.

In the event that the court or competent authorities
consider that the recommended candidate is for some
reason unacceptable, the consular officer may propose
a new candidate.

Aeticle 12

1. A consular officer shall have the right within his
district to meet with, communicate with, assist, and
advise any national of the sending state and, where
necessary, arrange for legal assistance for him. The
receiving state shall In no way restrict the access of na-
tionals of the sending state to its consular establish-
ments.

2. The appropriate authorities of the receiving state
shall immediately inform a consular officer of the send-
ing state about the arrest or detention in other form
of a national of the sending state.

3. A consular officer of the sending state shall have
the right without delay to visit and communicate with
a national of the sending state who is under arrest or
otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence
of Imprisonment. The rights referred to in this para-
graph shall be exercised In conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must not nullify these rights.

Article 13

1. A consular officer may provide aid and assistance
to vessels sailing under the flag of the sending state
which have entered a port in his consular district.

2. Without prejudice to the powers of the receiving
state, a consular officer may conduct investigations into
any incidents which occurred during the voyage on
vessels sailing under the flag of the sending state,
and may settle disputes of any kind between the mas-
ter, the officers and the seamen insofar as this may be
authorized by the laws of the sending state. A con-
sular officer may request the assistance of the compe-
tent authorities of the receiving state in the
performance of such duties.

3. In the event that the courts or other competent
authorities of the receiving state intend to take any
coercive action on vessels sailing under the flag of the
sending state while they are located in the waters of
the receiving state, the competent authorities of the
receiving state shall, unless it is impractical to do so
In view of the urgency of the matter, inform a con-
sular officer of the sending state prior to initiating
such action so that the consular officer may be present
when the action is taken. Whenever it is impractical
to notify a consular officer In advance, the competent
authorities of the receiving state shall inform him as
soon as possible thereafter of the action taken.

4. Paragraph 3 of this Article shall not apply to
customs, passport, and sanitary inspections, or to ac-

tion taken at the request or with the approval of the
master of the vessel.

5. The term "vessel", as used in the present Con-
vention, does not include warships.

Aeticle 14

If a vessel sailing imder the flag of the sending
state suffers shipwreck, runs aground, is swept ashore,
or suffers any other accident whatever within the ter-
ritorial limits of the receiving state, the competent
authorities of the receiving state shall Immediately
inform a consular officer and advise him of the meas-
ures which they have taken to rescue persons, vessel,
and cargo.

The consular officer may provide aU kinds of as-
sistance to such a vessel, the members of its crew,
and its passengers, as well as take measures in con-
nection with the preservation of the cargo and repair
of the ship, or he may request the authorities of the
receiving state to take such measures.

The competent authorities of the receiving state
shall render the necessary assistance to the consular
officer in measures taken by him in connection with
the accident to the vessel.

No customs duties shall be levied against a wrecked
vessel. Its cargo or stores, in the territory of the re-
ceiving state, unless they are delivered for use in that
state.

If the owner or anyone authorized to act for him ia
unable to make necessary arrangements in connection
with the vessel or its cargo, the consular officer may
make such arrangements. The consular officer may
under similar circumstances make arrangements in
connection with cargo owned by the sending state or
any of its nationals and found or brought into port
from a wrecked vessel sailing under the flag of any
state except a vessel of the receiving state.

Abticle 15
Articles 13 and 14, respectively, shall also apply to
aircraft.

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Aeticle 16

The national flag of the sending state and the con^
sular flag may be flown at the consular establishment,
at the residence of the head of the consular establish-
ment, and on his means of transport used by him in
the performance of his official duties. The shield
with the national coat-of-arms of the sending state
and the name of the establishment may also be affixed
on the building In which the consular establishment is
located.

Aeticle 17

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times
and wherever they may be. Unofficial papers shall
not be kept in the consular archives.

The buildings or parts of buildings and the land
ancillary thereto, used for the purposes of the con-
sular establishment and the residence of the head of
the consular establishment, shall be inviolable.

982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The police and other authorities of the recelvluB
state may not enter Uie bulldluB or that part of the
building which Is used for the purposes of the con-
sular estnl)llshiiient or the residence of the head of
the consular establishment without the consent of the
head thereof, persons appointed l)y him, or the head
of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

Aktiole is

1. The consular establishment shall have the right
to communicate with its Government, with the diplo-
matic mission and the consular establishments of the
sending state in the receiving state, or with other
diplomatic missions and consular cstahlishmpnts of
the sending state, making use of all ordinary means
of communication. In such communications, the con-
sular establishment shall have the right to u.se code,
diplomatic couriers, and the diplomatic pouch. The
same fees shall apply to consular establishments in
the use of ordinary means of communication as apply
to the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. The ofBeial correspondence of a consular estab-
lishment, regardless of what means of communication
are used, and the sealed diplomatic pouch bearing
visible external marks of its ofBcial character, shall
be Inviolable and not subject to examination or de-
tention by the authorities of the receiving state.

Abticle 19

1. Consular officers shall not be subject to the juris-
diction of the receiving state in matters relating to
their official activity. The same applies to employees
of the consular establishment, if they are nationals
of the sending state.

2. Consular officers and employees of the consular
establishment who are nationals of the sending state
shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state.

3. This immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state of consular officers and employees
of the consular establishment of the sending state may
be waived by the sending state. Waiver must always
b« express.

Abticle 20

1. Consular officers and employees of the consular
establishment, on the invitation of a court of the re-
ceiving state, shall appear in court for witness testi-
mony. Taking measures to compel a consular officer
or an employee of the consular establishment who is
a national of the sending state to appear in court as
a witness and to give witness testimony is not per-
missible.

2. If a consular officer or an employee of the con-
sular establishment who is a national of the sending
state for official reasons or for reasons considered valid
according to the laws of the receiving state cannot
appear in court, he shall Inform tlje court thereof and
give witness testimony on the premises of the consular
establishment or in his own abode.

3. Whenever under the laws of the receiving state
an oath is required to be taken In court by consular

officers and employees of the consular establishment,
an affirmation shall bo accepted In lieu thereof.

4. Consular officers and employees of the consular
estnblishmeut may refu.se to give witueMS testimony
on facts relating to their official activity.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 shall
also apply to proceedings conducted by administrative
authorities.

Abtiole 21

1. Immovable property, situated in the territory of
the receiving state, of which the sending state or one
or more persons acting In Its bolinlf Is the owner or
lessee and which Is used for diplDiiiutic or consular
purposes. Including residences for personnel attached
to the diplomatic and consular establishments, shall
be exempt from taxation of any kind Imimsed by the
receiving state or any of its states or local governments
other than such as represent payments for specific
services rendered.

2. The exemption from taxation referred to in para-
graph 1 of this Article shall not apply to such charges,
duties, and taxes If, under the law of the receiving
state, they are payable by the person who contracted
with the sending state or with the person acting on
Its behalf.

Abticle 22
A consular officer or employee of a consular estab-
lishment, who is not a national of the receiving state
and who does not have the status In the receiving state
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or simi-
lar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state
or any of its states or local governments on official
emoluments, salaries, wages, or allowances received
by such officer or employee from the sending state In
connection with the discharge of his official functions.

Abticle 23

1. A consular officer or employee of a consular estab-
lishment who is not a national of the receiving state
and who does not have the status in the receiving
state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, shall, except as provided in paragraph 2 of
this Article, be exempt from the payment of all taxes
or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiv-
ing state or any of its states or local governments, for
the payment of which the officer or employee of the
consular establishment would otherwise be legally
Uable.

2. The exemption from taxes or charges provided
in paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply In respect
to taxes or charges upon :

a) The acquisition or possession of private Immov-
able proi^erty located In the receiving state If the per-
sons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article do not
own or lease this property on the behalf of the sending
state for the purposes of the consular establishment ;

b) Income received from sources in the receiving
state other than as described in Article 22 of the pres-
ent Convention ;

JUNE 22, 1964

983

c) The transfer by gift of property in the receiving
state;

d) The transfer at death, including by inheritance,
of property in the receiving state.

3. However, the exemption from taxes or similar
charges provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, applies
in respect to movable inherited property left after the
death of a consular officer or employee of the consular
establishment or a member of his family residing with
him if they are not nationals of the receiving state or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and
if the property was located in the receiving state ex-
clusively in connection with the sojourn In this state
of the deceased as a consular officer or employee of the
consular establishment or member of his family
residing with him.

Article 24

A consular officer or employee of a consular estab-
lishment and members of his family residing with him
who are not nationals of the receiving state and who
do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be
exempt in the receiving state from service in the armed
forces and from all other types of compulsory service.

Aeticle 25

A consular officer or employee of a consular estab-
lishment and members of his family residing with him
who do not have the status in the receiving state of
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall
be exempt from all obligations under the laws and reg-
ulations of the receiving state with regard to the
registration of aliens, and obtaining permission to
reside, and from compliance with other similar require-
ments applicable to aliens.

Abticle 26

1. The same full exemption from customs duties and
internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by
reason of importation shall apply in the receiving state
to all articles, Including motor vehicles. Imported ex-
clusively for the official use of a consular establish-
ment, as applies to articles imported for the official
use of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. Consular officers, and employees of the consular
establishment, and members of their families residing
with them, who are not nationals of the receiving state,
and who do not have the status in the receiving state
of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
shall be granted, on the basis of reciprocity, the same
exemptions from customs duties and Internal revenue
or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importa-
tion, as are granted to corresponding personnel of the
diplomatic mission of the sending state.

3. For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Article the
term "corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mis-
sion" refers to members of the diplomatic staff in the
case of consular officers, and to members of the ad-

ministrative and technical staff In the ease of employees
of a consular establishment.

Akticle 27

Subject to the laws and regulations of the receiving
state concerning zones entry Into which is prohibited
or regulated for reasons of national security, a con-
sular officer shall be permitted to travel freely within
the limits of his consular district to carry out his
official duties.

Article 28

Without prejudice to their privileges and immuni-
ties, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privi-
leges and immunities to respect the laws and regula-
tions of the receiving state, Including traffic
regulations.

Article 29

1. The rights and obligations of consular officers
provided for in the present Convention also apply to
members of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mis-
sion of the Contracting Parties charged with the
performance of consular functions in the diplomatic
mission and who have been notified in a consular ca-
pacity to the foreign affairs ministry of the
receiving state by the diplomatic mission.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of Article 10
of the present Convention, the performance of consular
functions by the persons referred to In paragraph 1
of this Article shall not affect the diplomatic privileges
and immunities granted to them as members of the
diplomatic mission.

FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 30

1. The present Convention shall be subject to rati-
fication and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
following the exchange of instruments of ratification,
which shall take place in Washington as soon as
possible.

2. The Convention shall remain in force until six
months from the date on which one of the Contract-
ing Parties informs the other Contracting Party of its
desire to terminate its validity.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two
Contracting Parties have signed the present Conven-
tion and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow on June 1, 1964 in two copies, each
in the English and the Russian language, both texts
being equally authentic.

For the Government of
the United States of
America

FOY D. KOHLER

Ambassador of the United
States of America to
the USSR

For the Government of
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

A. Gromtko
Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics

984

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

PROTOCOL

To the Consular Convention Between the QoTernment
of the United States of America and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Uepublics

1. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that
the notification of a consular otlicer of tlie arrest or
detention in other form of a national of the sending
state siiecifled in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Con-
sular Convention between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 1, 1904,
shall take place within one to three days from the
time of arrest or detention depending on conditions of
communication.

2. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that
the rights specified in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of
the Consular Convention of a consular officer to visit
and communicate with a national of the sending state
who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody
shall be accorded within two to four days of the
arrest or detention of such national depending upon
his location.

3. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that
the rights specified in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the
Consular Convention of a consular officer to visit and
communicate with a national of the sending state
who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody
or is serving a sentence of imprisonment shall be ac-
corded on a continuing basis.

The present Protocol constitutes an integral part of
the Consuiar Convention between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 1,
1964.

Done at Moscow on June 1, 1964 in two copies, each
in the English and the Russian language, both texts
being equally authentic.

For the Government of For the Government of

the United States of
America

FOT D. KOHLEK

Ambassador of the United
States of America to
the USSR

the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

A. Gromyko

Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics

force for the United States September 11, 1050.
TIAS 2308.

Notiflcatiun received that U contidvrt Uielf bound:
Rwanda, April 30, 1004.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weaix)n tests in the atmos-
phere. In outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1903. Entered Into force Octol)er
10,1963. TIAS. 543.3.

liatiflcalionn dvpoHitcd: Senegal, June 2, 1904; Syrian
Arab Republic, June 1, 1904.

BILATERAL

Japan

Agreement providing economic and technical assistance
to promote the economic development of the Ryukyu
Islands, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange
of notes at Tokyo April 25, 1964. Entered Into force
April 25, 1904.

Korea

Petroleum agreement of 1964, wtih agreed minutes.
Signed at Seoul May 12, 1964. Enters into force
90 days after notification by Korea that it has rati-
fied the agreement.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Donald L. Fuller as scientific attach^ at New Delhi,
India, effective May 25. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 265 dated June 3.)

PUBLICATIONS

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs
outside the scope of the convention limiting the man-
ufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic
drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat.
1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796).
Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into

Department Publishes Foreign Relations
Volume on Europe for 1943

Press release 207 dated June 4, for release June 12

The Department of State on June 12 released For-
eign Relations of the United States, JO-iS, Volume If,
Europe, the sixth volume published In the series for
that year. The volume contains documentation on the
wartime relations of the United States with most of
the friendly or neutral governments of Western Europe.
The relations of the United States with Great Uritain
and the British Commonwealth and with the govern-

JTJNE 22, 19C4

985

ments of Eastern Europe in 1943 are covered in volume
III, previously published.

Of special importance and interest are the compila-
tions, among others, relating to the overthrow of the
Fascist regime in Italy and the emergence of Italy
as a cobelligerent ; the efforts of the United States
to assure the maintenance of Spain's neutrality;
American concern over the disunity among Yugoslav
resistance forces; attempts to reduce and divert the
volume of trade between the Axis Powers and the
European neutrals; and the political problems at-
tendant upon the successful military operations in
North Africa.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
19iS, Volume II, Europe (vii, 1,069 pp.; publication
7679) may be obtained from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20402, for $3.75 each.

Recent Releases

For sale ty the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, ichich
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Ireland, amending the agreement of March
16, 1956, as amended. Signed at Washington August 7,
1963. Entered into force January 10, 1964. TIAS
5511. 2 pp. 5<f.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Somali
Republic. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mogadiscio
November 27, 1962 and January 8, 1964. Entered Into
force January 8, 1964. TIAS 5512. 4 pp. 5tf.

Aviation — Transport Services. Agreement with Mex-
ico, extending the agreement of August 15, 1960. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at M6xlco August 14, 1963.
Entered into force provisionally August 15, 1963. En-
tered into force definitively January 6, 1964. TIAS

5513. 3 pp. 54.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam— Signed at Saigon January 9, 1964. Entered into
force January 9, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS

5514. 8 pp. 10^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Poland —
Signed at Washington February 3, 1964. Entered Into
force February 3, 1964. With exchanges of notea
TIAS 5516. 19 pp. 15!f.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Poland —
Signed at Washington February 3, 1964. Entered into
force February 3, 1964. With exchanges of notes.
TIAS 5517. 19 pp. 15^.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Release issued prior to June 1 which appears
In this issue of the BtJiiETiN is No. 259 of May 28.

No. Date Subject

260 6/1 U.S. delegation to ECE Committee
on Housing, Building and Plan-
ning (rewrite).
*261 6/1 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

262 6/1 Consular convention with the

U.S.S.R.

263 6/1 Joint communique on U.S. -Rumanian

talks (printed in Bulletin of
June 15).

264 6/2 Stevenson: Woman's National Dem-

ocratic Club.
*265 6/3 Fuller appointed scientific attache,
New Delhi (biographic details).

266 6/3 Governor of Hawaii confers on East-

West Center.

267 6/4 Foreign Relations of the United

States, 194s, Volume II, Europe
published.
t268 6/5 Mann : "The Democratic Ideal in Our
Latin American Policy."

269 6/4 Rostow: "On Working With His-

tory."

270 6/5 Cleveland: "Member of the Parish."

271 6/7 Rusk: "The National Interest-—

1964."

♦Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

986

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDLUITIN

INDEX Jum £S, 1964- Vol. Z, No. 1304

American Principles

The Nntlonnl Interest— 19C4 (Rusk) .... 955
On Working With Uistory (Rostow) .... 001
Asia. President Outlines Basic Themes of U.S.

Policy in Southeast Asia 053

Canada. Member of the Parish (Cleveland) . 971
Communism. On Working With History

(Rostow) OCl

Congress. Congressiouul Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy 076

Department and Foreign Service. Appoint-
ments (Fuller) 985

Economic Affairs

ECB Committee on Housing, Building and
Planning (delegation) 977

International Cotton Advisory Committee (dele-
gation) 977

On Working With History (Rostow) .... 961

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Governor of
Hawaii Confers on East-West Center . . . 976

Europe

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume
on Europe for 1943 985

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and
Planning (delegation) 977

Pledge to Freedom Renewed on 20th An-
niversary of D-Day (Johnson) 954

India

Fuller appointed scientific attach^ 085

Prime Minister Shastrl Assured of Continued

U.S. (Cooperation (Johnson) 960

International Organizations and Conferences

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and

Planning (delegation) 977

International Cotton Advisory Committee (dele-
gation) 977

IsraeL U.S. and Israel Exchange Views on Mat-
ters of Mutual Interest (Eshkol, Johnson, text
of communique) 968

Military Affairs. National Security and World
Responsibilities (Johnson) 050

Presidential Documents

National Security and World Responsibilities . 050

Pledge to Freedom Renewed on 20th An-
niversary of D-Day 054

President Outlines Basic Themes of U.S. Policy
In Southeast Asia 953

Prime Minister Shastrl Assured of Continued
U.S. Cooi)eration 060

U.S. and Israel Exchange Views on Matters
of Mutual Interest 058

United States and Soviet Union Sign Consular

Agreement 979

Publications

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume

on Europe for 1043 085

Recent Releases 886

Science. Fuller appointed scientUic attach^,

New Delhi 986

Treaty Information

Current Actions 986

United States and Soviet Union Sign Consular

Agreement (Johnson, text of convention) . . 979

U.S.S.R. United States and Soviet Union Sign
Consular Agreement (Johnson, text of con-
vention) 979

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 978

Member of the Parish (Cleveland) 971

Strengthening the Machinery for Peace (Ste-
venson) 968

Viet-N'am. President Outlines Basic Themes of

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia 953

Name Index

Cleveland, Harlan 971

Eshkol, Levi 958

Fuller, Donald L 985

Johnson, President . . . 950, 053. 054, 958, 960, 979

Rostow, W. W 961

Rusk, Secretary 955

Stevenson, Adiai E 966

DSB DEC G
PUBLIC LIBRARY- lie
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02117

' SuPERiNTErT^NTorrrcKSUMieMys'"'

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. 9300

IGPOI

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

I

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

This 22-page pamphlet, based on an address by Under Secretary George W. Ball at Roanoke, Va.,
on April 23, 1964, places Castro communism and United States policy toward it in perspective by
evaluating the threat of Castro and the present Cuban regime, by defining the two principul lines of
United States strategy in dealing with this menace, and by discussing the effectiveness of these policies.

PUBLICATION 7C00 15 CENTS

ORDER FORM

PUBLICATION 7690 15 centa

Please send me copies of V.8. Policy Toward, Cuba.

TO:

SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

GOVT. I'UINTI.NG OFFICE

WASHINGTON, O.C. 20402

NAMB

Enclosi'i] llnd $

ADDRESS

(cuhIi, chixk, or money order pay-
able to Supt. of Documeuta)

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF TTNITED STATES; FORKIOV T'nT,irv

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. Z, No. 1805

Jwne 29, 196^.

BUILDING A GREAT WORLD SOCIETY
Address by President Johnson 990

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN OUR POLICY TOWARD LATIN AAIERICA

by Assistant Secretary Mann 995

SECURITY COUNCIL TEAM TO EXiUIIN^ CAJMBODIA-VIET-NAM BORDER AREAS
Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stev&nson and Text of Resolution 1002

THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
Statements by M. Wilfred Goding and Thomas Remengesau 1007

For index see inside back cover

Building a Great World Society

Address hy President Johnson ^

Last year, within 6 months of each other, two
of the great men of this century passed from
this earth: President Jolm F. Kennedy and
Pope Jolin XXIII. They both left a world
transformed by their triumphs and lessened by
their leaving. They both handed on a heritage
of hope, a vision of the future which will occupy
the thoughts and labors of men for generations
yet to come.

For a generation, Americans have struggled
to keep the ambitions of nations from erupt-
ing into the annihilation of nuclear war. "We
have struggled to diminish hostility and to de-
crease tension, while battling aggression and
building our power. The years will not dim,
nor the burdens destroy, our resolve to seek and
not to yield, to find a way to peace in a world
where freedom grows.

But even if we achieve such a world, we will
only have taken a first step toward final ful-

^ Made at commencement exercises at the College of
the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass., on June 10 (White
House press release ; as-delivered test ) .

fillment of the hopes of Pope Jolm and Presi-
dent Kennedy. For just as the cold war has
consumed our energies, it has often limited our
horizons. We have tended to place evei-y chal-
lenge in the context of conflict, to regard every
difficulty as part of a struggle for domination.

Even if we end terror and even if we elim-
inate tension, even if we reduce arms and re-
strict conflict, even if peace were to come to
the nations, we would turn from this struggle
only to find ourselves on a new battleground as
filled with danger and as fraught with difficulty
as any ever faced by man. For many of our
most urgent problems do not spring from the
cold war or even from ambitions of our
adversaries.

These are the problems which will persist
beyond the cold war. They are the ominous
obstacles to man's effort to build a great world
society — a place where every man can find a
life free from hunger and disease, a life offer-
ing the chance to seek spiritual fulfillment un-
hampered by the degradation of bodily misery.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1305 PUBLICATION 7704 JUNE 29, 1984

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Ofllce
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
acenclos of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forelcn policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other oHicers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concernlnR treaties
and International afrreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are Hated cnrrently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $8.60,
foreign $12.25 ; single copy. 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The BuUetlii
Is Indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

990

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

These long years of conflict have <:;ivcn fresh
content to tiie ancient prophecy tiiat no man,
and no community, and no nation, is an island.
This truth, borne in upon us by the necessities
of our protection, is equally true for those prob-
lems which stretch beyond present dilTerences.
Those who live in the emerging conununity of
nations will ignore the problems of their neigh-
bors at the risk of their own prosperity.

It may seem diflicult to accept the fact that
even lasting peace will not bring respite from
world responsibility. But if we can bring to
the challenges which surpass conflict the same
qualities of resolution and compassion that we
have brought to the protection of freedom,
then your generation can shape the great world
society which is the ultimate purpose of peace.

Problems Which Menace Man's Welfare

I would like, briefly, today to mention three
problems which menace man's welfare and will
threaten it even when armed destruction and
war are things of the past. They are the prob-
lems of poverty, of disease, and of diminishing
natural resources.

First is the problem of poverty — the growing
division between the rich and poor nations. To-
day the per capita product of the developed
countries is $1,730 a year. In the developing
countries it is $143. And the gap is widening,
not narrowing. Our own growth must continue.
But vre must find ways to step up the growth
of others, or we will be an increasingly isolated
island of wealth in the midst of mounting
misery.

Second is man's struggle against disease — the
focal point in his war to control the destructive
forces of nature. Each year 3 million people
die from tuberculosis. Each year 5 million die
from dysentery, 500,000 from measles. In some
countries, one-sixth of the entire population
suffer from leprosy. Yet we have the knowl-
edge to reduce the toll of these diseases and
avert these millions of separate tragedies of
needless death and suffering.

Third is the need to develop new resources
and new ways to use existing resources. It has
been estimated that if everyone in the world
were to rise to the level of living of the United
States we would then have to extract about.

20 billion tons of iron, 300 million tons of cop-
per, 300 million tons of lead, and 200 million
tons of zinc. These totals are well over 100
times the world's present annual rate of
production.

There is no simple solution to these problems.
In the past there would have been no solution
at all. Today, the constantly unfolding con-
quests of science give man the power over his
world and nature which brings the prospect of
success within the purview of hope.

International Cooperation Year

To commemorate the United Nations' 20th
birtlulay, 10C5 has been designated Interna-
tional Cooperation Year.^ I propose to dedi-
cate this year to finding new techniques for
making man's knowledge serve man's welfare.
Let this be the year of science. Let it be a
turning point in the struggle — not of man
against man, but of man against nature. In
the midst of tension let us begin to chart a
course toward the possibilities of conquest which
bypass the politics of the cold war.

For our own part, we intend to call upon all
the resources of tliis great nation — both public
and private — to work with other nations to find
new methods of improving the life of man.

First, by September I will report to the third
international conference in Geneva on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy on our new
capability to use the power of the atom to meet
human needs. It appears that the long-
promised day of economical nuclear power is
close at hand.

In the past several months we have achieved
an economic breakthrough in the use of laree-
scale reactors for commercial power. As a
result of this rapid progress we are years ahead
of our planned progress. This new technology,
now being applied in the United States, will be
available to the world.

Moreover, the development of the large-
scale reactors offers a dramatic prospect of
transforming sea water into water suitable for
human consumption and industrial use. Large-
scale nuclear reactors and desalting plants of-

' For an address by Assistant Secretary Cleveland
on "The Political Tear of the Quiet Sun," see ButiExiN
of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 452.

JTJXE 2£

991

fer, in combination, economical electric power
and usable water in areas of need. We are
engaged in research and development to trans-
form this scientists' concept into reality.

Second, I intend to expand our efforts to
provide protection against disease. In the last
few years we have conducted pilot projects
in West Africa on methods of immunizing
yomig Africans against measles — the single
biggest killer of children in that area. The
success of that project lias enabled us to pro-
ceed, this year, with a program to immimize
one-fourth of the susceptible population in
seven countries of West Africa.

During International Cooperation Year we
will expand our efforts to prevent and to control
disease in every continent, cooperating with
other nations which seek to elevate the well-
being of mankind.

No nation can stand idly by while millions
suffer and die from afflictions which we have the
power to prevent.

Third, we will move ahead with plans to de-
vise a worldwide weather system, using the
satellites and facilities of all industrialized
countries. The space age has given us unparal-
leled capacity to predict the course of the
weather. By working together, on a global
basis, we can take new strides toward coping
with the historic enemies of storm and drought
and flood.

These are only a few examples of the many
fronts on which science can serve the society of
man. These are some of tlie possibilities which
unfold as reduced tension opens the way to
larger cooperation.

We are going ahead with our determined ef-
fort to bring peace to this world.

We are going ahead in our country to bring
an end to poverty and to racial injustice. In
the last 10 minutes we have made considerable
progress when we voted cloture in the Senate
today by a vote of Yl to 29.

The message of Pope Jolm a,nd John Ken-
nedy flowed from the message that burst upon
the world 2,000 years ago — a message of hope
and redemption not for a people or for a nation
but hope and redemption for all people of all
nations.

We now can join knowledge to faith and

science to belief to realize in our time the ancient
hope of a world which is a fit home for man.

The New Testament enjoins us to ''Go ye
therefore and teach all nations." Go forth
then, in that spirit, to put your hands m the
service of man and to put your liearts in the
service of God.

U.S. and Germany Reaffirm
Agreement on East-West Problems

Folloicing is the text of a joint communique
released on June 12 at the conclusion of talks
hetioeen President Johnson and Chancellor
Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of
Germany.

White House press release dated June 12

President Joluison and Chancellor Erhard
met on June 12 in Washington. They were ac-
companied by Secretary Rusk, Foreign Min-
ister [Gerhard] Schroeder and otlier advisers.

The President expressed his pleasure that the
Chancellor had come to Washington following
his official visit to Canada and receipt of an
honorary degree at Harvard, thus providing
an opportunity to review the international situ-
ation and to discuss areas of mutual interest
and concern to the United States and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.

The Chancellor and the President discussed
the need for finduag a just and peaceful solu-
tion to the problem of Germany and Berlin and
agreed that efforts to find such a solution must
continue. They agi*eed that a solution must be
based upon the right of self-determination and
take into consideration the security of Europe
as a whole. Every suitable opportunity should
be used to bring nearer the reunification of
Germany through self-detennination. So long
as Germany remains divided, Europe will not
achieve stability.

The President and the Chancellor noted the
Soviet Government's announcement that it
signed today [June 12] a Treaty of Friendship,
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation witli the
so-called German Democratic Republic, They
agreed tliat no unilateral move by the Soviet

992

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Union coukl in any way alFect (lio rij;li(s of tlio
Three "Western Powers or modify the obliga-
tions and responsibilities of the Soviet Union
with respect to Germany and Berlin. They
stressed that the Soviet Government would be
solely responsible for the consequences of any
attempt at interference with Allied rijjhts that
mi2;ht result from implementation of the new
treaty. They also reafllrmed that until Ger-
many is unified, only the freely elected and le-
gitimately constituted government of the Fed-
eral Republic of Gemiany and no one else can
speak for the German people.

The President restated the determination of
the United States to carry out fully its com-
mitments with respect to Berlin, including the
maintenance of the right of free access to West
Berlin and the continued freedom and viability
of the city.

Tlie President and Chancellor stressed the
importance of improving relations with the na-
tions of Eastern Europe. The President said
that the United States fully supports the actions
of the Federal Republic directed toward this
goal. They also expressed the conviction that
measures designed to reduce the threat of war
and to bring about arms control serve to pro-
mote the goal of German reunification.

The President and the Chancellor expressed
satisfaction at the progress achieved by the na-
tions of the Atlantic Community in developing
political stability as well as economic and mili-
tary strength. They reaflBrmed the continuing
importance of NATO to the defense and cohe-
sion of the West. They were agreed that the
proposed multilateral force would make a sig-
nificant addition to this military and political
strength and that efforts should be continued to
ready an agreement for signature by the end
of the year. The Chancellor stressed his in-
terest in the promotion of greater political
cooperation between the nations of Western
Europe.

In their review of the international scene,
the President described the serious situation
faced by the United States and the free world in
Southeast Asia. He and the Chancellor agreed
that the Communist regime in Hanoi must
cease its aggi-ession in South Viet-Nam and
Laos. The two governments also agreed that

U.S. Position on Soviet Treaty
With East Germany

Department Statement '

The conclusion or Implementation of this agree-
ment by the Soviet Union cannot In any case
affect Soviet obligations or res|M)risil)llitic>i under
ugrcoments antl arrniigcnu'nt.s between the Three
I'owers and (he Soviet Union on the subject of
Germany, including Berlin.

The Soviet Union remains bound by the en-
gagements which it assumed vIs-a-vis the Three
Powers, and continues to be responsible for the
fulfillment of its obligations to them.

The United States Government considers that
the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is the only German government freely and
legitimntely constituted, and therefore entitled
to speak for the German people in international
affairs.

The United States Government does not recog-
nize the East German regime nor the existence
of a state in Eastern Germany. The objective of
the United States remains the reunification of
Germany in peace and freedom on the basis of
self-determination.

' Read to news correspondents on June 12 by
Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

the Government of the Republic of Viet-Xam
must bo fully supported in its resistance against
the "Viet Cong. The Chancellor stated that his
govermnent would increase assistance to South
Viet-Xam in the political and economic fields.

They reviewed the Kennedy Round negotia-
tions imderway at Geneva and were agreed that
expanded trade in all conmaodities and substan-
tial tariff reductions would be in the interest of
all the nations of the free world.

They were agreed on the vital importance of
sustaining the flow of economic aid to the devel-
oping countries in order to support the efforts
of these countries to maintain their independ-
ence and to modernize and expand their econ-
omies to the point where further growth could
be sustained without extraordinary foreign as-
sistance. They were of the vi&\r that strength-
ening the private sector of the developing
economies can play a key role in the process
and they recognize the need for oflicial aid as
well as for foreign private investment to pro-

JTTNE 29, 1964

993

mote this objective. The President stressed his
intention to sustain the level of United States
aid commitments and expenditures. The Chan-
cellor in turn noted the substantial increase in
total aid commitments of the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1963 and stated that every effort
■will be made to increase the level of these
commitments this year and next.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed
also the constructive steps taken so far by Ger-
many to help reduce its large balance of pay-
ments surplus. Tlie President told the Chan-
cellor of his aj^preciation of German support
in helping the United States meet its balance
of payments problems.

The President and the Chancellor were both
happy to have had this opportimity to consult
on common problems, as part of the continuing
process of full consultation so indispensable to
the mamtenance of close relations between the
two countries. They were gratified to reaffirm
that their governments have established a solid
basis of cooperation and mutual understanding
in their common quest for peace.

U.S. Reconnaissance Flights
Over Laos

Following are three statements read to news
correspondents hy Department spokesmen re-
garding U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 6

A U.S. reconnaissance aircraft has been shot
down by ground fire in the area of the Plaine
des Jarres over Laos. The pilot was observed
to have ejected and landed safely. Efforts to
locate and rescue him were underway during the
day of June 6.

The U.S. Government had announced these
flights on May 21.^ Such reconnaissance flights
are undertaken to disclose information about
Pathet Lao and Viet Minh military activity
which is in direct violation of the Geneva ac-
cords on Laos of 1962. They were initiated in
accordance with the appeal of the Prime Min-
ister of the Government of National Union in

Laos, Prince Souvamia Phouma, in order, in v
the Prince's words, "to observe the activities and I
movements of the forces which are invading,
attacliing and fighting in Laos."

Information from these flights is being trans-
mitted to the Government of Laos and to the
International Control Commission.

With the agreement of the Eoyal Laotian
Government these flights by U.S. aircraft over
Laos will continue. The U.S. Government has
consulted witli the Government of Laos with
resjDect to measures required for the protection
of these flights.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 7

An FA-8 aircraft from the carrier Kitty
Hawk has been shot down by ground fire in the
area of the Plaines des Jarres over Laos while
participating in a reconnaissance mission. The
pilot was observed to have ejected and para-
chuted to the ground. Efforts to locate and
rescue him are underway.

As we have stated previously, the U.S. Gov-
ermnent has been undertaking such flights since
May 21 to disclose information about Pathet
Lao and Viet Minh activity which is in direct
violation with the Geneva accords on Laos of
1962.

The flights were initiated in accordance with
the appeal of the Prime Minister of the Govern-
ment of National Union in Laos in order "to
observe the activities and movements of the
forces which are invading, attacking and fight-
ing in Laos."

Information from these flights is and will
continue to be transmitted to the Government
of Laos and the International Control Com-
mission.

' On May 21 a Department spokesman made the fol-
lowing statement :

"We are working with the Uoyal Lao Government
in response to its request to assist in every way possil)le
in supplementing its information on intentions .ind dis-
positions of attacking forces. For this purpose certain
U.S. reconnaissance flights have been authorized in
view of the current inability of the International Con-
trol Commission to obtain adequate information. In-
formation obtained will be turned over as rapidly as
possible to the International Control Commission."

994

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

STATEMENT OF JUNE U

There has been no cliango in the matter of
photo reconnaissance flisiits. They will be un-
dertaken as necessary and in close consultation
with the Royal Government of I^ios.

As I have said before, wo liave been in full
consultation with Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma on this problem. Yesterday's meeting
between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and
Ambassador [Leonard] Unger was part of the
continuing consultation process. We share the
conviction of the Lao Government that the re-
fusal of tlie Communists to allow any effective
functioning by the ICC combined with Pathet

Ijao-Vict Minh recent actions of aggression has
created an urgent and continuing need for reli-
able information on eastern Laos. It is for that
reason that we agreed to undertake reconnais-
sance flights.

These flights have taken place and will take
place at the intervals necessary for the purpose
of obtaining information. We have a clear un-
derstanding on this matter with the Laos Gov-
ernment, and we are in agreement with that
Government also that it is not in the interest of
the Government of Laos or of those wlio under-
take these hazardous missions that any opera-
tional part of their work should be discussed.

The Democratic Ideal in Our Policy Toward Latin America

hy Thomas G. Mann

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs *

Thirty years ago this month I received a law
degree and started out as a young lawyer.
Then we were in the throes of the Great Depres-
sion and preoccupied with our domestic eco-
nomic problems. Students on campus were not
greatly concerned about foreign affairs in those
days.

Today the members of the graduating class
of this great Christian university will start their
careers at a time when our nation marches for-
ward to new horizons of economic opportunity,
individual dignity, and social justice. Tech-
nological advances have, however, presented us
with new challenges and new opportunities in
our relations with other countries. We are
caught up, as it were, in a shrinking, interde-
pendent world in which we have great responsi-
bilities and which has suddenly become com-

' Address made at commencement exercises at the
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., on June 7
(press release 2C8 dated June 5).

plex. We can no longer afford to live apart
from the rest of the world as if it did not
vitally affect our national and individual well-
being.

The problems which faced my graduating
class 30 years ago, formidable as they seemed
to us at the time, were certainly much more
elementary, much more simple, and by compari-
son much less important, than those which face
what Latin Americans would call your "genera-
tion of 1964."

Within this framework, I would like briefly
to discuss with you today one of the problems
of our Latin American foreigii policy — the
problem of what it is we can do to bring about
a more effective exercise of representative de-
mocracy in the Western Hemisphere. There
is no subject concerning our Latin American
foreign policy which has over the years gen-
erated more debate or a debate which has gen-
erated so much heat and, it seems at times, so
little light.

JUNE 29, 19G4

995

The first point I -wish to make is that United
States foreign policy is finnly and irrevocably
committed to the principle that every individ-
ual, no matter in what part of the world he
lives, has an inalienable right to his individual
freedom and to liis individual dignity.

For his day, as well as for ours, Benjamin
Franklin spoke for the Nation when he ex-
pressed the hope that

... a thorough knowledge of the Rights of Man
may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philos-
opher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and
say "This is my country".

More recently. President Jolinson, in speak-
ing of the charter of the Alliance for Progress,
expressed somewhat the same thought in differ-
ent words : ^

Our charter charges each American country to seek
and to strengthen representative democracy. Without
that democracy and without the freedom that it
nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise,
destroying the dignity of the spirit that it is really
meant to liberate. So we will continue to join with
you to encourage democracy until we build a hemi-
sphere of free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the
Arctic Circle.

Yardsticks of Progress

The example of a vigorous representative
democracy in the United States that assures
equality and dignity to all of our citizens will
provide strong support for our policy. A pol-
icy of consistent persuasion in discussions with
our Latin American friends is another way to
help promote democratic progress in the
hemisphere.

It has long been, and continues to be, our firm
policy to discourage any who conspire to over-
throw constitutionally elected governments.
But if govenmients are overthrown, it has long
been our practice, in ways compatible with the
sovereignty and the national dignity of others,
to encourage the holding of free and fair elec-
tioiLS — to encourage a return to constitutional
procedures. Other American Republics make
equally valuable contributions to building a
Western Hemisphere tradition of democracy
by their example, by the strengtli of their moral
positions, and by expressions of their principles.

' Bulletin of June 1, 1904, p. 854.

It is understandable that all of us sometimes
become impatient with the rate of progress to-
ward making this ideal a reality everywhere.
We have not yet reached perfection in our own
country. Many American Eepublics have
made great progress in establishing a demo-
cratic tradition within the last few decades.
In others, democracy seems at times to take
two steps forward only to be temporarily
pushed back a step. In Cuba the light of de-
mocracy has temporarily been extmguished.

But we should not, I think, judge either the
rate or degree of hemisphere progress toward
democracy solely by the niunber of coups d'etat
which take place. The degree of individual
freedom which exists in the hemisphere, the
average life span of de facto governments, the
extent of political repression, the degree of
freedom of the press and of peaceful assembly,
and the growing nmnber of people in the hemi-
sphere who consistently support the prmciple
of free and periodic elections, are also relevant
yardsticks.

If one looks at the forest instead of the trees,
he can see that these quiet, unpublicized efforts
on the part of the United States and other
American Eepublics have, along with many
other factors, contributed to a wider and deeper
observance of the forms of representative de-
mocracy in this hemisphere and, perhaps even
more important, to a growing respect by gov-
ermnents, in deeds as well as words, for the
dignity of man and for his basic human rights.
I am confident that the general movement will
continue to be forward; I hope it can be
accelerated.

Collective Action in Support of Democracy

One way to bring about more rapid progress
is by collective action of the conununity of
American states.

As early as 1837 Pedro Vicmia of Chile urged
the establisliment of a General Congress of
American States to oppose tyranny.

In 1945 the Uruguayan Government proposed
the doctrine that there is a "parallelism" be-
tween peace and democracy. The United
States supported this thesis. Only eight
American Eepublics, including the United

996

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

SUtea, rotfd aiSnn&llvely (or the Uroguaytn
propool.

In 196C, at • i.-netmg (it fortign minlsten in
Sui Jos^,* the United State* ngiia eupport«d
collective tction vid introduced a new con-
cept: Support of the idcAl of iv present ati re
democracy thuuld not tnerely be nrgatire in the
•cnse of oppodtioD to a pan.icuUr dictatorial
regime; it should podtivoly insure, by collective
actios, that people* hare ta opportuoity, in free
and fair elections, to ezprc« their will — so thi>
a Batista iriU not agaii bo followed by a Castra
There va? UiJo support for this thesis at the
time, althou;;h the majority, including the
I'luted States, did vote for mictions against
the Tni J i Ho regime.

More recently, VeNoeraela has taken the lead
in proposir.g informally that the American
•tates agree to consult together when unconsti-
tutional changes of govcnunent occur in the
hemisphere. We hare long since assurwl the
Venezuelan Government of our suppsat.

I would hope that the Venezuelan initiative
will be but a step in a future proce&s of develop-
ing a new international procedure whicli, while
esfeguarding the essential so'-erdgn rights of
ererr nation, dcOnos with care and precision the
kinds of violations of basic human rights which
are, to use the phrases of a former Secretary of
State,* of such a '^flagrant and noLorioos char-
acter" that they have a "^lationshin to the
mairtenance of international peace .ad eecn-
rity" and hence justify such collective aaioh as
may be agreed upon. If this were done, tyranny
of the kind we saw under Trujillo, and wnich we
still see under Castro today, coold b« effectively
and legally dealt with.

U,t. KiVKtatM* With latwvwrtlMi

It is sometimes said that since the American
commonity of nations has f'\iled to take effec-
tive collective action to eliminate dicta'orships
in the hemisphere, the United States — uiulat- .
erally and alone — should undertake to force ell
Latin American governments to stay on Ihe

' tor ba'kintUKt aee OyU^ Brpt 12 1900. p. 839.

• For text ot i •tatcment mad* br Berrrtarr of Btat*
ChrtitUn ▲. BtTtm on ▲!!«. 20, USD, «• i»id^
■•{« B. 1900. PL 8a&

path of constitatiotiality. The I iiited State*
has had a rather full experience in attenipting,
with the best of motives, to impose dsmocracy
on other coimthca. It is worth vhil* to recall
them.

Monroe's Declaration of 1623, in its oripnal
intent, was a shield for Li-vt America against
European powers seeking to recover lost colo-
rjes and to expend their territoriea. In the
three instances in w'lieh it was applied ia the
manner originally intended — in 18M, 1605, and
1902 — it was of considerable help to the I.Atin
American stales directly involved.

But in 19c4 Theodore Eooaevelt prMi«nt«d hi*
now famous corollary :

Chronic wraoj4olii( . . . ml/ Id America . . altl-
matcl; rc<]alre lateTTCoUon b7 Km* drtUaed Da>
UoL . . . [and] tlM cxerdn oi sd tatasutOasaJ poUfl*
power.

The philoeopby underlying the BooaeiTelt cor-
ollary wa^ not new ; the Piatt amentiment,
which impaired Cuban sovereignty, was already
an accomplished fact. Bat it did open the way
for a number of new adveoturea. In 1000 and
1909 the Marine* wero tent to Cubs, in 1909
ard 1912 toKicaragua, in 1912 to the Dominican
Republic, in 1915 to Haiti.

In 1913 a new moral dimension was udded to
the Roosevelt corollary in au aftempt i) justify
additional United Slates inten-entions. It was
stated in tITeae words:

Cooperttloa li pocsn>l« only whra stipponcd it er'ery
tnni b; tb» orderUr pivresaea ot liut (OTemmrat l>a«c<l
upon law.-nrt apoa art>ltrU7 or Imgnlar (BictL . . .

UndiT this doctrine we engaged in a ntw
series of interventions in Mexico. These led to
the occnpation of Veracruz and to Pershing's
expedition. They bronght us to the firge of
war with our southern neighbor at t.lie very time
we were being draws into the First World War.

Arthur Whitaker in his look The Western
Bcmupfiert f<U<t comes to this conclasion :

Protcetln ImptrlaUas (ssder tb* I90t coroHiry)
wcTi^'J iBtemot to correct droatloDS of etnmic wroos-
iaias «nJ chtoa raly to tie eitcct oec««jrj to prtvent
Bnropeac luterrmUon aca would then wimdraw. Tile
dTluxlas mlCilia (tb* 1913 poUc7). on tb* otlvr band,
bid DO gath 04 kcc cbuacter or limited cbjcctlT*. Tb*
mlulosarT'* work Ij cot Occt wb«n tb* d*TDs tiar*
been cajt oet : It ba* bardl j bcsun. Be oOBt star on

/TJKX ss, 19e«

«8T

■Bdi b» bM* uat^t hli ch>r(r« kov to tfi (ta* gotxl
lUc. iDd Owl oil- Ukt toltv • knc Uai«

AnU How»rd tlinr, in sfraking of th» 1P13
doctruie. trminds us in Lis book TA^ L'nit-cd
Sl~^t't and Mfzteo:

Ttiiit Uxrr wtr« "locd" trtilutloni md "6«d" r»TO-
luduDt. . . tbr laiur brouxtit toly rroil ualdcal-
Isllr prnplf Tu fo""' jrtUI* tb* former |<ut tb/ pf^
tiratar uitun bark ua tbr cooitltntluoil (rack .
Aa CTTcta la Uriico *o4 rljrvberv olUaattb' tbovMl.
ttwtat of "coo ciullunal Ircltima'-jr" oat oaworkatl*.
ta;i«clai:7 la i^tlo \nirrlnL Tt« I'cUed iiM\n . .
TvBoae^-«l II u a natlocol policy la tVn. . . .

The worJs of these two di?tingui»hed »cholars
may, from our point of view, teem rutbtr harsh-
Certainly our intentions were (food. But few
knowlciigeable people will deny that l!.ej ne.-
curately reflect Latin Ajnerict'n bitter reset ion
to our interventioniBt activities uuder doctrines
of lOOl and 19n.

Our interventions were, in the Lotiii Amer-
ican point of view, patronizing m the eitremo.
By inaking the Uri:teJ States tho sole judge of
Lattji Anaerica'a political moral ity, they were
ctjtrading to proud pe<'ple3 who believed that,
in their own wars of independence, they liad
earned the right to manage their own affai'>. —
to be masters in their own bouses. Tliey pro-
duced schismatic tendencies la the inter- Ameri-
can family and brought our relations with TAtin
■America to an all'.ime lo>7.

These historical eiperii«nces cuggeet two
things: Unilateral United States inttrventions
1 n the heir.isphere have never succeeded, in them-
selves in re-storing constitutional government
for any appreciable period cf time. .And tSey
have, in every cjse, left for our tountrr a legacy
of suspicion and resentment which has endured
long after our int«rveiition8 Wei's abandoned
aa imprarticoble

As Cline has observed:

The leacibr rrrord of dlscon] darlns tba yeara 1113
and 1B14 carriM Ita oirn Ipasona. One ta ibat inter-
imri<>Dal ^rob^lmj ar« (onr« complex thao tlosaa-
makern Rjcietinn anome A a«t of wortiir attltodct
U ao «iib«iltute tot cober«iit policy.

Franklin Boosevclt surely h»A t^aee lersoDS
of hiftnrr in mind when he not only pledged the
United Stnfcs to the policy of nonintervention
oat detintd his po'icy of the "good ne;gh!.)or'" as :

. . . Ui* Bflibtior wte tnnialaly napacU bllaaalf
and. brcnoa* hi- djra ao. r«wa(U tbi ttg^ta ot aibin
tba Btlcbtior «^ rapacu Ua oMt«atleii« and mpact*
tba aaorUtr et bis asTKiaaBtl la sad wtti • wtkrM

«^f iMlftibora.

Two ^iTOBjs do not tmiie a right. We cannot
achievo • peaceful world rulad by Uw if w«i
do not live op to our owa obligations.

latla AoMrtfati CaclrtM •! MMtatarraBtlaii

Aa an answer to the United Stntca iiittrven-
tionist doctrines, Lnlin Amerieanj Jeveli.ped
doctnnm c* their own. Let there be no im»-
ta'njj: These Latin Amtrican oounterdoctrinw
were 'iailormade" for the UoHed States; their
purpose was (o bring an end to United StAtxA
interventions. I thali mention only one :

By 192!s, when tho Sixth International Gov
ference of -Ajnericiui States met at H&bana, a
proposal was introduced which stated tho sim-
ple proposition that "N'o state has the right to
interfere in tho internal affiin of another.",
.\fter a long and somewhat acrimonious debate
the United States manaj^ d to prevent adoption
of the resolution, I'Ut the handwriting w«» on
tho wall- In 1933, at tho Seventh Conference in
Montevideo, the United States accepted the
doctrine of nonmtervention with qualiikations^
In 1936, at Bomoe Aires, wo accepted >t uncon-
ditionally.

This Latin American doctrine of noninter-
vention is now written irto the Charter of the
Organization of Americaa Stateb. It is k
treaty oblifption. Allow ma io read to yoa
articles 15 and lOof the charter :

AaiicLi IS. No State or cnop of Biatas has tba
rUbt to iDtirtMif. dlrectl/ or Indirmt/, for aoy
rraaon wtutri-er. In tba istersal or external aSalia
of any otber Bute Tbe fu>CDio( prtnclple problblt*
DOt only armed force tmt alio acj other form ot
taif rftpf nee ir aite mptM (brrat acalosl t^a nfraonallty
of ib« State or agalntl Ita fmUUcal, Cv'-'aoritc and ml-
cural el«nieDt«.

AvncLS 10 No BCaca may naa or t-wajwttt tho aaa
of coeiciTa meaturea of ao economic or political
cliara--trr lo order to forca lb* aorrrelco wtM of
aaotber 8tat« ami obuio from It adyastacn ot acr
klad.

As the scholars Thomas [Ann Thotcasand A.
J. Thomas, Jr.] point out in their Etady ot
Kcn-lnierveniioti:

OT*

DETAEtlUyT or STATB BtTLUTIK

ne nwK ol bitcmstlua 1* lb« •ttenpt U
compel. . . .

All of ihi* does not mraa that we will in th«
fniurp reco^iire til govermnenta which oom*
iato power in m oncon iitu'..onmI mnnii<t.
Elich case mnsl be looked u in the light of its
own facta. \\'hf ro the fads warrant it — where
the circumjlanees are nich, to use aomeone else's
phra», OS to "outrage the conscience of Amer-
ica"— we reserve our fieedora to register onr
indignation by refusing to recognize or to con-
Unua our econoiric cooperation

It doei mca-i that, consistent with our treaty
obligations, n-e oannot put ourselves in n doc-
trinaire etraightjac^ it of automatio application
of sanctions to ererr onoonstitntional regime in
the hemisphere with tlie obvious intention of
dictatmg internal political developmentd in
other cotuifries. As the facts amply demon-
6''ato, this is no departure from the practice
which has prevailed in the most recent years.

The third point to which I invite your at-
tention is this: TJnilateml uitervention for the
purpose of forc'ng constitutional changes in an-
other country does not always aerTe either the
catise of democracy yr the national security
interests of the United States.

To lllustrBf^ not long ago a majority of the
Guatemalan people voted in free elections for
Arbeaa, a candidate for president. Later the
<iaitemalan people discovered that Arbena waa
a Marxist- Leninist. Colonel Castillo led a suc-
c^aful revolt and was widely acclaimed by bis
people when he marched into Guatemala City.
Had we been uncooditioaally committed to the
support of all constitutional governments under
all circumslarcos, we would have been obliged
to do everything within our power to bring
about the overthrow of Castillo and to restore a
Slarxiat-Leninist to power against the will of
the Guatemalan people.

The question of "ur relationships with Com-
munist regimes in this hemisphere is, >^f course,
• separate *•■ ect and is beyond the scope of
that remarks. It raises separate questions,
such as our inherent right of self-defense and
measures, under existing treaties, to deal with
iituaiians which threaten th"? peace aiid security
of the hemisphere.

Mikhifl tka OeiMfratlc Meat • mmaxt

Against this background, what eonelasloiis
are to be drawn! \Vhal csxi wo do to help mat*
the democratic idal a t^ity in this hemi-
sphere I I offer the follow inj cnggcatiotis :

First, we should continue, in otir bilateral
discussions with other govarmsenta, to cnoonr-
tps democracy in the quiet, onpublidzed way
and on the day to-day basb that I haT* altwtdy
referred to; and we should support patallel
efforts of ot'icr American atatca. If there ii
no intent to force the will of a sovereign govern-
ment, this lactic is entirely compatible with onr
commitments and with the dignity and self-
rtupect of ot hers.

iv-cond, we should support appropriate meas-
ures for broadening iho scope of colh-ctive ac-
tion With the aim of addrecjing ourselvta first
to thoeo cases where repression, tyranny, ond
brutality outrage the conscience of mankind.
I can think of no way in which the Amincan
community of states can better serve the cause
of human dignity, individual and national free-
dom, and representative democracy than to
develop a set of procedures for dealing with
this type of problem. The Vnited States haa
never belicrd (hat collective action for such
purposes 13 proscribed by the Charter of the
Organizat'nn of American States; but if the
majcYity of the member etates are of a contrary
opinion, then let us amend the charter.

Th'.-d, in each caie where a government i^
ovejtiirown by force tlicre fhould bd a canv
ful, dispassionate ass!S£m«:it of each sitnation
in the light of r.n the surrounding facts and
citcumstancos so that dscisJons conc<ming rec-
ognition, trade, aid, and other related in»tt««
can he made which aro consistent with our
ideaK with international law, and with our
overall national intNcst*. In making this aa-
seescient, regard should also be paid to the fact
that not only is each American Republic differ-
ent from all the oti era but that each tie fceto
goremment is likewise different in ita aima. Its
motives, its policies, and in the kinds of prob-
lems it faces.

Fourth, if, as a result of this appraiaal, •
decljion is trade not to lecognire a regime—
and this may well be the case in the futtira

fxjsz ss, i*a<

W9

at it h«a ben m tb* jiaA — tbca i( AoaM he
nad* dear that noaraooxnlticn i« b**ed
•qu^traty on a failore on the part of another
(Dvenuneot u> abide b; the »«»«M|»t^ rul«t
•f intemntional oooduct.

Fifth, vban the decUion U made to rccog;-
&iaF a reclina. it should be clear that ti>rre is
no hi3i% nndnr uitemational law for (quatinj
rfc-jpr.ition witb Tinited SlatM apprcrral ot tlie
intamal politics! pd\u r^ and practioiw of
anofSrr ^vemmeat. hesolution XXXV of
the f«rr(h Inter- Anetirjn Conferer.ce of Ainer-
icAtt Statca ir^kcs (his point rery clear. It
declarear

Ttet tb»f«tal>UihiiiFnt .>r n.tiniroaaoof OlptataiU*
iTttVw vltb • { TrmBcat d<ics aot Impir tiu ^iidf
Btst qjos Ui* docu-itir pollrr tt tbit fo>«miacsi

SiXth, «e &,'iou1d oontinjf our catablisbed
practic* of cunsulting with oth*r American
Bepnbiioi Kbenew a nutation of recogs'.tion

FiDiIly. li" there be no mistake about our
00TjsiK»(>nt and comjilete Jevotuin to the prinra-
ples of honu:! diarnity tic! freedocn of the indi-
vidual. We be!ievB that thcM pnnciples i lui
onlv U- rtalu^ io a d<fnocrati>r political eytUm
in which pjverainenta ure the eervanti of the
people and rcsp»nsiv« to their will. They are
a central eltturn: in oar foreipi policy to'rard
Latin America. We Rhall in erenr way oon-
aistont with our obli^tioiu 'ontintie our efforta
to help loake dpn>ocracy a reality throogbout
the entire tucusphere.

A.I i^ often the eaae. there is more to be said
than time allows for. I have already presumed
on your coortesy by speaking so loDff. But if
I ara permitted on: word of ootmanl, 'A would be
this:

(hope you will feel a pride io your oniTersity,
your chnrth, and yoor country and in the efforts
they are xll making to create a peaceful world,
Tvkd by Ian and CTirist lan charity, which is de-
woted to both the material uid fp'ntoal pnxrreos
of all maiiicind in freed jcn. Ard I hope that
you wtU look to the future with oonfldoncs that
freedom and not tyranny is the "ware of the
futnre" i^i this hemuphere. I think yoa will
«• «*n greater progress toward freedom in
ytmr genaration than the impmsiTa gams 1
ha^^teen iomvtim^

U.S. WMctmm lurttti'

on CMnti In PtawsHi

Ot% /«iw 9 tK4 Intmuxtioml Cammiukm »f
JvritU rttaatfd at Geneva a report of iti fmi-
iiyjt vit\ TTffarJ to iSs erenit m Pantma t»
Jan'tcry lOt'i.' FoUj^rfng w a DepartnffU
$tai«mnU coneer^mf tik* rtporfvKich ictii raa^
to nnr.t eonrtpondenit on tkat day by SicHard
I. PhUlipi, DiTtftoT of t\a Offu of .Vrw*.

We wdi^me (his detailed ttody by an im-
p«rtial body ginng an objertlre acoonnt of tba
trnfortanate eveau of January. Th» report
ezonaratee the I' oiled Statta of tha charge that
we violated xim UnireraaJ Dedarmtioa of Ha-
inan Righta of the United Nation!, a dais*
which the International Cooruvian of Jarittf
was '.Yted to inTCEtigate by the Ka'jooal Bar
Association of Panama.

like report also A\tt» thai I'.S. aulhoritiea
were entitled to u£« force to inuet a real threat
to life and sccur.iy in the Tanal Zona, and it
regrets that P&ntmasian authonties "made no
ctiempt diu^ng the cnucal early hours is wtU
as for alnKwt three days thereafter to curb and
control ths nolant actiritiea of the milling
crowiis."

We beHere tliat the tragic loss of lircs and
the rte^-ucfion of property would have been
avoided had adequate meoson* been taken at
the outset

T>ie report concludes with the iipe that tha
work of the ICJ "ViU contribote to the growth
of ondcntaniing, cooperation, and amity be-
tween the two coontrieB and the;r peoplea, ao
tixaX they may move fonnud in tha furtheranca
of their mutual vital interests. "

We fully aubscribe to this sentiment.

HaroM C. McCltrten Namad
to PuihWM Advbory Committaa

radar Secretary Ball announced on Job* 8
(prces release ZT3) the appointment of narold
Chadwick McClellan to aerve as a member of

' Kor becfcarouad. an Bvuxna of Fabk t, US< p.

US.

1000

PEPM.lilt.VT or »TvTT StTUXTOT

I

ihr Ad> i:or> OuDiniitiee en Inttruliuoii liiui-
usj rroljL-tQft.'

This Co-nnut(ft<,cli«ired br 0»rnM» B. K*n-
dall, coQiueli wiih the Sfcirtwy of Stare »nd
th» AdniiEistritor of the AgetKy for lnttm»-
tional Derelopmen: on tha h&adLn^ of qieclAc
business problems «t>roaJ. It g-.re* particular
ftttecuou to f ho application of the Hickealorj.«r
Miiendaient (SKlion €206) of ths ForKign As-
sistance Act of I9i2, which call* for tli* temii-
D&tion uf ■s>uraDC« to couctries nstiooAlizmg
or «s]irppri»tmg U^.-ownsii property unJea*
*%pprop'iite steps" •re taken to meet Us ohli-
g»t:ojis under mtenuuionil l»w.

Tb« Comin:tt«« also meets birnoDtlUy to rt-
riew the hnndlu-.g by the State Dep&rtmant and
its misaiocs abroad of gpeci£o bosioeas com-
plair.td submitti^l ^y Ajnencui businees in
ooniiectioD with their ovcrsus operations.

this cuionvtr, sune>-t to define th* scop* and
raqmrru. iue tor lb* pcogrsni.

( b) Based on ihs ranlls of thcM annrjr* d»-
tailed eiiginwring lud tconoicic (tudiet «'ill bs
ramed .ut jointly.

(c) It is hoped thst, on the bails of than
suntiyiand studio, an ecunooir desalting proj-
ret of mutual technological mtemt, prodncisg
substantial quantities of water t\ • cpecialiied
agricultural and for indostn-il uses will bt un-
dertaken in Israel with th« activo participation
ofiha United Sutes.

The International Atomio Energy Agcti'-y
wUl be invited to partidjmte in the prcigram
from tha begi' '.ing, induduig acting as in
observer in the joint studies this somjiier. As
agreed by the Preshlent and the Pnm« Minister,
the knowledge and expenenca obtained from
tliis pm'Tam will bi< :ivailtble to all oountriea
with water deficienciM.

U.S^IsrMll TMin To Conduct
tunrvys for DosalUng Program

Joint Ccmmuni'iue

Pi«a nltam SSl diird lu* II; nritra Jaa* n

Further discusions on implementation of the
agreement of President Johnson and fnme
Uini£ter Efhkol to cooperate in desalting'
were 'xmducted during the week of Jane 1.

Dunng these di..- laoorj, Minister P'm
flsraeli Deputy Minister of Defodse Shimeon
Pares], C airman [of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission Gienn T.] Seebcrg [A.E.C.] Commis-
iioc'rs [Joim G.] Palfrey and [James T.]
Eaj.ney, and tyfficials o? tl.i* Departnaent of the
Interior agreeaJ that the program woold be
developed as follows:

(a) A joint C.S.-IsraeJi teclmical team will
be appointed immediately to conduct, during

*r>t utarmonsiml* ot prvnoaa tppotntsirata. Me
Brtxm.'^ of rrt> 25. 1063. p. ISS : Api. & l»e3, p. 5*0 :
and Oct. T. IMS. (k 642.

' For ie\i t • lolBl eoiSsisiilaM rtl«M<] oo Jone i
at Lb* nmci-j^ioti of Pnu^ llt£lsi«t Eabkol'a vlilt to
WaaiOiiftoo. ae* Bruxm of Jujm 22. 1804, p. K ..

Conpvtslenal DocuimntB
Relatlnf to Fortlgn Policy

Mtk Cwnreai, U tawHu

Temponrr 8n*peosioB at Lratiea tor ICtta) Seraik B»
port t9 anompaar BJL UM6S. H. Bcpc irTO. Uaj
4. l«M. 4 pp.

DrparDBcnca ot Btat« Jostle*, and Oooibmcc. ttt* Jo-
dlclarr. and n.-Ut*d Acenda* AnvapriatlaD BU],
riacal Tear IMS. Beport to aceoouiaiis BJL lUM.
H. B«pt 1374. U ar 4 ItM. tt pp.

A Badoctlon in tlia AppropilatlaD (or tba Peace Oorpt.
Cocununkatloti trwD tim TmUimt liaaBEllilct a
raductloo cotaUas ta.8aOjOOO ta tb* approprutios
rrqaeaced In th* Osral jraar IMS tnitfgtt tor tba Peoc*
Corp*. U. Due SOS. ilMj la, 1904. S pp,

RMloeatlDg an Addlttonal Ajsoont for rorelfn AMlM-
aac* ta Vlrtnaiu. Ucaaac* tna Uia Prealdeot rala-
tlr* to nqoeitlaf aa ad4Jtlciial *Tw»m» of 1129
mllllOD In matoal d«feoa* and Aertlopmeiit pncraa
fima* n. Doc 807. Ut TSi IMI » pp. ; and com-
moaJcatloii tnm th* Prw^daot to ibm Speakar of ttm
Eoc**.H Doc. 800. May 18. UM. I p,

Safom* add Eacapee*. Kcport of (tir 8en*I» Jodtct-
arr O mittnmadeby Itsenbr'oaiBUtt'TiTo IstcsU,
nt» . rotlrnu Oonaectad WUb TTiifinwii asd
urapan, cortthrr with lodlTij^ial Ti««a (i. Bapt.
lOCT. M*T i\ 1)04. 14 pp.

Elunld Weapons 8/atans B* pland rtid*r lattns-
tlocal ''/ootral? A CoU«ctJoa of Cxnrpts and a
B)bll<. <ipbj Prepand (or ibt 1US4-4S alfb Bcbool
rif^batfa. Prvpared b; th* rorelpi AffUn DlTtaba,
I.«(1alat:re Bcfertoo* Brrrkr. of th* UbiaJ7 of
Co(.«Tc«a, 8. Duk'. 72. IU7 IWL 80 pp.

JLWa tt, IS«4

1001

INTCMNATIONAL OHOAMlXATIOItt AHD CONfUCNCU

Security council Twin To Eumlne C«iiibodI»-Vl.t.M«m Bordw- Atom

FullovJn^ u a ttarcunt mudr in :ht V ^^ .
. ■■mnlif C^unal </f. June i by f .-'>'. fteprrs, 't-
../u-c Adiac E. Stet-^Mon, togtthcr ■flfh -'u^ U-ct
ul ,1 rr^olut'on adopttl hy the ivMW.l or. that
dty.

■TATKMCNT BY *M«A»*AOOH tTIVTNlON

C S /r K pr»n r»lf»»« ««>S

I want to nd.i a f>-w 'vords in eifbiiation of
(ha vote ..f n.> dt-lc-g^ition on the reajlution we
V.wf jUs'. adopted.

Foj ii ■'^eelv^ •he' Security Council has been
occupied « Hi. the -omi.h.mt broupUl to it witli
M'cenrv in a iiieml-cr ■'tatt. In the v,ew of my
de)e?«tion, n^ I said lien- on Muy 20,' our t^k
in tlip CoiriPil lia,- Ifen twofold :

Mr"- that Pf "•♦leMnc the erldencv md r,-iichlDg «
cmr»tiil .LI) !.nlon.f 4 eva'.ua'io:. of ;b^ fuil ».>urvv» sdJ
or.K-l;.. u? -Uc tD.-l<lcci, Wytm <:..i:;buJl« .nd ae
Republic of Mel .>»in. v. v. i,

S«,.nd. .leridlog jc pr;.^l-atle atPi«i by wblch .1..-
Inlled Nal.ou' iun uai- i'» .*u.Avi.ing expcr.,-n.v
to in«- tbi ce. J- of a 6liuaii"n »Ulcb bn» l.een <^ul^•
jne.-IMil ly the Governnuu'. A Lunibodii »• on
oiirrmeU Rrave iLrt-at to ibe i**™ and «i .Mlitj i>f
>)ntb>-^~! A-1-. ■

Witti legarJ to tlie first task, no r.ew evidenre
has Ix-er. introtiticed to ijppo . the Rravo
J.Arpe? made ULti nst my (iovemiiieiit. -TViich,
of ....ni<«, h»i.- not dcteiTcd the represent alive of
the Soviet Vi • n from repeating them dny
after d.iy— .i soviet ichnu)ue whicii is aa ill-
efleitive'.ii it i9 fitr.iliai to all of us who have
sat ir. thii Council Hurmp the past 18 yenrs.
F:i'?eb<*Hl- do n Jt hecoMie fn-ts hy f-ere con-
si am repel ii loll.

Bi LLtiiN "I Ju« I' ISW, ;> 037

I i-et^t that we have been oliliged to deny
apim and ftg^n that there i« any baau what-
soever for a chsrge of aggression agumst "uy
Governmsnt ; nor has there been any bogg^stion
of hostility toward Cambodia. It U » fart, and
a f.»ct for whicli we have repeatedly expressed
•.I'lrrct. thnt an .American adviser was with a
unit of the Vietnaniese forces which inadvert-
ently crossevi the border into Cambodm at
Chant r^a on March IP. For that wo liave long
since eiprcLsed our profound regret. Cut, a»
we have repeatedly «ated, l\o Americans
cros-sed tho border on May 7 or May 8— Uia
other insunces of wi.ich Cambodia has com-
plained.

In view of the lack of any evidence to «op-
port these charges oi repeated acta of aggrea-
sion. It 13 appropriate, I think, that the Counal
should pronounc* itself in the draft resoluUan
as It has.

I turn now to th'^ second task, wliich has as-
sumed increasing importance since the debat«
began. I must sivy that tlie action tiiat the Se-
curity Coun.il has tod.y taken harJl> c<irre-
sponds, in our judgmeiiu to tlie gravity of the
situation oa sc* forth by ihv representative* of
Cambodia ! ere in the Council. In our view, the
Council might well have taken more farreach-
ing -steps lu response to a complamt of this na-
ture—steps in which the United Nations has
pained great cjperienco m recent yej.rs. But
be that as it may, the Council has before it the
opportunity to set in motion a pnxedura by
which it an consider fur ^.er measures to pre-
vent any recurrence of incidents on the Cam-
bodian-Vietnan.eee tjorder, whatever and who-
evr may < the cause. This, Mr. i 'resident, is
a beginning.

1JC2

DEPARTsttNT OF f^\^t BnJ.rnM

I *m spc^nf, of ooa^a^ of pusgnph B,
which, ill our view, is the most gignificont and
important {»rt of this resolution. Undei this
par»trr»ph represanL&tireg from thre« members
of the Security rmncii trill visit both Vict-
Nun tnd C&mbodia, including Ihvwe area!)
along th« border which hare been the scene of
recent incidents, in order to eiimme anJ to
study those measuroc ■Hiich, hopefully, i.ii
a\oid a recurrence of incident* in the future.

lam confident Uiat in undertaking this assign-
ment and in drewinp op their repon the ivp-
rc9entativi>8 of the three Council mem e rs will
clioose to sfTutinire with the gre«t«st care vari-
ous needs which ha\i become apparent during
the Council's discussion of the Cambodian com-
plaint. 1 liave ill m-Jid, in this oonncction, the
need for Vietnamese armed forces to redoubli-
their efforts to avoid in3d\ertent crossinf^ of
the frontier— even in the heat of battle: the
need for clearly marking those areas of thp
frontier which aro poorly defined or nndofined
by nature; and, finally, the need for steps to
insure that Vict Coru; rebel? in their etforts to
subvert the Government of tjie Republic of Vict-
Najn, nre not able to take advantage of an ill-
marked and u.«de>|uat<:ly protected border to
se«>k either safe haven or ^ .ppliee o ■ Cambo-
dian territory.

I note with pleasure also paragraph 4, in
which all are .eq-iested by the Council "to rec-
ognize and respect Cambodia's neutrality and
territorial integrity." This is in harmony with
what I eiprtissed here on May C6

I should furthenaore no'o that this numoni-
tion to all states and authorities clearly mojt be
respected by the Communist regime in Hanoi
and b • tlie Viet Cong, whom it both controls
at.i directs.

In this connection may I recall to the atten-
tion of members of this Council a passage in
a Ititter dated August 31, 19C2, sent by Presi-
dent Kennedy to His hoyal Highness Prince
Sihanouk : '

. . . tb» fuAdampntal and ftbldlDff obJ«ctlvf of Che
VuilMl BCate« U ttLsc each country, larre cr.d small.
Uvv Ui p«>fle« iDd Itulepccdeoc* a** 'tut Its people mar
pror. -. enjoy the trtilta of its ovn endeercra, anil
pona* a courw ol intemaUoaal relatlona vt 1C3 own

cfeBoalna. Thli tpptlM opeclallj to couatrica wtlb
wtlrb «« hare tocti cUm* (rlosiU; r«taUoiw *J «• barv
vll^iCewk-iiUa.

la thu «(<lrti (Dd (B Tlrw of (he preaeot ptanraiM-
tloiia of Tour Bo;al HUtoeii. 1 aurarr r<Q tbai tlM
I'nliad Buu> recpvetJ Ctia scotraUt^. ItrrttorUl Id-
lefrlcj and lnde(«ud«not of Cainticxlli.

Thst position, Mr. Prwidcnt, remaius nn-
chii.ged.

I repeat that we felt, and still feel, that the
Scicurity Council could have dealt more com-
prehensively and more effectively with lh«
prvblcra before it. It is perhaps understand-
abls that some members of the Security Coun-
cil have been hesitant to laundi the United Na-
tions on a new venture in an oroa of the world
where the United N ations has »o far unJertaVea
direct activities only on a very limited scale.
Although even here we raujt. recall the Unit«d
Kations nussion in Laos in 1&!>!>, the tepreeen-
tatiiTS of the Secretary -General now eerrisg in
Laos and in Cambodia, tlie Umted Nations'
Gussing mission." and the subcommittee of the

enecal .\ssembly which vifiited Viet-Nam last
fall.

Though recognir.ing that a hesitancy etill
neverthe'ess exists, I feel compelled to reiterate
our conviction that, since the principal purpose
of the United Nations is to koep the peace, it
should not exclude itaelf from any area where
disputes or situations likely to endanger irter-
national peace und security may esist. In re-
gard to the situation on t!ie Cambodian-Viet-
namese frontier we felt and stiil feel that some
form of patrol orsurveillanco under United Na-
tions auspices would be \alunble. Wo have
been encouraged, moreover, lo note that the Re-
public of Viet-Nam, one of the principal part-
ies to t!ie present dispute, would welcoue a sim-
ilar development

\Ve hope and trust that, in thoir report on
measures capable of prerenting a recur:-ence of
troul I.J along thii frontier, thi three mcinbers
of the Council will keep in mind not only those
views and any other means by which the United
Nations orald be of assistance but also the
brcnder purpose of the United Nations and its

' Ft.r r.jt. Ki>e itH . Se^t 21. I!)e2, p. 400.

'Nll9 OCrna GoMln^ of BweOen. was appolDte^
(peclal reprv»ent»tlvt of Uic 8ecr«tar7^;;eiu:r*l la
Cambodia and Xballand on Jio. 1, l'J€3.

rem 2t, 1S«4

iWiS

fimdunental and mJispensable pe«ctin*ping

Ip 101U-) i-ion. Mr Presuient [Ans^na Assou-
an fslier], let m* fipiea. n'j- J>'leg»tion'8 re-
epecl (nd uimi ration for the pixtiu.oe, insight.,
anti I ^rbe.irance with which you, as reprefenta-
t.re 'if the Ivory Ct .t, and your distui^jujshtd
colioigue, Ai ilmfKiadiir [Ahmed Tiiibi] Ben-
lama, luire addtrssed yourselves to the tasks
wliich ha\-e Ifien placed l>efopei this Council. In
o'.ir view your eflorts well deeeire tha uiiaui-
iiious support of aU menil jrs of this Counci!
And. on behalf of n",y delegation, we wish to
thiir.k you n.ost sincerely.

TtXT OF RCftOLimON'

The ereittifj ComncU,

Comtiierb): the C'mpltlDt b; tba Royal OoTtmmcBt
of C*mt<»lM m d'XWiuE: i/MSn.

S'.ttmc t^^ •i^.temeats cade in Ctue Coaonl In rec*^
U} LMjcotBp:&lDt.

yotiH{t «uti regret the Liic!(]ent« ■v?it'-Ii hare oo-
eurrej od Oambodlan tenitory aiiJ '.h'- tTUtlng »lt-
oailoD o;. L^e CambodUn-Viftiiar eee tr-;jitlei.

Taking n^tf o* the apolocle* IDd ttt^t^ teiiderwS to
tlie BoTsl G-'TT^.-umect ot OambodU ta regard' to the*e
Incidents and th« ion of Ilie tbtj ha«e eotaUeil,

.Noting alT' the dealre of the Oorert.racDrs of the
Klnrd jm ot Cambod'a tn<l the Repobli^- o* Vlet-.Njm
to itui-cee<! :ii r«atariDf tbeU relatl'toa to ^ peecernl
ai;d uormal aitte,

1 Deptorrt the loddcnta catiaed by the penetnMon
of unit* of L.V Ansy of Uw BepabUc of Viet Naiu Into
Oaiii^-KlUu. uerriUirj '.

2- R€QMtt§ that JQMt acd fair compenaatlon ahoTild
l>e offfrevl u- the Royal OoT»miDect of Cainb-idla .

3 lmvitf-9 tboce reapooalble to ^ki^ a'l appropriate
iDtti^aree to prereiit any further violation -^f the C*m-
bodUn frontier ;

i /fc-j«e<r> all 8tau« and AathorlUea and li> pai^
tlro^ar ttt- memtieta of tlie Otueva Coi-fereiwv .o rec-
nini:ce and reapect OaiulMMUt'a neutrality aLd terri-
torial ln*eCTi*y ,

6^ Drrutf* to send tiirM \)t ltd memtwra to the two
countnen nod to the pla,>'e where the uoat recent In-
cldentj has-** ocnirre<i It order to cipuld tmrb meaa-
urea aa int. ^ prevent any rev-urreo-^ oi pucb Inrl-
dHita' Tl-y win rei-jrt to the Secnrtty CoilEcll
withla f'>r'v five daya

U>Natlon DUamuiiMnt Confertne*
R«convtfM« at G«n9va

Staument by Xt'tUiim C. Foati.r^

First, iny delegation would like to taanriate
it.-df RiLh tho tribute with which you, Mr.
Chairman [A. Correa do Lngo, of Brazil],
opened this session. Since 'he lust meeting of
'he Conference thi world has gneved over tho
deatli of a gr>^4t leader. Prime Muister Nehru
of India. Our deepest evmpathy tpta out to
t'' ip*opleof India at thL'< time of aaancia. The
vitahty of Indian democratic inttiiations ia one
of his leg.ciee. That v.tality has beeu amply
demonstrated in the past few waalcs. But in
India, as in the world at large, tnankind has
si.'ffercd a gTe:.t loss. Aa our I:ia.aa colleague
so ably sanj, iii • le (ii-;:irmanieiit tWld we shall
miss here a genuine source of inspiration. Pres-
ident Johnson has said, in this connection : '

... It la n:\t Joat aa a lea Jar of India that he aerrad
h.mastiy. Ptrbapa more than any world leader be
hsft ^lve^ eipi-e,«loc •■• man'a yvaralaf for pea.^. Thl*
ui the Issue of cur a^c. . . The--! roald tw oo mora
flttlr.g memorial to him Ibi-.i a world without war

The idea! A Prime Minister Nehm remaina
our jrvi) .ii '. in his me-morr we renew our pledge
lo seek i's realization

I fhoula row like to entend greetings to the
Sptviil Krpreeentative of the Secretary -Gen-
eral, Mr. [Dragoelav] Protitch, who is again
assifltinj: us. Let me also welcome back to our
table rev diftinguislied cochairman, iteputy
Foreip: Minister [Viilerian] Zorln, who par-
ticipated so actively at the beg racg of this
Conference in Llie spr.iig of 1962. I am glad
also to '^•e So many familiar faces around the

* t' N d <. 8/&741 : QsaAlxnotuly adopted hy the B*.
cur* -T Ooun^ on Juae 4.

'Tho Pre^deot of the Se^-iirtty Conn'-,, eoi. .need
oo Jujia S CN. .loc, 3/57431 that hi. liad appi''n'ed
nraall. the Irory Coaat, and SI jrr"C*5 to carry out thlj
c3t«.4lon.

' Made N-fore the Conference of tte Ig-Natloo Com-
lottu-e OQ rKearmHment at OcueTa on Jtne d. Mr.
Foster la Director of the V S Anna Control and Dia-
anrament Agency and head of the C S. rtelecatloD. Foe
teTta uf atatementa made by Mr Foeter and by Adriao
R. F"shfr Depu'- Director of the D.3. Arms CTitrol
and Plaarmament Axeiicy. before the wsslou of the
Conf.rtn. i- which ciinreoed Jar.. 21. 1964, and recessed
Apr 'ix. see Brixtri.^ ot Mar 2 1064. p S50; Mar. U,
I9<VI p ?,76: Apr. 20. 1964. p. 04] : and May 11. 1994.
p. 7r.o.

'K-T text of a tne^nge frotn rrealdent JohoaoD to
pTf^lde it ParieiialU Itadhaicrlabnau of ladta. ae* ili^ ,
Jonv I'. HUM, p 028.

1004

DEFAitnaNT or stite rruxTDf

t&ble — members of deie|^tjoiis *ho were her*
whun I was list hero in Kebnitry.

Mr. Chiirni&n, I ihoald like to extend p^r-
'iculir gre^ting^ to yuu. nho hare aneunied Lhe
ciztra rteponaibilitie* if the Chair on your first
day at the table, and also I wish to eitrnd (frvet-
rngs to our new rolltague from Mexico, Mr.
GoniPi Koblodo. I also welcome thooe othere
here »ho ar« particjpatit^j? in our delibecttions
for the firjt time.

Finallr, let me say to oor colleague from
Ethiopia that «e wish our former colleague.
Ambassador (Abwe} -^J?wle, an early recovery
from his grievous ^ounda.

Maaaufw T» NaK Arm* Raca New

I join you here today with Presulent iTohn-
son's instruction to moke every effort to find ii
basis for eerly agrtwnont on aafeguardenl— anj
I emplr 'ire "safeguarded" — alternatives to the
arms race.

You may remember that, in his yearend ex-
change with Chairman Khruslichev, Pr€«idMit
Johnson said : •

Tbe time (or •Iniplj tolklnj iboat peace . . b*»
paj«e<) — 1U04 tfaoold be a year IB whicb ve take tur^
tber nept toward that («il.

In a recent speech to the Associated Press in
Xew York * Preeidemt Johnsgn again made tJie
point that 19&4 was a year in whicii the United
States would work "to reach agreement on
measures to redu'-e armament and lessea the
chance of war."'

I.jke the measuree achieved in 1963, th.e cut-
backs in produrtiou ^ fissinnable malenal for
nuclear weapons announced by the Soviet Un-
ion, the United Kingdom, and my country '
were closely related to our work here. The
idea of a cutback aa a preliminary step to a cut-
off was r.entioned in President Johnaon's mes
sage to this Conference on 21 January of this
year.'' It was discussed hers, both pnvately
and in plenary meetings, during February. I
mention this because those announcements show
again thaj. our work here continuo^y con-

'i»iil., Jin.27.19W.p. Ul.

• /«<!.. Uty 11. 1994, p. 728.

'IbUI

•ror t«Jt. H* Mi.. re*> 10, lOM, p 2i4.

PmMMit Cafb far llttfMMatf Cfforti
To VMlt Anm Rac*

Vhitt ffovM StaimnU

Wbltt llM'M pnflB r«lftt.t d«tt4 Ja»* 0

President JobQwuo (May (JazM ii} Imiru'^ed
WlUtam r, roet4>r to make every effurt at ;be
Oi^rTa IMsarmctsmt roofen'ocv tu find nafi.-
fuarded alt«rsitlTr« to ttir anna not. Mr, Fo-
tar bead! lbs f'.P dalecailon co tb* CooXervoce

Tb« Craaldest aatd :

*'We baf«* talni tbe ITrst atrps down Ukt ^aiib-
«a7 to dtaainumeaL Iau year aair Ibe teat
ban treaty, ctie direct rommuclcatJaBa lick. auJ
the IN rx'anlotlon a^aloat owlear weapona In
■!>•'>. Tbla year Iwtb tbe Horlrt Gnton aod the
I'nlled Btatca bave aziDnuneed radoctJooa lb tbe
I'mductloD of Saaluoable material for botImi
weaiwna.

' Xacb of Ibtae atcpa polota In tb« dirfctKm of
effectire control of artoa. E^arb a>OTc« us a amaU
« ay dowo ibla loaf and dlfSailt road.

**We must not bealtatv now that tLe jou^ey
baa been be(nn. We muat ndoubic- oor eir.>n>
tintl. II Is (x.mHeted.

Id January Prcaldent Jolinfvn pn-irnled -i*-
cli4c propoaala for further atepa to the Con'w.
eiice.' loday be tnatrrcted Mr Poeiet to ael
forth ta Oect'Ta ^Kir plana for tiit proeedMrea
Deceaaary tu verify compliance wltb a numher
of hia Janrary t>fopocala la ord4*r tu'reucb eartv
afirT«nent On tSem

Tbe lulled 8tai« haa lonj U-llcTed tbat Is
apection or otb<T procedure* fur verification are
necvaoary for alfnlllcaAt ansa control and dla-
armaoesi maaaam to be taketi.

Tbe PreUdeot reempbaalaed bl» detennlnaiiuh
to pnraue aafegoarded axreeuieota vblcb woull
perrait ancb action. Tbey would be important,
first of aU, for peace. But tbey «culd also per-
mit us to devnte eyre of our er.erflea anJ r*-
•onrcea to buildUi« • (reater «ciety for nil
mankind

' For teit. *ee Ui lirri.^ of ret*. 10, 1004. Pl S*

tribufes to steps taken by governments in pur-
suit of peace.

My delegation will elaborate ftirther on the
cii'off at this session, as we »ii" on other pnv
poeals in the Preeident's 21 January message

A theme which runs throagh many of these
proposals— a theme which nas already been
stressed by other delegations her»~istbst while
we are gtruggbug with the mtncate problems

JCNE ::, i«a«

im*

o1 0fft%l and complete du>muLm«nc wfi should
4CTve pciohty to mfhliif tfrMnieiit on measura*
«'hirJk'.will halt ths trma nr« now. If Tre do
Di^ofiT Uak of tducving gtocral ind oom-
plcM <liasrmajnent «ill Iwcome e\rer more
difficoh.

Man; of the mcMuree which have betn gur-
oeissfiil 10 far follow that philoeophy. We now
hare a test ban treaty,' which binits the devel-
opment of larger nuclear w««pons. We hare
- 1 Antarctic treaty, which prohibits the spread
of weapona to an area o! tho earth whore the;
are not now present.* We ha»e a General As-
•embly rewilutioa (A./RES/1884 (XVIII))
tgthitx th« ipread of naclear weapons to otzter
space.' We hare annomoed reductions In the
pnoductioa of finmnniiMe r..i;tcnal for nuclear
weapont^rsdactjoiit which should slow down
the tmoe for erer-laryer stockpiles of such ma-
terial and, we hope, lead to a catofi in its
productiun.

Each of these stap« limits in sume my the
production or proliferation of armaments.
Each thereby serves our imnwuiate obiactiTS
of callinf a halt to the arms rK».

We woold move mnch further toward this
goal by adopting the cutoff, the freeze, and the
maasores we have propoaed to stop the spread
of nnclear weapons to tiations not now con-
trolling them. Moreover, our ultimate goal of
general and complet« disarmament would be
brought closer.

Tha rt^tttmHVmftatim

During our last session we discussed collateral
measures in greater depth than ever before.
Many delegations raised qiieetions about a prob-
lem which has seemed so many times to make
agreements here more diffictilt That problem
IS verification. To assist the Conference in gat-
tmg out of this difficulty, my delegation intends
to discuss verification in mora detail at this see-
sion. In particular, we will discuss it as it
relates to our proposals for collateral measures.

Verification should be sufficient to assure na-
tions that their security is not bemg jeopardized

through clandestine violations by other nats-.ms.
This roust have been vhjit Foreign &tin:A«r
[Andr«i A ] Oromykt; had in mind wbc;. ha
obsarred.

(>ar coastiT 4e« not lataod to laka acjcs* tt t!a
wortl . . . Kor do «« axixet otliera to Uk* u ai our

Our Secretary of State, Mr. Rusli, elaborst«d
on the same point early in this Ckmftreoxro.'*
He said :

No t^ftrvBitBi. tart* or maU. covld be vmtertM to
eDter into dlsamuuum arraacvinests n&dar wtilca
itirlr twofdea iiit(M b«com» rlctlm* of tll4 pttOij of
oclxn.

\a otber atrilr«.arcoantln«aa(] iDa>Un( (jateics art
ctutomarllj loctailKl to that ill* quntlua at caafldroea
need cot artw. CosSdeDcv (iws out of ksowIMfei
■uciilclao and fear ar« rooted In IcDonoceu TU* baa
been troa •lac* the beslnnlrs of time.

I.ct me ouka ib't pco^ clear: Tbe L'oltad Btitea
doea not uk fnr toepertloo tor inesectloo'e Mta. to-
epectloD t* for do pnipoee oUxr Utan aasorasce that
cocunlQnents are fnlflijed.

With that principle in mind, the Vnited
States has attempted to design its collateral
measures so as to reduce the scope of inspection
vhile providing the necessary assnrar.cs. of
compliance.

We fully reoogcize that many nations havs
facilities which cannot be opened to inspection
at this time. Certainly my Qovenunest has
sensitive facilities of this kind, but that do^.^ not
mesu we camiot find a way to reooncile this need
with the need for veri£cation. Indeed, that
should be one of oar primary tasks.

The formulation of VBriflcatioa propoaali re-
quires hard work and careful preparation '77 all
of us. The United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and other agencies of my
Government have devoted tens of millioss of
dolbrs to rAeaivh programii designed to roson-
cile tho need to provide assurance and tho need
to protect Mnsiti\-e facilities. Experts from
soma of our leading industrial and other con-
cerns and specialists vithin our Govenvj^ent
have devoted many hours to that end.

The verification plans which we will elaborats
at future meetings are the end i>rodact o' that

' For teit aee itM.. Aa« 12. 1M3. p. 239.
'For text, eee tK4.. Dec. 21. :9eE». p. 914.
•ror teit. ttiUd.. Not 11. IVeS. p. TM.

* For text of ■ etatement tcade by Becretary Boak
before ibe Conference on Uar. IS. 1863, e<« CMd.. t^. 2.
1««3. p. B31.

1006

oerAarvErr or state artxRix

tSon. Xiisi.eclioii would be canfinad to thoM
object*— •nd only thorn objects— which must
BeoeMarily be pUc««i ander Kcrutiny to provide
•anumnce thAt oofnmiuneDta are ful£lled. In
the freeze tnd the cutoff, for extoiptB, the pro-
duct ioo pUota to be reguUrlv observed would be
limited to those of a penicoUr type. We
would tieo limit the scope of the inspectors' ob-
aervbtioos within those plants eo as to inhibit
their receipt of informat-oa which might be of
miliury value. In neither the frwze nor the
cutoff would there be inspection to verify tlie
levels of retained annamenta.

That if also true of the mutual destruction of
B-ITb and TU-16'e." Here the inspectors
would look only at the actual aeetruction of
bombers. They would not esplore the country-

side to find out bow many bombers ictnaiaed
on each side after the Nxnbers were daitroyed.

Our purpoaa in dtecribing nrificatitir i*
clear. We believ'e a detailed analysis of this
subject is iwwntiil in order to move oa forward
toward early agreement on meaaingfol altama-
tives to the arms noe.

The United Stale* is ready to oonchida firm
agreements in each of the areas I have men-
tioned. It is also ready to consider any other
reasonable propoaal.

My mstruaions are to pnrane every practical
means for hilung thr arms race and reducing
armaments. This would be important, fiiet of
all, for poace; but it would also permit us to
devote more of our energies and resources to
building a greater society for all mankind.

TIM Trust TwTltary of th» Paclfle Idandt

FoUeneing are ttaUtnentt mad* in the United
Sutiont Tnulee*fup CovneH on Hay £8 by it.
Wilfred Ooding, High Committioner of th«
Tnut TerritaTy of the Pacifle f$landt ani Uj8.
Speeiai Reprtitntative in <"« TnuteetKip
CovncH, and Thoma* Remengeta>t, adviter to
the U£. deltgation.

tTATtHINT BY MJt CCOINa

C.s /CJ«. pnm mm— <«oi

It is a privilege and honor to appear again
before this body as the Special r«rrcscntativo
for the Administering Authority of the Trust
Territory of the Ficific lalaada.' The year
which is just concluding has been notable in sev-
erril reEpecta. It was highlighted by the vi^t of
the sixth United Nations visiting mission and

" lOT backfTonnd. tee iHS . Apr. 2a 19(V> p. 641.

' Fw a •tatemect mad* br Mr. Oodinc to t^e Tmitec-
•tll) CotmeQ on Jooa 5, 1863. m» lu Ufrci of aof. E.
IM3.lxai>T.

also marked the end .->f our Srst full year of
operation of a tremimdously expended program
in almost every phase of our op< . . ' ■'^'"> hiit most
particularly in tie field of elementary <<uicatiQa.
Th^ 1904 visiting mission, which spent ap-
proximately 6 weeks in the territory, wsa, I bo-
liere, the most widely traveled of any visiting
mission. By plane, boat, jeep, track, and other
miscellaneous conveyances, the misaion tra-
versed the territory from one end to the other,
meeting with elected oonncila, district legisla-
tures, holding public gatherings a.' well as
having numerous conferences with administrv
tion officials and Uictonesian citizens. The
1964 mission had several distinctions Ona
senior member, the dirtinguishod delegatd from
China, had served as chairman of the 1059 mis-
sion and, thus, was able to bring to the miarinn
a perspective based on firsthand personal anal-
ysis of local conditions. The distinguished
chairman, the Honorable Frank Comer,
brought to the mission his very special knowl-
edge of the Pacific area. The mission also had

rcn i», 1184

lOOT

tea unKjuv JuUndion, I beliriA, of bavmg lh«
tirtt voman n:«ciber tivM- to strvc od a visiting
mission. The diiunpuih«1 m«n)ber from
Liben*. tli< Honorable Aii^rir llnx>la. provt<l
to be » Ttal infpiration (o the women of the ter-
ritory. Theuiwon vuftnextrenieJ; oonsdra-
tious and Inrdworkinj; groop, mfeting pa-
tiently for )otig hours with vtiious committM!-
and dfle^ations and tcceptiii^ thr discomforts
of travel ID a mnote aira with equanimity anil
clieerfalness. The mission also waa the first to
travel to the <iouthenunoet of oar island groups,
maim;: a flyuig Inp to our Polynesian atullaof
XukuoiD and Kap>n^iuiiar8£^.

On behalf of the Adminsstenng Authority,
I nish to thanlc the chaiminn, Ambassidor
Coroar, for a vfrv intensive and useful report
and to assure him and the Council that the rec-
r>nimeiirliiiion< of ilie misFion wi'.' lie piven tlie
fullest poss.ble consideration.

In view of the very detailed report of the
visitins; mission nhich has been providej the
Conncil.' OS well ns our Hni.iinl report for fiscal
yenr 196S, which is up for review,' I shall «D
this presentation sketch only briefly the high-
li/jht« of our progi-am.s since last June 1963 to
the present time. I wish to assure the Council
that I «m. OS in former 6es.sions, ready to re-
spond to any questions the members may have
or to present additional ii^formation which may
be desired on luiy of out programs.

Adimlnl(tra«an

.\s I reported to tiie i3th -iession, the Con-
jrressof tlie I'nittd States in July cf 196-J r«i A
ourlepnl tiuthonraiion for appropriations from
$7V^ milliu.n to $17^^ million, thus enabling us
lo ptvseni greatiy increased appropiiatioD re-
quests. For fiscal \-ear lifS. the Congress ap-
propnoted fl.*> nuUioru much of which 'Ka.^
mrmirked for the accelerated elementary edui a-
'ion program. A similar appropriation of $15
million was provided for tlie year we are just
concluding, lliat ts, fiscal lOM, and I am grati-

' f.N. doc T/l«3a

'r«-«.( Trrrltort of Ike Porifc Itlamd; /»«» (De-
rartsTMit of SLalr publlcilloa 76T0i ; for aal* tr tlx.-
SujwTlntmlent of Doctuoenu. US GoT«mm*»t Print-
ln« <:>arr. Vttblagtou. D.C 20(02 ttl i

Ced to report that for next year (wbicit will
open on July 1), an approprtatiaD of tlTVi
mi'iion already hM been sppro\Td by the Houat
of RepresrntAti rta and by the Scnal.> Appro-
priations Committe». It now ozJy awaits fii\al
action by the Senate, where I hare erery cx-
pectfticD that this much tncnMed budgrt will
receive approval as it aJreuty hu in tba UoTia»
of Representatives.

Dunng the aessioa I shall ooimnent on what
I feel we have achieved to date with Lheee in-
creased appropriations and wliat v^c expect to
achieve in the next aeveraJ ycnrs. i wish here
only to stress that our annual appropriation was
more than doubled last year and that another
very substantial increase is :^tii;ipated thi5
coming year.

We were enabled in September 1063 to grant
ft major upward hourly miliiry adjustment for
the majority of the Microneaian Government
employees in the A ond B levels of llie Microne-
sian Title and Pay Plan. Similarly, the anniml
salanes for Microneeians occjpying senior pro-
fessional and execotire pomtioits were adjusted
upward with an avenge increase of well over 2!>
pensnt.

Supplemeni'^l benefits for MicTOQflEian
workers also were eetabliahed. As «n intfirim
measure prior to the cAsblishmeat of o retire-
ment system for Microncsian employee^ a
death benefit proj^ram vras institttted which
provides lump-sum cash payrcents to designated
sornvore of Micrcmesian employees who die
while in the service of the Oovemroent. A sick-
leave proRram for Micronesian ercployew, simi-
lar to that enjoyed by tho U.S. civil service
worker, also was instituted this pa.4 year. We
recognizo that thees and other me^rsares of this
nature will be of an interim natnre until a workj
able social security system can be developed foir
the Micronasian workers.

I am pleased to report that the turnover of
senior administrative positions to qniUified
Micronesians has moved steadily forward. In
Ponape Distnct, Mr. Leo Falcam was appointed
assistant district administrator. Tha visiting
mission, I am certain, will testify to the ability
of this young administrator dncn he eerred
capably and with distinction as acting district

1008

DtTAarKKKT OF STATI BTn.Lmil

administnto" Juring thd prriod tha vUitin^
mi jsioa gp«al in tho Ponspe Distriot. Appoint^
manU I'f three addiliiiuil Micronteitn* Co tilt
post of »ssi5tant district adiniuiitntor have
been mado this month. Mr. Thomu Remcn-
goato, who IS aorving here ta a member of tha
VS. delegation, has been appointed assistant
district administrator fn. public aflaira, Palaa
District. In Tnik, our largost district, Mr.
Raymond Setik has been appointed assistant
district administrator in charge of administrv
tive iervicaa, vbilo Mr. Tosi^o Nakayama hu
aKiuned the post of assistant district adc}ini5-
trator for pubhc affairs. The vuiting mi«»inTi
members will remember Mr. Setik since be waa
•erving in an acting capacity during their
visit. Mr. Nakayania is kiicnni to many mem-
ben of this body from his appearance at the
Trusteeship Council in 19C1, when hn cerrarl
as adriser or. the U.S. delegation.

In throe of our aiz distiicta, the aoooad Bsnior
administrative posts are now held by KlicroDJ^
(ians, and ^jians are being formulated to turn
OTtr similar posts in the oth^r districts to quali-
fied Microneeian adminisCratiTe officers. We
hare reBr!icd the state where young but capable
Mlcronesiui.? are prepared to assume top posi-
tions of responsibility. It is our intention to
incroasa the tempo of this turnover, using the
American staff, where required, increasingly in
the rol? of auTisora, eonsoltanta, and tech-
niciansL

In the lees giamoroos but equally important
secondary service activitiee replacement also
continued. The last remaining expatriate hos-
pital adminii::ator was replaced thid month in
Yap by a local staff member. A Tnikego assist-
ant supply oGcti took over the senior poet in
the supply eection a month a^o.

With the tiemendously expanded programs
now in progress, the workload at all levels of
activities has increased. Tciis has meant in-
crease in staff, both local and expatriate. The
expansion also has intensified the need for spe-
cialized training at all !>>veli to meet the de
c.uids of our expanding programs. In my
comments on functional activitita, I intend to
doooribe briefly the types of epecialiiad training
we are carrying out, but at this point I wouli

like to note tliat in addition to mir Kgular
•chol&rship program we propose to provide well
over ISO emplo3-ce3 and private individuals the
opportunity of inserrice training in their spe-
cialized fields iu niected organizations in
Hawaii, the United Statea mainland, as well aa
in special training centera which will be coa-
dui-tsd in the territory this coming year.

During the pan year tipecial attention has
been given to an analysis of onr administrative
orgoiiisation since I have long felt the need for
a butcr coordination end alinemcju of operat-
ing program-^ at the headquarters level. The
rc6ult has been * oompleta leorgiinizatioa with
four major areas of responaihilities each to be
beaded by an assiEtant commissioner. These
will be public affairs; oommuoity services
(c<>vering medical and edacation programs) ;
a tmified resources and development depart-
ment ; and an administrative^ fiscal, and aervioes
operation. Implementation of this organiza-
ticnal setup now is underway, and I am con-
fid nt that a more realistic and functional aline-
ment of reeponsibilitiee as well as more effective
coordination in all our efforts will be achieved.

Uaettloa

As the visiting mission has noted itt its report,
a new policy on education has b<«n basic to our
work and plum for accelerated development. A
year ago an elementary school construction pro-
gram was launched which calls for a total of
C22 new elementary school classrooms and 225
houses for United States teachers to be coa-
etmcted by the end of 1963. Durirg the past
year, 2.31 new classrooms and 104 teacher houses
werti ctmstructed, and this coming year another
179 new classrooms and lOS teacher houses will
I* built.

To insur^ that the new elementary schools
have adequate supplies and equipment, $3,400
per classroom has been btidgeteJ for this item.
Most of the school furniture is being constructed
by local firms, aa noted iji the report of tha
visiting mission. In the past 2 months, two
addition.".! contract* have lieen let for school
furniture, one to the Palau Woodworkers Guild
and the other to the Blicrtmesian Construction
Company of Saipan.

rem at, ie<4

1009

S«x»d*jy eJimtinn nuw U bfirg proTided
mil dtitrictd through the eetablhtuneat of dU-
tr\zt public high achoolf. Starting la Scptrm-
ber IK-i, the iitth grsde wm addeJ to diftrict
junior higl) achools, this past j-«ar the Itth
gtfAe waa added, and the opening of echool
this fan will lee the i2th grads in operation.
Additionally, a nrw junior high ftchool vma
establiahed in Ajuor, Ulithi, this pi3t year, and
a tOth grade will be added to the Kosaie Junior
High School in September Iftfrt. This, 1 know,
viU be of interest to the members of the visit-
ing mission since the iiitision received a request
tnt expansion of the Ktuaie school during its
visit to Kussiew

The nuniber of scholsrships was doubled doi-
iag the year under revier, and a similar in-
crease was possible for thit coming rear. Jest
prinrtomT departarefromthetemtoryforthis
session, I announced the awards of CO collegv
GchoUrships i>i general Eclls, 12 scholarships
in specific degree flclda, and 12 grants in pre-
tneJienl or paramivlical fields. Through the
Enst-Wcst Oentev, 23 rtodents received special
gr.inrs during tJio past year while 6 students
reoeired full degree scho'tr ^ip8 from this in-
stitution. Weeipfcta similar number of grants
from the Center this j-ear. Well over a hundred
8tnden!s of college level vrill be in tuiiversitiea
and colleges on scholarships this school year.
And therfl will bo ilmost anoOier hundred stu-
dents alti>ndinp college on their own or on a
eombinntion of private resources and partial
Administration aid.

An adult e«3ucit ion superrisor is bcinp added
to <■■ oh district educotion staff this fall as vrtll
as n su[)ervlsor at the Iieadqimrtera level. In
addition to liaving reeponsibiUty for tlie oreralJ
t^'iiicniion prnTom. these adult education sa- ,
pervisoR will be in charge of educational broad-
cistin^ and in this capacity will work closely
with tlio di.<tnct radio broadcast station man-
agers and prognjners.

The >Iicrone*ii»n Teacher F.dncation Center
in Ponape gmduatci its tirst cla?3 of 2o teach-
ers tli!S year and now has donbled its enroll-
ment as well aa its staff. Tl»e Cen'or is
operated on a contract nrrangement witli the
University of HawaiL This fall, however, a
fully tjuilified JLcponesion staff member ^\\\

join the prcaent l^niv-Braity'of Hawaii faculty
csembert of the Center.

In paragraph 61 of the rlsiting miaion r»-
port, the missica otJteJ with approval that &
propoaal to aopomt a supervissr of Libraiy nrr-
ices was under r-Ttai deration. I rograt that a
ciisundensta&ding on this propoaal appears to
hare occurred aiQc« w« hare had this saparrisor
of library jemcea on the job for the past jcar.
His headq'iarters, however, are maintained at
PICS (Pacific Islandj Caotral School] in
Ponape rr.thcr thsr at our main adimn'.£tratiTe
beadqosi tcrs in Saipon, and this may have led
to the miTOnderstapd'ng. However, ho is on
the job and daring the past j'ear developed prt>-
cedures for advising and assisting district edu-
cational administrators in reorganizing high
school libraries and advising on formaticm of
small libraries for the new elementary schools.
This coming month, in cooperation with the
Somh Pacific Commission and the Govemmeat
of Gus'n, a training course for further training
of Pacific area librarians will be conducted in
Guam. We expect to bare 14 of our local Ubrar-
ians attending this course.

In our EngUsh-langnage program efforts hav*
cen! jred ebon' providing teachers with cnitabk
texts and mavt. •■ »ls, especially for the elemen-
tary years "uid i.ie training of teachers in mod-
em methods of language leeching. TVorkEbopa
for Microneoinn and .Vmericsn teachers on laa-
guajre teaching have been held in all districts.

Our Literature Production Center has been
etrengthened with the appointment of the for-
mer dirp^tor of literature production services
of tho South Paciflc Commission as the new
head of our Center. One of his first tasks will
be to atialyze and assess current litemture pro-
duction and printic^ needs of the territory.
CoTtfideration is being given to the establish-
ment of a modem printing planL

We have expanded the community dcvolop-
ment program considerably and plan further
expansion this coming year. Working with
the theme of community "pilot projects"' in
dcpri!s.srd areas, wo propose to extend the con-
cept of self id where joint efforts of the gov-
emment and the people can improve the eco-
nomic, social, and culttiral conditions of the
commanitv.

1010

DDATrxrirr o* ntm. vcxiMna

PMIttaal AArMMaMit

The Council of Uicronesi* held two ■■iiimi
durii]^ ths year, both deroticj; major tunc to
recommeaUationi oonorr'-inf the formal ioQ of
• termorial irgialature. The basic reccmmen-
dationa of the Council wcr« embodied io a draft
order calling for th» formation ol a "Congrwa
of Microntaia." Copiaa of the draft were given
the visiting mission before its visit to the Trust
Temtory. Sini» that time further study has
been given the VM-ions proviaiona of the draft.
Although tinal decisions have not been t«ached
on all ospecta of the j- ■'iposal, we plan and ex-
' pect to Ije able to hold elcctiona for the legisla-
ture this fall and fully meet our 1863 target for
a functioning legislative body.

In five districts during the year, diatricl Icgia-
iatares have recommended lerised charters
streamliaing their or£:aiuzation. Many of the
former legislafive bodies were unwieldy in
sire The visiting mission bad an opportunity
to meet with full comp'cnienfs of the district
legislative bodies in the Marianas, Palau. Yap,
and Truk Districts and with representative
committeca of the legislatures in Ponapo and
the Marshalla. One of the major political tasks
from now on will be to work out a satisfactory
deline&t'on of authority between the new terri-
torial lPi,-islatiTe body and the district legisla-
tures. An additional problem of which we are
fully awars is the nc«d for fundamental politi-
cal education at the municipal level.

Cojra production, which remains the back-
bone of local economic enterprise, continued t*-
show improvement. Copra export revenue for
the fiscal year under review was ?l.a million.
Production has incrensed ihis past year, and if
the trend demonstrated ty tho first 10 montlis of
th« fiscal year coniinoes for another 2 Tionth:,
we anticipate llu". soma I3j600 tons wjl be ex-
ported with export revenues of well over $2,-
225,000. Du* to better shipping and marketing
procedures, as well ar lightly improved ftorld
prices, the Copra Stabilization Board w li able
to grant two price inert . . j dnrmg the year to
the copra producers, as well as to increase the
Copra Stabiiuation Fund reserves by some
$irr,000tc A level of 5711,000. ■fiTiile this may

\ a rela:i\xly small increase, the Cotmcil will
recall that falling world pri-vs is the prtvioos
2 years had resulted in the Copra StahllizstioQ
Fond dropping from a level of well over a mil-
lion dollars to less t nan $300,000. Daring theao
fi years of falling copra priass, (he administra-
tion maintained stabilized prices to tho pro-
ducer by drawing upon ths fund. If th*
present trend continues, it now appears that tho
board will be able to grant further price tn-
creasos to tho producer this coming year, as well
as to continue to build up tho Subiltcotioa
Fund reserves

Tha moat significant economic erent of tho
year was the actual oonttruction of tlie plant
required to begin commercial fishing operations
in the Palsu District imder an agreement with
tho Van Camp Seafood Corporation. Last
month materials for erecting a storage froeier
and other facilities arrived in I'alau. One f '
the provisions of the agreement provides for the
traiiiing of Micronesions as tuna fisliermen and
in ths installations asliom whero it is anticipated
that some CO or more Microncsians will be em-
ployed in the initial phases. Six 25-graG3-ton
tuna boats are being built and are expected to
begin operation from Koror by July 1, 1064.
Initially 48 Microneaians will be employed as
crewmembetB, liocal contractors m Pslaa are
participating in the construction of a quarters
buildmg to hou.ie some 120 tuna fishermen.
Other facihtits to be built or installed include a
1.500-ton fish storage freezer, ioemaking ma-
chines, water storaga tanks, office.9, and houses
for technical atid managsrial staff.

ilio adjiinist ration oontinuud toecnd trainees
to Hawaii to learn live-bait tuna fishinj. Pres-
ently some 23 trainees ore undergoing training
on tuna boats o,.eniting out of Hawaiian ports,
andotherswiU begivensimilaropportunity. It
is from this group of trainees that we hope to de-
^•elop a nucleus of experienced tuna fishermen
which can, in turn, train other Micronesians at
thoIocaMevcI.

Most of tho pilot projects in local fisheries de-
velopment to date have been concentrated in
Palau. With the establishment of a larg«-^ala
commercial fl3.^p^es venture in Koror, we now
propose to establish a pilot fisheries project in
ttio Truk District. This will permit the trans-
fer of the major fisheries development effort to

'inn 3», ]»s«

1011

Trvk, «herf inifi»l cr.iphisuwill l^girentothe
dnelopment of a tshmii ini)iu«!ry cnpuble of
mipplying nil local dfn mi.lj for firah tth. A
fisheries oiTlivr will still remain lu Palau to
wpervis* tlip lUliPriea i-Mrram, but 5t this st«{,'»
it is feJt that nmjor tmphssn must b* giren to
the e?t(iblislimeul of lishny fiicliiios in Tnik,
our l.irc'St dislrict. Kc>-ruiinnnt of •JJitioiml
fisliencs d^Ycloinuwit fn^rsoiuiel is b1?« Ix-mg
planiits! for this cyr>i:i^y»".

Uoalbiii!din(j opornticmo in I'ninu are hoing
incrr.vied. Tlio I'al.ia Hoallmil Icr^ .A»o<'irt-
tiou liurinj; the year i-omplot 1 anj Bold more
than n dozen boats wbilv nn addiiioitnl IJ b<iats
»ro on order. The I'ulau Uoa( Yaril now has
b««D cstablishfd is a goTerr.mcut p:liit project
under the iwiniiDisiration boatbuilder and cur-
rently has unJer v-onstniction a 7r' foot livc-hait
tuna boat for tho local fisheried project. The
Palan Boat Vard will also be used as a '.aining
ten'er for advanced f raining for boatbuiUlera
from all over the territory.

The derelopment of oooperatiTts and credit
unions "vas immeasurably aidwl during the year
by the sen-ioes of the l>eputy Director of Trade
and Industry, Government of Papua and >f6w
Guinea, who undertook a 6 month assigii:nent
as ooopemtivo officer for the Tru'^ Territory.
During this period he assisted in drafting' Ipjris-
lation governing the establishment and regula-
tion of cooperative association? and crelit
uni < and prepared standard urticlea of in-
oorpor.ition and bylaws forcr« lit unions I.,ast
month a i^ermanent cooperative officer ■w;v,s ap-
pointed to my stiff. Additionally, a cocpera-
tiva officer n-aa stationed in the Pa!a: rtistrict,
and a c^^perdtive officer for Ponapo District
has just bem appointed. Recruiting for a co-
operative officer for ln:k cnrrontly is under-
way. Thu3 we are strengthening tho services
provided local cooperatives and credit unions.

Tl>e Toun.-il will recall that ot the 30th ses-
sion I dpscriSed the Economic Development
Loan Fund .\hirh had becji created to stimu-
late the develoinicnt of local business enter-
prisea Tills fund now has assets cf $OC'1,000,
and another S100,'XK1 increment will be placed
in it after July 1, IPW. Additirinally, in the
Chartered TVading Comptiny Ixian Fui-d there
it anme $^70,(XX). If prtsent legislation now

pending in t]ie U.3. fenata it approved, v«
i-ropo'e to plarn the C'lnrterwl Trading Cora-
'pany I-oan Fund in tho general F.c'i'jmio
Development Find, Tliis will give ua a Tory
rtepctablo sum for developmea.t loaoa and for
loan guaranty |<urpoe(9.

Tliu l>onomJc Development Loan Commit-
tee, which has two Slicronesian members, vru
very activn during V^ f.eriod imdcr reWe.w
SiJiall-scala loans wer» made to such business
entities, as the Microncsian Product* Center to
set up a revolving fund ior purchaae of handi-'
craft; to t: Palau Handicraft and U'ood-
workers Guiiu to expacd operations t enable
the guild to ruako furniture ■ r the accelent«<l
elementary education echool program; to the
Mefalanim Housing Corporation, Ponape, to
expand operations and purchaae materials for
construction of low-cost cooperative housing;
and (o the Rota Shipping and Basinees Corpo-
i&tion to buy .\ motor vessel for transportation
of fresh produce, meat, fish, and i..asscngers
between Rota and Guam. Other loans financed
a small-Stale local fishing operation in Saip&n;
thi< expansion of a local sawmill in Beta; the
establishment of a radio repair ahop; and the
establishment of a repair shop for electrical ap-
pliances. Additionally, tho F^oonomio Develco-
ment Loan Fund guaranteed aoms 8101,000 of
loons with commercial banks. Theeo guaran-
ties included ft loan to the Kvajalein Import-
ing and Exporting Company, Majnro, to in-
cr""« working' capital; a loan to a leading
businearoian in Saipan to •• astruct a super-
market: n loan guaranty to enable a Saipar- e
businesswoman to pun-haso and install machin-
ery ani' equipment to process cnss.iva root for
Ttianufa.-lyre of starch ; and a loan for the estab-
U<;hmejit of a motel in connectiou with the
tourist trade in Saipan

S' -cial emphasis during the year was placed
on using local contractors whertver possitle
in the accelerated element&ry school construc-
tion prxigram. Thus, for example, tho Palau
Handicraft and Woodworkers Guild was
awarded coitrscts touling Jl-'JS.OOO for manu-
facturing elementary school furniture for the
new elementary school classroc:..s now being
built. The Metalanun Housing Corporation
was granted a contract to construct ID new ele-

1012

DSPABTJIENT car (TATE DXTLLmH

inwiUry schools on the Ulnid of Ponap*, and
uie MicroncKaa Construction CompaJiy of Su-
pan rootjved a 9142,000 oontraot fcr maivjfac-
tarc of school fumuore. In addition, over 20
BJiail coutract*^? rarious type* wer* anardrd
to r&riotu indiridual.< throughout the Trust
Territorj. Further, aidiuugh the contract for
a second i-icrcinenl of 90 additlar.nl tt«cher
hoojm teas avardtvd to a comSinr of outdide
cortractora, in vrtain a'pas snih as Ponape'thJa
!;nn uuboootmctM with tl>e Motalaninj housing
Corpomtion for ouristructioo of teachpr bouses
OQ the isiand of Kusaie.

Toarian in the territory, «It>.ou(rh atill of
small magnitude, was given impetia in tho
Mahanu District and Palau District. In the
Marianas a private motel is ber ./ built and sev-
eral local groups havp plajis for developing
tounsttype hoteis; in Palnu the Palau Travel
Bureaa whs formed and sponsored a special
"tour package" of Palau during the annual
Palau Fair held earlier this month.

The headquarters agricultun- staif was
etreugthened by the addition of an assistant
director of agriculture charged with primary
rfsponsibiliiy for o^icultiire extension work
and pi^pa ration of eiten.'sion literature; the ap-
pointment of a Jlicronaeian assistant staff en-
tomologist; the appointment of a (ilant patholo-
gist; and the i xruitment of a rice twhnician
to be in charge of a pilot rice project in Pone[>e.
The posii ion .if staff forester also was approved
but 'lad rot been Tilled at the end of the year.

The pcpppr exjiorinicnfatii-iri in Por.ape now
AS reached a point where a pilot Project in
pepi^itr dnelopmvnl by I'xai formers is war-
ranted. Accordingly a project has b<>en set up
under which 40i') local firmers w'l' t<e P'.ibsi-
dirwl in the planting'^f pepper gnrdtna over the
next 4 years. .\bo;it 50pepi*rganlansaronow
being cstablishod.

The rice development project at M Jtalanim,
Ponspe. is well underway Facilities for mill-
ing rice and equipment have been assembled,
and a hoe technician will be reporting this next
month to supervise this pilot project The Poi.-
apean farmer* involved in this project already
hsve cleared somo 20 acres of rice paddy land
in anticipation of the rics tech-iician's arrival.

In Truk a coir fiber development project his

received all it.s nutchinery and >• iji the prooesa
of detenmiiing maiiiiium production tech-
niques and ojicratior. of machinery, training
personnel, dekjiiuning production ousts, han-
dlmg, sorting, uid grading and baling of fiber.
The visiting mission will recall tliat in its u.-
•paction of the coir fiber project oertaio o.' the
mathinerv had not yet arrived. X am please^! to
report tliat the project now i« in operation.

A plant patholog}' division baa been set up
at Ponapw to combat the 8i.r»«d iif the en-
CBO canJier disease which developed in the past
S years. Modern laboratcry facilities liave been
provided, and ihe plant patho!ogi.l will visit
specialiicd cacao centers in Central Amencs
this summer to study disease prevention narrh-
oda. •':. Ponapo and Truk Districts, the spread
of the ca-ao canker disease has been checked
througli strict surveillance of all cacao plant-
ings and the pruning and burning of diseased
trees. An intensive education program in iha
use of proper sanitary practi.'c^ in pruning ca-
cao J bem)? carried out by agricuJtunil exten-
sion agents in our cacao-producing areas.

Xew plantings of cacao were made during the
year in Trjk, Ponape, Kusaie, and Palau, and
cncao subsidy payments continued as moio
plantings came into bearing. Export of cacao
is still t-mall sincf many beans are still osci /or
seedlings. Ho-vevcr. during the year some IP
:?n8 of cacS'i wa^ exported — a Email quantity
but double the amount exporfxl last year.
Trust TeiTitory beans have consist-^ntly sold at
premium prices — that is, 3 to 4 cents above the
worM market pric«(.

Tlio imp'rovtmeiil of cncontit groves continned
as an integral phase of the overall agriciUttual
de'^lopment program. Ne^ plantings and
thinning operations continued with»ome200,CiOO
selected coconut seedlings being planted bj
growers throughout the territory.

In Palau the ramie project attained its goal
of having Cu acres under cultivation. Under
the pilot project, machinery, fertilizer, plows,
and insecticides have been delivered to the
growers particijiating ia this pilot projocL

The success of tho fruitfly cradicatio.i pro-
gram at Itota, tinder the sterile-ij^' t«chniqu«
used by the rnite<l States Department of Ag-
ricnltore, brought ".bout the decision to continue

ixsnz :9, itc«

1013

th« pmp-tDi /or Saipui and Tioian, and ft sim-
ilar eradic.ition program h« been iMliiched. It
i* hoped that bcii. the rtiflun flj fcid ■ enttl
fruidy wili slionly lx> eliminated from th«
aorthem ^lariona Islaiids.

llio Murianu District nas established »8 tlia
livestock cfnter for (lie Trust Territ- ry, and
iniriductions ol Santa GcrtruJis an,l Aaijus
brcixliDjn bulli and hoi/ers trcm (ht United
States we"^ made. Pasfuro and fonwre im-
proMmcnt was a major ncrompliEhmcnt.
Through improved majinpvraent, the govcm-
a\6D! cattle herd of the Man nas Dislria, ii\-
creaifd its calf production from IC percent to
7i percent duroig the jear. T!.e diEtributioi.
of high-<]ualitv stock of poultrv and hogs also
continued.

In alJ districts i.ew or improved apricullural
stations were ir.der construction, and new farm
eqoiprneiit wns i^.-quired for nl' tations.

The Trust lerntof. Farm InM:tutc pradu-
ated lU .ret cln^5 of 16 traintcs in August 1P63,
and a ircoDd rlas^of 26 ".>es began cln&ses in
MatTih il. .1. Four Mioroncsian a^icaltural
workers ^ere selected to participate in a 4-
m'^nth practiLal island honiculture course in
Hawaii and Samoa. Preliminarj' plans were
carried ou! ii; collaboration with the Institute
of Technical Inlerchatijrc, Easl-Woit Center,
to hol.l u coconut seminar in July 1964 at
Metalanim. Ponspe, with 30 Micronesian coco-
nut ptowers and agriculturiils participatirg.
Specialist" -n coconut pnnluction from all over
the Pucific area will joint this seminar us re-
Miirce ?t itf

T' .1 more younsr Micronesians tliin> summer
will receive the b.S. Jegrve in tropical apri-
1 ult'jre and will !« joinirr disricl apriculiure
staffs Additionally, thi? year IJ ogricullurul
scholarships wi'i c again offered.

ruMIc Hiank

We are moving ihead rapidi_v in the improve-
ment of out public liealih pr^rom. Thrcuph
our incrvased nppropriation-s we > re able to
raiie the piibli..--lieallh operational bud^-et from
f 601,270 in fi«cal jt-ar 10C2 to?9i3fi26 in fiscal
year 19fK-, and for the current year 19C4 to
$l,a:\0(,'> For the coming fiscal year, which
will start this July, $2,12o,00'.i lias been budgeted

for the me>li 'nl ^rvioe ajad publio-hetlth pro-
grtn\. In ahcit, in hiea than 2 jeara* time, th»
publi -healih and medical Krrice budget liM
more than tripled. Additionally, under the
construction protprara, two new hoapitals were
built, one iu Puluu and the other in the Mai^
shalb, and • f»mplel« new h'ipital plant fct
Truk is fmded for this cominp year. A o«w
huepitil plant in the MMnanas District also «aa
complf ted a year and a half ago.

Purinjf the past 10 months a nitniber of major
programs in public health either were com-
pleted or were well underway.

Six medical doctors were appointed as clini-
cal consultants and practiiiontra, (ms in each
of the district hosoii^ls. Five of thtfn il D.'e
arc on duty, an'l we anticipate (hot the ■ izth
will ha reporting within the next month. At
II'' headquarters D new director of medical serv-
ices a.id an assistant director if medical serviera
were appointed, as well m a iliief of public
health, thus vaatly strengthening our medical
staff at li'.a territoria> level. I atu veiy pi^ xaui
to report that the new chief of public health
is a Uirronesian.

$110,tO0 was expended lliis past year to
launch a territory-wide immunization program,
and the first pliaae is approximately two-third*
toniplete. An additional $100,00'' to continue
I- ■ immunization program is included in the
forthcoming medical serviots budget. The im-
munization progTan\ will provide complete
cover.jre f"r every Microncsiau for po'o, tmall-
poi, dipiithcria, w'.iooping cough, tetanu.*, ty-
pho'd, pa-ntyphoia. and BCXt for increasir.<r
resistance to tuberculosis infection. By the end
of June, .(ome C'.,00o of our 65,000 populfttion
will havoreccl^ed thisiinmunilation protection.

An active TB control program continues.
An event of note was the e.-lablialiment during
the year of a tun ir registry for the territory.

Tlie polio rehabiliintion program in the Mar-
fhilla Di tjici continued witli the polio rehab'.ij-
tolion center ne.iring completion. Two U5.
physical therapists were nppoir.ted the center
and were carrying out a apcial therapy pro-
gram for (ha stricken children for most of the
yt.\T. If is our proi>osal to use the new re-
habilitation center not only for the polio pa-
tient.' hut also a.s a center for orthopedic work
for the entire terruoiy.

1014

vrrmmtrsr of etati otnxrm

Training for Microne&ian medical and para-
medical staff was greatly increased. Through
a joint progro n with the East- West Center in
Hawaii, a postgraduate refresher program for
mediciii officers ard nurses was laiinchwi. TJie
initial proup of medical officers and nurses com-
pleted th(« first course in April, and a second
course is in prugresa. This pmgmm Will con-
tinue until all of the Micronesian medical oS-
cers and nurs< h hsve an opportunity to receive
refio-her and p-jst^raduate training in hospi-
tals and clinics in Hawaii. A field trammir
center for Trust Territory s-initarians and com-
niuii'ty development lenders is schedule-? to be
held in Truk tl.u Juno ui'der joint East-We^t
Center and Trust Territory auspices, and it is
expected that some 40 ttafl members will par-
ticipate. Oiher inservice training programs
which are being worked out ^-ith East-West
Center oiEcials are a specialized traini:-; course
for nurse-dietitians, a specialized traimnp
course for laboratory technicians, and a re-
freshej ourse for local hospital adraimsC'ators.

Varimis public-health st.iff members attended
medioil or health conferences abroad djring
the year. The temtory's nurse supervisor and
head nurse of the Smpan Hospital tended a
nursing scliool conference in Fiji; a dietitian
attended a nutrition seminar sponsored by the
World Health Orga (illation in Manila; the chief
of public health attended a World Health Orga-
nization conference on health reporting in
Manilu ; and the assistant directoj' of medical
sen-ices is s< lieduled -o attend a World Health
Organization conference in June in ^'anila en
national health plunnin^i Every opportunity
is given for local staff members to broaden their
perspectives and contorts through att.ndance
at international conferences. A Saipanese
medicil officer early this month received a di-
plom.i cf >r P.H. from the School of Pul lie
Health, Tniversity of the Philippines, under
the auspices of a World Health Organization
feliowsliip. H} is ihe second Micronesian
medical officer to suc-esbfully complt.*' griuiu-
ate work in public health administration. Ad-
ditionally, » Vapese ni -dical officer was : orai-
nated for a similar World Health Organization
pubbc-health administration scholarship for
this coming year.

The medical scholar program has been greatly

intensified. Twelve special scholarships in pre-
mMical education were awarded this year, tmd
the nominees will join the 10 premedical
scholars now studying in collets in the Philip-
pines, Guam, Hawaii, and 'he United States.
Well over a lOO-peroent increase in medical
tniiiiing funds has been budgeted for this com-
ing year.

A combination medical and field trip ship
is being procured to enable the administr.itiou
to furnish better medical service to the districts
where scntte-ed islands pose a special problem
inr.idicalserv-icing.

A program of 'luilding new field dispensaries,
equipping them, and stocking them with ad- -
quale supplies of drugs is underway. Special
attention vriU be given to this program this
coming year with refreslier training for health
aides being an imponaut phase of this program.

During the year the territory again experi-
enced several outbreaks of influenza. Small-
scale infiuenza epidemics !ippear ahnost every
spri.ig and fall in the territory in snitc of all
precautions which we can take. For example,
last month a gastroenteritis-type influenza broke
out in Truk and the Marslialls. The outbreak
could be described as o summer flu with a ."i-day
duration period, but due to the patterns of so-
cial living of the Micronesians as well as certain
unusual features, sucii a-S a prolonged dmught
in Truk, the spre-id w.i3 unu.suaily rapid.
Prompt omergejicy aid in the fonn of additional
doctors, nurses, and drugs was extended to
Truk. Quarantine pro<'edures were instituted
to prevent spread to otiier district.s. The qiwr-
antine did enable us to prevent the spread ti> the
neighboring island of Ponapo, and a. U.S. Pub-
lic Hcaltli team was flowti to tlis tcrritor,-
during the outbreak to analyze the type of in-
fluenza. Preliniinary reports indicate t!)'* 'he
influenza was not of an tmusual variety but
was imiquc mainly in iu rapid spread and
number of cases.

Tram porta tlon

Of major Bignifioance in transportation were
the continued efforts toward construction cf
airfields in the Palau and Ponape Distriots.
These two areas are new sened primarily by
amphibinus-type aircraft witli very Jiinit«J

JUNE 2S, 1S04

1U15

cArpi luid pusMt^r ciptcilT. At (he visitiiig
rnkSiiion caw in I'&Uu rarUer this 7e«r, tcork is
proRrte^iDg on the 4,S0O-fixjt Airni kirtield on
Btttvliluap IsUnd »nd U now nearing conjil^-
fon. Tbis part}cu'.ar coiisfniclion projfct i«
of print importune* »» it wit) preatlv &id derel-
opniont of the Taisu District. Thnuch the
r>C— I ammft doe? call at Angua." i Jiand pe-
riod. -Ily, I. J-hour boat trip la require^, to
teach the dialrict center in Xorcr. Upon ocai-
plMion of tha A. mi facility, a 20-rainut« auto-
tnobiie and ferry trip will put all tr«reler» in
the distinct center.

Tho opetong of th» Airai airfield will also
stimalat* the tourist potential of Palau District.
Tourist accommrxlations and air traniporta.tion
limitations now place a ce-.Ung on the number
of tourists which c^n effeaive^v be bandied.
Loral eDtrppreneurs are beginning to move into
fin»ll.s.-ftle hotel operation in Kotor. but trans-
portation Itill renains the main Lvoftleneck.

In coDJun.-tion with the Airai development,
Uie impn/ved road network on Babelthojp has
brougl.t (rr^iter numbers of travelers from
Korr ID Hnbelthuap. With the opening of
regular ferry servi(^ just 3 weeks ago, a steady
stream of je>ps, automobiles, truck?, and motor-
i-ydee .:jli be sfen monng from Koror to Bibd-
thuap Fund."! have been allocated to I'egm the
complete rehabilitation of tiie road fyrtcm on
i^is island — the larcest in the territory. Fur-
tlier fiindinp and udditional new construction
♦ouipineiii "I! be cr.ade avulabk in the fisc&l
y«.aT bec'nninif July 1 . District rept sentatire*
are hichly optiinist:c in how this project will
affect ihf development 'if Babelthnap'3 possi-
bilities.

Upor. completion of the Palan airfield, atten-
tirn will then l)e sliifted to Ponape, which will
be the or.ly district not served by multiengine
land t>as(xl aircraft. Site selections at Ponape
hare been cnder review, and it is expected work
vrill bepin in 1963.

Improvements to other airfields hare been
complet'd in the past few months. Of particu-
lar importance &re new aviation fueling facili-
ties recently completed at Yap, Tmk, and
Ponape.

Air transportation requirements in the Trust
Temtory are growing constantly, particularly

in tbeGoam-Saipan link. Kear-capacit j spacA
requirements are being reported on practically
all f1i);ht3. An ercrincrtaaing flo' of riiitora
from Guam is bcii.g met by Saipfin businer^-
men with projected hotels and other scivc*
facilities to cater to tiie Tiaitcrs. The visitors
repre<i«nt a deluut4 sooroe of economic growth
for Saipan businessmen.

Reocnt derelopraents in ortnn transportstton
hare seen deeigi. and const ruction estimalea as-
cured from shipyards for A combination admin-
lit ration-medical vessel This proposed ahip ol.
some 100 feet will serve as on administratlvt
tield service vewcl for operation in the farfloiaf
Marshall Islands Dist rict. Estimates have been
wcurcd for a C.'>-foot vessel to meet tlie admin-
istrative requirements in the large Truk lagoon
nrea. Requests .'or estimates ha\-e also been
filed for 29 to SO- foot dJeeel powered vessels
; hat will be capable of meeting emergency needs
in outlying islands. The boats are to be de-
signed so as to permit use in open seas in relative
safety. Upon consideration of the variotis ship-
yard proposals, contract* will be awarded for
the constmrtion of these vessel .

IntWrnaUen and Radto

Radio broadcast •■■ jlities in the Trust Terri-
tory will sec the addition of a district station
in Ponnpo l>efore the end of the year, with other
new stations completed in Yap and Saipan by
October of this ye*r.

Three stations aro now broadcasting daily Id
the Trust Territory. They are in PaJau. th^
Xfarslmll?, and Tnik. All three of these sta-
tions arc in the prooees of being modemited.
Radio broadcast facilities have Rgnred prorai-
nemly in the education progniD in the territory
a.1 well es being a necessary tool in the adminis •
trat'^n of the territory. Hialth and sanitation
officials at both headquarters and dis'rict levfi
are making greater usi of brciidcast facilitiea to
provide a personto-person contact not other- .
wise possible in day-to-day activities.

The beadq-aartcn tape dnplicatica facility in
serving a greater role in the operation of exist-
ing stations by providing program material
from a wide \-ariety of sources as well as a source .
of ni ws for rebruadcast.

Ten Micranenans will enter broadcast timiu-

1019

DCFABTUEN'T OT STAim BCUXml

ing next month at tlie East-West Center in
Hawaii. These men will be provitUnl 1.1 weelcs
of instruction in script preparation and broad-
cast tecliniques so tliat greater use of locally
produced programs can be used to meet tiio
needs of the individual stations. This is a spe-
cial training project designed specifically for
Pacific area countries.

Three other Micronesians are currently re-
ceiving broadcast training through facilities in
Washington, D.C. These trainees are receiving
advanced instruction which will require 8
months. Upon their return to their respective
districts, they will take up responsible admin-
istrative positions in their district stations.

Accelerated programs in all areas of the Trust
Territory brought about the need for additional
information personnel at the headquarters level.
To this end, an American information officer has
been appointed and is providing inservice train-
ing and guidance to our Micronesian hiforma-
tion office i-s.

An informal information training course is
to be held this summer with two participants
from each district in an effort to establish a
working corps of Micronesian reporters. Upon
successful completion of this program, a more
thorough reporting of interdistrict activities
will be enjoyed.

Public Works

Construction activities in the Trust Territory
public works department continue to gain mo-
mentum with some $12 million budgeted during
the past 2 years for construction. In addition
to the accelerated elementary school construc-
tion program classrooms and teacher housing
throughout the territory, the public works de-
partment is directly involved in the Bal>elthuap
airfield construction in the Palau District and
tlie construction of five buildings in Saipan
being financed through Office of Emergency
Plamiing fimds as replacement for buildings
lost during the disastrous typhoon Olive of
April 1963.

Upon completion of the Office of Emergency
Planning projects on Saipan, there will have
been constructed a 60- by 200-foot transship-
ment warehouse, a two-story, 12-unit apartment
building, a 200- by 300- foot central supply ware-

JTJNE 29, 1964

house building, a 50- by 262-foot central repair
sliop building, a major repair of the Saipan pier.
In all, some $2,211,000 is being expended in a
rehabilitation program in conjunction with the
Ollico of Emergency Planning in Saipan and
Tinian.

Projects currently in the engineering and es-
timating section of public works include work
on the Palau, Yap, Ebeye, Afajuro, and Truk
water systems. The water col lect ion and sewage
distribution sy.stems of these areas all are slated
for major rehabilitation and/or installation of
new systems.

A program of replacement of heavy equip-
ment has been instituted which has seen the pur-
cha.se of 34 new units ranging from dump
trucks to large earthmoving equipment for air-
field construction work. This includes five
hea\7-duty earthmoving tractors delivered and
five more on order for early delivery.

Road improvement has been continued in all
districts through a grant-in-aid approach as
well as direct construction work by the admin-
istration.

Land Claims

The perple.xing problem of settlement for the
use and occupancy of certain lands on Kwaja-
lein, Ebeye, and other islands in the Kwajalein
and Majuro atolls of the Marshall Islands Dis-
trict was brought at last to a successful conclu-
sion on February 11 and 12, 1964, when agree-
ments were signed by landowners granting to
the Trust Territorj' government certain use
rights. One thousand dollars per acre was
agreed upon as compensation for past and
future use of the lands involved. The agree-
ments culminate several j^ears' negotiation by
the Trust Territory government to settle by
mutual agreement this longstanding land dis-
pute.

Status of Displaced Rongelapese

Again, as in former years, a medical sur-
vey was conducted in March by a joint AEC-
Trust Territory medical team, and the visiting
mission had an opportunity to meet with repre-
.sentatives of that team when it visited the is-
land of Rongelap. Reports by the A EC medi-

1017

cal officials again found the general health of the
Eongelapese to be satisfactory.

Last year the Council will recall that I re-
ported on a bill which will compensate the peo-
ple of Eongelap and which was passed by the
U.S. House of Eepresentatives and forwarded
to the Senate Interior Committee. This com-
mittee has held hearings on this legislation, and
last week staff members of the Senate committee
have discussed provisions of the bill with Mar-
shallese representatives of the Eongelap com-
munity. I am hopeful that final action will be
taken before the end of the present session of
Congress.

Plans for Rehabilitation of Ebeye

The visiting mission, I am certain, noted
housing, sanitation, and other conditions on the
island of Ebeye. Conditions there sorely need
improvement. That community has grown
without any advance planning or provision for
essential public utilities. Overcrowding is seri-
ous, as are other problems that go with such an
overexpanded island community. Conditions
are such that cleanup measures, which are regu-
larly imdertaken, can only be palliative and do
not get at the core of the essential problem. It
is a situation about which I have been particu-
larly concerned and one in which officials in
Washington also have been deeply interested.
The result has been a thorough analysis of the
particular needs of Ebeye. The Trust Territory
government is working with interested U.S.
Government departments to develop a major
program for the thorough upgrading of all
housing, water, power, and sewage facilities on
Ebeye Island. Conferences on this program
recently have been held in Washington, D.C.,
Kwajalein, and Honolulu. Eehabilitation work
will begin at once as soon as final agreement is
reached by the cooperating agencies. I have
high hopes that I shall be able to report next
year to the Council that a complete transforma-
tion is taking place on Ebeye.

I am most grateful to have this opportunity
to present this brief summary report, and I
shall, of course, attempt to provide any addi-
tional information that the members of the
Council may desire to supplement our annual
report or (o comment on questions raised in the
report of the 1964 visiting mission.

STATEMENT BY MR. REMENGESAU

U.S./U.N. press release 4404

It is indeed a great pleasure to be present
before this Council and to have the opportunity
to extend to all the honorable members greet-
ings from the people of the vastly scattered but
beautiful islands called Micronesia.

I am proud and honored to be the bearer of
the Micronesians' greetings to you and to ob-
serve at first hand the Trusteeship Council and
the Administering Authority in the process of
reviewing our current problems as well as the
progi'ess made during the year under review.
It is a privilege to be an eyewitness to the de-
liberations of a body which is attempting to
aid the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
achieve a harmonious, happy, and enriched life
based on equality, justice, and peace with the
rest of the world. The people of Micronesia
wish to reiterate their faith in the United Na-
tions— for what it has achieved and for what
it is endeavoring to attain and maintain for all
men and nations, gi'eat or small, independent or
dependent.

Equally, we have confidence in our Adminis-
tering Authority, and I am pleased to inform
the Comicil that, while there is still much to be
done in our territory, we have benefited by the
achievements of the Administering Authority
in all jihases of territorial developments. The
visiting mission, which has just returned from
a visit to our territory, will, I am sure, attest to
my saying that Micronesia in the past few years
has made great strides forward in the political,
social, educational, and economic fields.

This does not imply that the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands is making progress with-
out problems or difficulties. On the contrary,
each step we take forward means new problems
in planning and preparing for the next ad-
vanced step. But having problems in advanc- J
ing step by step, I believe, is not uncommon in i
the development of new countries of the world.

The significant fact is that, with the guidance
and support of the Administering Authority
under the watchful eyes of the Trusteeship
Council, and with the acceptance and determi-
nation of the people of Micronesia, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands has made con-
siderable advancement in all fields during the

1018

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

past few years. Altliough tlie rate of speed
may vary from one field of dcvelopiiieiit to the
otiier, real achievement is there to be seen.

The dilTerences in the rates of speed in cer-
tain fields of development may be explained by
priorities placed on various development pro-
grams. These priorities have been necessitated
by budgetary conditions in the past as well as
the physical resources of the territory. The
people of Micronesia well appreciate the dif-
ficulties faced by the Administering Authority
in its endenvor to promote political, social, edu-
cational, and economic conditions in the ter-
ritory in a manner to enable us to become a
self-governing people.

We are happy and grateful for the present
accelerated elementary school construction pro-
gram and for the recruitment of the hundreds
of American schoolteachers which is well under-
way. This is one of the great steps forward.
With Americans teaching at the elementary
schools, our Micronesian teachers will now be
able to acquire modern teaching methods by
taking advanced training in the territory or
abroad. The teaching of the English language,
from the first grade on, will give our children
better tools to use in the preparation of their
respective fields of endeavors. In addition, the
knowledge of and the use of English by Micro-
nesians as a common tool of communication
throughout the territorj' will bring about under-
standing and trust among all Micronesians who
now speak many languages. A common lan-
guage will solidify the unity of Micronesia and
■will help to insure the harmonious continuity
of whatever political status the Micronesians
choose for the future.

It is gratifj'ing to note that the Administer-
ing Authority is presently planning, as the next
accelerated program, the improvement of
public-health facilities and services in the terri-
torj'. The public-health and medical service
program, as with education, is dear to the hearts
of Micronesians. We realize that health is as
important as education for individuals, for
members of their families as well as for the
entire community.

'\^niile budgetary considerations and other
factors in the territory may necessitate empha-
sizing certain aspects of development programs
at dillerent times, I feel that education, eco-

nomic, and political gi-owth should have the
same priority and should move forward to-
gether. One cannot be placed above the other,
for all must be integrated together. We trust
tliat the Ailministering Authority is cognizant
of these needs and that consideration is being
given to accelerate the economic infrastructure.
AVe hope that the number of experts to do
needed research on economic potentialities will
be increased and that more technicians will be
provided to give teclmical advice and assistance.
The problem of how to bring in controlled out-
side capital investment to develop potential
industries which are beyond the capital ability
and know-how of the Micronesians should also
bo given serious consideration.

On the political front, we have certain mis-
givings on the type of thinking which stresses
that the political gi'owth of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands must be pushed as speed-
ily as possible irrespective of other factors.
There are those who overemphasize this aspect
of speed of political development of our islands.
As a Micronesian, I would like to achieve the
goal of self-government as quickly as possible.
Simultaneously, I believe that the political sta-
tus we acquire must be the expressed will of the
people as a result of a politically informed so-
ciety and one that is consistent with our max-
imum potential resources and capacities. In
one of our small islands we have a saying which
can be translated in several ways. One trans-
lation says: "You cannot hasten the ripening
of a papaya fruit." Or you can say: "You
cannot slow down the processes of the ripening
of a papaya." Still another meaning is: "It is
like the papaya fruit — when it is ripe, it will
show on the surface." So it might be said of
our political growth today. In one sense you
cannot hasten it ; in another, you cannot slow
it down; and in the last analysis, when the peo-
ple are ready for self-government, they will
sliow it and demand it.

While speed of action may seem to some to
be the important phase of political development
at the present time, most of us feel that the
present design of political growth through an
evolutionary process, as expressed by the peo-
ple themselves, is the most significant aspect.

The establishment of a tenitorial legislature
must be the next step in our political growth.

JUNi: 29, 1904

1019

The architectural framework of a proposed ter-
ritorial legislature or territorial congress was
begun 2 years ago by the present Council of
Micronesia, and soon we hope that we will see
the birth of this new and important body. It
is this new territorial legislature which will
shape the destiny of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands.

This present session of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil will be followed with much interest and
concern by the people of Micronesia. The
sixth visiting mission has just returned from the
territory and has presented its findings and
recommendations to the Council. Thus the
Council has before it firsthand information on
achievements as well as the current problems
of the territory. We, the Micronesians, sin-
cerely trust that this session will result in fur-
ther assistance and guidance, wliich will enable
us to continue our progressive development in
all areas.

Executive Committee of the Higli Commissioner's
Programme :
Progress Report on UNHCR Major Aid Programmes
(1955-1963) as at 31 December 1963. A/AC.96/
228. Marcli 25, 1964. 92 pp.
1964 Programme — New Projects : Proposal for As-
sistance to Refugees From Rwanda in the Kivu
Province of the Congo. A/AC.96/236. April 13,
1964. 19 pp.
1964 Programme — New Projects : Proposal for As-
sistance to Refugees From Rwanda in Burundi.
A/AC.96/240. April 2.S, 1964. 44 pp.
Consideration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance With the Charter of the United
Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on meth-
ods of factfinding. A/5694. May 1, 1964. 151 pp.
Draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Mini-
mum Age for Marriage and Registration of Mar-
riages. Memorandum by the Secretary-General.
A/5699. May 8, 1961. 11 pp.
Twenty-second Progress Report of the United Nations
Conciliation Commission for Palestine ( November 1,
1963. to April 30, 1964). A/5700. May 11, 1964.
2 pp.
Note Verbale Dated May 14, 1964, from the Secretary-
General to the Permanent Representatives of Mem-
ber States Regarding the Formation of the United
Republic of Tanganyika. A/5701. May 18, 1964.
2 pp.
Draft International Covenant on Human Rights. Note
bv the Secretary-General. A/5705. May 20, 1964.
21pp.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or procensed documents (such as those
listed beloiv) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.T.

General Assembly

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Report of the Scientific Group Established, at the
Request of the Government of India, To Visit the
Rocket Launching Site at Thumba. A/AC.105/17.
February 20, 1964. 51 pp.
Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of
Its Third Ses.slon (March 9-26, 1964) to the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
A/AC.10.5/19. March 26, 1964. 64 pp.
Intprnational Law Commission. Third Report on the
Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldcock, Special
Rapporteur. A/CN.4/167. March 3, 1964. 109 pp.
Special Committee on tlie Situation With Regard to
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples. The Question of Aden. Report by the
Secretary-General. A/AC.109/58. March 17, 1964.
2 pp.
Comments Received from Governments and Interna-
tional Organizations and Institutions Regarding
Technical Assistance To Promote (he Teacliing,
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of
International Law. A/5455/Add. 7. Jlarch 19, 1964.
21 pp.
Question of Southern Rhodesia. Note by the Secre-
tary-General. A/5691. March 20, 1964. 4 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Re-
port of the Committee on Industry and Natural
Resources (16th Session) to the Commission (20th
Session). E/CN.11/652. February 19, 1964. 72 pp.

Proposals for a Priority Programme of Co-ordinated
Action in the Field of Water Resources Within the
Framework of the United Nations Development
Decade. Report and recommendations prepared by
the U.N. Water Resources Development Center.
E/3863. March 10, 1964. 108 pp.

Report of the First Session of the Advisory Committee
on the Application of Science and Technology to
Development to the Economic and Social Coimcil,
February 25-March 6, 1964. E/3866. March 12,
1964, 45 pp. ; Add. 1, May 6. 1964, 63 pp.

Social Commission. Report on the World Social Situ-
ation : Planning for Balanced Social and Economic
Development in India. E/CN.5/346/Add. 12.
March 23, 1964. 48 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the Desirability of
Further Action to Revise or Replace the Convention
on Road Traffic (Geneva, September 19, 1949) and
the Protocol on Road Signs and Signals (Geneva,
September 19, 1949). E/38S3. April 28, 1964. 15 pp.

Assessment of Arrangements for Carrying Out United
Nations Responsibilities in the Field of the Preven-
tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Note
by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/383. April 28,
1964. 28 pp.

Inquiry Among Governments on Problems Resulting
From the Reciprocal Action of Economic Develop-
ment and Population Clianges. Report of the Secre-
tary-General. E/3895. May 18, 1964. 89 pp.

International Co-operation in Cartography : United
Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Af-
rica. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3906.
May 29, 1964. 4 pp.

1020

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of eclucationiU, .scientific,
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake
Success, November 22, I'JoO. Entered into force
May 21, lt>52.'
Arrcptance deposited: Cameroon, May 15, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April IS, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1!H;4.'

Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic (with reservation and declaration).
May 14, 1964.

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of
the poppy plant, the production of, international and
wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New
York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8,
1963. TIAS 5273.

Notification received that it considers itself hound:
Rwanda, April 30, 1964.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS
4900). Done at London April 11, 1002.=
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, May 22, 1964.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11. 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Kenya, June 2, 1964.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement relating to a military assistance program,
with memorandum of understanding. Effected by
exchange of notes at Buenos Aires May 10, 1964. En-
tered into force May 10, 1964.

Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1962 (TIAS
5125) , for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Washington June 8. 1964. Enters
Into force on the date on which each Government
shall have received from the other written notifica-
tion that it has complied with all statutory and con-
stitutional requirements for entry into force.

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricnltural Trade Development and Assistance

' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.

All .if l!i.-.l, lis amended (6S Stat. 4.''.4 : 7 U.S.C. 1701-
170!i). with ixchange of mites. Signeil at Taiiicl
June 3, 1964. I'^ntered into force June 3, 1964.

Agreement amending the agricultural i-ommoditles
agrtH-ment of August 31, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5151, ,5282). Effected by exchange of notcH at Taipei
June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, ]9(H.

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, ]9.5.'>, as
amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514. 510.5), for coopera-
tion concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed
at Washington June 8. 1964. Enters Into force on
the date on which each Government shall have re-
ceived from the oilier written notillc ntion lliat it has
complied with all statutory and constitutional re-
quirements for entry Into force.

Dominican Republic

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Santo
Domingo Xlarch 8. 1962.

Entered into force: June 10, 1964, upon receipt of
notification of ratification by the Dominican
Republic.

Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 19.55. as
amended (TIAS ;«10, 4837, 52.50. 5251). for coopera-
tion concerning civil u.ses of atomic energy. Signed
at Washington June 8. 1964. Enters into force on the
date on which each Government shall have received
from the other written notification that it has com-
plied with all statutory and constitutional require-
ments for entry into force.

Iceland

Interim agreement revising .schedule I of trade agree-
ment of Augu.st 27. 1943 (57 Stat. 1075). to conform
with Icelandic Tariff Act of 1963 until a revision is
negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. P^ffected by exchange of notes at Reyk-
javik May 29 and June 2, 1964. Entered into force
June 2, 1964.

Iran

Amendment to the agreement of March 5, 1957 (TIAS
4207), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 19(>4. Enters
into force on the date on which each Government
shall have received from the other written notifica-
tion that it has complied with all statutory and
constitutional requirements for entry Into force.

Thailand

Amendment to the agreement of March 13, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3522, 3842, 4.5.3.3. 5122), for coopera-
tion concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed
at Washington June 8. 1964. Enters into force on
the date on which each Government shall have re-
ceived from the other written notification that it has
complied with all statutory and constitutional
requirements for entry Into force.

United Kingdom

Agreement for minimum import prices on cereals,
cereal product.s and by-product.s. Effected by ex-
change of notes at London April 15, 1964. Entered
into force April 15, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Amendment to the agreement of April 22. 1959 (TIAS
4251), for cooperation concerning civil u.ses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 9, 1964.
Enters into force on the date each Government shall
have received from the other written notification
that it. has complied with all statutory and constitu-
tional requirements for entry into force.

JTTNE 29, 1964

1021

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale Vy the Superintendent of Documents, V. 8.
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington, B.C., 20 J,0.^.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments except in the case of free publications, which
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20a20.

Education— Commission for Educational Exchange
and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement
with the Federal Reiiublie of Germany. Signed at
Bonn November 20, 1962. Entered into force Janu-
ary 24, 1964. TIAS 5518. 11 PP. 10^.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Philip-
pines Exchange of notes— Signed at Washington
February 24, 1964. Entered into force February 24,
1964. With exchange of letters. TIAS 5519. 10 pp.
10^.

Technical Cooperation— Special Technical Services.
Agreement with Brazil, extending the agreement of
May 30 1953, as extended. Exchange of notes— Signed
at Rio de Janeiro December 27 and 30, 1963. Entered
into force December 31, 1963. TIAS 5520. 2 pp. 5<f.
Technical Cooperation— Agriculture and Natural Re-
sources. Agreement with Brazil, extending the agree-
ment of June 26, 1953, as amended and extended. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro December 27
and 30, 1963. Entered into force December 31, 1963.
TIAS 5521. 3 pp. 5«!.

Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement
with the Inter-American Development Bank. Signed
at Washington February 17, 1964. Entered Into force
February 17, 1964. TIAS 5.522. 2 pp. 5<t.
Financing of Assistance Under Alliance for Progress.
Agreement with the Pan American Union, modifying
and supplementing the agreement of November 29, 1961.
Signed at Washington February 17, 1064. Entered into
force February 17, 1964. TIAS 5523. 3 pp. 5<f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan,
amending the agreement of October 14, 1961, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi
Februarv 10, 1964. Entered into force February 10,
1964. TIAS 5524. 3 pp. 5(f.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland.
Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into
force February 13, 1964. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5525. 9 pp. 10(}.

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik Febru-
ary 13, 1964. Entered into force February 13, 1964.
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5526. 7 pp. 10<f.

Trade — Beef, Veal, and Mutton. Agreement with
Australia. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
February 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17,
1964. With Australian letter. TIAS 5527. 5 pp. 5^.

Trade — Beef and Veal. Agreement with Ireland. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington February 2.5,
1904. Entered into force February 25, 1064. With
Irish letter. TIAS 5528. 5 pp. 5^.

Trade — Beef and Veal. Agreement with New Zealand.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington Febru-

ary 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17, 1964.
With New Zealand letter. TIAS 5529. 5 pp. 5<f.
Defense— Furnishing of Equipment, Materials, and
Services. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo.
Exchange of notes — Signed at L^opoldville June 24 and
July 19, 1963. Entered into force July 19, 1963. TIAS
5530. 4 pp. 5^.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement
of March 27, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Bogotil October 11 and 25, 1963. Entered into force
October 25, 1963. TIAS 5531. 3 pp. 5(f.

Defense — Road Construction and Maintenance Capa-
bility of Paraguayan Army. Agreement with Para-
guay. Exchange of notes — Signed at Asuncion
February 10, 1964. Entered into force February 10,
1964. TIAS 5532. 4 pp. 5t}.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Spain. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Madrid January 29, 1964. En-
tered into force January 29, 1964. TIAS 5533. 10 pp.

10(f.

Defense — Military Assistance. Understanding with
Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeira
Januarv 30, 1964. Entered into force January 30, 1964.
TIAS 5534. 4 pp. 5«f.

Settlement for Logistical Support to Certain Armed
Forces for United Nations Operations in Korea.

Agreement with Australia (in its own behalf and in
behalf of New Zealand and the United Kingdom). Ex-
change of letters — Signed at Washington February 5,
1964. Entered into force February 5, 1964. TIAS
5538. 2 pp. 5(t.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the OiBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Release issued prior to June 8 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 268 of June 5.

No. Date Subject

•272 6/8 U.S. participation in international

conferences.
273 6/8 MeClellan appointed member of Ad-
visory Committee on Interna-
tional Business Problems (re-
write).

*274 6/9 Witman sworn in as Ambassador to
Togo (biographic details).

*275 6/9 Harriman : General Federation of
Women's Clubs, Atlantic City,
N.J. (excerpts).

•276 6/9 Cultural exchange (Africa).

•277 6/10 FSI senior seminar commencement

•278 6/10 Blair sworn in as Ambassador to
the Philippines (biographic de-
tails).

•279 6/10 Chayes resignation : exchange of
letters with President Johnson.

•2S0 6/11 Annual honor awards ceremony.
281 6/11 U.S.-Israel communique on water
desalting program (revised June
22).

t282 6/13 Rusk : commencement exercises at
Williams College.

•Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

1022

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUULETUr

INDEX June 29, 196^ Vol Z, No. 1305

American Republics. The Deiiioiratlc Ideal in
Hiir ri)llc.v Toward Latin America (XIanu) . . 093

Atomic Energy

Building n Great World Society (Jobnson) . . 000

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes

at Geneva (Foster) jqq^

Cambodia. Security Council Team To Examine
Cambodia-Viet-Xam Border Areas (Steven-
son, text of resolution) IOqo

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy jqqj

Disarmament

ISXation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes

at Geneva (Foster) jqq^

President Calls for Redoubled Efforts To Halt
^'■■"« K'i<^e 1005

Economic Affairs

Building a Great World Society (Johnson) . . 990

Harold C. McClellan Named to Business Ad-
visory Committee 1000

Germany

U.S. and Germany ReaflSrm Agreement on East-
West Problems (text of joint communique) . 992

U.S. Position on Soviet Treaty With East

Germany 003

International Law. U.S. Welcomes Jurists' Find-
ings on Events in Panama lOOO

International Organizations and Conferences

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes
at Geneva (Foster) IO04

President Calls for Redoubled Efforts To Halt
Arms Race lOog

Israel. U.S.-Israeli Team To Conduct Surve.vs
for Desalting Program (text of joint com-
munique) 1001

Laos. U.S. Reconnaissance Flights Over Laos . 094
Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Trust
Territory of the PncKlc Islands (Coding,

Ueniengesau) 1007

Panama. U.S. Welcomes Jurists' Findings on

Events In Panama jooo

Presidential Documents. President Calls for
Redouliled ElTorts To Halt Arms Race . . . 1005

Publications. Recent Releases 1022

Science. U.S.-Israell Team To Conduct Surveys
for Desalting Program (text of Joint com-
munique) 1001

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 1021
U.S.S.R. U.S. Position on Soviet Treaty With

East Germany 993

United Nations

Building a Great World Society (Johnson) . . 090

Current U.X. Documents 1020

Security Council Team To Examine Cambodia-
Viet-Xam Border Areas (Stevenson, text of

resolution) 1002

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Cod-
ing, Remengesau) 1007

Viet-Nam. Security Council Team To Examine
Cambodia-Viet-Xam Border Areas (Steven-
son, text of resolution) 1002

Name Index

Erhard, Ludwig gg^

Foster, William C 1004

Coding, M. Wilfred 1007

Johnson, President 990,992,1005

Mann, Thomas C 995

McClellan, Harold Chadwick 1000

Remengesau, Thomas 1007

Stevenson, Adlal E 1002

U.J. (ovctiiviiir mmriNc oFFictiim

CSB DtC G

PUBLIC LIBRARY-! IC
COPLEY SQUARE
BOSTON MASS 02117

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington dc. 20402

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, CSOO

(GPO>

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States

1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 191i3, Yohime
lY, The Near East and Africa.

Most of the content of this volume relates to wartime problems, particiilarly the defense of the
Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particular
interest are those on United States policy i-egarding the postwar political organization of Greece, the
problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward the
entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, Vohime IV, The Near East and Africa (publi-
cation 7665) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 20402, for $4 each,

PUBLICATION 7665 $4

ORDER FORM

TO:

8DPT. OF DOCLMRNTS
GOVT. PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

E2ncloeed find $

(each, check, or money order pay-
able to Bupt of Documents)

PUBLICATION 7665 $4

Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United Statetri

194s, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITr, STATE

3 9999 0635^ ('^

JUN 1 5 1967