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Vol. L, No. 

Apnl 6, 1964 


Message of t?ie President to tlie Congress 618 


Address by Secretary Rusk 630 


Address by President Johnson 535 

by Assistant Secretary Manning 641 


by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 560 

For index see inside back cover 

Foreign Aid 


To the Congress of the United States : 

The most important ingredient in the develop- 
ment of a nation is neither the amount nor the 
nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and 
commitment of the government and people di- 
rectly involved. 

To those nations which do commit themselves 
to progress under freedom, help from us and 
from others can pixivide the margin of differ- 
ence between failure and success. 

This is the heart of the matter. 

The proposals contained in this message ex- 
press our self-interest at the same time that 
they proclaim our national ideals. 

We will be laying up a harvest of woe for us 
and our children if we shrink from the task of 

'Transmitted Mar. 19 (White House press release) ; 
also printed in H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess., wUich 
includes a draft of a bill "To amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 19.54 to allow a credit against tax for 
certain investment in less developed countries, and for 
other purposes" and a draft of an act "To amend 
further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
and for other purposes." 

grappling in the world community with poverty 
and ignorance. 

These are the grim recruiting sergeants of 

They flourish wherever we falter. If we de- 
fault on our obligations, communism will ex- 
pand its ambitions. 

That is the stern equation which dominates 
our age, and from which there can be no escape 
in logic or in honor. 


It is against our national interest to tolerate 
waste or inefficiency or extravagance in any of 
these programs. But it is equally repugnant 
to our national interest to retreat from our ob- 
ligations and commitments while freedom re- 
mains under siege. 

We recognize that the United States cannot 
and should not sustain the burden of these pro- 
grams alone. 

Other nations are needed in this enterprise of 
mutual help. Encouraging signs exist that the 
process of sharing the burden is steadily 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Usned by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department Infor- 
mation le Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Inter- 
national Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
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NOTB : Contents of this publication are 
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herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
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The best way for the I'nited States to stimu- 
late this growth and to broaden tiiis partnersiiip 
in freedom is to make our own example an 
incentive to our friends and allies. 

We need the assurance of stability and prog- 
ress in a world restless with many dangers and 


In this progi-am we do not seek to cover the 
whole world. Aid on a worldwide scale is no 
part of our purpose. 

We seek instead, through prudent and respon- 
sible programs, to help carefully selected coun- 
tries whose survival in freedom is essential — 
and whose collapse would bring new opportu- 
nities for Communist expansion. 

There are no easy \nctories in this campaign. 
But there can be sudden disasters. We cannot 
ask for a reprieve from responsibility while 
freedom is in danger. The vital interests of the 
United States require us to stay in the battle. 
We dare not desert. 

Economic and military assistance, used at the 
right time and in the right way, can provide 
indispensable help to our foreign policy in 
enabling the United States to influence events 
instead of merely reacting to them. By com- 
mitting a small part of our resources before 
crises actually occur, we reduce the danger and 
frequency of those crises. 

Our foresight becomes a shield against 

The recommendations contained in this pro- 
gram for fiscal year 190.5 are designed to move 
the aid program in that direction. 

The)' reflect views and experience of the 
Congress, of the executive branch, and of in- 
formed private citizens. 


First : The request for funds must he realistic. 

For economic assistance, new authorisations 
of $917 million for f-tcal 1965 are recommended. 
Specifically, I recommend $335 million for 
supporting assistance, $22.5 million for tech- 
nical cooperation, $1.3-1 million for contribu- 
tions to international organizations, $150 mil- 
lion for the President's contingency fund, and 

$73 million for administrative and miscellane- 
ous expenses. 

For military a^ssistance, I recom,mend that 
the Congress provide a continuing authoriza- 
tion, subject to an annual review of each year's 
proposals by the authorizing committees in 
both Houses. 

For fiscal 1965, I recommend no additional 
authorizations for the Alliance for Progress 
or for development lending assistance in Asia 
or Africa. PLxisting authorizations for these 
programs are adequate. 

The appropriations recommended for fiscal 
1965 total $1 billion for military assistance and 
$2.Ji. billion for economic assistance. 

In fiscal 1964, the initial request was $4.9 bil- 
lion, later reduced to $4.5 billion. 

This fiscal year, the request, of $3.4 billion is 
$1.1 billion less than last year's request, al- 
though about the same as was available last 
year, taking into consideration the unexpended 
balance from the year before. 

Moreover, more than 80 percent of aid funds 
will be spent in the U.S. The impact of the 
program on our balance of payments will be 
less than ever before. 


These requests reflect a determination to con- 
tinue to improve the aid program both in con- 
cept and administration. The overall request 
represents a great deal of money — but it is an 
amount which we should, in all prudence, pro- 
vide to serve essential United States interests 
and commitments throughout the world. 

More than 1 million American men in uni- 
form are now stationed outside the United 
States. As insurance to avoid involving them 
and the Nation in a major conflict, we propose 
to spend through aid programs less than 4 cents 
out of every tax dollar. 

If there is any alternative insurance against, 
war, it might be found in an increase in the de- 
fense budget. But that would require not only 
many times more than $3.4 billion, for a mili- 
tary budget which already takes more than 50 
cents out of every tax dollar, but also a several- 
fold increase in our own militaiy manpower. 

The foreign assistance requested will pi-ovide 

APRIL G, 1964 


— the crucial assistance we have promised the 
people of Latin America who are committed to 
programs of economic and social progress; 

— continued economic development in India, 
Pakistan, and Turkey under the major interna- 
tional aid consortia to which we are a party; 

— the United States share of voluntary con- 
tributions to the United Nations technical co- 
operation programs and to such special interna- 
tional jDrograms as the work of the United Na- 
tions Children's Fund and the development of 
the Indus Basin ; 

— funds to meet our commitments to the free- 
dom of the people of South Vietnam, Korea, 
and for the other obligations we have under- 
taken in Asia and Africa. 

Secoxd: The funds I am requesting will he 
concentrated where they will produce the best 
results and speed the transition from United 
/States assistance to self-support wherever 

Two-thirds of the proposed military assist- 
ance will go to 11 nations along the periphery 
of the Sino-Soviet bloc, from Greece and Tur- 
key through Thailand and Vietnam to the Re- 
public of China and Korea. These funds are 
a key to the maintenance of over 3.5 million 
men under arms, raised and supported in 
large measure by the countries receiving the 

The need for supporting assistance — funds 
used primarily in countries facing defense or 
security emergencies — will continue to be re- 
duced. Fourteen countries which received sup- 
porting assistance 3 years ago will receive none 
in fiscal year 1965. 

Four-fifths of the present request will go to 
four countries: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and 

Two-thirds of the developinent lending pro- 
posed for fiscal 1965 (including Alliance for 
Progress lending) will be concentrated in six 
countries: Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, 
Pakistan, and India. 

Funds for educational and technical coopera- 
tion — to help start schools, health centers, agri- 
cultural experiment stations, credit services, 
and dozens of other institutions — are not con- 
centrated in a few countries. But they will 
be used for selected projects to raise the ability 

of less fortunate peoples to meet their own 
needs. To carry out tliese projects we are seek- 
ing the best personnel available in the United 
States — in private agencies, in universities, in 
State and local governments, and throughout 
the Federal Government. 

Wlierever possible, loe will speed up the 
transition from reliance on aid to self-support. 

In 17 nations the transition has been com- 
pleted and economic aid has ended. Fourteen 
countries are approaching the point where soft 
economic loans and grants will no longer be 
needed. New funds for military equipment 
gi'ants are being requested for seven fewer 
countries for fiscal 1965 than for the present 

Third: We must do more to utilize private 
initiative in the United States — and in the de- 
veloping countries — to promote economic de- 
velopment ahroad. 

During the past year : 

— the first new houses financed by U.S. pri- 
vate funds protected by AID guarantees were 
completed in Lima, Peru ; 

— the first rural electrification surveys, con- 
ducted by tlie National Eural Electric Coopera- 
tive xVssociation under contract to AID, were 
completed and the first rural electrification 
loan — in Nicaragua — was approved; 

— the first arrangement linking the public and 
private lesources of one of our States to a de- 
veloping country was established, between Cali- 
fornia and Chile. 

This effort must be expanded. 

Accordingly., we are encouraging the estdb- 
lishment of an Executive Service Corps. It 
will provide American businessmen with an 
opportunity to furnisli, on request, teclmical and 
managerial advice to businessmen in developing 

During the present year, the possibilities for 
mobilizing increased private resources for the 
development task will be developed by the Ad- 
visory Committee on Private Enterprise in For- 
eign Aid established under the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1963. 

In this connection, two specific legislative 
steps are recommended: 

One., legislation to provide a special tax credit 
for private investment hy U.S. businessmen in 



less developed countries. 

Two, additional authority for a final install- 
ment of the pilot prograin of guaranteeing 
private VJS. hotising investments in Latin 

Fourth : We will continue to seek greater 
international participation in aid. 

Other free-world industrial countries have 
increased their aid commitments since the early 
1950's. There are indications that further in- 
creases are in store. Canada recently an- 
nounced that it expects to increase its aid 
expenditures by 50 percent next yeai*. A 1963 
British white paper and a French official re- 
port pul)lislied in January 1964 point in the 
same direction. Other nations have rechiced 
interest rates and extended maturities on loans 
to develo]>insr countries. 

Of major importance in this effort are the 
operations of the International Development 
Association. Under the agreement for replen- 
ishing the resources of this Association, which 
is now before the Congress for approval, other 
countries will put up more than $1.40 for everj- 
dollar the U.S. provides to finance on easy terms 
development projects certified as sound by the 
"World Bank — projects which the developing 
countries could not afi'ord to pay for on regular 
commercial terms. This is international shar- 
ing in the aid effort at its best. For to the ex- 
tent we fiiruish funds to IDA, and they are 
augmented by the contributions of others, the 
needs of developing countries are met, thus 
reducing the amounts required for our own 
bilateral aid programs. 

Under the program before you the U.S. 
would be authorized to contribute $e312 million 
over a 3-j'ear period. Against this other coun- 
tries have pledged $438 million, which will be 
lost in the absence of the U.S. contribution. 
Action is needed now so that the Association 
may continue to undertake new projects even 
though the first appropriation will not be re- 
quired until fiscal year 1966. 

/ urge the Congress to authorize U.S. par- 
ticipation in this continued IDA subscription. 

Fifth: Let us msist on steadily increasing 
efiiciency in assistance operations. 

After careful study, I have decided to con- 
tinue the basic organization of aid operations. 

established after intensive review in 1961. 
Economic assistance operations will continue 
to be centered in the Agency for International 
Development, militai-j' assistance openitions in 
the Department of Defense. Both will be sub- 
ject to firm foreign policy guidance from the 
Secretary of State. 


One officer, Assistant Secretary of State 
Mann, has been assigned firm policy control 
over all aspects of our activities in Latin 

Full support will be given to the newly 
created Inter-American Alliance for I'rogress 
Committee whicli is designed to strengthen the 
aspect of partnership in the alliance. 

The AID Administrator has instructions to 
embark on a major program to improve the 
quality of his staff — and to reduce the total 
number of AID employees by 1,200 by the end 
of fiscal year 196.5. 

The AID Administrator has been directed 
to continue to consolidate AID missions with 
U.S. embassies and, wherever possible, to elimi- 
nate altogether separate AID field missions. 

The Secretary of Defense has been directed 
to continue to make substantial reductions in 
the number of personnel assigned to military 
assistance groups and missions. 

In this connection, I recommend two specific 
legislative steps: 

One, legislation to provide the AID Admin- 
istrator with authority to terminate a limited 
number of supervisory and policymaking em- 
ployees notioithstanding other provisions of 
lnu\ and to extend the existing Foreign Service 
^'■selection out" authority to other personnel. 

This is essential if the Administrator is to 
carry out my desire — and that of the Con- 
gress — that he improve the quality of the AID 
staff and, at the same time, reduce its total 

Two, legislation to permit outstanding 
United States representation on the Inter- 
Am-erican Alliance for Progress Committee 
under the leadership of Amhassador Teodoro 

■ See p. 540. 

APRH. 6, 19G4 


Finally, I am appointing a general advisory 
committee, as suggested by Senator [Jolm 
Sherman] Cooper and others, on foreign eco- 
nomic and military assistance problems. It 
will be composed of distinguished private citi- 
zens with varied backgrounds and will serve 
as a continuing source of counsel to me. In 
addition to its general responsibility the com- 
mittee will examine aid programs in individual 
countries. These reviews will be made by mem- 
bers of the advisory conmiittee, augmented as 
necessary by additional persons. I would hope 
that at least four or five country reviews, in- 
cluding two or three in Latin America, will be 
completed in the present year. 


I am convinced this program will enable the 
United States to live in a turbulent world with 
a greater measure of safety and of honor. 

There is in our heart the larger and nobler 
hope of strengthening the family of the free, 
quit* apart from our duty to disappoint the 
evil designs of the enemies of freedom. 

We wish to build a world in which the weak 
can walk without fear and in which even the 
smallest nation can work out its own destiny 
without the danger of violence and aggression. 

This program, based on the principle of mu- 
tual help, can make an essential contribution 
to these purposes and objectives which have 
guided our nation across the difficulties of these 
dangerous yea re. 

I recommend this program to the judgment 
and the conscience of the Congress in the be- 
lief that it will enlarge the strength of the free 
world — 

— aid in frustrating the ambitions of Com- 
munist imperialism, 

— reduce the hazards of widespread conflict, 

— support the moral commitment of free men 
everywhere to work for a just and peaceful 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
March 19, 1964. 

U.S. To Increase Economic 
and Military Aid to Viet-Nam 

Secretary of Defe7ise Robert S. McNarrmra 
and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, returned to Washington 
on March 13 from a 5-day inspection trip to the 
Republic of Viet-Nam. Folloit^ing is the text 
of a White House stat.e7nent released on March 
17 at the conclusion of their report to the Presi- 
dent and the National Security Council. 

White House press release dated March 17 

Secretai-y McNamara and General Taylor, 
following their initial oral report of Friday, 
today reported full}- to President Johnson and 
the members of tlie National Security Council. 
The report covered the situation in South Viet- 
Nam, the measures being taken by General 
Khanh and his government, and the need for 
United States assistance to supplement and sup- 
port, these measures. There was also discussion 
of the continuing support and direction of the 
Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam. 

At the close of the meeting the President ac- 
cepted the report and its principal recommenda- 
tions, which had the support of the National 
Security Council and Ambassador Lodge. 

Comparing the situation to last October, when 
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last 
reported fully on it,^ there have miquestionably 
been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken 
maximum advantage of two changes of govern- 
ment, and of more longstanding difficulties, in- 
cluding a serious weakness and overextension 
which had developed in the basically sound 
hamlet program. The supply of arms and 
cadres from the north has continued; careful 
and sophisticated control of Viet Cong opera- 
tions has been apparent; and evidence that such 
control is centered in Hanoi is clear and 

To meet the situation, General Khanh and 
his government are iicting vigorously and eflfec- 
tively. They have produced a sound central 
plan for the prosecution of the war, recogniz- 
ing to a far greater degree than before the cru- 
cial role of economic and social, as well as mili- 

' Bulletin of Oct. 21, 1963, p. G24, 



tary, action to insui-c tluit sirens cleared of tlie 
Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom. 

To carry out this phin, General Khanh re- 
quires the full enlistment of the people of South 
Viet-N:im, partly to augment the strengt.h of 
his aiitiguerrilla forces, but particularly to pro- 
vide the !idministratoi-s, health workers, teach- 
ers, luid others wjio must follow up in cleared 
areas. To meet this need, and to pi-ovide a more 
equitable and common basis of service, General 
Khanh has informed us tliat he projK)ses in the 
near future to put into efl'ect a National Mobili- 
zation Plan that will provide conditions and 
terms of serWce in appropriate jobs for all able- 
bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages. 

In addition, steps are required to bring up 
to i-e<iuired levels the pay and status of the para- 
military forces and to create a highly trained 
guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on 
its own ground. 

Finally, limited but significant additional 
equipment is proposed for the air forces, the 
river navy, and the mobile forces. 

In short, where the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment now has the power to clear any part 
of its territory. General Khanh's new program 
is designed to clear and to hold, step by step 
and province by province. 

This program will involve substantial in- 
creases in cost to the South Vietnamese econ- 
omy, which ill turn depends heavily on United 
States economic aid. Additional, though less 
substantial, military assistance funds are also 
needed, and increased United States training 
activity both on the civil and military side. 
The policy should continue of withdrawing 
United States personnel where their roles can 
be assumed by South Vietnamese and of send- 
ing additional men if they are needed. It will 
remain the policy of the United States to fur- 
nish assistance and support to South Viet- Nam 
for as long as it is required to brmg Commu- 
nist, aggr&ssion and terrorism under control. 

Se<;retary McNamara and General Taylor re- 
ported their overall conclusion that with con- 
tinued vigorous leadership from General Khanli 
and his government, and the carrying out of 
these steps, the situation can be significantly im- 
proved in the coming months. 

President Johnson Discusses 
the Presidency 

Following are the foreign policy portions of 
a television interview with President Johnson 
conducted at the White House on March J 4 by 
William II. Lawrence of the American Broad- 
casting Company, Eric Sevareid of tJie Colum- 
bia Broadcasting System, and David Brinkley 
of the National Broadcasting Company. 

White House press release dated March 15 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, considering 
the violent and abrupt manner of your succes- 
sion to the Presidency, I think everyone 
agrees that the transition has gone remarkably 
smoothly. Did this just happen, or did you 
start to plan these things, say, in those few 
hours in Air Force 1 as you flew back from 

The President: Well, we had a lot of help 
in the planning, Mr. Lawrence. A lot of 
thoughts that went through my mind, as I left 
the hospital, and on the way to Air P'orce 1, 
and while we were waiting for Judge Hughes 
and Mrs. Kennedy to come aboard — I wasn't 
sure whether this was an international con- 
spiracy, or just what it was, or what might 
happen next. I was sure that the whole Nation 
had been shaken and the world would be in 

As I rode back, I recognized that our first 
great problem was to assure the world that 
there would be continuity in transition, that 
our constitutional system would work. I real- 
ized the importance of uniting our people at 
home and asking them to carry forward with 
the program ; so I immediately plamied to have 
the bipartisan leaders come to the Wliite House 
upon my arrival. 

I asked the membei*s of the Cabinet who were 
then in town, the Director of the National Se- 
curity Council, and Mr. McNamara and others 
to meet me at ^Vndrews, and I appealed to all 
of those men to work with me on the transition 
and to try to so conduct ourselves as to assure 
the rest of the world that we did have conti- 
nuity and assure the people of this coimtry 
that we expected them to unite. 

APRIL 6, 1964 


Very shortly thereafter, President Eisen- 
hower came down and spent some time with 
me exploring the problems that he expected 
to arise confronting a new President. Presi- 
dent Truman came in and gave me his counsel, 
and we started off with the help and plans of 
a good many people and substantially well 

I don't know how well the Government did 
its part of the transition, but the people's part 
was well done. 

Mr. Lawrence : Wliat were your first priori- 
ties, Mr. President ? 

The President: The first priority was to try 
to display to the world that we could have con- 
tinuity and transition, that the program of 
President Kennedy would be caiTied on, that 
there was no need for them to be disturbed and 
fearful that our constitutional system had been 
endangered — to demonstrate to the people of 
this country that, although their leader had 
fallen and we had a new President, we must 
have imity and we must close ranks and we 
must work together for the good of all America 
and the world. 

Mr. Lawrence: Well, did you have any con- 
cern about the international posture that you 
must adopt so that, one, all of our allies would 
be reassured, and our potential enemies 
wouldn't get any wrong ideas ? 

The President: Oh, yes; and I spent the first 
full week meeting with more than 90 represent- 
atives from the nations of the world and trying 
to explain to them our constitutional system, 
and what they could expect imder it, and how 
we carry on the program that we had begun, 
and that I had been a part of the Kennedy- 
Johnson ticket that won the election in 1960, 
that we had a Kennedy- Johnson program, that 
I had been a participant in the formulation of 
that program, and that we would carry it on — 
maybe not as well as the late President could 
have, had he lived, but as best we could — and 
they need have no fear or no doubt. 

Mr. Lawrence: Wliat was the image that you 
wanted the potential enemy to get? 

The President: That we were sure and we 
were confident that we were united, that we had 
closed ranks, and not to tread on us. 

Mr. Sevareid: Did you send any kind of pri- 
vate messages to Chairman Khrushchev soon 
after you became President ? 

The President: No. We had representatives 
from all the nations here. I spent 2 or 3 days 
speaking to those representatives. 

Mr. Mikoyan was here, and I had a long visit 
with him, and I talked to him about the visit 
that Premier Khinishchev had made me when 
I was leader in the Senate, and we exchanged 
views for a period of time here in the office, 
just about the time of the fimeral. 

Mr. Lawrence: Did the subject come up of 
a possible exploratory, get-acquainted session 
with Mr. Khrushchev ? 

The President: No. We both expressed de- 
sire in our discussion that we understand each 
other better and that we would be glad to meet 
at some time when we felt that the agenda was 
such that would give promise of reaching some 
solution to the many problems that confront 
the two countries. But no definite plans were 
made for a meeting. None were proposed, but 
it was accepted as a possibility. 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, if I could 
make you a self-critic for a moment, what, if 
anything, that has happened in these last 120 
days would you do differently were you to do 
it again ? 

The President: Well, I don't know about 
that. I am sure that we have made a good many 
mistakes, but I don't know of any recommenda- 
tion that I have made that I would change. 

I would favor the same measures that I have 
recommended to the Congress. I would liandle 
the developments and the foreign policy fields 
such as Panama and Guantanamo and Zanzi- 
bar — Cyprus — as we have handled tliem. 

So while I am sure that we could improve on 
them if we had more time, in the light of what 
developed I wouldn't change any. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, tlie hundred 
days are over now, and the transition is over. 
This is now the Johnson administration. Could 
you give us an idea — not necessarily specific, 
unless you care to — what direction you would 
say your administration would take hereafter? 



What new approaches or ideas or philosophies 
we might see ? 

The President: Well, I think a message going 
to the Congress on Monday will indicate one 
approach. We are delormined, and we have a 
gronp of dedicated men tliat are going to try to 
get at the roots and the causes of poverty that 
cause 20 percent of our people to live otf of less 
than $3,000 a year. 

We are going to try to get at the roots and 
the c^iuscs and find the solution to doing some- 
thing about half a million men that, are rejected 
each yejxr because of mental or physical reasons 
for service. 

AVe are going to try to recognize and proceed 
on the basis that illiteracy and ignorance and 
disease cost this Government billions of dollars 
per year and make for mucli unhappine,ss. 

And the program of poverty this year is one 
example of what I would like to think will be 
carried on and grow in the years to come. I 
want this Government first of all to be dedi- 
cated to peace in our time, and do everything 
that we can conceivably do, any place, any time, 
with anyone, to resolve some of the differences 
that exist among mankind. 

In order to do that, tliis Government must be 
prepared and we must maintain strength and 
power tliat would insure our safety if attacked. 
In order to have peace, and to be prepared, we 
must be solvent and fiscally responsible. So 
for that reason we have tried to eliminate waste 
at everj- corner. I don't believe that we are 
going to make the Treasury' over by cutting out 
a few automobiles or turning out a few lights. 
But I do think it is a good example when you 
walk through the corridor and you see the 
closets where lights burn all day and all night 
just because someone didn't turn them off. 

So we have tried to set that example and we 
want a Government that is seeking peace, that 
is prepared for any eventuality, that is fiscally 
solvent, and that is compassionate, that meets 
the needs of the people for health and for edu- 
cation, and for physical and mental and spirit- 
ual strength. And our Government — that is 
the kind of a Johnson administration I would 
like to have and that is the kind that we are 
working toward. 

The Situation in Viet-Nam 

Mr. Jirinkley: You have liad reports in the 
last day or two from tlie Amljas.sailor to France 
[Charles E. Bohlen] and from Secretary 
[of Defense Robert S.] McNamara. Can you 
t«ll us anything of what ho reported to you 
from Viet-Nam? 

The Prenident: Yes, he made a veiy lengthy 
report and I think a responsible and construc- 
tive one. We are going to consider it in the 
Security Council further the early part of the 
week.^ AVe have problems in Viet-Nam, as we 
have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara 
has been out there — this is his fourth trip. We 
are very anxious to do what we can to lielp those 
people preserve their own freedom. We cher- 
ish ours, and we would like to see them preserve 
theirs. We have furnished them with counsel 
and advice, and men and materiel, to help them 
in their attempts to defend themselves. If peo- 
ple quit attacking them, we'd have no problem, 
but for 10 years this problem has been going on. 

I was reading a letter only today that (xen- 
eral Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem 
10 years ago,- and it is a letter that I could have 
well written to President IQianh and sent out 
by Mr. McNamara. 

Now, we have had that problem for a long 
time. We are going to have it for some time in 
the future, we can see, but we are patient people, 
and we love freedom, and we want to help 
others preserve it, and we are going to try to 
evolve the most effective and efficient plans we 
can to continue to help them. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Kennedy said, on the sub- 
ject of Viet-Nam, I think, that he did believe in 
the "falling domino" theory, that if Viet-Nam 
were lost that other countries in the area would 
soon be lost. 

The President: I think it would be a very 
dangerous thing, and I share President Ken- 
nedy's view, and I tliink the whole of South- 
east Asia would be involved and that would in- 
volve hundreds of millions of people, and I 
think it's — it cannot be ignored, we must do 
everything that we can, we must be responsible. 

' For text of a White House statement released at 
the close of a meetinp of the National Security Council 
on Mar. 17, see p. 522. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735. 

APRIL 0, 1004 


we must stay there and help them, and that is 
what we are going to do. 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, during tlie 
New Hampshire primary campaign. Governor 
Rockefeller criticized what he called "divided 
counsel" that was going out from Washington 
to the leaders of Viet-Nam. He said that while 
you and Secretary Rusk and Secretary' 
McNamara were committed to winning the war 
and defeating the Viet Cong, the Senate Ma- 
jority Leader, Senator [Mike] Mansfield, 
seemed to find favor with the idea of neutrali- 
zation advanced by President de Gaulle of 
France. What is your reaction to Governor 
Rockefeller's criticism ? 

The President: Well, I think the Governor 
should know that Senator Mansfield is very ex- 
perienced in the field of foreign relations, and 
served as a distinguished member of that com- 
mittee, and when he made his speech in the Sen- 
ate, he spoke for himself, and so stated. He 
was not speaking the administration viewpoint, 
and he did not leave any such impression. 
From time to time he has given me his counsel 
over the years in this general area of Southeast 
Asia, but when he made this speech he spoke for 
himself entirely, and there is no division in the 
administration between Secretary Rusk and 
Secretary McNamara and myself. We all feel 
alike on the matter. 

I think that there could even be some di- 
vision between Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Lodge 
[Henry Cabot Lodge, American Ambassador to 
the Republic of Viet-Nam], judging from what 
you have said. Mr. Lodge sees things pretty 
much as we do, and we are going to continue 
with our progi-am, and it is going to be a re- 
sponsible one, and we think a fruitful one. 

Mr. Lwwrence: Do ih& recommendations that 
Secretary McNamara brought back fi-om his 
last trip envisage a continuing role for Mr. 
Lodge in handling policies in South Viet-Nam? 
The President: Yes. Yes, he luis a very ini- 
portant role. He met with me in my office 2 
days after I became President, and I said to 
him at that time, "You are my top man there, 
and I want you to have the kind of people you 
want, and I want you to caiTy out the program 
you recommend and you will have our support 
here." He has worked very hard at that job, 
and we have sent him some new people from 

time to time, and we will be sending more. He 
has command of the full resources tliat we have 
out there, and he works very well with our peo- 

Mr. Lawrence: One of your speeches at the 
University of California in Los Angeles indi- 
cated a kind of hint to me that we might carry 
the war to the North Vietnamese if they didn't 
quit meddling in what you call a "dangerous 
game." ^ Are there any such plans that you 
can talk about at this time, sir ? 

The President: No, and I made no such hint. 
1 said it was a dangerous game to try to supply 
arms and become an aggressor and deprive peo- 
ple of their freedom, and that is true, whether 
it is in Viet-Nam or whether it is in this hemi- 
sphere, wherever it is. 

Mr. Laiorence : Mr. President, do we face the 
decision on Viet-Nam of the order of magnitude 
of Korea, for example? 

The President : No, I don't think so. I think 
that we have problems there, we have difficulties 
there — we have had for 10 ye-ars — and as I told 
you, a good many things have come and gone 
during that period of time; as long as there 
are people trying to preserve their freedom, we 
want to help them. 

America's Role in a Changing World 

Mr. Brinkley : Well, Mr. President, not only 
do we have a new administration in this coun- 
try, but we also have what might be described 
as a new world, since it is Sivid now that the 
postwar world is over, and the American lead- 
ership is challenged and questioned both by 
friends and enemy alike in many places now. 
So it is an entirely different world, very differ- 
ent world, from what it was a few years ago. 
What is your view and assessment of it? How 
do you see the American role from here on, now 
that we are no longer the unquestioned leader 
of the entire West ? 

The President: Well, I think that, as long as 
we are living in a world with 120 nations, we 
have got to realize that we have got 120 foreign 
policies. And we are living in a world where 
we recognize 114 other nations, and some tliat 

^ For text of remark.s made by President Johnson at 
Charter Day ceremonies at UCLA on Feb. 21, see ibi4.. 
Mar. 3G. 1964, p. 399. 



we don't recognize, and so I think at this time 
that our nation is held in high ostoom and re- 
spet;t and affection generally among the peoples 
of the world — the free world. I realize that 
we have dis<"ouraging incidents from time to 
time, and we have problems, and because we try 
to help with those problems, sometimes the role 
of the peacemaker is not a very happy one. 
And so, for that rea.son, we have to do things 
that we don't want to do sometimes, and are 
rather irritating — and sometimes we are abused 
because we do them, and sometimes we are mis- 
understood. But if the final result is good, 
then our action is justified. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, about 10 years 
ago an American Secretary of State termed 
neutrality as something immoral. Not long ago 
President Kennedy talked about making the 
world safe for diversity. Is a more and more 
diverse world, with the dimini.shing of the im- 
portance of great alliances, a trend toward a 
safer world ? 

The President: Yes, I think so. And you 
must remember this : that we are having all the 
new nations that are emerging, and they are 
coming in without experience, and they have 
their pride. A good many of them have the 
feeling that — pent-up feelings that they have 
nurtured for years and years. And they have 
an opportunity to express themselves, and some- 
times it looks a little odd for the Prime Minis- 
ter of a new country to come in with a pistol in 
his hand and arrest an American Charge 

But that does happen, and we have to be 
prepared for those developments and trj' to 
understand them and try to provide leadership 
that will keep us from getting in deeper water 
or more trouble, and that is what we are doing. 
Sometimes our people become very impatient. 
They cut the water off on us in Cuba, and I 
have got a good many recommendations from 
all over the country as to how to act very 
quickly. Some of them have said- — some of the 
men have even wanted me to run in the Marines, 
send them in immediately. 

Well, upon reflection, evaluation, and study, 
realizing not many people want more war and 
none of them really want more appeasement, 
you have to find a course that you can chart 

that will preserve your dignity and 8elf-res|)ect 
and still bring about the action that is nex^es- 
sary. So instead of si-nding in the Marines 
to turn the water on, we sent one admiral in to 
cut it off and arrange to make our own water, 
anil we think things worke-d out the best they 
could under those circumstances. 

Hut there are going to be these demands from 
time to time, people who feel that all we need 
to do is mash a button and determine every- 
body's foreign policy. But we are not living 
in that kind of world any more. They are 
going to determine it for themselves, and that 
is the way it should be. And we are going to 
have to come and reason with them and try to 
lead them instead of force them. And I 
think^ — I have no doubt but what for centuries 
to come we will be a leading force in molding 
the opinion of the world, and I think the better 
they know us the more they will like us. 

Mr. Lawrence: Is there anj' progress, Mr. 
President, in the deadlock over Panama and 
the absence of diplomatic relations with that 
country ? 

The President: We have been very close to 
agreement several times. I have no doubt but 
what agreement will l)e reached that will, in 
effect, provide for sitting down with Panama- 
nian authorities and discussing the problems 
that exist between us, and being guided only 
by what is fair and what is right and what is 
just, and ti-ying to resolve those problems. 
Xow, when that will come about, I don't know. 
We are anxious and willing and eager to do it 
any time its suits their convenience. 

Mr. Lnurrence : '\Miat is the hitch right now, 
Mr. President? 

The President: I think, first, they have an 
election on, and I think, translating our lan- 
guage into their language, that some of the 
agreements that we have to discuss these mat- 
ters, they perhaps feel that they would want 
stronger language than we are willing to agre« 
to and we want a different expression from 
what they want. It is largely a matter of try- 
ing to agree on the kind of language that will 
meet their problems and that we can honestly, 
sincerely agree to. We are not going to agree 
to any preconditions to negotiate a new treaty 
without Imowing what is going to be in that 

APRIL, 6, 1964 


treaty and without sitting down and working 
it out on the basis of equity. We thuik that 
that language can be resolved and will be re- 
solved in due time. 

Mr. BrinkUy: ilr. President, what is your 
assessment now of General de Gaulle's be- 
havior in the last year or two I "\Miat do you 
think about it ? 

The President: "Well, it is not for me to pass 
judgment on — 

Mr. Brinkley: In relation to us, sir? 
The President: — on General de Gaulle's con- 
duct. My conversations with liim have been 
very pleasant, and I would like to see him more 
in agreement on matters with us than he is, such 
as recognizing Red China. We did not think 
that was wise for France or for others or for 
the free world. But that is France's foreign 
policy. Tliat is not ours, and in his wisdom 
he decided he would follow that course, and 
that is a matter for him to determine. 

Mr. Laiirrence : Wliat do you hear from tlie 
people at the United Nations, Mr. President? 
Has the fact of French recognition now in- 
creased the prospect that the Red Chinese may 
be voted into membership at the U.N. ? 

The President: The situation changes from 
time to time, but we don't think that they will 
be voted into membership and we hope not. 
I don't believe they will. 

Mr. Lawrence: Wliat would be our reaction 
vis-a-vis the U.N. if they were admitted ? 

The President: Well, we will have to cross 
that bridge. I don't want to admit that they 
are going to be admitted and don't think they 

Mr. Lawrence: Senator Goldwater, for ex- 
ample, has argued that we should withdraw at 
once if the Red Chinese are admitted. 

The President: Well, that is Senator Gold- 
water's view, and I don't tliink they're going to 
be admitted, and I don't think we will have to 
face that question. 

Foreign Aid and the Alliance for Progress 

Mr. Brinkley: One you do have to face soon, 
Mr. I'resident, is to say something to Congress 
about foreign aid. That seems to have reached 
a peak of opposition. It seems to have reached 

some kind of peak last year. AYliat do you 
think the future of it is? 

The President: I think it is going to be very 
touffh to get a sood foreign aid measure 

CO*— *— 

through the Congress this year. Last year 
President Kennedy asked for ^.900,000.000. 
He later had that request carefully studied and 
reduced it to §4.500,000,000. We got a $3 bil- 
lion appropriation after I came to office. I 
signed the bill, and there was reappropriated 
about $400 million unexpended balances — 
$3,400,000,000. Now. I have conferred with the 
leaders in the House and Senate on that matter, 
and they all admit it is going to be more difficult 
this year than it ever has been before, although 
I don't think that is justified. Nevertheless, I 
request — we are not going to pad our request. 
We got $3,400,000,000 this year, and we will ask 
for something in the neighborhood of that for 
next year, and we will ask only what we need, 
and we hope we get what we ask, but it will be 
appreciably under what was asked last year and 
approximately the same that we got this year.* 
We think that we are justified in spending 
three or four cents of our tax dollar to protect 
the million men who are in uniform, our men, 
scattered throughout the world, and to keep 
them from going into combat, and this is the 
best weapon that I have. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, is there any one 
root cause for the apparent slowness of the 
Alliance for Progress? 

The President : Yes. It is very difficult to get 
21 nations to all agree and get their systems 
changed and their refonns efl'ected and to blend 
into their governmental philosophy the mod- 
ernization that is going to be required to make 
the Alliance for Progress a success. 

We are distressed that it hasn't been more 
successful, but we haven't lost faith. 

We are having a meeting ]\Ionday with all of 
the ambassadors from the Organization of 
American States. We are having a meeting 
Monday with all the ambassadors from the 
Western IIiMuisphcre. AVe are calling in all of 
our own aml)assadoi-s, and the tliree groups are 
gomg to meet, and we are going to point out 

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con- 
gress on foreign aid, dated Mar. 19, see p. 518. 



the weaknesses, and the slowness of certain re- 
forms that are re<]uinHK ami tlio i'0()|uMalion 
tJiat we must liave fi-om tlu>ir count rios, Un-ause 
there is no use of niakinjj bij; investments ami 
takinj; our taxpayei-s' funds unless theso re- 
forms are etl'iH-tive. 

Ami we aiv jj^iin^ to nuvke an appeal for a 
united attack tliat will i:;i\c new life to the 
Alliance for Pri><;rcss, and we have hopi>s that 
it will be successfid. 

The View From the Inside 

.1/r. Ldinyncc: Mr. President, yoxi have now 
been President for sometliinjx over 100 days. 
You have been around Wasiiinjiton for more 
than 30 years. How is the view from the inside 
as compai-ed with tlie view from the outside? 

T/ie President: Well, it is a much toufjhor 
job from the inside than 1 lhon<;lit it was from 
the outside. 

I have watclicd it since Mr. Hoover's days, 
and I realized the ix>sponsibilities it carried, and 
the obliirations of leadei-ship that were tliere, 
and the decisions that had to be maile, and the 
awesome responsibilities of the oflice. 

But I must say tiiat, when I started havinir 
to make those decisions and started hcariiifj; 
from the Congress, the Presidency looked a little 
dilTerent wlien you are in the Presidency tlian 
it did wiien you are in the Congress, and vice 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, Tliomas Jef- 
ferson referred to the oflice as a splendid misery. 
Harry Truman used to talk about it as if it 
were a prison cell. Do you like it? 

The Presidenf: I am doing the best I I'an in 
it, and I am enjoying wliat 1 am doing. 

Thomas Jeffei-son said the second oflice of the 
land was an honorable and easy one. The 
Presidency was a s])len(lid misery. But I 
found great interest in .serving in l)otii oflices, 
and it carries terrific and tremendous and awe- 

some itvsponsibilities, but 1 am proud of tins 
nation and I am so grateful timl 1 could liave 
an opportunity that 1 have iiad ii» .Vmerica tliat 
1 want to give my life seeing (hat the oppor- 
timily is {)erpet Mated for othei-s. 

1 am so proud of our system of government, 
of our fn>e enterprise, where our incentive .sys- 
tem and our n\en who head our big industries 
aiv willing to gi>t up at dayiiglit and gel to \m\ 
at midnight to oll'er employment ami civale new 
jobs for people, wheiv our men working theiv 
will try to get decent wages but will sit a<'ross 
the table and not act like cannilml.s, but will 
negotiate and reason things out together. 

1 am so hai)py to be a part of a system where 
the average per capita income is in exctvss of 
$•200 per month, when tliere are only si.\ na- 
tions in I lie entire world that have as much 
as $80 per month, and while the Soviet Union 
has three times as many tillable acres of land 
as we have and a population that's in excess 
of GUI'S and a great many resources that we 
don't have, that if properly developed would 
exceed our potential in water and oil and .so 
forth, nevertheless we have one thing they don't 
have and that is our system of private enter- 
prise, free enterprise, where the employer, hop- 
ing to make a little profit, tlu' laborer, hoping 
to justify his wages, can get togetiier and make 
a better mousetrap. 

They ha\e develo[)ed this into liii< most pow- 
erful and leading nation in the world, and I 
want to see it preserved. And T have an op- 
portunity to do sonictliingalK)ut it as I 'resilient. 

And I may not lie a great President, but as 
long as 1 am here, I am going to try to be a 
good President and do my dead-le\'el best, to 
see this system pi-eserved, because when the 
linal chips niv down it. is not. going to be the 
number of people we have or the number of 
acres or tlu^ ninnbcr of resources I hat win; the 
thing that is going to make us win is our sys- 
tem of government. 

Mr. Brhikley: Thiudt you, Mr. Prosiilent. 

APRIL 6, 1964 


The Toilsome Path to Peace 

Address by Secretary Busk ^ 

The first objective of our foreign policy is, 
in the words of the preamble to our Constitu- 
tion, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to our- 
selves and our Posterity." The "Blessings of 
Liberty" lie at the heart of the world struggle 
in which we are engaged. The central issue 
in that struggle is coercion versus free choice, 
tyranny versus freedom. And the most power- 
ful assets we have in this struggle are the ideas 
out of which this nation was bom and has 
grown. For these ideas and ideals are shared 
by most of mankind, including, I am convinced, 
a majority of those behind the Iron and Bam- 
boo Curtains. 

As I said elsewhere last month,'' I believe that 
every American boy and girl should be familiar 
with the American system of government and 
the ideas out of which it developed. I believe 
that each of our young should know that the 
priceless liberties which we enjoy did not spring 
into being overnight, that they were worked 
for and developed and defended — often with 
blood — over the generations, that they should 
never be taken for granted, that they can be 
preserved only by exercising them and by our 
vigilance and dedication. 

Tonight I should like to look with you at the 
world around us and appraise where we are in 
the struggle between tyranny and freedom. Be- 
yond question, this is a dangerous and turbulent 
world — a world of rapid change, of ever-accel- 
erating scientific and technological advance, of 

^ Made before a joint meeting of the Western Politi- 
cal Science Association and the International Studies 
Association at Salt Lake City, Utah, on Mar. 19 (press 
release 126). 

" Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 358. 

transition from old empires to new nations, of 
the rise of former colonial peoples to independ- 
ence and equality, of urgent demand for social 
and economic progress, for a better life for all. 
It is a noisy and disputatious world. It gives 
us in your State Department plenty of work to 

It is quite true that other nations don't al- 
ways talk or act as we would prefer. President 
Johnson reminded us a few days ago that we 
are living in a world of 120 foreign policies. 
We don't give orders to other nations — we don't 
believe in the kind of world in which any gov- 
ernment takes its orders from others. As Presi- 
dent Jolinson said,^ there are 

. . . people who feel that all we need to do Is mash 
a button and determine everybody's foreign policy. 
But we are not living in that kind of world any more. 
They are going to determine it for themselves, and 
that is the way it should be. And we are going to 
have to come and reason with them and try to lead 
them instead of force them. 

Bilateral Issues 

Let me try to put our problems in perspective. 
Koughly, there are four different kinds of inter- 
national problems with which we have to deal. 

In the first category are strictly bilateral is- 
sues between us and other governments. These 
usually have to do with trade or the protection 
of American nationals or property. They 
rarely involve dangerous issues. At present, 
we do have a painful dispute with our friends 
in Panama. Formally, it is a bilateral dispute. 
But because the Panama Canal is an important 
international convenience, the dispute affects 

' See p. 523. 



a great iiuiny other countries, especially those 
in this hemisphere. The Organization of 
American States has been trying to help move 
this dispute toward the conference table. Wo 
look forward hopefully to tlie restoration of 
relations between Panama and the United 
States ami to friendly discussions and adjust- 
ments of our common problems and interests. 

U.S. Policy Toward Communist States 

A second group of problems involves directly 
the central struggle between international com- 
munism and the free world. These include 
such dangerous and explosive issues sxs Berlin 
and Germany, Viet-Nam and Laos, and Cuba. 
In these issues we do and must play a leading 

Nobody need tell us in the State Department, 
or in our sister departments or agencies, that 
this world struggle is for keeps. Knowing what 
the Communists are up to and imderstanding 
their varied teclmiques are a major order of 
business in the State Department. We are fully 
aware that Moscow, as well as Peiping, remains 
committed to the Communist world revolu- 
tion — and that, although they may diifer over 
current tactics, both are determined to "bury" 
us and are prepared to try to expedite our de- 
mise by whatever means they think are effective 
within the levels of tolerable risk to themselves. 

The first objective of our policy toward the 
Communist states is to prevent them from ex- 
tending their domains — and to make it costly, 
dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so. 
To that end we maintain a nuclear deterrent 
of almost unimaginable power, and large, 
varied, and mobile conventional forces. We 
have also improved our capacity to deal with 
guerrilla warfare. 

Not since Korea has the Commimist world 
attempted to expand by frontal assault. We 
and other free nations must be determined to 
put an end also to indirect aggi*ession — to the 
filtering of men and arms across the frontiers, 
whether in Southeast Asia, Latin iimerica, or 
anywhere else. 

We also combat Commimist imperialism by 
helping the developing comitries to make eco- 
nomic and social progress. 

In the main, the world struggle is going well 

from our viewpoint. West lierlin remains free 
and prosperous. So does Western Europe as 
a whole. So does Japan. Many of the less 
developed nations have jnoved ahejid impre,«- 
sively. And almost all of them, old and new 
nations alike, are stubbornly defending theii 

Meanwhile, the Communist world is not only 
torn by disjjutes but beset with economic diffi- 
culties. The standard of living in mainland 
China is even lower than it was in 1957, before 
the "great leap" backward. The Soviet Union 
has done somewhat better but lias encountered 
a slowdown in growth rates and critical prob- 
lems of resource allocation. The smaller Com 
munist countries of Eastern Europe lag far be- 
hind Western Europe. Even with massive 
Soviet support, Cuba's economy is limping 
badly. And nearly all the Communist coun- 
tries have large and conspicuous difliculties in 
producing food. The notion that communism 
is a shortcut to the future for developing nations 
has been proved false. 

A\1iile we curb Communist imperialism, we 
seek agreements with our adversaries to reduce 
the dangers of a devastating war. The Soviets 
appear to recognize that they have a common 
interest with us in preventing a thermonuclear 
exchange. We and they have reached a few 
limited agreements. These do not yet consti- 
tute a detente. We shall continue to search for 
further agreements. But in the field of dis- 
armament not much progress can be made until 
the Soviets are prepared to accept reliable veri- 
fication and inspection of arms retained. And 
on many vital issues Moscow's views and the 
West's remain far apart. 

Beyond curbing Commimist imperialism and 
trying to achieve specific agreements to reduce 
the danger of a great war, there is a third ele- 
ment in our policy toward the Communist states. 
This is to encourage the trends within the Com- 
munist world toward national independence, 
peaceful cooperation, and open societies. These 
trends are visible in various degrees in different 
parts of the Communist world. Our capacity 
to encourage them is very limited. But we 
may be able to influence them somewhat. 

We believe that we can best further our ob- 
jectives by adjusting our policies to the differ- 

APRIL C, 1964 


ing behavior of different Communist states — or 
to the clianging behavior of the same state. 

U.S. Concern About Free-World Disputes 

A third category of problems miglit be labeled 
"other people's quarrels." The postwar explo- 
sion in the number of new states has multiplied 
disputes about boundaries, some old and some 
new. These are sometimes accentuated by 
racial, religious, and tribal frictions whose ori- 
gins precede the discovery of America. And 
we are learning that small countries, too, can 
fear small neighbors. 

Then, there are internal outbreaks of violence 
and coups which add to the headlines, and often 
to our headaches. In 1963 there were 12 forci- 
ble overturns of governments. 

Passions are flammable, and all too often the 
fuse is dangerously short. Ambition and guns 
seem to be in ready supply. Eesponsibility and 
public order are too often in short supply. 

Two questions therefore arise — understand- 
ably. One is: Does the United States really 
have to be concerned about all of these quarrels ? 
This question is asked frequently in the Depart- 
ment of State when a new dispute within the 
free world arises or an old one flares again. 
And the answer almost always turns out to be : 
Yes, we do. 

Remote and complex as some of these quarrels 
may be, the reasons for our interest are direct 
and simple. Unless they are quickly settled 
through other channels, most of them come to 
the United Nations, where we have to take a 
position. The U.N. Security Council is pres- 
ently seized with 61 matters, of which 57 are 
disputes. Fortunately, some of these disputes 
are no longer active. But many are. As a 
responsible member of the U.N. we could not 
avoid some involvement in these disputes even 
if we felt little real concern about them. 

Usually, however, we do feel real concern. 
Disputes within the free world often give the 
Communists opportunities to cause more serious 
trouble. And there is often the danger that 
dispute will lead to crisis, crisis to skirmish, 
skirmish to local war, and local war with con- 
ventional weapons to a confrontation, delib- 
erate or by suction, of the nuclear powers. As 
long as that possibility exists, the United States 

has a fundamental national security interest in 
the peaceful settlement of such disputes. 

Then, too, disputes within the free world 
dissipate energies and resources which are 
needed for constructive purposes. We have an 
enduring long-term interest in building the 
strength of the free world. And we have a 
dollars-and-cents interest in the most effective 
use of the aid we provide to the developing 
nations. If India and Pakistan would settle 
their quarrels and cooperate with each other 
in the common defense of the South Asian sub- 
continent, not only would that part of the world 
be more secure, but both countries could im- 
prove the living standards of their peoples more 
rapidly and at less cost, overall, to themselves 
and to the nations which are assisting them. 

Finally, we simply are too big to hide: We 
happen to be the most powerful nation in the 
world. Parties to any dispute like to have 
strong friends on their respective sides of the 

I do not recall an international dispute of the 
last 3 years in which each party has not so- 
licited our support and suggested what we 
should do to bring our weight to bear against 
its opponent. Much as we may dislike it, tliis, 
of course, often puts us in the middle. But 
it is from the middle that influence for a peace- 
ful solution can often be exerted. 

In this process we obviously cannot agree 
witli all the parties, nor can we usually agree 
100 percent with either party. So, to the extent 
that we are drawn in, we usually leave both 
sides somewhat dissatisfied and, on occasion, a 
bit angry with us. The role of the peacemaker 
is usually thankless, at least on the part of the 
parties to the dispute. But it is a responsibility 
we dare not shirk. 

Sharing Peacelteeping Responsibilities 

Does this mean that the United States must 
be the policeman — and the judge — for the en- 
tire free world ? That is the second of the two 
general questions about our role in "other peo- 
ple's quarrels." The answer is no. It is imprac- 
ticable and would be presumptuous for one na- 
tion to try to patrol every "beat" in the free 

There are other — and better — ways of making 



and keeping peace. Tliese lie in the activities 
of groups of nations cither informal or orga- 
nized. The advantages are perhaps obvious. 
But, as the late Justice Oliver "Woiulell Holmes 
once said: "We need education in the obvious 
more than investigation of the obscure." 

In some cases, a few important neighbors 
or other friends may be helpful. In others, 
regional organizations, such as the Organization 
of American States and the Organization of 
African Unity, may be useful. In still otliers, 
the United Nations may be the most effective 

An international organization is often more 
acceptable politically than any of its members 
acting individually. The flag of the United 
Nations is the emblem of a vrorld community. 
It can be flown in places where the flag of an- 
other sovereign nation would be considered an 

"When we act in concert with others, the re- 
sponsibility for success — or failure — is shared. 
And when we contribute to international peace- 
keeping missions, the costs also are shared. 

There has been some suggestion that the 
United States has carried somewhat more than 
its fair share of the financial load, wliile other 
nations have carried less than their share or 
none at all. 

Of course we think that all nations should 
carry their fair share at all times. But not all 
nations have agreed with us; some have been 
opposed to keeping or restoring the peace be- 
cause they believed their interests would be 
served by conflict. 

If we have carried a substantial share of the 
load, it has been because we considered it in 
our national interest to do so. That was the case 
in the Congo. President Eisenhower passed 
up a request from the Government of the Congo 
to intervene directly and turned, instead, to the 
United Nations. Wlien President Kemiedy 
took office, he reviewed the situation and de- 
cided to adhere to that policy. Eventually we 
bore something more than our normal share of 
the cost of this United Nations operation, but 
the expense to us was unquestionably much less 
than that of alternative ways of restoring order 
and keeping the Communists from establishing 
a base in this potentially rich coimtry in the 
heart of Africa. 

Now the United Nations has undertaken to 
restore order and peace in Cyprus and to medi- 
ate the dispute between Cypriots of Greek and 
Turkish descent. Tiie settlement of this dis- 
pute involving two of our NATO allies and the 
security of NATO's southeastern flank is of 
vital interest to us and all the free world. 

It is in our national interest, and in the 
national interest of all peaceful countries, to 
help create, train, and finance workable and 
effective international police machinery — to 
share our own capacity to act in the service of 
peace and to share responsibility for keeping 
the peace. 

We applaud the decisions taken by the Nor- 
dic countries and by Canada and Holland to 
earmark and train special units to be on call 
for peacekeeping duties with the United Na- 
tions. We therefore shall continue to work 
for a much more reliable system of financing 
such operations : The thought that the issue of 
peace or war might turn on the availabilitj^ of 
relatively small amounts of money is an offense 
to mind and morals. 

But I do not want to place all the emphasis 
on a police force ready to rush out after dis- 
putes have broken -into violence. The first 
order of business is to seek a resolution before 
violence occurs. xVnd tliis, of course, means 
early recourse to negotiation, mediation, arbi- 
tration, and any techniques of factfinding and 
observation that can help to clarify and de-fuse 
incipient threats to the peace. 

If this can be done through regional organi- 
zations without recoui"se to the United Nations, 
so much the better. If it can be done directly — 
or with the assistance of an impartial third 
party — better still. But, the world being what 
it is, more and more of these disputes are likely, 
in one form or another, to come before the 
United Nations. 

The United Nations is an imperfect organiza- 
tion ; no one knows that better than the policy- 
makers and policy executors who work in it and 
through it. The need for various improvements 
in the United Nations machinery has become 
increasingly clear. And not all of these require 
amendment of the chai'ter. Recently I sug- 
gested the consideration of several steps to im- 
prove the procedures of the General Assem- 
bly — steps designed to limit irresponsible talk 

APRIL C, 1964 



and symbolic resolutions and to promote re- 
sponsible decisions and recommendations, de- 
cisions and recommendations which will have 
the support of the nations which supply the 
TJ.N. with resources and have the capacity to 

Despite the difficulties which it has obviously 
experienced, the United Nations commands our 
continuing support. As President Johnson said 
to the General Assembly last December 17 : ^ 

. . . more than ever we support the United Nations 
as the best instrument yet devised to promote the 
peace of the world and to promote the well-being of 

Building a Decent World Order 

Improving and strengthening the United Na- 
tions is an important part — but only a part — of 
our greatest task : the building of a decent world 
order. Today our nation and our way of life 
can be safe only if our worldwide environment 
is safe. By worldwide I mean not only the land, 
waters, and air of the earth but the adjacent 
areas of space, as far as man can maintain in- 
struments capable of affecting life on earth. 
Our worldwide environment will be perma- 
nently safe only if mankind succeeds in estab- 
lishing a decent world order. 

An enormous part of our work in the State 
Department has to do with building, bit by bit, 
a decent world order. This receives relatively 
little attention in the headlines, but it goes on, 
day after day, around the clock. It includes 
hundreds of international conferences a year, 
many of them on teclmical areas of interna- 
tional cooperation and understanding, such as 
the control of narcotics, commercial aviation, 
postal services, et cetera. 

Tliis vast, constructive task is the heart of 
all we are doing to develop closer ties between 
ourselves and other countries of the free world. 
It imderlies our efforts to build imder the um- 
brella of the NATO alliance an effective Atlan- 
tic community and to achieve closer unitj' with 
our friends in the Pacific. It underlies our ef- 
forts to execute the grand design of an Alliance 
for Progress among the nations of this hemi- 

* Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112. 
' Ibid., Jan. C, 1904, p. 2. 

sphere. It underlies our efforts to create an 
effective partnership between the economically 
advanced countries and those that are newly 

This vast, constructive task involves the low- 
ering of barriers to world trade. It involves 
our foreign aid programs, which support the 
independence and the economic and social prog- 
ress of tlie developing countries. It involves 
all that we do to promote cultural and other 
exchanges with other nations. 

We do not — and must not — allow the drum- 
fire of crises in the headlines to cause us to 
neglect the building of a decent world order, 
the kind of world set forth in the preamble and 
articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. We are working toward : 

— a world free of aggression — aggression by 
whatever means; 

• — a world of independent nations, each with 
the institutions of its own choice but cooper- 
ating with one another to their mutual 
advantage ; 

— a world of economic and social advance for 
all peoples; 

— a world which provides sure and equitable 
means for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and which moves steadily toward a rule of law ; 

—a world in which the powers of the state 
over the individual are limited by law and cus- 
tom, in which the personal freedoms essential 
to the dignity of man are secure ; 

— a world free of hate and discrimination 
based on race, or nationality, or color, or eco- 
nomic or social status, or religious beliefs; 

— and a world of equal rights and equal op- 
portunities for the entire human race. 

We believe that is the kind of world which 
most of the peoples of the world want. That 
is the goal toward which we are working, tena- 
ciously and untiringly. And we are making 
headway. If we persevere, we shall eventually 
reach our goal : a world in which the "Blessings 
of Liberty" are secure for all mankind. We 
dare not falter. For unless the world is made 
safe for freedom, our own freedom cannot 

There are those who would quit the struggle 
by letting down our defenses, by gutting our 
foreign aid programs, by leaving the United 



Nations. They would abandon the field to our 
adverearics. That is, of course, what tlie Com- 
munists want most. It is no accident that their 
favorite slogan is "Yanks, go home." Insofar 
as anybody here or abroad pays attention to 
tlie quitters, they are lending aid and comfort 

to our enemies. I feci certain that the Ameri- 
can people will reject the quitters, with their 
prescription for retreat and defeat. I believe 
that the American people have the will and the 
stamina to push on along the toilsome path to 

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress 

Address hy President Johnson^ 

Thirty-one years ago this month Franklin 
Eoosevelt proclaimed the policy of the Good 
Neighbor. Tliree years ago this month John 
Kenned}' called for an Alliance for Progress 
among the American Republics.- Today my 
country rededicates itself to these principles 
and renews its commitment to the partnership 
of the hemisphere to carry them forward. 

We meet as fellow citizens of a remarkable 
hemisphere. Here, a century and a half ago, 
we began the movement for national independ- 
ence and freedom from foreign rule which is 
still the most powerful force in all the world. 
Here, despite occasional conflict, we have peace- 
fully shared our hemisphere to a degree un- 
matched by any nation, anywhere. 

Here, and in this very room, we have helped 
create a system of international cooperation 
which Franklin Roosevelt called "the oldest 
and the most successful association of sovereigii 
governments anywhere in tlie world." Here 
are 20 nations who, sharing the traditions and 
values of Western civilization, are bound to- 

'Made at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16 on 
the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de 
Santamaria as chairman of the Inter-American Com- 
mittee on the Alliance for Progress (White House press 
release; as-delivered text). 

' Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. 

gether by a common belief in the dignity of 
man. Here are 20 nations who have no desire 
to imjwse a single ideology or system on any- 
one else, who believe that each country must 
follow its own path to fulfillment with freedom, 
who take strength from the richness of their 

So it is on this — this history and this accom- 
plishment, these common values and this com- 
mon restraint — that we base our hope for our 
future. Today these hopes center largely on 
the Alliance for Progress that you are all so 
interested in. 

John F. Kennedy has been taken from us. 
The alliance remains a source for our faith and 
a cliallenge to our capacity. The Alliance for 
Progress owes much to the vision of President 
Kennedy. But he imderstood that it flows 
from the desires and ideas of those in each of 
our countries who seek progress with freedom. 
In its councils, all nations sit as eqiuils. This 
is the special significance of CIAP [Inter- 
American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress] — the organization that we honor 
today. Througli it, the alliance will now be 
guided by the advice and wisdom of men from 
throughout the hemisphere. 

It needs and is getting the best leadership our 

APRIL G, 1904 


continents have to offer. It has such leader- 
ship in Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, one of our 
most distinguislied Americans. 

Basic Principles of the Alliance 

In the last 3 years we have built a structure 
of common effort designed to endure for many 
years. In those years much has been accom- 
plished. Throughout Latin America new 
schools and factories, housing and hospitals 
have opened new opportunities. Nations have 
instituted new measures of land and tax reform, 
educational expansion, and economic stimulus 
and discipline. 

We are proud of these achievements. But as 
we take pride in what has thus far been done, 
our minds turn to the great unfinished business. 
Only by facing these shortcomings, only by 
fighting to overcome them, can we make our 
alliance succeed in the years ahead. 

Let me make clear what I believe in. They 
are not failures of principle or failures of belief. 
The alliance's basic principles of economic de- 
velopment, of social justice, of human freedom, 
are not only the right path; they are the only 
path for tliose who believe that botli the wel- 
fare and the dignity of man can advance side 
by side. To those who prize freedom, there 
just simply is no alternative. 

There is no magic formula to avoid the com- 
plex and the sometimes painful and difficult 
task of basic social reform and economic ad- 
vance. There is no simple trick that will trans- 
form despair into hope, that will turn misery 
and disease into abundance and health. Those 
who think that the path of progress in this 
hemisphere will be easy or painless are arousing 
false hopes and are inviting disappointment. 

Tha criticism which can give us new vigor 
and which must guide us is of those who share 
our beliefs but offer us better ways to move 
toward better goals. We have learned much 
about the difficulties and tlie flaws of our 
alliance in the past 3 years. We must today 
profit from this experience. With faith in our 
principles, with pride in our achievements, with 
tlie help of candid and constructive criticism, 
we are now prepared to move ahead with re- 
newed effort and renewed confidence. 

Need for Increased Cooperation 

Tlie first area of emphasis is increased co- 
operation — among ourselves, with other na- 
tions, with private and public institutions. We 
will continue our efforts to protect producing 
nations against disastrous price changes so 
harmful to their economies, and consumers 
against short supply and unfair price rises. 
We will intensify our cooperation in the use 
of our resources in the process of development. 
CIAP itself is an important step in that direc- 
tion, and CIAP has our full support. 

But other institutions as well — the Inter- 
American and World Banks, the private foun- 
dations and cooperatives, the savings institu- 
tions and sources of agricultural credit — must 
in every coimtry focus their energies on the 
efforts to overcome the massive difficulties of 
capital shortage and hunger and lack of ade- 
quate educational facilities. 

So that ray own country's participation in 
this cooperation might receive needed leader- 
ship and direction, I have given Secretary 
Mann, who enjoys my highest confidence, broad 
responsibility for our role in the alliance.^ His 
appointment reflects my complete determina- 
tion to meet all the commitments of the United 
States to the alliance. 

Our pledge of substantial external help has 
been met in the past, and my administration 
will spare no effort to meet it in the future, and 
my confidence is reinforced by my knowledge 
that the people of the United States also sup- 
port that commitment to our fellow Americans. 

We urge and we welcome the constructive 
contribution of developed nations outside this 
hemisphere. We believe in diversity in the 
modern world. We can all learn from one 
anotlier. Capital, teclmical know-how, access 
to markets, fair prices for basic commodities — 
all of these will contribute to the rapid develop- 
ment which is the goal of all of us. 

But public funds are not enough. We must 
work together to insure the maximum use of 

'Thomas C. Mann is Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs, Special Assistant to the 
President, and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance 
for ProRress. For text of a letter of Dec. 1."), 1963, 
from President Johnson to Mr. Mann at the time of 
his appointment, see ibid., .Tan. C, 1964, p. 9. 



private capital, domestic and foreign: witiiout 
it, {jrowtli will certainly fall far behind. Such 
capital will respond to a stable prospect of fair 
earnings and a chance to create badly needed 
industry and business on a responsible and safe 
and sound basis. Those who destroy the confi- 
dence of risk capital, or deny it a chance to 
offer its enertry and talent, endanger the hopes 
of their people for a more abundant life, be- 
cause our abundant life flows from that energy 
and from that talent that wo have given a 

The Area of Self-Help 

The second area of emphasis is the area of 
self-help. Progress cannot be created by form- 
ing international organizations. Progress can- 
not be imposed by foreign countries. Progress 
cannot be purchased with large amounts of 
money or even with large amounts of good will. 

Progress in each coimtry depends upon the 
willingness of that country to mobilize its own 
resources, to inspire its own people, to create 
the conditions in which growth can and will 
flourish, for although help can come from with- 
out, success must come only from within. Those 
who are not willing to do that which is un- 
popular and that which is difficult will not 
achieve that which is needed or that which 
will be lasting. This is as true of my own coun- 
try's fight against poverty and racial injustice 
as it is of the fight of others against hunger 
and disease and illiteracy — the ancient enemies 
of all mankind. 

By broadening education, we can liberate new 
talents and energy, freeing millions from the 
bonds of illiteracy. Through land reform 
aimed at increased production, taking different 
forms in each country, we can provide those 
who till the soil with self-respect and increased 
income, and each country with increased pro- 
duction to feed the hungry and to strengthen 
their economy. 

Fair and progressive taxes, effectively col- 
lected, can provide the resources that are needed 
to improve education and public-health condi- 
tions and the social structure that is needed 
for economic growth. Measures ranging from 
control of inflation and encouragement of ex- 

ports to the elimination of deficits in public 
enterprises can help provide the basis of eco- 
nomic stability and growth on which our alli- 
ance can flourish. 

The Pursuit of Social Justice 

The third area of emphasis is the pursuit 
of social justice. Development and material 
progress are not ends in themselves. They are 
means to a better life and means to an increased 
opportunity for us all. They are the means for 
each to contribute his best talents and each to 
contribute his best desires. They are tlie means 
to the full dignity of man, for the Alliance for 
Progress is a recognition that the claims of the 
poor and the oppressed are just claims. It is 
an effort to fulfill those claims while at the same 
time strengthening democratic society and 
maintaining the liberty of man. 

So, no matter how great our progress, it will 
lack meaning unless every American from the 
Indian of the Andes to the impoverished farmer 
of Appalachia can share in the fruits of change 
and growth. Land reform, tax changes, edu- 
cation expansion, the fight against disease all 
contribute to this end. Everything else that we 
must do must be shaped by these guiding prin- 
ciples. In these areas — cooperation, self-help, 
social justice — new emphasis can bring us 
closer to success. 

At the same time we must protect the alliance 
against the efforts of communism to tear down 
all that we are building. The recent proof of 
Cuban aggression in Venezuela is only the lat- 
est evidence of those intentions. We will soon 
discuss how best we can meet these threats to 
the independence of us all. But I now, today, 
assure you that the full power of the United 
States is ready to assist any country whose 
freedom is threatened by forces dictated from 
beyond the shores of this continent. 

The United States and Panama 

Let me now depart for a moment from my 
main theme to speak of the differences that 
have developed between Panama and the United 

Our own position is clear, and it has been 
from the first hour that we learned of the dis- 

APRIL 6, 1964 


turbances. The United States will meet with 
Panama any time, anywhere, to discuss any- 
thing, to work together, to cooperate with each 
other, to reason with one another, to review and 
to consider all of our problems together, to tell 
each other all our opinions, all our desires, and 
all our concerns, and to aim at solutions and 
answers that are fair and just and equitable 
without regard to the size or the strength or 
the wealth of either nation. 

We don't ask Panama to make any precom- 
mitments before we meet, and we intend to 
make none. Of course, we cannot begin on 
this work until diplomatic relations are re- 
sumed, but the United States is ready today, 
if Panama is ready. As of this moment, I do 
not believe that there has been a genuine meet- 
ing of the miiads between the two Presidents of 
the two countries involved. 

Press reports indicate that the Government 
of Panama feels that the language which has 
been under consideration for many days com- 
mits the United States to a rewriting and to 
a revision of the 1903 treaty. We have made 
no such commitment, and we would not think 
of doing so before diplomatic relations are re- 
sumed and miless a fair and satisfactory adjust- 
ment is agreed upon. 

Faith in tlie Power of Freedom 

Those of us who have gathered here today 
must realize that we are the principal guardians 
of the Alliance for Progress. But the alliance 
is not here, and it is not in office buildings; it 
is not in meeting rooms in presidential man- 
sions throughout the hemisphere. The alliance 
is in the aspirations of millions of farmers and 
workers, of men without education, of men 
without hope, of poverty-stricken families 
whose homes are the villages and the cities of an 
entire continent. 

They ask simply the opportunity to enter 
Into the M'orld of progress and to share in the 
growth of the land. From their leaders, from 
us, they demand concern and compassion and 
dedicated leadership and dedicated labor. 

I am confident that in the days to come we 
will be able to meet those needs. It will not 
be an easy task. The barriers are huge. Tlie 
enemies of our freedom seek to harass us at 

every turn. We are engaged in a struggle for 
the destiny of the American Republics, but it 
was a great poet, William Butler Yeats, who 
reminded us that there was doubt if any nation 
can become prosperous unless it has national 
faith. Our alliance will prosper because, I be- 
lieve, we do have that faith. It is not idle 
hope but the same faith that enabled us to 
nourish a new civilization in these spacious con- 
tinents, and in that new world we will carry 
forward our Alliance for Progress in such a 
way that men in all lands will marvel at the 
power of freedom to achieve the betterment of 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Hon- 
duras, Heman Corrales Padilla, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on March 16. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 118 dated March 16. 

U.S. Prepared To Review 
Differences With Panama 

Statement hy President Johnson ^ 

The present inability to resolve our differ- 
ences with Panama is a source of deep regret. 

Our two countries are not Imked by only a 
single agreement or a single interest. We are 
bound together in an inter-American system 
whose objective is, in the words of the charter, 
". . . through their mutual understanding and 
respect for the sovereignty of each one, to pro- 
vide for the betterment of all . . . ." 

Under the many treaties and declarations 
which form the fabric of that system, we have 
long been allies in the struggle to strengthen 
democracy and enhance the welfare of our 

' Read to news correspondents by President Johnson 
on Mar. 21 (White House press release). 



Our history is witness to this essential unity 
of interest and belief. Panama has unhesitat- 
ingly come to our side, twice in this century, 
when we were threatened by aggression. On 
December 7, 1941, Panama declared war on our 
attackers even before our own Congress had 
time to act. Since tluit war, Panama has whole- 
heartedly joined with us, and our sister Repub- 
lics, in shaping the agreements and goals of this 

AVe have also had a special relationship with 
Panama, for they have shared with us the bene- 
fits, the burdens and trust of maintaining the 
Panama Canal as a lifeline of defense and a 
keystone of hemispheric prosperity. All free 
nations are grateful for the effort they have 
given to this task. 

As circumstances change, as history shapes 
new attitudes and expectations, we have re- 
viewed periodically this special relationship. 

We are well aware that the claims of the Gov- 
ernment of Panama, and of the majority of the 
Panamanian people, do not spring from malice 
or hatred of America. They are based on a 
deepl}' felt sense of the honest and fair needs of 
Panama. It is, therefore, our obligation as al- 
lies and partners to re^aew these claims and to 
meet them, when meeting them is both just and 

We are ready to do this. 

We are prepared to review every issue which 
now divides us, and every problem which the 
Panama Government wishes to raise. 

We are prepared to do this at any time and 
at any place. 

As soon as he is invited by the Government of 
Panama, our Ambassador will be on his way. 
We shall also designate a special representative. 
He will arrive with full authority to discuss 
every difficulty. He will be charged with the 
responsibility of seeking a solution which recog- 
nizes the fair claims of Panama and protects 
the interests of all the American nations in the 
canal. We cannot determine, even before our 
meeting, what form that solution might best 
take. But his instructions will not prohibit any 
solution which is fair, and subject to the appro- 
priate constitutional processes of both our 

I hope that on this basis we can begin to re- 

solve our problems and move ahead to confront 
the real enemies of this hemisphere — the ene- 
mies of hunger and ignorance, and in- 
justice. I know President Chiari shares this 
hope. For, despite today's disagreements, the 
common values and interests which unite us are 
far stronger and more enduring than the differ- 
ences which now divide us. 

United States and Norway Extend 
Educational Exchange Program 

Press release 113 dated March 10 

Secretary Eusk and Norwegian Foreign Min- 
ister Halvard M. Lange signed at Washington 
on March 16 an agreement extending the bi- 
national progi'am of educational exchanges un- 
der the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. The 
amended agreement provides for the first time 
for the program to be jointly financed by Nor- 
way and the United States. Under the same 
act, similar joint financing agreements have 
been entered into with the Federal Eepublic of 
Germany, Austria, and Sweden. 

It is the intention of the U.S. Government, 
subject to appropriation of funds, to contribute 
the equivalent in Norwegian kroner of $1 mil- 
lion to the financing of this program. The 
Eoyal Norwegian Government plans a contribu- 
tion of 500,000 kroner ($70,000) . The program 
level for the 196J^65 academic year has been 
established at the equivalent in kroner of $214,- 
000, of which $200,000 will be contributed by the 
U.S. Government and $14,000 by the Govern- 
ment of Norway. 

The original U.S. educational exchange 
agreement with Norway was signed on May 25, 
1949.^ It is noteworthy that Mr. Lange signed 
for Norway on that occasion and has also signed 
all three of the intervening amended agree- 
ments ^ between the United States and Norway. 

Since the initiation of the program in 1949 
the U.S. Educational Foundation in Norway 
has administered grants to 1,394 Norwegian citi- 
zens who have traveled to the United States, 
and to 478 U.S. citizens who have gone to 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2000. 
' TIAS 3118, 3282, and 4503. 


Ambassadors and AID IVIission 
Chiefs in Latin America Meet 

Tlie Department of State announced on 
March 18 (press release 125) that on that day 
U.S. ambassadors and AID mission chiefs in 
Latin America had completed 3 days of joint 
consultations with senior officials in the Depart- 
ment of State and other agencies of the Govern- 
ment. President Johnson met with tlie ambas- 
sadors and other Department officials at the 
conclusion of their sessions. 

On March 16 the President, the ambassadors, 
the AID mission chiefs, the Latin American 
ambassadors in the United States, and State 
Department officials participated in ceremonies 
held at the Pan American Union to install 
Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as chairman of the 
newly created Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress.^ 

The joint consultations on overall U.S. policy 
in the hemisphere were arranged to give officials 
from the field an opportmaity to engage in a 
full exchange of views with those in Washing- 
ton responsible for formulating U.S. policy in 
Latin America, particularly in relation to Alli- 
ance for Progress operations. The exchange 
of views included a discussion of the reorgani- 
zation of the Bureau of Inter-American 

The meeting afforded an opportunity to hold 
a country-by-country review of political, eco- 
nomic, and social conditions in Latin America. 
The meeting also provided an opportunity to 
discuss programs of all other Government 
agencies whose activities have foreign policy 
implications besides those directly involved, 
namely State, AID, USIA, and the Peace 

Officials from the State Department who par- 
ticipated in the meetings included Secretary 
Eusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary 
Harriman, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, and 
Assistant Secretary Johnson, as well as AID 
Administrator Bell and Assistant Secretary 

Carl T. Rowan, Director of USIA, Agricul- 
ture Secretary Orville L. Freeman, Commerce 

Secretary Luther H. Hodges, Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy, Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, and 
Treasury Assistant Secretary John C. Bullitt 
also participated in the meetings. 

Representatives from Congress and from out- 
side the Government also participated in the 
meeting. Senators Wayne Morse and Hubert 
H. Humphrey addressed the ambassadors and 
discussed with them congressional attitudes af- 
fecting U.S. foreign policy. AFL-CIO Presi- 
dent George Meany also addressed the meeting 
in a discussion of labor conditions in Latin 

' See p. f>35. 

' Following is the text of a statement read to news 
correspondents on Mar. 16 by Richard I. Phillips, Direc- 
tor of the Office of News : 

"Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State and 
United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, will be responsible for the policy direction of 
U.S. economic assistance programs in Latin America 
that are within the broad framework of the Agency for 
International Development. The new arrangement 
will help carry out President Johnson's call for the 
United States to speak with one voice on Latin Amer- 
ican affairs. It also reflects the President's instruction 
that the Alliance for Progress receive priority in all 
AID operations. 

"In December the President appointed Mr. Mann as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
and announced that he would have broad authority 
over all Latin American activities of the U.S. Govern- 
ment. With the approval of Secretary Rusk, David 
E. Bell, Administrator of AID, has delegated to Mr. 
Mann the authorities of an AID Assistant Administra- 
tor with respect to loans, grants, and extended risk 
guaranties, as well as the selection and assignment of 
AID Latin American personnel in Washington and 
overseas missions. Exercise of this authority in cases 
of exceptional magnitude, significant departures from 
general AID policies, and in appointments to top-level 
jobs will be subject to Mr. Bell's concurrence. 

"The new arrangement will assure more closely com- 
bined operation of the geographic 'desks' in the De- 
partment of State's Bureau of Inter-Auierican Affairs 
and AID'S Bureau for Latin America. Under the ar- 
rangement the number of office directors will be in- 
creased from six to ten, the functional offices in the 
AID Bureau for Latin America will be retained, and 
the staff offices will continue to give advisory and 
supporting services to the alliance operations. 

"Mr. William D. Rogers, who is Deputy U.S. Co- 
ordinator for the Alliance for Progress, will serve as 
Mr. Mann's deputy for AID matters." 



Journalism and Foreign Affairs 

by Robert J. Manning 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 

One in my line of government work, when 
he faces an audience of journalists, has the diffi- 
cult choice of talking directly about his own 
work or dabbling more generally in foreign 

The second alternative is probably easier, and 
cert<ainly less risky. But I would prefer to 
talk tonight mostly about our business — journal- 
ism and foreign affairs. I think there is much 
we can discuss ; so I'll take the risk that before 
the night is out, I'll have proved myself akin 
to the ilark Twainian Daniel whom God, as the 
story goes "ordered forth into the lion's den, 
but he slipped and came in tenth." 

Information gaps are probablj' inevitable in 
the best informed societies, and ours is no ex- 
ception, however clearly defined the issues of 
foreign policy may be. Wliat I have been 
struck by in the past few years are the special 
reasons for such a gap today — and the special 
peril it holds. 

The reasons lie, of course, in the nature of 
our world. "We live at the floodtide of change 
in all the continents. We are confronted with 
a totalitarian ideology that seeks our destruc- 
tion. And we are riding the crest of a revolu- 
tion in science and teclmology. 

Each of the challenges we face would tax the 
wisdom, the ingenuity, and the patience of any 
generation of Americans. Together they pose 
a test greater than any our nation has con- 
fronted. Most acutely, they pose a test of 
public understanding. 

This is a test made difficult by our history. 
We Americans are the product of a century of 
precious isolation. We developed our nation 

behind the protective shield of great oceans. 
In the mid-19th century Alexis de Tocqueville 
wrote that the American system of government 
was the best ever invented by man. He pre- 
dicted it would be adequate to meet the needs 
of our society for many generations, unless the 
United States became actively involved in 
foreign affairs. The perceptive Frenchman 
did not try to predict wliat would happen in 
that eventuality because he considered it un- 
likely. Needless to say, it has happened, and 
with a vengeance. 

Since World War II we have catapulted to 
a position of world leadership and full world 
responsibility. Yet our training as a nation 
for such leadership and responsibility has been 
minimal. The great and complex problems of 
this age are difficult enough for our policy- 
makers to comprehend. How then are they to 
be adequately explained to and contributed to 
by the general public ? 

This Republic is in great peril when the pub- 
lic is inadequately informed. We see in many 
parts of our country today the results of public 
confusion on questions of foreign policy — a 
growing sense of frustration, among some 
groups, that has given rise to extremism; a 
quest for easy, quick "answers"; a search for 
scapegoats; a demand for such contradictory 
"solutions" as smaller budgets and "total vic- 
tory," higher tariffs and freer trade, cheap 
securitv and reckless venturesomeness. 

' Address made before the third annual government 
relations workshop of the National Editorial Associa- 
tion at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 13 (press release 

APRIL 6, 1064 


Without question, the subject matter of 
foreign policy is growing more complex. A 
great deal is happening all the time in foreign 
affairs all around our planet and, with the ad- 
vent of rockets, in outer space as well. 

We have our own national interest, our own 
set of foreign policies and foreign crises. 
These are diverse and complicated to a degree 
that frequently agonizes the most knowledge- 
able experts. But ours is a world of 120 other 
countries, of 120 other foreign policies, of 120 
other sets of national goals or national appe- 
tites. Keeping track of what is going on, and 
translating it into terms luiderstandable by 
large numbers of citizens, is a task that 
challenges both the press and the government 
departments concerned with foreign policy, 
primarily, of course, the Department of State 
and the Wliite House. 

Altering the "Adversary Relationship" 

The i-elationship of you, the press, and us 
in government in our open society is not a 
simple thing. It is at least as variegated as 
human nature, and vulnerable to human 
frailty. The traditional stance of the press 
confronting government is the adversary rela- 
tionship; its lieraldic sign is crossed swords 
witli bar sinister on a field of spilled ink. In 
domestic political matters excessive coziness 
between any element of the press and a reigning 
political group quickly and properly draws 

In foreign affairs, however, I question 
whether the old-fashioned adversary relation- 
ship is sufficient to the delicate task our nation 
faces these days on the world scene. Wlicn 
you print the news, to an important extent 
you make the larger facts. Wliat the press 
chooses to emphasize frequently becomes the 
postulates of public o])inion (though I have 
some reservations on this point) and as such 
can become an important ingredient of policy. 
In such a situation is the public interest best 
served when tlie press and government stand 
on separate pedestals and snipe at each other 
across a mythical abyss? I think you will 
agree tliat tlie answer is no — and that journal- 
ism as well as government is aware of the need 
for something more. I suggest that accurate 

reporting perhaps requires a closer relationship 
than may have been traditional, perhaps a 
closer one than some here tonight would con- 
sider wise or possible. 

On the basis of long experience in journal- 
ism and 2 years' experience in government, I 
suggest a direct cross-fertilization between 
American journalism and American govern- 
ment. Let me be as precise as possible, so as 
to avoid misunderstanding: The separation of 
journalism and government is as basic and as 
advisable as separation of church and state. 
Government intrusion into the functioning of 
journalism — whether by censorship, by regu- 
latory controls, by economic penetration, or 
political manipulation — would represent serious 
jeopardy to our political system. 

That accepted, there is more to be said about 
the subject. Countless times in these last 2 
years I have wished that officials in govern- 
ment knew more about journalism, its needs, its 
practices, its uses, and its shortcomings. Even 
more convinced am I that journalists — most of 
them — need to know more, much more, about 
government, how it works, why it works and, 
sometimes, does not work; how decisions are 
made and how they are not made; what are 
the facts as against the myths and miscon- 

There is one direct way to accomplish this. 
Journalism should encourage some of its top 
established hands, and some of its more prom- 
ising new hands, to take leave for intervals 
of a year or two in government service. The 
government would profit from the infusion of 
versatility, energy, and enterprise that makes 
a good newspaperman. The newspaperman 
would become a wiser and more valuable crafts- 
man. On his return, the newspaper reader 
would be better served and better informed. 

The opportunities for newspapermen in gov- 
ernment are not by any means confined to in- 
formation work (which in many ways is the 
least demanding and least rewarding of the 
many activities for which a competent news- 
man is fitted). The governmental careers of 
men like Carl Rowan, William Attwood, and 
John Bartlow Martin, to name a few, suggest 
tlie high quality of service and imagination that 
a journalistic background can pix)duce. 



I suppose there are still some editors and pub- 
lishers who, while sipping at the I'Jth hole with 
leaders of industry, banking, and commerce, will 
shake their heads and maintain that a news- 
paperman who enters into public service some- 
how taints himself for further journalism. It 
seems unfortunate that such thinking shoidd 
survive the kerosene lamp and the automobile 
crank. I can think literallj' of no activity that 
has been more educational to me as a journalist 
than these past "2 yeare in government. In a 
time when, as H. G. Wells says, "human history 
becomes more and more a race between education 
and catastrophe," I heartily recommend a few 
semesters in Washington or at an embassy 

Whatever steps might be taken to alter or 
improve the old adversary relationship, one 
point must be emphasized from the outset: It 
should neither suggest nor require any abdica- 
tion of the critical faculties of the reporter and 
editor. Quite the contrary, the more tliorough 
knowledge which skilled reporters today ac- 
cumulate about what is happening in foreign 
atl'airs serves to invigorate, not weaken, the 
function of responsible criticism. On a subject 
like South Viet-Xam — unquestionably one of the 
most diflicult and sensitive issues confronting 
us — the access to information within tlie govern- 
ment that has been available to the press has 
provided the basis for the considerable number 
of well-informed and critical editorials that 
have appeared in recent weeks. 

Irresponsible criticism is, of course, a dilTer- 
ent matter, but there is a very high correlation 
between misinformation, or lack of information, 
and the kind of wild criticism that graces the 
"hate sheets" of the right and reveals itself in 
the latent paranoia of a few newspapers and 
correspondents aroimd the country. The reck- 
less charges that pass for comment in these 
forums cannot survive exposure to information. 
It is no coincidence that with rare exceptions 
the -writers (I hesitate to dignify them, and 
besmirch the craft, by calling them reporters) 
■who regularly produce the most startling ac- 
cusations about the State Department do not call 
my office or any other section of the Department 
to ask questions or check conclusions. Appar- 
ently they feel their concoctions will clang more 
loudly if not muted by the facts. 

"A House With Many Window*" 

Leaving aside this category — in which, by the 
way, I place none of the regular State Depart- 
ment correspondents — it does seem to me that 
on the whole the job of communicating informa- 
tion about foreign policy is one that the press 
and the government have in common, not one 
in which our interests are opposed. The basic 
elements of my present job are remarkably sim- 
ilar to that of a repoiler : to get out the news — 
fast, accurate, and as complete as possible. 
Nearly always my associates — several of whom 
are also former newsmen — and I are in the po- 
sition of working with, not against, the report- 
ers who cover foreign news and call us daily, 
if not hourly. 

Information flows from the State Department 
in many ways. In testimony last year before 
Congressman [John E.] Moss's subcommittee 
on government information, James Reston of 
the New York Times described the Department 
as a "gabby outfit." Ours is a house with many 
windows, and its daily information output is 
enormous. Anyone who, as I have, has served 
as a correspondent in a foreign capital will 
vouch for the truth of the statement that no- 
where in the w'orld are reporters given such 
complete and unfettered access to the makers 
and shapers of foreign policy. As a practical 
matter, every State Department reporter has 
a government telephone directory which tells 
him what every officer in the Department does 
and who's in charge of what desk, area, or sec- 
tion. A reporter is not confined to a few known 
sources. ^AHiatever the subject that arises, he 
can quickly pinpoint the individuals with re- 
sponsibility and can call them directly, by di- 
rect dial, without having to filter through a 
central switchboard. Even home telephone 
niunbers are provided — and are regularly used 
by reporters with late-breaking deadlines. The 
newsmen assigned to the State Department 
make wide use of this access-by-telephone every 
day. It is a source of information at least as 
important as the regular press briefings by the 
Department spokesman and the Secretary of 
State. Naturally, as in any area, he has to 
build his own network of sources who are able 
and willing to sen-e him. But the sources are 
there to be cultivated. 

APRIL 6, 1964 


In addition, considerable use is made of back- 
ground briefings. This is tlie device, treasured 
by reporters everywhere, whereby a high official 
will discuss subjects but not for direct quotation 
and not for attribution. The stories that result 
are generally authoritative and accurate, and 
they contribute greatly to the supply of infor- 
mation publicly available about United States 
foreign relations. They provide important 
guidance on the government's thinking on a 
given topic. 

I have listened to a lot of nonsense about the 
so-called iniquity of the backgroimd briefing, 
but most of it comes from distant critics who 
make me agree with Josh Billings that "it is 
better to know nothing than to know what ain't 
so." Anybody with experience in reporting 
knows two things. One is that a reporter is 
only as good as his ability to separate fact from 
fancy, bogus from real. Another is that there 
is no such thing as goldfish-bowl diplomacy. 
Show me a businessman who conducts his busi- 
ness in a high-pitched voice at noon on Main 
Street, and I'll show you a diplomat who does 
his work by talking out loud on the front page 
of the Washington Post. 

Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty in nu- 
clear physics has a close analogy in foreign 
relations: It is usually not possible to describe 
a diplomatic situation publicly, however ac- 
curately, without changing it and making it 
different. The public comment itself becomes 
part of the situation. An on-the-record state- 
ment by the Secretary of State, be it a prepared 
speech or a response to a question, is instantly 
filmed, recorded, printed, and otherwise com- 
municated, with all the speed of modern tele- 
communications, to a mixed audience of friends, 
partners, skeptics, and enemies all aroimd the 
globe. Many are ready to seize on a single ill- 
considered word and blow it up for propaganda 
purposes. As a consequence, important com- 
ments issued formally on the record by high 
officials often must be planned as carefully as a 
surgical operation so that no listeners anywhere 
can have reason to misunderstand or abuse what 
is said. 

That is why most newsmen highly value the 
backgroimd device, which permits a policy of- 
ficer to speak freely and informally to let re- 

porters in on his thinking without giving our 
cold-war adversaries the same access. At the 
briefing conferences conducted twice a year at 
the Department for the press and other media 
a mixture of on-record and background discus- 
sions have been used. After the most recent 
conference, we asked the participants to com- 
ment on this point ; the 800 replies we received 
favored background briefuigs by four to one. 

In a sense the background rule makes it pos- 
sible for the government to take a reporter into 
its confidence. This calls for good faith on 
both sides, and it is nearly always present. The 
exceptions are happily infrequent, though no 
less irritating when they occur. It is a proce- 
dure that can be abused. It is an abuse, for 
example, for the government to use this method 
to float trial balloons, as a way to sample public 
opinion without choosing sides in advance, or 
in any way to mislead or misinform. It can be 
abused by reporters who fail to maintain the 
distinction between it and on-the-record brief- 
ings. But despite these pitfalls, its overall 
utility is great. The fact that a knife can be 
used to kill is no reason to eat with our fingers. 
The best safeguard against misuse of back- 
grounders lies in the skill and integrity of the 
reporters themselves. Wliat is said on back- 
ground or not for quotation is subject to the 
same acid tests of accuracy and relevancy as 
any other government pronouncement, and 
rightly so. 

Joint Responsibility in "Areas of Nondisclosure" 

Let me examine another aspect of the govern- 
ment-press relationship. It is frequently 
argued that it is the government's responsibility 
to keep secrets, the responsibility of the press 
to get them and print them. "The press lives 
by disclosure," opined the Times of London in 
1851. If a foreign agent came into the State 
Department and managed to procure secret in- 
formation, he would be liable to prosecution 
and a heavy sentence. When a reporter does 
the same thing, ho wins praise from his editor 
and gets nominated for prizes. The story is 
printed, and either way our enemies can read 

In the year 1964 I think that this simplified, 
traditional view of the role of the government 



ami (he role of the press is out of date. I j)refer 
to think that the responsibility both for inform- 
ing; tiie imblic and for niaintaininn; certain areas 
of nondisclosure is one which is siiared by the 
press and the govemmejit. To be sure, the 
press's responsibility is heavily weiphted to- 
ward full disclosure: I would not wish it other- 
wise. But I believe, and I think I speak for 
the majority of reportere, that we would lose 
an important ingreilient of the relationship of 
trust that is basic to how the press gets along 
witli government if the press did not recognize 
its responsibility in circumstances of great na- 
tional impoi'tnnce to help us keep some secrets. 
I feel that I am on solid ground when I say 
this because I know from my experience in the 
past year that with rare exceptions the report- 
ers who regularly cover the Department of 
State do recognize this responsibility. I know 
one reportei', for example, who is still sitting 
on a dramatic first-person story of his involve- 
ment in a rerent great international crisis. 
Many othei*s have happened upon or other- 
wise uncovered information which if immedi- 
ately divulged would have caused us serious 
difliculties. They did not immediately rush it 
into print, recognizing that to do so would not 
serve their own interests as responsible journal- 
ists seeking to report the news accurately and 
fully, and might seriously prejudice American 
foreign policy objectives or national security. 

Thirst for Foreign Policy Information Rising 

The responsibility for getting the news out 
is also one that we share. A great many things 
happen each day, only a few of which come to 
public attention— not because they are kept se- 
cret but because they are not considered news. 
The press itself is higlily selective. Only a 
fraction of the information that pours into a 
typical city room survives the cutting and par- 
ing process called editing and makas its way 
into print. Douglass Cater has written that 
the power of the press : 

. . . stems from Its ability to select — to define what 
is news and what isn't. In Washington on an average 
day, a good many hundreds of thousands of words are 
spoken, tens of dozens of "events" occur. The pres.s 
decides which of those words and events shall receive 
the prompt attention of millions and which, like tim- 

lH>r fallinK In a de»>i) and unlnliablled forest, Kball 
crash silently to the ground. 

Several independent studies show that an av- 
erage of ;5 to 8 percent of general news space 
in American newspapers is devoted to foreign 
affairs items. The average daily newspaper 
content of foreign news is 4 to 8 colunms. For- 
eign news actually sent by the A.s.sociate(l Press 
on its main ticker averages 2'2,000 words per 
day, or 27 columns. If nonduplicating items 
from other wire services plus special reports are ■ 
included, it can be calculated that the average 
American daily newspaper provides its readers 
with well under 20 percent of the foreign news 
actually reported each day. I simply do not 
think that is enough. 

The problem of making manageable the vast 
outpouring of news on foreign policy that be- 
comes available each day challenges journalism 
in many ways. The press often still practices 
methods of makeup, construction, and play that 
were in use half a century ago. As a result, 
editors often seem to be overwhelmed by the 
torrent of events and their readers have served 
up to them a daily collection of fragments. 
That approach to foreign affairs may have 
made sense when the United States was in- 
volved in only one crisis at a time. It no 
longer suffices today, when we are participants 
or ringside spectators to 15 to 20 crises at a 
time. The frequent result is that each day's 
news on each topic is apt to be so brief, so frag- 
mentary, as to be more misleading than no news 
at all. Too often, each day's fragment remains 
a fragment. As a restdt, in the words of the 
late Joe Liebling : 

Our present news situation, in the United States, is 
bn^aking down to something like the system of water 
distribution in the Casbah, where i)eddlers wander 
about with goatskins of water on small donkeys, and 
the inhabitants send down an oil tin and a couple of 
pennies when they feel thirst. 

Ironically this comes at a time when the na- 
tional thirst for foreign policy information is 
rising. The American people want to know 
what is happening, how it affects them, what 
we are doing about it. By any indication, in- 
cluding public opinion polls, more people are 
concerned about foreign policy than at any time 
in our history. Still one hears editors insisting 

APRIL 6, 1964 


that "the people" don't want to read a lot of 
foreign affairs guff. I do not believe it. 

The inability of the daily media to keep 
abreast of this rising level of interest is reflected 
in the success of other enterprises, particularly 
magazines, which give at least the impression 
of providing a fuller, connected account of for- 
eign news. Volume of information is not the 
problem; what is needed rather is a more re- 
flective approach to foreign news which relates 
the snippets to one another, which locates an 
event in history as well as geography, and which 
takes more profound account of the fact that 
other people's domestic politics often influence 
their foreign policies. 

Some Words of Criticism 

I do not want to abuse your hospitality, and 
I therefore hope that some words of criticism 
will not be taken amiss ; they come from a deep 
sense of involvement in the profession of jour- 
nalism and a desire to see improvements. I do 
not presume to tell you how to behave — for I 
recognize that tliere is no mightier potentate 
than the proprietor of an independent news- 
paper. Many of you, I know, are editors or 
publishers of weekly newspapers, and I under- 
stand there is solid backing to the claim that 
weeklies are more extensively and carefully 
read than many dailies. I understand also that 
in many cases the weekly is the only newspaper 
its readers i"ead. On both these counts, there- 
fore, it is depressing to know that so many edi- 
tors of weeklies disdain to provide their readers 
with much coverage of national and foreign 
affairs. I realize there are staffing and money 
problems, but in this age of communications 
wizardi-y, joint efforts, and speedy travel, the 
weekly community could easily and cheaply 
build up a service providing solid, well-written, 
and well-thought-out material on the big world 

Another more general characteristic of jour- 
nalism today should cause more concern than 
it seems to be causing. The press today suffers 
from a bad case of complacency and self -right- 
eousness, and is noteworthy among all fraterni- 
ties that perform public services for its lack of 

Our press today is keenly, sometimes even 

stridently, assertive of its rights and preroga- 
tives, but it has a bad case of laryngitis when 
it is time to talk about its responsibilities. If 
Congressman Moss will excuse me, I would like 
to say that the intellectual quality of a great 
deal of the testimony delivered to his subcom- 
mittee after the Cuban crisis was so low as to 
remind some of us of the old description of the 
Platte River in midsummer — 2 inches deep and 
a mile wide at the mouth. 

When it comes to actual performance, I think 
the press in this coimtry can be described as 
not only the freest and most imaginative but 
also the most responsible and best in the world. 
(One could make some reservations; for ex- 
ample, I would say tliat the vei-y best in British 
journalism surpasses most of the best in ours.) 
But we cannot afford to stop where we are and 
be satisfied. There is still too much tendency 
among editors to operate on the old-fashioned 
presumption that the reader has the IQ of a 
12-year-old child. There is still that ancient 
reflex that is mindful of the old Chicago city 
editor who once in anger called his staff to- 
gether and said, "What this newspaper needs 
is some new cliches." There is great truth in 
the indictment that the press is generally too 
greatly preoccupied by entertainment, by what 
it takes to reach the easier side of reader in- 

I have the impression that journalism is not 
doing enough to recruit and properly train top- 
level people. I have been struck in years since 
the war to find that newspapers and magazines, 
even some very good ones, have to go out and 
cajole people into journalism. The tendency 
to call it a profession and pay as if it weren't 
is still strong, once you get away from the 
metropolitan areas. 

As for the long vaunted "power of the press," 
where does that stand today? I confess that 
I am in a somewhat ambiguous state of mind; 
there are moments when I believe too many in 
government attach too much power or influence 
to the press; then there are mornings when I 
question that this is so. I think we have to 
concede that the power is indeed very great but 
that in general the press today is powerful more 
as an exciter than a provoker, and for the most 
part a channeler of other people's ideas and 
arguments. There has been a vast increase in 



analytical ami interpretive report in<r since tiie 
war, but still not a great deal of political, in- 
tellectual, tlie()l<)<;ical, or philosophical inspira- 
tion comes with the avera<;e newspajier in 

So the power of the press directly to influ- 
ence is in <;rejit part a negative power, as it is 
exerted today; it sterns in large part from 
othei"s' ideas. This is also related to the power 
of omission that comes from the fact that e^ich 
day the writers and the editors have to choose 
which large segments of a very large news 
Imdget they arc not going to pass on to the pub- 
lic. I don't mean to suggest that there is not 
still in our press the power to do great good 
(and bad) — great power to make or break ca- 
reei"s or ideas — but it is clearly limited, and the 
chief limit is set by the ability and the willing- 
ness of the possessors of this power to use it. 

Handling of Foreign Policy News 

Coming back to my home ground, the han- 
dling of foreign policy news, I would like to 
comment, if I ma}-, on two other tendencies that 
seem to me to create pi-oblems for all three 
elements — the newspapers, the readers, and the 

One is the newspapers" feverish preoccupa- 
tion not with what has happened but what is 
going to happen tomorrow. I know State De- 
partment correspondents who spend literally 
hours trying to learn the names of new ambas- 
sadorial or other appointees before candidates 
have even been selected. One prestigious news- 
paper over a period of several months had two 
separate "exclusive" stories reporting that a 
certain official had been picked as ambassador 
to two different capitals. The diplomat did not 
go to any one of those posts, and when he was 
actually appointed to his present post the news- 
paper neglected to report it. This overpreoccu- 
pation with getting ahead of events, to be the 
first to report what is going to happen, results 
in a lot of wasted motion, a lot of incorrect or 
highly premature stories, and any number of 
woes for government officials. More than that, 
however, it takes journalism's eye off the big 
part of the game — what has happened, what 
does it mean — to the detriment of us all. 

Even the best writers and reporters — and I 

believe that the corps that covers the Depart- 
ment of State and foreign affairs in Washing- 
ton is by and large the most diligent and most 
talented group in — are not always 
able to rise above the mixture of bugaboo and 
custom that dictates the structure and the play 
of stories. They are seriously handicapped by 
their eilitors' assmnption that it is still i>ossible 
to report the world's major convolutions as if 
they are innings in a ball game. This fre- 
quently leads to the scorecard wrap-up of a 
number of otherwise unrelated episodes in for- 
eign affairs, a device that few reporters like but 
one that many editors cannot resist. Usually 
the attempt is made to summarize a series of 
events around the world as "victories" or "de- 
feats" for U.S. policy. 

Nothing is easier, and few things are more 
misleading, than to chart, the tides of foreign 
relations with a limited set of phrases taken 
from the vocabulary of the sports page. The 
relations of nations in the world arena are not 
like a ball game; victory and defeiit are not de- 
termined by the number of times a ball goes 
out of the park. Evaluating progress in the 
cold war — forward, backward, sideways, up or 
down — is a subtle process, one which the most 
penetrating analysts usually avoid. They see 
all too clearly the folly of trying to pick out 
who's ahead from day to day or week to week. 

In a world where ideology confronts ideol- 
ogy, and both face the quickening tides of 
nationalism; where foreign policy pronoimce- 
ments by the leader of a nonalined state may be 
motivated by his domestic politics, and may in 
fact conflict with firm private assurances to the 
contrary — and are understood as such by all 
concerned; where aromid the globe nations and 
peoples above all are seeking their own form of 
development, their own definitions of progress; 
where Communist states swap insults and plot 
their own, nationally oriented paths m foreign 
and domestic policy; where our own alliances 
experience the natural retrenchments that must 
occur in a changing world — in such a world 
"victory"' and "defeat'' are usually no more than 
words to be played with. 

One of the occupational hazards of trying to 
keep score in foreign affairs is that it sometimes 
makes the practitioner look silly. Not even on 

APRIL 6, 1964 


the AP's weekly top-ten listings do teams 
plunge from victory to defeat and back again 
with the erratic swiftness ascribed to U.S. 

About 3 months ago a prominent weekly pub- 
lication put together a scorecard roundup 
which opened with the sentence: "Russia, the 
facts are showing, has lost the cold war." Two 
months later it printed a similar wrap-up which 
began : "Troubles of the world look somewhat 
less alarming than at any time in many years." 
A third installment, 4 weeks later, was summed 
up with tliis opening sentence: "America is 
going from defeat to defeat in almost every cor- 
ner of the world." It even carried a map pin- 
pointing the "defeats." Surely this must liave 
strained the credulity of some of the magazine's 
readers. I venture to suggest that the world 
has not changed that much in 3 months, and to 
deal with the matter in such a sophomoric man- 
ner verges on insult. The cold war goes on, 
neither won nor lost, but invariably changing 
in its manifestation. America is not "going 
from defeat to defeat" (nor does a globe have 

A reporter must always guard against re- 
porting the plausible as the actual, and this is 
certainly tnie in foreign affairs. What is likely 
or logical does not always happen in foreign 
policy; reporting likelihoods as facts before 
they come true is not far removed, it seems to 
me, from other kinds of misreporting. 

There is an important difference, it seems to 
me, between the right of a reporter to pursue 
information about foreign policy, or any other 
subject, and the responsibility of his newspaper 
to print all the data thus uncovered. The right 
of the reporter to try to find out what is hap- 
pening is limited only by his enterprise. I do 
not think any check beyond present security 
restrictions should be placed on a reporter's 
right to cover the news, which should be limited 
solely by liis enterprise. But the obligation to 
disclose by publication is not so absolute. 

Tlie press discloses in tlie name of the pub- 
lic's right to know. But the public also has a 
right to have its interests defended and ad- 
vanced in the field of foreign policy and nation- 
al security. These two rights may come in 
conflict, and when they do, the public may well 

prefer success to disclosure. There have been 
many ei:)isodes in the past 2 years — of which the 
Cuban missile crisis was the most dramatic — ■ 
where the success of American policy depended 
very directly on the presentation of a period of 
privacy during which the policy could be for- 
mulated and carried out, where disclosure 
would have spelled defeat. 

Where in these cases does the public interest 
lie? The public, I submit, has a right not to 
know when knowledge can gravely compromise 
our security or damage our foreign policy. 
Many reporters, among them the most able, re- 
spect both these rights. But their responsi- 
bility is less great than that of their editors, who 
are the ones who finally select what is printed — 
and is thus disseminated to the world at large, 
as well as the American people. It is not an 
easy responsibility to live with; it raises ques- 
tions to which no single answer is riglit. 

It is not for a government official to presume 
the right or the wisdom to settle this problem ; 
it is journalism's to contemplate, and I am sure 
that many of you have pondered it. 

Partnership Between Journalism and Government 

I have devoted mudi time to criticism be- 
cause I have assumed that you share with me a 
belief that healthy criticism is always needed 
among those who labor in the world of ideas. 
I have not taken pains to reiterate the obvious — 
that the American press today is indeed the 
"fourth brancli of government," in some ways 
the branch that is least captive of custom and 
least fearful to tread where the timid fear to 

A revelation of government service has been 
the discovery that this great partnership be- 
tween responsible journalism and responsible 
government — wary, sometimes abrasive, some- 
times argumentative — works, and it works for 
the country. 

A great nation devoid of intelligence, wrote 
Horace Mann, is "an obscene giant," destined 
despite its power and capacities, to "rush with 
the speed of a whirlwind to an ignominious 
end." We are together in striving to assure that 
this does not become our epitaph. 

The perils we live with today are jierhaps 
more subtle than those of World War II or 



the early days of the cold war. But they are 
no less real ami i)rol)al)ly more pernicious. 
Undeclannl warfare backed by (lie clialleuge of 
thermonuclear weapons is a greater danger than 
we e\er faced in the pa,st. These are problems 
for ail of us in press and government. To a 
very real extent we are partners in adversity. 

Department To Hold Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 

Tiie Department of State announced on 
March 20 (press release 1"27) that it would liold 
a national foreign policy conference for editors 
and broadcastei-s on April 20 and 21 at Wash- 
ington. Invitations have been extended by Sec- 
retary' Rusk to editors and commentators of the 
daily and periodical press and the broadcasting 
industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico. 

Secretary Rusk will address the conference. 
Among other officials expected to participate 
are Robert S. JMcXamara, Secretary' of Defense ; 
W. W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of 
State and Chairman of the Policy Planning 
Council; David E. Bell, Administrator of the 
Agency for International Development; Carl 
T. Rowan, Director of the U..S. Information 
Agency ; Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter- American Affairs ; Robert J. 
Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Pub- 
lic Affairs; and G. Mennen Williams, Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs. 

A new program feature this year will be a 
series of concurrent roundtable discussions, to 
be held on April 20, covering Africa, Eastern 
Europe, Sino-Soviet relations, Southeast- Asia, 
the Near East, the Western alliance, disarma- 
ment, and trade. 

The conference will be held under the "back- 
ground only" ground rule. Plenaiy sessions 
will meet in the West Auditorium of the De- 
partment of State. 

This will be the eighth in a series of national 
foreign policy conferences for editors and 
broadcasters. The conference program, begun 

in April 1961, is intended to assist the informa- 
tion media in making availal)l(> to the American 
public the maxinuim possiljje information in 
depth on cun-ent foreign policy issues. 

To evaluate the effectiveness of these ccmfer- 
ences, the Bureau of Pul)lic Affairs iTcently 
circulated a questionnaire to more than 2,000 
persons wlio have attended one or more of the 
programs since 19G1. Thirty-eight percent re- 
sponded; approximately 800 questionnaires 
were received in time to be evaluated. A clear 
majority approved the conferences and evalu- 
ated them as "excellent." Well over 600 ap- 
proved the format of the programs as held in 
the past. A recurring comment emphasized 
the need for "greater depth" in the program. 
Tlie inclusion of roundtal)]e discussions in the 
curi'ent conference is an effort to meet tiiis need. 

United States and New Zealand 
Hold Civil Aviation Talks 

Press release 104 dated March 11 

Delegations of New Zealand and the United 
States held civil aviation consultations at 
Washington from February 25 through March 
11, 1964. The discussions were held pursuant 
to the bilateral air transport agreement of 
1946 ^ and were concluded to the mutual satis- 
faction of both parties. 

Agreement was reached on an od refei'endum 
basis to replace the existing 1946 agi'eement 
with a more modern version and to incorporate 
in the new agreement certain amendments to 
the routes exchanged in 1946. 

The chaimian of the New Zealand delegation 
was Bruce Rae, Air Secretary. The U.S. dele- 
gation was headed by Henry T. Snowdon, chief 
of the Aviation Negotiations Division, Depart- 
ment of State. "Whitney Gillilland, member of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board, represented that 

1 Treaties and OUier International Acts Series 1573, 
4&45, 4789, 5085, and 5374. 

APRIL 6, 1004 


The Requisites of Abundance 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

As we finish our nourishing lunch, I do not 
have to remind you that at this very moment 
about one out of every two people in this world 
is hungry or malnourished. You know that. 
That's why you are here. 

Nor, I imagine, do I have to persuade you 
that a world still half hungry is an appalling 
fact, an intolerable statistic, a sliocking com- 
mentary on the human condition, and a politi- 
cal danger of the first water. You all agree 
with this — or you would be doing something else 
this noontime. 

We know the nature and the magnitude of 
the problem. I shall therefore address my 
speculations to the nature and magnitude of the 

Do we dare speak of a "solution," or the 
actual accomplishment of our freedom-from- 
hunger goal? Of course we do. Our moral 
outrage at a half-hungry world is validated 
precisely by the fact that we have all the tech- 
nical answers needed to produce enougli food to 
give all of the people of this teeming planet a 
decent daily diet. 

President Kennedy said it to the World Food 
Congress last summer : '^ "We have the ability 
. . . we have the means, we have the capac- 
ity, to eliminate hunger from the face of the 
earth. . . . We need only the will." 

And President Johnson reconunitted this 
nation to freedom from hunger in his address 

^ Address made before the third annual trustees 
meeting of the American Freedom-From-Hunger Foun- 
dation at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 9 (press release 

' Bulletin of .Tuly 8. 1063. p. .58. 

to the U.N. last year: ^ "The United States," he 
said, "wants to cooperate with all the members 
of this organization to conquer everywhere the 
ancient enemies of mankind — hunger, and dis- 
ease, and ignorance." 

The trouble, of course, is that world hunger 
is not just a technical problem — or even a clus- 
ter of technical problems. My business with 
you this day is to suggest just how complex 
and ramified the solutions must be, what a 
range of talents and disciplines and people and 
organizations, including the Freedom-From- 
Hunger Foundation, must be mobilized in the 
service of the noble ends we profess. 

Sharing Our Abundance 

The most obvious fact about world food is 
the drama of glut in the midst of want. This 
is the product of the technological revolution in 
American agriculture of recent decades — a 
revolution which is spreading rapidly through 
the Western World. Some agricultural scien- 
tists are persuaded that we are only on the 
thresliold of that revolution. They point, for 
example, to new vistas opened up by isotopic 
research, to the prospect of manufacturing syn- 
thetic proteins, to new ways of bringing sweet 
water to dried-out land. 

Yet even as things stand right now, with 
present knowledge and practice, the facts are 
.staggering: A single American farmer now 
produces enougli food for 2!) consumers — i of 
them overseas; agricultural output lias gone 
up 140 percent since tlio end of the Second 

" Ihid.. .Tan. 0. 19(H. p. 2. 



World Wax — three times the rate of industrial 
growtli; and tlio farm population hascoiitinuod 
to drop — the latest li<i;ure beinfr just over 7 per- 
cent of tJie total jx)pulation. 

So we have been foiv«d by circumstance, 
and pushed by our own sense of justice, to share 
our abundance. In little more than a decade 
we have shared some $1."^ billion worth of food 
with jjerhaps 400 million people in llii coun- 
tries. This includes school lunch programs, 
which now reach about 40 million children, not 
only improviiifr their diets but helping to lure 
tliem into learning. 

This is surely the humane and sensible thing 
to do. And in some cases the distribution of 
foot! serves as well to help maintain social sta- 
bility as a basis for peaceful reform. Ameri- 
can food has provided a minimal diet for the 
past 18 months for most of the unemployed of 
Constantine — and these unemployed, in this 
third largest city in Algeria, are about 50 per- 
cent of the whole working force. W^e will 
doubtless be doing more of this, not less, as time 
goes on. 

Yet we know that this kind of thing is at 
best a valuable stopgap — a way to buy a little 
more time while more basic solutions are sought. 
If there were practical ways to take our whole 
abundance and spread it around evenly in the 
places where it is needed, diets would be raised 
to tolerable levels everywhere — for about 3 or 
4 weeks. Then the food would be gone and the 
himger would be back. 

Transferring Farming Techniques 

More recently, we have begun to experiment 
with the more sophisticated idea of employing 
surplus food as a kind of development capital. 
This is to say that it is used as part payment 
for workers engaged in labor — intensive public 
works projects — land clearing, dam building, 
roadmaking, well digging, tree planting, and 
the like. Both the U.S. Food for Peace pro- 
gram and, on a small experimental scale, the 
joint U.N.-FAO World Food Program are busy 
along these lines in North Africa and elsewhere. 
A hundred schools are being built in Bolivia 
today under a food-for-work program. 

Thus can abundance serve multiple purposes 
beyond the immediate relief of hunger. 

But still this does not do much to produce 
more food on the spot, near where it is going 
to be eaten. For each of the world's malnour- 
ished peoples, freedom from hunger will be 
aihieved mostly by gi'owing more food for 

And that, of course, requires the transfer not 
only of food but of knowlexlge, the export not 
only of surpluses but of techniques. A great 
deal has been done about this too, since the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations was set up two decades ago, and 
especially since 1949, when President Truman 
launched the Point Four program of technical 

There are two major parts of this task. The 
first is the gathering of data, the exchange of 
information, the sharing of experience, the 
pooling of the fruits of research, and the co- 
ordination of future research. For some years 
this was the major activity of the FAO. It is 
a continuing job and will remain one: 95 of the 
500-odd international conferences to which the 
U.S. sent delegations last yeiir were concerned 
with some aspect of food and agriculture. 

The second — and even more important — part 
of the task is the transfer and adaptation of 
farming techniques from one cultural soil to 
another. And this has turned out to be vastly 
more complicated than was imagined at first. 
Wliat works in one place does not necessarily 
work in another, as most of you well know 
from experience. 

Nevertheless, the various technical assistance 
programs— operated by the U.N. family of 
agencies, by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and other countries' foreign aid 
programs, and by private organizations here 
and abroad — clearly are aimed at tlie heart of 
the matter: the technical capacity to grow a 
bigger crop on an acre of ground. 

A word of caution is needed here. There is a 
tendency, especially in the less developed coun- 
tries, to invest the words "science and tex-h- 
nology'' with the connotation of modern magic. 
Impatient for progress, frustrated by obstacles, 
too many people have seized upon the rich prom- 
ise of science and technology', torn it from a 
meaningful context, and pinned their hopes on 
an abstraction. There is nothing miraculous in 

APRIL 6. 1964 


science until competent technicians, working 
with real-life farmers, pvit it to work on real- 
life farms. 

Modern Farming Requires Fertilizers, Water 

But the problem of hunger and malnutrition 
does not begin or end on the farm. Nor will the 
solution be found on the farm alone. 

Modern agriculture, for example, requires 
discriminating use of chemical fertilizers. But 
it is not enough to know that. Indeed, it is 
worse than useless to know that — unless there 
is fertilizer to be had. Fertilizer can be had 
for liard-earned foreign exchange. Or it can 
be had by production at home, which may also 
require foreign exchange to build the plant. 
And that in turn may require the education, at 
home or abroad, of chemical engineers. 

Knowing about fertilizer is also worse than 
useless if the fertilizer, once produced, is not 
applied on the farm. Last fall that ebullient 
promoter of modern farming, Nikita Khru- 
shchev, spent much of a long speech in Kras- 
nodar urging the virtues of chemical fertilizer 
and pouring scorn on communities that waste 
the precious stuff. 

"Shameful things occur in practice," he said. 
"An enterprise is allocated mineral fertilizer; 
it is sent from the plant to the railroad station 
and thrown from the freight car directly onto 
a side slope, and these riches lie there for 
months and lose their value. . . . Mountains 
of fertilizers accumulate," he said, "they are 
covered with snow and children use these moim- 
tains for tobogganing. . . . We are being 
criticized in the bourgeois press for this mis- 
management, which is absolutely fair." "The 
distribution of fertilizers," said Chairman 
Khrushchev later on in the same speech, "is 
a big political issue." 

It is indeed a big political issue, not only in 
the Soviet Union but increasingly in the world 
at large. If, as we all believe, it is virtuous 
to distribute food abundance to our friends and 
neighbors around the world, it is positively 
angelic to promote the use of modern fertilizers. 

Beyond fertilizers, modern farming requires 
water, lots of water. Here there is much we 
don't yet know — about the economical desalt- 
ing of water and about how to iise the great 

resources of ground water that may still lie 
midiscovered mider the bare feet of mal- 
nourished millions in the world's developing 

If modern techniques can locate the vast lake 
wliicli, some say, lies beneath the Sahara, what 
a change that would make in the geography 
books of the future! If — or perhaps I should 
say when — sweet water can be readily produced 
from the seas or from brackish inland sources, 
the chance to produce irrigated crops will radi- 
cally change the destiny of hungry people in 
many a dusty land. 

Education, Institutions, Production Incentives 

Beyond fertilizer and water, modern farm- 
ing requires education — a stream of young 
scientists and engineers coming out of schools 
and colleges, a network of experiment stations, 
a web of extension services reaching out to every 

It is not enough to have the technology; it 
has to be taught to millions upon millions of 
sometimes suspicious, often stubborn, and 
always tradition-bound members of this ornery 
human race of ours. 

Every department of agriculture in the world 
has learned the hard way how tough it is to 
persuade the people who work the land to try 
something new. 

The chief obstacle to food production in 
nearly every developing country is the gag line 
of that oldest of all county agent jokes : "Why 
teach me anything more? I ain't farming now 
as well as I know how." But modern education 
stresses the application of science to the farm. 
The first principle of development is this: In 
a really productive economy there is no such 
thing as an uneducated farmer. 

Beyond fertilizer and water and education, 
modern farming demands complex institutions 
to serve the farmer — marketing and distribu- 
tion services, storage and preservation systems, 
rural credit banks, co-ops for buying and sell- 
ing, companies and co-ops for machinery and 
electric power. Modern farming also rests on 
viable farming units — and tiiat means each de- 
veloping country has to plunge into the tangled 
laws of inheritance, the forbidding mysteries 
of tax structure and interest rates, and that 



thorny political thicket called land tenure 

Beyond fertilizer and water and education 
and complex institutions, freedom from hunger 
requires incentives for the producers. 

The Communists for a time pretended this 
was not so — and thus converted into food- 
deticit areas tlio Communist-held areas we all 
learned in scliool to cull tlio "breadbasket of 
Europe." Now the cumbersome machinery of 
Soviet propaganda is being turned around, to 
promote better income for harder work by 
Soviet farmei-s. "It is important to materially 
interest the people . . . to . . . introduce a more 
rational . . . remuneration of labor." That's 
what Chairman Khrushchev said in that same 
speech in Krasnodar. Then he went on, dump- 
ing overboard in carload lots the traditional 
theories of Marxism : "The question of the 
remuneration is very important. I would even 
say that it [the remuneration of labor] is one of 
the most basic questions in economic manage- 
ment." That is quite an admission for a Com- 
munist leader to make in a public speech. 

In another speech in tlie Kremlin last month, 
Chairman Khrushchev took up the theme again. 
"It takes more tlian just a Communist Party 
program and Marxist-Leninist theory," he said, 
to make sure that "he who does not work does 
not eat." ""We cannot ignore the material fac- 
tor, we have no right to be visionaries divorced 
from life. . . . People who achieve high pro- 
duction results should not simply be listed on a 
roll of honor; they must be rewarded materially 
in every way. . . . We must fight against 

It has taken half a century for the Commu- 
nist leaders to learn the basic lesson of produc- 
tion incentives — an education provided at 
enormous expense by the peoples under Com- 
munist rule. Maybe now, at long last, gradua- 
tion is in sight. 

Agricultural Success in a Free Society 

Finally, beyond fertilizer and water and edu- 
cation and complex institutions and material in- 
centives, the achievement of freedom from 
hunger requires freedom. The positive evidence 
is the spectacular success of American agricul- 
ture in the 20th century. The negative proof 

lies in nearly half a century of food failures in 
Communist countries. 

The record fairly shouts the conclusion : In- 
dividual farmers in a police state will stub- 
bornly refuse to produce much more than they 
need for themselves. As a conse^juence, tliere 
is not a single Communist country that is not 
in deep trouble in the countryside — with the 
partial exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia, 
which have had the good sense not to pursue 
collective agriculture to its bitter, unproductive 

Thus it comes as no surprise that the new 
look in Soviet agriculture, as proclaimed again 
by Chairman Khrushchev last month, put the 
emphasis on personal incentive as the key to 
raising output per acre. 

Marx coukhrt be expected to understand the 
problem; he was a city boy, after all. But his 
modern interpreters are beginning to learn 
about productivity, not from looking backward 
at the teachings of Marx and Lenin but from 
looking across the world at what a democratic 
agricultural system can accomplish in a free 

It may well be that some other system of 
agriculture can be made to work in other cul- 
tural environments. Certainly we are not try- 
ing to sell everybody the family-size farm or the 
commercial farm, both of which have worked 
so well for us. 

But we do hope that the leaders of independ- 
ent nations — who may still be bemused with 
Marxist slogans but are perhaps less familiar 
witli the recent pressures within the Soviet bloc 
itself for the practical modification of Marxist 
theories — will not repeat that costly, fundamen- 
tal miscalculation the Communists made: the 
attempt to raise output on the farms without 
raising incentives to farmers. 

Police state methods just won't work for 
agriculture. There simply are not enough cops 
to go around to police the farmers of any coun- 
try. And if there were enougli cops, they would 
succeed only in reducing the farmers' incentive 
to produce food. Productivity on the farm is 
the sum of a hundred small decisions a day: 
If the farmer is not making each decision in 
such a way as to maximize his output per acre, 
no police force in the world can make him do so. 

APRIL 6, 1964 


But a system that rewards him and his family 
for high productivity can — and in our own free 
society does in fact — produce abundance. 

The Population Problem 

If you dare to work for world food abun- 
dance, you have to face a double dare as well : 
the gi'owing abundance of moutlis to be fed. 

I do not intend here to rehearse those fright- 
ening boxcar figures and repeat those statisti- 
cal extrapolations with which the demographers 
regularly try to raise the hair on our heads. I 
do want to mention, however, one piece of good 
news: In the very recent past the "population 
explosion'' has become a respectable subject of 
discussion — precisely because the demographers 
made their hair-raising forecasts and insisted 
that other people begin to pay some attention 
to them. 

So now at long last the taboo has been lifted 
from the subject of population gi'owth. We are 
past the point when the mention of the popula- 
tion problem brought a smirk to the face of the 
listener, as tliough the subject were dirty or 
funny or both. The way is clear now for serious 
discussion of a trend which, if uncontrolled, 
would commit the search for freedom from 
hunger to a perpetual treadmill or a chronic 

A few years ago it was considered politically 
impossible to inscribe the subject of population 
control on a U.N. agenda for rational debate. 
But a little more than a year ago the General 
Assembly passed an eminently .sensible resolu- 
tion * on the subject which offended nobody yet 
opened the way for much-needed research and 
for further U.N. work on the subject. 

In that process everyone discovered, to the 
surprise of most, that the only disagreement is 
on the outside fringes of a very large subject, 
and in between there is a wide area of common 
ground on which intelligent men from evei-y 
culture and every religious tradition can con- 
verge for dispassionate discourse and coopera- 
tive action. 

No one can hazard even an educated guess as 
to when or how the population growth rate may 

' For back^ouud and text of resolution, see ibid. 
.Tan. 7, 1963, p. 14. 

be brought within manageable limits. Birth 
rates in industrialized countries have eventually, 
but slowly, declined without much encourage- 
ment from governments. Now several coun- 
tries, notably India, Pakistan, Korea, and the 
United Arab Kepublic, are launched on active 
government programs to reduce explosive popu- 
lation growth rates. But by and large, when 
it comes to population control, there are no de- 
veloped and imderdeveloped countries. 

Unlike agriculture or industry or public 
health or almost any other subject, there is no 
place to go to learn how somebody else did it 
first. So in the population field international 
technical assistance starts from scratch, with 
little national experience to go on. And that 
is all the more reason for serious professional 
attention to the matter. 

Role of the Foundation 

I Iiave been trying to suggest that there is 
need for every kind of skill and insight in the 
complex, difficult, and stimulating task of wip- 
ing hunger from the face of the earth. Most 
especially, there is need for this foundation. 

The people who work on the projects you 
adopt will be dealing not so much with global 
figures or abstract techniques or social theory 
but with that ultimate obstacle to freedom from 
himger — the man who needs to know but who 
does not yet know that he needs to know, and 
does not yet use what he already knows. 

You bring to this daring endeavor what is 
crucially important — your own experience in 
building the private institutions on which all 
modem, free societies depend. You provide 
leadership to the Freedom-From-Hunger Cam- 
paign throughout the United States. The 
quality of that leadership is indicated by the 
fact that your new president, Mr. [Herbert. J.] 
Sugden, has agreed to take on this job and that 
he plans to devote a large part of his time and 
talent and energy to active direction of your 
work. The kind of interest and devotion you 
can command is attested by the fact that Mr. 
Weitz [Charles F. Weitz, FAO Coordinator of 
the Freedom -From -Hunger Campaign] flew 
over from Rome to attend this meeting. 

"Freedom from hunger" is a slogan and a 
symbol. We can take it as words, or we can 



tako it us !i call to action — a moral oblisiation, 
a politi«il necossity, and a tocimiwil inipt'rative 
t liat demands the best from all of us. 

I know you tjike it seriously, and so does your 
Goveniinent. We neetl you ius allies, as col- 
leasxues, as coworkers. We look forward to 
worUiuiT with you for the remainder of this 
campaijjn — and beyond. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 1st Session 

Cuban Hefuirtv rnihlcui. Ilearins bofore tbe Subcom- 
mittee To InvfstiKate Problems ("ouneotMl With 
Refugees juul Escapees of the Senate Committee ou 
the .Tudiciary. Part .S — Minneapolis, Miun. Novem- 
ber !», ISKi;}. m pp. 

U.S.-Owneil Forei^ru Currencies. Hearings before a 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern- 
jnent Operations. November l»-20, 1963. 260 pp. 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Hearing be- 
fore the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 
iMMie. January 31 — February li, 1!)64. 215 pp. 

Implementation of the Cargo Preference Laws by the 
Administrative Departments and Agencies. Report 
of the Senate Committee on Commerce supplement- 
ing its report of October 8. 1962, covering activities 
undertaken for the purixtse of achieving more gen- 
eral compliauee with the several congressional acts 
which reserve certain Government-aid and Govern- 
ment-financed cargoes to U.S. -flag commercial 
vessels. S. Rept. 871. February 10, 1964. 31 pp. 

Message from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting the sixth annual report covering United 
States participation in the International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency for the year 1962. H. Doc. 226. Feb- 
ruary 10, 1964. 27 pp. 

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Re- 
port to accompany S. 2136. S. Rept. 875. February 
21, 1964. 29 pp. 

Peat-e Cori)s .\ct Amendments. Hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2455. 
February 24, 1964. 53 pp. 

Coffee. Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Finance on H.R. 8864, an act to carry out the obliga- 
tions of the United States under the International 
Coffee Agreement, 1962. February 25-27, 1964. 
204 pp. 

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to ac- 
company S. !)44. S. Rept. 880. February 26, 19(^4. 
4 PI). 

Peac-e Corps Act Amendments. Report to accomi)any 
S. 24.55. S. Rept. 881. February 27, 1964. 6 pp. 

Use of Foreign Currencies. Report to accompany S. 
2115. S. Rept. 932. March 3. 1964. 7 pp. 

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Senate 
Committee on the .Judiciary made by its Subcommit- 
tee on Immigration and Naturalization pursuant to 
S. Res. 60, 88th, session, as extended. 
S. Rept. 933. March 3, 1964. 6 pp. 

Compliance With Convention on the Chamlzal. Report 
to accompany S. Sl'M. H. ItepU 12;«. Mareh 11, 
1SH14. 10 pp. 

Providing for the Re<^'f»guition and Kndorsement of the 
17tli Inleniatioual Publishers Congress. Report to 
aecom|«iny S..T. Res. 120. H. Rept. 121*4. March 11, 
19(M. 4 i»p. 


Current Actions 



Convention on the international recognition of rights 
in aircraft. Done at Geneva .lune 19, 1!)48. En- 
tered into force September 17, 19.")3. TIAS 2847. 
Ratification drpoxitcil : France, February 27, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear wesipon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
JIoscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. 
Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, Mareh 13, 1964. 

Red Sea Lights 

International agreement regarding the maintenance of 
certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London 
February 20, 1962.' 
Ratified ttii tlie President: March 16, 1964. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
19.59) (TIAS 4893), Willi annexes and additional 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.' 
Ratified by the President: March 16, 1964. 



Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 
23, 19.")5 (TIAS 3404), so as to provide for additional 
investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legis- 
lation. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz 
March 4, 1964. Entered into force March 4, 1964. 


Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1949. 
as amended (TIAS 2000, 3118, .3282, 4.503), for 
financing certain educational exchange programs. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, March 
10, 1964. Entered into force March 16, 1964. 


Agreement supplementing the agreement of March 17. 
1959 (TI.\S 4201), so as to provide for additional 
investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legis- 
lation. Effected by exchange ()f notes at Khartoum 
.March 2, 1964. Entered into force March 2. 1964. 

'Not in force. 

APRIL 6, 1964 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ' 

Scheduled April Through June 1964 

Caribbean Organization Telecommunications Meeting San Juan Apr. 1- 

U.N. ECE Working Group on Public Sector Statistics Geneva Apr. 6- 

International Coffee Council and Executive Board London Apr. 6- 

ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 2d Meeting Montreal Apr. 6- 

ITU Administrative Council: 19th Session Geneva Apr. 6- 

FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America Montevideo Apr. 10- 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 16th Meeting Washington Apr. 13- 

SEATO Council of Ministers: 9th Meeting Manila Apr. 13- 

IAEA Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage .... Vienna Apr. 13- 

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 19th Session Geneva Apr. 13- 

IMCO Group on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: 4th Session . . . London Apr. 14- 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Paris Apr. 15- 


OECD Ad Hoc Drafting Group for the Energy Report Paris Apr. 16- 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 23d Plenary Meeting .... New Delhi Apr. 16- 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 8th Session London Apr. 20- 

ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel: 1st Meeting Montreal Apr. 27- 

CENTO Ministerial Council: 12th Meeting Washington Apr. 28- 

17th International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 29- 

6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva May 4- 

ICEM E.xecutive Committee: 23d Session Geneva May 4- 

IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of London May 4- 

Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session. 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea London May 4- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session Geneva May 4- 

UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session Paris May 4- 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 5- 

IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session London May 11- 

U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics Geneva May 11- 

ICAO Airworthiness Cominittee: 6th Session Montreal May 11- 

ICEM Council: 21st Session Geneva Mav 11- 

NATO Mini.sterial Council The Hague May 12- 

FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session Rome May 14- 

International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting Tokyo May 18- 

E.xecutive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Geneva May 18- 

Refugees: 11th Session. 

BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement Geneva May 20- 

IMCO Council: 1 1th Session London May 25- 

ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study groups) . Geneva May 2o- 

Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress Vienna May 29- 

WHO Executive Board: 34th Session Geneva May 

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 

3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty . . . Brussels June 1- 

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 25th Session . Washington June 2- 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session , . Paris June 10- 

U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session The Hague June 15- 

U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations Mexico, D.F June 15- 

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Geneva June 22- 

Productivitv Statistics. 

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 10, 1964. Following is a of abbreviations: 
BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comit6 
consultatif international t^Mgraphique et t^Wphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; EGA, Economic 
Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, 
Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International .Aitomic 
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for 
European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele- 
communication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treatv Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization. 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1964 — Continued 

International Labor Coiiferpnce: 4Sth Session Geneva Juno 17- 

International Wlieat Council: 3(Hh Session London Juno 2:1- 

Htli International Film Festival Berlin June 26- 

U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial ICstatos Addis Ababa June 29- 

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designations and Rome June 

Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 7th Session. 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 

The Department of State announced on 
March 17 (press release 122) that Under Secre- 
tary of State George AY. Ball will head the 
U.S. delegation at the opening of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 23, 
1964. Assistant Secretary of State for Eco- 
nomic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson will head 
the delegation after Mr. Ball returns to Wash- 
ington late in March. Mr. Jolinson will be 
chairman of tlie delegation and one of four U.S. 
Representatives accredited to the Conference, 
which is scheduled to conclude on June 15, 1964. 

The other three U.S. Representatives accred- 
ited to the Conference, who will serve as vice 
chairmen of the delegation, will be Ben H. 
Brown, Jr., American consul general, Istan- 
bul; Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organiza- 
tion Affairs, who will attend the Conference 
May 4- June 14; and Walter M. Kotsclmig, 
Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Na- 
tions Economic and Social Council, who will 
attend the Conference March 23-May 3. The 
Alternate U.S. Representative will be Roger W. 
Tubby, U.S. Representative to the European 
Office of the United Nations and Other Inter- 
national Organizations, Geneva. 

The delegation will include four congres- 
sional advisers: Senator George A. Smathers, 
Senator James B. Pearson, Representative Cecil 
R. King, and Representative Victor A. Knox. 

There also will be several public advisers 
who have not yet been designated. 

The delegation also will include members of 

the Department of Commerce, the Department 
of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, tlie 
Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of 
the Treasury, as well as consulting advisers.^ 

This United Nations meeting will be the 
largest trade conference ever called and the 
first general U.N. conference on trade since the 
Habana Conference on Trade and Employ- 
ment in 1947-48. More than 1,500 persons, 
representing some 122 member countries of the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies, 
are expected to participate. 

The Conference has been scheduled as part 
of the program to implement the United Na- 
tions Development Decade, as the 1960"s have 
been proclaimed by the United Nations. The 
purpose of the Conference is to examine ways 
in which international trade can be made a 
more effective instrument in promoting the 
development of the less developed coimtries and 
thus facilitate progress toward international 
stability and well-being. 

The provisional agenda for the Conference 
was drawn up by a 32-nation Preparatory 
Committee in the course of three sessions last- 
ing a total of 10 weeks. It covers virtually all 
subjects relating to the need of tlie developing 
countries to increase their foreign exchange 
earnings, primarily tlirough trade. The agenda 
will be considered by five main committees 
which will deal with the following subjects : 

1. International commodity problems; 

2. Trade in manufactures and semimanu- 
factures ; 

3. Improvement of invisible trade of develop- 
ing countries and financing for an expansion of 
international trade; 

' For names of the other members of the U.S. dele- 
gation, see press release 122 dated Mar. 17. 

APRIL 6, 19G4 


4. Institutional arrangements, methods, and 
machinery to implement measures relating to 
the expansion of international trade, and 

5. Expansion of international trade and its 
significance for economic development and 
imi^lications of regional economic groupings. 

The Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations made the decision to hold the 
conference at its 34th session in the summer 
of 1962. The U.N. General Assembly passed 
a resolution in December 1962 requesting the 
Secretary-General to invite all members of the 
U.N., the specialized agencies, and the Inter- 
national Atomic Energj' Agency to the Confer- 
ence, to appoint a Secretary General of the 
Conference, and to assist the Preparatory 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, u-hieh 
may be obtained from the Offlce of Media Services, 
Department of State. Wa.fhington, D.C., 20520. 

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy 
Agency — Report by the President to the Congress for 
the Year 1962. Pub. 7622. International Organiza- 
tion and Conference Series 47. 23 pp. Limited dis- 

Foreign Visitor Programs. A description of the short- 
term cultural exchange programs and their objectives. 
This pamphlet, prepared by the Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, points 
up the many areas of volunteer activities in which the 
private citizen may play a vital role. Pub. 7631. In- 
ternational Information and Cultural Series 86. 11 pp. 

Sample Questions From the Examination for Foreign 
Service Officer or Foreign Service Career Reserve 
OflBcer. Pub. 7640. Department and Foreign Service 
Series 123. 52 pp. Limited distribution. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of the Confxo. Signed at L^opoldville February 
23, 1963. Entered into force February 23, 1963. With 
exchange of notes and aide memoire. TIAS 5461. 11 
pp. 100. 

Inter-American Highway. Agreement with Guatemala. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Guatemala September 

25 and October 3, 1963. Entered into force October 3, 
1963. TIAS 5463. 14 pp. lOp. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Tanganyilja. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Dar es Salaam November 
14, 1963. Entered into force November 14, 1963. TIAS 
5465. 4 pp. 50. 

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Senegal. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Dakar January 10 and 17, 
1963. Entered into force January 17, 1963. TIAS 5467. 
5 pp. 50. 

Maritime Matters — Use of Belgian Ports and Waters 
by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Belgium — 
Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Entered into force 
November 27, 1963. TIAS 5466. 10 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Brazil — 
Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 11, 1963. Entered 
into force September 11, 1963. With agreed minutes 
and exchanges of notes. TIAS 5471. 21 pp. 15^. 

Boundary Waters — Pilotage Services on the Great 
Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Agreement-s with 
Canada, amending the agreement of May 5, 1961, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington 
August 23 and September 10, 1963. Entered into force 
September 10, 1963. Operative April 29, 1963. And 
exchange of notes — Signed at Washington November 

19 and December 4, 1963. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 4, 1963. Operative August 1, 1903. TIAS 5468. 
10 pp. 100. 

Consular Convention. Convention with the Republic 
of Korea — Signed at Seoul January 8. 1963. Entered 
into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5469. 30 pp. 15<t. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sierra Leone, 
relating to the agreement of May 16 and 19, 1961. 

Exchange of notes — Signed at Freetown Decemtjer 28, 

1962, and November 13, 196:i. Entered into force No- 
vember 13, 1963. TIAS 5470. 2 pp. 50. 

Whaling. Amendments to the schetlule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention signed at Washington on 
December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Fifteenth Meeting 
of the International Whaling Comrai.ssion, London, 
July 5, 1963. Entered into force October 9, l!)63. TIAS 
5472. 2 pp. 50. 

Tracking Stations. Agreement with the Malagasy Re- 
public. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tananarive Oc- 
tober 7, 1963. Entered into force October 7, 1963. 
TIAS .5473. 9 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title FV. 

Agreement with Iraq, amending the agreement of Au- 
gust 27, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at Baghdad 
December 5, 1963. Entered into force December 5, 

1963. TIAS 5475. 3 pp. 50. 

Extradition. Convention with Israel — Signed at Wash- 
ington December 10, 1962. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 5, 1963. TIAS 5476. 17 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Bolivia, auieiuling the agreement of 
February 4. 1963, as amended. Exchange of note.'; — 
Signed at I.a Paz June 24. 1!)<53. Entere<l int« force 
June 24, 19<i;!. And exchange of notes — Signed at La 
I'az November 20. 1963. Entered into force Novem- 
ber 20, 1963. TIAS 5479. 7 pp. 100. 

.Aviation — Air TraflSc Control. Agreement with Can- 
ada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa December 

20 and 27, 196;i. Entered into force Deceml>er 27, 1963. 
TIAS 5480. 2 pp. 50. 



INDEX April 6, J964 Vol. L, No. 1293 

Agriculture. The Reiiuisites of Abundance 

(CU'velanil) •''>r.O 

American Republics 

Ambassadors and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin 

Anicrica Meet •^••lO 

President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . 52:? 
Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress 

(Johnson) •'>3i) 

Aviation. ITnited Stiites and New Zealand Hold 

Civil Aviation Talljs 549 

Communism. The Toilsome Path to Peace 

(Husk) ii."$0 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 555 

Foreign Aid (text of President's message) . . 518 

Department and Foreign Service. Ambassadors 
and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin America 
Meet 540 

Economic Affairs. U.N. Conference on Trade 

and Development (delegation) 557 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Unitetl 
States and Norway Extend Educational Ex- 
change Program 539 

Foreign Aid 

.\mbas.<yidors and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin 

America Meet 540 

Foreign Aid (text of President's message) . . 518 
President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . 523 
Third .\nniversary of the Alliance for Progress 

(Johnson) 535 

Honduras. letters of Credence (Corrales 

Padilla) 538 

International Organizations and Conferences 
Calendar of International Conferences and 

Meetings 556 

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 

(delegation) 5.57 

Military Affairs. U.S. To Increase Economic and 
Military Aid to Viet-Nam (White House state- 
ment) 522 

New Zealand. United States and New Zealand 

Hold Civil Aviation Talks 549 

Norway. United States and Norway Extend 

Educational Exchange Program 539 


Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress 

(Johnson) 535 

U.S. Prepared To Review Differences With 

Panama (Johnson) 538 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Aid 518 

President Johnson Discu.sses the Presidency . 523 
Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Prog- 
ress 535 

U.S. Prepared To Review Differences With 
Panama 538 

Public Affairs 

Department To Hold Conference for Editors 

and Broadcasters 549 

Journalism and Foreign Affairs (Manning) . . 541 

Publications. Recent Releases 558 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 555 

United States and New Zealand Hold Civil Avia- 
tion Talks 549 

l'nite«l Stales and Norway Extend Educational 

Exchange I'rogram fiJM) 

U.S.S.R. President Johnson Discusses the Presi- 
dency 523 

United Nations 

The Toilsome Path to Peace (Rusk) .... 5;$0 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 

(delegation) 5.57 


President Johnson Discusses the Presidency . . 523 
U.S. To Increase Economic and Military Aid to 

Viet-Nam (White statement) .... 522 

yame Index 

Cleveland. Harlan 550 

Corrales Padilla. Hernau 538 

Johnson, President 518,523,53.5,538 

Manning, Robert .1 541 

Rusk, Secretary 530 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to March 10 which ai>- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 102 
of March 9, 104 of March 11, and 109 of March 13. 

No. Date Subject 

113 3/16 Educational exchange program 
with Norway. 

*114 3/16 Martin sworn in as Ambassador to 
Argentina (biographic details). 

*115 3/16 U.S. participation in inteniational 

*116 3/16 Bundy sworn in as Assistant Secre- 
tary for Far Eastern Affairs 
(biographic details). 

*117 3/16 Conference on etjual employment 
118 3/16 Honduras credentials (rewrite). 

*11!) 3/17 Cultural exchange (Far East). 

tl20 3/16 Rusk : conference on equal employ- 
ment opportunity. 

*121 3/17 Harriman : National Farmers 
Union (excerpts). 
122 3/17 Delegation to U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development (re- 

*123 3/17 Mathews sworn in as .\mbassador 
to Nigeria (biographic details). 

tl24 3/17 Tyler: "The United States and a 
Changing Europe." 

125 3/lS Meeting of ambassadors and chiefs 

of AID missions to Latin 

126 3/19 Rusk: "The Toilsome Path to 


127 3/20 Foreign policy conference for edi- 

tors and broadcasters (rewrite). 
1128 3/20 Cleveland : "T h e Thirteenth 

♦Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 






The Making of Foreign Policy 

This 33-page pamphlet is a transcript of an inlterview of Secretary of Stat© Dean Rusk by Professor 
Eric Frederick Goldman of Princeton University, newly appointed consultant to President Jolinson. The 
interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television progi-am "The Open Mind." 

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a number of different aspects of the foreign policy 
process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationsliip of politics to foreign policy, the 
problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of 
public opinion on foreign policy. 



PUBLICATION 7658 20 cents 




Please send me copies of The Making of Foreign Policy 




Enclosed And $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt of Dociunents) 








Vol. L, No. 12H 

April 13, 196Jt 


6y Secretai'y of Defense Robert S. McNamara 562 


hy W. W. Eostow, Coumelor 578 


hy Assistant Secretary Tyler 587 

Statement hy Secretary Rusk 595 

For index see inside back cover 

United States Policy in Viet-Nam 

hy Robert S. McNamara 
Secretary of Defense ^ 

In South Viet-Nam, as you well know, the in- 
dependence of a nation and the freedom of its 
people are being threatened by Communist ag- 
gression and terrorism. In response to requests 
from the Government of South Viet-Nam the 
United States since 1954 has been providing as- 
sistance to the Vietnamese in their struggle to 
maintain their independence. 

My purpose this evening is threefold. After 
recalling some facts about Viet-Nam and its 
history, I want : 

— First, to explain our stake and objectives in 
South Viet-Nam ; 

— Second, to review for you the current situa- 
tion there as General [Maxwell D.] Taylor and 
I found it on our recent trip ; 

— And finally, to outline in broad terms the 
plans which have been worked out with General 

' Address made before the James Forrestal Memorial 
Awards dinner of the National Security Industrial As- 
sociation at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 26. 

Ivlianh for achieving our mutual objectives in 
South Viet-Nam. 

Description and History 

Let me begin by reminding you of some de- 
tails about South Viet-Nam, that narrow strip 
of ricli coastal mountain and delta lands run- 
ning 900 miles in the tropics along the South 
China Sea to the Gulf of Siam. It contains the 
mouth of the Mekong Eiver, the main artery of 
Southeast Asia. It has a population of about 
14 million — almost that of California — in an 
area slightly larger than England and Wales. 
South Viet-Nam does not exist by itself. Main- 
land Southeast Asia includes Laos, Cambodia, 
and the two Viet-Nams, together comprising 
former French Indochina. It also includes 
Thailand, Burma, and part of Malaysia. The 
Southeast Asian peninsula is a richly en- 
dowed land area of over 800,000 square miles, 
roughly the size of the United States east of the 
Mississippi, and containing almost 100 million 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
aKencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Inter- 
national Interest 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

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NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
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source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
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people. And immediately beyond to the east, 
are the Philippines ; not fax- to the west is India, 
to the north is Communist China, and to the 
south is what the Chinese Communists may con- 
sider the greatest prize of all — Indonesia's re- 
sources, territory, and the world's fifth largest 
population, wliose strategic location straddles 
and dominates the giiteway to the Indian Ocean. 

The Vietnamese lost the independence they 
had enjoyed since the 15th century when, a hun- 
dred years ago, the French assumed control in 
what is now Viet-Xam. A quarter century ago, 
during the Second "World "War, the Vichy i-e- 
gime yielded French Indochina to the Japanese. 
In the power vacuum of the war's end, the Com- 
munist Viet Minh moved rapidly to enhance 
their position and to build their bases for a 
power grab in North Viet-Xam. 

The attempt by the French, following "World 
"V\''ar II, to restore their rule — to buck the trend 
toward independence as shown in Burma, In- 
dia, and the Philippines — failed. The return- 
ing French encoimtered a strong military re- 
sistance movement which gradually fell more 
and more under Communist control. For 8 
years France sought to control the country 
while at the same time gradually gi-anting in- 
creasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnam- 
ese. Such actions, however, were not enough. 
In 1954, after the fall of the French stronghold 
at Dien Bien Pliu on May 7, the Geneva agree- 
ments of July 20 were signed, ending the hos- 
tilities and ending French rule in Indocliina. 
The country was rouglily cut in half at the 
I7th parallel, creating the Communist regime 
of Ho Clii Slinli in the north and a non- 
Commvmist state in the south. Although the 
United States was not a party to those Geneva 
agreements, the U.S. unilaterally declared that 
it would not violate them and that it would re- 
gard any violation by other parties as a serious 
threat to international peace and security. 

Under the Geneva agreements, it was hoped 
that South Viet-Nam would have an opportu- 
nity to build a free nation in peace — unalined 
and set apai-t from the global power struggle. 
But the problems confronting the new govern- 
ment were staggering: 900,000 refugees who 
had fled their homes in the north at the time 
of partition in order to escape Commimist 
rule; a long-term military threat from the 

north, which had emerged from the war with 
largo military forces; a government nearly 
paralyzed by 8 years of war and lacking suffi- 
cient trained officials for efToctive self-govern- 
ment; acute economic dislocation and lack of 
government revenues; and persisting pockets 
of southern territory that had long been held 
by Coimnunists and other dissident groups. In 
the face of such problems hopes were not high 
for the survival of the fledging Republic. 

That autumn, a decade ago. President X'^go 
Dinh Diem of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
turned to the United States for economic as- 
sistance. President Eisenhower understood the 
gravity of the situation, and he determined to 
give direct American aid to the new govern- 
ment to enable its survival. He wrote to Presi- 
dent Diem on October 1, 1954 : ^ 

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government 
of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, 
viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion 
or aggression through military means. 

The U.S. therefore provided help — largely 

On the basis of this assistance and the brave, 
sustained efforts of the South Vietnamese peo- 
ple, the 5 years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete 
evidence that South Viet-Nam was becoming 
a success story. By the end of this period, 
140,000 landless peasant families had been given 
land imder an agrarian reform program; the 
transportation system had been almost entirely 
rebuilt; rice production had reached the pre- 
war annual average of 3.5 million metric tons — 
and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber 
production had exceeded prewar totals; and 
construction was imder way on several medium- 
size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the 
development of a base for industrial growth. 

In addition to such economic progress, school 
enrollments had tripled, the number of pri- 
mary school teachers had increased from 30,000 
to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medical aid stations 
and maternity clinics had been established 
throughout the country. And the South 
Vietnamese Government had gone far toward 
creating an effective apparatus for the admin- 
istration of the nation. A National Institute of 
Administration had been established with our 

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735. 

APRIL 13, 1964 


technical and financial assistance — a center for 
the training of a new generation of civil serv- 
ants oriented toward careers of public service 
as opposed to the colonial concept of public 

For South Viet-Nam the horizon was bright. 
Its success stood in marked contrast to develop- 
ment in the north. Desjiite the vastly larger 
industrial plant inherited by Hanoi when Viet- 
Nam was partitioned, gross national product 
was considerably larger in the south — estimated 
at $110 per person in the south and $70 in the 
north. Wliile per capita food production in the 
north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had 
been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the 

It is ironical that free Viet-Nam's very 
achievements in these 5 years brought severe 
new problems. For the Communists in North 
Viet-Nam, like many others, had believed that 
South Viet-Nam would ultimately collapse and 
fall under Hanoi's control like ripe f iiiit from a 
tree. But by the end of 1959, South Viet-Nam 
was succeeding, despite all predictions ; and the 
Communist leaders evidently concluded that 
they would have to increase pressure on the 
South to make the fruit fall. 

At the Third National Congress of the Lao 
Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, September 
1960, North Viet-Nam's belligerency was made 
explicit. Ho Chi Minh stated, "The North is 
becoming more and more consolidated and 
transformed into a firm base for the struggle for 
national reunification." At the same congress 
it was announced that the party's new task was 
"to liberate the South from the atrocious rule 
of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." 
In brief, Hanoi was about to embark upon a 
program of wholesale violations of the Geneva 
agi-eements in order to wrest control of South 
Viet-Nam from its legitimate government. 

To the Communists, "liberation" meant sab- 
otage, terror, and assassination : attacks on in- 
nocent hamlets and villages and the coldblooded 
murder of thousands of schoolteachers, health 
workers, and local officials who had the mis- 
fortune to oppose the Communist version of 
"liberation." In 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000 
South Vietnamese civilians in and out of gov- 
ernment were assassinated and another 2,500 
were kidnaped. The Communists even assas- 

sinated the colonel who served as liaison officer 
to the International Control Commission. 

This aggression against South Viet-Nam was 
a major Communist effort, meticulously planned 
and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the 
government in Hanoi. In 1961 the Kepublic 
of Viet-Nam, unable to contain the menace 
by itself, appealed to the United States to honor 
its unilateral declaration of 1954. President 
Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively 
by sending to that country additional American 
advisers, arms, and aid.' 

U.S. Objectives 

I turn now to a consideration of United 
States objectives in South Viet-Nam. The 
United States has no designs whatever on the 
resources or territory of the area. Our na- 
tional interests do not require that South Viet- 
Nam serve as a Western base or as a member 
of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold. 

First, and most important, is the simple fact 
that South Viet-Nam, a member of the free- 
world family, is striving to preserve its inde- 
pendence from Communist attack. The Viet- 
namese have asked our help. We have given it. 
We shall continue to give it. 

We do so in their mterest; and we do so in 
our own clear self-interest. For basic to the 
principles of freedom and self-determination 
which have sustained our country for almost 
two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere 
to live and develop in peace. Our o\vn security 
is strengthened by the determination of others 
to remain free, and by our commitment to assist 
them. We will not let this member of our fam- 
ily down, regardless of its distance from our 

The ultimate goal of the United States in 
Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to 
help maintain free and independent nations 
whicli can develop politically, economically, and 
socially and which can be responsible members 
of the world community. In this region and 
elsewhere many peoples share our sense of the 
value of such freedom and independence. They 
have taken the risks and made the sacrifices 

" For an exrhange of messages between President 
Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see ibid., Jan. 
1, 1962, p. 13. 



linked to the commitment to membership in the 
family of the free world. They have done this 
ill the belief that we would buck up our pledges 
to help defend them. It is not right or even 
expedient — nor is it in our nature — to abandon 
them when the going is difficult. 

Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic 
significance in the forward defense of the 
ITnited States. Its location across east-west air 
and sea lanes Hanks the Indian subcontinent on 
one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines on the other and dominates the 
gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
In Communist hands this area would pose a 
most serious threat to the security of the United 
States and to the family of free-world nations 
to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, 
we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam. 

And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for 
the new Commiuiist strategy. Let me examine 
for a moment the nature of this strategy. 

Just as the Kennedy administration was 
coming into office in January 1961, Chairman 
Ivlirushchev made one of the most important 
speeches on Communist strategy of recent 
decades. In his report on a party conference 
entitled "For New Victories of the World Com- 
munist Slovement," Khrushchev stated: "In 
modern conditions, the following categories of 
wars should be distinguished : world wars, local 
wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings." 
He ruled out what he called "world wars" and 
"local wars" as being too dangerous for profit- 
able indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. 
But with regard to what he called "liberation 
wars," he referred specifically to Viet-Nam. He 
said, "It is a sacred war. We recognize such 
wars. . . ." 

I have pointed out on other occasions the 
enormous strategic nuclear power which the 
United States has developed to cope with the 
first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; deter- 
rence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack 
seems as assured as it can be. With respect to 
our general-purpose forces designed especially 
for local wars, within the past 3 years we have 
increased the number of our combat-ready 
Army divisions by about 45 percent, tactical 
air squadrons by 30 percent, airlift capabilities 
by 75 percent, with a 100-percent increase in 

ship construction luid conversion. In conjunc- 
tion with the forces of our allies our global pos- 
ture for deterrence and defense is still not all 
that it should be, but it is good. 

President Kennedy and President Jolmson 
have recognized, however, that our forces for 
the first two types of wars might not be appli- 
cable or effective against what the Communists 
call "wars of liberation," or what is properly 
called covert aggression or insurgency. We 
have therefore undertaken and continue to press 
a variety of programs to develop skilled special- 
ists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to 
help our allies counter the threat of insurgency. 

Communist interest in insurgency techniques 
did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that 
matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full 
of tactical instructions, which were adapted very 
successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writ- 
ings on guerrilla warfare have become classic 
references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true 
heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the 
worldwide victory of communism. The North 
Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's 
book — as well as Moscow's — and added some of 
their own. 

Thus today in Viet-Nam we are not dealing 
with factional disputes or the remnants of a 
colonial struggle against the French but rather 
with a major test case of commimism's new 
strategy. That strategy has so far been pur- 
sued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and 
failed in Malaya and the Philippines only be- 
cause of a long and arduous struggle by the 
people of these countries with assistance pro- 
vided by the British and the United States. 

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken 
full advantage of geography — the proximity to 
the Communist base of operations and the rug- 
ged, remote, and heavily foliated character of 
the border regions. They have utilized the 
diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings 
and exploited factionalism and legitimate as- 
pirations wherever possible. And, as I said 
earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terror- 
ism, and assassination on an unprecedented 

Wlio is the responsible party — the prime ag- 
gressor? First and foremost, without doubt, 
the prime aggressor is North Viet-Nam, whose 

APRIL 13, 1964 


leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy 
the independence of the South. To be sure, 
Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by 
Communist China. But Peiping's interest is 
hardly the same as that of Hanoi. 

For Hanoi, the immediate objective is 
limited: conquest of the South and national 
unification, perhaps coupled with control of 
Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory 
would be only a first step toward eventual 
Chinese hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and 
Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the 
new strategy in other parts of the world. 

Communist China's interests are clear : It has 
publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the 
revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have 
sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized 
the United States as a paper tiger and has in- 
sisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liber- 
ation and unification" of Viet-Nam could be 
conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling 
under the nuclear and the conventional defense 
of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel 
that it has a large stake in demonstrating the 
new strategy, using Viet-Nam as a test case. 
Success in Viet-Nam would be regarded by 
Peiping as vindication for China's views in the 
worldwide ideological struggle. 

Taking into account the relationship of Viet- 
Nam to Indochina — and of both to Southeast 
Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a 
whole — five U.S. Presidents have acted to pre- 
serve free- world strategic interests in the area. 
President Eoosevelt opposed Japanese penetra- 
tion in Indochina; President Truman resisted 
Communist aggression in Korea; President 
Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South 
Viet-Nam and undertook to defend Taiwan; 
President Kennedy stepped up our counter- 
insurgency effort in Viet-Nam; and President 
Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week 
that the United States will furnish assistance 
and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as 
it is required to bring Communist aggression 
and terrorism under control,* has approved the 

* For a White House statement Issued on Mar. 17 at 
the close of a meeting of the National Security Council 
at which Secretar.v McNamara and General Taylor 
reported to the President and the Council on their in- 
spection trip to the Republic of Viet-Nam, see ibid., 
Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522. 

program that I shall describe in a few minutes. 
The U.S. role in South Viet-Nam, then, is: 
first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, 
a member nation of our free-world family, to 
help them save their country for themselves; 
second, to Iielp prevent the strategic danger 
which would exist if communism absorbed 
Southeast Asia's people and resources; and 
third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that 
the free world can cope with Conmiunist "wars 
of liberation" as we have coped successfully with 
Communist aggression at other levels. 

The Current Situation 

I referred earlier to the progress in South 
Viet-Nam durmg 1954^1959. In our concern 
over the seriousness of the Viet Cong insur- 
gency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a 
favorable comparison still exists between prog- 
ress in the South — notwithstanding nearly 15 
years of bitter warfare — and the relative stag- 
nation in North Viet-Nam. 

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam," with a greater population than the South 
and only a marginally smaller area, appears to 
be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most 
prominent of which is its agricultural failure. 
Mismanagement, some poor weather, and a lack 
of fertilizers and insecticides have led to a seri- 
ous rice shortage. The 1963 per capita output 
of rice was about 20 percent lower than 1960. 
Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards 
will probably decline further in the cities, and 
critical food shortages may appear in some of 
the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the 
June rice crops are not bright. 

The internal transportation system remains 
primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas 
establislied for hea\'y industry. As for the 
people, they appear to be generally apathetic to 
what the party considers the needs of the state, 
and the peasantry has shown considerable in- 
genuity in frustrating the policies of the Gov- 

In contrast, in the Republic of Viet-Nam, 
despite Communist attempts to control or in- 
hibit every aspect of the domestic economy, out- 
put continued to rise. In 196.3 South Viet-Nam 
was once more able to export- some 300,000 tons 
of rice. Add to this the ja re- 1960 record : up to 



1960, significant production incrcnses in rice, 
rubber, sugar, textiles, and electric power, a 20- 
percent rise in per capita income, threefold ex- 
pansion of schools, and restoration of the trans- 
portation system. One cannot but conclude 
that, given stability and lack of subversive dis- 
ruption, South Vict-Nam would dramatically 
outstrip its northern neighbor and could become 
a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the 
well-being of the Far East as a whole. 

But, as we have seen, the Communists — be- 
cause South Viet-Nam is not theirs — are out to 
deny any such bright prospects. 

In the years inunediately following the sign- 
ing of the 1954 Geneva accords, the Communists 
in North Viet-Nam gave first priority to build- 
ing armed forces far larger tlian those of any 
other Southeast Asian coimtry. They did this 
to establish iron control over their own popula- 
tion and to insure a secure base for subversion in 
South Viet-Nam and Laos. In South Viet- 
Nam, instead of withdrawing fully, the 
Communists maintained a holding guerrilla 
operation, and they left behind cadres of men 
and large caches of weapons for later use. 

Beginning in 1959, as we have seen, the Com- 
mimists realized that they were losing the game 
and intensified their subvereive attack. In 
June 1962 a special report on Viet-Nam was is- 
sued by the International Control Commission,^ 
a unit created by the Geneva conference and 
composed of a Canadian, an Indian, and a Pole. 
Though it received little publicity at the time, 
this report presented evidence of Hanoi's sub- 
versive activities in South Viet-Nam and spe- 
cifically fomid Hanoi guilty of violating the 
Geneva accords. 

Since then, the illegal campaign of terror, 
violence, and subversion conducted by the Viet 
Cong and directed and supported from the 
north has greatly expanded. Military men, 
specialists, and secret agents continue to infil- 
trate into South Viet-Nam both directly from 
the north and through Laos and Cambodia. 
The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, par- 
ticularly those of large caliber, has increased. 
These include Chinese 75 mm. recoilless rifles 
and heavy macliineguns. Tons of explosive- 

producing chemicals snniggled in for use by the 
Viet Cong have been intercepted along with 
many munitions manufactured in Ked China 
and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the Commu- 
nist bloc. In December 1903 a Government 
force attacked a Viet Cong stronghold in Dinh 
Tuong Province and seized a large cache of 
equipment, some of which was of Chinese Com- 
munist manufacture. The Chinese equipment 
included a 90 mm. rocket launcher, 00 mm. 
mortars, carbines, TNT, and hundreds of thou- 
sands of roimds of various kinds of ammuni- 
tion. Some of the ammunition was manufac- 
tured as recently as 1902. 

When President Diem appealed to President 
Kennedy at the end of 1901, the South Viet- 
namese were quite plainly losing their fight 
against tlie Communists, and we promptly 
agreed to increase our assistance. 

Fourteen months later, in early 1963, Presi- 
dent Kemiedy w^as able to report to the nation 
that "The spearpoint of aggression has been 
blunted in South Viet-Nam." " It was evident 
that the Government had seized the initiative 
in most areas from the insurgents. But this 
progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political 
crises arising from troubles between the Gov- 
ernment and the Buddliists, students, and other 
non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem 
lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; 
there were accusations of maladministration 
and injustice. There were two changes of gov- 
ernment within 3 months. The fabric of gov- 
ernment was torn. The political control 
structure extending from Saigon down into the 
hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 in- 
cumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last 
year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had 
three chiefs in 3 months; one province had four. 
Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost 
all major military commands changed hands 
twice. Tlie confidence of the peasants was 
inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leader- 
ship and the loss of physical security. Army 
and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and 
the morale of the hamlet militia — the "Minute- 
men" — fell. In many areas power vacuums 

"^ For a Department statement regarding the report, 
see ibid., July 16, 1962, p. 109. 

* For excerpts from President Kennedy's state of the 
Union message of Jan. 14, 1963, see ibid., Feb. 4, 1963, 
p. 159. 

APRIL 13, 19G4 


developed causing confusion among the people 
and a rising rate of rural disorders. 

The Viet Cong fully exploited the resultant 
organizational turmoil and regained the initia- 
tive in the struggle. For example, in the second 
week following the November coup, Viet Cong 
incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking 
at 1,021 per week, while Goverimient casualties 
rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended ham- 
lets have been overrun or severely damaged. 
The January change in government produced a 
similar reaction. 

In short, the situation in South Viet- Nam has 
unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall. 

The picture is admittedly not an easy one 
to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and 
the kind of war, information is not always 
available or reliable. The areas imder Com- 
munist control vary from daytime to nighttime, 
from one week to another, according to seasonal 
and weather factors. Ajid, of course, in vari- 
ous areas the degree and importance of control 
differ. Although we estimate that in South 
Viet-Nam's 14 million population there are 
only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Viet Cong 
guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from 
among the South Vietnamese an irregular force 
of from 60,000 to 80,000 — mainly by coercion 
and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising 
material and political rewards. The loyalties 
of the hard coi'e have been cemented by years 
of fighting, first against the Japanese, tlien 
against the French, and, since 1954, against the 
fledgling government of South Viet-Nam. The 
young men joining them have been attracted by 
the excitement of the guerrilla life and then 
held by bonds of loyalty to their new comrades- 
in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only be- 
ginning to extend beyond the family or the 
clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by 
systematic indoctrination and by the example 
of what happens to infoiTnere and deserters. 

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction, 
and support from North Viet-Nam is a critical 
factor in the strength of the Viet Cong move- 
ment. But the large indigenous support that 
the Viet Oong receives means that solutions 
must be as political and economic as military. 
Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely 
"military" solution to tlie war in South Viet- 

The people of South Viet-Nam prefer inde- 
pendence and freedom. But they will not ex- 
ercise their choice for freedom and commit 
themselves to it in the face of the high personal 
risk of Communist retaliation — a kidnaped son, 
a burned home, a ravaged crop — unless they 
can have confidence in the ultimate outcome. 
Much therefore depends on the new govern- 
ment under General Khanh, for which we have 
high hopes. 

Today the government of General Khanh is 
vigorously rebuilding the machinery of admin- 
istration and reshaping plans to carry the war 
to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic 
leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the 
basic elements — political, economic, and psy- 
chological, as well as military — required to de- 
feat the Viet Cong. He is planning a program 
of economic and social advances for the wel- 
fare of his people. He has brought into sup- 
port of the Government representatives of key 
groups previously excluded. He and his col- 
leagues have developed plans for systematic 
liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong 
duress and for mobilization of all available 
Vietnamese resources in the defense of the 

At the same time, General Khanh has under- 
stood the need to improve South Viet-Nam's 
relations with its neighbors, Cambodia and 
Laos; he has taken steps toward conciliation, 
and he has been quick and forthright in ex- 
pressing his Government's regret over the re- 
cent Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's bor- 
ders. In short, he has demonstrated the energy, 
comprehension, and decision required by the 
difficult circumstances that he faces. 

A Program To Meet Our Objectives 

Before describing the means by which we 
hope to assist the South Vietnamese to succeed 
in their undertaking, let me point out the op- 
tions that President Johnson had before him 
when he received General Taylor's and my re- 
port last week. 

Some critics of our present policy have sug- 
gested one option — that wo simply withdraw. 
This the United States totally rejects for rea- 
sons I have stated. 

Other critics have called for a second and 



similar option — a "neutralization" of Viet- Nam. 
This, however, is (lie game of "wiiat's mine is 
mine, and wliat's yours is negotiable." No one 
seriously Iwlieves the Communists would agree 
to neutralization of North Viet-Nam. And, so 
far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, we have 
learned from the past that the Comnumists 
rarely honor the kind of treaty that rmis coun- 
ter to their compulsion to expand. 

Under the shadow of Communist power, 
neutralization would in reality be an interim 
device to permit Communist consolidation and 
eventual takeover. When General Taylor and 
I were in Hue, at the north end of South Viet- 
Nam, 2 weeks ago, several Vietnamese students 
carried posters which showed their recognition 
of the reality of neutralization. The signs 
read : "Neutralize today, communize tomorrow." 

Neutralization of South Viet-Nam, which is 
today under unprovoked subversive attack, 
would not be in any sense an achievement of 
the objectives I have outlined. As we tried to 
convey in Laos, we have no objection in prin- 
ciple to neutrality in the sense of nonalinement. 
But even there vre are learning lessons. Com- 
munist abuse of the Geneva accords, by treating 
the Laos corridor as a sanctuary for infiltra- 
tion, constantly threatens the precarious neu- 
trality. "Neutralization of South Viet-Nam" — 
an ambiguous phrase at best — was therefore 

The third option before the President was 
initiation of military actions outside South 
Viet-Nam, particularly against North Viet- 
Nam, in order to supplement the counterinsur- 
gency program in South Viet-Nam. This course 
of action — its implications and ways of carry- 
ing it out — has been carefully studied. 

Wliatever ultimate course of action may be 
forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that 
actions under this option would be only a sup- 
plement to, not a substitute for, progress with- 
in South Viet-Nam's own borders. 

The fourth course of action was to concen- 
trate on helping the South Vietnamese win the 
battle in their own country. This, all agree, 
is essential no matter what else is done. 

The President therefore approved the 12 
recommendations that General Taylor and I 
made relating to this option. 

"We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South 

Viet-Nam's Government and pledgetl economic 
assistance and military training and logistical 
support for as long as it takes to bring the in- 
surgency under control. 

"We will support the Government of South 
Viet-Nam in carrying out its anti-insurgency 
plan. Under that plan. Prime Minister Khanh 
intends to implement a national mobilization 
program to mobilize all national resources in 
the struggle. This means improving the qual- 
ity of the strategic hamlets, building them sys- 
tematically outward from secure areas, and cor- 
recting previous overextension. The security 
forces of Viet-Nam will be increased by at least 
50,000 men. They will be consolidated, and 
their efTectiveness and conditions of service will 
be improved. They will press the campaign 
with increased intensity. "We will provide re- 
quired additional materiel. This will include 
strengthening of the Vietnamese Air Force with 
better aircraft and improving the mobility of 
tlie ground forces. 

A broad national program is to be carried out, 
giving top priority to rural needs. The pro- 
gram includes land reform, loans to tenant farm- 
ers, health and welfare measures, economic de- 
velopment, and improved status for ethnic mi- 
norities and paramilitary troops. 

A Civil Administrative Corps will be estab- 
lished to bring better public services to the peo- 
ple. This will include teachers, health tech- 
nicians, agricultural workers, and other tech- 
nicians. The initial goal during 1964 will be 
at least 7,500 additional persons; ultimately 
there will be at least 40,000 men for more than 
8,000 hamlets, in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces. 

Farm productivity will be increased through 
doubled use of fertilizers to provide immediate 
and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas 
and to increase both their earnings and the 
nation's export earnings. 

"We have learned that in Viet-Nam political 
and economic progress are the sine qua non of 
military success and that military security is 
equally a prerequisite of internal progress. Our 
future joint efforts with the Vietnamese are 
going to apply these lessons. 

To conclude : Let me reiterate that our goal 
is peace and stability, both in Viet-Nam and 
Southeast Asia. But we have learned that 
"peace at any price" is not practical in the long 

APRIL 13, 1964 


run and that the cost of defending freedom 
must be borne if we are to have it at all. 

The road ahead in Viet-Nam is going to be 
long, difficult, and frustrating. It will take 
work, courage, imagination, and — perhaps more 
than anytliing else — patience to bear the burden 
of what President Kennedy called a "long twi- 
light struggle." In Viet-Nam, it has not been 
finished in the first hundred days of President 

Johnson's administration, and it may not be 
fhiished in the first 1,000 days; but, in coopera- 
tion with General Khanh's government, we have 
made a beginning. When the day comes that 
we can safely withdraw, we expect to leave an 
independent and stable South Viet-Nam, rich 
with resources and bright with prospects for 
contributing to the peace and prosperity of 
Southeast Asia and of the world. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 

Press release 135 dated March 27 

Secretary Rusk : I see the ranks are a bit thin 
this afternoon. I trust I have not intruded 
miduly into what I hope will be a long weekend 
for you. If your boss asks you, I see no particu- 
lar reason why you need to spend an inordinate 
amount of time around this department this 
weekend, but that could change without notice. 

I am ready for your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, rather than get involved in 
a philosophical question about myths and reali- 
ties, I ask you more directly your observations 
on Senator [J. TF.] Fulbrighfs comment that 
the administration'' s current policy toward Cuba 
is somewhat less than successful and that Castro 
is really an unpleasant nuisance rather than an 
intolerable danger. 

A. Well, Senator Fulbright, as he has done 
often in the past, has come forward with a 
thoughtful and a thought-provoking statement. 
He has made it clear that he was not speaking 
for the administration, he was speaking for 
himself; he was not floating a trial balloon for 
the administration. And we don't have time, 
and I think it would be inappropriate for me to 
take up his speech on a paragraph-by-para- 
graph basis. 

There are a number of things in it with which 
I fully agree. We are in a period of change. 
I have indicated to you on a number of oc- 
casions that we are on the front edge of im- 
portant changes in the world situation. Things 

are in motion. And it is very important, there- 
fore, for us to try to understand what those 
changes mean and how United States interests 
are related to those changes and how they bear 
upon the great issue of freedom in the world. 

I mean, for example. Senator Fulbright 
referred to changes in the Communist world. 
I myself spoke to that point before the Electri- 
cal Workers not long ago and tried to outline 
why we treat different Communist countries 

You know that the legislative branch, through 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 
executive branch and private groups are taking 
a look at this question of East- West trade. Al- 
though there are severe limitations on tlie extent 
to which such trade in any event might develop, 
it is a matter that is worth further examination 
after the events of the last several years. 

There are other points with which I would 
not agree. I think that Castro is more than a 
nuisance. He is a threat to this hemisphere. 
In the case of Venezuela there was a very direct 
threat through arms, through a plan, through 
an attempt to take over that constitutional and 
democratic Government by violent means at the 
time of their recent election. 

Mr. Castro knows and has known for a long 

' For text of Secretary Rusk's address before the In- 
tornational Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers, at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 25, see Bul- 
letin of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 390. 



time that his military and political connection 
witli Moscow and his attempt to interfere in 
the allairs of otlier countries in tiiis hemispiiere 
are insuperable obstacles to anything like nor- 
mal relations between himself and the rest of 
this hemisj)here. And whether ho himself could 
survive a change in those two points is a matter 
that rests more in Cuba than outside. 

But, neverthelciis, when a country like Vene- 
zuela — when other countries of this hemisphere 
find themselves under pressure from Castro 
througli agents or fimds or subversion of any 
sort, then it is up to the United States to join 
with those countries to see that this threat is 
met and dealt with. 

Now, it is true that economic isolation of 
Cuba has not been complete, but it has been 
very substantial. There has been a very sharp 
reduction in Cuba's trade with the free world, 
a very sharp reduction in free-world shipping, 
a very sharp reduction in free-world travel with 

Now, these are important and limiting 
Castro's ability to work his mischief outside 
of his own frontiers and to demonstrate both in 
Cuba and outside that this particular course 
is not the path of the future. 

Now, in Panama, I don't want to get into 
that very much because we are very close on 
that, and it may be that we can work out a way 
to get back to the table without too much delay 
and get to a frank discussion of any differences 
that might exist between us. We have had to 
be concerned about the problem of the type of 
precommitment, precondition, which would 
simply postpone for a time a charge of bad 
faith and possibly erode the validity of exist- 
ing arrangements through treaties and a num- 
ber of other agreements which regidate our 
relations with that country. But I think it is 
quite clear from the statements made by the 
two Presidents of the two countries that the 
common interest here is recognized and that we 
do hope that we can find a way back to the 
conference table without undue delay. 

I don't want to go into other matters in 
specific relation to Senator Fulbright's speech, 
but we travel on a main highway of policy on 
which there are soft shouldere on either side 
and our great task is to try to understand real- 
istically what is going on in the world, what 

the present situation is, what the prospects can 
be, and avoid the myths that are involved in 
the soft slioulders in eitiier direction. 

On the one side, to avoid illusions that blind 
us to the actual changes that are going on, try 
to keei> ourselves fully informed and related 
to those changes. On the other side, the myths 
that might develop under the impression that 
changes have already occurred that are much 
more far-reaching than in fact they are because 
we do have dangerous and difficult problems in 
front of us. 

And so, I do think that his statement was a 
contribution to a discussion that is worth while 
in this country because the people of this coun- 
try determine our policy and its main lines in 
the long run. But I think that perhaps I ought 
not to try to take it up on detailed paragraph- 
by-paragraph basis. 

Q. Mr. Secretary .1 Senator Fulbrighfs main 
point was not that the economic isolation of 
Cuba xoas incomplete, as you have put it, but 
that the economic blocJmde has failed and that 
to continue it at the risk of alienating our Eu- 
ropean friends is just going to lead to more and 
more trouble. Do you agree? 

A. I think that would underestimate the ex- 
tent of cooperation which countries in this 
hemisphere have had from other free-world 
countries in just this field. There have been cer- 
tain exceptions, as you know. There have been 
some buses and there have been some other con- 
tracts discussed, but there has been a very sub- 
stantial amoimt of cooperation with the atti- 
tudes of this hemisphere and the needs of this 
hemisphere with respect to this particular type 
of security threat so that I would think I would 
not in the first place characterize it as a failure. 
I think that there is a pretty broad understand- 
ing among our allies generally as to the nature 
of this problem. 

Problems of Cambodia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, both the Soviet Union and 
France have asked the United States to accede 
to an international conference to guarantee the 
neutrality and territorial integrity of Cam- 
bodia. Could you say what our policy is now 
toward that? 

APRIL 13, 1964 


A. Well, I think that today I would re- 
mind you that we have a great interest in the 
independence, the neutrality, the territorial in- 
tegrity of Cambodia. We have no special na- 
tional interest there except in a Cambodia which 
can play its proper role as an independent mem- 
ber of a family of nations. 

Now, its problems apparently are related to 
its own immediate neighbors, Viet-Nam and 
Thailand. These problems are of long dura- 
tion, have deep liistorical roots, and we feel that 
since there are signs that these problems can 
be worked out between Plinom Penh and its 
two immediate neighbors, that those processes 
ought to have a chance to find solutions. 

I would not want to make a categorical state- 
ment today about a conference, but in any event 
a conference needs the kind of preparation that 
would be involved in a meeting of the minds 
between Cambodia and its nearest neighbors. 
We think that this is a real possibility, and that 
if pursued with understanding and diligence 
on all sides this could be achieved, and that 
that would go a long way toward meeting the 
needs which Cambodia had in mind when a 
Geneva conference was proposed. 

But we are hopeful that this matter can be 
prepared, can be worked on in the area among 
those most unmediately concerned to see 
whether a solution of these problems can't be 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the New York 
papers this morning reported that you had 
asJced Russia for additional information on Lee 
Oswald. Can you confirm, that, please, for us? 

A. Yes. The Soviet Union, as perhaps you 
know, did furnish us with some information 
about Mr. Oswald and certain communications 
between him and their consular officers at one 
stage of his life. We have been requested by 
the President's Commission to obtain certain 
additional information, and we have trans- 
mitted that request to the Soviet Union. This 
has happened in the last few days, and of 
course there has been no sign of any reply, but 
this would be a matter for the President's 

Q. Mr. Secretary, wlien the congressional 
wool delegation left your office about 10 days 

ago. Senator [John 0.] Pastore said that you 
said you would contact — or that the Depart- 
ment would contact — the embassies of export- 
ing countries, wool-exporting countries, and 
then report back to the delegation. Have you 
done this? 

A. We have had some discussions on that 
subject, but we are not in a position today — 
perhaps we can next week — to make a report 
back on that subject. We have not done so. 

Regional Relationships 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you menti-oned the other 
day the shortcomings of SEATO [Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organisation], and you seemed to 
feel that some regional groupings anumg th^e 
countries concerned in the region — / wondered 
if you would care to amplify that and exactly 
what you had in mir\d? 

A. I til ink perhaps I might have said — and I 
am not certain on just which occasion you are 
referring, because I talk a good deal, I find, 
these days — 

Q. — the Foreign Affairs Committee — 

A. Beg pardon? Oh, yes. Wliat I had in 
mind there was that SEATO is not the com- 
plete answer to the problems of that area, that 
it would be a very constructive thing if the 
countries in the area could find a way to build 
on their own relations among themselves. You 
are familiar, for example, with the ASA [As- 
sociation of Southeast Asia] relationship 
among the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand. 
You are familiar with the discussions, still 
somewhat painful, among the Philippines, In- 
donesia, and Malaysia with respect to the pos- 
sibility of a Maphilindo. We think that these 
relationships within the area, without regard 
to the formal structure of a treaty arrange- 
ment, such as SEATO, can be a very construc- 
tive relationship in terms of strengthening 
their own mutual interests in each other's inde- 
pendence and security and well-being. That 
was the chief point that I had in mind, that 
over and above these regional security arrange- 
ments, there ought to be added the closest co- 
operation in the regions among the members of 
the region, including those that are in an alli- 



anco as well as those who call tliemselves non- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, was the release of the two 
American -flyers today in any way contingent 
upon public assurances on the part of the United 
States that there would be no longer any over- 
flights over Communist territories? 

A. Well, it is not a continfjency because that 
does not lend itself to a condition. We have 
already indicated that we recognize that this 
piano was where it was not supposed to be, and 
we have also indic^ited that we have taken addi- 
tional measures to try to prevent this kind of 
straying in the future. But this is not a condi- 
tion in any sense. Tliey were released because 
the Soviet Union looked at the matter and de- 
cided to release tliem, and I don't know of any 
conditions or any deals of that sort that were 

Q. Would you comment, Mr. Secretary, on 
the Soviet use of the word "expelled" flyers? 

A. No. I suppose we sometimes have sent 
people home, and we call it "deporting." I 
wouldn't attach any importance to that. We are 
glad to get them home. 

Present Facts About Communist China 

Q. Sir, m discussing Senator Fulbrighfs 
speech, you mentioned trade, Cuba, and Pana- 
ma. Do you have any thoughts on his remarks 
on CommAinist China's relations? 

A. Well, I want to say that, because I picked 
out certain points there, the fact that I did 
not allude to other points on either side of 
the ledger should not be taken as significant. 
In other words, don't go down the speech para- 
graph by paragraph and say that, because I 
didn't mention this, therefore you derive some- 
thing from it. I think that — well. Senator 
Fulbright himself pointed out that he would 
not be disposed to recognize Commimist China 
or to admit it to the United Nations. 

Now, here is a situation where we are not 
dealing with myths, but it is present facts — 
present facts. It is a fact that within the last 
2 years mainland China attacked India. It is 
a present fact that mainland China is giving aid 
and assistance to the effort to take over South 

Viet-Nam. It is a present fact, confirmed re- 
peatedly in our discussions in Warsaw, that they 
refuse to renounce force in the Formosa Strait 
and that any improvement of relationships is 
conditioned upon the surrender of Formosa to 
the mainland. It is a present fact that main- 
land China is engaging in various activities of 
mischief in continents like Africa and South 
America. It is a present fact that they are 
pressing a policy of militancy and aggression 
in a debate even within the Communist bloc 
itself. So that these are not. — these problems 
don't arise through any fixed turn of mind of 
15, 17 years ago, but they are problems that are 
operational today and we have to deal with 
them ; and I think that his speech indicated that 
there are some major obstacles to any change of 
policy in that respect. 

Responsibility of Leadership 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the main thrusts of 
the Fulbright speech was not so much, I don't 
suppose, that the administration does not realize 
or recognize some of these changes but that the 
American public and the politically expressive 
parts of that public do not recognize them. To 
what extent is this true and to what extent is 
failure, if there is such a failure, to actually in- 
hibit your ahility to adjust American policy to 
that, because, as you know, at the very end he 
accused you of rather chronic caution and so 

A. Well, I referred to his statement as a 
thoughtful and thought-provoking statement. 
It is important that these matters be discussed. 
We ought not to have what he referred to as 
"unthinkable thoughts" in the American scene. 
There ought to be a vigorous and lively debate 
about these matters. 

We have foimd, for example, that there has 
been — there has been considerable reluctance 
here to deal with different Communist coim- 
tries on a different basis, depending upon de- 
velopments and the possibilities of relationships 
with these countries. But I think it is our obli- 
gation in the executive, in the administration, to 
base our attitudes on reality and on facts and 
upon the national interest, and to put our con- 
clusions to the country and to the Congress 
based upon that, and not to anticipate what is 

APRIL 13, 1964 


possible or what the national reaction might be 
in the absence of leadership. I thmk we have 
responsibility of leadership, and this point came 
out in his statement. 

Q. Mr. Secrefaiy, are tue to attach any sig- 
nificance to the fact that you used the expression 
'■'■mainland ChincC'' instead of Communist China., 
and "Formosa"''' instead of Nationalist China? 

A. No, no, no. Those — (Laughter.) None 
whatever. None whatever. I was just trying 
to talk about those people over there — (Laugh- 
ter.) on the other side of the sea. No, we 
recognize the Nationalist Government of China, 
as do more than a majority of the members of 
the U.N. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen reports 
within the last few days that you have already 
made up your mind to retire at the end of Presi- 
dent Johnson\ term. Now, I think you have 
denied that once hefore, hut you may want to 
deny it again. {Laughter.) 

A. Well, with due respect to my colleagues 
back there, I have put this on cameras twice. I 
don't think I need to do it again. (Laughter.) 


Q. Mr. Secretary, hack on the flyers, could you 
comment on why it took so long — a week — to get 
them hack? And also what about the Russian 
claim that they have evidence that the flyers 
were spying? What about that? 

A. Well, the answer to the first part of your 
question is I just don't know. I have been in 
touch with — we have been in touch with the 
Soviet Government several times in this period. 
I have no explanation at the present time for 
any delay that might have occurred. 

On the second point, we are ourselves con- 
vinced, because we know what their instructions 
were, their flight plans were, their reporting 
was. We know that they were lost, that they 
were not engaged upon any mission over East 

Now, it is true this was a tactical reconnais- 
sance aircraft as a member of a tactical recon- 
naissance squadron. It had certain equipment 
on board. And I suppose the Russians looked 
at this pretty hard. But I think I will just 
leave it at that, until we have a chance to talk 

with these flyers and find out exactly what hap- 
pened, because it is, quite frankly, a little mys- 
terious as to how they could be that far off 
course. And we are going to do our best to find 
out why. 

U.S. Policy on Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate a stiijt oj 
our policy in trade toioard Cuba — from no trade 
with Cuba to one of gradual reestablishment of 
trade with Cuba? 

A. No, no, not unless they move to deal with 
these two utterly fundamental points announced 
by President Kennedy about 3 years ago and 
pursued by us and other members of the hemi- 
sphere since that time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to clarify whatever 
differences may exist on Cuba, are we as a gov- 
ernment still committed to bringing down 
Castro as the leader of Cuba on the grounds 
that he does not represent the Cuban people and 
on the grounds that he has a military connec- 
tion with Moscow and on the grounds he is 
seeking to export revolution? 

A. I think tl\ose tliree things all add up to 
the fact that this present regime in Cuba shows 
no signs of being able to make itself compatible 
with this hemisphere, as described and spelled 
out by the hemisphere at Punta del Este. So 
that I think all those things add up to the notion 
that Castro in Cuba doesn't mean normal rela- 
tions with the rest of the hemisphere. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned two points 
that Castro would have to satisfy in order to 
bring back normal relations or trade with Cuba. 
In the first point, about the military connection 
with the Soviet Union, what would you feel 
would constitute a break in this military con- 
nection — just simply the withdraxoal of troops, 
or sending back the guns that it received from, 
Russia to Russia, or what would you say would 
be the answer to that? 

A. I think the removal of the Soviet military 
pressure and any implications that the Soviet 
Union has a military or political commitment 
to Cuba with respect to its relations with the 
rest of the hemisphere. 

Yes, sir? 



NATO Multilateral Force 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the 
situation is at the moment with regard to the 
political consideration of the MLF force as 
regards the various countries in Western Eu- 
rope with lohom you are consulting on that 

A. Yes. The two committees liave been 
working very well on that — the Military Com- 
mittee and the Political Consultation Commit- 
tee. We shall be having their reports very 
shortly and will be discussing with other 

As you know, a number of governments have 
elected to t-ake part in the experimental multi- 
manned missile destroyer to test out some of the 
operational and practical questions involved, 
and partly as a demonstration. But I wouldn't 
want to try to be precise about the attitude of 
other governments, particularly on this matter. 
We have been very much encouraged with the 
way the discussions have been going, and I think 
we will expect to see that forward movement 
continued. But I think you will be hearing 
more about that in the next month or so as 
these reports come in. 

Q. Well, now, do you anticipate, Mr. Secre- 

A. Excuse me. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up hy this: 
Can you anticipate then, as things are going 
now, that the multilateral force will come about 

A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I am very much as- 
sured of that and very much encouraged by 
what has developed in the course of our con- 
sultations in the last several weeks on that. 

SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your amnwvmced trip to the 
SEATO Ministerial' Council meeting in Manila, 
and the after trip to Taiioan — could you explain 
the purpose of that a little, in the light of your 
earlier answer that the members of the alliances 
should form, closer relationships am-ong them- 
selves. Is this a death hnell for SEA TO ? 

A. Not at all. This is a stated meeting of 

SEATO. It is normal for the foreign ministers 
to meet at least once a year. This has been 
planned for some time. I think it is the 10th an- 
niversary of SPLVTO, actually, in Manila. Ma- 
nila was the actual location of the original 
signature. So I am going out there for that 
meeting. And I think that SEATO has shown 
that — the regional members particularly, as well 
as the other members — this arrangement, this 
mutual assurance has been of great importance 
to the security of the members of that organiza- 
tion. But there is nothing very special about 
the fact that I am going. I think it would be 
rather news if I were not going, in fact, under 
the circumstances. 

Q. Tlianh you. 

Security in Department of State 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there ha/ve been a number 
of assertions in recent weeks to the effect that 
the charges by a Polish defector named Gole- 
niewshi have been covered up, and tliat a se- 
curity investigation is under way in the State 
Department. Do you have any comment on 

A. Yes. I would be glad to comment. I 
haven't had this question in some time. I would 
be glad to comment on this question of security 
in the Department of State, because it does need 
better miderstanding and better public tinder- 

Every important Foreign Office, and that in- 
cludes the Department of State, is subject to 
attempts at penetration by foreign governments. 
These attempts are jjursued by technical means 
— for example, you may recall the Great Seal 
of the United States that Ambassador [Henry 
Cabot] Lodge displayed once in the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council - — and also pursued through the 
element of human frailty. This goes on all the 
time. And it requires an unrelenting effort to 
meet these attempts at penetration. 

Now, we here in the Department of State have 
almost all of our jobs classified as sensitive 
jobs — I suppose 97 percent or 98 percent of 
them. We leave out certain people in the ware- 
houses, and things of that sort. The general 
average around government is 5 percent to 10 

'For background, see ibid., June 13, 1960, p. 955. 

APRIL 13, 1964 


percent. Therefore, because of the nature of 
our business, we have to expect, and we do in 
fact obtain, a very high standard of conduct 
on the part of our people. And I am very proud 
of the way in wliich our people live up to these 
high standards of conduct. 

Now, this business of security is never end- 
ing — never ending. One can't relax on it, be- 
cause of the efforts that are being made to 
penetrate. This means that we bring our secu- 
rity clearances up to date when there is a promo- 
tion, or when there is an assignment to a signif- 
icant position, or, where this does not occur on 
a regular and periodic basis, we renew tliese 
security clearances by periodic investigations 
and reinvestigations. This goes on regularly. 

But, on the other hand, we are going to use a 
sense of justice and common sense in determin- 
ing what are security cases and what are prob- 
lems for us in this field. 

I have seen some discussion of this phrase 
"derogatory remarks" or "derogatory informa- 
tion." This is something which really requires 
a good deal of just plain, old-fashioned com- 
mon sense. 

I don't want to make light over a matter that 
is serious, but some years ago I was asked to be 
a consultant, and in filling out one of these se- 
curity blanks the question came "Has any mem- 
ber of your family ever tried to overthrow the 
Government of the United States by force and 
violence?" And I said "Yes." And the next 
question was: "If the answer is 'Yes,' who?" 
And I named both my grandfathers. (Laugh- 
ter.) Well, things went along until the inter- 
rogators came back and said, "About your 
grandfathers. ..." I said, "I thought one of 
them was at Gettysburg." (Laughter.) 

Well, I suppose 3 or 4 years from now it is 
entirely possible that this will be solemnly put 
down as a derogatory comment — you see? — in 
this field. (Laughter.) 

Now, I have very important duties in this re- 
spect as Secretary of State. We are going to 
pursue those duties to insure the security of this 
Department. But I have duties also because I 
am the American Secretary of State. And we 
are going to do it in the way that is consistent 
with our standards here in our constitutional 
society. But we are not going to play around 
with this element of security; it is far too im- 

portant. But we are not going to lose our heads 
in the process. 

Now, I have heard some discussion lately 
about things that happened 10 years ago, that 
my predecessors got into, resolved, acted upon. 
People working in this Department have secu- 
rity clearance ; and it is going to stay that way. 
But we are not going to lose our heads about it. 

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

The Hope for Reasoned Agreement 

Bemarks by President Johnson ^ 

Before I conclude, for a moment, if I may, I 
would just like to simply talk to you about your 
family and mine, about their future and their 

Last Sunday, Palm Sunday, as I sat in 
church, I thought about all of the problems that 
faced this world — ancient feuds and recent quar- 
rels that have disturbed widely separated parts 
of the earth. You have seen five or six different 
quarrels appearing on the front page of your 
morning newspaper, and you have heard about 
our foreign policy. 

The world has changed and so has the method 
of dealing with disiiiptions of the peace. There 
may have been a time when a Commander in 
Chief would order soldiers to march the very 
moment a disturbance occurred, although re- 
straint and fairness are not new to the American 
tradition. As a matter of fact, some people 
urged me to hurry in the Marines when the 
air became a little hot on a particular occasion 

But the world as it was and the world as it is 
are not the same any more. Once upon a time 
even large-scale wars could be waged without 
risking the end of civilization, but wliat was 
once upon a time is no longer so — because gen- 
eral war is impossible. In a matter of mo- 
ments, you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million 
of our adversaries, or they can, in the same 

' Made at the conclusion of an address before the 
national legislative conference of the building and 
construction trades at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 24 
(White House press release; as-dellvered text). 



amount of time, wipe out 50 million or 100 mil- 
lion of our people, taking half of our land, 
tiikinj; half of our i)opulation in a matter 
of an hour. So general war is impossible, and 
some alternatives are essential. The people of 
the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to 
ready attack. That is why we must follow the 
prophet Isaiah many, many times before we 
send the Marines and say, "Come now, and let 
lis reason together." And this is our objective : 
the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war. 

In this nuclear world, in this world of a hun- 
dred new nations, we must offer the outstretched 
arm that tries to help instead of an arm's-length 
sword that helps to kill. 

In every troubled spot in the world, this hope 
for reasoned agreement instead of rash retalia- 
tion can bear f niit. Agreement is being sought 
and we hope and believe soon will be worked out 
with our Panamanian friends. The United Na- 
tions peacekeeping machinery is already on its 
merciful mission in Cyprus and a mediator is 
being selected. 

The water problem that disturbed us at Guan- 
tanamo was solved not by a battalion of Marines 
bayoneting their way in to turn on the water, 
but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off. 
I can say to you that our base is self-sufficient. 
By lean readiness, a source of danger and dis- 
agreement has been removed. 

In Viet-Nam divergent voices cry out with 
suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some 
for more appeasement, some even for retreat. 
"We do not criticize them or demean them. We 
consider fully their suggestions. 

But today finds us where President Eisen- 
hower found himself 10 years ago. The posi- 
tion he took with Viet-Nam then in a letter that 
he sent to the then President ' is one that I could 
take in complete honesty today, and that is that 
we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve 
their independence and retain their freedom and 
keep from being enveloped by communism. 

We, the most powerful nation in the world, 
can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength 
is clear, and it is well known to those who would 
be our adversaries, but let's bo reminded that 
power brings obligation. The people in this 
country have more blessed hopes than bitter 
victory. The people of this country and the 
world expect more from their leaders than just 
a show of brute force. So our hope and our 
purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead 
of ready aggression ; to preserve our honor with- 
out a world in ruins ; to substitute, if we can, un- 
derstanding for retaliation. 

My most fervent prayer is to be a President 
who can make it possible for every boy in this 
land to grow to manhood by loving his coun- 
try — loving his country instead of dying for it. 

Secretary Rusk Heads Delegation 
to SEATO Council Meeting 

The Department of State announced on 
March 26 (press release 132) that Secretary 
Rusk would leave Washington April 10 to at- 
tend the ninth meeting of the Council of Min- 
isters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- 
tion (SEATO), which will be held at Manila 
April 13-15.^ 

After the meeting the Secretary will visit 
Taipei April 16-17 to consult with officials of 
the Government of the Republic of China. 

Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member 
countries are scheduled to attend the meeting, 
where they will exchange views on matters 
affecting the treaty area, as well as review the 
military and nonmilitary activities of the or- 

The member countries of SEATO are Austra- 
lia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zea- 
land, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 

* For text, see Bitlletin of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735. 

'For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, 
see press release 132. 

APRIL 13, 19G4 
72ft-082— 64- 


The Atlantic Agenda 

hy TF. TF. Rostow 

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^ 

Ten montlis ago I had the privilege of talking 
in Brussels on the subject of the Atlantic com- 
munity.^ At that time I tried to explain the 
historical roots of American support for the 
concepts of European integration and Atlantic 
partnership. I concluded that, so far as we in 
Washington could perceive, the character of 
likely changes on the world scene over the fore- 
seeable future would continue to make European 
integration and the Atlantic partnership^ the 
appropriate foundations for policy in the West. 
Shortly thereafter, as you will recall, President 
Kennedy authoritatively restated our policy in 
his Frankfurt speech of June 25, 1963 ; ^ and 
President Johnson has subsequently reaffirmed 
in words and deeds the continuity of a policy 
which, indeed, reaches back almost a generation 
in American political and diplomatic life. 

The events of recent months have, I believe, 
strengthened our commitment to this policy, 
while posing for the West an agenda somewhat 
different in its balance and emphasis than that 
with which we had become familiar in earlier 
years. In considering these matters with you 
tonight I should like to begin by trying to de- 
scribe the character of the changes going for- 
ward on the world scene and then turn to their 
consequences for the content of the Atlantic 

^ Address made before the American Chamber of Com- 
merce at Brussels, Belgium, on Mar. IG (press release 
110 dated Mar. 13). 

° For an address made by Mr. Rostow before the 
Belgo-American Association on May 9, 1963, see Bul- 
letin of June 3, 1963. p. 85."). 

' Ihid., July 22, 1963, p. 118. 

Present Situation 

It is increasingl}' clear that the Cuba missile 
crisis of October 1962 ended one phase in post- 
war history and began another. It brought to 
a halt what might be described as the post- 
Sputnik offensive. 

In the v,-ake of the first Sputnik — and heart- 
ened by that powerful symbolic event — a toler- 
ably unified Communist bloc launched against 
the free world a major offensive. The confident 
mood throTighout the Communist world was 
caught by Mao Tse-tung's post-Sputnik state- 
ment: "The east wind is prevailing over the 
west wind." 

It was in 1958 that the ultimatum on Berlin 
was launched by Moscow; Ho Chi Minh, in 
violation of the 1954 Geneva agi'eements, began 
to press down hard in South Viet-Nam and into 
central Laos. At the end of 1958 Castro took 
over in Cuba and began to press out into the 
Caribbean. The Commimists vigorously sought 
to exploit the aftermath of independence in the 
Congo, as well as opportunities in Indonesia 
and elsewhere in the developing areas. This 
post-Sputnik offensive aimed to gain ground in 
Europe by the application of nuclear black- 
mail against the West over the question of Ber- 
lin, and in the developing areas by a mixture of 
subversion and guerrilla warfare, aid and trade, 
and the projected image of communism as the 
wave of the future. 

Although this offensive was set back in two 
areas — by the Lebanon-Jordan and Quemoy- 
Matsu crises of 1958— it had real momentimi 
when President Kennedy came into office. The 



fii-st task of his administration was to deal 
with it. 

Rouglily between May of 1961 and October 
1962, uiulcr President Kennedy's leadership, 
this oll'ensive was halted. Dangerous Commu- 
nist actions by no means ceased, but the mo- 
mentum of the post-Sputnik offensive drained 
away. And Moscow confronted at home, and 
in its relations with Communist China and 
Eastern Europe, a set of searching and funda- 
mental problems. 

Sensing this historic interval of opportunity, 
President Kennedy in June 1963, in his Ameri- 
can University speech,* moved from the position 
of equilibrium and strength, which had been 
created under his leadership, in the direction of 

My theme tonight is simply this : Whether, in 
fact, the turning point of 1961-63 becomes a 
watershed in human history, in which the cold 
war gradually gives way to the organization 
of a peaceful and progressive community of 
nations, or whether it leads merely to a paren- 
thesis between two Communist offensives, de- 
pends primarily on what we in the free world 
make of this interval. 

It is evident — in Southeast Asia and in the 
Caribbean, for example — that the Communist 
danger remains acute. Peace has not broken 
out. Our understandings with the Soviet Un- 
ion cover an exceedingly narrow range. We 
evidently face danger as well as opportunity. 
And we confront new problems within the free 
world as well as in our relations with the Com- 
munist nations. 

Nevertheless, the initiative is in our hands if 
we have the will and the vision to seize it; if 
we deal with present problems in a way that 
strengthens the Atlantic partnership, both in- 
ternally and in its ties with less developed areas 
to the south ; and, above all, if we command the 
capacity to remain together at a time when the 
most obvious and imifying of the postwar 
threats — the threat to Berlin — has abated. 

In deciding what actions should be taken to 
these ends, we need to look at main trends in the 
world about us. 

At the moment, as I say, tlie threat to West- 
ern Europe on the central front has sub.sided; 
East-West trade is expanding; certain limited 
East-West agreements have l)een made; West 
Berlin is quiet, confident, and vital. On the 
other hand, the Soviet nuclear missile force is 
still expanding and remains targeted on West- 
ern Europe and tlie United States, and massive 
conventional forces remain at Moscow's 

Within the Atlantic alliance we are moving 
toward promising trade negotiations; we have 
made quiet progress in improving consultation 
about nuclear matters, about our economic aid 
to developing areas, and about our political 
moves toward other nations. On the other 
hand, there are still important problems ahead 
in the field of Atlantic trade; the question of 
how to share nuclear responsibility within the 
alliance remains with us; and we have much 
work to do in improving our programs of aid 
to less developed areas and in developing effec- 
tive techniques of political consultation. 

Meanwhile, two forces converge elsewhere in 
the world scene to produce considerable politi- 
cal turbulence. 

First, there is what might be called the nat- 
ural nationalism of the emerging nations of 
Asia, the Sliddle East, Africa, and Latin Amer- 
ica. A desire for increased national dignity 
and stature on the world scene, in the face of 
technically more advanced nations, is a funda- 
mental motive for the modernization of under- 
developed areas now, as it was in the 19th cen- 
tury. In the past year this tendency has, 
perhaps, been heightened to a degree in some 
areas by a sense that the cold-war threats have 
diminished and that it is possible and rational 
to pursue more vigorously narrow national ob- 
jectives. This tendency within the free world 
is, of course, systematically exploited by 

Second, as President Johnson noted in his 
state of the Union message,^ we have seen sys- 
tematic and purposeful efforts by Communist 
regimes to destroy the independence of other 
states by the illegal entry of arms and men 
across international frontiers to foment sub- 
version. I refer, of course, to the actions un- 

♦ Ihid., July 1, 1963, p. 2. 

• Ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110. 

APRIL 13, 19Gt 


dertaken by the regimes in Hanoi and Habana 
and to the general doctrines proclaimed from 
Peiping, which would assert the legitimacy of 
support for movements of Communist insur- 
rection conducted across international frontiers. 
The combination of the low cost to the Com- 
munists of doing damage, plus the technical 
difficulty of interception, has made subversion 
and guerrilla warfare the most durable Com- 
munist technique of the cold war. 

Thus, while in the main theater of Central 
Europe the cold war has at least temporarily 
abated, and wliile there are gi'ounds for great 
confidence about the long trend in the East- 
West balance, we observe problems, as well as 
opportunities, within the Atlantic partnership ; 
and we see a rolling succession of crises in the 
rest of the world compounded, as I say, of exu- 
berant nationalism, heightened by systematic 
Communist exploitation, plus the sinister and 
dangerous exercises being conducted by Ho Chi 
Minh and Castro in Southeast Asia and in the 

Our Agenda 

In the face of this situation our agenda in the 
Atlantic alliance has three broad dimensions: 

First, here in the northern part of tlie free 
world, to maintain and strengthen the cohesion 
of the free, industrialized countries as Europe 
gradually moves toward unity. 

Second, to work with the great southern areas 
of Asia, the Middle East, Afi'ica, and Latin 
America so as to accelerate their economic 

Third, while frustrating conununism where 
it still thrusts out against us, to refine our 
methods of political consultation so we can work 
together in helping other free nations to pro- 
tect their independence, while exploring such 
possibilities as may emerge of moving toward 
more peaceful and stable East-West relations. 

I turn now to each of these three points. 

Strengthening the North 

Witliin the north there are two great practical 
tasks before us in 1964: going ahead in the 
trade negotiations and continuing to work awav 
at the problem of more effective sharing of nu- 
clear responsibility. 

So far as the trade negotiations are con- 
cerned — here in a city filled with so much tech- 
nical exjDertise — I will confine myself to one 
brief observation. 

Every nation will, evidently, bring to those 
negotiations strongly felt special interests, 
charged with f)olitical meanmg. This will be 
true of the United States as well as of our 
European negotiating partners. Under these 
circumstances, it will be necessary for all the 
participants to bear in mind the large conunon 
interests involved in their success. No coun- 
try is going to be able to get all that it would 
like; but the vital economic interests of many 
nations will have to be respected in bringing 
the negotiations to successful completion. We 
can expect hard bargaining. The greatest 
stake in these negotiations, however, will not 
lie in this or that disadvantage avoided. It 
will lie in creating a general world environ- 
ment of lowered barriers to trade. 

I make this observation not merely as an 
official of the Department of State but as a 
professional economist. Trade negotiations 
are one of the few ways that government offi- 
cials can, so to speak, lay their hands on the 
economy. The fate of a nation's international 
trade position and its foreign balance is deter- 
mined by a great many factors, domestic and 
foreign, of which the level of tariffs is only 
one. A certain breadth of economic, as well as 
political, vision should, evidently, be brought 
to these important negotiations. For example, 
the ability of all nations involved to accept a 
world of lower tariffs would be inci-eased by a 
strengthening of measures for international 
monetary cooperation. 

So far as sharing of responsibility for nuclear 
deterrence is concerned, it has been clear for 
some time that the Atlantic alliance faces three 
broad alternatives. 

First: To retain responsibility solely in 
United States hands, while strengthening nu- 
clear consultation within the alliance. There 
is undoubtedly a need for ever closer consulta- 
tion on nuclear matters, and all of our countries 
should be constantly seeking for better ways of 
meeting this need. This is a necessary and im- 
portant part of any approach to tlie nuclear 
problem. But it may not fully meet the long- 
term desire of a strong and prosperous Europe 





to play wliat it would consider a self-respecting 
role in strategic deterrence. Major European 
countries have made clear their view that nu- 
clear consultation, alone, does not accord them 
such a role. That consultation may, further- 
more, not achieve optinuim etTectiveness, or 
fully grip the participants, if those taking part 
lack the knowledge and sense of responsibility 
that comes from sharing in the costs, owner- 
ship, and operation of strategic weapons. 

Second: Operational responsibility for stra- 
tegic deterrence might be shared more fidly 
with Europe on a national basis. When last 
here, I spoke of the divisions and tensions 
which such a coui"se would create in the Atlan- 
tic alliance. This course would also evidently 
make it more difKcult to build a cohesive Euro- 
pean community. For it would either divide 
this community into fii-st- and second-class citi- 
zens by sharing with some but not others, or 
it would lead to nuclear sharing with all major 
members of the community, thus extending and 
embedding in concrete the very notion of na- 
tional self-sufficiency which the community 
seeks to erode. 

And it would evidently be difficult, on the 
basis of thus strengthening and extending inde- 
pendent national forces, to progress toward a 
genuinely integrated European or Atlantic 
nuclear effort. In the absence of thus sharing 
nuclear power on a national basis, on the other 
hand, the chances of integration may be en- 
hanced by the costs and difficulty of making 
an independent effort succeed. The obstacles 
to creating a delivery sj'stem which can actu- 
ally penetrate sophisticated Soviet defenses are 
not trivial, and give some reason to believe that 
continuing national nuclear proliferation is far 
from inevitable if we can develop promising 

If we are neither to hoard sole responsibility 
for strategic deterrence in the United States 
nor disperse it nationally within the Atlantic 
alliance, this brings us to the third alternative: 
some pro^^sion for multilateral sharing which 
is consistent with the concepts of European in- 
tegration and Atlantic partnership. 

One possible approach to this need is repre- 
sented by the proposed missile fleet: the MLF 
[multilateral force]. 

In its military aspects the MLF could pro- 
vide Europe with an increased share in effective 
coverage of Soviet weapons systems threatening 
Europe, such as airlields and missile sites. 
There would be more than enough such military 
installations, to which tiie yield and accuracy 
of MLF missiles would be suited, to absorb 
fully the MLF's projected strength. The 
NATO international military authorities have 
made clear their view that it would be militarily 
more advantageous to have these military in- 
stallations covei-ed by a mix of e.xternal and of 
theater forces, including sea-based MHBM's 
[medium-range ballistic missiles], than by 
external forces alone. The United States is 
sufficiently convinced of the MLF's military ef- 
fectiveness so that it would, as Secretary [of 
Defense Robert S.] McXamara said at the last 
NATO meeting, be prepared to substitute the 
MLF for increased United States missile forces 
which it would otherwise have to build to meet 
important military needs. 

In its political aspects the MLF would pro- 
vide an enlarged role for Europe in the owner- 
ship, operation, and control of strategic nuclear 
power. The major participants would play a 
key role in MLF planning and thus in control 
of a force far larger and more effective than 
any which could be created by independent na- 
tional effort in Europe. That role could grow 
as Europe unified. President Johnson said, in 
speaking of this proposed missile fleet's ci-ea- 
tion, here on November 8 : "^ 

The movement to Atlantic jiartnership makes this 
possible. The movement to European unity makes this 
desirable — as a first step toward a greater European 
voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile 
fleet toward Euroiiean control, as Europe marches to- 
ward unity, is by no means excluded. 

This evolution would, of course, hinge, among 
other things, on a greater consensus — a genuine 
consensus, freely arrived at — among the poten- 
tial major European members of MLF than 
now exists about this matter. In dealing witli 
this question of nuclear control we must be care- 
ful not to consider as differences between the 
United States and Europe what are actually, in 
gootl part, unresolved issues among the Euro- 
pean nations themselves. These are complex 

• For text, see ihii., Dec. 2, 19C3, p. 852. 

APRIL 13. 1964 


and difficult questions ; European agreement on 
them may well depend on progress toward 
European unity. 

Because the MLF could provide European 
nations with a solid share in strategic deter- 
rence, it would also enhance the effectiveness of 
nuclear consultation. IMLF participants — par- 
ticularly major members — would be taking 
part in that consultation as responsible part- 
nere, rather than as bystanders. They would 
bring to it a background of information and a 
sense of responsibility wliich would enable them 
to play a more meaningful part in the process. 
And they would be responding to a clear opera- 
tional need to coordinate powerful strategic 
forces, which would lend heightened urgency 
and importance to the task. 

Improved nuclear consultation and creation 
of a multilateral force — two of the three courses 
of action I outlined — can thus be viewed not as 
alternatives but rather as mutually reinforcing 
steps to the same end — to be taken within the 
same time frame. The one may well enliance 
the other's effectiveness ; together, they may pro- 
vide the framework for an mcreasingly effec- 
tive approach to the problem of nuclear 

Such an approach must, of course, be consist- 
ent with our disarmament efforts. A joint mis- 
sile fleet would be even more proof against na- 
tional dissemination than existing arrangements 
for deploying missiles to allied forces, i.e., the 
arrangements which were used for past IRBM 
[intermediate-range ballistic missile] deploy- 
ments to Europe. For the MLF missiles would 
be under mixed multilateral manning and 
ownership, instead of under the national man- 
ning and ownership called for by present ar- 
rangements ; and the warheads would be imder 
multilateral control, instead of imder the bi- 
lateral control called for by present arrange- 
ments. It would thus be a step away from — 
not toward — national proliferation. 

The MLF evidently depends on both our 
interested European partners and the LTnited 
States. It is for each of us to consider the 
possible courses of action and decide how the 
important problem of nuclear sharing is to be 
approached. Our own careful studies, since the 
MLF was first put forward by the Eisenhower 

admmistration, have not indicated any alterna- 
tive approach which would be more effective in 
reconciling the needs of European integration 
and Atlantic defense. 

We believe that these two concepts, European 
integration and Atlantic defense, should sup- 
port and reinforce — not contradict — each other. 
Effective Atlantic defense helps to create a se- 
cure and cohesive military environment in 
which progress toward European integration is 
more likely to take place. European unity, in 
turn, helps to reinforce Atlantic defense by 
creating a stronger European partner in build- 
ing that defense. That is why the United 
States has always paralleled its efforts for At- 
lantic defense with steadfast support and en- 
couragement for the cause of European integra- 
tion — in the political as well as the economic 

The issue is thus not whether to seek Atlantic 
defense or European integration; it is how to 
seek toth these goals. 

This trend toward mutual confidence and 
interdependence within the Atlantic alliance 
is one of the great achievements of modern his- 
tory. After the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1961- 
62, I do not believe there are many in Europe 
who really doubt the American commitment to 
defend Europe's frontiers as our own, or the 
American commitment to risk New York for 
Brussels, or Washington for Paris, or Detroit 
for Ankara. Certainly no one in Moscow does. 
This commitment does not rest only on senti- 
ment. As President Kennedy pointed out at 

. . . war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, 
destroys peace in America. . . . That is why no admin- 
istration ... in Washington can fail to respond to such 
a threat — not merely from good will but from necessity. 

That is why we cannot wait imtil an aggressor 
has bitten deep into Europe before throwing our 
full strength, nuclear as well as nonnuclear, 
against Mm. 

We have seen, over the postwar years, how 
firmly the alliance knits together at moments of 
acute danger and crisis. The United States and 
Europe can and should go forward and build 
on this confidence, not destroy it. They should 
approach the nuclear problem with this end in 



North-South Economic Ties 

Turning to the second item on our agenda, 
north-south affairs, our first common task is to 
consider with our friends from tiie developing 
areas, at the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development,' what measures of 
trade and aid we can moimt together to accel- 
erate their development. 

It would be inappropriate for me to discuss 
the various proposals which may shortly be con- 
sidered at Geneva ; but it is clear that the more 
industrialized nations of the free world bear a 
common responsibility, rooted in enlightened 
self-interest, steadily to maintain over the years 
ahead a flow of capital and technical assistance 
to the nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
and Latin America; and we have an equal in- 
terest in their developing an ability to earn by 
their own efforts an enlarged flow of foreign 

If these nations are to maintain their inde- 
pendence, move toward political stability, and 
assimie on the world scene roles of increased 
importance and responsibility, they must mod- 
ernize their societies and provide for their citi- 
zens an environment of regular growth in wel- 
fare. That is a job which they must, mainly, 
do for themselves. But the margin of assist- 
ance which we of the Atlantic world and Japan 
can provide, through aid and trade, is a criti- 
cal margin. 

"We have been much heartened to see in recent 
years the expansion in the contribution of West- 
em Europe and Japan to this enterprise, but 
much remains to be done in several major 

First, there is the question of the volume of 
aid. The assistance provided by nations other 
than the United States has doubled over the past 
7 years. So has that of the United. States. 
Nevertheless the requirements continue to be 
large. More needs to be done. 

Second, there is the type of aid to be pro- 
vided. The fact that many of the loans ini- 
tially granted to the developing nations from 
Europe were relatively short-term has resulted 
in a buildup in their requirement for repay- 
ment which is likely to strain excessively the 

balance of payments of some of the developing 
nations in the years ahead. We shall have to 
provide longer term financing if we are not to 
risk frustrating the momentum of their 

Third, there is the question of where our aid 
goes. The willingness and the ability of Euro- 
pean nations to continue to render assistance to 
new nations formerly linked by colonial ties 
is a heartening and constructive fact on the 
world scene — for example, the continuing con- 
tribution of talent and funds provided by Bel- 
gium in the Congo. But with the passage of 
time we can and should expect Europe to widen 
its portfolio, to engage in constructive enter- 
prises with the developing nations in every 
quarter of the globe. 

As I imderlined in a talk in London last 
Tuesday* — on the Alliance for Progress — we 
believe it would, for example, be strengthening 
to the whole of the West if Europe would en- 
gage itself more deeply in the many construc- 
tive enterprises going forward in Latin jiVmer- 
ica; for, while our ties within the Western 
Hemisphere are close and deeply rooted, Latin 
America is also boimd to Western Europe by 
ties of conmierce and culture, religion and his- 
tory. For Europe now to share in the great 
adventure of modernization going forward in 
Latin America would give these old ties new 
meaning and draw Latin .America increasingly 
into the Atlantic world, of which it is so natural 
a component. 

Fourth, there is the question of coordination. 
Building on the increasing vitality of the Devel- 
opment Assistance Committee of the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development], and through consortium ar- 
rangements of the IBRD [International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development], we must 
increasingly concert our development efforts. 
And the International Development Associa- 
tion of the IBRD offers an effective channel 
for increasingly multilateral provision of aid 
in some cases. 

Behind this need to work together is a politi- 
cal fact : To the extent that we work together 
in these enterprises, the political task faced by 

' For background, see ihid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 557. 

• rbid.. Mar. 30, 1964, p. 496. 

APRIL 13, 1964 


our governments is rendered easier, as they 
confront their Parliaments and the Congress, 
and as they confront the citizens to -whom they 
are ultimately responsible. In democratic so- 
cieties, where citizens have many legitimate 
claims on the public revenues, it is not a sim- 
ple matter to persuade elected representatives 
of the wisdom of voting or otherwise granting 
assistance to the citizens of other nations. The 
case must be made with lucidity and convic- 
tion year after year. But to the extent that it 
is better known and understood by our peoples 
that our assistance to developing nations is an 
equitably shared common venture of the ad- 
vanced democracies — in the pursuit of large 
common interests — we increase the likelihood 
and the stability of public support. 

Private citizens have a major role to jilay 
in generating tliat support. I would hope that 
interested citizens on both sides of the Atlantic 
could find ways of working ever more closely 
together to this end. The concept of Atlantic 
partnership should find expression in such pri- 
vate, as well as governmental, efforts. 

Fifth, and finally, there is the question of 
the role of private enterprise. 

In the field of economic development there 
are, I believe, new opportunities for private en- 
terprise. In the first postwar generation of 
development there have emerged in many na- 
tions the beginnings of a vital private enter- 
prise sector. Thus far its efforts have been 
mainly focused in the large cities and on the 
production of import substitution goods for a 
relatively small upper middle-class market. 
The time is coming when private enterprise 
can begin to assume in developing areas the 
great social function it has come to perform in 
Western Europe, North America, and Japan, 
that is, to produce and to market efficiently the 
goods which the poor want and would buy if 
prices were lower and which they would work 
harder to acquire if they were cheaply and 
efficiently available. The problem is to pro- 
duce that widening of the market which Adam 
Smith correctly identified as the basis for ef- 
ficient industrialization almost two centuries 

In this widening out of the markets within 
tlie developing areas, the local private enter- 

prise sectors must take the lead ; but there exists 
also a great opportunity for foreign private 
enterprise to assist on the basis of knowledge 
and experience gained in the more advanced 
parts of the world, as well as with respect to 

Political Consultation 

Our north-south problems evidently trans- 
cend the question of economic development. As 
I suggested earlier, the inherent dynamics of 
the transition to modernization is compounded 
by Communist efforts to exploit difficult and 
dangerous regional problems in every quarter of 
the globe. Some of these are deeply rooted in 
histoiy ; others are the product of frictions aris- 
ing from postcolonial settlements. 

Some nations in the Atlantic community are 
inevitably drawn into these regional conflicts 
by past or current ties. We in the United 
States, because of our woi'ld role, tend to be- 
come involved even though we have no long 
historical connections with many of these 

It is evidently not appropriate for all of us 
in the North Atlantic community to engage our- 
selves directly in all efforts to maintain sta- 
bility and to seek peaceful solutions. It is ap- 
propriate, however, for all of us to understand 
with sympathy the character of the problems 
involved and to be helpful where it is possible. 
The fate of all of us in the West is involved, 
in some degree, in the pacific resolution of each 
of these regional tensions. It is not enough for 
lis each to stand back in those cases where we 
are not directly involved and be grateful that 
the burdens are carried by others in the Atlantic 

The political consultative machinery of 
NATO should be used more intensively to ex- 
change information about these problems and 
to produce an understanding of their complex- 
ity and of the common interests involved where 
active collaboration and engagement by all of 
us is not appropriate. 

We must try to move toward a common per- 
spective, not merely on the inner problems of 
the north but also toward common perspec- 
tives on problems throughout tlie world. Tliere 
must evidently be, within the Atlantic partner- 



ship, liciphtcned attention to political consulta- 
tion in ;ill its dimensions. 

This perspective must also extend to East>- 
AVest problems. 

With respect to these problems, it will be im- 
portant, I believe, over coming months that all 
of us in the Atlantic alliance focus our minds 
clearly on the problem posed for the free world 
by the purposeful shipment of arms and men 
across frontiers by the Communists in support 
of insurrectional movements. 

Illegal crossing of frontiers poses a special 
problem, in view of the economics of guerrilla 
warfare and other forms of subversion. A rela- 
tively small number of men and volume of arms 
can throw a heavy direct burden on a weak 
society, quite aside from the catalytic role of 
this kind of subversive activity, which Castro 
accurately described in his speech of Decem- 
ber 1961 as "the match you throw in the 

At the moment, Moscow appears somewhat 
less involved in these aggressive enterprises 
than other Communist regimes. Nevertheless 
they could lead to major confrontations which 
would affect all of us in the Atlantic alliance. 

Communist regimes must not be encouraged 
to believe that the enlarged commercial or other 
contacts wliich are being created in the present 
international situation provide them with li- 
cense to foment insurrection by illegal means in 
other nations. Specifically, it is important that 
the Communists in Asia imdei-stand well that 
the West is not ready to turn over Southeast 
Asia to Communist rule, either directly or 
through a process of neutralization which the 
Commimists and others would understand as 
tantamount to Communist hegemony. 

Our interest is the continued independence of 
the nations of Southeast Asia. 

On the Caribbean it is important for our 
friends in the Atlantic commimity to recall that 
during the Punta del Este conference of Jan- 
uary 22-31, 1962, important resolutions were 
passed by an overwhelming majority of the 
membei-s of the Organization of American 
States, which defined the Communist offensive 
in America; affirmed that tlie principles of com- 
munism were incompatible with the principles 
of the inter- American system ; and urged mem- 

ber states to take those .steps that they may con- 
sider appropriate for tiieir individual or col- 
lective self-defense and to cooperate, as may bo 
necessary or desirable, to strengthen their ca- 
pacity to counteract threats or acts of aggres- 
sion, subvereion, or other dangers to peace and 
security resulting from the continued interven- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet 
powers.^ We would hope that these resolutions, 
rooted in the same principle of regional self- 
defense on which NATO itself is based, would 
be undei-stood fully in Europe. 

We intend to consult fully witli our allies 
about the continuing problems tliat must be 
faced in combating Communist aggi-ession in 
Southeast Asia and the Caril)bcan. We hope 
that European nations will approiich this con- 
sultation with the same desire for full and frank 
discourse that we do. 

Aside from the problems in Southeast Asia 
and the Caribbean, we face a searching 
challenge in exploiting together the possibilities 
of moving toward a position of greater stability 
and reduced tension between Eastern and West- 
ern Europe and in the field of arms control. In 
this enterprise, which requires once again inten- 
sified political consultation within the alliance, 
we should be conscious that the Soviet Union 
has up to the present set very naiTow limits on 
the possible scope of negotiations. Tliere is no 
indication that Moscow is prepared to contem- 
plate the applic^ition of the principles of self- 
determination to East Germany. And thus far 
the Soviet Union has made clear that it will not 
contemplate arms control measures which in- 
volve effective international inspection in the 
Soviet Union as well as in the West. Clearly, 
then, the key problems of the cold war remain 
far from solution. 

Nevertheless, there are a good many specific 
limited issues affecting East-West relations 
under discussion. In dealing with them the 
interests of all membei-s of the alliance must be 
taken into account. In none of these fields will 
any move be taken without fullest and most 
extensive consultation with interested allies. 
This is the time for the alliance to learn how to 
work as closely together on problems of negotia- 

• For background and texts of resolutions, see ibid., 
Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

APRIL 13, 1904 


tioii with the Soviet Union as we have learned 
in the past to deal with problems of the common 
defense. It is good to know that there has been 
significant progress in this direction within the 
North Atlantic Council. My comitry liopes to 
join its partners in seeking further progress 
toward effective consultation. 

Movement toward European integration 
should be conducive to this progress. For 
there is no doubt we can consult more readily 
with a single strong European entity than with 
a number of separate and weaker partners. I 
cannot do better on this point than to quote 
what the present President of the United States 
said in Paris nearly 3 years ago." In the po- 
litical field, he said, the need 

... is to discover and act on the most basic of the 
various Alliance interests that are at stake and thus 
increase the Alliance's capacity to influence events in 
the world at large constructively. 

Progress toward an integrated European community 
will help to enhance that capacity and thus to 
strengthen the Atlantic Community. A more cohesive 
and powerful Europe within a developing Atlantic 
Community is needed to undertake the large tasks 
which lie ahead. The essentially national and loosely 
coordinated efforts of the past will no longer sufiice. 

That is one reason we support the movement 
toward European integration. The goals that 
Europe and the United States shared when they 
first set out down this road, with the original 
United States loan to the Coal and Steel Com- 
munity, stiU seem to us valid, necessary, and 
feasible. We look to continued progress to- 
ward their attainment. There will, of course, 
be obstacles and delays. But there should be 
no doubt of the outcome, if we stay the course. 

Facing the Future With Confidence 

As I suggested earlier, the common character- 
istic of the current Atlantic agenda is that it re- 
quires the nations of Europe to take increasing 
responsibility for issues which transcend the 
NATO area itself. But this, after all, is what 
we in the United States and our European 
friends hoped and expected would happen. 
Wlien the Marshall Plan was launched, the 
revival of Europe was begun, and we all threw 

' Ihid., Apr. 24, 1061, p. 581. 

our weight behind the concept of European 
integration. That early postwar commitment 
was an act of faith — faith that the ultimate 
logic of the Atlantic connection, already tested 
in two world wars and then under a third test 
by Stalin, would prevail and that an integrated 
Europe would build its policy on the funda- 
mental overlap in our respective interests, not 
on the potential cross-purposes and divergen- 
cies — which were, and are, evident enough. 

As we look out on the problems before us — 
almost a generation later — we believe that ini- 
tial postwar judgment was wise. The simple 
truth about the world in which we live is tliis : 
Neither its military technology, its communi- 
cations, its economic relations, nor its politics 
make it rational for any one of us to go it 
alone. The scale of the problems and the inti- 
macy of our interdependence leave us only one 
sensible course — to work, both within Europe 
and across the Atlantic, toward higlier degrees 
of concert in our international policies. 

If we can do this — if we can avoid lapsing 
back to comfortable but outmoded patterns of 
narrow nationalism — those of us who bear 
within our societies the stream of Western civi- 
lization and the responsibility for its continuity 
can face the future with confidence. We have 
every reason to believe that the principles in 
which our societies are rooted are historically 
viable: that the combination of personal free- 
dom and personal responsibility on which suc- 
cessful democracies are erected is valid for the 
second half of the 20th century as it has been 
in the past; that we have the opportunity to 
weave together a great partnership, stretching 
from Japan to Berlin, which would combine the 
diverse resources, energies, and moral commit- 
ment of the advanced nations of the free world; 
and that, from such a base, we can patiently 
and confidently search for a peaceful resolu- 
tion to the cold war on terms which would en- 
large the areas of human freedom and national 

None of this will happen automatically — 
without great public and private effort. There 
may well be dangerous crises still to surmount. 
There will certainly be long, difficult tasks of 
construction to carry forward stubbornly, in 



buikling an integrated Europeiin eonmuinity 
and a coliesive Atlantic partnci-ship, day after 
day, nioiitli after month, year after year. But 
I deeply believe that it lies within the grasp 
of this generation to make the years 19G1-19G3 

the hinge of history in the second half of this 
century — the interval of intense crisis, sur- 
mounted with strength and moderation, which 
opened the way to jjeaceful victoi-y for the 
forces of diversity and freedom. 

The United States and a Changing Europe 

&y WiUiam R. Tyler 

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^ 

I'm very glad to be with you this evening, 
and I thank you sincerely for having invited me. 
I told Mr. Duti'y that I have no Irish blood 
in me and thus am not entitled to wear the green 
on St. Patrick's Day. And yet, perhaps I may 
lay claim to being allowed to do so : I have been 
three times to Ireland in the last 2 years. The 
last time was with President Kennedy, and 
that experience convinced me that any Ameri- 
can's heart belongs in part to Ireland. 

Well, it is a ver\' different world today from 
the times of St. Patrick, or 100 years ago, or 
even 25 years ago. We are living in a world 
of change. The pace of history is not even, 
like that of a river. Its course is marked by 
periods of sudden intensity in the varying fields 
of human endeavor, whether it be in the arts, 
in literature, or in the sciences. The keynote 
of our times is change. All coimtries and all 
continents are experiencing in some degree the 
impact of new forces, generated partly from 
within themselves and partly by the experience 
of others. 

I was thinking the other day that we will 
shortly be marking the 15th anniversary of the 
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Let's 
take a brief look at Europe as it was then, com- 
pared with the situation todaj'. Such a com- 

'■ Address made before the Uibernian Society of Balti- 
more at Baltimore, Md., on Mar. 17 Cpress release 124). 

parison may serve to make us feel that, in spite 
of the problems we still face, the record gives 
us cause for some legitimate satisfaction at what 
has been achieved and averted, and for some 
hope that further progress is within our reach, 
that our efforts have not been in vain, and that 
many of the changes that are occurring are 
working for us. 

Europe Today 

In 1949 the economy of Europe lay in ruins. 

Today the member countries of NATO ac- 
count for 62 percent of the world's gross na- 
tional product, as against 21 percent for the 
Soviet bloc. 

In 1949 Europe lay defenseless but for us, 
under the direct threat of Soviet military ag- 

Today the members of NATO combined have 
more men mider arms and greater oA'erall mili- 
tary capability than the Soviet Union and her 

In 1949 Europe was a mosaic of prostrate 
national units. 

Today, thanks to our massive assistance under 
the Marshall Plan and thanks to the efforts of 
the Europeans themselves, Europe is becoming 
increasingly integrated, economically, commer- 
cially, and teclmologically. 

National boundaries are diminishing in im- 

APRIL 13, 19G4 


portance. National responsibilities are being 
increasingly subordinated to common responsi- 
bilities. The vision of enlightened Europeans 
after the war — such as Jean Monnet and Kobert 
Schuman of France, Konrad Adenauer of Ger- 
many, and Alcide de Gasperi of Italy — has 
given impetus to a new conception of the role 
and the destinies of Europe which, a quarter 
of a century ago, would have been dismissed as 

"We are witnessing today the emergence of 
conditions which will surely result in the estab- 
lishment of a partnership between the two sides 
of the Atlantic. Neither temporary setbacks 
nor hesitations can obscure the fact that com- 
mon considerations of interest, of security, of 
x-esponsibility toward the less developed coun- 
tries of the world, are pressing the United 
States and Europe forward along the converg- 
ing lines of a common purpose and toward a 
shared goal. 

We are about to engage in negotiations with 
60 other nations to reduce further the tariffs 
which inhibit trade between nations. If the 
free world is to benefit from the efficient use 
of resources, and from a more open trading 
system, this requires agi-eement in the first in- 
stance between the United States and the Euro- 
pean Common Market, for together we conduct 
90 percent of free- world trade. 

If there is to be an international financial 
system capable of supporting an increased flow 
of goods, tliis requires cooperation between our- 
selves and Europe. 

If there is to be an adequate flow of capital 
to meet the needs of less developed countries, 
it must come from North America and "West- 
em Europe, for there are no other major 

Differences of view within the Western alli- 
ance should not blind us to the fact that there 
is complete and unhesitating unity on the basic 
issue of the defense of the West. This was 
clearly demonstrated at the time of the Cuban 
crisis in 1962 and of the attempts by the Soviet 
Union to test the unity of the alliance by cre- 
ating incidents on the Berlin autobahn last fall. 

In other words, the essential political unity 
within NATO in terms of the East-West 
struggle, the prosperity of our free societies, 
and the strength of our defense — all this makes 

it possible for us to air certain differences in 
public without impairing the foundations of our 

A true alliance between free peoples must be 
evolutionary in cliaracter. We face new 
challenges and new opportunities in our world 
of change. 

I do not wish to sound Pollyannish to you. 
I do not underestimate the disappomtments and 
difficulties ahead of us. But I would not be 
speaking frankly if I did not express to you my 
conviction that, in the long run, the road before 
the free world runs forward and upward. 

Changes in Eastern Europe 

Now let us look for a few minutes at the 
changes which are taking place in Eastern 
Europe. There we see peoples who also have 
kindred ties with us but who were cut off from 
their share in European liberation and revival 
by the outcome of the war. In Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Kuma- 
nia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Stalin 
envisaged a sphere of Soviet domination as a 
base for ultimate expansion over the rest of 

The Eastern European peoples were sealed 
off from the West and held down by Soviet- 
patterned police apparatuses. Their widely 
varying economies and national institutions 
were forced into a single Communist mold, 
through which the resources of the entire area 
were put at the disposal of tlie Soviet Union. 
Polish coal, Rumanian oil, Czechoslovak urani- 
um were drained off for Soviet use. The peas- 
ant agi'iculture of Eastern Europe was thrown 
into chaos and its productivity virtually killed 
by collectivization, to fit Stalin's blueprint of 
uniformity. AVlien even native Communist 
leaders balked at the disregard for differing 
national needs, Stalin had them eliminated. 
To all appearances he had succeeded in reduc- 
ing the Eastern European countries to identical 
satellites, only a step removed from disappear- 
ance by absorption into the Soviet Union. 
They formed the westward protrusion of a 
seemingly monolithic bloc, threatening the 
security of the rest of Europe from which they 
had been involuntarily cut off. 

But this monolith endured only as long as 




Stalin was tliero to impose it ; after liim it bejian 
to crack. Actually its weaknesses had begun 
to show already in Stalin's last years, when, in 
1948, tlie Yugoslav Communists rejected his 
interference and made tlieir country independ- 
ent. Since tiieii Poland, Hungary, Albania, 
and Rumania in diiTering ways have challenged 
Soviet control, and throughout Eastern Europe 
the pattern imposed by Stalin has eroded away. 
AA'e can see many reasons why this has 
happened : 

1. Stalin's successors, struggling for his 
power, lacked his relentless grip. Further- 
more, they saw that changes were unavoidable 
to rule Eastern Europe successfully; but in 
ronndiating Stalin's methods they opened the 
gates to the forces of change. 

2. Economic difficulties, popular misery, and 
mounting national resentment over the years 
have exerted irresistible pressure on the Eastern 
European Communist regimes for change. 

3. The Sino-Soviet split in the world Com- 
munist movement has encouraged the Eastern 
European regimes to act more independently 
and to trj' to solve their own pressing problems, 
as the differing circumstances of each country 
may dictate. 

4. The strength and dynamism of the West, 
and Western economic and cultural magnetism, 
exerted on Eastern Europe at its very doorstep, 
liave exerted a strong pull on the Eastern 
European Communist governments toward ties 
with the West. 

5. The example of the front-runner in 
change — "revisionist" Yugoslavia — has encour- 
aged some of the Eastern European members 
of the Soviet camp to follow a more independ- 
ent course both in relation to Moscow and in 
programs at home. 

All of these factoi-s played a part in the rise 
of strong nationalist and reformist factions in 
the Polish and Hungarian parties in particular, 
and in the outbreak of the great crises of 1956. 
In Poland they led to reforms that, for Com- 
munists, were drastic : abolition of collectiviza- 
tion, withdrawal of direct Soviet control over 
the armed forces, a grant of considerable free- 
dom to the churcli, a turning to the West for 
economic support. In Hungary they caused 
the historic uprising that pushed the Com- 

munists to the point of asserting full in(Ic[)i'ri(l- 
enco from Moscow, until the Soviets sui)presseil 
this move by armed force. 

The military crushing of the Hungarian in- 
dependence movement, howeviM-, arre^sl^d the 
tides of change only momentarily. These tides 
are the same forces of nationalism, economic 
need, demand for more freedom, and Western 
attraction as before. The measures of Yugo- 
slavia and of Gomulka's Poland have strength- 
ened the hand of those in other Eastern Euro- 
pean regimes who want to seek similarly 
unorthodox ways of making socialism work 
better in their own countries. More recently, 
the Chinese Communist challenge to Moscow's 
authority, apart, from attracting tlie hard-shell 
Albanian leaders into sliifting their allegiance 
to Peiping, has given added impulse to the inde- 
pendent tendencies of other Eastern Eurojiean 
rulers. As a result, a quiet revolution is going 
forward — at an uneven pace among the differ- 
ent Eastern European countries, it is true, but 
with effects that seem boimd to change all of 
them in the long run. 

Take Rumania as a leading example. Its 
leaders have recently revealed their intention 
of building up the Rumanian industrial system 
on a national plan of their own, in opposition 
to proposals of Moscow to subordinate Ru- 
mania to a scheme of Soviet-Eastern Eurojiean 
joint development. They are turning to the 
West for the needed equipment. Meanwhile 
they have been further identifying their regime 
with the Rumanian nation by a new emphasis 
on the national culture and by some down- 
grading of things Russian. 

In Poland the posture of equality with Mos- 
cow assumed by the Gomulka regime in 1956 
has been maintained, as have generally Go- 
mulka's unorthodox experiments with more 
freedom, individual farming, and close eco- 
nomic ties with the West. In trade, the Poles 
have recently even entered a far-reaching ac- 
cord with their principal wartime foe, the West 

In Hungary the Government has been stead- 
ily easing restrictions and opening jobs and 
education to non-Communists in an effort to 
conciliate the peoples; and, to spur output, it 
is resorting to such unorthodox steps as encour- 


aging private production by peasants on collec- 
tive farms. It recently stopped jamming 
Western broadcasts, and it now permits Hun- 
garians, by the thousands, freely to travel to 
the West. It is trying to shift more of Him- 
gary's trade to the West, as well. 

Czechoslovakia is tardily and only gradually 
discarding some of its leaders and trappings 
of the Stalin era. It has lightened its travel 
restrictions and is seeking improved relations 
with the West, including the United States. 
For the first time in years there are no Ameri- 
can citizens in Czechoslovak prisons. 

In Bulgaria a spy trial was recently staged 
to warn the population against contacts with 
Americans. But the Government needs and 
seeks Western ties ; it has settled United States 
claims, for example, and it invites us to exhibit 
at its trade fair. Though a strict police regime, 
it is also showing a novel flexibility in some of 
its economic policies, such as promotion of pri- 
vate production on peasant household plots. 

In Soviet-occupied East Germany even the 
Stalinist regime of Ulbricht, stained with the 
shame of the Berlin wall, is attempting to de- 
vise ways of remedying its failures by borrow- 
ing capitalist-type incentives to help its ailing 
economy. There are other indications that the 
winds of change now blowing in Eastern Eu- 
rope are beginning to be felt in East Germany. 
The time will surely come when the people of 
Germany will be reunited with each other in 
freedom and when the heroism and steadfast- 
ness of the people of West Berlin will thus be 

These shifts and changes in the Eastern Euro- 
pean scene have important meaning for the 
United States, in view of our stake in a united 
and peaceful Europe. If the forces of history, 
geography, and change are tending to pull this 
or that Eastern European country back into 
more normal contact witli European life despite 
Communist control, it is to our interest to assist 
as we can. To do this, it is essential for the 
American public to keep abreast witli the evolv- 
ing realities in the eastern half of Europe and 
to realize that this area is not now a solid bloc 

of nations, as Stalin tried to make it, or merely 
a group of satellites of the Soviet Union. The 
present trend presents a challenge to us and our 
Western European friends to rebuild our con- 
tacts with the Eastern European peoples on a 
broad scale, through exchanges, trade, and other 
natural means. 

To sum up, we are today engaged in new and 
changing relations with both Western and East- 
em Europe. 

The larger, long-range objectives of the 
United States with respect to Europe are con- 
stant: We want Europe to be unified, secure, 
strong, free, and prosperous. 

As conditions in Europe change, so the means 
that the United States uses to work toward the 
attainment of its objectives must also necessar- 
ily change and evolve as the times require. 

The further implication of this truth is that 
the attitude of the American people toward the 
phenomenon of change must itself take into 
account the march of events. In this way we 
will be in a position to devise and support those 
policies which are best calculated to serve our 
own broad interests. 

Secretary of Interior Named 
to Export Expansion Committee 


Designating the Secretary of the Interior as a 
Member op the Interagency Committee on Export 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President 
of the United States, Section 1(a) of Executive Order 
No. 11132 ■ of December 12, 1963, is hereby amended 
by inserting "the Secretary of the Interior;" immedi- 
ately after "the Secretary of Defense ;". 


The White House, 
March 23, 1964. 

' No. 11148 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 3695. 

° For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.5. 



Foreign Policy and the Individual: Identity in Diversity 

hy Mrs. Katie Louchheim, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Advisory Services * 

I appreciate that the theme of your confer- 
once is ''Profiress Toward a World of Law and 
Order." While talking on this in general 
temis, perhaps von will allow me to relate the 
progress I hope to see with the individuals Mho 
must bring it about. In a world of some chaos 
and great diversity let us keep our eye on the 
individuals who, by a quickened sense of respon- 
sibility and perceptive analysis of issues, have 
the strength to move us forward. 

Let me quickly add that the other speakers on 
the program and this audience represent the 
best example of the individuals I have in mind. 

In thinking over the awesome conference sub- 
ject it was apparent that the most reasonable 
approacli to a world of order, in one of disorder, 
is through a world of law and the role of the 
individual in living by it. 

We know there are disorders in the world. 
Look at events, even at the surface level of news 
bulletins and weekly developments in Cyprus, 
Cuba, Panama, the Congo, Kaslunir, Laos, and 
Viet-Nam. We also admit of differences of 
opinion within the Atlantic community and 
profound divisions between the power centers 
of Moscow and Peiping. But these divisions, 
differences, and disorders are facts of life we 
are getting used to living with in a rapidly 
changing, turbulent, and complicated world. 
We would have more to worry about if the 
factors of cliange and turbulence were not 
present — if, for example, the great colonial 
revolutions that have doubled U.N". member- 

' Address made before a World Affairs Conference 
at the University of Nortli Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., 
on Mar. 12 (press release 105 dated Mar. 11). 

ship within two decades had not taken place. 
We are, after all, talking about progress to- 
ward law and order and not the precise arrival 
time of the millennium. 

Despite the crash of daily headlines it is 
important to understand that, in perspective, 
the 20th century, as the late 15th and early 
16th centuries, may well be one of the water- 
sheds of history. The Middle Ages saw the 
rise of capitalism in the form of nation-states 
built on the decay of feudalism; the 16th cen- 
tury released the individual from the corporate 
life of the Middle Ages and flowered in the 
humanism of the Renaissance and the revolu- 
tionary expansion of man's horizon. 

Today, with the infinite horizons of the nu- 
clear age and voyages of discovery in outer 
space upon us, we again look to the individual 
in our midst. We ask whether man's intellect 
and energy, striving always for a perfect world 
of law, will insure equality for all citizens of 
the new society. 

With the world expanding — in terms of 
people, nations, and possible points of friction — 
at an alarming rate, we must take a hard look at 
the pace and quality of progress if our mood of 
cautious optimism is to be justified. We would 
be well advised to discard what President 
Kennedy once referred to as the "comfort of 
opinion" for the "discomfort of thought." 

The Pattern of Change 

The pattern of change — revolutionary 
change — is so undisputable a fact of interna- 
tional life that it takes a good deal of thought 
just to keep up with developments. But since 

APRIL 13, 1904 


our focus is on the world of law, our best 
register of progress is through the United 
Nations and a system of some 77 international 
organizations and programs, including the 
World Court, the elder statesman of law and 
order. Most of you, I believe, are well aware 
of this because of the fact that, for many 
teclmical and political reasons, international 
organizations are a plain necessity of our times. 

Some statistics are perhaps of interest: 

The United States is a member of 51 inter- 
national organizations and a contributor to 26 
international operating programs. 

At its last session the U.N. General Assembly 
took action on 125 separate matters, and more 
than 14,000 votes were cast in which we had a 
substantial interest, in addition to all the pre- 
liminary work in committees. Its 111 members 
were increased to 113. 

Our State Department receives approxi- 
mately 1,300 cables every working day and 
sends out approximately 1,000 cabled replies, as 
well as 600 bags of daily mail. 

Last year alone, the U.S. Government at- 
tended 547 international conferences. 

All together, this represents a prodigious ef- 
fort on the part of men to build the common 
law of mankind — the accepted practices, pro- 
grams, and principles which cannot automati- 
cally guarantee but consistently build the 
stnicture of peace. 

But, going beyond statistics, you perhaps ask 
what we mean by peace and the objectives of 
foreign policy. One begins to answer by quot- 
ing the preamble to the Constitution, "to secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 

If you ask how we relate this to the United 
Nations, I would refer to the kind of world de- 
scribed in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of 
the U.N. Charter — ratified by an overwhelming 
show of bipartisan support at the end of a great 
war which had purged us of much of our paro- 
chial thinking and had taught us the lesson of 

Let me be specific. The kind of world we are 
working toward would be : 

— free of aggression — aggression by whatever 
means ; 

— a world of independent nations, each with 

the institutions of its own choice, but coop- 
erating with one another to their mutual 

— a world of economic and social advance for 
all peoples ; 

— a world which provides certain and equi- 
table means for the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes, and which moves steadily toward a rule 
of law ; 

— a world in which the powers of the state 
over the individual are limited by law and cus- 
tom, in which the personal freedom essential to 
the dignity of men is secure ; 

— a world free of hate and discrimination 
based on race, or nationality, or color, or eco- 
nomic or social status ; 

— and a world of equal rights and equal re- 
sponsibilities for the entire human race. 

Individual Involvement in Community Life 

But the approach to such a world — a world 
of law and order — however great our depend- 
ence on international institutions, must rely on 
the individual : people who are deeply involved 
in the issues of their times. 

"\'\niether we are physicists or farmers, doc- 
tors or divines, housewives or horticulturists, 
we must be involved in the quality of life around 
us. Our understanding is sharpened by in- 
volvement. As we participate, we are fulfilled. 
If our kind of world is to succeed and if the 
spirit of democracy is to flourish in the land, 
we cannot withdraw into our professions, we 
cannot seclude ourselves completely in special- 
ization. We must watch many horizons, expect- 
ing to see a few falling stars. 

As a contemporary philosopher, Scott Bu- 
chanan, said : "Tlie hiunan individual is respon- 
sible for injustice anywhere in the imiverse." 
Crisis comes with the morning coffee ; concern is 
a lengthening shadow ; change and challenge are 
our birtliright. 

Mr. Buchanan's remarks should not be taken 
to mean that each of us is responsible for in- 
justice anywhere but that ever}^ one of us has 
the responsibility for dealing with these 

To set the universe as the limits of our re- 
sponsibility may seem to you to be exaggerating 
the case. But if we were to ask that each indi- 



vidual assume responsibility for dealing with 
injustice in his own community, there would 
undoubtedly be acceptance of the proposition. 
A reasonable assignment^ — but if we ask, "Wliat 
can one individual do?" let us rompinber the 
attorney Charles Morgan, whose statement of 
conscience last fall answere<l the question of 
who was to blame for the death of four children. 
He said : "We all did it. Every last one of us 
is condemned for that crime and the bombing 
before it, and the ones last month, last year, a 
decade ago. We all did it." 

Wlio's to blame ? All of us, to the extent that 
as individuals we are empty of inner voice or too 
full of material possessions. 

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at 
the other limits of the globe. But the world is 
now the kind of place where events in our own 
community affect our standing at the other ends 
of the earth. Through the mediating mecha- 
nism of TV, films, radio, and press, the small 
print in our own commimity can now be read 
at the farthest ends of the globe. 

And so, for the informed, involved, partici- 
pating citizen, the educated man and woman, 
the community expands. It is not only his or 
her town or city. It is Rome, Cairo, and Coun- 
cil Bluffs, U.S.A., as well as Eome, Cairo, and 
Capetown in the world outside. 

To be effective as a citizen does not mean that 
you have to be a member of the State legisla- 
ture or a delegate to the United Nations. "Wliat 
you do and say on a local committee to clear 
urban slums, to save national parks, or to guar- 
antee equal opportimity to all citizens may make 
the difference between orderly progress and the 
often imperceptible decline of free institutions. 

We justify our heritage only by becoming 
involved in the life of our community and 

The Challenge of America 

The life of Jolm Kennedy is a case in point. 
He was a young man, impatient with the im- 
perfections of the world, who used his anger to 
give him strength. Although he recognized 
the realities of the world — cruelty, injustice, 
and disease — \\e worked ceaselessly, always 
through the orderly process of law, slow as this 
must have seemed, for the people and principles 

in which he believed. His life reminds us of 
cliallonges to every sector of American life — 
city, State, Federal, and the local community — 
which await our action. 

And it is tliese same princijiles which Presi- 
dent Johnson laid down so eloquently in his 
state of the Union address. The administra- 
tion's plans for a concerted and cohesive war 
against poverty put our problems into even 
sharper focus. 

We must all awake to the challenge of Amer- 
ica, for jioverty is neither a spur to progress 
nor some heavenly ordained penalty for failure 
or error. But it is of our making, our neglect, 
and nuist be repaired. We are determined that 
those who cannot .satisfy minimum needs, who 
"live on the outskirts of hope," isolated from 
the mainstream of American life and alienated 
from its values, must be restored to health if 
the fabric of a free society is to be strong. 

A free society has no easy options, no escape 
either into rigidity or into anarchy. It must 
survive the endless clash, which is what makes 
it both the most precarious and the most adapt- 
able social order ever worked out by men. 

As we turn to the war on poverty we know 
the needed refonns are not easy. They require 
multiple and radical changes. It is not simply 
the disabilities under which millions of our 
citizens have accepted defeat, but the stark fact 
that perhaps 20 percent of our people, including 
11 million children, live below the poverty line; 
that urban decay, linked with this poverty and 
exacerbated by racial tension, is eating out the 
heart of our great cities; that automation is de- 
manding higher skills just as a new flood of 
postwar children, all too unskilled, begin their 
search for work. 

We shall not exorcise these problems by the 
politics of verbal violence. We shall not exor- 
cise the violence by turning our backs on the 
problems themselves. We have to brace our- 
selves for a social effort as great, perhaps, as the 
waging of war itself if the promise of a free 
society is to be made good. 

I say this because we all must know that our 
ability to influence the course of events abroad 
is dependent tremendously on the quality of 
progress at home. A United States which fails 
to deal properly with its problems of race rela- 

APRIL 13, 1964 


tions, education, urban renewal, unemployment, 
and old age is unlikely to win acceptance for 
long as a leader on the world scene. 

The Role of the "Uncommon Man" 

In facing up to these problems I think it is 
healthy to appreciate that although we fre- 
quently talk about the "universality and 
brotherhood of man," we should pay more at- 
tention to the valuable and interesting differ- 
ences that distinguish all brothers, whether 30 
or 3,000 miles apart. 

In a world of overpopulation, high produc- 
tion, and mass consumption we have almost lost 
the sense of man as an individual. We have 
surely lost the noble, lieroic view of man that 
used to be called humanistic — the view that ex- 
isted in the Eenaissance — the view that was 
portrayed in Shakespeare's heroes and in 
Michelangelo's gi'eat frescoes. 

If we are to be sure of our identity in a world 
of diversity, we are going to have to lean more 
heavily on the "uncommon man" than on many 
of the stereotypes presently in circulation. 

As believers in freedom of speecli, we all re- 
spect the independent view, the original cast of 
mind. We must, however, be troubled by the 
expressions of fanatic intolerance which are still 
heard in the land and, more distressing, the ap- 
athy, the silent indifference of so many en- 
lightened men and women. In their hearts they 
condemn fanaticism, but they neither speak out 
to rebuke it or take action to repress it. 

Part of the answer to this problem may well 
be that, as a result of the nuclear age, the his- 
torical release of popular emotion and tension 
through war, fortunately, is no longer possible. 
However, we see in the nostalgic quest for war 
the perfect catharsis and the simple solution to 
complex issues in demands for "total victory." 
The truth is tliat the era of peace through mu- 
tual terror creates a new environment character- 
ized by a policy of nuclear restraint on the part 
of the more sophisticated world powers. 

There is a great opportimity here, for we 
must appreciate that, apart from tlie issue of 
human survival, the greatest goal being pui-sued 
within the framework of the United Nations is 
the steady extension of human rights. 

Wlien President Johnson addressed the 
United Nations in December he said,^ 

All that we have built In the wealth of nations, and 
all that we plan to do toward a better life for all, will 
be in vain if our feet should slip, or our vision falter, 
and our hopes end in another worldwide war. 

We look, he said, for "a peaceful revolution in 
the world, through a recommitment of all our 
members, rich and poor, and strong and weak, 
whatever their location or their ideology, to the 
basic principles of human welfare and of human 

Here is a challenge to which we must all re- 
spond — a challenge, in a world of greater di- 
vereity than disorder, by which individuals can 
reaffirm the peculiar talent, genius, and adven- 
ture of the American spirit. 

This spirit of adventure is dramatically ex- 
pressed in Catherine Drinker Bowen's biogi-a- 
phy of Francis Bacon. In describing the 
temper of the times, she says, "People spoke of 
America as today we speak of the moon, yet far 
more fruitfully." In Francis Bacon's own 
words we were "That great wind blowing from 
the west . . . the breath of life which blows on 
us from that New Continent." "Columbus," 
Bacon said, "has made hope reasonable." 

It is reasonable to be hopeful today — but only 
if America is still fresh with the breath of life, 
brincins: new men and ideas to the service of 

King Hussein of Jordan 
Visits United States 

The Department of State announced on 
March 26 (press release 134) that arrangements 
were being completed for the visit of His Maj- 
esty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite King- 
dom of Jordan, who will visit the United States 
April 13-23 at the invitation of President John- 

His Majesty will arrive at Washington, D.C., 
from Philadelphia, Pa., on April 14 for a 2-day 
visit. On April 16 His Majesty will depart for 
New York City and a trip to other areas in the 
United States. 

• BuiXETiN of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2. 




The Foreign Assistance Program 

Statement by Secretary Rusk ^ 

Mr. Chairman and members of the commit- 
tee : Thank you veiy much for the opportunity 
of appearing before you to make tlie initial 
presentation to the Congress of tlie mutual 
defense and development programs for fiscal 
year 1965. 

This committee has been dealing with our 
foreign assistance program for many years. 
You have been generous in your support and 
frank m your advice. The experienced judg- 
ment of the committee will continue to be of 
great assistance to us in making the program 
more effective, and we look forward to a pro- 
ductive review this year. 

This bill before you will provide authority for 
continuing a basic instriunent of U.S. foreign 
policy — foreign aid. 

The goal of this progi-am is simple and bears 
repeating: to provide assistance and encourage- 
ment to nations so that they can grow in in- 
dependence, security, and freedom. We seek no 
satellites; we seek no domination; we are not 
trying to buy friends. 

America is working to make the world safe 
for freedom. For I believe an important lesson 
has been learned in the postwar world — that as 
all people grow in freedom and independence, 
so the security of the U.S. is strengthened; and 
as others grow in economic strength, so the U.S. 
will continue to prosper. 

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs on Mar. 23 (press release 129) . 

Foreign aid can only do a small part of the 
job. American private enterprise must bear a 
heavier burden of investment in the underde- 
veloped world; our prospering allies must do 
more; and most of all the recipient nations must 
do their share — through self-help and reinvest- 
ment in their own economies. 

It is important to view the aid program in 
perspective. We have made a commitment to 
the free world. It is a long-term commitment, 
not made in anticipation of quick or dramatic 
results. We are dealing with nations striving 
to solve in a matter of years problems which 
took many decades to overcome in what we now 
regard as the developed countries. 

We should expect neither too much nor too 
little. Foreign aid should not be expected to 
win support from each recipient for our view 
on every international issue. And let us not 
levy on the mutual defense and development 
programs our disappointment in j-esterday's 
coup, or tomorrow's vote in the United Nations. 
The forces at work run deep. Let us expect, 
instead, to see in the years to come the growth 
of an international community in which the ac- 
tions of nations are not based on insecurity, fear, 
or frustration, but on basic independence of out- 
look and confidence in the future. 


This committee is being asked to provide $917 
million in new authorization for fiscal year 1965 
for the economic assistance program. No new 

APRIL 13, 1964 


authority is needed for development lending 
or for the Alliance for Progress. 

This committee is also being asked to provide 
a continuing authorization for the military as- 
sistance program. 

We are requesting, under the new and the 
existing authority, a total appropriation of $3.4 
billion— $2.4 billion for economic assistance and 
$1 billion for military assistance. 

Secretary [of Defense Kobert S.] McNamara, 
Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator of the 
Agency for International Development], and 
witnesses from the State and Defense Depart- 
ments will deal with these requests in greater 
detail. However, I should like to emphasize 
the need for providing the full amounts re- 
quested by President Johnson for fiscal year 
1965.2 In keeping with the President's instruc- 
tion that all budgetary requests be at minimum 
amoimts, this year's program is a tight, real- 
istic one. In previous years, the practice has 
been to plan the foreign aid program according 
to estimates of the best performance that could 
be expected by recipient nations. We are, of 
coui-se, still hopeful that the nations we are 
assisting will come forward with the necessary 
self-help and refonn measures. But we have 
learned it is unrealistic to expect them all to 
do so and we have budgeted accordingly. 

On the other hand the 1965 budget does not 
allow for sudden opportunities that sometimes 
present themselves in international economic 
affairs. We must be able to take advantage of 
opportunities in which swift action can advance 
us dramatically along the road to free-world 
cooperation and prosperity. Should such op- 
portunities arise, we will request prompt action 
by the Congress to provide any additional funds 
needed to meet emerging requirements. 


I should like to take this opportunity to ex- 
press my strong support for the military assist- 
ance program. 

In spite of recent hopeful developments, the 
Sino-Soviet threat continues. It is a direct 
military threat against the countries on the 
periphery of the bloc, and an indirect one— in 

" For text of the President's message to the Congress 
on foreign aid, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1064, p. 518. 

the form of subversion and guerrilla war— 
against many of the underdeveloped countries 
of the world. 

Our military assistance often has made it pos- 
sible for these nations to survive. It is essen- 
tial to their continued security and is vital to 
our own security as well. It is the key to the 
maintenance of more than 3.5 million men under 
arms. These men are an effective deterrent to 
aggression; and, moreover, without them our 
own defense costs would be much higher and 
more U.S. troops would have to be in the line. 
Military assistance helps to forge a vital link 
in our mutual defense. 

In fiscal year 1965, the foreign aid program 
will be even more concentrated than in the past. 
Two-thirds of all development lending funds 
are planned for seven countries— Chile, Colom- 
bia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and 
Timisia. Two-thirds of all military assistance 
funds will go to 11 countries along the Sino- 
Soviet periphery. Four-fifths of supporting 
assistance funds will go to four countries: 
Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Jordan. 

We intend to provide major development as- 
sistance only in cases where the countries them- 
selves are willing to make a substantial effort. 
For one of the clear lessons of recent history 
has been that unless a nation is willing to carry 
the major burden— in terms of reinvesting sav- 
ings, enacting tax reform, land reform, and 
other necessary legislation, and in terms of care- 
ful management of its own resources— no 
amount of outside assistance, whether from the 
U.S. or others, will have the necessary impact. 
We will continue to be strict in the disburse- 
ment of funds, in order to assure the greatest 
possible return from the taxpayers' money. 

During the coming fiscal year, there will be 
a speedup in the transition from reliance on aid 
to economic self-support for a number of coun- 
tries. Fourteen countries are now approaching 
the point where they will no longer need soft 
economic loans and grants. In 17 nations the 
transition has been completed and economic aid 


We have a solid record of success in these 
countries and many others. The quiet, slow, 
yet very real progress being made around the 



world is too often obscured in the day-to-day 
news of crisis and turmoil. A rejil revolution is 
taking place in the underdeveloped world as 
more and more people are acquiring the skills 
and the means for moving into the modem world 
and taking their place beside otiier free and in- 
dependent peoples. We have played a major 
role in this effort — a role of which we can be 


A central element of the fiscal year 1965 pro- 
gram is improved coordination of our assistance 
with the stcppcd-up efforts of other prosperous 
nations to help all of us improve our programs. 
The DAC agreement of April 19C3 was a ma- 
jor step in this direction and is already showing 
results. The appointment of your former col- 
league, Mr. Frank Coffin, as U.S. representative 
to the Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] should greatly 
strengthen our efforts to have other DxVC mem- 
bers bear a greater part of the burden. 

In the past year, the British and the Ca- 
nadians have announced new policies calling 
for both increased aid programs and liberalized 
lending terms. France, which already devotes 
a higher percentage of GNP to aid than do we, 
has recently released an official report pointing 
toward a continued increase of aid in the fu- 
ture. Germany's bilateral aid program has 
grown steadily for 3 years and its loan terms 
have been progressively liberalized, reaching an 
average of 20 years' maturity in 1963. 

However, the desired balance among donors 
in both amoimts and terms has not yet been 
reached. Recent reports from Europe have cast 
some doubt on the size of the increases that can 
be expected from others ; certainly a serious re- 
duction in our eflFort would be reflected else- 

We hope to make increased use of interna- 
tional lending agencies in the years ahead. 
Under matching formulas, U.S. dollars pro- 
vided to these organizations are supplemented 
by substantial contributions from other coun- 
tries. One of the most effective of thase instru- 
ments is the International Development Asso- 
ciation — an affiliate of the World Bank. I 
strongly urge House approval of U.S. partici- 

pation in replenishing the resources of this 


I should like to turn, if I may, to a brief dis- 
cussion of some key problem areas where U.S. 
aid is a factor. Witnesses from the State and 
Defense Departments and AID will be prepared 
to discuss these matters in detail. 

South Vietnam. This troubled part of the 
world is, of course, of major concern to all 
Americans. As this committee knows. Secre- 
tary INIcNamara and Administrator Bell have 
just returned from an on-the-spot appraisal of 
the situation and have reported to the Presi- 

South Vietnam is and will continue to be a 
major recipient of U.S. assistance. We are pro- 
viding direct support for the anti-insurgent mil- 
itary activities, while at the same time supplying 
needed key commodities for both defense and 
economic development of the country. As the 
Congress knows, this assistance has played a 
crucial role in the war against the Communists 
and must be maintained if this war is to be won. 
I share Secretary McNamara's concern that the 
fullest possible support be provided to the new 

Africa. In the past few months we have seen 
a series of flareups in some of the new nations 
on the continent of Africa. The U.S. is, of 
course, concerned about such instability. 

However, these recent events should not ob- 
scure the real progress toward independence and 
African unity that has been made. And it is 
most encouraging that where troubles have 
erupted the African nations collectively are tak- 
ing steps to reach peaceful solutions. 

In several nations, the frustrations of poverty 
and difficulties inherent in the early years of in- 
dependence have resulted in instability and have 
also provided possibilities for Communist pene- 
tration and exploitation. However, most are 
those where the Western Europeans bear pri- 
mary responsibility for supporting stability and 
growth and U.S. assistance is quite limited. 
We hope that with increased experience and 
with the inflow of training and capital from the 
Europeans and ourselves, the new nations of 

•/6i(f., p. 522. 

APRIl, 13, 1964 


Africa can overcome the strains of their post- 
independence periods and attain the stability 
and unity required for sustamed economic de- 

Cyprus. The present crisis on the island of 
Cyprus is a matter of grave concern to the 
United States. Not only is the future of an is- 
land involved, but the relations between two of 
our stanch allies and two major recipients of 
U.S. foreign assistance — Greece and Turkey. 
As long as the issue continues to poison the at- 
mosphere between these two nations and as long 
as the peoj^le of Cyprus live in terror, the free 
world is endangered. 

We are encouraged by the decision of the 
United Nations ^ to assist in restoring order and 
hope that this will lead to solution of the prob- 
lems which divide the island. As this commit- 
tee knows, the U.S. has committed itself to pro- 
viding fimds for support of the Emergency 
Force. Mr. Cleveland [Harlan Cleveland, As- 
sistant Secretary for International Organiza- 
tion Affairs] will discuss this request in detail 
with you in subsequent hearmgs. 

Indonesia. Another major area of concern 
in Southeast Asia is Indonesia. This commit- 
te« is familiar with the situation and with the 
efforts of the American Government to promote 
peaceful relations between Indonesia and neigh- 
boring Malaysia.^ It is our strong hope that 
negotiations will continue and prove successful. 
There is no persuasive reason why the countries 
of this area cannot live in peace. There is much 
to be done in terms of internal development, 
particularly in the case of Indonesia. It is the 
fifth largest and potentially one of the richest 
countries in the world. In recent years, how- 
ever, there has been little economic progress. 
The present situation in Indonesia is not con- 
ducive to effective economic stabilization which 
would provide a basis for development. The 
U.S. and other Western nations discontinued 
their efforts to help Indonesian stabilization last 
September when Indonesia intensified its "con- 
frontation" policy toward Malaysia. Since 
then the U.S. has initiated no new aid projects 
in Indonesia. 

' For text of resolution, see ibid.. Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466. 
"For background, see iUA., Feb. 19, 1964, p. 239. 

Last year, the Congress enacted a new sub- 
section (j) of section 620 of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act relating to assistance to Indonesia. 
This subsection requires a determination by the 
President that it is in the U.S. national mterest 
to extend assistance to Indonesia under the act. 
The President, in considermg whether to make 
this determination, has awaited the outcome of 
negotiations among Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines which should indicate the pros- 
pects for peace in that area. Meanwhile, only 
limited established programs of technical as- 
sistance, education, and malaria eradication 
have been continued with new funds. 

Arab-Israeli Relations. The U.S. has con- 
tinued to provide assistance both to Israel and 
to a number of the Arab states. These nations 
have a history of conflict and animosity. The 
U.S. will continue to work for a settlement of 
the disputes between Israel and her neighbors 
and for a general settlement in the Near East. 
There are resources and potential in the area 
sufficient to provide all peoples with a better 
standard of living. Resources which are di- 
verted from the job of providing economic 
growth and used to build armaments are a re- 
grettable waste. 

Last year the Congi-ess enacted a subsection 
(i) of section 620 of the assistance act, pro- 
hibiting assistance to any country which the 
President determines is engaging in or pre- 
paring for aggression. The activities of all 
recipient countries — including those in the Mid- 
dle East and Asia — are under continual exam- 
ination by this coimtry but no determination 
has been made under the provisions enacted 
last year. I can assure you that careful study 
is being given in every instance to detennine the 
application of the amendment. 

Cuba Shipping. Another amendment which 
was added to the Foreign Assistance Act last 
year was designed to cut off shipping of ma- 
terials to the island of Cuba. As this com- 
mittee knows, section 620(a)(3) went into 
effect on February 14, 196-1. Under the terms 
of the amendment, small amounts of assistance 
were terminated, involving the United King- 
dom, France, and Yugoslavia. We will con- 
tinue to monitor shipments to the island and 
examine the application in each situation of the 
congressional directive to us. 




Last week tlie nations of this hemisphere 
marked tlio third annivereary of President 
Kennedy's annoimcement of the Alliance for 
Proofress. It has been a fruitful 3 years — a 
period of victories and of some disappoint- 

As President Johnson said in his address 
marking this amiivei-sary : " 

Today my country rededlcates itself to these prin- 
ciples and renews its commitment to the partnership 
of the hemisphere to curry them forward. . . . 

With faith in our princijiles. with pride in our 
achievements, with the help of candid and constructive 
criticism, we are now prepared to move ahead with 
renewed effort and renewed confidence. 

The United States and the members of the al- 
liance pledged themselves to a decade or more 
of effort. Altliough less than one-third of the 
period has passed, mucii has been done. Mil- 
lions of children are being fed and educated; 
hundreds of thousands of new homes have been 
built; millions are free from the scourge of 
diseases. And, perhaps most important of all, 
the Latin American Continent looks to the fu- 
ture with hope. 

Tlie period of planning and initial commit- 
ment is over. The alliance is building momen- 
tum. Several of the members are making very 
satisfactory progi'ess; the Central American 
economic integration movement is growing 
faster than was expected ; tax laws passed since 
the inception of the alliance are having their 

The appointment of Thomas Mann to be 
Special Assistant to the President as well 
as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
America — to have firm policy control over all 
aspects of our activities in the area — is an 
indication of the prime concern of the ad- 

The recent apix)intment of Ambassador 
[Teodoro] Moscoso to be our representative to 
the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress — which will provide better co- 
operation among all member nations — is a most 
encouraging step. 

In sum, in spite of numerous shortrun prob- 
lems and crises — and these will continue — the 

• Hid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 535. 

long-range prospects are jjromising. It will be 
a long, tougli battle poverty, illiteracy, 
and disease, but it is one that all Americans — 
in both our continents— working together — can 


The bill before this committee rex[uests a total 
of $225 million in new authority for technical 
cooperation and development grants. In addi- 
tion, up to $85 million is being requested imder 
the Alliance for Progress technical cooperation 

This request underscores the reliance we place 
on these programs as a prime element in the 
development process. This request is only a 
small part of our total aid program— about 
one-tenth— but it is a vital part. For this is the 
seed money ; these are the funds that get things 
moving in the underdeveloped nations. 

Three aspects of the teclinical cooperation 
program bear emphasizing : 

First, it is an area in which Americans are 
uniquely qualified, for we have skills, training, 
and experience that are needed in the under- 
developed countries. 

Only decades ago, many of what are now 
prosperous areas of our country could liave 
been termed "underdeveloped." But through 
our agricultural extension services, rural elec- 
tric cooperatives, trade schools, land-grant col- 
leges, knowledge was applied to the problems of 
development and the U.S. economy grew. The 
old saying that "knowledge is power" might 
be amended to read "knowledge is prosperity." 

This experience and these skills can be put 
to use in other lands, and teclinical cooperation 
is an effective means of transmitting them. 

Second, teclmical cooperation is one of the 
most effective means of demonstrating what 
kind of people we are and of giving direct evi- 
dence of our interest in the welfare of others. 
There is a great reservoir of good will toward 
America in the underdeveloped world. A ma- 
jor reason has been the people-to-people efforts 
of both government and private groups — our 
technical assistance. Point 4, the Peace Corps, 
CARE, our missionaries, worldwide charities, 
our great foundations and imiversities. The 
doctor with his mobile health unit, the tech- 
nician who frees a village from malaria, the 

APRIL 13, 1964 


agricultural specialist, and the teacher are to 
millions of people in the world the symbol of 

Third, teclmical cooperation focuses on the 
present need of many coimtries. The basic fac- 
tor in economic development is, of course, 
people — healthy, well-trained people. With- 
out citizens who can work hard and effectively, 
no coimtry can grow — no matter how much 
capital is pumped into the economy from the 

By concentrating on the most basic needs — 
education and health for example — our teclmi- 
cal cooperation program enables other nations 
to take the first steps toward eventual self- 
sustaining economic growth. 

I urge the full authorization for this pro- 
gram in the coming fiscal year. I know of no 
program which brings greater dividends. 


In his message of March 19 — on the mutual 
defense and development programs — President 
Johnson said: 

We must do more to utilize private initiative in the 
United States — and in tlie developing countries — to 
promote economic development abroad. 

Five elements of the 1965 program are es- 
pecially designed to carry out this purpose: 

1. Tax Credit. The President will send to 
the Congress an amendment to the Internal 
Kevenue Code providing a special tax credit 
incentive to encourage private investment in 
less developed countries.' Under this legisla- 
tion, a tax credit would be granted to a U.S. 
taxpayer against total tax liability on income 
from all sources equal to 30 percent of the new 
investment in selected types of business activity. 
It would be available when there was either new 
direct investment or when over 50 percent of the 
profits were retained in an underdeveloped coun- 
try for investment. I urge congressional ap- 
proval of this important legislation. 

2. Advisory Committee. A nine-man advis- 
ory committee on private enterprise in foreign 
aid will soon be appointed as authorized by 
last year's foreign aid bill. This committee will 
make a detailed study of the role of private 

' For text, see H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 

resources and recommend ways in which this 
role can be increased and strengthened. We 
look forward to their report. 

3. Investment Gvurcmties. The past year has 
seen a major increase in activity in the invest- 
ment guaranty program and this trend is ex- 
pected to continue during the coming fiscal year. 
This is one of the most important direct efforts 
of the U.S. Government at encouraging private 
investment. A total of $1,125 million in guar- 
anties is now outstanding, an increase of $362 
million in calendar 1963. 

In addition, we are requesting authority for a 
final installment of the pilot program for guar- 
anteeing U.S. housing investments in Latin 

4. Use of Private Firms. AID will also 
place increased emphasis on contracting with 
private firms and organizations in providing 
technical assistance. Virtually all capital proj- 
ects are already carried out under private con- 
tract. In this way, the best possible utilization 
will be made of the skills and knowledge in the 
private sector — skills and knowledge not avail- 
able to the Government. 

5. Executive Service Corps. We fully sup- 
port the efforts of private industry to organize 
an Executive Service Corps. This corps, to be 
composed of men of experience in private busi- 
ness, would help to channel the knowledge and 
tecliniques of American private business to 
underdeveloped countries. 


As I said at the beginning of my statement, 
it is the firm hope of the administration that 
this year's review will be a frank and fruitful 
one, based on the facts and the program. 

The facts are clear : 

— aid is highly concentrated; two-thirds of 
development lending goes to 7 countries, and 
two- thirds of military assistance goes to 11 

— three-fifths of economic aid is now in the 
form of dollar repayable loans ; 

— 80 percent of foreign assistance funds is 
spent in this country ; 

— development assistance is provided under 
strict criteria and the self-help efforts of re- 
cipient nations are carefully assessed ; 



— our allies are doing moro ; 

— tliis year's aid request is $1.1 billion less 
than last year's; it represents less than 4 cents 
out of every tnx dollar; 

— we are mobilizing increased participation 
of U.S. and recipient country private resources. 

There have been mistakes, and I oirmot guar- 
antee tliiit there will not be others. A program 
of this magnitude and difficulty run by human 
beings cannot avoid some waste. We are in- 
volved in a highly complicated process, perhaps 
the most complex social and economic under- 
taking in the history of nations — the develop- 
ment of modern societies and economies. In 
the past 177 years of our own economic develop- 
ment we made mistakes, had successes and fail- 
ures, experimented, and often were inefficient 
and wasteful. We cannot expect perfection 
from others. 

I can assure this committee that under the 
leadership of Mr. Bell we have the best run, 
best administered program since the days of the 
Marshall Plan. 

The basic organizational structure — estab- 
lished in 1961 and tested in action — will be 
maintained. But operations will be increas- 
ingly efficient, the number of employees re- 
duced by 1,200 by the end of fiscal year 1965, 
and overseas missions consolidated with em- 
bassies wherever possible. 

AVorking together, the Congress and the exec- 
utive branch can assure the most prudent and 
effective use of foreign assistance in the years 


The foreign aid program of the 1960's — as it 
was in the 1940"s and 1950's — is planned and 
administered to serve the vital interests of the 
U.S. It is a prime instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy. U.S. foreign policy and U.S. security 
would be in great jeopardy without the aid pro- 
gram. As Mr. Bell and the regional witnesses 
will demonstrate in later testimony, U.S. as- 
sistance fits into a carefully planned pattern 
based on a study of each country and an anal- 
ysis of U.S. interest. 

The program which we are presenting for 
1965 is a tight, realistic one. It represents our 
minimum expectation. I strongly urge that 

this commitLee authorize the full amount 

AVo often hear talk about what we are doing 
to future generations of Americans and about 
the legacy which we give to our grandchildren. 
I would certainly not want mine to grow up 
in a world where the richest nation — having 
nearly half tlie worlds wealth — ignored for 
decades the needs of two-thirds of the people, 
who lived in poverty, disease, and hunger. It 
would surely not be a very safe or stable world. 
And even more, it would not bo a very great 
heritage or tradition to pass on. 

We would want to help others to move for- 
ward even if there were no such thing as Com- 
munist imperialism. But the Communist threat 
converts what we would want to do anyway 
into a vital necessity, a matter of the survival 
of freedom. 

The economically advanced countries are too 
strong and too healthy to be taken over either 
by force or by subversion. Few would dispute 
that this was one of the great achievements of 
the Marshall Plan and our postwar diplomacy. 

But the Sino-Soviet efforts have not ceased. 
Their drive is now centered on the less developed 
areas. If they can take these over, they could 
hope eventually to strangle the economically 
advanced part of the free world. 

Aid is a vital tool in this struggle. 

There are no easy answers; and it is wrong 
to expect the foreign aid program to solve all 
our problems. But without it the field would 
be left to our adversaries — not only 20th-century 
communism but the age-old enemies of man: 
ignorance, disease, and poverty. 

We are seeing results. 

The quiet victory is being won. 

This is not the time to quit. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 1st Session 

Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban 
Proposals and Related Matters. Hearings before the 
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Sen- 
ate Armed Services Committee. Part 1, May 7- 
August 9, 196.3, 540 pp. ; part 2, with index, August 
12-27, 19G3, 4.->5 pp. 

APRIL. 13, 1964 


88th Congress, 2d Session 

Winning the Cold War : The U.S. Ideological Offensive. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Part VI, U.S. Government Agen- 
cies and Programs (Department of State, U.S. In- 
formation Agency). January 13- February 20, 1964. 
126 pp. 

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. Part I, Recent Trends 
in Soviet and East European Literature, Arts, Hu- 
man Rights (Law and Religion), and the Younger 
Generation. January 27-30, 1964. 173 pp. 

Fishing in U.S. Territorial Waters. Hearings before 
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee 
on S. 19S8, H.R. 79.54, H.R. 8296, H.R. 9957, H.R. 
10028, and H.R. 10040. February 19-26. 1964. 208 pp. 

Compliance With the Convention on the Chamizal. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
S. 2394. February 26-27, 1964. 61 pp. 

Second Transisthmian Canal. Hearings before the 
Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2428, a bill to 
authorize a study of means of increasing the capacity 
and security of the Panama Canal, and for other 
purposes, and S. 2497, a bill to provide for an investi- 
gation and study to determine a site for the construc- 
tion of a sea-level interoceanic canal through the 
American isthmus. March 3—4, 1964. 79 pp. 

International Coffee Agreement Act of 1963. Report, 
together with minority and individual views, to ac- 
company H.R. 8864. S. Rept. 941. March 12, 1964. 
56 pp. 

The United States Balance of Payments. Report of 
the Joint Economic Committee, with additional 
views. S. Rept. 965. March 19, 1964. 30 pp. 

Foreign Assistance. Message from the President trans- 
mitting recommendations relative to foreign assist- 
ance. H. Doe. 2.50. March 19, 1964. 44 pp. 

Amendments to the Request for Appropriations for 
Foreign Assistance — Economic and Military Assist- 
ance. Communication from the President transmit- 
ting amendments to the request for appropriations 
transmitted in the budget for 1965 for foreign assist- 
ance — economic and military assistance. H. Doc. 
285. March 24, 1964. 2 pp. 

Exportation of Aircraft Engines as Working Parts of 
Aircraft. Report to accompany H.R. 1608. H. Rept. 
1268. March 24, 1964. 4 pp. 

Antiques Which May Be Imported Free of Duty. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 2330. H. Rept. 1269. 
March 24. 1964. 3 pp. 

Free Importation of Instant Coffee. Report to accom- 
pany H.R. 4198. H. Rept. 1272. March 24, 1964. 
4 pp. 

Providing for the Free Entry of One Mass Spectrom- 
eter for Oregon State University and One Mass 
Spectrometer for Wayne State University. Report 
to accompany H.R. 4364. H. Rept. 1273. March 24, 
1904. 2 pp. 

Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 7480. H. Rept. 1274. March 24, 1964. 
3 pp. 

Prevention of Double Taxation in Case of Certain To- 
bacco Products. Report to accompany H.R. 8268. 
H. Rept. 1275. March 24, 1964. 4 pp. 

Tariff Classification of Certain Particleboard. Report 
to accompany H.R. 8975. H. Rept. 1277. March 24, 
1964. 2 pp. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. En- 
tered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 25, 1964. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention of February 8, 
1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic Fish- 
eries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at 
Washington July 15, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Iceland, March 23, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at 
United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 
10, 1902. ' 

Signatures: Cuba, October 17, 1963; Czechoslovakia, 
October 8, 1963; Denmark (with reservation), Oc- 
tober 31, 1963 ; Italy, December 20, 1963 ; New Zea- 
land, December 23, 19(53 ; Rumania, December 27, 


International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa- 
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. 
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts 
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 

Accession deposited: Belgium and Luxembourg, 
March 10, 1964. 



Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense 
as.sistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels 
February 6, and March 11, 1964. Entered into force 
March 11, 1964. 


Agricultural conmiodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Seoul 
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. 

* Not in force. 



INDEX ^U»''^ 13, J964 Vol Z, No. 12H 

American Principles 

Foreign rolii-j- nntl the ludiviilual : Identity in 

Diversity (Louehlieim) 591 

The IIoix? for Reasoned Agreement (Johnson) . r>76 

Asia. Seorctiiry Rusk Heads Delegation to 

SKATO Council Meeting 577 

Cambodia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 

of March 27 570 

China, Communist. Secretary Rusk's News Con- 
ference of March 27 570 

Communism. The United States and a Changing 

Euroiie (Tyler) 587 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy COl 

The Foreign Assistance Program (Rusk) . . . 595 
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570 
Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

March 27 570 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 

Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . . . 570 

Economic Affairs 

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578 

Secretary of Interior Named to Export Expan- 
sion Committee (text of Executive order) . . 590 
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570 


The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578 

The United States and a Changing Europe 

(Tyler) 587 

Foreign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program 

(Rusk) 595 

Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan Visits United 

States 594 

Military Affairs 

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578 

United States Policy in Viet-Nam (McNamara) . 562 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The Atlantic Agenda (Rostow) 578 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570 

Presidential Documents 

The Hope for Reasoned Agreement 576 

Secretary of Interior Named to Export Expan- 
sion Committee 590 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy and the Individual: 
Identity in Diversity (Louchheim) .... 591 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

Secretary Rusk Heads Delegation to SEATO 

Council Meeting 577 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27 . 570 
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 602 

Viet-Nam. United States Policy in Viet-Nani 

(McNamara) 5G2 

Name Index 

Johnson, President 576, 590 

Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 591 

McNamara, Robert S , . 562 

Rostow, W. W 578 

Rusk, Secretary 570,595 

Tyler, WiUiam R 587 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 23-29 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of .News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to March 23 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the BuLurriN are Nos. KX) 
of March 11, 110 of March 13, and 124 of 
Slarch 17. 
No. Date Subject 

129 3/23 Rusk : House Committee on Foreign 

*130 3/23 U.S. participation in international 

*131 3/25 Wilkins to be designated Inspector 
General of Foreign Service (bio- 
graphic details). 
132 3/26 Delegation to 9th SEATO Council 
meeting (rewrite). 

tl33 3/25 Ball : U.N. Conference on Trade and 

134 3/26 Itinerary for visit of King of Jordan 


135 3/27 Rusk : news conference of March 27. 
♦136 3/28 Cultural exchange (Central Amer- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C., 20402 





The Making of Foreign Policy 

This 33-page pamplilet is a transcript of an interview of Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Professor 
Eric Frederick Goldman of Primceton University, newly appointed consultant to President Jolinson. The 
interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television progi-am "The Open Mind." 

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a niunber of different aspects of the foreign policy 
process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationship of politics to foreign policy, the 
problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of 
public opinion on foreign policy. 



PUBLICATION 7658 20 cents 


WASHINGTON, D.C., 20402 

Please send me copies of The Making oj Foreign Policy 



Enclosed And | _ 

(cash, check, or mouey order pay- 
able to Sapt. of Documents) 




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Yol. L, No, 1295 

April 20, 1964. 


Remarks by President Johnson 606 



hy Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 615 


by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 622 


Statement by Under Secretary Ball 63Jf. 

For index see inside back cover 

NATO, a Growing Partnership 

Remarks hy President Johnson ^ 

Fifteen years ago tomorrow, here in Wash- 
ington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.^ 
Less than 5 months later, after due constitu- 
tional process in all the signing coimtries, the 
treaty entered into force. From that time to 
this, the treaty has served the peace of the 

Tliis short treaty commits its parties to meet 
an armed attack on any of them in Europe or 
North America as "an attack against them all." 
For 15 years it has prevented any such attack. 
Created in response to Stalin's Iron Curtain 
and the loss of Czechoslovakian freedom, tliis 
treaty has lived through war in Korea, the 
threat of war over Berlin, and a crisis without 
precedent in Cuba. Each great event has 

'Made at the White House on Apr. 3 (White House 
press release) at a ceremony in observance of the 15th 
anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty on Apr. 4, 1049. 

' For text of treaty, see Btilletin of Mar. 20, 1949, 
p. 339 ; for texts of remarks made at the signing cere- 
mony and an address by President Truman, see ihid., 
Apr. 17, 1949, p. 471. 

tested NATO, and from each test we have 
gained increased strength. 

We began as 12 countries; today we are 15. 
Those we have gamed are among our most 
determined partners: Greece, Turkey, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 

What began as a treaty soon became a com- 
mand and then a great international organiza- 
tion. The number of ready divisions, includ- 
ing 6 ivom. the United States, has multiplied by 
5. The number of modern aircraft has multi- 
plied by 10 — all more effective by far than any 
were in 1949. So the alliance is real. Its 
forces operate. Its strength is knovm. Its 
weapons cover tlie full range of power, from 
small arms to nuclear missiles of the most 
modern design. 

From the beginning, this treaty has aimed 
not simply at defense but has aimed at the co- 
operative progress of all its members. On the 
day of its signing back there 15 years ago. 
President Truman described it as a "bulwark 
which will permit us to get on with the real 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
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of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
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Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
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NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
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business of government and society, the busi- 
ness of acliieving a fuller and happier life for 
our citizens." This treaty, in fact, C4vnie 2 years 
after we and other friends had begun our 
historic enterprise of economic recovery under 
the Marshall Plan. Our "real business" was 
already pretty well advanced. 

The IT) years since 1940 have seen the longest 
upward surge of economic growth that our At- 
lantic world has ever known. Our jiroduction 
and trade have more than doubled; our popu- 
lation has grown by more than a hundred mil- 
lion; the income of the average man has grown 
by more than 50 percent. Our inward peace 
and our outward confidence have gi'own steadily 
more secure. The internal threat of communism 
has shriveled in repeated failure. A new gen- 
eration, strong and free and healthy, walks our 
streets and rides in our care. Yes, we have 
done well. 

Danger has receded, but it has not disap- 
peared. The tsxsk of building our defenses is 
never really done. The temptation to relax 
must always be resisted. Our own Atlantic 
agenda has changed, but it is not short. 

Our first common task, therefore, is to move 
onward to that closer partnership which is so 
plainly in our common interest. The United 
States, for one, has learned much from 15 years 
of danger and achievement. In 1949 the sol- 
emn commitment of this treaty was for us an 
historic departure from isolation, and we have 
many great men, some among us and some away 
today, to thank for their leadership. 

Now it is a tested and recognized foundation 
stone of America's foreign policy. Wliat Rob- 
ert Schuman said for France in 1949 I repeat 
for my country today : 

Nations are more and more convinced that their 
fates are closely bound together ; their salvation and 
their welfare can no longer be based upon an egotistical 
and aggressive nationalism, but must rest upon the 
progressive application of human solidarity- 

The ways of our growing partnership are not 
eas}' . Though the union of Europe is her man- 
ifest destiny, the building of that unity is a long, 
hard job. But we, for our part, will never 
turn back to separatetl insecurity. We welcome 
the new strength of our transatlantic allies. 
We find no contradiction between national self- 

respect and interdepeiulent nmtual reliance. 
We are eager to share with the new Europe at 
every level of power and responsibility. We 
aim to share the lead in the search for new and 
stronger patterns of cooperation. 

We believe in the alliance because in our own 
interest we must, because in the common interest 
it works, and because in the world's interest it 
is right. 

We have other duties and opportunities. 
Our trade with one another and the world is 
not yet free and not yet broad enough to serve 
both us and others as it should. Our monetary 
systems have grown stronger, but they still too 
often limit us, when they should be, instead, a 
source of energy and growth. 

In ever-growing measure we have set our- 
selves and others free from the burden of colo- 
nialism. We have also set new precedents of 
generous concern for those that are less pros- 
perous than we. But our connection to the less 
developed nations is not yet what it should be 
and must be. This is not a one-way street, but 
we must work to do our full pai't to make it 
straight and make it broad. 

We remain vigilant in defending our liberties, 
but we must be alert to any hope of stable 
settlement with those who have made vigilance 
necessary and essential. In particular, we must 
be alive to the new spirit of diversity that is 
now abroad in Eastern Europe. We did not 
make the Iron Curtain. We did not build 
the wall. Gaps in the Curtain are welcome, 
and so are holes in the wall, whenever they are 
not hedged by traps. We continue to believe 
that the peace of all Europe requires the reuni- 
fication of the German people in freedom. We 
will be firm, but we will always be fair. Our 
guard is up, but our hand is out. 

We must build on our tradition of determined 
support for the United Nations. We are 
pledged to this purpose by the very articles of 
our treaty, and we have kept our pledge. The 
members of NATO provide most of the re- 
sources of the United Nations and most of its 
ability to help in keeping peace. Wlien we 
began, we promised that our treaty was con- 
sistent with the charter. Today we know that 
the charter and the treatj' are indispensable to 
one another. Neither can keep the peace alone. 

APRIL 20, 1G64 


We need them both, in full effectiveness, for as 
many years ahead as any of us can see. 

The Atlantic peoples have a magnificent his- 
tory, but they have known too much war. It 
is the splendor of this great alliance that, in 
keeping peace with its opponents, it has kept 

the road clear for a worldwide upward march 
toward the good life for free people. Proven 
in danger, strengthened in freedom, and resolute 
in purpose, we will go on, with God's help, to 
serve not only our own people but to serve the 
bright future of all mankind. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 3 

Press release 143 dated April 3 

Secretary Rush: This — what is for me an 
early morning press conference — was not a con- 
spiracy against those of you who attended the 
Wliite House photographers' dinner last night, 
but I was asked to vary as between morning 
and afternoon for the benefit of the afternoon 
papers and some of our European friends. So 
I will have some in the morning and some in the 

I am ready for your questions. 

Change of Government in Brazil 

Q. Mr. Secretary., do you see any improve- 
ment in relatione and any expansion of United 
States aid to Brazil as a result of the change in 
government there? 

A. Well, I think that we are ready, as we have 
been before, to work very closely with Brazil to 
enable them to get on with their great problems 
of economic and social development. We, as a 
matter of fact, thought we had an agreement 
about a year and a half — 2 years — ago by which 
we under the Alliance for Progress program 
would provide very important assistance for 
Brazil in relation to steps which we hoped that 
they would be taking in their own behalf. Un- 
fortunately that plan did not work out because 
the agreements we had worked out with Fi- 
nance Minister [San Tiago] Dantes did not 
prove acceptable in Brazil. They did not pro- 
ceed with them. 

But, of course, we are deeply interested in the 
economic vitality of that great country. It is a 

great sister Republic in this hemisphere, as large 
as the United States, with 75 or 80 million peo- 
ple, and we should be in closest touch with them 
about how we might be able to assist them in 
their necessities in this situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that 
the establishment of a new government or the 
succession of a new leader would improve Bra- 
ziVs cooperation with the other nations of the 
hemisphere on prohlems such as Castro Cuba? 

A. Well, I am sure you understand my reti- 
cence in commenting m detail about what has 
happened internally in Brazil — again, that 
great sister Republic. We have had the im- 
pression that in the past several weeks consid- 
erable concern developed within the Congress 
and among the Governors of the principal 
States, in the Armed Forces, and among large 
segments of the people, that the basic constitu- 
tional structure of Brazil was under threat and 
that Congress, the Governors, the Armed 
Forces, moved to insure the continuity of con- 
stitutional government in that country. 

Now, part of the concern is expressed by lead- 
ing Brazilians, and a conceni, which we shared, 
was that extremist elements were having more 
and more influence in the administration of 
President [Joao] Goulart. One does not have 
to say that independently. One can quote the 
concern about that expressed by many moderate 
and forwai'd-looking Brazilians. 

I would suppose that the new administration 
would, I think, mark time for the moment until 
the election of a new President by the Congress 



within this SO-diiy period provided under their 
constitution. Butl would also suppose that the 
deep conunitment of all those who have been 
workiufi on this problem in Brazil to constitu- 
tional government and to representative democ- 
racy would mean that Brazil would take a lead- 
ing pai't in the hemisphere and in the OAS on 
this issue of totalitarian regimes and particu- 
larly this threat from the extreme left. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since Brazil is so large a 
country and so important a cou7ifry in the Latin 
American scene, do you feel that the method of 
this change of government, since it was forced 
largely hy the military, could conceivably have 
an adverse effect on the democratic movements 
in the hemisphere? 

A. I would not think so. I think that in the 
first place it has been demonstrated over the last 
several years tliat the Armed Forces of Brazil 
basically are committed to constitutional gov- 
ernment in thal^/country and that this action did 
not occur until there were many signs that Presi- 
dent Goulart seemed to be moving to change the 
constitutional arrangements and to move to- 
ward some sort of authoritarian regime. 

This is a matter of controversy in Brazil and 
outside, but this was the fear that the basic, the 
moderate, democratic elements in that country 
had in their mind. I think this is also a matter 
on whicli millions of the people have testified 
in the streets in the last day or two in their dem- 
onstrations in support of what has been done 

But I want to emphasize that what has hap- 
pened has not resolved all of the problems by 
any means. Brazil has been in the process of 
dynamic development for as long as I can re- 
member — since childhood — a country with great 
resources, a country which has been moving with 
great vitality in its economic development. But 
in that process there are problems. There have 
been problems of inflation, problems of invest- 
ment, problems of external debt, some of the 
problems that we ourselves have known at a 
certain point of our history when we were in 
that process of almost dramatic development 
in respect to national resources. 

So that I would not suppose that what has 
happened in Brazil would suggest to people in 
other parts of Latin America that the tradi- 

President Sends Good Wishes 
to New President of Brazil 

Following is the text of a message of April ^ 
from President Johnson to Ranicri Mazzilli, 
President of the United States of Brazil. 

Wblte House press release dated AprU 2 

Please accept my wannest good wislics on your 
instaUation as President of tbe United States of 
Brazil. The American people have watched 
with anxiety the political and economic difficul- 
ties through which your great nation has been 
passing, and have admired the resolute will of 
the Brazilian community to resolve these diffi- 
culties within a frauieworli of constitutional 
democracy and without civil strife. 

The relations of friendship and cooperation 
between our two governments and peoples are a 
great historical legacy for us both and a precious 
asset in the interests of peace and prosperity and 
liberty in this hemisphere and in the whole 
world. I looli forward to the continued strength- 
ening of those relations and to our intensified co- 
operation in the interests of economic progress 
and social justice for all and of hemispheric and 
world peace. 

tional kind of golpe is any solution, because this 
is not that kind of situation in Brazil. This is 
a matter of where a much broader spectrum of 
the political, economic, social life of the country 
expressed itself in support of constitutional 

U.S. Commitment to Constitutional Process 

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you are on that 
theme, I don't think you have ever addressed 
yourself to the controversy that flared around 
Washington a few weeks ago about the alleged 
remarks of Mr. Mann [Assistant Secretary of 
State Thomas C. Mann] on this subject. Could 
you from your point of view suggest whether 
there has been even a subtle change of attitude 
here, not connected necessarily tvith the change 
of Presidents but whether ive felt that Peru, 
Dominican Republic, and so on, should not be a 
rule of thumb any more? 

A. Well, that controversy, if there was one, 
flared outside the Department of State and not 
inside. We have committed ourselves in this 
hemisphere to the strong and vigorous support 
of democratic and constitutional institutions. 

APRIL 20, 19C4 


As a matter of fact, the inner purpose of the 
Alliance for Progress was to make it possible 
for the necessary changes to occur within the 
structure of democratic and constitutional proc- 
ess, and we have affirmed very strongly with 
other countries of this hemisphere in places like 
Punta del Este a little more than 2 years ago ^ 
that commitment of the hemisphere to demo- 
cratic and constitutional process. 

Now, if unhappily in a particular situation, in 
a particular country, there is a disturbance — 
there might be a military takeover — this does 
not present us with a situation which we can 
simply walk away from because we and other 
members of this hemisphere necessarily have an 
interest in what happens in that situation. 
Therefore we have to continue to live with it, 
work with it, try to assist a particular country 
in coming back to constitutional process. This 
happened in Peru; it has happened in other 
countries. So that we stop short of saying 
that we simply lost interest in a country the 
moment it might depart from the constitu- 
tional path because our interest is in assisting 
that country in getting back to the constitu- 
tional path, finding its way back to the commit- 
ments of the hemisphere. 

So I don't know of any diilerence in the De- 
partment of State on this matter. There was, 
I think, a fragmentary report out of context 
of the particular discussion which alleged some 
speculation on this matter, but I think this was 
entirely beside the point and missed the main 
issues involved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, how loovZd 
you describe the policy of this Government on 
the matter of recognition? This has been — the 
United States has had different attitudes on this 
over the years. Do we recognize governments 
simply because they control the country, or do 
we taJce some other standard? 

A. Well, I don't believe that there is a single 
rule, a single formula, by which you can answer 
this question in relation to some 114 countries 
witli which we have relations. In many situa- 
tions we consult others who are directly and 
immediately concerned with the problem, to 

'For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, 
p. 270. 

see whether we ought to move with them in 
concert with regard to a particular situation. 
Wlien it is in Africa, it is with African coun- 
tries; when it is in Latin America, it is with 
Latin American countries. 

I would think that recognition is basically a 
political act which normally, in the usual cir- 
cmnstance, applies where a government is in 
control of the country and accepts its interna- 
tional responsibilities, but this will vary from 
time to time because as a political act it needs 
to be taken alongside of the other interests of 
the LTnited States in a particular situation, in- 
cluding our interest in moving jointly with 
others whenever possible in a concert of policy. 

Now, m the case of Brazil, of course, this 
matter does not arise because the succession 
there occuiTed as foreseen by the constitution 
and we would assume that recognition is not 
involved in that particular issue or point. 

Q. Well, in fact, you are saying we still do 
use some of Woodrow Wilson's touchstone on 
this, that there is something beyond the actual 
control of the country by the government of that 

A. I think so, I think so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is going to happen 
noio to those Brazilian external debt negotia- 
tions that I believe began a couple of months 

A. Well, I think that those conversations will 
of course be resumed, perhaps in a new frame- 
work. There are some important problems for 
the Government of Brazil to deal with, such as 
external debt, problems of inflation, problems of 
investments, but we would hope that the new 
government would turn its attention to these 
matters promptly and that we should go ahead 
in an effort to deal with these critical problems 
that any government of Brazil will have before 
it in the next several months. 

Castro and Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the debate that Senator 
\_J. TF.] Fulbright set off in foreign policy seems 
to be continuing and the latest yesterday was a 
speech by Senator \_Thomns /.] Dodd in which 
he predicted that eventually there would be a 
revolution in Cuba which would sweep out Gas- 



tro. Do you see any signs of such a revolution 
building up now? 

A. If I were speaking of the next weeks and 
nwnths ahead, I would say that I do not see 
any immediate prospect tluit internal forces in 
Cuba would be able to unseat the apparatus of 
police control that Castro has fastened on that 
island. ^^Hiat happens in the longer rim is of 
course for the future, but I see no immediate 
prospect of that. 

Q. In that connection, sir, there has re- 
cently been a political trial in Cuba \chich 
seemed to demonstrate som^ degree of division 
within the Communist apparatus in Cuba. 
What is the State Departments assessment of 
the degree of factional disputes between the 
Communist groups in Cuba? 

A. "Well, quite frankly, I haven't made or 
haven't had before me a detailed analysis of 
that particular trial or the evidence that was 
devised there, but I do have the impression that 
there has been some discussion inside Cuba 
among the leadership for some time, with per- 
haps three main trends expressed in one way 
or another: one, those who feel closer to Mos- 
cow ; and some, apparently a lesser number, who 
feel interested in Peiping's approach to these 
matters; and once in a while there are comments 
or suggestions that sound as though some Tito- 
ist kind of policy might be for Cuba's future. 

But so far as I know there has not been any 
serious discussion among the leadership in Cuba 
about the basis on which Cuba might find its 
way back to the hemisphere and rejoin the 
hemisphere on a basis of compatibility. But 
this internal discussion within the Cuban lead- 
ership is something on which we only get frag- 
mentary reports. I just can't answer you very 
specifically on that. 

Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Geneva there now has 
been public confirmation that there has been a 
series of U.S.-Soviet talks on nondissemination 
of nuclear weapons. Does it appear to you that 
that has come to a dead end at this point, or is 
there some further course of progress that you 

A. I would hope that it is not at a dead end, 

and as a matter of fact I don't really believe 
that it is, because this is a subject on which all 
of the nuclear powei-s necessarily liave an inter- 
est. It is true that we have from time to time 
discussed this matter with the Soviets. I was 
a little surprised to have it appear that this was 
something new. I would suppose that every- 
one had assumed that we have been talking 
about this with the Soviets. I have had some 
talks with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Min- 
ister Andrei A. Gromyko] about it, there have 
been talks with the Ambassador [Anatoliy F. 
Dobrynin], there have been talks in Geneva. 

Now, it is not going to be easy to bring this 
question of nondissemination of nuclear weap- 
ons to a formal agreement. On their side the 
Soviets have raised objections about our pro- 
posals for a multilateral force. Now, we know 
ourselves that the multilateral force will not 
involve the dissemination of nuclear weapons 
to other national nuclear capability or to other 
national armed forces, and from that point of 
view it is some protection against the further 
spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis. 
But I think that one would have to be fair and 
say that, until we have completed our discus- 
sions of the multilateral force and make those 
arrangements or prospective arrangements 
public, the Soviets themselves can't know that. 
They can hear me say it. They can hear our 
announced policy on the matter. But they 
won't be able to make their own assessment until 
the arrangements of the multilateral force can 
be completed and made public. 

I would hope that at that time they would 
themselves understand that the multilateral 
force has nothing to do with the dissemination 
of nuclear weapons to additional national nu- 
clear forces. 

Now, on our side wo have a very substantial 
interest in the nondissemination idea as it ap- 
plies to Peiping, but there is no evidence what- 
ever that Peiping would engage in the kind of 
agreement that wc have been talking with other 
eovemments about, and so at least some of our 
sense of urgency diminishes if it is clear that 
Peiping will not take part. 

But I would like to add this further note. 
The fact that it might be difficult to bring 
this question to a formal agreement is not the 
whole story. It is my impression that Moscow, 

APRIL 20, 1964 


Paris, London, Washington have a certain co- 
incidence of policy on this matter, that no one 
of these four governments is now in the process 
of distributing nuclear weapons to national 
forces — to additional national forces — and that 
this coincidence of policy is at least a part of the 
problem, and that if these four govei-nments 
adliere to that policy, then at least some of the 
problem is resolved without agreement on the 
basis of the nature of nuclear weapons and the 
nature of the interests which any nuclear power 
has in not having these weapons distributed 
indefinitely around the earth. 

Q. But would you say — 

A. Excuse me. Go ahead. 

Q. Would you say then, sir, in your view you 
believe that there is at present a de facto, a tacit 
understanding not to disseminate nuclear 

A. No. I specifically said that there is no 
agreement and there is no understanding. This 
is not in the picture. There is nothing — no one 
has, that I know of, has said among these four 
governments that we now agree that, or we now 
understand that. I am simply referring to our 
estimate with respect to a coincidence of policy. 
I do not have the impression, for example, to 
be very specific about it, that the Soviet Govern- 
ment is furnishing assistance to the Chinese in 
the development of nuclear weapons, and it is 
my impression that the other three nuclear 
powers are following the same policy with re- 
spect to other national nuclear forces. 

But this is a question that is not now in 
motion. That is, we are not making much 
headway on it, but I would hope that this is a 
question which is not closed, because we may 
come to a point at a somewhat later date when 
we can find a more formal agreement on this 

Viet-Nam and Laos 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen interesting 
reports from Southeast Asia saying thai Gen- 
eral Khanh \Nguyen Khanh, President of tlie 
Republic of Viet-Nam] has been meeting ivith 
Phoumi [Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos] and 
that they Jiave an agreement for hot pursuit in 
chasing the Viet Cong into Laos. Noio, the 

question is, lohere does the Premier, lohich is 
Souvanna [Phounia], come into this act? Has 
he been contacted? Do you believe that this 
report is correct? 

A. Oh, I don't have details on any such dis- 
cussion as has been reported. It is well known 
that we are concerned about the violations of 
the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos, which in- 
clude the use of Laotian territory for the in- 
filtration of assistance to the Viet Cong from 
North Viet-Nam. And what happened along 
that border is a matter of gi'eat interest, I 
thmk, both to Laos, which has a stake in the 
Geneva accords of '62, and to South Viet-Nam, 
who suffers from any violations of those 

But I don't have any information about any 
arrangements. And Souvanna Phouma, the 
Premier — we keep in close touch with him on 
this — on this type of problem, and he, too, 
knows of our concern about these possible sub- 
terranean violations of the accords of '62 and 
the infringement of Laotian neutrality that 
results from it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we heard, out of Bonn, 
that Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard is coming to 
the United States in June and is going to see 
President Johnson. Would you tell us what is 
on the mind of the Americans — what subject 
xoould the Americans like to discuss with the 

A. Oh, I think that — my understanding is 
that he is coming here on a private visit. Of 
course, while he is here, President Johnson will 
be delighted to see him. But I should imagine 
that in tenns of what subjects would be dis- 
cussed you could make your own list and it 
would be very accurate. (Laughter.) 

Q. Sir, the Indian Defense Minister \Y . B. 
Chavan] is supposed to be coming here in the 
near future. I was icondering lohether you 
could tell us tcliat this signifies? And, sec- 
ondly, under what political frameioork would 
these talks take place between India and the 

A. Well, we have had discussions with the 
Government of India for some time now about 
the nature of the threat which is posed against 
India from tlie north, the problem of their own 



security, and tlio assistance whicii we and 
Britain have been giving to India in this 
regard. I tliink tliis is a continuation of those 
discussions. I thinlv there is no significant or 
important change in any political structure or 
basis on which these talks would occur. These 
have been going on all the time. Often they 
occur in Xew Delhi, whenever one or another of 
our high officials go out there. We are glad to 
have them come liere so we can pursue those 
talks here. 

Q. Mr. Seci'etary, Ambassador {Charles E.'\ 
Bohlen saw President de Gaulle yesterday. 
My colleagues in Paris are distressed because 
they can't find out what has happened. Could 
you tell me? 

Q. Can't hear the question. 

A. I wouldn't want to embarrass your col- 
leagues in Paris by giving you sometliing 
which they couldn't get over there. ( Laughter. ) 
It was a general review of the situation. The 
Ambassador had not seen President de Gaulle 
for some time. A number of questions did 
come up. I think, again, perhaps you could 
make your own list and it might not be too 

Q. Could you say anything at this time about 
the Panama situation, Mr. Secretary? 

A. Well, I am very hopeful that we can bring 
this matter back to the conference table. I 
think that the statements of President Jolinson 
and President Chiari have indicated that there 
is a recognition on both sides that our interests 
on both sides require us to bring our differences, 
such as they are, to the conference table in or- 
der that we can find an answer to them. I 
think we are very close; we are getting closer. 
The Organization of American States has 
played a very constructive and helpful role in 
this matter, and I would hope that we can move 
on this without too much delay. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you feel the publi- 
cation of this Suslov letter ^ marks some hind 
of new stage in the Sino-Soviet dispute which 
raises new policy questions for the West? 

'A. report by Soviet Presidium member M. A. Suslov 
to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union, dated Feb. 14, 1964, 
and released for publication on Apr. 2. 

A. No. I think this is a matter of some im- 
portance in that it is a Soviet response to what 
was a very vigorous presentation of the Chinese 
point of view. I am a little reluct^int to com- 
ment from the bleachers on this matter. 

AVe will be studying, of course, that statement 
with greiit care. And although we do have con- 
siderable interest in the outcome of the discus- 
sion, as between militancy and coexistence, we 
are not inclined ourselves to try to intervene in 
that discussion in any significant way. I think 
we will just have to let that go forward and see 
what happens on it. 

Aid to Indonesia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when this — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible we will have 
to reevaluate our aid program, to India, rather, 
Indonesia, in light of some of President Su- 
kamo''s recent comments about it? 

A. Well, I did not myself interpret his recent 
remark as an intergovernmental communica- 
tion. (Laughter.) 

We have a very limited aid program there at 
the present time. Some of it is of great im- 
portance almost regardless of any particular 
political situation. For instance, the antima- 
larial program. This is the kind of thing that 
must not be allowed to lapse, because, if it lapses, 
then a large investment of some $30-40 million 
or more of effort goes down the drain and neigh- 
boring countries then become the victims of the 
failure of an antimalarial campaign in a place 
like Indonesia. So there is some aid progress. 

But, on the other hand, questions of future 
aid and enlargement of aid turn very much on 
not only the measures that Indonesia is pre- 
pared to take inside the country but also the ad- 
justment of their relations with their own im- 
mediate neighbors. We hope this can move 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week you said' you 
might have a report from Congress this tceek on 
the chances for an international wool agreement. 
Can you tell us whether you have made this re- 
port yet and what the chances are? 

A. Yes, my report is that we will see them 
next week. (Laughter.) 

• Bulletin of Apr. 13, 1964, p. 570. 

APRIL 20, 1964 


Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been another 
flareup in Anglo-U.S. relations over shipping, 
and the charge has been made in Britain in the 
last few days that new regulations lohich came 
into force today — by these regulations, being 
United States regulations — infringe the sov- 
ereignty of shipping, other shipping nations. 
Would you like to comment, please? 

A. Well, I have looked into this more than 
once and in some detail, and I think that I am 
well enough informed about it to know that 
there isn't much that I can say that can be help- 
ful today. 

It is true that we have the Bonner bill, which 
is aimed at dual pricing and shipping rates. 
That bill has been on the books for almost 3 
years now. We have deferred the application 
of that bill in respect to these dual rates for 
more than a year, in order to try to find a way 
to work out this matter with friendly maritime 

The Maritime Commission here is doing what 
it is required to do imder the law. Now, this 
creates some problems, and we will of course be 
in touch with other governments concerned and 
will try to find some answers to the problems. 
But it's a highly technical matter, and it's not 
something that can be dismissed with a slogan 
about sovereignty or interference, and that sort 
of thing. There are serious problems in both 
directions, and we hope that we can find some 
solution. But the problem is not new. It has 
been there for almost 3 years, and the applica- 
tion of these regulations has been deferred in an 
effort to find a solution. But the Maritime 
Commission is under a very severe mandate of 
law in this matter, and we will have to see where 
we go from here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cuhan newspaper Hoy 
has charged that the Brazilian revolution was 
prepared, ordered, and paid for in the United 
States. Would you care to comment? 

A. That is — did you hear the question ? 

Q. No. No. 

A. That the Brazilian revolution was pre- 
pared, ordered, and paid for in the United 
States, according to Cuban newspapers, was it? 

Q. That's right. 

A. Or a broadcast. Well, there is just not 
one iota of truth in tliis. It's just not so in any 
way, shape, or form. 

Status of East-West Issues 

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the time of the test ban 
last sum/mer, some people at least thought it was 
related to a new stage in the Sino-Soviet quar- 
rel. Since the temperature has been going up 
again, have you noticed any further breaking of 
the ice on any East-West issues? Are the Rus- 
sians showing any increased interest? 

A. I think that there is at present, except for 
one or two bilateral things, such as the consular 
agreement — at present there is not great move- 
ment. I suspect that part of it is because of 
the Moscow-Peiping dialog and the preoccupa- 
tion of the Communist world with that dif- 

I do believe that, quite apart from ideological 
questions, the Soviet Union, the Russian people, 
as Russians, are concerned about the prospect 
of living next door to 800 million Chinese by 
1970, armed with nuclear weapons. And I 
think that their interest in the test ban treaty, 
and our common interest in such things as the 
nondissemination of nuclear weapons, is based 
upon some miderstanding of the future dangers 
of a continued nuclear arms race among those 
who now have them and the further spread of 
these weapons among those who don't have 

But I don't see this leading to major dramatic 
developments, to new questions on which we and 
the Soviet Union, or the West and the Soviet 
Union, could agree in the next few weeks. 

We do continue to work at these disarmament 
questions in Geneva. We do, not because we 
think that we are going to get miraculous an- 
swers next week but because we just cannot af- 
ford to stop the effort. We have got to keep 
trying, because the alternatives are not very 
inviting. And it's the duty of diplomacy to 
keep working at these things, to see whethei 
we can make some headway, even though it may 
be small, at particular points, at particular mo- 
ments, to keep working at it. 

Q. Thank you, sir. 



The Anatomy of World Leadership 

hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

VJS. Representative to the United Nations * 

I do not have to tell you that next year San 
Francisco will be host to a commemorative meet- 
ing of the General Assembly to mark the 20th 
annivei-sary of the signing of the Charter of the 
United Nations. But I can report to you that 
the members of the United Nations in general 
and the Secretariat in particular are more than 
grateful for the interest and generosity of San 
Francisco and the State of California which will 
make this meeting possible. 

In the twilight of the war and the dawn of a 
new era, the charter was born here in San Fran- 
cisco. For those of us who were involved in 
that historic conference — and there are still 
some of us around — the memories are still there. 

And this brings me to what Beardsley Ruml 
said about the U.N. in 1945. It was one of the 
better prophecies of our age, and it goes like 

At the end of five years you will think the UN Is 
the greatest vision ever realized by man. 

At the end of ten years you will find doubts within 
yourself and all through the world. 

At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN 
cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds 
are against its ultimate life and success. 

It will only be when the UN is twenty years old 
that ... we will know that the UN is the only alterna- 
tive to the demolition of the world. 

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing 
that turned out to be ! 

And I think by now — 19 years later — a great 
many people have arrived at the fourth stage 
in Ruml's 20-year prophecy — that stage where 

' Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco, Calif., on Apr. 3 (press release 142 dated 
Apr. 2). 

we know that "the UN is the only alternative 
to the demolition of the world." 

Improving Machinery of Peaceful Settlement 

Let me be emphatic: This is not said in any 
rhetorical sense. It is said in a very down-to- 
earth sense. The world abounds in conflicts 
between nations — some old and some new — 
some silly, some serious — some minor and some 
potentially climactic. A few of these conflicts 
may be de-fused by direct negotiation, or by 
agreement to settle for the status quo, or even 
by the attrition of time. But many of them 
will require some changes — in boundaries or 
people or resources or leaders, or in claims, 
practices, procedures, positions, or attitudes. 

If change is not to be efl'ected by the institu- 
tion of war, which has been the great instru- 
ment of change through the ages, then it must 
be eifected by institutions for peaceful settle- 
ment and peaceful change — meaning, inescap- 
ably, by international organizations at the re- 
gional and global level. The only alternative 
to the disaster of war is the machinery of peace, 
because there is no way to exorcise conflict from 
the himian breast or the politics of nations. 
And international machinery for the peaceful 
resolution of conflict already has a better record 
than many people seem to realize. 

During the past decade and a half there have 
been some 20 occasions when the armed forces 
of two or more nations engaged in active hos- 
tilities. In only one case did the fighting end 
the way wars have ended traditionally — by the 
surrender of one side to the other. On at least 

APRIL 20, 1964 


20 other occasions there has been muior fight- 
ing on disputed frontiei-s, or armed revoUs in 
the outcome of wliicli otlier states liad a na- 
tional interest. In no case has the fighting 
spread to international warfare. 

Fifty-seven international disputes are now on 
the agenda of the Security Council of the 
United Nations. Some are settled, others dor- 
mant — and some are hardy perennials. One 
thing is clear about the 57 varieties of postwar 
disputes: Far less blood has been shed than 
would have been shed if the disputes had not 
found their way onto the agenda of the U.N. 
Security Council. 

The Organization of American States and, 
more recently, the Organization of African 
Unity have also dealt successfully with violence 
in their areas. 

Hostilities have been opened with gunfire 
and closed with cease-fires in the Far East, in 
the Western Pacific, in Southeast Asia, in the 
Middle East, in the Mediterranean, and in 
Africa— in some areas more than once since the 
end of the Second World War. 

And in the Caribbean, a year and a half ago, 
a nuclear giant got on — and then got off — a nu- 
clear collision course. 

Meanwhile, the most massive political trans- 
formation in history took place as the British, 
French, Belgian, and Dutch empires were dis- 
solved and the trust territories of the United 
Nations shifted from tutelage to independ- 
ence — with astonishingly little bloodshed all 
around. The world has never seen such a 
spectacle of peaceful change. 

But there are too many nviclear and conven- 
tional arms to doubt that grave danger to peace 
in our times still persists. There have been too 
many confrontations, too many close calls, too 
many pullbacks in the nick of time, too many 
rescue operations at one minute before midnight. 

Yet, if the record so far is no guarantee of 
peace, it offers the hope that if hostilities break 
out somewhere tomorrow, the next step will not 
be the sound of trumi^ets but the call to cease- 
fire. That hope can be hardened if we and 
other members of the United Nations have tlie 
sense and the will to improve the machinery 
of peaceful settlement and cultivate the pro- 
fession of peacemaking. 

Changes in World Relationships 

In recent weelcs and montlis there has been a 
lively ferment about U.S. foreign policy in some 
of the scholarly and popular publications, in 
some of the columns and commentaries, and 
from some of the public platforms in Wasliing- 
ton and elsewhere. 

Conditions in the world are changing, we 
are told. I could not agree more. The Presi- 
dent, the Secretary of State, and others have 
noted the point moi-e than once in botli general 
and specific terms. Indeed, I was speaking my- 
self just last week at Princeton^ about the ex- 
traordinary change in world affairs and inter- 
national relationships in the 3 short years since 
Dag Hammarskjold was killed — some of which 
have been discernible only since the resolution 
of the crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba. 

'\^^ien President Kennedy took office, a global 
stalemate, which was the logical outcome of the 
cold war, was virtually complete but still being 
tested to see whether steel was backed by nerves. 
In the less than 3 years that were given to him, 
President Kennedy had to show force on three 

First, he called up the reserves to convince 
the Soviets we would no more give in to a third 
ultimatum on Berlin than we would on the 
previous two ^ — though his first words in office 
included an offer to "those nations who would 
make themselves our adversary" to "begm anew 
the quest for peace." * 

Second, he was forced to resume nuclear test- 
ing in the atmosphere because the Soviets broke 
a moratorium in the futile search for an elusive 
nuclear superiority — though in that very an- 
nouncement he insisted that ". . . in the long 
run, the only real security in this age of nuclear 
peril rests not in armament but in disarma- 
ment." ° 

And, third, President Kennedy was forced to 
throw an armored noose around Cuba to prevent 
a clandestine shift of the balance of power in 

' For text, see U.S.AJ-N. press release 4374 dated 
Mnr. 23. 

" For text of a report to the X.Ttion by President 
Kennedy on the Berlin crisis, see Bulletin of Aug. 14, 
1961, p. 207. 

* For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address, 
see ibid., Feb. 6, 19C.1, p. 175. 

" For text, see ibid.. Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443. 



Soviet, fsxvor — tliougli in doing so he simulta- 
neously mobilized the peiicekeepiup macliincry 
of the Western Hemisphere and tlie United 

Yet now, in the early months of President 
Johnson's administration, we can see a much 
different and a much more complex and a some- 
what more hopeful world emerging: 

— a world which is no longer simply bipolar 
but in which multiple centers of power and in- 
fluence have come into beiiig: 

— a world in which the most extreme forms 
of power are the least likely to be used ; 

— a world in which realities are eroding rigid 
political dogmas; 

— a world in which there can be no ideological 
agreement but where there can be agreement on 
mutual survival : 

— a world in which imperialism is dying, and 
paternalism is dving too; 

— a world in which old trading systems, mon- 
etary systems, market systems, and other ele- 
ments of the conventional wisdom are being 
challenged and changed ; 

— and finally, a world in which fundamental 
issues of human rights, which have been hidden 
in closets down the long corridor of history, are 
out in the open and high on the agenda of hu- 
man affairs. 

We can see, in short, that the world was never 
as bipolar as it looked and that a misleading im- 
pression was created by the temporary weakness 
of other powers and by the challenge of Stalin- 
ist ambitions in the first postwar years. 

But let us recall that there was nothing myth- 
ical about the physical annexation of occupied 
states in the Soviet empire, nor about the mili- 
tary pressures, the insurrections, the infiltrations 
and coercion and blackmail and propaganda 
that Stalin launched in the postwar world, nor 
about the more recent attempts at nuclear black- 
mail and power politics. 

Let us agree that a cold war — unlike a hot 
one — does not have a sharp beginning and a 
sharp end : It is better understood as a state of 
affairs — a world condition. 

T>et us also agree that the changes we just 
noted, fundamental as they are, are not events 

• For background, see iiid., Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-746. 

but trends. They may continue in the same di- 
rection; they may become stalled; they might 
even be reversed for reasons beyond our control. 
And if the present leaders of the Soviet Union 
have come to see that expansion by anned force 
is irrational in the nuclear age, the leaders of 
Communist China have gone to spectacular enda 
to make clear that they still live in the age of 
Stalin — with what dangers to all of us we can 
scarcely discern. 

WHiile we're at it, let me point out that it takes 
two to make a detente. We on cur side may be 
encumbered by some myths but not by meta- 
physical dialectics. We may suffer from tired 
cliches but not from fixed dogma. We may 
conform to conventional wisdom, but we are 
not bound to secular scriptures. I mention this 
not to score propaganda points but to suggest 
that if we have trouble adapting to new 
realities, think of the difficulties of men who 
have been taught the "iron laws" of liistory 
and the "inevitability" of events which stub- 
bornly refuse to happen. 

No Shift Required in U.S. Aims 

So our task is twofold. 

On the one hand, let us by all means discard 
any obsolete labels — especially the black-and- 
white labels ; let us try to be sure that the spade 
we still call a spade has not rusted away while 
our eyes were avei'ted. On the other hand — 
and at the same time — let us be sure to get a 
firm grip on our sense of direction in the world 
that is changing about us. 

Let me say here and now that there has been 
a clear sense of positive direction at the base of 
our policies. 

We recall that United States support helped 
Turkey stand up to Stalin's threats — and tend to 
forget that the main function of that aid was to 
help build up a Turkish economy overtaxed by 
its own defense requirements. 

We recall that our aid helped the beleaguered 
Greeks to put down a Communist insurrec- 
tion — and tend to forget that most of that aid 
was economic. 

We recall that the Marshall Plan made it 
possible for Europe to rearm and help build up 
NATO — and tend to forget that its purpose 
was directed "not against any country or doc- 

APRIL 20, 1964 


trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos." ' 

And so it goes, for the Point 4 program and 
all the rest. The positive, constructive, pro- 
gressive, and hopeful dri\ang force of our post- 
war foreign policy has been obscured by the 
confrontation of military alliances, by the anns 
race, and by recurrent crises. 

Our consistent and forthcoming contribu- 
tions to the work of the whole United Nations 
family of agencies, which seek to build better 
lives for the undernourished two-thirds of 
himianity, has been overveiled by political 
wrangling in the Security Coimcil. 

Our steady encouragement of the growth of 
regional organizations and institutions for eco- 
nomic and social and technical progress has 
been half-hidden because we also were con- 
cerned with the physical security of the same 

Now we have reason to hope that with the 
test ban treaty, the resolution banning weapons 
of mass destruction in outer space, the installa- 
tion of the "hot line" between Moscow and 
Washington, the first halting steps toward 
U.S.-Soviet cooperation in exploring the uni- 
verse, and, above all, the hardening conviction 
about a mutual interest in survival — we have 
reason to hope, as I say, that the end of the cold 
war, in the particular form in which we have 
known it, may now be possible. Other rival- 
ries may take its place in time, rivalries that 
will require a revision of tactics. But between 
the two thermonuclear powers we have reason 
to hope that additional areas of common inter- 
est can be identified and further agreements 
reached — until this particular cold war fades 
into history. One of the imperatives of our 
foreign policy is to hasten that day. 

But my point here is this : To adjust to a world 
of lesser tensions from different directions does 
not require the painful discovery of shiny new 
policies, nor a sharp shift in our aims, nor a re- 
examination of our motives. Our policies will, 
as they have in the past, seek : 

— to help build up the capacity of the United 
Nations to effect peaceful resolution of con- 
flict and change ; 

' For remarks by Secretary Marshall on June 5, 
1947, see ibiii., June 15, 1947, p. 1159. 

— to similarly support the growing capacity M 
of regional organizations to handle their own ■ 
family problems and move toward unity in the 
economic, social, and technical spheres ; 

— to step up the flow of resources and tech- 
nology from the industrialized to the newly de- 
veloping countries ; 

— to offer cooperation in such exciting new 
ventures as creating a "World Weather Watch, a 
global system of satellite communications, the 
exploration of the imiverse, and in a thousand 
less spectacular jobs; 

— to keep everlastingly at the search for the 
next safe steps toward arms control and dis- 
armament ; 

— to insure the defensive strength of free 
and peaceful societies while the quest for peace 
continues ; 

— to hammer away at the manifold and some- 
times tedious task of creating a world — in Presi- 
dent Kennedy's phrase — that is "safe for di- , 
versity" because it rests on consent and not ^ 

Certainly we shall have to be adaptive and 
flexible, and even imaginative and inventive, as 
we pursue these ends. But there is nothing new 
in the ends. They are the ends we have pursued 
for better than a decade and a half. They are 
good ends, and no degree of complexity — no 
evolution in world affairs — should be allowed to 
obscure them or to divert us from their pursuit. 
But to take full advantage of the real muta- 
tions in power and influence will require us to be 
even clearer in our heads and even faster on our 
feet than we have been so far. 

As realists we must see the world as it is, 
not as we might like it to be. And what do we 
see ? We see the world as a neighborhood — in- 
terdependent in space, interdependent in com- 
munications, interdependent in economic life, 
and overshadowed by a fantastic Wagnerian 
possibility of instantaneous annihilation. We 
cannot conceal these fundamental facts. We 
dare not behave as though they did not exist. 
This is the reality science and technology have 
thrust upon us. 

And when we look back and ask ourselves, 
how have we hitherto dealt with the realities of 
our century? the answer is, I must confess, a 
little cheerless. Through two world wars and 



a ciitaclysiuic economic (lo{)ix>ssion, wo, the self- 
styled realists, produced a I'ecord of disaster. 
"WHiile every day tlie facts of interdependence 
were drawing our nations into closer and more 
vulnerable i)roximitj', we marched with a sover- 
eign illusion of state power boldly into shatter- 
ing catastrophe. 

I often think no war had been as tragic as that 
of 1939, for, in retrospect, it seems almost a 
precise, sleepwalking repetition of the war of 
1914 — the same actors, the same pressures, the 
same causes and provocations. And all this 
for the reason that in 1919 the victors left intact 
virtually all the causes of violent nationalism 
and irresfwusible sovereignty that had sparked 
the first conflict. America withdrew into an im- 
possible isolationism. The League, the ancestor 
of the U.N., was crippled at its birth. The con- 
cert of Europe broke down. The old, uneasy, 
unstable balance of power returned. 

Even so, the powers might perhaps have 
evaded the final tragedy if Europe and America 
had not also been compelled to act out on the 
economic stage the full consequences of sep- 
arate, isolated nationalism. 

But this is not the place to go into the multiple 
causes of the Great Depression, out of which 
sprang so many of the evils of Hitlerism, the 
demoralization of Europe, and the inevitable 
drift to war. 

Nature of Leadership in the Postwar World 

I make no apology for this brief excursion 
into our not-very-distant history, for, as George 
Santayana remarked : "Those who will not learn 
from history are destined to repeat it." And be- 
lieve me, the world cannot afford to repeat its 
history from 1914 to 1945. In the nuclear age 
total, unabridged national sovereignty, operat- 
ing blindly in the new era of growing inter- 
dependence, can produce the final lethal catas- 
trophe. If there is any realism in politics, any 
realism in economics, it must be to insure that 
such follies, such excesses, such disasters never 

Is this too big an order? Must men always 
behave in their individual interest in such a way 
that their collective interests invariably suffer? 
Of course not. And that brings me to some 
concluding words about the anatomy of world 

leadership. For the nature of leadership in a 
world safe for diversity— there's a subject on 
which some careful and perhaps painful re- 
thinking will be needed in the years ahead, and 
not only here at home. 

We have heard a great deal about leadership 
in the postwar world — leadership of the two 
contending blocs engaged in a struggle described 
as cold war. It is a simple statement of histori- 
cal fact to say that for a number of years one 
side was led unquestionably by the Soviet Union 
and the other side was led unquestionably by the 
United States of America. 

There was a fundamental difference in the 
character of the two leaderships : One was im- 
posed by the leader and his Red Army ; the other 
was imposed upon us by our resources and our 
capacity to act in a war-torn world. We have 
no apologies to make about our acceptance and 
performance of that role; indeed, we can be 
deeply proud of both. 

But the days of unquestioned and unchal- 
lenged leadership are past. The fear of exter- 
nal threat, which is the cement of alliances, has 
subsided somewhat — and some of the followers 
have grown strong enough to strike out on their 

And again there is a fundamental difference 
in the change that has occurred on the two sides. 
Communist China has broken away violently 
from the leadership of the Soviet Union in a 
split of unprecedented bitterness. There is 
hardly a Communist party anywhere in the 
world which has not felt the divisive repercus- 
sions of that schism. Meanwhile, the other 
members of the old Soviet bloc twist and turn 
and maneuver to put a bit more daylight be- 
tween them and the old leader. That is just 
about the last thing that the Soviet leaders 
wanted to happen — and they have done their 
best to prevent it. 

On our side an old friend within the alliance 
now sometimes declines to see things the way we 
see them for reasons which sometimes seem 
quite obscure to us from where we sit. Other 
old friends occasionally disagree — as we do with 
them — though very often, when we talk things 
out, we find our way to common ground. 

But our differences, even when they persist, 
do not set us at each other's throats in alleys 
and villages aroimd the world. A basic pur- 

APRIL 20, 1964 


pose of our whole postwar policy has been to 
help Europe get back on its feet, stand up on its 
own, and look us in the eye as equals. If we 
sometimes do not like what they say when they 
look us in the eye, let us not forget that we know 
something the Communists don't know : Lasting 
unity can be attained only among nations that 
are not dominated by any member of the group. 
Lasting unity is created not by the overlordship 
of the strong but by leadership of the strong in 
a community in wliich every member is equal 
because he is free. 

As the world of the two great blocs and the 
unalined states is breaking into a pluralism of 
power and prestige, the most powerful nation 
in the world still camiot throw up its hands 
and resign from a job which it never sought 
anyway. Leadership always will be needed; 
leadership always will be welcomed — provided 
it is the right kind of leadership in the right 
places at the right time. 

Wliat is the right kind of leadership in a 
world in which the prevailing political passion 
is national independence? What is the right 
way to exercise national power in an age when 
the most powerful nations cannot use their most 
powerful weapons? 

There is diplomacy, of course. There is joint 
military planning with close allies. There is 
common trade policy and development policy. 
There is technical cooperation and the export of 
science. There is information and cultural ex- 
change. All these — and other tangible things — 
come to mind. 

But what I have in mind is something less 
tangible than the spending of money and the 
organizing of resources. Wliat I have in mind 
is leadership by attitude — and by example. 

A wise Asian said not long ago that, in our 
time, his people would expect Americans to 
make a great effort to understand them, without 
themselves making a. great effort to understand 
the Americans. It is not easy for Americans to 
get used to a world in which they have to try 
hard to understand the sentiments and feelings 
and prides and prejudices of others — and then 
find that those others continue to cherish un- 
fair, false, even outrageous opinions about the 
purposes and motives of the United States of 

Put it this way : A man who serves as a leader 
in his community has to accustom himself to 
the fact that individual citizens and special- 
interest groups will often berate him for his 
actions because they have not considered all 
the angles the leader must consider before he 
acts. Much of this criticism the leader will 
think unfair; j'et, while he never can give way 
to pressure merely because it comes from the 
weak, neither can he give way to the tempta- 
tion of responding in kind, of lashing out at his 
adversaries, of talking or acting as irrespon- 
sibly as his less powerful but noisier critics. 
He has to do what he thinks is best — consulting 
all the elements of the community, but consult- 
ing his own independent best judgment as well. 
His patience, his restraint, his self-control, his 
magnanimity, his compassion — in a word, his 
maturity — will be often and sorely tried. But 
this is the price of power. He either learns 
that simple lesson, or he stops trying to be a 
leader among his fellow men. 

So it is with the leadership of a nation, 
among its fellow nations in a world not yet safe 
for diversity. We are, quite simply, too strong 
to react in kind to every ugly street cry, every 
student placard, every irresponsible act. In 
this kind of world, wielding our kind of power, 
real touglmess is not bluster but maturity. If 
we want to know how to act in such a world, 
we could do worse than to reread Kipling's //. 

Alongside the mature attitudes of the power- 
ful leader, I would place the impact of example 
as an instrument of leadersliip in the world that 
is emerging. And this leads me directly to two 
issues before our society right now : civil rights 
and the war against poverty. 

There was a time when some people lamented 
the exposure of racial discrimination in this 
country only because Communist propagandists 
could use it against us around the world. This 
was a mean and shallow view, an unworthy way 
to relate civil rights to foreign policy. 

Then, when an aroused nation at last decided 
to do something definitive about equality for 
all our people, it was quite properl}' said that 
this was not being done to please a foreign audi- 
ence but to cleanse our own conscience, to make 
our own. society whole at last, to elevate the 
quality of our domestic life. 



And so it is. But civil riglits — tlio equality 
of and dignity of the individual human being — 
is a universal issue, whatever form it may take 
within domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, after 
peace and war, it is the ultimate issue in almost 
all societies, the gut issue of the modern world. 
It is, I suppose, one of the things that makes the 
modern world modem. 

So when we in this nation, tending our own 
business, make a reality of the bright promise of 
equal rights for all, when we break down the 
artificial and ignorant barriers that limit the 
lives of a minority race, when we put an end to 
intolerance and open our schools ami our neigh- 
borhoods and our hearts to fellow humans re- 
gardless of race or other distinction, we are, 
willy-nilly, exercising leadership in world af- 
fairs. We set an example for all to see — and in 
doing so we add immeasurably to the prestige 
and influence of our voice aroimd the world, 
whether that was intended or not. We add to 
our stature in all things because we have added 
to the quality of our own life. Those societies 
which fully enfranchise all their members are 
also the most productive and stable — bright evi- 
dence that justice and morality constitute the 
most enlightened form of self-interest. 

Much the same thing can be said about Presi- 
dent Johnson's war on poverty. When the rich- 
est nation on the face of the earth, when the so- 
ciety which has produced the highest standard 
of living in history, turns as a matter of na- 
tional priority to the needs of the underprivi- 
leged 20 percent, we likewise are indulging in 
world leadersliip. We are showing that no level 
of social accomplisliment satisfies the free hu- 
man spirit. 

And poverty in nations, as President Johnson 
pointed out last week, is like poverty in fami- 
lies. Our foreign aid program is not a matter 
of doles and handouts. Wliether the war on 
poverty is waged at home or abroad, the aim is 
the same : the creation of opportunity, the trans- 

fer of skills, and the investment of capital to 
help others to help themselves. Here again we 
are showing that it is up to the great and power- 
ful to lead the way. 

For in this new world of diversity that is 
shaping up, the true leader is not the one who 
gives orders but the one who shows the way. 

The true leader is not the one who embraces 
agreeable myths but who faces the facts even 
when they are ugly. 

The true leader is not the one who expects fol- 
lowers but who welcomes the company of all 
who wish to join him. 

The true leader is not one who insists that his 
way is the only way but who is ready to share 
his own experience for what it is worth to others. 

These, it seems to me, are some of the parts of 
the anatomy of leadership that will be needed 
in a world which, indeed, is changing rapidly 
but which is concerned to the last with building 
a good society. The nation which leads the way 
to the good society need never fear for its in- 
fluence in this world, for that nation will be set- 
ting the pace for all others. 

I believe the emerging world society in which 
we have to operate offers us possibilities for cre- 
ative improvement at home and for creative di- 
plomacy and initiative abroad. That world is 
more plastic, more open to influence, than ever 
before. Hence it is our duty and our oppor- 
tunity to work in this new society for the gi-eat 
purposes that have always lain at the roots of 
America's domestic experiment : for a world in 
which life is held secure against arbitrary vio- 
lence, in which the pursuit of happiness is not 
crippled by lack of education and the lack of 
skill, in which men can find the ultimate lib- 
erty — to seek truth as they see it and to express 
their infinite diversity, imified through brother- 
hood, not fear. 

And that, it seems to me, brings world affairs 
into everyone's front parlor and everyone's 

AFBH, 20, 1964 

727-107—64 3 


The Thirteenth Alarm 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs'^ 

Just a week ago the United Nations answered 
the peacekeeping firebell for the 13th time. 
This time the alarm came from a troubled 
island in the Mediterranean Sea: one island 
with two warring ethnic commimities. As a 
result, two of our friends and NATO allies 
found themselves locked in an ever-tightening 
spiral of tension — closer to serious armed con- 
flict than most Americans would believe. 

Even before the fighting began last Christ- 
mastime, the issues were touchy in the extreme. 
Cyprus got its independence as part of a com- 
plex treaty structure which left British, Greek, 
and Turkish troops on the island, and a consti- 
tution that required both Turk and Greek 
Cypriots to agree on acts of the independent 
government. Now the first task became to break 
the vicious and lengthening chain in which in- 
cident begat incident and violence spawned 
violence. The second was to work out an agreed 
solution that would go to the root of the trouble. 

Talks among North Atlantic allies produced 
no workable answer. A regional peace force 
linked to the U.N. was agreed in principle but 
not in practice. Meanwhile, arms flowed in and 
local fighting infected first one village and then 
another. The Communists, everywhere the 
scavengers of independence, began to work to 
turn the situation to their advantage. And a 
few thousand harassed, heroic British soldiers 
tried to keep the island from exploding again 
in communal strife. 

And so the Cyprus issue came to the United 

' Address made before the Midwest Model United 
Nations at St. Louis, Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 128 
dated Mar. 20). 

Nations — for peacekeeping and peacemaking 
is the U.N.'s major business. Once again the 
United Nations Security Council had to listen 
to acrid debate and then agree to call up volun- 
teers for an international bucket brigade. For 
in Cyprus, as in 12 other cases, Shakespeare's 
wisdom well applies : 

A little fire is quickly trodden out ; 

Whicli, being suffered, rivers cannot quench. 

Beginning with Greece in 1947, the U.N.'s 
record of on-the-spot peacekeeping operations 
rims through Palestine, Kaslmair, Indonesia, 
Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, 
West New Guinea, Yemen, and now Cyprus. 
Some of these once-ominous problems still per- 
sist, but none of them seriously endangers world 
peace or threatens to mvolve the great powers 
in catastropluc contest. The United Nations has 
succeeded in moving them away from the bat- 
tlefields and barricades into the chambers and 
corridors where peace is made by lengthy and 
tedious talk. Solutions may not follow quickly 
or easily, but the guns are checked outside the 
conference halls. And that is what counts when 
the issue is peace or war. 

Now that the world has lived through a 
baker's dozen of these traumatic near-wars, we 
have a right to ask what progress we are making 
in keeping the peace. And the real test of prog- 
resfs, of course, is not whether emergencies stop 
occurring — because in this higlily flammable 
world there are quite a few oily rags lying 
around and too many careless people with 

The real test is whether we are better able 



to cope with crises when they do occur than we 
were, say, a decade ago. Is the world profiting 
from its ticklish experience, or are the peace- 
makers still plaj'ing each crisis by ear — on the 
same primitive instruments? What does the 
record show ? 

Diversity of Solutions 

The record so far tells us at least five things 
worth telling: 

First, threats to the peace can, and do, break 
out almost anywhere. Over the past 17 years, 
peacekeeping operations have been undertaken 
by the U.N. four times in the Middle East, 
twice in Southern Europe, twice in Southeast 
Asia, and once in the Far East, the Western 
Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and now in the 
Mediterranean. And while action was in every 
case left to the Organization of American 
States, the Security Council has had on its 
docket 13 crises in the Western Hemisphere. As 
of tonight the Security Council still has 57 large 
and small disputes listed on its agenda — some 
of which have been settled long since and some 
of which are dangerous enough still to require 
a watching brief by the Council. 

Second, the record tells us that each of these 
disputes — being different — has required dif- 
ferent kinds of peacekeeping machinery. In 
the Korean operation, uniquely large and 
uniquely destructive of young lives, the United 
Nations defended a nation against outside Com- 
munist aggression. In the Congo a major mili- 
tary police force was attacked and had to 
defend itself. In the Middle East and in Kash- 
mir the need was for armed peacekeepers to 
patrol armistice lines. In other cases observa- 
tion teams, factfinders, and mediators have 
filled the bill. 

Wliat's more, the weaponry, the political 
sponsorship, the racial composition, and the fi- 
nancing arrangements have all been different — 
each tailored to the necessities of the case. 

In retrospect this diversity of solutions makes 
the original idea of a standing U.N. army look 
rather naive and simplistic. But there was no 
experience to go on when the founders of the 
U.N. were trying to figure out, on paper, how 
to organize for peace in an unpredictable 
postwar world. 

The Congo Experience 

Third, our experience in the U.N. demon- 
strates that an international police force, once 
on the ground, has a mission unlike most na- 
tional military missions — because it's much less 
national and often less military. 

Members of U.N. peacekeeping forces are 
soldiers from the military establishments of the 
nations contributing units. They are com- 
manded by professional militaiy officers. They 
wear uniforms and carry guns. They sleep in 
tents or barracks and eat military rations. 

But once they put on the blue beret or, if need 
be, the blue helmet, they find they are supposed 
to be soldiers without enemies, fighters without 
rancor, members of an armed force without a 
military objective — their mission not to start 
shooting but to stop it, not to win a battle but 
to see to it there is no battle to be won or lost. 

The implications that flow from this strange 
state of affairs for soldiers-tumed-peacemakers 
are large and fascinating — and were seen most 
clearly in the Congo experience. Having spent 
some time talking about these things with U.N. 
officers during the tough days of the Congo 
operation, I should like to dwell for a moment 
on what was learned there. 

In a remote section of the Congo I visited 
with a brigadier general from Malaysia, com- 
manding a Malayan U.N. brigade. In a real 
war, he said, he would be merely commanding 
a brigade, but with the U.N. force he had to 
command each platoon. His point was that the 
smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol 
can easily become a major political issue. In 
the jungles of Malaya the Commimists that had 
been shooting at these same soldiers were clearly 
the enemy — no doubt about it. "But here," said 
the bi'igadier, "if somebody shoots at our sol- 
diers, it is a political question whether they 
should even shoot back." 

The point was clear enough in the case of 
Indian troops manning a checkpoint who were 
attacked by a howling mob of several thousand 
women organized by seces.sionists under Moise 
Tshombe. The women kicked, spat, slapped, 
ripped shirts, and tore insignia from the stoic 
Gurkhas who had been ordered not to fight even 
in self-defense. As the mob began to tire of this 
one-sided fight, the Indians fired exactly nine 

APRIL 20, 1964 

rounds of ammunition over the heads of the 
crowd and advanced to disperse the mob, using 
only their batons. The Indian officer in charge 
told me that an army unit brought in to put 
down such an outbreak under what he called a 
"normal situation" could readily have caused 
dozens or scores of civilian deaths. 

One commander in the Congo told me that 
when opposing troops run from a police force, 
the "no enemy" principle may require the U.N. 
force to let them get away. But curiously 
enough, he did not think this is necessarily a 
military disadvantage: "If a man has to rim 
away from you," he said, "he will deliberately 
exaggerate the size and effectiveness of your 
force, in order to look better in the eyes of his 
own people." 

If the rank and file of a peacekeeping force 
has to make a difficult adjustment, so do the 
officers. The commander of a peace force often 
must go out ahead of his troojos. This used to 
be a standard operating practice back in the 
Middle Ages, when a cormnander would ride out 
to parley with the opposing commander, to see 
whether things could be settled without any- 
body getting hurt. In more modern warfare 
the commanding officer doesn't spend much time 
in no man's land. But in this sense, U.N. peace- 
keeping has brought the sensible Middle Ages 
up to date — for the object, once again, is to 

The brigadier commanding the Indian bri- 
gade in the Congo made a regular and successful 
practice of going out ahead of his troops and 
persuading hostile local forces to return stolen 
helicopters, retire gracefully from the field 
without battle, and even to give up cities. It is 
remarkable, this officer reported, how well this 
sort of thing works in situations where the other 
side is not quite sure of itself or its orders. "If 
you do something that looks deliberately stupid, 
it is sometimes so surprising to others that you 
get away with it." 

A final distinction between an international 
peace force and a conventional military one is 
that a peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped 
area is often drawn deeply into the civil life of 
the community. U.N. units in the Congo found 
themselves providing leadership, supplies, 
transportation, and other services to local gov- 
ernments and sometimes to private firms in an 

effort to help the economy get moving again. 
The U.N. force even had to develop a scale of 
charges by which businesses could be billed for 
hauling goods to market in U.N. military 

Soldiers vdthout enemies operating on behalf 
of the world community are a new kind of 
people doing a new kind of work. Their doc- 
trine, their mandate, their training manuals, are 
still first drafts — and not yet ready for final 

Let me return to the record of U.N. peace- 
keeping so far and what it tells us about this 
imprecedented, pragmatic, and fateful business. 

Further Record of U.N. Peacekeeping 

Fourth^ the record shows clearly that the 
United Nations peacekeeping machinery is not 
an alternative to regional organizations or to 
direct diplomacy. All three are essential — to 
be employed separately or in some combination 
depending upon the task at hand. 

Issues directly involving basic national in- 
terests of the major powers will be settled be- 
tween them or not at all. Regional disputes 
are handled preferably within the framework 
of regional organizations — like the Organiza- 
tion of American States and the Organization 
of African Unity— when they are up to the job. 
In others, the United Nations must play the 
leading role — and in all disputes the United 
Nations by the terms of its charter is the 
last resort, the peacemaker in reserve. 

The best example of combined use of nation- 
al, regional, and world facilities was the fateful 
crisis over Soviet installation of missile sites in 
Cuba. Our response to that effort to change 
the world's power balance brought into action — 
at one and the same time — national power, the 
OAS, and the United Nations. Each played 
a mutually supporting role in a textbook case of 
crisis diplomacy. The Cyprus case is another 
fascinating study in irony and paradox: Here 
the United Nations, by keeping the peace on the 
island, can prevent the southern flank of NATO 
from bursting into flames. 

Fifth, and finally, the record shows that the 
peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations 
has operated in the national interests of the 
United States, as well as in the interest of every 



other nation that cares about the peace of the 
world. And that sfwuld include every respon- 
sible government in the world, regardless of its 
political, social, or economic structure. 

For there is a nuclear seed lurking somewhere 
in almost any open conflict anywhere today. 
Even where major power interests do not ap- 
pear to be directly and immediately involved, 
there is the danger that organized fighting at 
any level, and with any kind of arms, could 
eventually engage the interests or prestige of 
major powers and drag us into a nuclear war 
that nobody wanted. As long as nuclear arms 
exist, the threat exists that an armed skirmish 
can wind up in a mushroom cloud. 

So what serves peace anywhere serves our 
interests everywhere. This is one all-important 
area where we share common interests with the 
Soviet Union. And there is some reason to hope 
that the Soviet leaders agree. 

Maybe that is why Chairman Khrushchev, in 
his New Year's Day message,^ put the case for 
settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful 
means, including recourse to the United Nations. 
We are still dubious whether concrete policies 
will follow this general declaration; but it is 
the task of our diplomacy to find out — and to 
keep on seeking agreement on how to back the 
doctrine with effective machinery for peaceful 

Reassessing U.N.'s Capacity To Act for Peace 

Thus, the record of the peacekeeping experi- 
ence of the United Nations to date shows : 

— that threats to the peace can and do arise 
almost anywhere; 

— that every peacekeeping operation is likely 
to require a different kind of peace force than 
has ever been needed before ; 

— that the conduct of peacekeeping forces 
must be drawn more from the police books than 
from the military manuals ; 

— that when crisis comes, national, regional, 
and world action are not mutually exclusive 
but mutually reinforcing; and 

— that the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace 
has a lot to do with our national interests and. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1964, p. Ii38. 

indeed, our pereonal chances of survival in the 
age of the ultimate weapons. 

But does that mean the peacekeeping ma- 
chinery of the United Nations is all that it 
should be — that it is up to such an awesome 
assignment? It does not, and it is not. 

We can take some comfort in the fact that the 
U.N.'s peacekeeping performance to date has 
been heartening in most instances and brilliant 
in some. 

We can all be grateful that the Secretary- 
General is able to assemble a force of a few thou- 
sand men for Cyprus ; though if the British had 
not been holding the fort and had not then con- 
tributed half of the manpower, it would have 
been enormously difficult to mount the peace- 
keeping mission in Cyprus at all. 

We can be grateful, too, that the Canadians 
and the Nordic countries and Holland have 
agreed to earmark forces for future emergency 
duty with the United Nations. 

But there is something eerie about the spec- 
tacle of the United Nations having to plead and 
scrounge and cajole to help tack together a mini- 
mal peacekeeping force in the nick of time. 
There is something nightmarish about the 
notion that in a world which spends some $120 
billion a year in the name of defense and keeps 
some 20 million men under arms, peace could 
hang on tlie overnight availability of a few 
thousand men and a few million dollars. 

In short, the performance of the world com- 
munity is not yet nearly good enough. There 
will need to be many more earmarked imits 
from every continent, from a variety of nations, 
large and small — contingents always on the 
alert for prompt assignment in an emergency — 
so that once a peacekeeping mission has been 
authorized, the right mix of forces can be put 
together, if need be, in a matter of days, not 

We are entitled to hope that U.N. members 
will search their souls, reexamine their atti- 
tudes, and reassess their own national interests 
to make sure that the United Nations never 
wants for men or money to act in the interests 
of peace. We are entitled to hope that acquies- 
cence will give way to enthusiasm, that re- 
luctance will give way to responsibility, that 
service with the United Nations will be seen not 

APRIL 20, 1964 


as a burden but as an honor worthy of some of 
each nation's best men with the best training 
and talent and experience. 

And I speak not only of soldiers called to 
service as -peacekeepers but of statesmen called 
to serve as Tpencemakers. I see no reason why 
the United Nations should not have available 
a distinguished mternational panel of peace- 
makers — and should not be able to reach into 
any public or private institution and command 
the finest talents in tlie world to sen^e as fact- 
finders or observers or mediators or arbitrators 
to disputes which tear at the fragile fabric of 
world peace. The very difficulty the Secretary- 
General has been having this week in locating 
a mediator for Cyprus on whom all concerned 
can agree illustrates the need for more of this 
kind of talent already at the service of the world 

Meanwhile, the prickly problem of financing 
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and 
the Congo has produced a situation in which the 
United Nations is deeply in debt, a large num- 
ber of nations are in arrears on their peacekeep- 
ing assessments, the Soviet Union and others 
are headed toward collision with the dictum laid 
down in article 19 of the charter which says that 
any member owing more than 2 years of assess- 
ments "shall have no vote in the General As- 
sembly," and a shattering constitutional crisis 
could be in the making. 

Apart from the difficulties of cleaning up the 
past, there is the very likely prospect that the 
United Nations will be called upon again and 
again to restore the peace, to keep the peace, and 
to build at last a dynamic system of world order 
which will permit peaceful change in a world 
which will endure the status quo only until some- 
thing blows up. 

Will the members of the United Nations have 
the wit and the will to pro\'ide the United Na- 
tions with enough resources to do the jobs it is 
likely to be asked to do? The returns are not 
in, and nobody can say for sure. But I think 
the U.N.'s members will endow the U.N. with 
the capacity to act for peace, simply because it's 
there and it's badly needed. Nations, like 
people, seldom do things that require decisions, 
especially expensive decisions, until the need for 
action is obvious and compelling. And most 
learning is by doing. 

Tlie margin between success and failure in 
getting a peacekeepmg mission on the island of 
Cyprus was all too narrow for comfort. But 
I suspect that this has been noticed by others as 
well. I suspect that the service of the United 
Nations ia response to 13 fire alarms and scores 
of other warning signals is being reassessed in 
more than one capital around this globe. And, 
bit by bit, I suspect the world community is be- 
ing drawn by events into an unspoken consen- 
sus : Now, in these perilous years of our days, we 
cannot afford to be without effective, reliable, 
and operational machinery for peace. 

Trade Benefits To Be Continued 
to Poland and Yugoslavia 


Press release 144 dated April 3 

By direction of the President, the Secretary 
of State on April 3 reported to the Congress, 
as i-equired by section 231(b) of the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962, as amended, that a de- 
termination has been made to continue the ex- 
tension of the benefits of trade agreement 
concessions made by the United States to prod- 
ucts of Poland and Yugoslavia. 


Mauch 26, 1964 

Memorandum foe 

The Secretary of State 

The Secretary of the Treasury 

Subject: Determination under Section 231(b) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, 
Permitting Continuation of Nondiscrimina- 
tory Trade Treatment for Poland and 

Pursuant to section 231(b) of the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962, as amended, I hereby deter- 
mine that extending the benefits of trade agree- 
ment concessions made by the United States to 
products, whether imported directly or indi- 

• 29 Fed. Reg. 4851. 



rectly, of tlie Polisli People's Republic and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both 
of which were receiving trade concessions on 
December 16, 1963, will be important to the na- 
tional interest and will promote the independ- 
ence of these two countries from domination or 
control by international communism. The 
reasons for this determuiation are contained in 
the attached statement. 

The Secretary of State is directed to report 
this determination and the reasons therefor to 
the Congress, as required by section 231(b) of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. 

The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to 
inform the Commissioner of Customs of this 

Lyndon B. Johnson 


Subject: Determination under Section 231(b) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, 
Permitting Continuation of Non-Discrimina- 
tory Trade Treatment for Poland and 

The principal objective of United States policy in 
Eastern Europe is to encourage peaceful efforts tovs-ard 
loosening of control from Moscow. Both Yugoslavia 
and Poland have demonstrated that they are prepared 
to undertake considerable risks to maintain and in- 
crease their independence. Trade with the free world, 
and in particular with the United States, is one of the 
basic ways in which these countries can resist Soviet 
control. Depriving them of the opportunity to trade 
on competitive terms with the United States would be 
a sure way to reverse the trend in Eastern Europe and 
to increase the power and influence of the Soviets in 
Eastern Europe. 

A. Yugoslavia 

Although Yugoslavia is a communist country, its 
determination to maintain its independence from 
Soviet bloc domination has been demonstrated over the 
past fifteen years. The Yugoslav Government has en- 
couraged a broad range of contacts between Yugo- 
slavia and the West and has made Yugoslavia acces- 
sible to people, ideas, and information coming from the 

Yugoslavia is not a member of the Warsaw Pact nor 
of the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic As- 
sistance (CEMA). On the other hand, Yugoslavia has 
long been associated with all of the major free world 
economic organizations, including the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, the OECD [Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development] and the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In 
addition, it has been seeking the opiwrtunity to discuss 
trade arrnngemeuts with the EEC [European Eco- 
nomic Community]. More than 707c of Yugoslavia's 
foreign trade is with the free world, and Yugoslavia 
has undertaken imiwrtant reforms in its foreign trade 
system to bring it more into line with Western 

Since lOIS, when Yugoslavia's refusal to submit to 
domination by the USSR cau.sed its expulsion from the 
Soviet Bloc, the United States has followed a jwlicy of 
supporting Yugoslavia's desire to make its way as an 
independent state. This policy has served the national 
interest of the United States in important ways. 
Yugoslavia's assertion of indei)endence greatly weak- 
ened the strategic threat of Soviet-controlled military 
power in I^astern Europe. Indeed, the final victory 
over communist guerrillas in Greece was made pos.sible 
by the closing of the Yugoslav border against them. 
Yugoslav self assertion began the destruction of the 
image of monolithic communist solidarity, and it 
showed that a country can successfully refuse to sub- 
mit to domination by the Soviet Union. 

These considerations are slill valid and remain Im- 
portant to United States national interest today. The 
significance of Yugoslavia's independence has not di- 
minished. As long as its exami)le exists, the pressures 
on other communist parties and governments to seek 
similar advantageous solutions based on the exercise 
of national independence will grow. 

The continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treat- 
ment of Yugoslavia by the United States is of funda- 
mental importance in supporting the independence of 
Yugoslavia. Such trade relations with the United 
States demonstrate to th-.> Yugoslav leadership and peo- 
ple, as well as to the other nations of Eastern Europe, 
that the United States will permit normal trading pos- 
sibilities to countries which assert their independence 
from domination by international communism. 

Nondiscriminatory trade is also essential to enable 
Yugoslavia to maintain its exports to the United States 
so that it can import from us and earn the dollars re- 
quired to meet its debt repayment obligations to the 
United States. Yugoslavia's payments on dollar re- 
payable obligations will be well over .$10 million in 
each of the next several years. 

The Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet 
bloc are now, once again, making a concentrated effort 
to improve economic and other relations with Yugo- 
slavia. United States failure to continue nondiscrimi- 
natory trade treatment would contribute to forcing 
Yugoslavia into greater dependence upon the Soviet- 
controlled communist countries and thus undermine 
our efforts to assist Yugoslavia to pursue an inde- 
pendent, unaligned policy. 

B. Poland 

Poland has not achieved the degree of independence 
from Moscow that Yugoslavia has. Nevertheless, since 
the events of 19156, Poland has attained a large measure 

APRIL 20, 1904 


of autonomy both in internal affairs and in foreign 

After 1956, Poland reversed its policy toward collec- 
tivization of agriculture. Today, 87% of the arable 
land of Poland is privately held. 

A far greater degree of freedom of speech has been 
permitted in Poland since 1956, and intellectual activ- 
ity remains stimulating and lively. Poland has dis- 
continued jamming broadcasts of the Voice of America 
and Radio Free Europe and has participated in certain 
USIA programs by which American books and period- 
icals have been made available to the people of Poland. 
Poland has also permitted relatively free emigration to 
the West and has regularly permitted Poles to come to 
the United States to visit. 

Finally, basic freedom of worship is possible in 
Poland today- Poland permits religious education for 
children as well as a Catholic university and semi- 
naries. A number of religious holy days are observed 
as national holidays. While religion remains anath- 
ema to the Communists, and the Gomulka regime 
has probed for ways of bringing the Church under 
some control, Catholicism in Poland remains a potent 
force and an obstacle to complete communist domi- 
nation. The regime, well aware that an all-out attack 
on the Church would prejudice its beneficial relation- 
ship with the West, must show restraint so long as 
there is anything to gain in Poland's relation with the 

The United States and Poland have made good 
progress in resolving outstanding financial and eco- 
nomic problems. Over the past seven years the voliime 
of trade has grown and there are good prospects for 
steady growth in the future. 

Nondiscriminatory treatment for Poland products 
permits that country to earn dollars with which it can 
buy American goods and meet its substantial financial 
obligations to the United States Government and to 
private American citizens. Poland's payments on these 
obligations have reached almost $11 million annually 
and will increase to over .$20 million in 1967. These 
debts include, among others, the obligations arising 
from the settlement of claims of United States nation- 
als whose properties were nationalized in Poland, and 
the obligations to repay in dollars for previous pur- 
chases of surplus agricultural commodities under PL 
480. Cutting ofC trade on the present nondiscrimina- 
tory basis would impair Poland's ability to meet these 

As a consequence of the Polish events of 1956. 
Secretary of State Dulles determined, for purposes of 
section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (PL 480), that 
Poland was not a nation dominated or controlled by 
the foreign government or foreign organization con- 
trolling the world communist movement. Since that 
determination the United States has kept the Polish 
situation under close and continuing scrutiny. In 
November 1961 Secretary of State Rusk reaflirmed the 
determination of 1956. This is still our judgment 


Continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treatment 
for the products of Yugoslavia and Poland is important 
to our national interest. The maintenance of com- 
mercial trade relations between the United States and 
these countries will further the objective of encourag- 
ing and promoting their independence from domina- 
tion or control by international communism. 

United States and Italy Discuss 
Air Relations 

Joint Communique ^ 

Delegations representing the Governments of 
the United States of America and of Italy met 
in Rome from March 9 to March 20, 1964, to 
consult on problems of mutual concern relating 
to air relations between the two countries and to 
interpretation of the Air Transport Services 
Agreement between the two countries. The 
United States Delegation was under the chair- 
manship of Mr. Allen Ferguson, Coordinator 
for International Aviation, Department of 
State, and the Italian Delegation was under the 
chairmanship of General Felice Santini, Direc- 
tor General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of 
Transport and Civil Aviation. 

The two Delegations confirmed their confi- 
dence in the development of air relations be- 
tween the United States and Italy and in the 
continued growth of air traffic between the two 
countries. To this end each Delegation noted 
the suggestions expressed by the other and each 
agreed to submit them to its respective Govern- 
ment for the purpose of reaching resolution at 
an early date. 

With respect to all-cargo services, the United 
States Delegation expressed its imderstanding 
that such services are governed by the Air 
Transport Agreement between the two coim- 
tries, and the Italian Delegation expressed its 
understanding that all-cargo services are not 
included in that Agreement. Both Delegations 
agreed that the question was one of fundamen- 
tal importance. Following the proposal of the 
United States Delegation, the Italian Delega- 
tion agreed to submit the question to arbitra- 

' Released at Rome on Mar. 23. 



tion, as provided in Article 12 of the Air Trans- 
port Agreement. The two Delegations agreed 
to an interim arrangement for prompt com- 
mencement of sclieduled all-cjxrgo jet services 
pending the outcome of tlie arbitration, to be 
operated through eight jet all-cargo services per 
week, of whicli up to four may bo operated by 
the designated airlines of the United States and 
up to four by the designated airline of Italy. 

The two Delegations expressed their appre- 
ciation of the usefulness of their full, free and 
friendly exchange of views on mattere of com- 
mon concern in the civil aviation field, and 
looked forward to a further meeting in the near 

Equal Employment Opportunity 

Remarks hy Secretary Rusk ^ 

Once again it is my pleasure to welcome you 
to the Department and to see a considerable 
nmnber of friends among you. A great many 
changes have taken place in the 2i/^ years since 
we last met in this room. A courageous Presi- 
dent has passed from our midst, and another 
President has taken the reins and is pushing 
ahead with our hopes and aspirations and estab- 
lished policies in the entire field of civil rights 
and fair employment. 

Abroad we have faced and continue to face 
the enemies of peace and freedom. At home 
we are closer to a civil rights bill than ever 
seemed possible even a year ago. And we hope 
that with the passage of this civil rights bill our 
Negro citizens will come closer to their full 
heritage guaranteed them vmder our Constitu- 
tion. I continue to say to my friends in the 
Congress that the most important single thing 
that they can do to assist us in foreign policy 
is to pass that civil rights bill that is now before 
them — although that is not the principal reason 
why that bill should be passed. 

You may recall that 2^2 years ago I said that 

' Made at a conference on equal employment oppor- 
tunity at the Department of State on Mar. 12 (press 
release 120 dated Mar. 16). For a report on the meet- 
ing, see press release 117 dated Mar. 16. 

the biggest single burden we carry on our backs 
in our foreign relations in the 1960's is this 
problem of discrimination here at home, and 
today I would have to say again that discrimi- 
nation at home is still our biggest burden. 

In July I appeared before the Senate Com- 
merce Committee - and had an opportunity to 
speak of the relationship of discrimination at 
home to our foreign policy. I said that "racial 
discrimination . . . has important effects on 
our foreign relations. . . . the United States is 
widely regarded as the home of democracy and 
the leader of the struggle for freedom, for hu- 
man rights, for human dignity. We are ex- 
pected to be the model — no higher compliment 
could be paid to us." 

In a way, the Department of State bears an 
even greater responsibility than any other 
agency of government to practice at home what 
it preaches to the world. We have been trying 
to live up to this responsibility. 

Let us take a look at the picture here in the 
Department. Wliat progress can we report to 
you over the past 2i/^ years? How have we 
carried out the recommendations you made to 
us on your last visit here ? 

You know, as well as I do, that you can do 
almost anything with statistics. For example, 
I could tell you that, since January 1961, there 
has been a 130-percent increase in the number 
of Negro Foreign Service officers. And there 
has been a 112 percent increase in Negro civil 
servants at the GS-9 to -18 level. Looking at 
percentages, we may look good, but the actual 
figures show a different correlation when they 
are put side by side against total employment 
in the Department. For example, in January 
1961, there were 20 Negro Foreign Service offi- 
cers. Today there are 50 against a total figure 
of some 3,800 Foreign Ser^dce officers, and about 
the same is true on the civil service side. In 
1961, there were 25 Negi-o officers, grades 9 to 
18. Today there are 58, but against a total 
figure of 1,750. 

One important indication is the increasing 
number of higher level positions being held by 
Negro officers. Two and one-half years ago 
when we met, there were two Negro ambas- 

' Bulletin of July 29, 1963, p. 154. 

APRIL 20, 1964 


sadors. We gained one, as you know, since then, 
and recently lost him to the United States In- 
formation Agency. I wish I could give you 
the names of the Negro ambassadors and other 
high-level Negroes who are being considered for 
appointment by President Johnson, but I can- 
not do so at this time. I also wish I could give 
you the names of some of those who were invited 
to serve but felt unable to do so. There are 
now two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, one 
Deputy Chief of Mission, a principal ofEcer in 
charge of a consulate, two lawyers (both of 
whom are women), two security officers, plus 
many more, but this will give you at least some 
idea of the progress in this area. 

But going back to comparative statistics, I 
can tell you that there are more Negro officers 
in higher pajdng positions in the Department 
of State than in any other agency of the govern- 
ment. But, quite frankly, that isn't itself good 
enough. There are now 10 Negro officers at the 
GS-16 level and above. Our closest competitor 
in this is our sister agency, the Agency for In- 
ternational Development. 

You will recall that I told you at our last 
meeting how important personal contact is, how 
important it is for a "circle of gossip" to pass 
along the names of candidates for the foreign 
affairs field. We still need this kind of help 
if we are to show greater intake at the middle 
and senior levels. 

We also have to keep in mind the timelag be- 
tween finding peoj^le who are able and willing 
to take jobs in the foreign affairs field — and I 
emphasize both able and wRling — and their ac- 
tual entrance on duty. Tlie selection, process- 
ing, and placement functions all take time, but 
I do believe we are well along in our campaign 
to increase the intake of top Negroes into the 
Department. It is relevant in this matter of 
timelag, for example, for you to laiow that 
every post in the Department of State is rated 
a sensitive post. This is because every impor- 
tant foreign office is a target for penetration by 
other governments. Now, the general average 
of sensitive posts around government is between 
5 and 10 percent. Here we are 100 percent. 
Now, that means that we have to have the 
fullest background investigation, and this 
means delays of several months sometimes be- 

tween our desire to appoint someone and their 
actual entry on duty, and that applies of course 
to all of our employees and not just to any one 
particular group. 

Now let us look at the intake at the entrant 
level into the Foreign Service. In the past 12 
months, three young Negro Foreign Service ca- 
reer officers have entered on duty. One of them 
is our second Negro woman in the Foreign Serv- 
ice. As our examining panels are in the field 
right now, we don't know yet how many Negro 
officers may enter the career corps this year as 
a result of the 1963 examination. We have 
been, as you know, trying to increase our re- 
cruitment, but we do have the problem of suc- 
cessful completion of the examination. 

One of our main problems has been that the 
number of Negroes seeking positions in the 
State Department by means of the Foreign 
Service entrance examination is relatively small. 
Out of 3,815 candidates who took the exam in 
1961, only 119 of these were Negroes. In 1962, 
110 Negroes took the exam out of almost 3,000 

I am concerned that many young Negroes 
with potential for outstanding Foreign Ser\nce 
careers, who might well welcome the chance to 
serve their countiy abroad, do not seek entrance 
to the State Department by means of this open, 
competitive examination. And one of the 
things that you could do that would be very 
helpful to us is to help us overcome the relative 
lack of attraction of the Foreign Service for 
able young Negroes. If equal opportimity is to 
mean fair representation at all levels of the 
Department, it is essential that more Negroes 
apply for positions in this way. 

As you know, we have great hopes for the 
success of the Foreign Affairs Scholars Pro- 
gram which is under way now with a grant of 
$600,000 from the Ford Foundation.' I see 
Dr. Vincent Browne here, and I know he plans 
to give you a full report on tlie progress he is 
making. But briefly I want to say that, out of 
this program, some 160 mmority group young- 
sters will be benefited by the experience of a 
summer internship in one of the foreign affairs 
agencies, and we hope that a high percentage 

' For background, see ihid., Oct. 28, 1963, p. 684. 



of the 100 receiving gi-aduate training will 
enter the foreign affairs agencies. We will not 
of course know the full effects of this program 
inunediately, but the Department, and the gov- 
ernment service, and the public, all stand to 
gain very substantially from it, and we would 
be very much interested in your comments on 
this program as it will be discussed during your 

Among tlie briefing materials given you is a 
report on progi-ess made on your reconmienda- 
tions of 21/^ yeai-s ago. Your cooperation has 
been splendid. We could not possibly have 
achieved these results without your help and 
your constant encouragement. I am sure you 
will all have some comments to make during 
the discussion on these recommendations. 

Now, what more should we be doing to bring 
about better representation ? We know we have 
not exhausted the talent available to us, but 
somehow we are not connecting with all of it. 
I hope j'ou are going to be able to help us today 
in this area. 

Let me say just a few words on equal employ- 
ment opportunity for another group that has 
been called a minority group, although they are 
very much the majority, and that is the women. 
As you know, President Johnson has directed 
that steps be taken in every department and 
agency to open doors for the appointment of 
women, especially to higher level positions. It 
is a source of satisfaction to us — though not 
complacency — that the State Department, in- 
cluding the Foreign Service, has the highest 
number of women in the top grades of any 
agency of our government. We are eager to 
increase the number of women Foreign Service 
officers and to that end are encouraging more 
women to take the Foreign Service entrance 
examination. We lose a good many of them, 
chiefly to men, but nevertheless we have some 
very distinguished members of the Foreign 
Service who are women and the opportunities 
there are very large. In the last 21^ years, of 
the 473 junior officers brought into the Foreign 
Service, 10 percent were women. It is my 
hope — although I am fearful of any numerical 
quotas for anyone — it is my hope that in the 
coming years the percentage of Negro and other 

minority group candidates who are appointed 
will be at least as good. 

In suminar}', I want j'ou to know how pleased 
we are to have you here in the Department once 
again. I hope you will be completely frank in 
your convei-sations today. And I want you to 
know that we welcome your comments and your 
criticisms and your suggestions. I am sorry 
that I can't spend the rest of the day with you. 
But this morning I must go to a requiem mass 
for the King of Greece. I know that Under 
Secretary Ball is going to speak at your lunch- 
eon today and that Mr. Crockett [William J. 
Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Admin- 
istration] will be with you during the course of 
the day. 

So we want to close by expressing apprecia- 
tion to you for the time you are giving us and 
to assure you that we have the liveliest and 
keenest interest in equal employment oppor- 
tunity in the Department of State, that we are 
constantly on the search for talent and that we 
know that talent can come from any quarter, 
that we have the most demanding jobs to offer 
that one can find, I suspect, anywhere in the 
world, that the stakes of success in our business 
are very high, and that there are great satisfac- 
tions in that service for young people who want 
to dedicate themselves to their country and de- 
rive some sense of contributing in the most 
fundamental way to the well-being of mankind 
and to the success and the prosperity of our 
own and other peoples. 

So thank you very much for coming, and I 
will be watching with the greatest of interest 
the results of your conversations and will cer- 
tainly take into the fullest possible account the 
suggestions and recommendations which you 
make in the course of your discussions. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Duty on Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany 
H.R. 9.311. H. Kept. 1278. March 24, 1964. 3 pp. 

Tax on Light Bulbs Imported In Sets. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 2855. H. Rept. 1291. March 24, 19fr4. 
3 pp. 

APRIL 20, 1964 


Foreign Policy Needs People — Including You 

Remarks iy William J. Crockett 

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration^ 

However perplexing the problems of foreign pol- 
icy, whatever our goals may be, whatever the party 
in power, our policy cannot succeed without Involv- 
ing the efforts of capable, dedicated people. 

It takes such people to put a policy into effect, 
to judge its success, to assess its weakness, to alert 
us to pitfalls ahead, to evaluate the intentions of 
our friends as well as our enemies, and to make 
recommendations as to what policy will best serve 
America. This kind of responsibility takes good 
people — trained people, courageous people, loyal 
people, people who hold the United States interest 
above all else. 

The men and women who serve you around the 
world in your Foreign Service Corps are among 
the best in the world. They are representative of 
our country — geographically, socially, culturally, 
educationally, ethnically, and economically. 

We strive to attract to this service the best young 
men that our society produces. Our entrance stand- 
ards are tough — tough intellectually, tough phys- 
ically, and tough by moral standards. From more 
than 8,000 applicants this year we shall finally take 
less than 200 into the service of your country. We 
are selective. 

We want people who can speak languages, who 
have the knack of getting along with other kinds of 
people, and who will represent America faithfully — 
often in strange and even unfriendly lands, with 
risks to health and to life itself. We do not want 
security risks or persons disloyal to America. We 
have a rigorous security program designed to insure 
that your national interests are in safe hands. You 
are being well served — ably served, loyally served — 
by the finest and most dedicated corps of men and 
women ever assembled in one group. 

Finally there is you, the American citizen. How 
can you help with our foreign policy problems? 
What can one man or one community do? 

We are a government "of the people, by the 
people, for the people." This means that all de- 
cisions ultimately must pass the test of public ac- 
ceptance. You elect a House of Representatives 
and one-third of the Senate every 2 years, and a 
President every 4. Exercise your responsibilities 
as citizens. Be well informed — accurately in- 
formed — and then vote for the candidates of your 

' Made at the conclusion of an address before the 
1964 Greater Hastings Dinner at Hastings, Nebr., 
on Jan. 20. 

choice; but do it to serve one simple purpose — 
what is best for America ! 

Although the President and his executive branch 
are the initiators and negotiators of policy, they can 
go only so far as you will. 

There is an even more intimate involvement be- 
tween the individual citizen and foreign policy. It 
has been said that how we dispose of our affairs at 
home can decide elections, but how we dispose of 
our relations with the rest of the world can decide 
the survival of mankind. In a larger sense, how we 
as individual citizens dispose of our affairs at home 
will also decide how the world will dispose of its 
problems — including the survival of mankind. 

As we look about our great country with its beau- 
tiful cities, its wonderful highways, its productive 
farms, its mountains and forests and rivers, its edu- 
cational institutions, we can be justly proud. But if 
we look closer, we see widespread unemployment, 
young people dropping out of school before they have 
acquired the skills vpith which to earn a decent liv- 
ing, juvenile delinquency, and dismal slums. We see 
polluted streams and other natural resources ruined 
forever by our greed. We see a whole people — a 
people of a different color — who have been denied 
the fruits of the democracy and justice we proclaim 
so loudly. No, we don't believe in segregation, 
Each day we hear, or see in print, words of hatred 
and bigotry and half-truth that cast doubt upon the 
honesty, the loyalty, and the competence of those 
who represent us in positions of leadership. "The 
Congress is no good" — "the executive branch can't 
be trusted"— "the Supreme Court has betrayed us." 
So runs the evil theme. Ah yes, America has many 
unsolved problems ! 

What does all this have to do with foreign policy? 
Why do we have to insure the proper settling of 
these problems to insure the final victory over com- 
munism ? 

Because a strong America is the only kind that 
can survive and influence the affairs of the world. 
The world's judgment of America is as harsh as the 
judgment of your own conscience. Every American 
citizen must personally assume resiwnsibility for 
making America really what we proclaim it to be. 

Working on these problems, personally and as a 
part of the community, is what you can do for your 
country. It places you shoulder to shoulder with 
the men and women who are working for American 
Interests around the world. 




Calendar off International Confferences and Meetings > 

Adjourned During March 1964 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 20th Session . 

UN Economic Commission for Africa: 0th Session .... 

u!n. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia- 
tion: 13th Session. 

lA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Latin American Coor- 

GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session 

IAEA Board of Governors .•;.•:• ^ 

U N ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of 
Science and Technology to Development. 

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel 

International Coffee Council: Executive Board ...... 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 4th Session . 

U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 20th 

U.N." ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 4th 

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee of the 
Major Project on the E.xtension and Improvement of 
Primary Education in Latin America: 5th Session. 

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 5th Meeting . 

FAO Working Parties on Rice Production and Protection; 
on Rice Soils, Water, and Fertilizer Practices; and on 
Agricultural Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, 
Storage, and Processing. 

17th World Health Assembly , • ^' ' '• • 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Orgamza- 

U.N. Ad Hoc Tungsten Committee: Technical Worlsing 

UNESCO Conference on the Planning and Organization of 
Literacy Programs in Africa. ^ „ t i 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal 

OECD Pulp and Paper Committee: Statistical Working 

Party. _, ,. .. ■ 

Caribbean Organization: 4th Meeting of Standing Advisory 
Committee of the Caribbean Plan. 

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee . ••-,:,• • • • 

U N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles. . . 

Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 9th Meet- 
ing of Technical Advisory Council, and 3d Meetmg of 
Board of Directors. .■ c 

UNESCO Governmental Experts on the Preparation of a 
Draft Recommendation Concerning the International 
Standardization of Statistics Relating to Book and Period- 
ical Production. 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee ..... 

G4.TT Trade Negotiations Committee: Group on Cereals . . 

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of African 
Countries. ^ . . ,.., . , 

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: 16th Annual 


New York Feb. 17-Mar. 18 

Addis Ababa Feb. 19- Mar. 2 

Geneva Feb. 24- Mar. 4 

Alta Gracia, Argentina 

Feb. 24-Mar. 7 

Geneva Feb. 24-Mar. 20 

Vienna Feb. 25-Mar. 6 

New York Feb. 25-Mar. 6 

Paris Mar. 2 (1 day) 

London Mar. 2-5 

London Mar. 2-6 

Tehran Mar. 2-17 

New York Mar. 2-19 

Paris Mar. 3-6 

Brasilia Mar. 3-6 

Valparaiso Mar. 3-7 

Manila Mar. 3-14 

Geneva Mar. 3-21 

New York Mar. 9 (1 day) 

New York Mar. 9-10 

Abidjan Mar. 9-14 

Geneva Mar. 9-26 

Paris Mar. 16-17 

St. Thomas Mar. 16-18 

Paris Mar. 16-18 

Geneva Mar. 16-20 

Montevideo Mar. 16-22 

Paris Mar. 16-25 

Paris Mar. 17-19 

Geneva Mar. 17-20 

Abidjan Mar. 17-24 

San Diego Mar. 18-19 

■ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 2, 1964 FoUowing is a list of abbreviations: ECE, 
■ir„„„^min rnmmi^^inn for FuroDe- ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organi- 
luon GA?T Gen rS Agreema'it on Tar^s and Trade IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ; IA-ECO§0C, 
zaiion , vj.-i i i , yc c p a„„i„i r„„.,pil- TMCO. Intereovernmcntal Maritime Consultative Organization 

APEIL 20, 1964 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Adjourned During March 1964 — Continued 

OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Mar. 19-20 

OECD Committee for Agriculture: Working Party I (Agri- Paris Mar. 19-21 

cultural Policies). 

U.N. Ad Hoc Tungsten Committee New Yorls Mar. 23-25 

GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Geneva Mar. 23-25 


NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris Mar. 23-25 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV Paris Mar. 23-25 

(Expert Group). 
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 31st Session (and Ad Hoc Geneva Mar. 23-26 

Group of Experts on the Competitive Use of Steel). 
UNESCO Executive Committee for the Preservation of the Paris Mar. 23-27 

Nubian Monuments. 
FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and- Rome Mar. 24-26 

Mouth Disease: 11th Session. 
OECD Ad Hoc Committee on Social Sciences Paris Mar. 25 (1 day) 

In Session as of March 31, 1964 

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development . 

Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

Geneva Mar. 23, 1964- 

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing Countries 

Statement by Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Within the past few years the world has fo- 
cused great attention on the relations between 
wliat we have come to call the developed and the 
developing nations. There has been a wide ac- 
ceptance of the proposition that 20th-century 
concepts of humanity require that all the world's 
peoples have the oi^portunity to secure a decent 
standard of living. There has also been rec- 
ognition of the fact that, vmtil this goal is se- 
cured, the world will not attain the stability 
essential to the maintenance of peace. 

The tasks of development are familiar to all 
nations, no matter what may be their average 

^ Made before the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development at Geneva, Switzerland, on 
Mar. 25 (press release 133). For an announcement of 
the U.S. delegation to the Conference, which convened 
at Geneva on Mar. 23, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 
5.57; for an address by Assistant Secretary G. Griffith 
Johnson entitled "A Perspective on the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development," see ibid., Mar. 
16, 19C4, p. 410. 

levels of income. In the United States, for ex- 
ample, within this generation we have seen the 
development of a substantial part of our South, 
many of whose problems approximated those of 
the developing nations. And, as j'ou know. 
President Jolmson has launched a comprehen- 
sive program to push back the margins of 
poverty which still remain in the United States. 
But it is a major achievement of the postwar 
years that we have all come to accept the prob- 
lem of economic development as a matter of 
international interest and obligation. 

We have had many conferences to discuss 
separate aspects of this general subject. This 
Conference is, I think, unique. It is organized 
on a world scale, and it is addressed to the whole 
problem in its full dimensions. 

Tlie general frame of our discussions in the 
next few weeks must inevitably be the relations 
between the industrial and the developing coun- 
tries, but this Confei-ence should reduce those 



relations to practical terms. It should consider 
till of the means by which the developing coun- 
tries can obtain capital — and particularly for- 
eign exchange — necessaiy for develoi)mcnt, 
whether through the transfer of public resources 
in the form of foreign aid, through external 
private investment, through the enlargement of 
internal markets, or through the expansion of 
external trade. And all of these questions must 
be considered in the context of a world environ- 
ment that is compatible with our larger objec- 

In the careful and imaginative papers that 
have been drafted in preparation for this Con- 
ference, the problem facing the developing 
countries has been expressed in terms of a trade 
gap. I think none of us — least of all, our dis- 
tinguished Secretary General [Raiil Pre- 
bisch] — believes in a mechanistic approach to 
this question. I am sure he would agree with 
me that the trade gap should be regai'ded not so 
much as an arithmetical statement but as a fig- 
ure of speech broadly suggesting the scale and 
the challenge of the problem of development. 

I know he would agree also that there are no 
single or easy or even independent solutions to 
this problem. It is the responsibility of this 
Conference to consider all the feasible ways of 
expanding our efforts in all relevant fields. 

Of necessity, therefore, the Conference must 
grapple with a series of interdependent issues. 
It is altogether proper that the major focus for 
this Conference should be on the means for mak- 
ing trade a more effective instrument for de- 
velopment. But these possibilities cannot be 
considered in isolation. We must also explore 
the means of increasing and making more effec- 
tive use of the flow of foreign capital and teclini- 
cal assistance — both public and private; the 
economic merits of forming or expanding re- 
gional economic groupings; and generally the 
full range of internal policies that are critical 
to the mobilization and use of capital and that 
will necessarily shape the contribution that the 
external environment can make to development. 

Given the magnitude of the development 
problem, there is ample room for imagination 
and fresh ideas. At the same time, we must 
be wary of approaches that do not closely 
reflect the economic or political realities — ap- 

proaches that begin and end in discussion and 
tluis obscure the actions really needed for 

The representatives of my country are here 
to participate in the full and responsible dis- 
cussion of all the relevant problems, problem 
by problem and policy by policy. Since the 
end of World War II, we Americans have been 
greatly preoccupied with the task of creating 
better economic conditions in the world. This 
preoccupation has been nuvnifest in our trade 
policies, in our economic and technical assist- 
ance programs, in our Food for Pe<ace program, 
and in the Peace Corps. 

I am not here, however, to point out the 
merits of the policies my Government has fol- 
lowed. We have a great deal of business to do 
together in the weeks ahead, and I hope that 
we will all set aside the temptation to file self- 
serving briefs that consume the time of the 
Conference without advancing its objectives. 
Our problems lie ahead of us — not behind us. 

It is in this spirit that I wish to comment 
briefly on the broad questions before the Con- 
ference — not as separate issues but in terms of 
how they fit into the requirements for an effec- 
tive development strategy. 

Responsibilities of Industrial Countries 

I shall begin with the central assumption of 
this meeting — an assumption in which, I am 
sure, we all concur — that if the developing 
countries are to achieve self-sustaining growth, 
they must be able to earn a growing volume 
of foreign exchange in world markets. To do 
this, they must develop expanding markets for 
their raw materials at reasonably stable and 
equitable prices. They must also find gi-owing 
world outlets for the products of their nascent 
manufacturing industries. This will not hap- 
pen automatically. The expansion of trading 
opportunities involves difficult problems of 
policy and decision for both the industrial 
countries and the developing countries. 

Let me begin by reviewing the contributions 
that the industrial countries can make to the 
trade prospects of the developing countries and, 
at the same time, to the more effective use of 
world resources which expanding trade can 

APRIL 20, 1964 


President Pledges U.S. Cooperation 
in Task of Economic Improvement 

Message From Prcsiilent Johnson'^ 

White House press release dated March 25 

The great task of our time is to bring the fruits 
of economic well-being to all peoples in a \Yorlcl 
of peace and freedom. The nations of the world 
have gathered in Geneva for the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development to discuss 
together how to move ahead in accomplishing 
this task. On behalf of the people and Govern- 
ment of the United States of America, I hereby 
pledge our strongest cooperation in this great 
joint endeavor. 

' Read before the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development at Geneva on Mar. 25 by Under 
Secretary of State George W. Ball. 

First, and in my view most important, is the 
need for industrial countries to achieve and 
maintain full employment and a high rate of 
economic growth. These conditions will im- 
prove both demand and prices for the exports 
of the developing countries. For example, 
sustained economic recovery in the United 
States and Canada and continued high growth 
in Western Europe and Japan were largely 
responsible for the recent sharp turnaround in 
prices for industrial materials. They also con- 
tributed to a stronger market for some tropical 
products. This improvement in demand and 
prices, if sustained, will make a difference of 
at least $1 billion on an annual basis in the 
export earnings of the developing countries. 

Full employment in the industrial countries 
is also necessary to create a favorable climate 
for the structiiral readjustments that accom- 
pany trade liberalization. We must devise ways 
and means of cushioning sudden and sharp 
disruptions in the markets of importing coun- 
tries. On the basic issues, however, we in the 
industrial countries need more education in 
trade — both to deflate the mythology that still 
surrounds competition from the so-called low- 
wage countries and to produce a better under- 
standing of the large potential for gains from 
freer trade. Such education can best be con- 
ducted in an atmosphere of full employment. 

Second, the industrial countries as a group 
must be prepared to reduce tariffs and other 
barriers to the imports of primary products, 
semiprocessed materials, and manufactured 
goods of special interest to the developing 
countries. The industrial countries have done 
much in recent years to reduce these barriers. 
More can be achieved by deep, across-the-board 
tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round, and we are 
prepared to have these benefits accorded to the 
developing coimtries without asking reciprocity. 
Such tariff cuts can be of immediate help to the 
developing countries. But even more impor- 
tant, they can provide an environment that will 
make it possible for them to build productive 
export industries. It is at this point that the 
present Conference and the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Conference, 
which is to follow, so strongly complement each 

Third, the industrial countries should be pre- 
pared to cooperate, wherever and whenever 
feasible, in perfecting arrangements that would 
reduce instabilities associated with trade in 
commodities and thus enhance development. 

We have made some progress in cusliioning 
the effects of fluctuations in commodity prices 
through the new drawing rights in the Inter- 
national Monetaiy Fund. 

We also support efforts to stabilize prices of 
specific commodities in chronic oversupply at 
levels consistent both with market forces and 
development requirements. These problems can 
be usefully approached only on a commodity- 
by-commodity basis, and the arrangements we 
work out must be designed both to deal with the 
imderlying supply imbalances and to promote 
development. There is no grand design for the 
myriad of individual commodity situations and 
problems. We should frankly recognize that 
such agreements, important as they may be for 
some commodities, are feasible for only a small 

Principles of Nondiscriminatory Trade 

These lines of action all stem from the re- 
sponsibilities and obligations of a multilateral 
and nondiscriminatory trading system. We 
have worked throughout the postwar period to 
try to build such an open trading society in the 



conviction that it would jiromote a rational and 
iirective use of the world's resources, that it 
would benefit all participants in world trade, 
and that it would be most fully responsive to the 
constantly changing conditions of a djuiamic 
trading world. 

We still hold this conviction. We believe that 
the principle of nondiscrimination has great 
inherent values, that proposals to depart from 
that principle should be rigorously scrutinized, 
and that we should encourage such departures 
only where the case for doing so is strong and 
fully proven. 

During the period of preparation for this 
Conference, there has been considerable discus- 
sion of various forms of preferential tariff ar- 
rangements designed to benefit the developing 
nations. Proposals have also been put forward 
for the organization of regional or global mar- 
kets for the products of these countries. As I 
mentioned earlier, the United States believes 
that we should objectively examine any pro- 
posals that might contribute to development. 
But we must all be quite sure that proposals 
are defined with sufficient precision so that there 
is no misunderstanding as to their meaning. 
This is essential if their implications are to be 
fully comprehended and thoughtfully con- 

We must be sure also that such proposals will 
not create more problems than they solve. In 
other words, we must satisfy ourselves that they 
will produce significant economic benefits for at 
least some coimtries and that those benefits will 
outweigh the costs to all countries of depart- 
ing from the principles of nondiscriminatory 

With respect to preferential arrangements, 
for example, we must be clear whether a pro- 
posal is global or regional in character — 
whether it contemplates an application to all 
countries or only to specific countries or groups 
of countries. 

In the postwar world there have been two 
competing concepts as to how the industrial and 
developing countries might most usefully or- 
ganize their relations. In principle, my Gov- 
ernment has assumed that all industrial 
countries should accept a responsibility to ad- 
vance the economic well-being of all developing 

countries. But the view has also been ad- 
vanced — sometimes more by way of emphasis 
than as an assertion of discrete principle — that 
it would be better to organize these relationships 
on the basis of special responsibilities between 
individual industrial countries or groups of 
countries and individual developing countries 
or groups of countries. 

I do not think that we can fully resolve this 
major conceptual question in the coui-se of this 
Conference. But I do feel that, in discussing 
proposals for special trading relationships be- 
tween the industrial and developing countries, 
we must be quite clear whether they fall within 
one pattern or the other. Moreover, we should 
conduct our discussions during the coming 
weeks in full awareness that special trading ar- 
rangements have historically evolved in the con- 
text of special political relationships and that 
special responsibilities in the area of trade are 
likely to carry with them special responsibilities 
in the areas of politics and even of defense. 

I do not make these points to support either 
one approach or the other but rather to point 
out that serious departures from the principles 
of nondiscriminatorj^ trade — particularly in re- 
lation to trading arrangements between the in- 
dustrial and the developing countries — inevita- 
bly involve the question as to how key relations 
among nations should be organized. 

Improving Home Markets 

I have mentioned certain measures that in- 
dustrial countries can take to improve access to 
their markets and to expand their demand for 
imports from the developing countries. Simply 
stated, the more access, the more trade — and the 
United States strongly favors lower tariffs and 
greater market access. 

But tariffs have become less of a barrier to 
exports, and this will be true all the more after 
the Kennedy Round. To exploit the opportuni- 
ties that stem from greater market access for 
their manufactures, the developing countries 
must be able to compete not merely with other 
exporting countries but with the domestic in- 
dustries of the importuig countries. 

It is essential, therefore, for the developing 
countries to market their manufactures on a 
competitive basis. This, in turn, will often de- 

APRIL 20, 1964 


pend on their ability to develop mass national 
markets — or, where necessary, regional markets. 

It is in such markets that the economies of 
scale originate. This f imdamental point is well 
documented in the history of countries going 
through the process of development. Apart 
from a very few special cases, manufactures 
have been sold massively abroad only after they 
have been produced for an extensive market at 

Under these circumstances, we might all give 
more consideration and support to ways of ex- 
panding internal markets in the developing 
countries. In most cases this will require ac- 
tions in both the rural and urban areas and the 
use, in combination, of private and public capi- 
tal — domestic and foreign. 

In rural areas higher priority might well be 
accorded to raising agricultural productivity 
and modernizing systems of marketing. In 
urban areas more could be done to break away 
from the traditional and restrictive marketing 
patterns that characterize many of the narrowly 
based industries in the developing comitries and 
to aim at larger scale and lower cost production 
for the home market. 

These two lines of action could reinforce each 
other and result in a rise in productivity, a re- 
duction in costs, and an increase in demand. In 
these ways production for a large domestic mar- 
ket could help the developing countries produce 
and sell manufactured goods competitively on 
the world market. 

Economic Cooperation on Regional Basis 

Many coimtries, of course, are too small to 
provide domestic mass markets. The benefits 
of such a market may be achieved by economic 
cooperation on a regional basis. 

Unquestionably the postwar dismantling of 
colonial arrangements and the birth of 51 new 
countries has involved some serious economic 
costs. As our Secretary General has pointed 
out, nearly 100 of the nations represented at this 
Conference have populations of less than 15 
million. Of these, two-thirds have popula- 
tions of less than 5 million. 

The integration of national markets into 
regional markets offers possibilities for recoup- 
ing these economic costs — and much more. 

Manufacturing industries based on the larger 
internal needs of a regional market will reach a 
competitive position in international markets 
much earlier and much more effectively. 

The United States supports further efforts 
in this field. We favor changing the GATT 
rules to give developing countries more flexibil- 
ity to pursue various forms of economic inte- 
gration — partial or comprehensive. But the 
industrial countries should continue to be sub- 
ject to strict standards in this regard. 

This is, in other words, a case where special 
trade preferences among groups of developing 
countries could make a contribution to economic 
growth large enough to outweigh the costs of 
a departure from nondiscriminatory trading 

But let us have no illusions as to the under- 
lying requirement for real progress through 
integration. The economic advantages of such 
a course depend on the degi-ee to which competi- 
tive principles are permitted to guide the use 
and movement of labor, capital, and materials 
within an economic union or trading group. 
This requires that the participating nations put 
aside considerations of political prestige and 
advantage and that they commit themselves 
from the outset to a full line of action. Thus, 
each step forward will make it that much more 
difficult to reverse the entire process. 

Need for Private Foreign Investment 

Wlien we talk of a development gap, we are 
talking in large measure of the need of the 
developing countries to be able to draw on 
greater capital resources for investment. Part 
of these capital resources must be used to fi- 
nance the import of equipment and other mate- 
rials from abroad. All these cajjital resources 
are required to enable a nation to use its human 
and material resources more effectively and to 
gain access to the benefits of the constantly 
widening revolution in technology. 

Private foreign investment can itself provide 
a major source of such capital. In addition, it 
can stimulate the mobilization of domestic 
capital in the developing countries. Finally, 
it normally brings with it teclinological skills 
and a knowledge of foreign markets that can 



facilitate the efforts of developing countries 
to expand tlieir export industries. 

However, the data on the flow of private 
investment in recent years are vei-y disturbing. 
In 1956 the net flow of private capital from all 
member countries of the Development Assist- 
ance Conunittee to the developing countries 
amounted to $2.4 billion, or 43 percent of the 
total flow of foreign capital moving to those 
countries. By 1962 the contribution of private 
capital was still $2.4 billion, but it represented 
only 29 percent of the total capital flow. 

Over the past two or three decades standards 
of conduct in international business have under- 
gone drastic change for the better. Yet many 
developing countries are, I fear, still influenced 
by the cliches of the past. Would it not be use- 
ful to examine carefully the experience of coun- 
tries that have been attracting a flow of private 
foreign investment? "Would it not also be use- 
ful to study the new techniques, new attitudes, 
and new procedures that have arisen in this 
field in response to the conditions of this cen- 

In raising these questions I do not wish to be 
misunderstood. My countiy, while itself com- 
mitted to free enterprise, does not seek to dictate 
the form or shape of the economic systems of 
others. I recognize that there are internal po- 
litical and emotional pressures that may create 
opposition to the investment of external capital 
in many countries. I am well aware of differ- 
ences in conditions and outlook among the na- 
tions of the world that require diversity in 
business as well as in other forms of social orga- 
nization. I am aware also that even the facili- 
ties and organizational modes for providing 
such capital require adjustment to changing 
conditions. They have evolved in the past, and 
further evolution is in progress. 

But nations must make their choices of na- 
tional policy with full awareness of inescapable 
economic facts. Nations that elect to pursue 
policies that tend to eliminate the private sector 
or discriminate against outside investment 
should be aware that they are denying them- 
selves a source of capital that could otherwise 
greatly speed their ovm economic development. 

I suggest, therefore, that in the course of these 
proceedings we reexamine the possibilities of 

expanding the flow of external private invest- 
ment capital. 

Private capital admittedly cannot be more 
than one element in an interrelated approach to 
development. Yet, witli regard to this question 
as to so many others, the developing countries 
have it within their own hands to determine how 
fast they will move in achieving growth. Their 
attitudes and their laws and their procedures 
will, in most cases, determine whether the flow 
of external private capital and technology takes 
place. Experience gives us no limits on how far 
the process can carry. 

Role of Foreign Aid 

I turn finally to the question of foreign aid — 
bilateral and multilateral. Clearly this is 
neither the least important nor the residual ele- 
ment in the package. But economic assistance 
is made more — or less — effective by what hap- 
pens in the other fields we have discussed. 

My Government believes that foreign aid 
should assist developing countries with a sup- 
plemental source of capital. Tliis capital can 
contribute to development in the following spe- 
cific ways : 

First, as a supplemental source of long-term 
capital for certain projects that will not produce 
immediate returns but which are a necessary 
base for other projects and a stimulant to the 
development process as a whole; 

Second, as a source of capital to finance im- 
ports of materials and equipment that could 
otherwise become serious production bottlenecks 
in a situation of foreign exchange stringency ; 

Third, as a source of seed capital that can 
stimulate the mobilization and effective use of 
capital from internal sources. 

We believe, in short, that foreign aid will 
play an essential role if it exercises the catalytic 
effect it is designed to produce. This, in turn, 
will depend on cooperation between donor and 
recipient coimtries. 

We are looking forward to an extensive and 
frank discussion at the Conference of the re- 
quirements for aid and the functions aid can 
perform. At this point such a discussion could 
serve a healthy purpose. Almost without excep- 
tion the industrial countries now conrmiand the 
resources that enable them to participate in 

APRIL 20, 1964 


supplying foreign assistance. Yet more and 
more of the donor countries are becoming con- 
cerned over whether their eiforts are producing 
the results for which they had hoped. In al- 
locating capital assistance they sometimes find 
a shortage of what they consider to be soundly 
conceived projects. The developing countries, 
on the other hand, have now acquired the ex- 
perience to speak with some assurance on how 
they themselves can contribute to the process. 
A constructive exchange of views can resolve 
misunderstanding. It can lead to the time when 
industrial countries, in speaking of the need for 
self-help, and developing coimtries, in em- 
phasizing their requirements for foreign capi- 
tal, will not be talking at cross purposes. In 
fact, at the working level where development 
decisions are made from day to day, there is 
already a wider common basis of concepts, 
vocabulary, and experience than is generally 
understood. I believe this Conference can en- 
large these understandings among us. 

Collective Obligations and Responsibilities 

There are, it seems to me, a few general com- 
ments that we should bear in mind during our 

First, the economic growth of any nation is a 
mixture of interrelated elements. We can em- 
phasize one element or another at this Confer- 
ence, but it would be unwise for us to focus on 
any single element to the exclusion of the others. 

Second, economic development should not be 
studied simply in terms of aggregates. It is a 
phenomenon of individual coimtries. It is not 
the summation on a world basis of unrequited 
needs but the reflection of individual country 
programs, carefully drawn up, faithfully ex- 
ecuted, and reflecting a national purpose. 

Third, economic development is an intricate 
and difficult process. It has proved difficult 
for the industrial countries who have gone 
through it in the past, and it will be so for the 
newer countries that are going through it now. 
The developing countries of today, however, 
have the advantages of today's technology and 
of close international cooperation. These ad- 
vantages can accelerate the process of growth. 

These three propositions could, I think, set 
the tone for the Conference. After all, this is 

no adversary proceeding between the industrial 
and developing countries. The distinction be- 
tween the two groups is not a clear one, and the 
differences within the two groups are very large. 

We are here to solve problems we accept as 
common problems — not to debate. We are here 
to draw nations standing at different points 
along the historic paths of growth closer to- 
gether — not to divide them. 

The progress of the developing countries re- 
quires the cooperation of all, and it is futile to 
test proposals on the assumption that what one 
gains the other must necessarily lose. 

All of us — the industrial and developing 
countries — have unfilled aspirations at home. 
But we are also part of an interdependent world 
with collective obligations and responsibilities. 
We each have vested interests in the other's 

My comitry believes strongly in this kind of 
interdependence and in these kinds of vested 
interests. We have been, and continue to be, 
committed to help those who wish to help them- 
selves, and we undertake this commitment, as 
President Kennedy said in his inaugural ad- 
dress, for one reason only : "because it is right." ^ 

Advisers Named to Delegation 
to U.N. Trade Conference 

The Department of State announced on April 
2 (press release 141) the designation of the fol- 
lowing four public advisers to the U.S. delega- 
tion to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development : 

Nathaniel Goldfinger, director of the Department of 
Research, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C. 

Mrs. Claire Giannlni Hoffman, director of the Bank 
of America National Trust and Savings Associa- 
tion, San Francisco, Calif. 

Orin Lehman, board chairman, Colgreen Broadcast- 
ing Group, and executive director of the Eleanor 
Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, New York, N.Y. 

Bertrand Seidman, European economic representa- 
tive of the AFL-CIO, Paris. 

The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development opened at Geneva, Switzerland, 
March 23 and is scheduled to conclude on June 

"/ftW., Feb. 6,1961, p. 175. 



U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peaceful 
Nuclear Activities and for Bomber Destruction 

Following are statements made before the 
Conference of the 18-Natioti Committee on Dis- 
armament at Geneva by Adrian S. Fisher, Dep- 
uty Director of the UjS. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. 


At present only a few countries can produce 
nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all 
the world that their number not be increased. 

An increasingly large number of countries 
have peaceful nuclear programs. It is in the 
interest of all that their number continue to 

However, without effective safeguards, the 
materials and teclmology wliich are acquired 
for peacefid uses of nuclear energy may be di- 
verted to produce nuclear weapons. Unless ef- 
fective safeguards are applied, what started 
out as a use of the atom for peace may turn into 
the development of the atom for war. Should 
this happen, the benefits to mankind which we 
liope to obtain by the wide uses of nuclear en- 
ergy for peaceful purposes may be far over- 
shadowed by the dangers resulting from the 
increase in the nimiber of nations having the 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It is, 
therefore, of great importance that we create 
effective safeguards against this. To do so is 
not easy, but it is possible. 

It is in that light that I should like to discuss 
today two of the proposals contained in the fifth 
point of President Jolmson's message to this 

The fifth point of the President's message 
calls for an agreement : 

. . . that all transfers of nuclear materials for 
peaceful purposes take place under effective interna- 
tional safeguards. . . . 

It also calls upon the major nuclear powers to : 

. . . accept in an increasing number of their peace- 
ful nuclear activities the same inspection they recom- 
mend for other states. . . . 

I should like, first, to review the major in- 
ternational activities and policies of the United 
States in the field of atomic energy. Against 
that background, I shall then develop further 
those two proposals in the President's message 
for international safeguards. 

A series of agreements for cooperation pro- 
vides the basic framework within which the 
United States participates in peaceful nuclear 
activities with other countries and international 
organizations. These include agreements with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
with various regional organizations active in 
the field. They also include bilateral agree- 
ments for cooperation with some 35 countries. 

The nuclear materials which we have dis- 
tributed abroad under agreements for coopera- 
tion are valued at approximately $82.5 million. 
Eeactors and critical assemblies supplied by the 
United States are located in 24 countries. Each 
is subject to safeguards to insure against di- 
version of the materials or equipment to mili- 
tary uses. The system of safeguards applied 
bilaterally by the United States Government is 
administered by the United States Atomic En- 
ergy Commission. 

The United States has also given its strong 
support to the development of an effective sys- 
tem of international safeguards by the Inter- 

^For text, see Bctxetin of Feb. 10, 10C4, p. 224; 
for a statement made by William C. Foster on Jan. 31 
on President Johnson's proposal of a "verified freeze on 
the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear 
offensive and defensive vehicles," see i&irf.. Mar. 2. 1964, 
p. 350; for a statement made by Mr. Fo.ster on Feb. 6 
on the President's proposal to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons, see ihid.. Mar. 9, 1064, p. 376. 

APRIL 20, 1964 


national Atomic Enerofj' Agency. Tlie United 
States bilateral system is fully consistent with 
that IAEA system. 

In recent years the IAEA has made signifi- 
cant progress toward the development of a 
comprehensive system of international safe- 
guards. Agency safeguards for small reactors 
of less than 100,000 thermal kilowatts were 
adopted on 31 January 1961. Final action ex- 
tending the system to large reactors of 100,000 
thermal kilowatts or more was taken on 26 
February 1964. That final decision of the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA was unani- 
mous. In particular we welcome the coopera- 
tion of the Soviet Union in extending the 
Agency safeguards system. 

We hope that m the future the IAEA wiU 
extend further its system of safeguards to cover 
fuel fabrication and chemical reprocessing fa- 

It is the policy of the United States to trans- 
fer the administration of safeguards under its 
existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as 
rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this pol- 
icy, the United States and Japan, for instance, 
have recently transferred to the IAEA respon- 
sibility for administering safeguards under 
their existing agreement for cooperation. The 
United States is currently negotiating addition- 
al transfers with a number of its other bilateral 

Some 2 years ago, the IAEA was also in- 
vited by the United States to apply Agency 
safeguards to several of its own smaller re- 
search and power reactors. Three reactors in 
the United States are at present being inspected 
by the IAEA. Two are research reactors lo- 
cated at Brookhaven, New York ; the third is a 
45,500-thermal-kilowatt power reactor located 
in Ohio. The opening of these facilities to 
IAEA inspection has, we believe, been a step 
in developing the principle of safeguarding 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has also 
assisted the IAEA in gaining practical experi- 
ence in field-testing inspection tecliniques. 

The United States does not believe that the 
opening of these reactors to international in- 
spection is a derogation of its national sover- 
eignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. 
It involves recordkeeping, reporting, and in- 

spection — the same kind of controls as prudent 
management would naturally set up internally. 
For the purposes of a safeguard system, such 
controls must be checked and inspected by an 
external agency. 

For the necessai-y external check, we prefer 
international to bilateral safeguards. There is 
little reason for any country to doubt the ob- 
jectivity of inspections conducted by an inter- 
national inspectorate in which nationals of a 
variety of coimtries participate. 

I should now like to develop further the 
United States proposals regarding internation- 
al safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. 

First, the United States proposes that aU 
future transfers of nuclear materials for peace- 
ful purposes take place under effective interna- 
tional safeguards. We believe that this pro- 
posal could be implemented by appropriate 
agreements, which would grow out of this Con- 
ference, covering all such future transfers. 
Fissionable materials or raw materials or equip- 
ment essential to the production of fissionable 
materials would be covered. Suppliers would 
agree to transfer materials and equipment only 
under IAEA safeguards or similar arrange- 
ments. Recipients would agree to receive ma- 
terials or equipment only under such safe- 
guarded arrangements. Provisions relating to 
open teclinology and authorized visits by scien- 
tists for study and observation might also be 

We believe that the agreement regarding 
transfers should, in addition, provide for the 
extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an 
increasing number of the peaceful-use facilities 
of all states receiving assistance. 

Second, the United States proposes that the 
major nuclear powers accept in an increasing 
number of their own peaceful nuclear activities 
the same inspection as recommended for other 

As a first step in that direction, the United 
States has already accepted IAEA safeguards 
on certain of its peaceful-use facilities, as I 
have described previously. 

As a second step, the United States will in- 
vite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large 
power reactor in the United States. The 
Yankee power reactor at Kowe, Massachusetts, 



has been selected for this purpose. This pri- 
vately owned reactor, which is rated at a power 
level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the 
largest nuclear power reactors in operation in 
the United States. In 1963 it produced over 1 
billion electrical kilowatt hours. 

We are otFering the Yankee reactor for 
IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it 
will assist the IAEA further in developing and 
demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection 
tecliniques for large reactor facilities. Second, 
we intend it as an example to other nuclear 
powers. We hope that other states will join 
us in this step and invite the application of 
IAEA safeguards on some of their large civil 
reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in par- 
ticular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so. 

Progress toward development of an effective 
system of international safeguards for peaceful 
nuclear activities is an important objective in 
itself. Therefore the United States will invite 
IAEA inspection of the Yankee reactor 
whether or not other states reciprocate. But, 
as I have said, we urge the Soviet Union in 
particular to reciprocate. If it should do so, 
we could then discuss the possibility that we 
might both place additional peaceful atomic 
energy installations under IAEA safeguards. 

Some members of the Committee may wonder 
about the significance of these proposals as re- 
gards a slowing down of the arms race. Today 
I have talked about IAEA safeguards, not gen- 
eral and complete disarmament. I have talked 
of inspection of peaceful nuclear reactors in- 
stead of the destruction of armaments. Yet I 
believe that the proposals which the United 
States has put forward this morning could, if 
acted upon, produce one of the most significant 
developments of this Conference. 

In the future, atomic energy will become an 
increasingly important resource for fulfilling 
man's daily needs. As that happens, transfers 
of nuclear materials between states for peace- 
ful purposes will increase both in frequency and 
in size. Participation in atomic energy re- 
search and civil power programs will become 
more and more widespread. 

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to 
take the steps which will insure that these 
peaceful atomic energy activities are not di- 

verted to military purposes. It is essential to 
build up the international safeguards which 
will keep that from happening. 

If we do not, wo shall find that in extending 
the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful pur- 
poses we have not sown a field with choice seed 
which will ripen into a field of grain for the 
benefit of all mankind. We may find instead 
that we have sown the field with dragons' teeth 
and, when harvest comes, it will bristle with 
nuclear weapons. What the United States pro- 
poses are practical steps to keep that from hap- 


In our search for measures of common in- 
terest the United States has presented to this 
Conference a series of proposals which would 
in the first instance prevent the acceleration or 
extension of the arms race and would result 
eventually in a reversal of its course. Pro- 
posals such as those for a freeze of offensive and 
defensive strategic nuclear vehicles and a cutoff 
of the production of fissionable materials for 
use in nuclear weapons embody this approach. 

Today I should like to present to the Com- 
mittee a proposal for the physical destruction 
of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy 
are of real significance. They are bomber air- 
craft wliich can carry weapons of immense 
destructive capability. Agreement on and im- 
plementation of this measiu-e would present a 
graphic example of armament reduction to the 
entire world. 

The United States proposes destruction by the 
United States and the Soviet Union of an equal 
number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We pro- 
pose that tliis destruction be carried out at the 
rate of 20 per month on each side, the bombers 
to be taken from the operational inventory. We 
are prepared to continue destruction of these 
bombers at this rate for a period of 2 years. 
In addition, we are prepared to increase the 
total number destroyed by adding to the 
monthly quota an additional agreed number to 
be taken from bombers stored and preserved for 
emergency mobilization. 

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in 
which this destruction will be verified. The 
verification should be relatively simple. It 

APRIL 20, 1964 


should include no more than the observation 
of the destruction of the montlily quota of 
agreed bombers from each country at designated 

The B^7 bomber, which we are ready to de- 
stroy as our part of this agreement, is a truly 
formidable weapon. The B-47 is a six-engine 
jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles with- 
out refueling. With in-flight refueling, it is 
an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a 
multimegaton bomb load. AVe can gather some 
measure of the danger of our times by noting 
that the explosive yield from the bomb load of 
one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs 
dropped by all bombers in the Second World 

As long as such bombers remain in existence 
in the hands of the nuclear powers — whether ac- 
tually flying or stored so that they can easily 
be rendered flyable — they remain a substantial 
factor of military power. In the hands of non- 
nuclear powers — and used without nuclear 
weapons — these planes are no less a factor of 
military power. The B^7 is superior in many 
respects to any other bomber outside the forces 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. 

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. 
[Semyon K.] Tsarapkin, summed it up last 
Thursday when he said of bomber aircraft: 
"They still are a powerful means for attack." 

The United States and the Soviet Union are 
the possessors of the world's gi-eatest military 
arsenals. That is particularly true with regard 
to nuclear delivery vehicles. 

The B-47 and TU-16 bombers are logical 
armaments with which to start the process of 
physical destruction of arms. The United 
States and the Soviet Union possess roughly 
comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two 
types of aircraft have been assigned generally 
similar strategic roles. Thus, the balance in the 
overall force structure of the two sides would be 
maintained at the reduced levels resulting from 
their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping 
with the fifth principle in the Joint Statement 
of Agreed Principles : = that measures of this 
kind should be balanced so that no state or 
group of states should gain a military advan- 

' For text, see ihid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 

tage and that security should be insured equally 
for all. 

The verification required would be simple. It 
would not involve areas of great sensitivity. 

Some may argue that the destruction of B^7 
and TU-16 bombers makes no real difference 
because the United States plans to phase out the 
B^7. The United States does have plans to 
phase B-47's out of its battle-ready forces. I 
assume the Soviet Union also has phaseout 
plans for the TU-16. But the phasing out of 
aircraft does not mean destmction. Bombers 
in storage can be flying again in short order. 

Wliat the United States is now proposing is 
to negotiate a rate of destruction which, if im- 
mediately implemented, would be significantly 
faster than the recent destruction rate. More- 
over, phaseout plans are subject to reconsidera- 
tion in the light of changing international cir- 
cumstances. That has happened in the past; 
it could happen again. The United States is 
now proposing the actual physical destruction 
of an equal number of bombers on each side. 
Once actual physical destruction has been ac- 
complished, the aircraft can no longer be re- 
turned to operational status. 

I have already explained that the B^7 bomb- 
er is a truly fonnidable weapon. It makes a 
great deal of difference whether these bombers 
and the TU-16's are physically destroyed, as the 
United States proposes, or are retained in active 
forces, preserved for emergency mobilization, 
or transferred to third countries. 

TJie United States, in the proposal which we 
are discussing today, and the Soviet Union, in 
its proposal of 28 January, have both dealt with 
the destruction of bomber aircraft. We should, 
therefore, be able to follow the directions given 
us by the eighth principle of the Joint State- 
ment of Agreed Principles and work out the 
widest possible area of agreement between us 
at the earliest possible date. 

From the position which the Soviet Union has 
thus far put forward at this Conference we are 
not yet able to determine the extent and nature 
of the destruction of bombers it envisages; but 
that should be no obstacle to agreement on the 
United States proposal. Agreeuient on our pro- 
posal can be reached now, without involving us 
in the highly difficult issuer raised by an all-en- 
compassing plan. 



An agreement for the destruction of all bomb- 
er aircraft would raise a series of complex ques- 
tions. For cxam})lc, there is the question of the 
participating nations, not all of which might be 
able to agree to eliminate their bombers in the 
absence of altornat ive means of protecting them- 
selves. Again, there is the matter of coverage: 
What would constitute a bomber for the pur- 
poses of such an agreement? There are many 
types of aircraft, both civil and militiiry, which 
might be capable of carrying bombs, although 
we would not consider them as bombers and 
could not reasonably be expected to agree to 
their destruction. Perhaps the most serious 
question is the imbalance which would result 
from such a proposal. There are great differ- 
ences among nations in the size, mission, and 
strategic role of the bomber fleet of each, and 
consequently great differences in the effects 
which the elimination of all bombers would have 
on national security. 

The proposal of the United States makes it 
possible to get on promptly with the objective 
of the Soviet proposal — the physical destruc- 
tion of bombers — without having to deal with 
those vexatious problems. The aircraft we pro- 
pose to destroy would be included within any 
possible interpretation of the Soviet plan. 
Therefore the nations have everything to gain 
and nothing to lose by agreeing promptly to our 
proposal and by promptly putting the agree- 
ment into effect. 

The proposal to destroy an equal number of 
B-^7's and TU-16"s, if acted upon, could be of 
real significance to this Conference. 

First, it would provide a tangible reduction in 
one important category of the world's inventory 
of weapons. Tlie advantages of that can be 
seen in relation to such broad measures as a 
freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, where a re- 
duction in bombers would mean freezing at an 
even lower level than would otherwise be pos- 

Second, it would insure that the bombers de- 
stroyed covdd not be transferred to the arma- 
ment inventories of other nations. That would 
impose an important restraint on the prolifera- 
tion of highly sophisticated weapon systems. 
It would insure that the resources of other na- 
tions would not be diverted from the task of na- 

tional development to maintaining and operat- 
ing these costly weapons. 

To sunmiarize briefly what I have said, we 
propose that the United States and the Soviet 
Union agree to destroy an equal number of B^7 
and TU-16 bombers on a one-for-one basis, at 
an agreed rate, with simple verification. 

This proposal is only a step toward solving 
the problem of disarmament; but by taking it 
we can begin to reduce tlie destructive capabil- 
ity present in the world and lessen the dangers 
of its proliferation. We can take one more step 
toward reducing the nuclear threat which hangs 
over all mankind. 

For those reasons we should surely carry on 
with this proposal and do so right away. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed beloiv) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letters regarding the Somali-Ethiopian border dispute : 

Representative of Somalia to the President of the 
Security Council requesting that the Security 
Council be convened. S/5536. February 10, 1964. 
1 p. 

Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the 
Security Council, transmitting tests of messages 
sent on February 10 by Chairman Khrushchev to 
the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Prime Minister 
of Somalia. S/5538 and S/5539. February 13, 
1964. 3 pp. each. 

Representative of Somalia to the President of the 
Security Council, transmitting a cable dated Feb- 
ruary 13, 1964, from the Prime Minister of So- 
malia, superseding the request for conveniug of 
the Security Council pending action by the Orga- 
nization of African Unity. S/o542. February 14, 
1964. 2 pp. 

Representative of Somalia to the President of the 
Security Council, transmitting maps showing areas 
allegedly under Ethiopian attack. 8/55.57. Feb- 
ruary 20, 1964. 5 pp. 

Representative of Somalia to the President of the 
Security Council, transmitting the text of a reso- 
lution adopted on February 14, 1964, by the Ex- 
traordinary Session of the OAtJ Council of Minis- 
ters. S/5.'.58. February 20, 1964. 2 pp. 
Report by the Secretary-General on the organization 

and operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping 

Force in Cyprus. S/5593, March 12, 1964, 10 pp., 

and Add. 1, March 12, 1964, 1 p. 

APRIL 20, 19C4 



Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on temporary importation of pri- 
vate road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. 
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 
Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservation), Oc- 
tober 31, 1963. 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservations), 
October 31, 1963. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963 ; ' 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular 
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 
disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, March 
4, 1964. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien- 
tific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at 
Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force 
May 21, 1952." 

Extension to: Cook Islands (including Niue), Feb- 
ruary 28, 1964. 


International convention to facilitate the importation 
of commercial samples and advertising material. 
Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into 
force November 20, 1955; for the United States Oc- 
tober 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 
Accessio7i deposited: France, February 7, 1964. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 
relations concerning compulsory settlement of dis- 
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.' 
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Febru- 
ary 13, 1964. 


Constitution of tJie World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948 ; for the United States June 
21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Zanzibar, February 29, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 

Ratifications deposited: Uganda, April 2, 1964; Yugo- 
slavia, April 3, 1964. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 
1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force 
March 9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929. 
46 Stat 2183. 
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 12, 1964. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 
force October 21, 1950 ; for the United States Feb- 
ruary 2, 19.56. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, 
Accession deposited: Nepal, February 7, 19&4. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 21, 1953. Entered into force July 
7, 1954." 
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 12, 1964. 



Agreement relating to the winter maintenance of the 
Haines-Fairbanks pipeline. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ottawa March 6, 1964. Entered into force 
March 6, 1964. 

ivory Coast 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan 
March 10, 1964. Entered into force March 10, 1964. 


Agreement concerning United States defense areas In 
the Federation of The West Indies, with annexes, 
memorandum of understanding, agreed minute and 
exchanges of notes. Signed at Port of Spain Febru- 
ary 10, 1961. Entered into force February 10, 1961. 
TIAS 4734. 
Terminated with respect to Jamaica: March 19, 1964, 


Agreement for financing certain educational exchange 
progran>s. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid, 
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. 

Agreement providing for the financing of certain educa- 
tional exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 4120, 
4612) . Signed at Madrid October 16, 1958. 
Terminated: March 18, 1964 (superseded by agree- 
ment of March 18, 1964, supra). 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered Into force March 
2, 1964. 



INDEX Apt^il £0, J 964. Vol L, No. ie9S 

American Principles 

The Anatomy of World Leadership (Steven- 
son) 615 

Foreiiin Policy Needs People — Including Tou 

(Crockett) 632 

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News 
Conference of April 3 608 

Atomic Energ^r 

Secretary Husk's News Conference of April 3 . 608 

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peace- 
ful Nuclear Activities and for Bomber De- 
struction (Fisher) 641 

Aviation. United States and Italy Discuss Air 
Relations (joint communique) 628 


President Sends Good Wishes to New President 

of Brazil (text of message) 609 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 3 . 608 
Congo. TheThirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) . . 622 

Congress. Congressional Docimients Relating 
to Foreign Policy 631 

Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
April 3 608 

Cyprus. The Thirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) . 622 

Department and Foreign Service 

Equal Employment Opportunity (Rusk) . . . 629 

Foreign Policy Needs People — Including You 

(Crockett) 632 

Disarmament. U.S. Makes Proposals for Safe- 
guards for Peaceful Nuclear Activities and 
for Bomber Destruction (Fisher) .... 641 

Economic Affairs 

Advisers Named to Delegation to U.N. Trade 

Conference 640 

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing 

Countries (Ball) 634 

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of 

World Economic Improvement 636 

Trade Benefits To Be Continued to Poland and 

Yugoslavia 626 

Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 

of AprU 3 608 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 633 

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peace- 
ful Nuclear Activities and for Bomber De- 
struction (Fisher) 641 

Italy. United States and Italy Discuss Air Re- 
lations (joint communique) 628 

Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

April 3 608 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, a 

Growing Partnership (Johnson) 606 

Panama. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
April 3 608 

Poland. Trade Benefits To Be Continued to 
Poland and Yugoslavia 626 

Presidential Documents 

NATO, a Growing Partnership 606 

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of 

World Economic Improvement 636 

President Sends Good Wishes to New President 

of Brazil 609 

Trade Benefits To Be Contlnuetl to Poland and 

Yugoslavia 626 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Needs People — 

Including You (Crockett) 632 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 646 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
April 3 608 

United Nations 

Advisers Named to Delegation to U.N. Trade 
Conference 640 

The Anatomy of World Leadership (Steven- 
son) 615 

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing 
Countries (Ball) 634 

Current U.N. Documents 645 

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of 

World Economic Improvement 636 

TheThirteenth Alarm (Cleveland) 622 

Yugoslavia. Trade Benefits To Be Continued to 
Poland and Yugoslavia 626 

Xame Index 

Ball, George W 634 

Cleveland, Harlan 622 

Crockett, William J 632 

Fisher, Adrian S 641 

Johnson, President 606, 609, 626, 636 

Rusk, Secretary 608, 629 

Stevenson, Adlai E 615 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 30-April 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the Oflice 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to March 30 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 120 of 
March 16, 128 of March 20, and 133 of March 25. 

No. Date Subject 

*137 3/30 U.S. participation in international 

tl38 3/31 Williams: "New Patterns of Afri- 
can Trade." 

tl39 4/1 Schwartz : "Foreign and Domestic 
Implications of U.S. Immigration 

•140 4/1 Parking regulations for foreign dip- 

141 4/2 Public advisers named to delegation 

to U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development (rewrite). 

142 4/2 Stevenson : "The Anatomy of World 


143 4/3 Rusk : news conference of April 3. 

144 4/3 Continuation of trade concessions 

to Poland and Yugoslavia. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Buixetin. 



.^> I UN, D.C. 20402 







Third Anniversary of tiie Alliance for Progress 

This 12-page pamphlet is the text of an address by President Joluison at the Pan American Union 
on March 16, 1964, on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as Chairman of 
the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. 

President Jolinson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various 
areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success. 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 

PUBLICATION 7669 15 cents 

Please send me copies of Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Propreu 




"a CI? 







Vol L, No. 1296 

AprU 27, 1964 


Address by Secretary Rusk 650 


by Under Secretary Ball 667 


by Assistant Secretary Williams 664 

by Christian A. Herter 671 


hy Abba P. Schwartz 676 

For index see inside back cover 

The Atlantic Alliance 

Address hy Secretary Rush ^ 

Sixteen years ago last Friday, the Economic 
Cooperation Act, authorizing the Marshall 
Plan, became law. Fifteen years ago last Satur- 
day, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. 

You will recall the circumstances which led 
to these undertakings: the economic chaos in 
Europe resulting from the Second World War 
and the military threat resulting from Stalin's 
aggressive actions. 

Having learned from painful experience the 
price of failing to act together, and in good 
time, to curb aggression, the free nations of the 
North Atlantic decided to concert their re- 
sources and their policies for their common 
welfare and protection. Both of these 
great enterprises accomplished their primary 

The economic recovery of Europe has been 
achieved; present levels of productivity and 
prosperity are unprecedented in Europe's 

' Made before the Overseas Press Club of America at 
New Tork, N.X., on Apr. 7 (press release 148). 

The territorial integrity of every member of 
NATO has been preserved. And there has been 
no great war. 

The NATO nations contain half a billion 
people, with the great skills accumulated over 
a long history. Their total output has 
about doubled in 15 years and now exceeds 

The members of NATO, together with the 
other economically advanced countries of the 
free world, account for rouglily 60 percent of 
the world's total production. This is almost 
21/^ times the total production at the disposal of 
all the Commimist nations. The average per 
capita income of these free-world nations is four 
times that of the Communist world. 

Within this framework of security and pros- 
perity, free Europe has moved toward unity. 
The ancient quarrel between Germany and 
France, which cost their peoples and the world 
so much in blood and treasure, has been mended. 
Three European Communities have been built, 
and their executives are being merged this year. 
Thus, new concepts of integration and new in- 
stitutions have replaced the separate national 


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actions and loose and ephemeral alliances of 
the past. 

These are accomplisliments which are some- 
times so much taken for granted that their im- 
portance is underrated. Let's not forget where 
we stood 15 years ago, where we might well be 
today but for the Marshall Plan and NATO 
and the European Communities — or where we 
might be tomorrow should NATO relax its 
vigilance and the North Atlantic nations aban- 
don the principle of collective action in facing 
new tasks. 

As President Johnson said last Friday,- the 
North Atlantic alliance, "From the beginning 
. . . has aimed not simply at defense but . . . 
at the cooperative progress of all its members." 
Therefore, he said, we must "move onward to 
that closer partnership which is so plainly in 
our common interest." 

Tonight I should like to discuss some of the 
specific tasks to which we think the North At- 
lantic nations should address their eflForts. 

Security in a Changing Environment 

The first of these tasks is to maintain security 
in a changing environment. Dangerous issues 
between the Commxmist and free worlds remain 
unresolved. Although the Central European 
front remains quiet, massive Soviet ground and 
nuclear forces are still arrayed against Europe. 
In the absence of assured arrangements for the 
mutual reduction of arms, it would be foolhardy 
to dismantle the military strength of NATO. 
The task is rather to adapt that strength to a 
changing political and military environment. 
This means two things : 

First : While maintaining our efforts to deter 
or defeat deliberate attack with every needed 
weapon, we should continue also to increase 
NATO's capability to cope with lesser forms 
of conflict — effectively and without automatic 
escalation to the type of conflict no one can 
rationally seek. 

Second : There is a need to respond, in ways 
consistent with nonproliferation, to European 
desires for a responsible role in strategic nu- 
clear deterrence. 

Several hundred Soviet medium- and inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missiles are aimed at 

" Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 606. 

free Europe — many more missiles than are 
aimed at tiie United States. To cover some of 
these targets which threaten Europe, two suc- 
cessive NATO Supreme Commanders have pro- 
posed that MRBM's be deployed to the Euro- 
pean area. 

We believe that it makes more sense to put 
JklEBM's thus deployed to the European area 
at sea, instead of in heavily populated European 
areas. One way of deploying sea-based 
MRBM s would be under procedures involving 
national Allied manning and ownership of the 
missile and bilateral United States-Allied con- 
trol over the warhead's use. New nationally 
owned and manned strategic missile forces 
could, however, be divisive within the alliance 
and unsettling in terms of East-West relations. 

If Allied forces are to participate in MRBM 
deployment, but not under national manning 
and ownership, the only remaining possibility is 
mixed manning and ownership. 

These conclusions suggested the need for an 
imaginative breakthrough to a new pattern of 
ownership and control of medium-range nuclear 
weapons — a new pattern involving a greater de- 
gree of Allied integration than anything yet 

This is the origin of the so-called multilateral 
missile fleet — or MLF [multilateral force]. 
Eight nations are now discussing this concept 
in a working group at Paris, where substantial 
and encouraging progress has been made. 

The MLF will effectively discharge the task 
to which it is addressed. General [Lyman L.] 
Lemnitzer has said that its 200 well -protected 
MRBM's would be effective in covering some 
of the airfields and missiles threatening Europe. 
Indeed, its capabilities will be taken into full 
account in the development of future American 
forces, because we consider it a reliable compo- 
nent of overall NATO defense. 

The MLF plan also would permit nations in- 
terested in this specific problem to move ahead, 
without requiring the participation of nations 
which do not wish to take part. 

Furthermore, the plan follows the classic pat- 
tern of Atlantic partnership : The United States 
will be in the venture from the start, but the 
concept and structure of the force is such that 
Europe's role and influence can grow as more 




European countries join and as Europe moves 
toward unity. 

The MLF is, of course, not the end of the 
process of bringing our allies closer together in 
the field of nuclear defense. From this first 
step, much could flow. 

First, this truly integrated force will provide 
practical experience suggesting perhaps further 
applications — and even new ventures in Atlan- 
tic partnership. 

Second, this venture is bound to give the par- 
ticipants a deeper insight into the responsibility 
and the problems that go with strategic nuclear 
weapons. In so doing, it should make possible 
improved interallied consultation about the use 
of strategic forces, toward which a good start 
was made in the arrangements agreed to at 
Ottawa last year.^ And it should contribute 
to a common approach to the problems of 

Third, military integration may have impor- 
tant nonmilitary implications. Countries which 
join in owning, manning, and managing a major 
nuclear force are likely to find themselves drawn 
into increasingly intimate relations in a wide 
variety of ways. 

Finally, let me emphasize this : We do not see 
security for anybody in a world of proliferating 
national weapons systems. The detailed ar- 
rangements for the IVILF will include mutually 
agreed strong and enduring safeguards against 
any one nation's securing control of any of the 
MLF weapons. We believe that when the 
Soviet Government understands this, it will 
recognize that the MLF does not constitute a 
proliferation of national nuclear systems but, 
on the contrary, is an alternative to it. 

These are important reasons why support for 
the MI^F is the firm policy of President John- 
son's administration, as it was of two previous 
U.S. administrations. They are reasons why 
we expect to move ahead vigorously with other 
interested countries in its execution. As Pres- 
ident Johnson said at Brussels last November : * 

Tlie movement to Atlantic i)artnersliip makes this 

' For text of a communique adopted by the North At- 
lantic Council on May 24, 1963, see ibid., June 10, 1063, 
p. 805. 

' Ibid., Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852. 

possible. The movement to European unity makes this 
desirable — as a first step toward a greater European 
voice in nuclear matters. 

Political Consultation Within NATO 

We have never, however, considered the North 
Atlantic partnership as purely military — or as 
temporary or static. 

The great goal of our foreign policy is a 
world in which both peace and freedom are 
secure. We regard the nations of free Europe 
as senior partners in tliis vast effort. 

For various tasks, new patterns of collective 
action will be needed. 

In the political field we have increasmgly 
recognized the need for consultation about poli- 
cies both toward the Communist nations and in 
other areas. 

We continuously review together the changes 
that are occurring within the Communist 
world — the dispute between Peiping and 
Moscow, the trends toward more autonomy in 
Eastern Europe, the economic troubles of the 
Commvmist countries, the modest signs here and 
there of yearnings for more individual freedom. 
We must remain alert to opportunities for con- 
structive action growing out of these changes. 

We should not forget that the division of 
Germany is a continuing obstacle to permanent 
peace in Central Europe. A major task of our 
diplomacy should be to mitigate and eventually 
to eliminate this danger by moving toward Ger- 
man self-determination and unification. We 
believe that this can be done under terms which 
meet the legitimate security concerns of the 
Soviet Union and the smaller states of Eastern 

We must try unceasingly to abate the perils 
of the arms race. We hope that the Soviet 
Union will agree to various safeguards against 
war from miscalculation or accident. We 
should like to see real progress in reducing 
armaments. We hope that the Soviets will 
make that possible by modifying their opposi- 
tion to effective verification and inspection. 

The North Atlantic nations should also deal 
cooperatively and effectively with Communist 
aggression and subversive threats — in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa. I have in mind 



especially such countries as Laos and South 
Viet-Nani, which are tai'gets of aggression by 
Hanoi, with the support of the Chinese Com- 
munists; and Cuba, which is engaged in the 
export of arms, subversive agents, and guerrilla 
leadei-s to other Latin American nations. We 
believe that the North Atlantic nations should 
recognize a conunon interest in seeing that these 
aggressions are brought to an end. They should 
also contribute, where they can, to the settlement 
of disputes within the non-Communist world. 

I do not intend to lay out here a precise blue- 
print for improved political consultation within 
NATO. A great deal has been accomplislied in 
that direction in the last 3 years. But more can 
be done to the mutual benefit of all concerned. 
I would suggest a few broad guidelines, which 
we are trying increasingly to follow. 

Consultation should focus on specific prob- 
lems and should include the countries most inter- 
ested in joint action on these problems, while 
insuring that all the Atlantic allies are kept 
closely informed about concerted actions. 

Officials who bear responsibility for these 
problems in their own governments should be 
intimately involved. This expedites agi-eement 
and makes it possible for those who do agree to 
move ahead in concert. 

The means of fulfilling these principles will 
vary. Continuing discussions of Cuba in the 
North Atlantic Council, the latest involving 
Under Secretary Ball,^ have improved under- 
standing of the purj^ose and effectiveness of re- 
strictions on trade with Cuba. Consultation 
about Berlin and Germany in the "Washington 
quadripartite group [France, Federal Republic 
of Germany, U.K., U.S.] has resulted in agreed 
Western positions. It is not generally realized 
that the NATO permanent representatives con- 
tinually carry on consultations regarding a 
broad range of political subjects. These include 
not only problems within the NATO treaty area 
but outside as well. In the past year the United 
States has initiated consultation or exchange of 
information in NATO on approximately 30 
Lssues of significance. 

°Mr. Ball attended a meeting of the X.\T(1 Council 
at Paris on Mar. 27. 

In addition to the regular consideration of 
current political problems, geographic experts 
from the NATO countries meet in Paris twice 
a year to exchange views and prepare reports on 
the various areas of the world — such as Africa, 
the Middle East, and Far East. These reports 
are considered by the NATO ministers at their 
spring and winter meetings. The NATO Coun- 
cil also benefits from the periodic meetings of 
the Atlantic Political Advisory Group 
(APAG), NATO's long-range planning arm, 
whose members seek to anticipate problems or 
crises around the world. 

Tliere is particularly close consultation within 
NATO on disarmament issues and questions of 
European security. Approximately eveiy 2 
weeks, for example, a senior representative of 
one of the four Western Powers at the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference visits Paris to brief 
the NATO Permanent Council on developments 
in the disarmament talks. And before any 
major United States initiative in the disarma- 
ment field is put forward at Geneva, it is sub- 
jected to close consultation with our allies to 
insure that it does not adversely affect their 

Our political consultations are, of course, not 
confined to NATO. We have other allies and 
friends. We consult intimately with many 
other countries in all parts of the world about 
problems of common interest, including some 
of those which are discussed in NATO. And 
our NATO allies do the same. 

We intend to go forward pragmatically and 
flexibly in political consultation within NATO, 
adapting the procedure in each case to the end 
in view. And we sliall bear in mind, as we do, 
the possible need for evolution in these pro- 
cedures as Europe moves toward unity. As 
President Jolmson said at Brussels last year : 

If the European nations agree on how the voice of a 
uniting Europe should be heard more effectively in 
political consultations, we will consider their pro- 
posals sympathetically. 

But this is a matter in which we must wait 
for our European friends to come to a common 

We support European unity, but the future of 
Europe is for the free peoples of Europe to 



determine. We have been consistently unwill- 
ing to try to settle Europe's future in bilateral 
dealings with individual European govern- 
ments. For that reason, we have not been pre- 
pared to provide additional help to the develop- 
ment of national nuclear capabilities or to accept 
proposals for a directorate of a self-chosen few 
to manage the affairs of the West. These are 
not issues in bilateral relations with individual 
European countries. They are issues which af- 
fect the interests of, and must be settled by, the 
Atlantic allies together. But let no one mistake 
the free discussion of these issues which goes on 
within the alliance for disimity on the prime 
question of mutual defense ; the Cuban crisis of 
October 1962 demonstrated again how quickly 
NATO closes ranks in the face of an external 

Concerted Action Needed in Economic Field 

New tasks also confront us in the economic 
field. There are three main areas in which con- 
certed action is needed. 

First, there is trade. The acliievement of a 
truly integrated European Economic Com- 
munity has created large opportunities here. 

We cannot afford to lose sight of the basic 
goal of trade liberalization that motivates the 
Common Market and that led our Congress to 
enact the Trade Expansion Act. Liberaliza- 
tion must apply to both industrial and agricul- 
tural trade. The inherent difficulties in easing 
restrictions on trade can be overcome, and the 
Kennedy Round can succeed, only if the nego- 
tiations are approached on both sides of the 
Atlantic with statesmanship and mutual under- 
standing. It is essential that we keep in mind 
that the reductions in tariffs resulting from 
these negotiations will be to the mutual ad- 
vantage of all the participants and will serve 
to strengthen the foundation of the free world. 

At present in Geneva the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development is high- 
lighting the vast needs of the developing coun- 
tries for expanded export markets.^ These 
countries depend in part for their growth on 

° For a statement by Under Secretary Ball, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. G34. 

enlarging trade with Europe and the United 
States. The Kennedy Round negotiations, 
which will follow immediately upon this con- 
ference, should and will offer concrete and 
tangible progress toward this end. 

Joint economic action is also needed in the 
field of monetary and financial policy. For a 
considerable period after the war, when the 
United States and the United Kingdom dis- 
posed of almost all the West's international re- 
serve assets, full and multilateral consultation 
was not as essential as it is now. The large ac- 
cumulation of gold and foreign exchange assets 
on the Continent in the last several years has 
necessitated a more general pattern of Atlantic 

Such cooperation is well advanced in insuring 
orderly conditions in foreign exchange markets. 
Further steps are needed to ease the interna- 
tional flow of capital and to make sure that 
liquidity can expand as the volume of trade ex- 
pands. We must seek arrangements through 
which the Atlantic nations can work out their 
temporary balance-of-payments problems in an 
orderly fashion, without hampering the larger 
ends of Atlantic policy. The countries of the 
European Economic Community have special 
responsibilities, under the Treaty of Rome, for 
helping each other to this end. We are con- 
fident that progress toward both European and 
Atlantic cooperation will continue in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Finally, joint action is needed in aid to de- 
veloping countries. The time when it was fitting 
for the United States to provide the lion's share 
is past. It is essential that all the economically 
advanced countries act together to help the de- 
veloping countries expand their economies and 
improve their welfare. 

The members of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD, which include Japan, 
have increased materially the flow of resources 
to the developing countries. From 1958 to 1962 
the total flow of governmental aid from the 
DAC countries to the developing countries in- 
creased from $4,300,000,000 to $6,000,000,000. 
Aid from DAC countries other than the United 
States rose from $1,900,000,000 to $2,400,000,- 



000. Members of this Committee have also been 
seeking to improve consultation on important 
aid problems and to achieve better coordination 
of their individual aid programs. "We must ex- 
pect needs in this respect to grow, rather than 
to diminish. 

In each of these economic fields, therefore, 
closer concert is necessary — and is being sought 
with increasing effect. 

"The Time Is Now Ripe for Wider Tasks" 

My theme, as you have seen, is simply this : 

NATO is an alliance of free men determined 
to remain free, in full knowledge that peace and 
security are indivisible. 

It has performed the central task for which 
it was created. It remains essential for the pro- 
tection of its members and the security of the 
free world. The time is now ripe for wider 
tasks — in sharing responsibility for nuclear 
power; in concerting policies toward Commu- 
nist nations and the settlement of disputes with- 
in the free world ; and in cooperating more close- 
ly on worldwide problems of aid, trade, and 
monetary policy. 

These new tasks can be fulfilled only by de- 
veloping new forms of common action. 

We are moving ahead to do just this — joining 
with those nations which wish to cooperate, leav- 
ing the door open for others and for a larger 
European role as Europe moves toward unity. 

So let us proceed with quiet determination, 
avoiding both the drag of inertia and outmoded 
concepts and the seduction of sloganeering and 
apparent shortcuts, seizing the opportunities 
for more cohesive action with vigorous and open 
minds. In so doing we will demonstrate anew 
the vitality of the North Atlantic alliance in 
meeting the needs of the time. 

As far ahead as any of us can perceive, the 
preservation of the values and ideals of the West 
requires that the parties to this partnership 
work with increasing intimacy. 

As Carl Schurz reminds us : "Ideals are like 
stars; you will not succeed in touching them 
with your hands. But like the seafaring man on 
the desert of waters, you choose them as your 
guides, and following them you will reach your 

United States and Panama 
Reestablish Diplomatic Relations 


White Hoase press release dated April 3 

Your Excellencies, Members of the Congress : 
Today's agreement is both a beginning and a re- 
newal. It provides that we will reestablish 
diplomatic relations; we will immediately ap- 
point special ambassadors with sufficient powers 
to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of 
conflict between the two countries without limi- 
tations or preconditions of any kind. 

I have already talked to the distinguished 
President of Panama and informed him that 
the United States has selected the former dis- 
tinguished Secretary of the Treasury, a great 
law professor, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, to be 
our Ambassador to carry on these discussions. 

We will also send the regular Ambassador to 
Panama's name to the Senate as soon as we have 
received approval from the Panamanian Gov- 

We are thus embarking upon the solution of 
our problems without preconditions or limita- 
tions of any kind, believing that a lasting agree- 
ment depends upon the utmost freedom and the 
utmost flexibility of approach. We will now 
immediately renew relations, appoint special 
ambassadors, and begin a process which aims at 
a final resolution of our difficulties. 

Arrival at this agreement in the presence of 
understandable but intense emotions and con- 
victions is a tribute to our essential unity of 
interest. We share much history. We share a 
commitment to the liberty that we have achieved 
in the past and to the progress that we intend 
for the future. We can now proceed not only 
to solve today's difficulties but toward the in- 
creased welfare of all the people of the Americas 
under the Alliance for Progress. 

So, gentlemen, let us approach our search for 

' Made in the Cabinet Room at the White House fol- 
lowing a meeting of the National Security Council. 

' The Senate on Apr. 7 confirmed the nomination of 
Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


a solution with the openness and the generosity 
of those who seek only the strengthening of 
friendship. Let us meet as sovereign nations, 
as allies, and as equal partners in the inter- 
American system. 

Panama can be confident, as we are confident, 
that we each desire an agreement which pro- 
tects the interests and recognizes the needs of 
both our nations. 

I would also like on this occasion to especially 
and particularly thank the OAS for its very 
important role. This is further proof of the 
immatched effectiveness of the inter- American 
system. For decades disputes between the 
American nations have been settled at the con- 
ference table. This achievement in this hemi- 
sphere offers a hopeful model for all those who 
pursue peace in every continent. This is truly 
a great day for America, for Panama, for all the 
people of the Western Hemisphere, and for all 
freedom-loving people everywhere. 

We welcome you to the Wliite House. We 
thank you for having come. We greet espe- 
cially the ambassadors who are here and the 
members of the National Security Coimcil, who 
only a few moments ago approved this agree- 

Thank you very much. 


The Chairman of the General Committee of 
the Council of the Organization of American 
States acting provisionally as Organ of Con- 
sultation is pleased to announce that the duly 
authorized Representatives of the governments 
of the Republic of Panama and of the United 
States of America have agreed, on behalf of 
their governments, to a Joint Declaration which 
in the English and Spanish languages reads as 
follows : 

Joint Declaration 

In accordance with the friendly declarations of the 
Presidents of the United States of America and of the 
Republic of Panama of tiie 21st and 24th of March, 1964, 
respectively, annexed hereto," which are in agreement 
in a sincere desire to resolve favorably all the differ- 
ences between the two countries ; 

Meeting under the Chairmanship of the President of 
the Council and reeogiiizins the important cooperation 
offered by the Organization of American States through 

the Inter-American Peace Committee and the Delega- 
tion of the General Committee of the Organ of Consul- 
tation, the Representatives of both governments have 

1. To re-establish diplomatic relations. 

2. To designate without delay Special Ambassadors 
with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of 
the causes of conflict between the two countries, with- 
out limitations or preconditions of any kind. 

3. That therefore, the Ambassadors designated will 
begin immediately the necessary procedures with the 
objective of reaching a just and fair agreement which 
would be subject to the constitutional processes of each 

Washington, D.C., 
April 3, 1964 

Declaraci6n Conjunta 

De conformidad con las amistosas declaraciones de 
los Presidentes de los Estados Unidos de America y de 
la Republica de Panama del 21 y 24 de marzo de 1964, 
respectivamente, adjuntas a la presente, que coinciden 
en un sincero deseo de resolver favorablemente todas 
las diferencias de los dos paises : 

Reunidos bajo la Presidencia del senor Presidente del 
Consejo y luego de reconocer la vallosa cooperaci6n 
prestada por la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos 
a trav6s de la Comisi6n Interamericana de Paz y de 
la Delegaci6n de la Comision General del Organo de 
Consulta, los Representantes de ambos gobiernos ban 
acordado : 

1. Restablecer relaciones diplom&ticas. 

2. Designar sin demora Embajadores Especiales con 
poderes suficientes para procurar la pronta eliminaci6n 
de las causas de conflicto entre los dos paises, sin limita- 
ciones ni preeondiciones de ninguna clase. 

3. En eonsecuencia, los Embajadores designados ini- 
ciari'in de inmediato los procedimientos necesarios con 
el objeto de llegar a un convenio justo y equitativo que 
estaria sujeto a los procedimientos constitucionales de 
cada pais. 

Washington, D.C, 
3 de abril de 1964 

The Chairman of the General Committee of 
the Council of the Organization of American 
States acting provisionally as Organ of Con- 
sultation records that the parties agree that 
both texts are equally authentic and that the 
words "agreement" in the English version and 
"convenio" in the Spanish version cover all 
possible forms of international engagements. 



' Not printed here ; for text of President Johnson's 
statement of Mar. 21, see Bullbxin of Apr. 6, 19C4, p. 



The Open System in North-South Relations 

hy Under Secretary Ball * 

You have been addressing yourselves during 
this past week to the general theme of "National 
Security and the Aims of a Free Society." I 
understand that I am supposed to talk -with you 
on "Values and the Individual." While nor- 
mally I am very obedient to the terms of any 
mandate I may be given, I intend tonight to 
take some liberties. 

I am encouraged in this audacity by the free- 
dom you yourselves have been showing during 
the past week in challenging some of the fixed 
positions of American policy. I find this heart- 
ening. Those of us who spend our days and 
nights as active practitioners of foreign affairs 
are fully persuaded that there is no American 
policy that should be regarded as sacrosanct, no 
position or attitude that should not be con- 
stantly reviewed and scrutinized to make sure 
that it accords with the realities of the day. 

For the one unchallengeable fact about the 
time in which we live — this mid-20th century — 
is that it is a time of change, one of those fas- 
cinating periods in history when cataclysmic 
forces are at work giving a new shape and form 
to the world. 

During such a time, debate, skepticism, even 
iconoclasra are not only useful but essential. 
Yet, if they are to lead us to the right decisions, 
challenges to our existing policy must be based 
on a full recognition of the meaning of Amer- 
ica's strength and preeminence — and of the re- 
sponsibilities that go with it. Nothing could be 
more sterile or harmful than for this country 
to occupy itself with the invention of rational- 

izations to justify the abandonment of our re- 
sponsibilities. We are in the midstream of 
events. We cannot resign from history. 

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 

I emphasize this theme tonight because I have 
only recently returned from an extraordinary 
meeting that has given me a new sense of the 
reality of America's leadership and power. I 
refer to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, now imder way in 

That Conference can well be a landmark in 
the relations between the peoples and govern- 
ments of the rich industrial nations and the bil- 
lion individuals who live in what we have come 
to call the less developed comitries. 

The remarkable aspect of this Conference is 
not merely its size — 122 nations are represented 
and there are more than 2,000 delegates — nor its 
length — for it will continue for 3 months — but 
rather that it is a conference of, and for, the 
less developed countries. It is the leaders of 
those countries who have given the Conference 
its drive and impetus and provided its intellec- 
tual guidance. 

The Conference is pervaded by a sense of ur- 
gency, a sense of impatience. One can discern 
in the rhetoric of the representatives of the de- 
veloping countries the beginnings of a common 
and strident doctrine. As one delegate put it: 

In this conference we all should seek to advance the 
attainment of collective economic security under which 
developiiiK countries can fully exercise their rights 
to devplop. 

' Address made before the North Carolina University 
Symposium at Chapel Hill, N.C., on Apr. 9 (press re- 
lease 156). 

" For a statement made by Mr. Ball at Geneva on 
Mar. 25, see BuiximN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


And then he added : 

If, to this day, these rights have in fact been denied 
ns, it is due, to a large extent, to the actions and omis- 
sion of the developed countries. 

Structural Relations Between North and South 

"We have, of course, talked a great deal in the 
United States about the less developed coun- 
tries, the new nations that have been rather ro- 
mantically referred to as the Third World. But 
I fear that too often we have tended to discuss 
the problems of these nations in rather too nar- 
row terms. TVe have talked about foreign aid, 
or we have talked about commodity agree- 
ments. But we have not thought or talked 
enough about the great structural relationships 
that must be established between the handful 
of industrial nations located almost entirely in 
the Temperate Zone, in which 90 percent of the 
world's industrial development is concentrated, 
and that billion people who have in the last 20 
years made the fateful progress from coloni- 
alism to juridical independence. 

These structural relations cannot be ignored. 
After all, we must not overlook the fact that 
there is not one division in the world but two. 
There is the horizontal division between East 
and West which has been the constant preoccu- 
pation of our Western governments for the last 
20 years. There is also a vertical division be- 
tween the industrialized North and the impover- 
ished South. Lord Franks called attention to 
this division 5 years ago in referring to "the 
relationship of the industrialized nations of the 
North to the under-developed and developing 
countries that lie to the South of them, whether 
in Central or South America, in Africa or the 
Middle East, in South Asia or in the great island 
archipelagoes of the Pacific." 

In my remarks to you tonight I intend to talk 
about the nature of the relationships that must 
be established between the North and Souths 
and I refer to Lord Franks' definition rather 
than to the domestic one with which we are more 
familiar. I intend also to mention the problems 
that this poses for the United States as the one 
Western nation organized on a scale commensu- 
rate with world responsibilities. Finally, I shall 
touch briefly on the relevance of the North- 

South division to the division between the East 
and West. 

The Third World 

The billion people in the developing countries 
are a constant preoccupation of chancelleries 
and Foreign Offices. The shift in status of this 
vast population from colonial dependence to 
juridical independence has added a new dimen- 
sion to foreign policy — an additional element in 
an already complex and crowded equation. 

From the point of view of the United States, 
the creation of 48 new nations since the war has 
required a substantial reorganization of the 
whole apparatus of our foreign policy. Even as 
late as 20 years ago, the United States could do 
the bulk of its business around the world 
through embassies in a handful of industrial 
countries. But today we recognize 114 coun- 
tries and maintain 274 foreign posts. Our 
affairs with the billion newly independent 
people are no longer conducted indirectly 
through the Foreign Offices of Europe. Today 
we deal directly with the governments of the 
new states. 

These billion people and the new states they 
have created are by no means homogeneous. 
The Third World is marked by a wide diversity. 
The new states range all the way from loosely 
knit agglomerations of tribes to peoples with 
ancient cultures and deep sophistication. 

Wliat unites them is the common bond of 
poverty. More accurately, it is not so much 
poverty as the awareness of poverty. This 
awareness, this refusal to accept poverty as 
something preordained and unalterable, is a 
new phenomenon. 

It is not that, over the centuries, these peoples 
have grown poorer — for the most part, they are 
better off than were their ancestors. (And re- 
member that even Imperial Rome by today's 
standards would be a less developed country.) 
Wliat has created their impatience and discon- 
tent is that in the past century and a half, fol- 
lowing the Industrial Revolution, a handful of 
states, composed mostly of white populations 
living in the Temperate Zone, have grown fab- 
ulously rich. 

The peoples living outside the Temperate 
area began to recognize about two decades ago 



that their poverty was not an irrevocable judg- 
ment of fate. Tliis realization came about 
wlien tlie cumulative impact of two world wars 
shook tlie underpinnings of colonial structures. 
It was given added impetus as fast transport 
and communications spread far and wide that 
most dangerous agent ■provocateur — the idea of 
nationalism. Nationalism meant for the co- 
lonial peoples political independence. Political 
independence was identified with a better mate- 
rial life, a share of the ample fruits of modern 

Today these billion people — this Third 
World — are driven by a sense of purpose that 
tends to give a special political character to 
their activities. 

It tends also to bind together disparate peo- 
ples who would otherwise have little in common. 
The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, 
for example, is an extraordinary alliance mo- 
bilized under the banner of anticolonialism. 
That banner, that slogan, has intense symbolic 
significance. It means much more than the 
dismantling of colonial empires. It is an 
amalgam of memories, resentments, and aspira- 
tions — the insistence on a place in the sun, the 
demand for equality, the hope for improvement 
in economic well-being. 

Need for Mutual Confidence and Understanding 

The complete absorption of the less developed 
countries with their own immediate problems of 
survival and growth has often led to a lack of 
understanding on the part of the industrial 
world. Flying the flag of nonalinement, many 
of the less developed countries have been in- 
different to the contest between East and West. 
They have withheld commitment from the 
larger power struggle, which they have re- 
garded as lacking relevance to their own in- 
sistent concerns. 

This difficulty of understanding is but one 
of the elements that must be counted in the 
establishment of an effective relationship be- 
tween North and South. Obviously, such re- 
lations must be of a different character from 
those among industrial nations. The main com- 
ponent must be a conscious and systematic effort 
on the part of the industrial coimtries to help 
the less developed countries progress toward 

economic, social, and political betterment. 
There must be a redressing of the balance of ad- 
vantage. This requires more than money or 
equipment. It means technical help and ad- 
vice, commercial relations that will contribute 
to stability in the markets for their products, 
military assistance — more often than not some 
form of assurance that their vital interests will 
be protected from the aggression of their 

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it 
requires a high degree of mutual confidence and 
understanding — the creation of an environment 
in which both sides can work together toward 
a common purpose. 

Open System Versus Closed 

How are the relations between North and 
South, between the industrialized and develop- 
ing countries, to be organized in such a manner 
as to create this environment ? 

Throughout the postwar period there have 
been two competing approaches to the organiza- 
tion of these relations. One approach is that of 
an open system. The other is that of a series of 
closed systems. 

Under the open system all free-world indus- 
trial countries would accept responsibility for 
the economic, commercial, and political well- 
being of all developing countries without dis- 
crimination. They would, through systematic 
consultation, concert their efforts to acliieve this 

Under the closed system specific industrial 
countries or groups of countries in the North 
would maintain special relations with selected 
developing comitries or groups of countries in 
the South — and would establish preferential 
and discriminatory arrangements for cari-ying 
this out. This is the situation, for example, that 
exists with regard to the African states of the 
French Community and, to a lesser degree, 
within the British Commonwealth. 

During the postwar period, these two systems 
have operated alongside one another. But I 
think the time may well be approaching when 
all of us together — industrial and developing 
countries alike — may need to make a conscious 
choice as to the direction in which our relations 
should evolve. 

APRU, 27, 1964 


The United States has been the leading propo- 
nent of the open system. Under the onslaught 
of a tidal wave of nationalism, the war-weak- 
ened European colonial powers were forced to 
retreat first from one and then another overseas 
possession. To fill the vacuimis thus created 
and to prevent them from being filled by Com- 
munist power, the United States progressively 
extended its responsibilities. 

In moving to assist and defend these coun- 
tries we were not influenced by considerations 
of specific national interest or historic ties, since 
we carried no baggage of colonial liistory. We 
were simply the only free-world power capable 
of providing the strength and resources that 
were urgently required. In most of these situ- 
ations we operated on a postulate of general 
responsibility for stability and peace. 

We have, for example, no national interest of 
trade or investment in Viet-Nam, where we are 
providing the material assistance for a shooting 
war; nor do we have any discriminatory com- 
mercial preferences in Latin America, where we 
are joined in the Alliance for Progress. 

It is this willingness to accept world respon- 
sibilities unrelated to specific national interests 
that is America's unique contribution to the 
postwar world. This is most clearly seen in the 
context of foreign aid. There is nothing new 
about foreign aid per se. Subsidies between 
princes are as old as recorded history, and grants 
and loans between modern states in the 19th 
century were regarded as quite normal. But 
such transactions were historically related either 
to alliances or imperialism. 

Wliere the United States has brolvcn the pat- 
tern is in the diversity of its assistance pro- 
grams; we have not confined our assistance to 
countries with which we had special relation- 
ships or to situations in which we might expect 
a quid pro quo of special favors — and today we 
provide some form of assistance to 100 countries. 

In many of these cases we have acted in pur- 
suance of a generalized purpose — that the less 
developed nations as a whole should have the 
chance for a better life. We have pursued this 
purpose out of the conviction that only in this 
way can world peace and stability be assured. 

Consistent with our belief that there should be 
equality of opportunity for free-world growth. 

we have remained faithful to the most-favored- 
nation prmciple in our commercial relations. 
While we participate in special regional agen- 
cies for political consultation and action, such 
as the Organization of American States, we have 
sought no privileged markets for our products 
and we trade with all the world on a nondis- 
criminatory basis. 

Ties Deriving From Colonial Past 

Other Western nations in organizing their 
affairs with the developmg countries liave em- 
phasized closed systems. They have created 
special and discriminatory relations. They have 
preferred to direct their contributions to the 
improvement of the lot of the developing coim- 
tries on a selective basis and within the frame- 
work of ties that derive from a colonial past. 
These special relations have involved not merely 
the provision of assistance but special financial 
arrangements and special trading concessions 
under which products of the specific overseas 
countries have been given preferential access to 
metropolitan markets and where, quite fre- 
quently, reciprocal preferences have also been 

Obviously, in assisting their former colonies, 
these Western nations are contributing — in 
many cases substantially contributing — to the 
advancement of the developing world. And in 
many cases, in addition to supporting these spe- 
cial arrangements, they are, through contribu- 
tions to international organizations, assisting 
the developing nations on a more generalized 

But, without intending any disparaging im- 
plications, it is nonetheless tnie that, in the gen- 
eral pattern of their relationships with the 
Third World, the principal Western nations 
have tended to direct their efforts more to the 
advancement of specific national interests than 
to the discharge of generalized world responsi- 

The choice between these competing concepts 
for organizing relations between Nortli and 
South is a difficult one for tlie industrial coun- 
tries. For quite different reasons, it is also diffi- 
cult for the less developed countries. 

Struggling new nations now enjoying posi- 
tions of preference and discrimination in metro- 



l>olitan nmrkots may find it hard to cjivc them 
up. Vet most of these nations are aware tliat 
special trading; i-elations are likely to carry with 
tliem special political, financial, and economic 
relations tliat will impair tlicir freedom of 
choice or action. Given tlie brooding fear of 
what is loosely called "neocolonialism," special 
ties of this kind may be too suggestive of 
"spheres of influence" to be wholly comfortable. 

Need for More Equitable Balance 

How this issue is decided can have a particu- 
lar importance for the United States. For it 
bears directly on the achievement of a more 
equitable allocation of responsibilities among 
the industrial nations. This is one of the ma- 
jor pieces of unfinished business of the postwar 

For the last 20 years the United States has 
been expanding its responsibilities around the 
world as the European powers, weakened by 
war, have withdrawn before the impact of the 
anticolonial wave. Fortunately, our resources 
were equal to the task, and in absolute terms they 
have expanded in pace with our expanded re- 
sponsibilities. Today we are stronger than ever 

At the same time, however, our allies in Eu- 
rope have also grown strong. So has Japan in 
the Far East. Yet, for a period of time until 
the colonial chapter is finally closed, it is likely 
tliat our responsibilities will continue to expand 
as our allies complete their withdrawal from 
outmoded colonial positions. In other words, 
we find ourselves today, and may continue to 
find ourselves for some time, in a period when 
our responsibilities will be still expanding while 
our relative strength vis-a-vis other free-world 
industrial powers is diminishing. 

In the face of these facts we must, of necessity, 
search for the means of working out a more 
equitable balance of responsibilities with other 
free-world industrial powers. This means, of 
course, that the European metropolitan powers 
must, more and more, move back into tlie world 
in order to assume responsibilities commensu- 
rate with their growing resources. 

This process relates directly to the question 
of how North-South relations are organized. 
The question is this : Through what means will 

the oilier industrialized powers turn their 
strength and resources toward our common task 
in the less developed areas ? 

At the moment this question remains unan- 
swered. Certainly we can see great advantages 
in trying to build a world in which the free 
industrial powers unite in a common effort for 
the developing nations as a whole. Tiiis would 
not, of coui-se, preclude special bonds of friend- 
ship and intimacy between industrial and de- 
veloping nations, nor even some distribution of 
tasks among industrial nations on a geograph- 
ical basis. But there is a major difference be- 
tween ties based on cultural friendship or mili- 
tary necessity and ties predicated upon special 
financial or commercial regimes that are dis- 
criminatory in character. Discriminatory re- 
gimes tend not only to result in a poor use of 
world resources, but they also limit the possibili- 
ties for effective cooperation among nations, 
both in the North and South. 

European Unity and the Open System 

In principle, therefore, we should much pre- 
fer to see all the industrial nations work toward 
a kind of collective responsibility for all of the 
less developed countries — or, in other words, to- 
ward an open system. But this is on the as- 
sumption that the other industrial nations 
would be prepared to join wholeheartedly in 
such an effort. Would they, in other words, put 
forward the same or gi'eater exertions to assist 
the developing nations under a regime of gen- 
eralized responsibility as under the present se- 
lective relationships? 

Time alone can answer that question. The 
habits of nations for centuries have been to re- 
late action to national interest — usually, in a 
rather narrow sense. The attainment of a 
minimum size or scale — the possession of a 
minimum volume of resources, of material, of 
technology, of manpower — has proved a key 
element in detemiining the role, and the atti- 
tude, of nations. The willingness to identify 
national interest with a generalized world re- 
sponsibility may, in today's world, be possible 
only for very large nations — only for nations 
such as the United States, which command re- 
sources on a scale adequate to the requirements 
for leadership in the 20th century. 




If this assumption be right, there is probably 
a direct correlation between the willingness of 
European nations to accept world responsibility 
and the speed with which they move toward 
economic and political unity. The European 
leaders who have worked to unify Europe have 
long believed that only by unity can Europe 
achieve the scale requisite for an effective 
leadership role in the modern world. Only m 
this way can the peoples of Europe contribute 
the full measure of their capacity to the building 
and maintenance of a free and stable world. 

This proposition has long been a postulate of 
American policy. In supporting European 
unity we have acted on the assumption that a 
luiited Europe, as an equal partner, would be 
willing to undertake major world responsibili- 
ties that did not reflect narrow national inter- 
ests. We continue to regard that assumption as 
sound. There is an underlying harmony, in 
other words, between our support for European 
unity and our support for the open system. 

Bearing on East-West Problems 

In my remarks so far I have talked solely 
about relations between the North and South 
without discussing their bearing on the familiar 
East- West problems. It is significant that the 
Soviet Union, in spite of its efforts to appear as 
the sympathetic companion of the less devel- 
oped nations, has been clearly marked as an in- 
dustrial power at the United Nations Confer- 

In its own North-South relations the Soviet 
Union clearly pursues the policy of seeking to 
establish relationships of dominance through 
the tactics of bribes, threats, and subversion. It 
has made the Third World an arena of conten- 
tion in the East-West struggle. 

When Lord Franks first identified the prob- 
lem, he suggested that the relationships between 
the North and South might ultimately become as 
important as those between East and West. 
That time, in our judgment, is rapidly ap- 

The problem for us is how we can conduct 
our North-South relations in a manner that 
■will best serve the needs of the less developed 
countries while at the same time advancing the 
interests of the free world. 

For this purpose it seems clear to us that the 
open system has many advantages. It would, 
in President Johnson's words, best help the 
poorer countries of the world to "find a path 
to development through freedom — and freedom 
through development." ^ It would banish the 
specter of colonialism and tutelage. It would 
provide that chance of diversity which is the 
mark of freedom. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Haiti, 
Andre Theard, presented his credentials to 
President Johnson on April 8. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 

152 dated April 8. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Iraq, Nasir al-Hani, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on April 8. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 154 dated April 8. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Kenya, 
Burudi Nabwera, presented his credentials to 
President Johnson on April 8. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 

153 dated April 8. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Portu- 
gal, Vasco Vieira Garin, presented his creden- 
tials to President Johnson on April 8. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 149 dated April 8. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Tunisia, 
Rachid Driss, presented his credentials to Presi- 

' For an excerpt from the Economic Report of the 
President, see ibid.. Feb. 10. 1964, p. 222. 



dent Johnson on April 8. For texts of tlie 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release 150 
dated April 8. 

Export Expansion and 
Balance of Payments 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

Secretary [of Commerce Luther H.] Hodges, 
members of the Cabinet, ladies and gentlemen : I 
guess once a businessman, always a businessman. 
Luther is one of the great prides and products of 
our free enterprise sj'stem, but I did not say we 
had everything straightened out last Saturday. 
And don't ever mistake a temporary recognition 
of a partial job well done for anything like you 

I made the statement that I had been in- 
formed, I hope reliably, that our exports are 
going at a rate of about $7 billion a year; that 
was the balance in our favor; that I interpreted 
that as something that we could take some pride 
in; that I did not anticipate that that would 
necessarily be a permanent situation, but it is a 
very fine thing to observe. I should like to com- 
mend all those who have, along with the Secre- 
tary of Commerce, been engaged in this mission 
to expand the exports of the United States. I 
think there are few tasks that are more impor- 
tant or closer to my own concerns for the future 
of this country. 

An increase in our overseas trade, as all of us 
are aware, brings great benefits to every single 
sector of our American life. They benefit busi- 
ness by providing increased markets for our pro- 
duction. It will benefit the strength of the dol- 
lar by improving our balance of payments, and 
because I observed, Mr. Secretary, that our bal- 
ance of payments for the first quarter — not nec- 
essarily the last quarter — look good, that didn't 

' Made at the 'White House on Apr. 7 before the Inter- 
agency Committee on Export Expansion (White Honse 
press release). For text of an Executive order estab- 
lishing the Committee, see Bih-letin of Jan. 6, 1964, 
p. 25. 

mean that I underwrote everything that might 
happen during your tenure of office ! 

It will benefit labor and help in the war 
against poverty, since every billion dollars by 
which we increase exports 100,000 new jobs will 
be created. It will increase our world responsi- 
bilities by establisliing closer commercial rela- 
tions with industrialized countries in providing 
for the developing world the trade which can 
make them flourish and progress. That is why 
I am so happy to see so many of the various de- 
partments and agencies of Government inter- 
ested in this particular field here this morning. 

Through much of our history we have spent 
most of our etTort on expanding and satisfying 
the vigorous domestic market. We have con- 
centrated our production, our salesmanship, and 
our trade on a vast common market which spans 
the continent and embraces 200 million people. 
Our success in doing this has raised us to our 
present high level of prosperity here at home. 
But the very opportunities which this market 
provided often left us to neglect the opportu- 
nities for trade abroad, and neglected them we 

Other countries, forced to trade in order to 
survive, did develop sharper tools, more so- 
phisticated techniques for penetrating other 
markets. Our own share of the world trade has 
not been proportional to our capacity to produce 
goods that are needed and wanted by other 
lands. At this point in our own history, in 
world history, we can no longer afford to 
neglect opportunities for overseas trade. We 
cannot let those opportunities pass for lack of 
knowledge, or for lack of appropriate Govern- 
ment assistance. The prosperity of Europe and 
Japan, which we helped create, means not only 
larger markets for our goods but sharply 
increased competition for world markets. 

The rise of new nations in the developing 
world offers a large prospect for increased com- 
merce, and it has placed on us a national respon- 
sibility to provide a solid commercial basis 
for their development and their stability. 
Our commitment to the defense of freedom 
around the world means that exports must sub- 
stantially exceed imports if we are to keep our 
currency sound, as we intend to do. I took a 
great deal of pride last Saturday in making 




that observation, and I hope that we can take 
the examijle we have set and continue that very 
fine pace. 

We have the same productive genius and in- 
genuity which built tliis nation. So let us now 
apply those same qualities that we have applied 
here at home to increasing commerce with the 
world. Last September at the "VVliite House 
Conference 300 businessmen met and discussed 
problems and framed recommendations.- This 
Committee has now been established to act on 
these recommendations and to press forward the 
export drive on every front. Such action is 

I await your decisions; I await your actions. 
I have designated Mr. [Daniel L.] Goldy, who 
has just been sworn in, as the National Export 
Expansion Coordinator. He will help assure 
that the decisions of this Coramittee are imple- 
mented through the Government m order that 
we miss no opportunity to increase export trade. 
He has my highest confidence. If your efforts 

are successful, as I hope they will be and as I 
would like to encourage them to be, future gen- 
erations will recognize what you have accom- 
plished as one of the gi'eat cornerstones of our 
national strength and the well-being of our 

I know of no subject that intensely interests 
me more. I know of nothing that I will be 
prouder of than to see the record that you ring 
vip. I hope that you can continue the very fine 
balance that now exists and expand it in the 
days to come. I thank each agency represented 
here and each person who is participating in 
this meeting. Any encouragement I can give 
you, I want to do. Any help that I can extend, 
I want to do. I congratulate the Secretary for 
the leadership he has taken in this field and say 
to the Secretary of Commerce, I hope when I 
have another Saturday news conference that I 
can increase that $7 billion figure and that I can 
have as optimistic a report next quarter on bal- 
ance of payments as I did this quarter. 

New Patterns of African Trade 

6y G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '■ 

It gives me great pleasure to meet today with 
a group of businessmen interested in expand- 
ing American economic relations with Afi'ica. 
We are in a period when new patterns of trade 
are beginning to reshape the African market 
of the future. It is an especially good time to 
embark upon new business ventures on that 

Frankly, I am optimistic about Africa's fu- 
ture. My optimism is based on the years of 
intimate contact I have had with the African 

' For background, see ibUL, Oct. 14, 1963, p. 595. 

'Address made before the International Executives 
Convention at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 1 (press release 
138 dated Mar. 31). 

peoples and their leaders, for whom I have great 
respect. Africa's nations — both old and new — 
are seeking to develop themselves as rapidly as 
possible, and they are working arduously to 
build modem economies. In these efforts they 
are encouraging foreign investors to help them 
create modem, independent societies, and they 
are anxious to increase their import and export 
trade with the United States. To these goals 
we can onl}- give our hearty concurrence and 

There are many reasons why we can be opti- 
mistic about the economic future of Africa, and 
there are many reasons why American business 



should take a closer look at the opportunities 
offered by Africa's developing nations. 

The riclmess of Africa's mineral resources is 
well known, and the importance of these re- 
sources to the United States is substantial. 
Africa is a major world supplier of gold and 
diamonds, of cobalt and chrome, of copper, of 
manganese, of antimony. Eecently, large de- 
posits of petroleum, iron ore, and bauxite have 
begun to be developed, in many cases with sub- 
stantial U.S. investment. Yet much of the 
continent has not been fully explored by U.S. 
businessmen. Undoubtedly many new oppor- 
tunities await the more enterprising firms. 

Prospects also are favorable in other re- 
sources. There is generally little, if any, pop- 
ulation pressure in Africa, and m some areas 
there is even unused agricultural land to 
be made finiitful. Electric energy potential 
abounds in many areas — among them, the 
Congo Eiver basin alone is estimated to have 
one-third of the total world hydroelectric gen- 
erating capacity. 

Then there are social factors favorable to eco- 
nomic growth. There is no highly rigid caste 
or class structure, as in other areas of the world, 
and there are few land tenure patterns which 
restrict mobility. The more enterprising Afri- 
can is able to move to the city and rise quickly 
in business or the professions when he has the 
necessary skills and capital. 

At the same time there are drawbacks and 
hazards in expanded American business rela- 
tionships with Africa, and I tliink we must rec- 
ognize such risks frankly. 

There are a number of factors which seri- 
ously limit progress in Africa: a low level of 
education ; the lack of a substantial number of 
upper- and middle-level administrators, tech- 
nicians, and professional people; low produc- 
tivity rates; a shortage of entrepreneurs and 
indigenous capital ; and an inadequate network 
of transportation, communications, and other 
services. It would be difficult for Africa to 
overcome those conditions with its own re- 
sources, and it is in those areas that foreign 
trade, aid, and investment can make important 
contributions to African progress. 

On another plane, there have been severe 
political disturbances in many parts of the 

continent in recent months, and it is likely that 
there will be more unrest as long as aspirations 
remain unfulfilled. There is no need for me 
to catalog recent troubles ; they have been widely 
reported in the American press. Those serious 
matters cannot be dismissed lightly, but we 
should, nevertheless, view such disturbances in 
perspective. Most of the current conflicts and 
crises are typical of the trouble newly independ- 
ent countries encounter on the road to nation- 
hood. The problems spring from the frustra- 
tions created by poverty and the lack of swift 
progress, from the inevitable struggles between 
the old and the new, from the problems of 
societies moving from rural to urban life. 

Our concern with those troubles, however, 
should not lead us to lose sight of the quiet, 
steady progress being made throughout the 
African Continent. Increases in gross national 
product, rising electric power production, or 
improved secondary schools cannot compete in 
the headlines with news about an army mutiny. 
Yet in terms of human involvement, the quiet 
progress is really the big news in Africa, and it 
is far more widespread and lasting than Africa's 

A third problem that American businessmen 
should be aware of is found in the artificial bar- 
riers to trade and investment which arose during 
Africa's colonial era. This is a system which 
tended to bind, almost inextricably, the economy 
of a colony to that of a colonial power. Al- 
though much of Africa — and, indeed, the most 
populated part of the continent — is relatively 
open to American trade and investment, there 
are some areas, such as the Spanish and 
Portuguese territories and some former French 
territories in tropical Africa, in which it is 
difficult for American and other foreign busi- 
ness to trade. Through such devices as prefer- 
ential tariffs, bilateral trading arrangements, 
licensing systems, and exchange controls, na- 
tionals of the present and former metropolitan 
powers protect a predominant influence in the 
economies of those areas by sharply limiting 
conamodity exchanges with third countries. At 
the same time, however, the European powers 
are providing significant amounts of aid and 
related public funds to those areas, and main- 
tenance of their commercial privileges there is 
often defended on that basis. 

APKIL 27, 1964 

727-708 — 64- 


Wliile the United States recognizes the de- 
sirability of encouraging the European nations 
to continue to provide a high level of aid to 
Africa, vre do not feel we should be precluded 
from efforts to improve the U.S. business posi- 
tion. We feel that a broadening of our trading 
relations in these areas is not only in our own 
interest but m the interest of the African areas 
and of the European nations themselves. For 
that reason vre have studied with interest the 
recent Jeamieney report, which recommended 
that France diversify its assistance programs 
to embrace areas of Southeast Asia and Latin 
America. And we have noted President 
de Gaulle's overture to Mexico only 2 weeks 
ago, when he encouraged Mexicans to rely on 
more than one source for their economic as- 
sociations. "We hope that such diversification 
of economic interests will also occur in those 
parts of Africa which now have trade relations 
with one predominant source. 

Continent-Wide Cooperation 

Xow let me hasten to assure you that, despite 
the hazards and problems I have mentioned, 
there is a great deal of progress being made in 
Africa. There is much going well on that con- 
tinent, both politically and economically. 

One instrumentality that is contributing 
much to Africa's progress is the Organization of 
African Unity, which came into bemg last May 
at the historic African heads-of-state conference 
at Addis Ababa. It is now a 34-member, 
Africa-wide organization, embracing all inde- 
pendent states except South Africa. The OAU 
already has begun to function as a veliicle of 
continental political, economic, social, and cul- 
tural cooperation. It has made an impressive 
record for itself in the 10 months of its exist- 
ence — notably in encouraging a cease-fire and 
then a settlement of the Moroccan-Algerian 
border dispute. Last week it plaj-ed a similar 
role in bringing Ethiopia and Somalia together 
for talks aimed at arranging a cease-fire and at 
ending the sporadic border clashes between 
those two nations. 

Another Africa-wide body making an im- 
portant contribution to Africa's growth is the 
Economic C!ommission for Africa, a U.N. body 

operating under able African leadership. Tlie 
EGA has begun to play a vital role in Africa's 
economic planning. In particular, it is build- 
ing a philosophy of regional economic integra- 
tion and a program of regional projects to real- 
ize economies from large-scale enterprises and 
to avoid the duplication and competition inher- 
ent in basing development on a large number 
of small economic units in Africa. 

At its most recent meeting at Addis Ababa 
last month, the Economic Commission for Afri- 
ca marked an unportant milestone in the efforts 
of the African states to achieve economic in- 
tegration.^ That conference reflected a greater 
determination among African nations to find 
a common approach to the wide range of prob- 
lems impeding Africa's economic development. 

In addition there was a growing a'nareness 
that the existing fragmented markets of the con- 
tinent restrict Africa's efforts to develop. Pre- 
vailing economic units, it was argued, are too 
small to permit the use of the most up-to-date 
technology and mass market techniques. For 
these and related reasons, Africans showed an 
increasing desire to enlarge the size of their 
markets to enable them to realize the benefits 
that can be derived from large-scale operations. 
In this respect, EGA missions have' been work- 
ing in East, North, and West Africa to explore 
the possibilities of setting up such industries as 
iron and steel complexes and chemical opera- 
tions, to be located at sites considered optimum 
for natural resources and markets. 

One important result of all of these efforts by 
the Economic Gommission for Africa will be 
the expansion of opportunities for foreign trade 
and investment in many parts of the continent. 

U. S. Aid in Africa 

For its own part the United States Govern- 
ment is encouraging the growth of a climate in 
Africa which will be conducive to an expansion 
of U.S. trade and investment. This is a co- 
ordinated effort in which the principal instru- 
ments are the Department of Commerce, the 

' For texts of a message from President Johnson and 
a statement made before the Commission on Feb. 25 by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Af- 
fairs J. Wayne Fredericks, see Bulletin of Mar. 30, 
1964, p. 509. 



Department of State and its African posts, the 
A<j;ency for International Development, tiie De- 
partment of Agriculture, and the Export-Im- 
port Bank. 

At this time of year I am particularly con- 
cerned with the United States AID program. 
In a few days I will appear before Congress to 
explain why I think AID is an essential element 
of our African foreign policy. I am well aware 
that our AID program has critics — and I con- 
cede that constructive criticism is needed to keep 
the program healthy. However, I do believe 
that .some of the dissatisfaction with AID is due 
to misconceptions about its nature and its goals. 

The true purpose of AID is to encourage and 
enable countries to develop and preserve their 
independence and stability. "We believe that 
economic and social well-being and progress are 
integral parts of true independence and stabil- 
ity. While we recognize the importance of ef- 
forts undertaken by Africans themselves — and 
our AID program is geared to encourage Afri- 
cans to help themselves — it is in the best Ameri- 
can tradition to assist where we are able and 
where our aid is desired. 

All Americans have an important interest in 
the economic growth and betterment of life in 
Africa because of the long-range bearing these 
factors have on world peace and order. You 
as businessmen, however, have an even more 
direct stake in foreign aid. United States 
economic aid programs in Africa provide many 
opportunities for U.S. exporters and investors. 
These opportunities stem from the present re- 
quirement that aid dollars be spent for U.S. 
goods and services and from the inducements 
offered by AID to encourage United States in- 
vestment abroad. Combined with the growth 
of African markets resulting from an accelerat- 
ing pace of economic development, our AID 
efforts provide a wide variety of business oppor- 

So successful have these efforts been that Far- 
rell Lines African News Digest has written : 

Because of A.I.D., the entrepreneur of today, if his 
ideas are truly worthwhile, stands less risk than at any 
other time in our commercial history. The potential 
of American investment and interest in Africa is there- 
fore dependent upon the creativity and imagination of 
American businessmen. 

Altliough not the largest single donor in 
Africa, the U.S. Government in fiscal year 1962 
and again in fiscal year 19C3 provided about $500 
million in economic assistance to 34 African 
countries. Surplus food and fiber, under the 
Food for Peace program, accounted for nearly 
half of this amount. In contrast, other free- 
world governments provided $1,200 million, and 
the Sino-Soviet bloc extended $200-250 million 
in credits. Thus the United States contributed 
roughly one-fourth of Africa's $2 billion in 
external economic assistance from government 
sources. In addition, important contributions 
are made by U.S. private foundations, religious 
organizations, and other nongovernment groups. 

In carrying out our AID program, we strive 
in various ways to encourage the fullest par- 
ticipation of U.S. private concerns in African 
operations. Wliile we are naturally interested 
in having American business take advantage of 
all opportunities for profitable new business 
ventures, we also are interested in the participa- 
tion of United States concerns because of the 
entrepreneurial skills which American business 
can help transfer to Africa. A good example of 
such participation is the new Education Center 
at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, which 
was opened only 2 weeks ago by IBM World 
Trade Corporation to help English-speaking 
Africans acquire basic and technical education 
in such fields as data processing, accounting, 
government, economics, and mathematics. Next 
year, in Dakar, Senegal, IBM will open a second 
such center for French-speaking Africans. 

One part of our program that stands in direct 
support of American business is a series of in- 
vestment guaranties which have been arranged 
between the United States and 20 African coim- 
tries. Through these agreements, U.S. investors 
in Africa are protected against the risks of 
inconvertibility of currency and expropriation. 
In addition, 17 of these agreements cover war 
risk and 14 of them cover extended-risk guar- 
anties and guaranties against loss caused by 
revolution and insurrection. 

Even before deciding to invest in Africa, how- 
ever, an Ajnerican firm may be able to obtain 
financial assistance from AID to make a feasi- 
bility study to determine whether a proposed 

APRIL 27, 1964 


African business venture is sound. Three such 
inrestment suTTey grants have been made in 
Africa, and five applications for grants are 
being processed. 

There are also the so-called Cooley loans 
available in Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and Tuni- 
sia. These loans are made from local currency 
accounts that have been built up by the AID 
program and are available to United States 
firms getting established in those countries — 
particularly to businesses which yn\l increase 
sales of U.S. farm products. 

Even if you are not immediately interested 
in establishing a plant or sales operation in 
Africa, you should be aware of the stake of 
American business in our AID program. Be- 
tween 80 and 90 percent of our economic aid 
expenditures, for example, are for U.S. goods 
and services. The approximately $500 million 
spent last year on African aid provided jobs, 
income, profits, and service contracts for tens of 
thousands of workers and farmers, and hun- 
dreds of U.S. factories, universities, engineers, 
building contractors, and many others. 

AID estimates that 550,000 nongovernment 
jobs in the United States were provided by our 
worldwide aid expenditures in 1962. In New 
York State alone, major AID contracts amount- 
ed to more than $30 million in 1962 and some 
$45 million in 1963. And between 1960 and 
1963 AID-administered cargoes on American- 
flag cargo liners rose from just over $40 mil- 
lion to approximately $108 million. 

When our AID program provides a bull- 
dozer, telecommunication equipment, or a ship- 
load of wheat from our farm surplus, the story 
does not end at that point. The first shipment 
may be paid for by a grant or loan provided 
by the U.S. taxpayer. But bulldozers need spare 
parts and must be replaced one day, and tele- 
communication networks are often extended. 
Even dietary habits may change through in- 
creased use of American food products. New 
tastes and needs for American products can lead 
to new commercial sales, and this development 
can be an important end result of our AID pro- 
gram around the world. But unless the coun- 
tries of Africa are helped to grow out of their 
low-level economies at an early date, they may 
not become important markets for our products. 

Growrth of U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa 

In addition to United States aid, both trade 
and investment with Africa have been of 
rapidly growing importance to America in re- 
cent years. Total direct investment by United 
States firms grew fourfold in Africa from 1950 
to 1962, far more than our rate of increase of 
foreign investment in any other continent. In 
1962 United States investments in Africa 
totaled nearly $1.25 billion, an increase of 
$200 million over 1961. This increase was 
spread throughout Africa. In a similar man- 
ner, our total exports to Africa have more than 
doubled in value since 1950. In 1962 these 
exports amounted to almost $1 biUion. Our 
imports from Africa came to $750 million in 
1962 and were about 50 percent above the 1950 

Thus it is clear to me that many American 
businessmen are betting; on Africa as a good 
place to do business, to invest, and to make a 

The largest African markets for U.S. prod- 
ucts are the United Arab Republic, South 
Africa, Congo (Leopoldville), Liberia, Mo- 
rocco, and Nigeria. Nigeria, with a growing 
economy, the largest population in Africa, and 
a central location, bears careful consideration 
as a place for exports, a place to set up a 
regional sales office, or a place to build a branch 
plant. The Arthur D. Little Company of Bos- 
ton, on a contract with the Nigerian Govern- 
ment, has been seeking out investment oppor- 
timities for foreign firms in Nigeria for several 
years. There has been a remarkable increase 
in U.S. business activity in that country since 
it became independent in 1960. In these 4 
years U.S. firms in Nigeria have increased from 
9 to 72, including 3 banks, 6 petroleum com- 
panies, 13 manufacturing and assembly plants, 
and 20 service companies. 

Regional, rather than national, markets also 
bear watching, as closer relations develop 
among African nations. In terms of regional 
cooperation, the East African nations of Kenya, 
Tanganyika, and Uganda provide a well- 
developed example of how sovereign nations 
can work together in harmony. Through the 
East African Common Services Organiza- 
tion — a multinational body — the area's 25 



million people share a common currency, com- 
mon communications and transportation facil- 
ities, common tax administration, common re- 
search facilities, and common customs and 
tari/Ts. And outside of the framework of the 
EACSO, they have pooled their intellectual 
resources in the University of East Africa. 

All of these joint efforts make those three 
countries one of the world's advanced areas in 
cooperation and provide the area's people with 
services of a (]uality that would be difficult for 
individual nations to match. In addition, the 
effectiveness of such international cooperation 
makes a significant contribution to the area's 
overall stability. A further factor is that this 
cooperation has helped to make foreign assist- 
ance more effective in the area. Although U.S. 
efforts are primarily directed to individual 
countries, there are some programs we conduct 
on an East African regional basis. 

Throughout the continent there is a whole 
range of immediate opportunities open to 
American private business. There is room for 
export and import businesses, large and small. 
Transportation and communication facilities 
are also among the very highest priorities of 
African leaders. In addition, opportunities in- 
clude such areas as insurance, banking and loan 
associations, hotels and low-cost housing. 

There will be many sales opportunities in 
Africa as that continent's purchasing power 
rises and its population grows. Africa already 
is a significant market for a variety of U.S. 
products. In 19G2 the most important of these 
products were foodstuffs, which accounted for 
$178 million. Other products and their value 
were textile fibers and manufactures, $72 
million; industrial machinery, $140 million; 
tractors, $53 million; and chemicals, $46 

There also are opportunities for purchasing 
in Africa that I want to touch upon. Ad- 
mittedly, the range of goods available for such 
purchases is not as great as the range of oppor- 
tunities for investment and sales, but some do 
exist and others can be sought and foimd. 

Most of our principal imports from Africa — 
minerals, cocoa, coffee, and precious stones — 
are accounted for by American firms that have 
invested in extractive and production facilities 

in Africa. But there are some purchasing 
opportunities and markets for such products as 
African handicrafts and art objects, which are 
exotic and profitable items in this country. 
There are also various raw materials of a 
specialized nature that are available to Amer- 
ican purchasers, such as spices, sisal, and scarce 
minerals needed for technological research and 

A relatively unexplored and growing field 
for purchasers is that of processed and semi- 
processed goods. As Africa's economic devel- 
opment progresses, there is increasing interest 
among the nations of Africa to process their 
raw materials domestically for export to for- 
eign markets. Thus, sisal is being exported as 
twine, as well as a raw material. Another ex- 
ample is iron, which is being sold not only as 
ore but as ferromanganese or ferrochrome. 
This is a trend which will accelerate in the 
future, and it opens up many possibilities for 
American buyers. 

Five Steps for American Businessmen 

In conclusion, there are five steps I would 
suggest to businessmen interested in looking 
into the African market : 

1. Make a serious survey of the African mar- 
ket. Talks with banks and with other Ameri- 
can firms experienced in African business 
would enable you to get a view of what the con- 
tinent has to offer and what are some of the 
special problems of operations there. You 
should become acquainted with the Agency for 
International Development and with the De- 
partment of Commerce Field Office in New 
York, or wherever you operate, to be fully 
aware of the services the U.S. Government 
offers to the foreign trader and investor. The 
foreign trade publications of the Commerce 
Department can be especially helpful to you. 
In the last 13 months alone, the Commerce 
Department in Washington had 2,174 confer- 
ences with businessmen and processed 2,671 
written inquiries on trade or investment in 

2. Make a survey trip to Africa to look over 
opportunities on the spot. Here again you 
can enlist the services of the Department of 

APRIL 27, 1964 


Commerce, and the Department of State can 
advise its embassies in Africa and their staffs, 
particularly the commercial officers, of your 
visit. Thus, when you arrive in, say, Lagos, 
Dar-es-Salaam, or Tunis, the U.S. Embassy 
will be prepared to assist you in understanding 
the area and making important contacts there. 
The number of our commercial officers in 
Africa has risen from 4 in 1959 to 13 in 1964, to 
give you an idea of our increasing desire to 
provide services in Africa to American busi- 
nessmen. In addition to these special com- 
mercial officers, there are economic officers at 
every post who are ready to help you. 

3. To give the African market a fair chance, 
I would recommend the following procedure. 
Allow enough time in visiting a country to learn 
about it ; no one can adequately survey a market 
in a day or two. Sales representatives and 
sales literature should use the commercial 
language of the country, and prices should be 
quoted in local currency. Businessmen have 
often had difficulties in French-speaking Africa 
in particular because they were unable to use 
that language. 

4. Most important in any business operation 
in Africa, in my view, is the need to make a busi- 
ness venture a cooperative venture involving 
Africans in all phases. This is not only good 
politics but good business as well, because it 
means sharing American business know-how 
and developing Africans for more sophisticated 
work. Much attention should be given to the 
training and upgrading of Africans into in- 
creasingly responsible positions. It should be 
readily apparent that costs will be much lower 
if you employ Africans instead of sending 
Americans and their families abroad. 

5. Finally, gear your products and sales to 
the needs of the market. Some businessmen 
rather quickly decide that the African capacity 
to buy expensive or sophisticated products is too 
limited to be worth the trouble. If you should 
so decide, perhaps you should consider Afi'ican 
or U.S. manufacture of special products more 
suited to the current stage of development in 
Africa and gradually develop a market for more 
complex or more costly items. 

The principal fact to remember is that you are 
dealing with a changing market. Past patterns 

of production and trade are being radically al- 
tered in Africa. New urban communities are 
coming into being. Large-scale mining, indus- 
trial, and agricultural projects are under way 
in many parts of the continent. Purchasing 
power is rising. 

In some instances there are promising pros- 
pects for immediate opportunities for mar- 
keting and investment. In other cases the 
prospects are for the long term. 

In any event, the future of Africa is in Afri- 
can hands, and American business can assist 
those hands as they approach their tasks of na- 
tion building. From such joint efforts, Afri- 
cans and Americans alike have much to gain. 

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee 
To Meet at Ottawa 

Press release 157 dated April 9 

The ninth annual meetmg of the Jomt United 
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco- 
nomic Affairs will be held m Ottawa, April 

Eepresenting the United States will be the 
Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the 
Honorable W. Walton Butterworth, United 
States Ambassador to Canada; the Honorable 
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury ; the 
Honorable Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the 
Interior; the Honorable Orville Freeman, Sec- 
retary of Agriculture ; the Honorable Christian 
A. Herter, President's Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations ; the Honorable George 
W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; and the 
Honorable Walter W. Heller, Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers. Secretary Rusk will attend 
the meeting on April 30. 

The Government of Canada will be repre- 
sented by the Honorable Paul INIartin, Secretary 
of State for External Affairs; the Honorable 
Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance: the Hon- 
orable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and 
Commerce; the Honorable Harry Hays, Minis- 
ter of Agriculture; the Honorable Charles M. 
Drury, Minister of Industry; Mr. Norman A. 
Robertson, Chief Negotiator for the Govern- 
ment of Canada on Trade Negotiations; Mr. 
Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of 



Canada ; Mr. A. 1). P. Ilceney, Canadian Chair- 
man of the International Joint Commission; 
anil Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador 
to tiie United States. 

The Joint Committee was inaugurated in 1953 
to provide an opportunity for Cabinet oflicers of 
botli governments to consult and examine eco- 
nomic and trade matters of common intci'ost and 

concern to the two countries. Meetings have 
been held approximately once a year, alternately 
in Ottawa and in Washington. Tlie last meet- 
ing of the Joint Committee was held in Wash- 
ington, September 20-21, 19G3.> 

' For text of n comnmnique issued at the close of the 
meeting, see Buixktin of Oct. 7, 1903, p. 548. 

The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion 

hy Christian A. Herter 

Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations ^ 

Trade is front and center on the international 
stage this year. The U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development got under way in Geneva last 
week,- as you know. And the sixth round — the 
Kennedy Round, as it is widely called — of nego- 
tiations under the auspices of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, for short) 
will open in the same city May 4. 

It is the Kennedy Round for which my office 
is responsible and which I shall discuss today ; 
but I hope you will follow the course of the 
U.N. Conference in j'our newspapers, for it will 
have a considerable bearing on the GATT nego- 
tiations, particularly as they relate to the less 
developed countries. 

It was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which 
made the Kennedy Round possible. Because 
the European Common Market was often men- 
tioned in the course of the debates leading to 
the enactment of this historic legislation, there 
is still in many quarters, I believe, a tendency to 
think that these negotiations amount to a duet — 
sometimes harmonious, sometimes sounding less 
so — between the European Economic Commu- 
nity (the EEC) and ourselves. 

' Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit 
at Detroit, Mich., on Mar. 30. 

' For a statement by Under Secretary Ball at Geneva 
on Mar. 25, see Bulletin of Apr. 20, 19G4, p. 634. 

Here in Detroit, where you export with vigor, 
ingenuity, and enterprise to the whole wide 
world, you take a broader view. Our biggest 
single market — Canada — is just a tunnel's 
length away. Taking exports and imports to- 
gether, total U.S. trade with our northern neigh- 
bor adds up to almost $8 billion a year, whereas 
the total with the Common Market is $6.5 bil- 
lion. Indeed, our trade with the rest of Europe 
(mainly Britain and her fellow members of the 
European Free Trade Association, the so-called 
Outer Seven ^) is $5.4 billion a year, almost as 
much as with the Common Market. Our trade 
with Asia, Australia, and New Zealand amounts 
to $9 billion, 36 percent of it with Japan alone, 
and our trade with Latin America $7.6 billion. 

Thus, the Common Market is not in fact our 
principal trading partner — -nor are we theirs. 
The Common Market does almost $20 billion 
worth of trade with the rest of Europe, includ- 
ing the Soviet bloc — three times what they do 
with us. With EFTA alone, they do $14 billion 
worth of business, over twice what they do with 
us. Their trade with Asia, Australia, and New 
Zealand is $7 billion and with Africa $6.6 bil- 
lion, both slightly more than with the United 

' Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the U.K. comprise the Outer Seven. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


I cite these figures not to imply in any way 
that our trade with the Common Market is 
not important ; it is, and it should expand with 
the dynamic gi-owth of this new and vigorous 
trading entity. I cite these figures rather to 
show that, great as our stake and that of the 
EEC is in trade with each other, the stake each 
of us has in the general expansion of world 
trade is much greater. And it is the overall 
expansion of world trade which is the goal of 
the coming GATT negotiations. If all of us 
could match the pace set by the European Free 
Trade Association, wliich, per capita, does 
roughly double the amount of external trade 
that either the Common Market or the United 
States does, we would all be better off. 

Obviously, this is easier said than done. This 
thought comes to mind when I am asked, as I 
sometimes am, what we have been doing in the 
17 months that have passed since the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act was enacted. The answer is that 
we have been hard at work — both on our own 
preparations here at home and in many consul- 
tations, multilateral and bilateral, with our ne- 
gotiating partners abroad. Preparing for ne- 
gotiations like these, involving so many nations 
and so many diverse interests, is somewhat like 
launching a new model of automobile — only W 
times as complicated and time consuming. 

As we go into the home stretch, 5 weeks before 
the negotiations formally open, we have identi- 
fied five problems as of major importance : tariff 
disparities, exceptions from the negotiations, 
nontariff barriers, the role of the less developed 
countries, and trade in agricultural products. 

The Problem of Plenty 

The most difficult and complex of the prob- 
lems that face us is that of trade in agricultural 
products.* I make no apologies for stressing 
this, here in one of the major capitals of Ameri- 
can industry. Agriculture and industry are 
interwoven at every point in our economy. 
Farmers buy a great many of your products, and 
farmers are more dependent upon export mar- 
kets than any other major segment of the Amer- 
ican producers. The crops on 1 out of every 

* For an address on "Policy Problems in Interna- 
tional Trade of Agricultural Products" by Clarence W. 
Nichols, see Bulletin of Mar. IC, 1964. p. 416. 

5 acres cultivated here are shipped abroad. 
Farmers derive 15 percent of their income from 
exports, whereas the United States as a whole 
exports only 3.8 percent of its gross national 
product. Moreover, total farm exports, nm- 
ning at $5.6 billion a year, amount to 27 percent 
of our exports as a whole. 

This is not a one-way street. Other nations 
benefit greatly from access to our reasonably 
priced and wholesome food. This is an im- 
portant factor in restraining inflation, which 
is currently giving a number of governments 
cause for serious concern. 

The problem of agriculture is, basically, 
the problem of plenty. Modem agricultural 
methods have, like the sorcerer's apprentice, 
opened the floodgates to abundance. The agri- 
cultural revolution of the mid-20th century is 
as dramatic a leap forward as the achievement 
of mass production here in Detroit a half- 
century ago. It began here, and it is now in 
full flood in Europe. 

A new element has been introduced into an 
already complex situation by the effort of the 
European Economic Community to establish a 
common agricultural policy for its six member 
nations — an essential step in progress toward 
the unification of Europe. The implementa- 
tion of this policy is a matter of major impor- 
tance to us, for we export over a billion dollars' 
worth of farm products annually to the EEC. 
It is our biggest single cash market for agri- 
cultural products. 

We have made our view clear that the com- 
mon agricultural policy should be designed so 
as to preserve the opportunity of efficient sup- 
pliers to compete in the EEC market, ilore- 
over, we believe that the Community's agricul- 
tural policies, like our own, must be negotiable 
in GATT. This, indeed, was the consensus of 
the GATT ministers when they met in Geneva 
last May and adopted a unanimous resolution 
calling for "the creation of acceptable condi- 
tions of access to world markets for agricul- 
tural products in furtherance of a significant 
development and expansion of world trade in 
such products." ^ 

We had a sharp warning last year of pro- 

•For statements by Jlr. Herter at the GATT minis- 
terial meeting and text of a resolution adopted on May 
21, 1963, see ihid., June 24, 1963, p. 990. 



tectionist tendencies in the EEC The imple- 
inontiition with respect to poultry of the com- 
mon agricultural policy " had the elfect of 
triplinir the import charges on tlie poultry we 
shipped to Germany and sharply raising the 
pric« to German consumers. After patient and 
persistent eti'orts over manj' months had faileti 
to secure any significant easement of these 
onerous charges, we were compelled, at the be- 
ginning of this year, to raise tarilfs upon items 
involving an equivalent volume of EEC exports 
to the U.S/ We regretted doing this, but we 
felt we had to make the point — and make it 
forcofidly — that the Connnon Market, in put- 
ting its agricultural policy into effect, cannot 
with impunity ignore the interests of its out- 
side suppliers. 

High Level of Proposed Grain Prices 

Meanwhile, the EEC came forward in Decem- 
ber with two highly important proposals in the 
field of agriculture. 

The first deals with the fixing of wheat and 
feed grain prices at a common level within the 
EEC, a step required for a common agricul- 
tural policy. Presently, there is a wide range 
of grain prices within the EEC, with Germany 
having the highest and France the lowest. The 
EEC proposed that the common prices be fixed 
at levels between these extremes — levels which 
are, however, far above world prices. 

"Without going into details, I can say that we 
think that these proposed prices are too high. 
They will artificially stimulate increased grain 
production, particularly in France. They will 
tend to make the European Economic Com- 
munity more dependent upon uneconomic pro- 
duction and hence threaten the markets which 
we and other efficient farm products exporters 
presently enjoy there. 

Here again, European interests are affected as 
well as ours. The price of grain is a basic ele- 
ment in the cost of living. In particular, the 
proposed high prices for feed grains will lead to 
higher prices for meat and milk, which are in- 
creasingly important in the European diet as 
standards of living go up. 

" For statements by Mr. Herter. see ibid., June 24, 
196.3, p. 996, and Oct. 14, 1963, p. 605. 

' For text of Proclamation 3564, see ibid., Dec. 23, 
1963, p. 969. 

Many of the problems we see developing in 
agriculture trade and in the negotiations stem 
from the high level of grain prices the EEC is 
now considering. A decision to unify grain 
prices at substantially lower levels would make 
an important contribution to the Kennedy 
Round. I cannot stress too strongly the effect 
of the grain prices finally adopted by the EEC 
on the outcome of the whole trade negotiations. 

EEC Agricultural Negotiating Plan 

The second EEC proposal concerns the frame- 
work within which the agricultural negotiations 
in general should be carried on. This proposal 
has been described as one to bind the level of 
agricultural protection. Actually, it is pro- 
posed that all the major trading nations — food 
exporters and importers alike — make commit- 
ments with regard to their various present sys- 
tems of agricultural subsidies and/or price sup- 
ports — but there appear to be so many loopholes 
in this proposal that the commitments would 
not, in fact, be meaningful. 

The concept is simple at first sight, but its im- 
plementation would be immensely complicated. 
I shan't discuss it in detail here, but I will 
summarize our reactions. 

First, we cannot reconcile the Commission's 
proposals with decisions of GATT ministers 
which stated that there should be a significant 
liberalization of world trade and that the nego- 
tiations should cover all classes of products, in- 
cluding agriculture. The Community's nego- 
tiating plan for agriculture seems to establish as 
the objective of the negotiations the binding of 
increased levels of protection rather than re- 
ductions in trade barriers and expansion of 

Second, the plan not only fails to provide for 
any reductions in barriers; it would introduce 
new restrictions by eliminating existing tariff 
bindings, including zero bindings, and create the 
possibility of increased protection on all agri- 
cultural tariff items. It would halt any further 
development of trade based upon comparative 
advantage or changes in relative efficiency. In 
our view the point of departure of the negotia- 
tions must be existing concessions, and the pur- 
pose of the negotiations must be to achieve a 
further liberalization of trade. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


Third, there would be no stability of agricul- 
tural concessions, since the whole system under 
the Community's proposal terminates and has to 
be renegotiated every 3 years. A country which 
is a major exporter of agricultural products 
would have difficulty in assessing the balance of 
its advantages and disadvantages at the conclu- 
sion of the negotiations and would face the need 
for making a reassessment at the end of 3 years. 

For these and other reasons, the proposed 
EEC agricultural negotiating plan is neither ac- 
ceptable nor workable as a general negotiating 

U.S. Approach to Agricultural Trade 

Our approach to agricultural trade is prag- 
matic rather than dogmatic. Indeed, we have 
come to the conclusion that the spectrum of 
products and problems is so wide that no single 
formula will work. 

Two weeks ago in Geneva we made certain 
procedural suggestions as to how we might get 
started on practical sector-by-sector work, to see 
which negotiating methods appear to offer the 
best prospects for success for each particular 

We see the possibility of grouping together 
certain agricultural products by the nature of 
the products themselves. Another useful 
grouping appears to be according to the nature 
of the protection in force. The following ma- 
jor groups seem to be susceptible to this prag- 
matic approach. 

We would start with the basic principle that 
all the existing zero duty bindings, such as those 
on cotton and soy beans, will be retained. There 
are many other commodities, such as fresh fruit 
and processed fruits, for which fixed tariffs con- 
stitute the sole or major form of protection. 
For these commodities, we would seek to obtain 
as advantageous tariff cuts as possible. For 
items protected by a combination of measures, 
such as poultry and rice, we would seek arrange- 
ments to assure market access and the oppor- 
tunity for growth. We would also seek the re- 
moval or reduction of nontariff barriers where 
they exist. 

For some of the major agricultural products, 
the GATT ministers decided last May that ne- 
gotiations should be undertaken to establish 

worldwide commodity arrangements. These 
are grains, meat, and possibly dairy products. 
It is for these products and these commodity 
arrangements that the EEC proposals for meas- 
uring and freezing levels of protection may have 
application— but only when combined with pro- 
visions for assuring continued access to the 
market equal to the levels of a recent representa- 
tive period and opportunity to share in future 
growth. For us, the primary objective of a 
commodity arrangement is that set forth by the 
GATT ministers — the creation of acceptable 
conditions of access to world markets. 

This is a practicable and reasonable goal. 
Indeed, it has been incorporated in the agree- 
ments in principle which we and other major 
suppliers of grain to the United Kingdom have 
recently concluded with the British Govern- 
ment. Moreover, we are willing to practice what 
we preach — and we have shown that we are. 
The recent voluntary agreements to limit beef 
and veal exports to the United States which we 
negotiated last month with Australia, New Zea- 
land, and Ireland * assure them of a reasonable 
opportunity to compete for a share in our mar- 
ket and of participation in its growth. We be- 
lieve that these are sound principles for nego- 
tiating worldwide grains or meat arrangements. 

The negotiation of a world grains arrange- 
ment is an ambitious undertaking. While these 
negotiations will be lengthy, they must move 
along in phase with the industrial aspects of the 
Kennedy Round. 

I have said we are pragmatic. The overall 
result is what counts for us. We must obtain 
from these negotiations arrangements that in- 
sure, broadly speaking, achievement of the ob- 
jective established by the GATT ministers — 
"acceptable conditions of access to world mar- 
kets for agricultural products in furtherance of 
a significant development and expansion of 
world trade in such products." 

Its achievement would serve the interests of 
everyone— producers and consumers, exporting 
and importing countries. The benefits of in- 
creased trade, based upon relative efficiency, can 
be as great in agriculture as they have proven 
to be in industry. We cannot expect to move 

■ For texts, see ibid.. Mar. 9, 1964, p. 381, and Mar. 
23, 1964, p. 468. 



toward freer trade in industrial jiroducts if we 
at the same time leave agricultiiro stagnating 
in a morass of protectionism, or even sinking 
deeper into it. That is why I have said, often 
and emphatically, that the United States will 
enter into no ultimate agreement unless sig- 
nificant progress is registered toward trade lib- 
eralization in agricultural as well as in in- 
dustrial products. 
I said at the beginning of my talk that trade 

seems to dominate the international stage this 
year. That is partly because the danger of war 
has receded. And if the sounds emanating 
from trade negotiations sometimes remind us 
of the haggling at an oriental bazaar, they are 
nevertheless infinitely preferable to the thunder 
of guns. Moreover, in trade negotiations, unlike 
war, there need be no victors and no vanquished. 
As President Kennedy liked to say, a rising tide 
lifts all the boats. 

Foreign and Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws 

by Abba P. Schwartz 

Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs^ 

It is most gratifying to me to have the oppor- 
tunity to respond to your invitation to present 
to you this morning some observations on the 
foreign and domestic implications of our immi- 
gration laws and of our assistance to migrants 
and refugees abroad. 

As I entered this chapel today, I was shown 
the window which briefly depicts the historical 
origin of St. Olaf College. As you, and I, and 
others who are privileged to attend or visit this 
college become absorbed in the present beauty of 
the campus, impressed by the structures which 
have been built on this hill, aware of the aca- 
demic standards and the scholarly achievements 
of those who have studied and taught here, and 
familiar with the nationally known names of 
Eolvaag and Christiansen — as all of this con- 
fronts us, we cannot help but be overwhelmed by 
the significance of the contribution a small 
group of Norwegian immigrants has made to 
our American way of life. This institution is 
one more example — and a good example — of 
what is possible when a country opens its doors 
to immigrants. 

' Address made at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn., 
on Apr. 3 (press release 139 dated Apr. 1). 

We in the Department of State who have the 
responsibility for developing and applying 
United States policies in this area feel that the 
opportunities to discuss these matters with the 
public come all too infrequently, particularly in 
communities west of our eastern seaboard. 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was 
always mindful and proud of his Dutch herit- 
age, reminded us on several occasions that "we 
are all immigrants" and that the contributions 
which first-generation immigrants have made 
to the cultural and economic life of our country 
is in no small measure responsible for our 

Because of our heritage and the fact that the 
United States since the end of the Second 
World War has been placed in a role of critical 
leadership in a troubled and constantly chang- 
ing world, we are concerned to see to it that 
our immigration laws reflect our real charac- 
ter and objectives and maintain for us tlie image 
of ourselves as Americans that we would like to 
achieve abroad. The nature of this image 
plays an important role in the achievement of 
our foreign policies generally. 

Someplace in American history, Americans, 

APRIL 27, 1964 


who were immigrants themselves, began to be- 
lieve that the geographical and national origin 
of a man determined his suitability as an immi- 
grant. Subsequently this was codified into law 
and became our national immigration policy. 
At the same time in American history, however, 
Americans themselves learned to judge their 
fellow Americans on the basis of ability, indus- 
triousness, intelligence, integrity, and all the 
other factors which truly determine a man's 
value to society. In most laws of our nation 
we recognize this, except in our immigration 
laws, where we continue to imply judgment of 
a man on the basis of his national and geo- 
graphical origin. 

It is not hard to imagine, therefore, the impli- 
cation of this policy when it is interpreted to 
a man from a geographical area or of a national 
origin which is not "favored" by our present 
laws. Wliether an individual wants to come to 
the United States or not, he is left with the im- 
pression that our standards of judgment are 
not based on the merits of the individual — as 
we claim to judge men — but rather on an as- 
sumption which can be interpreted as bias and 

Thus, inasmuch as our immigration laws are 
interpreted as the basis of how we evaluate 
others around the world, it is not difficult to 
understand the impact this has on people 
abroad and its effect on our foreign relations. 
Therefore, if for no other reason than to tell 
people aromid the world the basis on which 
we actually judge ourselves and others— not to 
speak of the contributions all immigrant cul- 
tures and traditions have made to our way of 
life — a revision of our immigration laws is fully 
justified. We have the same concern with re- 
spect to reactions to our assistance abroad since 
World War II to migrants, refugees, displaced 
persons, and uprooted persons generally. 

The history of irmnigration to the United 
States is really the liistory of this country. 
The foundations of this nation were laid by peo- 
ple escaping oppression. The Puritans, the 
Huguenots, the Quakers, the Scotch-Irish, and 
the Spanish-Portuguese Jews were all refugees 
in their time. 

As far back as 1644 people speaking 18 dif- 
ferent languages were living side by side peace- 

fully in the town of New Amsterdam on Man- 
hattan Island. New York continued to wel- 
come the oppressed of every nation of Europe. 
This miion of diverse cultures and skills helped 
that State to attain its unique position in manu- 
facturing, conmierce, finance, and government. 
A roster of pioneers in the organization of 
many of our industries would fill many pages. 
Among them : 

— John Jacob Astor, a German immigrant, 
was the great pioneer in the fur industry ; 

— Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish immigrant 
boy, founded the American steel industry ; 

— Joseph Pulitzer, a Himgarian immigrant, 
made a great contribution to journalism; 

— Michael Cudahy, Irish, was one of the most 
successful figures in the development of the 
meatpacking industry ; 

■ — Joseph Bulova, Czech — the watch indus- 

— David Sarnoff, Russian — radio ; 

— Charles L. Fleischmann, Hungarian — the 
yeast industry ; 

—Frederick Weyerhaeuser, German — the 
lumber industry ; 

— William S. Knudsen, Dane — the automo- 
bile industry. 

And behind these eminent names are hundreds 
of thousands of nameless men and women who 
brought other important industries to this coxm- 
try. Our clothing industry was developed by 
German, Austrian, Russian, and Italian immi- 
grants and in recent years has been sustained 
by "migrants" from Puerto Rico and new immi- 
grants from other parts of the world. Our 
watchmaking industry was developed by French 
and Swiss immigrants; our pottei-y and china- 
ware industry by German immigrants; and the 
cheese industry by Germans and Swiss. 

Equally revealing are the many immigrants 
whose inventions formed the basis for American- 
bom entrepreneurs to develop our great indus- 
trial base. To mention only a few : Ole Evin- 
rude (Norwegian) — who invented the outboard 
motor; John Ericsson (Swedish) — the ironclad 
ship; David Lindquist (Swedish) — the electric 
elevator; Conrad Huber (Russian) — the flash- 
light; Michael Pupin (Serbian) — great discov- 
eries in electricity; David Thomas (Welsh- 
man) — the hot blast furnace; Alexander 



Graham licll (Scotsman), who invented the 

Many of these immiprunts entered our coun- 
trj- as children — young and unknown. They 
attended our schools and our laboratories. 
Their drive, their imagination, their desire to 
"prove themselves" helped to make United 
States industry the greatest in the world and 
our standard of living the highest. 

Many of the refugees who fled from Hitler's 
tyranny, such as Albert Einstein, were persons 
of great distinction who contributed immeas- 
urably to our scientific and cultural develop- 
ment, but others were small children, who fled 
with their families to this country for safety. 
Today they are working with other young sci- 
entists in our laboratories, helping to conquer 
space. The spirit that is so typically Ameri- 
can — the welcoming of people of all back- 
grounds and the freedom of opportunity — has 
helped the immigrant and the refiigee, who, in 
turn, have helped the United States. 

History of U.S. Immigration Policy 

The Federal Government at the outset of our 
history established a liberal immigration policy. 
The Constitution embodies civil rights provi- 
sions and a liberal attitude toward religious and 
ethnic differences. Ours was the first national 
state to proclaim the principle that there should 
be no religious test for office holding. And only 
the President of the United States must be native 
bom. All other officerholders may be natural- 
ized citizens. 

The Federal Government utilized the princi- 
ple of religious freedom to stimulate immigra- 
tion. After the adoption of the Federal Con- 
stitution in 1789 Congress passed the first Fed- 
eral legislation on immigration, which included 
a naturalization and a quarantine law. 

During the 1830's there was a large influx 
of immigrants from famine-stricken Ireland. 
Between 1841 and 1850 there was substantial 
refugee emigration from Germany. The com- 
bined German and Irish immigration was 1,713,- 
000 for the decade. Immigration for the next 
decade to 1860 increased to 2,598,000. The 
Scandinavians began to arrive after the Civil 
"War and settled in the Midwest. 

In the 1880's appreciable numbers of immi- 

grants entered for (he first time from Eastern 
and Southern Europe. They were the "new" 
immigrants. They came from the Ralkans, 
Central Europe, from Russia, and from Italy. 
Between 1882 and 1889 large numbers of Jews 
fled persecution from czarist terrors in Russia 
and began to enter the United States. Between 
1897 and 1914 our average immigration ex- 
ceeded a million a year. The new immigrants 
numbered 10 million, as against approximately 
3 million during the earlier period. 

With the development of urban society and 
huge industries in the cities, sociological changes 
took place. The problems of unplanned growth 
were blamed on the immigrant. The "new" im- 
migrants were represented as unwanted people 
in contrast with the "old," who in retrospect 
were glamourized as highly selected, adventur- 
ous, and specially trained. People forgot that 
the "old" were sometimes indentured servants, 
persons who had been imprisoned for debts. In 
reality, each new wave of immigrants had cre- 
ated fears in the "old." So the Irish and Ger- 
mans were accused of creating economic prob- 

This "fear of the stranger" played an impor- 
tant role in the restrictive immigration policies 
which developed. Labor itself, fearing for its 
jobs, was anti-immigration in that period. The 
immigrants were blamed for the industrial 

The restriction against Asiatics began with 
the barring of Chinese in 1882. It was the 
beginning of the use of racialism as a basis for 
restrictive immigration. The Japanese were 
next, and in 1917 the Asiatic Barred Zone was 
created. This act was passed despite President 
Wilson's veto and excluded persons from parts 
of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malaya 
states, the Asian part of Russia, part of Arabia, 
part of Afghanistan, most of the Polynesian Is- 
lands, and the East Indian Islands. As you can 
see, this represents a large part of the world. It 
was the progenitor of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, 
which I shall describe later, and of the 1924 act 
whicli used the national-origins quota system as 
the basis for allocating visas. 

Under the national-origins quota sj^stem 
which is embodied in our current immigration 
law each country outside of the Western Ilemi- 

APRIL 2 7, 1964 


sphere is allotted a specific number (a quota) 
of immigrants who may be admitted to the 
United States each year. This allocation is 
based on a proportion of a total equal to the 
proportion of the population in the United 
States in 1920 whose national origins, including 
ancestry, could be attributed to that particular 
country. The 1924 Immigration Act limited 
quota immigration to 150,000 and lessened the 
possibility of large-scale immigration from 
Eastern and Southern Europe because the basic 
formula resulted in disproportionate quotas to 
Northern European countries. 

In 1952 the immigration and nationality laws 
were codified and revised by Congress, and that 
law governs our basic immigration policies to- 
day. The 1952 act retained the national-origins 
principle as the basis for a quota system and in- 
stead of the Asiatic Barred Zone substituted the 
Asia-Pacific Triangle. While many of the pro- 
visions of this law modernized procedures, and 
granted important powers to the Attorney Gen- 
eral to admit persons in emergent circumstances, 
it retained many of the late 19th-century and 
early 20th-century antagonisms. 

Under the current law 157,000 quota visas are 
authorized annually. But they are never fully 
utilized because of the manner of the allocation. 
Thousands upon thousands of persons, otherwise 
qualified for admission, await their turn on the 
quota lists. 

A mother born in Ireland could join her son 
in the United States immediately, I am glad to 
say, because tlie Irish quota is large and never 
fully used. But a mother of an American citi- 
zen may not be able to join her son in this coun- 
try if she was born in Greece or Turkey, which 
have small quotas. Under the present law a 
parent of an American citizen is entitled to what 
is known as "second preference" and the law 
judges the parent's admissibility to join his child 
upon the place where the parent was born. But 
if the parent has more than 50-percent Asian 
blood, he is chargeable to the quota assigned to 
the Asian area from which he originally derived 
his Asian origin. 

Persons born in Great Britain are permitted 
65,361 quota numbers, but only about 40 percent 
are used. The unused are not available to na- 
tionals of other coimtries who desire to emigrate 

and whose skills and talents may be highly 
sought by us. Greece has a quota of 308, Hun- 
gary 865, Italy 5,666, all of which are oversub- 

Persons born in the Western Hemisphere are 
admitted nonquota. This provision of the law 
is based on our foreign policy of hemisphere 
friendship and solidarity. However, it does not 
apply to persons born in dependent colonies in 
the Western Hemisphere or to the inhabitants 
of former colonies — ^now independent — of Ja- 
maica, Trinidad, and Tobago. Wliether by 
accident or by design, this obviously does not 
serve United States foreign policy interests. 

Displaced Persons and Refugees 

Because the quotas based on national origin 
severely limit admissibility of persons of certain 
origins, it has been necessary for Congress to 
enact special legislation from time to time to 
take care of displaced persons and refugees from 
various forms of man's inhumanity to man. At 
this point I would like to digress from a discus- 
sion of our immigration laws to present a brief 
summary of what the United States has done 
since World War II in assisting uprooted per- 
sons not only to come to the United States but 
to find places of resettlement in other countries. 
The United States took the leadership in orga- 
nizing the United Nations Relief and Rehabili- 
tation Administration (UNRRA), which pro- 
vided immediate assistance to countries devas- 
tated by the Second World War and to several 
million persons who had been displaced. This 
organization was followed by the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO), a specialized 
agency established by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. The IRO moved over 
1,400,000 displaced persons, principally from 
Europe to resettlement in countries overseas. 
Upon the termination of the IRO, the United 
States took the leadership again in organizing 
the Intergovernmental Committee for European 
Migration (ICEM) in 1951. ICEM, with head- 
quarters in Geneva, Switzerland, has moved 
in the succeeding years 1,260,000 persons, in- 
cluding some 556,000 refugees from Europe and 
from mainland China through Hong Kong. 
Supported by our Government and 28 other 
member governments of the free world, that or- 



ganization continues today to move and re- 
settle refugees and migrants to new homes over- 

It is relevant to cite some of the dollar ex- 
penditures by the United States in these efforts. 
In 1945 and 194G the United States Army pro- 
vided assistance to disphiced persons apart from 
the assistance administered through UNRRA 
in the amount of $^00 million, while UNRRA 
accounted for some $'20 million of United States 
contributions in special assistance to refugees. 
The United States contribution to IRO between 
1948 and 1952 totaled $237 million. $93 mil- 
lion was spent through the United Nations Ko- 
rean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to re- 
settle displaced families who fled from North 
Korea during the Korean war. $90 million 
was provided for refugees from North Viet- 
Nam. Some $300 million to Palestine refugees 
has been channeled by us through the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales- 
tine Refugees, approximately $10 million 
through the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees to assist other refu- 
gees. $53 million has been spent through the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European 
Migration, $47 million through the United 
States Escapee Program, a direct unilateral ef- 
fort by the United States Government to assist 
postwar escapees from communism. With other 
expenditures in assistance to refugees, including 
grants of our surplus foods to various areas 
throughout the world, the total United States 
contribution from the end of World War II 
to the present for these purposes has been con- 
servatively estimated at over $1.3 billion. Such 
assistance is continuing currently at a rate of 
approximately $40 million annually. 

All of these current and past expenditures 
were public funds supplied by United States 
citizens. They do not include funds contributed 
by the American public through the well-orga- 
nized channels of voluntary effort. It is esti- 
mated that the American voluntary agencies 
themselves have contributed $1.2 billion in cash 
and commodities to assist refugees abroad since 
World War II. This is an impressive total and 
must be recorded in appraising the magnitude 
of the efforts of the United States Government 
and the Aonerican people in assisting those up- 

rooted by economic and political pressures and 
changes. This is a creditable chapter in our 
history and speaks well for the sense of resjion- 
sibility of all our citizens and our (Jovernment. 

Of equal importance, I believe, is the fact that 
since World War II, in response to specific 
refugee situations, the United States Govern- 
ment has admitted under different procedures 
over 1 million refugees from racial, religious, 
and political oppression. 42,000 were admitted 
under President Truman's directive of 1945; 
405,000 under the Displaced Persons Act of 
June 1948; 196,000 under the Refugee Relief 
Act of 1953, including 6,000 orphans; 38,000 
Hungarian refugees were admitted on parole 
under the discretionary authority granted to 
the Attorney General in the 1952 immigration 
law, immediately following the Hungarian up- 
rising in 1956. Some 150,000 refugees have 
been admitted under quota provisions of the 
regular immigration law, and since Castro took 
over Cuba we have admitted some 200,000 Cuban 

In response to the sudden influx of over 
100,000 Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in May 
1962, the Attorney General admitted some Chi- 
nese refugees on parole. Some 10,000 have ar- 
rived, and applications are still being consid- 
ered. This action promoted our foreign policy 
interest by demonstrating the humanitarian 
concern and friendship of the American people 
toward the Chinese people. 

As a result of varied experience under these 
special legislative acts benefiting refugees, the 
Congress enacted legislation in 1960 establish- 
ing the so-called "fair share" principle, under 
which we accept under parole 25 percent of all 
the refugees accepted collectively by all coun- 
tries of immigration in a preceding 6 montlis' 
period. To date some 13,025 refugees have been 
so accepted. 

You are probably much more familiar with 
the hospitality which the United States has 
afforded in recent years to over 200,000 refugees 
from Cuba, most of whom arrived in Florida 
but are gradually being relocated throughout 
the country. This was the first instance in 
experience in which the United States became 
a country of first asylum for refugees. 

The contributions of the United States Gov- 

AFRIL 27, 1964 


ernment and of the ^ynerican people in receiv- 
ing refugees and in providing funds and serv- 
ices for their relief abroad have played an im- 
portant role in our foreign policies. Our 
generous and quick responses to refugee situa- 
tions have characterized our function of leader- 
ship in a disturbed -world and stimulated similar 
actions by other governments. 

Proposals for Revision of Present Law 

The foregoing telescopic treatment of the 
past, although admittedly incomplete in many 
details, lays the groundwork for our considera- 
tion of the problem at present. 

We believe that American immigration policy 
as expressed in our laws is important both to 
our foreign policy and the domestic welfare of 
the United States. The national-origins quota 
system does not truly reflect the real character 
of the American people, but it does give a false 
image of our thinking to the world. Its effect 
is that a Greek is not as welcome as a Pole, 
and a Pole is not as welcome as a German. 
And it is based not on what you may be today 
but on where you were born. 

The present law grants priorities (prefer- 
ences) to certain family members and to persons 
with certain skills. But why should parents 
of American citizens be given only "second 
preference" in the quota, if their children want 
them? Wliy shoidd there be any quota at all 
for a parent of a United States citizen? And 
why should the parent of a legally resident alien 
not even be given a preference ? 

According to present law, a person whose 
services are detennined to be needed in the 
country because of education, technical training, 
specialized experience, or exceptional ability is 
entitled to "first preference." This is in the 
self-interest of the United States, since we bene- 
fit from all the education and experience. But 
even before such a preference is granted, an 
employer must produce a job, often to an un- 
known person and without any assurance that a 
petition for a preference will be granted. This 
is just one aspect of a complicated system which 
leaves some quotas filled and others unfilled. 
Does this add to our image of knowing how to 
do things well ? We should certainly te able to 
devise something better. 

Leaders of religious, civic, labor, and social 
service agencies have been calling for a change 
in the present system of allocating visas. They 
have endorsed strongly the historic step taken 
by the lat« President Kennedy in calling for 
the elimination of the national-origins quota 
system. In a special message to the Congress,^ 
President Kennedy on July 23, 1963, said: 

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am 
recommending relates to the national origins system 
of selecting Immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used 
to determine the number of quota immigrants per- 
mitted to enter the United States each year. Ac- 
cordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting 
deals with many problems which require remedial 
action, it concentrates attention primarily upon re- 
vision of our quota immigration system. The en- 
actment of this legislation will not resolve all of our 
important problems in the field of immigration law. 
It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which 
we can build in developing an immigration law that 
serves the national interest and reflects in every de- 
tail the principles of equality and human dignity to 
which our nation subscribe.?. 

President Johnson in January 1964, in liis 
remarks at the White House to representatives 
of organizations interested in immigration and 
refugee matters,' stated : 

We have met for the purpose of pointing up the 
fact that we have very serious problems In trying to 
get a fair immigration law. There is now before the 
Congress a bill that, I hope, can be supported by a 
majority of the Members of the Congress. 

This bill applies new tests and new standards which 
we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer 
specifically to : What is the training and qualification 
of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind 
of a citizen would he make, if he were admitted? 
What is his relationship to persons in the United 
States? And what is the time of his application? 
These are rules that are full of common sense, com- 
mon decency, which operate for the common good. 

That is why in my state of the Union message last 
Wednesday * I said that I hoped that in establishing 
preferences a nation that was really built by im- 
migrants — immigrants from all lands — could ask those 
who seek to Immigrate now : What can you do for 
our country? But we ought to never ask: In what 
country were you born? 

Before I elaborate on the position of the 
administration on immigration policy as ex- 
pressed by President Kennedy and President 

^ For text, see Bitlletin of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298. 
3 For text, see if)i<!.. Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211. 
* Ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110. 



Johnson antl on tlieir proposals for a revision 
of the law, I should like to comment on two 
other topics at issue in any reconsideration of 
iVmerican immigration policy. 

Policy on Asian Immigration 

One is the ai)proac-h (o Asian immigration 
reflected in our immigration laws, which I men- 
tioned earlier. Concern about the effect of the 
large number of Chinese and Japanese immi- 
grants in the latter part of the 19th century 
led eventually to the enactment of the so-called 
Chinese Exclusion Acts and of other laws prac- 
tically closing our doors to Japanese and other 
Asian immigrants. A reversal of this policy 
was initiated by President Franklin D. Roose- 
velt when he urged the Congress to eliminate 
the Chinese Exclusion Act and to astablish a 
quota for Cliinese persons. Congress complied 
with the President's request in 1943 and passed 
a similar law on behalf of Indian immigrants 
in 19-16. These acts, however, permitted only 
a token immigration of Chinese and Indian 
immigrants, since the entire volume of immi- 
gration from these two countries was governed 
by the small quotas set up for them, 105 for 
Chinese and 100 for Indians. In other words, 
no provisions were made to permit Chinese or 
Indian wives or children of United States citi- 
zens to join their husbands and parents without 
quota restrictions as in the case of non-Asian 
immigrants. The need for a more humane pol- 
icy toward Asian immigrants became apparent 
when an increasing number of our service- 
men during and after the Second World War 
married girls of various Asian ancestry. The 
Congress, after first responding to this situa- 
tion by the passage of special legislation, placed 
Asian spouses and children of United States 
citizens on equal footing with non-Asian 
spouses and children when it enacted the Im- 
migration and Nationality Act in 1952. This 
was a major development which in the heat of 
debate about the merits and demerits of 
our Immigration Act has frequently been 

While the 1952 law took this step forvvard, 
it continued to treat Asian immigrants differ- 
ently from non-Asians. It requires that an 
Asian person bom outside of the Asian area 

be charged to the quota of his ethnic origin, 
rather than to the quota of his place of birtli. 
On the other hand, Asians have benefited from 
the special displaced persons and refugee legis- 
lation and also from the special laws passed by 
the Congress to remove pressures from heavily 
overeubscribed quotas. 

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 

jVnother area of concern in our immigration 
policy is the limitation of our good-neighbor 
policy to those coimtries of the Western Hemi- 
sphere which were independent at the time of 
the enactment of the Immigration and Nation- 
ality Act in 1952. Countries in the Caribbean 
area which have gained their independence 
since 1952 are treated as quota areas. They 
are Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, each 
having an annual quota of 100. Since Con- 
gress first imposed quotas in 1921 on the volume 
of immigration, it has always exempted persons 
bom in any independent country of this hemi- 
sphere. It is hoped that the Congress will 
adhere to tliis policy with respect to newly in- 
dependent countries when it reconsiders our 
immigration policy and thus make our hemi- 
spheric policy consistent. 

Wliat is the outlook for a congressional re- 
view of immigration policy, and what is the 
stand the executive branch has taken on tlus 
issue ? 

President Kennedy submitted to the Congress 
in July of 1963 a request for a revision of our 
immigration laws, urging specifically that the 
Congress, over a period of 5 yeai-s, eliminate 
the national-origins system and that it imme- 
diately place Asians on the same footing with 
all other immigrants and give nonquota status 
to all persons bom in independent countries of 
the Western Hemisphere. Bills reflecting the 
President's proposals have been introduced in 
the House by Representative Emanuel Celler 
of New York and in the Senate by Philip Hart 
of Michigan. Senators Hubert H. Humphrey 
and Eugene J. McCarthy have cosponsored the 
bill. Earlier this year the Senate held some 
hearings on the administration bill. After the 
Congress has taken final action on the pending 
civil rights bill, it is expected that it will con- 
sider President Kennedy's and President John- 




son's request for a revision of the immigration 

WHaen Congi-ess deliberates the recommenda- 
tions of the achninistration, an important fac- 
tor vrill be the recognition that the changes 
proposed, M'liich may appear far-reaching to 
the superficial reader of our laws, are not dras- 
tic departures from our present policies. 
Rather they would reconcile the letter of our 
general law with the immigration jDolicy of the 
United States as it has developed during the 
last 10 years as a result of refugee and other 
special legislation enacted by the Congress. A 
recognition of this fact sliould be a persuasive 
factor in the considerations of the Congress. 

No one in the brief time allotted for this pres- 
entation can do justice to the subject. I can 
only hope that I may have convinced you that it 
is important that our immigration laws reflect 
our national character and objectives more ac- 
curately. Surely our concern is not for the ac- 
cident of place of birth but for the inherent 
moral worth of the individual who seeks to come 
to our shores. 

I also hope that you will be stimulated to help 
our Government and voluntary groups to do 
more in meeting the needs of those who must 
seek new opportunities for dignity and self- 
dependence through emigration to another 


Communications Satellite Program 
and the Department of State 

Statement hy Abram Chayes 
Legal Adviser^ 

Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss on behalf 
of the Department of State some of the inter- 
national aspects of the communications satellite 
program. It would perliaps be helpful if I 
identify and comment briefly on three areas of 
particular interest to the Department. 

First: Policy statements l)y the President - 
and llu". Communications Satellite Act itself 
establish broad national objectives in the for- 
eign policy field. In particular, it is the 
announced policy of the T"fnited States to 
favor the creation of a single global communica- 
tions satellite system with opportunities open 
to all nations to particijiate thcicin, (mOhm- as 

'Made before tlie Military Ojieratioii.s Subfoniniittee 
of the ("Dimnittee on Goveniiiieiit ()|icratioiis on 
Apr. 8 (iircHS release l.'il). 

'For texts, see IUji.lktin of .\iik. 11, VMM, \\. L'T.'J ; 
Sept. 21, 1!M;2, p. 4G7; and Dec. !l, 1!)(!.'}, p. 1)04. 

coowners or lessees of capacity in the system. 
Access to the system is to be nondiscriminatory, 
and care and attention are to be directed toward 
providing communication satellite services to 
economically less developed countries and areas 
as well as those more highly developed. 

As you loiow, a number of preliminary talks 
with future foreign partners of the corporation 
liave been held over the past year in preparation 
for the negotiation of international arrange- 
ments to set up the structure of the global sys- 
tem. In the preparation and conduct of these 
talks the corporation and the Department have 
enjoyed cjccellent working relations character- 
ized by close and effective collaboration, and we 
continue to do so. In this way the Department 
has been discharging its responsibilities in the 
imjilementation of the foreign policy objectives 
I have already- mentioned. 

Second : Tiie Department is closely involved 
witli the preparation of United States positions 
and conduct of negotiations relating to the allo- 
calion of radio frequencies for the various com- 
munication .'services. It sliould be noted that 
section 102(b) of the Connnunications Satellite 



Act directs that care and attention be given to 
eflScient and economical use of the electro- 
magnetic frequency spectrum. I am pleased to 
confirm that a major milestone in this Held was 
successfully passed last fall at the Extraor- 
dinary Administrative Eadio Conference on 
Space Communications of the International 
Telecommunication Union.' Satisfactory allo- 
cations of frequencies were made by the Confer- 
ence, and agreement was reached on procedures 
for their notification and use. The Department 
has a continuing interest in the international 
aspects of frequency management generally 
and as it affects the communications satellite 
program. Lieutenant Colonel [Seymour] 
Stearns of the Telecommunications Division of 
the Department is with me today and is pre- 
pared to respond in detail to any questions you 
may have on this phase of the Department's 

Tliird : The Department is itself a major user 
of telecommmiication services, and its facilities 
are part of the National Communications Sys- 
tem. The Department expects to benefit as a 
user from the further development of that sys- 
tem. Mr. [John W.] Coffey, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Communications, will answer any 
questions in this area. 

Against this background it can readily be 
appreciated that the Department has followed 
with interest the discussions between the Com- 
munications Satellite Corporation and the Sec- 
retary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the 
National Communications System, relating to 
the possibility of shared use by the United 
States Government of the global commercial 
communications satellite system to be brought 
into existence by the corporation and its future 
foreign partners. 

The Department has been kept fully informed 
of the progress of these discussions by repre- 
sentatives of both the Department of Defense 
and the corporation and has participated in 
them as appropriate. To date, the discussions 
have not resulted in any agreed basis for shared 
use. We are hopeful that a shared use of the 
global system can be worked out without in any 
way jeopardizing the policy objectives set forth 
in the act. But we do not believe it possible to 

say in the abstract whether or not this can be 
accomplished. When the current discussions 
result in a basis of agreement it will liave to be 
explained to and reviewed with the corporation's 
future partners. 

Finally, the Department of State is satisfied 
that all parties to the present discussions fully 
recognize the necessity that any specific arrange- 
ments for governmental use of the system sliould 
not impair the successful implementation of the 
national objectives to which I have referred. 
Final decisions, therefore, will be made in the 
light of the results of discussion with future for- 
eign partners of a specific program which must 
first be defined to the mutual satisfaction of the 
corporation and the Executive Agent of the Na- 
tional Communications System. The Depart- 
ment of State will, of course, actively participate 
in this process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes 
my prepared statement. I will be glad to an- 
swer any questions you and your colleagues may 

President Reports to Congress 
on Food for Peace Program 

White House press release dated April 3 

President Johnson reported to the Congress 
on April 3 that $1.6 billion worth of Food for 
Peace commodities were shipped overseas dur- 
ing 1963 as the United States set a new export 
record for farm products. 

The 19th semiannual report on activities un- 
der Public Law 480 ^ showed that total U.S. 
agricultural exports for the 1963 calendar year 
reached $5.6 billion, a 12-percent jump over the 
$5 billion volume in 1962. 

In a memorandum to the President accom- 
panying the July-December 1963 report, Rich- 
ard W. Renter, Director of Food for Peace, said 
that P.L. 480 "provides a ladder by which de- 
veloping nations climb to full trade partnership 
with the United States." He added: "It is 
significant that while $1.6 billion worth of Food 
for Peace commodities were being shipped over- 
seas during the 1963 calendar year, U.S. com- 

• For background, see ibid., Nov. 25, 1963, p. 835. 

' H. Doc. 294, 88th Cong., 2d sees. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


mercial exports of agricultural coromodities 
reached a record high of $4 billion." 

Noting tliat P.L. 480 will be 10 years old next 
July 10, Mr. Reuter advised the President that 
from a modest beginning, the program lias 
grown until, at the end of 1963, a total of $11.4 
billion worth of Food for Peace commodities 
had been delivered overseas. 

"Whereas only a few ships per month were 
required during those early days, today an 
average of five 10,000 ton ships leave American 
ports every day carrying Food for Peace car- 
goes to the hmigry of the world," Mr. Eeuter 
said. "Hundreds of millions of people a year 
now receive food — otherwise unavailable to 
them — from this sharing of the abundance of 
our farms." 

The President's report on the overeeas use of 
our food resources highlighted the following: 

— The Alliance for Progress project "Opera- 
tion Niilos" is now providing supplemental food 
daily to 10 million children and by the end of 
tliis year should reach 12 million — one out of 
every three school-age children in Latin Amer- 
ica. Cooperating alliance coimtries are them- 
selves contributing $13 million in equipment, 
supplies, and services to this massive education- 
nutrition effort. 

— -In country after coimtiy around the world, 
there is a shift from family relief feeding pro- 
grams to food-for-work and other "bootstrap" 
community development programs. Seven 
hundred thousand workers in 22 countries are 
earning food for their families — an estimated 
4 million persons — in part payment for their 
labor on projects ranging from scliool and road 
construction to land reclamation, irrigation, and 

— Food for Peace sales programs continue to 
encourage other nations to shift from food pur- 
chases with their own currencies to dollar-credit 
and cash purchases as their economies improve. 
In the past 21/^ years, 33 agreements for food 
purchases for long-term dollar credit (title IV) 
were entered into with 17 countries. In gen- 
eral, these new agreements represented a shift 
from purchases using only foreign currency 
(title I) to purchases for long-temi dollar credit 
or a dollar credit-foreign currency combination. 

— The first dollar repayments were made by 

foreign governments of credit extended under 
earlier title IV agreements, with receipts to the 
U.S. totaling $2.3 million. 

— Foreign currencies received by the United 
States from title I sales were increasingly used 
to pay U.S. overseas expenses, preventing a dol- 
lar outflow equivalent to $253.3 million during 
the year. 

"I am convinced that the Food for Peace 
program in the short run can effectively and 
economically meet human needs and in the long 
run can contribute significantly to the expansion 
of trade and the development of new world 
markets," Mr. Eeuter smnmed up the report to 
the President. "Public Law 480 has proven a 
most effective way to help close the 'food gap' 
that exists between the 'have' and the 'have not' 
nations of the world." 

The Food for Peace program is a mult i agency 
United States effort supervised and coordinated 
by the Food for Peace office in the Wliite House 
and administered primarily by the Department 
of Agriculture and the Agency for International 
Development of the Department of State. 



The Senate on April 7 confirmed the following nomi- 
nations : 

Henry L. T. Koren to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Congo (Brazzaville). (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated March 20.) 

Rutherford II. Poats to be Assistant Administrator 
for the Far East, Agency for International Develoi>- 
ment. (For biographic details, see White House press 
release dated JIareh 8.) 

Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 1G2 dated April 13.) 

Mrs. Katharine Ellius White to be Ambassador to 
Denmark. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated March 20.) 


Jlrs. Lee Walsh as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Evaluations, effective April li. ( For biographic details, 



sw Iippiirlim'Ul 

of State press release 14.") dated 


Canada Continues Suspension 
of Welland Canal Toils 


The Department of State announced on April 
9 (press release 155) an exchange of notes with 
the Government of Canada regarding the sus- 
pension of tolls on the Welland Canal. The 
tolls, which were suspended as of Julj' 18, 1962, 
and were to be reimposed April 1, 1964, will 
continue to be suspended. 


Ottawa, March 31, 1'JGi. 
No. 291 

KxiKi.i.KNCY : I have the honor to refer to your note 
No. 4(> datiHl March ,S1, 1!»04 in wliieh you refer to the 
intergovernmental agreement Ity excliange of notes 
dated December 19 and 2(), IOCS, regarding the rcim- 
position of tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 
l!>r>4, at the rates and tinder the terms In effect im- 
mediately prior to the suspension of these tolls in 1962. 

You state that upon re-examination of this matter 
the Canadian Government has concluded that it would 
be preferable not to reimpose the tolls on the Welland 
Canal at the present time. I have been instructed by 
my Government to Inform you that the proposal not to 
reimpose tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964 
is at'cei>table. 

Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute 
an agreement between our two Governments to continue 
in force, beyond April 1, 19G4, the agreement recorded 
in (he exchange of notes of July 3 and 13, 19C2 in re- 
lation to the Welland Canal. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Ivan B. AVhite 
Charge d'Affaires ad interim 


Ottawa, March SI, 1964. 
No. 46 

Excellency, I have the honotir to refer to Note No. 
198 of December 19, 1963 ' to you from the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs and to your reply in Note 
202 of December 20, 1963 ' regarding the intention of 
the Government of Canada to reimpose tolls on the 
Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964 at the rates and under 
the terms existing immediately prior to the suspen- 
sion of these tolls in 1962. 

The Canadian Government has now re-examined this 
matter and has come to the conclusion that it would 
be preferable not to reimpose tolls on the Welland 
Canal at the present time. 

Accordingly I have the honour to propose that this 
Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement be- 
tween our two Governments to continue in force be- 
yond April 1, 1964, the Agreement recorded in the Ex- 
change of Notes of July 3 and 13, 1962 - in relation to 
the Welland Canal. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Paul Mabtin 
Secretary of State for External Affairs 

' For text, see Bct.letin of Jan. 13, 1964, p. 68. 
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 255. 

Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 

Done at New York June 4. 1954. Entered into force 

September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 

Accessions deposited: Cuba (with reservation), Octo- 
ber 23, 1963; Hungary (with reservation), October 
29, 1963. 


Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.' 

Signatures: Portugal, March 11, 1964; Venezuela {ad 
referendum), March 13, 1964. 

Fur Seals 

Protocol amending the interim convention of February 

9. 1957 (TIAS 3948), on conservation of North Pa- 
cific fur seals. Done at Washington Octolier S, 1963. 
Ratification deposited: Japan, April 10. 1904. 
Entered into force: April 10, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty bannini; nuclear weapon test.s in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 

10. 1963. TIAS 5433. 

notification deposited: Mauritania, April 6, 1964. 

' Not in force. 

APRIL 27, 1964 


Red Sea Lights 

International agreement regarding the maintenance of 
certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London Feb- 
ruary 20, 1962.' 
Acceptance deposited: United States, April 3, 1964. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959) (TIAS 4893), with annexes and additional 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.' 
Ratifications deposited: United States, Territories of 
the United States, April 3, 1964. 


International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa- 
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. 
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part 1 and parts 
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Japan, AprU. 10, 1964. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Taipei October 19, 1963. 
Entered into force October 19, 1963. With exchange of 
letters— Signed at Taipei October 21, 1963. TIAS 5482. 
13 pp. 100. 

Telecommunication — Radio Communications Between 
Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. Agree- 
ment with Colombia. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Bogotd November 16 and 29, 1963. Entered into force 
December 29, 1963. TIAS 5483. 4 pp. 50. 

Weather Stations — Cooperative Program on Guade- 
loupe Island. Agreement with France, extending the 
agreement of March 23, 1956, as supplemented and ex- 
tended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Paris August 
13 and November 25, 1963. Entered into force Novem- 
ber 25, 1963. Operative July 1, 1962. TIAS 5485. 4 
pp. 50. 



Agreement to continue in force beyond April 1, 1964, 
the agreement of July 3 and 13, 1962 (TIAS 5117), 
providing for the suspension of tolls on the Welland 
Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
March 31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964. 


Agreement amending agreement concerning trade In 
cotton textiles of October 19, 1963 (TIAS 5482), by 
revising agreed levels for categories 50 (trousers, 
slacks, and shorts) and 26 (cotton duck). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Taiwan February 3 and 
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. 


Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Ef- 
fected by exchanges of notes at Lisbon March 12, 
1964. Entered into force March 12, 1964. 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of November 28, 1961, as amended (TIAS 
4904, 5392). Effected by exchange of notes at Lis- 
bon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered into force 
April 3, 1964. 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V.8. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.G., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Reimposi- 
tion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with 
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa Decem- 
ber 19 and 20, 1963. Entered into force December 20, 
1963. TIAS 5481. 2 pp. 5<t. 

* Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 6-12 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to April 6 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 138 of 
March 31 and 139 of April 1. 

No. Date Subject 

*145 4/6 Mrs. Walsh sworn in as Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Evaluations 
( biographic details ) . 

*146 4/6 Rusk : death of General MacArthur. 

*147 4/6 U.S. participation in international 

148 4/7 Rusk : "The Atlantic Alliance." 

149 4/8 Portugal credentials (rewrite). 

150 4/8 Tunisia credentials (rewrite). 

151 4/8 Chayes : statement on communica- 

tions satellite program, Military 
Operations Subcommittee, House 
Committee on Government Oper- 

152 4/8 Haiti credentials (rewrite). 

153 4/8 Kenya credentials (rewrite). 

154 4/8 Iraq credentials (rewrite). 

155 4/9 Continued suspension of WeUand 

Canal tolls. 

156 4/9 Ball : "The Open System in North- 

South Relations." 

157 4/9 Meeting of Joint U.S.-Canadian 

Committee on Trade and Eco- 
nomic Affairs. 

♦158 4/9 Cleveland: "The Strategy of Edu- 
cational Development." 

*159 4/9 Itinerary for visit of King of Jor- 

tl60 4/10 Williams : "Diplomatic Rapport Be- 
tween Africa and the United 

*161 4/10 Mcllvaine designated coordinator, 
FSl National Interdepartmental 
Seminar (biographic details). 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



INDEX April 27, 1964. Vol. L, No. 1296 

Africa. New Patterns of African Trade ( Wil- 
liams) 604 


Presideut Reports to Congress on Food for Peace 
Program 683 

The Hole of Agriculture in Trade Expansion 

(Herter) 671 

American Republics. United States and Panama 
Reestablish Diplomatic Relations (Johnson, 
OAS announcement, joint declaration) . . . 655 


Canada Continues Suspension of TVelland Canal 
Tolls (Martin, White) 685 

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at 

Ottawa 670 

Congo (Brazzaville). Koren confirmed as Am- 
bassador 684 


Communications Satellite Program and the De- 
partment of State (Chayes) 682 

Confirmations (Koren, Poats, Vaughn, White) . 684 

President Reports to Congress on Food for Peace 
Program 683 

Denmark. Mrs. White confirmed as Ambassa- 
dor 684 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Walsh) 684 

Confirmations (Koren, Poats, Vaughn, White) . 684 

Economic Affairs 

The Atlantic Alliance (Rusk) 650 

Canada Continues Suspension of Welland Canal 

Tolls (Martin, White) 685 

Export Expansion and Balance of Payments 

(Johnson) 663 

New Patterns of African Trade (Williams) . . 664 

The Open System in North-SouUi Relations 

(Ball) 657 

The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion 

(Herter) 671 

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at 
Ottawa 670 

Foreign Aid 

New Patterns of African Trade (Williams) . . 664 

The Open System in North-South Relations 

(Ball) 657 

Poats confirmed as Assistant Administrator for 

the Far East, AID 684 

President Reports to Congress on Food for Peace 
Program 683 

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Th^ard) .... 662 

Immigration and Naturalization. Foreign and 
Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration 
Laws (Schwartz) 675 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo- 
matic Relations (Johnson, OAS announce- 
ment, joint declaration) 655 

Iraq. Letters of Credence (al-Hanl) 662 

Kenya. Letters of Credence (Nabwera) . . . 662 
Military Affairs. The Atlantic Alliance (Rusk) . 650 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The At- 
lantic AUiance (Rusk) 650 


United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo- 
matic Relations (Johnson, OAS announce- 
ment, joint declaration) 655 

Vaughn confirmed as Ambassador 684 

Portugal. Letters of Credence (Garin) . . , . 662 
Presidential Documents 

Export Expansion and Balance of Payments . . 663 
United States and Panama Reestablish Diplo- 
matic Relations 655 

Publications. Recent Releases 686 

Refugees. Foreign and Domestic Implications 

of U.S. Immigration Laws (Schwartz) . . . 675 

Science. Communications Satellite Program 

and the Department of State (Chayes) . . . 682 

Treaty Information 

Canada Continues Suspension of Welland Canal 

Tolls (Martin, White) 685 

Current Actions 685 

Tunisia. Letters of Credence (Driss) .... 662 
United Nations. The Open System in North- 
South Relations (Ball) 657 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 657 

Chayes, Abram 682 

Driss, Rachid 662 

Garin, Vasco Vieira 662 

al-Hani, Nasir 662 

Herter, Christian A 671 

Johnson, President 655, 663 

Koren, Henry L. T 684 

Martin, Paul 685 

Nabwera, Burudi 662 

Poats, Rutherford M 684 

Rusk, Secretary 650 

Schwartz, Abba P 675 

Th^ard, Andr6 662 

Vaughn, Jack Hood 684 

Walsh, Mrs. Lee 684 

White, Ivan B 685 

White, Mrs. Katherine Elkus 684 

Williams, G. Mennen 664 



DSB etc G 



BOSTON MASS 02 t*^ ^^ 


WASHINGTON, D.C. a 20402 





Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress 

This 12-page pamphlet is the text of an address by President Johnson at the Pan American Union 
on March 16, 1964, on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as Chairman of 
the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. 

President Jolinson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various 
areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success. 



PUBLICATION 7669 15 cents 



Please send me copies of Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress 




Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 








V oh L,N 0.1297 

May 4, 196^ 


Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Conwiunique 690 


by Assistant Secretary Williams 698 

Statement by Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara 705 


Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon 717 

For index see inside back cover 

SEATO CounciB of Ministers iVSeets at fVianiia 

The ninth meeting of the Council of Minis- 
ters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
was held at Manila, April 13-15. Following 
are texts of a statement made hy Secretary Rusk 
at the opening session on April 13 and a com- 
munique issued at the close of the meeting on 
April 15. 


It is most fitting indeed that the SEATO 
Council meeting should be held this year in 
Manila, imder the distinguished cliairmanship 
of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines, for it was here, 10 years ago, that 
the Manila Pact,^ which created the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization, was signed by eight 
nations from both hemispheres who shared the 
determination to remain free. 

I am also gladdened, Mr. Chairman, by the 
glorious welcome with which we liave been re- 
ceived by your President and his stimulating 

' For text, see Buluetin of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393. 

words to us here today and the welcome of your 
Government and your people. 

The situation facing us in the treaty area in 
1954 was fraught with peril and with severe 
problems. As you will recall, in 1954 Viet- 
Nam had just been partitioned and the pros- 
f)ects for the fledgling Republic of South Viet- 
Nam were far from promising. Laos was an 
arena of guerrilla war which had spilled over 
from the struggle in Viet-Nam between the 
French and Vietnamese forces and their Com- 
munist-led adversaries. The Communist in- 
surgency in Malaya had not then been brought 
under control by Malayan and British Com- 
monwealth jungle fighters. Throughout the 
area, economic problems — to a great extent a 
legacy of the damage wrought by World War 
II — loomed very large. 

Some of the same problems still persist. In 
Laos, despite the Geneva agreements of 1962, 
the situation remains unsettled and the pro- 
Communist Pathet Lao forces are continuing 
their military pressures against the neutralist 
and conservative forces. North Viet-Nam con- 
tinues to maintain troops in Laos, to supply 


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military equipment to the Pathet Lao, and to 
infiltrate Viet Cong through Laos into Soutli 
Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva agree- 
ments of 1962. 

South Viet-Nam is the target of a continuing 
aggi'ession directed, supported, and supplied 
from Hanoi. The Communists have increased 
their attacks. But the Govermnent and people 
of South Viet-Nam are moving witli firm de- 
termination to defeat this aggression. 

My country has been encouraged by the vig- 
orous reaction of General [Nguyen] Khanh 
and his government to the campaign of Com- 
munist terror and subversion, as well as by the 
Vietnamese Government's clear recognition 
that this war will not be won by militarj' action 
alone but that there must be economic and so- 
cial progress among all elements of the Viet- 
namese people. 

We tend to be preoccupied with our own 
problems in the free world. But let us not lose 
sight of the serious difficulties within the Com- 
munist world. These stem in part from the 
economic failures of communism, in part from 
divergent views and interests among Commu- 
nist leaders and states, including historic na- 
tional differences. These internal quarrels 
limit the grave capabilities of the Communist 
world. And the boast that commimism was the 
economic shortcut to the future for developing 
coimtries has been proved clearly false. 

The inefficiencies of Communist agricultural 
production have become increasingly conspicu- 
ous. Industrial growth, even in the Soviet 
Union, has slowed down sharply. Here in the 
Western Pacific the economic plight of Com- 
mimist China and North Viet-Nam contrast 
dramatically with the progress of the free coim- 
tries of the area, including the regional mem- 
bers of SEATO. 

We welcomed in the United States the forma- 
tion of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, and 
we continue to regard it as a positive and pro- 
gressive development.'' We are seriously con- 
cerned by external threats to the security and 
integrity of Malaysia and hope that a solution 
can be found to this problem which will con- 

' For a Department statement of Sept. 14, 1963, see 
ibid., Oct 7, 1963, p. 542. 

tribute to the stability and progress of the en- 
lire treaty area. 

While serious economic problems continue to 
confront South and Southeast Asia, encourag- 
ing progress has been made toward their solu- 
tion. SEATO's skilled-labor training projects 
provide a good example of what is being done 
in the economic field. 

Looking at this 10-year period in its broadest 
aspect, it is apparent that we are living in a 
period of tremendous change. In the economic, 
scientific, and social sphere this is indeed a revo- 
lutionary age. This being so, it is extremely 
important that we understand what these 
changes mean for us, how they are related to 
our interests, and how they affect the issue with 
which we are so deeply concerned — that is the 
issue of freedom in the world. 

Our comprehension of these changes will en- 
able us to move with the times, to work more 
effectively within the SEATO framework to 
achieve a better and safer community of nations 
and peoples. 

I would like on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, 
to pay tribute on behalf of my country to a 
person whose skill and dedication in behalf of 
SEATO would be difficult to match. I refer, 
of course, to Mr. Pote Sarasin, SEATO Sec- 
retary General until his resignation last De- 
cember, who had served this organization since 
1957. We are fortunate to have the services 
of his worthy successor, Mr. Konthi Supha- 
mongkhon. We also wish to express our deep 
appreciation to the outgoing Deputy Secretary 
General, Mr. William Worth, who has served 
SEATO so effectively and loyally during the 
past 6 years. 

In the days ahead we shall be examining im- 
portant questions concerning the treaty area. 
My delegation and I look forward to hearing 
the views of the other member nations and to 
studying with you the best means of meeting 
our common problems. 

We have important work to do. SEATO's 
mission — the preservation and strengthening 
of peace and security in the treaty area — is as 
relevant today, indeed, as critical today, as it 
was in 1954. This is a time to rededicate our- 
selves to this mission, as my country now does. 

MAT 4, 1964 


"With the "Manila spirit" to guide us, we look 
forward to the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, for 
serious and intimate discussions with our 
SEATO colleagues. 


Press release 166 dated April 15 

1. The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization held its ninth meeting in Manila from April 
13 to 15, 1964, under the chairmanship of the Honour- 
able Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of the Thilippines. The inaugural ad- 
dress was delivered by the Honourable Diosdado 
Maeapagal, President of the Republic of the Phil- 

General Observations 

2. The Council discussed the international situa- 
tion with particular attention to the conditions exist- 
ing in the treaty area at the close of SEATO's first 
decade. It was agreed that SEATO has had, and con- 
tinues to have, a most important stabilizing influence 
in South-East Asia. 

3. The Council noted that, while the member nations 
of the alliance have continued over the past year to 
enjoy peaceful progress and national security, the 
Communist threat remains. The Council studied the 
various manifestations of this threat in the treaty 
area and the means required to combat them. Despite 
the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, world 
domination remains the aim of communism and thus 
vigilance must not be relaxed. In addition to meas- 
ures to deter overt aggression and active insurgency, 
there should continue to be emphasis on the develop- 
ment of economic and social conditions which 
strengthen national resistance to subversion. 

4. Re-affirming that the determination of national 
policy rests with individual governments, the Council 
declared that material support and encouragement 
should be given to those nations vrhich, in defending 
themselves, need and request such support. 

Republic of Vietnam 

5. The Council (see paragraph 10 regarding the 
position of France) surveyed with special attention 
the situation in Vietnam. It noted the efforts made 
there to check increasing subversive and aggressive 
activities and expressed its continuing deep interest 
and sympathy for the Government and people of Viet- 
nam in their struggle. 

6. The Council expressed grave concern about the 
continuing Communist aggression against the Repub- 
lic of Vietnam, a protocol state under the terms of 
the Manila Pact. Documentary and material evidence 
continues to show that this organized campaign is 
directed, supplied and supported by the Communist 
regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the 
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962. 

7. The Government and people of the Republic of 
Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their de- 
termination to fight for their country. The Council 
affirmed its confidence that the program of political 
and administrative reform, military action, pacifica- 
tion, and economic and social development recently 
instituted by the Government of the Republic of Viet- 
nam, together with the support it is receiving from 
member nations of SEATO and from other nations 
in the free world, will greatly enhance the ability of 
the Vietnamese people to defeat the Communist cam- 
paign and will at the same time improve their pros- 
pects for a better life. 

8. The Council agreed that the members of SEATO 
should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further 
concrete steps within their respective capabilities in 
fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. 

9. The Council agreed that the defeat of the Com- 
munist campaign is essential not only to the security 
of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East 
Asia. It will also be convincing proof that Communist 
expansion by such tactics will not be permitted. 

10. The French Council member, while expressing 
the sympathy and friendship of France for the Viet- 
namese people, who for such a long time have been 
undergoing such severe trials and who aspire towards 
real independence, stated that under the present seri- 
ous circumstances it was wise to abstain from any 


11. The Council expressed concern that the achieve- 
ment of a neutral and independent government of na- 
tional union in Laos is being jeopardized by repeated 
violations of the Geneva Agreement of 1962, particu- 
larly by North Vietnamese military assistance and 
intervention and by repeated Pathet Lao attacks. It 
is urged that the International Control Commission 
be accorded the necessary facilities to fulfill its duty, 
under the provisions of that agreement, of investigat- 
ing violations in all parts of the kingdom. It is agreed 
to keep the situation under close scrutiny. 


12. The Council noted that regional members of the 
alliance continue to be prime targets for Communist 
subversion, but that effective counter-measures are 
being taken by the respective governments to prevent 
the exploitation of vulnerable areas. SEATO has as- 
sisted in the co-ordination of material and other aid 
provided at the request of member countries. 

Interests of Member States 

13. The Council noted the anxiety expressed by cer- 
tain member countries for due consideration of their 
individual problems in the context of the region as a 
wliole. keeping in view (he provisions of the Manila 
Pact. In this connection, the Council noted tlie ob- 
servation of the President of the Philippines that the 
interests of member states should not be placed at a 



disiKlvjiiiliiKt' ill rt'laliim to tlioso of iion-iiu'inber states. 

14. Till" CouiK'il Iioaril full rt'iiorts from its various 
iiioiiiluTs about iirobloius of intiTost to members In- 
volving their relations with non-member states. 

Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation 

ITi. The rouiicil reviewed the progress made by 
existing; SEATO civil projects, and aKrecd that other 
propo.sals should be examined through which SKATO 
might make similar contributions to the welfare of 
the region. 

1(5. The SEATO General Medical Research Labora- 
tory in Hangkok. the SEATO Clinical Uesearch Centre 
in Bangkok, and the SEATO Cholera Uesearch Lab- 
oratory in Dacca are investigating and imblisliing the 
causes, treatment and control of diseases. 

17. The SEATO Regional Community Development 
Technical Assistance Centre in T'bol, Thailand, is de- 
veloping techniques and disseminating information on 
economic self-help and local development. 

15. The SEATO Graduate School of Engineering in 
Bangkok plays an important part in tlie development 
of trained personnel needed in the region. The Coun- 
cil directed that a study should be made of the financ- 
ing of the school so as to ensure its future as a regional 
institution of higher learning. 

19. The skilled labour projects in the Asian member 
countries are helping to provide skilled manpower for 
the developing industrial plants of the Asian member 

20. The Council also reviewed the program for cul- 
tural co-operation and agreed that the established 
practice of awarding research fellowships, post-grad- 
uate and undergraduate scholarships and professor- 
ships is contributing to the advancement of knowledge 
and to international cultural relations. 

Military Planning and Exercises 

1:1. The Council recorded its conviction that ade- 
quate defences, individual and collective, are essential 
to the maintenance of .security. The experience gained 
from regular and systematic military planning among 
the eight member nations and from the conduct of 
military exercises, of which 2.") have been held to date, 
is one of the most important and valuable assets of 
the Alliance. 

22. The Council commended the conduct of the mili- 
tary defence exercises held during the past year, in- 
cluding the civic action programs which were of direct 
benefit to the local population. 

23. The Council approved the report of the military 
advisers, and noted with satisfaction that the Mili- 
tary Planning Oifice had revised and refined defence 
plans in the light of changing or anticipated situations. 

Staff Changes 

24. The Council expressed its deep appreciation to 
His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin, who served as Sec- 

retary-General from the creation of that position in 
PJ.">7 until his resignallon In December 1!)<;;! upon his 
appointment as a member of the Cabinet of Thailand. 
The Council took especial recognition of his skill and 
untiring efforts in improving and strengthening the 
organization aiul of the eminent contribution he made 
to the cause of collective security. 

2."). The Council conveyed its gratitude to Mr. Wil- 
liam Worth, whose tenure of office as Deputy Secre- 
tary-General and Chairman of the Permanent Working 
Group ends shortly after the conclusion of the Council 
meeting. It commended him for his outstanding and 
dedicated service during the seven years he has held 
those positions. 

2C. The Council welcomed the incumbent Secretary- 
General, His Excellency Mr. Konllii Suphamongkhon, 
who was appointed in Fel)ruary of this year. It 
welcomed Mr. David A. Wraight, who has been ap- 
pointed to succeed Mr. Worth. 


27. The Council expressed its warm appreciation to 
the staff of the organization for their valuable services. 

Next Meeting 

28. The Council accepted with pleasure the invita- 
tion of Her Majesty's Government in the t'nited King- 
dom to hold its next meeting in Loudon in 190.5. 

Expression of Gratitude 

29. The Council exi)ressed its gratitude to the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines for its hos- 
pitality and the excellent arrangements made for the 
conference. The meeting voted warm thanks to the 
Chairman, the Honourable Mr. Salvador P. Lopez. 

Leaders of National Delegations 

30. The leaders of the national delegations to the 
Council meeting were: 

The Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for 
External Affairs of Australia 

His Excellency Jlr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs of France 

The Right Honourable Keith Hoiyoake, Prime Min- 
ister and Minister of External Affairs of New 

His Excellency Dr. A. M. Malik, Ambassador of 
Pakistan to the Philippines 

The Honourable Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines 

His Excellency Mr. Tbanat Kboinan, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailand 

The Right Honourable Lord Carringtnn, Minister 
Without Portfolio, United Kingdom 

The Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of 
the United States 

MAY 4, 19G4 


U.S. Reaffirms Comsriitrraents 
to Taiwan and Viet-Nam 

At the conclusion of the meeting of the 
SEATO Council of Ministers at Manila,^ Sec- 
retary Rush -fleio to Taiwan for a visit loith 
Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Eepublic of 
China, and then to the Republic of Viet-Nam. 
Following are texts of statements made by Mr. 
Rusk on his arrival at Taipei April 16 and at 
Saigon April 17, together with a statement made 
at the White House upon his retiirn to Wash- 
ington April 20. 


I greatly welcome this opportunity to visit 
Taiwan. I bring you warmest greetings from 
the President of the United States, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and the American people. 

The United States Government and the 
American people are associated with you in a 
Treaty of Mutual Defense. I wish to reaffirm 
our dedication to the commitments in this 
treaty, our support of the Republic of China 
as the Government of China, and our opposi- 
tion to any proposal to deprive the Republic of 
China of its rightful place in the United Na- 
tions and to seat the Chinese Communists in its 

The Conmiunist regime on the mainland of 
China calls itself revolutionary and boasts of 
progress, despite the fact that its policies have 
inflicted terrible setbacks on the people of the 
mainland. It is the Government and people of 
the Republic of China who have been carrying 
out successfully progressive programs which re- 
flect the true revolutionary inheritance of the 
Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 
These forward-looking programs continue to 
improve the well-being of the people of the 
Republic of China. 

I salute tliB resolute will and positive achieve- 
ment of the Republic of China under the leader- 
ship of President Cliiang Kai-shek. The 
American people have always regarded the 
Chinese people with admiration. We value you 

as stalwart comrades in the struggle to secure a 
more prosperous, just, and satisfying life for all 
free men everywhere, and a peace safe from the 
threats of aggression. I look forward to dis- 
cussions with your leaders on the major prob- 
lems facing free men today. May the friend- 
ship and close understanding between our two 
peoples, as your own phrase puts it, live 10,000 
years ! 

' See p. 690 . 


I bring the greetings of President Jolmson 
and the American people to the valiant govern- 
ment and valiant people of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam. Your independence, security, and well- 
being are at the center of our deep commitment 
to you in your present struggle. I am very 
pleased to have this chance to get acquainted 
personally with General [Nguyen] Klianh and 
his colleagues and to learn firsthand about your 
action to defeat aggression from the north and 
to improve the living conditions of the people 
of Viet-Nam. 

Earlier this week in Manila, I attended the 
meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi- 
zation. You can take heart from the degree of 
solidarity achieved there among both your close 
neighbors and your strong friends. We were 
fully aware of the eloquent testimony which 
your Government and people have given to your 
determinatioii to fight for your country. 

We agreed that the defeat of the Communist 
campaign is essential not only to the security 
of the Republic of Viet-Nam but to that of 
Southeast Asia. 

We agreed that the members of SEATO 
should remain prepared, if necessary, to take 
further concrete steps within their respective 
capabilities to fulfill their obligations under the 

You will have peace here in this beautiful 
country when Hanoi and Peiping have been 
taught to leave their neighbors alone. You 
and those of us who are at your side must defeat 
their effort to impose their own misery upon 
you. That this will be done I have not the 
slightest doubt, and I am here to make clear 
once again that we shall help you do it. 




President Johnson 

Secretary Knsk has just made a very interest- 
ing and infornmtive report on his meeting witli 
SEATO and with Generalissimo Chiang Kai- 
shek and with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] 
Lodge in Saigon. Secretary [of Defense Robert 
S.] McNamara and Mr. [George W.] Ball and 
Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy and myself heard with 
great interest some reconunendations tlie Secre- 
tary made, together with his observations and 
conclusions in connection with the effort of 
South Viet-Nam. The Secretary will be glad 
to make a statement to you at this time. 

Secretary Rusk 

Tliunk you, Mr. President. 

I do feel that this trip to the Philippines and 
to the Republic of China and to Saigon was 
veiy important for me and was very helpful to 
our conmion effort. At the SEATO meeting 
it was quite apparent that those members of the 
free world do look upon the security of South 
Viet-Nam as utterly vital to the security of 
Southeast Asia and that the security of South- 
east Asia in turn is vital to the entire free 
world. There was no one at the SEATO meet- 
ing who did not hope that this effort succeeds, 
and all of them but one made it very clear in 
our public declaration that this was so and that 
they were putting their full effort behind it. 
We talked about further measures that could 
be taken to support the present Government of 
South Viet-Nam with a good deal of unity and 
solidarity of purpose, and I came away from 
that meeting very much encouraged by the at- 
titude of those who are in the area and those 
who are making a major effort in the area. 

Over in Taiwan I had some very interesting 
discussions with President Chiang Kai-shek. 
The people on Taiwan have done a remarkable 
job in building up a thriving economy and im- 
proving the social standards of that island. 
They are now sending technical assistance per- 
sonnel to the other countries who are in a devel- 
oping process and who need to borrow from the 
Republic of China some of the experience of 
success which has occurred on that island, and 

that is one of the very important developments 
of the last year or two. 

I had a chance to go over with President 
Chiang Kai-shek the full security situation in 
the Pacific Ocean area. I reported to him on 
the SEATO meeting and assured him of our 
continued support for the international position 
of the Republic of China in the United States 
and elsewhere. 

In Saigon I was much interested to get a de- 
tailed report on a province-by-province basis 
of the course of the struggle in that comitry. 
I was encouraged to discover that there were a 
considerable number of provinces where pacifi- 
cation is moving ahead, and in those provinces 
where there is peace, good progress is being 
made on the economic and social development 
of the country. 

I must say the overwhelming impression I 
got in South Viet-Nam was that that country 
could be a gleaming coimtry if only it had 
peace; that is the missing element. It has re- 
sources, it has a lively and intelligent popula- 
tion, it has some trained leadership of very con- 
siderable capacity, an important geographic po- 
sition; it is favored by nature. If it could con- 
tinue now, as we think it will, to finish up its 
pacification progi'am, there is a country that 
can play an imjaortant, strong, active role 
among the free nations of Southeast Asia. 

There are provinces there where the situa- 
tion is still critical, and the plans that have been 
laid down by General Khanh and his colleagues 
and by our own Ambassador and General [Paul 
D.] Harkins seem to be well devised to deal with 
the situation in those critical provinces; but it 
will take some further time, some further effort 
by the South Vietnamese and by us. Also, I 
think that South Viet-Nam will be calling for 
more assistance of a political sort, an economic 
sort, and perhaps in other respects from other 
free-world countries who have demonstrated 
their interest in that country. We know that 
there are those who are prepared to provide 
personnel and to provide economic resources 
and whatever assistance might be needed to get 
on with this job. 

General Khanh himself is an impressive man. 
He shows great vigor and understanding. He is 
trying now to invigorate the administration of 
the country following the political uncertainties 

MAY 4, 19C4 


since last November. He is on the right track, 
and he is making good progress. We believe 
that the prospect there is that there can be 
steady improvement in those critical provinces 
and that we can go ahead now and exploit and 
profit from the peace which has been estab- 
lished in others. 

So I came back encouraged from my trip, 
without any misunderstanding about the diffi- 
culty of the job still ahead and without any lack 
of resolve about the necessity for getting on 
with it, because that covmtry deserves peace and 
the security of the free world requires that 
Southeast Asia and South Viet-Nam be secure. 

Thank you very much. 

Question-and-Answer Period 

Q. The President said that he had heard with 
great interest recommendations that you had 
brought hack. Would you he at liherty, sir., to 
tell Its what some of these recommendations are? 

A. Well, I would not want to go into detail 
about a number of recommendations that I have 
brouglit back to add to those which Secretary 
McNamara brought back on his recent trip.= 
Mine, as you would expect, lie more largely in 
the political field. I do think that South Viet- 
Nam, for example, has perhaps during the po- 
litical difficulties of the last 3 or 4 months al- 
lowed its international diplomatic effort to drop 
off somewhat and that they should go ahead 
now and move with considerable vigor and 
activity in explaining their case to the rest of the 
world and enlisting the political support of the 
free world in their struggle, and I am sure tliey 
will be doing that now that they have settled 
down and are getting on with the job. 

I think also that it has been indicated that 
there are other countries who are prepared to 
be helpful in resources in South Viet-Nam, and 
we must now move to pull that together and see 
that all those who wish to contribute have a 
chance to do so and that the total is coordinated 
into a consistent effort to win this struggle at 
the earliest possible moment. 

Q. What countries are these? 

'For a White House statement dated Mar. 17, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 0, 1964, p. .522. 

A. I think some of the SEATO countries, for 
example, and there are some non-SEATO coun- 
tries that have indicated a willingness to help. 
One thing, for example, that I can mention is 
tliat tliere is at the moment a critical fertilizer 
shortage in South Viet-Nam just at the begin- 
ning of the planting season. It has been a little 
difficult to find sources nearby to get there in 
time. Both the Philippines and the Eepublic of 
China have offered fertilizer to meet this situa- 
tion. These are very substantial quantities, and 
we are pleased that they have come forward. 
This may seem to be a rather small thing, 
but a combination of small things make up large 
things ; so we are going to be trying to pull these 

Q. Toti 7nentwned peace. Mr. Rusk. Do you 
have any impression among the leadership of 
South Viet-Nam at the present time that they 
would he loilling now or in the near future to 
negotiate with North Viet-Nam? 

A. Oh, no. I think that that is not in their 
minds at all because there is no known question, 
at least no question that I know about, on which 
negotiations would appear to be successful. The 
answer there is a very simple one : If those in 
the North in Hanoi and Peiping would leave 
their neighbors to the South alone, there would 
be peace and there would be no need for an 
American military presence in that area. We 
have never asked for bases in South Viet-Nam. 
Our 15,000 or 16,000 men are there as a direct 
result of these pressures from the North and the 
infiltration of cadres and weapons and political 
control into the Viet Cong insurrection in the 
South. So I do not see the basis for a nego- 

We have got two agreements affecting that 
part of the world whicli were negotiated, which 
represent solemn commitments on the part of 
Peiping and Hanoi. Those are the Geneva 
agreements of 1954 and 1962. They have 
treated those agreements with contempt. There 
is no occasion as far as I can see that peace is 
going to come about by an agreement which 
would simply represent a piece of paper on the 
other sitic while tliey go ahead with tlieir mis- 
chievous activities in the South. Now, we need 
peace through action, peace througli demonstra- 
tion by the North that they are leaving their 



neifrhbors alone, and that could come about by 
decision in Hanoi and Peiping. If they make 
tiiat decision, tlu'ii peace could be restored very 
quickly out there. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you. said that other nations 
had offered help and that one of the things 
was to get all this help together. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did that help involve anything in a mili- 
tary — ? 

A. Well, there are a few military personnel 
already in South Viet-Nam from other coun- 
tries. I think there may be some technical 
people and some specialists. I do not myself 
envision organized combat units at the present 
moment from other countries. Thank you. 

Q. Military advisers from, other countries? 

A. There are some there now, and I think 
there miofht well be a good use for some more. 
Thank you. 

Q. Thank you. 

President Calls for Review 
of Tariffs on Glass Products 

White House press release dated April 15 

President Jolinson has requested the Tariff 
Commission to begin an inv^estigation for the 
purpose of advising him on the probable eco- 
nomic effects of reducing or terminating the 
special temporary tariff protection on cylinder, 
crown, and sheet glass. 

Increased tariffs on these glass products were 
imposed on March 19, 19G2,' after an escape- 
clause investigation established the need for 
such temporarj' protection. The situation in 
the industry must, under the law, be reviewed 
each year by the Commission. The first annual 
review was completed last autumn under the 
provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
That act also provides, in section 351(d)(2), 
that the President may call for a full-scale re- 
view of the case by the Tariff Commission in 
order to advise him of the probable economic 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1962, p. 

effect of modifying the special escape-clause 

The annual Tariff Commission report on this 
case was reviewed by the Special Representa- 
tive for Trade Negotiations, Christian A. Her- 
ter, and the interagency committees responsible 
to Governor Herter s oflice. 

President Johnson Holds Talks 
With King Hussein of Jordan 

Ilis Majesty Hussein /, King of the Hash- 
emite Kingdojn of Jordan, visited the United 
States April 13-24- (^^ t^^^ invitation of President 
Johnson. His Majesty arrived at Philadelphia 
April 13 and was in Washington April H-16. 
where he met with President Johnson and other 
Government officials. King Hussein and his 
party left Washington on the afternoon of 
April 16 for New York City and on the folloio- 
ing day departed for visits to Cape Kennedy 
and West Palm Beach, Fla., April 18-19, and 
Houston, Tex., April 20-21, returning to New 
York City April 22, where the official portion 
of the visit was completed April 2^. Thereaf- 
ter, His Majesty visited San Francisco, Calif., 
Denver and Colorado Springs, Colo., and 
Chicago, III., and departed the United States 
April 29. Following is the text of a joint com- 
munique released at Washington April 15 at 
the conclusion of discussions held by President 
Johnson and King Hussein April 11^ and 15. 

White House press release dated April 15 

King Hussein of Jordan and President Jolin- 
son have completed two days of discussions on 
matters of mutual interest and concern. Both 
welcomed the opportunity presented by the 
King's visit at the invitation of the President 
for a full exchange of views. 

The President presented the views of the 
United States on various world problems, in- 
cluding those of the Middle East. He empha- 
sized the strong desire of the United States for 
friendly relations with all Arab states, and its 
devotion to peace in the area. King Hussein 
put forward the views of Jordan and tlie other 
Arab states on various Middle East problems 
and their impact on relations between the two 

MAT 4. 1904 


nations. Cordiality, good will and candor 
marked the discussions. A common concern 
for preserving and strengthening a just peace 
in the area was evident throughout the talks. 
The two leaders declared their firm determi- 
nation to make every effort to increase the broad 
area of understanding which already exists be- 
tween Jordan and the United States and agreed 

that His Majesty's visit advanced this objective. 

The President expressed the intention of the 
Government of the United States to continue 
to support Jordanian efforts to attain a viable 
and self-sustaining economy. 

His Majesty and his party will spend a few 
days travelling in the United States before re- 
turning home. 

Diplomatic Rapport Between Africa and the United States 

by G. Mennen Williatns 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

In 1y92 a newly emerging, underdeveloped 
country called the United States of America 
struggled to convert a vast wilderness into a 
viable nation. Although our population in 
those days was a sparse 4 million people, such 
cities as Philadelphia, with its nearly 43,000 
people, faced difficulties with urban expansion. 

In addition to such domestic problems, we 
also were concerned with survival in a world 
in which we had few friends. Having lost the 
protection of the British Fleet when we came 
to independence, one of the earliest diplomatic 
tasks of the infant United States was to mini- 
mize the harsh treatment American ships were 
receiving at the hands of the older, more estab- 
lished nations of North Africa. Consequently 
we set up the first American consulate in Africa 
at Algiers on June 7, 1792. Before the end of 
the 18th century, we also had established posts 
at Tripoli (1795), Tunis (1795), and Tangier 
(1797) in North Africa, and at Cape Town 
(1799) in Africa's southernmost nation. 

North Africa's political climate in those early 
days of relations between the governments of 
that area and the fledglmg United States was 

'Address made before the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on 
Apr. 10 (press release ICO). 

not conducive to the development of diplomatic 
rapport, however. American shipping was fair 
game and a new source of revenue for the Afri- 
cans, and we were forced to make substantial 
tribute payments to the four North African 
powers. Nor was this all. In 1798 the Ameri- 
can frigate George Washington, after deliver- 
ing 26 barrels of silver dollars in tribute to the 
Dey of Algiers, was forced at gunpoint to trans- 
jjort an Algerian mission to Constantinople. 
Perhaps even more humiliating was the fact 
that, upon arrival, the Turkish port officer in- 
formed the ship's crew that his Government had 
never heard of a country called the United 

Obviously, good diplomatic rapport was not 
a characteristic of early relations between 
Africa and the United States. 

Througliout the 19th and into tlie earlj' 20th 
century, we had relatively few diplomatic con- 
tacts with Africa, although this was a great 
jjeriod of missionary activity on the continent. 
In that century and a half, however, wo did 
increase the number of U.S. posts concerned 
with trade and consular matters throughout 
Africa. Thus it Mas we entered Portugal's 
African territories (1853), Liberia (1863), the 
Congo (18S4), Ethiopia (1903), Nigeria 
(1916), and Kenya (1918) and increased the 



number of American posts in Morocco and 
Soutli Africa. "We also l\ad a consulate on Zan- 
zibar from 1837 to 1915 to serve American 
traders and whaling ships tliat used the port 
for supplies. 

World War II and After 

"With the coming of World "War II, Africa 
took on new importance. In 1!)40 wo opened 
a post at Dakar, Senegal, then the capital of 
French "West Africa and the African port of 
entrj- for much of our wartime transatlantic 
shipping and air transport. During the war 
3'ears, the emphasis our posts had given to trade 
and consular affairs was replaced by a new con- 
cern with political and economic reporting — 
the former because the United States in this 
period had a number of important military fa- 
cilities in Africa, and many significant military 
operations were conducted in African terri- 
tories; and the latter because Africa's extensive 
natural resources included many strategic ma- 
terials needed for the Allied war effort. 

Africa's rise to prominence during the war 
years also led to the ultimate development of a 
Bureau of African Affairs as a separate Depart- 
ment of Stat© entity to deal with African mat- 
ters. Although responsibility for much of 
Africa was transferred from what was then 
the Division of European Affairs to the Near 
Eastern Division in 1937, practically all sub- 
stantive decisions concerning Africa continued 
to be made in the Division of European Affairs. 
The bulk of the African Continent was con- 
trolled at that time by European colonial pow- 
ers. Egypt was then, as it is today, the respon- 
sibility of Near Eastern Affairs. It was not 
tmtil 1943 that a small African Section was set 
up within the Near Eastern Division. 

A trend toward a more unified approach to 
Africa began to take place in the postwar years. 
In 1956 responsibility for South Africa and 
Jiladagascar was transferred from the Bureau 
of European Affairs to the Bureau of Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 

In that same year, 1956, the importance of 
Africa was further recognized by a reorganiza- 
tion in the Near Eastern Bureau which led to 
the creation of the post of Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs and two Offices — 

one for Northern Africa and one for Southern 
Africa. In view of the rapid progress of most 
of the continent toward independence in the 
late 1950's, the next logical step — the creation 
of a separate Bureau of African Affairs for all 
of Africa except Egypt — was taken in 1958. My 
predecessor, Joseph Satterthwaite, now our Am- 
bassador to South Africa, was the first 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. 

It IS interesting also to nolo the changes that 
have taken place in our operations in Africa 
during the last quarter century. In 1939, on 
the eve of World War II, we had no embassies 
in Africa but we did have 4 legations, 3 consul- 
ates general, 8 consulates, and 1 consular 
agency — a total of 16 posts. Today we have 
nearlj' four times that many posts. There are 
now 58, exclusive of Egypt, of which 34 are 
embassies, 7 are consulates general, 14 are con- 
sulates, 1 is a consular agency, and 2 are em- 
bassy branch offices. Perhaps these figures 
dramatize better than any other measure the 
rapid increase in Africa's importance to the 
United States. 

Recognition of Africa's Potential 

Although the swiftness with which most of 
Africa achieved independent status was not an- 
ticipated by many people, tho Department was 
fortunate enough to have had a nucleus of For- 
eign Service officers with a particular interest 
in Africa. From about 1940 on, this group, 
which recognized Africa's great potential, be- 
gan to giv'e the U.S. Government a better under- 
standing of the likely course of Africa's postwar 
development. This small band of men laid 
the foundations for the high degree of diplo- 
matic rapport that exists between Africa and 
the United States today, and several of them, 
I am happy to say, still serve their Government 
in high jjosts in "Washington and Africa. 

The principal contribution of these early 
African specialists was a recognition that it 
was in the interests of the United States to 
stand forthrightly on the side of self-determi- 
nation in Africa and to express our support 
of the legitimate aspirations of Africa's de- 
pendent people. To establish an American 
presence in Africa and to demonstrate what 
the people of Africa were capable of achieving. 

MAT 4, 1964 


a pilot assistance program was set up in Liberia 
(1942-43) — one of the two independent coun- 
tries under the African Division's jurisdiction 
at that time. This program, I might point 
out, was implemented even before President 
Truman's Point 4 program was announced in 
1949. Looking ahead to commercial use, lend- 
lease authority was used to build Liberia's Free 
Port at Monrovia and to improve the facilities 
at that country's major airport, Eobertsfield. 
From the remnants of the World War II Office 
of War Information's program, faint begin- 
nings were made toward establishing a U.S. 
information program in Africa. 

All of this was done by about 1950, and the 
men and women of the African Division who 
did it had very little support for their eiforts. 
You will recall that this was the 2:)eriGd when 
we were concentrating on Europe's reconstruc- 
tion, and the principal problem areas in foreign 
affairs were in the Middle and Far East. Con- 
sequently, Africa had a lower priority and re- 
ceived a relatively small amount of attention 
until the true nature of the continent's rebirth 
in independence became broadly Icnown in the 
latter part of the 1950's. 

Wlien it was cleai-ly seen that forces at work 
on the African Continent were moving at a 
vastly accelerated rate, it became possible for 
the African Bureau to move toward meeting 
the many diplomatic challenges the new situa- 
tion presented. For example, we adopted a 
policy of recognizing newly independent gov- 
ernments at once. In many cases the United 
States has been the first foreign country to ex- 
tend diplomatic recognition to the new African 
nations. The promptness with which we have 
welcomed new nations to the world connnunity 
has had a great deal to do with the development 
of diplomatic rapport between ourselves and 

Examples of Diplomatic Rapport 

There are many interesting stories that can 
be told about the outstanding efforts Foreign 
Service officers have made to be prompt in estab- 
lishing diplomatic relations with new African 
governments. The establishment in 19G0 of 
our first consulate at Bamako, Mali, is a case in 
point. Mali, as you know, came to independ- 

ence with Senegal in the Mali Federation. As 
our principal post in the Federation was at 
Dakar, opening the consulate at Bamako was 
not at that time an urgent matter. The officer 
who was assigned to open the consulate at Ba- 
mako, Jolin Dean, previously had established 
our first post at Lome, Togo, in 1959 and was 
taking a brief leave in Switzerland with his 
family before reporting to his new position at 
Bamako. However, when lie heard a i\adio 
statement that Mali and Senegal had dissolved 
the Federation, he knew this meant that inde- 
pendent Mali would be without U.S. representa- 
tion and he immediately took a train to Geneva 
and cabled Washington for instructions. 
Within 24 hours Dean was instructed to pro- 
ceed to Bamako at once and open a U.S. con- 
sulate. Two hours after receiving his instinic- 
tions, he had packed his bags and was on his 
way. He stopped at the U.S. Embassy in Paris 
and picked up two American flags, a typewriter. 
Government stationery, and code equipment 
and was on a plane to Bamako the same evening. 
On August 26, 1960, at 7 a.m., Dean landed 
at Bamako. He went straight to a hotel, got 
two rooms to use as an office, a flagpole for the 
American flag, and a car for transportation. 
By noon he liad rented a post office box and 
established a telegraphic address for the Ameri- 
can consulate — but only after he had convinced 
the local postmaster that the U.S. Govermnent 
should be billed monthly rather than each time 
he sent a cable. He next sent his first message 
to Washington — the traditional "Assumed 
charge." In the afternoon he visited the Mali 
Chief of Protocol to tell him the American con- 
sulate was open, and he met with American 
missionaries and businessmen representing 
American interests to obtain bilingual office 
help. By sundown the consulate was in busi- 
ness. That night, and for 2 months thereafter, 
Dean took his code equipment to bed with him 
to safeguard it. In one day the United States 
liad opened its post in I\lali, and ^Malians have 
not forgotten that the first foreign represen- 
tative in their country was an American named 
John Dean. This is the type of swift response 
to a fast-breaking situation that lias helped 
build diplomatic rapport between Africa and 
the United States. 



The development of rapport is also a question 
of doing what has to be done with whatever is 
available to do the job. In this respect, a 
young Foreign Service officer, Roger Proven- 
cher, arrived at Ouagadougou, Upper Volt a, 
on Thanksgiving Day, 1960, to establish our 
diplomatic mission there. He could find no 
hotel room in that city of 11,000 suddenly 
turned into a national capital; so he made do 
with an unused cot and a mosquito not in the 
local customs office. After 3 nights there, ho 
persuaded the Central Hotel to give him a 
room — but he got it only on the condition that 
he vacate it on Sundays for occupants who had 
reserved the room on an annual basis. On 
Smidays, however, the hotel gave Provencher 
space in a former chickenhouse on the hotel 
grounds which had been redecorated in pink 
and green. 

Such difficulties abroad, while inconvenient 
at the time, can always be looked upon in retro- 
spect with good humor. But African diplo- 
mats encounter difficulties in this country, too, 
and many of these difficulties are not of the 
laughing variety. Particularly, I am thinking 
about the series of incidents in which African 
diplomats have been barred from restaurants 
and other public establishments in tliis coun- 
try. Xeedless to saj', these incidents have 
stramed the diplomatic rapport between Africa 
and the United States, and it is largely because 
of the imderstanding and restraint of our 
African guests that much of our rapport has 
not been dissipated. 

Rapport between Africans and Americans 
also has developed through extracurricular ac- 
tivities of American diplomats and their fam- 
ilies in Africa. There are, for example, the 
activities of Ambassador Mercer Cook, the for- 
mer Howard University professor and authority 
on African literature who represents us in Ni- 
ger, and his wife. Mrs. Cook, who was a social 
worker, organized the sending of $30,000 worth 
of medicines to the people of Niger and is very 
active with women's organizations throughout 
the country. 

Another type of American who has done much 
to develop African-American rappoi't is the 
technical specialist, of whom a good example is 
Frank Pinder, a graduate of Florida A. & M. 
College, who recently was promoted to Deputy 

Director of (he U.S. AID Mission to Ghana. 
Now a legend in many parts of West Africa, 
Pinder has, over the last 16 years, introduced 
fundamental changes into the agricultural sys- 
tems of Liberia and Ghana. He is as welcome 
in the homes of farmers in some of the most re- 
mote areas of those two countries as he is in 
their capitals. His work has been praised by 
President [William V. S.] Tubman of Liberia 
and by Foreign Minister [Kojo] Botsio of 
Ghana, and, when he left Liberia for Ghana in 
1958, he was offered but had to decline a decora- 
tion from the Government of Liberia. 

And, of course, the outstanding performances 
of U.S. ambassadors in Africa have been the 
foundation on which rapport between Africa 
and the United States has been built. To name 
just a few, there is Edmund Gullion, who has 
just left the Congo and whose consummate skill 
and jiatienco contributed much to the reunifica- 
tion of that country; William Attwood, whose 
work in Guinea despite sizable obstacles helped 
markedly to develop a strong bond of friend- 
ship between the United States and that coun- 
try ; Joseph Palmer, who served with great dis- 
tinction in Nigeria and developed a knowledge 
of the counti-y that few people can match 
through his visits by car and riverboat to Nige- 
rians in every one of that country's 31 provinces ; 
and William Porter, who headed our mission in 
Algeria in a time of extreme mirest and personal 
danger — subsequent to which he became Ambas- 
sador — and who was able to maintain effectively 
the interests of the United States through satis- 
factory relations with both the French authori- 
ties and the emerging Algerian authorities. 
This was a remarkable demonstration of effec- 
tive diplomacy in a difficult and chaotic transi- 
tion period. 

Let me also mention a remarkable American 
who was a tower of strength in East Africa — 
William "Red" Duggan, our consul general in 
Dar-es-Salaam from 1958 to 1961, M-ho serv-ed 
in Tanganyika during the period in which that 
country moved toward independence. Duggan 's 
devotion to duty cost him his sight, but it won 
him the friendship of the people of Tanganyika 
and their President, Julius Nyerere, who invited 
Duggan to be his personal guest at Tanganyika's 
independence ceremonies. 

MAT 4, 1964 


Impact of U.S. Presidents 

It is impossible to describe diplomatic rapport 
between Africa and the United States without 
mentioning the impact of three of our Presi- 
dents with great interest in that continent. 

Franklin D. Eoosevelt is well known through- 
out North Africa for the impact he made in 
1943 in Casablanca upon Morocco's Sultan, who, 
at independence, became King Mohammed V. 

John F. Kennedy established rapport with 
freedom-loving Africans everywhere with his 
1957 Senate speech analyzing the Algerian sit- 
uation and prescribing independence as the only 
answer. During his Presidency, he so linked 
United States and African aspirations that 
Kennedy is a truly respected name throughout 

Senegalese remember President Lyndon B. 
Jolmson's attendance at their country's first an- 
niversaiy of independence in 1961. His warm, 
infonnal diplomacy convinced Africans of the 
sincerity of American efforts to establish mean- 
ingful friendship with the new nation, and the 
cordiality with which he was received was de- 
monstrable evidence that genuine rapport was 
established by his visit. 

Foundations of Diplomatic Rapport 

Individual rapport between Africans and 
Americans, official or private, has generally 
benefited from important common personal 
characteristics. By and large, Africans and 
Americans both admire and respond to frank- 
ness and openness in personal and official deal- 
ings and share a well-developed sense of humor 
and enjoyment of life. 

Africans and Americans enjoy such a sub- 
stantial individual rapport not simply because 
of shared common and sympathetic character- 
istics but basically because we — as people and 
as nations — cherish common objectives and 

Africans and Americans want freedom and 
independence and the right to control their 
own destinies. These goals inspired the Dec- 
laration of Independence of our young Repub- 
lic, and they have brought 31 new nations to 
freedom in Africa in the last dozen years. 

Africans and Americans today insist on per- 
sonal and national dignity for themselves and 

for all men. American history, like modem 
African history, provides demonstrable evi- 
dence of our belief in this principle. 

Africans and Americans have a common in- 
terest in improving their daily living conditions. 
We share a desire to reduce the burdens created 
by poverty, disease, malnutrition, and illiteracy 
as quickly as possible. 

This mutuality of aspirations has won us 
many friends on that continent. The combined 
efforts of both public and private organizations 
and individuals to speed the attaimnent of those 
objectives have assured many Africans that the 
United States is indeed mterested in the future 
of Africa, and this broad-based interest has 
made the development of diplomatic rapport 

The American people traditionally have had a 
deep and sincere interest in the progress of other 
peoples and a genuine concern with assisting 
those less favored materially than oureelves. 
This humanitarian interest is expressed in 
Africa in the work of U.S. missionary groups, 
in the African activities of private foundations, 
in the African programs of labor organizations, 
colleges, and universities. It is reflected also 
in the work of the Peace Corps, of our AID 
missions, our information offices, and our For- 
eign Service. 

Our presence in Africa also is motivated by 
national self-interest. We have learned that 
peace is indivisible. We know that our peace 
and security is best assured in a world where 
nations are genuinely free and and progressing 
toward greater economic and social well-being. 
We know that there can be no real security and 
peace for us or for our children in any part 
of the world that is troubled by instability or 
disorder. We have a strong self-interest, there- 
fore, in helping Africa to find a place in a world 
in which all of us — the people of Africa and the 
people of the United States — can live in greater 
security and abundance. 

A century ago, Abraham Lincoln asked: 
"What constitutes the bulwark of our own lib- 
erty and independence?" And he answered: 
"It is not our frowning battlements, our bris- 
tling sea coasts, the guns of our war steamers, 
or the strength of our gallant and disciplined 
army. These are not our reliance against a re- 



sumption of tynxmiy in our fair land. All of 
tliem may be turned against our liberties, with- 
out making us stronger or weaker for the strug- 
gle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which 
God has planted in our bosoms. Our defense 
is in the preservation of the spirit which prizes 
liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands, 
every where." 

These words — and the actions we take in sup- 
port of them — are the true basis of diplomatic 
rapport between Africa and the United States. 
If we continue to chait our course by the funda- 
mental principles on which this nation was 
founded, I am confident that the rapport which 
today exists between Africa and the United 
States will characterize our relations through- 
out the foreseeable future. 

U.S. Reaffirms Support 
of Royal Lao Government 

Department Statement^ 

We are maintaining a close watch on develop- 
ments in Laos and are in touch with our Em- 
bassy there. The U.S. Government has fully 
supported, and we continue fully to support, 
the Geneva agreements of 1902 and the Royal 
Government of National Union. 

We are therefore categorically opposed to any 
seizure of power and are urging immediate re- 
lease of the neutralists as a first step toward 
restoring the situation. 

Ignacio Lozano Named Adviser 
on Cultural Exchange Program 

The Department of State announced on 
April 17 (press release 168) that Ignacio E. 
Lozano, Jr., a Los Angeles industrialist and 
publisher of La Opinion, a Spanish-language 
daily newspaper, had on that day been sworn in 

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 19 by Richard 
I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News, in response 
to information from Vientiane that a group of Laotian 
military leaders had attempted to overthrow the Royal 
Government of National Union. 

as a consultant to Lucius D. Battle, Assistant 
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. 
Mr. Lozano will assist the cultural exchange 
program as an adviser on Latin American 

United States and United Kingdom 
Conclude Grains Agreement 

Following is a statement released at Wash- 
ington on April 16 by Christian A. Herter, the 
Presidents /Special Rejn-csentative for Trade 
Negotiations, regarding a grains agreement 
concluded at London on April 15 hy an ex- 
change of notes between U.S. Ambassador 
David K. E. Bruce and the Earl of Dundee, 
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 

The United States and the United Kingdom 
have entered into an agreement on grains im- 
ports into Britain which has major implica- 
tions for the Kennedy Eound of international 
trade negotiations in the field of agricultural 
products.^ Through this agreement, American 
grain farmers will have the opportunity to 
maintain at least their present level of grains 
exports to the U.K. and will have the addi- 
tional opportunity to sell more grains as that 
market grows. The products covered by the 
agreement include wheat, wheat flour, and 
major feed grains. 

The U.K. is introducing important changes 
in her domestic gi-ains policies to insure that a 
fair and reasonable balance is maintained be- 
tween domestic grains production on the one 
hand and grains imports into the U.K. on the 
other, broadly based on present supplies to the 
U.K. market and providing that both domestic 
producers and overseas suppliers shall have the 
opportunity to share in any future growth in 
the U.K. market on a fair and reasonable basis. 

A significant provision of the agreement is 
that the U.K. Government will take effective 
corrective action at the earliest practicable time 
if total grains imports fall appreciably below 

' For an address by Mr. Herter on "The Role of 
Agriculture in Trade Expansion," see Bulletin of 
Apr. 27, 19&4, p. 671. 

MAT 4, 1964 


the average level of the last 3 years. Further, 
the U.K. has agreed to review annually with its 
major overseas suppliers the operation of its 
domestic grains policies in light of the objective 
of sharing its market between domestic pro- 
ducers and overseas suppliers in a fair and 
reasonable way. 

A similar agi-eement has been concluded be- 
tween the U.K. and each of her other major 
cereals suppliers, Australia and Canada. 

Under tlie agreements, the U.K.'s overseas 
suppliers will cooperate in helping the U.K. 
assure that grain prices in that market do not 
fall below prescribed minimum prices. Today 
world grains prices are above those prescribed 
as minimum in the agreement. If they should 
fall below the minimum, the exporter may take 
steps to insure that grains sell in the U.K. at 
the prescribed price or the U.K. may enforce a 
levy to raise the imported price to the agreed 

For a number of years, the U.K. has provided 
her producers with guaranteed returns on 
grains production at levels substantially above 
world prices. This has been achieved by mak- 
ing grains available to British consumers at 
world price levels and using direct payments to 
British farmers equal to the difference between 
actual market price levels and the guaranteed 
price. The effect has been to make overseas 
producers residual suppliers in the U.K. mar- 
ket, since British farmers were assured the guar- 
anteed return on all the grains they produced. 
British grains production has expanded 
sharply under this program, and the proportion 
of total consumption supplied by imports has 
declined substantially over the years. 

Under the new system, British farmers -wiU 
be paid a guaranteed return based on "standard 
quantity." The "standard quantity"' will be 
based on present levels of production. The in- 
troduction of a "standard quantity" provides 
for a lower per unit return to farmers if pro- 
duction exceeds this "standard quantity." For 
example, if it developed that the "standard 
quantity" were 90 percent of production, then 

the per unit deficiency jjayment would be 10 
percent less than that which would have been 
paid if the "standard quantity" had not been 

The U.S. considers this arrangement an im- 
portant precedent for the negotiation of accept- 
able conditions of access to world markets for 
major agi'icultural products in the Kennedy 
Round of trade negotiations, which is just get- 
ting under way. Discussions have already be- 
gun on a world grains arrangement as a part 
of the Kennedy Round. The U.K. is one of the 
world's major grains importers and the com- 
mitment she has undertaken to take effective 
corrective action if imports show an appreciable 
decline below the average volume during the 3 
years preceding July 1, 1964, is an important 
contribution to the successful outcome of a 
world grains arrangement. The present bilat- 
eral agreements between the U.K. and its prin- 
cipal overseas grains suppliers may be replaced 
by a world grains arrangement when present 
negotiations are successfully concluded. 

United States and France Discuss 
Air Cargo Operations 

Department Announcement 

Press release 167 dated April 17 

Representatives of the United States and 
France will meet in Washington begmning on 
April 20 for an exchange of views concerning 
air cargo operations between the United States 
and France. The consultations will take place 
at the request of the French Government. Con- 
sideration will be given to questions relating to 
the routing and capacity of air cargo service. 

The chairman of the French delegtition will 
be Mr. Augustin Jordan, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The chairman of the U.S. delegation 
will be INIr. Henry T. Snowdon, Chief of the 
xVviation Negotiations Division, Department of 




The Military Assistance Program for 1965 

Statement by Robert S. McNamara 
Secretary of Defense ' 

ilr. Chairman, members of the committee: 
I greatly welcome this opportmiity to appear 
before you in support of the fiscal year 1965 
military assistance program. In my considered 
judgment, this program, and the foreign aid 
program generally, has now become the most 
critical element of our overall national security 

It has long been recognized that the Com- 
mimist threat to our security and the security 
of the entire free world is not only military but 
involves every area of human endeavor — it is 
political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is 
scientific, and it extends even into the cultural 
spheres. In such a struggle, great strategic 
nuclear power alone is not enough. Indeed, 
even great strategic nuclear power comple- 
mented by great conventional power alone 
is not enough. As Chairman Kiirushchev 
warned us more than 3 years ago, the Com- 
munists, while rejecting global nuclear wars 
and even local wars, fully support the so-called 
"wars of national liberation" which we know 
from bitter experience as guerrilla wars and in- 
surrections. The Chinese Communists are 
even more militant in their support of armed 
aggression as an instrimaent of foreign policy. 
Indeed, one of the major differences in outlook 
between these two Communist powers is the 

' Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on Mar. 25. 

degree of risk which each believes should be 
taken in pressing their expansionist policies. 

We believe that the actions we have taken to 
strengthen, protect, and make more ready our 
strategic nuclear forces have convinced at least 
the Soviet Union that a nuclear attack against 
us or our allies could not end in other than dis- 
aster for them. We believe the measures we 
have taken to expand, modernize, and supply 
more adequately our limited-war forces have 
discouraged at least the Soviet Union from risk- 
ing even a conventional war against the U.S. 
and its allies. But if we are to meet the avowed 
Communist threat across the entire spectrum of 
conflict, then we must also be ready to take 
whatever measures are necessary to counter 
their efforts to promote guerrilla wars and in- 
surrections. And much of this task can be 
accomplished only by the assistance, both mili- 
tary and economic, we give our less prosperous 

Moreover, our global military strategy since 
the end of World War II, particularly in the 
limited-war area, has always assumed the avail- 
ability of allied forces. In other words, our 
strategy has long been based on the concept of 
the collective defense of the free world. And 
this means that our own security requires that 
we have strong allies around the world. We do 
in fact have strong allies, particularly in West- 
ern Europe. Indeed, the great and growing 
strength of our NATO allies in that region 
stands as a monument to the success of our 

MAT 4, 1964 



foreign aid programs in the post-World War II 

But many of our friends and allies in other 
areas of the free world have not yet succeeded 
in building up their economic strength to the 
point where they can make their full contribu- 
tion to the collective defense. These nations 
still need our help, in some cases not only in the 
form of military assistance but economic assist- 
ance as well. The development of their eco- 
nomise and military strength in the context of 
the collective defense of the free world is ob- 
viously in our own national interests. Wlio can 
deny that the military strength of Greece and 
Turkey, the southern bastion of NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization], is important to 
our own security? "Wlio can say that the mili- 
tary strength of South Korea, the Republic of 
China, and South Vietnam is not essential to our 
position in the far Pacific ? Wlio can deny that 
the survival of these nations as independent 
states on the very periphery of Communist 
power is vital to our own national secvirity 
objective of preventing the further spread of 
communism, whether by overt or covert aggres- 
sion ? If these nations were to succumb to Com- 
munist aggression, would not the security of 
the entire free world be weakened, including 
our own ? 

In my opinion, it makes no sense whatsoever 
to spend $50 billion a year on our own military 
forces and refuse to spend a mere 2 percent of 
that amoxmt to provide that critical margin of 
assistance required to insure the military effec- 
tiveness of the forces of our allies who stand 
beside us in the collective defense of the free 
world. It is surely ironic that at the very time 
the Communists are increasing tlieir efforts in 
this new arena of the struggle — guerrilla war- 
fare, insurrection, and covert aggression — we 
should want to diminish our efforts in this same 
arena. Certainly, it must be clear to all Ameri- 
cans that if we fail to support those free na- 
tions which need and want our help in main- 
taining their independence, we will have to use 
our own forces if we are to prevent the expan- 
sion of communism through overt or covert 
armed aggression. As President Johnson re- 
cently stated,^ the foi-eign aid program is the 

' For text of President Johnson's message to Congress 
on foreign aid, see BurLEXiN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518. 

best weapon we have to insure that our own men 
in uniform need not go into combat. 

We are well aware that the Congress, and 
perhaps the people of this country, are growing 
weary of the continued burden of the foreign 
aid progi'am. President Johnson stated frankly 
that ". . . it is going to be very tough to get a 
good foreign aid measure througli the Congress 
this year," but, lae added, ". . . we are not going 
to pad our request ... we will ask only what 
we need, and we hope we get what we 
ask. . . ." ^ This is the approach the Depart- 
ment of Defense has taken in formulating the 
military assistance program we are presenting 
liere today. We are asking for a total of $1 
billion in new obligational authority, the same 
amount appropriated for this purpose last year. 
We are asking the reappropriation of $25 mil- 
lion, the amount of presently available funds 
which we estimate will remain unobligated at 
the end of the current fiscal year. In addition, 
we believe we can recoup, in FY 1965, $135 mil- 
lion of prior year funds which have been re- 
served but not expended as a result of price 
changes, cancellations, and slippages in prior 
year programs. These three sources together 
would provide a total military assistance pro- 
gram of $1,160 million for FY 1965 compared 
with a program of $1,200 million in FY 1964 
and about $1,600 million in FY 1963, as shown 
on tlie third from the last line of the table at- 
tached to this statement. 

Last year when I appeared before this com- 
mittee I stated that we hoped to reduce the mil- 
itary assistance program to about $1 billion a 
year by 1968. But neither I nor the Clay 
Committee (The President's Committee To 
Strengthen the Security of the Free World) 
believed that our security could be properly 
protected by such a low level of appropriation 
in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. We are present- 
ing a request of only $1 billion for FY 1965 
solely because the Congress has made it crystal 
clear to the executive branch that it is unwilling 
to appropriate a larger amomit. 

There should be no illusions that the differ- 
ence between what we consider the optimmn 
program and the program we are requesting can 
be made up by increased recoupments, by living 

' lUd., p. 523. 



off the pipeline, or by a greater use of excess 

With regard to recoupments, the $135 million 
already reflected in our 1005 estimate is all wo 
can expect to generate in the next fiscal year. 
In FY 1964 we estimated recoupments of $125 
million, and it now appears that the actual 
amount "recouped" will be within 3 percent of 
our estimate. In fiscal yeare 1962 and 1963, as 
a result of an intensive effort to "shake out"' the 
program, we "recouped" a total of $490 million. 
I am satisfied that we have "shaken out" about 
all we can. 

With regard to financing future year pro- 
gi'ams by drawing down the so-called "pipe- 
line," I can assure you that such a course would 
simply result in "robbing Peter to pay Paul." 
These imexpended balances, popularly called 
the "pipeline," represent funds which have been 
obligated for goods and services which have not 
yet been delivered. Fimds must be available to 
pay for these goods and services when they are 
delivered. Moreover, this unexpended balance 
for militai-y assistance is shrinking. At the end 
of FY 1962, the unexpended balance, for grant 
aid and credit assistance combined, was $2,784 
million. At the end of FY 1963, the balance 
had been reduced to $2,422 million. By the end 
of the current fiscal year we expect the balance 
to declme to $2,087 million. In FY 1965, as- 
suming the budget request of $1 billion in new 
obligational authority is appropriated and 
assuming our estimates of collections and ex- 
penditures for that year are realized, the un- 
expended balance will decline to about $1.9 
billion — a total reduction of almost $900 million 
since the end of FY 1962. 

Finally, with regard to the use of excess 
stocks, let me assure you that little relief can be 
expected from that source. We had originally 
anticipated using about $48 million of excess 
stocks for the current fiscal year program; it 
now appears that only $28 million of such stocks 
will be available. The remainder of the require- 
ment will have to be met from new procurement 
or not met at all. 

Thus, the future strength and combat effec- 
tiveness of the forces of our allies, forces upon 
which we depend to fight alongside our own in 
the event of war, will be determined by the ac- 

tions of this committee and this Congi-ess on our 
1965 military assistance budget request. 

Now, what will our 1965 military assistance 
program provide and why is it needed? We 
have tried during the last year to develop a more 
meaningful format for the presentation of the 
military assistance program to the Congress and 
the Nation — a format which shows more 
directly the relationship between the individual 
country programs and our own national se- 
curity objectives. Accordingly, we have di- 
vided the country programs into six major cate- 
gories : Forward Defense ; Alliance for Progress 
Security; Military Base Rights; Grant Aid 
Phaseout; Free-World Orientation; and U.S. 
Force Support and Military Assistance Pro- 
gram Administration. 

The first category, "Forward Defense," com- 
prises the grant aid military assistance pro- 
grams for 11 nations stretching along the south- 
ern and eastern perimeters of the Communist 
bloc — from Greece and Turkey in the Eastern 
Mediterranean to Korea in the Western Pacific. 
These 11 countries — Greece, Turkey, Iran, 
Pakistan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the 
Philippines, the Republic of China, and 
Korea — maintain more than 31^ million men un- 
der arms and account for $745 million, or two- 
thirds of the total FY 1965 military assistance 
program. These nations, plus NATO in West- 
ern Europe, and Japan in the Western Pacific, 
are truly the free world's and our own nation's 
frontline of defense against Soviet and Chinese 
Communist expansion through military aggres- 

The next grouping, "Alliance for Progress 
Security," consisting in FY 1965 of 15 Latin 
American nations, accounts for $66.2 million, 
less than 6 percent of the total 1965 military 
assistance program. Our primary objective 
here is, of course, to insure the security of the 
Western Hemisphere against Communist pene- 

The third category, "Military Base Rights," 
for which $24.4 million is proposed, includes 
4 countries in each of which we have important 
base rights. 

The fourth category, "Grant Aid Phaseout," 
includes, in the FY 1965 program, only 3 coun- 
tries — Denmark, Japan, and Norway — com- 

3IAY 4, 1904 


pared with 12 countries in FY 1963. These 3 
country programs will be phased out when our 
present commitments are completed. This cate- 
gory accounts for $53 million of the FY 1965 
military assistance program, or less than 5 per- 

The fifth category, "Free-World Orienta- 
tion,"' includes, in FY 1965, 7 countries whose 
continued independence and stability we believe 
is of great value to our own national interests. 
Altogether they account for only $15.2 million, 
or a little more than 1 percent of the total 1965 
military assistance program. 

The final category, "U.S. Force Support and 
MAP Administration," is essentially the "all 
other" category and accounts for $256.2 million, 
or 22 percent, of the total 1965 militaiy assist- 
ance program. However, about $76 million of 
this amoimt, for "Infrastructure" and "Inter- 
national Military Headquarters," actually rep- 
resent costs of U.S. military forces which by 
long-established custom have been funded in the 
military assistance program. Also included in 
this category is $50 million for credit assistance 
which we expect will eventually be paid back 
to the United States. No contingency fund has 
been included in the 1965 military assistance 
budget request. 

Other Defense witnesses who are scheduled to 
appear before this committee are prepared to 
discuss the military assistance progi-am at what- 
ever level of detail you desire. What I would 
like to do at this time is to highlight, in terms 
of the six categories I have described, some of 
the major problems we face. 

Forward Defense Programs 

This, as I pointed out, is the most important 
category and accoimts for about two-thirds of 
the total FY 1965 military assistance program. 
The Zyo million men under arms supported by 
the 11 countries in this category represent an in- 
crement of defensive strength which is essential 
to the success of our overall military strategy". 
These forces relieve us of the tremendous bur- 
den, in dollars and in manpower, which we 
would otherwise have to assume, either by de- 
ploying additional U.S. forces overseas or by 
holding additional forces in a central reserve in 
the United States and providing for the neces- 

sary airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equip- 

In all of our contingency plannmg involving 
the areas of the world where these countries are 
located, we take into full account the availabil- 
ity of these indigenous forces. Moreover, the 
existence of reasonably adequate military forces 
in these nations on the periphery of Communist 
power, by eliminatmg the hope of a quick, easy, 
and cheap victory, reduces the likelihood of 
Communist attack. Perhaps even more impor- 
tant, the ability of the indigenous forces to 
respond promptly to local aggression greatly 
reduces the risk of subsequent direct U.S. in- 
volvement in fulfillment of its mutual defense 
commitments and thereby the risk of escalation 
into larger wars. These commitments are em- 
bodied in a series of treaties with many of the 
countries which form the free-world defensive 
peruneter against aggi'ession from the Commu- 
nists. Of the 11 countries included in this cate- 
gory, Greece and Turkey are members of 
XATO. Turkey is also a member of CENTO 
[Central Treaty Organization] together with 
Iran and Pakistan and is thus the link between 
NATO and CENTO. Pakistan is also a mem- 
ber of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organi- 
zation] together with Thailand and the Philip- 
pines and is thus the link between CENTO and 

The U.S. also has bilateral defense agreements 
with the Philippines, Korea, and the Republic 
of Chma, and we are presentlj' engaged in assist- 
ing the people of South A'ietnam in combating 
the covert Communist aggression in that coun- 
try. We are also supporting the Government 
of Laos where the Pathet Lao are taking every 
opportunity to sabotage the coalition govern- 
ment. Finally, we are assisting the Govenmient 
of India in strengthening its military forces 
against the threat of Chinese Communist attack 
from the north. 

The $745 million we have proposed in the FY 
1965 military assistance program for these 11 
countries is far short of what would be required 
if we were to attempt to raise the modernization 
of these forces to the levels called for by JCS 
[Joint Chiefs of Staff] planning. A recent 
study by the Department of Defense of 7 of 
these countries on the Communist peripliery in- 
dicates that the total requirement for major 



etiuipiiRuit alone would call for ;?7U0 inillioii 
more throu<i;h I'JGS) than what would be available 
under a continuing $1 billion a year program. 
Operating costs alone are estimated to be on the 
order of $300 million per year for these 7 coun- 
tries. Since a $1 billion military assistance pro- 
gram will j)ermit the allocation of only about 
$500 million to these 7 countries, only about $200 
million will be available for force moderniza- 
tion, including major equipment, compared with 
the computed requirement of almost $400 mil- 
lion per year for major ecjuipment alone. 

The inqjact of this problem can best be under- 
stood in terms of individual country progi'ams. 

Greece and Turkey 

As I indicated earlier, Greek and Turkish 
militarj- forces form the southern bastion of 
XATO, complemented by the United States Gth 
Fleet in the Mediterranean. NATO depends 
heavily on these two nations to hold the soutliern 
flank. Greece is faced by relativelj' well-armed 
Bulgarian forces and Turkey by both Bulgarian 
and Soviet forces. 

Both Turkey and Greece face serious prob- 
lems in maintaining their current levels of de- 
fense expenditures. Both will continue to need 
financial assistance from other members of 
NATO, and, m this connection. Secretary Rusk 
at the NATO ministerial meeting last December 
strongly urged our NATO allies, who have made 
a small start in providing financial assistance to 
Greece and Turkey, to expand their effort 
greatly. But the United States will continue to 
have to make up the critical margin of support 
if these two NATO comitries are to be expected 
to carry out their roles under present NATO 
military planning. 

As shown on the attached table we have again 
been forced to reduce military assistance to the 
"Forward Defense" nations, including both 
Greece and Turkey. We hope that the other 
NATO allies will help to offset part of this cut. 
but I would be less than candid if I did not tell 
you that the situation on the southern flank of 
NATO is serious. 

Last year I received from General [Lyman 
L.] Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe, a cable in which he expressed liis serious 
concern with the deterioration of the military 
capabilities of the Greek and Turkish forces in 

the face of inqjroving Connuunist capabilities 
across their borders. General Lenmitzer 
pointed out that the problem was not in the 
lighting caliber of the forces of either of these 
two countries but rather in eciuipment delicien- 
cies which the countries themselves could clearly 
not afford to correct. 

Recently I received another communication 
from General Lemnitzer, which I would like to 
discuss with this committee in executive session. 
In this communication, he again expresses his 
concern with the situation on the southern flank 
with regard to equipment deficiencies whicii 
have been caused by reductions in military as- 
sistance funds. All I can tell General Lem- 
nitzer is what I am telling you. namely, that we 
are allocating to Greece and Turkey all that is 
feasible within a military assistance program 
budget of a billion dollars in new obligational 
authority. Of the amount which we have in- 
cluded for Greece in the 1965 program, only 
about one-third will be available for investment 
and practically all of that will be used for the 
Air Force. Accordingly, significant moderni- 
zation of the groimd forces must be deferred. 

The Turkish armed forces are in the same 
straits. Alore than 60 percent of the 1965 pro- 
gram for Turkey will be required for operating 
costs, leaving less than 40 percent of a reduced 
amount for investment. In order to provide 
minimum army force improvements in the FY 
19G5 program, it will be necessary to defer some 
spare parts, training ammunition, and attrition 
replacement. As in the case of Greece, much 
of the equipment in the Turkish ground forces 
is of World War II vintage, repair parts are 
no longer available, and maintenance costs have 
been prohibitive. 

The present difficulties between Greece and 
Turkey over Cyprus should not be permitted to 
obscure the fact that both of these countries are 
loyal and dedicated members of NATO and the 
continued military strength of both is essential 
to the execution of NATO military strategy. 

Iran, Pakistan, and iTuUa 

Iran, Pakistan, and India are on the frontline 
of the free world's defense against Communist 
encroachment in the Near East and South Asia. 
The Chinese Communists' attack on the north- 
ern provinces of India in October of 1962 pro- 

SX.\T 4. 1804 


vided a classic example of the danger of mili- 
tary weakness in the nations bordering Com- 
munist China. Here, again, was clear proof 
that military weakness tempts Communist ag- 
gression and that neither neutrality nor at- 
tempts at political acconmiodation insures 
security against the Communist threat. 

This attack brought home to the Government 
of India the importance of maintaining strong 
military forces along their northern borders. 
The United States and the British Common- 
wealth nations responded to India's urgent re- 
quest for assistance with a program of $120 
million, of which the U.S. provided half. In 
FY 1964 we programed another increment, as 
you know, and we have included an additional 
amount in the FY 1965 program. We are also 
providing in the 1964 program some excess 
stocks, including some radar and communica- 
tions equipment. We plan to continue the 
modernization of a number of moimtain divi- 
sions and to provide certain other assistance. 
We believe that the U.K. and the Common- 
wealth countries will also continue their sup- 
port of the Indian armed forces. 

Our military assistance to India has deeply 
troubled Pakistan, as you are well aware. 
Nevertheless, it is important to the entire free 
world, including Pakistan, that India be able 
to defend itself against Chinese Communist 
aggression. The Unit<>d States has taken great 
pains to assure the Government of Pakistan 
that our aid to India will not be at the expense 
of Pakistan's security, to which we are commit- 
ted under our mutual defense agreements. 
General [Maxwell C] Taylor, in his recent 
visit, again endeavored to reassure Pakistan of 
our continued interest in, and support of, its 
national integrity. An additional increment of 
equipment and training is provided for Pakistan 
in the FY 1965 military assistance program. 
While much has been done to improve the capa- 
bilities of the Pakistan army, equipment de- 
ficiencies still exist. To meet some of these 
deficiencies, the FY 1965 program emphasizes 
ground-force improvements. 

With respect to Iran, our objective has been 
to help build up its military forces to the point 
where they can insure internal security and 
provide at least an initial defense against an 
overt Soviet attack. Although the Iranian 

military forces, with our aid, have improved 
significantly during the last decade, they are 
still not, and never can be, a match for Soviet 
forces presently deployed along the Iranian 
borders, even though the terrain favors the 

Despite its strategic vulnerability, it seems 
quite unlikely that the Soviet Union would, in 
view of our mutual cooperation agreement with 
Iran, deliberately undei'take a major aggression 
against that country in tlie near future. The 
more likely contingency is a covert or ambiguous 
aggression using dissident elements in Iran or 
neighboring nations to pave the way for ulti- 
mate Communist takeover. In Iran, as else- 
where in the world, the best defense against the 
spread of communism is a steady improvement 
in economic and social conditions, which is the 
primary aim of our economic assistance eflorts. 
In this connection, the assurance of a continued 
substantial level of military assistance support 
has enabled the Shah to concentrate on reforms 
leading to economic and social progress 
tlu'oughout the country. 

The FY 1965 military assistance program 
provides funds to continue improvement of 
Iran's air defense capabilities and to support the 
reorganization of the Iranian gi'ound forces 
which is now underway. This reorganization is 
designed to provide a smaller but more mobile 
and better trained army. 

Southeast Asia 

Included in the Forward Defense category are 
three Southeast Asian countries — Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Laos. The continued independ- 
ence of Vietnam is essential to the defense of 
Southeast Asia. There is a serious question in 
my mind as to whether the amount provided for 
Vietnam in the 1965 program will be sufficienL 
Since we have not included a contingency fund 
in our 1965 military assistance budget request, 
any increase in the Vietnam program — and I am 
reasonably sure an increase will be required — 
will have to be made at the expense of other 
country programs, or will have to be provided 
by transfer from economic aid. This is the case 
in the current year's program for which we are 
anticipating a $50 million transfer of economic 
aid funds under section 610 of the law. 

Last week a statement was issued by the 



White House,* suninmrizing Goncral Tiiylor's 
and my report to the President and the Nut ioniil 
Security Council on the situation in Vietnam. 
But I want to emphasize again that we intend 
to provide whatever amounts of economic aid, 
military training, and logistics support are re- 
quired to maintain the independence of the Re- 
public of Vietnam. In all of the millions of 
words that have been written and spoken in 
recent months on the subject of Vietnam, one 
issue stands out above all others, and that is — 
can a nation maintain its independence in the 
face of Comminiist-supported armed insur- 
gency? Can a free government supported by 
other free- world nations succeed in suppressing 
such armed insurgency supported by its neigh- 
bors? This is the crucial question, not only in 
Vietnam, but in all of the newly emerging and 
weaker nations of the world. This is the issue 
which must be resolved in South Vietnam by the 
people of South Vietnam, with our economic, 
training, and logistics support. 

"We must demonstrate to both friend and foe 
alike that an independent people, given the will 
to remain independent and given the will to 
fight and struggle and sacrifice for their inde- 
pendence, can, with the economic, technical, 
training, and logistics support from other free- 
world countries, sustain their independence and 
suppress armed insurgency, even if supported 
from the outside. As I stated at the outset. 
Chairman Klnnishchev put us on notice 3 years 
ago that the kind of struggle now taking place 
in Vietnam is precisely the kind of war the 
Communists favor and will strongly support in 
the future. Either we confront this problem in 
Vietnam and prove to the Communists that this 
type of armed aggression will also fail, or we 
will have to face the same problem increasingly 
in other areas. And it cannot be avoided so long 
as the Communists continue to view this kind of 
aggression as the key to their policy of expan- 

Our military assistance objectives with re- 
spect to Thailand are closely related to those for 
South Vietnam. The loss of either country to 
the Chinese Communists would endanger the 
independence of neighboring nations and seri- 
ously jeopardize U.S. security interests. The 

' Ibid., p. 522. 

1905 program is designed to help sustain the 
armed forces of tliat country. 

The U.S. is continuing to provide military 
assistance to the Koyal Lao Government at that 
Government's request and thus in fidl accord 
with the Geneva agreements. This military 
assistance is designed to maintain neutralist and 
conservative forces loyal to Prime Minister Sou- 
vanna Phouma at the minimum level necessary 
to prevent the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese 
forces from advancing into non-Communist ter- 
ritory. The 1965 program has been designed to 
provide minimum operating essentials for the 
neutralist and conservative forces. 

The Philippines 

Both the strategic location of the Philippines 
and our long history of close cooperation and 
mutual good will make that nation a key ally 
associated with us in the common defense, not 
only bilaterally but also as a member of 
SEATO. The objective of our 1965 military 
assistance program for the Philippines is to en- 
hance the capabilities of its military and para- 
military forces to prevent or defeat Communist 
insurgencies and to help develop forces deploy- 
able within the SEATO area for mutual de- 
fense tasks. Attainment of these objectives and 
continuing close association between the U.S. 
and the Philippines in collective security under- 
takings are very much in our national interest. 

Rejmhlic of Korea and the Republic of China 

Two other key countries on the Communist 
periphery which complete the arc of free- world 
forward defense — Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of China — are directly exposed to the 
threat of Communist aggression. Although 
Red forces in the Far East do not yet have the 
full range of capabilities of the Soviet military 
machine, their very number and expendability 
represent massive power subject to the will of 
an avowedly belligerent adversary. To deter 
the exercise of that power against our security 
interests and those of our allies in the area, we 
count heavily upon the combat effectiveness of 
the sizable forces maintained by the Republics 
of China and Korea. 

Adequate military assistance to the armed 
forces of South Korea and the Republic of 
China not only helps to protect our security 

MAY 4, 1964 


interests in the Far East, but far more itupor- 
tant, it substantially reduces the risk of an 
emergency requirement for direct intervention 
by the United States. In this comiection, it is 
pertinent to note that our FY 1965 program for 
Korea is less than 1 percent of the direct mili- 
tary costs we incurred in the Korean conflict in 
1950-53. The cost in terms of American casual- 
ties suffered in that conflict cannot, of course, be 
reduced to dollars and cents. The 1965 program 
for the Eepublic of China is also quite modest 
considering the forces that nation is maintain- 
ing. It would be highly imprudent of us not 
to insure that the troops on the free-world side of 
the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Straits have 
conventional weapons at least as effective as 
those of their opponents. 

As members of this committee are aware, the 
Chinese Communists have never given up their 
goal to add Taiwan to their empire. They can 
be prevented from achieving this goal only by 
a combination of the strength of United States 
and Eepublic of China forces defending the 
Taiwan Straits — a course of action to which the 
U.S. is conunitted by treaty with the Republic 
of China. Military assistance to the Eepublic 
of Cliina has already greatly strengthened those 
forces, but additional military assistance ex- 
penditures are required if this capability is to 
be maintained. Nearly two-thirds of the value 
of the FY 1965 program will be required to 
maintain these forces, leaving only a small 
amount for equipment and training. 

Alliance for Progress Security Program 

This important category accounts for less than 
6 percent of the total 1965 military assistance 
program — $66.2 million divided among 15 coun- 
tries, compared with $65.4 million divided 
among 20 countries in FY 1963. Of the $66.2 
million, 52 percent is for internal security pro- 
grams, 24 percent for naval defense, 15 percent 
for civic action, and the remaining 9 percent for 
general training and programs which have not 
j'et been developed in detail. 

The military assistance program for Latin 
America is an integral part of the entire 
Alliance for Progress effort. As the recent 
experience of Venezuela so clearly demonstrates, 
internal security is essential to llie development 

of democratic govermnent m Latin America. 
In the light of the avowed objectives of Com- 
munist policy, we can expect that the attempts 
made in Venezuela to overthrow the legitimate 
government by subversion and armed insurrec- 
tion will be repeated elsewhere in Latin Amer- 
ica. While military assistance alone is cer- 
tainly not the whole solution to the problem of 
stable govermnent and economic development 
in Latin America, it does make a very important 
contribution toward that goal. 

Military Base Program 

This category includes only 4 countries, in all 
of wliich we have facilities used by our own 
forces. The total amoimt of money involved is 
relatively qxiite small, $24.4 million, or about 2 
percent of the total 1965 program. In Spain 
we have valuable naval and air bases mcluding 
the new Polaris base at E-ota. In the case of 
Portugal, we have the air facilities in the Azores 
wliich are important to our transatlantic airlift 
operations. In Libya we have the "Wheelus Air 
Base, which is used both for air transport and 
for the training of certain of our forces in 
Europe. The formal agreement permitting the 
LTnited States to use the facility in the Azores 
has expired, but we continue to operate there 
on an informal basis, pending renegotiation of 
the agreement with Portugal. 

Grant Aid Phaseout Program 

In consonance with our policy to phase out 
of the military assistance grant aid program 
all of those recipient countries which have 
achieved adequate levels of economic strength, 
the number of countries in this categorv has 
been reduced from 12 as late as FY 1963 to 
only 3 in the program now before j'ou. ilili- 
tary assistance to these 3 remaining countries is 
limited to the fulfillment of prior-year commit- 
ments and to training associated therewith. 
These commitments take the form of United 
States participation in cost-sharing undertak- 
ings which generate increases in the recipient 
nations' defense budgets and thus contribute to 
the strengthening of the common defense as 
well as increases in purchases from the United 
States. The total amount proposed for FY 
1965 to fulfill these commitments is $53 million, 



or iiboiit ;") pi'ireiit of the total projiiiuii. No 
new commitments will be made to these coun- 
t rii's, and they luive been so informed. 

Free-World Orientation Program 

Sliiilitly more tlian 1 percent of the total pro- 
posed military assistance program is designed 
to proiliule or niininiize Coniminust bloc inllu- 
ence in 7 countries. These programs provide 
modest amounts of military assistance to uiider- 
deveU)ped and emerging nations where it is im- 
portant to the security interests of the United 
States and the common defense of tlic free 
world to preserve and encoui'age resistance to 
the extension of Communist influence. In some 
cases, programs are designed to establish or 
maintain a friendly United States relationsliip 
with the military forces — often a potentially 
important factor in tlie local situation. In 
ot her cases, the amount of United States mili- 
tary assistance furnished to uncommitted na- 
tions is considerably smaller than that provided 
by the Soviet Union. These programs repre- 
sent, in many cases, a calculated risk in that 
they may not succeed in their main objective. 
But the amoimts are so small and the potential 
for gains to the cause of freedom is so large 
that the risk seems well worth taking. 

United States Force Support and Military Assist- 
ance Program Administration 

As I have indicated earlier we have continued 
to include m the military assistance program the 
costs for the XATO Infrastructure and Inter- 
national Military Headquarters which, al- 
though they could more properly be considered 
costs of the U.S. forces, have traditionally been 
funded in this progi-am. Accordingly, had 
there not been a military assistance program, 
these costs would have had to be borne in the 
regular defense budget. 

Another item included here, for want of a 
better place to put it, is the $r)0 million for credit 
assistance which we anticipate will eventually 
be repaid to the United States Treasuiy. Other 
Defense witnesses will discuss with you supply 
operations and regional costs for which we have 
included in the 19G.5 progi-am $84.7 million and 
$22.1 million, respectively ; but I would like to 
discuss very briefly the $23.5 million included 

for program administration. You will notice 
on the attached table that we have reduced pro- 
gram administration costs from $24.9 million 
in FY 1U03 to $24 million in FY 1964. Now we 
are reducing it another one-half million dollars, 
notwithstanding the fact that salary scales have 
increased. In part, the reduction in program 
administration costs over the FY'' 1963-65 period 
reflects our eilort to reduce civilian employment 
in the Department of Defense, which, as you 
may know, will be brought below the 1 million 
level for the first time since 1950. The number 
of militai-y personnel assigned to military assist- 
ance activities is also being reduced, with result- 
ant savings to this program in travel costs, etc. 

Supporting Assistance 

Although supporting assistance is not prop- 
erly a part of the military assistance program 
and is included in the economic assistance re- 
quest, I would like to emphasize that the $335 
million included for this purpose in the Presi- 
dent's 1965 budget is of great importance to the 
success of the military assistance program. Of 
the total program, $240 million is being re- 
quested for Vietnam, Korea, and Laos alone. 
This assistance is essential to the maintenance 
of the military forces and also provides some of 
the economic support required to underpin the 
military efTort in those countries. Vietnam 
alone will consume over one-third of the total 
supporting assistance requested in the 1965 
budget, and I can personally testify that at least 
that amount of funds is absolutely essential to 
our effort in that country. 

Legislative Changes 

Before I conclude my statement, there are a 
number of legislative changes I would like to 
touch on. 

Section 507 - Military Sales 

As presently written, this section requires 
governments making purchases from the U.S. 
under dependable undertakings to make pay- 
ment no later than the time the T Tnited States is 
required to pay its contractors. This require- 
ment has caused considerable difTiculty for coun- 
tries whose laws prohibit payment until the 
items purchased are actually delivered. The 

MAY 4, 1964 


proposed amendment would authorize the pur- 
chaser to make payment under dependable 
vmdertakings within 120 days of delivery of the 
Defense articles or the performance of Defense 
services, when the President determines that 
such an arrangement is in the national interest. 
The Department of Defense would use available 
appropriations to meet its payments to U.S. 
suppliers under the terms of the contract. 
These appropriations would be reimbursed in 
full from payments made by the purchasing 
government. We are confident that the author- 
ity provided by tliis amendment would consid- 
erably enhance our ability to compete for mili- 
tary sales throughout tlie world, without any 
risk of loss to the United States Government. 

The sale of military equipment, supplies, and 
sei*vices to other countries is of considerable 
importance to the United States at this time. 
First, it contributes to our economic well-being 
by providing jobs in this country; second, the 
receipts from these sales help to reduce our 
adverse balance of payments ; and third, the use 

Department of Defense 
Military Assistance Program 

(* Millions) 

Fiscal Year 


Forward Defense 
Alliance for Progress 
Military Base 
Grant Aid Phaseout 
Free-World Orientation 
U.S. Force Support and 
MAP Administration 


International Military 

S\ipply Operations 

Regional Costs 

Program Administration 

Credit Assistance 


Total Obligational Au- 
thority 1, 599. 2 
Less: Recoupments and 

Reappropriations 274. 2 

New Obligational Author- 
ity 1, 325. 


379. 8 

* Includes Operation and Maintenance of the MAP 
Installations and Storage and Maintenance of M.\P 
Stockpiles which are shown as Supply Operations costs 
in FY 1903 and FY 1904. 

•■ Anticipates $50 million transfer from economic aid 

of common equipment, supplies, and services 
helps to promote the continuing cooperation of 
U.S. and allied forces. 

Section 503 - General Authority 

We are also requesting an amendment to 
section 503 which would permit the more exten- 
sive participation of private credit agencies in 
the financing of military sales. We estimate 
that in the current fiscal year a total of $213 
million of military sales will be financed through 
private institutions and the Export-Import 
Bank. I think we can all agree that this is a 
highly desirable way to finance such sales. 
However, the political situation in certain coun- 
tries which may be potential purchasers of U.S. 
military equipment has made private lenders 
reluctant to extend credit at the going rates 
under tlie existing law. Accordingly, we are 
proposing an amendment to section 503 which 
would provide for military sales a guaranty 
similar to that provided in the investment guar- 
anty program. Under the proposed provision, 
a fractional reserve of 25 percent of the amount 
guaranteed wouhl be required. 

Section 620 (m) - "Church Amendment''' 

The training proviso to section 620 (m) ex- 
pires at the end of FY 1964 and in our judgment 
should be extended. This is the provision 
which authorizes the Department of Defense to 
furnish military training assistance to eco- 
nomically developed nations. We believe that 
the furnishing of this type of training to sucli 
nations is a fruitful source of potential sales of 
U.S. military equipment, since it exposes mili- 
tary personnel of other countries to U.S. doc- 
trine and equipment. We propose, however, 
tliat tlie limitation on the amount of training 
which may be furnished to anj' one country be 
reduced from $1 million to $500,000 per year. 

Section 510 - Draw-Down Authoritxj 

This section, which gives the President au- 
thority to draw down Defense stocks for mili- 
tary assistance when he finds such action vital 
to tlie security of the United States, also expires 
on June 30, 1964. Altliough we have not made 
use of this autliority because we believe it 
sliould be invoked only as a last resort, we 
strongly urge that it be renewed. As I have 



already stated, the fiscal year 1965 military as- 
sistance program is so tight that little or no 
flexibility exists to meet unanticipated emer- 
gencies. Accordingly, this special aiitliority 
may be of vital importance to us during the next 
fiscal year. The military departments whose 
stocks are drawn down must, of course, be re- 
imbursed from subsequent military assistance 

Continuing Authorization 

We believe the present practice of requiring 
an annual authorization for the military as- 
sistance program is not conducive to sound, 
long-term planning, either by ourselves or by 
the recipient nations. Military assistance is 
clearly one of the essential tools of U.S. foreign 
policy, and we should be willing to acknowledge 
tiiat fact by providing a continuing authoriza- 
tion for that essential program. The Defense 
Department, of course, would continue to ap- 
pear before the authorizing committees each 
year, as we have in the past, to report on our 
problems and progress and to present the pro- 
gram proposed for the forthcoming fiscal year, 
and the bill proposed by the President expressly 
requires such presentations. 


Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan and members 
of the committee, I believe that with this FY 
1965 military assistance program we have come 
to a critical decision point. Unless we are as- 
sured of at least a billion dollars a year for 
military assistance over the next several years, 
the military strength we have helped to build 
up around the periphery of the Communist 
bloc will quickly melt away. Even with a bil- 
lion dollars a year we will have to consider care- 
fully the advisability of proposing a reduction 
in the size of the forces and military personnel 
strengths supported by the military assistance 
program. Tliis may well be necessary in order 
to achieve a better balance between the size of 
the forces and the quality of their equipment. 
Combat effectiveness as j-ou well know is not 
only a function of numbers of men but of their 
equipping and training as well. 

Anything less than $1 billion a year in new 
militarj' assistance funds will inevitably require 

a reassessment of our entire policy of depending 
on indigenous forces in preparing our own con- 
tingency war plans and, accordingly, of the size 
and character of our own military forces. I 
believe it is obvious to all of us that any at- 
tempt to offset the loss of combat effectiveness 
in those allied forces supported by the military 
assistance program by increases in our own 
forces is bound to cost far more for the same 
amount of combat capability. Yet if we are 
to provide adequately for our national security 
and the collective defense of the free world, we 
will have to make these additional expenditures. 
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I appeal to you and 
to your colleagues on this committee to give our 
FY 1965 military assistance program your full 
and unequivocal support, not only in the com- 
mittee but on the floor of the House. The 
security of our nation demands it. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Winning the Cold War ; The U.S. Ideological Offensive. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Part VII (appendixes to 
part VI) : A. The Cold War Since 19C0, B. Research 
Studies of U.S. Information Agency, January 1964, 
123 pp. ; part VIII, U.S. Government Agencies and 
Programs (Agency for International Development, 
Department of Defense), January I.t-10, 10G4, 145 pp. 

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Part II : Economic 
Developments, Political Trends and Party Faction- 
alism, Distribution of American Publications, Impli- 
cations for U.S. Foreign Policy, State Department 
Views. February 18-March 10, 1964. IIC pp. 

International Development Association Act Amend- 
ment. Hearings before the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency on S. 2214. March 23-24, 
1964. 104 pp. 

Authorizing the President To Appoint a Commission To 
Study the Feasibility of, and Most Suitable Site for, 
the Second Interoceanic Canal Connecting the At- 
lantic and Pacific Oceans. Report to accompany 
S. 2701. S. Rept. 008. March 20, 1904. 11 pp. 

Small Business and Foreign Trade. A report of the 
House Select Committee on Small Business pursuant 
to II. Res. 13. II. Rept. 1303. April 6, 1!)04. 46 pp. 

Amendment to International Development Association 
Act. Report to accompany S. 2214. H. Rept. 1312. 
April 9, 1964. 16 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Shoe Lathes. 
Report to accompany U.R. 10468. H. Rept. 1325. 
April 15, 19C4. 2 pp. 

MAT 4, 1964 



CaEendar of International Conferences and iV9eetings> 

Scheduled May Through July 1964 

ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: Geneva May 4- 

7th Session. 

6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva May 4- 

ICEM Executive Committee: 23d Session Geneva May 4- 

IMCO Worliing Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Sta- London May 4r- 

bility of Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session. 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea . . London May 4- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session . . . Geneva Mav 4- 

UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session Paris Mav 4- 

FAO/WHO Code of Principles Committee for Milk and Milk Rome May 4- 


FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: Rome May 4- 

8th Session. 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 5- 

IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session . . . London May 11- 

U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics Geneva May 11- 

ICEM Council: 21st Session Geneva May 11- 

NATO Ministerial Council The Hague May 12- 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission The Hague May 12- 

OECD Energy Committee: Special Committee for Oil Paris Mav 12- 

OECD Working Party III (Balance of Payments) Paris May 14- 

OECD Energy Committee Paris May 14- 

OECD Ministerial Meeting on Science: Interim Committee . . . Paris May 14- 

FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session Rome May 14- 

International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting Tokyo May 18- 

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program Geneva May 18- 

for Refugees: 11th Session. 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session New York May 20- 

BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement Geneva May 20- 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session New York May 20- 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical Sub- Geneva May 22- 


IMCO Council: 11th Session London May 25- 

ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study Geneva May 25- 


OECD Industry Committee Paris May 26- 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . . Paris May 27- 

Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress Vienna May 29- 

WHO Executive Board: 34th Session Geneva May 

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 

1st International Short Film Festival Cracow, Poland June 1- 

3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty . Brussels June 1- 

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning: 25th Washington June 2- 


FAO International Meeting on Dairy Education Paris June 2- 

OECD Pulp and Paper Committee Paris June 9- 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Ses- Paris June 10- 


'Prepared in the Office of International Conferences. Apr. 14, V.H'A. Following is a list of abbreviations: 
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BlltPI, United International Bureaus 
for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property ; CCITT, Comity consultatif international ti'Idgraphique 
et tcK'phonique ; EUA, Economic Commission for Africa: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East ; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council ; FAO. Food and Asri- 
oulturc Orgiinization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Intor-.Vmerican Efonomic 
and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM. Intergovernmental ('(inimittee 
for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization; ITU, International Tolecomumnication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEP, I'nlted Nations Children's Fimd; 
WHO, World Health Organization. 



U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee 

I'. N. Special Fund GovcrniiiK Council: 12tli Session 

U.N. Special Comnnttce on Frientlly Kclalions 

International Labor Conference: 48th Session 

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee 

U.N. ECE Working Group on Productivity Statistics 

International Wlioat Council: :i'.)th Session 

14tli International Tilm Festival 

FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 9th Session 

U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial Estates 

1C.\0 .\irworthiness Conunittee: 0th Session 

International Sugar Council: 17th Session 

UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee 

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs .\dministration : 4th Ses- 

14th International Film Festival 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program . 

27th International Conference on Public Education 

ANZUS Council 

I MCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session 

IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Ses- 

lA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d 

South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commis- 

Vienna June 15- 

The Hague Juw 15- 

M6xico, D.F June 15- 

Geneva June 17- 

Geneva June 22 

Geneva lune 22- 

London Iuih^ 23- 

Berlin June 26- 

Ilome June 29- 

Addis Abalia June 29- 

Paris June 

London June 

NewYork June 

Bangkok July 1- 

Karlovy Vary, Czeehoslovalda . July 4- 

Genevii July 6- 

Geneva July 6- 

Washington July 13- 

London luly 13- 

Geneva July 13- 

London July 20- 

Santiago July 

Wellington July 

Achievements of the I titer- American Development Bank 

Statement by Douglas Dillon 
Secretary of the Treasury ^ 

It is particularly fitting that -we are holding 
our fiftli annual meeting of the Bank's Gov- 
ernors today, which is being observed in my 
country as Pan American Day. There could 
be no more fitting place for today's meeting 
than tliis honored and historic city, which 
Bolivar chose for the first Inter-American Con- 
ference, the Congress of Panama. 

This is the 140th year since Bolivar prophe- 
sied proudly and boldly that "a hundred cen- 
turies hence, posterity, searching for the origin 
of our public law and recalling the compacts 
that solidified its destiny, will touch with re- 
spect the protocols of the Isthmus. In them 
will be found the plan of our first alliances that 

• Made before the annual meeting of the Governors 
of the Inter-American Development Bank at Panama 
on Apr. 14. Mr. Dillon is U.S. Governor of the Bank. 

will have marked the begimiing of our relation 
with the universe." 

The Bank, then, could not be more "at home" 
than here in Panama, where inter-American 
meetings first were launched, for the Bank in 
the best inter-American tradition is a strong 
and progressive force in the social and economic 
development of the hemisphere. 

In 1963 the Inter-American Development 
Bank completed its third full year of operations 
and once again compiled an impressive record 
of achievement. 

To support the economic and social develop- 
ment of its Latin American members, the Bunk 
last year authorized 56 new loans, for a total of 
$259 million. Its lifetime loan approvals at 
the end of the year liad reached the impressive 
figure of $875 million, and activity under these 
loans is proceeding at a sharply accelerated 

MAT 4, 1964 


pace. Total disbursements at the end of 1963 
were $206 million — more than three times larger 
than disbursements at the end of 1962. 

Impressive as they are, these statistics can 
give us only a limited appreciation of the truly 
remarkable work which the Bank's dedicated 
management and staff have accomplished in the 
past 3 years. Each loan, for example, reflects 
weeks and months of careful scrutiny and plan- 
ning. Behind each loan, moreover, lie several 
additional applications for projects found 
wanting or not yet ready for execution but 
which nonetheless required — and merited — time 
and effort to review. 

The Bank has also continued its efforts to 
mobilize private capital for Latin American 
development in the highly industrialized free 
countries. Last year the Bank was able to sell 
a total of $7.4 million in additional participa- 
tion — without any guaranty — in the United 
States, Canada, and Western Europe. As you 
know, the Bank has just floated its third suc- 
cessful bond issue — the second in the United 
States — in the amount of $50 million. In addi- 
tion, the Bank is actively negotiating for fur- 
ther flotations in various Western European 
countries. I am confident that these efforts will 
soon bear fruit. Additional external capital 
has also been mobilized by the Bank through 
arrangements for the joint financing of projects. 
As stated in the annual report, five of the Bank's 
ordinary capital loans last year were made in 
association with other external sources of 

Equally important — although perhaps less 
immediately evident in our usual review of the 
Bank's activities — is the fact that the Bank's 
lending policies have stimulated the mobiliza- 
tion of very large amounts of domestic capital 
in its member countries. The total cost of proj- 
ects financed by the $875 million of the Bank's 
loans amounts to nearly $2.5 billion. Most of 
the additional cost — some $1.5 billion of it — • 
represents the direct participation of local 
interests — governments, firms, and individ- 
uals — and their provision of the domestic capital 

In directing the Bank's lending policies, 
President [Felipe] Herrera has increasingly 
emphasized the encouragement of regional 

integTation. It seems to me all to the good that 
the Bank should give priority to loans having 
a "regional integration component," for re- 
gional integration is essential if an adequate 
rate of economic growth is to be achieved in 
Latin America. I note that in the pursuit of 
these policies the Bank has extended a $6 mil- 
lion line of credit to the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration and has made a $3 
million loan to the national universities of the 
five Central American countries in order to in- 
sure technical progress within the framework 
of that area's vigorous movement toward 
regional integration. 

During the past year the Bank moved to im- 
plement the export credits program which the 
Governors approved in Caracas. The Bank has 
given specific form to the general directive laid 
down by the Governors and has completed the 
detailed regulations to govern tliis new activity. 
The $30 million of ordinary capital resources 
allocated to this program has now been put to 
work by the grant of lines of credit to several 
member countries. I am sure we will all watch 
with great interest and expectation the impor- 
tant role this export financing program can play 
in the development of capital goods production, 
export diversification, reduced trade barriers, 
and regional integration. 

Increase in Lendable Resources 

The pace of the Bank's activities required 
some time ago that the Govemore consider an 
increase in the Bank's lendable resources. The 
process begun 2 years ago in Buenos Aires has 
now been completed and the authorized ordinary 
capital of the Bank now stands at the equivalent 
of an imposing $2.15 billion, of which $475 mil- 
lion is the authorized paid-in capital stock and 
$1,675 million is callable capital. Our Congress 
in January authorized United States participa- 
tion in this increase to the extent of $411.8 mil- 
lion in callable capital, which will be subscribed 
in two installments — this year and next — along 
with the subscription of the Bank's other mem- 
bers. With the Bank's demonstrated success in 
raising funds in private capital markets, the in- 
creased authorized capital provides ample assur- 
ance of adequate resources for projects on stand- 
ard "bankable" terms for several years to come. 



Wo have nt the moment no such assurance on 
the avaihvbility of Bank funds for so-called 
"soft" loans — loans designed to supplement 
those made on ordinan- hankiiitr tonus. Agree- 
ment was reached earlier this year on an increase 
of $73.2 million in the Fund for Special Opera- 
tions, of whicli $50 million will ho paid in by 
my Government on Ajiril 28. This will bring 
the total capital of the Fund for Special Opera- 
tions to the equivalent of $210.5 million, of 
which $150 million will have been paid in by 
the United States. In addition, our Congress 
last year appropriated an additional $131 mil- 
lion to increase the Social Progress Trust Fund 
administered by the Bank. Tliese additional 
fimds for loans on easj* repayment terms will 
sufBce for loss than 1 year of lending operations 
at an adequate rate. It is urgent, therefore, 
that the Governors address themselves once 
again to the future of the Bank's lending activ- 
ities on soft terms and begin action to obtain the 
requisite f imds. 

Proposal To Enlarge Special Operations Fund 

At our last meeting in Caracas, and again in 
the report on this matter which is now before 
you, my Government has expressed its view that 
the Bank would be strengthened if at this point 
in its life — and at this juncture of the Alliance 
for Progress — the lending windows to which 
the United States and other member coimtries 
provide funds were reduced from the existing 
three to two. "We have, therefore, proposed that 
there be no further replenishment of the Social 
Progress Trust Fund and that, instead, there be 
a substantial enlargement of the Fund for Spe- 
cial Operations. 

The Social Progress Trust Fund, as you know, 
grew directly from the Act of Bogota, and the 
emphasis which at that time we all agreed to 
place on social development in Latin America. 
It was unfortunately all too true that social 
progress in the hemisphere had been sadly ne- 
glected, and therefore it was both essential and 
proper that the Act of Bogota call attention to 
the priority needs of the social sector. 

The Act of Bogota, as we all know, was soon 
succeeded by the great milestone of hemi- 
spheric dedication and cooperation, the Charter 
of Punta del Este. That charter gave formal 

recognition to the fact that soi'iul and economic 
progress arc mutually reinforcing objectives. 
It also called for comprehensive planning of 
the path to progress — planning that would 
make it necessary to reduce or remove any shari) 
distinction between economic and social proj- 
ects. The mark of well-prepared plans — which, 
happily, are now well advanced in a number 
of countries — is the rational allocation of avail- 
able lesources between the economic and social 
sectors, taking full account of their interde- 
pendence. We can expect, therefore, that the 
Bank, in deciding upon particular projects for 
financing, will increasingly take into account 
both economic and social considerations and 
not just one or the other. With this approach, 
only two sources of financing, one hard, one 
soft, seem necessary — the choice between them 
to be determined not necessarily just by the 
nature of the project but also by the situation 
of the borrower or other special circumstances. 
In the context of these considerations, I hope 
that we can agree at this meeting to seek the 
commitment of our governments to a 3-year 
program to enlarge the Fund for Special Op- 
erations by an amomit equal to $300 million per 
annum, of which the United States would con- 
tribute $250 million, and the other members of 
the Bank, $50 million, all in our own national 

This enlargement, which would enable the 
Fund to make loans on special terms for the 
purposes currently being financed by both the 
Fund and the Social Progress Trust Fund, 
can be accomplished without any change in the 
agreement establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank. This would simplify the 
legislative problems of the member govern- 
ments. This is particularly desirable as far as 
the United States is concerned. In view of our 
forthcoming national election, the United 
States Congress can be expected to adjourn 
some^vhat earlier in the year than has recently 
been the case. Delay in reaching agreement on 
this matter or the introduction of complexities 
involving basic changes in the Bank's charter 
would greatly increase our difficulty in obtain- 
ing congressional approval this year — as can 
be attested by the Members of the United States 
Congress who have come here from Washing- 

MAT 4, 1964 


ton to attend this meeting as members of our 

The Alliance for Progress 

We look for the Bank to continue and expand 
its role as the "Bank of the Alliance." During 
the past year the Bank has assumed new duties 
as financial agent in the mobilization of ex- 
ternal resources for national development pro- 
grams, in filling a special advisory role M-ith 
various entities concerned with the provision 
of external development financing, and, finally, 
as technical adviser to the newly established 
Inter-American Alliance for Progress Com- 
mittee (known as CIAP). In connection es- 
pecially with the latter body, it seems 
appropriate for the Bank to assume a more 
active role in the programing of development 
assistance and in directing its activities toward 
the support of well-designed national and re- 
gional programs. 

Turning to the Alliance for Progress, in 
which the Bank plays such an important role, 
I think we must, in honesty, acknowledge that 
the present moment is one characterized by 
skepticism and doubt, both in Latin America 
and in the United States. Unquestionably, we 
still have a long way to go before we achieve 
the objectives envisioned in the Charter of 
Punta del Este. But while we face that fact, 
let it not obscure the equally important fact 
that, by every realistic measure, we have come 
a long way. 

First, in the recent creation of the Inter- 
American Alliance for Progress Committee, 
CIAP, we have established a sound mechanism 
for hemispheric coordination and guidance 
within the framework of the alliance. Our 
appointment of Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso 
as United States representative has made clear 
that the United States wishes to play an active 
role in this Committee, to which President 
Johnson has pledged "our full support." " 

Second, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that 11 of the 19 Latin American member 
countries have been achieving the minimum 2^^ 
percent per capita growth target set at Punta 

• For text of an address made by President Johnson 
at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16, see Bitlletin 
of Apr. 6, 19(34, p. 535. 

del Este. Equallj' important, perhaps, is tlie 
fact that throughout the hemisphere we have 
witnessed in the past 2 j'ears the creation of new 
institutions vital to the pace of future gi'owth. 
The Bank itself has participated in the estab- 
lishment or reform of a variety of intermediate 
credit institutions — development banks, agri- 
cultural credit banks, savings and loan and 
housing fuiance institutions — all critical in the 
process of domestic resource mobilization. In- 
tense efforts are being devoted to the reform of 
tax structures, improved tax collection, a more 
equitable and productive distribution of land, 
and improved facilities in the fields of health 
and education. 

These are the very sinews of growth, and the 
attention and activity focused in these areas in 
the past 2 years has far surpassed anything 
ever before witnessed in the hemisphere. The 
fruits of endeavors such as these will not 
miraculously ripen overnight; on the contrary, 
progress will be difficult and even hazardous. 
But without these efforts, progress simply will 
not occur. "We therefore have a clear choice 
before us : 

— Shall we hold timorously back, afraid to 
move because we might stir up waters that 
could become troubled ? 

— Or shall we venture forth on new paths — 
but always within a framework of free and 
democratic institutions — that will offer all of 
our peoples a fair share in the gradually ripen- 
ing fruit of our mutual endeavors ? 

On behalf of my country, I urge that we 
move without timidity and with confidence. 

So far as external funds are concerned, tak- 
ing into full acount the self-help measures of the 
various comitries of Latin America in connec- 
tion with their commitments imder the Charter 
of Punta del Este, the Laiited States continues 
to be prepared to provide public assistance in 
the order of magnitude suggested by the char- 
ter. As our AID [Agency for International 
Development] Administrator, Mr. David Bell, 
emphasized in his address to the Governors last 
year, the pace at which aid can be provided must 
depend upon a series of preparatory and corre- 
lated actions. Careful advance planning and 
sound project implementation takes time, and 
there will be inevitable laijs between conmiit- 



nu'iit ;uul (lisbui'sement of funds. I have 
pointetl out tlic close attention tlie liank has 
given to the problem of project execution and 
loan disbursements durin<j the past year and 
wish to assure you that our own linancing insti- 
tutions have also made every etl'ort — consistent 
with the overriding requirements of sound proj- 
ect implementation — to expedite disbursement. 

Among the disappointments of the past 2 
years, I might note that the commitment of ex- 
ternal funds from lOurope has thus far been less 
than had been hoped. Recently there has been 
new evidence of European interest in Latin 
America symbolized by the recent visits of Pres- 
ident de Gaulle and President Liiebke. The 
United States wholeheartedly welcomes these 
renewed signs of European interest and hopes 
that the interest will be clearly manifested in 
an increase in the kinds of low-interest, long- 
term development loans so badly needed by 
Latin America. In addition to liberal terms, we 
■would hope that European assistance to Latin 
America would be carefully related to the over- 
all planning effort and to the system of pri- 
orities established within the context of the 
Alliance for Progress. The proposal of the 
Governor for Argentina raises interesting pos- 
sibilities in this respect, and I can state that mj' 
delegation is in full accord with the objectives 
underlying his proposal. 

I should like once again to emphasize in the 
strongest terms the need for the Latin American 
countries themselves to be on guard against 
terms of assistance from any source which 
would create an unacceptable burden for the 
future. The indiscriminate and mirestrained 
acceptance of short- and medium-term suppliers 
credits, in cases where longer term development 
loans are the real need, all too often simply 
creates an miwieldy and mimanageable prob- 
lem which can veiy quickJj' assume crisis pro- 
portions leading to a slowdown in the pace of 

Mobilizing Private Investment 

The field of private investment is another 
area where flows of external capital have proved 
disappointing. In this comiection, we must 
constantly bear in mind the fact that the foreign 
investor always has alternative possibilities for 

investment of his capital. Given the high levels 
of current economic activity in the United 
States and Europe, the opportunities for profit- 
able investment at home in both areas are rela- 
tively great. In order to attract private fimds 
from the United States or Europe, or to induce 
the inv-jstment of local private capital, a coun- 
try — whether already industrialized or devel- 
oping — must maintain an investment climate 
which offers a reasonable prospect thiit a sound 
project will yield a return commensurate with 
the risk involved. The choice is for each coun- 
try to make. The results will depend, to a very 
great extent, upon that choice. 

In (ho United States over the past 3 years we 
have adopted a series of tax measures to increase 
the relative attractiveness of investment at home 
as compared with investment in other free, in- 
dustrialized countries. Countries that deliber- 
ately hamper the investment of private capital, 
or fail to provide a hospitable climate, should be 
aware of the fact that they are forgoing sources 
of financing and teclmical knowledge of great 
importance to their future growth and to the 
strength of their international position — 
sources which cannot possibly be replaced by 
public funds. 

An important corollary of a favorable "in- 
vestment climate" is a country's ability to raise 
capital abroad. In this connection the recent 
experience of Mexico comes to mind: Mexico 
has been able to float two highly successful 
bond issues in the capital markets of the United 
States — one last year and a second just 2 weeks 
ago — for a total of $65 million. It goes without 
saying that these Mexican issues were very wel- 
come, and we hope that other Latin American 
countries will be able to follow this example in 
mobilizing private external funds for their de- 
velopment. I should mention here that the 
interest equalization tax on foreign securities 
wliich has been proposed to the United States 
Congress by my Government ^ is not designed 
to apply to the securities of the Latin American 

Finally, I cannot let this occasion pass with- 
out mention of the world trade and develop- 
ment conference now under way in Geneva.^ I 

' For background, see ibid., Mar. 23, 1064, p. 464. 
' For background, see ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634. 

MAT 4, 1964 


am aware of the intense interest which your 
Governments have in this conference and in its 
purpose of helping to ease the problem facing 
the developing world. That endeavor is, of 
course, one in which the United States has long 
taken the lead, and I would simply like to em- 
phasize my country's determination to continue 
its efforts, in every feasible way, to serve that 

Mr. Chairman, the tangible evidence of the 
Bank's progress placed before us at this meet- 
ing symbolizes the activity, movement, and 
forward progress being accomplished through- 
out Latin America under the guidance of the 
Charter of Punta del Este. I am confident that 
at our meeting next year, and in the years ahead, 
we will find ourselves increasingly able to meet 
the needs of Latin America and of Western 
Hemisphere solidarity. 


Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Cuba (with reservation), No- 
vember 20, 1963. 


International air services transit agreement. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for 
the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, April 16, 1964. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Designations 

Vienna April 18, 1961.' 

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics (with reservation and declaration), March 
25, 1964. 


Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem- 
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. 
TIAS 1501. 
Notification of tcithdrawal: Cuba, April 2, 1964. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the North- 
west Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 
2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at 
Washington July 15, 1963.' 

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, April 13, 1964. 


Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the 
international telecommunication convention, 1959 
(TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. 
Entered into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States 
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4S93. 
Notification of approval: Mexico, March 7, 1964. 



Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La 
Paz March 25, 1964. Entered into force March 25, 


Agreement for the continued application to Tanganyika 
of the provisions of the agreement between the United 
States and the United Kingdom for technical coop- 
eration (TIAS 2281). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Dar-es-Salaam, December 9, 1963. Entered into 
force December 9, 1963. 


Agreement for the abolition of all nonimmigrant visa 
fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade, 
December 30, 1963, and March 27 and April 4, 1964. 
Entered into force April 15, 1964. 


' Not in force. 

Robinson Mcllvaine as Coordinator of the National 
Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, 
effective April 13. (For biographic details, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 161 dated April 10.) 



INDEX May 4, 196!^ Vol. L, No. 1S97 

Africa. Diplomatic Rapport Between Afric-a 
and the United States (Williams) .... 698 

American Republics 

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Kaiik (Dillon) 717 

Ignacio Ixizano Xamed Adviser on Cultural Ex- 
change Program "03 

Asia. SE.\TO Council of Ministers Meets at 
Manila (Rusk, text of communique) . . . COO 

Aviation. United States and France Discuss 

Air Cargo Operations 704 

China. U.S. Reaffirms Commitments to Taiwan 

and Viet-Xam (Rusk) C94 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 715 

The Military Assistance Program for 1965 

(McNamara) 705 

Department and Foreign Service. Designations 

(Mcllvaine) 722 

Diplomacy. Diplomatic Rapport Between Af- 
rica and the United States (Williams) . . . 698 

Economic Affairs 

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank (Dillon) 717 

President Calls for Review of Tariffs on Glass 

Products 697 

United States and United Kingdom Conclude 

Grains Agreement (Ilerter) 703 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Ignacio 
Lozano Named Adviser on Cultural Exchange 
Program 703 

Foreign Aid. The Military Assistance Program 
for 1965 (McNamara) 705 

France. United States and France Discuss Air 
Cargo Operations 704 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Achievements of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank (Dillon) 717 

Calendar of International Conferences and 

Meetings 716 

Jordan. President Johnson Holds Talks With 
King Hussein of Jordan (text of joint com- 
munique) 697 

Laos. U.S. Reaffirms Support of Royal Lao 
Government 703 

Military Affairs. The Military Assistance Pro- 
gram for 1965 (McNamara) 705 

Presidential Documents. President Johnson 

Holds Talks With King Hussein of Jordan . 697 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO 
Council of Ministers Meets at Manila (Rusk, 
text of communique) 690 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 722 

United States and United Kingdom Conclude 

Grains AKieenient (Ilorter) 703 

United Kingdom. United States and United 
Kingdom Conclude Grains Agreement 
(Ilerter) 703 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Reaffirms Commitments to 
Taiwan and Viet-Nam (Rusk) 694 

Name Indcie 

Dillon, Douglas 717 

Herter, Christian A 703 

King Hussein I 697 

Johnson, President 697 

Lozano, Ignacio E., Jr 703 

Mcllvaine, Robinson 722 

McNamara, Robert S 705 

Rusk, Secretary 690,694 

Williams, G. Mennen 698 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to April 13 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 160 of April 

No. Date Subject 

*1G2 4/13 Vaughn sworn in as Ambassador to 

Panama (biographic details). 
*163 4/13 Dr. Ferebee sworn in as consultant 

to Medical Division (biographic 

*1(54 4/13 U.S. participation in international 

•165 4/14 Itinerary for visit of King of 

16G 4/15 SEATO communique. 

167 4/17 Talks with France on air cargo 


168 4/17 Lozano named consultant to Assist- 

ant Secretary Battle (rewrite). 
*169 4/17 Barnett: "China and the Chinese." 
tl70 4/17 Williams : "African Issues at the 

United Nations." 

♦Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


DSB etc G 


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Address hy Secretary Rusk 732 


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by Under Secretary Ball 738 

For index see inside hack cover 

America as a Great Power 

Address ty President Johnson ^ 

The world has changed many times since 
General Wasliington comiseled his new and 
weak coimtry to "observe good faith and justice 
toward all nations." Great empires have risen 
and dissolved. Great heroes have made their 
entrances and have left the stage. And Amer- 
ica has slowly, often reluctantly, grown to be a 
great power and a leading member of world 

So we seek today, as we did in Washington's 
time, to protect the life of our nation, to 
preserve the liberty of our citizens, and to pur- 
sue the happiness of our people. This is the 
touchstone of our world policy. 

Thus we seek to add no territory to our do- 
minion, no satellites to our orbit, no slavish 
followers to our policies. The most impressive 
witness to this restraint is that for a century our 
own frontiers have stood quiet and stood un- 
armed. But we have also learned in this cen- 
tury, and we have learned it at painful and 

' Made before the Associated Press at New York, 
N.Y., on Apr. 20 (White House press release; as- 
delivered text). 

bloody cost, that our own freedom depends on 
the freedom of others, that our own protection 
I'equires that we help protect others, that we 
draw increased strength from the strength of 

Thus, to allies we are the most dependable 
and enduring of friends, for our own safety 
depends upon the strength of that friendship. 
To enemies we are the most steadfast and de- 
termined of foes, for we know that surrender 
anywhere threatens defeat everywhere. For a 
generation, without regard to party or region 
or class, our coimtry has been united in a basic 
foreign policy that grows from this inescapable 

Tested Principles of Foreign Policy 

The principles of this foreign policy have 
been shaped in battle, have been tested in dan- 
ger, have been sustained in achievement. They 
have endured imder four Presidents of the 
United States, because they reflect the realities 
of our world and they reflect the aims of our 


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Particular actions must change as events 
change conditions. We must be alert to shifting 
realities, to emerging opportunities, and always 
alert to any fresh dangers. But we must not 
mistake day-to-day changes for fundamental 
movements in the course of history. It often 
requires greater courage and resolution to main- 
tain a policy which time has tested than to 
change it in the face of the moment's pressures. 
Our foreign policy rests on very tested 

First, since Korea, we have labored to build 
a military strength of unmatched might. We 
have succeeded. If the threat of war has les- 
sened, it is largely because our opponents realize 
attack would bring destruction. This effort has 
been costly. But the costs of weakness are far 
greater than the costs of strength, and the pay- 
ment far more painful. That is why, in the 
last 3 years, your Goverimient has strengthened 
the whole range of America's defenses. 

We have increased defense spending in these 
3 years by approximately $6 billion over the 
last year of the Eisenliower administration, and 
tliis year we are spending approximately $8 
billion more on defense than we were during 
that last year. 

Second, we have strongly resisted Communist 
efforts to extend their dominion and expand 
their power. We have taken the risks and we 
have used the power which this principle de- 
manded. We have avoided purposeless provo- 
cation and needless adventure. The Berlin 
airlift, the Korean war, the defense of For- 
mosa, the Cuba crisis, the struggle in Viet-Nam, 
prove our determination to resist aggression 
and prove our ability to adapt particular re- 
sponse to particular challenge. 

Third, we have worked for tlie revival of 
strength among our allies, initially, to oppose 
Commvmist encroachment on war-weakened na- 
tions; in the long run, because our own future 
rests on the vitality and the unity of the West- 
em society to which we belong. 

Fourth, we have encouraged the independ- 
ence and the progress of developing countries. 
We are safer and we are more comfortable in a 
world where all people can govern themselves 
in their own way, and where all nations have 
the inner strength to resist external domination. 

Fifth, we have pursued every hope of a last- 

ing peace. From the Baruch Plan, named after 
that noble resident of this city, to the test ban 
treaty, we have sought and welcomed agree- 
ments which decrease danger without decreas- 
ing security. In that pursuit, for 20 years we 
have been the leading power in the support of 
the United Nations. In that pursuit, this year 
as in every year, we will work to reach agree- 
ment on measures to reduce armament and 
lessen the chance of war. 

Today we apply these same principles in a 
world that is much changed since 1945. Europe 
seeks a new role for strength rather than con- 
tenting itself with protection for weakness. 
The unity of commimism is being eroded by the 
insistent forces of nationalism and diverging 
interest. A whole new group of societies is 
painfully struggling toward the modern world. 

Our basic principles are adequate to this 
slxifting world. 

But foreign policy is more than just a set of 
general principles. It is the changing appli- 
cation of those principles to specific dangers 
and to specific opportunities. It involves knowl- 
edge of strengths and awareness of limitations 
in each new situation. 

The presence of offensive missiles in Cuba 
was a fact. The presence of fallout in the at- 
mosphere has been a fact. The presence of 
guerrillas in Viet-Nam, at this hour, is a fact. 

Such facts cannot be dealt with simply by 
historical judgments or general precepts. They 
require concrete acts of courage, and wisdom, 
and often restraint. These qualities of endur- 
ance and innovation, these qualities of continu- 
ity and change are at work in at least six major 
areas of continuing concern to you. 

Relations With the Soviet Union 

First is our relationship with the Soviet 
Union, the center of our concern for peace. 
Communists, using force and intrigue, seek to 
bring about a Conmiunist-dominated world. 
Our convictions, our interests, our life as a 
nation, demand that we resolutely oppose, with 
all of our might, that effort to dominate the 
world. This activity, and this alone, is the cause 
of the cold war between us. 

For the United States has nothing to fear 
from peaceful competition. We welcome it, 
and we will win it. It is our system which 

MAT 11, 1964 


flourishes and grows stronger in a world free 
from the threat of war. And in such a com- 
petition all people, eveiywhere, will be the 
gainers. Today there are new pressures, new 
realities, which make it permissible to hope that 
the pursuit of peace is in the interests of the 
Soviet Union as it is in ours. 

And our own restraint may be convincing the 
Soviet leaders of the reality that we, in Ajnerica, 
seek neither war nor the destruction of the 
Soviet Union. Thus I am very hopeful that we 
can take important steps toward the day when 
in the words of the Old Testament, "nation 
shall not lift up sword against nation, neither 
shall they learn war any more." 

We must remember that peace will not come 
suddenly. It will not emei-ge dramatically from 
a single agreement or a single meetmg. It will 
be advanced by concrete and limited accommo- 
dations, by the gradual growth of common in- 
terests, by the increased awareness of shifting 
dangers and alinements, and by the develop- 
ment of trust in a good faith based on a reasoned 
view of the world. 

Our own position is clear. We will discuss 
any problem, we will listen to any proposal, 
we will pursue any agreement, we will take any 
action which might lessen the chance of war 
without sacrificing the interests of our allies 
or our own ability to defend the alliance against 
attack. In other words, our guard is up but 
our hand is out. 

I am taking two actions today which reflect 
both our desire to reduce tensions and our un- 
willingness to risk weakness. I have ordered 
a further substantial reduction in our produc- 
tion of enriched uranium, to be carried out over 
a 4-year period. Wlien added to previous re- 
ductions, this will mean an overall decrease in 
the production of plutonium by 20 percent, and 
of enriclied uranium by 40 percent. By bring- 
ing production in line with need — and the chart 
shows now that our production is here [gestur- 
inff], and our need is here, and our reduction 
today will bring it here — we think we will re- 
duce tension while we maintain all the necessary 

We must not operate a WPA nuclear project, 
just to provide employment, when our needs 
have been met. And in reaching these decisions, 

I have been in close consultation with Prime 
Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with 
my amiouncement now. Chairman IClirushchev 
is releasing a statement in Moscow, at 2 o'clock 
our time, in which he makes definite commit- 
ments to steps toward a more peaceful world. 
He agrees to discontinue the construction of two 
big new atomic reactors for the production of 
plutonium over the next several years, to reduce 
substantially the production of U-235 for nu- 
clear weapons, and to allocate more fissionable 
material for peaceful uses. 

This is not disarmament. Tliis is not a dec- 
lai-ation of peace. But it is a hopeful sign, 
and it is a step forward which we welcome 
and which we can take in hope that the world 
may yet, one day, live without the fear of war. 
At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safe- 
guards against weakening our nuclear strength 
which we adopted at the time of the test ban 

The Atlantic Partnership 

The second area of continuing effort is the 
development of Atlantic partnership with a 
stronger and more unified Europe. Having be- 
gun this policy when peril was great, we will not 
now abandon it as success moves closer. We 
worked for a stronger and more prosperous 
Europe, and Europe is strong and prosperous 
today because of our work and beyond our 

We have supported a close partnership with 
a more unified Europe, and in the past 15 years 
more peaceful steps have been taken in tliis di- 
rection than have been taken at any time in our 
history. The pursuit of this goal, like the pur- 
suit of any large and worthy cause, will not be 
easy or imtroubled. But the realities of the 
modern world teach that increased greatness 
and prosperity demand increased unity and 
partnership. The underlying forces of Euro- 
pean life are eroding old barriers, and they are 
dissolving old suspicions. Common institu- 
tions are expanding common interest. 

National boundaries continue to fade imder 
the impact of travel and commerce and com- 
munication. A new generation is coming of 
age, unscarred by old hostilities or old ambi- 



tions, tliinking of themselves as Europeans, 
tlieir values shaped hy a common Western cul- 
ture. Tiieso forces, and the steadfast etVort of 
all who share common goals, will shape the 
future. And luiity based on hope will ulti- 
mately prove stron<rer than unity based on fear. 

AVe realize that sharing the burden of leader- 
ship requires us to share the responsibilities of 
power. As a step in this direction we support 
the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force 
composed of those nations which desire to par- 
ticipate. We also welcome agreed new mecha- 
nisms for political consultation on mutual in- 
terests throughout the world with whatever 
changes in organization are necessary to make 
such consultation rapid and effective. 

The experience of two world ware has taught 
us that the fundamental security interests of the 
T^nited States and of Europe are the same. 
AMiat we learned in time of war, we not 
now forget in time of peace. For more than 
a decade we have sought to enlarge the independ- 
ence and ease the rigors of tlie people of Eastern 
Europe. We have used the tools of peaceful 
exchange in goods, in persons, and in ideas, to 
open up communication with these restless na- 
tions that Mr. Khrushchev refers to sometimes 
as "children who are grown up too big to spank." 
We have used limited direct assistance where the 
needs of our security have allowed us to follow 
the demands of our compassion. 

In that spirit within the last month I have 
exercised the power granted the President by the 
Congress and I have reaffirmed the right of open 
trade with Poland and Yugoslavia.- 

Latin America 

In the third area of continuing concern, Latin 
America, we have renewed our commitment to 
the Alliance for Progress, we have sought peace- 
ful settlement of disputes among the American 
nations, and we have supported the OAS effort 
to isolate Communist-controlled Cuba. The 
Alliance for Progress is the central task today 
of this hemisphere. That task is going ahead 
successfully . 

But that alliance means more than economic 
assistance or investment. It requires us to en- 

' Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 626. 

courage and to support those democratic polit- 
ical forces which seek essential change within 
the framework of constitutional government. 
It means preference for rapid evolution as the 
only real alternative to violent revolution. To 
struggle to stand still in Latin America is just 
to "throw the sand against the wind." 

We must, of course, always be on guard 
against Communist subversion. But anticom- 
numism alone will never suffice, to insure our 
liberty or fulfill our dreams. That is going to 
take leadership, leadership that is dedicated to 
economic progi-ess without uneconomic priv- 
ilege, to social change which enhances social 
justice, to political reform which widens human 

The resumption of relations with Panama^ 
proves once again the unmatched ability of our 
inter-American system to resolve these disputes 
among our good neighbors. At the outset of 
that dispute with Panama, the first morning I 
stated to the President of Panama by telephone 
our willingness to seek a solution to all prob- 
lems without conditions of any kind. And I told 
him that our negotiators would meet theire 
anywhere, anytime, to discuss anything, and we 
would do what was fair, just, and right. We 
never departed from that willingness. And on 
that basis, the dispute was settled. 

We now move toward solution with the 
generosity of friends who realize, as Woodrow 
Wilson once said, "You cannot be friends on any 
other terms than upon the terms of equality." 

The use of Cuba as a base for subversion and 
terror is an obstacle to our hopes for the West- 
ern Hemisphere. Our first task must be, as 
it has been, to isolate Cuba from the inter- 
American system, to frustrate its efforts to de- 
stroy free governments, and to expose the weak- 
ness of communism so that all can see. That 
policy is in effect, and that policy is working. 
The problems of this hemisphere would be far 
more serious if Castro today sat at the councils 
of the Organization of American States dis- 
rupting debates and blocking decision, if Castro 
had open channels of trade and communication 
along which subversion and terror could flow, 
if his economy had been a successful model 

' lUd., Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655. 

MAY 11, 1964 


rather than a dismal waniing to all of lus 

The effectiveness of our policy is more than 
a matter of trade statistics. It has increased 
awareness of difference and danger, it has re- 
vealed the brutal nature of the Cuban regime, 
it has lessened opportunities for subversion, it 
has reduced the number of Castro's followers, 
and it has drained the resources of our adver- 
saries, who are spending more than $1 million 
a day. "We will continue this policy with every 
peacefid means at our command. 

The Far East 

A fourth area of continuity and change is the 
battle for freedom in the Far East. In the 
last 20 years, in two wars, millions of Americans 
have fought to prevent the armed conquest of 
free Asia. Having invested so heavily in the 
past, we will not weaken in the present. The 
first American diplomatic mission to the Far 
East was instructed to inform all countries that 
"we will never make conquests, or ask any na- 
tion to let us establish ourselves in their 

That was our policy in 1832. That is our 
policy in 1964. Our conquering forces left Asia 
after World War II with less territory under 
our flag than ever before. But if we have de- 
sired no conquest for ourselves, we have also 
steadfastly opposed it for others. The inde- 
pendence of Asian nations is a link in our own 

In Korea we proved the futility of direct ag- 
gression. In Viet-Nam the Communists today 
try the more insidious, but equally dangerous, 
methods of subversion, terror, and guerrilla 
warfare. They conduct a campaign organized, 
directed, supplied, and supported from Hanoi. 
This, too, we will prove futile. Armed Com- 
munist attack on Viet-Nam is a reality. The 
fighting spirit of South Viet-Nam is a reality, 
as Secretary Rusk told us from there yesterday. 
The request of a friend for our help in this 
terrible moment is a reality. 

The statement of the SEATO allies that 
Communist defeat is "essential" is a reality.* 
To fail to respond to these realities would re- 

* For text of communique of Apr. 15, see ibid.. May 4, 
19C4, p. C92. 

fleet on our honor as a nation, would undermine 
worldwide confidence in our courage, would 
convince every nation in South Asia that it 
must now bow to Communist terms to survive. 
The situation in Viet-Nam is difficult. But 
there is an old American saying that "when 
the going gets tough, the tough get going." So 
let no one doubt that we are in this battle as 
long as South Viet-Nam wants our support 
and needs our assistance to protect its freedom. 
I have already ordered measures to step up 
the fighting capacity of the South Vietnamese 
forces, to help improve the welfare and the 
morale of their civilian population, to keep our 
forces at whatever level continued independence 
and freedom require. No negotiated settlement 
in Viet-Nam is possible, as long as the Com- 
munists hope to achieve victory by force. 

Once war seems hopeless, then peace may be 
possible. The door is always open to any settle- 
ment which assures the independence of South 
Viet-Nam and its freedom to seek help for its 

In Laos we continue to support the Geneva 
agreements which offer what we think is the 
best hope of peace and independence for that 
strife-torn land. At mj' instruction yesterday 
Assistant Secretary of State William Bimdy 
went to Laos, and he has already arrived there 
for a firsthand examination of the developments, 
developments that have come in the last 48 
hours. At the moment we are encouraged by 
reports of progress toward the reestablislmient 
of orderly, legal government. 

As for China itself, so long as the Commu- 
nist Chinese pursue conflict and preach violence, 
there can be and will be no easing of relation- 
ships. There are some who prophesy that these 
policies will change. But America must base 
its acts on present realities and not on future 
hopes. It is not we who must reexamine our 
view of China. It is the Chinese Communists 
who mixst reexamine their view of the world. 

Nor can anyone doubt our unalterable com- 
mitment to the defense and liberty of free China. 
Meanwhile, we will say to our historic friends, 
the talented and courageous Chinese people on 
the mainland, that just as we opposed aggression 
against them, we must oppose aggression by 
their rulers and for the same reasons. 



The New Nations of Africa and Asia 

Fifth is our concern with tlie new nations of 
Africa and Asia. We welcome their emergence, 
for their goals flow from hopes like our own. 
We began the revolt from colonial rule which is 
now reshaping continents and which is now 
creating new nations. Our mastery of tcch- 
nologj- has heliicd men to learn that poverty is 
not inevitable, that disease and hunger are not 
laws of nature. Having helped create hopes, 
we must now help satisfy them, or we will wit- 
ness a rising discontent which may ultimately 
menace our own welfare. 

Wliat we desire for the developing nations 
is what we desire for ourselves — economic prog- 
ress which will permit them to shape their own 
institutions, and the independence which will 
allow them to take a dignified place in the world 

Let there be no mistake about our intention to 
win the war against poverty at home, and let 
there be no mistake about our intention to fight 
that war around the world. This battle will not 
be easy and it will not be swift. It takes time to 
educate young minds and shape the structure 
of a modern economy. But the world must not 
be di%'ided into rich nations and poor nations, or 
white nations and colored nations. In such di- 
vision. I know you must realize, are the seeds of 
terrible discord and danger in decades to come. 
For the wall between rich and poor is a wall 
of glass through which all can see. 

We recognize the need for more stable prices 
for raw materials, for broader opportunity for 
trade among nations. We are ready to help 
meet these claims, as we have already done, for 
example, with the negotiation of the interna- 
tional coffee agreement, and as we will do in 
the weeks ahead in the Kennedy Round. We 
will continue with the direct economic assist- 
ance whicli has been a vital part of our policy 
for 20 years. 

Foreign Aid 

Last year the Congress reduced foreign aid 
from $4.9 billion — later modified by General 
Clay's committee to $4.5 billion — and Congress 
reduced that to a total of $3.4 billion that they 
appropriated to me to deal with the problems 

of 120 nations. This year I ordered that our 
request be cut to the absolute minimum consist- 
ent with our commitments and our .security, 
allowing for no cushions or no padding, and 
tliat was done. 

Every dollar cut from that request for $3.4 
billion will directly diminish the security of the 
United States. And if, in spite of this clear 
need and this clear warning, substantial cuts 
are made again this year in either military or 
economic funds, I want to sound a warning that 
it will be my solemn duty as President to submit 
supplemental requests for additional amounts 
until the necessary funds of $3.4 billion are 

In these areas, and in other areas of concern, 
we remain faithful to tested principle and deep 
conviction while shaping our actions to shifting 
dangers and to fresh opportunity. This year is 
an election year in the United States. And in 
this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad 
mistake growing discussion for growing dis- 
sension, conflict over programs for conflict over 
principles, or political division for political 
paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been 
made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of 
our adversaries. 

Now let those at home, who share in the great 
democratic struggle, remember that the world 
is their audience and that attack and opposition 
to old policies must not be just for opposition's 
sake, that it requires responsible presentation 
of new choices, that in the protection of our 
security — the protection of American security — 
partisan politics must always yield to national 

I recognize that those who seek to discuss 
great public issues in this election year must 
be informed on those issues. Therefore I have 
today instructed the Departments of State and 
Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency 
to be prepared and to provide all major candi- 
dates for the office of President with all possible 
information helpful to their discussion of 
American policy. I hope candidates will ac- 
cept this offer in the spirit in which it is made, 
the encouragement of the responsible discussion 
which is the touchstone of the democratic 

MAT 11, 1964 


In the past 20 years we have gradually be- 
come aware that America is forever bomid up 
in the affairs of the whole world. Our own fu- 
ture is linked to the future of all. In great 
capitals and in tiny villages, in the councils of 
great powers and in the rooms of unknown 
planners, events are being set in motion which 
will continually call upon our attention and our 

Prophecy is always unsure. But if anything 
is certain, it is that tliis nation can never again 
retreat from world responsibility. You must 
know, and we must realize, that we will be 
involved in the world for the rest of our history. 
We must accustom ourselves to working for 

liberty in the community of nations as we have 
pursued it in our commmiity of States. 

The struggle is not merely long. The strug- 
gle is imending. For it is part of man's ancient 
effort to master the passions of his mind, the 
demands of Ms spirit, the cruelties of nature. 
Yes, we have entered a new arena. The door 
has closed behind us, and the old stage has 
passed into history. 

Dangers will replace dangers, challenges will 
take the place of challenges, new hopes will 
come as old hopes fade. There is no turning 
from a course which will require wisdom and 
much endurance so long as the name of America 
still sounds in this land and around the world. 

The Situation in tiie Western Pacific 

Address hy Secretary Rush ^ 

It is a great pleasure for me to be once more 
in. Indiana and to be here at Valparaiso Uni- 
versity in company with my friend from across 
the aisle. Congressman Charles Halleck. One 
who has been deeply concerned for many years 
with foreign policy must pay I'espect to the 
indelible imprint which he made upon the his- 
tory of our times while serving his country as 
majority leader in the 80th Congress at a time 
when we were picking up once more, on a bi- 
partisan basis, our heavy responsibilities for the 
maintenance of peace through such measures 
as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, 
and the beginnings of NATO. It was a special 
pleasure for me to respond to your kind invita- 
tion because it was so strongly endorsed by this 
distinguished public servant. 

Please accept my warmest congratulations 
and best wishes as you dedicate this Law School, 

' Made at the dedication of a new building for the 
School of Law at Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, 
Ind., on Apr. 2.5 (pre.S8 release 186). 

an occasion made celebrated by the presence 
of one of the greatest of our legal statesmen, 
the Chief Justice of the United States. It was 
my own personal aspiration to become a lawyer, 
but a world war intervened. I have continued 
to marvel at the role of law in enlarging the 
freedom of those who are within its compass. 
I have long felt that the nature of our legal 
order has been much too much neglected in the 
education of the ordinary citizen. One can only 
express some measure of astonisliment, for ex- 
ample, that the most pervasive and compelling 
aspect of our social enviroimient is given so 
little attention in undergraduate or liberal arts 

In our relations with the rest of the world, the 
building of a decent world order is our prin- 
cipal preoccupation — the subject of most of our 
effort, the content of most of our cables, the 
commitment of all of our representatives abroad. 
Little by little that decent world order is coming 
into being, and law is being given its chance to 



lay ii healing liiiiul upon ilisi)utcs and to enlarge 
the area of freedom by allowing more conlident 
preiliction about what others will do. There- 
fore it is a very special pleasure for me to be a 
part of this dedication event. 

U.S. Security Interests in the Western Pacific 

There are many aspects of our foreign policy 
which 1 migiit discuss with you. But 1 shall 
make my talk tonight primarily a report on a 
10-day trip across the Pacitic, from which I re- 
turned Monday evening.- 

The security of the United States — and of the 
free world as a whole — is deeply involved in 
the 'Western Pacitic. The vital contribution to 
freedom being made by Japan, the Eepublic of 
Korea, and the Republic of China is, I believe, 
generally recognized in the United States. We 
have a defensive alliance with each of those 
nations. All three were ratified overwhelm- 
ingly by the United States Senate. Only two 
Senators voted against the mutual security pact 
with Japan and only six agamst the security 
pacts with the Republics of Korea and Cliina. 
Southeast Asia also is vital to our security. 
Including the island countries off its shores, it 
has more than 200 million jjeople. It contains 
rich agricidtural lands and valuable mineral 
resources. Parts of it are relatively lightly 
populated. Standing at the crossroads between 
two oceans and two contments, it is a region of 
great strategic importance, not only to all the 
people who live in the great arc from Karaclii 
to Tokyo but to the free world as a whole. 

Our interest in the defense of that region is 
recognized through tliree defensive alliances: 
our direct mutual security pact with the Re- 
public of the Philippines, AXZUS (our defen- 
sive alliance with Australia and New Zealand), 
and SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization. All three of these treaties were rati- 
fied overwhelmingly by the Senate. 

The Communists are eager to take over South- 
east Asia. They are trying hard to do so by 
means short of the overt type of aggression they 

' For statements made by Secretary Rusk at Taipei 
and Saigon Apr. 16 and 17 and on liis return to Wash- 
ington Apr. 20, see Buxletin of May 4, 1964. p. 694. 

attempted in Korea 14 years ago. They are 
atteiiii)tiiig to win by subversion — and, in S()\ith 
Viet-Nam, by acts of terror and guerrilla war- 

This assault on tiie Republic of Viet-Nam was 
organized and is directed, supported, and sup- 
plied by the Nortli Vietnamese Communist re- 
gime in Hanoi. Hanoi also directed and con- 
tinues to support the Communist threat to Laos, 
where there is presently an uncertain "peace." 
The North Vietnamese spearheads of aggres- 
sion are supported by the Communist regime in 
Peiping, which rules some 700 million people. 
And the assault on Viet-Nam is supported at 
least verbally by Moscow. For, in the upside- 
down jargon of the Communists, this is a so- 
called "war of national liberation" — and a form 
of aggression which has the blessing of the 
Soviet as well as the Chinese Conununists. 

Fourteen years ago the Commmiists launched 
an open aggression against the Republic of 
Korea. Had that aggression been allowed to 
succeed, Japan would have come imder a more 
direct threat and the psychological effects of an 
unchallenged Conmiunist aggression would have 
been felt all over the world. Probably most of 
the free comitries on the periphery of the Com- 
munist world in Asia would have felt it neces- 
sary to submit to Commmiist domination. 

Since the Korea war, no Communist state has 
again ventured an aU-out direct aggression. 
But they have not abandoned the technique of 
aggression tlirough guerrilla warfare, sustained 
by infiltrating trained men and arms across na- 
tional frontiers. That is the technique they are 
using in Southeast Asia. 

If the Commimists were to succeed in their 
assault on South Viet-Nam, the consequences to 
us, and to the free world as a whole, would be 
very serious. The rest of Southeast Asia would 
be in jeopardy, and saving it would be more 
costly, in blood and treasure, than defeating the 
aggression in South Viet-Nam. And the loss of 
Southeast Asia as a whole to the Communists 
would bring about a major shift in the balance 
of power. The South Asian subcontinent would 
be flanked, and Australia would be directly 
threatened. Such an immense victory for the 
Communists might well undermine the will of 

MAT 11. 1964 


free peoples on other continents to defend them- 

These, very briefly, are the reasons why Pres- 
ident Eisenhower decided to assist the Eepublic 
of South Viet-Nam; why, when the Communists 
stepped up their assault, President Kennedy de- 
cided to increase our assistance ; and wliy Presi- 
dent Jolmson has increased it further and has 
promised that we will continue to help the 
Eepublic of Viet-Nam until this aggression 
against it is defeated. 

The SEATO Council Meeting 

Tlie threat to Southeast Asia was, of course, 
the principal subject before the meeting of the 
SEATO Council of Ministers, which I attended 
in Manila last week.^ This defensive alliance 
was signed in Manila nearly 10 years ago, fol- 
lowing the Geneva accords, which brought to a 
close the war in Indochina in which France had 
been engaged. The purpose of the Manila Pact 
was to curb further Communist aggression in 
Southeast Asia, and by a protocol the protec- 
tion of SEATO was extended to the three non- 
Communist states of former Indochina, should 
they request it. Cambodia and Laos have re- 
nounced that option. South Viet-Nam has not 
requested assistance from SEATO but is re- 
ceiving help not only from the United States 
but, on a small scale, from other individual 
SEATO members. 

At the meeting in Manila last week, the eight 
SEATO members considered all aspects of the 
attack on South Viet-Nam. None suggested 
that the free nations should turn their back and 
walk — or run — away from this aggression. 
France was already committed to what it calls 
a "political solution"— that is, to some form of 
so-called "neutralization." But it did not sub- 
mit any specific proposal along that line. The 
consensus of the other members was that so- 
called "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam 
would be only a device for turning it over to 
the Communists. 

Indeed, seven of tlie eight members of 
SEATO had little difficulty in arriving at some 

'For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk 
at the SEATO meeting on Apr. 13 and a eommuuique 
released on Apr. 15, see ihid., p. GOO. 

clear-cut pronouncements concerning the assault 
on the Eepublic of Viet-Nam. 

They agreed that it is an "aggression" and 
that it is "directed, supplied and supported by 
the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in 
flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 
and 1962." 

They agreed that "the defeat of the Com- 
munist campaign is essential not only to the 
security of the Eepublic of Vietnam, but to that 
of South-East Asia" and that "it will also be 
convincing proof that Communist expansion by 
such tactics will not be permitted." 

They also agreed that "the members of 
SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, 
to take furtlier concrete steps within their 
respective capabilities of fulfillment of their 
obligations under the treaty." 

It should be noted that the seven members 
who agreed on these and related declarations 
ai'e the regional members — Thailand, the Phil- 
ippines, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zea- 
land — and the two others which maintain 
military forces in the area : Great Britain and 
the United States. 

The communique adopted at Manila was by 
far the strongest ever issued by a SEATO 
Council. It demonstrated that SEATO is far 
from moribund. It is a warning which Hanoi 
and Peij^ing would do well to heed. 

The Philippines 

While in the Pliilippines I had the oppor- 
tunity to talk at length with President [Dios- 
dado] Macapagal and his colleagues in the 
Philippine Government. 

Tlie Eepublic of the Philippines is a vigor- 
ous, thriving democracy, committed to consti- 
tutional procedures, combining political sta- 
bility with economic and social progress. 
Under President Macapagal's strong leadership, 
it is shouldering increasing responsibilities for 
preserving peace in Southeast Asia. 

The Philippine people have not forgotten 
Bataan and Corregidor, and General Mac- 
Arthur's return to the Philippines. They re- 
member that Filipinos and Americans fought 
side by side. Tliey know that freedom does not 
come cheap but is for the strong in spirit. 



We Americans are rightfully proud of our 
association with the Government and people of 
the Philippines, who share so fully with us a 
dedication to democracy ajid human rights. 

The Republic of China 

At Taipei I had the opportunity to discuss 
with President Chiang Kai-shek and the mem- 
bers of his government a wide range of matters 
of common interest. The Republic of China 
is a rampart of freedom in the "Western Pacific. 
We support it as the Government of China, and 
we remain firmly opposed to any proposal to 
deprive it of its riglitful place in the United 
Nations and to seat the Cliinese Communists in 
its place. 

The Republic of China continues to make re- 
markable economic and social progress. Its 
land reform and programs for rural develop- 
ment have been among the most successful in 
the world. Its citizens have achieved levels of 
well-being which contrast dramatically with 
the misery of their kinsmen on the mainland. 

Many developing countries could profit from 
study of the programs of economic and social 
improvement which have been applied success- 
fully on Taiwan. Also, the Republic of China 
is educating and training increasing numbers 
of men and women in various professions and 
skills which are in short supply in most parts 
of the world. These provide an expanding 
reservoir of technical advice and assistance on 
which other free nations are increasingly draw- 

In the people of the Republic of Cluna, we 
have talented, vigorous, and resolute allies dedi- 
cated to freedom. 

U.S. Role in Viet-Nam 

In Viet-Nam, I talked at length with General 
[Nguyen] Khanh and his colleagues, as well as 
with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, Geii- 
eral [Paul D.] Harkins, and other members of 
our American team. These talks reinforced 
my confidence in the will and the ability of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to 
lead the people of that country to victory and 
a better life. 

Our policy is to assist the Government and 

people of South Viet-Nam in achieving those 
objectives. As President Johnson said in New 
York Monday : * 

The statement of the SEATO allies that Ck)ininu- 
nist defeat is "essential" is a reality. To fail to re- 
spond . . . would reflect on our honor as a nation, 
would undermine worldwide confidence in our cour- 
age, would convince every nation in South Asia that 
it must now bow to Communist terms to survive. 

... So let no one doubt that we are in this battle 
as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and 
needs our assistance to protect its freedom. 

Our appraisal of the morale and capabilities 
of the Government and people of South Viet- 
Nam is not exclusively American. Seven mem- 
bers of SEATO — all of whom have represent- 
atives in South Viet-Nam — joined in saying: 

The Government and people of the Republic of 
Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their 
determination to fight for their country. 

The SEATO Coimcil also expressed its con- 
fidence in the "program of political and 
administrative reform, military action, pacifi- 
cation, and economic and social development 
recently instituted by the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam. . . ." That favorable 
judgment was further reinforced in my own 
mind by what I saw and heard in Viet-Nam. 
General Khanh has both vigor and breadth of 
view. He believes that defeating the Com- 
munists requires a combination of military, 
political, economic, and social programs. His 
objective is not only to root out the Communists 
but to improve the living standards of the 
Vietnamese people. 

Actually, between the end of the Indochinese 
war in 1954 and 1959, South Viet-Nam made 
great economic and social progress. Its 
achievements left the vaunted Communist para- 
dise m North Viet-Nam far behind. Almost 
certainly that is why Hanoi reactivated the as- 
sault on South Viet-Nam in 1959. 

The Communist campaign has, of course, held 
back South Viet-Nam's overall economic devel- 
opment. But I saw at firsthand that progress 
continues even in the midst of war. I visited 
a modern synthetic textile plant and a modern 
papcrmaking plant near Saigon. About 200 

' See p. 726. 

MAY 11, 1964 


miles northeast of Saigon I visited a "New 
Life" hamlet. This is m a relatively secure 
province— and one which General Khanh de- 
scribed as a "pilot province," an example of 
what can and will be done elsewhere as the 
Communists are rooted out. I visited also a 
large dam and hydroelectric installation built 
by*the Japanese as part of their reparations 
ao-reement. This installation will also provide 


water for irrigation. 

I believe that economic and social develop- 
ment should be accelerated in the relatively 
secure areas of the country. I discussed with 
General Klianh and his colleagues various ways 
in which our aid program might be improved 
and in which other free nations might provide 
useful assistance, both military and civilian. 
There is need for more people of several profes- 
sions and vocations— not least, for more physi- 
cians. I believe that several free nations are 
prepared to send more help, both in people and 
in critical materiel. 

The Viet Cong have scored some gains in the 
last few months. They took advantage of two 
successive coups and the resultant turnovers in 
•South Vietnamese administrative personnel to 
increase their efforts. They recaptured some 
of the more exposed strategic hamlets. They 
have managed to launch a few rather large-scale 
attacks, although they continue to rely chiefly 
on assassinations and small assaults. 

General Khanh's objective is not only to 
"clear" but to "hold." With American assist- 
ance, he is moving ahead with training and 
equipping of local self-defense forces for vil- 
lages and hamlets in the less exposed areas, thus 
"releasing regular troops for offensive actions 
"against the Viet Cong. He is increasing his 
security forces by some 50,000 men. I believe 
that his efforts are beginning to show results. 

We can all take deep pride in the perform- 
ance of the American military men who are 
training and supporting the South Vietnamese. 
We should take pride also in our civilian offi- 
cials and their families, who work amid danger. 
The Vietnamese people are energetic, intelli- 
gent, and quick to learn. They have a great 
economic potential. "Wlien they have won the 
peace and security which they are fighting for, 
and so fully deserve, they can become, I believe, 

one of the most prosperous people in that part 
of the world. 

Communist Activities in Laos 

In Laos, we support the Geneva agreements 
of 1962 calling for a neutral, independent coun- 
try. We continue to support a Government of 
National Union with Prince Souvanna Phouma 
as Premier. However, we recognize that the 
Communist Pathet Lao and their North Viet- 
namese allies have not honored the Geneva 
agreements. There are still North Vietnamese 
military personnel in Laos in violation of those 
agreements; and they assist the Pathet Lao in 
attacks on Government forces. The Commu- 
nists exclude the National Government from the 
areas which they control and refuse to allow 
the International Control Commission to per- 
form its peace supei' vision functions m those 
areas. The Communists also are actively at 
work trying to subvert areas mider non-Com- 
munist control. And they still move men, 
weapons, and other supplies from North Viet- 
Nam to South Viet-Nam over the "Ho Chi Minh 
trail" through Laos, in violation of the Geneva 

There could be peace in Laos and throughout 
Southeast Asia if Hanoi and Peiping would 
comply with existing agreements to which they 
solemnly subscribed. The issue of peace is just 
that simple. 

Economic Failures of Communism 

Everywhere that I went on this trip to South- 
east Asia, my heart was wanned by the mani- 
festations of friendship for the United States. 
And I have had the same experience durmg the 
two visits I have paid to Japan and Korea as 
Secretai-y of State. 

Also I have found in the Western Pacific 
countries widespread recognition of the eco- 
nomic failures of communism. The notion that 
communism is a shortcut to the future for de- 
veloping countries has been shattered by expe- 
rience. Communism in China and North Viet- 
Nam is not only brutal but an abysmal economic 
faihire. The Soviets have done better, but their 
growth rate has dropped below that of West- 
ern Europe and the United States, not to men- 
tion Japan. And they have developed serious 



difliculties in feeding themselves. Indeed, 
Conuuunist methods are a sure-fire means of 
reducing farm production. 

"While (\>ninuinist China and North Viet- 
Xam are boggetl down in a morass of misery, 
most of tlie nations of the Western Pacific con- 
tinue to advance economically and socially. 
Japan, which had a large industrial base be- 
fore the Second World War, keeps on forging 
ahead in production and living standards and 
is making increasingly significant contributions 
to the technical and economic advancement of 
other free Asian countries. Australia and 
New Zealand enjoy high living standards, of 
course, and are contributing positively to both 
the security and the well-being of countries to 
their "Far North." The Philippines, Thai- 
land, the Republic of China, and Malaysia have 
made noteworthy economic progress and, as 
they continue to surge forward, are able to 
increase their assistance to other countries. 

Despite their economic failures — indeed, per- 
haps all the more because of these failures — 
the Asian Communists remain dangerous. 
Desperation might lead them to deeds which 
rational men would shim. 

The dispute between Moscow and Peiping is 
partly about the means of promoting the Com- 
munist world revolution. The free world must 
take care not to let any Communists anywhere 
suppose that they can profit from aggression 
or militancy. 

Most of the leaders and peoples of free Asia 
know that the free nations are far stronger 
than the Communist nations. In particular, 
they realize the power of the United States. 
What they are not always certain about is the 
resolve of the free world, including the United 
States, to deter or defeat aggression. They 
know that the foremost Communist objective 
is to get the Yankees to go home. They some- 
times fear that we may, in fact, go home. 

Our armed forces west of Alaska and Hawaii 
number in the range of 200,000 men. We have 
them there for the same reason that we have 
military forces in Western Europe and else- 
where: to protect the security of the United 
States, which is inseparable from that of the 
free world as a whole. 

Our programs of military and economic as- 
sistance to the free nations of Asia serve the 
same end. We must take care that they are 
strong enough, well enough financed, to do the 

On the trip from which I just returned, I 
gave renewed assurances that the United States 
has no intention of accommodating the Com- 
munists — of assisting their campaigns for world 
domination — by bringing the Yanks home. I 
said that we are in the Western Pacific to stay 
until that part of the world is safe for freedom. 

U.S. and Japan To Exchange Data 
on Use of Natural Resources 

Press release 183 dated AprU 24 

Secretary Rusk announced on April 24 that 
Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr 
will visit Japan next month to inaugurate an 
exchange of information on applied science and 
engineering as it relates to improved use of 
natural resources. 

The joint Cabinet meeting held at Tokyo last 
January ^ determined that such an exchange, 
proposed for the United States by Under Sec- 
retary Carr, would have definite mutual 

Under Secretary Carr will meet with Vice 
Minister Taro Hisada of the Japanese Science 
and Technology Agency on May 12-13 at 
Tokyo. Among the topics to be discussed in 
this initial exchange are: (1) blending of coal 
for the steel industry; (2) diversified sources 
of energy, including liquefied petroleum gas 
from Alaska, and solar energy; and (3) air 
and water pollution. 

Under Secretary Carr will be accompanied 
by assistants from the Department of State, 
the Department of Coimnerce, and the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture. 

^ For test of a joint communique of the third meet- 
ing of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on 
Trade and Economic Affairs, see BtrLLETiN of Feb. 17, 
1964, p. 235. 

MAT 11, 1964 


Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba 

hy Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Foreign policies are rarely bom full-armed 
like Minerva. More often they evolve in re- 
sponse to events and circumstances. 

In such cases there is a danger that the as- 
sumptions on which policies are foimded may 
become obscured. 

This has, I think, happened to some extent 
with regard to our policy toward the present 
govermnent of Cuba. Some of the public dis- 
cussion that has surroimded that policy has in- 
volved misapprehensions on a number of 
fronts — misapprehensions as to the nature of the 
danger posed by the present and potential ac- 
tivities of the Castro government, misapprehen- 
sions as to the range of policies available to 
counter that danger, and misapprehensions as 
to the objectives that we can expect to accom- 
plish by the policies employed. 

In my observations to you this evening, I 
shall try to answer some of the questions that 
have arisen with regard to our Cuba policy and 
shall try to clarify some of the confusion that 
has been apparent in the public debate. 

The Nature of the Threat 

First, what is the nature of the threat imposed 
by existence of a Communist regime in Cuba ? 

It is not, in our judgment, a military threat to 
the United States. We shall never permit it to 
menace our own strategic power, as our actions 
in October 1962 demonstrated. We are taking 
constant and effective measures to insure that 
such a threat does not occur again — and we shall 
continue to take those measures. 

' Address made before a convention of the Omicron 
Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va., on Apr. 23 (press 
release 180). 

Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military 
threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed 
forces are large and equipped with modern 
weaponry. They are by all odds the most 
powerful military establishment in Latin Amer- 
ica. But Cuba does not possess air- and sealift 
sufficient to permit it to take offensive action 
against its neighbors, and, in any event, we 
maintain overwhelming military forces in the 
area to prevent Cuba from attacking other 
American Eepublics. 

The menace of Castro communism to Latin 
America is of a different and— perhaps I might 
say — a more modern kind. It is the menace of 
subversion, the undermining of existing govern- 
ments, the arming of organized Communist mi- 
norities, and the moimting of campaigns of 
sabotage and terror. 

Latin America, Tempting Target for Communism 

Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly 
vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is 
greatest where social injustice is widely preva- 
lent, where anachronistic societies remain dom- 
inated by small elites — tight little oligarchies 
that control the bulk of the productive wealth. 
In some places these oligarchies have only re- 
cently — and reluctantly — begun to make con- 
cessions to the insistent demands of the millions 
of economically submerged peoples for a meas- 
ure of social justice and a decent standard of 

For Latin America, as has been frequently 
remarked, is in the throes of a great transforma- 
tion from a continent of backward societies to 
a continent of new, modern nations. During 
tliis period of change and tension, it offers a 



tempting target for the Communists. They 
are at least as conscious as we of the importance 
jiiul woaUnpss of the area. They are at least 
as deteriuined as we to see that the brew pro- 
duced by the Latin American ferment is to their 
liking. They have, therefore, I'egarded the es- 
tablishment of a Communist government in 
Cuba — a Communist Latin American state at 
the very doorstep of the United States — as a 
major asset for coimuunism. 

Cuba, a Base for Subversion 

In tlieir determination to establish a center 
of subversion for Latin America in Cuba, the 
Communists have found a natural lieutenant in 
Fidel Castro. Castro regards himself as the 
"liberator" of all Latin jVmerica. A born revo- 
lutionary, driven by a hunger for power and 
prestige, he looks upon the southern half of 
the American Continent as a proper field for the 
fulfillment of his ambitions. He seeks a revo- 
lutionary millennium in which the example of 
Cuba will have swept the continent, and his po- 
sition of liberator and leader — not of the small 
island of Cuba, but of all Latin America — will 
have been assured. 

This vision springs from his psychological 
and political needs. It is necessary to the man 
and equally to his followers, whose revolution- 
ary enthusiasm must be constantly fed on the 
prospect of further advance beyond the confines 
of the island — an island which they look upon 
as the base from which the continent-wide rev- 
olution will be propagated by word and deed. 

That Castro intends to extend Communist 
power, and that he is actively seeking to do so, 
have been clearly shown. The most recent and 
dramatic evidence is the three tons of arms sent 
from Cuba to Venezuelan Castroist insurgents. 
As you know, an investigating committee of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) was 
appointed to study all aspects of this case. It 
found that the evidence clearly substantiated 
the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban 
intervention and aggression. The committee's 
report provides the basis for further collective 
OAS action against Cuba, and the members 
are consulting now among themselves to de- 
termine the collective measures which should 
be taken. 

Two Principal Lines of U.S. Strategy 

The United States, as the strongest nation in 
the AVestern Ilemispliere, is faced with a dif- 
ficult but practical problem. With the exist- 
ence of a Communist center in Latin America, 
how do we and our Latin American allies pre- 
vent that center from being used as an active 
center for Communist infection? 

The most obvious and direct way to elimi- 
nate the Castro regime in Cuba would be by 
direct military action designed to replace the 
present government by a non-Communist gov- 
ernment friendly to the West. Less direct ac- 
tion might take the form of an enforced block- 
ade — which would still be an act of war. 

At the other end of the spectrum from mili- 
tary action is a policy of trying to negotiate 
with Castro. Taking account of the decisions 
reached within the American system, notably at 
Punta del Este in January 1962 ^ and later in 
October 1962,' we have consistently maintained 
that two elements in the Cuban situation are not 
negotiable. First, Castro's political, economic, 
and military dependence upon the Soviets ; and, 
second, the continuance of Castro's subversive 
activities in Latin America. 

We see no present evidence that Castro is pre- 
pared to eliminate these two conditions — and, 
in fact, the evidence thus far is all the other 

The limits in which we must erect a Cuban 
policy are, therefore, well defined and narrow. 
If, on the one hand, we do not wish to adopt 
policies that involve an act of war — and even 
the most vigorous critics of our Cuban policy 
have rejected this course of action — and, on the 
other, there seems little sign of a possibility of 
serious negotiation with the present regime, we 
are left with two principal lines of strategy for 
dealing with the menace of Castro's Cuba to 
Latin America. 

First, we must take all possible measures to 
strengthen the Latin American nations so that 
they may, through individual and collective 
means, resist Communist subversion. 

Second, we must employ all available instru- 

' For background, see Bdij,etin of Feb. 19, 1962, 
p. 270. 
'For backgrround, see ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720. 

MAT 11, 1964 


ments of power less than acts of war to limit 
or reduce the ability of the Cuban government 
to advance the Communist cause in Latin Amer- 
ica through propaganda, sabotage, and subver- 


Cooperative Actions of American States 

To the greatest extent possible, we ai-e pur- 
suing both these lines of strategy within the 
framework of the inter- American system. We 
have sought to make clear to our Latin Ameri- 
can friends that the problem of protecting the 
continent against the menace of Castro commu- 
nism must be tackled by the American states as 
a collective undertaking. The Organization 
of American States is tlie principal instrumen- 
tality for this puqiose, but we are also employ- 
ing other multilateral groupings within the 
inter-American family. 

In January 1962, the foreign ministers of 
the OAS formally found the Castro regime to 
be incompatible with the inter-American sys- 
tem and excluded it from further participation 
in that system. The foreign ministers also ap- 
proved the immediate suspension of trade with 
Cuba in arms and war material. 

In early October 1962, the foreign ministers 
of the OAS informally met to consider the 
problems arising from growing Sino-Soviet 
intervention in Cuba, particularly the attempt 
to convert the island into an amied base for 
Communist subversive penetration of the hem- 
isphere. In their conclusions, the foreign min- 
isters pointed out: 

1. The need for the American Republics and 
all other independent countries to review their 
policies on trade with Cuba, including the use 
of their ships in the Cuban trade ; 

2. The importance of intensifying measures 
against Communist subversion; 

3. The desirability of keeping a careful check 
on the delivery of arms to Cuba ; and 

4. The need for special studies of the transfer 
of funds for subversive purposes, the flow of 
subversive propaganda, and the utilization of 
Cuba as a base for training in subversive tech- 

The Council of the OAS subsequently di- 
rected the preparation of a special study on 

measures for controlling funds, propaganda, 
and training for subversive purposes. The 
Council sent the report, incorporating specific 
and general recommendations in these three 
fields, to member governments in July 1963 
urging that the recommended measures be car- 
ried out promptly. 

Meanwhile, in April 1963, the five Central 
American Republics, together with Panama and 
the United States, undertook a cooperative ef- 
fort to safeguard the Caribbean area against 
Cuban subversive activities.^ At that meeting, 
and at a subsequent second meeting in January 
1964, the cooperating coimtries agreed on a se- 
ries of measures to increase the security of the 
countries of the area. The program includes 
the control of subversive travel, funds, and 
propaganda, the strengthening of security or- 
ganizations, and tlie improvement of communi- 
cations between national security agencies. 

Following its own investigation of the re- 
cently discovered Venezuelan arms cache, the 
OAS is now studying additional measures for 
dealing with Cuba as a base of subversion and 
for policing Cuban-supported activities in 
Latin America. 

These cooperative actions by the American 
states have shown considerable success. In 
order to control movement to and from Cuba for 
subversive purposes, many Latin American gov- 
ernments have instituted procedures for restrict- 
ing travel by their nationals to Cuba. As a 
result of these measures only 50 percent as many 
Latin Americans were able to travel to Cuba 
during 1963 as during the preceding year. 

We continue to work with individual govern- 
ments to help them improve the ability of their 
police and armed forces to deal with terrorism 
and insurgency. The United States and Latin 
American governments are also cooperating 
with increasing efi'ectiveness in exchanging in- 
telligence on Castroist subversion activities and 
in improving communications between their 
security services. 

In the long run, however, Latin America will 
be rendered immune to Communist infection 
only by an amelioi-ation of the conditions — 
political, ecoiioinic, and social — in which sub- 

* Ihith. Alay 6. mo.'^. p. 719. 



vei-sion flourishos. The United States and the 
froe nations of Latin America have, (iierefore, 
tlirongh the Alliance for Progress, uiulertalcen 
a major colUvtive oH'ort. It is diriu'ted at the 
amhitious target of transforming tlie structure 
and productive capacity of tlie Latin American 
nations so as to bring about not merely an in- 
crease but a more equitable distribution of re- 
sources. Given the magnitude of this under- 
taking, it will be yeai-s before major results can 
be acliieved. But until such a transformation is 
accomplisiied, Latin America will remain a fer- 
tile seedbed for Communist subversion. 

Program of Economic Denial 

By strengthening the Latin American nations 
through collective political, economic, and mili- 
tary measures we are increasing their ability to 
resist subversion. But at the same time we must 
actively pursue measures against Cuba to limit 
its ability to subvert. 

In tliis effort we are exploiting the propa- 
ganda potential to the fullest. But an informa- 
tion program must be regarded primarily as a 
supplement to substantive policies. Given the 
present limits of action, we must rely, as our 
major instrument, on a systematic program of 
economic denial. 

This is the only policy — short of the use of 
force — that gives promise of having a signifi- 
cant impact on Cuba and its continuance as a 
Communist base in the Western Hemisphere. 
Such a program, in our judgment, can and does 
work effectively to achieve objectives that are 
in the manifest interest not only of the United 
States and Latin America but of other free- 
world nations. 

Objectives of Economic Deniai Program 

In discussing the effectiveness of this pro- 
gram, let me make one point quite clear. We 
have never contended that a program of eco- 
nomic denial — short of an act of war such as 
a military blockade that would cut off bloc as 
well as free-world trade — is likely hy itself to 
bring down the present Cuban regime. The 
objectives which this program can accomplish 
are more limited. They are four in number : 

First, to reduce the will and ability of tlie 
present Cuban regime to e.xport subversion and 
violence to the other American states; 

Second, to make ])lain to tlie people of Cuba 
and to elements of the power structure of the 
regime that the present regime cannot serve 
their interests; 

Third, to demon.strate to the peoples of the 
American Republics that communism has no 
future in the Western Hemisphere; and 

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet 
Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in 
the Western Hemisphere. 

Those are the objectives which we seek to 
achieve by a program of economic denial against 
Cuba. That program reflects the purpose of 
the Organization of American States. In our 
opinion, it is realistically designed to accom- 
plish the limited but nonetheless important ob- 
jectives toward which it is directed. 

Cuba Vuinerable to Economic Pressure 

Kconomic denial is a weapon that must be 
used with great selectivity. It can never be 
more effective than the economic circumstances 
of the target country. A program of general 
economic denial against the Soviet Union, for 
example, would in the long run make little 
sense, since the Soviet Union imports from the 
free world only about one-half of 1 percent of 
its gross national product. But Cuba presents 
a wholly different situation. It is a small island 
with meager natural resources and a low level of 
industrial development. Prior to the Castro 
regime, its imports from the free world — prin- 
cipally the United States — represented more 
than 30 percent of its gross national product. 

Those imports were the vital elements of its 
economic prosperity. They consisted princi- 
pally of industrial goods and equipment, fuel, 
raw materials, and foodstuff's. 

Cuba's industrial installations, its power 
plants, its sugar mills, its transportation equip- 
ment are all of Western origin. After 5 years 
Cuba's industrial plant is obsolete and rapidly 
deteriorating. With no continuing supply of 
spare parts, it has resorted to cannibalizing its 
existing equipment. 

MAT 11, 1964 



In addition, Cuba has become far more ex- 
posed and vubierable to economic pressure be- 
cause Castro's internal policies have driven into 
exile several himdred thousand Cubans — the 
managerial and professional elite. Tliere is now 
a great shortage of skills, and much of the 
equipment in the industrial plant is mishan- 
dled. This situation has been further aggra- 
vated by management decisions taken on ideo- 
logical, rather than economic, grounds. 

Cuba is, therefore, vulnerable to a policy of 
economic denial. The proof of its vulnerability 
is well illustrated by what has happened to the 
Cuban economy since trade with the West was 
first restricted. Today the Cuban standard of 
living is some 20 percent below pre-Castro 
levels. Such statistics, of course, do not tell 
the complete story because many essential items 
are rationed and many imported items, such as 
fresh fruits and canned goods, have almost dis- 
appeared. The Cuban people are allowed, for 
example, two bars of soap per person per month, 
three pounds of meat per person per month, 
and six oimces of coffee per person per month — 
when they can get them. 

Industrial output, which accounts for less 
than 25 percent of the gross national product, 
has remained stagnant. Quality has frequently 
been sacrificed to maintain the volume of pro- 
duction. In many industries output is shoddy, 
centralized operations inefficient, and labor 
productivity extremely low, in large part be- 
cause of lack of morale and incentive. Plants 
and machinery are often idle owing to a lack 
of spare parts or raw materials, and break- 
downs in water, power, and transport exacer- 
bate the general disorganization. 

Cuban sugar production — the basis of the 
entire economy — has fallen drastically. Last 
year's production of 3.8 million tons was the 
lowest since the early 1940's, and the crop for 
this year will probably be near the same figure. 

With the curtailment of free-world trade, 
exports have fallen drastically — from more 
than $800 million in 1958 to less than $500 mil- 
lion in 1963. The lines of trade have been com- 
pletely redrawn. In 1958, substantially all im- 
ports came from free- world sources; last year, 
85 percent came from the bloc. It is perhaps 
pertinent to point out that Cuban exports to 
Latin America fell from $24 million in 1953 to 

an estimated $8 million in 1962, while Latin 
American exports to Cuba fell from $78 million 
in 1958 to an estimated $6.7 million in 1962. 

Restrictions on Shipping and on Vital Goods 

In order to exploit Cuba's economic vulnera- 
bility we have developed programs of common 
action on two levels : 

First, to restrict the availability of free- 
world shipping to Cuba ; 

Second, to limit the categories of goods that 
may be available to Cuba. 

In order to make these policies effective, we 
have sought the cooperation of the other major 
industrialized coxmtries of the free world, and 
particularly our NATO allies. We have ob- 
tained considerable, although not complete, 

For example, the number of calls by free- 
world vessels at Cuban ports dropped 60 per- 
cent in 1963 as compared to 1962, and there are 
reasonable prospects that, over 1964 as a whole, 
there will be a further drop. 

Realistically, we must recognize that the re- 
striction of free- world shipping, while useful, is 
of only limited utility. Shipping under the 
control of the bloc could transport the goods 
that Cuba requires, although at the cost of a 
considerable reorganization and disruption of 
schedules and charters. 

Much more important is the denial of those 
categories of goods that are most vital to the 
opei-ation of the Cuban economy. This in- 
cludes industrial goods, transport equipment, 
and critical materials. Not only is Cuba wholly 
dependent on a large and continuing import of 
consumer goods if it is to maintain more than 
a subsistence economy, but its limited industrial 
plant, including the sugar industry, is based on 
Western equipment that is rajiidly becoming 
worn out and obsolete and on Western trans- 
port equipment that is rapidly falling apart. It 
is important, therefore, that the West sliould 
not bolster the economy by providing spare 
parts and replacements. 

This was the reason, for example, tliat the 
administration took sucli a strong position 
against the recent sale of 450 buses to the Castro 
government- — 400 of wliicli are to be used in 
Habana. Those 400 additional buses will al- 



most double available public transport in the 
city that dominates Cuba's economic life. 
Without those buses the efficiency of the Cuban 
economy and the level of Cuban morale would 
bo further impaired. 

The sale of Western locomotives to Cuba, for 
instance, would have an even {j:reater impact. 
Movement of su<?ar to Cuban ports is almost 
entirely by rail, and the motive power of the 
Cuban railroad system is presently in a critical 
state of disrepair. In a late 1963 description 
of the "desperate state" of the railroad system, 
a Cuban official organ estimated that only one- 
quarter as many locomotives were then in op- 
erating condition as in 1959. To replace even 
a part of this equipment would be a very big 
boon to the Cuban economy. 

The position of our Government in seeking 
to prevent the sale of such heavy equipment to 
the Cuban regime has, unfortunately, not al- 
ways been fully understood either in the United 
States or by some of our friends abroad. The 
question has frequently been confused by the 
curious contention that the sale of United States 
wheat to the Soviet Union somehow justifies the 
sale of critical supplies to Cuba. Such an argu- 
ment betrays a misunderstanding of the nature 
and objectives of the program of economic de- 
nial which I have attempted to describe tliis 

As I mentioned earlier, the continent-wide 
economy of the Soviet Union, which in many 
ways approaches self-sufficiency, is far less vul- 
nerable to economic denial than that of Cuba. 
There would be no point in trying to influence 
Soviet strength or Soviet policy by a general 
effort to deny exports to that country. All that 
has ever been attempted is a selective program 
of denying access primarily to strategic goods. 

The United States has long had a modest 
trade in agricultural products with the Soviet 
Union. The special aspect of the wheat sale 
was its unusual size and character. The Soviet 
Union has been traditionally an exporter of 
wheat, and before approaching the United 
States it had already contracted the bulk of its 
wheat import requirements from Canada and 
Australia. Purchases from United States were, 
from the Soviet point of view, marginal. Even 
the 214 million tons originally discussed would 

have totaled only about 3i^ percent of normal 
Soviet bread grain production. 

Under these circumstances it is quite clear 
that the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in- 
volved considerations quit« unrelated to those 
involved in tlie denial of economic goods and 
other capital equipment to Cuba. Thus any 
sale of wheat to the Soviet Union was not of 
great importance to the Soviet economy and of 
slight importance to the food stocks of the 
Soviet people. But our denial of industrial and 
transport equipment and spare parts to Cuba 
can mean a serious impairment in the state of 
the Cuban economy. 

Oddly enough, these two quite distinct ques- 
tions have been confused — sometimes, I fear, 
deliberately — by people holding quite disparate 
views — by those in Europe who would like to 
find an excuse to sell heavy equipment to Cuba 
and by those in America who would like to find 
a basis for attacking the wheat sale. An ob- 
jective comparison of these two situations re- 
veals the emptiness of the argument. 

Cuban Economic Failure 

In the course of my observations this eve- 
ning, I have tried to spell out for you the bases 
for our policy toward Cuba and to explain par- 
ticularly the reasons why we are seeking — and 
shall continue to seek — to limit the supply of 
critical goods to the Cuban economy. 

This program is directed at the present Cuban 
government. It will be continued so long as 
that government persists in its efforts to subvert 
and undermine the free societies of Latin 

Within recent weeks it has become more than 
ever apparent that our program is succeeding. 
Cuba under communism is providing a spectacle 
of economic failure for all to see. Far from of- 
fering a better life for the Cuban people, com- 
munism is bringing only depression and want. 

Today the Cuban economy is in a mess — a 
mess produced by incompetent management, 
ideological interference, and the refusal of the 
United States and many other Western socie- 
ties to deal with a government that is seeking 
to undermine its neighbors. 

The magnitude of the Cuban economic failure 
is clearly apparent in the constant complaints of 
the present Cuban leaders. 

MAT 11, 1964 


But if our program of economic denial is 
helping to accentuate the failures of the Cuban 
economy, let me make it quite clear that it is 
not aimed at the Cuban people. The United 
States has no quarrel with the people of Cuba. 
It feels no animosity, only sympathy and sor- 
row. We have shown our good will by exempt- 
ins food and medicines from tlie restrictions im- 
posed on our trade with Cuba. "We have never 
sought in any way to starve the Cuban people. 

For we are confident that the people of Cuba 
will not always be compelled to suffer under 
Communist tyranny. 

Given freedom and democracy, Cuba could 
develop its high potential for economic and 
social progress. The Cuban people should not 
be forced to serve as a vehicle for the intrusion 
into this hemisphere of an alien way of life that 
can bring them neither progress nor liberty. 
Let one final point be clear. We oppose the 
present Cuban regime not just because its am- 
bitions menace our hemispheric neighbors. We 
oppose it, above all, because its standards of 
conduct and its tyrannical practices condemn 
the people of Cuba to misery and fear. 

The people of Cuba deserve better than that. 

Second, I would point out that the surveil- 
lance flights are thoroughly based on the resolu- 
tion approved by the OAS [Organization of 
American States] on October 23, 1962.^ 

Tliird, I would remind you of the various 
statements made by the late President Kennedy 
and by Secretary Rusk during the past 15 
months on this subject, making it unmistakably 
clear that we regard the overflights as a neces- 
sity to avoid the deception which was practiced 
against us in 1962. 

Fourth, I would recall that Secretary Rusk 
said, in March a year ago : "If there were any 
interruption with our surveillance . . . that 
could create a very dangerous situation." ^ 

Our publicly expressed position on this ques- 
tion remains unchanged. 

Statement by President Johnson, April 21 

I do think that it is essential that we main- 
tain surveillance and know whether any mis- 
siles are being shipped into Cuba. We will 
have to maintain our reconnaissance and our 
overflights. Any action on their part to stop 
that would be a very serious action. We have 
so informed them and informed their friends. 

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba 
Remains Unchanged 

Following is a statement Tnade l>y Rieh/ird I. 
Phillips, Director of the Office of News, on 
AfHl 20 in response to a query from a news 
correspondent regarding surveillance flights 
over Cuba, together with a statement mxide hy 
President Johnson on the following day dur- 
ing a question-and-answer period at a meeting 
at the White House with a group of editors and 

Statement by Mr. Phillips, April 20 

First, I would recall that the overflights are 
a substitute for the on-site inspection agreed to 
by the Soviets in October 1962, but which Fidel 
Castro refused to permit. 

' For an excerpt from remarks made by the Presi- 
dent to the editors and broadcasters on Apr. 21, see p. 

Defense, AEC Report to President 
on Test Ban Treaty Safeguards 

White House press releas* dated April 20 

The White House today [April 20] released 
the text of a letter from Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara and Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
reporting their conclusions following a joint 
review conducted by the Department of Defense 
and the Atomic Energy Commission of the 
status of progress during the past 8 months 
on the implementalion of the limited test ban 
treaty safeguards recommended by the Joint 

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722. 
"/6ief., Apr. 1,1963, p. 467. 



Chiefs of Staff, and approved by the late Pres- 
ident Kennedy. 

In releasing this letter, the President reem- 
phasizcd the statement ho made today in a 
speech before the Associated Press ^ that his 
administration is committed to tlie policy first 
expressed in the four points in President Ken- 
nedy's letter to Senators [Mike] Mansfield and 
[Everett M.] Dirksen on September 11, 1963.= 
These four points were restated in the McNa- 
mara-Seaborg letter released today. 

The President also pointed out that while 
an adequate underground testing program is. 
under present circumstances, essential to our 
national security, the United States continues 
to be alert to possibilities for the relaxation of 
tensions and the building of a permanent peace. 
Although we are testing nuclear weapons as 
now permitted by the limited test ban treaty, 
we still support a complete cessation of all test- 
ing of nuclear weapons accompanied by an ade- 
quate system of inspection to insure both sides 
against violations. The United States Gov- 
ernment is ready at any time to negotiate a 
treaty providing for such a comprehensive test 


Apeil 16, 1964 

Deab Mb. President: The Department of Defense 
and the Atomic Energy Commission have reviewed the 
status of our joint progress on the implementation 
of the limited test ban treaty safeguards recommended 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President 

The status of implementation of the safeguards is 
as follows : 

Safeguard 1 

"The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and 
continuing underground nuclear test programs de- 
signed to add to our knowledge and improve our 
weapons in all areas of significance to our military 
posture for the future." 

In the eight months since the signing of the lim- 
ited test ban treaty, the United States has announced 
a total of 20 underground detonations. The test pro- 
gram has in fact been more extensive than this since 
it has been and will continue to be the policy that the 

' See p. 726. 

" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496. 

AEG will not announce all detonations at the Nevada 
Test Site. 

Important information has been obtained on new 
weapons designs and weapons effects. The hlRhest 
yield nuclear device ever detonated in the continental 
United States was lired underground ut the Nevada 
Test Site. Weapons effects tests have been carried 
out underground and others are being planned and 

Safeguard 2 

"The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory 
facilities and programs in theoretical and explora- 
tory nuclear technology whicli will attract, retain 
and insure the continued application of our human 
scientific resources to these programs on which con- 
tinued progress in nuclear technology deiwnds." 

During Fiscal Year 1964, the AEG and DoD will 

spend about $350 million on weapons development and 
effects laboratory research. During this period, over 
$25 million will be expended on improvements of AEG 
nuclear laboratory facilities. Technical programs are 
being maintained at a high level to meet military re- 
quirements and increased effort is being placed on re- 
search and development programs to gain more 
fundamental knowledge in nuclear weapons technology. 
Program adjustments are underway in the Depart- 
ment of Defense weapons effects laboratories. These 
adjustments are designed to emphasize development 
of improved laboratory simxilation and analytical ap- 
proaches to weapons effects problems, as well as full 
exploitation of underground testing. 

Safeguard S 

"The maintenance of the facilities and resources 
necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the 
atmosphere should they be deemed es.sential to our 
national security or should the treaty or any of its 
terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union." 

The DoD and AEG are proceeding, on schedule, 
with the development of a capability "to institute 
promptly nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere" 
on minimum reaction times. As of January 1, 1965, 
the United States will have the capability to proceed 
with: (a) tests to verify designs of stockpile weapons 
within two months ; (b) tests of entire nuclear weapons 
systems, including delivery vehicles, missile and nu- 
clear warhead proof tests within two months; (c) 
tests of experimental devices designed to explore new 
concepts of nuclear weapons technology within three 
months; and (d) tests relating to military effects of 
nuclear detonations within a period of six to nine 

Safeguard 4 

"The improvement of our capability, within feasi- 
ble and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the 
treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our 
knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabili- 
ties, and achievements." 

MAT 11, 1964 


The Atomic Energy Detection System is being aug- 
mented to improve our capability to monitor at- 
mosplierie tests by other countries and to improve 
our identification ability at higher altitudes. Studies 
are continuing in ways and means to improve detec- 
tion techniques and systems for both underground and 
space shots. The detonations at the Nevada Test Site 
are providing valuable information to Improve tech- 
niques for detection of underground nuclear shots. A 
nuclear experiment designed specifically to provide 
data for improvement of underground detection sys- 
tems was executed on October 26, 1963, near Fallon, 
Nevada. Construction is proceeding for other experi- 

ments designed to investigate the phenomenology of 
underground detonations. In mid-October 1963 an 
Atlas Agena rocket successfully placed into orbit two 
instrumented satellites designed for the detection of 
nuclear explosions in deep space. Work is continuing 
on ground based detectors of nuclear explosions in 

We will be pleased to discuss any aspects of these 
programs at your convenience. 
Respectfully yours, 

RoBEBT S. McNamaba, Secretary of Defence 
Glenn T. Seabobq, Chairman, Atomic Etn- 
ergy Commission 

The Local Community and World Affairs 

Remarks by President Johnson. ' 

I would like to talk to you about one area in 
which Me can see with some cei-tainty the shape 
of things to come. That is the fight against 
poverty around the world. We are waging an 
all-out war against poverty here at home. We 
are committed to pursue that war to final vic- 
tory. But we are also engaged in that same 
battle on 100 different fronts around the world, 
in 100 or more nations. 

We do this for two reasons: First, for the 
first time in history, man has the real power to 
overcome poverty. We have proved that by 
the wise application of modern teclinology. 
The determined labor of skilled men and women 
can ultimately produce enough food and cloth- 
ing and shelter for all mankind. The possession 
of new abilities gives us new responsibilities, 
and we want to live up to those responsibilities. 
That is our Christian duty. 

Second, we now know that the progress which 

' Excerpt from remarks made by the President on 
Apr. 21 in the flower garden at the White House be- 
fore a group of editors and broadcasters attending a 
2-day foreign policy conference at the Department of 
State. For complete text, see White House press re- 
lease dated Apr. 21. 

others make in satisfying their own desire for 
a better life will ultimately affect our o^vn fu- 
ture and our own prospects, for we are now a 
part of a single world community and you no 
longer can confine your activities or your in- 
fluence to your local county seat. Names such 
as Saigon, Rio, and the Congo once stirred only 
thoughts of romantic adventure and great, 
mysterious distance, but today, as we meet here, 
we follow the events of those capitals with a 
close concern based on the knowledge that what 
happens there today will surely affect our action 
and our hopes here tomorrow. 

That is whj' you and I have a special respon- 
sibility to explain the problems of the develop- 
ing world abroad to the American people at 
home. We must do better than we have done 
in explaining why our children's welfare and 
the welfare of our country may well depend on 
the wisdom and the foresiglit that we show in 
working with the people of other lands. To 
do this, we must first understand clearly how 
most of the people of the world live. 

I discussed in New York yesterday ^ — and it 
took me 41 minutes to complete it — just a brief 

' See p. 726. 



description of the problems that exist in cer- 
tain areas of the world. Only by doing so can 
we truly understand the marvel of our own 
•rood fortune in this country. 
1 On three continents, in dozens of countries, 
hundreds of millions of people stniggle to exist 
on incomes of little more than a dollar a week. 
In the 112 or more nations, only C of them 
liave an income of as much as $80 a month: 
Sweden and Switzerland, Australia and New 
Zealand, Canada and the United States. Here 
we ought to get down on our knees every night 
and thank the good Lord for our blessings, 
that our income can be more than $200 a month, 
when more than two-tliirds of the people of 
the world have less than $8 a month. These 
people have less to spend each day on food and 
on shelter and on clothing, on medicine, on all 
of their needs, than the average American 
spends at his comer drugstore for a package of 
cigarettes. They live in rundown country 
shacks of tar paper. They live in city slums. 
They live without heat, water, or sanitation of 
any kind. 

Their children have no schools to go to. 
They have no doctors or hospitals to attend. 
Their life expectancy is somewhere between 
35 and 40 years of age. Worst of all, many of 
them live without any hope at all. They see no 
escape from the ancient cycle of misery and 

These are not new conditions. Poverty, hun- 
ger, and disease are afflictions as old as man 
himself. But in our time and in this age there 
lias been a change. The change is not so much 
in the realities of life but in the hopes and the 
expectations of the future. If a peaceful revo- 
lution in these areas is impossible, a violent 
revolution is inevitable. 

We who stand here in peace and security 
and prosperity must realize that we are greatly 
outnumbered in this world, more than 17 to 1 
in population, in area, in race, in religion, in 
color. You take any criteria and measure your- 
self by that standard, and you will find that we 
are in a very small minority. 

I sat here the other day and talked to a 
most prosperous American. He came to tell 
nie of the successes in this country whei-e he owns 
more than a million acres of land, to discuss 

the 100,000- acre ranch that he once owned in 
Cuba — that he once owned in Cuba. So to- 
day, as we meet here, we must realize that these 
young, teeming masses are determined to have 
some of the better things of life. I stood in 
an African hut on another continent not many 
months ago, and I saw a mother with a baby 
on her breast, one in her stomach, and one on 
her back, and eight on the floor, in this adobe 
hut. I thought of my own mother and the trials 
that she had raising her family. As I looked 
into this African mother's eyes, I saw the same 
look in that mother's eyes that I saw in my 
own mother's eyes when she was determined 
that her children would have food, clothes, and 
an education. 

You hear me when I tell you that in the world 
we are outnumbered 17 to 1, but these numbers, 
these masses of humanity, are either going to 
make a peaceful revolution possible or they are 
going to make a violent revolution inevitable. 
All you have to do is turn on the television and 
see the young student riots in nation after na- 
tion. So the television and the radio sets, the 
wonders of communication, to us are delightful 
instruments of pleasure, and to some of us they 
are important aids to business. But they have 
become the instruments of revolution in the rest 
of the world. 

The shrinking of distances, the ready access 
to information about other countries and other 
people, have made these folks aware that a bet- 
ter life may be within their grasp, and a better 
life is possible. They now know that the condi- 
tions that their fathers accepted with weary 
resignation are no longer inevitable. They 
know now that depression and despair are not 
the ordained lot of man. 

This knowledge has helped create the world- 
wide boom of vast portent which we know as 
the revolution of rising expectations. The 
meaning of this revolution is very simple: It 
means that people in the rest of the world want 
for themselves the same things that you and I 
want for our loved ones, for our friends, and 
for our children, and that most of us already 
have. They intend that their families shall live 
a decent life and that they have a job that gives 
them survival and dignity. They intend that 
their children shall be taught to read and to 
write. They intend that the himgry shall be 

MAT 11, 1964 


fed and the sick shall be treated. Thev intend 
to take their place in the great movement of 
modern society, to take their sliare in the benefits 
of that society. 

These just desires, once unleaslied, can never 
again be stifled. The people of the developing 
world are on the march, and we want to be be- 
side them on that march. 

I can think of nothing that would give me 
more satisfaction than the knowledge that I 
could beUeve that you wielders of the pen and 
you molders of opinion, you leaders in public 
life, could take your stand this morning on the 
side of preserA-ing humanity and uplifting it 
throughout the world. 

Our gross national product in this, the rich- 
est of all nations, this quarter, is running at the 
rate of 860S.5 billion— $60S billion. We are ask- 
ing to distribute m the form of help, aid, and 
military assistance to aU the nations who want 
to have fi'eedom less than one-half of 1 percent 
of that amount — $3.4 billion. But because 
of what we call it, and because of how it has 
been administered, and because it is far away, 
we don't realize that tliis investment is not only 
one of the most Christian acts that this great, 
powerful, rich coimtry coidd do but it is an 
act of necessity if we are to preserve our image 
in the world and our leadership in the world 
and, most of all, our society. 

Oh, how I would like to feel that we could, 
here in this rose garden today, laimch a new 
movement to develop a gi'eater society, a better 
society in all the world, not only by driving 
poverty from our midst here at home — it was 
one-third of the ill-fed, iD-clad, and ill-housed 
when Mr. Eoosevelt was here, and today we 
have it down to one-fifth — but that we could 
drive that one-fifth into the basements and pull 
a better cover over the land, and we could also 
make some steps to developing taxpayers in- 
stead of just tax e;\ters, and helping others help 
themselves, following the Golden Rule not only 
at home but abroad, saying to these 112 nations, 
"We are going to do unto you as we would have 
you do unto us if our positions were reversed." 

We must help developing countries because 
our own welfare demands it. It takes no great 
gift of foresight to realize that unless there is 
progress and unless there is growmg satisfac- 

tion of just desires, there will be discontent and 
there will be restlessness. The developing 
world would soon become a cauldron of violence, 
hatred, and revolution without some assistance. 
How would you feel if you were a member of 
a family whose total income was less than $80 
per year? Yet a majority of the people of 
the world have incomes of less than $S0 a year. 
Under such conditions, commmiism, with its 
false and easy promises of a magic formula, 
might well be able to transform these popular 
desires into an instrument of revolution. That 
is wliy every American who is concerned about 
the future of his comitry must also be concerned 
about the future of Africa, Asia, and our old 
friends in Latin America. 

Xo President who looks beyond the immedi- 
ate problems which crowd liis desk can fail to 
extend the hand and the heart of this country 
to those who are struggling elsewhere. We 
help these cotmtries in many ways, tlirough 
trade and raw materials and manufactures, 
with the Peace Corps now workmg in more 
than -10 of them, through programs of economic 
assistance, through the exchange of scholars 
and students and ideas. 

We know that we have much to gain from 
them. We know that we can learn from their 
cultures, from their arts, from their traditions, 
for many of them are as rich in spiritual treas- 
ure as they are poor in material goods. These 
are government programs, but it is also im- 
portant for cities and towns, for private orga- 
nizations and private individuals, to become 
interested and involved in the affairs of the 

So I hope you will make this one of your first 
orders of business when you return to your 
homes. You can do this in many ways. Your 
communities can establish direct contact with 
commimities in other countries. You can ar- 
range for exchange of visits. You can arninge 
for help to schools and hospitals in a similar 
conmiimity, in a sister country, in a developing 
land. You can try and establish scholarships 
to bring deserving students to your local col- 
lege or to your local high school for education. 
You can arrange programs of study and discus- 
sion about the problems of these other countries 
that a good manv of vour folks have not read 



about or studied about. You can conduct ex- 
hibits or perfonuiinces of tlie arts and music, 
folklore, of others. 

These are just a few examples of the multi- 
tude of ix)ssibilities which are open to those 
who are willing to assume a personal responsi- 
bilit}' for America's interest in the rest of the 
world. We must never forget that concern and 
sympathy are often as important as material 
assistance. This must not be a patronizing 
concern, but it must be the concern of equal for 
equal, the concern of brother for brother. 

As you all know from our own experience, 
people everj'where are as hungrj- for respect 
as they are hungry for bread. I hope you will 
explain this to your people, and, as leaders 
of local opinion, I hope you can begin to shape 
in your local communities a fruitful collabora- 
tion between your people and the peoples of 
the lands. You are a part of the world. You 
are going to live in it. There are societies in 
other lands that are now venturing to take the 
same step that your colonial forefathers took, 
your revolutionary forefathers took, when they 
brought into existence this, the most powerful 
of all nations. 

America's great strength in world affairs is 
not in Washington. It rests on dedicated la- 
bor of the private institutions. It rests on or- 
ganizations and local governments. It rests on 
the leaders and molders of public opinion, of 
wliich you are a substantial part. If we can 
summon that strength to our relations with the 
developing world, then we will have a weapon 
which our adversaries cannot ever hope to 
match. Then, and only then, will all Ameri- 
cans be proudly joined in a great adventure 
which unites the highest of our national ideals 
and the most important of our national needs. 

If I can leave one hope and one wish with 
you, it would be as a result of your visit here 
and of your study and application of what you 
have learned in your discussions, that upon 
your return home you could put the spotlight 
of j-our own community on the spotlight of 
other communities in the world, and somewhere 
out yonder you could lend a helping hand to lift 
up and to lead a people who are not as fortunate 
as we are. I believe that that would give you 
and your commimity a satisfaction that will 
never come from a paycheck. 

I think fhat. if you can provide that leader- 
ship, America will not only contiinie to l)e the 
leader of the world but we will be justified in 
being the leader of the world. But if we sit 
here just enjoying our material resources, if we 
are content to become fat and flabby at 50, and 
let the rest of the world go by, the time will not 
be far away when we will be hearing a knock 
on our door in the middle of the night and we 
will be hearing voices clamoring for freedom, 
independence, food, and shelter, just as our rev- 
olutionary forefathers clamored for it. 

President Greets Public Advisory 
Committee for Trade Negotiations 

Remarks by President Johnson ' 

Governor Herter, ladies and gentlemen: 
Wlien Governor Herter explained this meeting 
to me and asked that we schedule it, he kept 
assuring me that his party would be small, and 
I was tempted to tell the Governor that, next 
to seeing him personally, few things would make 
me happier than to be sure that his party really 
was small — his Republican Party. 

I am sure that all of you appreciate, as I do, 
that you are privileged to work with one of the 
most able and respected public men of our time, 
in the person of Christian Herter.^ He is set- 
ting an inspiring example of imselfish devotion 
to duty in his present labors, as he has ever since 
I have known him, and that has been a good 
many years. 

The country is no less in the debt of each of 
you for your own public-spirited participation 
in this undertaking which is so much in our na- 
tional interest and which I think is so much in 
the interest of the free world. As a legislator 
long before I became a public executive, I am 
always mindful of the wisdom of a great Eng- 
lislunan's observation, and that observation was 

' Made in the flower garden at the White House on 
Apr. 21 CWhite House pres-s release) ; for an Execu- 
tive order establishing the Committee, see Bclletin 
of Mar. .30. 1964, p. .506 ; for names of the Committee 
members, see White House press dated Mar. 2. 

' Mr. Herter is the President's Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations. 

MAY 11, 1964 


that free trade, one of the greatest blessings 
which a government can confer upon a people, 
is in almost every country unpopular. 

I know, and I think you know, how far we in 
the United States have come toward a mature 
and toward a rational understanding of the op- 
portunities which trade presents for the build- 
ing of the kind of a world that men want. The 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will endure as one 
of the greatest monuments to President Ken- 
nedy's leadership — and how difficult it was to 
pass that act, and how long and faithfully he 
worked on it ! But it will also stand as a mile- 
stone to the progress of popular understanding 
among business, labor, and agriculture. 

I hope that our friends in other lands will 
neither underestimate nor undervalue the 
strength of American sujiport for success of 
the trade negotiations that we have entered. 
That act 2 years ago was made possible by the 
kind of unselfish and nonpartisan public sup- 
port that you are providing again now. We 
are going to greatly need your advice and your 
counsel and, most of all, your real help. The 
negotiations will be lengthy, and, of course, they 
will be complex. They will be difficult at all 
times. But as we believe the cause is worthy, 
we know that the gains can be great. 

I look forward with a certain amount of 
prudent optimism to the round of negotiations 
which the 1962 act by our Congress has made 
possible. Of course, we will need to be patient 
and persistent. We will need at all times, of 
course, to be firm. We are willing to offer our 
free-world friends access to American markets, 
but we expect and we must have access to their 
markets also. Tliat applies to our agricultural 
as well as our industrial exports. 

The United States will enter into no ultimate 
agreement unless progress is registered toward 
trade liberalization on the products of our farms 
as well as our factories. These negotiations are 
not the kind in which some nations need lose 
because others gain. Their success will be to 
the advantage of all. The opportunity, there- 
fore, is here to build a partnership for progress 
among the free-world industrial nations and 

then between them and the developing nations. 
We mean to fully explore that opportunity, 
and we mean to fully pursue it. 

At home we are moving to eliminate the causes 
of poverty among all Americans. In the world 
we believe that a long step can be taken toward 
a victory over that poverty everywhere if free 
nations will only work together for a victory 
over the obstacles to free trade. 

This morning it is somewhat dampened by the 
atmosphere, but let me say to each of you, and 
to Governor Herter in particular, that I express 
the gratitude of the American people to you for 
lending your hand to the laying of this most im- 
portant cornerstone for what we all hope in the 
days to come will be a much better world, a 
world where peace endures and where prosperity 
is present. 

I am sorry that we have inclement weather. 
I would like to %asit with you longer. But 1 
do want you to know from the bottom of my 
heart that we feel deeply in your debt for the 
contribution j'ou have made. We look forward 
with great anticipation to the fruits of your 

Thank you. 

Private Committee To Help Find 
Embassy Sites in Washington 

The Department of State announced on 
April 20 (press release 175) that the Depart- 
ment and the D.C. Board of Commissioners 
have asked Garfield I. Kass, a Washington 
builder and developer, to form a committee ^ 
to assist in finding sites in the Nation's Capital 
where foreign government chanceries and other 
foreign government offices may be established 
in the future without legal impediments or pub- 
lic controversy. The Department will main- 
tain liaison with the private committee through 
Pedro A. Sanjuan, Director of Special Repre- 
sentational Services. 

' For names of the members of the committee, see 
Department of State press release 1S5 dated Apr. 24. 



African Issues at the United Nations 

hy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretanj for African Affairs ^ 

Almost exactly 1 j-ear ago, I spoke to the 
Collegiate Council for the United Nations at 
the University of Maryland. In that talk, I 
listed six principal African aspirations: 

1. freedom and independence from colonial 
rule ; 

2. personal and national dignity on the same 
basis as other peoples of the -vvorld ; 

3. improved standards of living; 

4. African imity ; 

5. nonalinement in the confrontation of great 
powers ; and 

6. an increasingly important African role in 
the United Nations. 

These remain the chief African aspirations. 
Much still remains to be done before they can be 
satisfactorily realized. But in even so short 
a period as a year, significant progress has been 
made toward their attainment. 

During the past year two more African na- 
tions, Kenya and Zanzibar, achieved independ- 
ence and became members of the United Nations, 
raising the total African membership to 35. 
Two other nations, Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia (to be known as Malawi and Zambia) , 
are scheduled to become independent later this 
year. Thus there has been and continues to be 
progress toward the overriding African goal of 
independence for all African peoples. There 
remain, however, several territories, mainly in 
southern Africa, where the path to self-determi- 
nation for the majority of the population is 

' Address made before the fourth annual leadership 
institute of the Collegiate Council for the United Na- 
tions at Chicago, 111., on Apr. 18 (press release 170 
dated Apr. 17). 

strewn with difficulties, where race relations 
are increasingly embittered, and where the fu- 
ture is obscure. 

It is harder to measure progress toward the 
second African goal of personal and national 
dignity. However, the increasingly active role 
African leaders are playing in the councils of 
the world suggests that there may have been 
more progress in this field than we generally 
realize. This new African prominence in 
world affairs is focusing on areas of resistance 
to progress in human relations. Thus, for the 
Africans, any sense of progress on the world 
stage is marred by the ever harsher application 
of the doctrine of apartheid to their brothers 
in South Africa. In fact, the shadow of this 
problem falls on those who believe in human 
dignity everywhere. 

The improvement of living standards is a 
long-term process and involves ever-rising ex- 
pectations. "Wliile we do not have adequate fig- 
ures yet for 19G3, there has been a generally 
rising trend in the indications of economic 
progress in Africa for the past few years. Afri- 
can exports, for example, rose by 42 percent be- 
tween 1952 and 1961. Between 1957 and 1961 
the gross national product of Liberia rose an- 
nually by 5.3 percent, of Ethiopia by 4.8 per- 
cent, of Sudan by 4.5 percent, and of Nigeria 
by 3.8 percent. Technical assistance and eco- 
nomic aid projects that are contributing or will 
contribute to better living for many Africans 
could be cited in practically every African coim- 
try. But the gap between living standards in the 
developed and less developed countries remains 

MAY 11, 1964 


Both we. and the Africans must do all we can 
to reduce this gap. Moreover, such U.N. instru- 
mentalities as the World Health Organization, 
the Economic Commission for Africa, the Spe- 
cial Fund, and the U.N. Technical Assistance 
Progi-am have a continuing significant contri- 
bution to make. 

Organization of African Unity 

Africans are keenly aware that their needs 
are great and their individual resources are 
small. They know that only by combining their 
efforts and working together will they achieve 
the best jiossible rate of progress and security. 
Visible progress toward this desirable goal of 
African unity clearly was made during the past 
year. This is not to say it is around the corner. 
But there have been some truly remarkable 
accomplishments recently in the field of inter- 
African cooperation. The continent-wide Orga- 
nization of African Unity, formed only last 
May, has successfully weathered its first serious 
tests. OAU has played a prominent role in set- 
tling disputes between Algeria and Morocco 
and between Ethiopia and Somalia, although 
the latter is not yet fully resolved. The im- 
portant point, however, is that these disputes 
have been dealt with by Africans themselves 
tlirough their own organization. They have de- 
veloped political machinery which has helped 
to dampen down threatening international con- 
flicts and which provides hope for negotiated 
solutions without extracontinental interven- 

Progress toward the African goal of non- 
alinement is somewhat more difficult to evalu- 
ate, particularly for an American. But in the 
sense of remaining free from outside domina- 
tion, this aspiration generally has been achieved 
in Africa. There are threats — occasionally 
serious threats — to the preservation of this kind 
of freedom in some African areas. Overall, 
however, there is a growing awareness of such 
threats and a general determination to safe- 
guard new-found freedoms from foreign ideolo- 

The sixth goal I listed last year was Africa's 
desire to play an increasingly active role in a 
strong and efficacious United Nations. Here, 
too, there lias been progress in the past 12 

months. Anyone who has observed recent ses- 
sions of the U.N. General Assembly in action 
has no doubt about the important part being 
played by Africans. For example, they played a 
key role in obtaining a 6-month extension of 
U.N. forces in the Congo on a satisfactory basis. 
In addition, the majority of African states op- 
posed the Soviets' troika proposals for reor- 
ganizing and weakening the U.N. Secretariat. 
A majority also voted against replacing the 
representatives of the Republic of China with 
those of the Chinese Communist regime in the 
United Nations. 

Their prominence is not merely a question of 
numbers, although African states now comprise 
almost one-tliird of U.N. membership — 35 of 113 
members. Nor is it simply a question of their 
being active and vocal, although they are fre- 
quently both. Rather, it is a question of their 
faith in the United Nations as an effective in- 
strument for peaceful change. They are con- 
vinced that the United Nations is important to 
world progress, and they seek to make maximum 
use of the U.N. to achieve their aspirations. It 
is, in fact, a measure of their responsibility that 
they place major emphasis on petitioning the 
world organization to bring about changes they 
feel deeply about. This is one of the many rea- 
sons why the United States is one of the strong- 
est supporters of the United Nations. 

Southern Rhodesia; Portuguese Territories 

At the same time, I would not suggest that 
we always see eye to eye with Africans in the 
U.N. On the basic goals of self-determination 
and human dignity, we are in agreement. On 
matters of method and timing, we sometimes 
differ. The global range of our interests and re- 
sponsibilities makes the formulation of our 
policy on any matter a complex process — a proc- 
ess in which we must find the best possible ac- 
commodation among our differing and even con- 
flicting national interests, the interests of our 
friends, and those of our opponents. 

Take the Southern Rhodesia question, for ex- 
ample. The African nations are gravely con- 
cerned about the situation there and its poten- 
tial for severe trouble. Britain, too, is greatly 
disturbed by the trouble inlierent in the Southern 
Rhodesia problem. And so is t he United States. 



The possibility of anotlicr indopoiuleiit country 
in soutliern Africa controlitHl by a relatively 
small white minority, in which the overwhelm- 
ing African majority is without adequate rep- 
i-esentation, legitimately arouses ilie apprehen- 
sions of everyone concerned with the peaceful 
and harmonious development of that ]);irt. of 
the world. 

But tlie Southern Rhodesian question is 
clearly the kind of problem that is best solved 
by the principals themselves. There is a need 
for agreement to be reached among the various 
elements of the Southern Khodesian population 
through consultation, negotiation, and agree- 

But what can and should the U.X. do about it? 
Should the U.N. call for an immediate con- 
stitutional conference in Southern Rhodesia to 
arrange for majority rule based on miiversal 
adult suffrage and tix an early date for inde- 
pendence? Or might such a categorical blue- 
print actually prevent European and African 
leaders from getting together to talk about 
their political future? As U.S. Ambassador 
Sidney Yates said recently in the U.N.'s coloni- 
alism committee: - "We are all in favor of con- 
stitutional changes; the question is how best 
to get them." Ambassador Yates went on to 
suggest "exploratory conversations" between the 
parties as a practical step forward. The com- 
mittee majority, however, preferred to press 
for an immediate constitutional conference, and 
the United States had to abstain on the conmiit- 
te«'s resolution. Clearly, this approach does 
not attempt to reconcile the conflicting inter- 
ests that should work together to give the 
people of Southern Rhodesia the kind of gov- 
ernment to which they are entitled. 

The Portuguese territories in southern Africa, 
where there is both potential and actual trou- 
ble, are another difficult problem. Africans in 
those areas feel increasingly frustrated in their 
efforts to achieve political expression. The 
United Nations says these people should have 
the right to self-determination. The United 

' For text of a statement made by Mr. Yates on Mar. 
12, 1964. before the Special Committee on the Situation 
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declara- 
tion on the GrantinK of Independence to Colonial Coun- 
tries and Peoples, see U.S./U.N. press release 4372. 

States fully agrees. And, in its own particidar 
way, so does Portugal. Then what is the prob- 
lem i 

In those territories the problem is a little more 
complex than differences on method and timing. 
It is also a question of an agreed definition of 
the goal. In principle, of course, self-determi- 
nation is simply a people's free choice of political 
institutions. The African nations recognize this 
principle but cannot conceive of any choice by 
the people of the Portuguese territories other 
than complete independence. It may be that 
this is what the people will choose. The Por- 
tuguese, however, while recognizing the prin- 
ciple of self-determination, believe that there 
are options which the people may choose other 
than independence. 

Last year there was a briefly encouraging de- 
velopment toward a solution to the Portuguese- 
African problem, when discussions between Por- 
tugal's Foreign Minister and the representa- 
tives of several African countries were held im- 
der the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General. 
Unfortunately these talks were discontinued 
owing to inability to agree on a definition of self- 
determination. The Secretary-General has been 
asked to continue his efforts, however. 

Now, where can the United Nations go from 
here? What kind of U.N. efforts should the 
United States support ? We sincerely hope that 
both the Portuguese and the Africans will agree 
to start talking again. 

Problems of South Africa and South-West Africa 

The most intractable problems in southern 
Africa are the race relations of South Africa 
and South Africa's administration of the for- 
mer German colony of South-West Africa. 
Since the United Nations' inception, some 27 
resolutions regarding South Africa's racial poli- 
cies have been passed by the U.N. General As- 
sembly and the Security Council. In that same 
period the General Assembly has passed over 
70 resolutions about South-West Africa alone ! 
The International Court of Justice has ren- 
dered advisory opinions regarding South-West 
Africa three times. In recent months South 
African and South-West African issues have 
been before various U.N. bodies and have caused 
controversy in several associated agencies. In 

MAY 11, 1964 


tlie next few weeks and months U.N. committees 
and other U.N. bodies will be further consider- 
ing these and associated issues. 

As you know, South Africa's mandate over 
South-West Africa, which was assigned by the 
League of Nations after World War I, is cur- 
rently the subject of a contentious case before 
the International Court of Justice. Two Afri- 
can countries that were members of the League 
of Nations — Ethiopia and Liberia — have asked 
the Court to judge whether the Mandatory has 
lived up to its obligations. The mandate agree- 
ment stipulates that the Mandatory should de- 
velop "to tlie utmost" the "material and moral 
well-being and social progress of the inhabit- 
ants." The Court's judgment is not expected 
until next year. The previous applications to 
the Court on South-West African issues have 
been for advisory opinions, which the parties 
were free to accept or disregard. In the cur- 
rent litigation, however, the parties are obli- 
gated to respect the Court's judgment. 

The South African Government's Commis- 
sion of Inquiry into development plans for 
South-West Africa, the Odendaal Commission, 
has proposed that the Territory be divided into 
a white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands." 
Each homeland would have its own "citizen- 
ship" and legislature and, the Commission rec- 
ommends, become increasingly independent of 
the others. The Commission also advocates 
large-scale incorporation of the Territory's ad- 
ministrative structure into the Republic's gov- 
ernmental departments. Spokesmen of the 
South African Government have endorsed 
broad principles of the Odendaal Commission's 
report, including proposals for large expendi- 
tures on roads, water resources, a large hydro- 
electric project, and other development; but 
the Government has not yet committed itself 
formally to any specific implementation. If 
it implemented the controversial proposals of 
the Commission before the judgment of the 
Court was rendered, the ICJ might be peti- 
tioned for an interim order to halt such action, 
which could precipitate an early crisis in the 
United Nations. 

We believe it would be in the best interest of 
everyone that no action be taken by South 
Africa that would complicate the ICJ case on 

South-West Africa. At the same time, we hope 
that other African govermnents will not press 
for action by the United Nations before the 
ICJ decision is reached. It is our view that 
action with respect to this international terri- 
tory, whether by the Mandatory or by inter- 
national bodies, should proceed and could pro- 
ceed more effectively on a sound legal basis. 
No one should act in a way prejudicial to the 
Court's consideration of the problem. Court 
procedures may be slow compared with the 
swift pace of modern Africa. However, the 
United States believes not only that there is no 
other responsible course but also that proceed- 
ing under Court authority is likely to be the 
only effective way of dealing with this matter. 

Tlie most difficult problem of all is to reach 
definite conclusions about what the United Na- 
tions can effectively do about apartheid in the 
Republic of South Africa itself. This is a 
tragic problem involving both whites and non- 
whites whose families have lived in the area for 
centuries, building up one of the highest stand- 
ards of living in Africa. Both sides have equi- 
ties, but apartheid is intolerable for black 

Here are some examples. A black African: 

1. cannot vote in national and provincial 
elections ; 

2. camiot serve in Parliament ; 

3. cannot attend the university of his choice ; 

4. cannot remain in any urban area over 72 
hours unless he satisfies certain long-term resi- 
dence or employment standards (and, under 
a bill passed a few days ago by the South Afri- 
can House of Assembly, even these rights are 
to be taken away) ; 

5. cannot strike or bargain collectively ; 

6. cannot fill positions in industry or com- 
merce reserved for whites by Govermnent reg- 
ulations ; 

7. camiot serve on a jury ; 

8. cannot, when detained under certain laws, 
seek legal advice or have recourse to the courts ; 

9. camiot demonstrate against existing laws. 

There is a growing body of security laws. 
Under the 1950 Suppression of Communism 
Act, as extended, a Communist can include one 
who advocates such objects as bringing about 



political, industrial, social, or economic change 
by picket inj; or similar peaceful action. As a 
result, a number of non-Communists, and, in- 
deed, anti-Conuiiuixists, have been convicted or 
restricted under this act. 

Under a 1963 law, a police officer may without 
warrant arrest and detain for successive 90-day 
periods persons wiio might have information 
about or who might intend to commit specific 
types of political offenses, as well as persons 
actually suspected of committing such offenses. 
Such arrest and confinement is instantly renew- 
able, and without notification to lawyer or fam- 
ily. Pei-sons serving sentences of imprisonment 
under several national security laws may be 
kejit indefinitely in prison after completion of 
their sentences if the Minister of Justice be- 
lieves the individual, on release, might further 
the achievement of any of the statutory objects 
of communism. Thus, Kobert Sobukwe, anti- 
Communist President of the Pan-Africanist 
Congress, was jailed in May 1963, immediately 
on completion of his 3-year term for incitement, 
and is still imprisoned on Robben Island in Ta- 
ble Bay near Cape Town. 

This year and next, the several major issues 
regarding South Africa and the Territory of 
South- West Africa appear to be heading toward 
a climax. The litigation concerning the man- 
date before the Court, the report of the Com- 
mittee of Experts on South Africa, considera- 
tion by U.N. bodies of the issues of political 
trials and other repression of dissent, pressures 
for sanctions — all appear to be converging in 
an accelerated wa3^ 

In and outside the United Nations, men of 
good will must be determined and imaginative 
to find peaceful solutions to the heavy problems 
that confront Africa. 

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate 
on Aid Programs for Ryukyus 

Press release 184 dated AprU 24 

In ceremonies held at Tokyo at 10:30 a.m., 
April 25, 19G-1 (Tokyo time), the United States 
and Japan concluded an agreement to est;iblish 
a Consultative Committee and a Technical 
Committee to facilitate cooperation between 

the two Governments in programs of economic 
and t*.'chnical assistance in the Ryukyu Islands. 
The new agreement was concluded in accord- 
ance with the policy announced by the late 
President Kennedy on March 19, 1962, calling 
for a cooperative relationship between the 
United States and Japan in programs of assist- 
ance to the Ryukyuan people. 

The first meeting of the Consultative Com- 
mittee was held immediately after the signing 
of the exchange of notes ^ between the two Gov- 
ernments. It is expected that the Technical 
Committee, with a representative of the U.S. 
High Conmiissioner of the Ryulcyu Islands 
serving as chairman and with participation by 
representatives of the Governments of Japan 
and the Ryukyu Islands, will commence its 
functions in connection with carrying out the 
agreement in the near future. 

U.S. and China Agree To Extend 
Educational Exchange Program 

Press release 182 dated April 24 

The Governments of the Republic of China 
and the United States on April 23 signed at 
Taipei a revised agreement extending the pro- 
gram of educational exchanges between the two 
countries begun in 1947. 

The current agreement is the latest in a series 
renewed in various participating countries 
under the broader authority of the Fulbright- 
Hays Act of 1961. It was signed by Foreign 
]Minister Shen Chang-huan and American 
Ambassador Jerauld Wright. 

The new agreement will enable the U.S. Edu- 
cational Foundation in the Republic of Cliina 
to carry out a wider range of educational and 
cultural programs, including facilitation of 
private exchange programs between the two 
countries. It also permits funding of the foun- 
dation's activities in U.S. and other currencies 
as well as in Chinese currency. Another provi- 
sion authorizes the foundation to accept contri- 
butions for its programs from other sources. 

' Not printed here. 

MAT 11, 1964 



U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Proposal 
in Disarmament Committee 

Statement by Adrian S. Fisher ^ 

During the past few years this Conference 
has been living within the lengthening shadow 
of an arms race. Our task has been to shed 
the liglit whicli will wipe out this sliadow. 

During that time this Conference has been 
working in the face of a paradox — the paradox 
of increasing armaments on botli sides, paid 
for in spiraling costs, resulting in increased 
danger to both sides rather than increased 

The President of the United States, in his 
message to the Conference of 21 January of 
this year,^ offered a program to stop what 
would otherwise become an inexorable buildup 
of more and more weapons of greater and 
greater destructive power. In putting this 
program forward the President emphasized: 

. . . we must first endeavor to halt further increases 
in strategic armaments now. 

Because it could halt further increases in 
strategic armaments now, tlie most significant 
and potentially far-reaching measure which the 
President of the United States put before this 
Conference is that dealing with a verified freeze 
of the number and characteristics of strategic 
offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles. It is 
this measure which the United States would 
like to explore further in this Committee. 

^ Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Com- 
mittee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 16. 
Mr. Fisher is Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency. For statements made 
before the Conference by William C. Foster on Jan. 1 
and Feb. 6, see Buixetin of Mar. 2, 1964, p. S.'jO, and 
Mar. 9, 1964, p. 3,H\ ; for statements made by Mr. Fisher 
on Mar. 5 and 19, see ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641. 

" For text, see ihid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224. 

We have all heard the awesome figures deal- 
ing with the number of nuclear delivery velii- 
cles now plamied to be built during the next 
few years. Chairman Khrushchev has stated 
the intentions of the Soviet Union graphically. 
He has talked of rockets being produced like 


The United States has recently indicated that 
its force now contains more than 750 operational 
long-range ballistic missiles. The United 
States has aimounced that that number will rise, 
under present plans, to more than 1,700 during 
the next few years. 

During the period when this Conference has 
been going on — while we have been discussing 
at this table the means of reducing arms — stra- 
tegic armaments have been increasing at a rapid 
rate. The figui-es that I will give are applicable 
to the United States, but it is clear that, in the 
absence of an agreement, the forces of the Soviet 
Union will also increase rapidly. 

This Conference began in 1962. In 1963 the 
inventory of operational vehicles in the United 
States increased by approximately 200 percent 
ovev the 1962 level. In 1964 it is increasing by 
550 percent. By 1965 it will have grown to 
an aggregate increase of 750 percent over the 
1962 level. As I indicated a moment ago, we 
must assume that the Soviet Union is increas- 
ing its missiles at a similar rate. 

I do not set forth those figures in order to 
engage in hindsight. It is useless for us to spec- 
ulate upon what results this Conference might 
have achieved had we concentrated first on meas- 
ures to hold constant the numbers of strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles. It is useless to specu- 
late whether we could have a^-oided a situation 
in which both sides substantially increased their 
strategic nuclear vehicles while arguing how 
best to reduce them. 

It is of no utility for this Conference to con- 
sider what might have been the effects of some- 



thing we did not do 2 yeai"s ajro upon our situa- 
tion today. It is, iio\vi>vi>r, of tlu> frn-atcst 
utility for this Conference to consider the edVct 
of wiint we can do today upon our situation 2, 3, 
and many more years from today. The fre^'ze 
of the number of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles will have a decisive impact on the pro- 
gram to build more of these armaments — pro- 
grams which will go forward if no agreement 
of this type is reached. If this measure were 
agreed upon and implemented, it would accom- 
plish more practical results during the next 
several years — in terms of actual inventories of 
weapons of mass destruction — than any collat- 
eral measure put before this Conference. 

The freeze would keep many hundreds of the 
deadliest weapons ever devised by naan out of 
the arsenals of the future and would halt all 
progress on e\'en more deadly ones now being 
developed. Moreover, as President Jolmson 
has stated, the measure we are now discussing, 
by preventing the further expansion of the 
deadly and costly arms race, can open the path 
to reductions in all types of forces from present 

The freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, par- 
ticularly in conjunction with the cutoff of pro- 
duction of fissionable materials for use in 
nuclear weapons, would have a stabilizing effect 
on the military' environment. It would, as I 
have just pointed out, curb the nuclear arms 
race. Moreover, it would facilitate progress 
toward general disarmament, although it is, of 
course, not linked with the conclusion of a treaty 
on general disarmament. It is our belief, there- 
fore, that the freeze and the cutoff could usefully 
be explored in parallel as companion measures. 

Description of Vehicles To Be Frozen 

On the instructions of President Johnson, I 
would now like to present further details con- 
cerning the elements of the strategic nuclear 
vehicle freeze. These details should answer a 
number of the questions which have been asked 
in the Committee about this measure. We also 
hope that they will serve as a stimulus for fur- 
ther exploration of the freeze on strategic nu- 
clear vehicles by the Conference. 

Under the agreement which the United States 
proposes to explore, the numbers and character- 

istics of the following strategic nuclear vehicles 
would be frozen : 

Fii-st, ground-based surface-to-surface mis- 
siles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or 
greater, together with their asscK-iated launch- 
ing facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface 
missiles having a range of 100 kilometers 
or greater, together with their associated 

Second, strategic bombers having an empty 
weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together 
with any associated air-to-surface missiles hav- 
ing a range of 100 kilometers or greater; 

Third, ground-based surface-to-surface mis- 
siles ha\'ing a range of between 1,000 kilometers 
and 5,000 kilometers, together with their asso- 
ciated launching facilities; 

Fourth, strategic bombers having an empty 
weight of between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000 
kilograms, together witli any associated air-to- 
surfaco missiles having a range of 100 kilome- 
ters or greater ; 

Fifth, strategic anti-missile-missile systems, 
together with their associated launching facili- 
ties. In connection with this type of armament, 
further teclmical discussions will be required in 
order to formulate a workable and acceptable 
definition of "anti-missile-missile systems." 

Limitations on Production and Testing 

Let me turn now to the limitations on produc- 
tion and testing. 

The production of new types of armaments 
that fall within the listing I have outlined would 
be prohibited. The production of all existing 
types of armaments within this listing, and of 
specified major subassemblies of these arma- 
ments, would be halted, except for production 
required to cover the maintenance of the vehi- 
cles, their accidental loss, and the expenditure 
of missiles within agreed annual quotas for con- 
fidence and training firings. 

Replacement would be on a one-for-one basis 
of the same type. Production for authorized 
replacements would not be permitted to exceed 
agreed annual nmnbers which would, in effect, 
amount to a small percentage of the inventories 
of armaments existing in the hands of the re- 
spective sides at tlie effective date of the freeze 
agreement. Verification of inventories would 

MAT 11, 19G4 


not be involved. The agreed replacement num- 
bers would be subject to periodic review. 

With respect to replacement of armaments 
no longer in production, the parties would seek 
to agree upon acceptable substitutes from among 
weapons in production. In the absence of such 
an agreement on items out of production the 
party concerned could reopen production lines 
for one-f or-one replacement. 

Control over the number of missile launchers 
is an essential element of the program. Limita- 
tions would also be imposed on the construction 
and improvement of launchers and launching 
facilities, commensurate with the spirit of the 
production limitations. 

Production of boosters for use in space pro- 
grams would be permitted even though such ve- 
hicles are equivalent to the boosters used for 
armaments, but would be limited to the quantity 
needed to meet the announced use of the boosters 
for such space programs. 

Limitations on testing would be applied under 
the program. Certain types of tests and firings 
would, however, be permitted. Confidence and 
training firings of existing affected missiles 
would be limited to an agreed annual number 
for each type of missile, subject to periodic re- 
view, as I indicated earlier. Tests of new mis- 
siles and aircraft systems would be permitted 
to continue, subject to verification, as far as 
required for allowed space and civil air pro- 
grams and for development of nonstrategic 
types of weapons not affected by the freeze. 
Limitation on research and development testing 
would be the subject of teclinical discussions. 


How would the freeze be verified ? As a point 
of departure, the parties to the agreement would 
have to make a complete declaration of all pro- 
duction and testing facilities relevant to the 
agreement. Declarations would be made after 
the conclusion but before the implementation 
of the agreement. Included would be facilities 
producing — or which were recently utilized in 
producing — completed armaments and specified 
major subassemblies of aniiaments affected by 
the freeze. Facilities producing, or recently in- 
volved in the production of, vehicles for space 
or aeronautical programs and their major sub- 

assemblies — these vehicles being equivalent to 
the boosters used for affected armaments — 
would also be included. All installations used 
for space lamichings and sites to be used for 
all allowed missile firings would also be de- 
clared. Declarations would have to be kept up 
to date if new facilities were used. 

The verification arrangements wliich we have 
in mind for the freeze would concentrate on 
monitoring critical production steps, replace- 
ments, and launchings. A verification system 
sufficient to provide adequate assurance of com- 
pliance would of course be required. Such a 
system could include the following: 

(1) continuing inspection of declared facili- 

(2) a specified number of inspections per 
year to check undeclared locations for possible 
prohibited activities such as armament produc- 
tion or launching-site construction ; 

(3) the stationmg of observers to verify all 
space launchings and all allowed missile firings 
in order that stated requirements for replace- 
ment missiles could be verified and the laimch- 
ing of prohibited types of missiles detected; 

(4) observation of the destruction of — or, in 
the case of accidents, other confirmation of — 
vehicles and laimchers being replaced. 

Further details of the verification system re- 
ciuired will be developed on the basis of further 
study. It is clear, however, that the verifica- 
tion system for the measure wliich we are now 
exploring would be less extensive than that re- 
quired for general and complete disarmament. 
It would not involve verification of the levels 
or the deployment of existing armaments. 

To formalize an agi-eement on the freeze, we 
would propose embodying it in a treaty which 
would enter into force within an agreed interval 
after signature and ratification by the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and such other states 
as might be agreed. "We believe that such a 
treaty should contain a withdrawal clause simi- 
lar to that contained in the partial test ban 
treaty,^ with which I know the chainuan is 
familiar. The freeze agreement should also 
contain a provision that a conference would be 
liold, periodically or at the call of any party, 
to consider whether the treaty should be con- 

" For text, see ihid., Aug. 12, 1903, p. 239. 




tinued or modified. It should he further pro- 
vided tliat lifter such a conference any party 
could consider whether to exercise its right 
under the withdrawal clause on the basis of the 
results of the conference. 

this important mesisure. With aj^reement on 
this measure, we shall have stopped on a plateau 
from wliich we could begin the descent from 

Significance of Freeze Proposal 

1 have deseribed the essential elements of the 
I'nited States proposal to explore a verified 
freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles. We have 
put forward this concept for serious exploration 
by the Soviet Union, the United States, and 
their respective allies. As a result of such con- 
tinuing exploration, the United States may 
wish, therefore, to review the outline of the ele- 
ments of the freeze concept which I have just 

The freeze provides a practical means to halt 
the most costly and potentially destructive seg- 
ment of the amis race. The suggestion for a 
freeze deals with the areas of the arms race 
which are of the greatest danger and with the 
arms which are most easily controlled. This 
suggestion is designed to affect those armaments 
which are the most significant in halting the 
arms race and wliich are, at the same time, the 
simplest to verify in regard to limitations on 
production and testing. 

Agreement on this measure, especially if 
coupled with its companion measure — the cutoff 
of production of fissionable materials for use in 
nuclear weapons — would provdde an excellent 
point of departure for major arms reductions 
to follow. It would slow dovsTi what is now an 
ever-mounting spiral of armaments and by so 
doing greatly facilitate progress toward disarm- 

We ask all members of this Conference to 
examine with care the measure we have set 
forth here this morning. We particularly ask 
the Soviet Union, as one of the states primarily 
affected by this measure, to give the details care- 
ful attention. This is a measure dealing with 
a complex problem. We hope and expect that 
governments will look at this measure care- 
fully and thoughtfully before indicating their 

We ask that this Committee explore the freeze 
in the spirit in which it is proposed. We hope 
that that will lead to a fruitful exploration of 

U.S. Proposes Town-Centered 
Planning for Asia 

The 20th session of the U. N. Economic Com- 
mission for Asia and the Far Ea^t was held at 
Tehran, Iran, March 2-17. Following is a 
statement made before the Com,mission on 
March If. by Kenneth T. Young, V.S. repre- 

Mr. Chairman [Ali Naghi Alikliani of Iran] : 
I join my colleagues in warmly welcoming your 
election as chairman of ECAFE's 20th session 
and the election of His Excellency Dr. [Abdul 
Hakim] Tabibi of Afghanistan as our first vice 
chairman and The Honorable Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mr. [J. R.] Marshall, of New Zealand 
as our second vice chairman. Under your 
guidance, sir, our meeting has already been pro- 
ductive and efficient. It should mark another 
milestone in the constructive record of ECAFE. 

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great 
interest to the statements of our distinguished 
Executive Secretary [U Nyun] and previous 
speakers. They form a significant and, I think, 
remarkable analysis of this region's complexi- 
ties. Yet, Mr. Chairman, I have the impres- 
sion that a single and simple theme underlies 
this meeting: action for progress in bettering 
the conditions of Asia's people. May I direct 
a few observations to this worthy theme. 

First, contmued economic improvement per- 
mitted the United States to increase its foreign 
purchases in 1963 in the ECAFE region as else- 
where. Of the $17 billion of goods bought by 
the United States in lOG-'i, some $3 billion came 
from this region. This was an increase of $280 
million over 1962. With the U.S. economy con- 
tmuing to expand and with an anticipated gross 
national product of almost $625 billion in 1964, 
U.S. demand for products of the ECAFE coxm- 
tries should continue to rise, particularly if cur- 
rent efforts to reduce obstacles to international 
trade are successful. 

SLVT 11, 1964 


Secondlj', President Johnson will present a 
message to the Congress on assistance for eco- 
nomic progress and political stability.^ One of 
the interesting and encouraging developments 
in the ECAFE region is the expanding ex- 
change of assistance among the countries repre- 
sented here. 

Thirdly, discussion and actions of various 
kinds are needed to expand markets. The 
movement in the ECAFE region toward en- 
largement of markets through regional arrange- 
ments offei-s promise for diversification of 
industry and eventually the expansion of both 
intraregional and extraregional trade. Con- 
sideration of export potential in national de- 
velopment plans is a constructive trend, 
supplementing continuing efforts toward import 
substitution. We are interested in useful meas- 
ures for regional cooperation in the ECAFE 
area, as described in the survey. 

Fourthly, the Kennedy Round of trade nego- 
tiations under the GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade], scheduled to begin in 
late spring of this year,= can result in major 
reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers. 
This can open markets for the goods of the 
developing countries. The GATT Contracting 
Parties have agreed that full reciprocity in 
tariff reductions will not be expected from the 
developing countries. The very fonn of the 
negotiations — across-the-board cuts instead of 
the former method of item-by-item bargain- 
ing — ^ill itself be advantageous to the develop- 
ing countries. We intend to use our negotiating 
authority under the Trade Expansion Act to 
the fullest possible extent to secure tariff reduc- 
tions on products of chief interest to the de- 
veloping countries. These negotiations offer 
our best immediate opportmaity for widespread 
reduction of trade barriers which may other- 
wise frustrate the export potential of the de- 
veloping countries. 

Fifthly, the forthcoming United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development will ap- 

' For text of President Johnson's mes-sage on foreign 
aifl, transmitted to the Congress on Mar. 19, see Bul- 
ij.;tin of Apr. G, 10G4, p. .518. 

"For an address on "The Role of Agriculture in 
Trade Expansion" by Christian A. Herter, see ibid., 
Apr. 27, 1964, p. 671. 

propriately consider a wide range of pro- 
posals.' At a press conference held on February 
29, President Jolmson expressed his attitude 
toward development of world trade as follows : 

We are very interested in that conference. We are 
going to participate in it and malie every contribution 
we can. We thinli it is essential in the interest of the 
peoples of the world that trade barriers be pulled 
down. We are going to contribute everything we can 
to that end. 

Sixthly, the secretariat's very able Economic 
Survey for 1963 has highlighted the principal 
problem for action, namely, that lagging devel- 
opment of agriculture threatens the general eco- 
nomic progress of the area. We too are partic- 
ularly concerned over the fact that population 
growth continues to outpace increases in na- 
tional production. More people means more 
young people m every country. The growing 
youth majority deserves more attention and 
higher priority in action for development. 
Food production must be increased considerably 
to meet the needs of increasing populations and 
to assure healthy economic growth for peo- 
ple in the ECAFE area. For the well-being of 
Asian peoples, the United States delegation 
joins in the view that more attention and action 
should now be directed to rural improvement 
and agricultural progress in Asia. 

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, in my fi