Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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Given By
U. S. CUPT. OF DOCUMF.MTS

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

I'd.

THE

DEPARTMINT

STATE

BULLETIN

%hh - 19o5

Vol. LI, Nos. 1306-1331

July 6-Dec. 28. 1964

INDEX

timber

Date

of Issue

Pages

1306

July

1964

1- 36

1307

July

13,

1964

37- 72

1308

July

20,

1964

73-104

1309

July

27,

1964

105-136

1310

Aug.

1964

137-172

1311

Aug.

10,

1964

173-212

1312

Aug.

17,

1964

213-256

1313

Aug.

24,

1964

257-296

1314

Aug.

31,

1964

297-328

1315

Sept.

1964

329-360

1316

Sept.

14,

1964

361-392

1317

Sept.

21,

1964

393-424

1318

Sept.

28,

1964

425-456

lumber

Date

of Issue

Pages

1319

Oct.

1964

457-496

1320

Oct.

12,

1964

497-532

1321

Oct.

19,

1964

533-568

1322

Oct.

26,

1964

569-608

1323

Nov.

1964

609-648

1324

Nov.

1964

649-692

1325

Nov.

16,

1964

693-728

1326

Nov.

23,

1964

729-764

1327

Nov.

30,

1964

765-800

1328

Dec.

1964

801-836

1329

Dec.

14,

1964

837-864

1330

Dec.

21.

1964

865-896

1331

Dec.

28,

1964

897-928

Corrections for Volume LI

The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call
attention to the following errors in Volume LI :

July 13, page 56: The last sentence in the first
full paragraph in the second column should read
"But at least it provides a means for the two
countries to work out useful arrangements re-
garding future border difficulties."

September 7, page 338: The paragraph begin-
ning at the top of the righthand column should
read "Now, we have had a continuing prog^ram of
assistance to Indonesia. Because of Indonesia's
policy of what they call 'confrontation' with
Malaysia, the volume. . . ."

October 19, page 551: The first line of the
third full paragraph should read: "Between April
and August 1959. . . ."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Publication 7917

Released November 1965

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printlns Office,
Washington, D.C., 20402 -Price 30 cenU

INDEX

Volume LI: Numbers 1306 - 1331, July 6 - December 28, 1964

Abel, Elie, 268, 394, 616

Abu Simbel, temples of, 645

Acheson, Dean, 441

Adebo, S. O., 827

Advisory Commission on International Educational

and Cultural Affairs, 485
Africa (see also individual countries) :
Communist economic and educational aid (Rusk),

501
East Africa, sigrnificant developments (Williams),

53
Economic Commission for, U.N.: Rusk, 501;

F. H. Williams, 251
Newly developed nations:

Economic and social progress (Rusk), 499
Problems of: Rusk, 499; Williams, 41
Potential wealth (Williams), 51
Propaganda (Williams), 733

Technical aid program increased (Williams), 920
U.S. assistance programs: Harriman, 332;

Hutchinson, 915; Rusk, 500
U.S. principles (Harriman), 330
Volta Dam project (Duke), 343
Agency for International Development:
Aid to underdeveloped countries: Bell, 376; Free-
man, 383
Brazil, U.S. loan under Alliance for Progress, 59
Foreign aid program:

Annual report, 1963 (Johnson), 675
Financial assistance to credit institutions: Dil-
lon, 878; Glaessner, 881
Widening programs in housing, agriculture, and
cooperatives (Glaessner), 883
Growth of (Mann), 479
New markets for U.S. products (Bell), 207
Review of accomplishments (Dillon), 880
Services encouraging investment of private capital

abroad (Rusk), 651
Two forms of institution building (Hutchinson),
916
Aggression :
Communist attack on U.S. destroyers (Johnson),

259, 260, 261
Philippines, effect of armed attack against, 632
Southeast Asia, U.S. response to: Johnson, 79,

262, 300; McNamara, 265; Rusk, 264
U.S. Congress, joint resolution, 268

Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas pro-
grams (see also Food for Peace) :
Agreements with: Chile, 168, 861; Congo
(Leopoldville), 453, 493; Ecuador, 690;
Greece, 294, 861; Guinea, 294, 894; Indonesia,
390; Iran, 102, 646, 894; Israel, 69; Korea,
69; Paraguay, 494; Tunisia, 168; United
Arab Republic, 168, 494; Viet-Nam, 294, 646;
Yugoslavia, 798
Public Law 480, importance of (Rusk), 426
Agriculture :

EEC bargaining problems (Herter), 119
Farmer ownership of land (Freeman), 387
Imports, appendix to tariff schedules (proclama-
tion), 122
Role in economic development: Bell, 376; Free-
man, 383, 387; Rostow, 664; Rusk, 574, 651
Trade in agricultural products, Europe (Rusk),
766, 769
Agriculture, Department of, role in world rural
development: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383; Rusk,
574
AID. See Agency for International Development
Air Force, Army, Naval missions, U.S., agreement

with Chile, 762
Air navigation and transport. See under Aviation
Aircraft. See Aviation

Airmail, universal postal convention (1957) provi-
sions re : Algeria, 34 ; Kenya, 833
Ajavon, Robert, 461
Al-Sowayel, I. A., 461
Algeria:

Food for Peace program (Harriman), 332
Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 325, 390, 452, 832
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress
Alliance for Progress:

Accomplishments and rate of progress: Harriman,
884; Johnson, 705; Mann, 479, 597, 706, 898;
Rostow, 310; Rusk, 851
Aid in development of financing institutions

(Dillon), 878
Brazil, U.S. loan agreement, 59
Ceremony opening exhibits at Pan American

Union (Mann), 305
Chile, technical assistance projects (Rusk), 635
Inter-American Economic and Social Council

review of progress (Mann), 898
Joint communique (Johnson-Orlich), 81

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

931

Alliance for Progress — Continued

Principles and purpose: Bell, 823; Harriman, 885;
Mann, 479; Rostow, 306; M. W. Williams, 748
Problems confronting: Mann, 594; Rostow, 308
Social security, 7th inter-American conference on

(Merriam), 320
Structure of (Rostow), 307
U.S. delegations, 859

U.S. views and support: Bell, 823; Harriman,
885; Johnson, 804; Mann, 595; Rusk, 852
America Illustrated, USIA publication, 909
American Field Service, remarks to students (John-
son), 189
American governments, change in attitude toward

Cuba (Rusk), 175
American Republics. See Latin America and Organi-
zation of American States
American States, Organization of. See Organization

of American States
American Veterans of World War II and Korea,

traditional policy of (Rusk), 362
AMVETS. See American Veterans of World War

II and Korea
Andean Indian Program, scope of (Tubby), 741
Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie, 78
Anderson, Robert B., 54
Antarctic treaty:

Inspections under (Rusk), 403, 406
U.S. views (Johnson), 402
Antarctica :

Agreements on conservation of flora and fauna:

Entry into force, 34; South Africa, 646
Research and exploration 1961-1964, under Ant-
arctic treaty, 404
Anti-Semitism, U.N. action urged (Williams), 421
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) Council
meeting:
Announcement of, 43
Policy toward Southeast Asia, 146
Remarks (Rusk), 194
Apartheid :

U.N. condemns apartheid, resolution, 33
U.S. views: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree,
761 ; Williams, 53
Arab-Israel dispute (Talbot), 703
Argentina :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144
Trade negotiations proposed, 369
Treaties, agreements, etc., 566, 925
Armaments (see also Disarmament, and Nuclear
Weapons) :
Control and reduction of (Timberlake), 413
Cost of maintaining world freedom (Duke), 346
Development and changes since 1950 (Rusk), 363
U.S.S.R.:

Comparison (Hughes), 8
MRBM buildup (Rostow), 41
Armed forces:

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Armed forces

Armed Forces — Continued
Treatment in time of war, Geneva conventions
(1949), relative to: Jamaica, 605; Niger,
Rwanda, Uganda, 134
Armed forces, U.S.:

Air Force, Army, Naval missions, agreement with

Chile, 762
Maintaining strategic advantage: Hughes, 8;

Rusk, 215, 464
Ships. See Ships and shipping
Asea, Solomon Bayo, 582

Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see aha
ANZUS Council, Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation, and individual countries) :
Asian views of U.S. (Rahman), 218
Chinese Communists' nuclear strength, effect on

security in Asia (Bundy), 616
Communism, major problem in Asia (Bundy), 535
Economic and social development, problems and
progress in: Bundy, 534, 538; F. H. Williams,
250
Far East:

Economic and military changes since 1950

(Rusk), 363
U.S. encouragement for defensive alliances
(Rusk), 363
Newly independent nations, nationalism in

(Bundy), 541
Southeast Asia:

ANZUS, review of position and stand in Asia
and Pacific (13th Council meeting commu-
nique) , 146
Conferences, conditions for success (Rusk), 219,

270
Geneva accords. See Geneva accords
Neutrality, U.S. opposition (Bundy), 338, 339
Soviet position and responsibilities (Rusk), 270
U.N., resume of activity (Sisco), 58
U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 278
U.S. Military bases, importance of (Bundy),

536
U.S. policy, views and position: Bundy, 334;
Johnson, 259, 302, 632; Rusk, 216, 225, 227,
235, 267, 268, 580; Stevenson, 273
Atlantic alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization
Atlantic Community (see also Atlantic partnership,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) :
Common objectives (Johnson), 866
Interdependence of Europe and America: John-
son, 846, 868; Rostow, 39
Political and economic problems (McGhee), 23
Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin

America (Rusk), 652
Atlantic partnership:

Need for a united Europe: Ball, 773; Rostow, 40
Value of cooperation : Rostow, 42 ; Rusk, 768

932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Atomic energy, peaceful uses of:

Agreements re application of safeguards: Argen-
tina, 925; Austria, 325; China, 566; Greece,
69; IAEA, 69, 325, 326, 529, 566, 605, 925;
Philippines, 529; Thailand, 605; U.S., 69,
325, 326, 529, 566, 605, 925; Viet-Nam, 925
Agreements re civil uses of: Argentina, 566;
Brazil, 422, 762; China, 326; France, 453;
Israel, 358; Philippines, 798; Portugal, 326,
798; U.K., 102, 894; Viet-Nam, 326
International cooperation, need for increased
(Seaborg), 779, 786
\ Prospects for growth of nuclear power uses (Sea-
borg), 779
Remarks (Johnson), 411
Third International Conference:
Progress reported (Seaborg), 519
U.S. papers and exhibits (Seaborg), 408
Atomic Energy Agency, International:

Accomplishments and responsibilities (Seaborg),

519
Research, training, and technical assistance pro-
grams, review and U.S. contribution to (Sea-
borg), 522
Role of IAEA (Seaborg), 781, 784
Safeguards system, 27; review (Seaborg), 520
Senate confirms nominations to IAEA General

Conference, 520
Treaties, agreements, etc.:

Application of IAEA safeguards to the bilateral
agreements :

1955: China, U.S., 566; Philippines, U.S., 529
1957: Thailand, U.S., 605
1959: Austria, U.S., 325; Viet-Nam, U.S., 925
1962: Argentina, U.S., 925
1964: Greece, U.S., 69; U.S., 326
Statute amended : Cameroon, 168 ; Kuwait, 893
U.S. nuclear reactors placed under IAEA safe-
guards, 27
Atomic energfy information. See under North At-
lantic Treaty
Atoms-for-peace program (Seaborg), 782
Australia :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 460
ANZUS Council meeting, 43, 146
Australian-American Educational Foundation, es-
tablishment, joint announcement, 311
Educational exchange agreement signed, 442
Exchange of greetings (Holyoake, Rusk), 194
Overseas Telecommunications Commission, 358
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 358, 390, 890
Austria :

Austrian assets agreement, administration of

(Executive order), 60
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 325, 566, 690, 890
(Reisepass only)
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic

Aviation :

Air transport:

Canada, renegotiation with, 188

Civil air transport negotiations concluded with

Mexico, 133
Italy-U.S. begin consultations, 855
Japan-U.S. consultation recessed, 313
Aircraft, F-104G Starfighter, 21
Soviet charges of U.S. overflights, exchange of

notes, 483
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air services transit agreement, international

(1944): Somali Republic, 69; Rwanda, 133
Air transport agreements with: India, 798;
Italy, 253; Mexico, 357, 494; New Zealand,
60, 69
Aircraft :

Convention for unification of rules, precau-
tionary attachment of: Algeria, Senegal,
832
Convention on international recognition of

rights in: Algeria, 452
Convention on offenses committed on board

aircraft: Ireland, Spain, 797
Double taxation on earnings from operation
of, U.S.-Mexico agreement for relief of, 326
Carriage by air:

Convention (1929) for unification of certain
rules re: Algeria, 390; Cuba (with reserva-
tion), 797; Syrian Arab Republic, 390;
Western Samoa, 422
Protocol amending: Algeria, 390; Brazil, 797;
Canada, 390; Mali, 422; Senegal, 797;
Syrian Arab Republic, 390 ; Western Samoa,
422
Civil aviation, international:

Convention (1944) on: Malawi, 494; Zambia,

762
Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and
61 on sessions of ICAO assembly: Chad,
France, Kenya, Somalia, 690
Protocol amending article 50(a) re ICAO
Council membership: Chad, Kenya, So-
malia, 690
Protocol re requests for extraordinary meet-
ings: Austria, Chad, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Germany, Jamaica, Kenya, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Somalia, Syrian Arab Re-
public, 690
U.S. International Aviation Month, 1964, procla-
mation, 314

Baird, Joseph M., 313
Balaceanu, Petre, 305
Balance of payments:

Deficit, effect on economy (Mann), 595

Latin America (Harriman), 886

U.K., prospects for improving (Johnson), 848

U.S.:

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

933

Balance of payments — Continued

Effect of international travel (Mace), 888
Status of and efforts to improve: Bell, 208;
Dillon, 445, 753; Johnson, 751; Roosa, 669
Ball, George W., addresses, remarks, and statements:
Atlantic partnership, U.S. views, 626, 773
Communism, lessening hold on bloc countries, 625
Congo, rescue operations in, 843
Cyprus, U.S. objectives, 301, 477
Europe:

Annual ministerial meetings of OECD, 847
Economic policies of the U.S., 848
Propositions fundamental to U.S. policies, 625
Television interviews, 301, 843
U.N., major roles of and factors affecting, 626,

694
U.S., responsibilities as a global power, 473
Barnett, Robert W., 586
Barrenechea, Norberto, 144
Battle, Lucius D., 110, 254
Belgium :

Congo, joint U.S.-Belgium rescue operations, 840,

845
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 294, 452, 566, 797,

861, 890
Embassy in Viet-Nam proposed (Lodge), 435

Bell, David E., 205, 376, 821
Benton, William, 715

Berlin:

Air access, U.S., U.K., France reaffirm rights of
free access, 44, 368

Berlin passes (McGhee), 141

Germany-U.S. talks, summary, 849

Soviet attitude (Rusk), 225

U.S. position: 44; Ball, 773; McGhee, 871, 872,
875; Rusk, 655

Western position defined, tripartite agreement
(June 1964), 44
Bill of Rights Day, proclamation, 887
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for
unification of rules re: Algeria, 325; Peru, 894
Black, Eugene, 441
Blevins, Merrill M., 418
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 369
Bolle, Maarten, 334
Bolivia :

Passport agreement, 890

U.S. renews relations, 901
Bonsai, Philip W., 856
Book burning: Rowan, 908; Rusk, 905
Bradley, Omar, 441
Branco, Castelo, 435
Brazil :

AID loan, 59

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144

Economic progress (Rusk), 225

"Kennedy Round", 369

Brazil — Continued

Supports U.S. attitude and actions in Maddoz
attack (Branco), 435

Treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 566, 762, 797, 832,
833, 861, 890

U.S. support and friendship (Johnson), 436
British Guiana, U.S.-U.K. agreement extending

technical assistance, 134
Brookhaven Research Reactors, 27
Brosio, Manlio, 275, 673
Brown, Ben Hill, Jr., 894
Brown, Winthrop G., 254
Bulgaria, 78
Bundy, William P.:

Chinese Communists' nuclear device, effect on
security in Asia, 616

East Asia, development of and U.S. policy, 534

Indonesia, U.S. aid to, 338, 450

Japan, role in Asia and U.S. policy, 536

Southeast Asia, U.S. role in, 334

Television interviews, 334, 616
Bureau of Mines, U.S., 358
Burma, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 530
Business, parallel roles with diplomacy (McGhee),

18
Butterworth, W. Walton, 170

Calendar of international conferences and meetings

(see also subject) , 28, 148, 355
Cambodia:

Neutrality, U.S. views (Bundy), 338
Passport agreement, 890

Poisonous chemicals, U.S. answers charges: Ste-
venson, 319; Yost, 274
U.N. Cambodia-Viet-Nam report, U.S. remarks

(Stevenson), 527
U. N. observers recommended to settle border prob-
lem (Rusk), 270
U.S. Ambassador (Kidder), confirmation, 134
U.S.-Cambodia talks proposed, 856
Cameroon :

Railroad construction, 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 452
Campbell, Persia, 313
Campobello Park, 312, 390
Camus, Albert (quoted), 347
Canada :

Columbia River Treaty:

Canadian-U.S. cooperative development, 494
Exchange of notes, 509
Proclamation, 507

Ratification ceremonies (Johnson, Pearson), 504
Haines Road, winter maintenance, 926
Issues exempted from interest equalization tax,

Executive order (Johnson), 442
Meetings : Johnson-Pearson, 504 ; Rusk-Martin, 472
Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense (U.S.-
Canada) 4th meeting, report of, 45

934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Canada — Continued

North Pacific fisheries, U.S.-Canada-Japan talks

resumed (Johnson) , 441
Overseas Telecommunication Corporation, 358
St. Lawrence Seaway, supplementary toll agree-
ment, and text of notes (Martin-Butterworth),
169
Treaties, agreements, etc., 134, 169, 188, 358, 390,

452, 494, 513, 530, 646, 890, 926
U.S.-Canadian cooperation summarized (Harri-

man), 237, 240
Water levels and pollution studies by IJC re-
quested, joint U.S.-Canadian, 598
Captive Nations Week, proclamation, 63
Carlson, Paul, 838, 839
Castro, Fidel:

Decline of Cuban economy under Castro (Mann),

550
Efforts of American Republics to sever relations

with (Rusk), 216
Intervention in Venezuela (Rusk), 175
Probable effect of sanctions on Castro influence

(Rusk), 231
Totalitarianism under (Mann), 550
Use of subversive tactics (Mann), 551
Castro, Raul H., 606
CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance),

818
Central America (see also individual countries) :
AID assistance for development banks (Glaessner),

883
Common Market, 81

Sea-level canal site study approved (Johnson), 554
Central American Bank for Economic Integration,

883
Ceylon :

Educational exchange agreement signed, 443
Treaties, agreements, etc., 453, 890
U.S. Ambassador, confirmed (Lyon), 254
Chad, international civil aviation, convention (1961)

on, protocol amending art. 50(a) of, 690
Charter of the United Nations. See United Nations

Charter
Chase, Milton, 231
Chemicals, poisonous, Cambodian charges : Stevenson,

319; Yost, 274
Chile:

Development projects (Rusk), 634
Maule River project (Rusk), 636
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 762, 861, 890
China :

U.N. representation, question of (Rusk), 772
U.S.-Japanese views contrasted (Barnett), 590
China, Communist (see also Communism) :

Congo, interference in: Ball, 844; Harriman, 333;

Rusk, 399
Disarmament unlikely (Rusk), 772
Geneva Accords, need for Chinese to conform
(Rusk), 226

China, Communist — Continued

Gulf of Tonkin, attacks in (Rusk) , 269

Military and political policies and problems

(Bundy), 325, 535
Nuclear device:

Political Implications: Bundy, 536, 616; Johnson,

611; Rostow, 40; Rusk, 614, 658
Probable effect on Chinese economy (Rusk), 658
U.S. views (Rusk), 614
Nuclear test:

Contamination of atmosphere (Johnson) , 612
Probable trends of Chinese policy: Johnson, 612;

Rusk, 615
U.S. awareness of capability: Johnson, 612;

Rusk, 542, 614
U.S. defense commitments reaffirmed: Johnson,

612,613; Rusk, 614
U.S. military and other policy, as affected by:
Bundy, 616; Johnson, 612; Rusk, 542, 614
Southeast Asia:

Aggression in: Bundy, 337; Rusk, 226; 466
U.S. warnings (Rusk), 225, 772
U.S. policy (Bundy), 536

Viet-Nam, combat aircrafts in action in (Bundy),
337
China, Republic of:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 326, 925
U.N. representation, question of (Rusk), 772
Churchill, Sir Winston, 856
Churin, Aleksandr I., 145
CIAP. See under Alliance for Progress
Civil rights:

Africa judges U.S. by (G. M. Williams), 732
U.S. dedication to cause of (Johnson), 78, 300
U.S. steps to insure (F. H. Williams), 420
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva convention
(1949) relative to treatment of: Jamaica, 605;
Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, 134
Civilians. See Congo: U.S. hostages
Claims:

Cuba, U.S. nationals claims against, 674
Greece, agreement for refunding certain indebted-
ness to U.S., 134
Rumania, final payment under 1960 agreement, 92
U.S. nationals, agreement with Yugoslavia, 792;

text of agreement, 830
Vesting provision on American interests abroad,
study requested, 675
Clark, Bob, 231

Classified information, agreement with Italy for safe-
guarding, with annex for general security pro-
ceedings, 294
Classified patent applications, agreements re: Ger-
many, 34; Sweden, 861
Clayton, Will (quoted), 19
Cleveland, Harlan, 351
Coffee, international agreement, 1962:

Current actions: Belgium, 168; Finland, 494;
Ghana, 646; Luxembourg, 726; Venezuela, 566

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

935

Coffee, international agreement, 1962 — Continued
Importance and effects of (Rusk), 221
Senate inaction (Rusk), 554
Coffin, Frank, 722
Cold war, changes in (Hughes), 7
Collective security (see also Mutual defense) :

Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. See ANZUS

and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Japan-U.S. (Bundy), 536
Not affected by Chinese nuclear capabilities:

Bundy, 616; Johnson, 612, 613; Rusk, 614
Western Hemisphere. See Organization of Ameri-
can States
Collisions at sea, international regulations for pre-
venting:
Current actions, 452

U.S.-Soviet exchange of notes re Soviet violation,
482
Colonialism, U.S. policy: Harriman, 332; Rusk, 440
Columbia :

Passport agreement, 890

Private Investment Fund, success of (Glaessner),
882
Columbia River. See under Canada
Columbia Storage Power Exchange, 613
Columbus Day, 1964, proclamation, 597
Commercial treaties. See Trade: Treaties
Commodity trade problems. See Ag:riculture : Trade

and individual commodity
Common markets. See name of market
Communications satellites (see also Radio and Tele-
communication) :
Global commercial communications satellite:

Agreements establishing interim arrangements:
Current actions : Australia, 253, 358 ; Belgium,
253, 566; Canada, Denmark, France, 253,
358; Germany, 253, 530; Ireland, 253, 605;
Israel, 894; Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 253,
358; Norway, 390; Portugal, 726; Spain,
358; Sweden, 566; Switzerland, 253, 494;
U.K., 253, 358; U.S. 253; Vatican City, 253,
358
Statement, signing of agreements (Johnson), 348
International conference on, 281
Scheduled, 167
Text of agreements, on interim arrangements,

281
U.S. delegation named, 168
India, proposed as site of ITU tracking station

(Tubby), 745
Syncom III (Plimpton), 757
Japan-U.S. TV link: Johnson, 591; Rusk, Shiina,
692
U.S. exhibits in Eastern Europe (Rowan), 910
Communications Satellite Corporation, 281, 358
Communism (see also China, Communist; Cuba;
Sino-Soviet dispute, and Soviet Union:

Communism — Continued

Aggression and subversive activities (see also
under China, Communist, Cuba, Geneva ac-
cords) : Hughes, 14; Rostow, 39
Southeast Asia (Rusk), 224, 235
U.S. policy: Johnson, 259, 262; Rusk, 263, 267
Constant threat of: Bell, 822; Harriman, 239;

Rostow, 39; Rusk, 217
Decreasing influence of: Ball, 625; Duke, 347;
Harriman, 240; Johnson, 546; McGhee, 717,
874; Rusk, 216, 233, 366, 465; Wright, 819
Effect in shaping U.S. policy: Johnson, 611; Mc-
Ghee, 874 ; Rusk, 235, 364, 366, 464, 618
Economic theories, failure in practice: Freeman,

386; Mann, 550; Rusk, 366, 467, 574, 850
Failure to attract newly independent nations : Ball,

695; Johnson, 646
Laos, obligations of Communists (Rusk), 269
Lessened hold on Eastern Europe: Hughes, 12;
McGhee, 717, 874; Rostow, 39; Rowan, 908;
Rusk, 465 ; Wright, 819
Need to find points of agreement (Rusk), 222, 464
U.S. policy and position (Rusk), 467
Use "targets of opportunity" (Hughes), 14
World, objectives : Ball, 625 ; Bell, 822 ; Harriman,
238; Hughes, 7; Mann, 549; Rusk, 177, 215,
235, 463 ; Stevenson, 919
Conference of Nonalined Nations, 577, 680
Conferences and organizations, international. See
International organizations and conferences and
subject
Congo, Republic of the (Brazzaville), Chinese Com-
munist embassy (Harriman), 333
Congo, Republic of the ( Leopold ville) :

Basically an African problem (Rusk), 428
Communist involvement : Ball, 844 ; Harriman, 333 ;

Rusk, 399
Congo francs, U.S.-U.N., agreement, 494
Government leaders and Chinese Communist in-
fluence (Ball), 844
OAU talks:

Effect of (Rusk), 428
U.S. cooperation, 563
Problems and effect on development: Fredericks,
199; Harriman, 332; Rusk, 428; Williams, 52
Telecommunication services expanded (Tubby),

745
Treaties, agreements, etc., 453, 494
Tshombe, Moise

U.S.-Belgium rescue operations, 843
U.S. views on his return: Ball, 844; Harriman,
333; Rusk, 224
U.N. aid (Harriman), 332

U.S. hostages, negotiations re safety and rescue:
Gbenye, 839; Godley, 839, 840; Rusk, 838;
Stevenson, 840, 842; authorized by Congo
(Tshombe), 843

936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Congo, Republic of the (Leopoldville) — Continued
U.S. position: Ball, 843; Johnson, 845; Steven-
son, 840
Withdrawal of rescue mission (Stevenson), 891
U.S. policy: Fredericks, 199; Rusk, 224, 399, 400,
428, 502
Congress, U.S.:
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 64,
122, 147, 280, 317, 354, 407, 554, 600, 754,
820, 857
Foreign policy and regulation of international

shipping, hearing (G. G. Johnson), 314
House Committee on Banking and Currency:
U.S. balance of payments, effect of interna-
tional travel (Mace), 888
Legislation :

Cuban claims bill (H. R. 12259) signed, 674
Food for Peace program extended, and disap-
proval of two provisions (Johnson), 677, 678
Sea-level canal site bill, approved (S. 2701),

554
U.S. beef imports, disapproval of limitations
(Rusk), 226
Legislation, proposed:

Appropriations asked, for U.S.-Mexico flood

project, 544
Coffee agreement, inaction regretted (Rusk),

554
Immigration laws, revision urged (Rusk), 98,

276, 471
Indonesia, State Department opposes end of
aid to (McCloskey), 313
Presidential messages, letters, and reports. See

under Johnson, Lyndon B.
Southeast Asia:

Congressional resolution signed (Johnson), 302

U.S. measures to repel attack, text of joint

resolution, 268

Conservation of living resources of the high seas,

convention on: Dominican Republic, 530;

Uganda, 605

Consular convention and protocol, agreement with

Japan, 102, 168
Consular relations, Vienna convention (1963) on
and optional protocol: Tunisia, 209; Upper
Volta, 566
Consultants on world problems, panel members

named (Johnson), 441
Contiguous zone and territorial sea, convention
(1958) on: Dominican Republic, 325; Uganda,
605; U.S., 452
Continental shelf, convention (1958) on the: Domin-
ican Republic, 530 ; Uganda, 605
Cook, Mercer, 134

Copyright convention, universal (1952), and proto-
cols 1, 2, 3: Guatemala, 390; New Zealand,
Cook Islands, Tokelau Islands, 358
Costa Rica:

President, visit to U.S. and joint communique, 81
Treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 422

Cotton textiles:

Agreements with U.S. re trade in: Greece, 209,
290; Hong Kong, 517; India, 530; Italy, 358;
Spain, 69, 794, 798; Turkey, 209, 292, 358;
Yugoslavia, 602, 646
Long-term arrangements (1962) re international
trade in: Finland, 494
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 818
Court of Justice, International. See International

Court of Justice
Cowles, John, 441
Creel, Robert C, 69

Cuba (see also Castro and Org:anization of Ameri-
can States) :
Aggressive and subversive activities: Harriman,
238; Hughes, 8, 14; Johnson, 81; Mann, 551;
Rusk, 174, 175, 224, 325
American Republics united front against (Rusk),

178, 216, 232, 578
Assets in U.S., study of vesting provision of

claims bill requested (Johnson), 674
Communism no benefit to (Rusk), 365
Decline of Cuban economy under Castro (Mann),

550
Exile government, U.S. position (Rusk), 398
Intervention in Venezuela (Rusk), 174, 224
Missile crisis, compared with present conditions in

Viet-Nam (Rusk), 270
Treaties, agreements, etc., 690, 797, 890
U.S. position and views (Rusk), 852
Cuban claims bill, purpose (Johnson), 674
Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization,

U.N., 253, 646
Cultural property, convention (1954) and protocol
for protection during armed conflict, Cyprus,
566
Cultural relations and prog^rams (see also Educa-
tional exchange) :
Rural development in less developed nations, value

of (Bell), 376
Treaties, agreements, etc.

Inter-American cultural relations, convention

(1954) for promotion of, Costa Rica, 390
UNESCO constitution, Kenya, 253
Customs (see also Tariff policy) :
Road vehicles, private, convention (1954) on tem-
porary importation, Japan, 69
Touring, convention re customs facilities : Tangan-
yika and Zanzibar, 797
Cyprus :
Agreements re protection of cultural property,

566
Basically a Turkish-Greek Cypriot problem

(Rusk), 399
Greeks expelled by Turks, caused by Cjrprus situ-
ation (Stevenson), 564
Increased importation of arms (Stevenson), 65
Kjrrenia Pass situation (U Thant quoted), 65
Passport agreement, 890
Possibility of war spreading (Ball), 301, 477

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

937

Cyprus — Continued

Talks and joint communiques: Johnson-Inonu, 48;

Johnson-Papandreou, 49
U.N. efforts and role:
Address (Rusk), 428

Cease-fire resolution (Stevenson), 318, 561
Peace-keeping force:

Extension approved by Security Council

(Stevenson), 65
Financing (Stevenson), 562
U.S. support (Yost), 563
U.S. ambassadors, consultation with (Rusk), 428
U.S. position and efforts for peace: Ball, 301, 477;
Johnson, 299; Rusk, 399, 428; Stevenson, 65,
561; Talbot, 703
Czechoslovakia, convention (1962) on international
civil aviation, agreement on protocol re amend-
ment, 690

Dahomey, U.S. Ambassador (Knox), confirmation,

134
de Valera, Eamon, personal comments on (Duke),

343
Dean, Arthur, 441

Defense areas, U.S., agreements with U.K., 390
Denmark :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 168, 253, 294, 358,
452, 690
Department of State. See State Department
Desalination :

Combination nuclear power desalting plants,

future of (Seaborg), 521
Importance (Johnson), 231, 723
International symposium, 1965, announcement of
first symposium and Secretary General
(Blevins) appointed, 417
Israeli-U.S. joint study:

Report and recommendations, (Johnson), 231,

724, 725
U.S. representatives named, 231
Nuclear desalting projects:
Future of (Seaborg), 521
New projects (Seaborg), 780
Soviet-U.S. talks and agreements, 144, 828, 829,

861
U.S. position on nuclear desalting (Seaborg),
522
d'Estaing, Valery G., 323
Detente (McGhee), 871

Development loans (see also Foreign aid. Interna-
tional Bank, and International Development
Association), Brazil, 59
Dillon, Douglas:

Alliance for Progress, development of financing

institutions, 878
Balance of payments, 445, 753
Expanding U.S. economy, 444

Dillon, Douglas — Continued

Recommends increased fund quotas to IMF, 446
Diplomatic relations and recognition:
Bolivia, relations renewed, 901
Governments in exile (Rusk), 398
Vienna convention (1961) and protocols: Ecua-
dor, 832; Germany, 925; Japan, 133; Tunisia,
168; United Arab Republic, 133; U.K., 529
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign

Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation
of credentials: Argentina, 144; Australia, 460
Brazil, 144; Honduras, 582; Luxembourg, 109
Malawi, 369; Nepal, 869; Netherlands, 109
Philippines, 144; Rumania, 305; Saudi Arabia,
461; Togo, 461; Uganda, 582
Disarmament (see also Armaments, Eighteen-Na-
tion Committee on Disarmament, Nuclear
weapons, and Outer space) :
Chinese Communist position (Rusk) , 615, 772
18-Nation Disarmament Committee. See Eighteen

Nation Disarmament Committee
Nuclear vehicle freeze proposed (Timberlake),

413
Soviet position (Rusk), 615
U.S. position (Hughes), 8
Discrimination. See Racial discrimination
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-19^5,
Series D, Volume XIII, The War Years, June
23-December 11, 1941, published, 833
Dominican Republic, treaties, ag^reements, etc., 253,

325, 530, 890
Double taxation, U.S., agreements and conventions
for avoidance of:
Estates of deceased persons, Greece, 69, 134
Income:

Japan (1954), 253, 326, 401, 422, 453

Japan (1957), 253, 401, 422

Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles (1954),

253, 326, 566, 601, 606
Philippines (1964), 601, 606
Sweden (1939), 253, 326, 452, 453, 530
Ships and aircraft, Mexico, 326
Drugs, narcotic:

Manufacture and distribution of:

Convention (1961) limiting and regulating:
Ruanda, 452; Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 253
Protocol (1948) bringing under international
control drugs outside scope of 1931 conven-
tion: Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 762
Opium, convention (1912) reg;ulating production,
trade, and use of: Rwanda, 69
Duke, Angier B.:

Freedom's hopes and dilemmas, 340
Protocol and peacekeeping, 736
Dulles, Allen W., 441
Dungan, Ralph Anthony, 894
Dunne, Finley P. (quoted), 343

938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

East Africa Common Market, 53
East-West relations {see also Europe, Eastern) :
Germany-U.S. talks, summary of positions, 847
Peripheral nature of (McGhee), 871, 872
Trade relationships (Wright), 815
Eban, Abba (quoted), 342
ECA. See Economic Commission for Africa
ECAFE. See Economic Commission for Asia and

the Far East
ECE. See Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA. See Economic Commission for Latin America
Economic and Social Council, U.N. :
Documents, list of, 68, 132, 252, 452
Human rights, U.N. role in protecting and ex-
panding (F. H. Williams), 418, 787
Purpose and role of: Cleveland, 241, 244; Steven-
son, 814 ; F. H. Williams, 248
Status of women in family law, report on U.N.

seminar (Tillett), 128
Suggestions for improving (Cleveland), 241
Technical assistance program for 1965-1966

(Williams), 920
U.S. representative, confirmation (F. H. Wil-
liams), 134
Economic and social development (see also Eco-
nomic and technical aid. Foreign aid programs,
and Less developed countries) :
Adjustments in economy, limiting conditions to

(Roosa), 670
Africa. See under Africa
Asia, regional cooperation in (Bundy), 540
Chile, programs for (Rusk), 634
Effect of monetary cooperation on economic

growth: Johnson, 848; G. G. Johnson, 711
Factors of economic growth: Bell, 379, 823; G. G.

Johnson, 714; Mann, 900; Rostow, 668
Gains since 1950, contrasted with Communist

economy (Rusk), 366
Importance of development of underdeveloped

areas, 151
Interdependence of factors and need for balanced

development: Bell, 823, 824; Rostow, 665
Italy, recent changes in pattern of economy

(Roosa), 672
Japan, progress and problems (Bamett), 586
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress
Malnourished people, importance of care to

(Duke), 344
Netherlands, recent changes in pattern of eco-
nomics (Roosa), 672
Private investment, U.S. efforts to increase: Bell,
207, 825; Johnson, 676; Rusk, 573, 651, 770
Private sector, importance of: Harriman, 886;

Mann, 901
Social security conference (Merriam), 320
Trade, U.S. efforts to increase: Freeman, 384;

Rusk, 572, 770
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
recommendations, 159

Economic and social development — Continued
U.N. science and technology progrrams, accom-
plishments and promise (Stevenson), 812
U.S. position and views: Bell, 376; Cleveland,
246; Freeman, 383; Mann, 775; Rusk, 572,
770
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries
(see also Agency for International Develop-
ment, Agricultural surpluses. Alliance for
Progress, Economic and social development.
Food for Peace, Foreign aid programs. Inter-
national Bank, International Development Asso-
ciation, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, and United Nations: Tech-
nical assistance programs) :
Africa, U.S. aid to (Hutchinson), 915
Technical assistance program for 1965-1966

(Williams), 920
U.S. agreements with U.K., 134
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., progress of:

Rusk, 501 ; F. H. Williams, 251
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,

U.N., work praised (Williams), 250
Economic Commission for Europe, U.N., primary

tasks (F. H. Williams), 249
Economic Commission for Latin America, U.N.:
Progress of (F. H. Williams), 251
Exports increased (Mann), 899
Economic policy and relations, U.S. (see also indi-
vidual countries) :
Domestic economy:

Favorable state of (Dillon), 444

Important economic issues listed (Johnson), 751

Interdependence of public and private needs

(Stevenson), 811
1964 gains (Johnson), 653, 848
Results of trade liberalization policy on U.S.

economy (Johnson), 752
Waste, "war on" (Johnson), 653
Foreign economic policy:
Gross national product, free world and Com-
munist, growth compared (Rusk), 366
Role of U.S. in world economy (Rusk), 571
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social Council, U.N.
Ecuador, treaties, agreements, etc., 606, 690, 832, 890
Education (see also Cultural relations and programs,
and Educational exchange) :
Africa. See Africa
Foreign affairs. See Foreig:n Service Institute and

National academy of foreign affairs
Land-grant colleges, 376, 383

Need in less developed countries: Bell, 376; Free-
man, 383
9% million teachers needed to meet UNESCO's

goal (world-wide) (Duke), 347
Role of educational systems (Rostow), 667
Technological training needed (Rusk), 437
Educational and cultural affairs, international:
Technical assistance:

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

939

Educational and cultural affairs, international —
Continued

British Guinea, U.S.-U.K. agreement extending

aid program, 134
Value and type of U.S. assistance to less devel-
oped countries: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383
Educational exchange program, international (see
also Cultural relations and Education) :
Advantages and results (Battle), 110
Advisory Commission, second annual report to

Congress, 485
Treaties, agreements, etc.: Australia, 311, 390,
442; Ceylon, 443, 453; Paraguay, 726; Yugo-
slavia, 831, 833
Two-way value (Rusk), 438
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
U.N.:
Constitution of: Iceland, 646; Kenya, 253
Nubian temples, efforts to preserve, 645
U.S. delegates to 13th session appointed, 715
EEC. See European Economic Community
Egypt. See United Arab Republic
Eight-Power Working Group, preparation of MLF

charter, 847
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

Conference (1964) accomplishments (Johnson),

524
U.S. position and proposals (Foster), 123, 524
El Salvador:

Nuclear weapon test ban, agreement, 894
U.S. Ambassador (Castro) , confirmation, 606
Embassies :

Belgian embassy opened in Viet-Nam (Lodge), 435
Cuban, centers of subversion (Rusk), 232
U.S.:

Damage to, and book burning deplored (Rusk),

905
Embassy at Zanzibar converted to consulate, 91
Engelhard, Charles W., 723

ESRO. See European Space Research Organization
Estates of deceased persons, avoidance of double

taxation, agreement with Greece, 69, 134
Ethiopia, 890, 894
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community),

agreement with U.S. (Seaborg), 785
Europe (see also Atlantic partnership, European
headings, individual countries, and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) :
Central Europe, U.S. policies affecting (McGhee),

871, 874
Eastern Europe:

Changing relationships with U.S.: Rostow, 39;

Rusk, 107
Effect on East-West trade (Wright), 817
Factors contributing to growing independence:
Hughes, 12; McGhee, 717, 874; Rostow, 39;
Rowan, 908; Rusk, 465; Wright, 819

Europe — Continued

Radio Free Europe (Johnson), 876

Tourism, long-range economic effects (McGhee),

718
U.S. exhibits, reaction to (Rowan), 910
U.S. policy (McGhee), 720
Economic assistance, effect of U.S. aid: Johnson,

676; Rusk, 363
Economic development, role of U.N. Economic

Commissions (F. H. Williams), 249
Negotiations for political union, U.S. position

(Rusk), 432
Nuclear weapons, conditions for obtaining (Ros-
tow), 41
Shipping rates, reaction to dual rate contracts

(G. G. Johnson), 315
Unification, U.S. views and support (Rusk), 363,

766, 768
U.S. policy toward: Ball, 848; Johnson, 867
Western Europe:

Basic common interests with U.S. (Rostow), 38

Economic rehabilitation (McGhee), 20

Future involvement in world affairs (Rostow),

39
Political relationships, changes in (McGhee), 19
Soviet Union, continued threat (Rostow), 39
European Atomic Energy Community agreement

with U.S., 785
European Common Market:

Stimulated trade and economic growth: Duke, 341;

McGhee, 22
U.S. position on reciprocal concessions (Rusk), 769
European Economic Community:
Industrial exceptions list, U.S. postpones GATT

talks, 754
Internal bargaining problems (Herter), 119
Political effects of (McGhee), 22
U.S. interest and policy: Ball, 848; Johnson, 868
European Space Research Organization, joint satel-
lite agreement with NASA, 203; (text) 204
Executive orders:

Austrian assets agreement. Attorney General

authorized to administer (11158), 60
Canadian issues to be exempt from interest equal-
ization tax (11175), 442
Trade negotiations. Public Advisory Committee
membership increased (11159), 92
Executive Service Corp, International (Rusk), 651
Export-Import Bank, Rumania, credit guarantees

(Johnson), 26
Exports (see also Imports and Trade) :
Coffee. See Coffee

Latin America, increases in (Mann), 899
Recommendations by U.N. Committee on Trade

and Development, 154
U.S.:

Agricultural, need for expanding market (Free-
man) , 384

940

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Exports — Continued

Beef exports, disapproval of Senate legislation

(Rusk), 226
Efforts to encourage exports (Rusk), 770
Expansion of: Johnson, 675; Rusk, 572
Role of AID in creating new markets (Bell), 207
Extradition:

Belgium, agreements re convention (1901) as sup-
plemented, 294, 861
Brazil, agreements re convention (1961) and pro-
tocol, 832, 861

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Inter-
national Rice Commission, amended constitution
of, Guatemala, 861
Far East. See Asia
Ferguson, Allen R., 855

Finance Corporation, International (Rusk), 652
Finland :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 452, 494, 566, 890
U.S. ambassador, confirmed (Thompson), 254
Fish and fisheries:

Fishing and conservation of living resources of the
high seas, convention (1958) : Dominican Re-
public, 530; Uganda, 605
Japan-U.S. king crab fishing agreement, 829, 861
North Pacific fisheries :

Negotiations Canada, Japan, U.S., resumed

(Johnson), 441
U.S. position on (Johnson), 441
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, protocol to inter-
national convention (1949) re harp and hood
seals: Denmark, 253; Portugal, 646; Spain,
358; U.S., 69, 168
Whaling convention (1946), international, amend-
ments to schedule of, 646
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., Inter-
national Rice Commission, amended constitution :
Guatemala, 861
Food-f or-Peace Program :
Objectives and value: Harriman, 332; Johnson,

677; Renter, 678; Rusk, 426
Semiannual report summarized, second half fiscal

year 1964, 678
Undesirable provisions of 1964 bill (Johnson), 678
Foreign affairs, consultants on: Johnson, 663; Rusk,

430
Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also Agency for In-
ternational Development, Economic and technical
aid, and Peace Corps) :
Africa (Hutchinson), 915
Communism, weapon against (Rusk), 332, 573
Liberia (Trimble), 914
Need for and objectives: Bell, 205, 376, 380, 821;

Harriman, 330; Rusk, 464
Self-help, importance of: Bell, 206, 822; Mann, 596
U.S. policy: Cleveland, 247; Hutchinson, 918;
Johnson. 675

Foreign aid programs of other governments:

Belgium, aid to Congo, 332

Compared with U.S. aid (Bell), 824

Multilateral aid programs, need for continuance
and expansion (Tubby), 746

U.N. aid to Congo (Harriman), 332
Foreign policy, U.S. (see also Historical summary,
and under Communism) :

Bipartisan nature: Johnson, 302; Rusk, 82,
217, 221, 233, 234, 362, 397, 398, 399, 431,
463, 578

Congressional documents relating to foreign
policy, lists, 147, 280, 317, 407, 554, 600, 754,
820, 857

Continuity and stability (Johnson), 653

Flexible nature of (Hughes), 6

Food-for-Peace program, eff'ects of (Johnson), 677

Interdependence of all problems (Ball), 476

Need for firmness (Rusk), 222

Not subject to election-year pressures (Rusk),
222, 576

Presidential campaign, problems created by, 398

Principles, objectives, and problems: Ball, 625;
Bundy, 534, 541; Harriman, 330; Johnson,
79, 508, 543, 545; Rostow, 306; Rowan, 907;
Rusk, 3, 75, 215, 217, 234, 440, 498, 501, 557,
559, 618, 656, 852

Republican platform (Rusk) 233

Responsibilities as a global power (Ball), 473

Stabilizing element of post-war world (Rusk),
654
Foreign Service (see also State Department) :

Ambassadors, appointments and confirmations, 46,
69, 101, 134, 254, 606, 894

Marine Corps, working partnership (Rusk), 643

USIA career Foreign Service officers part of FSO
corps (Johnson), 663
Foreign Service Institute, science and technology

seminar, 674
Foreign students in the U.S. (see also Educational
exchange) :

Malawi, 680

University enrollments, (Battle), 116
Foreign trade. See Trade
Foreign travel to U.S.:

Agreement extending certain foreign passports
beyond expiration date: Australia, Austria
(Reisepass only), Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany
(Reisepass and Kinderausweis) , Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Korea,
Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malagasy Re-
public, Malaya, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia,

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

941

Foreig:n Travel to U.S. — Continued

U.A.R., U.K. (including Jersey and Guernsey
and its Dependencies), Uruguay, Venezuela,
890
Eastern Europe, encouragement of foreign travel

(McGhee), 718
U.S. efforts to encourage (Mace), 888
Foster, William C. :

Disarmament Conference, U.S. proposals at, 525
Nuclear test ban, U.S. position, 526
Nuclear weapons, proposed cutoflf of production of
materials and delivery vehicles, 123
France:

Berlin, free air access right reaffirmed, 368
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 325, 358, 452, 453,
690, 726, 890
Fredericks, J. Wayne, 197
Free World:

Freedom, forward-moving process (Duke) , 344
Growing prosperity, flexible use of power (Duke),

342
Interdependence of (Ball), 476
Problems and dangers confronting (Rusk), 467,

558
U.S. building free-world strength : Ball, 473 ; Rusk,
217
Freedom :

U.S. policy toward victory for (Rusk), 463
Universal need (Rowan), 907

World-wide trend to national independence, essen-
tials of (Duke), 340, 344
Freeman, Orville L., 383
Fulbright, Senator (quoted), 115

Galatti, Stephen, 189, 215

Gardiner, Robert, 251

Gardner, John, 381

GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general agreement on

Gbenye, Christophe, 839

General agreement on tariffs and trade. See Tariffs

and trade, general agreement on
General Assembly, U. N.:
Accomplishments (Sisco),55
Documents, lists of, 68, 252, 451, 828, 859, 921
Financial crisis:

Article 19, issues and implications: Rusk, 577;

Stevenson, 687
Basis of U.N. authority (Rusk), 576
Congo operation (ONUC) (Stevenson), 682
Legal and binding obligations of U.N. members:

Rusk, 577; Stevenson, 687
Middle East operation (UNEF) (Stevenson),

682
No-vote agreement during discussions of consti-
tution (Stevenson), 891
Soviet position: Ball, 699; Rusk, 576; Stevenson,

682, 683
U.S. efforts toward solution (Stevenson), 688

General Assembly, U.N. — Continued

Financing of future peacekeeping operations (Ste-
venson), 891
19th Session:

Provisional agenda, 491
Supplementary list, 789
Outer space, U.N. position and views, 757
Soviet Union, world objectives (Stevenson), 919
Geneva accords:

ANZUS Council views, 146

U.S. and Laos support and Communist nonsup-

port, 4, 47, 216, 219, 223, 226, 262, 264, 430,

581

U.S. position (Bundy), 337, 339

Geneva, center of multiagency projects (Tubby), 740

Geneva convention (1958) on the continental shelf:

Dominican Republic, 530
Geneva conventions (1949) relative to treatment of
prisoners of war, wounded and sick, armed
forces and civilians in time of war:
Current actions: Jamaica, 605; Niger, Rwanda,

Uganda, 134
Violations against, in Congo, 846
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen-Na-

tion Disarmament Committee
Germany :

Berlin. See Berlin

Foreign policy documents (1918-1945), volume re-
leased by Department, 833
Reunification :

Tripartite declaration for German reunification,

44
U.S. position: Ball, 773; Johnson, 543, 867;
McGhee, 142, 871, 873
Germany, Federal Republic of:

All-German television network broadcast of Secre-
tary Rusk interview, 106
Franco-German relations improving (McGhee), 140
Multilateral force, views, 575
Non-military help to Viet-Nam promised (Lodge),

435
Passport agreement (Reisepass and Kinderaus-

weis), 890
Rusk-Schroeder talks, summary of, 847
Soviet charges against, U.S. disapproval of (John-
son), 368
Soviet-German talks, U.S. views (Rusk), 431
Trade with Eastern Europe: McGhee, 720; Rusk,

107; Wright, 819
Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 530, 690, 894, 925
U.S. views (McGhee), 138
Ghana, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 646, 726
Gilpatric, Roswell, 441
Glaessner, Philip, 881
Godley, G. McMurtrie, 839, 840

Great Lakes, water levels and pollution studies by
IJC requested, 598

942

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Greece (see also Cyprus) :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 134, 209, 294, 462,

861, 890
U.S. regrets expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul
(Stevenson), 564
Greenfield, James L., 389

Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 861, 890
Guinea, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 890, 894
Gyani, General (quoted), 65

Hague conference (1951) on private international

law, statute on, U.S., 762
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 79
Harriman, W. Averell, addresses and statements:

Africa, U.S. policy, 330

Alliance for Progress, purpose and U.S. support
for, 884

Canada-U.S. common objectives in international
field, 237
Hasluck, Paul, 195

Health (see also World Health Organization), medi-
cal research (Rusk), 620
Hensley, Stewart, 394
Herbert, Nicholas, 334
Herman, George, 614
Herter, Christian A., 119
Hightower, John, 394
Historical summary:

American independence: Johnson, 461; Rusk, 74

Antarctica and Antarctic Treaty, 403

Cold war, since World War II (Hughes) , 7

Development of U.S. economic poKcy by Adams and
Jefferson (Rusk), 571

Pearl Harbor (Rowan), 906

Post-war Europe (McGhee), 19

State Department, established and named (Patter-
son, Langley) , 370

United Nations (Ball), 694

U.S. social development (Mann), 775

World in 1937 (Ball), 623

World, since 1950, U.S. foreign policy (Rusk) , 363
HoflFman, Paul, 441
Holyoake, Keith J., 195
Honduras :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 582

Nuclear test ban treaty, 566

Passport agreement, 890
Hong Kong, cotton textile agreements with U.S., 517
Hornig, Donald F., 145, 321
■"Hot-line" (Rusk), 364, 368, 398
Hughes, Thomas L., 6
Human rights:

Role of U.N. (Williams) , 787

U.N. Social Committee accomplishments on (Wil-
liams), 419

U.S. position: Rusk, 75; Williams, 787

Urgency of need for protecting (Williams), 418

Human Rights Conference, proposed, U.S. view

(Williams), 789
Human Rights Day, proclamation, 887
Human Rights Year, International (Williams), 787
Hungary, growth of freedom under Wechsberg

(Duke), 347
Hutchinson, Edmond C, 915

IAEA. See Atomic Energy Agency, International
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development
ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC. See International Control Commission
Iceland, treaties, agreements, etc., 646, 861, 890, 926
ICJ. See International Court of Justice
ICY. See International Cooperation Year
IDA. See International Development Association
IPC. See International Finance Corporation
Ikeda, Hayato, 26
lUueca, Jorge, 54

IMF. See Monetary Fund, International
Immigration (see also Visas) :

National-origin basis eliminated in proposed law

(Rusk), 471
Revision of current laws urged (Rusk), 276, 471
Tonga, Kingdom of, quota set (proclamation), 443
U.S. policy (Rusk): Asia, 278; Jamaica and
Trinidad, 279
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariff policy,
U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on;
and Trade) :
Agricultural, appendix to U.S. tariff schedules

(proclamation), 122
Cotton velveteen fabrics, agreement with Italy,

358
Import-export trade gap in developing countries,

151
U.S. imports, impact on American business
(Rusk), 470
Income, conventions for avoidance of double taxation.

See Double taxation
India:

Chinese Communists' nuclear device, effect on mili-
tary situation (Bundy), 616
Effect of conditions in India and Pakistan on

Southeast Asia (Talbot), 702
Need for rural development (Bell), 376
Nuclear energy, decision on use of (Rusk), 579
Satellite tracking station project (Tubby), 746
Soviet assistance promises overlap U.S. (Rusk),

471
Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 530, 690, 798, 890
Indonesia :
Agreement re agricultural commodities, 390
Desirability of continuing U.S. aid, 313
Malaysia dispute, need for peaceful settlement

(Rusk), 429, 472, 579
Requests for books, (Rowan), 909
U.S. aid to (Bundy) , 338, 450

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

943

Industrial exceptions list, GATT negotiations, 754
Industrial property, convention (1883) for protec-
tion of: Trinidad and Tobago, 209
Inflation, causes and dangers (Mann), 594
Information Agency, U.S. See United States Infor-
mation Agency
Information, classified, ag^reement with Italy re
safeguarding, with annex for general security
proceedings, 294
Inonu, Ismet, visit to U.S. and joint communique,

48, 49
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, 898
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, conference on, current action, Philippines,
925
International Air Services transit agi-eement (1944) :

Rwanda, 133; Somali Republic, 69
International Atomic Energy Agency. See Atomic

Energy Agency, International
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, financial statement:
Fiscal years 1964, 332
First quarter, fiscal year 1965, 790
International Control Commission, responsible for

supervision of Geneva accords (Rusk), 4
International cooperation :
Economic:

Effect of monetary cooperation on economic

strength: Johnson, 848; McGhee, 22
U.S. responsibility: Johnson, 80; G. G. John-
son, 711
Outer space programs (Plimpton), 755
U.S. responsibility for and leadership in (Harri-

man), 237
Value of and necessity: Hughes, 16; Johnson,
80; Rusk, 619; Tubby, 740
International Cooperation Year (1965) :

Cabinet committee and chairman named (John-
son, Rusk), 857
Proclamation, 558
Scope of work (Stevenson), 813
Statements: Johnson, 555; Rusk, 557
International Court of Justice :

Statute of: Malawi, Malta, Zambia, 894
U.S. support and views (Rusk), 802
Value of advisory opinions (Rusk), 803
International Development Association, subscriptions

for replenishment of resources, 119
International Executive Service Corps, 651
International Finance Corporation. See Finance Cor-
poration, International
International Hydrological Decade, plans for U.S.

participation, 321
International Labor Conference, 48th session, U.S.

delegation, 67
International law:

Private international law, statute of Hague con-
ference (1951) on, U.S., 762
Role in world affairs (Rusk), 802

International Monetary Fund. See Monetary Fund,

International
International organizations (see also subject) :
Calendar of meetings, 28, 148, 355
Universal copyright convention, protocols 1, 2, 3:
Guatemala, 390; New Zealand, Cook Islands,
Tokelau Islands, 358
International Rice Commission, amended constitu-
tion, Guatemala, 861
International Telecommunication Union:
Congo, success of ITU efforts (Tubby), 745
Present role and future problems (Tubby), 743
Investment of private capital abroad :

Expansion and efforts to encourage: Johnson,

676; Rusk, 573, 770
Guarantees, agreements re: Liberia, 690; Mali,

294; Mauritania, 690
Importance to less developed countries : Bell, 825 ;
Rusk, 651
Iran, treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 646, 894
Iraq, 894
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 452, 605,

797, 890
Iron Curtain, 819
Israel :

Arab-Israel dispute, U.S.-U.N. efforts at settle-
ment (Talbot), 703
Desalination :

Report on joint U. S.-Israel survey, 725
U.S. team named for desalination talks in
Israel, 231
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 134, 358, 452, 797,
890, 894
Italy, treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 253, 294, 358,

566, 855, 894, 925
ITU. See International Telecommunication Union
Ivory Coast:

Passport agreement, 890
Radio regulations, 926

Jacobson, Jerome, 617
Jamaica :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 494, 605, 690, 798,

890
U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 278
Japan :

Civil air transport consultations, recessed, 313
Economic and social development, progress in:

Bamett, 587; Bundy, 538
Income tax protocol enters into force with U.S.,

401
Japan-U.S. differences in dealing with communist

world (Harnett), 589
Japan-U.S. friendship and common views: Bar-

nett, 586 ; Bundy, 538
Japanese-Chinese common viewpoint (Barnett),

590
King crab fishing agreement with U.S.:
Joint announcement, 829

944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Japan — Continued

King crab fishing agreement with U.S. — Continued

Remarks (Rusk, Takeuchi) and text, 892
Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 358
Korea, relationship to security of Japan (Bundy),

537, 540
North Pacific fisheries talks to resume (Johnson),

441
Prime Minister Sato to visit U.S., 912
Role as a major nation: Bamett, 586; Bundy, 539
Scientific cooperation, U.S.-Japan committee on

(Rusk), 61
Security of, importance to U.S. (Bundy), 536
Shipping regulations, position on (G. G. Johnson),

314
Trade relations, U.S. and China (Bundy), 540
Transpacific telephone cable (Johnson, Ikeda), 26
Treaties, agreements, etc., 84, 102, 133, 168, 209,

253, 326, 358, 390, 422, 452, 453, 861
TV transmission by Syncom III satellite: John-
son, 591; Rusk, Shiina, 592
Japan, Research Institute of, 534
Johnson, G. Griffith:

Chairman, International Conference, Global Com-
mercial Communications Satellite System,
168, 281
Statements :

International economic cooperation, progress

and prospects, 708
Shipping and U.S. foreign policy, 314
Johnson, Lyndon B.:

Addresses, statements, etc.:

Aggression and U.S. preparedness, 259, 260,

262, 461, 653
Alliance for Progress:
Progress during 1964, 705
U.S. views and support, 804
American Field Service students, 189
Atlantic community, interdependence of U.S.

and Europe, 846, 866
Atomic Energy, Third International Confer-
ence on the Peaceful Uses of, U.S. technology
and future, 411
Chamizal settlement ceremony, 545
Chinese Communists test first nuclear device,

611
Civil rights, 300
Columbia River Treaty:
Ceremonies, 504

Ratification, (Executive order), 509
Communications satellite agreements signed,

348
Communism, lessening influence of, 546
Communist attack on U.S. destroyers, 259
Congo, treatment and rescue of U.S. hostages,

845
Cuban claims bill signed, study of vesting provi-
sion requested, 674

Cyprus, U.S. peace efforts, 299

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued

Desalination :

Importance, 60, 723
Study requested, 230

Disarmament Conference (1964) accomplish-
ments (quoted), 524

Domestic economy: status, gains, factors aflfect-
ing, 653, 751, 848

Food-for-Peace Program, 677

Foreign Service officers, USIA, 663

Galatti, Stephen, Presidential citation, 189

Germany, U.S. desires reunification of, 543

International cooperation, 508, 555

International Cooperation Year (1965), cabinet
committee named, 857

Israel-U.S. desalination study, 724

Japan, TV transmission link via Syncom III,
591

Mexico-U.S. mutual friendship and support, 805

NATO:

Role of, 582, 584

U.S. confidence in, 478

North Pacific fisheries negotiations resumed, 441

Nuclear test ban treaty, first anniversary, 228

Nuclear war, dangers of, 458

Nuclear weapons, U.S. position on use and con-
trol, 460

OAS action on Cuban aggression praised, 184

Peace, U.S. efforts toward world peace, 298

Peace Corps, need for enlarging, 735

Personnel of highest caliber sought for inter-
national agencies, 388

Philippines, joint defense, 632

Radio Free Europe, value to Eastern Europe,
876

Ranger VII moon photographs sent to world
leaders, 348

Sea-level canal site study approved, 554

Southeast Asia, U.S. position in, 302

Soviet Union:

Change in leadership, 610

Water desalination, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. study

considered, 60
Weather information exchange agreement, 791

Tariff commission study on stainless steel flat-
ware requested, 63

Trade liberalization, U.S. policy, 752

United Kingdom:

Balance-of-payments position, 848
Labor Party victory, 613

United Nations:

19th anniversary, 697
U.S. views and support, 303

U.S. foreign policy, problems, goals, 79, 462,
543, 545, 653, 663

U. S. S. Sam Raybum commissioned, 877

Viet-Nam :

General Maxwell D. Taylor named ambassa-
dor to, 46

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

945

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued

Viet-Nam — Continued

Report on meeting with Congress and Gov-
ernment officials, 432
U.S. policy, 259, 260, 262, 299

World problems, consultants, panel members
named, 441
Correspondence and messages:

African Heads of State, conference of, grreet-
ings and expressions of friendship, 147

Brazil, mutual friendship and support, 436

Brosio, Manlio, congratulations on election as
NATO Secretary General, 275

Churchill, Sir Winston, greetings on 90th birth-
day, 856

Japan, transpacific telephone cable linkage in-
augurated, 26

Labor, role in economic progress, 852

Lodge, Henry Cabot, resignation as Ambassa-
dor to Viet-Nam accepted, 47

Malta, congratulations on achieving independ-
ence, 503

NATO, U.S. views and support, 673

Nonalined Nations, Conference of, U.S. support
for world peace, 581

Wilson, Harold, congratulations on election as
Prime Minister, 613

Zambia, congratulations on achieving independ-
ence, 722
Executive orders. See Executive orders
Foreign policy views of (Rusk), 107
Meetings with:

Brosio, Manlio (NATO Secretary General), 583

Heads of State and officials of, remarks and
joint communiques: Costa Rica, 81; Greece,
49; Malagasy, 229; Malaysia, 190; Mexico,
805; Philippines, 628; Turkey, 48; U. K., 902

U Thant, 303
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:

Agency for International Development, 1963
annual report, 675

Antarctica, international cooperation and U.S.
policy, 402

Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 261

Europe, effect of U.S. aid to, 676

Food for Peace report to Congress, 678

Foreign assistance program report, fiscal year
1963, 675

Mexico-U.S. flood project, additional funds re-
quested, 544

NATO 144b agreement with U.S. approved,
exchange of atomic information, 95

Private industry, increased business abroad
(1963), 675

Rumania, credit guarantees for, 26

Trade Agreements Program, 8th annual report,
516

U.N., U.S. participation in, 349
Proclamations. See Proclamations

Johnson, Mrs. Lyndon B., Campobello Park cere-
monies, 312
Johnson, U. Alexis, 46
Jordan, agreement re nuclear test ban treaty, 168

Kalb, Marvin, 771

Kashmir dispute (Talbot), 702

Kennedy, John F. :

Principles of (Cleveland), 248
U.S. position on Ryukyus Islands, 536
"Kennedy Round":

Blumenthal holds talks in Latin American coun-
tries, 369
Opportunities for trade expansion: G. G. John-
son, 712, 714; McGhee, 24; Rusk, 470, 767,
768
Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tions, members appointed, 313
Significance of concept (Rusk), 771
Kenya, treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 325, 566, 690,

833
Khanh, Nguyen:

Leadership of, 394, 471

Progress toward new provisional government in

Viet-Nam (Taylor), 433
U.S. attitude toward and support: Rusk, 222;
Taylor, 434
Khatri, Padma B., 869
Khrushchev, Nikita S.:

Dominant figure in Soviet policy: Johnson, 610;

Rusk, 655
Principles, as expressed in U.N. (Stevenson), 490
Retirement, 657
Kidder, Randolph A., 134
King crab fishing agreement. See Japan
Kistiakowsky, George, 441
Knox, Clinton E., 134
Kohler, Foy D., 108

Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 358
Korea, Republic of:

Essential to security of Japan (Bundy), 537, 540
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 168, 253, 890
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Brown), 254
U.S.-Korea exchange pledges of cooperation
(Bundy, Lee Ton Wong), 542
Kosygin, Aleksai N., 657
Kuwait, IAEA statute, agreement, 893

Labor Organization, International:

Conference, 48th session, U.S. delegation, 67
Constitution, current action, Zambia, 925

Lambert, Tom, 334

Land-grant colleges, 376, 383

Land tenure reform (Freeman), 387

Langton, Baden, 654

Laos:

Change in government, U.S. position, 219
Communist intervention: Johnson, 262; Rusk, 3,
226, 365, 772

946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Laos — Continued

Conference on Laos, proposed :
Preconditions for, 219
Soviet responsibilities (Rusk), 269
U.S. position (Rusk), 270
Geneva accords:

ANZUS Council, position of, 146

Geneva accords, 1962: Johnson, 262; Rusk, 4,

219, 430, 580
Soviet obligations not affected by change in
leadership (Rusk), 657
Neutrality (Bundy), 338
Passport agreement, 890
Soviet statement (July 26), text, 220
Strategic and political importance (Rusk), 4
U.S. position: Bundy, 339; Johnson, 47; Rusk,
216, 264, 772
Larson, Arthur, 441

Latin America {see also Central America, Organiza-
tion of American States, and individual coun-
tries) :
AID loans:

Increase in U.S. aid during 1963 (Johnson), 675
Loans to credit institutions (Glaessner), 881
Role of CIAP (Rostow), 306
Balance of payments: Harriman, 886; Mann, 595
Capital markets in, development of (Dillon), 879
Coffee trade problems. See Coffee
Common market, advantages of (Mann), 900
Communism in and efforts against: Hughes, 13,

15; Mann, 549, 551
Development banks, vital role of (Harriman), 886
Economic and social development:

Industrialization stages (Rostow), 310
Interdependence of (M. W. Williams), 747
Population, problems caused by increase

(Mann), 808
Rate of progress: Mann, 479, 594, 706; F. H.
Williams, 251
Exports, increases in (Mann), 899
Inter-American solidarity (Mann), 552
Monetary and budgeting problems (Mann), 594
Scientific manpower shortage (Rusk), 635
Social progress, U. S. views and support (Mann),
777
Law, international. See International law
Law of the sea (see also Geneva conventions and
Safety of life at sea) , conventions on, 325, 452,
529, 605
Leadership, qualities of free- world leaders (Duke),

342
League of Nations, compared with U.N. (Steven-
son), 30
Lebanon, passport agreement, 890
Ledesma, Oscar, 144
Leibman, Morris, 441
Leif Erikson Day, 1964, proclamation, 401

Less developed countries (see also Newly independ-
ent nations) :
Agricultural development:

Importance of: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383; Ros-
tow, 664; Rusk, 574, 651
Land reform effects (Freeman), 387
Communism, constant threat of: Bell, 822; Har-
riman, 239; Rostow, 39; Rusk, 217
Economic and social development. See Economic
and social development and Economic and
technical aid
Education, need for increased: Battle, 112; Bell,

376; Freeman, 383
Exports, decline, 154
Food for Peace Program, extension bill sig^ned

(Johnson), 677
Foreign aid, value of (Bell), 822
Health problems (Tubby), 742
International Monetary Fund, U.S. recommends
general enlargement of quotas (Dillon), 446
Problems of development: Ball, 626; Bell, 379;

Cleveland, 245; Rostow, 668
Role of Japan in (Bundy), 539
Self-help essential (Bell), 823, 824
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, rec-
ommendations, 154
U.S. efforts to increase trade with and private in-
vestments in: Freeman, 384; Rusk, 572, 770
U.S. private investment, opportunities and effect
of: Bell, 207, 825; Rusk, 651
Liberia :

Treaties, ag^reements, etc., 34, 452, 690
U.S. foreign aid and economic development (Trim-
ble), 914
Libraries: Rowan, 908; Rusk, 905
Lisagor, Peter, 394
Load line convention, international (1930): Algeria,

69
Lodge, Henry Cabot :

Purpose of proposed visit to European capitals

(Bundy), 334
Resigns as Ambassador to Viet-Nam, 46
Viet-Nam, result of talks with European govern-
ments re, 435
Lovett, Robert, 441
Luthuli, Albert, 54, 202
Luxembourg:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 109
Treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 326, 726, 890
Lyon, Cecil B., 254

Macapagal, Diosdado, 628

Mace, Charles H., 888

Madagascar, Safety of Life at Sea, international
conference (1960) on, re regrulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 452

Maddox incident. See under Ships and shipping

Magalhaes, Juracy M., 144

Malagasy Republic:

Passport agreement, 890

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

947

Malagasy Republic — Continued

Visit of President Tsiranana to U.S., 229
Malawi :

Convention (1944) on international civil aviation,

494
Immigration quota established (Johnson), 753
U.N. membership:
Admission to, 894

Statements: Stevenson, 919; Yost, 680
U.S. ambassador, confirmed (Gilstrap), 101
Malaya, passport agreement, 890
Malaysia :

Indonesia dispute:

Indonesian parachutists (Rusk), 429
Soviet veto of U.N. resolution, U.S. views (Ste-
venson) , 489
U.N. role (Stevenson), 448, 472
U.S. desire for peaceful settlement (Rusk), 579
Nuclear test ban treaty agreement, 168
Visit of Prime Minister Rahman to U.S., 190;
joint communique (Johnson-Rahman), 193
Mali, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 422, 833
Malta :

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pro-
visional application, 894
Independence, U.S. congratulations re (Johnson),

503
U.N. membership: 894; Stevenson, 919; Yost, 759
Mann, Thomas C, addresses and statements:
Alliance for Progress:

Developments and factors affecting, 597, 898
Exhibits at Pan American Union, 305
Organization and purpose, 479, 593
Text of progress report, 706
Cuba, economic and political failures of Castro,

550
Latin America:

Communism, efforts against, 549
Economic and social development:
Agencies, 479
Population increase:
Effect of, 807
U.S. views and support, 777
Mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperative agree-
ment between U.S. and Dominican Republic, 530
Marine Corps, working partnership with Foreign

Service, (Rusk), 643
Marriage :

Convention (1962) on, current actions: Denmark,
690; Dominican Republic, 762; Finland, 566;
Mali, 422; New Zealand, 133; Sweden, 133;
Western Samoa, 566; Yugoslavia, 168
U.N. seminar on status of women in family law
(Tillett), 130
Marshall Plan: McGhee, 19; Wright, 818
Martin, James V., Jr., 453
Martin, Paul, 169
Mathis, John M., 313

Mauritania, Investment Guaranty Program agree-
ment, 690

Mayobre, Jose A., 251
McCloskey, Robert J., 606
McCloy, John, 441
McDonald, David L., 662

McGhee, George C, addresses and statements:
Business and diplomacy, parallel roles of, 18
Central Europe, changes and progress in, 870
Eastern Europe:

Growing independence, 716
U.S. policy, 720
Germany, responsibilities of and U.S. position, 138
McNamara, Robert S., 265
McPherson, Harry C, Jr., 294
Merriam, Ida C, 320

Meteorological research agreement with U.S.: Ja-
maica, 798; Peru, 358
Meteorological satellites:

Asset to proposed World Weather System (Plimp-
ton), 757
Data exchange agreement, NASA-Soviet Union
(text), 792
Mexico:

Chamizal ceremonies (Johnson) , 545
President Mateos, visit to U.S., 545
President-elect Ordaz, visit to U.S., 805
Treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 326, 357, 494, 890
U.S.-Mexico flood control project (Johnson), 544
Military mission, agreement with Liberia amending

and extending agreement of 1951, 34
Mines, U.S. Bureau of, agreement with Australia

for services of research chemist, 358
Missile launchers, proposed inspection (Timberlake),

416
Mixed-manned ship demonstration: McDonald, 662;

Nitze, 660; Rusk, 662
MLF. See under 'NATO
Monaco, passport agreement, 890
Monetary Fund, International:

Purpose and effectiveness: G. G. Johnson, 710,

713 ; McGhee, 22
Review of functions, 323

U.S. recommendations for general quota enlarge-
ment (Dillon), 446
Mongolian People's Republic, international telecom-
munication convention (1959), with annexes,
494
Moscoso, Teodoro, 441
Mulford, Stewart, 231
Multilateral force. See under North Atlantic Treaty

Organization
Mutual defense :

Philippines (Johnson), 632

Reaffirmed after Chinese nuclear test (Johnson),
612, 613
Mutual defense assistance agreements: Japan, 168;
Luxembourg, 726; Norway, 530

NAG. See North Atlantic Council
Narcotics. See Drugs, narcotic

948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Meteorological satellite and conventional data ex-
change agreement with Soviet Union, 791;
text of agreement, 792
Scientific satellite agreement with ESRO, 203;
text of agreement, 204
National Freedom from Hunger Week, proclama-
tion, 388
National-origins principle (Rusk), 276
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Naval ships. See Ships

Near and Middle East. See individual countries
Nepal :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 869
Nuclear weapon test ban agreement, 605
Netherlands :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 109

Income tax protocol ratified, 601

Proposed aid and education for Viet-Nam

(Lodge), 435
Treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 326, 358, 452, 494,
566, 606, 690, 833, 890, 926
Neutrality, U.S. position on (Bundy), 338, 339
New Zealand:

Air transport services agreement signed, 60
Prime Minister Holyoake, visit to U.S., 195
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 133, 168, 358, 690
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed
countries) :
Development of free institutions, importance of

(Duke), 345
Nationalist upsurge (Bundy), 541
Problems compared with early U.S. (Rusk), 77
U.S. position: Ball, 476; Johnson, 722
Nicaragua, international telecommunication conven-
tion (1959) with annexes, 325
Niger :

Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment of pris-
oners of war, wounded and sick, armed forces,
and civilians in time of war, 134
Nuclear test ban treaty agreement, 134
Nigeria :

Economic advances in (Rusk), 501
Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 690, 890
Nimbus I, value of data (Plimpton), 757
Nitze, Paul H., 661
Nonalined nations, conference of:

Nuclear test ban, interest in (Rusk), 580
U.S. views: Johnson, 581; Rusk, 577
North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

Agreement re cooperation on atomic information:
Belgium, 134, 797; Canada, 134, 646; Den-
mark, 134, 294; France, 134, 726; Germany,
134; Greece, 134, 861; Iceland, 134, 861; Italy,
134, 566; Luxembourg, Netherlands, 134;
Norway, 294, 690; Portugal, 294, 390; Turkey,
134, 566; U.K., 134; U.S., 134, 566

North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Continued
Armed forces:

F-104G Starfighter (McGhee), 21
Need for continued mobilization (Rostow), 39
Possible responses to Soviet MRBM buildup
(Rostow), 41
Atomic energy information, agreement between
parties to NATO for cooperation re, text, 96
Canada, Johnson-Wilson joint communique, 903
Cyprus, possible effects of spread of war (Ball),

301
Germany-U.S. talks, summary of positions, 847
MLF. See under Nuclear weapons, multilateral

force
Nuclear weapons:

Alternative proposals for use of MRBM (Ros-
tow), 41
Consultations under existing treaties (Rusk),

428
Multilateral force:

Eight-Power Working Group, 847
German views, 575, 847
National manning and ownership, 41
U.S. position and support: 367; Ball, 774;
Johnson, 847; Nitze, 661; Rostow, 41; Rusk,
661
Unity in Atlantic alliance, basis for: Ball, 626;
Rostow, 42
Role of Europe (Rostow), 39
Tests: See Nuclear weapons tests
Orig^inal purpose and results of (McGhee), 20
Political consultations, U.S. views (Rostow), 42
Problems, same as in Southeast Asia (Rusk), 108
Role of: Brosio, 584, Rostow, 38
Secretary General:

U.S. support for (Johnson, Rusk), 275
Visit with President Johnson, 582
Strategy of flexible response, 226
U.S. position and views (Johnson), 93, 478, 547,
582, 584, 673
North Pacific Fisheries. See under Fish and fisheries
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See under Fish and

fisheries
Norway:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 358, 390, 452, 530,

690, 890
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Tibbetts), 254
NS Savannah, agreements concerning:

Ireland, legal liability for loss or damage arising

from operation in, 294
Use of ports and territorial waters: Italy, 894;

Portugal, 926; Spain, 253
Visits to: Denmark, Sweden, 168; U.K. territory,
294
Nubian monuments, 645

Nuclear defense or deterrent, NATO and Europe.
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Nu-
clear weapons, Multilateral force

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

949

Nuclear ener^. See Atomic energy, NS Savannah,

and Nuclear headings
Nuclear reactors:

Plutonium production increases (Seaborg), 781
Safeguards:

Agreement, U.S.-IAEA, 27, 69
History and future of (Seaborg), 782
Nuclear test ban treaty (1963) :

Anniversary statement: Johnson, 228; U.S.-Soviet

joint statement, 270
Current actions: Austria, 168; Dominican Repub-
lic, 253; El Salvador, 894; Germany, 894
Honduras, 566; Iraq, 894; Italy, 925; Japan
34; Jordan, 168; Korea, 253; Malaysia, 168
Nepal, 605; Netherlands, 494; Niger, 134
Peru, 209; San Marino, 134; Surinam, 494
Tobago, 168; Togo, 925; Trinidad, 168
Soviet compliance (Rusk), 225
U.S. views and support: Foster, 526; Johnson,
613
Nuclear war:

Accidental war, measures for reducing dangers of

(Johnson), 459
Power of bombs as a deterrent to war: Bundy,
617; Johnson, 459; Rowan, 907; Rusk, 464,
615
Nuclear weapons:

China, Communist. See under China, Communist
Dissemination of, need for international agree-
ment on (Johnson), 367
Measures to halt spread (Foster), 526
Proliferation of, problems (Rusk), 657
Safeguards, advantages of international over bi-
lateral, 521
Soviet-U.S. capabilities compared (Hughes), 8
Strategic advantage, need for U.S. to maintain

(Hughes), 9
U.S. position:

Partial disarmament (Foster), 124
Use of, 367
U.S. proposal to reduce fissionable materials, with
verification and implementation procedures:
Foster, 123; Timberlake, 413
Nuclear weapons tests (see also under China, Com-
munists) :
Cessation of: Europe (Rostow), 41
Chinese Communist attitude (Rusk), 612, 655,
657; and effect of Soviet attitude (Rusk), 654
U.K., U.S. test low-yield nuclear device in Nevada,

joint announcement, 193
U.S. position (Johnson) , 613

OAS. See Organization of American States

OAU. See Organization of African Unity

OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development
OEEC. See Organization for European Economic

Cooperation

Oil, pollution of sea by, convention (1954) for pre-
vention of, Italy, 34
Olympio, Sylvanus (Duke), 343
Opium. See under Drugs, narcotic
Ordaz, Gustavo Diaz, 806

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment :
Annual ministerial meeting (Ball), 847
Convention (1960) on, and supplementary proto-
cols, Japan, 209
Organization for European Economic Cooperation

(McGhee), 20
Organization of African Unity :
Congo:

Aid from U.S. discussed, 553

Hostages, appeal for protection and rescue of,

838, 840, 842
Result of OAU talks (Rusk), 428
U.S. views (Johnson), 147
Organization of American States:

Cuban crisis, efforts and role (Rusk), 216, 578
Rio Treaty, U.S. confidence affirmed, 271
U.S. cooperation, 82
Venezuela, Cuban interference in:
Report of OAS committee (Rusk) , 176
Resolution, text, 179
Orlich, Francisco J., 81
Outer space (see also Satellites, earth) :
Cooperative efforts, international:

Soviet-U.S. cooperation needed (Rusk), 365
Success of and increase in (Plimpton), 755
Exploration, legal problems (Plimpton), 758
Proposed space programs and space launching con-
trol (Timberlake), 415
Radar capabilities, U.S., to detect missiles (John-
son), 46
Ranger VII, moon photographs (Johnson), 348
U.N. Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, rec-
ommendations and proposed meeting (Plimp-
ton), 756
U.S. position (Johnson), 462

Vehicle tracking and communications station,
agreement with U.S. re establishment and
operation of, Nigeria, 294

Pakistan :

Kashmir dispute (Talbot), 702

Rural public works program in East Pakistan,
success of (Bell), 379

Treaties, ag^reements, etc., 452, 890
Panama :

Agreement on Peace Corps program, 209

Anderson-Illueca talks to continue, 54

Panama Canal talks resumed, 887

Sea-level canal site study approved (Johnson),
554
Papandreou, George, 49 ,

Paraguay: i

Trade agreement with U.S., proclamation, 120

Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 494, 726

950

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Passports. See Foreign travel to U.S.

Patent applications, classified, agreement amending

1959 agreements, Germany, 34
Peace :
Addresses (Rusk), 215, 656
Role of U.N. (Ball), 694, 700
U.S. efforts (Johnson) 80, 298
Peace Corps program:

Agreements re establishment of: Kenya, 566;

Panama, 209
Need for increase in size (Johnson), 735
Pearson, Lester B., 505
Perkins, James, 441
Personnel, selection for international agencies

(Johnson), 388
Peru:
Trade negotiations, proposed, 369
Treaties, agreements, etc., 209, 358, 452, 890, 894
Petroleum, agreement (1964) with Korea, 168
Philippines:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144
Educational, social, and economic progress, 630
Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. support reaffirmed,

632
President:

Common views, 632
Visit to U.S., 628
Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 529, 601, 798, 890,

925
U.S. commitment to security of (Rusk), 580
Phillips, Richard I., 606
Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 430

Piqua Organic Moderated Power Reactor, placed un-
der IAEA safeguard, 27
Plimpton, Francis T. P., 486, 755
Poland :

PL 480 assistance, restrictions on (Rusk), 426
Trade with U.S., reasons for increase (Wright),

819
Treaties, agreements, etc., 452
Trend toward independence (McGhee), 717
Pollution of internal water:

Great Lakes area study requested, 598
Red River study requested, 599
Pollution of sea by oil, convention (1954) for pre-
vention of: Ghana, 726; Italy, 34
Portugal, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 326, 390,

452, 646, 726, 798, 890, 926
Postal convention (1957) universal, with final pro-
tocol, annex, regulations of execution and pro-
visions re airmail: Algeria, 34; Kenya, 833
Power sources, scientific research programs in

(Rusk), 620
Presidential election, U.S. (Rusk), 236, 237
Prisoners of war:

Geneva conventions (1949) relative to treatment
of: Jamaica, 605; Niger, Rwanda, Uganda,
134
Treatment of. See under Congo, Hostages

Private development banks, conditions for success

of: Dillon, 878; Glaessner, 882
Private enterprise:

Accomplishments (Rusk), 650
Role of (Rostow), 667
Proclamations by the President:
Bill of Rights Day (3631), 887
Captive Nations Week, 1964 (3594), 63
Churchill, Sir Winston, Day (3630), 856
Columbia River Treaty, 507
Columbus Day, 1964 (3621), 597
Human Rights Day (3631), 887
Immigration quota for Tonga (3613), 443
International Cooperation Year, 1965 (3620), 558
Leif Erikson Day, 1964 (3610), 401
Malawi immigration quota (3626), 753
National Freedom from Hunger Week (3606), 388
Pulaski Memorial Day (3605), 354
Trade agreements with Parag^uay and U.A.R.

(3596), 120
U.S. International Aviation Month, 1964 (3602),

314
U.S. Tariff schedules on agricultural products,

appendix corrected (3597), 122
Von Steuben Day (3615), 472
Warsaw Uprising Day (3603), 271
Protocol, international conference of protocol chiefs
suggested, to agree on basic rules (Duke), 738
Public Law 480. See Agricultural surpluses and

Food for Peace
Publications:
Agreement for exchange of official publications:

Ethiopia, 894
Congressional documents relating to foreign poli-
cy, lists, 64, 122, 147, 280, 317, 354, 407, 554,
600, 754, 820, 857
Convention (1958) re international exchange of:

agreement, Brazil, 566
State Department:
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-
1945, Series D, Volume XI 11, Th-e War Years,
June 23-December 11, 19U, published, 833
Lists of recent releases, 34, 70, 210, 254, 326,

453, 530, 798, 833, 862, 926
State Department Bulletin, 25th anniversary, 2
Treaty with Norway for exchange of official pub-
lications, 358
United Nations: lists of current documents, 68,
132, 252, 275, 325, 357, 450, 529, 565, 790, 828,
859, 921
USIA, America Illustrated, 909
Pulaski Memorial Day, proclamation, 354

Racial discrimination (see also Civil Rights) ;
Anti-Semitism (Williams) , 421
Apartheid: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree,

761; Williams, 53
ILO constitution, proposed changes, 68

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

951

Racial discrimination — Continued
U.S. immig^ration policy (Rusk), 278
U.S. progress in eliminating: Johnson, 300; Rusk,
77 ; Williams, 419
Radar capabilities, U.S., to detect missiles in outer

space (Johnson) , 46
Radio :

Regulations:

(1959) Annexed to international telecommuni-
cation convention. See under Telecommunica-
tion convention (1959)
(1959) Partial revision: China, 925; France,
325; Group of territories represented by
French Overseas Post and Telecommunica-
tion Agency, 833; Iceland, 925; Ivory Coast,
925; Jamaica, 494; Kenya, 325; Mali, 833;
Netherlands, 925; Senegal, 833; Sierra Leone,
925; South Africa, 798; Tanganyika, 325;
Territory of South West Africa, 798; Uganda,
325; Vatican City State, 925.
Work of ITU (Tubby), 744
U.S. agreement with Costa Rica re reciprocal
authorization for licensed amateur operators,
422
Radio Free Europe: Johnson, 876; Rowan, 908
Rahman, Tunku Abdul, 190, 218
Ranger VII, photographs of moon sent to world

leaders (Johnson) , 348
Rash, Bryson, 394

Rayburn, Sam, tribute to (Johnson), 877
Red River pollution study requested, 599
Refugees, universal copyright convention (1952),
protocol 1, re application to works of: Guate-
mala, 390; New Zealand, 358
Republican platforms, foreign policy (Rusk), 233,

397
Research :

Nuclear power, U.S. research: Johnson, 411; Sea-

borg, 408
Spectrographic research agreement, 358
Reuter, Ernst, 870
Renter, Richard W., 503, 678
Rhodesia, U.S. views, 721

Rice Commission, International, amended constitu-
tion: Guatemala, 861
Ricketts, Claude V., USS, 660
Road traffic:

Convention (1949) on, with annexes: Japan, 390;

Rwanda, 494
Convention (1954) on custom facilities for tour-
ing: Tanganyika, Zanzibar, 797
Road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on tem-
porary importation: Japan, 69
Roosa, Robert V., 669
Roosevelt Campobello International Park :
Agreement for establishment, Canada, 390
Ceremonies at, 312

Rostow, Walt W., addresses and statements:
Alliance for Progress, August 1964, 306
Economic development in changing societies, 664
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, 38
Increase in national movements (quoted) 341, 342
Major issues in and international responsibility

for guerrilla warfare, 346
U.S. representative to CIAP named, 859
Roth, William M., 853
Rowan, Carl T., 906
Rubadiri, James D., 369
Rumania :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 305
Credit guarantees for U.S. services (Johnson), 26
Growing spirit of independence (Rusk), 465
Safety of life at sea, convention (1960) on, re

preventing collisions at sea, 453
Trade with U.S. increased (Wright), 819
Rural Development, International, conference on,

addresses: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383
Rusk, Dean:

Addresses, remarks, and statements :

Africa, problems of, and U.S. aid to, 499
AID, encouragement to private investment

abroad, 651
Alliance for Prog^ress, review of accomplish-
ments, 851
Armed forces overseas, purpose for, 464
Asia, Southeast:

Conmiunist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 263,

267, 268
Problems arising from Chinese Communist

policy, 772
U.S. position, 82, 84, 226, 580
Berlin, U.S. position unchanged by Soviet lead-
ership change; 655
Book burning and damage to U.S. embassies

deplored, 905
Chile, science and development in, 634
China, Communist:

Attempts to influence Congo politics, 399
Nuclear test:
Capacity, 542
Political and other effects, 614, 655, 657,

658, 659
Probable effect on Chinese policies and
economy, 658, 772
Cleveland, Harlan, 857
Coffee agreement. Congress inaction, 554
Communism :

Economic failure of, 850
U.S. policy toward, 463, 464
Congo :

OAU meeting, 428

Political developments and U.S. position on,

83, 224, 399, 428, 502
Treatment of U.S. citizens protested, 838
Cuba:

Aggressive and subversive activities, 174, 224

952

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Busk, Dean — Continued

Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued
Cuba — Continued

Eflfectiveness of OAS measures against, 216,
231, 578

Exile government, 398

Steps taken to isolate, 365

U.S. views, 233, 270, 852
Cyprus :

Basic issues, 88, 399

U.N. role, 428
Declaration of Independence, principles, 74
Disarmament, Communist attitude, 615, 655, 772
Economic policy, U.S., 366, 571
Education essential for international under-
standing, 437
Elected office, not a candidate for, 225, 236
Electoral period, U.S. problems during, 398, 430
Europe:

Eastern Europe, trends toward national free-
dom, 107, 465

Need for strong modem Europe, 363, 432, 768
Food for Peace program, importance of, 426
Foreign aid, need for and U.S. objectives, 217,

464
Foreigrn policy advisors, 430
Foreign policy, U.S.:

Bipartisan nature, 221, 431, 576

Democratic and Republican platforms re-
viewed, 233

Factors affecting, 363, 618

Influence on world peace, 658, 654, 656

Objectives, 106, 185, 362, 395, 498, 558, 852
Geneva accords, U.S. support and Communist

violations, 4, 219, 223, 226, 264, 430, 581
Germany, Erhard-Khrushchev talks, 431
Governments in exile, problems of recognition,

398
Immigration :

Advantages of proposed bill, 471

Revision of present law urged, 276
India :

Nuclear energy, peaceful purposes only, 579

Soviet assistance promises overlap U.S., 471
Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 429, 472, 579
International Coffee Agreement, 221
International Cooperation Year (1965), 557
International Court of Justice, value of advisory

opinions, 803
International law, need for further expansion,

802
International relations, major problems of, 107
Japan:

King crab fishing agreement, 892

Satellite communication with, 592
Kennedy Round, significance of, 700, 767
Laos:

Situation in, 3, 269, 365

Soviet commitments, 657

Rusk, Dean — Continued

Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued

Malaysia:

Indonesian parachutists incident, 429
U.S. position, 472

Marine Corps, working partnership with For-
eign Service, 643

Martin, Paul, 472

NATO:

Multilateral force, 575, 661

Nuclear weapons, consultations under treaties,

428
Problems of coordination of policy, 108

Newly independent nations, U.S. position and
aid, 498, 651

Nonalined countries, conference of (Cairo), 577,
580

Nuclear weapons tests, need for on-site inspec-
tion, 655

Nuclear war, dangers of, 464

Peace, goal of U.S., 214

Private investment abroad, less developed coun-
tries' interest increased, 651

Scientific research, importance of international
cooperation, 619

SEATO, work and accomplishments of, 400

Sino-Soviet rift, effect on Southeast Asia, 223

Soviet Union:

Change in leadership, 655, 656
Response to suggestion for conference on
Laos, 218

State Department Bulletin, 25th anniversary, 2

Trade, U. S. policy, 767

Trade Expansion Act, purpose of, 470

Trade unions, role in economic and social prog-
ress, 849

U.K. Labor party effect on U.K. foreign policy,
659

United Nations:

Communist China, representation not recom-
mended, 772
Peacekeeping operations, basic constitutional

issue, 576, 577
Role in : Congo, 83 ; Viet-Nam, 85

United Nations Charter, 440

Viet-Nam :

Negotiations and prospects for, 429
Situation, 222, 235, 396, 427, 468, 471
U.S. position and views, 82, 84, 86, 226, 236,
394, 576

Wool textile agreements, international, lack of
progress on, 429
Correspondence :

Antarctic Treaty, inspections under, 403

NATO, greetings to Manlio Brosio, 275
Meetings:

ANZUS Council, 194

Germany, Rusk-Schroeder talks, simimary of
positions, 847

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

953

Rusk, Dean — Continued
Meetings — Continued

U.S.-Japan Science Committee on Scientific Co-
operation, 61
News conferences.transcripts of, 82, 221, 468, 575
Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 106, 231,
268, 394, 614, 654, 771
Rwanda, treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 452, 494
Ryan, Robert J., 134
Rjrukyu Islands:

Political Adviser to U.S. High Commissioner (Mar-
tin), desigrnated, 453
Strategic importance (Bundy), 536

Safety of life at sea :

Convention (1960) on: Belgium, Burma, Cam-
eroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
452; Liberia, 34, 452; Madagascar, 452;
Netherlands, including Surinam and Neth-
erlands Antilles, 452, 833; Norway, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, 452; Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Union
of Soviet Socialistic Republics, United Arab
Republic, 453; United Kingdom, 69, 453;
United States, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 453.
Soviet violations, U.S. charges and exchange of
notes, 482
St. Lawrence Seaway, agreement with Canada on

tolls, 134; text, 169
Salvage at sea, convention (1910) for unification

of rules re : Algeria, 325
San Marino, nuclear test ban treaty, 134
Sancho-Bonet, Rafael, 209
Sanctions against South Africa, 31, 33
Sansom, George (quoted), 590
Samoff, David (quoted), 619
Satellites, earth:

Communications satellites. See Communications

satellites
Meteorological satellites. See Meteorological satel-
lites
NASA-ESRO agreement, 203
U.S. measures re protection against armed satel-
lites (Johnson), 462
Sato, Eisaku, 912

Saudi Arabia, ambassador to U.S., credentials, 461
Scali, John, 231, 655
Schurmann, Carl W. A., 109

Science (see also Atomic energy, Nuclear weapons,
Outer space, and Satellites)
Accelerating rate of scientific advances (Ball),

622
Opportunities of modem science and technology

(Stevenson), 811
Potential consequences of free international ex-
change of discoveries in (Rusk), 619
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization

Scientific cooperation, U.S.-Japan Committee on,

meeting, Washing^ton, 1964, 61
Seaborg, Glenn T. :
Atomic energy, developments and progress, 779
Confirmed as U.S. representative to 8th IAEA

Conference, 520
IAEA:

Programs and future of, 519
Safeguards system, 781
International Conference on Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energ^y, 3d meeting:
Chairman of U.S. delegation, appointed, 412
Review of nuclear power in U.S., 411
U.S. papers and exhibits, 408
Seals. See under Fish and fisheries
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secretary of State (see also Rusk, Dean), non-in-
volvement in U.S. political campaign (Rusk), 398
Security Council, U.N.:

Accomplishments of and U.S. support for (Sisco),

55
Cyprus, U.S. support of U.N. position: Steven-
son, 31, 562; Yost, 563
List of documents, 68, 252, 275, 325, 450, 529,

565, 790, 828, 859, 921
Resolutions :
Cyprus:

Extension of peacekeeping force in, 67
Immediate cease-fire called for, 318
South Africa, apartheid policy condemned, 33
South Africa, committee to study use of sanc-
tions, 33
Soviet position on peacekeeping operations

(Stevenson), 683
U.N. membership, recommendations:
Malawi (Yost), 680, 681n
Malta (Yost), 759n
Zambia (Yost), 759n
Veto power, Soviet use of (Stevenson), 450n, 489,
682
Senegal:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 797, 832, 833
U.S. Ambassador (Cook), confirmation, 134
Senghor, Leopold (quoted), 499
Shiina, Etsusaburo, 592
Ships and shipping:

Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers; USS
Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy: 258;
Bundy, 335, 336; Johnson, 259, 260, 261; Mc-
Namara, 265; Rusk, 263, 267, 268; Steven-
son, 272
Text of U.S. joint resolution, 268
Regulation :

U.K. Shipping contracts and commercial docu-
ments bill (G. G. Johnson), 317
U.S. foreign policy and regulation of interna-
tional shipping (G. G. Johnson), 314
Soviet interference:
Duxbury Bay, exchange of notes, 482
SS Sister Katingo, U.S. protests, 145

954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Ships and Shipping — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.:

Double taxation on eamingfs from operation of,

agreements with Mexico for relief of, 326
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization, convention on, Philippines, 925
NS Savannah, agreements re: Denmark, 168;
Ireland, 294; Italy, 894; Portugal, 926; Spain,
253; Sweden, 168; U.K., 294
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 726, 926
Sino-Soviet dispute:

Chinese nuclear bomb: Bundy, 616; Rusk, 657
U.S. views: Ball, 625; Bundy, 339, 537, 616; Har-
riman, 239; Hughes, 11; McGhee, 719; Rusk,
223, 615, 657
Sisco, Joseph J., 55

Slavery convention (1926) as amended: Argentina,
566; Jamaica, 390; Switzerland, 325; Turkey,
325; Uganda, 566
Social security, 7th inter-American conference on

(Merriara), 320
Somalia, international convention (1954) on civil

aviation, protocols, 690
Soto, Ricardo Midence, 582
South Africa (see also Africa) :

Apartheid: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree,

761; Williams, 53
Detention clause (Williams), 54
Luthuli, Albert, restrictions on (Williams), 54,

202
Problems of (Rusk), 502
Sanctions proposed, U.S. position (Stevenson), 31,

33
Treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 646, 798
U.S. position and views: Fredericks, 200; Rusk,
503; Stevenson, 32
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, work of and

accomplishments: Bundy, 540; Rusk, 400
South- West Africa:

Radio regulations (1949), 798
U.N. Subcommittee report, U.S. views (Tree), 760
U.S. policy (Fredericks), 202
South Pacific Commission, amending 1947 ag^reement
establishing: Australia, France, New Zealand,
U.K., U.S., 646
Soviet Union (see also Communism) :

Berlin, Soviet position on (Rusk), 44, 225, 368
Change of leadership: Johnson, 610; Rusk, 655,

656, 657
Communist bloc, changing attitudes of individual
states: Ball, 625; Duke, 341; McGhee, 717
Desalination :

Talks on joint study and representatives, 60, 144
Text of agreement, 829, 861
Disarmament, lack of interest (Rusk), 615
Economy, drains on (Hughes), 10
European resurgence has changed objectives of

(Duke), 341
Foreig:n aid program: Hughes, 10; Rusk, 471

Soviet Union — Continued
Germany:

Erhard-Khrushchev talks (Rusk), 431
Responsible for continued division of (McGhee),

873
U.S. disapproval of Soviet charges (Johnson),
368
"Hot-line", purpose (Rusk), 364, 369, 398
Laos:

Neutrality violated (Rusk), 4, 218
Responsibilities toward: 269; Rusk, 657
Soviet allegations re U.S. activities, 219
Text of Soviet statement, 220
Meteorologrical satellite and conventional data ex-
change agreement with NASA (text), 792
Policy of exploitation of vulnerable areas (Duke),

342
Safety at sea convention, 453
SAM missile sites in Cuba, problem of (Rusk),

88
United Nations:

Attitude toward U.N. projects (Tubby), 747
Financial crisis, actions and arguments: Rusk,

576; Stevenson, 683
Security Council, use of veto in: 450n; Steven-
son, 489, 682
United States:

Aircraft, alleged overflights, 483
Exhibits, favorable reaction to (Rowan), 910
Ships, interference with, 145, 482
U.S.-Soviet relations: Kohler, 108; Rusk, 222
Veto on Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, U.S. views

(Stevenson), 489
Weather information, agreement with U.S. to

exchange data (Johnson), 791
World, objectives. See under Communism
Spain:
Cotton textile agrreement with U.S., text, 794
Technical aid to Viet-Nam promised (Lodge), 435
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 253, 358, 453, 566,
797, 798, 890
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations:
Deputy (Blumenthal) holds talks in Latin Amer-
ican countries, 369
GATT notified date of negotiations on industrial

exceptions list, 754
Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tions, members appointed, 313
Roster of technical representatives established, 517
Spectrographic research, U.S.-Australia agrreement

for services of research chemist, 358
Spiewak, Irving, 231
Stainless steel flatware, Johnson asks tariff study

on, 63
Standardization, International Organization for

(Tubby), 743
State Department (see also Agency for Interna-
tional Development, Foreign Service, and Peace
Corps) :

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

955

State Department — Continued

Appointments and desi^ations, 67, 69, 209, 412,

453, 606, 646, 857, 858, 859
Assistant Secretary of State, confirmation : Green-
field, 389; McPherson, 294
Bulletin, anniversary statement on (Rusk), 2
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, goals

and work of (Battle), 111
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs,

confirmation (Phillips), 606
Established and named (Patterson and Langley),

370
Political adviser to Ryukyu Islands (Martin), 453
Publications. See under Publications
Stateless persons and refugees, universal copyright
convention, protocol 1: Guatemala, 390; New
Zealand, 358
Status quo (Rowan), 907
Steinmetz, Maurice, 109

Stevenson, Adlai E., addresses, letters, and state-
ments :
Cambodia-U.N.-Viet-Nam report, U.S. comments

on, 527
Cambodian charges, investigation requested, 319
Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 272
Congo, negotiations re U.S. nationals and rescue

operations, 840, 842, 845, 891
Cyprus, U.N. peace efforts and U.S. support for,

64, 318, 561
International Cooperation Year (1965), 813
Malawi, U.N. membership, 919
Malaysia-Indonesia dispute, 448
Malta, U.N. membership, 919
Science and technology, future of, 810
South Africa, problems of, and U.S. position, 29
Soviet Union:

U.S. regrets veto of Malaysia issue, 489
World, objectives, 919
Turks expel Greeks from Istanbul, U.S. regret,

564
United Nations:

Financial crisis, 681, 826
No-voting agreement, 891
Science and technology projects, 812
U.S. peace aims, 273
Zambia, U.N. membership, 919
Strategic Air Command (Johnson), 585
Sullivan, William H., 894
Summit meetings (Rusk), 615, 659, 660
Surinam, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 494
Sweden :

Income tax convention for the avoidance of double

taxation, effective date, 452
Treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 168, 253, 326, 453,
566, 861, 890
Sweet, Sidney S., 313

Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 325, 494, 890
Syrian Arab Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 390,
690, 890

Taiwan :

Economic growth in (Bell), 206
U.S. foreign aid program (Bell), 823
Takeuchi, Ryuji, 590, 892
Talbot, Phillips, 701
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, treaties, agreements, etc.,

253, 325, 762, 797, 894
Tariff Commission, U.S., stainless steel flatware

study requested, 63
Tariff policy, U.S. {see also Economic policy and
relations; Tariffs and trade, general agreement
on ; and Trade) :
Agricultural imports, correction to appendix of

schedule, 122
Europe: Cleveland, 245; Rusk, 766
Japan, tariff and quota problems (Bamett), 588
Problems arising from UNCTAD recommenda-
tions (Cleveland), 246
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on :

Accomplishments: G. G. Johnson, 710; McGhee,

21
Ag:reements, declarations, proces-verbal, and pro-
tocols:
Accessions to, current actions on:

Iceland, provisional: Austria, Brazil, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Rhodesia, Sweden, United
States, 798
Spain, protocol for: Austria, 566
Tunisia, provisional: Australia, Finland, New
Zealand, Norway, United Arab Republic,
168
Yugoslavia, provisional: Argentina, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey,
Denmark, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway,
Pakistan, Senegal, Southern Rhodesia,
Sweden, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Arab Republic, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 798
Article XXXVI, Part IV, draft, 922; notes

and supplementary provisions, 925
Article XXXVII, Part IV, draft, 923; notes

and supplementary provisions 925
Article XXXVIII, Part IV, draft, 924
Geneva tariff conference (1960-61) :

Protocol embodying results of, Nigeria, 690
Poland, declaration on relations between con-
tracting parties and Poland: United Arab
Republic, 168
Provisional application of, protocol of:
Malawi, 494; Malta, Tanganyika and Zanzi-
bar, 894; Togo, 102
Rectifications and modifications to texts of
schedules: 5th-9th protocols: Cuba, 102
Industrial exceptions list, 754

956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Tariffs and trade, general agreement on : — Continued
International tariff negotiations:

Latin America, Blunienthal holds talks in, 369

Role of industry (Roth), 855

Roster of technical representatives established

(Herter), 517
U.S. views: 754; Johnson, 752; Rusk, 768
Trade Negotiations, Public Advisory Committee:
Advisers appointed, 313
Membership increased, 92
Taxation:

Canadian issues exempt from interest equaliza-
tion taxes (Johnson), 442
Double taxation, conventions for avoidance of.
See Double taxation
Taylor, Maxwell D., 433
Technical assistance and cooperation. See Economic

and technical assistance
Telecommunication (see also Communications and
Radio) :
International convention (1959) :

Current actions: Brazil, 833; Burma, 530; Iran,
390; Nicaragua, 325; Mongolian People's Re-
public, 494
Radio regulations: (1959), partial revision,
with annexes and additional protocol: Den-
mark, 34; France, 325; French Overseas Post
and Telecommunications Agency, 833; Jamai-
ca, 494; Kenya, 325; Mali, 833; Senegal, 833;
South Africa, 798; South- West Africa, 798;
Tanganyika, 325; Uganda, 325; U.S., 134
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to
international telecommunications convention
(1959) : current action, Senegal, 833
Future of (Sarnoflf), 619

Loran-C agreement (1964) and Associated
Monitor Control Station: Canada, 530
Transpacific telephone cable inaugurated (John-
son, Ikeda) , 26
Telecommunication Union, International. See Inter-
national Telecommunication Union
Territorial sea and contiguous zone :
Convention (1958) on, 325, 452, 605
NS Savannah, use by. See NS Savannah
Thailand, passport agreement, 890
Thompson, Tyler, 254
Tibbetts, Margaret Joy, 254
Tillett, Gladys A., 128
Timberlake, Clare H., 413
Tito, Mrs. Broz, 343
Tito, Marshal, 343
Togo:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 461
President Olympio (Duke), 343
Treaties, agreements, etc., 890, 925
Tonga, Kingdom of, immigration quota determined

(Johnson), 443
Tonkin, Gulf of. See Ships and shipping: Commu-
nist attacks

Touring, convention re customs facilities: Tangan-
yika and Zanzibar, 797
Tourism, Eastern Europe (McGhee), 718
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses. Customs,
Economic policy, Exports, Imports, and Tariff
policy) :
Balance of payments. See Balance of payments
Barriers, reduction of:
Europe (Rusk), 227

U.S. position: Cleveland, 245; Rusk, 769
East- West trade relationships, (Wright), 815
EEC. See European Economic Community
Expansion of, efforts for:

U.N. Trade and Development Conference:
Final Act, text of preamble and recommenda-
tions, 150
U.S. views on U.N. recommendations (Cleve-
land), 245
U.S. position: Bell, 206; G. G. Johnson, 709;
Johnson, 517, 752; Rusk, 571
Japan: Barnett, 589; Bundy, 540
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Ex-
pansion Act
Treaties, on cotton textiles :

Agreements with U.S. re trade in: Greece, 209,
290; Hong Kong, 517; India, 530; Italy,
358; Spain, 69, 794, 798; Turkey, 209,
292, 358; Yugoslavia, 602, 646
Long-term arrangements (1962) re interna-
tional trade in: Finland, 494
U.S. trade:

Agricultural imports, correction to appendix of

schedule, 122
Europe, relations with: McGhee, 22; Rusk, 227,

769
Industrial exceptions list, U.S. prepared to post-
pone GATT talks, 754
Latin America, volume of, and U.S. trade policy
(Mann), 900
Trade agreements with:

Paraguay, supplementary agreements and partial

termination of, proclamation, 120
United Arab Republic, agreement supplementary
to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
proclamation, 120
Trade and Development Conference, U.N. See under

Trade: Expansion of
Trade Expansion Act of 1962:
8th annual report (Johnson), 516
Objectives and importance of (Rusk), 470
Trade Negotiations, Public Advisory Committee. See
under Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
Trade unions, role in economic and social progress

(Rusk), 849
Treasury Department, 715

Treaties, agreements, etc., international (for indi-
vidual treaty, see subject), 34, 102, 133, 168,
209, 253, 294, 325, 357, 390, 422, 452, 494, 529,
566, 601, 646, 690, 726, 762, 797, 832, 861, 893,
925

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

957

Tree, Mrs. Marietta P., 600, 760

Trimble, William C, 912

Trinidad, U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 279

Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agreements, etc., 168,
209

Tshombe, Moise:

U.S. position on: Harriman, 333; Rusk, 224
U.S.-Belgium rescue operations authorized by
Congo government, 843

Tsiranana, Philibert, visit to U.S., 229

Trusteeship Council, U.N., list of documents, 275

Tubby, Roger W., 740

Tunisia, treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 209, 890

Turkey (See also Cyprus) :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 209, 325, 566
U.S. regrrets expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul
(Stevenson), 564

U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union
U Thant:

Role in nuclear test ban treaty, 270
Visit to Washington, 304
Uganda :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 582
Treaties, agreements, etc., 325, 605
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Vienna con-
vention (1961) on diplomatic relations, 133
UNCTAD. See Trade: Expansion of
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization, U.N.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet

Union
United Arab Republic:

Arab-Israel dispute, U.S.-U.N. efforts to settle

(Talbot), 703
Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 133, 168, 169, 453,

494, 890
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Battle), 254
United Kingdom:

Balance of payments, prospects for improving

position (Johnson), 848
Berlin, reaffirms free air access rights to, 368
Import surcharges, 714
Indonesia-Malaysia, defense commitments (Rusk),

472
Labor party victory: Johnson, 613; Rusk, 659
Nuclear device tested in Nevada, U.K.-U.S. joint

release on, 193
Shipping contracts and commercial documents bill
becomes law in U. K. (G. G. Johnson), 317
Treaties, agreements, etc., 102, 134, 294, 358, 390,

453, 529, 797, 890, 894
Viet-Nam, European countries assure aid to
(Lodge), 435
United Nations:
Accomplishments, problems, and role of: Ball,
626, 694; Cleveland, 351; Duke, 736; Rusk,
217; Stevenson, 813; Talbot, 701; F. H. Wil-
liams, 787

United Nations — Continued

Agreement re grant of Congo francs, accruing to
U.S. under agricultural commodities agree-
ment, 494
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Conference on Trade and Development. See un-
der Trade: Expansion of
Congo (Rusk), 83

Cyprus situation, Soviet Union abstains from vot-
ing on (Ball), 301
Documents, lists of, 68, 132, 252, 275, 325, 357,

450, 529, 565, 790, 828, 859, 921
Financing of peacekeeping operations :
Soviet views: Rusk, 576; Stevenson, 683
U.S. concern and position: Plimpton, 486;
Sisco, 57; Stevenson, 66, 681, 826; Steven-
son-Adebo letters, 825
U.S. memorandum (text) , 681
General Assembly. See General Assembly
Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, U.S. calls for U.N.

negotiations (Stevenson), 448
International Court of Justice, effect of advisory

opinions issued by, 803
League of Nations-U.N. compared (Stevenson), 30
Membership, admission to : Malawi, Malta, Zambia,

894
19th anniversary, remarks (Johnson), 697
Role of U.N. seminars (Tillett), 128
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, recom-
mendations in field of outer space (Plimpton),
756
Security Council. See Security Council
South-West Africa, U.S. disapproval of U.N. re-
port on (Tree), 760
Soviet veto (Stevenson), 450n, 489, 682
Soviet views:

Lack of support of aid programs (Tubby), 747
Principles opposed to U.N.: Ball, 301, 626;
Rusk, 463
Special Fund, accomplishments of (Stevenson),

813
Technical assistance programs:
Congo (Harriman), 332
Need for continuance and expansion (Tubby),

740, 746
OPEX (operational, administrative and execu-
tive) personnel, requests for (F. H. Wil-
liams), 920
U.S. financial support (F. H. Williams), 827
U.S. representatives to U.N., confirmation, 600
U.S. views and support: Ball, 478; Johnson, 80,
304, 349; Rusk, 217; Stevenson, 827; Tal-
bot, 701
United Nations Charter:

Principles and objectives: Ball, 694; Rusk, 440;

F. H. Williams, 418
Statute of: Malawi, Malta, Zambia, 894
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
(Tillett), 128

958

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

United Nations Economic and Social CounciL See

Economic and Social Council
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Orgranization. See Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, U.N.
United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid

(Stevenson), 30
United Nations Special Fund, 813
United States citizens and nationals :
Protection of:

Congo, treatment of hostages, 838, 839
U.S. position and efforts to protect, 840, 842
Yugoslavia, claims against, text of agreement,
762, 830
United States Information Agency :
Role building peace (Rovcan), 906
U.S. exhibits in Eastern Europe (Rowan), 910
United States International Aviation Month, 1964,

314
U.S.-Japan Science Committee on Scientific Co-
operation
4th meeting (Rusk), 61
Text of joint communique, 62
USS Maddox, See under Ships and shipping
USS Sam Raybum commissioned (Johnson), 877
USS Claude V. Ricketts, 660
Universities, role in world rural development: Bell,

376; Freeman, 383
Upper Volta, Vienna convention on consular rela-
tions re settlement of disputes, 566
Uruguay :

Joint U.S.-Uruguayan Trade Committee meeting,

617
Passport agreement, 890

Vatican City State, treaties, agreements, etc., 358,

926
Venezuela :

Cuban intervention: Mann, 551; Rusk, 174, 224;

resolution, text, 179
Treaties, agreements, etc., 566, 890
Viet-Nam :

Agricultural output increasing with U.S. aid, 869
Aid from countries other than U.S.:
Desirability of (Rusk), 227
U.K. aid (Lodge), 435
Communist aggression and subversion: 870;
Bundy, 537; Johnson, 47, 260, 262; Rusk, 4,
226, 235, 236, 428
ANZUS Council position on, 146
Attacks on U.S. destroyers, USS Maddox and
USS C. Turner Joy: 258; Bundy, 335, 336;
Johnson, 259, 260, 261; McNamara, 265;
Rusk, 263, 267, 268; Stevenson, 272
Geneva accords, need to return to (Bundy), 335,

339
Internal politics and need for stable government:
Duke, 345; Rusk, 222, 395, 396, 427, 466, 468,
659; Taylor, 433, 434, 869

Viet-Nam — Continued

Negotiated settlement, question of: Lodge, 436;

Rusk, 397, 429, 439
Neutrality, question of (Bundy), 338
Religious factions and effects of: Rusk, 396, 470;

Taylor, 434
Situation, compared with Cuban missile crisis

(Rusk), 270
Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 326, 453, 646, 925
U.S. ambassador appointed (Taylor), 46
U.S. military support: Bundy, 336; Rusk, 82, 223,

224, 228, 396, 904; Sisco, 58; Taylor, 434
U.S. objectives and peace efforts: Bundy, 336, 537;
Johnson, 46, 299, 436, 869; Rusk, 82, 365, 394,
466, 469, 576; Taylor, 434
Viet-Nam, North, aggression and subversion in Viet-
Nam. See Viet-Nam : Communist aggression
Visas {see also Immigration) :
Quota reserve pool (Rusk), 277
Visas by mail (Mace), 889
Von Steuben Day, proclamation, 472
Vorster, B. J. (Williams), 53

Wadsworth, James, 441

Waller, John K., 460

War:

Communist policy of harassment (Hughes), 9
U.S. strength a deterrent to war (Johnson), 877

Ware, Caroline F., 313

Warsaw Uprising Day, proclamation, 271

Water Desalination. See Desalination

Weather :

Scientific research, programs in (Rusk), 619
Soviet-U.S. agreement on exchange of information
(Johnson), 791

Weaver, George L-P., 67

Weights and measures, conventions (1875) (1921) :
South Africa, 422

Wellman, Harvey R., 646

West Indies, U.S.-U.N. agreements on defense areas,
390

Western Europe. See Europe: Western Europe

Western Hemisphere:

Alliance for Progress, background for (Rusk), 363
Measures against Castro regime (Rusk), 174
Women, status of, U.N. seminar (Tillett), 128

Western Samoa, treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 566

Whaling. See Fish and fisheries

Wheat agreement (1962), international, current ac-
tions: Ecuador, 606; Sierra Leone, 726

WHO. See World Health Organization

Williams, Franklin H., 134, 248, 419, 787, 827

Williams, G. Mennen, 51, 730

Williams, Murat W., 747

Wilson, Harold, 902

WMO. See World Meteorological Organization

Women, measures to improve status in Western
Hemisphere, U.N. seminar (Tillett), 128

Wool textiles ag^reement, international (Rusk), 429

World Bank. See International Bank

INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1964

959

World cooperation on basic research (Rusk) , 217
World Health Organization, role of (Tubby), 741
World Meteorological Organization, work of (Tubby),

743
World peace. See Peace
World problems, consultants on, 441
World Weather System, U.S. support (Johnson), 791
Wright, Robert B., 815

Yankee nuclear power reactor, 27

Yost, Charles W., 274, 563, 680, 759

Yugoslavia :

Changing trade patterns (McGhee) , 717

Claims agreement re U.S. nationals concluded, 830

Yugoslavia — Continued

Educational exchange agreement signed, 831
Effect of independence, 718
PL 480 assistance, restrictions on (Rusk), 426
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 453, 602, 646, 762,
798, 833

Zambia :

Independence (Johnson), 722

Treaties, agreements, etc., 762, 925

U.N. membership; 759n, 894, 919; Yost, 759

U.S. gifts to (Engelhard), 723
Zanzibar, convention on narcotic drugs, 253

960

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

it U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 770-22S/10

^d'^sc^

y I

THE OFFICLil. WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

V ''■

BULLETIN

Yol. LI, No. 1306

July 6, 1964

WHY LAOS IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT

Address iy Secretary Busk 3

THE PARALLEL ROLES OF BUSINESS AND DIPLOMACY

IN AN ERA OF EXPANDING FRONTIERS

iy Ambassador George C. McGhee 18

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS APARTHEID

IN SOUTH AFRICA; SETS UP COMMITTEE TO STUDY SANCTIONS

Statements ty Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson and Text of Resolution 29

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DIVERSITY
by Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research 6

For index see inside bach cover

The 25th Anniversary of the Department off State Bulletin

statement hy Secretary Rusk

On July 1st of this year the Department of State passes a special milestone — the 25th anniversary of
its official periodical, the Department of State Bulletin.

The Bulletin is unique. No other government in the vrorld publishes so complete a current record of
its foreign policy. In making public this weekly compilation of documents, the United States Government
recognizes that a well-informed public is vital to democracy and that the people have a right to know what
their Government is doing and saying on specific issues. As I have said many times, I feel strongly that
our ability to pursue effectively any major course of foreign policy is in direct relation to the degree of
public understanding of and support for such policy.

In the 25 years since the Bulletin first appeared on July 1, 1939, the world has experienced immense
political, economic, and social changes. Faithfully and accurately, week by week, the Bulletin has set
down for the historical record this country's stand on these changes.

The first issue contained, among other documents, a statement by Secretary Hull on the peace and
neutrality legislation being considered by the Congress and a message from President Roosevelt on the
importance of trade in promoting a stable world. The Bulletin of December 13, 1941, carried the President's
address to the Nation on that fateful December 7 Sunday and his message declaring war against Japan ;
it also included the declarations of war against the United States by the Axis Powers. The historic
message of President Truman recommending a program of aid to Greece and Turkey to withstand
Communist imperialism and the historic speech of Secretary Marshall which led to the Marshall Plan to
rebuild war-torn Europe were printed in full in the Bulletin, as were President Eisenhower's open-skies
proposal and President Kennedy's call for an Alliance for Progress in the Americas.

The Department first began to publish an official periodical on October 5, 1929. It was a small
pamphlet called Press Releases, which, for the first time, made available to the public in printed form on
a weekly basis the Department's daily mimeographed releases.

The Department of State Bulletin is the successor to that publication and to a monthly called Treaty
Information. After consultation with persons and organizations outside the Government who used one or
both of those pamphlets, the Department decided to combine them in a single periodical. And so, for a
quarter of a century, the Bulletin has served a wide range of readers — the scholar who requires complete
and accurate texts for his research, the specialist seeking reliable citations, the student struggling with his
term paper, and the citizen who simply wants a firsthand source of information on TT.S. foreign policy.

In its 25 years the Bulletin has served them all well. I am sure scholar and layman will join me in
this anniversary salute to a highly respected arm of our public affairs program — the Department of State
Bulletin.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1306 PUBLICATION 7708 JULY 6, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
asencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
forelcn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Forelprn
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forelcn policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is Included concerning treaties
and International asreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative ninte-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington. D.C.,
20402. Price ; 52 issues, domestic $8.50.
foreign $12.25 ; single copy. 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTB : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXEnN

Why Laos Is Critically Important

Address hy Secretary Rush ^

As President [Joltn E.] Sawyer noted in in-
viting me, this is the I75th anniversary of the
Department of State, as well as your I75th
commencement. We are not exactly the same
age, however, because you, on occasion, have
held more than one commencement a year. But
in our early days we were about the same size —
perhaps you were a little larger. At your first
commencement, I am informed, you had four
graduates, one professor, and four tutors. Our
first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, had
one chief clerk, three ordinary clerks, and a
French translator. As late as 1800 there were
only 10 men in the Department, including the
Secretary. And your undergraduates prob-
ably outnumbered our diplomatic missions
overseas. For, when Jefferson stepped down
as Secretary of State, we had representatives in
only 5 countries — and as late as 1800 in no more
than 12.

Of necessity, we grew more than you did in
the next century and a quarter. But in my
student days the Department of State and our
Foreign Service were still relatively small.
And we didn't have a very active foreign policy.
For, after the First World War, we had re-
treated into isolation and felt comfortably se-
cure behind the oceans. We paid dearly for
the lesson that what happens across the oceans
can affect us vitally. But even at the end of
the second and most destructive of world wars,
we were slow to realize the fundamental change
in our relationship to the rest of the world

' Made at commencement exercises at Williams Col-
lege, Williamstown, Mass., on June 14 (press release
282 dated June 13; prepared text).

brought about by nuclear warheads and the
growing range of airplanes and rockets.

Today, we can be secure only to the extent
that our total environment is secure — and by
"total environment" I mean the land, waters,
and earth of the entire world and adjacent areas
of space.

Today, thermonuclear war could destroy
much of the Northern Hemisphere in hours.
Even small wars are dangerous — because they
may easily grow into great wars. Wliat hap-
pens halfway around the world may affect our
security quite as much as what happens on our
doorstep. Universal peace is no longer just
a noble ideal; it is essential to the survival of
civilization and the human race. A peaceful,
decent world order is the central goal of our for-
eign policy. If we are ever to achieve that goal,
aggression must be treated as intolerable ; those
who practice or plan for aggression, in whatever
form, must be taught that aggression is not
only futile but costly to the aggressor. And if
mankind is to achieve a stable peace, govern-
ments must keep their word — solemn interna-
tional agreements can no longer be regarded as
scraps of paper.

Background of Situation in Laos

With these self-evident truths in mind, I
should like to review briefly the background
of a situation nearly halfway around the world,
in a landlocked, poor, rugged country about
the size of Great Britain but containing only
two or three million people. I refer to Laos.
Laos is the scene of Commimist aggression, bad
faith, and duplicity.

JTTLT 6, 1964

Why are we concerned about Laos? First,
because of its location. On the north and
northeast it has nearly 1,100 miles of border
with Communist China and Communist North
Viet-Nam. It also shares 1,750 miles of border
with four non-Communist countries, including
Thailand, the heartland of Southeast Asia, and
South Viet-Nam, which is resisting an aggres-
sion directed and supplied by Communist North
Viet-Nam with the support of Communist
China.

In 1949 the French granted Laos independ-
ence within the French Union. But the North
Vietnamese Communists managed to attract a
few Lao dissidents by pledges of military help
and teclxnical advice. In September 1950 the
North Viet-Nam radio announced formation of
the "resistance government of the Pathet Lao."
Later broadcasts claimed that this government
had a "national assembly," had picked a "prime
minister," and had formed a "people's libera-
tion army." All this occurred not in Laos but
in North Viet-Nam.

In 1953 North Vietnamese forces invaded
Laos, taking with them their puppet Pathet Lao
government and troops. Wlien the Indochinese
war was brought to an end by the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954,^ the Communists controlled two
provinces of Laos. But under those agreements
Laos was to be one country, the Pathet Lao
forces were to be integrated into the Royal Lao
Army, and all foreign military forces were to
be withdrawn, excepting limited forces and two
bases reserved for France. Those pledges were
signed by the Communist regimes of North Viet-
Nam and mainland China as well as by the
Soviet Union and Poland.

But, because of Pathet Lao intransigence,
those agreements did not bring peace and unity
to Laos. And, in 1960, fighting among non-
Communist elements gave the Communists new
opportunities. Wlien President Kennedy took
office, the Soviet Union was airlifting arms and
ammunition from Hanoi to Communist and
neutralist forces in northeast Laos and on the
strategic Plaine des Jarres. And we were sup-

porting the Government forces in the Mekong
Valley.

The 1962 Geneva Accords

The Soviet Union, however, indicated that it
desired an independent and neutral Laos.'
And we had no wish beyond a free Laos that
could live at peace with its neighbors. Subject
to a cease-fire we agreed to negotiate. Finally,
new accords were signed in Geneva m July
1962.^

All participants "solemnly declared" their
respect for the sovereignty, neutrality, and ter-
ritorial integi'ity of Laos. They agi'eed, among
other things, to: (1) withdraw all foreign
troops in the presence of international inspec-
tors; (2) prohibit introduction of military
forces in any capacity; (3) withhold any war
materiel from Laos except as "the Eoyal Gov-
ernment of Laos may consider necessary"; (4)
not use the territory of Laos to intervene in the
internal affairs of other countries.

Responsibility for general supervision of the
accords was given to an International Control
Commission (ICC) composed of representatives
of Canada and Poland with India as chairman.

And all agreed also to svipport a Government
of National Union composed of three factions,
with the neutral leader Prince Souvanna
Phouma as Premier.

The 14 governments which made these pledges
included Communist China and Communist
North Viet-Nam as well as the Soviet Union
and Poland.

Record of Communist Aggression and Deception

Wliat happened? The non-Communist na-
tions complied with the agreements. North
Viet-Nam and its Pathet Lao puppets did not.
We promptly withdrew our 600-man military
aid mission. North Viet-Nam kept several
thousand troops and military teclmicians in
Laos. North Vietnamese cadres are tlie back-
bone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion.

'For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State publica-
tion 6446), p. 750.

" For background, see Bulletin of July 2, 1962, p. 12.

' For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos
and an accompanying protocol, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

This was, and is, of course, a major violation
of the Geneva accords.

Later, North Viet-Nam sent additional forces
back into Laos — some of them in organized bat-
talions — a second major violation.

The North Vietnamese have continued to use,
and improve, the corridor through Laos to rein-
force and supply the Viet Cong in South Viet-
Nam — a third major violation.

The Communists have continued to ship arms
into Laos as well as through it — another major
violation.

The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese
Communists have compounded these interna-
tional felonies by denials that they were com-
mitting them.

But there was another major violation which
they could not deny. They barred freedom of
access to the areas under their control, both to
the Lao Government and to the International
Control Commission. The Royal Lao Govern-
ment, on the other hand, opened the areas imder
its control to access not only by the ICC but
by all Lao factions.

The Commimists repeatedly fired at person-
nel and aircraft on legitimate missions under
the authority of the Royal Lao Government.
They even fired on ICC helicopters. They re-
peatedly violated the cease-fire agreement.
And this spring they launched an assault on
the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, driv-
ing them off the Plaine des Jarres, where they
had been since early 1961.

Tliis, in bare simimary, is the Communist
record of aggression, bad faith, and deception
in Laos.

A Communist takeover in Laos would be as
unacceptable as a Communist takeover in South
Viet-Nam. The rest of Southeast Asia would
be in jeopardy, and saving it would be much

more costly, in blood and treasure, than turn-
ing back the aggressors in Laos and South
Viet-Nam. The loss of Southeast Asia as a
whole to the Communists would be intolerable.

Need for Compliance With Present Agreements

The Commmiist assault on Laos, like that
on South Viet-Nam, involves the larger ques-
tion of whether anyone is to be permitted to
succeed in aggression by terror, guerrilla war-
fare, and the infiltration of arms and military
personnel across national frontiers. If they
are allowed to gain from these assaults in South-
east Asia, the Commimist advocates of militancy
everywhere will feel encouraged.

Also at stake is the fundamental question of
whether solemn international contracts are to
be perforated. All who believe in peace and in
buildmg a decent world order and rule of law
have an interest in seeing that no government
be allowed to gain from breaking its promises.

There is talk of negotiating new political
settlements in Southeast Asia. But political
settlements were reached in 1954 and 1962. The
Geneva accords of 1962 were precisely agree-
ments to neutralize Laos. No new agreements
are required. All that is needed is compliance
with the agreements already made.

The prescription for peace in Laos and Viet-
Nam is simple : Leave your neighbors alone. It
is in the vital interest of the free world that
Peiping and Hanoi — and all Communists
everywhere — learn, once and for all, that they
cannot reap rewards from militancy, aggression
by seepage, and duplicity. For our part, we
certainly do not intend to abandon the peoples
of Laos or Viet-Nam or other countries who are
trying to remain free from Communist domina-
tion.

JULY 6. 1964

Making the World Safe for Diversity

hy Thomas L. Hughes

Director of Intelligence and Research ^

General [Andrew P.] O'Meara, distinguished
representatives of the armed forces of the
Americas, and fellow citizens of the American
Kepublics : Wlien I was invited to be with you
this morning, I was asked to try to give you a
broad picture of worldwide problems and poli-
cies as viewed from Washington.

As I thought about how best to comply with
General O'Meara's request, various alternative
titles occurred to me : "The Dilemmas of a De-
polarizing World," or "The Changing Shape
of Conflict," or "The Predicaments of Partial
Success," or "The Distractions of Diversity,"
or "The Continuing Communist Challenge."

In any case what I have to say this morning
will have much to do with all these themes.
For any overview of the world political situa-
tion today is bound to consider the new dimen-
sions of complexity and variety that now affect
the Communist and non-Communist worlds
alike. Indeed, on our side they are the prod-
ucts of the very diversity for which we have
been fighting and working to make the world
safe.

Impressions of Diversity

It was a year ago this month, in his famous
speech at American University,^ that President
Kennedy spoke of making the world "safe for
diversity." Since then it has become clearer
than ever before that we live at a floodtide of
diversity and change in all the continents.

Of course there is the continuing fact that
we are still confronted with an authoritarian
ideology which seeks our destruction and which

is inventive in the means of pursuing it. But
there is also the human fact of the "revolution
of rising expectations" sweeping the southern
continents. There is the psychological fact of
cold- war battle fatigue. There is the physical
fact that we are riding the crest of a revolution
in science and technology. Tliere is the frus-
trating fact that all of this is occurring in a
world of some 120 countries, of some 120 for-
eign policies, of some 120 sets of national goals
or national appetites.

New forms of nationalism are expressing
themselves just at a time when international
organizations are both more plentiful and more
necessary than ever before. In many parts of
the world the psychological awkwardness of the
contest continues between the Communists, who
say they will uproot the status quo, and the rest
of us, who say that we do not really favor the
status quo actually. Differing views of the
world are seen from the different national capi-
tals — the big pictures and the little pictures
blurring one another even as they overlap in the
varying perspectives of Mexico City, Tokyo,
Baghdad, Leopoldville, Ottawa, Paris, and
Saigon. In some parts of the world old ideolo-
gies are dying. In other parts the tlirust for
new ideologies is a prime political fact.

Leaders, governments, and people, respond-
ing to their own political necessities and cur-
rent national needs, are moving ahead on dif-
ferent historical schedules. The last 12 months

' Address made at a conference of officers of the Latin
American armed forces, sponsored by the U.S. South-
ern Command, in the Panama Canal Zone on June 8.

' Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

alone have unpredictably seen the advent of
new administrations in Washington, London,
Rio, Bonn, Rome, and New Delhi. There are
no generally accepted international political
timetables. Indeed, many of us must operate
daily in a host of situations where it is clear
that this generation of the world's political
leaders are, understandably but often, out of
phase with one another. Incidentally these
asymmetrical facts of life have a great deal
to do with the relevance which one nation's mil-
itary, scientific, technological, political, and
economic experience has for other nations —
even for its good friends and allies.

On our part the "illusion of American om-
nipotence" is an illusion we have long since
overcome, if indeed it ever existed. There was
also a time when some people thought that we
North Americans tended to look out on the
world seeing only two kinds of people: Rus-
sians and potential manpower that we and the
Russians could compete for. If ever true,
those days too are gone. The thoughtful citi-
zens of the United States increasingly imder-
stand that it is a rather honorable thing to be
in an historical situation where we cannot save
ourselves without helping others save them-
selves as well.

Two years ago Washington was preoccupied
with the ominous threat of a direct nuclear con-
frontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
in the crises over Berlin and Cuba. Today,
while we can never neglect the possibility that
such direct crises will return abruptly, we
nevertheless find ourselves worrying much more
of the time about crises in which the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. are far less directly involved —
crises like Cyprus, Zanzibar, the Congo, and
Kashmir, not to speak of Laos and South Viet-
Nam, where the U.S.S.R. claims to have little
involvement and less influence.

In a sense the tide of the cold war has defi-
nitely turned. There is an unmistakable move-
ment away from a bipolar confrontation of the
two superpowers toward a more diversified
world. We are moving from a period of dan-
gerously abnormal simplicity into a period of
more relatively normal diversity.

But freedom's struggle against conmiunism
is far from over and far from won. Indeed,

to the extent that the Communist threat and
the danger of nuclear war have been major
factors in imifying the free, non-Communist
world, our very success in completing phase
one of the struggle against communism threat-
ens to complicate matters by eroding our unity
for the new phase which has now begun.

I should like to examine some of the prob-
lems posed by this decomposition of the bipolar
world. It is a problem very much on our minds
in Washington, and I suspect it is very much
on the minds of your governments as well. I
take it that the main purpose of this inter-
American conference is, in fact, to provide a
forum for a mutually profitable discussion of
the new dimensions of our ongoing struggle
with international communism.

Let us review some of the essential elements
of this struggle as they affect the world politi-
cal scene.

Containment: Its Success and Obsolescence

In the wake of World War II the issue was
stark and clear. Freedom was directly and im-
minently threatened by Stalinist-directed ex-
pansionism. Admittedly, our concept of con-
tainment was, strictly speaking, a negative
one. It was designed to muster the necessary
strength to bar the way to Communist expan-
sion. While Moscow saw its historic mission as
one of making over the world on a Communist
model, the United States and other countries
who joined in a series of defensive alliances set
themselves the opposite goal. Our objective
was not to force our institutions upon other
countries but to help preserve freedom of choice
against those who would deny that freedom.

Broadly speaking, the policy of containment
has both succeeded and become obsolete. The
conspicuous forward motion of conventional
Commimist armies has been stopped. Uni-
formed Communist troops have not spilled in
force over borders since June 1950 in Korea.

The bedrock of containment has been the mili-
tai-y strength of the free world and, in partic-
ular, the ability of the United States to deter
Soviet use of nuclear weapons. We have had
no illusions about Soviet magnanimity for the
weak, and when, in the late 1950's, the Soviets
used their Sputnik and their newly developed

JULY 6, 1964

ICBM to challenge us to an arms race, our
determination stiffened.

We set about building a nuclear force which
could withstand any Soviet attack and then
retaliate with devastating effect. Sophisticated
U.S. strategic weapons systems, long in develop-
ment and only shortly behind the operational
readiness dates of the more simplified Soviet
program, were rushed to completion. Polaris
submarines, largely immime from enemy at-
tack, were deployed in the oceans around the
U.S.S.R. The alert status of SAC [Strategic
Air Command] bombers, both on the ground
and airborne, was further improved. U.S.
intercontinental missiles, notably the solid-
fueled, quick-reacting Minuteman, were in-
creasingly dispersed and hardened. This year
we are spending approximately $8 billion more
on defense than we were in 1960.

There can be no question today that our
second-strike capability is credible to the
Soviets. They know as well as we do that the
United States Air Force has 540 strategic
bombers on alert which could, in the face of a
surprise missile attack, take off for their targets.
In contrast we estimate that the Soviets could
place over the United States, on two-way mis-
sions, no more than approximately 120 heavy
bombers plus perhaps an additional 150 medium
bombers over Alaska and our Northwest. To-
day our Air Force has some 750 ICBM's on
launchers. The Soviets have less than one-
fourth that number in operation. We have 192
Polaris missiles deployed. The Soviets have
substantially fewer submarine-borne missiles in
operation. Those they do have cannot be
launched while the submarine remains sub-
merged, and they have a range of less than a
third of Polaris's 1,500 miles.

Clearly a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union
would have to be an irrational decision. No
one can guarantee against that, but the likeli-
hood of it has receded.

Yet if our nuclear strength is a relatively firm
hedge against nuclear attack today, it is by no
means a cure-all for the host of remaining polit-
ical problems. Nuclear threats cannot be in-
voked lightly. The United States could employ
its nuclear forces only upon the gi-avest provoca-
tion. Even assuming for an instant that an

American surprise attack on the Soviet Union
were not morally repugnant, as every American
President of the nuclear age has declared it to
be, it would still have to be ruled out on grounds
of impracticality. Even in the most optimistic
appraisal of the potential results of a nuclear
exchange, i.e., one in which the U.S. was as-
sumed to have the advantage of striking first,
the casualties to the West would still number
in the tens of millions of lives.

Maintaining a Strategic Advantage

We recognize that for the foreseeable future
a major portion of our military expenditures
will have to continue to be devoted to maintain-
ing our strategic advantage. But the largest
items in our mammoth defense budget are con-
sciously being appropriated in the profound
hope that the weapons systems which they
finance will never be used. Thus our nation's
leaders of both political parties are willing to
cope with the domestic problems of spending
billions of dollars on missiles which, if our
policies are successful, will not be laimched.

We intend our strategic advantage not only
to deter actual Soviet aggression but to limit
Soviet ability to use nuclear weapons for pur-
poses of intimidation. The Cuban missile crisis
showed to what lengths the Soviet Union might
go in order to improve its strategic leverage
upon both North and South America — although
the relatively careless manner in which the
Soviets attempted to install their offensive mis-
siles, and the speed with which they withdrew
them, suggest strongly that the Communist
leaders in Moscow miscalculated badly the risks
they thought they were running. We think that
the Cuban crisis taught the Soviets a lesson, and
we do not expect them to miscalculate so rashly
again.

Since, however, the purpose of our nuclear
forces is to deter aggression and contribute to
the avoidance of nuclear war, we have no desire
to amass megatons as a miser hoards gold. We
are deeply interested in probing every possible
approach to effective arms control if it would
afford a safer means to assure stability and
security.

Our interest in arms control and disarmament

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

is sometimes misunderstood. I wish to assure
any of you who may be worried that this effort
is one we are undertaking with our eyes wide
open. We know what we are doing. The tenta-
tive steps already taken in the direction of arms
control are designed to create more security, not
less. We have far too great an investment in
our present military strength ever to jeopardize
it without proportionate gain. We have no in-
tention of gambling with it whimsically or
amateurislily.

We will, however, look both to continued
improvement of our own defenses and to re-
sponsible disarmament measures to the degree
that either points to our main objective : increas-
ing the safety of the free, non-Communist
world. We recognize that an imchecked arms
race, together with the possible spread of in-
creasingly devastating weapons to more and
more covmtries, takes us further away from the
kind of security wliich might otherwise even-
tually be ours under an international peace-
keeping system providing a reliable means of
effective, enforcible arms control.

The Need for Flexibility

In the meantime, as the likelihood of a sur-
prise nuclear attack, or even a surprise conven-
tional attack, by the Soviets has decreased, the
necessity for a more diversified and rapidly
reacting capability to meet local crises has be-
come more important. A variety of threats
requires a variety of possible responses. We
realize all too well that the so-called nuclear
stalemate does not rule out the possibility of
other forms of Communist military aggression.
We ourselves have been committed to develop-
ing forces capable of an increasingly flexible
response to the variety of military threats which
fall short of general nuclear war. As a result,
U.S. military options have steadily increased,
U.S. ability to meet less-than-outright aggres-
sion has improved, and U.S. "command and
control"' capabilities to insure reliability and
conformity to our larger national objectives
have become more sophisticated. We have
aided, and will continue to aid, other free, non-
Communist countries in building up their own
defenses to meet the new conditions. Thus the
free, non-Commiuiist world will possess gradu-

ated capabilities both to deter Communist or
Communist-sponsored external threats at vary-
ing levels of intensity and to respond to the
diversified aggression of Communist-supported
internal insurgency.

Pursuing this policy of graduated deterrence
and flexible response, we have consciously been
promoting a worldwide mobility of our forces —
not only strategic but tactical as well. Thus,
while our strategic strike forces remain ready
for action on an instant's notice, our tactical
aircraft, ground forces, and naval units are in-
creasingly able to bring U.S. military elements
to virtually any part of the world where they
may be needed. Tactical fighter aircraft take
off in the Far East and land a few hours later
in Arizona. Army divisions are moved by air
to Europe and back again, without losing their
operational readiness. American naval power
from either the Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans
can go on short notice to patrol the Indian
Ocean. The U.N. peacekeeping force now on
Cyprus was transported there largely by Ameri-
can air power.

I think we should be quite clear about the
purpose of all this. If, as Mr. Khrushchev has
declared, deliberate nuclear war is imthinkable,
and if deliberate conventional war between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is also less likely because
it may so easily turn into a nuclear war, it
does not follow that international violence is
unthinkable. In fact, to the degree that the
Communists forsake or postpone the use of
major violence to achieve their ends, the danger
of lesser levels of violence is probably increased.

Thus at the same time as the Cuban crisis we
had a sudden, limited attack with conventional
forces by Communist China upon India, in the
isolated and forbidding terrain of the Hima-
layan Moimtains. Thus there have been guer-
rilla training, sabotage planning, and infiltra-
tion and subversion of free Latin American
countries proceeding from Cuba. Thus harass-
ing actions short of violence, as well as acts of
suspicious but anonymous violence, occur in
much of the non-Communist world.

Often these situations produce requests for
immediate, on-the-spot U.S. action. Often
they bear within themselves the potentialities of
escalation to vastly destructive proportions.

There has been nothing yet to indicate that the
Communists will leave their neighbors in peace,
or that they will refrain from deliberate sub-
version and the fomenting of violence in other
countries, or that they will restrain themselves
from infiltrating cadres to stiffen and direct
guerrilla warfare in violation of international
agreements.

The fact that Communist military aggression
from within a coimtry is becoming more fre-
quent, and the fact that it is more complicated
to deal with, do not make it less dangerous. By
far the greater part of the Viet Cong forces in
South Viet-Nam are South Vietnamese, and
the preponderance of Viet Cong weapons come
not from Communist countries but from cap-
ture, purchase, and local manufacture. Thus,
while controlling tlie war from Hanoi, the Com-
munists are able to claim that the conflict in
South Viet-Nam is internal, and even, with their
customary hypocrisy, that it is a war of resist-
ance against American imperialism. In Laos
similar tactics are being pursued, with the same
objective of gaining control over the entire
country. In Cuba the revolution was ostensibly
led by non-Communist Cubans. Certainly it
was supported by millions of non-Communist
Cubans. It was only after the revolution suc-
ceeded that the relationship with Moscow be-
came overt.

This is in truth a more sophisticated and
dangerous form of aggression, when the leaders
of an aggressive war cannot be located, when
their sources of supply can rarely be interdicted,
when enemy forces are usually not outsiders,
and when truces do not halt the conflict. These
factors reinforce the underlying wisdom of
policies designed to foreclose, at level after level
on the scale of military violence, the options
open to the Communists for using force to gain
their purposes. These policies must proceed.
They are more important than ever now that
outright military aggression across national
boundaries appears less likely than previously.
For, while Communist methods have changed,
and the natvire of the Communist threat is
changing. Communist objectives remain un-
changed. Indeed the increased diversification
and sophistication of the Communist military
threat has been matched by a diversification and

sophistication of the economic and political
threats as well.

Soviet Economy: Perseverance Through Strain

I mentioned what seems to me to have been
the Soviet miscalculation in the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962. There was another earlier Soviet
miscalculation in 1958, in the first flush of new-
found optimism over Sputnik. Soviet leaders
apparently assumed that they would not only
be able to mount a new strategic challenge to
the free world but that at the same time they
could continue a rapid and balanced rate of
economic growth sufficient to provide for con-
sumer needs at home and effective economic aid
abroad.

As it happened, the Soviet planners were
proved wrong. Moscow's own statistics show
how, under the pressure of a Soviet-initiated
arms race and as a result of other flaws in the
Soviet economic system, national income growth
rates declined from an average of 9.5 percent
per year between 1956 and 1959 to 6 percent in
1962 and 4.5 percent last year. At the same time
the Soviet leadership had been promising more
prosperity to its citizenry and whetting existing
appetites for consumer goods. The result has
been an ongoing debate in the Soviet hierarchy
over the proper allocation of resources for new
investment. The principal claimants — military
expenditures, heavy industry, and consumer
goods including agriculture — have tended to be
relatively evenly matched. It has been a
debate which no one has really won. Even
though the economic situation deteriorated bad-
ly as a result of crop failures recently, the
tendency has been to postpone any radical
changes in the structure of the Soviet economy.

It is possible that these economic strains were
a major factor last year in the Kremlin's will-
ingness to conclude the limited test ban agree-
ment and thus initiate a period of reduced ten-
sions. At the same time, it would be imrealistic
for us to assume that the Soviet Union is so
poor that it has no freedom of choice in assess-
ing its own priorities. For example, it might
seem that, pressed as they are, the Soviets would
cut back on foreign aid programs. Yet precisely
at this time of economic adversity, Moscow is

DEPAHTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

once again showing its willingness to tighten
its belt if that is necessary to take advantage
of political opportunities. Soviet commitments
in foreign economic aid are rising again. New
commitments in the first 5 months of this year
are in excess of $600 million. The record high
in the past was $859 million for all of 1959.

Moreover, in the aid field, as elsewhere,
Moscow's flexibility is often enhanced by the au-
thoritarian nature of its government. Its ca-
pacity for making rapid decisions at tactically
useful moments contrasts with our own .sober
and methodical requirements which flow from
our democratic form of government, from our
Congress, and from our Bureau of the Budget.
Thus the U.S.S.R. has the ability to offer addi-
tional credits to countries even though previ-
ous ones are not fully used, as it has recently
done for the steel mill at Bone, Algeria. The
U.S.S.R. has agreed to aid projects and an-
nounced firm commitments to them even before
preliminary cost estimates, detailed surveys, or
feasibility studies by the Soviets are made —
Egypt's Aswan Dam and India's proposed
Bokaro steel mill are examples. In both these
cases the U.S.S.R. has benefited doubly by pick-
ing up projects previously considered by the
U.S. which we, for one reason or another, were
unable to assist.

In addition the U.S.S.R. aid authorities are
able, when political needs require, to offer grants
to recipients who, for political or economic
reasons or both, hesitate to become obligated
to Moscow for credits. Nepal, Yemen, and
Kenya have been beneficiaries recently of this
practice. Moreover, there is no strong outcry
in the Soviet leadership or the Soviet press when
the Kremlin permits comingling of Soviet aid
with "Western assistance. Today, for instance,
the Soviets are building a school in Ethiopia
which will be staffed by teachers being trained
in the U.S.

Soviet flexibility is also illustrated by an oc-
casional extension of an open line of credit for
a fixed amount without any specific projects
being mentioned. The $100 million credit ex-
tended last fall to Algeria was merely for
"economic development." Thus the Soviet
economic offensive continues, flexible and
unabated.

The Communist Rift

The growing rift between Moscow and Pei-
ping is also, of course, contributing to pro-
found changes in the Communist world.
Viewed broadly, a falling out among our po-
tential enemies is a welcome development and
one which, like so many other recent develop-
ments, calls for flexible responses on our part.
But the Sino-Soviet rift, like the other changes,
does not mean that the net Communist threat
is receding everywhere or anywhere. On the
contrary, the rift may diversify and intensify
the threat at least in some areas, just as the
ingredients and forms of the challenge will cer-
tainly be heavily conditioned by it.

The vilification of one another by the Soviet
and Cliinese Communists is having far-reach-
ing effects upon the international Communist
movement. Not even the epochal struggle be-
tween Stalin and the Trotskyites had such
effects — the Trotskyites were outcasts from the
start without the advantage of command over
the most populous state in the world.

Tliese effects cut two ways. On the one
hand, the dispute has seriously tarnished the
image of Communist unity as well as the au-
thority and universality of Communist dogma,
both of which have traditionally been essential
to the elan of the Communist movement and its
appeal to potential supporters. After all, a
worldwide argument among Communists about
fundamentals makes it painfully clear that
Marxism is hardly a scientific method capable
of producing clear answers to social problems.

On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet recrimi-
nations have greatly accelerated the fragmen-
tation of control within the world Communist
movement. Loosened controls have permitted
Communist states and parties to pursue their
objectives with greater freedom. Indeed, some
of them are likely to benefit by the removal of
prior handicaps. Local Communist leaders
will have a wider range of choice and a freer
hand in pursiiing those policies which they re-
gard as most effective in their own national
enviromnents.

As each attacks the other and defends its
own position, Moscow and Peiping are bidding
for the support of Communists throughout the

JULY 6, 19G4

world. The Soviets still have the backing —
in one degree or another — of most party lead-
ers and organizations, although the degree of
support for Soviet tactics has tended to be more
aixd more qualified. Even those parties most
opposed to the Chinese Commimists' theoretical
propositions have been reluctant to support the
Soviets in any effort to impose sanctions on the
Chinese, lest their own freedom of action be
curtailed by a resurgence of tightened control
within the movement. The Chinese have
gained the support of half a dozen foreign par-
ties and have been actively supporting the for-
mation of new Chinese-oriented Commimist
organizations. Above all, the mere existence
of a rival Chinese line has weakened the estab-
lished Soviet authority and encouraged greater
independence among and within all parties.

In Hungary the other day, IQirushchev said
that communism now stood for "better goulash
and better ballet." While we may take it for
granted that communism still means more than
that to Kiirushchev himself, it surely means
more than that to Mao.

We may in one country or another find our-
selves faced with rival Communist parties —
one Moscow-oriented and the other Peiping-
oriented, one seeking to infiltrate the existing
government or a broadly based opposition by
-means of united-front tactics, while the other
takes the road of revolutionary violence. We
may face two or more enemies in a given situa-
tion instead of one.

This erosion of Connnunist unity does not by
any means end the dangers of communism, but
we should not gloss over it as insignificant.
The result for us may be a two- front struggle,
but it is not a deliberate deception contrived or
arranged between the two Communist capitals.
Instead, the whole Communist tradition of doc-
trinal discipline authoritatively interpreted, of
party discipline rutUessly enforced on an iden-
tifiable membership, of a disciplined worldwide
subversive order of battle supported by a single
power center wliich ultimately decides on tim-
ing and tactics — this whole Connnunist tradi-
tion is itself undergoing contradictions and is
at the verge of breaking up. In the process
of breaking up, the splinters may become ex-
ceedingly sharp.

For instance, competition with Communist
China imijoses upon the Soviet Union a new
need to demonstrate to critical Communist au-
diences that the Soviet Union is not derelict in
its revolutionary duty. It is not surprising,
therefore, that a new emphasis on national lib-
eration movements has appeared in Soviet pub-
lic statements in the past 6 months. The extent
to which Moscow will translate into action its
avowed support for violence for these purposes
remains to be seen. But at the least, the Soviet
Union may be less likely to counsel restraint
to those who champion violence, a factor which
adds to the probabilities that the Conamunist
challenge is an abiding, not a subsiding, one.

The Disarray of Safety

Returning to our side of the Iron Curtain, we
should note that holes are now being poked into
it from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If con-
tainment was a negative policy — a policy of
blocking communism's outward thrust into the
free world — we now have an opportunity, a
marginal but growing one, to pursue a positive
policy of influencing developments in certain
parts of the Commmiist world. In some ways
we can contribute to the evolution of healthier
trends.

I have in mmd particularly the resurgence of
nationalism in Eastern Europe. In part be-
cause of the weakening of controls within the
bloc as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the
countries of Eastern Europe are increasingly
able to pursue their own interests and to seek
better relations with the West. We should not
expect too much. But by judiciously respond-
ing to their approaches, we can aid these coun-
tries in their efforts to detach themselves a little
further from Soviet control — and to move to-
ward policies of their own which may become
more expressive of their national mterests than
of old-style Communist ambitions for world
conquest.

Yet in order to do so, we shall once more have
to pursue increasingly flexible policies. Of
course, one man's flexibility is another man's
inconsistency. Doubtless there will be those
who find elements of inconsistencj' in a policy
which treats different Communists differently.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUTiLETIN

Indeed, the problem of coping with such seem-
ing inconsistencies will be with us more and
more. For if we continue to succeed in moder-
ating the Communist threat, and in encouraging
individual Communist countries to pursue less
dramatically threatening policies toward us, we
shall move into a period in which the whole
pattern of international politics, familiar since
World "War II, will tend to blur.

Basically, containment was a simple policy,
and, because the threat of nuclear war was so
compelling, it tended to claim everyone's atten-
tion. Because containment was essentially a
defensive policy, it tended to reinforce a con-
servative outlook, more often than not putting
us in the position of reacting to others' initia-
tives. Our fundamental objective then as now
was not to impose our political attitudes or in-
stitutions upon others but to help other coun-
tries preserve their freedom of choice against
Communist expansion.

Today, at the moment of our success, we are
finding that the very diversities we have sought
to preserve are emerging in public, claiming
attention themselves, and creating the appear-
ance of considerable divisiveness among friends.
The world seems to be less sharply divided into
the Communist and the free. The once satellite
countries of Eastern Europe are somewhat freer
than they used to be. They are, says Ivliru-
shchev, "too big to spank." Benefiting by the
contrast with Peiping, Moscow itself seems
milder. Our preoccupation with the Soviet
threat appears to many to be lessening. Al-
liances seem less secure. It has become some-
thing of a journalist's cliche to talk of the
"disarray" in NATO and the OAS.

As the process of diversification continues in
both the Communist and non-Communist
worlds, thoughtful commentators worry that
our alertness to Communist actions and our
capacity to counteract them may wane. The
warning is appropriate. These dangers exist,
and we must guard against them. Let us hope,
however, that they add up more to appearances
than reality — that they are surface manifesta-
tions, not of decay, but of the growing pains of
the Atlantic and American communities.

Tiie question for all of us in the free, non-
Communist nations is how to operate in this

possibly safer, more diverse world. In the dayr
to-day business of foreign affairs one becomes
almost nostalgic for the terror of the cold war.
Things were more easily organizable then.
Fear tended to cement alliances more closely,
and policy could afford the luxury of slogans,
and simplification. But these were the inci-
dental benefits of our proximity to Armaged- •
don. Now, with the process of depolarization
coinciding with the arrival of an apparently
safer world, we shall have new opportunities,
as well as new dangers. It is important not
to jeopardize the opportimities, just as it is,
essential not to indulge in self-delusion or false
optimism over the prospects of a sudden epi-
demic of peace.

The Revolutionary Situation

Here in the free, non-Communist world, as we
concentrate more and more on internal sub-
version and the counterinsurgency measures
necessary to counteract it, there are several
things of which we should beware.

Let us beware of any lingering notion that
the United States has the solution for everyone
else's problems. No country in the world is
less isolationist today than we. But we cannot
come in and settle your problems for you. We
know as well as you do that after all is said
and done, after all our aid has come and gone,
the problems remain yours, not ours.

Let us beware of any residual notion that it
benefits a country to keep its Communist
threat — that a local Communist menace can be
a natural resource, like oil or diamonds, easily
convertible into U.S. support. The day is gone,
if it ever existed, when an alleged Communist
menace would trigger an automatic Pavlovian
response in Washington. In the months and
years ahead, the United States will not neces-
sarily respond most to those who have the most
Communists.

Let us beware of thinking that all internal
violence can be charged off to Commimist in-
fluence, when that influence may often be merely
one element among others. We cannot make
the world behave the way the words behave.
It will be increasingly important for us in our
own minds to separate Commmiists from non-

JTJLT 6, 1964

Communists at a time when the Communists
are trying harder than ever to cloud over that
distinction. We must avoid becoming en-
tangled in the very confusions -which the Com-
munists themselves will be working overtime to
cause.

For all of us engaged in the fight against com-
munism there will be a new premium on the
carefulness of our own analysis, the accuracy
with which we choose our targets, and the wis-
dom which we employ in our tactics. In each
situation we confront we must try to identify
clearly the real problem, the real enemy, and the
real opportunity.

Let us beware of giving the Communists more
credit than they deserve. There are two sides
to this notion of Communist "targets of oppor-
tunity." The Communists may have chosen
the target, but the society concerned, by its
previous lack of action, has provided the oppor-
tunity. There is something else about the
phrase that bothers me. Even the notion of a
"target of opportunity" somehow makes the
problem seem small, episodic, surprising, unex-
pected, and manageable by minimum effort.
The phrase does not convey the endemic, his-
toric, pervasive scale of the native-born revolu-
tionary situations which actually confront much
of the free, non-Communist world. Many of
these are situations not in any sense dependent
upon Communist sponsorship or inspiration,
situations which would have been here to plague
us if Marx, Lenin, Mao, or Khrushchev had
never been born.

Infiltration is indeed a new form of aggi'es-
sion. Guerrillas, saboteurs, organizers, agita-
tors, are indeed a new dimension of the threat.
But in a larger sense, ideas are no respecters
of boundaries. The fact that danger crosses a
frontier should cause us to look at the condi-
tions which attract the infiltrator in the first
place, which make him choose this coimtry
rather than another as his target. Let us be-
ware of thinking that people inside vulnerable
societies can be insulated from revolutionary
danger just by posting guards in the watch-
towers on the frontiers, along the coastlines, and
in the airport waiting rooms, or by making the
customs officials more vigilant.

Likewise the probable new push of the Soviet-

oriented wings of the Communist parties to-
ward popular- front activities will require even
greater discrimination, sensitivity, and political
skill to combat. But the fact that popular
fronts can once more be organized should itself
constitute an early warning of danger, as well
as a confession of past failure to meet real prob-
lems. It means that that particular society is
already sufficiently sick and many of its people
sufficiently frustrated for such a regrouping on
the left to occur. It means that the objective
situation itself is a stormy petrel of genuine
danger, of serious disease in the body politic, of
growing odds against any kind of "stability."

In Cuba the revolution came first and the
deliverance to communism came afterward.
The Communists do not have to get out in
front. They do not necessarily advertise them-
selves in advance. They count heavily on our
own errors.

So above all let us beware of thiiiking that
the problems which have attracted Communist
attention are therefore somehow not real prob-
lems, or that once the Communists have been
rounded up, jailed, or deprived of their civil
rights, the problems themselves will somehow
go away. In all likelihood these problems are
not synthetic or artificial. In all likelihood
they will not go away imtil they are met. In
all likelihood we ignore them at our peril. In
all likelihood there is no ultimate postponement
except at the cost of a worse and more final
reckoning.

Much depends on how we look at the world.
Security, after all, has meaning only for those
who have something to preserve. Some people
who have things to preserve take a deeply pessi-
mistic view, regarding the status quo as sub-
stantially nonviable, impossible to perpetuate
much longer. If we take this view, then most
of what we do becomes a deliberate holding op-
eration and we hope only to escape at the end,
luckily with our relics, lives, and perhaps our
fortunes, but just in time. In the meantime
our spiritual climate becomes reduced to the
sheer enjoyment of one more banquet feast,
knowing that the handwriting is already on the
wall.

A more enlightened conservative view holds
out the hope for prolonging the status quo by

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULIiETIN

adjusting it under various rules of enlightened
expediency. This way protest may be placated
and the predictable upheaval will perhaps be
put off to the successor generation.

But the real conservatives in today's world
are likely to be more radical. Looking at the
world with their eyes open, they have a non-
doctrinaire appreciation of both the enormous
problems and the remaining opportunities — op-
portunities for partnership, joint venture, and
genuine cooperation before time rims out.
They realize that radical measures are essential
if anything is to be conserved, and they know
that not everything is worth conserving. They
will deliberately separate themselves from the
latter distractions, work hard to broaden the in-
digenous centers of society, and concentrate
their efforts in those points and places which
are key- — not only because of their potentiality
for influence but also because of their capacity
for democratic leadership.

I can think of no propositions more widely
accepted in Washington than these. Our As-
sistant Secretary of State for Inter- American
Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, who regretted very
much indeed that he could not be here today,
and whose special greetings I bring to you, had
this to say less than a month ago : ^

I should like to state in the very beginning — and to
say it very clearly — that the Government and people of
the United States do not forget that their own nation
was born in revolution. Nor can we forget that the
process of social, economic, and political change in our
country has been continuous since 1776. It still goes
on. We still seek that kind of change which will bring
about the greatest good for the greatest number of our
people.

We therefore have a natural sympathy and affinity
for those governments who seek change and progress.
Those governments which institute bold, soundly con-
ceived programs of reform designed to achieve

national and individual freedom,
a high and sustained level of economic growth,
a greater degree of social justice, and
equal opportunity for all to rise as high in society as
their talents and efforts will take them,

will find warmhearted sympathy in Washington.

That Secretary Mann's position is supported
in depth by the highest authority of the United

States Government is equally clear. President
Johnson himself recently said : *

To struggle to stand still in Latin America Is Just
to "throw the sand against the wind."

We must, of course, always be on guard against Com-
munist subversion. But anticommunism alone will
never suffice to insure our liberty or fulfill our dreams.
That is going to take leadership, leadership that is
dedicated to economic progress without uneconomic
privilege, to social change which enhances social jus-
tice, to political reform which widens human freedom.

Likewise at his meeting with the ambassadors
at the White House on May 11, 1964, to review
the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson
proclaimed : °

... we will continue to join with, you to encourage
democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations
from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle.

But the charter of the alliance is not confined to
political democracy. It commands a peaceful, demo-
cratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It
calls upon us to throw open the gates of opportunity
... to the poor and to the oppressed. It asks that
unju.st privilege be ended and that unfair power be
curbed.

The President said, "We say now, if a peaceful
revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is
inevitable."

The Latin American Frontline

President Johnson was addressing himself to
this hemisphere — to those "20 nations . . . who
take strength from the ricliness of their diver-
sity." ^ And what he said has particular rele-
vance to this hemisphere because of the chang-
ing world challenge we have been discussing
this morning. For at the height of the cold war,
the American Republics were geographically
not on the frontlines. Although presumably
no one wanted to be closer to the frontlines,
there was a feeling in some quarters that less
attention was being paid to our hemispheric
problems because of their distance from the
fray.

The converse is true under today's conditions

' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 857.

* Ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726.

' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 854.

' For an address by President Johnson on the third
anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, see ibid., Apr.
6, 1964, p. 535.

JULY 6, 1964

of nuclear stalemate. Today the problems con-
fronting this hemisphere move more and more
to the forefront. They become less and less
distinguishable from the problems which the
new forms of Communist aggression present
worldwide. Vast oceans protect us less against
these new forms than they did against the old.
Targets for Communist attention in the Amer-
icas are now as inviting as they are anywhere
in Africa, or the Middle East, or in South and
Southeast Asia.

Indeed, Latin America may appear to Mos-
cow and Peiping to be especially valuable ex-
perimentally. In a sense the Communists may
think they can risk more in Latin America.
Cuba was a risk. The Communists lost gravely
there in October 1962, but they by no means
lost everything. Moreover, there is a special
advantage which the Communists think they
see in this hemisphere. They hope to manip-
ulate in a direct way whatever specific anti-
United States feeling they can find. They tell
themselves that they can find it here in the West-
em Hemisphere more than elsewhere, and they
would like to exploit the opportunity for as
much as it is worth.

This hemisphere of ours has a rich and polit-
ically honored tradition against "intervention"
from the outside, a feeling which we North
Americans came to respect after a few unhappy
and misguided attempts to infringe upon it our-
selves in the Central American and Caribbean
areas two generations ago. Yet as Communist-
inspired threats to the peace and violations of
human rights begin to occur increasingly within
countries, rather than by direct aggression
across borders, the ambit of our common in-
terest grows. It does so in spite of our deep
convictions for "sovereignty" and against "in-
tervention." We all in fact have a stake in each
successful popular government in the hemi-
sphere.

In this connection the international commu-
nity too will have to address itself increasingly
to new, imaginative, and legal means for the
internal safeguarding of our common interests.
Recent United Nations activities in the Congo,
Cyprus, and now Cambodia are hopeful exam-
ples of international action legitimatizing inter-
national intervention, just as the OAS action

at the time of the Cuban missile crisis provided
a necessary legal basis for inspection-by-recon-
naissance over Cuba against a threat which
endangered the whole hemisphere.

Then too there is another form of interna-
tional involvement going on which will affect
us more and more — an increasing internation-
alization of specialists. Military experts and
advisers from various countries will be called
upon, often under international auspices, for
service in a variety of ways in foreign lands.
Increasing attention is being paid to the new
role of armies in transitional societies: the ac-
tive furtherance in an orderly manner of the
processes of progressive change. Successful
experience in Latin America could become an
invaluable laboratory for useful transplanta-
tion elsewhere.

But most of all, this new, diverse, differen-
tiated world confronts us all with choices —
with opportunities for deliberate preferences
in the reordering of our priorities.

For you as for us, there will be decisions on
the proper allocation of resources to and within
your military budgets. There will be decisions
on how to shape and keep power appropriate to
your real needs.

For you as for us, it will be necessary to warn
against overoptimism, false assumptions, and
temptations toward collective streaks of inde-
cisiveness. There will be the problem of act-
ing when action is required, at the same time
as we resist impulses for cheap victories, short-
term results, simple slogans, and easy solutions.

For you as for us, there will be the necessity
to follow several policies at once, taking initia-
tives all the while we hedge against their fail-
ure. There will be certain inherited and
declining situations which seem to have gone
beyond the point of reversal or arrest. There
will be new claims on your attention and new
appeals for your support.

For you as for us, answering the demand for
economic and social progress will become essen-
tial, not only as an ideological preference but
as a strategic necessity. In the struggle we
face, economic growth and social reform are as
critically important as military strength itself.
We in the United States are still committed
wholeheartedly to all three.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

As the leaders of the American armed foi-ces,
you have a unique chance to influence these de-
velopments in a favorable direction. In many
cases you alone can provide the crucial margin
of influence which will spell success or failure.
You know, better than most otliers, that power
cannot indefinitely become a substitute for peo-
ple. In the very natui-e of your work you have
opportunities to set the course of your countries
toward progress rooted in popular involve-
ment, motivation, training, civic action, and
citizenship — identifying yourselves with, and
working among, the people whom armies and
navies and air forces are supposed to serve. I
laiow that there is a growing appreciation in
Washington and elsewhere that many of you
are already doing just that.

Everywhere all of our efforts are increasingly
mixing civilian and military ingredients. Com-
bating subversion is a typical case in point. But
the subversion of the Communists cannot be
met by subverting the constitution in the proc-
ess. In the long sweep of history the subversion
of the right may be just as dangerous in terms
of probable results for the hemisphere as the
subversion of the left. The situation itself is
revolutionary. We have tlie choice of joining
the revolution and channeling it into the most
constructive possible paths, or opposing it and
delivering its leadership to forces whicli can
destroy most that we hold dear. Mucli of what
I have said, indeed, adds up to a requirement
for a "revolution from above."

Predicament and Prophecy

So I return to my beginning. The searching
questions remain : Can we cooperate as well
without the cementing fear of imminent nuclear
catastrophe? Can we continue to organize for
the "common defense" at the time when that
defense is becoming more complicated? Can
we join in creating the only lasting immimity
against aggression from without or within —
the quick and effective building of better
societies?

Of course there are still a good many ways in
which the world can stumble into world war III.

We could all be brought up short again by a
sudden new crisis pitting us against the
U.S.S.R. once more on familiar cold-war lines.
But in the absence of such a crisis, all of us who
clierish freedom will have to work harder to-
gether if we are to maintain our unity and co-
hesion in tliis new world witli its emerging
diversities and its requirements for flexibility.
We shall have to consult one anotlier more fre-
quently and have to search harder for new and
more imaginative forms of cooperation. We
can less and less rely on our enemies to do our
political thinking for us.

From all over the world this many-sided
challenge is taking on a new urgency : Act now,
white men, brown men, black men, Asians, Afri-
cans, Europeans, and Americans. Act now, to-
gether, creatively, ahead of chaos, so that this
new opportunity is not lost, so that the tragic
debacles of China and Indochina and Cuba
need not become a pattern of an even larger
tragedy. Act now, for in the next 10 years posi-
tive ideas, dedicated people, and peaceful action
may do wliat no extra amount of guns, bombs,
and bloodshed can ever accomplish later.

As we consider the challenge to this hemi-
sphere, we can remember with profit the lesson
of Bolivar's life and work — that revolutions
can stagnate if they are not followed by the re-
lease of creative social energy. In the despair
of his last days on earth, the Liberator la-
mented : "To serve a revolution is to plow the
sea." "We must fearlessly lay the foundation
of South American liberty," he had warned at
an earlier moment of victory. "To hesitate is
destruction." His warning, unheeded, had be-
come prophetic.

And so too the time has come for each of us,
in his own way, in his own position of responsi-
bility, in his own American Eepublic, to lieed
the words of Lincohi, as poignant for our own
generation as tliey were a hundred years ago :

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inade-
quate to the stormy present. The occasion is
piled high witli difficulty, and we must rise with
the occasion. As our case is new, so we must
think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall
ourselves, and then we sliall save our country."

JULY 6, 1964
735-162— e

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy
in an Era of Expanding Frontiers

hy George G. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^

That the American Bankers Association has
accorded a diplomat a place in the crowded
schedule of its monetary conference seems to me
an encouraging sign of our times. This op-
portunity to meet and talk with you is very
welcome, since it is my firm belief that represen-
tatives of private endeavor such as you, and
representatives of government such as I, do
indeed have much in common to discuss. This is
why I have chosen as my subject "The Parallel
Roles of Business and Diplomacy in an Era of
Expanding Frontiers."

As I hope to show, we have entered tliis era
by having together progressively broken down
barriers between nations to the flow of trade,
capital, and ideas. Another barrier which we
would, in my view, do well to dismantle com-
pletely is the notion that public policy and pri-
vate activity have their own spheres of action
and that these spheres are, so to speak, separated
by a fence. It happens that I have spent some
years on each side of that figurative fence, as
a businessman as well as a government servant.
This experience has convinced me that any arbi-
trary division of public and private interests
does not correspond to the realities of the second
half of the 20th century. To plan wisely for
the period ahead, we need a better and a broader
concept of the respective functions of business
and government and how they interact.

In these remarks I shall try to outline such a

' Address made at the 11th annual monetary con-
ference of the American Bankers Association at
Vienna, Austria, on May 19.

concept. In brief, the proposition I submit to
you is that: There is but one sphere of action
for both business and government and that is
the whole complex world of today, in which the
affairs of nations and individuals alike are inter-
locked. Within that sphere, the interests and
objectives of business and government do not
diverge but run parallel. It is the task of gov-
ernment to provide a framework of public pol-
icy within which private endeavor can bring
its full energies to bear on the challenge of
building a safer and more prosperous free so-
ciety. In overwhelmLng measure, however, the
actual work of building must lie in the hands
of private businessmen.

It is the responsibility of government to act
when there is any distortion in the relations be-
tween nations which prevents private enterprise
from fulfilling its normal role. Reciprocally, it
is tlie responsibility of private enterprise to use
its opportunities wisely and on its own to seek
further avenues for economic progress with
imagination and perseverance.

It is not a question of one leading and the
other following. At times, governments must
act before the pent-up potential of private en-
deavor can be released. At other times, it is
business which, through its exploration of new
territories, creates the in:ipetus for an adjust-
ment of public policy. Opportmiities for initi-
ative change from one to the other as conditions
change in the world sphere in wliich both busi-
ness and govenmient operate. The present mo-
ment of history — and it is my hope that I shall

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

be able to convince you of this — is, in my judg-
ment, one in which the Western World must look
chiefly to you, and to your colleagues in busi-
ness, to take the initiative.

I would like to illustrate the parallelism be-
tween the actions of business and government
by reviewing the contributions of both to the
extraordinary progress made by the Western
World since the war. I think we can be justly
proud of the achievements of both. Diplomacy
has succeeded in creating a new framework of
economic stability and freedom. Business has
responded by buildhig a greatly strengthened
productive base and by creating a new network
of international business relationships — within
this framework. Business and diplomacy have,
in this historic era, performed complementary,
not competitive, roles. One would have been
meaningless without the wholehearted support
of the other.

The Concept of International Cooperation

Virtually all of the major diplomatic deci-
sions taken in the industrial West since the war
have been linked by a conmion purpose, even
though the link is not always obvious. The
majority of Western statesmen have put aside
notions of narrow national advantage to pur-
sue — with a large measure of success — the new
concept that greater advantages are attainable
through international cooperation. Such men
as Schuman and Momiet in France, Bevin in
the United Kingdom, Spaak in Belgium, De
Gasperi in Italy, Adenauer and Erhard in Ger-
many — and Marshall and Clayton in the United
States — have already won a place in history as
creators of such a concept.

This radical change in the political relation-
ships within the Western World was possible,
however, only because businessmen as well as
statesmen worked to achieve it. In essence,
the new policy represents a declaration of faith
on the part of governments in the willingness
and ability of private enterprise to accept new
challenges. It calls upon busmessmen to ex-
change the assurance of protection in limited
national markets for the oppoi'tunity to com-
pete m broader markets. It relies upon the
talents and imagination of business to give sub-

stance to the dream of a new Europe and a new
kind of partnership between J^urope and
America.

But let us go back to the beginning. The war
left in its wake a bewildering array of interre-
lated problems. Europe lay in economic chaos.
The social and political structure of many
European nations had been destroyed or se-
verely shaken. The wealmess of Western Eu-
rope encouraged internal political division and
whetted Communist appetites for subversion
and aggression. The need for action was po-
litically urgent.

Considered in purely economic terms, the im-
mediate problem in Europe was a shortage of
both private and public capital for reconstruc-
tion. Furthermore, it was not only the basic
facilities of industry which needed rebuilding.
The entire payments system had broken down.
As Will Clayton described the situation in his
famous memorandum of May 1947 to General
Marshall :

Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political posi-
tion reflects the economic. One political crisis after
another merely denotes the existence of grave economic
distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly
starving. More consumer's goods and restored con-
fidence in the local currency are absolutely essential
if the peasant is again to supply food in normal quan-
tities to the cities. . . .

The Marshall Plan and the OEEC

The first step was a political one : a recogni-
tion on the part of the United States that action
was needed because the fate of Western Europe
was important to Americans. To meet the sit-
uation the United States lamiched the Marshall
Plan. I want to emphasize, however, that the
purpose of the Marshall Plan was not just to
rebuild Europe with government funds. It was
to restore that part of the framework for eco-
nomic activity which had been damaged. The
injection of capital did, indeed, produce the
desired effect of reactivating the payments sys-
tem and thus released the enormous energies of
the private sector. Farmers could again send
their produce to the consumer markets with con-
fidence that the currency they received in pay-
ment would remain stable and could be ex-
changed for goods which the cities could again

JULY 6, 1964

manufacture. Raw materials again flowed to
factories. The international payments system
began to work again. The Marshall Plan was
a vivid example of the complementary roles of
government and private business activity.

I am sm-e most of you appreciate, however,
that the Marshall Plan also had positive polit-
ical goals. One aim was to halt the Communist
drive to enter and subvert governments, revive
the popular-front concept, and capture control
of non-Communist organizations of all kinds.
The Marshall Plan helped to restore faith in
democratic institutions by showing that they
were able to respond effectively to urgent needs.
It gave the lie to Lenin's dogma that, because of
the inherent contradictions of capitalism, capi-
talist states cannot cooperate for a constructive
purpose but must inevitably fall into conflict.

It is of interest to note statistics which show,
in some measure, the political effect which eco-
nomic rehabilitation, in concert of course with
other factors, had in Western Europe. In
France, the number of seats held by Commu-
nists in the National Assembly decreased from
163 in 1946 to 103 in 1951. In Italy, the Com-
munist Party's share of the vote fell from 31
percent in 1948 to 23 percent in 1953. In Bel-
gium and Holland, Communist strength deteri-
orated markedly from the high point of 1945-
46 to a level at which it constituted no threat
to orderly government in the early fifties. In
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Com-
munist Party dropped from 5.7 percent of the
vote in 1949 to 2.2 percent in 1953.

The Marshall Plan also had a second political
goal. It looked beyond the chaos of the moment
toward the creation of a new kind of Europe,
one free of the national rivalries which twice
had plunged the world into war. The plan was
framed, by the f arsighted statesmen who guided
it, to give impetus to political integration in
Western Europe. It was also intended to de-
velop among Europeans the habit of working
together toward common goals.

But here again, the objective was not simply
that of integi'ating governmental aims but of
establishing a framework within which private
interests could act with greater freedom and
confidence. Today one need only contemplate
the growing number of European-wide business
concerns which got their start under the Mar-

shall Plan to realize how private business has
responded to the idea of a European- wide eco-
nomic entity.

One of the major instruments of postwar eco-
nomic policy has been the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation — the OEEC.
This organization embraced 17 European coun-
tries, with the United States and Canada par-
ticipating as associates. The OEEC was
founded in Paris in 1948, in a period of general
shortages, internal price controls, and rationing.
Foreign trade was subject to a restrictive regime
of quotas. As long as these restrictions were
maintained, tariffs played only a secondary role
in limiting trade.

Most countries, in the early postwar years,
were obliged to try to balance their trade on a
rigid bilateral basis. From its inception, the
OEEC worked to break down these walls of
protectionism. As one of its first acts, it
adopted a Code of Liberalization. Each mem-
ber of the OEEC midertook, on a regional basis,
progressively to dismantle its quantitative re-
strictions to trade. In order to lubricate this
process of liberalization and to facilitate multi-
lateral settlements, the European Payments
Union was founded.

Private initiative throughout Western Eu-
rope responded quickly to these new opportuni-
ties for trade and investment. Exports to
member countries rose from $7.6 billion in 1948
to $13.5 billion in 1953. During the same period
the real gross national product of the area ad-
vanced from $132 billion to $172 billion a year,
a gain of over 30 percent. These exports and
imports are but the statistical expression of the
cumulative effects of the activities of tens of
thousands of private manufacturers and trad-
ers, whose energies had been released by govern-
mental action.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Political and economic measures, however,
were not of themselves sufficient to meet the total
problem that the Western nations faced at that
time. In fact, they could not have succeeded
had not the governments concerned also taken
unprecedented politico-military steps to defend
the Atlantic community from the threat of So-
viet aggression.

DEl'ARTJrENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Czeclioslovakian coup d'etat and the Ber-
lin blockade, in 1948, shattered postwar hopes
of East-West cooperation. America and Eu-
rope had to look urgently to their defenses.
Their response was in the pattern set by their
experience of cooperation in economic matters.
They created the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, an alliance unique in history in that it
placed national forces, in peacetime, under inter-
national command. NATO provided the shield
of security and the sense of confidence which
were vital to Europe's reconstruction and the
continuing dynamic development of the Atlantic
community.

The sharing of defense responsibilities among
the NATO partners has vastly increased the
security of each — and of all. At the same time
it has permitted the Atlantic community con-
fidently to devote large resources to productive
purposes, despite the constant external threat.
This has been possible because NATO has suc-
cessfully met that threat. Twenty-five NATO
divisions — representing no fewer than seven
NATO nations — guard the eastern bastions of
Atlantic freedom. The presence in Germany
of the equivalent of six divisions of American
troops testifies to the United States' energetic
fulfillment of its own NATO commitments and
to America's recognition that the defense of
Europe and the United States is inseparable.

There is, however, no cause for complacency.
Advances in military science, and the continued
presence of powerful Soviet armies in Eastern
Europe, require continual modernization and
further strengthening of NATO's military
might, particularly its conventional forces. In
the nuclear field, too, the formation of a seaborne
multilateral force — now under consideration by
eight nations — will provide an important diver-
sification and strengthening of the NATO deter-
rent and a means whereby Europe may play a
more extensive nuclear role in its own defense.

Like most of the postwar institutions we have
created, NATO also fulfills a multiple purpose.
In its early years NATO was necessarily pre-
occupied by the menace of military aggression
in Europe. Since that period, however, devel-
opments in the world political situation have
compelled the alliance to take a broader view
of its responsibilities in meeting the total threat
to our democratic institutions. The members

of the alliance have made NATO an effective
forum for political consultation. Day by day,
in the North Atlantic Council, the representa-
tives of 15 nations exchange views and infor-
mation on a wide variety of international issues
affecting the vital interests of the free world.
Like the Marshall Plan, NATO has also given
additional scope to private enterprise and has
provided a new stimulus to its ingenuity. For
reasons of security and gi-eater rationalization
of effort, NATO has encouraged as broad a
production base as possible — embracing large
segments of the private sector. Wliile there are
many examples of cooperative production ef-
forts which have given the alliance new and
better weapons, one of the most outstanding is
certainly the imprecedented common effort to
produce the F-104G Starfighter. In this vast
program, which has now involved expenditures
of over $3 billion, such famous names in air-
craft manufacture as Lockheed, Fiat, Messer-
schmitt, and Fokker have combined their tech-
nical skills to contribute to the common defense
of the West.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Another early postwar achievement of di-
plomacy was the establishment in 1947 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — the
GATT. Not only did the GATT keep under
strict surveillance the application of the quanti-
tative restrictions and exchange controls which,
at that time, were the operative barriers to
trade. Looking ahead to the era in which
quotas would be eliminated, the GATT began
a series of multilateral negotiations to reduce
tariffs. The tariff negotiations under GATT
were lengthy and difficult — the most recent con-
ference, the so-called Dillon Round, lasted
almost 2 years. They acliieved, however, very
substantial reductions in tariff levels on a world-
wide basis.

There is still considerable work to be done
under the GATT, not only in the tariff field
but also in removing nontariff obstacles to trade.
The most immediate and important challenge
ahead is the Kennedy Round negotiations,
which have just had their formal opening at
Geneva.^ The success of these negotiations is

°For background, see Bulletin of June 1, 1964,
p. 878.

aXTLY 6, 1964

an imperative not just for the Atlantic nations
but for the whole free world.

The Process of "Building Europe"

The postwar development of international
cooperation also encouraged Europeans to take
steps, among themselves, toward more compre-
hensive economic and political unification. M.
Schuman's proposal in 1950 for a Coal and Steel
Community was the first step in this direction.
After the failure of the proposal for a Euro-
pean Defense Community in 1954, European
statesmen again sought new ways of achieving
progress toward European political unification.
The result was the Treaty of Rome of 1957,
establishing both the European Economic Com-
munity and EIIRATOM.

The United States Government welcomed
and supported the establisliment of both these
communities. Our support was primarily
based on their importance as leading toward an
eventual political union of Europe. We also
recognized, however, that the establishment of
a unified European economic area, although it
posed risks of discrimination against us, would
ultimately result in a greatly increased flow of
trade and investment between Europe and
America — to the economic advantage of both.

On both sides of the Atlantic we are having
problems of adjustment as this new European
entity is being created. This process of re-
ciprocal adjustment will continue and will pro-
vide headaches for us all. However, we must
not let our difficulties cause us to lose sight of
the larger economic and political advantages.
It was, in fact, the stimulus of the EEC which
prompted the establishment of the European
Free Trade Association — and the United States
Trade Expansion Act — both important steps
toward reducing trade barriers in the Western
World.

The process of "building Europe," as the
proponents of European unity call it, is far
from complete. Yet it is certainly more than
begun. It is universally recognized that the
European Economic Conmiunity has had the
political effect of drawing its members closer
together. There have been checks in the move-
ment toward unity. A major one was the
failure of the negotiations for British entry into

the EEC. Indeed, there is not at present full
agreement among Europeans on either the mem-
bership or the nature of the Europe of the
future they are seeking to create. It seems
clear, however, that a great majority of Euro-
peans favor further steps toward integration,
and I am confident that, in the long run, this
desire will find fruition in a great political
act of union.

In the meantime, much freer movement of
goods, labor, and capital among the Common
Market countries has made it possible for the
first time to rationalize production on a Euro-
pean-wide basis and thereby to benefit directly
almost 200 million consumers. A more com-
plete "division of labor" within Europe has
been achieved. American private traders have
also participated substantially in the new oppor-
tunities that have been created in the Common
Market area. This is shown by the fact that
U.S. exports to the Common Market rose from
about $2.4 billion in 1958 to something like $3.9
billion in 1963.

Moreover, many American firms, desiring to
share in the rapid growth of the Common
Market, have invested heavily in building new
manufacturing and assembly plants in the EEC
area. These investments have brought about
a healthy cross-fertilization of ideas and pro-
duction techniques across the Atlantic. Most
Common Market countries recognize, as do the
Germans, that these investments stimulate com-
petition and increase productivity within
Europe. They help provide new markets for
European manufacturers. They also have the
important effect of accelerating the overall eco-
nomic integration taking place within the At-
lantic world.

International Monetary Cooperation

An important goal of more than a decade of
postwar economic diplomacy was the achieve-
ment of currency convertibility within the At-
lantic world. This goal had been set at the 1944
monetary conference at Bretton Woods. There
the twin institutions — the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank — were estab-
lished with the view to bringing about a new
multilateral monetary order in the postwar
period. With the economic gains I have de-

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BUU^TIN

scribed, most European members of the Atlantic
community -were able by 1958 to announce full
or partial convertibility of their currencies.

Primarily because of its profound impact, the
advent of currency convertibility has brought
in its wake some difficult problems of adjust-
ment. However, the postwar habit of consulta-
tion has continued to expand — particularly in
the field of international monetary cooperation.
I have in mind the periodic discussions within
the IMF itself; the Economic Policy Committee
and Working Party III of the OECD, the
successor of the OEEC ; the monthly meetings
in Basel of central bankers; the cooperative
study of the world's payments system now
underway by the Group of Ten ; ^ and the Lon-
don gold pool. This cooperation has made it
possible to respond effectively, and sometimes
with lightning rapidity, to the new strains of a
convertible world.

Within this larger framework, the Common
Market as an institution has also begun to at-
tack the problem of inflation on a Community-
wide basis. The measures announced last
month in Brussels will certainly assist in assur-
ing more stable monetary conditions among the
Six. It is a concomitant of its successful inte-
gration in trade that the Common Market
achieve an increasing degree of integration in
fiscal and monetary policies — looking toward
the full economic union scheduled for 1970.
In this instance, inflationary pressures through-
out Europe, but particularly in Italy, provided
the problem and the stimulus. The Community
has recognized that, when a member suffers
difficulties of this kind, the matter is of con-
cern to the whole Community.

All these achievements of postwar diplo-
macy—the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, NATO,
the GATT, the Common Market, and currency
convertibility — have one vital element in com-
mon : the recognition that decisions of one coun-
try affect the interests of others. The recogni-
tion of interdependence in economic matters,
and the establishment of rules and institutions
aimed at reducing or eliminating national eco-
nomic barriers, contrast sharply with the "beg-
gar thy neighbor" attitude which prevailed be-
tween the two world wars. It was this attitude

* For background, see ibid., Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615.

that contributed greatly to the spreading of the
Great Depression throughout Europe and North
America during the 1930's. It is interesting and
instructive to recall that, here in this lovely city
of Vienna, the depression was triggered in Eu-
rope when self-defeating decisions taken outside
Austria caused the failure of the Kreditanstalt.

While this complex of postwar institutions
has prevented many of the abuses of former
times, its greatest value has been in the scope
it has given to private initiative. We on the
govermnental side are proud that we have been
able to create this institutional framework.
You on the private side can, in my opinion, be
equally proud of the dramatic way in which you
have responded to the opportunities thus opened
up.

Your accomplishments and those of your col-
leagues and clients have indeed been remark-
able. Tlie combined GNP of the Atlantic area
rose from about $450 billion in 1950 to almost
$1,000 billion last year. The foreign trade of
the Atlantic nations has almost doubled during
the past 10 years — from roughly $50 billion in
1953 to over $90 billion today. The new eco-
nomic activity this trade reflects has provided
20 million additional jobs since 1950. These
new figures demonstrate the rapid increase in
prosperity made possible by an international
rationalization of private productive effort.

But this is by no means the entire story. The
increasing integration of our economies has
certainly brought us all closer together in a
number of ways. How far the process has gone
in affecting our daily lives was impressed upon
me recently when my daughter asked me
whether I had heard the latest definition of
what it is to be a typical American. A typi-
cal American, she said, is a man who drives
home from an Italian movie in his German car,
sits down on his Danish furniture, and writes
with his Japanese ballpoint pen on Irish sta-
tionery to his Congressman, complaining about
too much gold outflow from the United States.
Our movement toward Atlantic integration has,
however, not only given us greater prosperity
and fullness of life ; it has created greater imity
and through greater unity greater strength.

I am, of course, well aware that serious politi-
cal and economic problems still confront the
Atlantic community. Our diplomacy does not

JXTLT 6, 1964

take them lightly. Considered in isolation
from the general trend of our affairs, some
of them seem formidable. In economic mat-
ters, the Europe of the Six is able to speak
with one voice and the United States is able
to consult and negotiate with this entity to our
mutual advantage. There is, however, no
representative at the international conference
table who speaks for Europe on the political
plane. There one hears many voices — some-
times strident voices — representing purely
national interests. The major Continental Eu-
ropean powers are often not in accord. Consul-
tation with us thus becomes a process much
more complex and much less fiixitful than it
could be if Europe were a political entity. As
a result, Europe's collective "weight" in world
affairs is much less than it should be.

Those who focus their gaze only on the diffi-
culties we are encountering will find the catalog
discouraging. Let me point out, however, that
a good many of our current concerns are the
product, not of stagnation in the Atlantic com-
munity, but of its tremendous achievements.
We would not be worrying about imperfections
in the organization of Europe and an Atlantic
partnership if we had not already advanced such
a long way toward establishing both. In the
perspective of almost two decades of develop-
ment, the state of our Atlantic world gives busi-
nessmen and diplomats alike just reason for
pride — and for confidence in the future.

The Atlantic World and the Developing Nations

We all know that we cannot stand still. We
on the government side must continue to cope
with new problems as they arise and to seek to
create even greater opportunities for private
endeavor. However, I submit that, at the pres-
ent stage, the function of diplomacy within the
Atlantic community consists more of striving to
perfect existing institutions and concepts than
of creating new ones. The key internal politi-
cal forces which will shape our future have
already been set in motion.

Indeed, the real challenge to our diplomacy
today lies in a new direction. It is to make
possible the expansion of our horizons beyond
the confines of our Atlantic world, to our rela-

tions with the vast areas and peoples of the de-
veloping countries. Here diplomacy is begin-
ning a new chapter of history. Here, during
the decades ahead, the task of both diplomacy
and private business is to establish a new dimen-
sion to their cooperation.

Wliile we recognize that we have much to
learn about the complicated process of develop-
ment, it seems to me that some of the basic
principles that have worked so well in bringing
prosperity and integration to our Atlantic
world are applicable. Large transfers of public
as well as private capital will be required;
security against the threat of invasion or sub-
version must be assured ; impediments to trade
must be reduced or eliminated ; stable monetary
conditions must be attained ; and above all there
will need to be created a governmental and insti-
tutional framework which gives scope and stim-
ulation to private enterprise. In meeting the
challenges of the less developed world, there will
be a need for all of the energy and creativeness,
as well as the patience and understanding, which
both diplomacy and business can provide.

A successful Kennedy Round will in itself
create new opportunities for a further substan-
tial expansion of trade— not just among the
Atlantic nations but between us and tlae develop-
ing world. The success of this effort, of course,
not only depends on the diplomatic skills of the
various nations represented at the conference
but the extent to which private businessmen
throughout the West support these negotiations
and take advantage of the new trade opportuni-
ties which the negotiations will create.

In providing for the future, we must also be
prepared to work cooperatively to strengthen
the processes for adjusting payments balances
between countries. Much remains to be learned
as we seek to develop a dependable adjustment
mechanism within the context of payments
freedom. We cannot, however, safely rely upon
the outcome of uncoordinated policies or the re-
sultant of random forces to do the job for us.

Another major task both for the Atlantic na-
tions and the developing countries is to insure
the continuing stability of the world's payments
system and the adequacy of international li-
quidity. This matter, as you know, is currently

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

being studied by the Group of Ten. Since Sec-
retary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon and
Under Secretary [of the Treasury Eobert V.]
Eoosa will surely have much to say to you on
this subject, I will do no more than mention it
as a further important area in which the inter-
ests of government and business coincide.

Other government problems will remain.
New ones will doubtless emerge. Broadly
viewed, however, the Kennedy Round tariff re-
ductions and the further strengthening of the
international payments system will bring the
Atlantic community to the threshold of a new
era, in which a major responsibility for further
economic expansion will rest in private hands.
To maintain what has been achieved, and to
build upon it, will be a task for you, for your
European colleagues, and for your clients on
both sides of the Atlantic.

This task will not be easy. It involves much
more than the exploitation of new trade op-
portunities. The maintenance of our newly
won freedoms requires economic statesmanship
of the highest order — combined with a long-
term perspective. The high degree of integra-
tion we have achieved cannot survive if our
private firms cry for national protection when-
ever they feel the pinch of competition. Our
industrial associations cannot just be pressure
groups for new restrictions on trade, denounc-
ing a product because it is "foreign" — or because
it was produced elsewhere with less expensive
labor. Such attitudes can destroy the precious
framework of freedom which we in govern-
ment have in the postwar years striven so hard
to build, and which you in business have so
strongly supported.

Pattern of Parallel and Reciprocal Roles

Summing up, we have traced the roles of
government and business in the postwar years.
The pattern which emerges is one of parallel
and reciprocal actions. I hope you will grant
that, in the dark days following the war when
the economic weather was so bad as to be con-
sidered almost hopeless, diplomacy demon-
strated its ability to act courageously and de-
cisively. With an improvement in climate, pri-

vate enterprise responded vigorously and
boldly. Further diplomatic moves, some of
which are still in train, have again enlarged the
sphere of potential private achievement. Now,
again, the next move is up to you.

Within the business community, you bankers
will have an especially important part to play.
You are more than just the financiers of trade
and industry. You are also the advisers and
counselors of business leadership. In two
important ways, your advice will be influential
in determining whether we of the Western
World rise fully to the challenges we face.

One is the opportunity you have to stimulate
responsible discussion of the problems and po-
tentialities which lie ahead both for business
and for government. You can do much to
insure that questions of business and govern-
mental policy are considered in an Atlantic-
wide perspective — indeed, in a free-world per-
spective, which is their true context today.

The other and even more important service
you can perform is to aid business in identifying
and grasping the myriads of opportunities for
private enterprise which have been created by
parallel public and private action in the postwar
years. If you can assist in guiding the ener-
gies of private enterprise into the channels
which now lie open to receive them, you will
indeed help to make this era of expanding
frontiers an era of triumph for free men.

Your vision must leap over oceans and na-
tional boundaries. You must advise your
clients in Chicago — or Topeka — of opportuni-
ties in Frankfurt — or Lagos — just as your pred-
ecessors advised Eastern investors of oppor-
tunities in California. Some day you and your
European colleagues will find it as natural to
carry on business intercontinentally as you now
find it to deal with your fellow bankers
throughout the United States.

A wide field for achievement lies before you.
I am confident that you will, as you pursue your
task, find your Government at your side — not
hindering but ready to help you over the diffi-
cult paths. I am confident that you, for your
part, will discharge your own responsibilities
with broad vision and high purpose.

JITLT 6, 1964

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate
Transpacific Teleplione Cable

Following is an exchange of remarks between
President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Hayato Ikeda on June 18 inaugurating a
new transpacific telephone cable from Hawaii
to Japan.

White House press release dated June 18
President Johnson

This is an historic and happy occasion. The
new cable between our countries is another wel-
come step toward transforming the Pacific from
a barrier to a bridge between Asia and America.

I am sure better communications will mean
even better understanding between our peoples.

We are proud this symbol of the strong bonds
of friendship between the United States and
Japan is being placed in service this year when
the Olympic games focus the eyes of the world
on your country and your capital city.

May I take this opportunity to express to you
and your countrymen the sympathy and con-
cern of my countrymen for the suffering and
sorrow inflicted by the earthquakes this week.

We are proud to work with your country in
the labors of the free world, Mr. Prime Min-
ister, and it is my great pleasure to talk with
you in this way tonight.

Prime Minister Ikeda

Thank you very much for your gracious mes-
sage, Mr. President, which I just listened to
on this newly installed means of commimica-
tion.

Today the transpacific cable for which both
Japan and the United States have long yearned
is successfully opened. We can indeed congrat-
ulate ourselves for this achievement. In behalf
of the people and Government of Japan, I
should like to express my heartfelt felicitation
to yon, Mr. President, and to the people of the
United States.

The rapid progress made in the field of science
and technology has brought about revolutionary
changes in the field of electric telecommunica-
tions. The role such changes have played in

the advancement of man's well-being is immeas-
urable.

In political, economic, cultural, and other
areas of our endeavors, the relations between
Japan and the United States have become closer
than ever. This newly created physical bond
across the Pacific, in addition to the recent de-
velopment in the satellite communications, will
enable our peoples even more to deepen our
mutual understandings and encourage our coop-
erative works. The fact that we can now
exchange our voices between Tokyo and Wash-
ington more clearly and speedily than ever will
benefit greatly not only the relations between
Japan and the United States but also our com-
mon effort to achieve peace and prosperity in
the world.

Mr. President, we deeply appreciate the
sympathy you and the people of your country
have extended to us on the earthquake disaster
in northwest Japan.

Being grateful to share with you, Mr. Presi-
dent, the privilege of being the first user of this
cable, I should like to extend on this occasion
my greetings to you, Mr. President, and to con-
vey the deep feelings of friendship and good
wishes of the Japanese people to the people of
the United States.

President Announces Determination
On Credit Guarantees for Rumania

Follotohig is the text of a letter from, Presi-
dent Johnson to Carl Hayden., President pro
tempore of the Senate. An identical letter xoas
sent on the same day to John W. McCormack,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated June 15

June 15, 1964
Dear Mr. PREsroENT: In compliance with
Title III of the Foreign Aid and Related Agen-
cies Appropriation Act, 1964, this is to inform
you that I have determined that it is in the
national interest for the Export-Import Bank to
issue guarantees in connection with the sale of
United States products and services to Rumania.
This determination is in addition to the deter-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

mination relating to agricultural products of
which I informed you on February 4, 1964 ' and
is intended to cover all types of United States
products and services.

Tliese guarantees will be limited to sales on
short and medium term credits.

The Export-Import Bank will report the
individual guarantees to the Congress as they
may be issued.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors
Placed Under IAEA Safeguards

Ths UjS. Ato-mic Energy Com/mission re-
leased on June 11 the following announcement,
which had ieen distributed to the public media
that day at Vienna by the International Atomic
Energy Agency.

The Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency today [June 11] ap-
proved an agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and tlie Agency
whereby four reactors in the United States will
be placed under Agency safeguards against
diversion to nonpeaceful ends.

The four reactors concerned are the Yankee
Nuclear Power Station in Howe, Massachusetts ;
the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor;
the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor; and
the Piqua Organic Moderated Power Reactor.^
The most important of these is the Yankee
Power Reactor, both because of its size and the
fact that it is the first power plant with a ther-
mal capacity of more than 100 megawatts to be
placed under the IAEA expanded safeguards
system which was finally approved by the board
in February of this year.

Tlie Yankee Reactor, owned by the Yankee
Atomic Electric Company, is a pressurized,

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 24, 1964, p. 298.

" The two research reactors are located at Brook-
haven National Laboratory on Long Island in New
York, and the Piqua reactor is located at Piqua, Ohio.

light water nuclear power plant producing elec-
tricity for the New England area. It is fueled
with slightly enriched uranium, and its annual
plutonium production is estimated at over 80
kilograms. The output has been raised to 600
megawatts thermal (175 MWE) although it
was originally designed for only 392 megawatts
thermal. The plant is privately owned and
operated.

The International Atomic Energy Agency
Director General was informed in April of this
year that the United States intended to invite
the Agency to apply its safeguards to this facil-
ity, and this intent was also announced by the
U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Con-
ference in Geneva.^

An agreement for such an application of
IAEA safeguards has in the meantime been
drafted by the U.S. authorities and the Agency
secretariat, and the board today approved the
agreement which will be in force for five years.
The Yankee Reactor will be open for inspection
"at all times", but it has not yet been decided
if Agency inspectors will make frequent inspec-
tion trips from Vienna or have an inspector
stationed at the facility.

The Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor
with a capacity of 20 MWT will also be open for
inspection at all times because of its large in-
ventory of highly enriched fuel. The Medical
Research Reactor in Brookliaven has a capacity
of 3 M^VT and the Piqua Power Reactor of 45.5
MWT ; the latter started to produce electricity
in November 1963.

The last three reactors have been inspected
by IAEA under its safeguards system since
mid-1962, but the agreement covering this phase
was drawn up mainly to make it possible for the
Agency staff to gain experience in the practical
application of safeguards. The agreement now
approved by the board covers full safeguards
arrangements in accordance with the Agency
statute.

The cost of the safeguards arrangements
under this agreement will be borne by IAEA.

' For text of a statement made by Adrian S. Fisher
on Mar. 5, see Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

JULY 6, 1964

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^

In Session as of June 30, 1964

Conference of the 18- Nation Committee on Disarmament .... Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

Scheduied July Through September 1964

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Bangkok

Session.

14th International Film Festival Karlovy Vary, Czecho-
slovakia.

BIRPI Industrial Property Seminar for Latin America Bogotd

FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program: Geneva

5th Session.

27th International Conference on Public Education Geneva

5th European Civil Aviation Conference Strasbourg

ANZUS Council: 1 1th Meeting Washington

IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session London

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 10th Tokyo

Session.

PAHC Permanent Executive Committee and the Darien Sub- Mexico, D.F . . . .

committee.

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session Geneva

IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th London

Session.

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Telecommunication Experts: 2d Tokyo

Session.

17th International Film Festival Locarno

lA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Santiago

Meeting.

South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commis- Wellington

sion.

8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Vina del Mar, Chile .

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th London

Session.

ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok

UNESCO International Conference on Youth Grenoble

Meeting of the P.artics to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of Ottawa

the North Pacific Ocean.

3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Geneva

Energy.

17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh

South Pacific Commission: Regional Education Seminar Noumea

ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session Montreal

3d FAO Regional Conference for Africa Tananarive

ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Costs . Geneva

ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference Madrid

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: lOtli Session . . . Washington

U.N. ECA Industrial Coordination Conference in West Africa . . . Bamako, Mali . . . .

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- New York

tions.

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcommittee on London Sept. 21

Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain.

July 1-

July 4-

July 6-
July 6-

July 6-
July 6-
July 13-
July 13-
July 13-

July 13-

July 13-
July 20-

July 22-

July 22-
July

July

Aug. 1-
Aug. 4-

Aug. 4-
Aug. 23-
Aug. 31-

Aug. 31-

August
August or Sep

tember
Sept. 1-
Sept. 3-
Sept. 7-
Sept. 7-
Sept. 8-
Sept. 15-
Sept. 15-

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 19, 1964. Following is a list of abbre\iations:
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for
the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture
Organization; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation
Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Orga-
nization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication
Union; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congress; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United
Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

28 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session

2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Health . . .

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry . . .

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session

FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session

BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee

U.N. ECE Coal Committee

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Meeting .

International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly ....

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Session.

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting . . .

Inter-American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Directing
Council.

lA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports

PAHO Directing Council: 15th Meeting

Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Educa-
tion.

U.N. ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage
Techniques.

UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference

UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session

UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Survey
Methods.

Geneva Sept. 21-

Beirut Sept. 21-

Geneva Sept. 21-

Rome Sept. 22-

Auckland Sept. 22-

Geneva Sept. 28-

Copenhagen Sept. 28-

Caracas Sept. 30-

Manila September

San Jos6 September

Montevideo September

Lima September

Mexico, D.F. September

Santiago September

Paris September

Cairo September

Paris September

Toulouse September

U.N. Security Council Condemns Apartheid in South Africa;
Sets Up Committee To Study Sanctions

Following are two statements made hy Am-
bassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representa-
tive, in the Security Council, together with a
resolution adopted hy the Council on June 18.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 16

U.S. /U.N. press release 4415 and Corr. 1

I want to express the appreciation of my dele-
gation to the distinguished Ambassador of
Norway and to the other conferees who have
produced the resolution that has just been in-
troduced after prolonged and careful consid-
eration. Pending the introduction of a resolu-
tion, we have refrained from speaking at this
session of the Security Council on the subject
of apartheid. However, now that a resolution
is before the Council for action, I should like to
take the liberty of expressing the views of my
Government on the subject of racial discrimina-

tion in the Republic of South Africa and on the
resolution that has been mtroduced.

The apartheid policies of the Government of
South Africa not only offend the principles set
forth in the charter; they challenge our deter-
mination to uphold these principles, and they
challenge the ability of the United Nations to
find the best means of influencing the course
of South African history toward peaceful
change.

South Africa's racial policies have forced
upon the United Nations the task of trying to
persuade a member state to alter a course of
action wliich affects not only its own peoples
but the racial situation in the world at large.
The United Nations' task is not only to help
the majority of the peoples of South Africa to
fulfill their legitimate aspirations but also to
avoid a racial conflict which could seriously
trouble peace and progress in Afi-ica and
throughout the world.

JTILY 6, 1964

Ever since the seventh session in 1952, the
Assembly first, and then the Security Council,
have sought to express the United Nations' con-
victions and impress its influence upon a situa-
tion which, because it involves violations of the
charter and because it may become even more
serious, is a situation of international concern.

In the world of today no nation can be en-
tirely "sovereign," no nation can ignore the im-
pact of its national acts on the rest of mankind.
In a recent address delivered at the University
of California, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in comparing the evolution of
the League of Nations and the United Nations
stated this idea very clearly: "The basis," he
said, "of both the League of Nations and the
United Nations is the pledge by sovereign
states to cooperate, a pledge which involves
some measure of sacrifice of sovereignty in the
common interest .... We are now moving-
away quickly from the world of compartmenta-
lized self-sufficiency into a world where Imman
solidarity daily becomes more essential."

In the second place, Mr. President, in their
continuing concern for the situation in South
Africa, the member states of this organization
have adhered to the concept that the freedom of
men anywhere is the concern of men every-
where. This concept is not only expressed in
the 55th article of our charter and in the Decla-
ration of Human Riglits but is inscribed on the
hearts of men of good will universally.

Finally, Mr. President, the member states of
the United Nations have considered the policy
of apartheid to be a racial issue and therefore of
concern to all men. They consider it racist in
its origins, arrogant in its implementation, and,
in its consequences, potentially dangerous for
all.

For many years the United States Govern-
ment has urged the Government of the Republic
of South Africa, both within and outside the
United Nations, to abandon this policy.

I would add, Mr. President, that opposition
to apartheid in this country springs from the
very roots of our historical and political ideals.
It is intensified by the determined efforts we
have now set in motion in this country to realize
fully the society these ideals prescribe, one
which affords equal and just treatment to all our

citizens without regard to race or religion, and
without discrimination of any kind.

New Developments in South Africa

Since last the Security Council turned its at-
tention to the question of apartheid, new de-
velopments in South Africa have increased our
concern. Just last week we learned with pro-
found regret of the life sentences imposed on
eight of the defendants in the Rivonia trials, in-
cluding some of the most prominent leaders in
the struggle against apartheid, although we
were, of course, relieved that death sentences
were not imposed. The sentences and the ac-
tions that led to them are yet another distressing
sign of the tragic interaction between repres-
sion and violence which in South Africa today
continues to frustrate any progress toward con-
ciliation and negotiation. The basic philosophy
of the laws under which the defendants were
charged, the law under which persons are de-
tained for the purpose of providing evidence,
and the whole legislative and administrative
machinery which takes away the rights of all in
trying to preserve them for a minority, is cause
for deep concern.

Since the Security Council last considered
apartheid, the promulgation of new laws of the
kind described in the report of the Special Com-
mittee on Apartheid, the further additions to
the military forces of South Africa that might
be used for internal suppression, and the pas-
sage by the Soutli African Parliament of the dis-
criminatory Bantu Laws Amendment bill, all
these indications give us little hope that the
Government is changing its view of the status
of non whites in South Africa.

Tliere is no doubt in our minds that seeds of
violence are planted by each one of these repres-
sive acts based upon the repugnant philosophy
of apartheid. There is an increasingly dan-
gerous interaction between repression and vio-
lence, and time is running out in which to turn
the spiral down — toward a peaceful solution.
The moving statement of Nelson Mandela,
spoken in his defense at the Rivonia trial, pre-
sented to the world the anguish and frustration
of those struggling against the mjustices of
South Africa's racial policies.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Since the adoption of the Security Council's
resolution of 4 December/ the Council has re-
ceived two reports from the Special Committee
on Apartheid ^ and the report of the Secretary-
GeneraP which contained the report of the
group of experts which he appointed under the
terms of that resolution. We have examined the
various conclusions and recommendations of
these bodies with care. While we have a number
of reservations about certain aspects of these re-
ports, and in particular do not subscribe to the
recommendations in paragraph 121 of the report
of the group of experts, we share the intense
concern which they reflect.

We very much regret tliat the South African
Government did not choose to afford the group
of experts an opportunity to visit South Africa
and thus to enhance the objectivity and accu-
racy of their report. Such a visit would, we
think, have facilitated the group's task.

Their report places particular emphasis on
the need for what they term a "National Con-
vention'' to help to bring about a peaceful reso-
lution of the situation. The United States has
consistently held that the ultimate solution in
South Africa must be worked out by the peoples
of South Africa themselves, worked out on the
basis of a free and equal exchange of views be-
tween all segments of the population, worked
out on the basis of give and take.

The first link in such consultation must be the
establishment of communication. We would
hope the South African Government for its
part would respond favorably to such a concept,
would cooperate with the United Nations, and
would seek such assistance, both within and out-
side the United Nations, as might be usefiil.

We also see merit in the concept of a special
training and education program for South
Africans to be established under the auspices of
the United Nations. Such a program would
afford to those South Africans who liave chosen
to leave their country, or who have little access
to higher education within their country, a

' For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on
Dec. 4 and text of the resolution, see Bulletin of
Jan. 20, 1964, p. 92.

' U.N. docs. S/5621 and S/5717.

' U.N. doc. S/5658 and Corr. 1.

chance to pursue their studies elsewhere. The
United States is prepared to examine oppor-
tunities to contribute to such a program, both
financially and in terms of scholarship and other
facilities at American educational institutions.
There is much interest throughout the world in
such a program and much willingness to help in
providing educational opportunities for South
Africans. In the past, however, there has been
some difficulty in finding the best way of apply-
ing offers of assistance. We would envisage
that such a program, if established, would pro-
vide a useful central point for administering
effectively educational assistance for South
Africans.

U.S. Position Concerning Sanctions

Much has been said here in the Council and
elsewhere on the question of sanctions. My
Government continues to believe that the situa-
tion in South Africa, though charged with som-
ber and dangerous implications, does not today
provide a basis under the charter for the appli-
cation by the Security Council of coercive meas-
ures. Nor can we support the concept of an
ultimatum to the South African Government
which could be interpreted as threatening the
application of coercive measures in the situation
now prevailing, since in our view the charter
clearly does not empower the Security Council
to apply coercive measures in such a situation.

However, the group of experts has suggested
that a study of sanctions be undertaken. My
Government has given this proposal serious and
prolonged consideration and would be prepared
to support the initiation of a properly designed
study and to participate in it. But — and let
me be explicit — our willingness to see such a
study go forward under certain circumstances
or our willingness to participate in such a study
represents in no way an advance commitment
on the part of my Government to support at
any specific time the application under the
charter of coercive measures with regard to the
South African situation or any other situation ;
nor should this position be interpreted as re-
lating to our view of the situation in South
Africa today or what it may become tomorrow.
We do feel that such a study, if agreed to by

JTXLT 6, 1964

the Security Council, could make a contribu-
tion to a fuller understanding on the part of
the Council. Wliile our support for such a
study, and agreement to participate in it, is
without any commitments or implications as to
our future actions, we think that if and when
a situation arose in which sanctions might be
appropriately considered imder the charter — a
situation which does not today exist — the avail-
ability of a detailed, practical, and expert study
would have considerable utility.

Mr. President, like other members of the
United Nations, we continue to search for prac-
tical means of bringing about in South Africa
the changes we all seek. In a spirit of fairness
we must search for means and steps which
would have a practical and beneficial effect on
the present situation. This has been the spirit
of the resolutions adopted by the Council last
August * and December, and we believe that it
is the spirit of the resolution just introduced
by the distinguished representative of Norway.
Needless to say, we will continue to adhere to
the past resolutions of the Security Council,
and we will continue to search for ways of im-
pressing upon the Government of South Africa
the conviction of our Government and people
that only through a policy of justice and equity
for all its peoples can it look forward to a
peaceful future.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 18

U.S. /U.N. press release 4416

I want to intervene briefly to express once
again the appreciation of the United States
delegation both to the sponsors of this resolu-
tion and to the several delegations wliicli have
worked so hard and so long to reach an agree-
ment on its terms. As the representative of
Norway said the day before yesterday in intro-
ducing the resolution, it represents a compro-
mise but we feel a valid comiaromise which may
well prove helpful toward the solution of this
stubborn problem which has vexed the world

* For U.S. .statements made in the Security Council
on Aug. 2 and 7, 1963, and text of a resolution adopted
on Aug. 7, see Bulletin of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

community and our debates for so many years.
Mr. President, I am afraid that the distin-
guished representative of Morocco has mis-
understood my statement of the day before
yesterday. "Wliat I said was that my delega-
tion could not subscribe to the recommendations
of the group of experts contained in paragraph
121 of the report. I call to your attention that
that paragraph reads in part as follows:

If no satisfactory reply is received from the South
African Government by the stipulated date. ... we
recommend that the Security Council . . . then take
the decision to apply economic sanctions in the light
of the result of the examination recommended . . .
above.

Wliat we cannot subscribe to, Mr. President, is
the concept of an ultimatum to South Africa
that, unless it complies with the recommenda-
tions for a convention by a stipulated date, eco-
nomic sanctions will automatically be applied,
regardless of the factual situation.

Secondly, I am sorry that the Soviet Union
could not support a resolution calling for a
study of measui-es which might be taken by this
Coimcil in accordance with the charter to in-
fluence the repugnant racial policies of South
Africa. In our opinion another rhetorical
cold-war attack on the United States, which
could have been copied from a hundred similar
attacks by the Soviet Union, is not a substitute
for some positive action about the sad situa-
tion in South Africa.

As I said the other day, the United States
will continue to search for practical means
which will assist in bringing about the changes
that I am sure we all seek. TVe will not only
use our best efforts to implement effectively
this present resolution, but we will continue to
adhere to past resolutions. Paragraph 12 of
the resolution that we have just adopted re-
affirms provisions contained in resolutions
adopted in August and December last. At
those times my Go\'ernment defined its position
on these questions and affirmed its adherence
to these provisions. I wish to reaffirm United
States adherence to these provisions with, of
course, the same understanding set forth in
August and December by the representutive of
my Government.

DEP.MtTMENT OF ST.VTE HULLETIN

Finally, Mr. President, let me express the
hope, which I am sure is common to all of the
representatives here present, that when we next
meet on this question we will be able to perceive
more improvement in the racial situation in
South Africa than we have heretofore.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION'

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of race conflict in
Soutli Africa resulting from tlie policies of apartheid
of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,
brought to the attention of the Security Council by
fifty-eight Member States in their letter of 27 April
1964,

Being gravely concerned with the situation in South
Africa arising out of the policies of apartheid which
are contrary to the principles and purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations and inconsistent with
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as well as South Africa's obligations under the
Charter,

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Sec-
retary-General pursuant to the Security Council
resolution of 4 December 1963 ( S/5471) ,

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of
T August 1963 (S/5386), 4 December 1963 (S/.5471)
and 9 June 1964 ( S/5761 ) ,

Convinced that the situation in South Africa is con-
tinuing seriously to disturb international peace and
security.

Deploring the refusal of the Government of the Re-
public of South Africa to comply with pertinent Secur-
ity Council resolutions.

Taking into account the recommendations and con-
clusions of the Group of Experts,

1. Condemns the apartheid policies of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa and the legis-
lation supporting these policies, such as the General
Law Amendment Act, and in particular its ninety-day
detention clause ;

2. Urgently reiterates its appeal to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa to liberate all
persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other re-
strictions for having opposed the policies of apartheid ;

3. Notes the recommendations and the conclusions
in the Report of the Group of Experts ;

^ U.N. doc. S/5773 ; adopted by the Council on June 18
by a vote of 8 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Czecho-
slovakia, France, U.S.S.R.).

4. Urgently appeals to the Government of the Re-
public of South Africa to :

(a) renounce the execution of any persons sen-
tenced to death for their opposition to the policy of
apartheid ;

(b) grant immediate amnesty to all per.sons de-
tained or on trial, as well as clemency to all persons
sentenced for their opposition to the Government's
racial policies ;

(c) abolish the practice of imprisonment without
charges, without access to counsel or without the
right of prompt trial ;

5. Endorses and subscribes in particular to the main
conclusion of the Group of Experts that "all the
people of South Africa should be brought into con-
sultation and should thus be enabled to decide the
future of their country at the national level" ;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consider what
assistance the United Nations may offer to facilitate
such consultations among representatives of all ele-
ments of the population in South Africa ;

7. Invites the Government of the Republic of South
Africa to accept the main conclusion of the Group of
Experts referred to in paragraph 5 above and to co-
operate with the Secretary-General and to submit its
views to him with respect to such consultations by 30
November 1964 ;

8. Decides to establish an Expert Committee, com-
posed of representatives of each present member of the
Security Council, to undertake a technical and prac-
tical study, and report to the Security Council as to
the feasibility, effectiveness, and implications of meas-
ures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the
Security Council under the United Nations Charter;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to the
Expert Committee the Secretariat's material on the
subjects to be studied by the Committee, and to co-
operate with the Committee as requested by it ;

10. Authorises the Expert Committee to request all
United Nations Members to co-operate with it and to
submit their views on such measures to the Committee
no later than 30 November 1964, and the Committee
to complete its report not later than three months
thereafter ;

11. Invites the Secretary-General in consultation
with appropriate United Nations specialized agencies
to establish an educational and training programme
for the purpose of arranging for education and train-
ing abroad for South Africans ;

12. Reaffirms its call upon all States to cease forth-
with the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms,
ammunition of all types, military vehicles, and equip-
ment and materials for the manufacture and main-
tenance of arms and ammtinition in South Africa ;

13. Requests all Member States to take such steps as
they deem appropriate to persuade the Government
of the Republic of South Africa to comply with this
resolution.

JXTLT 6, 1964

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Liberia

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of
January 11, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2171, 3140,
3955, 4460, 4733), relating to a military mission to
Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia
December 17, 1963, and April 24, 1964. Entered
into force April 24, 1964.

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations, including agreed measures for con-
servation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted
at Brussels June 2, 1964, at the Third Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting. Enters into force
upon notification of approval by all governments
whose representatives are entitled to participate in
Antarctic treaty consultative meetings.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc-
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 15, 1964.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12,
1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Acceptance deposited: Italy (with reservations) , May
25, 1964.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, an-
nex, regulations of execution, and provisions re-
garding air mail with final protocol. Done at Ot-
tawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1,

1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherence: Algeria, May 28, 1964.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,

1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, May 26, 1964.
Enters into force: May 26, 1965.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.'
Notification of approval: Denmark, May 4, 1964.

BILATERAL

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9 and
May 23, 1959 (TIAS 4369), approving the procedures
for reciprocal filing of classified patent applications
in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn
January 14 and May 28, 1964. Entered into force
May 28, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, V.8.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, which
may be obtained from the Offlce of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Informational Media Guaranties. Agreement with
Pakistan, amending the agreement of February 12 and
May 1, 19.54, as amended. Exchange of letters — Dated
at Karachi August 10, 1962, and April 15, 1963. En-
tered into force April 15, 1963. TIAS 5535. 4 pp. 5^.

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Portugal, amending the agreement of
March 19, 1960. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lisbon
June 3 and December 4, 1903. Entered into force De-
cember 4, 1963. TIAS 5536. 4 pp. 5(J.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan.
Signed at Amman February 11, 1964. Entered into
force February 11, 1964. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5537. 10 pp. 10«S.

Weather Stations — Continuation of Cooperative Me-
teorological Program. Agreement with Mexico. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Mexico February 14, 1964.
Entered into force February 14, 1964. Operative Janu-
ary 1, 1964. With memorandum of understanding.
TIAS 5540. 13 pp. lOi^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan.
Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered into force
March 2, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5541.
9 pp. 104.

Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ottawa March 6, 1964. Entered into force March 6,
1964. TIAS 5543. 2 pp. 5«(.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sudan, re-
lating to the agreement of March 17, 1959. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered
into force March 2, 1964. TIAS 5544. 3 pp. 5^.

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Norway, amending the agreement of May 25,
1949, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Washington March 16. 1964. Entered into force
March 16, 1964. TIAS 5545. 6 pp. 5«(.

Mutual Defense Assistance — Administrative Expendi-
tures. Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex B
to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Brussels February 6 and March 11,
1964. Entered into force March 11, 1964. TIAS 5546.
3 pp. 5^.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX July 6, 1961^ Vol. LI, No. 1306

American Republics. Making the World Safe

for Diversity (Hughes) 6

Atomic Energy. Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors

Placed Under IAEA Safeguards 27

Communism. Making the World Safe for Di-
versity (Hughes) 6

Congress. President Announces Determination
on Credit Guarantees for Rumania (text of
letter) 26

Disarmament. Making the World Safe for Di-
versity (Hughes) &

Economic Affairs

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy
in an Era of Expanding Frontiers (McGhee) . 18

President Announces Determination on Credit

Guarantees for Rumania (text of letter) . . 26

Europe

Making the World Safe for Diversity (Hughes) . 6

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy

in an Era of Expanding Frontiers (McGhee) . 18

Human Rights. U.N. Security Council Con-
demns Apartheid in South Africa ; Sets Up
Committee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson,
text of resolution) 29

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 28

Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors Placed Under IAEA
Safeguards 27

Japan. U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Transpacific

Telephone Cable (Ikeda, Johnson) .... 26

Laos. Why Laos Is Critically Important

(Rusk) 3

Military Affairs. Making the World Safe for

Diversity (Hughes) 6

Presidential Documents

President Announces Determination on Credit

Guarantees for Rumania 26

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Transpacific Tele-
phone Cable 26

Publications

Recent Releases . . ; 34

The 25th Anniversary of the Department of

State Bulletin (Rusk) 2

Rumania. President Announces Determination
on Credit Guarantees for Rumania (text of
letter) 26

South Africa. U.N. Security Council Condemns
Apartheid in South Africa ; Sets Up Commit-
tee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson, text of
resolution) 29

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 34

U.S.S.R. Making the World Safe for Diversity

(Hughes) . 6

United Nations. U.N. Security Council Con-
demns Apartheid in South Africa; Sets Up
Committee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson,
text of resolution) 29

Viet-Nam. Why Laos Is Critically Important

(Rusk) 3

Name Index

Hughes, Thomas L g

Ikeda, Hayato , 26

Johnson, President 26

McGhee, George O ig

Rusk, Secretary 2, 3

Stevenson, Adlai E 29

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C..
20520.

Release issued prior to June 15 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 282 of June 13.

Subject

No. Date

*283 6/15

*284 6/17

t285 6/17

*286 6/18

»287 6/19

*288 6/19

U.S. participation in international

conferences.
Sullivan : foreign policy conference,

Cleveland (excerpts).
Williams: "Africa South of the

Equator."
G. Lewis Jones to direct FSI senior

seminar (biographic details).
Program for visit of Turkish Prime

Minister.
Program for visit of Greek Prime

Minister.

*Not printed.

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of tlie United States
1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^3, Volum
/F, The Near East and Africa.

Most of the content of this volume relates to wartime problems, particularly the defense of th
Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particula
interest are those on United States policy regarding the postwar political organization of Greece, th
problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward th
entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine.

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__ _ ___ i

THE OFFICIAL WEEIOLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

JUL 2^ 1984

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

R-

L JUL '^< '"^v

\' B. a ».. /

Vol LI, No. 1307

July 13, 1964-

PRESIDENT JOHNSON DISCUSSES CYPRUS SITUATION
WITH PRIME MINISTERS OF TURKEY AND GREECE 48

EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 38

THREE WESTERN POWERS REAFFIRM DESIRE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Text of Tripartite Declaration 44

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR

6y Assistant Secretary Williams 61

THE RESURGENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

hy Joseph J. Sisco 55

For index see inside hack cover

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

hy W. W. Rostoio

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Plannvng Council ^

I have come today to share witli you some
thoughts about the future of Europe and the
Atlantic alliance. It is natural that we should
all address ourselves to this subject because we
have been passing through a period of pause
and of debate. The reasons for the pause and
the debate are clear enough.

First, the outcome of the Cuba missile crisis
brought to an end a period of intense crisis
and confrontation with the Soviet Union, which
began with the laimching of the Sputnik at the
end of 1957 and continued down to October
1962. The central front has been quiet now
for some time.

Second, the failure of British entry into the
Common Market early in 1963 raised funda-
mental questions about the future of European
organization as well as the future character of
relations between Europe and the United States.

' Address made before the Assembly of tie Western
European Union at Rome, Italy, on June 24 (press re-
lease 292 dated June 23) .

Essentially, what we have all been discussing,
in the light of these and other events, are two
questions :

Are NATO and the Atlantic comiection still
necessary, now that the confrontation with the
U.S.S.K. in Central Europe has abated?

Is European integration still feasible and de-
sirable, given the course of affairs within
Europe over the past year and a half?

And it is to those two questions that I shall
address myself this morning.

Our Agenda

It may be usefid to begin by trying to set
down the agenda Western Europe and the
United States must address. Only by assessing
the tasks with wliich history confronts us can
we judge whether they can best be dispatched
in partnership between the United States and
a uniting Europe or in some other way.

Here are some of the critical problems that
we must grip effectively in the days and months
and years ahead.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1307 PUBLICATION 7712 JULY 13, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
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and statements and addresses made by
the President and hy the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international afTiiirs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is Included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States Is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
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Publications of the Department, Unltetl
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Use of funds for printing of this pub-
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1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

First, there is the need for defense. Soviet
military capabilities remain as formidable as
they ever were. Soviet armies are still poised
just beyond the Elbe, with powerful reserves
capable of being summoned promptly from the
East. Hundreds of Soviet missiles are still tar-
geted on Western Europe. We demonstrated
in the Berlin and Cuban crises that power exists
in the West capable of neutralizing this Soviet
military establishment and capable of render-
ing fruitless Soviet efforts to exploit that power
for diplomatic advantage. That demonstra-
tion, however, would not have been fully effec-
tive without integrated Western military power
and the higliest degree of political concert in the
West. If we dilute or fracture that integrated
power, or if we fragment that political unity,
I have no doubt that we would see a revival of
the pressures and methods of the period 1958-62.
The first task of the West remains the continued
mobilization not merely of collective Western
strength but also the collective will to defend
the vital interests of the West. For the oldest
and most basic reasons, therefore, we still need
a vital NATO.

Second: The growing strength, confidence,
and pride of Western Europe require that Eu-
rope share more substantially the burdens and
responsibilities in the field of nuclear arms. I
have in mind here both aspects of that problem :
sharing in the process of deterrence and sharing
in the process of moving as rapidly as condi-
tions permit toward a world of effective arms
control. These are, literally, life-and-death is-
sues for all our peoples, and the wholesome fact
of European revival requires that Europe play
a large role in resolving them.

Third: The forces of nationalism and human-
ism are on the rise within the Communist world
at a time when it is being subjected to the strains
of the Sino-Soviet split. This hopefid histori-
cal movement jjoses for all of us searching ques-
tions and responsibilities, for none of us has
ever accepted the notion that Europe ends on
the Elbe. How shall we move peacefully to-
ward the application of the principle of self-
determination in Germany? Wliat shall our
policy be toward an increasingly assertive and
liberal Eastern Europe ? Wliat shall our policy
be toward the Soviet Union itself ?

Fourth: The great continental regions to the
south of us — Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America — are moving to modernize their
societies and to assert, the dignity of their status
on the world scene. The future of those of us
who live in the rich and comfortable northern
parts of the free world — the future of our chil-
dren and grandcliildren — will substantially de-
pend on the outcome of these powerful revolu-
tionary impulses. Specifically, there is the
question: How can we best help these peoples
to the south through trade and aid — and, I
would add, through human comradesliip — in
this momentous and challenging era of transi-
tion? How can we help them through this
great historical adventure in ways which maxi-
mize the chance that they emerge as independ-
ent and increasingly democratic societies. The
recent United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development in Geneva dramatizes the eco-
nomic dimensions of this problem vividly. It
will evidently rise on our common agenda in
the future.

Fifth: The changes to the south of us have
posed for them and for us a searching set of
regional conflicts. Some of the new nations—
or newly assertive nations — have reacted
against what they regard as imfair or unsat-
isfactory postcolonial settlements. This clash
of nationalism within regions of the developing
world has yielded a set of dangerous problems :
in Southeast Asia, within the Indian subcon-
tinent, in the Middle East, in Africa, and even
in the Mediterranean. Although these clashes
arise from strong nationalist impulses, every
one of them is subject to the most active ex-
ploitation by the Commimists. Each is capa-
ble of producing dangerous degeneration in re-
gional conditions or war itself. These clashes —
whether they are resolved pacifically or lead to
violence — vitally concern us all. From this
concern, and from the capability which we share
for affecting the issue, flows another major task
for the West.

Sixth: In Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean,
and in Africa the Communists are still pressing
the teclmique of what they call wars of national
liberation. In particular, there are those
among the Communists who believe that the
training of men for insurrection, their illegal
infiltration across frontiers, and their supply

JTTLT 13, 19G4

with arms and money are the last best hope
for the extension of Communist power. We
in the West have been forced to frustrate a
whole array of Communist aggressive tech-
niques since Stalin launched his offensive
against tlie West in 1946. We now must dem-
onstrate that we can sterilize and render futile
this method of aggression, which President
Jolmson has designated "a deeply dangerous
game." ^ On our success or failure in tliis task
may depend whether the years ahead are years
of war or of peace, for surely we in the West,
who have faced down so many threats to vital
positions over the years, will not passively ac-
cept their loss by this low-grade but dangerous
form of aggression.

Seventh: We shall confront the implications
in the foreseeable future of the acquisition by
Communist China of a nuclear capability.
That capability is likely to be of limited direct
military significance and easily capable of de-
terrence by arms available to the West. Never-
theless, it will pose for us all the possibilities
of nuclear confrontation with a second Com-
munist power, and it may set in motion im-
portant ijolitical and psychological problems,
in Asia and elsewhere, of concern to us all.
Shaping the ways in which we will meet these
problems is a major task for the West.

European Unity and Atlantic Partnersiiip

I return now to the question that I posed at
the start: the future of the Atlantic alliance
and of European organization.

One way of putting this question is this:
Would it be wiser for us to face the array of
problems that I described, each of us on his own,
or shall we face these problems together? Is
there a sufficient basis of common interest among
us to come to grips with them on the basis of
partnership between the United States and a
imiting Europe ? Or shall we each devise poli-
cies which reflect narrow national interests and
concerns in approaching them ?

So far as we in Washington are concerned,
we are convinced that the problems of defense ;
nuclear deterrence and arms control ; the linked

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the
University of California at Los Angeles on Feb. 21,
1964, see Buixetin of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 399.

problems of German imity, policy toward East-
em Europe, and the Soviet Union ; the problems
of trade and aid with the developing countries ;
the problems of regional instability ; the problem
of Communist insurrectional aggression; and
the problem of the Chinese Conununist nuclear
capability should all be gripped as nearly as
possible on a communal basis.

And we believe, now as in the past, that the
best way to move toward a communal basis is
by going forward toward both European unity
and Atlantic partnership.

We need European unity because, if Europe
accepts as a legitimate part of the Atlantic
agenda the array of global issues to which I re-
ferred earlier, it is much more likely to come to
grips with them effectively on a united rather
tlian a fragmented basis.

This is evident when we look at the problems
and opportunities we face in Eastern Europe.
It is already clear from the experience of the
postwar generation that European unity has not
merely been a source of strength in the face of
Communist pressure, not merely a source of
mutual confidence and prosperity; it has also
been a demonstration to the governments and
peoples of Eastern Europe of the continued
viability of the West and a powerful pole of
attraction to them.

None of us can now foresee the kind of Europe
which will emerge in time from the processes
of change going forward to the East. Our
broad objectives in that area are, I believe,
shared on both sides of the Atlantic. We wish
to see the present division of Germany and
Europe ended by peaceful steps. We wish to
assist in constructive ways in the evolution of
nations now imder Communist rule. There can
be little doubt that this objective will best be
advanced by the emergence of an integrated
Europe which pursues in unity a constructive
policy toward the East.

The same principle holds good when we look
at problems and opportunities in the southern
half of the globe. We are talking here about
regions whose population in 1980 will be, as
nearly as we can calculate, 2.3 billion human
beings: 410 million in Africa, 1.4 billion in free
Asia, 145 million in the Middle East, 375 mil-
lion in Latin America. Wliatever their vicissi-
tudes, these peoples will and should advance in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the generation ahead in their ability to absorb
and use the tools of modern science, technol-
ogy, and industry.

In working with these peoples — in trying to
deal constructively with the problems they pose
for the world commmiity — it is hard to believe
that the classic nation-state of Europe, with a
population of 50 or 60 million, can, by itself,
be an effective unit. To deal with the problems
before us, Europe must generate a global vision
of its interests and possibilities, and that global
vision is only likely to emerge as Europe moves
toward integration — as it achieves a unity suffi-
cient to concert the use of its enormous ma-
terial, political, cultural, and spiritual
resources.

But even an integrated Europe will lack — as
does my own country — the power, by itself, to
meet many of these problems : the problems of
defense, of effective policy toward the Com-
munist nations, and of sustaining the cause of
freedom to the south.

These are tasks which can only be success-
fully dispatched if Europe and the United
States address them in closest concert. It was
in recognition of this need that wise statesmen
on both sides of the Atlantic have wished, since
the war, to parallel progress toward European
unity with progress toward an increasingly inti-
mate Atlantic partnership.

But this partnership can only flourish if it is
solidly based on a genuine European and Amer-
ican desire to share fully both the burdens and
the responsibilities of power. This will in-
volve changes for both Europe and the United
States. Since the war my country has carried
the lion's share of both the burdens and respon-
sibilities. Now it must learn to share the re-
sponsibilities on a basis of equality and mutual
respect. And Europe must come to share the
burdens in the degree that its growing resources
permit.

This is what partnership between the two
great continents means and requires.

Making Partnership Work — the Nuclear Issue

To illustrate the sharing of burdens and re-
sponsibilities let me discuss two fields in which
new common action is urgently needed : nuclear
defense and political consultation.

I turn first to nuclear defense.

The Soviet Union lias built up a powerful
array of RIRBM'S threatening Europe. In the
face of this threat General [Lyman L.] Lem-
nitzer, like General [Lauris] Norstad, has pro-
posed that MRBM's be deployed to Allied
forces in the European area.

There are, broadly speaking, three ways in
which we could resj^ond to this proposal.

We could refuse outright. This could
weaken the notion of Atlantic partnership by
indicating that we were unwilling to extend it
to the field of strategic weapons. It would
weaken the concept of European unity by leav-
ing untouched the present divisive gap between
those major European powers which have a
share in ownership and operation of strategic
weapons and those which do not. This gap
seems unlikely soon to wither away by itself.
And if we cannot respond to the natural desire
of major European countries to play a larger
role in strategic deterrence by constructive
measures, pressures for a further extension of
individual small national programs may grow,
with all the attendant dangers.

Alternatively, we could agree to deploy
MRBM's under the same "two key" system that
was used for first-generation IRBM's and that
is still used for shorter range tactical nuclear
weapons on the central front. Under this sys-
tem, the missiles are nationally owned and
manned by the Allied coimtry buying the mis-
siles, and the warheads would be released for
use by bilateral decision of that country and
the United States. However, creation of such
new nationally manned and owned strategic
missile forces could stimulate fears and rivalry
in the West and be troubling in terms of East-
West relations.

If we are not to refuse MRBM's, and are not
to deploy them under national manning and
ownership, the alternative is to deploy them
under multilateral manning and ownership.

That is the origin of the proposed multilat-
eral missile fleet.

Creation of this force may prove to be a criti-
cal turning point in the affairs of the alliance.
There is little doubt in our minds that the role
of Europe in the operation of strategic nuclear
weapons will expand. The question is: Shall

JULY 13, 1964

we proceed in this field on an integrated basis,
or shall the alliance fragment on this fimda-
mental issue along national lines ?

We in Washington have learned how power-
fully the nuclear problem shapes political atti-
tudes within nations and among nations. We
think further fragmentation of our nuclear ca-
pabilities and policies will weaken the alliance
at its foundations. On the other hand, we are
confident that a decision to go forward with the
MLF [multilateral force] will serve as the basis
for greater unity in the alliance, not merely in
the field of military policy itself but in the field
of arms control and in other areas.

Nations joined in an integrated nuclear ven-
ture are bound to be drawn closer together in
ways that none of us can now fully foresee.
They will have to detennine common positions
on arms control negotiations affecting this ven-
ture; they will be taking part in such negotia-
tions as countries with a tangible stake in the
outcome, not as bystanders. They will have to
consult closely about the conditions under which
the force would be placed in a state of alert or
used, and this will inevitably involve them in
intimate consultation about a variety of political
situations which bear upon the availability or
use of nuclear weapons.

In short, in deciding whether to go forward
with the MLF we are decidmg not merely how
to shai-e nuclear power ; we are taking decisions
which will influence the future political organi-
zation of the West. We are choosing between
national approaches and a new step toward inte-
gration in the deepest sense of the word.

It is because this fundamental issue is involved
that we have wished to leave the structure of the
MLF sufficiently flexible to adjust as Europe
moves toward unity. As the European Action
Committee indicated in its recent statement, the
MLF could be the begmning of a true partner-
ship between the United States and Europe in
the nuclear field.

Making Partnership Work — Political Consultation

The second field of forward movement m part-
nership I wish to discuss is that of political con-
sultation. This bears on many of the tasks I
mentioned earlier. Our efforts to advance Ger-
man unity and constructive evolution in Eastern

Europe, our attempts to sustain the cause of
freedom and progress in the less developed coun-
tries — all of these must be gripped through more
effective processes of political consultation.

Evidently our perspectives on these problems
within the Atlantic area are not identical.
Evidently, if we are to devise common policies,
we must consult with a new intensity over a
much wider range than in the past, understand-
ing that consultation means assumption of re-
sponsibility and of risk as well as the mutual
giving of advice. We are anxious to see the
agenda of the Atlantic alliance expanded in
ways which would pennit us increasingly to grip
these problems on a communal rather than a
separate basis.

We hold this view for two reasons.

First, we are convinced that our common in-
terests in the face of these problems are far
more weighty than our differences and that
serious and sustained consultation could bring
us toward roughly common conclusions as to
appropriate courses of action.

Second, we are convinced that, without such
movement toward concert on the problems which
confront us on a global basis, our unity on the
minimum essential and continuing tasks of
NATO could be endangered. We have all seen
over the years problems arising outside the
NATO area itself which put strams on the
NATO alliance internally. We have thus far
successfully weathered such strams. But it
would be unwise for us not to reckon that a suc-
cessful North Atlantic alliance will require in
the future a much higher degi'ee of concert on
global problems than was required over the past
15 years.

It is for these two fundamental reasons — the
existence of basic common interests and the dan-
ger of not building our policy upon them — that
we are prepared to attack the problem of extend-
ing political consultation within the Atlantic
alliance.

This means being willing to go forward in
closer consultation with those countries that are
ready and willing to proceed. This may some-
times be less than all 15 NATO nations, if some
wish to remain aloof. Some problems will, per-
haps, be dealt with in smaller groujDS, but all
NATO members should be kept generally
informed.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

It means being willing to bring policymaking
officials from home governments, who are
directly concerned with the problems under dis-
cussion, together as often as necessary — a proc-
ess which has proved of critical importance in
the development of the European Commmiity.

It means being willing to strengthen the role
of the Secretary General and the international
staff, as necessary to make these procedures
work. We are all impressed with the role played
by the commissions in the European Communi-
ties, and by the Secretary-General in the U.N.
as catalytic agents in the process of agreement.
There are lessons to be learned here as we seek
to improve Atlantic political consideration.

And, finally, it means being willing to struc-
ture this consultation in ways that will enable
Europe to achieve growing influence as it moves
toward unity. The consultation that we envis-
age would do just this. To the extent that Eu-
ropean nations could concert among themselves
about the issues under discussion, their ability
to affect the agi'eed outcome would surely be
enhanced.

Progress Toward a New, Stable World Order

As we assess the changes that have taken
place over the past year and a half, and as we
scan the horizons ahead, we in Washington be-
lieve that we were all wise when we committed
ourselves after the war to work toward both
European imity and an intimate Atlantic con-
nection. It is perhaps worth recalling that we
did this not merely to meet Stalin's direct and
brutal challenge. On both sides of the Atlantic
the movement for European unity and the At-
lantic partnership reflected an acknowledgment
of errors made by all of us between the two
world wars. These two pieces of architecture,
in which a generation of men on both sides of
the Atlantic have invested their best talents,
reflect an awareness of the tragic mistakes we
made between the wars in returning to old-
fashioned nationalism. It is not too much to
say that the Second World War was an unneces-
sary product of those mistakes.

Now there are forces at work in the world
which could lead us in one of two directions.
There are forces of fragmentation and of vio-
lence which, in many quarters of the globe, could

easily get out of hand, plunging us from a pre-
carious peace into chaos. But there are also
forces now m play which could take us toward
peace and stability in the generation ahead. It
does not lie outside our common capabilities
to organize in the next generation a new world
order to replace that which was shattered in
1914 and never replaced.

The time for pause and debate is drawing to
a close. In the MLF, in the Kennedy Round,
and in the array of issues and opportunities pre-
sented to us from outside the NATO area itself
we are confronted with matters which require
decision. We believe that what our common
interests demand is a new surge of energy and
determination to solve these problems in
common — a phase of rapid forward movement
in both Atlantic and European unity. We be-
lieve that the possibilities of building a new and
stable world order in the generation ahead de-
pend on such forward movement in the face of
our agenda.

Progress toward that objective — and there
can be no other rational objective in a
nuclear age — requires continued Western unity,
patience, dedication, and conunon effort. If we
in the Atlantic world emerge from this period
of pause and debate with a new surge of energy
and creativeness with respect to both Western
unity and the Atlantic alliance, I believe we
have it in our power to make the Berlin and
Cuba crises of 1961 and 1962 a nearly bloodless
but decisive turning point in the cold war. We
could move on together to a peaceful resolution
of the cold war, which would not merely pre-
serve but enlarge and enrich that common West-
em heritage which can only be maintained in
the second half of the 20th century if we work
together in common loyalty to that heritage.

ANZUS Council To Meet
at Washington

Press release 294 dated June 24

The Governments of Australia and New Zea-
land have accepted the invitation of the United
States Government to hold a meeting of the
ANZUS Council in Wasliington on July 17 and

JULY 13, 1964

18, 1964. Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake
will represent New Zealand, Minister of Exter-
nal Affairs Paul Hasluck will represent Austra-
lia, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk will
represent the United States.

The last of these annual meetings was held on
June 5 and 6, 1963, in Wellington, New Zealand.^
The ANZUS Council meetings rotate each year
among the capitals of the signatory nations and
provide the medium for discussion and ex-
change of views in implementation of the
ANZUS pact.

Right of Unrestricted Air Access
to Berlin Reasserted by U.S.

Following is the text of a Department state-
ment read to nexos correspondents on June 23
hy Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office
of News, in response to inquiries about Tass
reports on Soviet notes delivered to the embas-
sies of the United States and Great Britain at
Moscoio on June 20.

We did receive a note conceniing flights from
the United States to Berlin. We are studying
the note and will be consulting with our allies
who have received similar notes. The notes
say that tlie flights are "illegal" in the absence
of agreement between the airline and the au-
thorities of the so-called "German Democratic
Eepublic," and that the Soviets will withhold
as to these flights what they term their "guar-
antee of flight safety."

The rights of the three Western Powers to
air access to and from Berlin arise from the
Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and have been
confirmed by Four Power agreements estab-
lishing the Berlin air corridors. These rights
of access are for unrestricted flight by Allied
aircraft and are without restriction as to the
origin or destination of such flights.

The three Western Powers, pursuant to Four
Power agreements and procedures of long
standing, file flight plans in the Berlin Air
Safety Center and pass them to the Soviets

' Bulletin of June 24, 1963, p. 967.

solely for their information, so that they may
adjust their own flights accordingly.

These agreements do not call for any state-
ment by the Soviets of a "guarantee of flight
safety."

These flights are continuing on a normal
basis. The U.S. Government will hold the So-
viet Government responsible for the safety of
all American aircraft in the Berlin air
corridors.

Tliree Western Powers Reaffirm
Desire for German Reunification

Following is the text of a tripartite declara-
tion which was released simultaneously at Lorv-
don, Paris, and Washington on June 26 and
was also made available at Bonn, where, in a
separate declaration, the Federal Republic of
Germany expressed its support for tJie aims of
the tripartite declaration.

Press release 300 dated June 26

The Governments of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, after consult-
ing with the Government of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, wish to state the following with
regard to the agreement signed by the Soviet
Union and the so-called "German Democratic
Republic" on June 12, 1964. This agreement,
among other things, deals with questions re-
lated to Germany as a whole and to Berlin in
particidar.

1. As the Soviet Government was reminded
before the signing of this agreement, it is clear
that any agi'eement which the Soviet Union
may make with the so-called "German Demo-
cratic Republic" cannot affect Soviet obliga-
tions or responsibilities under agreements and
arrangements with the Three Powers on the
subject of Germany including Berlin and ac-
cess thereto. The Three Governments consider
that the Soviet Union remains boimd by these
engagements, and they will continue to hold the
Soviet Government responsible for the fulfill-
ment of its obligations.

2. West Berlin is not an "independent politi-
cal unit". Within the framework of their re-
sponsibilities regarding Germany as a whole,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the Four Powers have put the German capital,
the city of "Greater Berlin," under their joint
administration. Unilateral initiatives taken
by the Soviet Government in order to block the
quadripartite administration of the city cannot
in any way modify tliis legal situation nor
abrogate the rights and responsibilities of the
Four Powers in regard to Berlin. Wliile re-
serving their rights relating to Berlin, the
Three Western Powers, taking account of the
necessities for the development of the city, have
authorized, in accordance with the agreements
of October 23, 1954, the establisliment of close
ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic
of Germany, including permission to the Fed-
eral Republic to ensure representation of Ber-
lin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin.
These ties, the existence of which is essential to
the viability of Berlin, are in no way incon-
sistent with the quadripartite status of the city
and will be maintained in the future.

3. The Three Governments consider that the
Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is the only German government freely and
legitimately constituted and therefore entitled
to speak for the German people in international
affairs. The Three Govermnents do not recog-
nize the East German regime nor the existence
of a state in eastern Germany. As for the pro-
visions related to the "frontiers" of this so-called
state, the Three Governments reiterate that
within Germany and Berlin there are no fron-
tiers but rather a "demarcation line" and the
"sector borders" and that, accordmg to the very
agreements to which the agreement of June 12
refers, the fmal determination of the frontiers
of Germany must await a peace settlement for
the whole of Germany.

4. The charges of "revanchism" and "milita-
rism" contained in the agreement of June 12 are
without basis. The Government of the Federal
Republic of Gennany in its statement of Octo-
ber 3, 1954, has renovmced the use of force to
achieve the reunification of Gennany or the
modification of the present boundaries of the
Federal Republic of Germany. This remains
its policy.

5. The Three Governments agree that the
safeguarding of peace and security is today more
than ever a vital problem for all nations and

that a just and peaceful settlement of outstand-
ing problems in Europe is essential to the estab-
lisliment of lasting peace and security. Such
a settlement requires the application in the
whole of Germany of the principle of self-deter-
mination. This prhicii^le is reaffirmed in the
United Nations Charter, which the agreement
of June 12 itself mvokes. By ignoring this
principle, the agreement of June 12 seeks to
perpetuate the arbitrary division of Germany,
which is a continuing source of international
tension and an obstacle to a peaceful settlement
of European problems. The exercise of self-
determination, which should lead to the reunifi-
cation of Germany in peace and freedom, re-
mains a fimdamental objective of the Three
Governments.

6. The Three Governments are convinced that
such a settlement should be sought as soon as
possible. This settlement should include pro-
gressive solutions which would bring about Ger-
man reunification and security in Europe. On
such a basis, the Three Governments are always
ready to take advantage of any opportunity
which would peacefully reestablish Gennan
unity in freedom.

U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews
Current Defense ProbSems

Joint C omraunique

Press release 297 dated June 25

The Canada-United States Ministerial Com-
mittee on Joint Defense met today [Jmie 251
at the Department of State.

Today's meeting, the fourth since the Com-
mittee's establishment in 1958, grew out of dis-
cussions last year at Hyannis Port between
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pear-
son.^ In keeping with the need for continuing
close cooperation between the two countries in
defense matters, President Johnson and Prime
Minister Pearson decided during their talks last
January,^ that the Ministerial Committee on

' Bulletin of May 27, 1963, p. 815.
" For text of a joint communique, see xbiA., Feb. 10,
1964, p. 199.

JTJLY 13, 1964

Joint Defense should meet during the first half
of 1964.

Previous meetings were held at Paris in 1958 ;
Camp David, United States in 1959 ; and Monte-
bello, Canada in 1960.^

Among the subjects discussed by the Min-
isters were the changing nature of the threat to
the North American continent and measures to
meet that threat; the current developments in
NATO ; the desire of both comitries for an ef-
fective arms control and disarmament program ;
and international peacekeeping activities.
Particular attention was given to a review of
the defense production sharing progi-am under
which industiy in the two countries is utilized
on a continental basis so as to meet most equita-
bly the equipment needs of mutual defense.

The United States was represented by Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the
Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Secretaiy of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara, and the United
States Ambassador to Canada W. Walton
Butterworth. Canada was represented by
Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul
Martin, Minister of National Defence Paul
Hellyer, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon,
Associate Minister of National Defence Lucien
Cardin, Minister of Defence Pi-oduction Charles
Drury, and the Canadian Ambassador to the
United States C. S. A. Ritchie.

President Names New Ambassador
to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy

Statement hy President Johnson ^

On June 19 Ambassador Lodge [Heni-y Cabot
Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Viet-Nam] informed me that he must return
to private life as soon as possible. I have in-
formed Ambassador Lodge that I must, of
course, respect his decision, and accordingly I
have accepted his resignation to take effect as

' The first meeting was held at Paris in December
1958 during the regular annual ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council ; for texts of communiques
issued at the close of the second and third meetings,
see iUa., Nov. 30, 1959, p. 789, and Aug. 1, 19G0, p. 172.

' Read by the President at his news conference on
June 23.

soon as he returns. This nation has been most
fortunate to have Ambassador Lodge's distin-
guished and dedicated service in a post of the
highest importance for the last year.

I intend to nominate General Maxwell D.
Taylor to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Viet-Nam, succeeding Ambassador Lodge.
General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, is an officer of outstanding quality.
His remarkable career has shown a devotion to
democracy, commitment to freedom, and under-
standing of the ways of Communist terrorism
and subversion which in my opinion fit him in
an unusual measure for this new and demanding
assignment.

I also intend to name Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
[Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs], whose nomination as Career Ambas-
sador is now before the Senate, to hold the new
post of Deputy Ambassador to the Republic of
Viet-Nam. Mr. Johnson will proceed to Saigon
immediately and will act as the chief of our
mission there until General Taylor's arrival.

Mr. Jolmson is an outstanding career diplo-
mat, the Department's most experienced author-
ity on Southeast Asia, with experience both in
the field and in senior posts in the Department
of State ; he is ideally qualified to support Gen-
eral Taylor in the management of the American
team m Viet-Nam.

I am deeply pleased that these two distin-
guished Americans have agreed, on short notice,
to take up these new assignments — I got their
agreement late yesterday and last evening — and
I am satisfied that together they will give the
United States the best possible field leadership
in support, of our embattled friends, the people
of South Viet-Nam.

I wish to annoimce that I intend to nominate
General Earle G. "Wlieeler to take the place of
General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

Let me take a moment to read you Ambas-
sador Lodge's letter and my reply:

June 19, 1964
Dear Mk. President : Herewith I tender my resig-
nation as Ambassador to Vietnam. I do so entirely
for personal reasons.

My thanks go to you for your unfailing devotion
to problems connected with American policy in Viet-
nam, for your guidance, courtesy, consideration and for

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

enabling me to have this opportunity to serve the
United States. And my heartfelt gratitude goes to
the late President Kennedy, who appointed me.

Although in a dangerous iwsition, the Republic of
Vietnam is on the right track and the Vietnamese are
to be commended for their determination not to sub-
mit to any foreign domination, whatever the source.
Persistent and patient execution of existing civil and
military plans will bring victory — provided hostile ex-
ternal pressures are contained, which I am sure they
can be. This is indeed a time to persist and not to get
discouraged or impatient. I am sure we will persist.

With respectful regard,
Very sincerely yours,

Henky Cabot Lodge

June 23, 1964
Deae Ambassador Lodge : I accept with deep regret
your resignation as Ambassador to Viet Nam. I hereby
authorize you to make your farewell call to General
Khanh and to depart at your convenience thereafter.
I hope to see you at once on your return, to hear your
final report and to offer best personal wishes on your
return to private life.

Your readiness to assume the duties of American
Ambassador to Viet Nam in a time of danger and dif-
ficulty was in the great tradition of disinterested pub-
lic service. Those who carry on after you will find
encouragement in your example. Your departure will
mean no change in the steadfast determination of the
United States to support the Government and the peo-
ple of South Viet Nam in their struggle for peace and
security, which means an end of Communist terror and
an end of external aggression. As you say, we will
persist.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

I have stated our policy as I see it in Viet-
Nani on other occasions, and statements to the
press which I read, the letter that enunciated
that policy written by President Eisenhower on
October 1, 1954, and released on October 25,
1954.^ I have referred to it in various public
addresses, but for your benefit and the benefit
of the American people, I would like to make a
brief statement restating that policy for those
that may not have gotten it, or in order to at
least repeat it.

The policy of the United States toward South-

' For a statement by President Johnson on June 2,
in which he read the letter of Oct. 1, 1954, from Presi-
dent Eisenhower to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh
Diem, see Buixetin of June 22, 1964, p. 953.

east Asia remains as it was on June 2d, when I
summarized it in four simple propositions:

First, America keeps her word.

Second, the issue is the future of Southeast
Asia as a whole.

Third, our purpose is peace.

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a
struggle for freedom on every front of human
activity.

In these last weeks there has been particular
concern with Laos. There again the problem
is caused by the aggressive acts of others and by
their disregard for their given word. Our own
actions, and what we have said about them, are
governed by the legitimate desires of the Gov-
ernment of Laos. Wliere the International Con-
trol Commission has been kept out, our airmen
have been sent to look — and where they are fired
on, they are ready to defend themselves. This
armed reconnaissance can be ended tomorrow
if those who are breaking the peace of Laos
will simply keep their agreements. We specifi-
cally support full compliance by everyone with
the Geneva accords of 1962.

I have said before that there is danger in
Southeast Asia. It is a danger brought on by
the terrorism and aggression so clearly, if secre-
tively, directed from Hanoi. The United States
intends no rasliness and seeks no wider war.
But the United States is determined to use its
strength to help those who are defending them-
selves against terror and aggression. We are a
people of peace — but not of weakness or
timidity.

I sliould like to repeat again that our purpose
is peace. Our people in South Viet-Nam are
helping to protect people against terror. They
are also helping — and they will help more — in
increasing agricultm-al production, in expand-
ing medical help, and building a sense of hope.
They are helping — and they will help more —
to give confidence to those who seek to help
themselves, and modern equipment to those who
can use it, and friendly counsel to those who are
giving leadership. These are proud people,
and the task of building their peace and prog-
ress is their own; but they can coimt on our
help for as long as they need it and want it.

JULY 13, 1964

President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece

President Johnson held talks regarding the
situation in Cyprus with the Prime Minister of
Turkey, Ismet Inonu, who visited Washington
Jwne 22 and 23, and with the Prime Minister of
Greece, George Papandreou, who was in Wash-
ington June 24--26. Following are texts of ex-
changes of greetings and joint communiques
released at the close of the visits of the two
Prime Ministers.

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER INONU

Exchange of Greetings, June 22

White House press release dated June 22

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a pleasure to meet
with you again and to welcome you once more
to our United States. The American people
remember with deep appreciation your visit
here last year in our national hour of sorrow
upon the death of our beloved President, Jolin
F. Kemiedy. For myself, I shall never forget
my own visit to your country 2 years ago and
the great outpouring of friendship for America
which your people demonstrated so generously
in your cities and your coimtryside.

From that visit I remember especially the
conversations we were privileged to have to-
gether, Mr. Prime Minister. I was inspired by
both your vision and your determination to lead
Turkey toward the fulfillment of the dreams of
the great Ataturk, at whose side you once
worked.

The history of your land is ancient ; the his-
tory of our land is young. Yet Turkey and

the United States have much in conmion. We
share alike a zeal to safeguard our mdepend-
ence, to uphold democratic values under the
rule of law, and to seek after those solutions
which will be peaceful and permanent. We
are not only good friends, but we are close allies.
We have marched together in arms. We stand
together as partners in NATO. We work to-
gether as associates in CENTO.

We welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, as a
leader of a nation united with us in a deter-
mination to preserve world peace and, through
collective security, to stand steadfast against
the tlireat of Commimist aggression. Above all,
Mr. Prime Minister, we welcome you as a friend
who comes representmg a strong and stalwart
people for whom the American people have only
the warmest feelings of friendship and respect.
I am confident that in our discussions this
friendly spirit will prevail, as we work together
toward the solutions of problems which trouble
us all.

PRIME MINISTER INONU

Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and my-
self I wish to thank you from the bottom of
our hearts for this sincere and splendid wel-
come. I liave no doubt that the people of
Tui'key look upon this \'isit as anotlier occasion
to cement the deep-rooted and lasting friend-
ship between our two countries. Our two peo-
ples have always been conscious of having com-
mon ideals and of having linked our destinies.

We in Turkey believe that friendship between
coimtries is based not on transitory interests
but on a common faith in ultimate justice and
unwavering principles.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLEnTN'

Mr. President, friendships are proved in try-
ing times. If my visit can help to brmg better
imderstanding of the problems and issues that
now interest our part of the world, my mission
will be useful.

We believe in peace, but we also know that
peace cannot be lasting unless it is based in
justice. For your great country we in Turkey
have always borne the most sincere feelings of
esteem, confidence, and good will.

For Mrs. Johnson and yourself, Mr. Presi-
dent, my wife and I have such deep personal
regard that your gracious welcome is both
touching and overwhelming. We are happy
and honored to be the guests of a great Presi-
dent of the United States.

To you, Mr. President, to your gracious wife,
and to those of the great American public who
can hear me, on behalf of ourselves and the
people of Turkey, I say, once again, thank you.

Joint Communique, June 23

White House press release dated June 23

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey and Presi-
dent Jolmson have discussed all aspects of the
problem of Cyprus. Both leaders welcomed
the opportunity presented by the Prime Minis-
ter's visit at the President's invitation for a
full exchange of views.

The discussion, proceeding from the present
binding effects of existing treaties, covered ways
in which present difficulties might be adjusted
by negotiation and agreement. The urgent
necessity for such agreement upon lasting solu-
tions was underlined.

The Prime Minister and the President also
considered ways in which their countries could
strengthen the efforts of the United Nations ^
with respect to the safety and security of the
commvmities on Cyprus.

The cordial and candid conver.sations of the
two leaders strengthened the broad understand-
ing already existing between Turkey and the
United States.

The President and the Prime Minister ex-
pressed their conviction that their peoples are
devoted to common democratic principles, to
individual freedom, to human dignity and to
peace in justice.

' See p. 64.

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU

Exchange of Greetings, June 24

White House press release dated June 24

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a proud privilege
for me to welcome you to the United States this
morning and to express my deep personal ap-
preciation for your coming to our country at
this time.

This country and your country are bound
together by ties that are both ancient and mod-
ern. The founders of these United States drew
deeply from the wisdom and the ideals of an-
cient Greece in formulating the concepts of our
own free and democratic society. In this 20th
century, your country and mine have stood
stalwartly together to defend those enduring
ideals against aggi'essors and to advance their
fulfillment among our people.

We are friends in freedom; we are allies in
NATO for peace; we are coworkers in the
common labors of progress and prosperity.
These are strong and welcome bonds. We are
bound together also, Mr. Prime Minister, by
close and lasting ties of kinship. Americans
harbor a very warm afl'ection for those of your
countrymen and their dependents who have
honored us through the years by coming to live
in our midst as neighbors, as friends, and as
leaders in American life.

In recent months, occasions of grief have
brought us close together in moments of na-
tional sorrow. Last November Queen Frederika
came to our country as a representative of your
country at the time of the tragic death of Presi-
dent Kennedy. Only a short time later, Mrs.
Jolmson made a sad mission of mourning to at-
tend the fimeral of your beloved King Paul,
whom we had been privileged to meet so happily
on our visit to your land only 2 years ago.

Today I am confident that your visit and the
talks that we shall have together will again
affirm the close and cordial relations between
Greece and the United States. With diligence
and understanding, we shall seek to chart a
course that will preserve the union and harmony
of free nations, militantly opposed to Commu-
nist aggression.

JULY 13, 1964

We in America know that the people of
Greece yield to no other people in the world
in their devotion to freedom and independence
and in their desire to keep the peace won and
maintained by such great sacrifice from free
men in our times.

Mr. Prime Minister, it is to that cause of peace
that our efforts are dedicated today.

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU

Mr. President, I thank you for your kind
welcome. I regard it as a great privilege that
upon your friendly invitation I find myself in
the Capital of the mighty American democ-
racy, the great friend and ally of Greece, and
before this famous mansion which has housed
so many illustrious promoters of human achieve-
ment, of liberty and justice.

I am happy that I shall be given the oppor-
tunity to become personally acquainted with the
present great leader of the United States, the
champion of peace, as well as with members
of his administration and of the Congress of
the United States.

Your concern for the maintenance of peace
and freedom is shared by the Greek nation and
by myself. Greece has always tried for the
promotion of peace. A people that has suf-
fered as much as ours from the violence of war
and the reverses of liistory can only long for
peace, but no peace can be durable without jus-
tice and no settlement of problems can be right
and just if it is not based on democracy and
freedom.

In the past there existed a distinction between
the world of ideals and the world of politics,
between a policy based on idealism and a policy
based upon realism. Nowadays they have
merged into one, and the policy is today the
more positive the more it is in consonance with
ideas. This constitutes the glory of our times,
the glory of the free world whom you are called
upon by history to lead.

My country does not forget that the United
States, through the doctrine which bears the
name of one of your great predecessors. Presi-
dent Truman, has been instrumental in the
defense of Greece against aggression, as well
as in the rehabilitation of the country, ex-
hausted and devastated by cruel years of war.

Greece also feels proud to be represented in
your great democracy by a number of citizens
of Greek descent who constitute a living link
between the two nations, and of our national
cultural ties to the world of American
civilization.

Mr. President, I welcome this opportunity to
bring to you and to the people of the United
States the cordial salute of the people of
Greece.

Joint Communique, June 25

White House press release dated June 25

During the visit to Washington of the Prime
Minister of Greece conversations were held be-
tween Mr. George A. Papandreou and the Pres-
ident of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and other officials of the United States
Government.

The conversations, which were conducted in
an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordial-
ity, have contributed to the strengthening of the
close ties between Greece and the United
States.

The visit provided the opportunity to the
Greek Prime Minister and the President of the
United States to review various aspects of the
international situation and to discuss subjects
of mutual interest.

The President of the United States and the
Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful
exchange of views on the Cyprus situation.
Both expressed full support of the efforts
undertaken by the Security Council and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for
the establishment of peace in the island and
for rapidly finding a permanent solution. The
Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the
Greek position on the problem. He empha-
sized that a permanent solution should be based
upon the principles of democracy and justice.
The two leaders reiterated their determination
to make every effort to increase the understand-
ing among allies.

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep
appreciation for the generous support of the
United States Government and people in the
hard struggle of the Greek people for their
freedom and welfare.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Africa South of the Equator

hy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

In this second half of the 20th century, we
have been privileged to witness one of the great
movements in world history — Africa's march
to freedom and independence. Today there are
34 independent nations in Africa, and others
are on their way. Thirty of those new nations
achieved independence in the last 12I/2 years,
and all but two — Algeria and the Congo — made
the transition in relatively peaceful circum-
stances.

This march has brought to many lands a tri-
umphant flowering of human dignity, and it has
reinvigorated international affairs in the world
of free men. But it also has brought new
trials and tribulations to many of those new
nations, as they struggle to break through the
shackles of poverty, ignorance, and disease to
catch up with the more developed portions of
the world.

Africa is an immense continent. It is more
than three times the size of the United States,
yet it has a population of only some 265 million
people. The continent faces severe handicaps.
Its people have an annual per capita income of
only $120; 85 percent of its inhabitants are
illiterate; and its health problems are charac-
terized by the fact that one out of five children
dies before reaching his teens. Africa has few
people with technical and other middle skills
and few managers and professional people. As
a result, most of the continent's productivity is
low. Africa also is handicapped by a shortage
of industry and by an inadequate network of

' Address made before a Department of State for-
eign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18
( press release 285 dated June 17 ) .

transportation, communications, and other serv-
ices left by the former colonial powers.

Nevertheless, I believe Africa has a promising
future, despite the very real difficulties wliich
have manifested themselves in economic and
political ups and downs. The continent is rich
in both human and material resources, although
they are greatly in need of development.

Both will be developed, however, because it is
in the interest of Africa and the world, includ-
ing the United States, that they be developed.
Our assistance, and that of other free- world na-
tions, not only provides Africans with an
alternative to Communist overtures, but it plays
the positive role of helping Africans improve
their well-being and develop a peaceful and
prosperous continent.

Africa's mineral resources are well known,
and their importance to the United States is
substantial. Africa is the source of 60 percent of
the world's gold and 90 percent of its diamonds.
It produces three-fourths of the world's cobalt
and significant amoimts of petroleum, iron ore,
and bauxite. In addition, it is an important
source of such vital modem metals as copper,
chrome, manganese, antimony, and uranium.

The continent's hydroelectric potential is
estimated at 40 percent of the world's water-
power supply, but it is so far little developed.

African agriculture is still almost marginal
on the whole. It produces only about 5 percent
of the world's agricultural products, although
it has more arable land than the United States,
which produces 16 percent. Where modern
agriculture is practiced, however, agricultural
productivity rises sharply.

JULT 13, 1964

Africans have been quick to see the desirabil-
ity of continental and regional cooperation —
to settle political disputes through the Organi-
zation of African Unity, to maximize economic
growth by elimination of trade barriers, to plan
regional enterprises through the U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa and other regional or-
ganizations.

All of this activity is reflected in concrete
progress in various parts of the continent. In
trade, for example, African exports increased
42 percent between 1952 and 1961. Ethiopia's
gross national product increased annually by
4.8 percent between 1957 and 1961, to take an-
other example. In the important field of edu-
cation, Nigeria allocated 19.4 percent of its
budget to education and Ghana 18 percent in
fiscal year 1963. These few statistics indicate
that Africans ai-e trying — and succeeding in
their efforts — to make economic and social
progress.

There are areas, however, where there is much
unfinished business in Africa. Many of these
areas are below the Equator, and I would like
to discuss three with you today — the Congo,
East Africa, and South Africa. In the inter-
est of time, I will omit such important areas
as the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Portu-
guese territories, but I am prepared to comment
on those countries in the question period if you
desire.

The Congo

Just 4 years ago this month, the large Repub-
lic of the Congo came to independence and al-
most immediately was engulfed in civil war.
Three of its then-six provinces — Kasai, Katan-
ga, and Orientale — attempted to secede, and
the Communist bloc was doing all it could to
fan the flames of disorder. The Congolese Gov-
ernment decided to ask for U.N. assistance in
reuniting the country and preserving its terri-
torial integrity, and the United States fully sup-
ported such action. Through the medium of the
United Nations, an East- West confrontation
and Communist penetration were averted in
Central Africa. When the Katangese secession
movement collapsed in January 1963, a period
was put to that unhappy chapter in the short
history of the fledgling Congo Republic.

The end of secession was not the end of the
Congo's problems, however. The nation still
faces grave problems which will grow more
acute with the withdrawal of U.N. forces in the
next 12 days. Today the question of the Con-
go's continued existence as a geographic entity
settles squarely on the shoulders of the Con-
golese themselves, and we are increasing our
efforts to help the Congolese protect their in-
ternal security. Today there are two serious
revolts against the authority of the Central Gov-
ernment — one in Kwilu Province in the west,
which began in January, and the other in Kivu
in the east, which began in April.

A third area of potential difficulty is Katanga
in the south. Elements of former rebel chief
Moise Tshombe's gendarmes, once 12,000 strong,
are still present in outlying areas of Katanga
Province or are just across the border in the
Portuguese territory of Angola. Those forces,
which probably include some mercenaries, rep-
resent a latent threat to the Congo Government.

We are watching Congolese developments
very carefully. Wliile there is little doubt that
Communists outside the Congo are encouraging
the Kwilu and Kivu revolts — and some of the
leaders of those revolts have contacts with Com-
munists — communism as a force behind the
revolts is almost nonexistent. Much of today's
trouble is due to tribal differences, economic
dissatisfaction, and opposition to tlie Central
Government.

We are most anxious to assist the Congolese
Government to develop its ability to preserve
internal security. For more than a year now,
the United States has been providing military
equipment, such as ground and air transporta-
tion, to help in the training of the Congolese
National Army. Our efforts have been linked
with those of Belgium, Israel, and Italy, who
are performing the actual training of the Army.

On the economic side, there are still serious
problems for the Congo to face, but I was
pleased to find many signs of a clear economic
upturn and an encouraging growth of business
and financial confidence during my brief visit
to the Congo last month. Of particular sig-
nificance, relations between the Congolese and
the Belgians have improved greatly in recent
months, and an important Belgian aid program
recently was announced.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXETDT

Today there are some 50,000-60,000 Belgian
educators, technicians, businessmen, clergy, and
persons with other specialties presently working
in the Congo and assisting the Congolese people.
The giant copper and cobalt mining company,
Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, is back in
full production as well. Although noting that
its 1963 profits were down, largely as a result
of exchange losses caused by the devaluation of
the Congolese franc last November, its recent
annual statement added that order and security
in Katanga had improved and that its 1964 cop-
per production should be as high as last year's.

East Africa

Turning to East Africa, there have been many
interesting and significant developments re-
cently in that part of the continent. Probably
the most striking was the recent formation of
the United Eepublic of Tanganyika and Zanzi-
bar. The change of government in Zanzibar
last January was an explosive issue which
created problems for the mainland governments
of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. Wliile
the revolt was initially one of the dissatisfied
black African majority against the ruling Arab
minority, pro-Communist elements played an
important part in the revolution. They then
moved into key posts in the revolutionary gov-
ernment, where they began to work closely with
the Chinese and Soviet bloc Communists. The
United Eepublic, which was formed in May, is
a new governmental arrangement developed by
the Zanzibaris and Tanganyikans themselves to
better meet their mutual needs and aspirations.
We feel it is an excellent example of the way
Africans work out solutions to African prob-
lems on their own initiative.

East Africa has long been noted for its
regional cooperation. An East African Com-
mon Market, shared by Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanganyika, has existed since 1922. This Com-
mon Market is directed by a body known as
the East African Common Services Organiza-
tion (EACSO). A closely related organiza-
tion, the East African Currency Board, ad-
ministers a common currency for the East
African countries and Aden. Through EAC-
SO, the 25 million people of the area's countries
share a common tax administration, common

research facilities, and common services in such
fields as telecommunications, postal facilities,
customs, tariffs, civil aviation, railways, and
harbors.

In recent months the distribution of regional
revenues and the location of East African in-
dustry became the subject of intense criticism,
and there was a possibility that the Common
Market might break up. Last month at a meet-
ing in Nairobi, however, the three heads of
state — Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote, and
Julius Nyerere — agreed upon a new East Afri-
can Common Market agreement to redress
existing imbalances.

Traditionally, Kenya has dominated the en-
tire East African market. Under the new
agreement, Kenya will restrict its exports to
Uganda and the United Republic in fields
where those countries have unused capacity in
existing plants and where they want to expand
their industries. In addition, an allocation of
new industries is to be worked out under which
each of the three countries will produce certain
types of products exclusively for the entire East
African market. We believe tliis is an impor-
tant step in giving added impetus to the al-
ready high degree of cooperation in East
Africa.

South Africa

In the Republic of South Africa, apartheid
is a tragic problem involving both whites and
non whites whose families have lived in the area
for centuries, building up one of the highest
standards of living in Africa. The deadlock
between nonwhite aspirations and the white-
controlled Govenmient's attempt to hold the
line is already having extensive repercussions
elsewhere, especially in newly independent
Africa and the U.N.

The Republic of South Africa is much in the
news recently because of incidents connected
with its policy of repression.

Last week eight leaders in the resistance to
apartheid — black, white, and Indian — were
sentenced to life imprisonment in the widely
publicized Rivonia trial.

Last week Justice Minister [B. J.] Vorster
announced in the South African Parliament
that he intended to recommend renewal of the

JTJLT 13, 1964

786-160 — 64-

controversial 90-day detention clause. By this
clause the police may arrest without charge and
hold in solitary confinement any person sus-
pected of hairing information about certain
types of political offenses or about plans to com-
mit them. Persons can be arrested and held for
successive 90-day periods ; and as many as three
terms in a row, separated only by moments, have
been imposed on the same individual. This
clause must be reproclaimed by the State Presi-
dent by June 30 to remain in effect. Should it
be allowed to lapse, as Mr. Vorster said he might
recommend later, at least for a while, the law
says it can be reproclaimed again at any time
for periods not to exceed 12 months without re-
newal. Large numbers of South African law-
yers, doctors, scholars, and others have pro-
tested against the clause as an invasion of civil
and human rights. Spokesmen of all major
religions — Moslem, Protestant, Jewish, and
Catholic — have appealed to the Government to
let it lapse.

On May 23, two South African policemen
entered a small general store in South Africa's
Natal Province and served notices of renewed
and intensified restrictions on the proprietor of
the store, an elderly Zulu ex-chief — the famed
Albert Luthuli, President General of the
African National Congress and winner of the
Nobel Peace Prize. Five years ago he was
served with two notices restricting Mm to liis
local district on the groimds that his activities
invited hostility between black and white and
furthered the objects of communism. Now he
is restricted for another 5 years and limited to
Groutville, a small mission reserve. Nothing
he says or writes can be published in South
Africa except by special permission, and he
cannot have visitors from outside this small
farming reserve except by permission of the
Government.

All three of these matters — the Rivonia trial,
the 90-day detention clause, and the restrictions
on Chief Luthuli — have brought many letters
of protest to our Congressmen and Senators,
as well as to the executive branch, from both
individual Americans and organizations. Our
leading labor and church organizations have
issued official statements deploring the cycle
of increasing repression and violence in South
Africa.

While our desire — together with our efforts —
to get the races together in South Africa stems
from principle and morality, it arises equally
from a major interest in the security of the
United States. The hard fact of the matter is
that the LTnited States has an important in-
terest in peace and stability everywhere. And
we have a particular concern in South Africa
to prevent giving the Communists an oppor-
tunity for subversion and to prevent the possi-
bility of setting race against race.

So, in brief conclusion, the continent of Africa
is challenged to bring new order in those areas
where there is adversity. There have been
troubles and there will be others, but some of
them have been solved and more than a little
progress has been made. Despite the preva-
lence of problems, I am optimistic for the long-
run future of the continent.

United States and Panama
Continue Discussions

Department Statement

Press release 291 dated June 23

Ambassadors [Jorge] lEueca and [Robert
B.] Anderson annoimced today [June 23] that
they have been conferring on a continuing basis
with reference to the procediiral matters in-
volved in the meetings between the Panamanian
and United States delegations in order to re-
solve any differences that might exist between
the two coimtries.^

They are formulating the substantive prob-
lems which will be the subjects of their pro-
ceedings. There is a liigh degree of cordiality
and understanding between the two delegations,
each appreciating the problems of the other.
Meetings will continue on a day-to-day basis.
At such times as there are significant develop-
ments appropriate news releases will be made
m order to keep the people of both Republics
informed.

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 27, 1964, p.

655.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Resurgence of the United Nations Security Council

iy Joseph J. Sisco

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^

As I was scanning a large Midwest news-
paper recently, a poem caught my eye. It was
one of those rhymes in which the words have
been shoehomed into the meter that plague
most newspaper editors and their readers alike,
but this one had a ring of reality to it. With
apologies to lovers of fine literature in the audi-
ence, I'd like to read it to you now :

I'm so weary of chaos in Laos

I'm so weary of fights in Algiers

I'm so weary of Castro — and all that fiasco

Of violence, fury and fears.

I'm gonna go out to my garden

There contemplate wind, sun and sky

And good things of earth — that have real worth

In a world gone so sadly awry.

Though some will question the merit of this
little verse as poetry, I doubt whether many of
us, including the people who have addressed
you from this platform today, would deny hav-
ing shared the sentiment at one time or another.
It has a certain attraction to those of us who
burn the midnight oil night after night in the
Department of State, coping with the profu-
sion of crises that keep popping around the
globe and which, more likely than not, wind
up in the United Nations. Every crisis these
days seems to have a U.N. angle.

"In the Good Old Days"

The U.N. used to be largely a seasonal busi-
ness. Today it's strictly year round. In fact,
I get the feeling at times that we are somewhat
in the same fix as the newly successful busi-
nessman who was questioned by the tax col-

lector about his earnings for the year. "Young
man," he said, "I've been so busy making it I
haven't had time to count it yet !"

In the early histoiy of the United Nations
there was an annual lull between sessions of the
General Assembly and we had time to count
the crises. But look at what happens now.

The 18th General Assembly, which ended last
fall, was a phenomenally busy one. The As-
sembly considered over 100 items — peacekeep-
ing, peacemaking, colonial issues, human rights,
U.N. finances, economic development, and
others — involving the interests, aspirations, and
policies of 112 countries. More and more, com-
mittees of the Assembly are meeting during
what used to be the off season.

And there are more international confer-
ences, too. The U.N. Trade and Development
Conference of 119 members has just wound up
a 3-month session. This is only the beguining
of a dialog between developed and developing
countries about their economic and trade
policies.

But the most dramatic thing is that we have
had over 100 sessions of the Security Council
since last June. There have been very few pe-
riods in the history of the United Nations when
the Council has been busier.

So it's fair to ask just what this frenetic ac-
tivity is all about and what it means for us as
Americans. In short, I think it's time to take
stock, even if, like the businessman, we can't

' Address made before a Department of State for-
eign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18.

JtTLT 13, 1964

really afford to stop what we're doing to count
what we've done.

Council Action During the Past Year

Since last June the Security Council has con-
sidered nine major issues. I need hardly re-
mind you of the outstanding ones; almost by
definition they are the most intractable and most
dangerous conflicts around the world.

Early this year the Security Council estab-
lished the U.N. Force for Cyprus. This week
it is meeting to extend the mandate of the Force
and the mediator for an additional period of
service.^

In April the Council called on the Secretary-
General to provide assistance to Yemen and the
United Kingdom, who are having differences
over the Yemen-Aden border.

In another series of meetings the Security
Council focused once again on the Kashmir
dispute — exhorting the parties to work out their
differences and to use the third-party help of
the Secretary-General.

Just 2 weeks ago the Council established a
U.N. Commission made up of Brazil, the Ivory
Coast, and Morocco to look into the Cambodian-
South Viet-Nam border situation and to come
up with recommendations within 45 days on
how to make the poorly defined border more
secure.*

And just this week the Council is again air-
ing the South African apartheid issue.^

You might ask: Does all this motion mean
progress toward a more peaceful world? The
answer to this question depends on the yardstick
used.

If by progress we mean long-range solutions
at one fell swoop, the answer is obviously "no."
If by progress we mean success in avoiding
something worse, the answer is just as obviously
"yes."

The U.N. Force and the U.N. mediator have
not provided the final answer to the critical
Cyprus issue. But the U.N. presence has at
least helped to keep a lid on the situation so that
through mediation and the helping hand of in-

' See p. 64.

^For background, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964,
p. 1002.

* Ibid., July 0, 1904, p. 29.

terested countries a more lasting solution can
be found without blowing up the eastern Medi-
terranean world in the process.

The U.N. coromission dealing with the Cam-
bodian-South Viet-Nam border cannot be ex-
pected to solve the difficulties in Southeast Asia.
But at least it provides a means for the two
countries to work out useful arrangements re-
terranean world in the process.

Kashmir still escapes solution, as it has for
over a decade. But the Council is a place where
the parties can talk instead of fight — and where
they can be pressed to get together and try again
for a solution.

The troubles between the United Kingdom
and Yemen over Aden may not dissolve sud-
denly. But at least the U.N. is ready to help
the parties if they desire.

The Council's action obviously will not end
apartheid in South Africa. But the Council
can at least marshal world opinion in favor of
meaningful consultations between all parties
concerned.

This all illustrates that there are no quick
panaceas in international politics. The long
and drawn-out problems are toughest both for
citizen and policymaker. Diplomacy consists
of tough, day-by-day decisions designed to keep
conflicts from becoming crises and crises leading
to incidents and incidents erupting into war ; it
consists of actions by ourselves or in conjunction
with allies or within the framework of regional
or world organizations to seek peaceful resolu-
tion of threats to the peace and prompt restora-
tion of peace when it is broken.

Some of the situations I mentioned are still
in the headlines ; others have moved to the back
pages or out of the news altogether. And we
were involved in each of them — a reflection of
our position as a world power.

Why the Resurgence of the Council

For many years the intended role of the Secu-
rity Council was hampered by one veto after
another cast by the Soviet Union. In 1950 it
became necessary to pass the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution to provide a meclianism for
the General Assembly to act quickly when the
Council could not act. Many observers began
t-o talk of the demise of the Security Coimcil as

DEPARTJrENT OF STATE BULLETIN

though it had become a vestigial organ, like the
human appendix. Its current resurgence is
therefore all the more interesting at tliis time.

Tliere are good reasons why the Security
Council is more than ever in the thick of things.

First, desj^ite the principle of sovereign equal-
ity among the member states, everyone knows
that there are very great differences in power
and influence and responsibility in the worka-
day world of nations. Tlie framers of the
charter realized this perfectly well when they
designed the Security Council and gave it pri-
mary responsibility for keeping the peace. As
you know, the five major powers of the postwar
world were made permanent members and the
six other members are elected on a rotating basis
to provide a broad geographic representation.

So tlie composition of the Security Council
gives recognition to tlie reality of disparate na-
tional strengths and assigns major responsibility
to the major powers — wliich plainly is the way it
ought to be.

We face the question of expansion of the
Council within the next year. With a hundred-
percent increase m tlie size of the U.N. mem-
bership since the charter was signed, it is imder-
standable that the new members consider they
are not adequately represented on tlie Council.
Since the suggested increase of the Security
Council from 11 to 15 would require the first
charter amendment, it must be viewed m the
context of the whole constitutional development
of the United Nations, including the importance
we attach to the principle of collective financial
responsibility.

Second, tlie Security Council is small enough
to make prompt and effective action possible
and flexible enough to cope with a wide variety
of peacekeeping problems. In practice the
Council has approached the cases brought be-
fore it not from the point of view of rigid legal
norms — which was one of the characteristic
failures of the League of Nations — but as the
highly political body it is, seeking the best
agreement it can reach by debate, negotiation,
and compromise — the very stuff of practical
political action.

Third, the renewed primacy of the Security
Council in peacekeeping matters is a reflection
of the growing realization that maintenance of
the peace is in the common interest of all U.N.

members, whatever their ideological and other
differences may be. It is also a recognition by
the small powers that in many of the tough
problems big-power involvement is necessary.
All but a handful of states committed to mili-
tant violence are gradually accepting the idea
that any serious breach of the peace raises the
danger of ultimate nuclear annihilation, that all
states therefore share a common interest in
peaceful resolution of the inevitable disputes
that will plague the world for a long time to
come, and that international peacekeeping ma-
chinery offers a safe and effective way to deal
with such disputes.

It is worth noting that since the Lebanese
crisis in 1958 the Soviet Union has not blocked
a U.N. peacekeeping operation with a veto. Re-
gardless of the fundamental differences which
remain, there seems to be greater recognition of
the utility of the U.N. as a buffer, as a third
party which can help avoid big-power confron-
tation.

More than 40 nations already have con-
tributed troops to the various U.N. peacekeeping
forces in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo,
and Cyprus ; and other nations, including espe-
cially our own, have contributed logistical sup-
port and other services.

I do not think it is too much to hope that we
may be approaching something like an inter-
national consensus — with the consijicuous ex-
ception of Communist China — on the need for
peaceful settlement of disputes among nations
and on the corollary need for international ma-
chinery to keep the lid on dangerous situations
while solutions are being worked out at the
conference tables.

This in general is why the United States wel-
comes the new-foimd vigor and relevance of the
Security Council and hopes that it will continue
to play its role as the major instrument of the
world community for keeping and repairing
world peace.

And this is why the United States has sup-
ported improvements in the peacekeeping ma-
chinery of the United Nations, why we welcome
the recent steps by the Canadians, the Nordic
countries and the Netherlands, and just recently
by Iran, to earmark troops for U.N. emergency
service, and why we shall continue to press for

JTJLT 13, 1964

adequate planning, training, resources, and fi-
nancing so that the U.N", can have a flexible
callup system when forces are needed. The
peace of the world should never go up in smoke
and nuclear debris for want of a few thousand
men or a few million dollars in the nick of time.
We have, on several occasions, been uncom-
fortably close to that outrageous predicament
and do not want it ever to happen again.

Let me be clear about one other thing. The
peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations
is not in any sense a substitute for national de-
fense capabilities or the regional machinery
such as the Organization of American States or
NATO. It is supplementary and complemen-
tary to national and regional responses to con-
flict and crisis.

The Charter of the United Nations explicitly
confirms the inherent right of all states to na-
tional defense. The charter also recognizes ex-
plicitly the competence of regional organiza-
tions and, in fact, exhorts parties to disputes
to try to solve them within a regional frame-
work before bringing them to the Unit«d
Nations.

So instead of restricting the options open to
us in dealing with threats to peace and secu-
rity — as some people seem to fear — the peace-
keeping machinery of the United Nations ex-
tends the range of available options for U.S.
policy and action. In tliis significant sense, the
U.N.'s capacity to defend the peace is part of
our own capacity to defend the peace — an asset
which is no less valuable to us because it is
shared with the other members of the U.N.

The United Nations and Soutlieast Asia

Now let me turn, finally, to Southeast Asia,
which concerns all of us these days.

The U.N. has, in fact, been in business in
Southeast Asia more than most people think.

The Security Council overrode Soviet opposi-
tion and sent a commission to Laos in 1959,
which helped quiet matters temporarily.

U Thant's representative has been busy try-
ing to ease relations between Thailand and
Cambodia.

When some doubted the feelings of people in
Sabah and Sarawak toward union with

Malaysia, a U.N. commission sent out a survey
team and confirmed that they favored it.

The U.N. worked out and helped administer
a peaceful solution to the conflict between In-
donesia and the Netherlands over the former
colony of Dutch West New Guinea.

The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East has developed a broad blueprint
for the Lower Mekong Basin, and some work
has already been done on projects along the
tributaries of the Mekong. If the Communists
would stop their aggression against their South-
east Asian neighbors, such regional economic
development schemes could bring great benefits
to Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and
Thailand.

The Assembly sent a group this past fall to
South Viet-Nam to make an impartial inquiry
into alleged violation of human rights.

And, as was mentioned previously, the U.N.
is in business on the Cambodian-South Viet-
Nam border issue.

Today we hear criticism that the United Na-
tions is not doing enough — that it should take
on the peacekeeping job in that whole troubled
peninsula that used to be Indochina.

Wliy isn't the U.N. doing more ?

This question has to be considered in histori-
cal context. The recent history of Southeast
Asia is one of trying to make the Geneva agree-
ments on Viet-Nam and Laos work the way they
were supposed to work.

The military assistance which this Govern-
ment is giving to the Government of Viet-Nam
is not an alternative to a political settlement ; it
is in support of a political settlement reached
long ago. That settlement lias been violated
deliberately and systematically by regimes out-
side the Eepublic of Viet-Nam to the point
where the independence of Viet-Nam — formally
guaranteed by the signatories of the Geneva
agreement — is threatened.

So there is no question of military action
versus political settlement; the military action
that is taking place is to enforce a political set-
tlement long since reached but long since
breached by Viet-Nam's northern neiglibors.
We help the Vietnamese defend themselves
against armed subversion from the outside to
prove, once and for all, that aggression simply

DEPABTMEirr OF STATE BULLBTTN

does not pay. As Secretary Eusk said
recently : °

All that is needed to restore peace in Laos and Viet-
Nam is for the Communists to live up to the agree-
ments they have already made. All that is needed is
for the Communists to stop their aggressions, to go
home, to leave their neighbors alone.

It is manifest that the members of the U.N.
would not agree to take this job off our hands
and let us go away and forget it. Our power
and determination are needed to persuade the
Communists that it is in their interest to stop
aggression and start keeping the promises they
made at Geneva in 1954 and 1962. If this hap-
pens, the nations of the area will need inter-
national help in protecting their independence
and developing their economies. The U.N.
might have a role to play here as the situation
develops.

All this suggests, in conclusion, that if the
United Nations has been busy in recent months,
it is unlikely to be less busy in the months and
years ahead. If the Security Council does not
set a new record for meetings held or crises dealt
with in each succeeding year, it at least is likely
to deserve the role of primary peacekeeping
organ assigned it by the founding fathers.

And it is in the peacekeeping field that the
U.N. has best served the interests of the United
States and the cause of peace. If we are ever
to have a secure system of world order, it will
grow from a surer system of settling more and
more kinds of disputes, in more and more parts
of the world, without recourse to arms. And
this, after all, is the purpose — and the prom-
ise — of a charter the Senate ratified by 89 votes
to 2, and a United Nations Organization which,
19 years later, we find increasingly worthy of
our growing support.

United States Agrees To Lend
Brazil $50 Million

U.S./U-N. press release 4420 dated June 24

The United States and Brazil on June 24
signed an Alliance for Progi'ess agreement
under which the United States will loan Brazil

' Ibid., June 8, 1964, p. 886.

$50 million in support of that nation's program
of stabilization, development, and reform.
The loan, from the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, provides for repayment
over 40 years, including a 10-year grace period.
Interest is at % percent during the grace
period and 2 percent per year during the
remaining 30 years.

The signing of the agreement took place in
New York, due to the presence there of U.S.
and Brazilian officials.

The loan is additional to understandings now
being reached for the financing of various spe-
cific projects designed to promote the economic
development and social progress of the Brazil-
ian peojDle, and supplements the supply of U.S.
agricultural products to Brazil under the Food
for Peace program.

Brazil also expects to obtain debt relief
through negotiations taking place in Paris with
the United States, Japan, and European credi-
tors. Such negotiations are expected to be con-
cluded in the near future.

The $50 million loan wiU be used so as to gen-
erate a cruzeiro counterpart which can be used
for noninflationary financing of basic activi-
ties such as maintaining the expanding employ-
ment and increasing agricultural productivity.
Specifically, these counterpart funds will be
used predominantly to finance low-cost hous-
ing, for working capital for industry, and to
expand agricultural credit for medium and
small farmers, who have limited access to the
credit market.

Within the spirit of the Charter of Punta del
Este, the Brazilian Government is formulating
a comprehensive program of development, sta-
bilization, and reform which can serve as a basis
for later discussions with international institu-
tions and the governments of the United States
and other friendly countries of Brazilian needs
for external assistance.

A number of measures in line with the objec-
tives of development, stabilization, and reform
have already been taken, such as those designed
to reduce the budgetary deficit, to increase for-
eign exchange earnings, to expand private in-
vestment, to institute a large-scale program of
low-cost housing, and to increase agricultural
productivity.

JTTLT 13, 1964

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint
Study on Desalting of Sea Water

Statement hy President Johnson ^

I am happy to announce that the United
States and the Soviet Union have agreed to ex-
plore the possibility of scientific cooperation on
methods of desalting sea water, including the
possible use of nuclear power. As an initial
step, the meeting of U.S. and So^'iet representa-
tives will be held in Washington on July 14
and 15 of this year. The purpose of the initial
meeting will be, first, to discuss the general
problem of desalting; two, to i-eview the present
activities and plans of the two coimtries in this
area; three, to consider possible areas of coop-
eration. The representatives will then advise
their respective governments as to the best way
to proceed.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation will be
Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. He
succeeded Dr. Jerome Wiesner. The U.S. dele-
gation will also include representatives of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.
Department of the Interior.

I hope that this meeting will lead to effective
scientific cooperation between the United States
and the Soviet Union and what could become a
very important activity of great economic sig-
nificance to many areas of the world.

Attorney General To Administer
Austrian Assets Agreement

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Desiqnatino the Attobney General as the Officer

AtTTHORIZED To ADMINISTER THE PrOVTSIONS OF THE

Austrian Assets Agreement of January 30, 1959
Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me
by Article I of the Agreement entitled "Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of Austria Regarding the Return of Austrian Prop-
erty, Rights and Interests," which was signed at
Washington on January 30, 1959,^ and was ratified by

the United States on March 4, 1964, pursuant to the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States
on February 25, 1964, I hereby designate the Attorney
General of the United States as the officer authorized
to administer and give effect to the provisions of that
Agreement.

The Attorney General is authorized to delegate any
of the functions conferred upon him by this order
to any ofiicer or employee of the Department of Justice.

As used in this order, the term "functions" includes
duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and
discretion.

The White House,
June 22, 196Jt.

U.S. and New Zealand Sign
Air Transport Agreement

Press release 293 dated June 24

The United States and New Zealand on
June 24 signed a bilateral air transport serv-
ices agreement in Wellington. The agreement,
which was initialed ad referendum on March 11,
1964,^ was signed on behalf of their Govern-
ments by K. J. Holyoake, Prime Minister of
New Zealand, and Herbert B. Powell, United
States Ambassador to New Zealand.

The new agreement replaces the 1946 air
transport services agreement between the
United States and New Zealand.^ In addition
to bringing up to date several articles of the
1946 agreement, the new agreement incorporates
certain amendments to the routes which were
exchanged between New Zealand and the
United States in 1946. The routes agreed upon
will permit an airline designated by New
Zealand to operate to Los Angeles via the So-
ciety Islands or via Honolulu, and to operate
the "Coral Route" in the South Pacific via
American Samoa. The United States airline
will be able to operate to and beyond Auckland
and Christchurch via, inter alia, the Society-
Islands.

'Read by the President at his news conference on
June 23.
" No. 11158 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 7981.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5577^
'For background, see Buixetin of Apr. 6, 1964, p.

549.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1573^

4645, 4789, 5085, and 5374.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLErTIN:

U.S.-Japan Science Committee
Concludes Fourth Meeting

The United States-J a-pan Committee on
Scientific Cooperation met at Washington, D.C.,
June 23-26. Following are an announcement
of the meeting, remarks made hy Secretary Ru,sk
hefore the Committee on June 23, and the text
of a joint communique released at the close of
the meeting on June 26.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETING

Tlie Department of State announced on June
22 (press release 289) that the United States-
Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation
would hold its fourth series of meetings at
Washington, D.C., June 23-26.^ The Commit-
tee, composed of distinguished scientific leaders
of the two countries, advises the respective Gov-
ernments on ways of strengthening cooperation
between the United States and Japan. At its
forthcoming meeting, the Committee will study
a report from the two Governments on the
status of the cooperative science program con-
ducted under its aegis. It will consider possible
new areas of scientific cooperation. The Com-
mittee is also expected to discuss ways in which
the scientists of both countries can combine their
knowledge and efforts in research which could
lead toward prediction of the time and place of
earthquakes and tidal waves, problems of vital
importance to both Japan and the United States.

The United States-Japan Committee on
Scientific Cooperation is one of three high-level
U.S.-Japan consultative bodies which Prime
Minister Ikeda of Japan and President Ken-
nedy, during Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to
Washington in Jime 1961, agreed to establish
to strengthen the partnership between the
United States and Japan.- The other commit-
tees are the Cabinet-level Joint United States-
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs and the United States-Japan Conference
on Cultural and Educational Interchange.

^ For names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese
delegations, see Department of State press release 289
dated June 22.

' For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin of
July 10, 1961, p. 57.

The Committee on Scientific Cooperation has
held three meetings to date : December 1961 in
Tokyo, May 1962 in Washington,^ and May
1963 in Tokyo. The Committee and its co-
operative science program, administered on the
United States side by the National Science
Foundation, has already achieved scientific co-
operation of benefit to both countries. The
Committee has concentrated on the promotion
of the exchange of scholars and scientific in-
formation and materials, and the encourage-
ment of joint research projects in specified
scientific areas. These areas include: earth
sciences of the Pacific area, animal and plant
geography and ecology of the Pacific area,
medical sciences, and hurricanes and typhoons.
Geophysical studies of Pacific volcanoes and
deep-sea seismic studies are among the coopera-
tive research projects initiated to date. Japa-
nese and American scientists have also met to
discuss such subjects of common concern as can-
cer chemotherapy and education in the sciences.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

I have the liveliest personal interest in the
work of this joint Committee on Scientific Co-
operation. I am very pleased to be with you
at this fourth joint session of the U.S.-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation. I have
just this moment left President Johnson, who
asked me to extend to you his personal greetings
on behalf of the U.S. Government. For me it
is a special pleasure to see a number of old
friends. In a former capacity I enjoyed many
close associations in the scientific community
both in the U.S. and Japan.

Wlien they met in June 1961, Prime Minister
Ikeda and the late President Kennedy agreed
on the importance of a closer relationship be-
tween our two countries especially in the fields
of economic, cultural, and scientific affairs.
Both Prime Minister Ikeda and President
Kennedy felt that each of us had a great deal
to do for each other, that we have much to learn
from each other.

' For texts of joint communiques Issued at the close
of the first and second meetings, see ibid., Jan. 8, 1962,
p. 66, and June 11, 1962, p. 954.

JTXLT 13, 1964

President Johnson is dedicated to that same
objective. One of his first decisions as Presi-
dent was to ask Prime Minister Ikeda to re-
schedule the third meeting of the U.S.-Japan
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs,
postponed by the tragic event of last November
while the American delegation was en route
over the Pacific. This was done in spite of the
heavy pressures of legislative demands upon
both your Cabinet and upon ours.* As I said
in Tokyo in January,^ notliing can testify better
to the reality of the partnership that exists be-
tween our two countries. That partnership is
rooted in common interests and purposes and
ideals.

The efforts of this Committee have been
watched with a great deal of interest by both
Governments. In the short space of less than 3
years your discussions and recommendations
have underlined the importance of scientific re-
search to national development. It was the
marriage of education with research and ex-
perimentation that explained the dramatic de-
velopment of our own country in the past 50
years. So both our countries, as well as many
others, have a strong practical interest in your
efforts to develop means, for example, of pre-
dicting the time and place of earthquakes and
tidal waves. You have f oimd many other areas
of useful cooperation, and we are confident you
will find still others.

Our Governments realize this partnership
that exists between us should not be exclusive or
narrow. For they know neither of our coim-
tries can achieve enduring prosperity and peace
apart from the rest of the world. Among our
most common interests is that of building a de-
cent world order. This includes, among other
things, helping the developing countries to
modernize their economic and social systems.
For men everywhere have come to believe that
modern science and teclinology can make pos-
sible a decent standard of living for all. That
reliance is important because in the next two or
three decades we shall discover whether science

' For text of a joint communique releiised at the
close of the third meeting of the Joint United States-
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, see
ma., Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235.

»/6i(?., p. 230.

and teclinology can provide an answer which in
the past has been provided by aggression, in-
vasion, the taking of resources from other
peoples. Neither stability nor moral satisfac-
tion is to be found in a world which is divided
between a few rich and very many poor.

So your Committee has great responsibilities
and great opportunities. It is a genuine pleas-
ure to have you with us once again, and I wish
you continuing success in extending cooperation
in science between our two coimtries. To the
extent that we can do so, we spin the infinity
of threads that bind people together and
remind ourselves that, despite our trivial
differences, frail man, confronted with a some-
times hostile physical universe, is boimd to-
gether more importantly by the fact of his
humanity than he is separated by the emotions
and the fears among men themselves. So this
is the great prospect; this is the great vision
which scientific cooperation can meet. It cuts
across ideological lines.

Just today we have announced cooperation
with the Soviet Union on the desalination of
sea water.^ One-third of our own country
needs advances in this field. International co-
operation, certainly, is needed because it is time
for man to think of himself as man and to
try to cooperate witliin the family of man. It
is too late to take another view. We cannot
afford to consult our historical fears, our am-
bitions, our appetites. We must think of our-
selves as men.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The fourth meeting of the United States-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation was held at the
Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 23-26,
1964. Dr. Harry C. Kelly. Head of the United States
Delegation, and Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, Head of the
Japanese Delegation, served as Co-Chairmen of the
Committee.

The Committee expressed its confidence that the
joint enterprises undertaken by scientists of the two
nations during the past three years have established
a firm basis for exjianding scientific cooperation be-
tween the United States and Japan. The work already
underway shows that international cooperation in the
sciences contributes not alone to the advance of knowl-

' See p. 60.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

edge but also to the improvement of understanding
among nations and the attainment of world i)eace.

The Committee received reports from panels in each
of the seven areas of cooperation and agreed to trans-
mit several of the recommendations to their govern-
ments. The names of Panels serving the seven areas
in which activity has been sponsored by the Committee
for the past three years are :

(1) Exchange of Scholars.

(2) Exchange of Scientific and Technical Informa-
tion and Materials.

(3) Earth Sciences of the Pacific Area.

(4) Animal and Plant Geography and Ecology of
the Pacific Area. ( The name of this Panel was changed
to "Biological Sciences").

(5) Medical Sciences.

(6) Education in the Sciences.

(7) Hurricane and Typhoon Research.

As an addition to the joint research projects already
underway, the Committee agreed to recommend to the
respective governments that drug abuse be designated
an appropriate field for joint research in the area of
the medical sciences, since the abuse of drugs is a
growing problem in both countries, and its pattern in
the U.S. and Japan has certain features in common,
differing from that in many other countries.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held in
Tokyo in June, 1965.

Captive Nations Week, 1964

A PROCLAMATION'

Wheeeas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959
(73 Stat. 212) authorizes and requests the President of
the United States of America to issue a proclamation
each year designating the third week in July as "Cap-
tive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and
independence shall have been achieved for all the
captive nations of the world ; and

Whereas the cause of human rights and personal
dignity remains a universal a.spiration ; and

Whereas this nation is firmly committed to the
cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and

Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to
the people of the captive nations the support of the
Government and the people of the United States of
America for their just aspirations :

Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States of America, do hereby designate
the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations
Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America
to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and
activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion

to the just aspirations of aU people for national inde-
pendence and human liberty.

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this eighteenth day

of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hun-

[seal] dred and sixty-four, and of the Independence

of the United States of America the one

hundred and eighty-eighth.

luyJuJw»».«-«

By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

President Asks for Tariff Study
on Stainless Steel Flatware

White House press release dated June 23

The President on June 23 requested the
Tariff Commission to begin an investigation
for the purpose of advising him on the probable
economic effects of a change in special tariff re-
strictions on imports of stainless steel table flat-
ware.

The restrictions on stainless steel flatware
were first imposed on November 1, 1959,^ after
an escape-clause investigation established the
need for such action. Tlie situation in the in-
dustry has since been reviewed each year by the
Commission, the most recent review having
been completed in the fall of 1963 under the
provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
The act also provides, in section 351(d) (2), for
a full-scale review of the probable economic
effect of the "reduction or termination" of re-
strictions should the President or the Tariff
Commission call for one.

The Commission's annual review indicated
that there have been improvements in domestic
production and sales of stainless steel flatware
since the escape-clause action went into effect,
and that in the same period imports have been
reduced to about half their previous volume.

The President, in referring the case to the
Tariff Commission, annoimced that the Com-

' No. 3594 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 7971.

' Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1959, p. 727.

JULY 13, 1964

mission's annual review had been submitted to
him by his Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, Christian A. Herter, and was ac-
companied by the views of the interagency
committees responsible to Governor Herter's
office.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Food for Peace : Nineteenth Semiannual Report on Ac-
tivities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Con-
gress, as Amended, Outlining Operations Under the

Act During the Period July 1 Through December 31,

196.3. H. Doc. 204. Undated. 139 pp.
Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council

on International Monetary and Financial Problems

During the Period January 1-June 30, 1963. H.

Doc. 297. April 14, 1964. 90 pp.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502.

Part VII (including appendix and index). May

5-6, 1964. 180 pp.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Report of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 11380. H. Rept

1443. June 1, 1964. 75 pp.
Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Report on

hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the

House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Rept. 1442.

June 1, 1964. 19 pp.
Establishing the Roosevelt Campobello International

Parli. Report to accompany H.R. 9740. H. Rept.

1466. June 9, 1964. 12 pp.
Ninth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, June 11,

1964. Report of the United States House delegation

to the conference held in Paris, November 4-8, 1963.

H. Rept. 1478. June 11, 1964. 51 pp.
Aircraft Engines. Report to accompany H.R. 1608.

S. Rept. 1081. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
Certain Wools. Report to accompany H.R. 2652. S.

Rept. 1082. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
Instant Coffee. Report to accompany H.R. 4198. S.

Rept. 1084. June 16, 1964. 4 pp.
Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 7480. S.

Rept. 1085. June 16, 1064. 3 pp.
Double Taxation of Certain Tobacco Products. Report

to accompany H.R. 8268. S. Rept. 1086. June 16,

1964. 5 pp.
Certain Particleboard. Report to accompany H.R.

8975. S. Rept. 10S7. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 10463. S.

Rept. 1089. June 16, 1964. 5 pp.
Temporary Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From

Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H.R.

10466. S. Rept. 1091. 5 pp.
Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R.

10468. S. Rept. 1092. June 16, 1964. 2 pp.
Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R.

10.537. S. Rept. 1093. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R.

9311. S. Rept. 1094. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
Roosevelt Campobello International Park. Report to

accompany S. 2464. S. Rept. 1097. June 19, 1964.

12 pp.

Security Council Votes Extension
of Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Following is a statement made hy U.S. Repre-
sentative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Secu-
rity Council on June 19^ together ivith the text
of a resolution adopted unanimously hy the
Council on June 20.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S. /U.N. press release 4417 dated June 19

Before proceeding to tlie substance of my re-
marks, may I first express the appreciation of
my Government to tlie Secretary-General for
his statesmanlike efforts in behalf of peace in
the Eastern Mediterranean during these past
few montlis. Tlie recruitment and deployment
in Cyprus of a peacekeeping force of between
six and seven thousand men with all of the at-
tendant problems of negotiations, logistics,
headquarters, staffing, command arrangements,
and force directives is an operation of consid-
erable magnitude and difficulty. The United
Nations has met this test in a manner worthy
of its best traditions. In mounting tliis peace-
keeping operation and in the selection of per-
sonnel to direct the operation in the field, the
Secretary-General has once again demonstrated
his instinct for finding the right man for the
job.

General [P. S.] Gyani, Commander of the
United Nations Force, and General [R. M. P.]
Carver, his deputy, have been both skillful and
patient in dealing with the complex and frus-
trating problems which the United Nations
Force has encountered. We are hopeful that
General [K. S.] Thimayya, a distinguished
compatriot of General Gyani and for whom we
have the highest regard, will find it possible
to respond favorably to the Secretary-General's
request that he replace General Gyani, who we
understand finds it necessary to leave Cyprus.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CUULETIN

The Secretaiy-General's Special Representa-
tive, Seiior Galo Plaza, has labored with ex-
traordinary energy, dedication, and quick gi-asp
of the situation to resolve some of its most dif-
ficult aspects. Also in response to the resolu-
tion that we adopted on March 4,' the Secretary-
General designated a distinguished Finnish
diplomat. Ambassador Sakari Tuomioja, who
continues his patient efforts to find a peaceful
solution and an agreed settlement of the political
problem confronting Cyprus. For his success,
as we have so often repeated, restoration of
tranquil conditions on the island is imperative.
For this reason particularly, we all owe a debt
of gi-atitude to those states — Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zea-
land, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — whose
soldiers and police make up the United Nations
peacekeeping force. Without their persever-
ance there would be little hope for a return to
law and order, for improvement in the relations
between the communities, and for an ultimate
solution of the conflict in the interest of world
peace.

But the United Nations Force has made prog-
ress since it became operational about 3 months
ago. There have been encouraging forward
steps — eliminating fortifications, arrangements
for harvesting the crops, and so forth — in the
implementation of the program outlined in the
Secretai-y-General's April 29 report.^ Never-
theless it is clear, as the Secretary-General has
stated in his rei:)ort to us of June 15,^ that the
withdrawal of the Force at this time would lead
to an early resumption of the fighting, which
might well develop into a still more serious con-
flict. With the mandate to restore normal con-
ditions uncompleted, my Government believes
that the first order of business in this Council
is to assure an extension of the United Nations
Force in the island. For this reason we heart-
ily support the resolution placed before the
Comicil by the distinguished representative of
Brazil. I tliink it is clear that whatever short-
coming may exist in the mandate of the Force,
it is unlikely that we could agi-ee at this time
on any changes in the balanced resolution so
laboriously constructed in February.

^ For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 19C4, p. 466.
"^ U.N. doc. S/56T1 and Corr. 1.
' U.N. doc. S/5764 and Oorr. 1.

The mandate of the Force permits it to take
firm action where necessary. And it is heart-
ening to note that with increasing firmness the
fighting has subsided. For example, with re-
spect to the situation in the Kyrenia Pass area,
the Secretary-General's report states:

Although better armed with heavy weapons and
In greater numerical strength, there are no signs of the
Greek Oypriots resuming their attaclis in the St. Hila-
rion area, and the location of permanent UNFICYP
posts with the forward troops of both sides has clearly
acted as a deterrent to any positive offensive action.

In the light of recent incidents which have en-
dangered the lives of men of the Force, it has been
made clear to both sides that a repetition of such
incidents will result in the removal of any post used
as a base for fire against troops of UNFICYP, u.sing
force if necessary after due warning has been given.

Mr. President, we applaud such resolute pur-
pose, and we believe that continued vigorous
implementation of the mandate will contribute
more and more to law and order if — and I
emphasize if — the parties will avoid further
acts and utterances that aggravate the fears and
tensions.

In this connection we find the increased im-
portation of arms most serious. The greater
the quantity of arms wielded by the two sides,
the more difficult is the task of the peacekeepers.
The Secretary-General has expressed his grave
concern on that score in his report. The units
in the Force and the Force Commander have
done likewise. On May 28, 1 remind the Coim-
cil, General Gyani stated :

One of the major obstacles in the way of the United
Nations force is the irresponsible and senseless con-
duct of armed men of both communities who do not
appear to have any discipline or to be responsible to
any established authority, but have been acting on
their own reckless initiative, regardless of the un-
fortunate and serious consequences of their acts. Too
many unauthorized people in Cyprus are carrying too
many weapons. In the hands of these thoughtless and
irresponsible elements these weapons become a major
factor in the delay in a return to normal life. It is
absolutely essential that these elements of the popu-
lation, both Greek Cypriote and Turk Cypriote, should
be restrained and disciplined and their weapons re-
moved from them. Until such action is taken, violence
and a sense of insecurity will necessarily pervade the
country and the tasks of the United Nations will be
correspondingly made more difficult and its chances of
success limited.

Mr. President, I welcome the statement by

the representative of the Soviet Union here this
afternoon that weapons do not help in the solu-
tion of conflicts.

We believe that the competitive inflow of
arms into Cyprus aggravates the tension be-
tween the two communities in the island, a ten-
sion which is reflected at the very center of gov-
ernmental decisionmaking. The two elements
of the Government, whose cooperation is the
very basis of the nation's constitution, are not
acting together and are presenting the United
Nations and its members not only with danger-
ous military possibilities but with bafiling legal
and political problems.

As to whether pai-ticular actions by public
oflScials or governmental bodies relating to con-
scription or to arms importation are constitu-
tional, it seems to us it is not for us or any organ
of the United Nations to decide. But it is all
too clear that, whatever may be the constitu-
tional situation, the importation of arms into
an island already stuffed with armament, and
the raising of armed forces beyond original in-
tention or current requirements by anyone, are
clearly contrary to the letter and the intent of
the Security Coimcil resolution of March 4.
The Secretary-General himself raises a ques-
tion about these actions ; and, in our view, they
are more than questionable. Wliether from the
standpoint of internal security in Cyprus or
United Nations responsibility there, those ac-
tions are certahily of dubious legality, unhelp-
ful and unwise.

The United Nations Force, in order to succeed
in implementing its mandate, must have the full
cooperation of the two communities in Cyprus.
And in this connection we are deeply shocked
over the practice of taking hostages and par-
ticularly the incident involving the apparent
abduction and disappearance of members of the
United Nations Force.

If the United Nations is to pacify Cyprus,
it must have much greater cooperation from
the two communities — cooperation not just in
the fields included in the program the Secre-
tary-General outlined in his report of April 29,
but cooperation to stop the increase of arma-
ments on the island.

This applies also to all members of the
United Nations, as operative paragraph 1 of the
March 4 resolution makes clear in these words :

Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with I
their obligations under the Charter of the United Na-
tions, to refrain from any action or threat of action
likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Re-
public of Cyprus, or to endanger international
peace. . . .

This responsibility applies, we believe, par-
ticularly to the parties to the international
agreements with respect to Cyprus. For this
reason a favorable atmosphere for the work of
the United Nations, both of its force on Cyprus
and its mediator, requires that all states, and
these states in particular, refrain from any type
of military action, support, or supply which
adds to tension on the island.

We have heard, Mr. President, the charges
by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cy-
prus [Spyros Kyprianou] that the threat of
military intervention by Turkey is the basic
cause of tension and violence in the island. We
have heard, on the other hand, the charges by
the distinguished representative of Turkey
[Orhan Eralp] that continued armed attacks
by Greek Cypriots on Turkish Cypriots and
unconstitutional action by President Makarios
and his Government in conscripting new forces
and in seeking heavy arms abroad are what
threaten peace and provoke possible interven-
tion. It is not our purpose, nor is it feasible
for the Security Council at this time, to sift all
of these charges and to discover the truth.
There is doubtless truth on both sides. It is
inescapably clear, however, that the actions
of each party cited by the other are in fact
creating mistrust and fear, undermining rather
than building confidence between the two com-
munities, making infinitely more difficidt a just
and final solution, and, indeed, threatening not
only to raise to appalling proportions the con-
flict in Cyprus but even to destroy peace in the
Eastern INIediterranean.

Mr. President, these dire eventualities must
not occur. This is the obligation of the United
Nations peacekeeping force, and most pai'ticu-
larly this is the responsibility of the parties di-
rectly concerned. Wo appeal to them that,
rather than leveling bitter charges against each
other, they consider prayerfully what each can
himself do to lower tension and to restore con-
fidence. It is never too late for magnanimity,
and ultimately it is only by magnanimity and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXBTtNT

mutual concession that this grievous problem
will be resolved.

It is not for my Government to say what that
solution should be. We do believe, however,
that the parties should take steps without de-
lay which can set the stage for a negotiated
solution acceptable to all concerned. We do not
expect a solution can be reached without con-
cessions and sacrifices or that it can be entirely
satisfactory to either side, but a solution must
be found. It should be lasting, just, and with-
out humiliation to any of those concerned. The
process of achieving such a solution must begin
and without delay. The first and most urgent
step, it seems to us, is the passage of the resolu-
tion before us.

Before concluding, Mr. President, I should
like to caU to the Council's attention para-
graphs 126 and 127 of the Secretary-General's
report, in which he notes that financial pledges
have been received sufficient to cover the cost
of the first 3 months of the United Nations
Force operation, but that more than $7 million
in additional pledges will be required to cover
the cost of a further 3 months. Mr. President,
only a relatively small number of coimtries —
some 20 to date — have carried the financial bur-
den of supporting the United Nations operation
in Cyprus. My Government, in response to the
Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary con-
tributions, pledged $2 million toward the cost
of the first 3 months' operation, and it also
transported most of the United Nations con-
tingents to Cyprus at no cost to this organiza-
tion.

The maintenance of international peace and
security is set foith in article 1 of the Charter
of the United Nations as its first purpose.
Wlien peace is threatened anywhere, it should
certainly be the concern of all members of this
organization. I would, therefore, appeal ur-
gently to all members to respond to the request
of the Secretary-General so that the success of
this operation on Cyprus may not in any way
be prejudiced by lack of financial support.

Finally, Mr. President, in view of the critical
situation, we hope that the Council will proceed
to vote as quickly as possible on the joint draft
resolution now before us so as to give the Secre-
tary-General adequate time to make the nec-

essary administrative, financial, and other
arrangements for the extension of the United
Nations Force on Cyprus.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION <

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General
(S/5764) considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the
Security Council resolution of 4 March 19&i (S/5575)
for an additional period of three months to be useful
and advisable,

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Secretary-
General for his efforts in the implementation of the
Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964 and
13 March 1964,=

Expressing its deep appreciation to the States that
have contributed troops, police, supplies and finan-
cial support for the implementation of the Security
Council resolution of 4 March 1964,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964 and
13 March 1964 ;

2. Calls vpon all Member States to comply with the
above-mentioned resolutions ;

3. Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General
(S/5764) ;

4. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United
Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the
Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an
additional period of three months, ending 26 Septem-
ber 1964 (S/5575).

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on
June 25 (press release 296) that the United
States would be represented by the following
tripartite delegation at the 48th session of the
International Labor Conference at Geneva,
June 17-July 9.^
Repeesenting the Government of the United States

Delegates

George L-P "Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
International Affairs

' U.N. doc. S/5778 ; adopted unanimously on June 20.

' U.N. doc. S/5603.

^ For names of the advisers to the tripartite delega-
tion, see Department of State press release 296 dated
June 25.

JULY 13, 1964

George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Substitute Delegates

John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of

Commerce
Roger W. Tubby, Ambassador, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Congressional Advisers

Kenneth Keating, U.S. Senate

Bobert P. Griffin, House of Representatives

Alternate Congressional Advisers
Albert H. Quie, House of Representatives
Adam Clayton Powell, House of Representatives
James Roosevelt, House of Representatives

Representing the Employers of the United States

Delegate

Richard Wagner, Chairman of the Executive Commit-
tee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Vice Chairman
of the Board, Champlin Oil and Refining Co.,
Chicago, 111.

Representing the Workers of the United States
Delegate

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, Inter-
national Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz is at-
tending the meeting as a "visiting minister."

These annual meetings have as their purpose
the discussion of means of improving working
conditions and Labor standards throughout the
world. At this year's conference special atten-
tion will be focused on proposals to amend the
ILO constitution so as to provide for suspension
of countries found by the United Nations to be
pursuing a declared policy of racial discrimina-
tion.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed ielmo) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed, publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Cambodia-South Viet-Nam Border Dispute: Letters
from the representative of Cambodia : S/5728, June 2,
1964, 5 pp.; S/5765, June 1.5, 1965, 2 pp.; S/5770,
June 17, 1964, 1 p. Note of President of the Se-
curity Council designating members of Committee

of Experts, S/5749, June 5, 1964, 1 p. Letter from
the representative of United Kingdom, 8/5777,
June 19, 1964, 2 pp.

Letters from the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey
on the Cyprus dispute : S/5740, June 3, 1964, 3 pp. ;
S/5743, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5744, June 5, 1964,
4 pp. ; S/5746, June 5, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5747, June 5,
1964, 2 pp.; S/5748, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5753,
June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5754, June 8, 1964, 3 pp.;
8/5755, June 8, 1964. 3 pp.; S/5762, June 10, 1964,
2 pp. ; S/5766, June 15, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5768, June 16,
1964, 3 pp.; S/5774, June 18, 1964, 6 pp.; S/5779,
June 22, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5781, June 23, 1964, 3 pp.

Reports by the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Operation in Cyprus: S/5764, June 15, 1964,
40 pp. and map ; S/5764/Corr. 1, June 16, 1964, 1 p. ;
S/5764/Add. 1, June 19, 1964, 2 pp.

Letters and report on question of apartheid in South
Africa: S/574.5, June 5, 1964, 1 p.; S/5658/Add. 3,
June 8, 1964, 5 pp. ; S/5757, June 9, 1964, 1 p. ; S/5759,
June 9, 1964, 1 p.

Letters from the representatives of Haiti and the Do-
minican Republic on border incidents : S/5750,
June 8, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5750, June 9, 1964, 1 p.;
S/5763, June 10, 1964, 1 p.

General Assembly

Report on the Implementation of the Current Pro-
gramme for 1963 (Including the Complementary As-
sistance Programme and Other Projects), submitted
by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
A/AC.96/229. April 15, 1964. 48 pp.

Note on the Situation of Refugees in Nepal submitted
by the High Commissioner. A/AC.96/241. May 4,
1964. 10 pp.

International Law Commission. Report on the Sixth
Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee (Cairo, February-March 1964) by
Bduardo Jimtoez de Ar^chaga, Observer for the
Commission. A/CN.4/172. May 11, 1964. 20 pp.

Measures To Implement the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Report of the Secretary-General.
A/5698. June 8, 1964. 39 pp.

Opening Date of the Nineteenth Regular Session of
the General Assembly (November 10, 1964). Note
by the Secretary-General. A/5708. June 15, 19(54.
5 pp.

Letter dated June 3, 1964, from the representative of
Kuwait to the Secretary-General on the Question of
Aden. A/AC.109/83. June 17, 1964. 3 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Social De-
velopment of Latin America in the Postwar Period.
E/CN.12/600. April 15, 1964. 169 pp.

Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Structure
and Activities of the United Nations and the Spe-
cialized Agencies in Schools and Other Educational
Institutions of Member States. Report of the Secre-
tarv-General and the Director-General of UNESCO,
E/3S75, April 15, 1964, 266 pp., and Corr. 1, May 27,
1964, 8 pp.

Social Commission. Report on the World Social Situ-
ation : Planning for balanced social and economic
development in the United Arab Republic. E/CN.5/
346/Add. 10. April 24, 1964. 62 pp.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards. Signed
at Vienna June 15, 1964. Enters into force on the
date on which the Agency accepts the initial inven-
tory of materials, equipment, and facilities which
are within the scope of the Agency safeguard system.
Signatures: Greece, International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States.

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4,
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS
3943.
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at

Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for

the United States February S, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Somali Republic, June 10,

1964.

Load Line

International load line convention. Done at London
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933.
47 Stat. 2228.
Accession deposited: Algeria, April 11, 1964.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu-
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914,
for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat.
1912.

Notification received that it considers itself iound:
Rwanda, May 5, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention of Febru-
ary 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at
Washington July 15, 1963.'
Ratification advised hy the Senate: June 23, 1964.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1960. Done at London June 17, I960.'
Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, June 11,
1964.'

BILATERAL

France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, 4694, 5128), for co-
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Washington June 22, 19(>4. Enters into
force on the date on which each Government shall
have received from the other written notification
that it has complied with all statutory and consti-
tutional requirements for entry into force.

Greece

Protocol supplementing convention of February 20,
1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance of double tax-
ation and prevention of fiscal evasion of taxes on
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Athens Febru-
ary 12, 1964.'
Ratificatimi advised hy the Senate: June 23, 1964.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement for the application of safeguards to United
States reactor facilities. Signed at Vienna June 15,
1964. Enters into force on the date on which the
Agency accepts the initial inventory of facilities
and materials to be placed under Agency safeguards.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington June 23, 1964. Entered into force June
23, 1964.

Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of March 18, 1964 (TIAS 5547). Effected
by exchange of notes at Seoul June 15, 1964. En-
tered into force June 15, 19(34.

New Zealand

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Welling-
ton June 24, 1964. Entered into force June 24, 1964.

Air transport services agreement of December 3, 1946,
as supplemented (TIAS 1573, 4645, 4789, 5085, 5374).
Terminated: June 24, 1964 (replaced by agreement
of June 24, 1964, supra).

Spain

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in
cotton textiles of July 16, 1963 (TIAS 5427). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington June 15
and 17, 1964. Entered into force June 17, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force.

* With a declaration.

Designations

Robert C. Creel as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, effective June 24. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 295
dated June 26.)

JULY 13, 1064

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale iy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 201,02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, ichich
viay ie obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Peru.
Signed at Lima February 13, 1964. Entered into
force February 13, 1964. With excliange of notes.
TIAS .5539. 17 pp. 100.

Education— Educational Foundation and Financing
of Exchange Programs. Agreement witli Iceland.
Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into
force February 13, 1964. TIAS 5542. 10 pp. 100.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witti the Re-
public of Korea. Signed at Seoul March 18, 1964.
Entered into force March 18, 1964. With exchanges
of notes. TIAS 5547. 10 pp. 100.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Bolivia, re-
lating to the agreement of September 23, 1955. Ex-
change of notes— Signed at La Paz March 4, 1964.
Entered into force March 4, 1964. TIAS 5548. 3 pp.
50.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China,
amending the agreement of October 19, 1963. Ex-
change of letters— Signed at Taipei February 3 and
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.
TIAS 5549. 3 pp. 50.

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of
November 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Dated at Lisbon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered
into force April 3, 1964. TIAS 5550. 5 pp. 50.

Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspen-
sion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with
Canada, continuing the agreement of July 3 and
13, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa March
31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964. TIAS
5551. 2 pp. 5^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ivory
Coast. Signed at Abidjan March 10, 1964. Entered
into force March 10, 1964. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5552. 9 pp. 100.

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Protocol
with Japan, amending the agreement of June 16, 1958,
as amended. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963.
Entered into force April 21, 1964. TIAS 5553. 5 pp.
50.

Technical Cooperation — Continued Application to Tan-
ganyika of the U.S.-U.K. Agreement of July 13, 1951.
Agreement with Tanganyika. Exchange of notes — •
Dated at Dar es Salaam December 9, 1963. Entered
into force December 9, 1963. TIAS 5554. 2 pp. 50.

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Belgium and Luxembourg, amending the
agreement of October 8, 1948, as amended. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Brussels April 2, 1964. And ex-
change of notes — Signed at Luxembourg March 12 and
April 2, 1964. Entered into force April 2, 1964. TIAS
5555. 11 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia.
Signed at Tunis April 7, 1964. Entered into force
April 7, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5556.
14 pp. 10^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel,
amending the agreement of December 6, 1962, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964.
TIAS 5557. 2 pp. 50.

North Pacific Fur Seals. Protocol with Canada,
Japan, and U.S.S.R., amending the Interim Convention
of February 9, 1957. Signed at Washington October 8,

1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964. TIAS 5558.
20 pp. 150.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington April 15,

1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5559.
6 pp. 50.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica.
Plxchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 31
and April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964.
TIAS 5560. 3 pp. 5^.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Ivory Coast
Exchange of notes — Dated at Abidjan April 5 and 21,
1962. Entered into force April 21, 1962. TIAS 5561.
4 pp. 50.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to June 22 which appears
in this issue of the Eut.t.f.tin is No. 285 of June
17.

No. Date Subject

289 6/22 U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific

Cooperation (rewrite).
*290 6/22 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

291 6/23 Discussions with Panama.

292 6/23 Rostow : "Europe and the Atlantic

Alliance."

293 6/24 Air transport services agreement

with New Zealand.

294 6/24 ANZUS Council meeting.

*295 6/26 Creel designated Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs
(biographic details).

296 6/25 Delegation to International Labor

Conference (rewrite).

297 6/25 Canada-U.S. Committee on Joint

Defense.

*298 6/26 Program for visit of President of

Costa Rica.
300 6/26 Tripartite declaration on Soviet
agreement with East Germany.

*301 6/26 Harriman : St. Lawrence Seaway
commemorative luncheon, Muske-
gon, Mich, (excerpts).

*Not printed.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTIN

INDEX July 13, 196Jf Vol. LI, No. 1307

Africa. Africa South of the Equator (Wil-
liams) ~. 51

Australia. ANZUS Council To Meet at Wash-
ington , . 43

Austria. Attorney General To Administer Aus-
trian Assets Agreement (text of Executive
order) 60

Aviation

Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re-
asserted by U.S 44

U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport
Agreement 60

Brazil. United States Agrees To Lend Brazil

$50 Million , 59

Canada. U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews Ctir-
rent Defense Problems (text of joint com-
munique) u . 45

Claims and Property. Attorney General To Ad-
minister Austrian Assets Agreement (text of
Executive order) 60

Congo (Leopoldville). Africa South of the
Equator (Williams) 51

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy 64

Cyprus

President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece
(exchanges of greetings and joint communi-
ques) 48

Security Council Votes Extension of Peacekeep-
ing Force in Cyprus (Stevenson, text of reso-
lution) 64

Department and Foreign Service. Designa-
tions (Creel) ,....> 69

Economic Aflfairs

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38
President Asks for Tariff Study on Stainless

Steel Flatware ^ . 63

Europe

Captive Nations Week, 1964 (text of proclama-
tion) 63

Creel designated Deputy Assistant Secretary . . 69
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38

Foreign Aid. United States Agrees To Lend
Brazil $50 Million 59

France. Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire
for German Reunification (text of tripartite
declaration) , 44

Germany

Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re-
asserted by U.S. 44

Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for Ger-
man Reunification (text of tripartite declara-
tion) , . 44

Greece. President Johnson Discusses Cyprus
Situation With Prime Ministers of Turkey
and Greece (exchanges of greetings and joint
communiques) 48

International Organizations and Conferences
ANZUS Council To Meet at Washington ... 43
International Labor Conference (delegation) . . 67

Japan. U.S.-Japan Science Committee Con-
cludes Fourth Meeting (Rusk, text of joint
communique) 61

Labor. International Labor Conference (dele-
gation) 67

Laos. President Names New Ambassador to

Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy 46

Military Affairs

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38
U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews Current De-
fense Problems (text of joint communique) . . 45

New Zealand

ANZUS Council To Meet at Washington ... 43
U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport
Agreement 60

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) .... 38

Panama. United States and Panama Continue
Discussions 54

Presidential Documents

Attorney General To Administer Austrian As-
sets Agreement 60

Captive Nations Week, 1964 63

President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and
Greece 48

President Names New Ambassador to Saigon,

Reiterates U.S. Policy 46

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De-
salting of Sea Water 60

Publications. Recent Releases 70

Science

U.S.-Japan Science Committee Concludes Fourth

Meeting (Rusk, text of joint communique) . . 61

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De-
salting of Sea Water (Johnson) 60

South Africa. Africa South of the Equator

(Williams) 51

Treaty Information

Current Actions . , 69

U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport

Agreement . , 60

Turkey. President Johnson Discusses Cyprus
Situation With Prime Ministers of Turkey
and Greece (exchanges of greetings and joint
communiques) 48

U.S.S.R.

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38

Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re-
asserted by U.S . . . 44

Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for Ger-
man Reimification (text of tripartite declara-
tion) . . . . , 44

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De-
salting of Sea Water (Johnson) 60

United Kingdom. Three Western Powers Re-
affirm Desire for German Reunification (text
of tripartite declaration) 44

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 68

The Resurgence of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (Sisco) 55

Security Council Votes Extension of Peacekeep-
ing Force in Cyprus (Stevenson, text of reso-
lution) 64

Viet-Nam. President Names New Ambassador

to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy . . . , . 46

Name Index

Creel, Robert C 69

Inonu, Ismet . . , 48

Johnson, President 46, 48, 60, 63

Johnson, U. Alexis 46

Lodge, Henry Cabot 46

Papandreou, George . 48

Rostow, W. W 38

Rusk, Secretary 61

Sisco, Joseph J 55

Stevenson, Adlai E 64

Taylor, Maxwell D 46

Williams, G. Mennen 5X

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1965: International Cooperation Year

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International
Cooperation Year." This 5-page pamphlet discusses this theme by pointing out that "international
cooperation is a fact of life . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century."

As the pamphlet suggests, "Perhaps we can make two things of the Year: a massive opportunity
for public education about America's role in international cooperation, and a chance to speed up some
very concrete tasks on international institution building, by including them as special targets to shoot
for in 1965." The article concludes by listing 10 specific targets at which we might aim.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY EECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POT^IpY ^

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

July 20, 1964

THE SINGLE GOAL OF PEACE

Address by President Johnson 79

THE UNIVERSAL APPEAL OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Address hy Secretary Busk 74-

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 1 82

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS

Statement hy Secretary Busk 98

NITED STATES AND NATO MEMBERS SIGN NEW AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

IN EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION

Message of the President to the Congress and Text of Agreement 93

For index see inside 'back cover

The Universal Appeal of the Declaration of Independence

Address hy Secretary Rush '

It is an exceptional honor to speak here, in
this historic place, on this historic day. I am
mindful tliat I am following in the immediate
footsteps of two Presidents whom I have had the
high privilege of serving as Secretary of State.
President Kennedy spoke here 2 years ago
today ,^ and President Jolmson, as Vice Presi-
dent, a year ago.

All of us, as Americans, have a deep feeling
about the Hall in which were born the two
fundamental documents of our national life:
the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution. As Secretary of State, I have special
further interest in this neighborhood, because
very near here — at 13 South Sixth Street —
stood the first home of the Department of For-
eign Affairs of the United States, which later
became the Department of State.

For Americans this annual festival is — and,

' Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on
July 4 (press release 313 dated July 3) .
" For text, see Bulletin of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

let us hope, always will be — glorious, an occa-
sion for reviewing our national achievements,
for pride and gratitude, and for sober reflection
on the unfinished business of freedom. But we
who celebrate tliis day in 1964 can draw courage
and hope from tlie fact that just 2 days ago a
great civil rights bill has become the law of the
land — a bill designed to make all our citizens
free, just as 188 years ago here we made our
nation free.

The Fourth of July is important to us as the
anniversary of our national independence.
We would celebrate it even if as a nation we
were much less than we are. And other na-
tions would join us in celebrating it, if only
because we were the first colony in the modern
world to break away.

But the importance of the Fourth of July
does not lie, exclusively or primarily, in the fact
that we won our national independence and be-
came a great military power with formidable
material accomplishments. It lies rather in the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. U08 PUBLICATION 7714 JULY 20, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by tlie Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public aud interested
agencies of the Government with iufor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreipn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general Interna-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 issues, domestic $S.50 ;
foreign $12.2.'): single copy. 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19.
1061).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as tlie
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ideas and ideals about men and their relation-
ships to each other to wMch we have been com-
mitted since our national birth. It is these
which make the Fourth of July a date of his-
toric significance.

The great document of July 1776 was a dec-
laration not only of independence but of repre-
sentative government and of the rights of man.

The burden of complaint of the American
colonists was that a tyrannical king was depriv-
ing them of their historic rights. And, in fact,
the British jjeople had been building their liber-
ties, bit by bit through centuries, in their de-
velopment of the common law and the evolution
of parliament and the legislative bodies of the
American Colonies.

The Rise of the Democracies

But the Declaration did not rest its case solely
on the particular violations of limited liberties
previously won. It proclaimed the gi-eat gen-
eral propositions :

. . . that aU men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inialienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.

These principles were set forth not as the
special property of the inhabitants of the Brit-
ish Colonies in Nortli America but as universal
truths, applicable to all men and for all time.
And, over the decades, the appeal of these prin-
ciples has endured and broadened.

The strength of those simple notions, the will-
ingness of men to fight for them, has brought
down one despotism and one empire after
another. Those were the ideas which inspired
the rise of the democracies of Western Europe,
the liberators of Latin America, and the evolu-
tion of the British Commonwealth. Since the
Second World War they have led to the creation
of more than 50 new nations.

The basic propositions of our Declaration of
Independence may be found in the constitutions
of many countries. And some of them are em-
bodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
Its preamble says the "peoples of the United
Nations" are "determined ... to reaffirm faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity

and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large
and small. . . ." Article 55 speaks of "respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples" and pledges the United
Nations to promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the various conventions on specific human
rights subscribed to by members of the United
Nations help to promote human rights.

Unhappily these principles and commitments
are often breached. Unfortunately, also, many
nations, both old and new, which call themselves
republics or democracies are not.

But these ideas and ideals have gripped the
minds of ordinar;v' men and women in all parts
of the world. Their translation into practice
may be slow and imeven — and marked by set-
backs here and there — but it continues.

The most powerful opponents of these basic
ideas today are the leaders of the principal
Communist states. But even the Commimists
recognize the appeal of such words as "free-
dom" and "democracy." They call their gov-
ernments "republics" or "people's republics" or
"democratic republics," although not one of
them has a government chosen in a free election.
They even apply the label of "wars of libera-
tion" to the sort of gangster wars of terror and
aggression they are waging against the people
of Laos and South Viet-Nam.

In the Conununist world we can see the cen-
trifugal force of national traditions and inter-
ests. Most of the smaller Communist states of
Eastern Europe are reacliing out for more
autonomy. And within at least some of the
Communist states we can see persistent, if still
limited, yearnings for more personal liberty —
for more freedom to speak and travel and act,
for better protection against arbitrary pimish-
ment, for more influence on the decisions of
those who rule.

The commitments which our forebears made
for us to history in Independence Hall — in the
Declaration and in the Constitution — are both
our driving force as a nation and the central
concern of our foreign policy. The prime ob-

JTJLY 20, 19G4

jective of our foreign policy, as of our military
power, is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity."

Making the Total Environment Secure

We can no longer secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity by isolat-
ing our nation, our continent, or our hemisphere
from the rest of the world. The speed of mod-
ern communications and transportation and the
range and destructiveness of modem weapons
have erased the margins of distance and time
which until the end of the Second World War
contributed greatly to our security.

Today we can be secure only to the extent
that our total enviromnent is secure — and by
total environment we mean not only the land,
waters, and air of the earth but space as far out
as instruments can be projected capable of af-
fecting significantly human affairs.

Our endeavors to make our total environment
more secure move simultaneously along several
lines.

First of all, it is essential to repel — and to
do all we can to prevent- — aggression by what-
ever means. To deter aggression, we maintain,
with our allies, massive retaliatory forces and
increasingly strong and mobile conventional
forces. And as President Jolmson has made
clear, we are determined to help those who are
victims of such aggressions as are now going on
in Southeast Asia — guerrilla warfare and ter-
rorism directed from the outside and sustained
by infiltrating trained men and arms across
national frontiers. We shall soon be meeting
with our partners in the Organization of Ainer-
ican States to take additional steps to insure
that Cuba does not serve as an effective base
for that type of aggression in Latin America.

Wliile we do our part in deterring and
repelling aggi-ession, we also seek areas of agree-
ment — and of cooperation — with our adver-
saries. We believe that the Soviet leaders rec-
ognize a common interest with us in reducing
the dangers of a great war. We most earnestly
hope that they will open their doors, as we are
willing to open ours, to the sort of inspection
which will make possible genuine progress in
reducing armaments. At the same time, we

heartily favor increasing contacts between our
people and those of the Eastern European
states and the Soviet Union. And we welcome
cooperative undertakings such as the work on
desalmization of water on wliich Soviet scien-
tists and our own recently agreed.^

In President Jolinson's words, ". . . our
guard is up but our hand is out." * He has
made it clear that we will continue to discuss
any problem, to examine any proposal, to make
any agreement, to take any action, which might
lessen the danger of war without impairing the
interests and security of the free world.

Building the Free World

However, foreign policy is not concerned
solely with our adversaries. We apply our-
selves night and day to the great task of build-
ing the free world.

Two years ago today. President Kennedy
spoke here on the grand theme of "interde-
pendence" — with particular emphasis on our
hopes for a closer and stronger Atlantic part-
nership "as a nucleus for the eventual union
of all free men." A closer and even more effec-
tive partnership with other advanced nations
of the free world— those of the Atlantic and
Japan and others in the Pacific — remains a
major goal of our policy.

We are equally interested in closer and more
effective partnership with other free nations —
in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. All
of the advanced nations of the free world have
an immense stake in seeing the developing coun-
tries make economic, social, and political prog-
ress in freedom. I

The peoples of the new nations and of many
older ones are aflame with expectations of a
better life. Many have discovered what others
had learned earlier — that national independence
does not automatically bring economic and so-
cial improvements. But all of them are deter-
mined to move ahead. The whole world knows
that modem teclmology enables men to rise
above bare subsistence.

Few, if any, of the new nations are as favor-
ably situated as we were when we won our inde-

» Ibid., July 13, 1964, p. 60.
' Ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

pendence. AVe had already been educated in
political and even economic independence to a
notable degree before our Kevolution. We had
before us a rich contment, capable of producing
an array of items much wanted on the world
market. We had no ancien regime to contend
with within our boundaries. We had a fairly
homogeneous and only tolerably contentious
people. We were underpopulated to such a de-
gree that our normally liigh regard for the
individual man had economic as well as philo-
sophic support. Moreover, we had many tal-
ented and educated leaders.

To the new nation of the late 20th century,
the American's story must sound improbably
easy. Many comitries now emerging must im-
provise educational systems after independ-
ence. Many must struggle to sell commodities
on a world market where demand is not ade-
quate and prices are sagging. Many have social
tensions and constant political instability at
home. Some have limited resources. Many are
heavily populated. Few have an adequate sup-
ply of leadership and trained men for the many
roles independence requires. And to advance
economically they must master quickly difficult
teclinologies and comjjlex problems of organiza-
tion and administration.

How should we, the prototype of new nations,
regai'd our successors in the stream of develop-
ing nations? With imderstanding, since they
are now where we were once. With patience,
since their tasks are even harder to solve than
were our own. With support, as we were as-
sisted by older nations during our own begin-
nmgs. And with confidence in ideas and ideals
which have inspired the rise of the peoples of
Latin America, Asia, and Africa to the "sepa-
rate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them."

These are not simple requirements. The
winds of freedom blowing around have kicked
up quite a storm, and the United States is often
buffeted. But since the storm really began on
these shores, let us ride with it, with grace and
poise. If the new nations request advice, we are
here to offer our services. If they ask for and
can use assistance, it is clearly in our interests
to provide it. Through our aid programs,

through the Peace Corps, through the Alliance
for Progress, through the activities of American
companies overseas, through the activities of
our churches, and foundations, and other pri-
vate institutions — through these, and many
more chamiels, including the millions of Ameri-
cans who go abroad as tourists, let us con-
stantly demonstrate the meaning of a free so-
ciety and our abiding interest in freedom for
others.

In judging the performance of others, let us
never forget that democracy is a difficult system
to operate. Very few nations have been able to
make it work consistently. But people keep
coming back to it, keep trying to make it work,
because government with the consent of the gov-
erned is that form of government fully consist-
ent with the dignity of man.

Improving Our Own Society

While we help others to move ahead eco-
nomically and socially and to achieve political
stability in freedom, we must keep everlast-
ingly at the task of improving our own society.
A nation with our pledges to ourselves and to
mankind cannot tolerate discriminations based
on religion, race, or color. A nation with our
productive capacity cannot tolerate slums,
whether rural or urban. And we must begin
to attack our pockets of poverty in a more sys-
tematic way, as President Jolinson has pro-
posed, even though we shall not wipe them out
overnight.

We owe these tilings to ourselves. I am in-
terested in them as a citizen, but also as Secre-
taiy of State. For whatever improves our
national life also strengthens freedom in the
world struggle in which we are engaged. We
are the trustees, the leaders, of the cause of
freedom. Our enemies rejoice in our blemishes.
The friends of freedom, who are a gi-eat major-
ity of mankind, expect us to set a splendid
example.

The ultimate objective of our foreign policy
is a decent world order — the kind of world out-
lined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of
the United Nations Charter. Week by week,
and day by day, we are working our way toward

JTJLT 20, 1964

that goal — developing the institutions of inter-
national cooperation, of peacemaking and
peacekeeping, weaving the infinity of threads
that bind peoples around the world closer to-
gether, building, bit by bit, the common law
of mankind.

The ideas and ideals we stand for and have
done so much to nurture and defend in the
last 188 years are, we believe, shared by a great
majority of the human race. As President
Jolmson put it, in signing the Civil Eights Act,
"Today in far comers of distant continents the
ideals of those American patriots still shape
the struggles of men who hmiger for freedom."
They give us allies and friends among ordinary
men and women everywhere — including behind
the Iron and Bamboo Curtauis. They have
never had greater validity or wider support
than they have now. They are the most power-
ful ideas on earth, and the stoi-y of 2,000 yeai-s
of striving points to the victory of freedom.

Mrs. Anderson Addresses Bulgarian
People on U. S. Independence Day

Followmg is a translation of an address in
the Bulgarian language made hy Mrs. Eugenie
Anderson, Atnerica/n Minister to Bulgaria, for
broadcast on July 4 from Sofia over Bulgarian
television and radio.

Press release 312 dated July 2, for release July 4

Good evening. Once again I have the pleas-
ure to speak to you, the Bulgarian people, on
America's Independence Day.^ I appreciate
this opportunity and wish to tliank the Bul-
garian Government for this courtesy.

As the American Minister in Sofia, I bring you
peaceful and friendly greetings from President
Johnson and the American people. On this
day we celebrate the cause of freedom, and we
greet all those peoples who, like ourselves, want
to help build a world free of war and want.

' For the text of an address made by Mrs. Anderson
on .Tilly 3, 1963, see Bulletin of July 22, 1963, p. 141.

Now I have been living in your beautiful
country for nearly 2 years. During this time I
have visited many of Bulgaria's historic shrines.
I have wandered the old streets of Kopriv-
shtitsa. I have stood in the churches of the
martyrs at Batak and Penishtitsa. I have
visited your Constitution Hall at Tumovo.
These famous places have evoked my admiration
for Bulgaria's struggle for its independence.

As you know, my country also achieved its
independence from foreign domination less than
200 years ago. Our nation was founded on the
revolutionary principles of equality, freedom,
and justice.

We are still engaged in fulfilling these ideals.
We are striving to improve our democracy.
Just 2 days ago President Johnson signed an
historic law. This will strengthen our Consti-
tution's guarantee of equal opportunities to all
Americans irrespective of race, creed, or
national origin.

Also we are working to provide ever better
living conditions for our own people. But we
believe that our nation, and indeed all humanity,
can tlirive only in a peaceful world. This must
be a world which offers all men hope for improv-
ing their lot, for escaping privation and
drudgery. We want to cooperate in lifting the
ancient burdens of mankind.

Only a few months ago, we Americans — and
all those who cherish freedom and peace — lost a
valiant friend. Wlien John F. Kennedy was so
suddenly taken from us, we felt as if a light had
gone out. Now President Jolinson has won the
trust and affection of t\\& American people.
The same purposes for which President Ken-
nedy lived are shared by our new President and
by the American people. Today, President
Jolinson fights for peace, human rights, and a
decent livelihood for the world's needy people.

And so, in closing, on behalf of President
Jolmson and the American people, we reafBrm
our unchanging commitment to peace, freedom,
and human welfare. In this spirit we celebrate
American Independence Day, and in this spirit
we wish the Bulgarian people well.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The Single Goal of Peace

Address hi/ President Johnson

Following are the foreign policy portions of
an address made iy President Johnson at a
Swedish celebration at Minneapolis, Minn., on
June 28.

WMte House press release dated June 28; as-delivered text

The Bible coimsels us : "To everything there
is a season, and a time to every purpose under
tlie heaven ... a time of war, and a time of
peace."

So I come today to speak to you in the hope
that, after decades of war and threats of war, we
may be nearing a time of peace. Today, as al-
ways, if a nation is to keep its freedom it must
be prepared to risk war. When necessary, we
will take that risk. But as long as I am Presi-
dent, I vsdll spare neither my office nor myself
in the quest for peace. That peace is much
more than the absence of war. In fact, peace
is much the same thing in our world commimity
as it is here in your community, or in the small
community of Jolmson City, Texas, where I
gi'ew up.

If, in your town, every morning brings fear
that the serenity of the streets will be shattered
by the sounds of violence, then there is no peace.
If one man can compel others, unjustly and un-
lawfully, to do what he commands them to do,
then your community is not a place of peace.
If we have neither the will nor a way to settle
disputes among neighbors without force and
violence, then none of us can live in peace. If
we do not work together to help others fulfill
their fair desires, then peace is insecure. For
in a community, as in the world, if the strong
and the wealthy ignore the needs of the poor
and the oppressed, frustrations will result in
force. Peace, therefore, is a world where no

nation fears another, or no nation can force
another to follow its command. It is a world
where differences are solved without destruc-
tion and common effort is directed at common
problems.

Such a peace will not come by a single act or
a single moment. It will take decades and gen-
erations of persistent and patient effort. That
great son of Sweden, Dag Hammarskjold, once
said:

The qualities it requires are just those which I feel
we all need today — perseverance and patience, a firm
grip on realities, careful but imaginative planning, a
clear avrareness of the dangers — but also of the fact
that fate is what we make it. . . .

With these qualities as our foundation, we
follow several goals to the smgle goal of peace.
And what are those goals? First is restraint
in the use of ix)wer. We must be, and we are,
strong enough to protect ourselves and our al-
lies. But it was a great historian who re-
minded us that: "No aspect of power more
impresses men than its exercise with restraint."

We do not advance the cause of freedom by
calling on the fidl might of our military to solve
every problem. We won a great victory in
Cuba because we stood there for many days,
firm without using force. In Viet-Nam we are
engaged in a brutal and a bitter struggle try-
ing to help a friend. There, too, we will stand
firm to help maintain their own freedom and
to give them counsel and advice and help as
necessary.

Second is the search for practical solutions
to particular problems. Agreements will not
flow from a sudden trust among nations. Trust
comes from a slow series of agi-eements. Each

JULY 20, 1964

agreement must be fashioned as the products
of your famous craftsmanship are fashioned,
with attention to detail, with practical skills,
with faith in the importance of the result.

And so, even while we are caught in conflict
in one part of the world, we labor to build the
structure of agreement which can bring peace to
all the rest of the world. In this way we have
signed a treaty already ending nuclear tests in
the atmosphere. Already we have cut back our
production of atomic fuel and weapons.
Already we have established a "liot line" be-
tween Washington and Moscow. Already we
are meeting with the Soviets to pool our efforts
in making fresh water from the oceans. These
agreements, by themselves, have not ended ten-
sions or they have not ended war. But because
of them we have moved much closer to peace.

And tlie third point that I want to bring up
is respect for the rights and fears of others.
We can never compromise the cause of freedom.
But as we work in our world community we
must always remember that differences with
others do not always flow from a desire for
domination. They can come from honest clash
of honest beliefs of goals. And in such cases
our strength does not entitle us to impose our
interest. Rather, our desire for peace compels
us to seek just compromise. And we must also
recognize, although this is very hard to do,
that other nations may honestly fear our inten-
tions or the intentions of our allies. There is
no need for such fear. For we in America
seek neither dominion or conquest. But where
it exists, we must work to dispel that fear.

Tlie fourth point that I want to make is
cooi^eration in solving the problems which are
greater than immediate conflicts. Most of our
neighbors in the world live in the midst of
himger and poverty. Most of our neighbors
live in the midst of disease and ignorance. We
are proud of the fact that here in America,
across the world, American workers and Amer-
ican food and American capital are building
industry and are expanding farms, are educat-
ing the young and are caring for the sick and
are feeding the hungry.

We will continue to seek such cooperation.
No peace and no power is strong enough to
stand for long against the restless discontent

of millions who are without hope. For peace
to last, all must have a stake in its benefits.

Fifth is the ability to adjust disputes without
the use of force. It is, in short, the pursuit
of justice. We can find guidance here in our
own country's historic pledge to the rule of law.
That is a pledge to abide by the law and to
accept its settlements. It is a pledge to submit
to courts and to be satisfied by court decisions.
It is a pledge to respect, uphold, and always
obey the law of the land. For if any take griev-
ances and disputes into their own hands, the
safety and the freedom of all is in peril. "Due
process" is the safeguard of our civalization. As
a President of the United States and as an
individual citizen, I stand totally committed to
the integrity of justice and the enforcement of
the law. But legal government depends upon
law-loving and law-abiding citizens. Today the
key to peace in our own land is obedience to the
great moral command that no man should deny
to another the liberties the Constitution creates,
as the law defines those liberties. And it rests
on the even more hallowed rule that, whatever
our disagreements, we treat others with the
peaceful respect that we reserve and desire for
ourselves. So, too, we seek a world commimity
in which answers can win acceptance without the
use of force. For this purpose, all the ma-
chinery of international justice is useless unless
it is infused with the good faith of nations.
On a worldwide basis, we place much hope in
the United Nations.

Twenty years after World War I the Le<ague
of Nations was discredited. Twenty years after
World War II the United Nations is, thank
God, a stronger force for peace than ever be-
fore. Our support — the steadfast support of
nations like Sweden — has made that possible.
And let any of those who might choose to
criticize the United Nations always remember
that where the United Nations has gone, from
Iran to the Congo, the Communists have not
conquered. Tliis is not because the United Na-
tions supports our cause or becaiise it exists just
to help us against our enemies. It is because the
United Nations is on the side of national in-
dependence, on the side of peaceful justice, of
self-determination, of himian freedom ; and that
is (he side tliat we are on, too.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Tliese are the several tasks — these are the
several paths that we take to peace. At times
in the solitude of my office, peace seems dis-
couragmgly distant. My days are often filled
with crisis and conflict. Yet each time that I
come here among the people of my country I
feel new hope and renewed faith. There was a
legendary figure who, each time his feet touched
the earth, redoubled his strength. Your friend-
sliip and your warmth and your wishes are
equally the source of my strength.

I want to remind you finally, as I finish, that
it is with the people and not with their leaders
that the final question whether the liberties and
the life of this land shall be "preserved to the
latest generations." If you can do this, if you
do do this, then our cliildren's children will
gladl)' remember us in the ancient phrase:
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be
called the children of God."

President Orlich of Costa Rica
Visits Washington

President Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica
visited Washington June 30-July 2. Following
is the text of a joint communique released on
July 1 at the close of talks hetween President
Johnson and President Orlich.

White House press release dated July 1

The President of Costa Rica, Francisco
Orlicli, and President Johnson have concluded
friendly discussions on matters of mutual con-
cern.

The two Presidents discussed the Alliance
for Progress and the contribution it is making
toward the economic and social development of
the Hemisphere. They expressed their satisfac-
tion with its achievements in Central America
and the Hemisphere since President Kennedy's
visit to San Jose, and reaffirmed their faith in
the goals of the Alliance. They noted especially
the intimate relationship which exists between
the practice of effective representative democ-
racy and the achievement of social and economic
progress, and they renewed their determination

to encourage democratic ideals tlirougliout the
Hemisphere. President Jolmson expressed his
admiration for the leadership which Costa
Rican people have given over the years, by their
example, to the accomplishment of this objec-
tive.

President Orlich reviewed the efforts of the
Central American countries to promote their
economic well-being through the Central Amer-
ican Common Market. President Jolinson ex-
pressed gratification that these efforts had al-
ready made a significant contribution to the
economic development of Central America. The
two Presidents discussed the participation of
private enterprise in the Central American
Common Market, and the fundamental impor-
tance of cooperation between the i^ublic and
private sectors in creating sound and healthy
conditions in which each can make its most ef-
fective contribution. They agreed that a re-
sponsible and vigorous private sector is an essen-
tial element of a free and democratic society,
and is indispensable to the success of the Central
American Common Market and the Alliance
for Progress.

President Orlich outlined the economic sit-
uation in his country, and expressed apprecia-
tion for the understanding and friendly cooper-
ation of the United States. He gave special
praise to the United States Navy Seabees, who
are cooperating with Costa Rica to relieve flood
conditions, which have been seriously aggra-
vated by the eruption of Irazu Volcano. Presi-
dent Jolmson assured President Orlich of the
continued and sympathetic cooperation of the
United States in the present natural disaster
afflicting Costa Rica, and of the desire of the
United States to help Costa Rica achieve fur-
ther economic and social progress in keeping
with the Charter of Punta del Este.

The Presidents noted the continued efforts of
svibversive agents trained in Cuba and other
Communist countries to create unrest and un-
dermine democratic governments in Latin
America. They agreed that each country must
adopt effective measures to defend itself against
such activities, and that the Organization of
American States should take meaningful steps
to demonstrate the collective will of the Ameri-
can Republics to resist such aggi-ession.

JULY 20, 1964

The Presidents concluded their talks by ex-
pressing satisfaction that relations between
their two countries had reached a high level of
mutual understanding and respect. They

pledged themselves to continued cooperation
within the Organization of American States to
achieve the objectives of the Alliance for
Progress.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1

Press release 307 dated July 1

Secretary Rush : Before those boxes get roll-
ing let me make an administrative comment.
There is no special significance in the timing of
this press conference. I have not had one in
some time. But I do plan to take next week
off and get a few days' rest. I gather that many
of you will be traveling to San Francisco to take
account of the events out there ; and so it may be
a little time before we can have another one,
and so I thought I'd put myself at your dis-
posal today. So with that and without a pre-
pared statement, why not begin ?

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you mentioned San
Francisco, one of the most discussed issues
around toion today is tohether the conflict in the
policies in Viet-Nam is a suitable subject for
political debate this year. What is your view as
Secretary of State?

A. Oh, I think the situation in Southeast Asia
is proper for public discussion. It is a major
commitment of the United States to do what we
can to assist the countries of Southeast Asia to
maintain their security and their independence.
We have a large involvement there of men. We
invested very large resources in the security and
independence of southeastern Asia. These are
matters of public interest which deserve public
discussion.

It has not been my experience thus far in
meeting with congressional committees in ex-
ecutive session or otherwise that these are issues
that lend themselves to partisan debate. We are
all stockholders in these problems. Both parties
are stockholders.

Viet-Nam was divided in 1954. Southeast
Asia was exposed to infiltration and penetration
from North Viet-Nam during the fifties. We
all have a stake in the outcome. We all are in-
terested in the right solutions. But I have not
felt that the balances of judgment on these mat-
ters have turned on partisan lines.

These are serious questions to wliich, I think,
serious leadership of both parties ought to ad-
dress themselves in terms of the national interest
and the interest of the American people.

So I would suppose that there will be in the
weeks and months ahead, as there has been in
the months past, a very lively public discussion
of these matters. I do not quite see where the
basis is for making these discussions specifically
partisan in character, because they are not parti-
san issues in that sense.

Future of the Congo

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United Nations is pull-
ing its forces out of the Congo after 4 years, and
the Secretary-GeneraVs report ^ was not opti-
mistic about the future, and there are a number
of predictions of widespread chaos to follow.
I wonder if you could give us your assessment
of the future of that area.

A. Well, first, I think we ought to recall
that, for the past 4 years or more, after Presi-
dent Eisenhower made the decision that the
Congo problem as far as the United States was
concerned ought to be a problem for the United
Nations, the United Nations has undertaken a
^•erv large peacekeeping operation in tlie Congo

' U.N. doc. S/5784.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

with a large investment both of men and mate-
rials. And just yesterday wo saw the repatri-
ation of the last of the United Nations military
forces in the Congo.

This has been a remarkable achievement these
past i years on the part of the United Nations
in preserving the peace and providuig a vast
amount of technical assistance and training and
giving that country, wliich is as large as the
United States east of the Mississippi, a chance
to evolve in unity without complete disruption,
without vast civil wars; and so this has been a
major contribution.

Now, at the present time the Congo is at a
very important moment. Its government has
resigned, as expected, in connection with a con-
stitutional position. There is a referendum on
the constitution underway, which I think will
end on July 10. I presume that at that time
there will be formed a provisional government,
after which more permanent arrangements will
be worked out.

President [Joseph] Kasavubu and the
Congolese leaders are carrying a very heavy re-
sponsibility at the present time to try to find a
solid political basis on which this vast country
with its many tribes and many traditions and
many differences can work together in harmony.
We do not despair of that at all despite the fact
that there are obviously some very serious prob-
lems involved. But the present situation, which
changes almost on an hourly basis, is that con-
versations and consultations are going on
among the Congolese leaders to see if they can
find a consensus on the basis of which a govern-
ment can be formed which can lead this vast
and potentially progressive and prosperous
country into the future.

Meanwhile the U.N. resolutions remain in ef-
fect. One of these resolutions requests member
governments to be of assistance to the Congo
as they try to work out their problems. And
we therefore hope that all governments on the
outside will be completely sympathetic and help-
fid to the Congolese leaders in trying to meet
their difficult situation. It is obviously a situa-
tion on which one cannot go very far in predic-
tion. But we do believe that the Congolese
leaders can find a basis for moving ahead now

and taking advantage of the base which was
provided by 4 years of relative peace and con-
siderable strengthening of the administrative,
technical, and educational apparatus of the
country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps you could clarify
this aspect of the Congo situation for the
record, sir. For a considerable period of the
U.N. activity there, the V.N. — part of the U.N.
operations and part of the United States^ con-
cern was directed against Moise Tshombe and
the Katanga separatist situation. I realize that
the United States position was that the concern
was with the separatist element of that and
there was no United States position that the
United States was opposed to Tslwmbe in the
Central Government. Could you clarify the
present attitude of the United States toward
that general situation?

A. Well, let me remind you that there were
some difficulties at one time between Mr.
Tshombe and the U.N. over the issue of the
secession of Katanga and that we were sup-
porting the U.N. on that issue, and, therefore,
there was some tension between us and Mr.
Tshombe and his colleagues, who were support-
ing secession.

But on the other hand, even at that time, in
January 1963, we said that we understand that
the object of the U.N. is to be a peaceful
Katanga, reintegrated into the Congolese state
in the Congo. "There is no desire to deny Mr.
Tshombe a place in the future political life of
the Congo, but this will depend on the Congo-
lese people and on Mr. Tshombe himself." ^

Now, in reminding you of what we have said
before on that point, I would caution you that
I do not have in front of me a list of all the
other Congolese leaders about whom you might
ask similar questions on which our answers
might be similar. In other words, my comment
today is not especially related to Mr. Tshombe.

Basically, we feel that this is an internal po-
litical matter for the Congolese and that it is
for the leaders of the Congo — the authentic
leaders of the Congo — from the various dis-

°For a Department statement of Jan. 4, 1963, see
Bulletin of Jan. 21, 1963, p. 91.

JULY 20. 1964

tricts, provinces, tribes, traditions, now to pull
themselves together and form a government
that can lead that country into the future.

U.S. Objective in Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to Southeast
Asia, in tlie event that the Communist forces do
not heed advice to halt aggression there, what
further steps do you feel it is necessary for the
United States to take to preserve the security
and freedom of these cov/atries?

A. Well, I find it very difficult to talk with
any precision about the future. I realize that
everyone's interest focuses upon the future.
That is perfectly understandable.

Wliat is very simple is our purpose in South-
east Asia. I think the present facts in South-
east Asia are very clear and are generally
known.

Now, the reason why we cannot be clear about
the future is that there are many governments
and authorities participating in the writing of
this scenario — the governments and peoples of
Southeast Asia; the governments members of
SEATO, of which we are a prominent member ;
the authorities in Khang Khay, tliat is the
Pathet Lao authorities in Laos, in Hanoi,
Peipijig, Moscow; the three governments on
the ICC [International Control Commission].

Therefore, without being in a position to
know what these various scenario writers are
gomg to be doing and deciding, it is not possible
for just one of us to put together a picture of
the future.

What seems to me to be very simple is that
the United States' objective, as President John-
son stated at his press conference,^ and again
in his speech on Sunday,* is peace in Southeast
Asia. That is why we are there. We want a
peace that will leave the peoples of Laos and
South Viet-Nam and other countries of that
region in control of their own destinies. It is
just as simple as that. A peace that will — in
which the countries of that area, particularly
Hanoi and Peiping, will leave their neighbors
alone. A peace that will make it possible for

* For a statement made by President Johnson at a
press conference on June 23, see xbiH., July 13, 1964,
p. 46.

* See p. 79.

the United States to be content with the secu-
rity of the peoples and governments of that
area.

And so we have to thiuk about how we can
best obtain it.

Now, peace, obviously, is not obtained by
gomg out and looking for war, although there
is always the risk of further development in
dangerous confrontations of this sort.

Peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia
without any extension of the fighting. There-
fore, the first objective of our policy and our
desire in Southeast Asia is to exploit that possi-
bility. I say that it ought to be, because there
are firm agreements, precise agreements, sub-
scribed to by all those involved in this present
situation, which were intended to provide peace
and which could provide peace if they were
lived up to.

Peace, on the other hand, cannot be attained
by acquiescence to aggression. And there is
aggression in South Viet-Nam, and aggression
in Laos, in contravention of solemn agreements.
In both cases this aggression is inspired and
supplied by the Communist regime in Hanoi,
with the political backing and help of the Com-
munist regime in Peiping.

This violates solemn international commit-
ments of 1954 and 1962. And so it has to be,
I think, an object of our policy to make it
possible for that kind of aggression to be suc-
cessfully resisted by the people of Southeast
Asia.

A third element is the fact that peace in those
circumstances cannot be obtained by military
power alone. The Conununists know it. They
are working on that basis. We know it. We
are working on that basis.

And that is why the United States' support
of the Republic of South Viet-Nam is based
not on military activity alone but on a broatl-
based program of economic and i^olitical and
sociological support for the people and the
Government of South Viet-Nam.

And that is why our policy in Laos is based
on diplomatic efforts to sustain the government
of Prince Souvamia Phouma and the strength-
ening of the forces which are opposing the
Communist Pathet Lao.^

" See p. 8S.

DEPAKTMKNT OF STATE BULLETIN

One of the most encouraging elements in that
situation is that we see no indication, no serious
indication, of any widespread interest among
the people of Southeast Asia for any answer
coming out of Hanoi.

The problem that the villager in the country-
side faces in South Viet-Nam is, for example,
whether he is free to cooperate with the Gov-
ernment without liaving his throat cut at night.
Because the Viet Cong are not engaging in any
serious way the armed forces of South Viet-
Nam — they are attacking the people and the
elementary structure of government in the
coiuitryside, the undefended, unarmed elements
of the population — the district leader, the
schoolteacher. And therefore the problem of
the armed forces is to find and fix in order to
be able to fight these elusive, hard core of Viet
Cong^ who may number in the range of some
30,000, remforced by some volunteers from the
not, shall we say, professionals.

But there is no popular wave of interest in
the political solutions that are offered by Hanoi,
no desire to pick up communism as a way of
life.

The problem is that of combining the steady
building of the structure of life in the country-
side with the minimum security that makes that
possible so that life can go on. And in much
of the country, certainly more than half of the
country, this is possible and is moving on.
There are some critical provinces in the delta
area, for example, where this is not yet pos-
sible, and a great deal of effort is being ex-
pended and will be expended on those particular
provinces.

And so we are backing to the fullest extent
the willingness, the readiness, the desire, the
ability of the peoples of Southeast Asia to work
out their own way of life.

Our objectives there, again, are very simple.

Tlie future is clouded with uncertainty. But
this is of necessity the case.

I know that everyone would like to see the
future clearly. So would we in government. I
am sure other governments would like to do the
same. But perhaps mercifully that is withheld
from ordinary human beings, and we don't have
the crystal balls that will tell us what all those
involved in this situation will be doing and de-
ciding in the next weeks and months.

But our own purposes and determinations
there are very simple.

The U.N. Role in Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary., how do you reply to men
like Senator [Wayne'] Morse who say that the
United States is an outlaw nation and has he-
come, in his words, the greatest threat to peace
in the world hecause nre have not turned the
Southeast Asia problem over to the United Na-
tions for settlement?

A. Well, we had discussions of that in com-
mittee and elsewhere.

The United States is pressing for full com-
pliance with solemn agreements — agreements,
as in the case of Laos, which have been subject
to major, persistent, callous violations by the
other side. All that we want in this situation
is compliance with those agreements in Laos.
They were designed for the neutrality, the inde-
pendence, and the security of that country.

Now, we, therefore, believe that both our pur-
poses and our action are in fidl accord with
international law and international practice in
these situations. "We are faced by opponents
who have shown historically a contempt for
commitments and agreements. So I would not
suppose there is any real point on the question
of our being an outlaw.

As far as the United Nations is concerned,
the United Nations has been involved in South-
east Asia in a variety of ways. In 1959 the
Security Council sent a commission to Laos.
A U.N. representative has been working for
some time on the border problems between Cam-
bodia and Thailand. Last year the General
Assembly sent a mission of inquiry, you will
recall, to look into alleged violations of human
rights in Viet-Nam.

There is a very substantial U.N. activity going
on in connection with the development of the
Lower Mekong Basin, involving several of these
states. And just 4 weeks ago the Security Coun-
cil authorized a committee of inquiry to see
what should be done to avoid further incidents
on the frontier between Cambodia and South
Viet-Nam.^

" For background, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964,
p. 1002.

JULY 20, 1964

Now, on this last instance, the Cambodian
commission of inquiry, Hanoi and Peiping have
blasted the very idea of such a commission.
The Viet Cong along the Cambodian border
have said that they can't guarantee the safety
of this commission if they come into areas —
so-called "liberated" areas — of South Viet-Nam.
In other words, the other side is saying to the
United Nations, "Stay out of it ; we are not go-
ing to let you function."

The U.N. Charter presupposes that, if there
is existing machinery for the settlement of dis-
putes (you might wish to look at article 33),
the full resources of existing machinery should
be utilized and exhausted before these matters
come to the United Nations. Now, there was a
14-power conference on Laos, for example, and
those governments are in contact with each other
in considerable detail about what can be done to
restore the peace and to bring about compliance
with the Geneva accords.

I should thmk that it would be expected that
if you were to go to the United Nations today,
for example, on Laos, you would be told to use
the existing machinery to the fullest and report
back, or something of that sort; that those who
have signed the agreement should consult among
themselves and try to find an answer.

Further, in the absence of a decision by
Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbore
alone, then someone has to assist these coimtries
in the actual engagement of the enemy, that is,
the aggressor.

In general, there has only been one instance,
and a very special instance, in which the United
Nations forces, as such, have been able to take
on what amounted to a combat situation. That
was in Korea, which was possible because at that
time the Soviet Union was not sitting at the
Security Council table and was not there to
cast a veto.

I doubt very much that the United Nations
would be able to put forward forces that would
give the kind of support that is required in
Southeast Asia, in the absence of a decision by
Hanoi and Peiping to come off of it and to abide
by agreements.

U.N. forces are extremely valuable in peace-
keeping operations, in peace-watching opera-
tions. But operations which are in the presence

of the kind of fightmg going on in Southeast
Asia would be something that, I think, the
United Nations would find very difficult. But
I would add that, just as the Cambodian case
came to the Security Council, it is entirely pos-
sible that some of these other situations might
come to the U.N. at some point. But the ques-
tion of timing, and under what circumstances,
and with what prospect of success, and in the
light of what proposed United Nations action —
these matters can be better assessed.

I don't, at the moment, believe that either the
Laotian question or the South Vietnamese ques-
tion can be measurably moved toward a peace-
ful solution simply by throwing them overnight
into the U.N. Security Council.

Optimism on Situation in Soutli Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, Atrbbassador [Henry
Cabot'l Lodge returned from, his post in Saigon
with some qualijxed o-ptimism about the situa-
tion in South Viet-Nain. I wondered, sir, if
you share that sense of optimism,?

A. Yes, I must say that I do. I am one of
those people in town who read every day the
complete and detailed operational report that
comes in every day fi'om South Viet-Nam — re-
ports that cover the military operations, the
political and psychological situation. And I
must say that, as I read those reports on a day-
by-day basis, I find myself wondering about the
morale of the Viet Cong.

Now, we know tliis is a mean and distressing
and frustrating kind of contest in which the
South Vietnamese are engaged and in which we
are engaged, in wliich we are losing men every
week. But because it is frustrating for us does
not mean that it is entirely pleasant for the
other side. And I think they have very serious
problems — not only in fact, in terms of losses,
disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am
not pessimistic about the situation. It is diffi-
cult, it is going to take some time, it is going
to take more of the heroic job being done by
South Vietnamese and Americans and others
in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of
despair whatever.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated a reasonably
relaxed hands-off attitude toward the possible

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

emergence of M. Tshoinbe as a figure in the
Central Government. Would you feel equally
relaceed about Mr. [Antoine] Gisenga''s 7'elease
and return to political life?

A. Well, I wondered whether I should com-
ment at all about Mr. Tshombe as an individ-
ual, because I would be inviting a list of other
personalities there.

"VVhy don't we just wait and see how these
consultations among Congolese leaders will
work out? If it is Mr. Gizenga, then I can
think of another dozen that can be named. I
don't want to go into a political glossary of the
Congo at a time when they are all discussing
with each other.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. Some of the confusion and concern in this
country about Southeast Asia seems to stem,
from the fact that the administration bloivs
hot and cold on the issue. Last week the em-
2)hasis seemed to be on our willingness to go to
war to protect our interest and position in
Southeast Asia. This xoeek the evnpJmsis seems
to be on our passion for peace and the fact that
there are no military solutions out there for tlie
problem. How do you explain what seems to
be very inconsistent about the approach here?

A. "Well, I don't want to engage myself in
a debate about the problems faced by you gen-
tlemen when you are reporting stories on the
pressures of deadlines and so forth, but let me
point out to you that these changing fads may
be changing trends in the way in which entire
speeches are reported. For example, when the
President was speaking the other day, I saw
fewer references than I would have suspected —
than I would have expected — to his sentence in
which he said, ". . . as long as I am President,
I will spare neither my office nor myself in the
quest for peace," " in connection with the pre-
ceding sentence that talked about the necessity
for risking war.

I tliink if you take full paragraplis — and
I am thinking now of the President's Jime 23d
statement, his opening statement on Viet-

' See p. 79.

Nam — that the context has been complete. I
think everyone knows that what we want is
peace out in that part of the world. Everyone
knows that it's a risky and dangerous situation.
Everyone knows that much depends upon what
others are going to decide, just as well as on
what we do.

Now, I don't know how you can parse the
future any more precisely than tliat. Let's see.
But there is no doubt about our own objective
there. And I'm not aware of any differences
of weight being given week by week to these
various elements in the situation. The pur-
pose remains the same.

Supervision of South Viet-Nam Borders

Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech today Ambas-
sador Lodge said the proper supervision of the
borders between South Viet-Nam and its neigh-
bors toas absolutely essential for ending aggres-
sion in Viet-Nam and achieving peace in South-
east Asia. Do we have any new measures., or
any new ways of carrying out old mesawres,
which will effectively meet this need of super-
vising the borders?

A. You will recall at the Security Council
when this question came up we proposed as one
of the solutions there a U.N. force on the order
of, say, 1,200 men which would be able to assist
in watching and policing those borders, in order
that those frontiers would not be violated in
either direction, that Cambodia's neutrality
would be fully guaranteed not only against the
South Vietnamese armed forces, who might
have been involved in one or two incidents
across those borders, but against the Viet Cong,
who have abused those borders.

But there was not sufficient support in the
United Nations to constitute that kind of force.
\Vliat was done was to send a commission of
three members — the Ivory Coast, Brazil, and
Morocco — to go out and have a look at this
border situation and make recommendations.
Now, we know that the authorities in Saigon
have not the slightest interest in committing
incidents across the border of Cambodia. We
also know that the Viet Cong operate — they
cross back and forth across those borders, and,
when the Viet Cong and the forces of South

JULT 20, 1964

Viet-Nam get into a scrap along those borders,
the fighting can go across the border. And this
creates a great distress, quite understandably,
in Phnoni Penli.

So we would like to see effective steps taken
to insure the integrity of those borders from
any quarter. And we know that Saigon would
welcome such steps, because it would be a great
relief from their point of view. And this would
be an additional insurance to Prince Sihanouk
that no one is plotting against the integrity of
the borders of Cambodia, because this just isn't
in the picture — that is, no one in the
government.

The Cyprus Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary., how do you visualise pre-
cisely Mr. [Dean] Acheson^s role in the Cyprus
situation, and how do you visualise precisely
General de GauUe^s role in the Cyprus situa-
tion?

A. Well, I'm not entirely clear that either one
of them has a very operational role at the
moment. Wliat we have been concerned with is
that there be peace on the island that would give
all the parties a chance to get in touch somehow
with each other, primarily through the United
Nations media, to try to find a permanent solu-
tion of that baffling and dangerous situation.

Now, two of the parties involved are NATO
members — Greece and Turkey — and it may be
that friends of Greece and Turkey can be of
some assistance in helping the U.N. mediator
find some points of common interest or common
contact in this situation. But this is a matter
that is still for discussion and still under ne-
gotiation. And I think there is very little that
I can add this afternoon on that point.

Q. Mr. Secretary —

A. As far as General de Gaulle is concerned,
I'm not informed of any particular role that he
is playing or plans to play.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we havenH heard much
about Cuba here recently. Could you give us
your latest report on the progress of Soviet
troop withdrawals from Cuba, and also has the
Soviet Union directly or indirectly given the

United States an idea of how they plan to dis-
pose of those SAM Tnissiles in Cuba?

A. No. I can only refer you to what the Presi-
dent said in his recent press conference
[April 23]. The Soviet military personnel, we
believe, are leaving the island steadily, that
there are further withdrawals. We are not
getting into the numbers game that you re-
member of some months ago.

But on your last point, as to whether the
Soviets have informed us about the disposition
of the SAM sites, they have not informed us
of the dispositions they have made or have in
mind.

Gentlemen, as you know, I have a ceremony
coming up in a few minutes in comiection with
the 40th anniversary of the Rogers Act estab-
lishing the Foreign Service. So if you will ex-
cuse me, I think I will withdraw.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Consultations Held at Vientiane
on Situation in Laos

Joint Conn/mu/nique ^

On May 26, 1964 the British Charge d'Af-
f aires in Vientiane, acting as representative of
the British Co-Chairman of the International
Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian
Question held at Geneva in 1961/62, and in re-
sponse to a request from the Prime Minister of
Laos in a letter of May 19 addressed to the
representatives of both Co-Chairmen, invited
representatives of each of the signatory powers
to attend consultations under Article 4 of the
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed
at Geneva on July 23, 1962.= The consultations
opened at the British Embassy in Vientiane on
June 2 and the final meeting was held on June
29. They were presided over by the British
Charge d'Affaires.

2. Heads of Mission representing the Gov-
ernments of Canada, Thailand, the U.S.A. and

^ Released at Vientiane, Laos, on June 29.

'For text, see Buixetin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

the Kepublic of Vietnam took part in the con-
suhations on the basis of this invitation.

3. The Ambassador of India also partici-
pated in the consultations on the understanding
that :

(A) He regarded the consultations merely as
informal consultations among ambassadors of
certain Geneva powers in Vientiane;

(B) He did not regard the ambassadors'
meetings in Vientiane as consultations en-
visaged under Article 4 of the Geneva Dec-
laration, nor as a substitute for a 14-power
international conference which his Government
strongly supported ;

(C) His participation would be aimed at,
besides an exchange of views on the situation in
Laos, the convocation of 14-power consultations
under Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration and/
or an international conference.

The Ambassador of India was consequently
unable to associate himself with any statement
in the nature of a finding on the military situa-
tion as set out in paragraph 6 below or with any
proposal concerning matters of which the
I.C.S.C. [International Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Laos] was or should be
seized, in view of India's status as a supervisory
power and chairman of the I.C.S.C. He ex-
pressed the view that the Commission was the
only body charged by the Geneva Conference to
make investigations into violations of the cease-
fire and to furnish appropriate reports to the
Co-Chairmen. He also expressed the view that
the Commission should be requested to make a
speedy investigation into the present military
situation and to report urgently to the Co-
Chairmen of the Geneva Conference if it had
not already done so.

4. The consultations were intended to provide
for an exchange of views between the partici-
pating countries aimed at finding ways and
means to bring about an improvement in the sit-
uation in Laos, and as a means of supporting
and strengthening tlie Government of National
Union. The Prime Minister [Prince Souvanna
Phouma] held regidar and frequent exchanges
with the chairman of tlie consultations and the
Laotian Government made available any infor-
mation requested by the consultants ; in this way

the Government was associated with the con-
sultations, maintaining contact and showing its
continuing interest in the proceedings. The
Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction with
the work carried out during the consultations.

5. The representatives agreed that the dete-
riorating military situation in Laos presented a
grave threat to the peace of South-East Asia.
They agreed to call on the Co-Chairmen in the
way each thought appropriate, to do everything
in their power to urge all parties concerned to
bring about an immediate cease-fire throughout
the Kingdom and withdraw all forces to the
positions which they held before the recent
fighting. The cease-fire and withdrawal should
be controlled and verified by the I.C.S.C.

6. During the meeting a detailed assessment
of recent developments in the military situation
was made by the representatives of Canada,
Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United
States and the Kepublic of Vietnam. (India did
not participate in this assessment for the reasons
set out in paragraph 3 above.) On the basis
of this assessment the five representatives con-
demned the recent Pathet Lao attacks on the
neutralist forces of General Kong Le, attacks
clearly made with North Vietnamese assistance,
as being in flagrant violation of the Geneva
Agreements. In the course of this study evi-
dence was produced concerning the use by NortJi
Vietnam of Laos teiTitory to interfere in the
internal affairs of the Eepublic of Vietnam.
The conclusions of the assessment and the action
whicli these representatives are recommending
in the way each thinks appropriate to the Co-
Chairmen are set out in the document annexed
to this communique.

7. The representatives were agreed that the
Geneva Agreements, if carried out in a con-
structive spirit, provide the necessary frame-
work to assure the sovereignty, independence,
neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the
Kingdom of Laos. They considered, in rela-
tion to the work of the I.C.S.C. and the duties
imposed on it by the Geneva Protocol, certain
recommendations that might be made to the
Commission by the Co-Chairmen under Article
8 of the Protocol. They considered in partic-
ular recommendations relating to : the resump-

JULY 20, 1964

tion of full participation in the work of the
Commission by the Polish Commissioner; the
importance of the continued and effective func-
tioning of the Commission in full enjoyment
of security and immunity for members of the
Commission and its personnel; the provision
of all facilities to the Commission to move with-
out hindrance in Laos for the purpose of carry-
ing out investigations; and the according of
maximum co-operation by the Koyal Laotian
Government and all political groups in Laos to
the Commission in order to enable it to perform
its functions under the Geneva Agreements.

8. The representatives looked forward to a
stabilization of the political situation in Laos
which would ensure the willing co-operation of
all the principal political groups in the country
and enable the Government of National Union,
with Prince Souvanna as Prime Minister, to dis-
charge its responsibility for the execution of the
cease-fire as contemplated under Article 9 of
the Protocol to the Geneva Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos. To this end they expressed
the hope that an early meeting could be held be-
tween the leaders of the political parties and
urged the Co-Chairmen to use their influence to
bring this about.

9. The meeting also discussed on an explora-
tory basis and without commitment the nature
of prior conditions that would be necessary if
agreement were ultimately to be reached on the
holding of a new international conference on
the Laotian question. In this context refer-
ence was also made to other proposals for con-
sultations on the Laotian question.

Caix fob Ceasefire and Withdrawal '

The undersigned representatives of the signatories
of the Geneva Accords meeting in Vientiane have, at
the request of the Prime Minister of Laos, studied re-
cent developments in the military situation in Laos
with particular attention to the breaches of the terms
of the Geneva declaration on the neutrality of Laos
on July 23, 1962 and the protocol to this declaration.
They have reached the following conclusions :

(1) There has been a general offensive by Pathet
Lao forces in the Plain of Jars area and eastern Xieng

' Signed on June 20 by the representatives of Canada,
Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Khouang province which started at the beginning of
February 1964, culminated in a large scale attack
launched on May 16, and is still continuing. This gen-
eral offensive is in accordance with the pattern of
encroachment by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
forces which has been observed since the signature of
the Geneva agreements in July, 19(52.

(2) The Neutralist forces of General Kong Le are at
present grouped in areas to the west and south of the
Plain of Jars, where they are continuing to resist at-
tacks. Pathet Lao propaganda that these forces have
been wiped out is thus demonstrably untrue.

(3) Though the Neutralist forces of General Kong
Le have suffered some individual desertions, there were
no defections of units as claimed by the Pathet Lao.

(4) The so called "true Neutralist" forces of Colonel
Deuane are not numerically strong enough nor have
they the equipment to have launched unaided an attack
of the scale tiat has taken place against a much larger
force, well equipped and supported by artillery, tanks,
and attack and transport aircraft of the Royal Laotian
Air Force, not to mention causing the displacement of
thousands of refugees.

(5) There is therefore no truth in the allegations
that the recent fighting has been between different
Neutralist factions.

(6) There is indisputable evidence of North Viet-
namese involvement in the offensive. This has taken
the form of North Vietnamese fighting cadres as well
as extensive logistic support. A study of the Pathet
Lao forces, the undeveloped area from which they are
forced to recruit and the lack of any industrial capa-
bility within their territory shows clearly that they
have been, and still are, incapable of producing the
sophisticated weapons used by them, or the trained
technicians or soldiers to serve these weapons. Bear-
ing in mind the growth of the Pathet Lao forces from
very small beginnings to their present strength, it is
obvious that this could only have taken place with tie
use of instructors from outside and with the inclusion
of foreign cadres within their organisation to ensure
their continuous and progressive efficiency. All Pathet
Lao road communications run into North Viet Nam and
it Is self-evident that such cadres and logistic support
come from North Viet Nam and are trained North
Vietnamese soldiers and technicians.

(7) As a result of their recent operations the Pathet
Lao and their allies are in a tactically advantageous
position from which to conduct further military opera-
tions and are in fact continuing their offensive.

(8) There is furthermore firm evidence of the sys-
tematic use of Lao territory by tlie North Vietnamese
for the infiltration of men and arms into South Viet
Nam. This evidence concerned freqtu'nt occasions be-
tween July 23, 1962 and April 19G4 on which large
parties of North Vietnamese cadres and combatants
passed through Laotian territory in breach of Article
2(1) of the Geneva declaraticm and of Articles 4 and
6 of the protocol to this declaration.

DEPARTMENT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN

2. In the light of these conclusions and of the great
dangers inherent in the present situation for the sov-
ereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial
integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and for the peace of
South-East Asia as a whole, and acting on behalf of
their governments, the representatives call for an im-
mediate end to the fighting throughout Laos.

3. The representatives agreed to invite the co-Chair-
men in the way each thought appropriate:

(a) To address an urgent appeal for an immediate
ceasefire to all parties in Laos ;

(b) To call for a withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces
to the positions held on February 1, 1964 ;

(c) To call all North Vietnamese forces to withdraw
from Laotian territory and to desist from any further
use of Laotian territory for the purpose of interfering
in the internal affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam ;

(d) To call on the International Commission for
Supervision and Control to submit a report on the sit-
uation without delay ;

(e) To provide general guidance to the International
Commission for Supervision and Control to assist it
in its duties to control and verify the ceasefire and
withdrawal under (b) and (c) above, and to report to
the co-Chairmen on the action it takes (drawing atten-
tion to any hindrance encountered in the carrying out
its duties) on the observance of the ceasefire and on
the progress made with and date of completion of the
withdrawal ;

( f ) To call on the Royal Lao Government authorities
and on all military commanders and other persons
exercising authority in any area of Laos which the
Commission judges it necessary to visit in carrying out
the request at (e) to give the Commission every assist-
ance in its task.

missions in Dar-es-Salaam that diplomatic rep-
resentatives who had presented their creden-
tials to President [Julius] Nycrere of Tangan-
yika before April 26 are now regarded Jis
being accredited to the United Republic of
Tanganyika and Zanzibar and that there is no
need to present fresh credentials.

Frank C. Carlucci, who has been the Ameri-
can Charge in Zanzibar, will remain as U.S.
consul.

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits

Malagasy Republic and Malawi

The Department of State announced on July 1
(press release 305) that Assistant Secretary
Williams would depart that day for a 1-week
visit to the Malagasy Republic and to Malawi.
He will visit the Malagasy Republic on July 3
and 4 before going to Nyasaland on July 5 as
a member of the official U.S. delegation to the
ceremonies in which Nyasaland becomes the
independent nation of Malawi.

U.S. Presents Independence
Gifts to Malawi

U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar
Converted to Consulate

Press release 302 dated June 29

The State Department announced on June 29
that on June 27 the United States Embassy,
Zanzibar, was converted to a consulate.

This action came in response to a request
from the Government of the United Republic
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar that aiTange-
ments be made by those comitries having em-
bassies in Zanzibar to convert their embassies
to consulates.

The Government of the United Republic of
Tanganyika and Zanzibar has also informed
the American Embassy and other diplomatic

Following is the text of a statement made hy
Rufxhs E. Clement, Personal Representative of
the President of the United States, at the pres-
entation of the United States'' independence
gifts to Malawi at Blantyre, Malawi, on July If..
Dr. Clement is president of Atlanta University.

Press release 314 dated July 3, for release July 4

It is a great privilege and a joy for me to
be here in this lovely land, among the people
of Malawi, as we celebrate your great move into
the community of independent nations.

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago this
day, July 4, 1776, the United States of America
shed its colonial bonds. As Americans at home
and abroad commemorate our national in-
dependence, I have a special honor. President

JULY 20, 3 964

Lyndon B. Jolanson has asked me, as his Per-
sonal Representative and as America's Special
Ambassador, to present to you, Mr. Prime
Minister [Dr. H. Kamuzii Banda], our coun-
try's independence gifts to the people of
Malawi.

Our gifts are radio broadcasting equipment
and mobile health facilities, which are intended
respectively to expand Malawi's mass communi-
cations and popular education services and to
help increase the physical welfare and general
well-being of your people.

Mindful of Malawi's need for nationwide
communications, we are presenting to you two
medium-wave radio broadcasting transmitters,
as well as relay equipment and towers. To help
assure eifective operation of these installations,
my country's gifts also comprise a certain num-
ber of related teclinical training scholarships.

With these new facilities, which will begin
operation next October, Malawi will have a
greatly increased capacity to see that its citizens
in all regions know more about their homeland
and about the events shaping their continent
and the world in which we live. A related and
equally important potential of this broadcast
equipment is that of popular instruction by
radio, which accords with Malawi's educational
development program.

Mindful of your desire to improve the health
and thereby the productive capacity of your
people, our gift of a mobile medical unit com-
bines a self-sufficient X-ray unit with mobile
medical clinic facilities.

These gifts reflect the United States' desire
to help Malawi speed its development. Politi-
cally and economically strong nations in Africa,
we believe, are in the best interests of the people
of Africa and of the United States.

In its careful pursuit of independence,
Malawi has clearly indicated its desire for a
nationhood in which all of its people's welfare
will be increased. It is with much pleasure
that I now present these gifts to the Govern-
ment and people of Malawi. May they serve
you well.

Rumania Makes Final Payment
Under 1960 Financial Agreement

Press release 308 dated July 2

On July 1 the Rumanian Govermnent made
a payment of $500,000 to the Government of
the United States, thus completing its payment
obligations under a financial agreement con-
cluded between the United States and Rumania
on March 30, 1960.^

The 1960 agreement provided for Riunanian
payment of $24,526,370 on a lump-sum basis in
settlement of the claims of U.S. nationals aris-
ing out of war damage, nationalization, and
commercial and financial debts. The lump-sum
settlement included $22,026,370 in assets of the
Rumanian Government and Rumanian corpora-
tions which had been blocked in the United
States during World War II, and $2,500,000 to
be paid by the Rxunanian Government to the
U.S. Government in five installments between
July 1, 1960, and July 1, 1964.

President Increases Membership
of Trade Negotiations Committee

AN EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Amendment op Executive Order No. 11143, Relating
TO THE Public Advisory Committee fob Trade
Negotiations

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President
of the United States, it is ordered that Executive
Order No. 11143 of March 2, 1964" (29 F.R. 3127), be,
and it is hereby, amended by substituting "45 mem-
bers" for "40 members" in subsection (b) of Section 1
thereof (48 CFR § 2.1(b) ).

The White House,
Junc23,196't.

'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4451.

' No. 11159 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 8137.

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 506.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

THE CONGRESS

United States and NATO Members Sign New Agreement
for Cooperation in Exchange of Atomic Information

Following are texts of a message to the Con-
gress from President Johnson concerning a
neio agreement between the parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding
atomic information, togetlier with accompany-
ing documents and the text of the agreement.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated June 30

Letter of Transmittal

To the Congress of the United States :

On May 16, 1964, the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission jointly recommended to me, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, a pro-
posed new agreement to provide for cooperation
in the exchange of atomic information with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its
member nations.

The new agreement will supersede an exist-
ing agreement executed in 1955,^ and will do
two things :

a. It will extend the types of information
which we can exchange with NATO. This ex-
panded area of information is needed to enable
our Allies to make effective use of nuclear de-
livery systems being provided them by the
United States under bilateral procedures and
agreements following creation of NATO atomic
stockpiles in 1957.

b. It will permit NATO member countries
to share in information which the U.S. has

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3521.

hitherto been exchanging only with the NATO
organization itself under the 1955 agreement.
This will make these countries' role in alliance
plannmg in the nuclear field more effective.

This new agreement thus represents a logical
and useful step in our continuing and varied
efforts to ensure wider Allied participation in
NATO nuclear defense. Such wider partici-
pation is necessary on both military and politi-
cal grounds. It is needed to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of NATO defense. On political
grounds, it is needed to reinforce NATO co-
hesion by meeting our Allies' legitimate desire
to make a constructive contribution to nuclear
defense.

Therefore, I have authorized the Secretary
of State to execute this new agreement between
the Government of the United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its
member nations to provide for the cooperation
relevant to the exchange of atomic information
for NATO planning purposes.

In accordance with the Atomic Enei-gy Act
of 1954, as amended, I am submitting to each
House of the Congress an authoritative copy
of the signed agreement, together with a letter
from the Secretai-y of State, a copy of the joint
letter from the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
recommending my approval of the agreement,
and a copy of my approval memorandum.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House,
June 30, 196 ^.

Letter to the President From Secretary Rusk

June 22, 1964
Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to
forwai'd to you with a view to its transmission
to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Infor-
mation [Energy] Act of 1954, as amended, an
authoritative copy of an agreement between the
Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty for co-
operation regarding atomic information.

The Agreement was signed on behalf of the
United States on June 18, 1964, pursuant to the
authorization granted in your memorandum of
May 19 to the Secretaiy of Defense and the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
A copy of this memorandmn was transmitted
to the Department of State.

A total of ten nations have signed the Agree-
ment and the remaining member states are ex-
pected to sign in the near future.
Faithfully yours.

Dean Rusk

Letter to the President From Chairman of Atomic
Energy Commission and Secretary of Defense

May 18, 1964
Dear Mr. President: There is hereby sub-
mitted for your consideration and approval a
proposed agreement between the Government
of the United States and the other parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation re-
garding atomic information.

The proposed Agreement would supersede
the "Agreement Between the Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regard-
ing Atomic Information" signed in Paris on 22
June 1955. In 1958, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 was amended by Public Law 85-479
to permit increased cooperation with our allies.
While the 1955 Agreement played an impor-
tant part in enabling the United States to com-
municate to NATO certain atomic information
necessary to the Alliance, the proposed new
Agreement will provide for more extensive co-
operation by permitting the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the individual NATO
member nations to receive the kind of atomic
information that is necessary to an increasing
understanding and knowledge of and participa-
tion in the political and strategic consensus

upon which the collective military capacity of
the North Atlantic Alliance depends.

This agreement establishes an improved
framework luider which such cooperation may
be carried out. In accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 144b. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, Article I of the Agree-
ment provides that the United States will, while
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization con-
tinues to make substantial contributions to the
mutual defense and security, cooperate by com-
municating to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization and its Member States, while they
continue to make such contributions, atomic in-
formation in accordance with this Agreement,
provided the United States Government deter-
mines that such cooperation will promote ana
will not constitute an imreasonable risk to its
defense and security.

Article II provides tliat other NATO nations
will, to the extent they determine necessary,
transmit atomic information of their own origin
and of the same types as provided for in the
proposed Agreement under terms and condi-
tions the same as, or similar to, those in the
proposed Agreement.

Article III of the Agreement provides for
the communication of atomic information
necessary to the development of defense plans,
the training of personnel in the employment of
and defense against atomic weapons and other
militai-y applications of atomic energy; the
evaluation of the capabilities of potential ene-
mies in the employment of atomic weapons and
other military applications of atomic energy;
and the development of compatible delivery sys-
tems for atomic weapons.

Article IV of the Agreement stipulates that
the cooperation under the Agreement will be
carried out by the United States in accordance
with its applicable laws, and makes clear that
there will be no transfer under the Agreement of
atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons systems involving Restricted Data.
This Article also provides that the information
conunmiicated by the United States shall be used
exclusively for the preparation or implementa-
tion of NATO defense plans or activities and
the development of deliverj' systems in the

department of state bulletin

common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Article V of the proposed Agreement outlines
the procedures for the safeguarding of informa-
tion commimicated under the Agreement. It
is significant to note that the infonnation trans-
mitted under the Agreement shall not be com-
municated or exchanged by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization or persons under its juris-
diction to any unauthorized persons or beyond
the jurisdiction of that organization except that
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may
communicate, unless it is otherwise specified by
the United States, information to its member
nations as is necessary to carry out functions
related to NATO missions. This article also
provides that the member nations will not com-
municate information received under this agree-
ment to unauthorized persons or beyond the
jurisdiction of the Member States concerned.
Member States may, however, communicate such
information to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization or, when authorized by the United
States, to other Member States requiring the in-
formation for functions related to NATO
missions.

Article VI provides that other provisions of
the Agreement notwithstanding, the United
States may stipulate tlie degi-ee to which any
atomic information made available under the
Agreement may be disseminated to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or its Member
States.

Under Article XI the proposed Agreement
would supersede the 1955 NATO Agreement
and all information previously transmitted
under the tenns of the 1955 Agreement would
be considered to have been communicated under
the new Agreement.

The new Agreement would remain in force
until terminated by unanimous agreement of
the parties or superseded by another agreement.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is
making and the NATO Member States, in
participating with the United States in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are
making substantial and material contributions
to the mutual defense and security. It is the
view of the Department of Defense and the
Atomic Energy Commission that this Agree-

ment is entirely in accord with the provisions of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It
is the considered opinion of the Department of
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission
that the performance of the proposed Agree-
ment will promote and will not constitute an
imreasonable risk to the common defense and
security. Accordingly, it is recommended that
in accordance with Section 123b. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, you :

A. Determine that the performance of the
proposed Agreement will promote and will not
constitute an imreasonable risk to the common
defense and security of the United States ; and

B. Approve the proposed Agi-eement and au-
thorize its execution for the Government of the
United States in a maimer designated by the
Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the fore-
going recommendations.

Respectfully yours,

Glexn T. Seaborg

Chairman

Atomic Energy

Com/mission

Robert S. McNamara

Secretary of Defense

Memorandum of Approval

May 19, 1964
Memorandum for The Secretary or Defense
The Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commission

Subject : New NATO 144b Agreement

In your joint letter to me of May 18, 1964,
you recommended that I approve a proposed
new NATO 144b Agreement between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and
all other member states of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, for cooperation relevant
to the exchange of atomic infonnation for
NATO planning purposes.

Having considered your joint recommenda-
tions and the cooperation provided for in the
proposed new agreement, including security
safeguards and other terms and conditions of
the agi'eement, I hereby :

(1) deteiTuine that the performance of this
proposed new agreement will promote and will

JULY

not constitute an imreasonable risk to the com-
mon defense and security ; and

(2) approve the proposed agreement and au-
thorize its execution for the Government of the
United States in a manner designated by the
Secretary of State.

Ltndox B. Johnson

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERA-
TION REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION

Preamble

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Recognising that their mutual security and defence
requires that they be prepared to meet the contin-
gencies of atomic warfare, and

Recognising that their common interest will be ad-
vanced by making available to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and its member states informa-
tion pertinent thereto, and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was prepared
with these piiri)oses in mind,

Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Agree as follows :

Article I
In accordance with and subject to the requirements
of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, the Government of the United States of
America will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation continues to make substantial and material
contributions to the mutual defence and security, co-
operate by communicating, from time to time, to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member
states, while they continue to make such contributions,
atomic information in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement, provided that the Government of
the United States of America determines tliat such
co-operation will promote and will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to its defence and security.

Abticle II
Paralleling the undertaking of the Government of
the United States of America under this Agreement,
the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization will, to the extent they deem necessary,
communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Orguniza-
tion, including its military and civilian elements, and
to member states atomic information of their own
origin of the same types provided for in this Agree-
ment. The terms and conditions governing these com-
munications by other member states will be the subject

of subsequent agreements, but will be the same or
similar to the terms and conditions specified in this
Agreement.

Abticle III
The Government of the United States of America
will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, including its military and civilian elements,
and to member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization requiring the atomic information in con-
nection with their functions related to NATO missions,
such atomic information as is determined by the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America to be neces-
sary to:

( a ) the development of defence plans ;

(b) the training of personnel in the employment
of and defence against atomic weapons and other
military applications of atomic energy ;

(c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential
enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and
other military applications of atomic energy ; and

(d) the development of delivery systems compatible
with the atomic weapons which they carry.

Article IV

1. Co-operation under this Agreement will be carried
out by the Government of the United States of America
in accordance with its applicable laws.

2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer
by the Government of the United States of America of
atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons,
or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems in-
volving Restricted Data.

3. The atomic information communicated by the
Government of the United States of America pursuant
to this Agreement shall be used exclusively for the
preparation or implementation of NATO defence plans
and activities and the development of delivery systems
in the common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Article V

1. Atomic information communicated pursuant to
this Agreement shall be accorded full security protec-
tion under applicable NATO regulations and proce-
dures, agreed security arrangements, and national
legislation and regulations. In no case will the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or its member states
maintain security standards for the safeguarding of
atomic information less restrictive than those set forth
in the pertinent NATO security regulations and other
agreed security arrangements in effect on the date this
Agreement comes into force.

2. The establishment and co-ordination of the se-
curity programme in all NATO military and civilian
elements will be effected under the authority of the
North Atlantic Council in conformity with procedures
set forth in agreed security arrangements.

3. Atomic information communicated by the Govern-
ment of the United States of America pursuant to this
Agreement will be made available through channels for

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

communicating atomic information now existing or as
may be hereafter agreed.

4. Atomic information communicated or exchanged
pursuant to this Agreement shall not be communicated
or exchanged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthor-
ized persons or, except as provided in paragraph 5 of
this article, beyond the jurisdiction of that
Organization.

5. Unless otherwise specified by the Government of
the United States of America, United States atomic
information provided to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization may be communicated by the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization to its member states as
necessary to carry out functions related to NATO mis-
sions, provided that dissemination of such atomic in-
formation within such member states is limited to those
specific individuals concerned with the NATO missions
for which the information is required. Member states
agree that atomic information so received from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or otherwise pur-
suant to this Agreement will not be transferred to un-
authorised persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the
recipient member state ; however, such information
may be communicated to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or, when authorised by the Government
of the United States of America, to other member states
requiring the information for functions related to
NATO missions.

Article VI
Other provisions of this Agreement notwithstanding,
the Government of the United States of America may
stipulate the degree to which any of the atomic infor-
mation made available by it to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization or member states may be dis-
seminated, may specify the categories of persons who
may have access to such information, and may impose
such other restrictions on the dissemination of infor-
mation as it deems necessary.

Article VII

1. A Party receiving atomic information under this
Agreement shall use it for the purposes specified herein
only. Any inventions or discoveries resulting from
possession of such information on the part of a recipi-
ent Party or i)ersons under its jurisdiction shall be
made available to the Government of the United States
of America for defence purposes without charge in
accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed
and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article V of this Agreement.

2. The application or use of any information com-
municated under this Agreement shall be the responsi-
bility of the Party receiving it; the Party communi-
cating the information does not provide any indemnity
or warranty with respect to its application or use.

Article VIII
Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to
supersede or otherwise affect bilateral agreements be-

tween Parties to this Agreement providing for co-oper-
ation in the exchange of atomic information.

Article IX
For the purposes of this Agreement :

(a) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilising
atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting
or propelling the device (where such means is a sepa-
rable and divisible part of the device), the principal
purpose of which is for use as, or for development of,
a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(b) "Atomic information" to be provided by the
Government of the United States of America under
this Agreement means information which is designated
"Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" by
the Government of the United States of America.

Article X

1. This Agreement shall enter ilito force upon receipt
by the Government of the United States of America of
notification from all Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty that they are willing to be bound by the terms
of the Agreement.

2. The Government of the United States of America
will inform all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,
and will also inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, of each notification and of the entry into force
of this Agreement.

3.. This Agreement shall remain in force until termi-
nated by unanimous agreement or superseded by
another agreement, it being understood, however, that
termination of this Agreement as a whole shall not
release any Party from the requirements of this Agree-
ment to safeguard information made available pur-
suant to it.

Article XI
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI (4) of
the Agreement between the Parties to the North At-
lantic Treaty for Co-oiJeration regarding Atomic In-
formation, signed in Paris on 22nd June, 19.5."), the pres-
ent Agreement shall upon its entry into force supersede
the above-mentioned Agreement, it being understood,
however, that information communicated under that
Agreement shall be considered for all purposes to have
been communicated under the provisions of this Agree-
ment.

Article XII

This Agreement shall bear the date on which it is
opened for signature and shall remain open for signa-
ture until it has been signed by all the States Parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives
have signed the present Agreement on behalf of their
respective States, members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and on behalf of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Done at Paris this 18th day of June 1964, in the Eng-
lish and French languages, both texts being equally

JULY 20, 1964

authoritative, in a single original which shall be depos-
ited in the archives of the Government of the United
States of America. The Government of the United
States of America shall transmit certified copies
thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.

Foreign Policy Aspects
of U.S. Immigration Laws

Statement hy Secretary Busk ^

I appreciate this opportimit.y to appear be-
fore yoii to discuss a very important problem.
I refer to the effect on the operation of our
foreign policies of the national-origins system
which is the basis of our immigration laws.

The administration has proposed in H.R. 7700
and S. 1932 the progressive elimination of the
national-origins system from our immigration
laws. I should like to discuss with you the
foreign policy aspects of our immigration laws
and of the administration's proposals from the
point of view of the Department of State.
Others will discuss internal or national aspects
of the achnmistration's proposals.

Under the national-origins system, the j^ri-
mary objective was to maintain the etlmic bal-
ance among the American population as it
existed in 1920. This system preserves prefer-
ences based on race and place of birth in the
admission of quota inmiigrants to the United
States. This results in discrimination in our
hospitality to different nationalities in a world
situation which is quite different from that
which existed at the time the national-origins
system was originally adopted.

Since the end of World War II, the United
States has been placed in the role of critical
leadership in a troubled and constantly chang-
ing world. We are concerned to see that our
immigration laws reflect our real character and
objectives.

What other peoples tliink about us plays an
important role in the achievement of our foreign

^ Made before the subcommittee on immigration and
nationality of the Hou.se Committee on the Judiciary
on July 2 (press release 309) .

policies. We in the United States have learned
to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of
their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity,
and all the other factors which truly determine
a man's value to society. We do not reflect this
judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold
to immigration laws which classify men ac-
cording to national and geograpliical origiti.
It is not difficult, therefore, to underetand the
reaction to this policy of a man from a geo-
graphical area, or of a national origin, which
is not favored by our present quota laws. Ir-
respective of whetlier the man desires to come
to the United States or not, he gets the impres-
sion that our standards of judgment are not
based on the merits of the individual — as we
proclaim — but rather on an assumption which
can be interpreted as bias and prejudice. In-
asmuch as our immigration laws are regarded
as the basis of how we evaluate others around
the world, their effect on people abroad, and
consequently on our influence, can readily be
seen.

There have been times in the past when we
have been accused of preoccupation with the
peoples of the West to the neglect of Asian
peoples in the Far East. Unfortunately, the
national-origins system gives a measure of sup-
poi-t and credence to these observations.

Progressive Liberalization of Iminigration Laws

Actually, Mr. Chairman, we are not (juite as
prejudiced as we sometimes appear. Congress
has progressively liberalized our immigration
laws to permit the reunion of families. We ad-
mit the native-born from our sister Republics
in the Western Hemisphere on a nonquota basis
witliout discrimination as to origin or place of
birth. Congress has also found it desirable
over the years to pass special laws providing
for the admission, generally on a nonquota
basis, of immigrants of different races and
circumstances who have been uprooted and dis-
placed by political upheavals. In these special
laws we have exhibited a generosity of spirit
and a complete absence of concern about the
origin, race, and place of birth of tlie refugees
whom we have achnitted to our shores under
circumstances of need.

I don't have to remind you, Mr. Chairman,

DEPARTMENT OF ST.VTE BULLETIN

and the members of tlie committee, of the fine
record Congress established in passing tlie Dis-
placed Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Eelief
Act in 1953, and the "Fair Share" Refugee-
Escapee Act in 1960. These acts, for all prac-
tical purposes, exempted refugees from the
quota restrictions which would have delayed
their entry into this country for many yeai-s.

JNIore recent legislation has clearly reflected
the intent of the Congi-ess to relieve pressures
created by quota restrictions. On five separate
occasions since 1957 the Congress granted non-
quota status to quota immigrants who had been
waiting for visas for an extensive period of
time. Wliile I shall not indulge in a statistical
presentation, I should like to remind this com-
mittee that, as a result of this liberalizing policy
of the Congress, only 34 percent of the 2,599,349
immigrants who came to the United States from
1953 through 1962 were quota immigrants.

What is needed, basically, is to bring our im-
migration laws into line with the real character
and disposition of the American people, who
are at heart and in fact hospitable, kindly dis-
posed, and interested in all races and cultures.
This is so because we know from actual experi-
ence that immigi-ants previously admitted, re-
gardless of race and place of birth, have made
their distinctive contribution to what is America
today.

President Kennedy, in a special message to
the Congi-ess on July 23, 1963, said : -

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am
recommending relates to the national origins system
of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it hag been used
to determine the number of quota immigrants per-
mitted to enter the United States each year. Accord-
ingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals
with many problems which require remedial action, it
concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our
quota immigration system. The enactment of this
legislation will not resolve all of our important prob-
lems in the field of immigration law. It will, how-
ever, provide a sound basis upon which we can build
in developing an immigration law that serves the na-
tional interest and reflects in every detail the principles
of equality and human dignity to which our nation
subscribes.

President Jolmson m January 1964 said : ^

This bill applies new tests and new standards which
we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer
specifically to : What is the training and qualification

of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of
a citizen would he make, if he were admitted? What
is his relationship to persons in the Unitetl States?
And what is the time of his application? These are
rules that are full of common sense, common decency,
which operate for the common good.

That is why in my state of the Union message last
Wednesday [January 8, 1964],' I said that I hoiked that
in establishing preferences a nation that was really
built by immigrants — immigrants from all lands —
could ask those who seek to immigrate now : What can
you do for our country? But we ought to never ask:
In what country were you born?

The Administration's Proposals

The administration's proposal would elimi-
nate the national-origins system on a gradual
basis by reducing all established quotas by 20
percent each year for 5 years. The present
total of quota authorizations would be main-
tained, except initially all minimum quotas and
subquotas would be increased from 100 to 200.
These minimum quotas would have the 20-per-
cent reduction each year applied to them.

A quota reserve pool is established by section
2 of the bill before the committee, under which
all numbers would be allocated by the fifth
year. In each of the 5 years constituting the
period of transition, the pool would consist of
(1) the numbers released from national-origin
quotas each year, under the 20-percent progres-
sive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned
to the old quotas but unused the previous year
because insufficient demand for them existed
in the assigned quota area.

Experience has shown that we have approxi-
mately 50,000 \\sa. numbers annually which are
unused and are not available for reallocation
to other quota areas. These unused numbers
are chiefly from the United Kingdom and Irish
quotas.

In tlie fifth year all quota allocations would
be made from the quota reserve pool, which
would then become a worldwide quota. So
that no one country could enjoy a dispropor-
tionate amoimt of numbers from the pool
based on registrations of relatively long stand-
ing, the bill provides that no one country could

= For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.
' For text, see ihid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211.
* Hill., .Tan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

JULY 20, 19G4

receive more than 10 percent of the total author-
ized quota numbers.

A strict "first come, first served" basis of al-i
locating visa quotas would create some prob-
lems in certain countries of Northern and West-
ern Europe, which under the national-origins
system enjoyed a situation where quota num-
bers were readily available to visa applicants.
To apply the new principle rigidly would re-
sult, after a few years, in eliminating immi-
gration from these countries almost entirely.
Sucli a result would be undesirable, not only
because it frustrates the aim of the bill that
immigration from all countries sliould continue
but also because many of the comitries so af-
fected are our closest allies. At a time when
our national security rests in large part on a
continual strengthening of our ties with these
countries, it would be anomalous indeed to re-
strict opportunities for their nationals here.
Therefore the bill allows the President to re-
serve up to 50 percent of the pool reserve for
allocation to qualified immigrants who coidd
obtain visas under the present system but not
under the temis of the bill before the commit-
tee, and whose admission would further the na-
tional security interests in maintaining close
ties with their countries.

Policy on Asian Immigration

Also involved in this is the issue of our immi-
gration policy toward Asian persons, to which
I now wish to address myself. Perhaps the
most discriminatory aspect of the present law
is the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle, which
requires persons of Asian stock to be attributed
to quota areas not of their plac« of birth but
according to their racial ancestry. This fea-
ture of the present law is indefensible from a
foreign policy point of view. It represents an
overt statutoiy discrimination against more
than one-half of the world's population.

Here again our request is not that the Con-
gress drastically depart from existing policy,
but rather that it pursue to a conclusion a de-
velopment which began more than 20 years ago.
As your committee is well aware, the Congress,
at the request of President Roosevelt, elimi-
nated in 1943 the Chinese Exclusion Laws and
established for the first time a quota for the

immigration of Chinese persons. This well-
considered and cautious beginning of a revision
of our policy of excluding Asian persons has
been followed by progressively liberal amend-
ments to our laws. In 1952 the drafters of the
Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated
race as a bar to naturalization and thereby to
immigration. Asian spouses and cliildren of
American citizens were given the same non-
quota status as enjoyed I^y any person of
non-Asian ancestry. The only discriminatory
features affecting Asian persons which then
remained were the establishment of an upper
limit of 2,000 for the so-called minimum quotas
in the Asian area, and the rule that the quota
of an Asian person born outside the Asian
sphere be governed by ancestry rather than by
place of birth. The Congress in 1961 removed
the 2,000 limit on the number of Asian immi-
grants from minimum quota areas. The only
remaining discriminatory provision of the law
now, therefore, is the one requiring that an
Asian person be charged to an Asian quota even
if he were born outside the Asian area in a
quota or nonquota country.

The restrictive effect of this rule has been
significantly tempered during tlie last decade as
a result of the special legislation to which I
referred earlier. The very liberal policy which
found expression in these special measures, as
distinct from the letter of the general law, is
best illustrated by the volume and composition
of immigriition from some of tlie major coun-
tries of the Far East. During the 10-year
period from 1953 to 1963, a total of 119,677 im-
migi'ants came to tlie United States from China,
Japan, and the Philippines. 109,65-4 of these
were nonquota inmiigrants, and less than 10
percent were quota inmiigrants. These facts
may startle those who read in our immigration
laws that Japan has an annual quota of 185, the
Philippines a quota of 100, and that China has
a total of 205 quota numbers a year. Any in-
crease in the volume of immigration resulting
from the proposed amendments would be rather
limited against the actual volume of Asian im-
migration into the United States between 1953
and 1963. "We deprive ourselves of a powerful
weapon in our fight against misinformation if
wo do not reconcile here too the letter of the law

100

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

with the facts of immigration and thus erase the
unfavorable impression made by our old quota
limitation for Asian persons.

I urge you most earnestly to eliminate this
last vestige of disci-imination against Asian per-
sons from our immigration laws. This action
would bring to a logical conclusion the progres-
sive policy the Congress has followed since 1943.

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

Consistent with the foregoing, I should like
to urge you to accord equal status to all immi-
grants born in our American sister Republics.
It has always been the policy of the Congress
to recognize the common bond uniting the
Americas by exempting from any quota restric-
tions those immigrants who were bom in inde-
pendent countries of the Westeni Hemisphere.
Wlien the Congress in 1952 formulated the per-
tinent provisions of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, it included in the list of nonquota
countries all those which were independent at
that time. Meanwhile, our neighbors in the
Caribbean — Jamaica, and Trinidad and To-
bago — have become independent. The wording
of the law required that we proclaim for each of
these areas quotas of 100. We have had serious
representations from these countries concerning
these quota restrictions which are interpreted
as discriminatory measures. Jamaica and
Trinidad are among our best friends in this
hemis|)here, and their friendship is of consider-
able significance to us.

Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American
Affairs Thomas C] Mann will expand upon
this in later testimony. Mr. Abba P. Schwartz,
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Con-
sular Affairs, will also present a statement on
the refugee aspects of the administration's
proposal.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, without going into
the economic aspects of the administration's
proposals, on which others will testify, I wish
to conclude with a few general considerations.

Present-day immigration is very different in
volume and makeup from the older migration
on which most of our thinking is still based;
and its significance for this country is consider-
ably different. Immigration now comes in
limited volume and includes a relatively high

proportion of older people, females, and persons
of high skill and training.

The significance of immigration for the
United States now depends less on the number
than on the quality of the immigrants.

The explanation for the high pi-ofessional
and teclmical quality of present immigration
lies in part in the nonquota and preference pro-
visions of our immigration laws that favor the
admission of highly qualified migrants. But
still more it depends on world conditions of
postwar economic and social dislocations, dis-
criminations, and insecurities in various parts
of the world that have disturbed social and
occupational strata not normally disposed to
emigrate and have attracted them to the greater
political freedom and economic opportunity
offered in the United States. Under present
circumstances the United States has a rare op-
portunity to draw migrants of high intelligence
and ability from abroad; and immigration, if
well administered, can be one of our greatest na-
tional resources, a source of manpower and
brainpower in a divided world.

It should be emphasized that there has been
no relaxing of the qualitative criteria for ad-
missibility to the United States, and that no
relaxation of these mental, moral, economic, and
ideological criteria is proposed in S. 1932 or
H.R. 7700.

I urge you, Mr. Chainnan, and members of
this committee, that you give most careful con-
sideration to the President's proposals em-
bodied in H.R. 7700 and S. 1932.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on July 1 confirmed the following nomi-
nations :

Sam P. Gilstrap to be Ambassador to Malawi. (For
biographic details, see White House press release dated
June 26.)

U. Alexis Johnson to be Career Ambassador.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see De-
partment of State press release 311 dated July 2.)

JXTLY 20, 1964

101

TREATY INFORMATION

Consular Convention Ratifications
Exchanged by U.S. and Japan

Press release 306 dated July 1, for release July 2

Instruments of ratification of the consular
convention between the United States and
Japan, signed at Tokyo on Marcli 22, 1963, were
exchanged on July 2 in Wasliington. The ex-
change was made by Secretary Rusk and the
Japanese Ambassador, Eyuji Takeuchi, in a
brief formal ceremony at the Department of
State. This action completes the procedures
required for bringing the convention into force.
By its terms, the convention will enter into
force on August 1, 1964, 30 days after the ex-
change of ratifications.

The convention defines and establishes the
duties, rights, privileges, exemptions, and im-
munities of consular officers of each countiy in
the territory of the other country. The con-
vention with Japan is comparable to consular
conventions concluded by the United States
with other friendly countries in recent years.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 188.3, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Dated at The Hague November 6, 192.5. Entered into
force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6,
1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification that it considers itself hound: Niger,
September 10. 1903.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of in-
diustrial property of Marcli 20, 1883, revised at
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2,
1911, at The Hague November (>, 192."), at London
June 2, 19.34. and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. En-
tered into force January 4, 19(52. TIAS 4931.
Adherence deposited: Niger, June 5, 19C4.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes
and schedules and protocol of provisional applica-
tion. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947.
TIAS 1700.

Admitted as contracting party (irith rights and ob-
ligations dating from independence) : Togo, March
20, 19<>4.

Cuba on May 25, JOS.'i, signed the following:

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3,
VX,-)}

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 19.57.'

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30,
19.57."

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18,
19.59."

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17,
19.59."

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agreement of April 3, 19.56
(TIAS .3.571), providing for disposition of equipment
and materials furnished by the United States under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of Jan-
uary 30 and February 9, 1951 ( TIAS 2293) . Effected
by exchange of notes at Taipei June 3, 1964. En-
tered into force June 3, 1964.

Iran

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and As.sistance
Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 USC 1701-
1709), with exchange of notes of November 18, 1963,
and June 11, 1964. Signed at Tehran November 17,
1903. Entered into force November 17, 1963.

Japan

Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo
March 22, 1963.

Ratifications e.iehangcd: July 2, 1964.
Enters into force: August 1, 1964.

United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreemenl of June 1.5, 19.55. as
amended (TIAS 3321, 33.59. 300S, 4078. .5397), for
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Sigued at Washington June 29. 19<>4. Enters into
force on the date on which each Government shall
have received from tlie other written notification
that it has complied with all statutory and constitu-
tional requirements for entry into force.

' Not in force.

102

DEPARTMENT OF STATE UULLETIN

I NDEX July 20, 1964. Vol. LI, No. 1308

American Principles. The Universal Appeal of
the Declaration of Independence (Rusk) . . 74

Atomic Energy. United States and NATO Mem-
bers Sign New Agreement for Cooperation in
Exchange of Atomic Information (.Johnson,
McNamara, Rusk, Seaborg, text of agree-
jnent) 03

Bulgaria. Mrs. Anderson Addresses Bulgarian

People on U.S. Independence Day 78

Cambodia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of July 1 82

Claims and Property. Rumania Makes Final

Payment Under 1960 Financial Agreement . . 92

Congo (Leopoldville). Secretary Rusk's News

Conference of July 1 82

Congress

Confirmations (Gilstrap, U. Alexis Johnson,
Taylor) 101

Foreign Policy Aspects of U.S. Immigration

Laws (Rusk) 08

United States and NATO Members Sign New
Agreement for Cooperation in Exchange of
Atomic Information (Johnson, McNamara,
Rusk, Seaborg, text of agreement) .... 93

Costa Rica. President Orlich of Costa Rica
Visits Washington (test of joint com-
munique) 81

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Gilstrap, U. Alexis Johnson,
Taylor) , 101

U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Converted to Con-
sulate , . 91

Economic Affairs. President Increases Member-
ship of Trade Negotiations Committee (text
of Executive order) 92

Immigration and Naturalization. Foreign Pol-
icy Asjiects of U.S. Immigration Laws
(Rusk) 98

Japan. Consular Convention Ratifications Ex-
changed by U.S. and Japan 102

Laos. Consultations Held at Vientiane on Situa-
tion in Laos (text of communique) .... 88

Malagasy Republic. Assistant Secretary Wil-
liams Visits Malagasy Republic and Malawi . 91

Malawi

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits Malagasy

Republic and Malawi 91

Gilstrap confirmed as Ambassador 101

U.S. Presents Independence Gifts to Malawi

(Clement) , 91

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. United
States and NATO Members Sign New Agree-
ment for Cooperation in Exchange of Atomic
Information (Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Sea-
borg, text of agreement) 93

Presidential Documents

President Increases Membership of Trade Nego-
tiations Committee 92

President Orlich of Costa Rica Visits Wash-
ington 81

The Single Goal of Peace 79

United States and NATO Members Sign New
Agreement for Cooperation in Exchange of
Atomic Information 93

Rumania. Rumania Makes Final Payment

Under 1060 Financial Agreement ..... 92

Tanganyika. U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Con-
verted to Consulate 91

Treaty Information

Consular Convention Ratifications Exchanged by

U.S. and Japan 102

Current Actions 102

United States and NATO Members Sign New
Agreement for Coojieration in Exchange of
Atomic Information (Johnson, McNamara,

Rusk, Seaborg, text of agreement) 93

United Nations

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1 . . 82

The Single Goal of Peace (Johnson) .... 79

Viet-Nam

Consultations Held at Vientiane on Situation in

Laos (text of communique) 88

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1 . . 82

The Single Goal of Peace (Johnson) ..... 79

Taylor confirmed as Ambassador 101

Zanzibar. U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Converted

to Consulate 91

Name Index

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 78

Clement, Rufus B 91

Gilstrap, Sam P loi

Johnson, President 79, 81, 92, 93

Johnson, U. Alexis lOl

McNamara, Robert S 94

Orlich, Francisco J 81

Rusk, Secretary 74,82,94,98

Seaborg, Glenn T 95

Taylor, Maxwell D 101

Williams, G. Mennen 91

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases, June 29-July 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

Subject

U.S. participation in international

conferences.
U.S. Embassy in Zanzibar becomes

consulate.
40th anniversary of Foreign Service.
Exchange of notes with Canada on

Seaway tolls.
Williams visits Malagasy Republic

and Malawi (rewrite).
Exchange of ratifications of consular

convention with Japan.
Rusk : news conference of July 1.
Rumania makes final payment under

1960 financial agreement.
Rusk : statement on immigration

legislation.
Battle: "The Need To Explore

Inner Space" (excerpts).
Taylor sworn in as Ambassador to

Viet-Nam (biographic details).
Anderson : U.S. Independence Day,

Sofia, Bulgaria.
Rusk : Independence HaU, Phila-
delphia, Pa.
Clement : independence gifts to

Malawi.

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bth-letin.

No.

Date

*290

6/29

302

6/29

*303
t304

6/30
6/30

30.5

7/1

306

7/1

307
308

7/1
7/2

309

7/2

t310

7/2

•311

7/2

312

7/2

313

7/3

314

7/3

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ADDRESS

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Yol. LI, No. 1309

July 87, J964

SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON GERMAN TELEVISION 106

THE NEED TO EXPLORE INNER SPACE

by Assistant Secretary Battle 110

U.S. OUTLINES CUTOFF AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO HALT PRODUCTION

OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE

Statements by William G. Foster 123

EXISTING LAW AND MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE STATUS OF WOMEN

IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Article by Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett 128

For index see inside back cover

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on German Television

Following is the transcript of an interview
between Secretary Rusk and Gerd Ruge of the
All-German Television Network {First) re-
corded at Washington and hroadcast at Ham-
burg, Germany, on July 9 as part of a documen-
tary entitled '"'' Change in the White House — the
Evolving of American Policy.''''

Q. Has there been any change in the process
of policy and decisionmaking under President
Johnson? Has President Johnson stressed
different foreign policy questions from those
which were important under President
Kennedy?

A. Well, under our constitutional system an
enormous responsibility falls upon the Presi-
dent of the United States, and of course each
President is going to have differences of style
and differences in his own personal method of
operation. Well, all Presidents will lean very
heavily upon the great departments of govern-
ment and, in the case of foreign policy, upon
the Department of State. But these differences
don't affect very much the imderlying basic
policy of the American people. These policies

turn upon the kind of country we are, the kind
of people we are, what we hope for in the
world ahead of us, on the one side, and then, on
the other side, the shape of this turbulent world
scene outside the United States. These policies
are bipartisan in character. They have been
consistent since World War II.

Let me illustrate. The American people
really do believe that governments derive their
just power from the consent of the governed.
This is why we react instinctively to colonial
questions as we do. This is why we are so
deeply concerned about what is happening in
Eastern Europe and why we believe in the self-
determination of the German people. This is
why we can get along so much better with
democracies than with dictatorships, and this
is why we are concerned about some of our own
problems in our own society and with not
living up to this basic idea.

Another elementary notion in our foreign
policy is to be found in the United Nations
Charter. The underlying crisis of our day
is the picture of the world as devised in the
United Nations Charter under attack from the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1309 PUBLICATION 7716 JULY 27, 19fi4

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the OflSce
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
state and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which
the Dnited States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 issues, domestic JS.50 ;
foreign $12.25 : single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

106

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Communist notion of a world revolution. Now,
we are deeply committed to the United Na-
tions Charter kind of world. We have some
differences in policy, but these are basically
nonpartisan in character.

President Johnson took over after our tragedy
last November with great understanding of the
main lines of American policy. He had been
personally involved in them for the last 15 years,
and he is active with an energy and a sure hand
that has given great confidence to all people. I
think he feels the human aspects of foreign
policies as much as any President I have seen.
Because he really does know that foreign policy
involves every home and every community and
every country, and his own personal background
leads liim to feel these matters very deeply be-
cause he knows that policy is people, and he
feels that very strongly. As I say, he is a man
of great energy who doesn't rest imtil he knows
we liave done everything that we can to bring
a little peace and decency into a particular
situation.

Q. Do you feel that the present state of
detente in international relatione is any different
or any more lading than earlier periods of
relaxation of tension?

A. This word detente is a very confusing
word, and I think we have to be very careful
about it, because there are those who think that
we have entered an entirely new chapter. I
myself don't find that in the present situation.
It is true that there have been certain agree-
ments — the nuclear test ban treaty — there is a
little more trade, perhaps. And we have some
certain agreements about outer space, a little
more cooperation, a little more sobriety perhaps
between the NATO countries, on the one side,
and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other.
We still have very large and potentially dan-
gerous questions unresolved — for example, Ger-
many and Berlin, Cuba, Southeast Asia — so that
this struggle, this underlying struggle between
the forces of freedom and the forces of coercion
is still with us. Mr. Khrushchev has said there
is no ideological coexistence, and that means
that the Communists have not abandoned their
idea of the world revolution; and so long as
that is true I think it's very hazardous to speak

about a detente as though the major problems
have been solved. They have not been. We
must use the time we have to try to prepare
ourselves to find solutions to some of these prob-
lems. But those solutions have not been yet
foimd.

Germany and Eastern Europe

Q. In xvhat ways can relations with the East-
em European nations be developed? What can
Germany'' s role 5e in this process? How would
this process influence the prohlems of Berlin
and of a divided Germ/iny?

A. Oh, I think so. I think the great interest
all of us have in an area like Eastern Europe —
and I would include the Soviet Union in this —
is to try to reinforce the natural and instinctive
and decent relationships between the people
themselves. I think one can say with a fair
confidence that the people of the Warsaw Pact
countries and the people of the NATO countries
would like to see peace established, and it is the
problem of the governments to try to find a way
to bring about this great desire of people
on both sides of the Curtain. But there are
problems.

Now, I would think that the smaller coun-
tries of Eastern Europe do show signs of a nos-
talgic historic interest in their ties with the
main center of Western civilization in Western
Europe. They are part of Europe; they feel
it from the cultural, scientific, educational im-
petus and from their background; and to a
lesser extent they are interested in improving
their relations with the United States. I think
this is all to the good. I think one of the most
important things which happened in the last
2 years has been the improvement of the rela-
tions between the Federal Republic and a num-
ber of the Eastern European countries. This
is good, not just because here are fellow Euro-
peans coming into contact with each other; it
also is a means to reduce that fear of Germany
which is in the background of the European
history for the past 50 years.

So, I think, these are the constructive ideas
and, as these movements go forward, people's
attitudes will change and new opportimities
wUl open up. Now, we know that after 17

JTJLY 27, 1964

lor

years of tension that tension has not moved
toward the reunification of Germany. We
can't guarantee that a reduction of tension will
move in that direction, but the more normally
people can feel toward each other the greater
are the opportunities to bring up a lasting
solution to some of these difficult problems.

Consultation on Problems of Common Interest

Q. In what ways can the -process of coopera-
tion and consultation in the Western alliance
he improved in regard to prohlems of common
interest in Europe, Southeast Asia, and other
parts of the world?

A. Well, I think that — in the first place, let
me say, I believe that the NATO alliance today
is just as unified as ever on the central issue of
security in respect to threats from the East.
I think there is no problem on that point what-
ever, and today NATO is stronger in military
terms than it has ever been in its history. But
there are some problems of coordination of
policy. There is the question as to how Europe
is going to organize itself, and, until that ques-
tion is answered by Europeans, then we cannot
be certain as to what the eventual organization
of NATO ought to be. There are some difficult
questions arising because in NATO there are
those who carry very heavy responsibilities in
other parts of the world — the United States,
Britain, France, and others.

We, ourselves, have 42 allies around the globe.
Now, we believe, sitting where we do and with
our responsibility, that the interest of the free
world in the security of free nations is indivisi-
ble. Therefore we would hope that the NATO
countries would recognize that, in an area like
Southeast Asia, what we are trying to do there
is exactly what we have wanted to do and have
tried to do successfully in Europe. It is to help
free countries maintain their security and inde-
pendence. Now, Europe is a long way away
from Southeast Asia, and I think in NATO we
have not yet found a way to develop common
policies based upon the indivisible interest of
the free world right around the entire globe.
We are improving, we have discussed at great
length, and consultation goes forward, but, as
yet, we have not found a completely satisfactory
answer to this rather difficult question.

Ambassador Kohler Makes Fourth
of July Address on Moscow TV

Following is a translation of an address in
the Russian language made hy American Awr-
hassador Foy D. Kohler for broadcast on Mos-
cow television on July 4-

Good evening, friends. I am grateful for the
opportunity to speak briefly to you about what
our national holiday, the Fourth of July, means
to Americans in the Soviet Union and elsewhere
around the world.

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago
today, delegates from the Thirteen American
Colonies, meeting in Philadelphia, voted to de-
clare these colonies free and independent states.
Already in a state of armed rebellion against the
British King, they listed their grievances and
proclaimed their intention to be free. They
closed their Declaration of Independence with
these great words :

And for the support of this declaration, with a firm
reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes
and our sacred Honor.

Thus began the independent life of the United
States of America. John Adams, one of the
revolutionaries, wrote, "The river is passed, and
the bridge cut away." The American experi-
ment had begun. Since that Fourth of July,
1776, the American people, like other people who
look into their revolutionary past for inspira-
tion, have always paid special homage to this
day. Abraham Lincoln, the great emancipator
of the slaves, once remarked tliat all his politi-
cal philosophy sprang from the thouglits and
the ideals of the makers of the American Revo-
lution. That American philosophy is nowhere
better summarized than in the words of the
Declaration itself. "We hold these truths to be
self-evident," it proclaims, "that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness. Tliat to secure tliese rights, Gov-
ernments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the
governed."

It therefore seems to us particularly fitting
that the great congressional debate of our day

108

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

on the question of civil rights has reached a pos-
itive conclusion on the eve of the Fourth of July.
When the Senate passed the civil rights bill,
President Johnson said : '

. . . this bill Is a renewal and a reinforcement, a
symbol and a strengthening of that abiding commit-
ment to human dignity and the equality of man which
has been the guiding purpose of the American nation
for 200 years.

I am happy to inform you that the day before
yesterday this bill was signed into law.

We thus take pride in what representative
United States Government has accomplished
this Fourth of July in connection with one of
the most urgent of American national problems.
The debate, it would be noticed, took place in
the American tradition begun in 1776 — pub-
licly, open to the eyes of the world, and with due
regard for the processes of law.

Americans also take heart today in the fact
that their Government and political system have
survived the deep and dreadful shock occasioned
by the violent death of a beloved and respected
leader. The vitality and continuity of the
American system have been vividly demonstrat-
ed since that fateful day in November. With-
out losing a step and with the overwhelming
support of the American people, our new Presi-
dent has moved with vigor and imagination to
carry forward President Kennedy's passionate
search for justice without violence at home and
for peace with honor abroad.

I know that in this quest for peace we have
a common goal. As American Ambassador
to the Soviet Union and as an American citizen
who has long known and respected the Soviet
people, I am personally pleased to note — and
to have participated in — the various small, but
hopeful, steps we have taken during the past
year to improve United States-Soviet relations.
These include, between ourselves, such steps as
the establishment of the direct line between
Washington and Moscow, the conclusion of a
new exchanges agreement, the signing of a con-
sular convention, a series of agreements to ex-

' For text of an address made by President Johnson
at San Francisco, Calif., on June 19, 1964, see White
House press release dated June 19.

plore the possibilities of increased scientific co-
operation in such varied areas as space research
and desalination; and, with others, such steps
as the agreement to ban nuclear tests and to
refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons.

We believe we must continue to work hard to
improve understanding between our two great
peoples. We look forward to the day when there
will be a free movement of our people back
and forth. We would like to receive far more
Soviet citizens in the United States. We have
much to share with each other, and the ex-
changes that take place today of writers,
artists, musicians, doctors, scientists, students,
athletes, and engineers are only a fraction of
what we should be doing.

Americans by nature tend to be optimists.
We are also realists and do not underestimate
the seriousness and complexity of the problems
that divide us in many parts of the world. But
let me assure you that we have faith that we can
and must resolve these differences without war.
Only peace will give our two peoples the chance
to realize in full measure the rights in which we
believe, and the basic aspirations I am sure we
share, for "life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness" for all. That is the hope of all Ameri-
cans as we celebrate the 188th anniversary of
the American Kevolution.

Letters off Credence

Luxembourg

The newly appointed Ambassador of Luxem-
bourg, Maurice Steinmetz, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on July 7. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 318 dated July 7.

Netherlands

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Netherlands, Carl Willem Alwin Schurmann,
presented his credentials to President Johnson
on July 7. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Department
of State press release 317 (revised) dated July 7.

JULY 27, 1964

109

The Need To Explore Inner Space

hy Lucius D. Battle

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Ajfairs ^

I am very glad to be with you here and am
grateful for the warmth of your welcome.

We are nearing the Fourth of July, with its
peremiial appeal to public speakers — frequent
or infrequent. But what I plan to say has more
to do with a national "Declaration of Inter-
dependence" this country has made in recent
years than with our historic Declaration of In-
dependence. Though that great revolutionary
document, with a message which still reverber-
ates around the world, always suggests ample
and inviting themes.

One real, and personal, reason for welcoming
your invitation lies in the fact that I have just
completed 2 years in the job I hold — with re-
sponsibility for the educational and cultural
programs of the Department of State. This is
not long enough to know everything I would
like to know about this extremely varied and
sensitive activity. I say "sensitive" because it
deals with people primarily, with their minds,
their aims and aspirations, their various skills
and talents, present and potential. But 2 years
is a logical time for assessment.

Let us look at the scope and shape and mean-
ing, as I see them, of the complex area we call
educational and cultural affairs. Let us see how
these activities have come to play a significant
role in our foreign relations.

Now for a word about a word: "interface.''
I understand that "interface" is a technical term
in geometry. Looking back on my schoolboy

^Address made at the first of the series of 1964
World Affairs Previews at the summer session at the
University of Nehraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on July 2 (ex-
cerpts released as press release 310) .

days, I do not recall my jousts with geometry
with any special enthusiasm. But I'm told
"interface" has become a meaningful word in
the great enterprises of aerospace, too. It has
an imaginative use, I think, in the titles for this
series of talks.- For it invites our attention —
in the idea of a common boundary, or interface,
between subjects — to the increasing inter-
connections and interactions between education
and foreign policy in this country and to their
implications for all of us today.

There is growing recognition of this rela-
tively new, and relatively undeveloped, area of
our foreign relations. We in international edu-
cational activities are grateful to this university
for its leadership in this field — a leadersliip we
have known before in other forms, both institu-
tional and individual.

And so you have staked out tlie subject and
provided the occasion, and I thank you for doing
both. I take it my role is to be a sort of guide
for a tour over the common ground where edu-
cation and foreign policy meet — and to be open
for questions when the tour ends !

As a veteran of many after-dinner and after-
luncheon speeches, I have learned of the utility
of the summary at the outset of what a speaker
intends to say. Not just the generalities I have
so far used, but a specific synopsis — like those
some magazines use at the beginning of an
article. I have done this a number of times,
usually with good effect. But not always. Not
so long ago, after completing an address which

"The seneral topic assignwl to Mr. Battle was "Edu-
catiou/Foreigu Policy Interface."

110

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I had begim with a brief synopsis, a member
of the audience came up to me. He compli-
mented me warmly on my synopsis and then
said: "But you didn't say what you said you
were going to say !" Apparently I had drifted
off my announced wavelength. I will try to
keep a steady signal, loud and clear, here today.
Wliat, then, is my synopsis ? And what is the
title— "The Need To Explore Inner Space" —
all about ? Here it is.

A Synopsis

1. Our ultimate security lies in the minds of
men — in "inner space." Wars will not start in
outer space; if they come, they will start in
inner space — in men's minds, in ignorance, in
prejudice, in overweening pride.

2. Educational exchanges and related activi-
ties play a imique and a key role in reaching
men's minds ; they enable people to see and hear
for themselves. They assist the formation of
attitudes and approaches based on understand-
ing, rather than fixed answers which may be
obsoleted in an evolving, changing world.
They encourage informed attitudes in place of
horseback opinions and other glib and perhaps
glittering answers. It is the essence of success-
ful diplomacy in our time — a time when more
people have more to say about their diplomacy
and participate more fully themselves as "citi-
zen diplomats"' — to recognize that the road to
peace requires great endurance and persistence.
Attitudes and approaches based on understand-
ing, and adaptable to new facts or requirements,
offer the best prospect of enabling us resolutely
to stay the course.

Educational exchanges and related activities
have the further advantage of providing a lad-
der for the national, as well as indi^adual,
advancement so much desired throughout the
world — not only in emerging and newly devel-
oping lands, but in more mature societies as
well.

3. I want to tell you something of the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which I
have the honor to head. It conducts programs
and initiates new activities where needed, but
its essential function is that of a blending or
f rising agency.

It blends or fuses the resources and skills

within government. That is, it gives policy
guidance and coordination to other agencies and
departments having programs in international
education. It also blends or fuses with govern-
ment programs and activities the resources and
skills of the great private sector, outside gov-
ernment., where this is mutually desirable.
Through these varied activities, the Department
is able to acliieve a stronger total effort than it
could alone, or than individual organizations
could achieve alone.

4. In conclusion, education and foreign policy
do have a common boundary, do interact, in the
world today.

We do not suppose the influence of educa-
tional exchanges and related activities on world
peace can be instant. But we believe it can be
important, over time. With passage of the
Fulbright Act in 1946 and subsequent legisla-
tion, this country has written a "Declaration of
/nj'frdependence" through exchanges — a decla-
ration that mutual exchanges can do much to
bring about mutual imderstanding.

For exchange is an influence working for
mutual understanding — in men's minds, in that
inner space where we know the ultimate course
of our civilization on this little outpost in stellar
space will inevitably be determined.

Public Interest in International Affairs

So ends my synopsis. Now, any of you who
feel this is enough can nod off for an early af-
ternoon siesta — for the remainder of these
remarks. If you want to hear more, that is all
right too. In fact, I will be very pleased. So
for those now ready to take the grand tour, let
me say that I will try to keep on the track, as I
indicated earlier, and move at a good pace.

First of all, why do we come together in the
summer of 1964 to talk about "education and
foreign policy"? We would not have done so
two decades ago. What has happened in the
world in 20 years? Wliy are activities we
group under the convenient banner of "educa-
tion" meaningful to all of us, individually, and
hopeful as a means of greater understanding
among nations ?

The period since World War II has seen a
profound deepening of citizen involvement
in international activities. Diplomacy is no

JtTLT 27, 1964

111

longer conducted between governments alone;
whole peoples are now vastly more involved :

— through travel ;

— through eyewitnessing or hearing, by tele-
vision or radio, great international events as
they actually take place ;

— through growing familiarity with the work
of peacekeeping machinery, such as the United
Nations ;

— through having foreign students and other
foreign visitors in their communities and in
their homes ;

— through participation in nongovernmental
organizations — church groups, fraternal asso-
ciations, world affairs councils, colleges and
imiversities, labor unions, community hospital-
ity centers, women's clubs, and many more —
that conduct or support international educa-
tional activities.

You can think of many other examples for
such a list.

By and large, the widening spread of informa-
tion and understanding among the peoples of
the world is making government more and more
responsive to what people know and how people
feel. There is, therefore, a broadening base for
foreign policies in many parts of the world.
This is an important new element in diplomacy.

We can see the growth of public interest and
participation in international affairs in States
like Nebraska and others of the Midwest. Ne-
braska's international roots run deep. Two
centuries ago there were English, Spanish, and
French claims to this territory. In 1763 Span-
ish claims were recognized, later French. It
became part of the United States, as you know,
in Thomas Jefferson's great real-estate trans-
action, the Louisiana Purchase. Later, the
waves of immigration from Germany, Sweden,
what is now Czechoslovakia, and from other
European countries formed strong connections
between the Old World and the New.

Geography played a part in the relative weak-
ening of many of these connections in the late
19th and 20th centuries. Our seaboards held
their ties to the Old World more firmly than
did many sections farther inland. For one
thing, trade and travel to east coast and west

coast ports — the great flow and counterflow of
persons and of goods — helped to keep fast and
enlarge the traditional connections of our
coastal areas with other parts of the world.

So there came a time when many Americans
let it be known that they preferred to be let
alone, and to go it alone. These views were per-
haps most marked in the period between the
wars. Involvement in international affairs for
many persons consisted largely of the simple, if
painful, act of paying taxes.

How far the pendulum has swung since
World War II is dramatically apparent to all
of us. The United Nations, the atom bomb, the
Strategic Air Command, the jet airplane, Ful-
bright scholarships. Sputnik, emerging nations,
outer space, Telstar — these few words are
enough to evoke the whole new world of the
postwar era.

Growing Concern for Education

So it is in such a world — a world in great
tension in spite of, and to a degree because of,
its great technological advances — that we have
seen education become a more central concern
in all our thinking, individual, national, and
international.

We have come to realize, as individuals, that
the increasingly complex and technical processes
of our lives can be managed successfully only
by enlarging the educational opportunities for
all our citizens.

We have come to realize, too, as nations — in
the early stages of development and in advanced
stages as well — that education is truly a ladder
of national growth and progress, and perhaps
mankind's last best hope of peace on earth.

Confidence in the efficacy of education to help
individuals and nations achieve their goals is
probably the most widely accepted of all the
common beliefs of men today, the world around.
This is true in nations on both sides of the
various curtains — Iron, Bamboo, and any other.
It is truly a great current of our time.

It is now but a simple step to see that inter-
national education offers opportunities for de-
veloped nations to assist the less developed. And
it offers the less developed a means of rising
to higher levels of economic and social stability,

112

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

where they can strengthen the whole structure
of world security.

Viewed in these broad, historical terms, the
wide-ranging system of exchange we know
today appears to have been foreordained and
inevitable. Exchange of people and through
them of knowledge was clearly one of the most
hopeful means available to the hand of man for
building — slowly, but securely — ^the foundations
of enduring peace.

Ironically, perhaps, these means to peace were
first found in war — or in the aftermath of war,
in foreign currencies held to our credit in other
countries from the sale of surplus war materials.
The Fulbright Act of 1946, which made use of
these funds, was truly a case of "beating swords
into plowshares."

Exchanges between nations could, however,
be no overnight solution to problems of misun-
derstanding and distrust. They could not be
expected to bring political problems to neat
solutions. But they could help to build mutual
understanding. They could ease man's prog-
ress on what Secretary Rusk has called "the
toilsome path to peace." ' And they could per-
haps do more. No one can say where the limits
may lie when men first identify the interests
they share and then go on to find new areas of
agreement they find they can share. This is the
kind of hope that lies at the base of President
Johnson's call to continue to "build bridges,"
as he said, "across the gulf which has divided us
from Eastern Europe." *

But this is only a part of the almost world-
wide system of exchanges we have developed in
this country in less than 20 years.

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

Let me describe it in terms of what my bureau
does. The bureau's activities touch, in some de-
gree at least, much of the whole field — the work
of private organizations, agencies of the U.S.
Government, and multigovemmental organiza-
tions like UNESCO [United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization].
We can get a general view of the field, as well as
a closeup of my bureau.

• BuiXETiN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 530.

* Ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 922.

There is one simple guide I would like to
offer to give a clearer picture of what my bu-
reau, essentially, is. You know of government
lending agencies we have had — the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, the Home Owners
Loan Corporation, and others. You know, too,
of mending agencies — the Marshall Plan for
Western Europe, for example, and the Ameri-
can Red Cross, which operates under congres-
sional charter, and others. You hear, too, of
spending agencies.

I would like you to think of our bureau as a
blending agency. For it is our principal func-
tion to blend or fuse public and private sources
of support, or "moneypower," and private and
public sources of manpower. All activities,
however varied in sponsorship or support, are
pointed steadily toward the goal of furthering
mutual understanding.

The total complex of State Department activ-
ity in this field is centered in CU, as our bureau
is known in Department shorthand. A Divi-
sion of Cultural Relations was first established
in 1938. Our bureau, as such, goes back only
about 5 years, however. It has had Assistant
Secretary status only 3 years.

It is one of the larger bureaus in the Depart-
ment. We have approximately 400 employees
and an annual budget of approximately $56
million, a substantial portion of which still
comes from foreign-currency balances owned by
the United States in other countries.

We conduct exchanges with 135 countries
and territories. With 48 of these countries
there are agreements providing for binational
commissions — sometimes called United States
Educational Foundations — which help to ad-
minister overseas the exchanges authorized un-
der the Fulbright-Hays Act.

We also serve as the coordinating point in
the Government for all of the activities in inter-
national education conducted by some 25 agen-
cies. Seven of these agencies, which have the
principal programs, come together periodically
as members of the Interagency Council on In-
ternational Educational and Cultural Affairs.
Sitting with me on this Council are the U.S.
Commissioner of Education, the Director of the
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Direc-
tor of the Peace Corps, and representatives of

JULY 27. 1864

113

the Agency for International Development
(AID), the Bureau of the Budget, and the
Defense Department.

A "People Program"

But let us not get lost in bureaucracy. Let
us remember that we are engaged primarily in
conducting a people program. Most of our
money goes into grants to enable people to
study, or teach, or lecture, or conduct research,
or observe our society, or meet with and talk
with their counterparts in other countries, or
pursue some other academic or related informa-
tional purpose. People are the carriers of the
ideas, the aims and aspirations, the question-
ings and curiosities we seek of each other.

In proper academic fashion, I ought to go to
a blackboard for the next few minutes and put
down some figures. I want you to see, in
quantitative terms, what I mean when I say
this is a people program.

In fiscal year 1963 we exchanged some 8,300
persons — 5,800 coming to the United States and
2,500 going from the United States. Counting
about 2,000 renewal grants for that year, we had
roughly 10,300 people under our grants, in
varying degrees of support.

Since 1949, the total of grantees under State
Department programs has been about 85,000.
Some 60,000 have come here in that time, and
some 25,000 Americans have gone to other coun-
tries. These are impressive figures for such a
program in such a short time — impressive, too,
as evidence of the steady congressional and pub-
lic support this program has had since its in-
ception.

During 1963, on the academic side, we sent
out several categories of Americans to study,
to teach, to lecture in a university, to conduct
advanced research — to a total of about 2,000.

Among nonacademic categories, we send out
American specialists — representatives of a wide
variety of fields, including athletic coaches. Su-
preme Court Justices, Nobel Prize winners in
varied fields, professors, and others. All are
selected to discuss or demonstrate their particu-
lar specialties, in the context of American aims
and ideals, with their counterparts and others
interested abroad. Some 300 such specialists
went abroad for us in 1963.

We also send out performing arts groups —
professional and amateur — to demonstrate
abroad our cultural achievements and our inter-
est in these arts. Some 646 people visited 427
cities in 90 countries imder this program in the
same fiscal year. It will be of special interest
to you here that almost half the number of per-
fo liners — nearly 300 — were in musical groups
from college and university campuses, from
Maryland to California. These young, talented
amateurs have demonstrated not only a high
competence in their art but a great capacity for
meeting young people in other countries on their
own terms, both musically and as representa-
tives of their generation and their nation.

We also bring in people from other countries.
The academic program runs to about 2,000 for-
eign students and about 2,400 in the categories
of teachers, lecturers, research scholars, and
educational travel grantees. In general, they
come to study, to visit as members of a student
group, to teach in or study our educational sys-
tem, to lecture in a imiversity, to conduct ad-
vanced research, or to gain practical profes-
sional training.

In addition, we bring in foreign leaders and
foreign specialists, about 1,250 in 1963. This is
an extremely important category of our ex-
changes, because these grants enable leaders
from other countries to observe our "open so-
ciety" at firsthand, to base their impressions
upon observable fact rather than upon incom-
plete or distorted information.

Exchanges in an Open Society

Our open society lends itself peculiarly well
to exchanges. It gives exchange a maximum
opportunity to be effective. This works advan-
tages both ways. Our visitors learn from us,
and we learn from our ^^sitors. No society can
be sufficient unto itself in the realm of ideas,
any more than in the realm of trade. Hence, we
continue to be dependent on the importation of
ideas, new Imowledge, new insights, new ap-
proaches from other countries. Ajnerica has
always encouraged free trade in ideas, in schol-
arship, in literature, in science. Foreign visitors
can be welcome carriers of ideas and insights,
and good exponents and defenders of them. On
their visits here their American hosts and col-

114

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

leagues have the opportunity to discuss ideas
with them. Through the friendly confrontation
of exchange, the ideas that divide can often be
cut away, or at least cut down in size and effect;
and the ideas that unite can be given greater
force and effect.

At the celebration of the 15th anniversary of
our exchange agreement with the Netlierlands,
at The Hague in May, Senator Fulbright said
that "probably the most valuable gift we have
to offer other nations is the example of our will-
ingness to debate, to dissect, to disagree, to take
unpopular positions. This is the essential, the
tiiie meaning of our open society and perhaps
the greatest validity of the argument for expos-
ing other people to it. . . ." And he added :

Restraint and responsibility among nations, even as
among people, must develop from tlie widest possible
exposure to men and ideas. It was these considerations
I had in mind when I first sought support from my
Congress for exchange programs. They seem even more
valid today, and as I look to the future, they are com-
pelling.

Exchange of persons and related activities
not only reflect our open society ; they also help
to sustain it and to encourage a climate of free
discussion elsewhere. Exchange is a force
that works on the side of open societies — to
help to keep them open or to help them become
more so.

We have now toured some of the prmcipal
parts of our exchange program. If I could
merely list the principal categories of people
we send out, and those we bring in, as I have,
my task in describing the bureau's wide-rang-
ing array of activities would be fairly easy.
But there is much more to educational and cul-
tural affairs, and there is no convenient label
for the broad bracket of activities I must, at
least, mention. Let me refer to a few :

We assist some 100 American-sponsored ele-
mentary and secondary schools overseas — insti-
tutions to meet the needs of Americans abroad
and also to serve as demonstration centers of
American educational methods and ideals.

We participate actively in multilateral orga-
nizations. Among those are UNESCO, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the Organization
of American States (OAS). Our work with
OAS, of course, places particular emphasis on

programs of the Alliance for Progress.

We have a general responsibility for the de-
velopment of the Center for Cultural and Tech-
nical Interchange Between East and West- —
the East- West Center in Honolulu. Tliis effort
to provide a scholarly meeting ground for
Asians and Americans has had the strong lead-
ership of President Johnson, Congressman
Kooney of New York, and others who have seen
in the creation of the Center an opportunity
to put the values of exchange into concrete and
enduring fonn in the mid-Pacific.

These are only some of the so-called related
activities that go along with our basic educa-
tional and cultural exchange programs. And
I should record clearly one more fact, that
CU serves as an initiating agency, with a view
to seemg that gaps in our total international
educational effort are adequately filled. One
example is the initiative taken to provide better
screening, orientation, and counseling services
abroad for prospective foreign students, before
they leave their home countries. Later prob-
lems of social or academic adjustment can be
minimized, if not averted, by more adequate
services at the application and admission stages.

Through this whole complex pattern of ac-
tivity, we make a contribution to encouraging
the easy, natural interchange of ideas and of
people that forms one of the more promising
conditions for peace.

We know there is progress. We know, for
example, that people talk more freely across
all barriers than they did only a few years
ago.

At the time the telegraph cable was put
through to India in 1870, John Ruskin ex-
pressed doubts whether there had been any-
thing really significant to say on the new copper
wire, "either to India or to any other place."

No one would ask today, when the new under-
seas telephone cable is put through to Japan
in a service inaugurated by President Jolmson
and Premier Ikeda,^ what meaningful and man-
ifold uses there would be for this new facility.
International dialog and discussion — even to
the point of an international "Town Meeting
of the Woi"ld" via Telstar — has come to be an

° Ihid., July 6, 1964, p. 26.

JXTLT 27, 1964

115

accepted part of the whole pattern of an in-
creasingly close-knit world.

I believe we have more to say, in terms of
our idea of the kind of world we want to see;
and I believe we are recognizing more and more
that we have much to learn from other coun-
tries and other peoples. Certainly the interest
of American institutions in establisliing over-
seas campuses and centers, and of Americans
in many fields of activity in participating in
international conferences and seminars, is
greater than ever before.

Activities of the Private Sector

The preeminent source of strength for our
total international effort in educational and cul-
tural affairs is the private sector. Within it
our system of higher education is a major re-
source base. In both numbers and diversity,
this system is imparalleled in the world. More
than 1,800 colleges and universities in this coun-
try, for example, have foreign students en-
rolled; the total number is approximately
75,000. Your university here is one with a
substantial enrollment of foreign students from
many lands.

Like its sister land-grant institutions,
Nebraska has many other forms of direct inter-
national involvement. Since 1958, as many of
you know, the university has held an AID
[Agency for International Development] con-
tract, now in excess of $3 million, for assistance
to Ataturk University in Turkey in the devel-
opment of its programs in agriculture, engi-
neering, business administration, and educa-
tion. Since the end of last month Nebraska
has had a new Peace Corps training project
on its campus. This group of volunteers wUl
go to Bolivia after 10 weeks of training. Your
campus has also been the site of significant meet-
ings over the last 2 years on the international
role colleges and universities should play.

Nebraska furnishes an excellent example, too,
of a program in which our bureau has a co-
operating and supplementing role. The un-
dergraduate program in Latin American studies
in the College of Arts and Sciences includes,
as you know, an exchange program with El
Colegio de Mexico, in Mexico City. As a part
of a two-way exchange, selected Nebraska un-

dergraduates are enabled to pursue their studies
for a full academic year at this institution.
The second such group left for Mexico late in
June. Here is a splendid cooperative arrange-
ment, one in which the broad and diversified
program offered at Nebraska is significantly
supplemented by residence and study in Mexico.
The Department of State, through the bureau
I head, has been pleased to assist this program
through grants to cover costs of transportation,
tuition, and a living allowance. Here is an ex-
ample very close at hand of the blending or
fusing function of which I spoke earlier.

Your Chancellor [Clifford M. Hardin] has
been a national leader in international educa-
tional planning. The university's sons and
daughters have contributed importantly. One
is my friend and colleague, William J. Crockett,
the very able Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Administration. I would also mention
two brothers, Theodore Sorensen, who has made
a distinguished contribution to public under-
standing of foreign as well as domestic issues
through his close association with President
Kennedy, and Thomas Sorensen, who has dis-
charged with great skill the difficult and de-
manding responsibilities of Deputy Director
for policy and plans for USIA [United States
Information Agency].

The international role of institutions like
Nebraska is great, and growing. Projections
prepared at the Fund for the Advancement of
Education suggest that by 1985 some 80 percent
of the country's college and university students
will be in publicly supported educational in-
stitutions. Today's figure is about 60 percent.
If this projection for 1985 proves correct, then
the international role of the great State institu-
tions will be steadDy enlarging over the next
two decades.

My visit to Lincoln and later today to Omaha
suggests one other base, besides that of higher
education, on which much that we do depends.
That is the base provided by community activity
in the arts. The encouragement given by Amer-
ican communities to furthering opportunities in
music, drama, and other performing arts — as
well as in the visual arts — provides a foundation
for the projection abroad of American interest
and achievement in these fields. Tliis kind of

116

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLEnN

activity also enables our visitors to see for them-
selves what the sense of commiinity means to
Americans — how they create and sustain their
local cultural institutions. You can be proud
of what has been created here, with the Shel-
don Memorial Art Gallery, which I visited this
morning, as a tnily outstanding example.

"VVe all have much work still to do, of course,
to make our society what it can be. The chal-
lenge of the "great society," of which President
Johnson has spoken, is "to enrich and elevate
our national life, and to advance the quality of
our American civilization." ® Realization of
these goals will require the fuller participation
of our citizens in their community and national
life — their responding to, as he said, "a chal-
lenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward
a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches
the marvelous products of our labor."

How Do We Know Exchanges Are Effective?

How do we know that this relatively new ac-
tivity of educational and cultural exchange has
been worth the effort? How do we know ex-
changes are effective ?

Probably the most convincing single docu-
ment is a report, titled A Beacon of Hope, by the
U.S. Advisory Commission on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs.' Early in
1963 this Commission reported to Congress on
interviews with foreign grantees in 20 countries
and with other informed persons here and
abroad. The report deals with the Department
of State's programs and program activities. I
can do no better than read to you the concluding
paragraph of this report :

Looking back at the program's first 14 years as a
world-wide activity of the Department of State, we
believe that the Congress and the American people can
feel pride and deep satisfaction that, although some
improvements are yet to be made, the exchange pro-
gram they conceived has proved so effective to their
purposes. As it has developed in the course of these

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on May 22, 1964,
see White House press release dated May 22.

' A limited number of copies of the report are avail-
able upon request from the office of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs, Room 4513, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20.520.

years, it has established itself as a basic ingredient of
the foreign relations of the United States. There is
no other international activity of our Government that
enjoys so much spontaneous public approval, elicits
such extensive citizen participation, and yields such
impressive evidences of success. In a time when most
international activities seem almost unbearably com-
plex, hazardous and obscure in outcome, the success
of educational exchange is a beacon of hope.

But we have no airborne magnetometers or
Geiger coimters to tell us when we have struck
a rich vein of success in an exchange effort, or
a streak of what may be lean ore, at best. There
are no computers, no machinery, for this kind
of measurement. We can only depend on our
reports from the field and from our grantees,
and from the "debriefings," as we call them, of
many who have gone overseas for us and come
through Washington to tell us of their experi-
ences.

Such evidence does add up. It comes to us in
the form of a Gene Kelly, back from West
Africa, where his French-speaking ability added
a further asset to his already substantial store
of personal qualifications. The appreciative
crowds that pressed in on Mr. Kelly in his
many scheduled and unscheduled appearances
left little doubt that he was, as one post officer
put it in his report, "a smash success."

John Steinbeck left tangible records of his
impact in the Soviet Union and in Finland.
One is a chair in a student dormitory in Lenin-
grad University with the inscription cut on the
back : "Here sat John Steinbeck, November 12,
1963." The occasion was a several hours' meet-
ing with Soviet students. And in Finland the
record shows exacting and exhausting days of
interviews, radio and television appearances,
meetings with writers and educational groups,
autographing sessions, and the like. As the
word of "no more names" went out to a group
still waiting for autographs, a little lady came
up with a well-thumbed copy of Of Mice and
Men. She asked for an autograph for her neph-
ew, who was ill in bed, she said, and who had
asked her to take to Mr. Steinbeck the copy of
the book on which the boy had written a school
theme.

The autographing session was resumed — for
the benefit of the boy, and for the others in line.

Wilma Rudolph, the track star, visited

JULY

1964

IIT

African countries and attended the African
Friendship Games at Dakar. She drew enthu-
siastic press and post reports for the popularity
resulting from her athletic reputation and from
the modest personality she displayed to crowds
of admirers.

From Omaha, Lorena B. Hahn, formerly
United States Representative to the United Na-
tions Commission on the Status of Women, has
three times been a representative of the United
States, through our bureau, in overseas mis-
sions — to the Near East, Africa, and the Far
East in 1954, to Europe in 1956, and to the Far
East in 1957.

The nearly 300 American college and univer-
sity students who have gone abroad for us in the
last 6 months sang or played in 198 cities in 49
countries. No one who attended the debriefings
of these groups — or read their own accounts or
the reports written by the posts visited — can
doubt the strong, positive impact these young
Americans made.

Foreign leaders who have visited this coun-
try give us evidence of the value of their visits.
Julius Nyerere, now President of the United
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was a
"foreign leader" visitor a couple of years ago.
Twelve of the 20 members of Chancellor
Erhard's Cabinet — including Foreign Minister
Gerhard Schroeder and Defense Minister Kai-
Uwe von Hassel — were grantees in years past.
So, too, was a young man named Willy Brandt,
now Mayor of Berlin. And there are many
more.

A Declaration of Interdependence

There are only a few leading ideas I would
like to emphasize and reinforce before I con-
clude.

Our times have made possible tliis new edu-
cational component of our foreign policy;
indeed, they have made it imperative.

It has become possible because for the first
time in history the Western World now has both
the compassion and the capacity to assist less
privileged nations, through education, along the
road of social and economic progress.

It has become imperative because for the first
time in history survival is no longer a comfort-

able, philosophical issue. It has become an
operational one.

So what happens in the minds of men is vital
to us all. Men have shaped the future in varied
ways. A man by the name of Lincoln, a cen-
tury ago, saw the gathering storm over slavery
and was ready to pour the balm of his great
understanding, sympathy, and charity into the
wounds of a bitter civil war. A half-century
later a man fired a bullet into an Austrian
Archduke in a town in the Balkans, the first shot
of World War I ; and another man, Wilson by
name, was pouring into the mainstream of the
American democracy the ideas of the "new
freedom." These were ideas for domestic devel-
opment that influenced the later accomplish-
ments of other men, like Senator George W.
Norris, who also left a marked impact on our
national life.

The crucial importance of what goes on in the
minds of men — for good or ill — is clear beyond
question. The opportmiities to reach men's
minds — to make information and understand-
ing available to them — are unprecedented today.
The effectiveness of exchanges and related activ-
ities in doing this job is well demonstrated.

We therefore move ahead in the work of inter-
national education in the confident belief that
education can be decisive over time. It can be
the ultimate determinant of whether foreign
policy is mformed by knowledge and under-
standing or inflamed by prejudice and passion,
by dictatorial or demagogic leaders.

Education can, in fact, be the ultimate deter-
rent — for our ultimate security truly lies in the
minds of men.

Happily, we are committed to the further ex-
ploration of this "inner space." We are com-
mitted through acts of Congress, and we are
committed through the voluntary participation
of the many thousands of organizations and
individuals who play some part in the total ef-
fort we make through exchanges. As these op-
portunities expand in an ever more interdepend-
ent world, we will need to reach new levels of
citizen participation.

In our national commitment to this course I
believe we have made over the last two decades
a national "Declaration of /n^erdependence" —

118

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

a statement of faith in the slow processes of edu-
cation to serve the ends of mutual luiderstand-
ing. The programs of exchange we conduct
have already become, in Secretary Rusk's words,
"one of the most powerful, altliough quiet, ele-
ments in our foreign policy."

These are some of the ways in which I think
education and foreign policy relate and inter-
act. This is what I think our programs are
really all about and what the commitment the
University of Nebraska and hundreds of other
American colleges and universities have made is
all about. The bureau I have the honor to head
plays a part in weaving or fusing the public
and private sectors more closely together — in
helping to create and sustain a kind of common
enterprise in which we all have a part and in
which, I believe, we can all take pride.

U.S. states Position on Question
of Unified EEC Grains Price

Followmg is the text of a statement released,
at W ashing ton on July 3 hy Christian A. Eer-
ter, the Presidents Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations. The statement was broad-
cast simultaneoiish/ in Germany hy Deutsch-
landfunk as part of a recorded interview with
Mr. Herter.

1. A unified grains price decision now is not
indispensable as far as the United States is
concerned. We believe that negotiations on in-
dustrial products, agricultural products other
than grains, and even on grains, could be car-
ried right up to the concluding stage in Geneva
without a unified grains price decision if the
EEC [European Economic Community] nego-
tiator were in a position to negotiate on these
matters.

2. In the view of the United States, the prob-
lem seems to lie therefore not in Geneva but
in Brussels. It seems to have become an indis-
pensable element in the internal bargaining sit-
uation with the EEC that the imified grains
price decision be made now and that in the
absence of such a decision the EEC represent-

atives will be unable to enter into negotiations
on virtually any matter in Geneva.

3. Unless the capabilities of the EEC to nego-
tiate on industrial products and on agricultural
products including grains is restored in one way
or another, the timetable and even the final re-
sults of the Kennedy Round could be put in
serious jeopardy. The preparations for the
tabling of exceptions lists (which in the view
of the United States must be done simultane-
ously for industry and agriculture) must be
resumed at the latest by the end of the summer
holidays if we are to meet the target date of
November 16. In view of the already serious
delays in the past, such further delays in the
progress of the Kennedy Round would seri-
ously endanger the negotiations. That would
create a situation where the negotiations might
well fail or at best be seriously impaired.

4. As far as the United States is concerned,
the question of a unified grains price can in
any case not be seen in isolation. While the
United States wishes to see the lowest possible
grains price in the Community, it is clear that
any such price now being considered is so high
as to require assurances for the maintenance of
grain imports.

New Resources To Be Contributed
for Replenishment of IDA Funds

The International Development Association
announced on July 7 that formalities looking
toward the replenishment of its resources in the
amount of $750 million had been completed.
This was accomplished on June 29 with the
formal notification to IDA by 12 governments
that they would contribute new resources to the
organization aggregating more than $600 mil-
lion, which was a condition prescribed by IDA's
Board of Governors when the replenisliment
was authorized in September 1963.

The new funds will be available for commit-
ment in new development credits by IDA over
a period extending to at least June 30, 1966.
Payment is to be made in three equal annual in-
stallments, the first not due imtil November

JULY 27, 1964

119

1965, one year after the final payment on the
subscription to IDA's initial resources.

The following list shows the 12 governments
wliich had given formal notification to IDA by
June 29, together with the amoimts of their
contributions ; Belgiimi, which gave notification
on July 2, is included in the list :

($ U.S.)

Australia 19, 800, 000

Austria 5,040, 000

Belgium 8, 250, 000

Denmark 7, 500, 000

France 61, 872, 000

Germany 72, 600, 000

Italy 30, 000. 000

Japan 41, 250, 000

Luxembourg 375, 000

Norway 6, 600, 000

Sweden 15, 000, 000

United Kingdom 96, 600, 000

United States 312, 000, 000

Four other governments are taking steps
toward formal notification that they will con-
tribute the amounts proposed for them. The
four are :

($U.S.)

Canada 41, 700, 000

Finland 2, 298, 000

Netherlands 16, 500, 000

South Africa 3,990,000

In addition, the Government of Kuwait has
decided to participate in the replenishment of
IDA resources, with a contribution of $3.36
million.

Initial subscriptions to IDA, together with
three supplementary contributions by Sweden
totaling more than $15 million, have amounted
to more than $790.9 million in freely convertible
currency. With its new commitment of $15
million, Sweden's contributions to IDA will
have totaled $40,225,000, or nearly four times
the amount of its initial subscription.

IDA was established in 1960 by member
governments of the World Bank. IDA's
Articles of Agreement authorize it to make
development credits on terms bearing less
heavily on the balance of payments of recipient
countries than do conventional loans. All of
the development credits so far extended by IDA
have been repayable in foreign exchange over
50 years, free of interest. To help meet IDA's
administrative costs, a service charge of three-
fourths of 1 percent per annum is payable on
amounts withdrawn and outstanding.

IDA so far has extended credits amounting

to $778,350,000 for economic development
projects in 22 countries. It has lent $395.85
million for the development of railways, high-
ways, and telecommunications; $132.8 million
for irrigation, land improvement, flood control,
and other projects to increase the output of food
and other agricultural products; $85.5 million
for the construction of schools and of municipal
water and sewerage systems; $57.7 million for
the development of electric power facilities;
and $106.5 million for the development of
industry.

Trade With Paraguay

and the United Arab Republic

A PROCLAMATION"

Pboclamation op Aobeements With Paraguay and
THE United Abab Republic Relating to Teade
Agreements and op the Termination in Part or a
Trade Agreement Proclamation Relating to Para-
guay.

Table of Contents

part i — purposes
PART n — identification and justification

(A) Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bi-
lateral Agreement

(1) Identification

(2) Determination

(B) Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclama-

tion
(1) Identiflcation

(1) Identiflcation

(2) Determination

part hi — proclaiming part

(A) Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bi-
lateral Agreement

(B) Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclama-
tion

(O) United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplemen-
tary to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Part I — Purposes

The purposes of this proclamation are:

(a) Paraguay — To proclaim portions of two agree-
ments with Paraguay, amending the bilateral trade
agreement with Paraguay, which contain no new tariff
concessions by the United States but under which
Paraguay may participate in the Latin American Free
Trade Association without violating tie bilateral trade
agreement.

( b ) Paraguay — To proclaim the termination of those
portions of the trade agreement proclamation relating

» No. 3596 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 9419.

120

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to the bilateral trade agreement with Paraguay which
concern the schedules of tariff concessions contained
In that agreement.

(c) United Arah Republic — To proclaim an agree-
ment for the provisional accession of the United Arab
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade involving the application of the general provi-
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
but no tariff concessions.

Pabt II — Identification and Justification

A. Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral

Agreement

1. Identification — Numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the agreement of April 2, 1962 (TIAS 5000), and un-
numbered paragraph 3 of the agreement of June 26,
1963 (TIAS 5390), between the United States and Para-
guay, relate to and modify the application of the gen-
eral provisions of the trade agreement of September 12,

1946, between the two countries (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2689) .'

2. Determination — I have determined that it is re-
quired or appropriate (A) on and after April 2, 1962,
that the trade agreement with Paraguay of Septem-
ber 12, 1946, shall be applied as supplemented by
numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement of
April 2, 1962, and (B) on and after June 26, 1963, that
that trade agreement shall be applied as further supple-
mented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agreement
of June 26, 1963.

B. Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclamation
1. Identification — The proclamation of March 10,

1947, proclaimed the trade agreement of September 12,
1946, between the United States and Paraguay, as sup-
plemented by an exchange of notes of September 12,
1946, relating to duties and surcharges on certain prod-
ucts in Schedule I of the trade agreement. Unnum-
bered paragraph 1 of the agreement of June 26, 1963,
between the United States and Paraguay, terminated,
effective June 30, 1963, Articles VII through XII, the
references in Article XVII to Articles XI and
XII, and Schedules I and II of that trade agreement
of September 12, 1946. Unnumbered paragraph 2 of
the same agreement of June 26, 1963, terminated the
supplementary exchange of notes of September 12, 1946.

C. United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplementary

to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

1. Identification — The Declaration of November 13,
1962,' on the Provisional Accession of the United Arab
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade* became effective for the United States on
May 3, 1963 (TIAS 5309) .

2. Determination — I have determined that it is re-
quired or appropriate, on and after May 3, 1963, that
those provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and agreements supplementary thereto
which have heretofore been proclaimed shall be applied
as supplemented by the Declaration of November 13,
1962, regarding the United Arab Republic.

Pabt III — Pboclaimino Pabt

Now, THEBEFORB, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States of America, acting under the au-
thority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States of America, including Section 350
(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19
U.S.C. 1351(a)(6)), do hereby proclaim that:

A. Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral

Agreement
On and after April 2, 1962, the trade agreement be-
tween the United States and Paraguay, described in
Part II (A)(1) of this proclamation, shall be applied
as supplemented by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agree-
ment of April 2, 1963, and on and after June 26, 1963,
that trade agreement shall be applied as further sup-
plemented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agree-
ment of June 26, 1963.

B. Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclamation
On and after June 30, 1963, the Proclamation of

March 10, 1947, proclaiming the trade agreement be-
tween the United States and Paraguay, as supple-
mented shall be terminated insofar as it relates to
those provisions, described in Part II (B)(1) of this
proclamation, which were terminated by the provisions
of the agreement of June 26, 1963, described in Part
11 (B)(1).

0. United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplementary
to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

On and after May 3, 1963, those provisions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as supple-
mented, described in Part II (C) (1) of this proclama-
tion, shall be applied as supplemented by the Declara-
tion on Provisional Accession of the United Arab Re-
public, described in Part II (C) (1).

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be aifixed.

Done at the City of Washington this sixth day of

July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred

[seal] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the

United States of America the one hundred and

eighty-ninth.

By the President :

Geobge W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

' The trade agreement was proclaimed by the procla-
mation of March 10, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2688).
[Footnote in original.]

" For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 184.

' That agreement of October 30, 1947, was proclaimed
by Proclamation 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat,
(pt. 2) 1103), which proclamation has been supple-
mented by subsequent proclamations. [Footnote in
original.]

JULY 27, 1964

121

Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules
on Agricultural imports Corrected

A PROCLAMATION'

Proclamation CJoerectino Pabt 3 op the Appendix to
THE Tariff Schediiles OF THE UNITED States With
Respect to the Importation of Agricultural Com-
modities

Whereas headnote 1 to part 3 of the Appendix to the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat),
as published at the direction of the President pursuant
to section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of
1962, states that part 3 covers "the provisions pro-
claimed by the President pursuant to section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended * * * im-
posing * * * quantitative limitations on articles im-
ported into the United States • * »" ; and

Whereas the references to seed rye in headnote 2(d)
in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the
United States are obsolete because there are no current
import restrictions imposed on seed rye under section
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended;
and

Whereas, by Proclamation No. 3019 of June 8, 1953 '
(3 CPR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 189) which was issued
pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the President imposed
import quotas on certain dairy products, subject to
allocation and license requirements administered by
the Secretary of Agriculture, including an annual ag-
gregate quota of 496,000 pounds upon imports of dried
buttermilk, which was also applicable to dried whey;
and

Whereas item 950.01 in part 3 of the Appendix to
the Tariff Schedules of the United States includes dried
buttermilk but does not include dried whey as being
subject to the aforementioned annual quota of 496,000
pounds ; and

Whereas, pursuant to section 102(3) of the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962, the President proclaimed the
additional import restrictions set forth in part 3 of the
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States
( Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963,' paragraph
numbered 3; 3 CPR, 1963 Supp., p. 73) in the erro-
neous belief that the quota specified in item 950.01 for
dried buttermilk was the effective restriction "pro-
claimed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act" as provided in section 102(3) of the
Tariff Classification Act of 1962 ; and

WHEaiEAS the United States Tariff Commission has
advised me that in the preparation of part 3 of the
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States
pursuant to title I of Public Law 768, 83d Congress, and
the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, it inadvertently

overlooked the fact that the aforementioned quota pro-
visions of Proclamation No. 3019 applied to dried whey
as well as to dried buttermilk ; and

Whereas it would be contrary to the Intent and pur-
pose of, and the procedures prescribed by, section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the
Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to permit these errors
to remain uncorrected :

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of
the United States of America, acting under and by
virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and
in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the
Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim
that—

(a) headnote 2(d) of part 3 of the Appendix to the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 441)
is hereby amended by deleting "seed rye or" from the
first line thereof and "of 56 pounds each for rye and"
from the seventh line thereof ; and

(b) the superior heading immediately preceding item
950.01 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules
of the United States (77A Stat. 442) is hereby amended
to read as follows : "Dried milk, dried cream, and
dried whey provided for in part 4 of schedule 1 :" ;
and the article description for item 950.01 is hereby
amended by deleting "item 115.45" and inserting in
lieu thereof "items 115.45 and 118.05".

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand

and caused the Seal of the United States of America

to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this seventh day of

July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred

[seal] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the

United States of America the one hundred and

eighty-ninth.

LyM.i W '^Al.tvC*. .

' No. 3597 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 9421.

* For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

" For text, see iUd., Sept. 23, 1963, p. 478.

By the President :

Qeoroe W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Economic Policies and Practices. Paper No. 5, Unem-
ployment Programs in Sweden. Materials prepared
for the Joint Economic Committee. Undated. 51
pp. [Joint Committee print]

Administration of National Security. The American
Ambassador. A study submitted by the Subcom-
mittee on National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Senate Committee on Government Operations.
June 15, 1964. 16 pp. [Committee print]

122

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Verification Provisions To Halt
Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use

Folloto'mg are tv)o state7nents made before the
Conference of the 18-Nation Commnittee on Dis-
armmnent at Geneva by William C. Foster,
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency and chairman of the U.S.
delegation to the Conference.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 18

First, let me welcome, on behalf of my dele-
gation and myself, Ambassador [R. K.] Nehru
of India on his return to our Conference. We
are very happy to see him here again.

Second, Mr. Chairman, in conformity with
the agreed agenda whicli you have amiounced
today, the United States will talk in general
about collateral measures. We feel that the
most important collateral measures put before
this Conference deal with the nuclear arms
race. The United States has already presented
a broad range of measures in this area ; and we
have approaclied the problem by suggesting
measures which would both halt the nuclear
arms race and reverse it.^

As I pointed out in my statement at the 188th
meeting [June 9],^ our approach to collateral
measures is to seek early agreements which
would stop the production and the proliferation
of more and bigger weapons. In addition, we
have developed proposals which would begin

^ For texts of statements made by Mr. Foster and by
Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of tlie U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, during the session
of the Conference which convened Jan. 21, 1964, and
recessed Apr. 24, see Bulletin of Mar. 2, 1964, p. 3.50 ;
Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376 ; Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641 ; and May 11,
1964, p. 756.

' For text, see ma., June 29, 1964, p. 1004.

to reduce the number of weapons already
I^roduced.

In this area of nuclear armaments we ap-
proached tlie problem in two different ways.
First, we dealt with the carriers of such
weapons- We proposed a freeze of offensive
and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
As a means of reducing the numbers of strategic
vehicles, the United States has made a proposal
for the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 jet
bombers. Both the strategic vehicle freeze and
the jet bomber destruction could be carried out
under verification provisions less burdensome
than those which would have to accompany gen-
eral and complete disarmament.

The second United States approach to the
problem of nuclear arms has been to suggest
measures which deal with the stockpiles of
nuclear explosives themselves. To stop in-
creases in these stockpiles, we have proposed a
cutoff of the production of fissionable material
for weapon uses. This is a logical companion
measure for the strategic nuclear delivery ve-
hicle freeze. One measure freezes the number
and characteristics of the carriers; the other
freezes the amount of fissionable material avail-
able for bombs and warheads which are carried.

We have also made a proposal to reduce the
stockpiles of nuclear explosives for use in
weapons. To this end the United States has
proposed the transfer of significant amounts
of fissionable material to nonweapon use.

The nuclear ai-ms race is thus attacked on
two fronts. The strategic vehicle freeze and
bomber destruction would not only halt the
increase but actually begin a decrease in the
numbers of delivery vehicles. The cutoff and
transfer proposals would not only halt the in-
crease but actually begin a decrease in the size

JULY 27, 1964

123

of nuclear stocks on both sides.

Today, within this group of measures, I
should like to emphasize the cutoff. We be-
lieve that it holds promise ; and I say that for
two reasons. First, it is in this general area
that the most recent steps have been taken by
both sides. The announcements by the major
nuclear powers last April of cutbacks in fission-
able material production ' do lend weight to
our hope that we may be able to take further
significant steps. Secondly, the United States
approaches negotiations in this area with a
great deal of flexibility. In essence, our pro-
posals cover the full range — from the cutbacks
which have recently been announced by the
three nuclear participants at this Conference,
through further plant-by-plant shutdowns with
verification, to a complete cutoff with verifica-
tion. We are thus prepared to consider and
accept a wide range of possible alternatives.
For that reason we are hopeful that further
results can be achieved.

Basic Elements of U.S. Position

I should now like to review the basic elements
of the United States position on a cutoff, some
of which have been presented before and some
of which have not.

We are prepared to accept a complete, verified
cutoff of the production of fissionable material
for use in nuclear weapons. We are willing to
accept this as a measure separate from and
prior to agreement on stage I of general dis-
armament and the establishment of an interna-
tional disarmament organization as envisaged
in the United States draft treaty outline.*

We believe that the verification involved for
such a measure could be limited in scope.

We believe that, in addition to nuclear
powers, nonnuclear powers may wish to accede
to a cutoff agreement.

The implementation of a cutoff such as this
would have two principal advantages :

First, it would slow the arms race by lim-
iting the quantity of fissionable material avail-

' For an address by President Johnson before the
Associated Press at New York City on Apr. 20, 1964,
see iUd., May 11, 1964, p. 726.

* For text, see ihid.. May 7, 1962, p. 747.

able for use in nuclear weapons of all kinds.
Fissionable material which could be made into
weapons would still be produced as a by-
product in reactors designed for electric power
production, propulsion, or other uses. There
is no way to avoid this. But this material
would be reserved for peaceful uses imder ade-
quate safeguards if the cutoff were adopted;
and reactors whose only function was to make
fissionable material for weapons would be shut
down. The cutoff would thus stop production
of the vital explosive ingredient for use in nu-
clear weapons. It would halt the production
of fissionable material for use in the f uU range
of nuclear weapons. This range extends from
strategic bombs and warheads to tactical battle-
field weapons. It extends from strategic anti-
ballistic missiles to various types of shorter
range air defense rockets.

Second, it would help to inhibit the further
spread of nuclear weapons. It would put fixed
limits on the amounts of nuclear material avail-
able for national nuclear weapons programs in
many areas of the world. It would reinforce
the existing incentives against the transfer to
other nations of fissionable material for use in
weapons.

In our view a cutoff arrangement should in-
clude the following basic undertakings:

First, each party would agree to halt, pro-
hibit, and prevent the production, at facilities
under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable
material for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, each party would also agree to re-
frain from rendering assistance to anyone for
the purpose of production anywhere of fission-
able material for use in nuclear weapons.

Third, each party would agree to accept ap-
propriate inspection.

Fourth, the agreement should contain a with-
drawal clause, perhaps one similar to that in-
corporated in the partial test ban treaty .' Such
a clause would serve to guard agaiiist occur-
rences related to the subject matter of the
agreement which might affect adversely the
security position of the parties.

As I pointed out earlier, verification of a
cutoff could be relatively limited in scope. It
would deal with three kinds of facilities hav-

' For text, see iUd.. Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

124

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ing functions related to the production of fis-
sionable material: (1) those which were de-
clared and completely shut down; (2) those
which were declared and continued to produce
fissionable material for non weapon purposes;
and (3) those, if any, which were not declared
but which might be engaged in clandestine
production.

A plant-by-plant shutdown might in the be-
ginning be verified on a plant-by-plant basis.
Inspection thus would be even less at the outset
than it would be in a complete cutoff.

In August 1962 the United Kingdom delega-
tion submitted an interesting paper on the con-
trol of fissionable material production in gen-
eral and complete disarmament.* Paragraphs
1 through 26 of that paper deal with control
of a cutoff in such circumstances. I can assure
representatives that the control provisions
which we have in mind for the cutoff as a sep-
arable, pre-stage-I measure would be less than
those envisaged in that paper for general dis-
armament. This is true because, as a separable
measure, the risk of small diversions of fission-
able material by one of the nuclear powers is
less significant than it would be under general
disarmament. As the United Kingdom paper
makes clear, large, hidden nuclear production
plants would be difficult to construct and con-
ceal, given limited but sufficient inspection
rights to deter such activity.

In future statements we shall explore in more
d,etail the verification provisions of such a
cutoff.

Transfer of U-235 to Nonweapon Use

In addition to the cutoff the United States
has proposed the transfer of significant quan-
tities of weapon-grade U-235 to nonweapon
purposes. Such an arrangement could be made
only in connection with a cutoff agreement.
However, the cutoff agreement itself could be
implemented alone.

We have indicated at past meetings that we
would consider the transfer of amounts in excess
of the originally proposed figure of 50,000 kilo-
grams of weapon-grade U-235. We have also
indicated that if the Soviet Union felt that the
transfer of equal amounts would involve in-

• ENDC/60.

equities for it, the United States was prepared
to consider transferring some reasonable, larger
amount than the Soviet Union. As an example
of such an arrangement, we have indicated that
we would be willing to transfer 60,000 kilo-
grams to the Soviet Union's 40,000 kilograms
of weapon-grade U-235.

At the 166th meeting [February 13] of this
Committee, I pointed out that this proposal
was no mere gesture. Some of the figures on
its magnitude are worth repeating. The cost
of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is
$720 million. If completely fissioned, it would
release about 1,000 megatons of TNT equiva-
lent, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent
for every man, woman, and child on earth.

The unilateral announcements made in April
by the nuclear powers represented here have put
us on the path to the cutoff and the eventual
reduction of explosive materials available for
nuclear weapons. It is our earnest hope that
these steps can be followed with agreements for
a complete or partial cessation of production of
this material and for meaningful transfers of
fissionable material to nonweapon purposes.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 25

Last week I described our proposal for a cut-
off in the production of fissionable material for
weapon purposes and its potential effect on
nuclear stockpiles. Today I should like to dis-
cuss the verification provisions which we would
propose for nuclear powers under a separate
cutoff agreement. The appropriate verification
procedures for nonnuclear powers need further
study, and therefore I will not touch on them
today.

At our 188th meeting I set forth our general
philosophy in regard to verification. I men-
tioned the extensive research in this area under-
taken by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. That research seeks to devise systems
which reconcile the need for adequate verifica-
tion with the desire to protect the sensitive facil-
ities of inspected parties.

The inspection system we have designed for
a cutoff agreement recognizes that certain sen-
sitive facilities may be involved. It represents
a concrete expression of our philosophy.

JTJLT 27, 1964

125

To establish the scope of the inspection sys-
tem, we started with its puqDOse. That purpose
is to provide a high degree of assurance that no
significant increase in existing stockpiles of
materials for weapon use could result under the
agreement.

We are not asking for inspection for its own
sake or in order to spot minor inaccuracies. Our
inspection requirements have been guided by
our security needs. As I pointed out last Thurs-
day, under a complete cutoff as a separate meas-
ure, small diversions of fissionable materials by
nuclear powers would be less significant than
under general disarmament.

The inspection system we propose is designed
with all those thoughts in mind. It seeks only
that amount of inspection necessary to guard
against significant diversions by the parties.

The system which we propose would subject
three types of facilities to inspection: U-235
separation plants, which produce enriched
uranium; nuclear reactors, which also produce
fissionable material; and chemical-separation
plants, which isolate the products of reactor
operations. There would be no need to inspect
mines or refineries. Nor would there be any
requirement to inspect nuclear stockpiles.

Operation of Inspection System

The system would operate in the following
manner. First, each nuclear power would de-
clare all U-235 separation plants, chemical-sep-
aration plants, and reactors.

Under the cutoff agreement, a nuclear state
would probably close many fissionable-material
plants rather than maintain them in partial
operation. The declarations would, therefore,
specify, by individual identification and loca-
tion, plants to be shut down and plants to
continue allowed production.

Such declarations would not reveal informa-
tion concerning the storage or deployment of
nuclear weapons. Nor would tliere be a state-
ment of the amount of fissionable material
presently available to each party for use in
weapons. The declarations would include the
amoimt of fissionable materials required for
allowed purposes and the production schedules
for each facility which would remain in opera-
tion. Production requirements would be stated

according to categories of allowed purposes.
These would include research, power and pro-
pulsion reactors, explosions for peaceful pur-
poses, and transfers to other states or to inter-
national organizations for allowed purposes.

Eacli nuclear power could question the accu-
racy of another's declaration. If a satisfactory
explanation were not received, the questioning
power would have the right to withdraw from
the agreement.

The next step after the submission of dec-
larations would be the inspections themselves.
These would be of three kinds :

First, to check that shutdown plants did not
resume operation ;

Second, to guard against overfulfillment or
diversion of production at the declared operat-
ing plants; and

Third, to insure that no undeclared plants
were engaged, contrary to the agreement, in
clandestine production of fissionable material
for use in weapons.

Implementing Inspection Procedures

I should now like to sketch briefly for the
Committee how each kind of inspection might
be implemented.

Let us begin with the simplest : the observa-
tion of a facility which had been shut down
completely. This would require an initial in-
spection to identify the plant and to insure
cessation of production. Thereafter only occa-
sional inspections would suffice to confirm the
shutdown status. The procedure can be simple,
because reopening any significant part of a
shvitdown production complex is a very difficult
and time-consuming process. Irregular inspec-
tions, undertaken without too much advance
notice, would inhibit resumption of operation.

Procedures for monitoring allowed produc-
tion at declared facilities are also relatively
simple and less intrusive than might at first be
expected.

First, to see that U-235 separation plants
produced U-235 in declared amounts only, in-
spectors would require ground access to the
perimeter of the process buildings. They would
measure the electrical input to the plant. They
would check the perimeter uranium input, de-

126

DEPARTJrENT OF STATE BUI.LETIN

clared product output, and uranium tails for
uranium and U-235 content. They would not
enter the actual separation plant. By such a
perimeter examination, the inspectore could
gage the amount of fissionable material avail-
able for allowed uses. By these procedures
they would also be able to estimate the produc-
tion potential accurately enough to guard
against diversion of significant quantities. Of
course, if the U-235 product were stored for
future peaceful use, the U-235 input and output
at the storage sites would have to be recorded
and the sites monitored.

Second, to inspect nuclear reactors maintained
in operation. International Atomic Energy
Agency procedures could be used. Under a
cutoff agreement, nuclear powers could agree
to accept IAEA or similar inspection on a
phased basis, starting with reactors of 100 or
more thermal megawatts. Since tlie fissionable
product of the reactors would be processed in
declared chemical-separation plants, there
would be added assurance against its diversion
to prohibited uses.

Third, to monitor chemical-separation plants,
the inspectors would require complete access to
the facilities at all times. Tliis is because the
plutonium, the U-233, and the enriched uraniimi
fuel — all possible products of chemical separa-
tion — are all also potentially useful in weapons.

Inspectors of a chemical-separation plant
would maintain a system of records, check re-
ports on materials and use of the facility, and
insure that all material was accomited for.
Plutonium, U-233, and enriched uranium would
be monitored in storage or used imder safe-
guards consistent with those I have been de-
scribing. But a nuclear power could choose a
substitute for this particular inspection pro-
cedure. It could place mider international
safeguards an equal amount of the same type
of fissionable material as that to be processed
in the chemical-separation plant. Of course,
the substituted material could not previously
have been imder international safeguards. By
making an independent measurement of the
feed to the plant — that is, of all the material
to be processed in the plant — the inspectors
could determine the quantity of fissionable ma-
terial to be substituted.

By those three methods, it would be possible
to verify that fissionable materials were
produced at declared facilities according to
agreed allowances.

Finally, we would have to insure that no
undeclared facilities were producing fissionable
materials. For this purpose, we propose that
the parties allow a limited number of inspec-
tions of suspected clandestine facilities. Nor-
mally such inspection would require internal
access to the suspected facility. However, if it
were considered particularly sensitive, appro-
priate external inspection might suffice. The
guiding principle would be that a nuclear jwwer
could take any reasonable precaution to pro-
tect its sensitive facilities as long as the in-
spectors were satisfied that no prohibited ac-
tivities were occurring.

The procedures I have described are designed
for declared plants, both operating and shut
down. They would also cover undeclared
plants. The International Atomic Energy
Agency might undertake the inspection of the
declared plants. We are prepared to explore
that possibility with the Agency. For unde-
clared plants, we propose adversary inspection :
We inspect you, and you inspect us.

These procedures would constitute a reliable
verification system for the complete cutoff with-
out involving excessive mtnision. There would
be no inspection of mines and refineries and no
inspection of existing nuclear weapon stock-
piles. As much as possible, inspection would
take place on the periphery of those plants to
be inspected.

We have also proposed a partial cutoff, on a
plant-by-plant basis. Verification of such a
cutoff would at the outset be even more lunited,
involving only inspection of shutdown plants.

We have submitted today, as a Conference
document, a paper containing the system I have
just outlined, with some additional details.'
We hope it will be studied by this Committee.
We recognize that the technical aspects of the
proposed verification system are somewhat
complex. For this reason, we neither expect
nor desire an immediate reaction, although we
do hope to hear the considered views of the
members of the Committee in due course.

ENDC/134.

JULY

1964

127

Existing Law and Measures To Improve the Status of Women
in tlie Western Hemispliere

U.N. SEMINAR ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN FAMILY LAW
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, DECEMBER 3-17, 1963

ly Gladys A. Tillett

One of the durable satisfactions of serving as
U.S. Kepresentative on the United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women is partici-
pation in a United Nations regional seminar.
Here standards which have been recommended
to the Commission at its annual sessions are dis-
cussed in relation to the progress and problems
of women in the region. As the head of the
U.S. delegation to the United Nations Seminar
on the Status of Women in Family Law, held at
Bogota, Colombia, December 3-17, 1963, it was
my privilege to participate with women leaders
from nearly all countries in this hemisphere in
a discussion of existing law and practice and of
measures to improve the status of women
throughout the Americas.

Participation

The success of the Bogotd seminar was as-
sured by the high qualifications of the partici-
pants, who came from 25 countries and ter-
ritories in the Western Hemisphere : Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Kica,
Dominican Kepublic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Marti-

• Mrs. Tillett is the U.8. Representative
on the Commission on the Status of
Women of the Economic and Social Cotm-
cil of the United Nations. She was head
of the V.S. delegation to the V.N. Seminar
on the Status of "Women im, Family Law.

nique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Puerto Kico, St. Lucia, Surinam, Trini-
dad and Tobago, the United States, and Uru-
guay. As in all U.N. seminars, the participants
were named by their governments as experts in
their field and they came uninstructed.

The host coimtry, Colombia, had an impres-
sive delegation, headed by an attorney who had
formerly served as Senator and Cabinet Minis-
ter; the other Colombian members held high
posts in government or national life.

Mexico's participant was a Justice of the
Mexican Supreme Court. She had two alter-
nates: one the head of a department in the
Mexican Ministry of Government and also
Chairman of the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women, and the other a well-known
practicing attorney in Mexico City.

Five other countries — Argentina, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua — also
sent judges, and Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama
sent distinguished professors of law or social
service. The participant from Canada has been
a member of the Senate of her country for
many years.

The participant from the Dominican Republic
was one of its ambassadors to the United Na-
tions, and was also President of the Inter-
American Commission of Women. Others held
high professional positions — in the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru, in the
Ministries of Finance of Haiti and Paraguay, in
the Ministry of Development and Welfare of
Jamaica. The participant from Uruguay was

128

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BXJLLETIN'

the chief of the Department of Architecture in
the Ministry of Public Works. Honduras sent
its Vice Minister of Education, and Trinidad
and Tobago its Education Officer. St. Lucia
sent a former member of its Legislative Council,
and Martinique and Surinam sent experts in
social rehabilitation.

Serving as alternates on the U.S. delegation
were Mrs. Eliska Chanlett, the U.S. delegate
on the Inter- American Commission of Women,
and Mrs. Alice A. Morrison, Chief of the Divi-
sion of Legislation and Standards in the Wom-
en's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sent Mrs.
Cardona de Lopez-Baralt of its Department of
Justice.

With one exception, all the countries repre-
sented sent women participants. This was in
contrast to the situation in an earlier seminar on
family law which I attended in Tokyo in 1962,^
where half the participants were men, including
three supreme court justices and a number of
high officials in Departments of Justice.

In preparation for both the Tokyo and
Bogota meetings I had traveled widely, in the
Far East and in Latin America, on a Depart-
ment of State specialist grant. During these
trips I talked with high officials about seminar
plans, conferred with leaders of nongovernmen-
tal organizations entitled to send observers, and
met many of the distinguished representatives
who later attended the seminars.

Altogether, some 20 international women's
organizations recognized as consultants by the
U.N. Economic and Social Council attended
the Bogota seminar and joined in the discus-
sions. They included such groups as the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists, the Internation-
al Federation of Women Lawyers, the World
Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, the
YWCA, the Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, and the Friends World
Committee. The International Council of Wo-
men sent its international President, Mrs. Craig
Schuller, as representative. The International
Federation of Business and Professional Wo-
men was represented by U.S. Federal Court
Judge Sarah T. Hughes of Dallas, Tex., who

administered the oath to President Lyndon B.
Jolmson.

The Government of Colombia provided facil-
ities for the seminar and made the preparatory
arrangements. The United Nations provided
secretariat services including simultaneous
translation.^

As in the Status of Women Commission and
all other United Nations bodies, documentation
was provided in advance. There were three
major papers. One, prepared by the United
Nations, dealt with U.N. action thus far; the
second, prepared by Miss Gladys Harrison,
formerly Assistant General Counsel in the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, dealt with "The Status of Women in
Family Law in the United States and Can-
ada"; and the third, prepared by Miss Maria
Lavalle Urbina of Mexico, dealt with the
"Status of Women in Latin American Family
Law." In addition, participants provided
nearly 20 working papers on the laws in their
own countries. The United States paper was
prepared by my alternate, Mrs. Morrison.

Opening of the Seminar

At the opening session attended by the For-
eign Minister of Colombia and many other dig-
nitaries, the participants observed a minute of
silence in memory of the late President, John F.
Kennedy. Throughout the session there were
many expressions of the high regard and affec-
tion in which he was held and of appreciation
for his imaginative leadership in improving
the life of all the people in the hemisphere.

Judge Hughes, in acknowledging these trib-
utes in a later session, said:

Personally and as a citizen of the United States I
wish to thank our distinguished President for her trib-
ute in her opening remarks to our beloved President
Kennedy, whom I deeply admired for his courage, his
wisdom, and his concern for the people of the world
and particularly of Latin America.

I realize it is not on the agenda, but I should like
to assure the people of Central and South America that
President Johnson believes in hemispheric solidarity
and in the Alliance for Progress. He will support the
alliance in the same way as President Kennedy, realiz-

'Mrs. Tillett attended the Tokyo seminar as U.S.
observer.

'For the report, see U.N. doc. ST/TAC/HRA8.
Earlier U.N. seminars on the status of women in family
law are reported in Nos. 11 and 14 of this series.

JULY 27, 1964

129

ing that the growth of Latin America and its develop-
ment are necessary, if we in the United States are to
progress. He believes in the individual rights of men
and women and strongly supports the United Nations
and its program of human rights. I have known and
been a friend of President Johnson and his wife for
many years.

The officers who were elected at tlie first
plenary session served as a steering committee
throughout the seminar. Mrs. Esmeralda
Arboleda de Uribe of Colombia was elected
chairman. The three vice chairmen were Mrs.
Maria Cristina Salmoran de Tamayo of
Mexico, Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett of the United
States, and Mrs. Julia Guarino Fiechter of
Uruguay. Senator Muriel McQ. Fergusson of
Canada and Mrs. Winifred Hewitt of Jamaica
served as rapporteurs.

In addition, discussion leaders were appointed
for each of the items on the agenda. Miss Car-
men Natalia Martinez Bonilla of the Dominican
Republic was the leader on "Age of marriage,
consent to marriage and registration of mar-
riages"; Miss Ava Maria Vargas Dubon of
Guatemala on "Effects of marriage on the per-
sonal status of women"; Mrs. Alba Alonzo de
Quesada of Honduras on "Effects of marriage
on the property rights of women" ; Miss Maria
Lavalle Urbina of Mexico on "Dissolution of
marriage, annulment, separation"; Miss Emma
Pilotin of Martinique on "Parental rights and
duties" ; Mrs. Julia Uriona de Olmos of Bolivia
on the "Legal status of unmarried women";
Miss Carmela Aguilar Ayanz of Peru on "In-
heritance rights of women"; and Mrs. Emma
Cardona de Lopez-Baralt of Puerto Eico on
"Social factors affecting the status of women in
family law."

Early in the discussion the chairman pointed
out that we were not there to enumerate the
laws of our respective countries but to examine
existing inequities and to see what can be done
about them. To further the chairman's objec-
tive of encouraging frank discussion, my first
intervention made it clear that in the United
States women have problems, too.

In the matter of domicile, the agenda subject
then under discussion, the basic principle estab-
lished by law in most U.S. jurisdictions is that
the domicile of the wife follows that of the hus-
band. Today, as a result of this ancient rule,

married women living separate from their hus-
bands sometimes may be denied the exercise of
their rights of citizenship — voting, running for
political office, and jury service — on the basis
that they lack the required legal domicile. My
statement continued :

I am happy to say that in recent years State laws
have begun to recognize a separate domicile for mar-
ried women. We have made some progress, but today
there are only four States which appear to recognize
a married woman's separate domicile for all purx)oses
without imposing limitations.

I pomted out also that an increasing number
of States allow a married woman to acquire a
separate domicile for certain specified purposes,
such as voting, taxation, jury service, election
to public office, and administration of estates.

The chairman of the seminar expressed ap-
preciation for my statement. She said that,
since the representative of the major industrial
country in the Western Hemisphere was willing
to acknowledge the existence of "problems,"
she hoped that delegates from other countries
would be willing to follow the U.S. example.
Throughout the seminar, the frank discussion
of legal discriminations and constructive ways
of dealing with them was of great benefit to
all participants.

Hemispheric Problems

The thread of concern running through the
discussion was the need for improvement of
family law as a means for affording legal recog-
nition to the human dignity and rights of
women.

Many delegates reported that, while progress
was being made in the elimination of discrimi-
natory laws and customs, such progress was
spotty. This was pointedly brought out early
in the session by one participant, who prefaced
her opening statement with the rueful comment
that women seemed to have responsibilities,
rather than rights.

The two subjects on the agenda tliat gave rise
to the most extended discussion were dissolu-
tion of marriage and the legal status of im-
married women.

In the discussion of divorce, there was great
interest in the measures being taken in the
United States to help married couples settle

130

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULIJITIN

their differences with the help of family coun-
seling. I pointed out that family counseling is
now taught in some major universities and that
a number of States have enacted laws that make
such counseling obligatoiy prior to the hearing
of a divorce action.

The discussion of divorce brought out wide
variation in law and practice; some countries
do not allow divorce on any grounds, while
others recognize it as a means of dissolving
marriage and allow the spouses to remari-y. It
was recognized that effective legal protections
during marriage must be available for the wife
as a means of establishing sound family rela-
tions and tliat such protections would also help
reduce the emphasis on divorce.

Many participants were in favor of raising
the legal minimum age for marriage. It was
felt that this would lead to more stable mar-
riages and might also t«nd to decrease the
demand for divorce. It was emphasized that
a higher minimmn age would allow time for
better education and training of the intending
spouses. In this connection I stated that the
United States is steadily making progress in
raising the minimum age of marriage ; only four
States now permit marriage of girls as young as
14, and in these cases they must have parental
consent.

I mentioned that many of our high schools
and colleges offer courses in family living and
that these are very popular with young people.
In response to the interest tliis statement
aroused, I added :

A variety of methods are currently being used to
promote the stability of marriage in the United States.
One method is the training for family living taught
in many of our high schools. In such courses teenage
boys and girls are taught that marriage is a partner-
ship to which both partners contribute different but
equally imiwrtant skills. Formal training for family
life helps instill attitudes of consideration and coopera-
tion which are so important to a happy marriage.

In addition, marriage counseling has attained the
status of a profession in the United States. Several
major universities provide courses to permit the award
of a doctorate in this field. As an indication of the
high standards in this profession, the Menninger
Foundation of Topeka, Kansas, requires a graduate
or profes.sional degree in one's chosen profession plus
3 years of practical experience as a prerequisite for
training in marriage counseling. Representatives of
such professions as law, psychology, education, religion,

and social service have completed training in marriage
counseling.

In my statement on parental rights and duties
I noted that, in the United States, the father has
primary responsibility for support of the cliil-
dren both during marriage and after divorce.
The seminar discussed at length the problem of
support where fathers abandon their families.
I also pointed out that provision is made to
collect support money from the father, where-
ever he goes, and to send it to the mother.

Under the agenda item entitled "Legal status
of immarried women," the discussion revolved
almost entirely around the rights of the immar-
ried mother and her child. It was felt that de
facto unions often reflected lack of educational
opportunities, a low level of economic develop-
ment, and related factors. Numerous other
problems were noted.

During a session at which I presided, my
alternate, Mrs. Chanlett, made a statement on
the Alliance for Progress, pointing out the im-
portance of women making use of its new re-
sources for community development and for the
improvement of family life.

Seminar Followup

Participants agreed on the need for legal re-
forms to eliminate injustices against women
and to strengthen the family as an institution.

To follow up a seminar on family law it is
important that an objective evaluation be made
in each country of the progress of women in
that coimtry. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt called
attention to this need at an informal gathering
of members of the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women in New York in the spring
of 1962. She pointed out that the U.N. Com-
mission on the Status of Women had set the
pattern but that it is the responsibility of each
country to make an examination of its own
laws and customs to see how these measure up.
She noted that the United States was then mak-
ing a review through the Presidential commis-
sion of which she was chairman.

Other types of commissions have been estab-
lished in various countries. At the Tokyo sem-
inar frequent mention was made of the Pakistan
Commission on Family Laws, which pro-
moted numerous legal reforms in that coun-

JULT 27, 1964

131

try. In Singapore the appointment of such a
commission led to the enactment of a new code
of laws for women, known as the Woman's
Charter.

To help carry into effect conclusions reached
by a U.N. seminar or by a commission or study
group in an individual country, women's vol-
untary organizations play an indispensable role.
Through their study and action programs, they
not only educate their own members but usually
also reach a wide cross section of the public.
Awareness of this fact was implicit in the dis-
cussions at the Bogota seminar and recurred
constantly in conclusions reached by the partici-
pants. Such women's organizations are firmly
established in Latin America and are increas-
ingly important centers of strength and
influence. They, and their counterparts in the
United States and Canada, offer a ready means
for stimulating improvements in the status of
women in family law throughout the hemi-
sphere. Their work will be of major impor-
tance in putting the conclusions reached at the
Bogota seminar into practical effect.

Conclusion

The Bogota seminar strengthened my convic-
tion as to the usefulness of U.N. regional semi-
nars in improving the status of women. Espe-
cially in situations where women face problems
caused not alone by laws but by long-established
customs, these seminars provide an invaluable
opportunity for frank and free discussion of
existing inequities and exchange of information
on measures which have proved useful in elimi-
nating them. Seminars serve as a valuable arm
to the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women by focusing attention of national lead-
ers and of men and women at the grassroots
level on the basic principles developed by that
Commission.

Each series of U.N. seminars on the status of
women deals with a major role of women. In
today's world a woman has many roles. The
adoption by the General Assembly in 1962 of a
resolution suggesting the establishment of a
long-term program for the advancement of
women,' with particular emphasis on the de-

' U.N. doc. A/RES/1777 (XVII).

veloping countries, reflects the tremendous im-
portance attached by governments of these coun-
tries to the potential of women in economic and
social progress. More and more countries are
recognizing that they need women as well as
men for purposes of national development and
the raising of living standards. At its 17th
annual session in March 1963, the U.N. Com-
mission on the Status of Women voted to initi-
ate a third series of seminars in 1965 on the role
of women in economic development, with spe-
cial emphasis on the developing countries.

Governments and women's voluntary organi-
zations look to the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women for leadership in the estab-
lisliment of basic principles on all aspects of
women's status. The recommendations devel-
oped by the Commission at its annual meetings,
based on factual information on existing law
and practice, provide the guidelines for prac-
tical action. Through regional seminars, these
recommendations can find application in each
of the participating coimtries and thus open
the way for new avenues of service and oppor-
tunity for women throughout the world.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publieations may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Economic and Social Council

Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance: The Use of Ex-
perts From Developing Countries. E/TAC/140.
Rev. 1. April 27, 19C4. 6 pp.

Technical Assistance Activities of the United Nations.
Report of the Secretary-General. E/3870, May 11,
1964, 179 pp.; Addendum, E/3870/Add. 1, June 10,
1964, 167 pp.

Inquiry Among Governments on Problems Resulting
From the Reciprocal Action of Economic Develop-
ment and Population Changes. Report of the Sec-
retary-General. E/3.S9r). May 18, 1964. 89 pp.

Future of the United Nations Water Resources De-
velopment Centre. Note by the Secretary-General.
E/3894. May 19, 1964. 2 pp.

Interim Co-Ordinating Committee for International
Commodity Arrangements. 1964 Review of Interna-
tional Commodity Problems. E/3856. May 29, 1964.
101 pp.

132

DEP^UITMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

United Nations Children's Fund. Children and Youth
in Development Planning. Conclusions of a round-
table conference held at Bellagio, Italy, April 1-7,
1964. E/ICEF/498. June 'Z. li)(J4. 13 pp.

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament.
Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Re-
leased by Disarmament. Replies of governments.
E/3898/Add. 1. June 3, 1964. 31 pp.

Training of National Technical Personnel for Accel-
erated Industrialization of Developing Countries.
Report by the Secretary-General. E/3901, June 3,
1964, 38 pp. ; E/3901/Add. 1. June 3, 1964, l.')8 pp.

Recent Developments Relating to New Sources of
Energy. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3903.
June 3. 1964. 43 pp.

Internationnl Co-Operation in Cartography. Interna-
tional Co-Operation in the Standardization of Geo-
graphical Names. Report by the Secretary-General.
E'3!)07. June 3. 1964. 4 pp.

Development of Natural Resources. Report on work
being done in the field of nonagricultural resources.
E/3904. June 15, 1964. 30 pp.

Measnre.s To Implement the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination. Progress report by the Secretary-Gen-
eral. E/3916. June 1.5, 1964. 2 pp.

United Nations Development Decade. Relationships
Among Planning Institutes. Report by the Secre-
tary-General. E/3923. June 19, 1964. 9 pp.

United Nations Training and Research Institute.
Progress rei)ort by the Secretary-General. E/3924.
June 19. 1964. 3 pp.

route could apply to the U.S. Civil Aeronautics
Board for permission to use the same aircraft
for flights beyond Detroit to a city in Canada
■without traffic rights between Detroit and such
Canadian city. The United States would issue
the necessary authorization if the point in
Canada applied for were Montreal.

The delegations also agreed that the present
agreement should be extended to June 30, 1965.

The agreements arrived at in these discus-
sions, if approved by the two Governments, will
be formalized through diplomatic channels be-
fore the expiration of the existing agreement.

The conversations were held in a spirit of
friendship and cordiality. The Mexican dele-
gation was headed by Alberto Acuna Ongay,
Civil Aeronautics Administrator of the Depart-
ment of Communications and Transport, and
the U.S. delegation by William E. Kniglit, As-
sistant Chief of the Aviation Negotiations Divi-
sion of the Department of State.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Mexico Conclude
Civil Air Transport Negotiations

Press release 316 dated July 6

The United States and Mexico recently con-
cluded conversations designed to reacli an agree-
ment on the regulations that miglit govern aero-
nautical relations between the two countries
after August 15, 1964, the date of expiration of
the air transport agreement in force between
Mexico and the United States.'

During the discussions it was agreed on an ad
referendum basis that Mexico would receive a
route "Mexico City-Detroit" as the route here-
tofore left unspecified in the present agreement.
It was further agreed that the carrier desig-
nated by the Mexican Government to fly the

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675
and 5513.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for
the United States February 8, 194.%. .TO Stnt. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Rwanda, July 6, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964.'

Ratifications depoxitcd: 3a\i!\r\, June 8, 1964;
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Hepiihlic (with a reser-
vation and declaration ), June 12, 1964.
AcceSHion deposited: United Arab Republic (with
reservations I , June 9. 1064.
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations concerning acquisition of nationality.
Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force
April 24, 1964.'

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic, June 9,
1964.
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations C(jncerning eomrmlsory settlement of dis-
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1964. Entered into
force Ajiril 24. 1964."
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964.

Mairiage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for
marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened

' Not in force for the United States.

JULT 27, 1964

133

for signature at the United Nations December 10,
1962.'

Ratifications deposited: New Zealand, June 12, 1964 ;
Sweden (with a reservation), June 16, 1964.

North Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Energy

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information.
Done at Paris June 18, 1964. Enters into force upon
receipt by the United States of notification from all
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are
willing to be bound by the terms of the agreement.
Signatures: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,
June 18, 1964; Italy, June 22, 1964; Denmark,
June 25, 1964 ; Canada, June 30, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October
10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: Niger, San Marino, July 9,
1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva
1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.'
Proclaimed by the President: July 7, 1964.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners

of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950 ; for the United States Feb-
ruary 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365,
respectively.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Niger, April 16, 1964; Rwanda, March 21,
1964.
Adherence deposited: Uganda, May 18, 1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 1959
(TIAS 4192), governing tolls on the Saint Lawrence
Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa
June 30, 1964. Entered into force July 1, 1964.

Greece

Protocol modifying and supplementing convention of
February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance
of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion
of taxes on estates of deceased i)ersons. Signed at
Athens February 12, 1964.'
Ratified by the President: July 7, 1964.

Agreement providing for the refunding of certain in-
debtedness due from Greece to the United States.
Signed at Athens May 28, 1964. Enters into force
subject to legislation passed by the United States
Congress and signed by the President.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington July 6, 1964. Entered into force July
6, 1964.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of June 29 and
July 12, 1954, as extended (TIAS 3152, 4290), for a
technical assistance program in British Guiana.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June
22 and 29, 1964. Entered into force June 29, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on July 8 confirmed the following nomi-
nations:

Mercer Cook to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Senegal. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 327 dated July 16.)

Randolph A. Kidder to be Ambas.sador to the King-
dom of Cambodia. (For biographic details, see White
House press relea.se dated June 16.)

Clinton E. Knox to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Dahomey. ( For biographic details, see White House
press release dated June 9.)

Robert J. R.van to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Niger. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated May 28) .

Franklin H. Williams to be the representative of
the United States on the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 323 dated July 10. )

134

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtXLLETIN

INDEX July 27, 1961^ Vol. LI, No. 1309

Agriculture

Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul-
tural Imports Corrected (text of proclama-
tion) 122

U.S. States Position on Question of Unified EEC

Grains Price (Herter) 119

American Republics. Existing Law and Meas-
ures To Improve the Status of Women in the
Western Hemisphere (Tillett) 128

Atomic Energy. U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Veri-
fication Provisions To Halt Production of Fis-
sionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use
(Foster) 123

Aviation. United States and Mexico Conclude

Civil Air Transport Negotiations 133

Cambodia. Kidder confirmed as Ambassador . 134

Congress

Confirmations (Cools, Kidder, Knox, Ryan, Wil-
liams) 134

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 122

Dahomey. Knox confirmed as Ambassador . . 134

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Cooli, Kidder, Knox, Ryan, Williams) . 134

Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Veri-
fication Provisions To Halt Production of Fis-
sionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use
(Foster) 123

Economic Affairs

Apijendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul-
tural Imports Corrected (text of proclama-
tion) 122

New Resources To Be Contributed for Replen-
ishment of IDA Funds 119

Trade With Paraguay and the United Arab Re-
public (text of proclamation) 120

U.S. States Position on Question of Unified EEC

Grains Price (Herter) 119

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Need To

Explore Inner Space (Battle) 110

Europe. U.S. States Position on Question of

Unified EEC Grains Price (Herter) .... 119

Germany. Secretary Rusli Interviewed on Ger-
man Television (Ruge, Rusk) 106

Human Rights. Existing Law and Measures To
Improve the Status of Women in the Western
Hemisphere (Tillett) 128

International Organizations and Conferences

New Resources To Be Contributed for Replen-
ishment of IDA Funds 119

U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Verification Provisions
To Halt Production of Fissionable Materials
for Nuclear Weapons Use (Foster) .... 123

Williams confirmed as U.S. representative,

ECOSOC 134

Luxembourg. Letters of Credence (Steinmetz) . 109
Mexico. United States and Mexico Conclude

Civil Air Transport Negotiations 133

Netherlands. Letters of Credence (Schur-

mann) 109

Niger. Ryan confirmed as Ambassador .... 134
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk Interviewed on German Television
(Ruge, Rusk) 106

Paraguay. Trade With Paraguay and the
United Arab Republic (text of proclama-
tion) 120

Presidential Documents

Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul-
tural Imports Corrected 122

Trade With Paraguay and the United Arab Re-
public , 120

Senegal. Cook confirmed as Ambassador . . . 134

Treaty Information

Current Actions 133

United States and Mexico Conclude Civil Air

Transport Negotiations 133

U.S.S.R. Ambassador Kohler Makes Fourth of

July Address on Moscow TV 108

United Arab Republic. Trade With Paraguay
and the United Arab Republic (text of procla-
mation) 120

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents ... 132

Existing Law and Measures To Improve the
Status of Women in the Western Hemisphere

(Tillett) 128

Name Index

Battle, Lucius D 110

Cook, Mercer 134

Foster, William C 123

Herter, Christian A 119

Johnson, President 120, 122

Kidder, Randolph A 134

Knox, Clinton E 134

Kohler, Foy D 108

Ruge, Gerd 106

Rusk, Secretary 106

Ryan, Robert J 134

Schurmann, Carl Willem Alwin 109

Steinmetz, Maurice 109

Tillett, Gladys A 128

Williams, Franklin H 134

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 6-12

Press releases may he obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to July 6 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 310 of July 2.

Subject

U.S. participation in International
conferences.

U.S.-Mexiean civil air transport
negotiations.

Netherlands credentials (revised)
(rewrite).

Luxembourg credentials (rewrite).

Program for visit of Prime Minister
of Malaysia.
Philippines credentials (rewrite).
Argentina credentials (rewrite).
Brazil credentials (rewrite).

Williams sworn in as U.S. Repre-
sentative on U.N. Economic and
Social Council (biographic de-
tails).

Kass sworn in as consultant (bio-
graphic details).

No.

Date

»315

7/6

316

7/6

317

7/7

318
*319

7/7
7/8

t320
t321
t322
»323

7/9
7/9
7/9
7/10

*324 7/10

♦Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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ADDRESS

CITT. STATE

■^*^

THE OFFICIAL WEEIflLY RECOED OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LI, No. 1310

August 3, 196k

SOME AMERICAN THOUGHTS ON CURRENT ISSUES

hy Ambassador George C. McGhee 138

ANZUS REVIEWS AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN ASIA AND PACIFIC

Text of Coinvmnique II/B

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

ADOPTS FINAD ACT

Text of Preamble and Recommendations 150

For index see inside back cover

Some American Thoughts on Current Issues

ty George C. McOhee

Anibassador to the Federal Republic of Oermamy-

Hard though it is to reconcile with these
lovely surroundings, we have all come here to
Tuetzing to work. Our task is quite simply to
think and talk about the issues that confront
the world today — which when done seriously
is work indeed, but of the most stimulating sort.
It is work which I am pleased and honored to
share with you and your distinguished guests.

Tuetzing, in a remarkably short time, has be-
come closely associated with that type of infor-
mal but informed discussion from which we
can hope to derive a better understanding of
today's problems — and hopefully some progress
toward their solution. I have been fortunate in
participating in similar conferences over a
number of years. This type of gathering has
no rival, in my opinion, in prodding us to re-
examine long-held notions and to open our
minds to new concepts. To me the real value
of such meetings of minds is in the exchange of

* Address made before a summer conference at the
Evangelical Academy at Tuetzing, Germany, on July 16.

ideas, in the free flow of conversation as we walk
and talk along Tuetzing's lovely garden paths.

I have decided, therefore, to make my re-
marks quite informal. I hope you will tliink of
them as a kind of conversation. Although I
shall inevitably monopolize it for the first half
hour or so, it will, I hope, continue with your
comments and questions today and in smaller
groups tomorrow. My purpose is to comment
on four current questions arising out of the rela-
tions between my country and Germany, to
which I have devoted my attention as American
Ambassador.

These four are by no means the only impor-
tant foreign policy matters affecting Germany
with which my Government is at tliis time con-
cerned, nor is there necessarily any direct rela-
tionship among them. I will, moreover, make
no attempt to indicate their relative importance
nor to deal with them in all their aspects. Tliis
I leave to your part of the "conversation." My
purpose is, quite simply, to present an American

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1310 PUBLICATION 7718 AUGUST 3, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments In the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is Included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general Inter-
national Interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb : 52 Issues, domestic J8.50,
foreign $12.25 : single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is Indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

138

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

point of view which my German friends will
not consider an intrusion into their exclusive
affairs.

The topics I have chosen are the following:
(1) our worldwide responsibilities; (2) the
future of Europe; (3) Berlin passes; (4) re-
unification. You will agree, I think, that I have
not sought to avoid the controversial.

Our Worldwide Responsibilities

Recently there appeared in a German news-
paper a cartoon which depicted a poor little
donkey, labeled Germany, which the American
Uncle Sam was loading down with a variety of
burdens — aid to Viet-Nam, troops for Cyprus,
and the like. It appeared from the expression
on the donkey's face that lie might be wondering
"TVHiat next?" or "Is there no end?"

Although it is true that there has in recent
months been a proliferation of demands on Ger-
man skills and resources, I believe that the
image of Germany portrayed by the little
donkey is, in 1964, grossly inaccui-ate. Ger-
many is now strong, both politically and eco-
nomically. Perhaps we in the United States
have come to realize the implications of this
sooner than you, because we have come to know
how strength is measured in today's world. As
a consequence we know how urgently the
strength of Germany is needed.

You have been remarkably successful in
rapidly rebuilding, within a democratic frame-
work, a nation which is economically much
stronger than Germany has ever been before.
It is, therefore, natural that the free nations
look increasingly to the Federal Republic to
assume a greater role in this or that — ofttimes
to Germans seemingly remote — part of the
world. The reputation "made in Germany"
was not destroyed by Hitler in spite of his best
efforts. In Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
in Eastern Europe the reputation of your skills,
your energy, and your progress is very high.
Many wish to take advantage of the experience
which has contributed so importantly to your
own success.

A specific case in point is the recent appeal
of the United States to its allies, in support of
the Government of South Viet-Nam, to render
appropriate assistance in stemming the tide of

Communist aggression in that country. There
are those in Germany who say, "Viet-Nam is
far away. Why does it concern us ? Why was
this call directed to us?" One answer, of
course, is that the request went to all of our
allies, of wliich 17, including the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, have already responded favor-
ably. Basically, however, those who pose such
questions fail to realize that the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany is, according to many indices,
the second strongest nation in the free world.
If the world struggle against communism is to
succeed, this great strength is needed, not just
in protecting Germany's own borders but wher-
ever freedom is in jeopardy.

There is wide support in Germany for a for-
ward strategy in the defense of the NATO area.
The defense of freedom in today's world re-
quires a truly forward strategy. This entails
increasing contributions, in formerly remote
areas like Viet-Nam and central Africa, from
countries which, like Germany, have only re-
cently acquired the ability to contribute. The
contribution need not, in every case, be a mili-
tary one. Indeed, our Government did not sug-
gest that Germany send military forces to South
Viet-Nam.

Freedom is, however, indivisible; what hap-
pens in the Mekong Valley can have an impor-
tant bearing on what happens in Berlin. Ag-
gression anywhere must be made so expensive
that those tempted to indulge in it will see the
folly of their course. It is when those who have
the greatest stake in freedom band together to
defend it — wherever and whenever required —
that we move toward our common goal.

Sometimes it is urged that Germany's recent
past makes it unwise for Germany to assume
roles outside its borders. I see no reason why
Germany should indefinitely remain the captive
of the unfavorable aspects of its history. We
in our country recognize that Germany is today
a new Germany. Wliy should not Germans?

Gei-many, indeed, has many advantages when
it comes to dealing with problems affecting the
new countries of Africa and Asia. Through the
early loss of colonies, Germany has largely
escaped involvement in the history of colonial-
ism in the 20th century. This minimizes sus-
picion of German motives in taking an active
interest in these regions. To this advantage

AUGUST 3, 1964

139

must be added those of German teclinical and
industrial know-liow, which enjoys worldwide
respect, as do German scientific and cultural
attainments.

Nobody particularly enjoys being impor-
tuned, but a man who has become rich soon finds
that he has in the process become the target of
increased demands. Those who have been con-
tributing feel that he should be willing to help
support the commimity which has made it pos-
sible for him to prosper. His standing in the
community will depend on his response. This
is somewhat the position in which Germany
now finds itself.

That is why the United States, which is a
strong but heavily laden beast of burden itself,
looks increasingly to Germany for help. We
have, moreover, foimd a very welcome response.
The Federal Republic is doing much through-
out the world, not just because we have asked it
to but on its own initiative, in a clear recog-
nition of where German interests and respon-
sibilities lie. One example is the Federal
Republic's foreign aid program, which is sub-
stantial and is one of the few national programs,
apart from our own, which is on a worldwide —
not an area-of-interest — ^basis.

The United States, in the discharge of its
own worldwide responsibilities, devotes a sub-
stantial percentage cf its gross national product
to foreign economic and military assistance. It
is our hope that the Federal Republic, with its
growing resources, will increasingly make a
comparable effort. If the developing world
looks to Germany for more, it is in reality a
flattering tribute to your strength and to your
rapidly increasing influence ui the world.

The Future of Europe

We have been pleased in recent years to ob-
serve a steady development of closer relations
between Germany and its neighbors in Western
Europe — a development signalized, in the case
of France, by the conclusion of the Franco-
German treaty in 1963. Through a highly suc-
cessful series of official visits, Chancellor [Lud-
wig] Erhard in recent months has further
extended and strengthened fTiendly ties with
other states of Europe. The Queen of England
will visit Germany in the spring of 1965.

It is not, in our view, any contradiction for
European states to wish to draw closer together
and, at the same time, to maintain or enhance
their close relations with the United States. We
do not consider it necessary for Germany to
have to make a choice. The two go hand in
hand. Yet I have often been asked for our
views about this matter, and especially about
the close relations between France and Ger-
many. Not long ago I replied tliat if Franco-
Gennan rapprochement had not already been
achieved, I would, as U.S. Ambassador to Ger-
many, be doing my best to promote it as an im-
portant goal in the common interest.

Lideed, the establislunent of close ties be-
tween France and Germany has been a major
objective of postwar U.S. foreign policy. It is
axiomatic to every student of liistory that the
elimination of Franco-German rivalry is a nec-
essary precondition to the establislunent of a
soimd European and world order. This ha-s
been the conviction of Europe's outstanding
postwar statesmen — men like Konrad Ade-
nauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman.
Realization that Franco-German enmity must
disappear in turn brought agreement on the
need for a unified Europe as the best means of
acliieving this objective permanently.

The United States strongly supported the
establislmient of tlie European Coal and Steel
Community, the European Defense Community,
the European Economic Community, and
EURATOM. We are convinced that a united
Europe can be built on the heritage its nations
share. Though there have been setbacks on the
road to European political integration, the
progress toward European economic integration
in the last 10 years has been truly impressive.

That progress has certainly not been achieved
despite, or at the expense of, a close Franco-
German relationship. The one could not have
taken place in the absence of the other. Franco-
German cooperation is a reality. The United
States welcomes it as long as it does not exclude
wider cooperation. The Atlantic community
can, I believe, be increasingly strengthened by
the friendship and close relationship between
these two great countries, each of which has
much to offer to the other — and to Europe.

It is true that the signature of the Franco-

140

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

German treaty came as a surprise to many
Americans, particularly in the light of what
had already been accomplished without a for-
mal treaty. However, the preamble appended
to the treaty by the German Bimdestag at the
time of ratification fully answered any ques-
tions we might have had, with a clear statement
that the treaty would be used to further the
common goals of the Western alliance. Fears
which had been expressed that the Franco-Ger-
man treaty might be used as a vehicle for a
new power alinement in Western Europe have so
far proved groundless. It is in the interest not
only of Germany and France but of Europe and
the whole Atlantic community that they remain
so.

I am persuaded that the United States and
the Federal Republic are in accord on the major
objectives that we are seeking in Europe: the
strengthening of free Europe, the economic and
political integration of Europe, and the solidi-
fication of the Atlantic partnership. The
United States would naturally view with con-
cern the development of an inward-oriented
Europe or a fragmented Europe, either of which
would be inconsistent with these objectives. I
am confident, however, that the goal our Gov-
ernments have sought so long will prevail.

The Berlin Pass Issue

From the beginning of the talks on the issu-
ance of passes to residents of West Berlin for
visits to the Soviet sector over the last Christ-
mas season, there have been conflicting reports
on the attitude of the United States. It was
then frequently stated in the press that the
United States had reservations about the proto-
col signed with the East Germans. More re-
cently, I have seen reports that we favor pass
arrangements and are pressing the Federal au-
thorities to extend such negotiating contacts
with the East German regime.

I appreciate the deep emotional interest
aroused among most Germans by the pass nego-
tiations. How could it be otherwise when the
outcome determines whether families who have
been cruelly separated can see one another again,
and whether the artificial division between one
part of Berlin and the other will be lessened,
even if only temporarily and in one direction?

This issue reaches to the very heart of the Ger-
man people. I think it is worth while, there-
fore, now that talks are going on in Berlin on
a further pass arrangement, to describe briefly
the American attitude.

A basic factor is that we consider the present
division of Germany and of Berlin completely
unjustified and unnecessary — a threat to sta-
bility in central Europe. We welcome steps,
once decided upon by the authorities in Bonn
and Berlin, that can reduce this artificial divi-
sion and bring Germans on one side of the wall
closer to Germans on the other. We welcomed
the massive visitation of West Berlin residents
to East Berlin arranged over the holidays be-
cause of the humanitarian benefits it brought.

We all know, however, that there is more to
the pass question than the joy of family re-
unions. The visitations have involved discus-
sions between representatives of the Berlin
Senat and representatives of the East German
regime. This circumstance poses complex and
sensitive problems, some of which are of direct
concern to the United States and others of more
concern to the Germans. The United States,
France, and Great Britain are responsible for
the security of West Berlin. We have, and
must retain, ultimate authority in the city in
order to meet this responsibility.

It is from this point of view that we must
examine any pass arrangement. Would it un-
dermine the rights and responsibilities of the
Allies? Would it tend to alter the status of
Berlin to that of a "third German state," in-
dependent of Allied control and stripped of
political and economic ties with the Federal
Republic? These would be our concerns.

If the Senat were negotiating independently,
without our concuiTence, on a matter which
could vitally affect Allied interests, Allied au-
thority could be jeopardized. We therefore
need to know what is going on at every stage of
the negotiations, and we expect that our concur-
rence will be obtained before positions are taken.
The United States gave its concuiTence to the
pass arrangement at Christmas because we con-
sidered that Allied interests wei-e not adversely
affected — neither the security of Berlin, nor its
status, nor the position of the Allies.

The discussions with the East Germans, and

AUGUST 3, 1964

141

their signature at the bottom of protocols, do,
however, raise other far-reacliing problems, in-
cluding the question of the extent to -n-hich the
Federal Kepublic and the Senat should deal
with representatives of the Ulbricht regime.
This we have felt from the beginning is an area
in wliich German authorities should define the
German interest. The United States has not
taken sides nor sought to influence the respon-
sible authorities one way or the other. I can
assure you that we are not disinterested in this
matter, but in its present context and dmiensions
we shall continue to regard it as primarily a
question of concern to the proper German
authorities.

Reunification

The announcement last month by the Soviet
Govermnent that it had concluded a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the so-called
"German Democratic Kepublic" has again called
attention to the Soviet responsibility for the
continued enforced division of Germany. This
is of course a world problem and not just a
tragedy for the German people, since, as Chan-
cellor Erhard and President Jolmson stated in
their communique of June 13,^ there can be no
stability in Europe so long as Germany is di-
vided. This statement should be a clear answer
to those who accuse the United States of believ-
ing that a detente (a word so vague that I wish
it could be elimmated from our vocabularies)
exists or can exist imtil this cause of tension is
removed from central Europe.

The United States has endeavored again and
again since 1945 to make its position clear on
the issue of German reunification. After the
Soviet Union annoimced its treaty, we joined
with the French and British to state our policy
in a tripartite declaration.^ We declared that :

... a just and peaceful settlement of outstanding
problems in Europe is essential to the establishment
of lasting peace and security. Such a settlement re-
quires the application in the whole of Germany of the
principle of self-determination. . . . The exercise of
self-determination, which should lead to the reunifica-
tion of Germany in peace and freedom, remains a
fundamental objective of the Three Governments.

' For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 992.
• For text, see ibid., July 13, 1964, p. 44.

The Three Governments are convinced that such a
settlement should be sought as soon as possible.

This is our policy, and although the Soviets
have different views, they are fully aware of
our own.

After the Berlin crisis of 1961, wliich oc-
curred shortly after the Kennedy administra-
tion came into office, discussions among the
Allies and exploratory talks with the Soviets
largely engaged the attention of the President,
Secretary of State, and other high officials for
more than a year. Hours of probing conversa-
tions with the Soviets revealed absolutely no
basis for serious negotiations.

We have never ceased to be ready to discuss
the German question with the Soviet Union
when we thought that there was anything to be
gained, and we remain ready to do so, in coordi-
nation with our German, French, and British
allies. American consultations with the Fed-
eral Reptiblic in this area have been exception-
ally close, and, as you know, they are
continuing.

All of us who are concerned with German
reimification, however, have a responsibility to
ourselves, and a right to ask others, to maintain
a strict intellectual honesty about this very vital
problem. All of us know the same facts. All of
us, Germans as well as Americans, know the
same difficulties. It is very easy to say, "Why
haven't you done something about reunifica-
tion?" It is more difficult to say, particularly
in the light of the fact that both Americans and
Germans have renounced the use of force in
achieving reunification, what in fact we should
do about it right now. It is important that we
continually reaffirm our objective by words and
declarations, but we should be aware of the
limitations of such words alone in moving the
Soviets. Until the opportunity for a real for-
ward movement toward reunification arises, let
us not create doubts and conflicts between our-
selves by unwarranted accusations of inactivity.

In the meantime, the United States camiot
defer efforts to solve other important problems
which clearlj' do not affect the prospects for
German reunification. Tlie German question
is at this time unfortunately characterized by
a face-to-face confrontation in which political
positions are fixed. By contrast, affairs in some

142

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

other parts of the world are in a greater state
of flux, and our policy must deal with that fact.
The intrusion of Communist force in Southeast
Asia and the infiltration of Africa and Latin
America are both active and not merely poten-
tial cliallenges. Meeting them poses demand-
ing tasks for us and the free world. At the
same time, the imperatives of the nuclear age
require that we make every effort, while there
is still time, to halt the piling up of ever more
destructive forms of armament. The fact that
we make these efforts does not mean that our
interest in European security, or German re-
unification, is in any way diminished.

"VVliat is the significance of the new Soviet
treaty for the German question? On the face
of it the treaty does not portend serious alarums
or excursions. It may indeed reflect a more
sober Soviet policy on Berlin, essentially de-
flated of its aggressiveness of the period from
1958 to 1963. "We must, of course, remain
watchful of actions that may be taken in its
aftermath.

The treaty is, however, largely declaratory
in nature, and I cannot perceive that it has al-
tered any essential element in the German situa-
tion. To suppose it to be a new departure in
Soviet policy, designed to perpetuate the status
quo, is to attribute to the signing of a treaty
the kind of binding legal significance it would
have only in the free world. The Soviet Union
has consistently been committed to the division
of Germany. The treaty reafEmis the commit-
ment, but it is nothing new.

"We should not be unduly pessimistic about
the prospects for German reunification. The
present state of affairs will not persist indefi-
nitely. Gloomy predictions that it will persist
do not take into account the present course and
tempo of the historical process, or the "Western
capabilities of influencing them. Tlie most
striking trends in Europe and within the Com-
munist bloc were scarcely visible 10 years ago.
"Western Europe is completing the transition
into a unified economic complex of great poten-
tial prosperity and attractive power to the East.
The East European countries are slowly reac-
quiring a measure of national independence.
Increasingly they are turning toward contacts
with "Western Europe and the United States.

The Soviets doubtless still consider their pres-
ence in East Germany important to their secu-
rity and a lever to use to "solve" the German
question on their terms. However, the Zone
today would seem to be a wasting asset to the
Soviets — an anachronism alongside an Eastern
Europe where barriers are coming down.
"Wlien tliis becomes more apparent, the con-
tinued occupation could lose its essential raison
d'etre to the Soviets.

"We of the "West should in the future be able
to exert increasing influence over developments
in Eastern Europe. If we further our contacts
there and promote the reentry of its states into
peaceful and friendly interchange with us, we
will progressively dismantle the mistaken prem-
ises on which the division of Germany is based.
If we cannot immediately solve the problem,
we can at least attempt to change its context.
This is what President Jolinson meant in liis
Lexington speech of May 23,'' when he stated
that wise development of relations with the na-
tions of East Europe would speed reunification.
This is a sound proposition, and it is far-
sighted of your statesmen that they are putting
it into practice so vigorously.

U.S.-German Relations

In closing, I would like to refer not just to
specific issues in current relations between our
two countries but to the very nature of these
relations. I feel that this is often a matter of
some concern in Germany, as it is in "Wasliing-
ton. The complaint is heard here that German
foreign policy is merely the tail which is
dragged along behind the kite of American for-
eign policy. You are certainly aware that on
the other side of the Atlantic the opposite com-
plaint is sometimes heard. Bonn is said to exer-
cise a veto in critical areas of U.S. foreign
policy.

I believe that both of these complaints are
wrong; however, they point to the need to de-
fine cai-efully the nature of the partnership be-
tween the Federal Republic and the United
States. The problem, as it might be phrased,
is whether each partner should freely tell the
other what he thinks should be done. My an-

* Ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 922.

AUGUST 3, 1964

143

swer is yes, provided the partnership is founded,
as our concept of it is, on the thesis that the
United States and Germany are both sovereign
nations, bound to consider, but free to reject,
the advice of the other.

The United States bears heavy responsibilities
in the free world. If we falter, freedom fal-
ters. Suppose, for example, that we had not
taken the initiative in bringing aid to embattled
Viet-Nam and in urging others to support the
government there against Communist encroach-
ment. The Federal Republic might be spared
approaches from Wasliington to explain the
urgency of the need for help, but who, in the
long nm, would be the gainer? Not the Fed-
eral Republic; certainly not the other free na-
tions — only the Communists. I believe that the
German people will increasingly realize this
as they continue to assume tlie share of world
responsibilities commensurate to their growing
strength.

We, as your partner, welcome steps in this
direction. There will be areas in which you
yourselves will wish to take the initiative. In
such cases we will look to you to advise us what
should be done. Neither of us has a veto or a
mandate to dictate the other's actions. As part-
ners in a common endeavor of gigantic propor-
tions, and of staggering implications as to the
future of the free world, we shall, however, need
increasingly to pool our ideas, our resources,
and our determinations, in pursuit of our com-
mon goals. This, I think, is the tme nature of
our relationship.

I commend my words to the spirit of imder-
standing of Tuetzing.

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Argentine Republic, Norberto Miguel Barrene-
chea, presented liis credentials to President
Johnson on July 9. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release 321 dated
July 9.

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil,
Juracy Montenegro Magalhaes, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on July 9.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 322 dated July 9.

Philippines

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of the Philippines, Oscar Ledesma, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson on j
July 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release 320 dated July 9.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks
on Desalting of Sea Water

JOINT MEMORANDUM

White House press release dated July 16

Representatives of tlie United Stat&s and the
Soviet Union met in Washington from July 14
to 16, as previously agreed,^ to explore the pos-
sibility of mutually beneficial scientific coopera-
tion in the development of methods for desalt-
ing sea water, including the possible use of nu-
clear energy. The United States delegation
was headed by Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Tech-
nology. The Soviet delegation was headed by
A. I. Churin, Chief Administrator of the State
Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work.

The representatives of the two countries dis-
cussed the problems of desalting brackish water
as well as sea water. Tliey reviewed the pres-
ent activities and plans of the two countries
relating to the scientific problems of desalting
water, to technological methods for desalting on
both small and very large scales, and on the
development of reactors suitable for use in
large-scale desalting processes.

' For a statement by President Johnson, see Bulletin
of July 13, 1964, p. CO.

144

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Certain possible forms of cooperation were
identified during the meeting :

1. The conduct, by each country, of scientific
researcli and development work in the field of
desalting sea water, including the utilization
of atomic energy, in accordance to its own pro-
gram and at its owa expense.

2. The exchange, on a reciprocal basis, of
scientific reports, including results obtained
from work on pilot and demonstration plants.

3. The arrangement, by mutual agreement, of
symposia to discuss specific scientific and tech-
nical problems and projects.

4. The arrangement, on a reciprocal basis,
of visits by teclinical experts to appropriate
installations and laboratories.

During their current visit here the Soviet
delegation will be given the opportunity to visit
several installations and laboratories engaged
in developing desalting processes, as well as to
related atomic energy installations in the U.S.A.
The Soviet delegation has likewise invited an
American delegation to visit similar mstalla-
tions and laboratories in the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of both delegations, the discus-
sions of these problems were carried on in a
business-like manner and were useful for both
sides.

As a result of the discussions the delegations
will report to their governments on the best
means of cooperation in the field of desalting
sea water, including utilization of atomic
energy.

U.S., U.S.S.R. REPRESENTATIVES

The White House announced on July 16 that
the following representatives of the United
States and the Soviet Union would attend the
meeting on scientific cooperation in the desalt-
ing of sea water, which was held at Washington,
D.C., July 14^16.

V.8. Representatives

Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department of
the Interior

Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commis-
sion

James T. Ramey, Member, Atomic Energy Commission

John Calhoun, Assistant Secretary for Research and
Development, Department of the Interior

Ragnar Kollefson, Director, Office of International Sci-
entific Affairs, Department of State

C. F. MacGowan, Director, Office of Saline Water,
Department of the Interior.

U.S.S.R. Representatives

Aleksandr I. Churin, Chief Administrator of State
Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work

Vitaliy A. Klyachko, Head of Laboratory, All Union
Scientific Research Institute on Water Supply,
Canals and Hydroelectric Construction

Aleksandr I. Leypunskiy, Scientific Manager, Physical
Power Institute

Nikolay M. Sinev, Deputy Chairman, State Committee
on Atomic Energy

Georgiy M. Solovyev, Deputy Chief of Administration
of State Committees on Scientific Research Coordina-
tion

Mikhail P. Vukalovich, Assistant Director of Moscow
Power Institute

Fedor P. Zaostrovskiy, Director, Scientific Research
Institute, Chemical Machinery Construction.

U.S. Protests to Soviet Union
on Incident involving U.S. Vessel

Depariment Statement^

The Charge of the Embassy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgi M. Kor-
nienko, was called to the Department this after-
noon [July 17] to receive an oral protest from
Acting Secretary for European Affairs Richard
Davis regarding an incident involving the
United States merchant vessel SS Sister Ka-
tingo in the Black Sea.

Mr. Kornienko was informed that according
to the report of the ship's master, Artur H.
Fertig of Wading [River], Long Island, a dis-
pute over stevedoring charges had been referred
to the Ministry of the Merchant Marine in
Moscow, where it was confirmed that differences
would be arbitrated and the ship would be per-
mitted to sail after discharging its cargo of
wheat. Local port authorities at Novorossisk,
however, refused clearance and the ship sailed
July 15 without permission. A Soviet patrol

^ Read to news correspondents on July 17 by Robert
J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, Office of News.

AUGUST 3, 1964

145

vessel followed the SS Sister Katingo outside
the harbor, and, when the ship failed to heed
an order to return to port, a Soviet naval craft
fired three rounds across the bow of the ship.
The SS Shter Katingo was then boarded,
searched, and the captain ordered to pay a fine
and sign papers, after wliicli the ship was per-
mitted to continue its voyage to Istanbul.

In making the protest, Mr. Davis noted that,
while under international law Soviet authorities
may have been within strictly legal rights in
the particular circumstances to pursue, board,
and search this vessel, the methods employed by
the Soviet authorities were excessive and clearly
outside the norms of acceptable behavior.

The Soviet authorities were requested to un-
dertake measures to prevent a repetition of this
incident.

ANZUS Reviews Areas of
Interest in Asia and Pacific

Mutual

Following is the text of a comrrvu/nique of the
13th ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and
United States Security Treaty) Coimcil meet-
ing, which was held at Washington July 17-18.

Press release 330 dated July 18

The ANZUS Council held its annual meeting
in Washington on July 17 and 18, 1964. The
Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime
Minister and Minister for External Affairs,
represented New Zealand; the Honorable Paul
Hasluck, ilinister for External Affairs, repre-
sented Australia; and the Honorable Dean
Rusk, Secretary of State, represented the United
States.

The Council expressed satisfaction that the
pattern of regular annual meetings has been re-
stored. It agreed that these meetings not only
provide opportunity for full, frank exchanges
of views on problems of common interests but
serve to emphasize the importance of this defen-
sive alliance of three nations which share a com-
mon heritage, common institutions, common
values, and common purposes.

The Council noted with grave concern the
continuing threat to peace in South and South-

east Asia and the Pacific region posed by the
aggressive North Vietnamese and Communist
Chinese regimes. It reaffirmed the determina-
tion expressed at its 1963 meeting ^ to cooperate
with otlier countries equally determined to pre-
serve their national independence by promoting
the peace and security of the area.

The Council gave particular attention to the
aggression against South Viet-Nam which the
Communist regime in Hanoi organized and is
directing, supplying and supporting in flagrant
violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and
1962. It agi'eed that the defeat of this aggres-
sion is necessary not only to the security of
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but
as a demonstration that Communist expansion
by such tactics will not be allowed to succeed.
The Council noted with satisfaction that the
members of ANZUS had increased their assist-
ance to the Republic of Viet-Nam since the
SEATO Council Meeting in April.^ It agreed
that they should remain prepared, if necessary,
to take further concrete steps within their re-
spective capabilities to assure the defeat of this
aggression. It expressed the hope that other
nations who prize freedom will join in assist-
ing the valiant people of South Viet-Nam to
preserve their freedom. It affirmed its confi-
dence that programs of political and adminis-
trative reform, military action, pacification, and
economic and social development instituted by
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam,
together with the continued backing of the Free
World, will enable the people of South Viet-
Nam to achieve the peace, stability and better
life which presently are denied to them by the
Communist aggressors.

The Council also devoted special attention to
the threat to the security and stability of Laos
brought about by Communist violations of the
Geneva Agreements of 1962. It expressed its
grave concern over the continued presence and
intervention in Laos of North Vietnamese forces
and over recent Pathet Lao attacks against Gov-
ernment forces. It called for full compliance

' For text of a communique, see BuiiETiN of June 24,
1963, V. 967.

"For texts of a statement by Secretary Rusk and a
final communique, see Hid., May 4, 1964, p. 690.

146

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTXLLETIN'

with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements,
including full support for Prime Minister Sou-
vanna Phouma's demand that the Communist
forces withdraw from the areas which they
recently seized in violation of the Agreements.

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in which
all three nations are also members and to which
they renewed pledges of support at the recent
Manila Council Meeting, continues to make an
essential contribution to the peace and stability
of the region.

The Council reaffirmed its continuing sup-
port for Malaysia. It noted that two of its
members are now giving aid, both in forces and
in material, to assist Malaysian defense. Tlie
Council recognized that in this region, as else-
where, force must not be employed in violation
of the territorial integrity of other nations. It
expressed the hope that the independence of
Malaysia would be respected and that peaceful
relationships with neighboring states would be
restored so that all could contribute to the
peace, security and advancement of Southeast
Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

The Council noted with gratification the sub-
stantial economic and social progress of most
of the free nations of the Western Pacific, whose
continuing advance contrasts sharply with the
economic failures of the Communist states. It
applauded the increasing cooperation between
the more developed and the less developed na-
tions of the Western Pacific in promoting
economic and social progress and political
stability.

The Council reviewed the efforts being made
to move toward a total ban on nuclear testing
and toward general disarmament and expressed
the resolve of the members of ANZUS to con-
tinue working individually and collectively to-
ward these goals. It noted with regret that
some governments have not yet signed the
nuclear test ban treaty negotiated last year.

Eeaffirming the value to the members of the
regular, high level exchange of views afforded
by the meetings of the ANZUS Council, the
Ministers stated their intention to meet again
within approximately one year, at a place to be
determined.

U.S. Sends Message to Conference
of African Leaders at Cairo

Following is the text of a message from Presi-
dent Johnson to President Gamal Ahdel Nas-
ser of the United Arab Republic to be con-
veyed to the Conference of African Heads of
State, which convened at Cairo on July 17.

White House press release dated July 17

July 17, 1964

I extend, through you, to the representatives
of the nations and peoples of Africa gathered
in Cairo, the friendly greetings of the Govern-
ment and people of the United States of
America.

As the Heads of State and of Government
meet again one year after creating the Organiza-
tion of African Unity at that historic Addis
Ababa gathering, we are impressed with the
striking progress which has been made toward
African unity in peace and freedom.

Africa through the OAU has shown its ca-
pacity to deal through peaceful means with
African problems, including such disputes as
have arisen among its members. In this way,
within the framework of the United Nations
Charter, African nations are making a vital
contribution to world peace.

As the OAU moves into its second year of
activity, it will face new challenges which, I am
sure, it will meet in the same spirit it has al-
ready demonstrated in the momentous year just
past. I and the people of the United States
extend to this Organization our best wishes for
continued progress toward your high auns.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Satellite Coniinvmlcations — 1964. Hearings before a
subcommittee of the House Government Operations
Committee. Parti. March 17-May 28, 19(54. 657pp.

Foreign Assistance 1964. Hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on S. 26.59, S. 2660, and

AUGUST 3, 1904

147

H.R. 11380, bills relating to foreign assistance.
March 31-June 23, 1964. 628 pp.

Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
Amended, the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955,
as Amended, and the EURATOM Cooperation Act of
1958, as Amended. Reports to accompany H.R.
11832 and S. 2963. H. Rept. 1525 and S. Rept. 1128.
June 30, 1964. 13 pp. each.

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to ac-
company S. 944. H. Rept. 1532. July 1, 1964. 4 pp.

Rio Grande Canalization Project. Report to accom-
pany S. 2370. H. Rept. 1533. July 1, 19C4. 6 pp.

Emergency International Flood Control Works, Lower
Colorado River. Report to accompany H.R. 7419.
H. Rept. 1534. July 1, 1964. 12 pp.

International Commission for Supervision and Control
in Laos. Report to accompany S. 1627. H. Rept.
1535. July 1, 1964. 9 pp.

The Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 1964.
Report to accompany H.R. 10485. H. Rept. 1536.
July 1, 1964. 20 pp.

Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To
Authorize Additional Appropriations, and for Other
Purposes. Report to accompany H.R. 11754. H.
Rept. 1537. July 1, 1964. 3 pp.

Report of the Fourth Conference of the Mexico-United
States Interparliamentary Group, by Hon. Robert

N. C. Nix, chairman of Representatives delegation.
H. Rept. 1531. July 1, 1964. 26 pp.

Meat Imports — Wild Birds and Wild Animals. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 1839. S. Rept. 1167. July
2, 1964. 11 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services made by its Subcommittee on the Operation
of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment, for the period December 1, 1961, through No-
vember 30, 1962. S. Rept. 1171. July 8, 1964. 15
pp.

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parlia-
mentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res.
339. July 8, 1964. 2 pp.

Protecting Heads of Foreign States and Other Desig-
nated Officials. Report to accompany S. 1917. S.
Rept. 1179. July 9, 1964. 9 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Individual views of
Senator Morse on H.R. 11380. S. Rept 1188, Part
2. July 10, 1964. 25 pp.

The Growing Strength of the Soviet Merchant Fleet.
Prepared for the use of the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee at the request of Chairman Warren G. Mag-
nuson by the Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress. July 10, 1964. 46 pp. [Com-
mittee print].

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^

In Session as of July 31, 1964

Conference of the IS-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

6th Round of GATT Tarifif Negotiations Geneva May 4, 1964-

Scheduled August Through October 1964

8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Vina del Mar, Chile Aug. 1-

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by London Aug. 4-

Sea: 6th Session.

ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok Aug. 4-

International Seed Testing Association : Executive Commit- Edinburgh Aug. 10-

tee Meeting.

17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 16-

U.N. Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law . . . Lom6, Togo Aug. 17-

UNESCO International Conference on Youth Grenoble Aug. 23-

South Pacific Commission: 2d Regional Education Seminar . Noumea, New Caledonia . . . Aug. 24-

3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Geneva Aug. 31-

Atomic Energy.

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 16, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations :
BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Proi)erty ; EGA, Economic
Commission for Africa ; ECAFE. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ; ECE, Economic Commission
for Europe ; FAO. Food and Agriculture Organization ; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ;
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council ;
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICBM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration;
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU,
International Telecommunication Union; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations;
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization;
WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

148

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

PAHO Directing Council: 15th Mooting Mexico, D. F Aug. 31-

ICAO Legal Committee : 15th Session Montreal Sept. 1-

3d FAO liegional Conference for Africa Tananarive Sept. 3-

ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Geneva Sept. 7-

Costs.

ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference Madrid Sept. 7-

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 10th Session . Washington . . . ^ Sept. 8-

IMCO Special Assembly Washington Sept. 8-

Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Ottawa Sept. 9-

Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.

IAEA General Conference : Sth Regular Session Vienna Sept. 1 5-

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary New York Sept. 15-

Questions.

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 9th Session London Sept. 16-

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Manila Sept. 17-

Session.

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session Geneva Sept. 21-

2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Beirut Sept. 21-

Health.

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry. Geneva Sept. 21-

IMCO CouncQ: 13th Session London Sept. 22-

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session . . Rome Sept. 22-

FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session . . . Auckland Sept. 22-

BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee Geneva Sept. 28-

U.N. ECE Coal Committee Geneva Sept. 28-

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session . . Geneva Sept. 28-

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Copenhagen Sept. 28-

Meeting.

International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly. . Caracas Sept. 30-

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting. San Jos6 September

Inter- American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Montevideo September

Directing Council.

lA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports . . Lima September

Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Santiago September

Education.

ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage Paris September

Techniques.

UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference . . . Cairo September

UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session Paris September

UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Toulouse September

Survey Methods.

U.N. EGA Industrial Coordination Conference on West Africa Bamako, Mali Oct. 5-

U.N. ECA Subregional Industries Committee: 2d Ad Hoc Tangier Oct. 5-

Meeting.

U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 22d Session Geneva Oct. 5-

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcom- London Oct. 5-

mittee on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain.

ILO Technical Meeting Concerning Certain Aspects of Labor- Geneva Oct. 5-

Management Relations Within Undertakings.

FAO Council: 43d Session Rome Oct. 5-

ILO Meeting of Experts on Welfare Facilities for Industrial Geneva Oct. 5-

Workers.

UNESCO Executive Board: 68th Session Paris Oct. 5-

12th General Conference on Weights and Measures .... Paris Oct. 6-

5th Inter-American Indian Conference Quito Oct. 10-

BIRPI Committee of Experts on International Classification Geneva Oct. 12-

of Industrial Designs.

U.N. ECE Governmental Experts on Rational Utilization of Geneva Oct. 12-

Water Resources.

FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 9th Session . . Curitiba, Brazil Oct. 13-

South Pacific Commission: 26th Session Noumea, New Caledonia . . . Oct. 14-

FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 11th Session Kuala Lumpur Oct. 16-

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 12th Geneva Oct. 19-

Plenary Assembly.

U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners . . . Bangkok Oct. 19-

U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 13th Geneva Oct. 19-

Session.

7th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East Cairo Oct. 19-

UNESCO General Conference: 13th Session Paris Oct. 20-

4th FAO Regional Conference for Europe Salzburg Oct. 26-

U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: Sth Session Bangkok Oct. 27-

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Pro- Geneva October

gram for Refugees: 12th Session.

1st FAO Regional Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa . . Nairobi October

AUGUST 3, 1964

14»

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Adopts Final Act

Representatives of 118 nations took part in
a United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development which met at Geneva from March
23 to June 16. Under Secretary of State
George W. Ball headed the U.S. delegation}
Followi/ng are the preamble and recommenda-
tions contained in the Final Act which was
adopted on Jwne 16?

PREAMBLE

The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development has adopted this Final Act.

Section I. Backgroujjt)

1. The States participating in the Conference
are determined to achieve the high purposes em-
bodied in the United Nations Charter "to pro-
mote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom" ; ^ to seek a better and
more effective system of international economic
co-operation, whereby the division of the world
into areas of poverty and plenty may be ban-
ished and prosperity achieved by all; and to
find ways by which the hiunan and material
resources of the world may be harnessed for
the abolition of poverty everywhere. In an
age when scientific progress has put imprece-

^ For a statement by Mr. Ball before the Conference
on Mar. 25 and a message from President Johnson, see
Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

' In addition to the portion printed here, the Final
Act (U.N. doc. E/CONF.46/L.28) includes: Annex A,
showing the results of the voting; Annex B, contain-
ing observations of delegations ; and Annex C, messages
from heads of state and other communications.

' Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.
[Footnote in original.]

dented abundance vtdthin man's reach, it is es-
sential that the flows of world trade should
help to eliminate the wide economic disparities
among nations. The international community
must combine its efforts to ensure that all coun-
tries—regardless of size, of wealth, of economic
and social system — enjoy the benefits of inter-
national trade for their economic development
and social progress.

2. Recognizing that imiversal peace and pros-
perity are closely linked and that the economic
growth of the developing coimtries will also
contribute to the economic growth of the devel-
oped countries, realizing the danger of a widen-
ing gulf in living standards between peoples,
and convinced of the benefits of international co-
operation with a view to helping the developing
countries to reach a higher standard of life,
the States signatories of this Final Act are re-
solved, in a sense of human solidarity, "to em-
ploy international machmery for the promotion
of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples." '

3. In endorsing the decision to convene the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the General Assembly of the
United Nations was motivated by certain basic
considerations. Economic and social progress
throughout the world depends in large measure
on a steady expansion in international trade.
Tlie extensive development of equitable and
mutually advantageous international trade cre-
ates a good basis for the establishment of
neighbourly relations between States, helps to
strengthen peace and an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and understanding among nations,
and promotes higher living standards and more
rapid economic progress in all countries of the

150

DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

world. Finally, the accelerated economic de-
velopment of the developing countries depends
largely on a substantial increase in their share
in international trade.

4. The task of development, which implies a
complex of structural changes in the economic
and social environment in which men live, is for
the benefit of the people as a whole. The devel-
oping countries are already engaged in a deter-
mined attempt to achieve, by their own efforts,
a breakthrough into self-sustaining economic
growth which furthers social progress. These
efforts must continue and be enlarged. Eco-
nomic and social progress should go together.
If privilege, extremes of wealth and poverty,
and social injustice persist, then the goal of
development is lost. If the social and cultural
dimension of development is ignored, economic
advance alone can bring no abiding benefit.

5. The developing countries recognize that
they have the primary responsibility to raise
the living standards of their peoples; but their
national exertions to this end will be greatly
impaired if not supplemented and strengthened
by constructive international action based on
respect for national sovereignty. An essential
element of such action is that international
policies in the field of trade and development
should result in a modified international divi-
sion of labour which is more rational and equi-
table and is accompanied by the necessary
adjustments m world production and trade.
The resultant increase in productivity and pur-
chasing power of the developing countries will
contribute to the economic growth of the indus-
trialized coimtries as well, and thus become a
means to world-wide prosperity.

6. The issues before the Conference have been
at once challenging and urgent. "While there are
varying degrees of development, the joint in-
come of the developing countries, with two-
thirds of the world's population, is not much
more than one-tenth of that of the industrialized
covmtries. Moreover, the dramatic increase in
the population of the developing countries
multiplies the difficulties they face in assuring
to their peoples even the simplest elements of a
decent human life. The aim must be to create
jointly new trade and new wealth, so as to share
a common prosperity, and thereby avoid the

waste and other unfavourable consequences of
closed paths to development. The international
community is called upon to join in a construc-
tive and universal policy of co-operation for
trade and development which will further
economic progress tliroughout the world.

7. The designation of the nineteen-sixties as
the United Nations Development Decade was a
recognition of deep world-wide concern with
the urgent necessity of raising the standard of
living of the developing countries and an ear-
nest of the resolve of the United Nations, work-
ing together, to accomplish this task. Wide
concern has been expressed regarding the in-
adequacy of the Decade's objective of a mini-
mum rate of growth of aggi-egate national
income of 5 per cent per annimi by 1970. To
attain even this rate of growth it is essential
that measures and action be taken by both the
developing and the developed countries, includ-
ing measures to raise the level and accelerate
the rate of growth of earnings of the developing
countries from trade, as a means of helping
them to overcome their persistent external im-
balance.

8. The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development was convened in order to pro-
vide, by means of international co-operation,
appropriate solutions to the problems of world
trade in the interest of all peoples and partic-
ularly to the urgent trade and development
problems of the developing countries. In a
period when their need for imports of develop-
ment goods and for technical knowledge has
been increasing, developing coimtries have been
faced with a situation in which their export
earnings and capacity to import goods and
services have been inadequate. The growth in
import requirements has not been matched by a
commensurate expansion in export earnings.
The resultant trade gap, which gold and foreign
exchange reserves have been inadequate to
bridge, has had to be filled very largely by capi-
tal imports. This in itself cannot provide a
complete or permanent solution, and indeed the
servicing of external debts and the outgoings
on other "invisible" items themselves present
severe burdens for developing countries. More-
over, the terms of trade have operated to the
disadvantage of the developing countries. In

AUGUST 3, 1964

151

recent years many developing countries have
been faced with declining prices for their ex-
ports of primary commodities at a time when
prices of tlieir imports of manufactured goods,
particularly capital equipment, have increased.
This, together with the heavy dependence of
individual developing countries on primary
commodity exports has reduced their capacity
to import. Unless these and other unfavourable
trends are changed in the near future, the ef-
forts of the developing coimtries to develop,
diversify and industrialize their economies will
be seriously hampered.

9. Deeply sensible of the urgency of the prob-
lems with which the Conference has dealt, the
States participating in this Conference, taking
note of the recommendations of the Conference,
are determined to do their utmost to lay the
foundations of a better world economic order.

Section II. CoNSTmjTiosr and Proceedings

10. Wlien, in the third week of December
1961, the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions designated the current decade as "the
United Nations Development Decade", it also
asked the Secretary-General to consult members
on the advisability of convening an interna-
tional conference on international trade prob-
lems. Both resolutions (1Y07 (XVI) and 1710
(XVI)) sprang from the growing conviction
that the economic aims of the Charter would
best be furthered by a bold new programme of
international economic co-operation ; and it was
in this conviction that the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development had its
origin.

11. The Cairo Conference on the Problems
of Economic Development held in July 1962
issued a Declaration (which was later welcomed
by the United Nations General Assembly in
resolution 1820 (XVII) ) strongly recommend-
ing the early convening of an international con-
ference on trade and development. The idea of
such a Conference having gained ground, the
General Assembly of the United Nations en-
dorsed, on 8 December 1962 (resolution 1785
(XVII) ), the decision taken in August 1962 by
the Economic and Social Council (resolution
917 (XXXIV)) whereby the Council resolved
to convene this Conference and to establish a

Preparatory Committee to consider its agenda.
The Secretary-General was requested to invite
all States Members of the United Nations and
members of the specialized agencies and of the
International Atomic Energy Agency to take
part in the Conference. The deliberation of the
Preparatory Committee's three sessions * were
fruitful : a detailed provisional agenda for the
Conference was drawn up, and a report was
prepared defining the problems to be examined
and suggesting the directions in which possible
solutions might be sought. At the Committee's
request the secretariats of the United Nations
family of organizations prepared many studies
of the issues involved. Tlie Secretary-General
of the Conference sought the advice of govern-
ments and scholars, and prepared liis report en-
titled Towards a New Trade Policy for Devel-
opment [E/CONF.46/3]. Member States, in-
dividually and in groups, also submitted useful 1
fjroposals and suggestions to the Conference. ■

12. On 18 July 1963, the Economic and Social
Council decided that the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development should be
held in Geneva, beginning on 23 March 1964
and continuing until 15 June 1964, and approved
the provisional agenda drawn up by the Pre-
paratory Committee (Economic and Social
Council resolution 963 (XXXVI)). By its
resolution of 11 November 1963 the General
Assembly (resolution 1897 (XVIII)) noted
the work of the Preparatory Conmiittee and of
the Secretary-General of the Conference, wel-
comed the Joint Declaration of the Developing
Countries,^ and invited States to give serious
consideration to it. The regional economic com-

' The first session of the Preparatory Committee took
place at United Nations Headquarters from 22 January
to 5 February 1963 ; the second was held at the Euro-
pean Office of the United Nations, at Geneva, from
21 May to 29 June 1963; and the third session was
at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 15 February
1964. At its third session, the Committee decided that
Informal closed meetings should be held prior to the
opening of the Conference. These pre-Conference meet-
ings were held in Geneva from 18 to 23 March 1964.
[Footnote in original.]

' The Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries
was adopted at the same time as, and forms an annex
to, the General Assembly resolution In question.
[Footnote In original.]

152

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

missions and other regional organizations con-
sidered questions of trade and development and
adopted important resolutions and declara-
tions.* Meanwhile, as the practical arrange-
ments for the Conference went forward, the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council were the principal forum for debates
expressing the high hopes vested by the peoples
of the United Nations in the Conference as a
potential turning point in international co-
operation in the field of trade and development.
13. Aware of these high hopes, the represent-
atives of the following one hundred and twenty ^
States gathered in Geneva from 23 March to
16 June 1964 to take part in the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development :

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma,
Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam-
bodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,
Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Congo ( Leopold ville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cvprus,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federal Re-
public of Germany, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Slesico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Paki.stan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Re-
public of Viet-Nam, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tanganyika,' Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United

" See the reports relating to the Brasilia meeting
convened by the Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica (E/CONF.46/60 and 71) and the Alta Gracia
Charter approved by the Special Latin American Co-
ordinating Committee of the Organization of American
States, (E/CONF.46/100) the resolutions adopted by
the Economic Commission for Africa (E/CONF.4G/S2)
and by the Economic and Social Commission of African
Unity at Niamey (E/CONP.46/107), the resolution of
the Economic Commission for Europe (E/CONF.46/46)
and the Teheran resolutions of the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East (E/CONF.46/87).
[Footnote in original.]

' Somalia and Western Samoa were invited, but did
not attend the Conference. [Footnote in original.]

Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper
Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zanzibar.'

14. The inaugural address was delivered by
the President of Switzerland; the Secretary-
General of the United Nations also addressed
the Conference; and messages of goodwill and
good wishes for success were received from nu-
merous Heads of State. After adopting its
agenda and electing its officers — a President,
twenty-seven Vice-Presidents, and a Rap-
porteur — the Conference was addressed by its
President and heard, over a period of twelve
days, an address by its Secretary-General and
a series of policy statements by heads of dele-
gations, most of whom were Cabinet ministers,
and by representatives of a number of inter-
governmental economic organizations. Five
Committees of the whole were established for
detailed study of the items of the agenda. The
General Committee of the Conference comprised
the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Rap-
porteur, and the Chairmen of the five Commit-
tees. The Conference also established a Draft-
ing Conmiittee for the Final Act.

15. With a view to reaching agreement on
the issues before the Conference, many infonnal
meetings were held and important consultations
conducted among groups of delegations. A no-
table feature of the Conference was the fact that
the delegations of the States signatories of the
Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries
co-ordinated their work with a view to enhanc-
ing general co-operation among all delegations.

SECTiO]sr III. Findings

Tlie Conference has been guided by the fol-
lowing findings :

16. World trade has expanded substantially
in recent years : the value of world exports has
more than doubled since 1950. The principal
impulse for this growth has been provided by
the overall expansion of the world economy,
aided by national and international action as
well as enormous scientific and technical prog-

' On 27 May 1964, as a result of the formation of the
United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the
delegations of Tanganyika and Zanzibar were recon-
stituted as a unified delegation. [Footnote in original.]

AUGUST 3, 1964
738-657—64-

153

ress and the social and economic changes in the
world.

17. The countries of the worid did not share
proportionately in this expansion of interna-
tional trade. While exports of developing
countries rose from $19.2 billion to $28.9 billion
between 1950 and 1962, that is by 50 per cent, the
expansion of exports from these countries pro-
ceeded at an appreciably lower rate than that
of developed coimtries. As a result, the share
of developing countries in world exports de-
clined steadily from nearly one-third in 1950
to only slightly more than one-fifth in 1962.
Concurrently, the developed market economies
increased their share from three-fifths to two-
thirds, and the centrally planned economies
from 8 per cent to 13 per cent. One of the rea-
sons for the decline in the rate of expansion of
world exports from 8.4 per cent per annum in
the early fifties to rather less than 5 per cent in
the early sixties is the inability of the develop-
ing countries to attain a higher rate of export
expansion.

18. Tlie difficulties experienced by developing
countries in increasing the sale of their products
at remunerative prices in the markets of most
of the liighly industrialized countries have
placed a limit on the extent to which they can
purchase capital goods and machinery from the
developed countries, which in turn has contrib-
uted to a slower rate of expansion of world
trade than would have been the case if the de-
veloping countries had been enabled to increase
their exports at a faster rate. Further, measures
having discriminatory or protectionist effects
applied by certain developed coimtries have
hampered the development of the trade of devel-
oping countries and of world trade in general.

19. The difficulties of developing countries
were aggravated by deterioration in their terms
of trade during the period 1950-1962. The
slower growth in the quantity of exports of the
developing countries and the adverse movement
of their terms of trade were largely the reflexion
of the present commodity composition of their
trade, consisting, as it does, predominantly of
the exchange of primary product exports for
manufactured imports whose relative positions
in world markets have undergone significant
changes. World trade in manufactures has

been increasing at an annual rate more than
twice that of trade in primary products. Fac-
tors contributing to the sluggishness of primary
product exports include the low response of
consumer demand for food to increases in
income of consumers in the advanced coimtries
where incomes and food consumption are al-
ready high, the widespread use of substitutes
and synthetics, and the increasing output of
primary products in advanced countries which
has been the result both of domestic policies,
in many cases reinforced by protective barriers,
as well as a general increase in productivity
stemming from technological progress. These
long-term trends have been accentuated by
short-term fluctuations in export earnings
caused by economic recessions and other factors.

20. The deterioration in terms of trade and
the sluggish expansion of the export quantiun
of developing countries occurred at a time when
their need for imported supplies to speed up
the pace of their economic development sharply
increased. There is a close link between the
rate of economic growth and the available sup-
ply of investment goods. The developing
countries require a specific increase in the sup-
ply of investment goods in order to achieve the
Development Decade target. Since their do-
mestic capacity to produce these goods is
limited, a substantial amount of such goods has
to be imported. Imports have to be financed
through export receipts and inflows of capital
from abroad. Thus, the resources required for
a higher rate of growth would obviously have
to be sought in additional export earnings and
an increase in the net inflow of long-term public
and private funds.

21. The developing countries' surplus of ex-
ports over imports in 1950 became a deficit in
1962 of $2.3 billion, while their net payments
for investment income and other invisibles were
about $3.3 billion around 1960. This deficit
was covered by the provision of aid and other
capital flows. However, the gap between the
import requirements of developing countries
and their export earnings has been widening.
According to United Nations Secretariat esti-
mates, this gap could be of the order of $20
billion a year in 1970, on the basis of a 5 per cent
per annum rate of growth set as the target for

154

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the United Nations Development Decade, as-
suming no change in the trends of the fifties
upon which tliese estimates were based.

22. In recent years, the developing countries
have been turning increasingly to economic and
social planning as the most effective means for
accelerating their growth. Their plans, poli-
cies and institutions are designed to achieve the
transformation of tlieir economic and social
structures and to provide for maximum sav-
ing, investment and output to a pre-determined
order of priorities for a targeted rate of g^o^vth.
However realistic the plans drawn up by the
developing coimtries may be, their realization
is hindered bj' the instability of international
markets for primary products and by condi-
tions restricting the access of primary commodi-
ties and semi-manufactures and manufactures
to the markets of the developed countries. The
continued dependence on the export of a single
product or a few commodities whose prices
have been declining in the past has made the
realization of the development plans all the
more difficult. The realization of economic and
social development plans of the developing
countries necessitates an appropriate change
in the present structure of international trade
in such a way as to afford them the opportunity
of earning adequate and stable supplies of for-
eign exchange.

23. An overwhelming proportion — over two-
thirds — of the import and export trade of de-
veloping countries is with the developed market
economies. Between 1950 and 1962 the total
exports of the developed market economies to
the developing countries increased by 98 per
cent, rising from $10,650 million to $21,060 mil-
lion. This contrasted with the exports of the
developing countries to the developed market
coimtries, which increased by 56 per cent, rising
from $13,220 million to $20,660 million.

24. The reason for the failure of exports of
the developing countries to the developed
market economies to expand at a faster rat« can
be attributed to a number of factors. Refer-
ence has already been made in the foregoing
passages to contributory factors of a general
character. Specific policies include price-
support programmes, customs duties and in-
ternal taxes and fiscal charges imposed on the

consumption of tropical products, export sub-
sidies on commodities of interest to developing
countries, and liigher levels of tariffs imposed
on processed products relative to those applied
to such products when exported in their natural
form. Tliese factors have contributed to the
sluggishness of the demand for the products
of developing countries and in the case of some
commodities to tlie accumulation of surpluses
which have tended to exercise a depressing ef-
fect on world commodity prices. There is need
for the elimination of these obstacles by na-
tional and international action designed to im-
prove access and expand market opportunities
for the exports of primary products, semi-
manufactures and manufactures of developing
countries in order to increase their export
earnings.

25. Owing to its relatively recent origin,
trade between developing countries and the cen-
trally planned economies is so far limited to a
relatively small number of countries and con-
stitutes a small part of the trade turnover of
developing coimtries as a whole. In 1962,
$1,630 million, or 5.6 per cent of the total ex-
ports of the developing countries went to the
centrally planned economies, wliile imports
from the latter into the former totalled $2,150
million and formed 7.3 per cent of total imports.
This trade has, however, shown a tendency to
increase rapidly in recent years. Thus, in
terms of value, the exports of the countries with
centrally planned economies to developing
coimtries increased from $405 million to $2,150
million, or by 430 per cent, between 1950 and
1962, while exports from the developing coun-
tries to the countries with centrally planned
economies showed an expansion from $610 mil-
lion to $1,630 million, or by 167 per cent, over
the same period.

26. Tlie expansion in trade has been secured
mainly through medium and long-term bilateral
trade agreements which stipulate the quantity
and/or the value of goods to be exchanged. In
spite of the rapidity of growth in trade between
the two groups of countries, there is still con-
siderable scope for expansion, which can be
secured through the removal of certain obstacles
which prevent a faster rate of growth and by
further positive measures taken by the inter-

AUGUST 3, 1964

155

ested countries. The major obstacles arise from
the fact that trade relations have not yet been
established between many developing countries
and centrally planned economies, the need, in
some cases, due to the bilateral trade system, for
individual developing countries to balance their
trade with individual centrally planned econo-
mies, and the paucity of knowledge among pub-
lic and private organizations of trade partners
in some developing countries about the products
and the trade policies and practices of the cen-
trally planned economies.

27. These problems can be solved and trade
between countries of the two groups expanded
at a more rapid rate through the establishment
of normal trade relations between centrally
planned economies and a larger number of de-
veloping countries; through the gi-anting by
countri&s with centrally planned economies to
developing countries, within the framework of
the former's foreign trade system, of special
advantages conducive to the promotion of such
trade; through the adoption by the centrally
planned economies, within the framework of
their long-term plans, of appropriate measures
to secure the diversification and a proportion-
ately increasing growth of their imports of
primary, semi-manufactured and manufac-
tured products from developed countries; and
through increased utilization by centrally plan-
ned economies, in addition to bilateral aiTange-
ments, of multilateral trade and payment meth-
ods, when these are considered to be of mutual
advantage to all partners in the trade. Develop-
ing countries for their part should accord the
countries with centrally planned economies con-
ditions for trade not inferior to those granted
nomially to the developed market economy
countries.

28. Trade between the centrally planned
countries and the developed market economies
has grown rapidly in recent years. The full
potentiality of this trade, however, has not been
realized because of administrative, economic
and trade policy obstacles. Efforts to discover
means to solve these problems and increase trade
to the mutual benefit of all partners concerned
and thus achieve levels of trade commensurate
with the apparent possibilities, have shown in-

creasing progress in recent years.

29. Continuation of such efforts in whatever
available forums, including within the frame-
work of the future institutional arrangements
recommended by the Conference, should result
in progressively greater levels of trade between
countries having different economic and social
systems. It is recognized that such a develop-
ment would be in the interest of world trade as
a whole.

30. While trade between developed countries
is increasing and while the share of such ex-
changes in total world trade is also rising, the
level of trade between developing countries is
very low and its importance in world trade has
been decreasing. The expansion of inter and
intra-regional trade is important to developing
countries insofar as it provides them with wider
markets for their products and enables them to
further diversify their trade and to save on
scarce foreign exchange. Hence, the establish-
ment of closer and broader trade ties between
developing countries is necessary.

Seciion IV. Reasons and Considerations

In drawing up its recommendations, the Con-
ference has been guided by the following es-
sential reasons and considerations :

(31) Tlie development of equitable and
mutually advantageous trade can promote
higher standards of living, full employment and
rapid economic progress in all countries of the
world.

(32) The fundamental problems of develop-
ing countries are well identified and what is
now required is a universal readiness to act and
generally to adopt practical measures aimed at
increasing exports and export earnings of
developing countries and accelerating their
economic development.

(33) At the root of the foreign trade diffi-
culties facing the developing countries and other
countries highly dependent on a narrow range
of primary commodities are the slow rate of
gi'owth of demand for their exports of primary
commodities, accounting for 90 per cent of their
exports, the increasing participation of de-
veloped countries in world trade in primary
commodities, and the deterioration in the terms

156

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUULETIN

of trade of developing countries from 1950 to
1962.

(34) During the period of structural read-
justments of their economies, the developing
countries will remain heavily dependent on
commodity exports to meet growing import
needs involved in the process of industrializa-
tion and diversification.

(35) Because of the outstanding importance
of commodity trade for economic development,
particularly of the developing coimtries and the
special difficulties affecting trade in primary
commodities, it is important and urgent that
action bo taken over a wide front and on dy-
namic and comprehensive lines so as to conduct
a concerted attack on international commodity
problems.

(36) There is accordingly a need for a delib-
erate effort on the part of all industrialized
countries to remedy the adverse tendencies in
question.

(37) This comprehensive action should in-
clude international commodity arrangements as
one of the means of stimulating a dynamic and
steady growth of the real export earnings of the
developing countries so as to provide them with
expanding resources for their economic and
social development and of securing overall
stabilization in primary commodity markets.
It is also necessary to accelerate the removal of
existing obstacles and to forestall the creation
of new obstacles to commodity trade.

(38) Compensatory financing is an appro-
priate solution to meet the serious residual
problems caused by short-term fluctuations in
the prices of and earnings from primary com-
modity exports. For residual long-term prob-
lems financial solutions should be sought.

(39) The developing coimtries should not
rely merely on the expansion of traditional ex-
ports of primary products and raw materials.
Promotion of industries with an export poten-
tial in developing coimtries is essential. Diver-
sification and expansion of exports of manu-
factured and semi-manufactured goods are
among the important means to assist the devel-
oping countries to achieve in time a balance
in their external accounts.

(40) The establisliment and expansion in de-
veloping countries of industries with an export

potential call for a whole series of inter-related
measures and action on the part of tlie develop-
ing countries within the framework of overall
planning, as well as by developed countries and
appropriate international organizations.

(41) The role of the public sector in the eco-
nomic development of developing coimtries is
recognized, as well as the role of private capital,
domestic and foreign.

(42) Developing countries face obstacles and
difficulties in marketing their manufactures and
semi-manufactures in the developed countries.
In order to facilitate the industrial exports of
developing countries, their products should have
freer access particularly to the markets of the
developed countries, but also to the markets of
other developing countries.

(43) Easier access to markets should be pro-
vided not only for existing and traditional ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures,
but also for a wider range of products in order
to improve the opportunities for the establish-
ment in the developing countries of a wider
range of industries more technically evolved
and producing industrial goods of higher de-
grees of complexity.

(44) Substantial imports of manufactures
and semi-manufactures may involve some re-
adjustment in the industrial structures of the
developed countries.

(45) A lowering of trade barriers would im-
prove the competitive position of the develop-
ing countries relative to that of domestic
producers in the market of each developed coun-
try, but it would not improve their competitive
position in that market in relation to ex-
ports from other developed countries. Special
measures in favour of exports from devel-
oping countries would be needed to bring
about the required expansion of such exports.

(46) In addition to the expansion of exports
of manufactures to developed countries, the ex-
pansion of such trade among the developing
countries themselves would contribute towards
solving the dilemma posed by the economic and
technological requirements of modern industry
on the one hand and the limited domestic
markets of individual countries on the other.
Because of the many forms which economic co-
operation might have in various cases and the

AUGUST 3, 1964

157

problems which they might cause, it is con-
sidered that a certain flexibility is needed.

(47) The Conference has considered the gen-
eral targets on which the international com-
munity might focus in dealing with the problems
of development through trade and international
co-operation. A number of principles and
criteria aimed at providing constructive guide-
lines for policies in the various areas of inter-
national financial and technical co-operation
have been formulated. The major questions
identified are as follows :

(a) The need for higher growth rates for
developing countries; measures to be taken by
developed and developing countries, including
measures to increase foreign exchange avail-
abilities.

(b) Guide-lines for international financial
and teclinical co-operation; temis and condi-
tions of aid, and the relation of trade and aid to
maintain the continuity of sound development
plans or programmes.

(d) The need and means for increasing the
flow of financial resources to the developing
coimtries.

(e) Compensatory finance; supplementary
financial measures.

(f) Aspects of shipping and all other in-
visible items.

(g) The need for periodic reviews.

(48) There is wide recognition of the im-
portance and gravity of the problem posed by
the financing of development, in all its many
complex aspects, and this recognition should
form the basis for continuing reviews and action
in this field.

(49 ) There is also recognition of the need for
greater and more systematic effoits by all par-
ties involved, with a fair division of responsi-
bilities among developed and developing
coimtries, in order to engender the necessary
co-operative efforts at the national, regional and
international levels.

(50) More specifically, there is wide agree-
ment in some key areas which, though necessar-
ily limited in scope, constituted forward steps.
These areas include measures for accelerated
growth in developing countries and increase in
foreign exchange availabilities; guide-lines for

international financial and teclmical co-opera-
tion, compensatory financing and supplemen-
tary financial measures, and for dealing with
external debt problems; and some aspects of
shipping in relation to the trade of developing
countries.

(51) FinaUy, in some other areas, there is
also agreement that specific measures which
have been proposed shoulji be given further
consideration or should be studied by the ap-
propriate international organizations.

52. In approaching the problem of institu-
tional arrangements, the Conference has taken
into account the fact tliat sustained efforts are
necessary to raise the standards of living in all
countries and to accelerate the economic growth
of developing countries, and that international
trade is an important instrument for economic
development. The Conference has provided a
imique opportunity to make a comprehensive
review of the problems of trade and of trade
in relation to economic development, particu-
larly those problems affecting the developing
countries. It has recognized that adequate and
effectively functioning organizational arrange-
ments are essential if the full contribution of
international trade to the accelerated growth
of the developing countries is to be successfully
realized through the formulation and imple-
mentation of the necessary policies.

53. To this end, the Conference has ex-
amined the operation of existing international
institutions and has recognized both their con-
tributions and their limitations in dealing with
all the problems of trade and related problems
of development. It believes that participating
governments should make the most effective use
of institutions and arrangements to which they
are or may become parties, and is convinced, at
the same time, that there should be a further
review of both the present and the proposed
institutional arrangements, in the light of the
experience of their work and activities. The
Conference has further taken note of the wide-
spread desire among developing coimtries for
a comprehensive trade organization, and has
recognized that further institutional arrange-
ments are necessary in order to continue the
work initiated by this Conference and to imple-
ment its recommendations and conclusions.

158

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

SECOND PART— A CONSOLIDATION OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE '

Section I. Principles

1. The Conference has recommended the fol-
lowing General Principles to govern interna-
tional trade relations and trade policies condu-
cive to development :

General Prineiple One

Economic relations between comitries, includ-
ing trade relations, shall be based on respect for
the principle of sovereign equality of states,
self-determination of peoples, and non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of other countries.

General Principle Two

There shall be no discrimination on the basis
of differences in socio-economic systems. Adap-
tation of trading methods shall be consistent
with this principle.

General Principle Three

Every country has the sovereign right freely
to trade with other countries, and freely to dis-
pose of its natural resources in the interest of
the economic development and well-being of its
own people.

General Principle Four

Economic development and social progress
should be the common concern of the whole
international community and should by increas-
ing economic prosperity and well-being help
strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation
among nations. Accordingly, all countries
pledge themselves to pursue internal and exter-
nal economic policies designed to accelerate eco-
nomic growth throughout the world, and in
particular to help promote in developing coun-
tries a rate of growth consistent with the need
to bring about substantial and steady increase
in average income in order to narrow the gap
between the standard of living in developing
countries and that in the developed countries.

General Principle Five

National and international economic policies

'The results of the voting on the Principles and
Recoimnendations adopted by the Conference appear In
Annex A. Observations and reservations appear in
Annex B. [Footnote in original.]

should be directed towards the attainment of an
inteiTiational division of labour in harmony
with the needs and interests of developing coun-
tries in particular and of the world as a whole.
Developed countries should assist the develop-
ing countries in their efforts to sj^eed up their
economic and social progress, should co-operate
in measures taken by developing comitries for
diversifying their economies and should encour-
age appropriate adjustments in their own econ-
omies to this end.

General Principle Six

International trade is one of the most impor-
tant factors in economic development. It
should be governed by such rules as are con-
sistent with the attainment of economic and
social progress and should not be hampered by
measures incompatible therewith. All coim-
tries should co-operate in creating conditions
of mternational trade conducive in particular
to the achievement of a rapid increase in the
export earnings of developing countries and in
general to the promotion of an expansion and
diversification of trade between aU countries,
whether at similar levels of development, at
different levels of development, or having dif-
ferent economic and social systems.

General Principle Seven

The expansion and diversification of inter-
national trade depends upon increasing access
to markets, and upon remunerative prices for
the exports of primary products. Developed
coimtries shall progressively reduce and, in ap-
propriate cases, eliminate barriers and other
restrictions that hmder trade and consumption
of products of particular interest to developing
countries and take positive measures such as
will create and increase markets for the exports
of developing countries. All coimtries should
co-operate through suitable international ar-
rangements on an orderly basis in implement-
ing measures designed to increase and stabilize
commodity export earnings, particularly of de-
veloping countries, at equitable and remmiera-
tive prices and to maintain a mutually accept-
able relationship between the prices of
manufactured goods and those of primary
products.

159

General Principle Eight

International trade should be conducted to
mutual advantage on the basis of the most
favoured nation treatment and should be free
from measures detrimental to the trading in-
terests of other countries. However, developed
comitries should grant concessions to all devel-
oping countries and extend to developing coun-
tries all concessions they grant to one another
and should not in granting these or other con-
cessions, require any concessions in return from
developing countries. New preferential con-
cessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be
made to developing countries as a whole and
such preferences should not be extended to de-
veloped countries. Developing countries need
not extend to developed countries preferential
treatment in operation amongst them. Special
preferences at present enjoyed by certain de-
veloping countries in certain developed coun-
tries should be regarded as transitional and
subject to progressive reduction. They should
be eliminated as and when effective interna-
tional measures guaranteeing at least equivalent
advantages to the countries concerned come into
operation.

General Principle Nine

Developed countries participating in regional
economic groupings should do their utmost to
ensure that their economic integration does not
cause injury to, or otherwise adversely affect,
the expansion of their imports from third
countries, and in particular from developing
coimtries, either individually or collectively.

General Principle Ten

Regional economic groupings, integration or
other forms of economic co-operation should be
promoted among developing comitries as a
means of expanding their intra-regional and
extra-regional trade and encouraging their eco-
nomic growth and their industrial and agri-
cultural diversification with due regard to the
special features of development of the various
countries concerned as well as their economic
and social systems. It will be necessary to en-
sure that such co-operation makes an effective
contribution to the economic development of
these countries, and does not inhibit the eco-

nomic development of other developing coun-
tries outside such groupings.

General Principle Eleven

International institutions and developed
countries should provide an increasing net
flow of international financial, technical and
economic assistance to support and reinforce,
by supplementing the export earnings of de-
veloping countries, the efforts made by them to
accelerate their economic growth through diver-
sification, industrialization and increase of
productivity on the basis of their national
policies, plans and programmes of economic
development. Such assistance, should not be
subject to any political or military conditions.
This assistance whatever its form and from
whatever source, including foreign public and
private loans and capital, should flow to de-
veloping countries on terms fully in keeping
with their trade and development needs. In-
ternational financial and monetary policies
should be designed to take full account of the
trade and development needs of developing
countries.

General Principle Twelve

All countries recognize that a significant por-
tion of resources released in successive stages
as a result of the conclusion of an agreement on
general and complete disannament imder effec-
tive international control should be allocated to
the promotion of economic development in de-
veloping coimtries.

General Principle Thirteen

The Conference decided to include, as a
separate part of the Principles adopted by the
Conference, the Principles relating to transit
trade of land-locked countries set forth below.

General Principle Fourteen

Complete decolonization in compliance with
the United Nations Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples and the liquidation of the remnants of
colonialism in all its forms is a necessary condi-
tion for economic development and the exercise
of sovereign rights over natural resources.

General Principle Fifteen

The adoption of international policies and
measures for the economic development of tlie

160

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

developing countries shall take into account the
individual characteristics and different stages
of development of the developing countries,
special attention being paid to the less developed
among them, as an effective means of ensuring
sustained growth with equitable opportunity
for each developing country.

2. The Conference has recommended a
number of Special Principles to govern interna-
tional trade relations and trade policies con-
ducive to development (see Annex A.I.I.) .

3. The Conference has adopted the following
recommendation on Principles relating to tran-
sit trade of land-locked countries :

The Conference,

Having regard to the various aspects of the
problem of transit trade of land-locked States,

Considering that for the promotion of the
economic development of the land-locked
States, it is essential to provide facilities to
enable them to overcome the effects of their
land-locked position on their trade.

Adopts the following principles together with
the Interpretative Note :

Principle I

The recognition of the right of each land-
locked State of free access to the sea is an essen-
tial principle for the expansion of international
trade and economic development.

Principle II

In territorial and on internal waters, vessels
flying the flag of land-locked countries should
have identical rights and enjoy treatment iden-
tical to that enjoyed by vessels flying the flag
of coastal States other than the territorial Stat«.

Principle III

In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on
equal terms with coastal States, States having
no sea coast should have free access to the sea.
To this end States situated between the sea and
a State having no sea coast shall by common
agreement with the latter and in conformity
with existing international conventions accord
to ships flying the flag of that State treatment
equal to that accorded to their own ships or to
the ships of any other State as regards access to
sea ports and the use of such ports.

Principle IV

In order to promote fully the economic de-
velopment of the land-locked countries, the said
countries should be afforded by all States, on
the basis of reciprocity, free and unrestricted
transit, in such a manner that they have free
access to regional and international trade in
all circumstances and for every type of goods.

Goods in transit should not be subject to any
customs duty.

Means of transport in transit should not be
subject to special taxes or charges higher than
those levied for the use of means of transport of
the transit country.

Principle V

The State of transit, while maintaining full
sovereignty over its territory shall have the right
to take all indispensable measures to ensure that
the exercise of the right of free and unrestricted
transit shall in no way infringe its legitimate
interests of any kind.

Principle VI

In order to accelerate the evolution of a uni-
versal approach to the solution of the special
and particular problems of trade and develop-
ment of land-locked countries in the different
geographical areas, the conclusion of regional
and other international agreements in this
regard should be encouraged by all States.

Principle VII

The facilities and special rights accorded to
land-locked countries in view of their special
geographical position are excluded from the
operation of the most-favoured-nation clause.

Principle VIII

The principles which govern the right of free
access to the sea of the land-locked State shall
in no way abrogate existing agreements between
two or more contracting parties concerning the
problems, nor shall they raise an obstacle as
regards the conclusion of such agreements in
the future, provided that the latter do not
estabish a regime which is less favourable than
or opposed to the above-mentioned provisions.

Interpretative Note
These Principles are inter-related and each

AUGUST 3, 1964

161

Principle should be construed in the context of
the otlier Principles.

4. In the light of its adoption of principles
governing international trade relations and
trade policies conducive to development, the
Conference has recognized the necessity of
achieving the broadest possible measure of
agreement at the earliest possible moment on a
set of Principles, and has recommended that
the institutional machinery proposed by the
Conference should continue efforts to that end
(see Annex A.I.3) .

Section II. International Commodity
Problems

5. In order to deal with the problems facing
the primary commodity trade of developing
countries the Conference has recommended that
the provisions outlined below should be con-
sidered as means of increasing the export earn-
ings of the developing countries by general
measures as well as by specific measures related
to individual commodities and, that, to this end,
practical steps should be taken by governments
concerned to implement at the earliest possible
date those of the following provisions which are
applicable in the light of certain considerations
(see Annex A.II.l), as solutions of the urgent
problems of developing countries.

(a) Provisions for international conunodity
arrangements with a basic objective of stimu-
lating a dynamic and steady growth and ensur-
ing reasonable predictability in the real export
earnings of the developing countries so as to
provide them with expanding resources for
their economic and social development, while
taking into accoimt the interests of consumers
in importing countries, through remunerative,
equitable and stable prices for primary com-
modities, having due regard to their import
purchasing power, assured satisfactory access
and increased imports and consumption, as well
as co-ordination of production and marketing
policies (see Annexes A.II.l and A.II.2) :

(b) Provisions for a progi'amme of measures
and actions for the removal of obstacles (tariff,
non-tariff and other) and discriminatory prac-
tices and for expansion of market opportmiities
for primary commodity exports and for in-

creases in their consumption and imports in
developed countries (see Annex A.II.l and
A.II.2).

6. The Conference has given general ap-
proval to the establishment of a commission on
commodity arrangements and policies within
the framework of the continuing institutional
machinery which will be established following
the UNCTAD. The Conference has also gen-
erally formulated terms of reference for the
new commission and requested that they be
given prompt and favourable consideration by
the continuing institutional machinery (see
Annex A.II.l).

7. The Conference has also adopted recom-
mendations for active measures to promote
market opportimities for primary commodity
exports and for increases in consumption and
imports in both developed and developing
countries. It has expressed the belief that food
aid should become an integral and continuing
part of international aid under the United
Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations. It has also rec-
ommended special action, both national and
international, to deal with cases where natural
products exported by developing countries face
competition from synthetics and other substi-
tutes. It has also recommended, infer alia, the
study and preparation of a programme of ac-
tion for the organization of commodity trade
(see Annexes A.II.3, A.II.4, A.II.5, A.II.6,
A.II.7 and A.II.8).

8. The Conference has noted the heavy de-
pendence of some developing countries on for-
eign exchange earnings from the export of
minerals and fuels, and has recommended that
the developed countries should effectively re-
duce and/or eliminate barriei-s and discrimina-
tion to the trade and consumption of those
products, particularly internal taxation, with
a view to increasing the real income of the
developing countries from the said exports. It
has also recommended action to provide the
developing countries producing minerals and
fuels with an appreciable increase in the rev-
enues which accrue to them as a result of the
export of these natural resources (see Annex
A.II.9).

162

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

SeCTIO^T III. TR-VDE IX ]\L\NTJFAC'njRES AND

Semi-Manitfactures

9. The Conference recognizes the urgent need
for the diversification and expansion of the ex-
port trade of developing countries in manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures as a means of
accelerating their economic development and
raising their standards of living. It considers
that individual and joint action by both devel-
oped and developing countries is necessary to
enable the latter to obtain increased participa-
tion conuuensurate with the needs of their de-
velopment in the growth of international trade
in manufactured and semi-manufactured
products.

10. The Conference has adopted a series of
recommendations designed to help in the pro-
motion of industries with an export potential
and in the expansion of their export trade in
manufactures and semi-manufactures. These
recommendations deal with the following
questions :

(a) Industrial development (see Annex
A.III.l) , dealing with the creation of a special-
ized agency for industrial development;

(b) Industrial branch agreements on partial
division of labour (see Annex A.III.2) ;

11. The Conference has recommended the
adoption by governments participating in the
Conference of certain guidelines in their foreign
trade and assistance policies and programmes
providing for increased access in the largest pos-
sible measure to markets for manufactured and
semi-manufactured products of interest to de-
veloping countries, so as to enable these coun-
tries to increase and diversify their exports of
these products on a stable and lasting basis.
These guidelines also include appropriate provi-
sion by developing and developed countries for
co-operation between governments and private
groups to build up export production in devel-
oping countries (see Annexes A.III.4, and
A.III.6).

12. The Conference has noted both the agree-
ment signified by all developing coimtries and

a great majority of the developed countries with
the principle of assisting the industrial develop-
ment of developing countries by the extension of
preferences in their favour and the opposition
to tliis principle expressed by some developed
countries. The Conference has recommended
that the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions establish a Committee of govermnental
representatives to consider the matter with a
view to working out the best method of imple-
menting such preferences on the basis of non-
reciprocity from the developing countries as
well as to discuss further differences of princi-
ple involved (see Annex A.III.5).

13. The Confei-ence has adopted a recommen-
dation based on the readiness of the centrally
plamied economies to take action with a view to
increasing through appropriate measures the
import of manufactures and semi-manufactures
from the developing countries (see Annex
A.III.7).

14. The Conference has adopted a recommen-
dation outlining practical measures for promo-
tion of trade in manufactures and semi-manu-
factures among developing countries (see Annex
A.III.8).

15. The Conference has also adopted a recom-
mendation calling on developed countries to
take certain measures, inter alia^ on import pro-
motion and industrial adjustment (see Annex
A.IIL6).

Section IV. Financing for an Expansion of
International Trade and Improvement of
THE Invisible Trade of Developing Coun-
tries

16. On the main issues before the Conference
on the financing of development, trade and in-
visible transactions, a large consensus of agree-
ment was reached, though complete agreement
was not always achieved.

17. The Conference recognizes the wide con-
cern expressed regarding the inadequacy of the
growth target of 5 per cent per annum set for
the United Nations Development Decade. The
Conference acknowledges the need for steps to
be taken, by both developing and developed
countries, to mobilize domestic and interna-
tional resources for accelerated growth in de-

163

veloping countries at rates even higher than
envisaged for the Development Decade where
feasible; and that the economic situations, poli-
cies and plans of individual developing coun-
tries be examined for this purpose with the
consent of the country concerned. The Con-
ference also recognizes in this connexion that
the import capacity of developing countries, re-
sulting from the combined total of export
proceeds, invisible earnings and capital inflow,
and taking into account the evolution of prices,
should rise sufficiently, and the measures taken
by the developing countries themselves should
be adequate, so as to enable those higher rates
of growth to be achieved ; and that all countries,
developed and developing, should undertake,
individually and in co-operation, such measures
as may be necessary to ensure this. The Con-
ference has also recommended that each eco-
nomically advanced country should endeavour
to supply, in the light of principles set forth in
Annex A.IV.l, financial resources to the devel-
oping countries of a minimum net amount ap-
proaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of
its national income, having regard, however, to
the special position of certain countries which
are net importers of capital (see Annex
A.IV.2). The Conference has also adopted a
recommendation providing, inter alia, that the
rate of interest of government loans to the de-
veloping countries should not normally exceed
3 per c«nt (see Annex A.IV.3) .

18. The Conference has adopted recommenda-
tions concerning terms and conditions of finan-
cial and technical co-operation provided by
industrialized countries through bilateral and
multilateral programmes of assistance to
developing countries (see Annexes A.IV.l,
A.IV.3 and A.IV.4).

19. The Conference has proposed certain
measures to deal with the increasing burden of
accumulated debt and service payments in devel-
oping countries, with the objective of facilitat-
ing, whenever warranted and under appropriate
conditions, the re-scheduling or consolidation
of debts with appropriate periods of grace and
amortization, and reasonable rates of interest
(see Annexes A.IV.l and A.IV.5). It has also
approved the possibility of deliveries on credit

of industrial equipment reimbursable in goods
(see Annex A.IV.6) .

20. Tlie Conference has adopted the follow-
ing recommendations proposing measures and
studies concerning an increase in the volume or
an improvement in the terms of financing for
developing comitries :

(a) Recommendations concerning a United
Nations Capital Development Fund (see Annex
A.IV.7), the gradual transformation of the
United Nations Special Fund (see Annex
A.IV.8) ;

(b) The provision of aid for development on
a regional basis (see Annexes A.rV.9 and
A.IV.IO) ;

(c) The promotion of the flow of public and
private capital both to the public and private
sectors in developing countries (see Annexes
A.IV.11, A.IV.12 and A.IV.13) ;

(d) Review of the use and terms of credit,
export financing and marketing, and credit in-
surance (see Annexes A.IV.14, A.IV.15 and
A.IV.16).

21. Tlie Conference has recognized further
that adverse movements in the export proceeds
of developing countries can be disruptive of
development. The Conference has, therefore,
recommended that, as regards payments diffi-
culties caused by temporary export shortfalls,
members of the International Monetary Fund
should study certain measures with a view to
liberalizing the terms of the compensatory
credit system operated by the Fund since Feb-
ruary 1963 (see Annex A.IV.17). As regards
longer-term problems, the Conference has rec-
ommended (see Annex A.IV.18) :

(a) That the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development be invited to study
the feasibility of a scheme that would provide
supplementary financial resources to developing
countries experiencing shortfalls in export
proceeds from reasonable expectations. The
relevant economic circumstances for consider-
ation would include the adverse effects of signif-
icant increases in import prices.

(b) That the continuing machinery rec-
ommended by this Conference be invited to
study and organize further discussions of con-

164

DEPAKTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

cepts and proposals for compensatory financing
put forward by the delegations of developing
countries at the Conference, taking into account
the effect of shortfalls in export earnings and
adverse movements in the terms of trade.

22. The Conference has also recommended
a study of the international monetary issues
relating to problems of trade and development
with special reference to the objectives and
decisions of this Conference (see Annex
A.IV.19) . It has also approved a recoinmenda-
tion on the participation of nationals of devel-
oping coimtries in the process of policy
fonnulation in international financial and
monetary agencies (see Annex A.IV.20).

23. The Conference has agreed on a draft text
containing a common measure of understanding
on shipping questions, and has recommended
that appropriate intergovernmental procedures,
including any committee that might be deemed
necessary, be established to promote understand-
ing and co-operation in the field of shipping,
and to study and report on its economic aspects
(see Annexes A.IV.21 and A.IV.22) .

24. The Conference has also considered and
recommended measures on insurance, tourism,
technical assistance and transfer of technology,
taking into account the need to improve the in-
visible trade of developing countries (see An-
nexes A.IV.23, A.IV.24, A.IV.25 and A.IV.26).

Section V. iNSTiTrrnoNAL ARRAisTGEittENTs

2.5. The Conference has recommended to the
United Nations General Assembly that it adopt
at its nineteenth session the following pro-
visions, inter alia :

(a) The present United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development should be estab-
lished as an organ of the General Assembly to
be convened at intervals of not more than three
years and with a membership comprising those
states which are members of the United Nations,
the specialized agencies, or the I.A.E.A.

(b) The principal functions of the Confer-
ence shall be :

( i ) To promote international trade, especially
with a view to accelerating economic de-
velopment, particularly trade between
countries at different stages of develop-

ment, between developing countries and
between countries with different systems
of economic and social organization, tak-
ing into account the functions performed
by existing international organizations;

(ii) To formulate principles and policies on
international trade and related problems
of economic development ;

(iii) To make proposals for putting the said
principles and policies into effect and to
take such other steps witliin its compe-
tence as may be relevant to this end, hav-
ing regard to differences in economic sys-
tems and stages of development ;

(iv) Generally, to review and facilitate the co-
ordination of activities of other institu-
tions within the United Nations system
in the field of international trade and re-
lated problems of economic development
and in this regard to co-operate with the
General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council in respect to the perform-
ance of their Charter responsibilities for
co-ordination;

(v) To initiate action, where appropriate, in
co-operation with the competent organs
of the United Nations for the negotiation
and adoption of multilateral legal instru-
ments in the field of trade, with due re-
gard to the adequacy of existing organs
of negotiation and without duplication of
their activities ;

(vi) To be available as a centre for harmoniz-
ing the trade and related development
policies of governments and regional eco-
nomic groupings in pursuance of Article
1 of the United Nations Charter; and

(vii) To deal with any other matters within
the scope of its competence.

(c) A permanent organ of the Conference,
to be known as the Trade and Development
Board, should be established as part of the
United Nations machinery in the economic field,
consisting of 55 members elected by the Con-
ference from among its membership, with full
regard for both equitable geographical distri-
bution and the desirability of continuing repre-
sentation for the principal trading states.

(d) For the effective discharge of its func-
tions, the Board should establish such subsidiary

AUGUST 3, 1964

165

organs as may be necessary, and in particular
three committees — on commodities, manufac-
tures, and invisibles and financing related to
trade.

(e) Each State represented on the Confer-
ence should have one vote. Subject to provi-
sions to be determined by the General Assembly
at its nineteenth session after consideration by
it of a report and proposals to be made by a
Special Committee to be appointed by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, decisions of
the Conference on matters of substance should
be taken by a two-thirds majority of the repre-
sentatives present and voting, and decisions of
the Board by simple majority. The task of the
Special Committee shall be to prepare proposals
for procedures within the continuing machinery
designed to establish a process of conciliation to
take place before voting and to provide an ade-
quate basis for the adoption of recommenda-
tions with regard to proposals of a specific
nature for action substantially affecting the
economic or financial interests of particular
countries.

(f) Arrangements should be made, in ac-
cordance with Article 101 of the Cliarter, for
the immediate ostablislmient of an adequate,
permanent and full-time secretariat within the
United Nations Secretariat for the proper serv-
icing of the Conference, the Board and its sub-
sidiary bodies.

(g) The Conference sliould review in the
light of experience the effectiveness and further
evolution of institutional arrangements with a
view to recommending such changes and im-
provements as might be necessary. To this end
it should study all relevant subjects including
matters relating to the establislmient of a com-
prehensive organization based on the entire
membership of the United Nations system of
organizations to deal with trade and with trade
in relation to development (see Annex A.V.I).

26. The Conference has also recommended
action concerning interim institutional arrange-
ments, and the terms of reference of subsidiary
organs of the Executive Council (see Annexes
A.V.2andA.V.3).

Section VI. Special Problems

27. The Conference has requested the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations to appoint

a committee of 24 members, representing land-
locked, transit and other interested states as
governmental experts and on the basis of equi-
table geograpliical distribution. The said com-
mittee is to be convened during 1964 to prepare
a new draft convention dealing with transit
trade of land-locked countries. The Confer-
ence has recommended that the new draft con-
vention be submitted for consideration and
adoption by a conference of plenipotentiaries to
be convened by the United Nations in the mid-
dle of 1965 (see Annex A.VI.l) .

28. The Conference has recommended that'
international organizations set up by the de-
veloping coimtries which are the principal
exporters of non-renewable natural products
be recognized and encouraged to enable them to
defend their interests (see Annex A.VI.2).

29. The Conference has also adopted a
recommendation concerning expanded utiliza-
tion of long-term trade agreements (see Annex
A.VI.3).

30. The Conference has recommended non-
discrimination in dealing with governmental
trading organizations in foreign trade (see
Annex A.VI.4) .

Section VII. Programme of Work

31. In addition to the Programme of Work
implied in the recommendations referred to
above, the Conference has recommended the
following:

(1) A study of the feasibility of rates of
growth higher than those which have been
experienced by most coimtries individually
during the past decade, and even higher than
those envisaged for the United Nations Devel-
opment Decade, and of measures for developing
and developed countries to take to achieve them
(see Annex A.IV.2) ;

(2) An overall economic and social survey
of the depressed areas of the developing world
and of special measures to make possible imme-
diate action to secure a substantial improvement
in the living levels of the populations of these
areas (see Annex A.\n[.5) ;

(3) A programme of work for the Commis-
sion on Commodity Arrangements and Policies,
or any equivalent body that may be established
within the continuing machinery, for the devel-

166

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

opment of appropriate guiding lines and pro-
cedures for commodity arrangements and, in
respect of commodities to which certain condi-
tions apply, for commodity negotiations and
export studies (see Annex A.II.S) ;

(4) Further studies in the commodity field
regarding promotion and marketing arrange-
ments, and measures to deal with problems of
substitution and various types of research
aiming at an expansion of market opportunities
for expoi-ts of primary commodities from de-
veloping countries (see Annexes A.II.8 and
A.II.5);

(5) Work related to the provision of eco-
nomic and teclinical assistance with a view to
expanding the export earnings of developing
countries from primary commodities, semi-
manufactures and finished manufactures (see
Annexes A.II.8, A.II.6 and A.II.5, Annexes
A.III.4 and A.III.7 and Annex A.IV.25) ;

(6) A study of methods of payment that
would assist in promoting trade among develop-
ing countries (see Annex A.II.6 and Aimex
A.III.7) ;

(7) The necessary economic and statistical
studies of world trade, with special reference
to the problems of developing coimtries (see
Annex A.VI.5 and Annex A.II.8) ;

( 8 ) The transmittal to the continuing United
Nations trade macMnery which it is proposed
to establish, for further consideration and
action, a draft recommendation submitted by
Czechoslovakia on measures for expansion of
trade between countries having difi'erent eco-
nomic and social systems (see Annex A.VI.6) ;

(9) The transmittal to the continuing trade
machinery, for further consideration and ac-
tion, of draft recommendations on the policies
and practices of regional economic groupings
among developed coimtries and on the promo-
tion of regional economic groupings among de-
veloping coimtries, submitted by a number of
developing countries (see Annex A.VI.7) ;

(10) The transmittal to one of the organs to
be set up by the Conference for further study of
part III of the proposal concerning the use of
subsidies for improving the competitive posi-
tion of manufactures and semi-manufactures of
developing countries (see report of the Second
Committee, E/COXF.46/132, para. 24) ;

(11) The elaboration of trade aspects of an
economic programme of disarmament (see
Annex A.VI.10).

Global Communications Satellite
Conference Held at Washington

Press release 328 dated July 17

An International Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence on Interim Arrangements for a Global
Commercial Communications Satellite System
will be held at Washington beginning July 21
with the U.S. Government as host. Delegations
from 18 coimtries, including the United States,
are scheduled to participate.

The subject of the conference will be two in-
terrelated proposed agreements. One is inter-
governmental and contains the organizational
principles as a basis for a global system of
satellite connnunications. The other deals with
the commercial, financial, and teclinical opera-
tions and wiU be entered into by the designated
communications entities of each country.

Wlien all issues are agreed upon, the first
agreement would be entered into by the U.S.
Government as an executive agreement. The
Communications Satellite Corporation, mider
the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, is the
designated entity of the United States and
would be the signatory of the second agreement.
Under the proposed international arrange-
ments the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion will serve as manager of the global system
on behalf of all participants in the international
joint venture.

There have been a number of conferences and
talks with regard to the formation of the global
commercial communications satellite system
during the past year. The last conferences were
held in London in June 1964.

The Washington conference will be held in
the international conference suite of the De-
partment of State. The United States has in-
vited delegations from Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Ke-
public of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.

AUGUST 3, 1964

167

All these countries have been participants in
previous conferences and talks. However, the
proposed agi-eements will be open for signature
to any country which is a member of the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union. Even if
a country does not become a capital contributor
or signatory, use of the system will be available
to all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The U.S. delegation to the conference will be
headed by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs, and will
include Leo D. Welch, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Communications
Satellite Corporation, E. William Henry,
Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission, and Richard N. Gardner, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
amended. Done at New Yorli October 26, 1956. En-
tered into force July 29, 19.57. TIAS 3873, 528-1.
Acceptance deposited: Cameroon, July 13, 1964.

CoKee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters,
New Yorl£, September 28 through November 30, 1962.
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Belgium, June 29, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964.^
Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for
marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for
signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962."
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, June 19, 1964.

' Not in force for the United States.
" Not in force.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February
8, 1949 (TIAS 20S9), for the Northwe.st Atlantic
fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at
Washington July 15, 1963."
Ratified hy the President: July 13, 1964.
Ratification deposited: United States, July 13, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October
10, 1963. TIAS .5433.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, July 17, 1964: Jor-
dan, July 10, 1964; Malaysia, July 16, 1904; Trini-
dad and Tobago, July 14, 1964.

Trade

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the
Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done
at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force No-
vember 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.
Signature: United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964.
Second proc^s-verbal extending declaration on provi-
sional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12. 1963.'
Signatures: Australia, April 21, 1964: Finland. May
8, 1961; New Zealand, April 29, 1964; Norway,
May 6, 1964 ; United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964.

BILATERAL
Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5195, 5252, 5304, 5342) , with related notes. Effected
by exchange of notes at Santiago June 30, 1964.
Entered into force June 30, 1964.

Denmark

Agreement concerning visits of the NS Savannah.
Signed at Copenhagen July 2, 1964. Entered into
force July 2, 1964.

Japan

Agreement for Japan's contributions for United States
administrative and related expenses during Japanese
fiscal year 1964 under the mutual defense assistance
agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected
by exchange of notes at Toliyo July 9, 19(54. En-
tered into force July 9, 1964.

Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo
March 22, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1964.
TIAS 5602.
Proclaimed hy the President: July 10, 19(>4.

Korea

Petroleum agreement of 1964, with agreed minute.
Signed at Seoul May 12, 1964.
Enters into force: September 3, 1964.

Sweden

Agreement concerning the visits of the NS Savannah
to Sweden. Effected by exchange of notes at Stock-
holm July 0, 1964. Entered into force July 6, 1964.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of April 7, 1964 (TIAS 5556). Effected

168

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

by exchange of notes at Tunis July 7, 1964. Entered
into force July 7, 1964.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of October 8, 19G2, as amended (TIAS
5179, 5440, 5.579). Effected by exchange of notes at
Cairo June 30, 1964. Entered into force June 30,
1964.

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes
on St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls

Press release 304 dated June 30
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Embassy at Ottawa on
June 30 exchanged notes with the Canadian De-
partment of External Affairs approving an
agreement supplementary to the January 29,
1959, memorandum of agreement respecting the
St. Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls.^ By this
exchange the two Governments have agreed to
extend the developmental period of the Seaway
for 2 years until July 1, 1966. During this
period no change in the original tariff of tolls is
proposed.

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

No. 101

The Secretary of State for External Affairs
presents his compliments to the Ambassador of
the United States of America and has the
honour to refer to an exchange of notes dated
March 9, 1959, which made binding from April
1, 1959, a memorandum of agreement dated
January 29, 1959, between the St. Lawrence Sea-
way Authority and the Saint Lawrence Sea-
way Development Corporation respecting the
Saint Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls. On
IVIay 28, 1964, the Authority and the Corpora-
tion signed a memorandum of agreement sup-
plementary to their agreement of January, 1959.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs has

^ For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and
text of the memorandum of agreement, see Bulletin
of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.

the honour to inform the Ambassador that the
memorandum of supplementary agreement, a
copy of which is attached and is incorporated
in this note, has been confirmed by the Canadian
Government.

Therefore, in accordance with the supple-
mentary agreement, the Secretary of State for
External Affairs has the honour to propose that
Clause 7 of the agreement of January, 1959, be
deleted and the following substituted therefor :

"7. That the Authority and the Corporation,
having caused the tariff to be reviewed, shall,
not later than July 1, 1966, report to their re-
spective Governments as to the sufficiency of the
authorized tolls to meet the statutory require-
ments, recommending a level of tolls related as
realistically as possible to these requirements."

If the United States Government approves,
it is suggested that tliis note and the Ambassa-
dor's reply shall constitute an agreement be-
tween the two Governments giving effect to the
foregoing proposal from July 1, 1964.

Patjl Martin
Ottawa, June 30, 1961^.

Memorandum of Supplementary Agreement

MEMORANDUM OP SUPPLEMENTARY AGREE-
MENT made this 28th day of May, one thousand nine
hundred and sixty-four.

Between : The St. Lawrence Seaway Authobitt,
(hereinafter referred to as "the Author-
ity"),

and
The Saint La ween ce Seawat Develop-
ment CoBPORATioN, (hereinafter referred
to as "the Corporation").

Whereas Clause 7 of the Memorandum of Agree-
ment made on the 29th day of January, 1959, between
the Authority and the Corporation respecting The St.
Lawrence Seaway Tariff of Tolls provides "that the
Authority and the Corporation shall, after five com-
plete seasons of navigation have elapsed, and not later
than July 1, 1964, report to their respective Govern-
ments as to the sufficiency of the authorized tolls to
meet the statutory requirements, and to cause the
Tariff to be reviewed accordingly" ;

And whereas the Authority and the Corporation, in
conducting a joint review of the sufficiency of the
tolls, are prepared to agree that :

(a) The report by the Entities will be deferred from
July 1, 1964 to July 1, 1966, and the developmental
period of the Seaway will thereby be extended by two
years and will be deemed to terminate at the end of

169

the 1966 navigation season. Accordingly no change
in tolls will be proposed at the present time.

(b) The joint review will be continued and at the
conclusion of this two-year extension, tolls proposals
will be related as realistically as possible to the finan-
cial requirements of the Seaway Entities.

Now THEBEFORE THIS MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMEN-
TARY AGREEMENT WITNESSETH THAT the parties hereto
agree to recommend to their respective Governments
that Clause 7 of the 1959 Agreement respecting tolls be
deleted and the following substituted therefor:

7. That the Authority and the Corporation, having
caused the Tariff to be reviewed, shall, not later than
July 1, 1966, report to their respective Governments
as to the sufliciency of the authorized tolls to meet the
statutory requirements, recommending a level of
tolls related as realistically as possible to these
requirements.

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AUTHORITY

R. J. Rankin

President

SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

J. H. McCann

Administrator

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

No. 387

The Ambassador of the United States of
America [W. Walton Butterworth] presents liis
compliments to the Secretaiy of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs and has the honor to refer to his
note no. 101 of June 30, 1964, proposing that
Clause 7 of the Agreement between the St. Law-
rence Seaway Development Corporation and
the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority dated
January 29, 1959, be deleted and replaced with
the provision contained in the Agreement of
May 28, 1964 between the entities which is
quoted in his note.

The terms and conditions set forth in the
above-mentioned note and the attached Mem-
orandum of Supplementary Agreement are ac-
ceptable to the Government of the United
States, which concurs in the proposal that the
note of the Secretary of State for External
Affairs and this reply shall constitute an agree-
ment between the United States and Canadian
Governments giving effect to the joint proposal

of the Corporation and the Authority from
July 1, 1964.

W. W. B.

Embassy of the United States of America
Ottawa, June 30, 196^.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, tchich
may ie obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C, 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India,
amending the agreement of November 26, 1962. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at New Delhi April 17, 1964.
Entered into force April 17, 1964. TIAS 5562. 3 pp.

50.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vlet-Nam,
amending the agreement of January 9, 1964. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Saigon April 14, 1964.
Entered into force April 14, 1964. TIAS 5563. 3 pp.
50.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C,
20520.

Releases issued prior to July 13 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 304 of Jime
30 and 320, 321, and 322 of July 9.

No. Date Subject

*325 7/15 Ryan sworn in as Ambassador to
Niger (biographic details).

♦326 7/13 U.S. participation in international
conferences.

♦327 7/16 Cook sworn in as Ambassador to

Senegal (biographic details).
328 7/17 Conference on global communica-
tions satellite system.

♦329 7/17 Kidder sworn in as Ambassador to

Cambodia (biographic details).
330 7/18 ANZUS Council communique.

*Not printed.

170

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX August S, 1964 Vol. LI, No. 1310

Africa. U.S. Sends Message to Conference of
African Leaders at Cairo (Johnson) .... 147

Argentina. Letters of Credence (Barrene-

chea) 144

Asia. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual In-
terest in Asia and Pacific (text of com-
munique) 140

Australia. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual In-
terest in Asia and Pacific (text of com-
munique) 146

Brazil. Letters of Credence (Magalhaes) . . 144

Canada. U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on
St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and
memorandum of supplementary agreement) . 169

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating

to Foreign Policy 147

Economic Affairs

United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre-
amble and recommendations) 150

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on St. Law-
rence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and memo-
randum of supplementary agreement) . . . 169

Germany. Some American Thoughts on Cur-
rent Issues (McGhee) 138

International Organizations and Conferences

ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual Interest in

Asia and Pacific (text of communique) . . 146

Calendar of International Conferences and

Meetings 148

Global Communications Satellite Conference

Held at Washington 167

United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre-
amble and recommendations) 150

New Zealand. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mu-
tual Interest In Asia and Pacific (text of com-
munique) 146

Philippines. Letters of Credence (Ledesma) . 144

Presidential Documents. U.S. Sends Message
to Conference of African Leaders at Cairo . . 147

Publications. Recent Releases 170

Science

Global Communications Satellite Conference

Held at Washington 167

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Desalting of

Sea Water (text of joint memorandum) . . 144

Treaty Information

Current Actions 168

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on St. Law-
rence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and memo-
randum of supplementary agreement) . . . 169

U.S.S.R.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Desalting of

Sea Water (text of joint memorandum) . . 144

U.S. Protests to Soviet Union on Incident Involv-
ing U.S. Vessel 145

United Nations

United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre-
amble and recommendations) 150

Name Index

Barrenechea, Norberto Miguel 144

Johnson, President 147

Ledesma, Oscar 144

Magalhaes, Juracy Montenegro 144

McGhee, George C 138

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECOED OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

9 3^

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

■M

Vol LI, No. 1311

August 10, 1964

OAS APPROVES RIO TREATY MEASURES AGAINST CASTRO REGIME

Statement hy Secretary Rv^k and Text of Final Act 174

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Remarks iy Secretary Rusk 185

AMERICAN POLICY IN AFRICA

iy J. Wayne Fredericks 197

THE NEW IMPLICATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION

ly David E. Bell 205

For index see inside hack cover

OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures
Against Castro Regime

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of
Consultation in application of the Inter-Ameri-
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held
at Washington July 21-S6 to consider Vene-
zuelan charges of Cuhan intervention and ag-
gression. Following is a statement mude hy
Secretary Rusk on July 22 and text of the Final
Act, ivhich was signed on July 26.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 333 dated July 22 ; as-delivered text

Mr. Chairman, fellow ministers: Yon have
complimented us all, Mr. Chairman [Vasco
Leitao da Cunha, Minister for Foreign Aifairs
of Brazil], in your willingness to serve as our
presiding officer, and your chairmanship gives
great satisfaction to every colleague at this
table.

Five times in as many years the foreign min-
isters of the American Republics have met to
consider situations affecting the peace of the

hemisphere arising in whole or in part from the
interventionist activities of the Castro regime.
This is a measure of the frequency with which
our regional security system has had to act to
thwart Castro's aggressive designs.

In the face of continued Cuban aggression
the time has now come to make it abimdantly
clear to the Castro regime that the American
governments in complete solidarity will no
longer tolerate its efforts to export revolution
through the classic Communist techniques of
terror and guerrilla warfare and the infiltra-
tion of arms and subversive agents.

Origins of Cuban Aggression

The pattern of Cuban aggression emerged
soon after the Castro regime came to power in
1959. You will recall the armed expeditions
which set forth from Cuban territory against
Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti
during the first 6 months of that year. When
itliis direct method of overthrowing govern-
ments failed, the Cuban government turned to

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 13U PUBLICATION 7720 AUGUST 10, 1964

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the indirect technique of subversion. From the
sending of armed hxnding parties, Castro shifted
to training in subversive teclmiques, transfer of
funds for subversive elements, dissemination of
systematic and hostile propaganda, and the
clandestine shipment of botli arms and men.
The new pattern emerged in full bloom last
year, when Castro made a major effort to dis-
rupt the democratic elections in Venezuela and,
beyond that, to destroy the democratic institu-
tions of that country.

Establishment of Communist Beachhead in Cuba

But it took some time to "tool up" this new
mechanism for indirect aggression. Mean-
while, the Castro regime embarked upon an-
other type of assault against the traditions and
principles of the American community of na-
tions: the establishment of the Communist
system in Cuba itself and the facilitation of
military intervention by an extracontinental
totalitarian power in this hemisphere.

I will not take the time here to go into all the
details, but you will recall that by mid-1960 the
construction of the apparatus of a Communist
state in Cuba was well advanced. Likewise its
ties with the Soviet bloc and with Commimist
China were firmly established. Castro signed
the first agreement with the Soviets in February
1960 and with the Red Chinese in July. Cuba
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union in May 1960 and with the satellite coun-
tries in succeeding months. On July 9, 1960,
Premier Khrushchev made his offer to support
Cuba with rocket power, and President [Os-
valdo] Dorticos replied the following day, hail-
ing, as he put it, "the message of solidarity
spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet
Union."' These words were shortly followed
by deeds in the form of shipments of large
quantities of Soviet arms. On January 2, 1961,
Castro paraded these weapons for the world to
see, and the flow of arms and the parades con-
tinued in the years since.

By August 1960, when the American foreign
ministers met in San Jose for the Seventh Meet-
ing of Consultation, Cuba clearly had become
Communist and international communism had
opened an important beachhead in the Western
Hemisphere.

The Hemisphere's initial Response

The response of the American governments
to this flagrant challenge to hemisphere security
fell short — surely we would have to say now —
of the nature of the threat. Neither at the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation in 1959 ^ nor the
Seventh Meeting in 1960 " did the foreign min-
isters act in a way to make clear to the Castro
regime that the transformation of Cuba into a
base of operations for international communism
would not be tolerated by the American
community.

Tlie task of throwing up the hemisphere's de-
fenses devolved on subsequent consultations
beginning with the Eighth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in January 1962 at Pmita del Este.'

Transformation of the Hemisphere's Attitude

The change in the hemisphere's attitude to-
ward the danger represented by a Commimist
Cuba became clearly discernible in the careful
study made by the Inter- American Peace Com-
mittee in November and December 1961. At
the request of the Government of Peru the
Committee examined, among other things, the
Castro regime's relations with the Sino-Soviet
bloc and Cuba's promotion of subversion and
revolution in other American Republics. The
Committee in its report arrived at these prin-
cipal conclusions — and let us not forget this
documentation of our hemisphere :

1. The identification of tlie Government of Cuba with
the Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialism of the
Soviet type, together with the rebuilding of the Cuban
liolitical organization on the basis of the one-party
system of government that is in accordance with that
ideology, presuppose iX)sitions that are basically antag-
onistic to the principle established in the Charter of
the Organization . . . that

The solidarity of the American States and the high
aims which are sought through it require the political
organization of those States on the basis of the effec-
tive exercise of representative democracy. . . .

3. The present connections of the Government of
Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evi-
dently incompatible with the principles and standards
that govern the regional system . . . [and] will pre-
vent the said Government from fulfilling the obliga-

' Bulletin of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.
' Ibitl.. Sept. 12, 1960, p. 39.5.
' Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

AUGUST 10, 1964

175

tions stipulated in the Charter of the Organization and
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

4. As regards the intense subversive activity in which
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in
America and the activities of the Cuban Government
... it is evident that they would constitute acts that,
within the system for the "political defense" of the
Hemisphere, have been classed as acts of "political
aggression" or "aggression of a nonmilitary character."

Based in large part on the findings of the
Peace Committee, the American governments
took their first, historic stand against commu-
nism in Cuba at the Punta del Este conference.
Many of you were there. The fundamental deci-
sions made then have been of major importance
to us since. They stimulated a new awareness of
the dangers inherent in the Communist offen-
sive in America. They gave fresh impetus to
efforts to develop internal security capabilities
to combat subversion. They helped to fulfill a
moral commitment of the Organization of
American States to defend its basic purposes
and principles against the open challenge of one
of its members. And they served to pave the
way for the swift, decisive, and equally historic
decision taken by the American governments
on October 23, 1962, which played such a sig-
nificant role in forcing the Soviet Union to
withdraw its offensive weapons systems from
Cuba.*

Cuban Intervention in Venezuela

Tlie missile crisis removed whatever doubt
remained concerning the Castro regime's status
as a pawn of the Soviet bloc. It should have
served as a warning to Castro and his followers
that the American governments were united and
firm in their resolve not to permit Cuba to be
used as a base for the expansion of communism
on this continent and that their patience was
rumiing out. Again he did not heed the warn-
ing. Instead, he redoubled his subversive of-
fensive against the hemisphere. And he chose
"Venezuela as a primary target.

I would recall that in the summer of 1963 a
Special Committee of the Council of the OAS,
imder the distinguished leadership of Ambassa-
dor [Juan Bautista] de Lavalle of Peru, com-
pleted a detailed study of the Cuban effort to

' Ihid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

promote subversion in our countries. And in
its report the Committee noted that :

Immediately after the October crisis, spokesmen of
the Cuban Government began making a series of
speeches openly advocating armed insurrection in
Latin America as a means of introducing economic ■
and social changes based on the communist system. ■
Although this does not constitute a position that is
entirely different from that hitherto held by the Castro
regime, the frequency, intensity, and origin of these
I)rovocations are such that they lead the Committee
to conclude that the Cuban regime has begun a new
phase of promoting and encouraging violent subversion
in other countries of the hemisphere.

The Committee also called attention to what
it described as "two facts that are intimately
related to the policy enunciated by the Cuban
leaders." "One of these," the Committee stated,
"is the tactic of bringing hundreds of persons to
Cuba from all the countries of the hemisphere
in order to indoctrinate them and train them
in the techniques of subversion. The second is
the well-known plan of sabotage, terrorism, and
guerrilla action that has been unleashed in cer-
tain countries, particularly in Venezuela, and
the impetus that the Cuban communist leaders
have given to tliis movement."

In further explanation of its conclusion on
Venezuela the Committee added :

There is no doubt that the Castro regime has se-
lected Venezuela as its primary objective. This was
indicated by the communist spokesman Bias Roca in
his speech on January 24, 1963, commemorating the
fifth anniversary of the fall of P^rez Jimenez : "When
the people of Venezuela achieve victory, [he said]
when they gain full independence from imperialism
. . . then all America will be inflamed, all America
will advance, all America will be freed once and for
all from the ominous yoke of Yankee imperialism.
If their struggle is a help to us today, [he said] their
victory will be an even greater help. Then we shall
no longer be a solitary island in the Caribbean con-
fronting the yanquee imperialists, but rather we shall
have fl base of support on the mainland."

And try they did — until they came up against
the resolute will of the leaders and the people
of Venezuela. The Cuban effort is detailed in
the report of the OAS Investigating Commit-
tee, which serves as the basis for our action.

The Committee found these to be the chief
manifestations of the Castro regime's interven-
tion in Venezuela :

a. A hostile and systematic campaign of propaganda

176

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

against the Government of Venezuela, as well as the
incitement to and support of the communist subversion
that is being carried out in that country ;

b. Training, in all kinds of subversive activities, of
numerous Venezuelan citizens, who traveled to Cuba
for that purpose ;

c. Reniittance of funds through these travelers and
other channels, for the purpose of maintaining and in-
creasing subversive activities, and

d. The provision of arms to guerrilla and terrorist
groups operating in Venezuela, as shown by the ship-
ment of arms discovered on November 1, 1963, on the
Paraguauii Peninsula, and the plan for the capture
of the city of Caracas. . . .

The evidence to support these findings is
clearly and convincingly set forth in the report.
The facts established by the Investigating Com-
mittee leave no doubt whatsoever of Cuba's part
in this conspiracy against Venezuela.

I know of no greater tribute to democracy
in this hemisphere, Mr. Chairman, in modern
times — and no greater rebuff to the sinister de-
signs of the Castro regime — than the manner
in which the Venezuelan people went to the polls
on December 1, 1963.

Based on this experience, it is my firm convic-
tion that we have a solemn responsibility both
to the Venezuelan people and to our own peo-
ples not to permit the Castro regime to mount
another subversive assault against any Ameri-
can Republic. Our governments acted reso-
lutely against a dictator of the right who
plotted to assassinate President [Romulo]
Betancourt in 1960.= They unanimously
agreed on sanctions. I now ask: Can we do
less against a dictator of the left who tried to
assassinate democracy in Venezuela ?

Likelihood of Continued Cuban Subversion

By its very nature international communism
is aggressive and expansive. We see it at work
in all parts of the world, constantly probing
and testing for weak spots which it might ex-
ploit. In modern dress it marches in the guise
of diplomatic relations, trade missions, and cul-
tural exchanges, and peace movements, and
youth organizations, and the like. It flies the
false ideological banners of "peaceful coexist-
ence" and "wars of national liberation." But
no one should be deceived.

' IMd., Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

We in the United States are under no illu-
sion as to the designs of the Communists against
us and the free world. We know that the Com-
munist menace is deadly serious, that they seek
their goals through varied means, and that de-
ceit is a standard element in their tactics.

We are fully aware — and should be — that
Moscow, as well as Peiping and Habana, re-
mains committed to the Communist world
revolution. Chairman Khrushchev tells us
frankly and bluntly that coexistence cannot ex-
tend to the ideological sphere, that between us
there will be continued competition and con-
flict. Castro said on July 26 last year that in
Latin America the course to follow is violent
revolution waged by fighting revolutionaries,
that the correlation of forces in the world had
changed in favor of those seeking change
through armed struggle, and that when revolu-
tionaries in other Latin American countries
know how to fulfill their duty they will have
the decided support of the Soviet Union and
all the socialist camp, including Cuba.

Last week the Cuban government, following
the practice of other Communist governments,
announced its slogans for this year's July 26
celebration. It is no accident, and indeed it is
highly pertinent to our deliberations, that
among the slogans this one appears : "Long live
the heroic struggle of the Venezuelan people."
In plain language that means : "Long live the
struggle against the heroic Venezuelan people."

We should have no illusions about Castro's
continuing purpose to export the Cuban revolu-
tion. He came to power with the design of
converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra
of the Americas. That apparently remains his
design. His temperament and ambition, the
dynamics of his internal situation, the counsel
of those whom he serves and those who serve
him — all compel him to promote subversion as
a means for breaking out of his insular position.

After years of self-righteous protestations
that Cuba exported its revolution by example
only, Castro in a recent press interview finally
acknowledged that Cuba had been supporting,
and will continue to support, subversive groups
in other countries. Tliis admission, it is true,
adds nothing to what we had already learned
through experience. It does serve, however, to

AUGUST 10, 19 64

irr

underscore Castro's purpose to give the hemi-
sphere no respite in his relentless campaign to
foment subversion whenever and wherever
conditions permit.

In this interview Castro also tried to put
Cuba's subversive activities on the bargaining
counter. I wish to make one point very clear :
that as far as the United States is concerned,
the encouragement and support of subversion
by the Castro regime against other countries of
this hemisphere is not a subject for bargaining.
It simply must stop. And when it does, the
hemisphere will know it without the need for
discussions with the Castro regime.

Task of This Meeting

As I stated at the outset, I regard our task
as being to determine what measures should
now be taken to impress on the Castro regime
that the hemisphere will no longer permit its
subversive acts against the American Republics.
In my opinion there are three types of measures
which we can take to drive this point home.

One should represent the American com-
munity's reaction to Castro's efforts to destroy
democracy in Venezuela. Certainly this inter-
vention should not be allowed to go without
imposition of sanctions.

I want to make it very clear that the United
States considers that the adoption of sanctions
by the foreign ministers would be directed ex-
clusively against the Castro regime and not
against any other state or people. I hope this
can be made clear in the Final Act of this con-
ference. Rather our concern is that we not fail
in our obligations to a sister Republic which has
been made the victim of aggression and, indeed,
which even today continues to spend its blood
and treasure to combat Castro Communist sub-
version and to defend democracy and freedom.
To respond to the call of our sister Republic for
collective action is our paramount obligation.

The second type of measure would carry the
community's clear warning to the Castro regime
that if it persists in acts of subversion in other
American Republics the full weight of the re-
gional security system will be applied. This
should serve as a deterrent, and I trust the
Castro regime will heed such a message.

Awareness that subversion, supported by ter-
ror, sabotage, and guerrilla action, as practiced
by the international Communist movement, is
as dangerous a form of aggression as an armed
attack has been very slow in developing in this
hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the
world. I think it is fair to say that until very
recently there has been a lack of sufficient under-
standing of this point everywhere, and this has
led to uncertainty in some quarters as to
whether our regional security system possesses
an adequate mechanism for dealing with Com-
munist subversion.

In the opinion of my Government there is no
doubt that the Rio Treaty* clearly recognizes
multiple forms of aggression and provides effec-
tive machinery for defending against them.
The preamble states that the treaty is intended,
among other things, "to provide for effective
reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks
against any American State, and in order to deal
with threats of aggression against any of them."
Article 3 provides for mutual assistance in meet-
ing an armed attack against any signatoi-y ; arti-
cle 6 specifically recognizes the existence of
"aggression which is not an armed attack"; and
finally, article 9, while defining unprovoked
armed attack and invasion by the armed forces
of a state as aggi-ession, opens ■with the very
significant wording: "In addition to other acts
which the Organ of Consultation may charac-
terize as aggression. . . ." And thus we feel
that the Rio Treaty specifically recognizes the
existence of various forms of aggression and,
most importantly, recognizes the authority of
the Council of the Organization of American
States, or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, to
characterize them as such. Article 3 of the Rio
Treaty spells out procedures for prompt action
in the event of armed attack, and article 6 does
the same for a wide variety of situations falling
short of armed attack.

A third type of measure should urge our o^vn
governments and those of other free-world
comitries to take appropriate steps in the field
of trade with Cuba. This is appropriate be-
cause the Communist threat to this hemisphere
is a threat also to otlier parts of the free world.

* For text, see ibid., Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

178

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I should like to mention two matters which,
although not directly related to the subject of
this meeting, nevertheless have an important
bearing on our deliberation.

Message to the Cuban People

The one is that we should remember that the
Cuban people, both inside and outside their
troubled homeland, will be following our delib-
erations with greatest interest. They should
know tliat they have not been forgotten and that
our desires for a free Cuba remain unchanged.
I know of no more eloquent and concise expres-
sion of these desires than that which President
Kennedy and the Presidents of the Central
American Republics and Panama included in
the Declaration of San Jose in March 1963.'
As a restatement of my Government's views on
this point and in tribute to the memory of the
late President, I should simply like to repeat a
portion of that declaration to which other col-
leagues have already generously alluded :

The Presidents declare that they have no doubt that
the genuine Cuban revolution will live again, and its
betrayers will fall into the shadows of history, and the
martyred people of the oppressed isle of the Caribbean
will be free from foreign Communist domination, free
to choose for themselves the kind of government they
wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the
Hemisphere in the common undertaking to secure for
each individual the liberty, dignity, and well-being
which are the objectives of all free societies.

Progress and Freedom

In line M-ith the final thought of that state-
ment, I think we should never lose sight of the
fact that our central task in this hemisphere is
to promote progress with freedom. This is the
vision of the Alliance for Progress. This is
the path our governments have set for them-
selves under the Charter of Punta del Este. As
President Johnson said last May in discussing
the alliance with the ambassadors of your
respective countries: ^

In devotion to democracy, we are guided by the
command of Bolivar that we must fearlessly lay the
foundations of South American liberty : to hesitate is
destruction.

Our charter charges each American country to seek

' For test, see ibid., Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.
' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 854.

and to strengthen representative democracy. Without
that democracy and without the freedom that It
nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise,
destroying the dignity of the spirit it is really meant
to liberate. So we will continue to join with you to
encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of
free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic
Circle.

I close, Mr. Chairman, with one final word, a
word I know to be from both the Government
and from the people of the United States to our
friends throughout the hemisphere, a word on
which my fellow countrymen are imited, on a
nonpartisan basis.

Wlien our Founding Fathers signed our
Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Frank-
lin made the famous remark, "We must all hang
together, or assuredly we shall all hang
separately."

Today it is Venezuela which is under attack.
Is thei-e any one of us who can say with assur-
ance, "It cannot be my country tomorrow"?
So let's say to our brothers in Venezuela, its
government and its brave people, "We are with
you in full solidarity and will act with you to
insure the safety of your democracy."

And let's say to the Castro regime, "Your
interference in the affairs of other countries in
this hemisphere must stop — must stop and stop
now." This is the basis on which the attitude
of the United States will rest when we come to
the resolutions which will be before us. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.

TEXT OF FINAL ACT

FINAL ACT

Ninth Meeting op Consultation of Ministers of

FOBEIGN AfFAIBS, SeEVINQ AS ORGAN OF CONSULTA-
TION IN Application of the Inter-Amebican
Treaty of Recipeocal Assistance

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, was held at the headquarters of the Orga-
nization of American States, the Pan American Union,
in Washington, D.C., from July 21 to 26, 1964.

The Council of the Organization of American Sthtes
convoked the Meeting by a resolution adopted on
December 3, 1963, which reads as follows :

Whereas :
The CouncU has taken cognizance of the note of the

AUGUST 10, 1964

179

Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, by means
of which his government requests that, in accordance
v?ith Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, the Organ of Consultation be
immediately convoked to consider measures that must
be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and
aggression on the part of the Cuban Government affect-
ing the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of
Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic
institutions ; and

The Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, has
furnished information to substantiate his requests,

The Council of the Organization of American States

Resolves :

1. To convoke the Organ of Consultation in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, to meet on the date and at
the place to be fixed in due time.

2. To constitute itself and act provisionally as Organ
of Consultation, in accordance with Article 12 of the
aforementioned treaty.

3. To inform the Security Council of the United
Nations of the text of this resolution.

At the meeting held on the same day, December 3,
1963, the Council of the Organization, acting provision-
ally as Organ of Consultation, adopted a resolution,
whereby a committee was appointed to investigate the
acts denounced by Venezuela and to report thereon.
The committee, which was composed of representatives
of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States
of America, and Uruguay, presented its report at the
meeting held on February 24, 1964, by the Council,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation.

With respect to the date and place of the Meeting,
the Council of the Organization of American States
at its special meeting on June 26, 1964, adopted the
following resolution :

Whereas :

On December 3, 1963, the Council of the Organiza-
tion convoked the Organ of Consultation in accordance
with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, stating that it would meet at a
place and at a time to be set in due time.

The Council of the Organization of American States
Resolves :

1. That the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Con-
sultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, shall be held at the head-
quarters of the Organization of American States.

2. To set July 21, 1904, as the date for the opening
of the meeting.

The organization of the Meeting of Consultation
and its deliberations were governed by the Regulations
of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Applica-
tion of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As-
sistance, approved by the Council of the Organization

of American States at the meeting held on July 29,
1960.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of
the Regulations of the Meeting, a closed preliminary
session was held on the morning of July 21. On that
occasion, the matters to be dealt with at the opening
session were considered, and the order of precedence of
the members of this Meeting of Consultation was es-
tablished by lot, as follows:

Chilb His Excellency Mr. Julio Philippi

Izquierdo
Minister of Foreign Affairs
CoLOMBLi His Excellency Mr. Fernando GCmez

Martinez
Minister of Foreign Affairs
BoLTVLi. His Excellency Mr. Fernando Itu-

rralde Chinel
Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship
Guatemala His Excellency Mr. Alberto Herrarte

Gonzalez
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Venezuela His Excellency Mr. Ignacio Iribarren

Borges
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brazil His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da

Cunha
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
El Salvador His Excellency Mr. H^tor Escobar

Serrano
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Uruguay His Excellency Mr. Alejandro Zo-

rrilla de San Martin
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dominican His Excellency Mr. Jos6 A. Bonilla

Republic Atiles

Special Delegate
Ecuador His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Es-

cudero
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Costa Rica His Excellency Mr. Daniel Oduber

Quir6s
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Paraquat His Excellency Mr. Raul Sapena

Pastor
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Haiti His Excellency Mr. Ren6 Chalmers

Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and Worship
Nicaragua His Excellency Mr. Alfonso Ortega

Urbina
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Panama His Excellency Mr. Galileo Solis

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mexico His Excellency Mr. Vicente Sdnchez

Gavito
Special Delegate
Peru His Excellency Mr. Fernando

Scliwalb LApez-Aldana
Minister of Foreign Affairs

180

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

United States His Excellency Mr. Dean Rusk

OF America Secretary of State
Aboentina His Excellency Mr. Miguel Angel

Zavala Ortiz
Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship
Honduras His Excellency Mr. Jorge Fidel

DurOn
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency, Dr. Jos6 A. Mora, Secretary General
of the Organization of American States also partici-
pated in the Meeting.

Finding it necessary to return to his country, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, by note dated
July 23, 1964, addressed to the Secretary General of the
Meeting, appointed Mr. Celso Pastor de la Torre,
Peruvian Ambassador to the United States of America,
as Special Delegate to the Meeting.

Mr. Jos6 Rolz-Bennett also attended the Meeting as
representative of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

In accordance with Article 27 of the Regulations, on
July 21, the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States, Mr. Jos6 A. Mora, installed tie
opening session, at which His Excellency Mr. Vasco
Leitao da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs of Brazil, was elected President of the Meet-
ing. At the same session, His Excellency Mr. Galileo
Solis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, was
elected Vice President of the Meeting. In accordance
with the same article, Mr. ■\\1Lliam Sanders, Secre-
tary of the Council of the Organization of American
States, acted as Secretary General of the Meeting.
Mr. Santiago Ortiz, Director of the Office of Council
and Conference Secretariat Services, acted as Assist-
ant Secretary General.

His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, and His Excel-
lency Mr. Alejandro Zorrilla de San Martin, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, addressed the inaugural
session held on the same date.

In accordance with the Regulations, the Meeting
appointed a Credentials Committee composed of the
Foreign Ministers of Peru, Uruguay, and Nicaragua.
It also appointed a Style Committee composed of
representatives of Colombia, Brazil, Haiti, and the
United States of America.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 20 of
the Regulations, a General Committee was formed,
composed of all the members and charged with con-
sidering the topics and submitting their conclusions
to a plenary session of the Meeting for approval.
His Excellency Mr. Fernando G6mez Martinez, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, and His Excel-
lency Mr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, Minister of For-
eign Affairs of Argentina, were designated as Chairman
and Rapporteur of the General Committee, respectively.

This Final Act was signed at the closing session
held on July 26. His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Escudero,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, and His Ex-

cellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, President of the Meeting,
addressed the same session.

As the result of its deliberations, the Ninth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
approved the following resolutions and declarations:

I
Application of Measures to the Present Government

OF CtJBA"

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance,

Having seen the report of the Investigating Com-
mittee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council
of the Organization of American States, acting pro-
visionally as Organ of Consultation, and

CONSIDEMNQ :

That the said report establishes among its con-
clusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the
target of a series of actions sponsored and directed
by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to sul)-
vert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the
democratic Government of Venezuela through terror-
ism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare," and

That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of inter-
vention and aggression, conflict with the principles and
aims of the inter-American system,

Resolves :

1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investi-
gating Committee constitute an aggression and an
intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba
in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of
the member states.

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government
of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention
against the territorial Inviolability, the sovereignty,
and the political independence of Venezuela.

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures :

a. That the governments of the American states
not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with
the Government of Cuba ;

b. That the governments of the American states sus-
pend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with
Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical
equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian
reasons; and

c. That the governments of the American states
suspend all sea transportation between their countries

' Adopted by a vote of 1.5 to 4 (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico,
Uruguay). Venezuela was not eligible to vote.

AUGUST 10, 1964

181

and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be
necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of
American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds
of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted
in the present resolution at such time as the Govern-
ment of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger
to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should
persist in carrying out acts that possess character-
istics of aggression and intervention against one or
more of the member states of the Organization, the
member states shall preserve their essential rights
as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either
individual or collective form, which could go so far
as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ
of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace
and security of the hemisphere.

6. To urge those states not members of the Organi-
zation of American States that are animated by the
same ideals as the Inter-American system to examine
the possibility of effectively demonstrating their soli-
darity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organi-
zation of American States to transmit to the United
Nations Security Council the text of the present reso-
lution, in accordance with the provisions of Article
54 of the United Nations Charter.

Declaration to the People of Cuba '"

Whereas :

The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of
American States declares that, "the historic mission
of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and
a favorable environment for the development of his
personality and the realization of his just aspira-
tions" ; and that "the true significance of American
solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the
consolidation on this continent, within the framework
of democratic institutions, of a system of individual
liberty and social justice based on respect for the
essential rights of man" ;

The Charter of the Organization declares that the
solidarity of the American states and the high pur-
poses toward which it is dedicated demand that the
political organization of these states be based on the
effective exercise of representative democracy ;

The Charter also proclaims "the fundamental rights
of the individual" and reaffirms that the "education
of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom,
and peace" ;

The Declaration of Santiago, Chile," adopted by the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign

"Adopted by a vote of 16 to 0, with 3 abstentions
(Bolivia, Chile, Mexico) .
" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

Affairs and signed by the present Cuban Government,
proclaimed that the faith of peoples of America in
the effective exercise of representative democracy is
the best vehicle for the promotion of their social and
political progress (Resolution XCV of the Tenth Inter-
American Conference), while weU-planned and in-
tensive development of the economies of the American
countries and improvement in the standard of living
of their peoples represent the best and firmest foun-
dation on which the practical exercise of democracy
and the stabilization of their institutions can be
established ;

The Ninth International Conference of American
States condemned "the methods of every system tend-
ing to suppress political and civil rights and liberties,
and in particular the action of international com-
munism or any other totalitarian doctrine" ;

The present Government of Cuba, identifying itself
with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has
established a political, economic, and social system
alien to the democratic and Christian traditions of
the American family of nations and contrary to the
principles of juridical organization upon which rest
the security and peaceful harmonious relations of
the peoples of the hemisphere ; and

The exclusion of the present Government of Cuba
from participation in the inter-American system, by
virtue of the provisions of Resolution VI '^ of the
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, by no means signifies any intention
to deny the Cuban people their rightful place in the
community of American peoples ;

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance,
Declares :

That the free peoples of the Americas are convinced
that the inter-American system offers to the Cuban
people unequaled conditions for the realization of their
ideals of peace, liberty, and social and economic
progress ;

That the peoples belonging to the inter-American
system are in complete sympathy with the Cuban peo-
ple in all their sufferings, in the face of the total loss of
their liberty both in the spiritual domain and in the
social and economic field, the denial of their most ele-
mentary human rights, the burden of their persecu-
tions, and the destruction of a legal system that was
open to improvement and that offered the possibility of
stability ; and

That, within this spirit of solidarity, the free peoples
of America cannot and must not remain indifferent to
or uninterested in the fate of the noble Cuban people,
which is oppressed by a dictatorship that renounces
the Christian and democratic traditions of the Ameri-
can peoples ; and in consequence

" For text, see ibid., Feb. 19, 19G2, p. 281.

182

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Expresses :

1. Its profound conceni. for the fate of the brother
people of Cuba.

2. Its deepest hope that the Cuban people, strength-
ened by confidence in the solidarity with them of the
other American peoples and governments, will be able,
by their own endeavor, very soon to liberate themselves
from the tyranny of the Communist regime that op-
presses them and to establish in that country a govern-
ment freely elected by the will of the people that will
assure respect for fundamental human rights.

3. Its firm conviction that the emphatic condemna-
tion of the policy of the present Cuban Government of
aggression and intervention against Venezuela will be
taken by the people of Cuba as a renewed stimulus for
its hope there will come to prevail in that country a
climate of freedom that will offer to man in Cuba a
favorable environment for the development of his per-
sonality and the realization of his just aspirations.

Ill

Reqionai, and International Economic
Coordination ^'

Whereas :

The objectives of liberty and democracy that inspire
the inter-American system, threatened as they are by
communist subversion, cannot be fully attained if the
peoples of the states that compose it lack adequate and
sufficient means for bringing about vigorous social
progress and better standards of living ;

The persistence of a situation in which the world
is divided into areas of poverty and plenty is a serious
obstacle to any possibility that may present itself in
the American hemisphere for achieving an economically
more just society ;

Harmonious and decisive action is indispensable, in
both the regional and the international spheres, to com-
bat the causes of economic underdevelopment and so-
cial backwardness, since prosperity and world peace
based on the freedom of man cannot be achieved unless
all the American countries attain equality in the eco-
nomic and social field ;

In particular, the continued existence of such a state
of underdevelopment and poverty among large sectors
of mankind, which becomes more acute in spite of the
world increase in wealth and the advance of science
and technology from which these sectors cannot derive
full benefit ; encourages the subversive action of inter-
national communism ;

The countries of Latin America expressed their as-
pirations in the Charter of Alta Gracia and declared
their determined intention to work together to build
a better world in which there will be a more equitable
distribution of income;

The Conference on Trade and Development, held
recently in Geneva," provided a forum for a full dis-
cussion of the problems of international economics
and established the basis for adequate solutions to
problems arising in the fields of raw materials, manu-
factured products, and international financing ; and

The instruments adopted at the two aforementioned
meetings supplement and perfect those signed at the
Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council held at Punta del Este in August 1961,
and especially, the Charter of Punta del Este,"

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter- American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance,

Declares :

That the aims of unity and peace with liberty and
democracy pursued in the struggle against interna-
tional communism, which threatens the stability of the
institutions of the inter-American system and of the
countries that compose it, must be achieved by elimi-
nating those obstacles that hinder social progress and
economic development, and

Resolves :

1. To reaffirm the determined will of their peoples
to work, in the regional and international spheres,
for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the
Charter of Alta Gracia and at the Conference on Trade
and Development, which are in line with the aims and
purposes of the Alliance for Progress.

2. To request the Inter-American Economic and So-
cial Council to continue the necessary studies in order
to find adequate solutions to the problems involved.

Diplomatic Relations Among the
Member States '*
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance,

Resolves :

To transmit to the Council of the Organization of
American States the draft resolution "Diplomatic Re-
lations Among the Member States," presented by the
Delegation of Argentina (OEA/Ser. F/II.9/Doc. No. 30,
Rev. 2).

V
Vote op Recognition "

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,

" Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0.

" For text of the preamble and the recommendations
contained in the Final Act, which was adopted by the
Conference on June 16, see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 1964,
p. 150.

"For background and texts of the Declaration to
the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta
del Este, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

" Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0.

" Adopted by acclamation.

AUGUST 10, 1964

183

President Praises OAS Action
Condemning Cuban Aggression

statement 62/ President Johnson
White House presB release dated July 30

The inter-American system demonstrated once
again ttiis week its effectiveness and vitality by
dealing resolutely with Cuban aggression against
Venezuela. The speeches at the meeting showed
general agreement on a verdict condemning
Cuban aggression, and the final resolution made
it abundantly clear that the hemisphere will not
tolerate aggression by subversion. There was a
genuine concern, which we shared, that although
Venezuela was the target of Communist aggres-
sion today, another country might be the target
tomorrow, and that we must stand all for one
and one for all. Many able diplomats contrib-
uted to this encouraging result, but we Ameri-
cans can be proud of our own Secretary Rusk
and of Secretary Tom Mann [Thomas C. Mann,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs] and Ambassador Bunker [Ellsworth
Bunker, U.S. Representative on the OAS Coun-
cil], who backed him up.

Resolves :

To congratulate His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da
Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil,
on the wise and intelligent manner in which he guided
the deliberations of the Meeting.

Vote op Thanks "
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,

Resolves :

1. To express to His Excellency Mr. JosS A. Mora,
Secretary General of the Organization of American
States, its appreciation for all the attentions and
courtesies extended to the delegates in connection with
this Meeting.

2. To place on record its gratitude to the Secretary
General of the Meeting, Mr. William Sanders, and to
all who collaborated with him, for the manner in which
the advisory and secretariat services of the Meeting
were organized and carried out.

3. To offer its appreciation to the hemisphere and
world press and other information media for the effi-
cient service they rendered to the Meeting.

STATEMENTS
Statement of Chile

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of Resolution

I, because of its doubts regarding the legality of the '
use of the term "aggression" in describing the acts.
It voted negatively on paragraph 3, because it is firmly 1
convinced that the measures agreed to are not appro- I
priate to the particular case that has brought about
the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recip-
rocal Assistance. It also voted against paragraph 5,
because it believes that there are discrepancies between
the provisions of that paragraph and those of Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations and of Article
3 of the Rio Treaty. VTith reference to its abstention
on paragraph 6, its attitude is consistent with the atti-
tude taken with respect to the measures called for in
paragraph 3.

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on
the Declaration to the People of Cuba since, although
agreeing with its basic content, it maintains relations
with the Republic of Cuba and since it believes pre-
cisely in the principle of nonintervention, it has deemed
it preferable not to give positive support to this
resolution.

Statement op Mexico

The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter
of record in the Final Act, that the Government of
Mexico :

1. Is convinced that the measures provided for in the
third paragraph of the operative part of Resolution I
(which the Delegation of Mexico voted against) lack
foundation inasmuch as the Inter- American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance does not envisage, in any part,
the application of such measures in situations of the
kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of
Consultation.

2. Makes a specific reservation to the fifth para-
graph of the operative part of the same resolution
since it endeavors to extend, in such a way as to be
incompatible with the provisions of Articles 3 and 10
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
the right to individual or collective self-defense.

3. Reiterates without reservations its "will to co-
operate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles
and purposes of a policy of peace," to which "is essen-
tially related" the "obligation of mutual assistance and
common defense of the American Republics," in ac-
cordance with the provisions of paragraph five of the
Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance.

In witness whereof, the Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs sign the present Final Act.

Done in the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.,
United States of America, in the four oflicial languages
of the Organization, on July twenty-six, nineteen
hundred sixty-four. The Secretary General shall de-
posit the original of the Final Act in the archives of
the Pan American Union, which will transmit the
authenticated copies thereof to the goverimients of the
American republics.

" Adopted by acclamation.

184

DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Some Thoughts on the Conduct of Foreign Policy

Remarks iy Secretary Rusk '

Gentlemen, I want to welcome you personally
to the Department of State this morning and,
as a member of the State Department Legion
Post, to give you a special welcome on their
behalf. Being a member of Boys Nation is
a very real distinction, and I want to congratu-
late you and the Legion for this very stimu-
lating program.

I was delighted to meet David Jolm Long,
whom you have elected as your Secretary of
State. That is the end of his political career !
[Laughter.]

But I want to take a moment or two just to
give you some feel of what this foreign policy
business is all about, not just my own side. I
started with a meeting at 8 o'clock at breakfast
with the Secretary of Defense and the head of
our Disarmament Agency. We still have an
arms race. There is not much prospect that
that is going to turn downward, although it
is not going up quite as fast as it perhaps might.

I will be meeting all day with the foreign
ministers of the Latin American countries.^
We are all together here in this hemisphere,
while you are in town, to take some additional
measures against Castro.

I will be meeting with the Prime Minister of
Malaysia, who is visiting us at the moment.'

And there will be a meeting tliis evening that
will run until past bedtime.

So life is busy. And the United States is
busy. And the world is pretty turbulent. We

' Made before Boys Nation at Washington, D.C., on
July 23.
= See p. 174.
= See p. 190.

will be going through a rather special season
here the next 3 or 4 months while our people
are engaging in the grand inquest of the Na-
tion that occurs every 4 years to decide who
shall be responsible for our Federal Govern-
ment for the next 4 years. Tliis makes some
difference abroad because, as is sometimes said,
when Uncle Sam coughs, the rest of the world
begins to sneeze. They are very much inter-
ested in what we do here, how we conduct
ourselves, and how we move in the world about
us.

But the point I want to emphasize to you is
that foreign policy is not something which
"those people in Washington" carry on with
people from other countries in some abstract
way uncomiected with your own afTairs. For-
eign policy is about you. This is a point you
must really get into your gizzards. It has to
do with your home, the military service most
of you are going to engage in, your chances
for a decent future, and these days, indeed, the
existence of the Northern Hemisphere.

We know, here in the Department of State,
that foreign policy is about people, and tliat is
the brooding, overriding consideration in every-
thing that we do, whether it's trade, or whether
it's trying to get the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots to find some basis of agree-
ment on their little island, or whether it's trying
to insist, as we are insisting, that Hanoi and
Peiping leave their neighbors alone, or whether
it's trying to work out some scientific coopera-
tion with all countries, including Communist
countries, on this matter of desalting sea water.
This is all about what happens to individual
people.

ATTGUST 10, 1964

185

Directions of U.S. Policy

The second point I'd like to make is that our
policy — that is, the directions of our policy, the
objectives of our policy — are really very simple.
I would suggest that if I were to ask you fel-
lows to sit down on a pop quiz and write two
pages about what you tliink the American peo-
ple are trying to accomplish in the world, you
would be able to do it very accurately, and most
of you would be in agreement.

Let me suggest two ways in which you can
remind yourselves as to what our policy — our
objectives — are. First reread the first part of
the Declaration of Independence. How many
of you have done that, say, in the last 6 months ?
[Large show of hands.] Well, good for Boys
Nation ! This is really very important.

The American people really do believe that
governments derive their just powers from the
consent of the governed. Now, the philoso-
phers can play around with that and find prob-
lems in it from a purely intellectual point of
view, but the American people believe that that
is the heart of political wisdom. And this is
a scarlet tliread that runs through most of our
policy.

For example, this is why the American people
instinctively favor the independence of nations
on these great colonial issues. We invented
that idea. This is why it's easier for us to
work intimately with a democracy than with a
dictatorship. This is why we are so deeply
concerned about what has gone on over the years
in Eastern Europe. That is why we are so
much concerned when here at home we fail to
live up to the commitments of our own con-
sciences and our own political basis.

There isn't a country in the world that
doesn't have problems, say, of discrimination, or
failure to live up to the highest ideals. But we
can't use that as an alibi. Everyone is watching
us. They are expecting us to make good on our
commitments. We are the only country in the
world at the present time that is expected to bat
a thousand in this business. And if we fail,
those failures just rush aroimd the world at the
speed of light and our enemies are joyful and
our friends are distressed. So we have the
pressure of history upon us to do the best job

we can here in our own society. So this simple
notion that governments derive their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed is an oper-
ating principle of policy that you see at work
all the time.

Now, another thing that you might want to
read, if you haven't recently, is the preamble
and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations
Charter. Those of us who participated in
World War II came out of that war with the
hope that perhaps mankind had it made finally.
We had been scarred by the flames of that war.
We were thinking long and deeply with other
nations about what kind of world we ought to
have. And on a bipartisan basis — almost
imanimity in the Senate — we joined with other
nations to sit down and write out those simple
principles in the preamble and articles 1 and 2.
One rogue govermnent stood in the way in
1945 — Stalin's Soviet Union. I'm convinced
that if Stalin had played ball with the United
Nations according to his commitments, tliis
could have transformed the course of history.
But he didn't, he didn't.

It reminds us, by the way, that we need
strength, and great strength, if we are to make
peace. I think it is probably correct to say
that the drastic, far-reaching demobilization
of the Western World that occurred at the end
of World AVar II was perhaps the most serious
mistake our people ever made.

When I was a student in Germany many years
ago, I was out on a lake in a canoe, and I went
ashore for some lunch, and I pulled the canoe
up on the beach and had my lunch. When I
got back the canoe was gone. The water police
putted aroimd in their motor boats, and after
about an hour, they came back trailing the canoe
and they said, "We have the thief. He will be
punished. Here is your boat. Here is your
canoe. But we are fining you five marks for
tempting thieves." Because I had left the
canoe up there without being locked or tied up
or anything of that sort.

So here is the problem for democracies on that
matter of strength. I think it's entirely prob-
able that after World War II, through de-
mobilization, we tempted thieves. We exposed
Stalin to the pressures of enormous temptations
to reach out and grab. And he grabbed. And

186

DEPARTMENT OF 8TATE BUIXETIN

we have been rebuilding the strength of the
free world ever since.

But look at the preamble and articles 1 and
2 of the United Nations Charter — an associa-
tion of independent nations, voluntarily co-
operating in their common interest across
national frontiers, joining together in mutual
defense, settling disputes by peaceful means if
possible. I mean those are things that are
pretty fundamental to policy on a bipartisan
basis in this country.

The Confrontation With Communism

Now, let me say just a word about the kinds
of problems we have, and then I will have to
run, because I have foreign ministers over there
waiting for a meeting.

Very seldom do we, as the United States, have
a bitter, painful, strictly bilateral issue with
any other government. Most of our quarrels
with other governments have to do with what's
gouig to happen to somebody else. We had
one of these bilateral issues not long ago with
Panama. But these are extremely rare. Our
general bilateral relations with most govern-
ments in the world tend to be pretty good.

But we do have many problems that arise
out of this great confrontation between com-
munism and the free world. This is the under-
lying crisis of our day. The contest is be-
tween the United Nations kind of world
order on the one side and a Communist world
revolution kind of world order on the other,
and so many problems arise out of that
confrontation.

You sometimes hear this word detente. Be-
ware of it. It's a very tricky word. I got
trapped myself in it not long ago in a press
conference. I said that although there might
have been some reduction in tension, it is in-
correct to speak of a detente. One of the news-
papermen present went to a dictionary and
looked up detente., and it said, "A certain
reduction in tension" !

It is true that we do not have in front of us
at the moment a blazing crisis with the Soviet
Union. But the big, dangerous, explosive
problems are still with us. They have not been
resolved. Germany, Berlin, Cuba, Southeast

Asia — these big problems are there. "We are
not in a state of settled peace. So we have got
to do all that is required to take care of our
vital interests.

Other People's Quarrels

There is a tliird range of questions, and that
is what might be called other people's quarrels.
I suppose there are 25 or 30 countries that we
have relations with who have some sort of
quarrel with their iimnediate neiglibors. And
we get drawn into these quarrels, either because
we are members of international bodies where
they come up, such as the United Nations, or
because our own interest requires us to take a
hand to try to settle them, or because the parties
themselves come to us asking for help, either to
settle or at least to ask our support for their
own particular point of view.

At any given time, these are the things that
occupy the greater part of our agenda. Well,
we can't run away from these problems. They
are there. The outcome is of interest to us.
If there are two nations with whom we hope
to be friends, such as Pakistan and India, and
they themselves are in a bitter controversy
with each other, then this cannot help but com-
plicate our relations with both Pakistan and
India. And so tliis is a problem.

We receive every working day in this Depart-
ment about 1,300 cables from our posts all over
the world. This is official cables. We get
telegrams from the public in addition to that !
[Laughter.] We send out a thousand cables a
day, all of them signed "Rusk," and I see about
six of them. [Laughter.]

Building a Decent World Order

Most of that business has to do with the on-
going business of building a decent world order.
Today we will be attending 15 to 20 inter-
national meetings somewhere in the world — as
a government. I don't have to count them be-
cause that is true on every working day. And
these meetings throughout the year cover a
gi'eat variety of things — everything from the
nuclear arms race to epidemiological control,
or the allocation of radio frequencies, or basic
education in the Amazon Valley, or whatever
it might be. This is the great constructive

AUGUST 10, 1964

187

work in which governments and ordinary men
and women all over the world are engaged.

I'd like also to say that here is where our
greatest strength lies. You know, of course,
that this countiy has in the military field almost
literally unimaginable strength. It is hard to
conceive of what the world would be like if that
strength were completely employed. So don't
worry about strength. There is plenty of
strength in the military field.

But there is also a great deal of strength in
what I referred to earlier, when I referred first
to the Declaration of Independence. These
simple, direct, human commitments of the
American people are a source of the greatest
strength of all in this country because these are
commitments that we share with ordinary men
and women in practically every other country,
including the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

These elementary commitments to a decent
standard of living and to some personal dignity
and to concern for family and a need for educa-
tion and things of that sort^ — those are pretty
universal. Those people who wrote our Decla-
ration of Independence felt that those were
deeply rooted in human nature and in the re-
lation between man and God. I think they
were right, because people have been thinking
about these things for more than 2,000 years,
and my guess is that something that has been
worked on for 2,000 years can kick up some
pretty fundamental ideas.

But we never have to argue with people in
other parts of the world on what the American
people are after. This is the point I want to
impress on you. We never spend any time, be-
cause these decent commitments of the American
people are known and recognized and respected.
The complications come in how to get on with
them in a complex and ticklish situation and
how these general principles apply to a particu-
lar situation.

But these commitments are a source of our
greatest alliances, because they mean that in
times of crisis there is not so much neutralism
as you would suppose.

Don't worry about the difference between
allies and neutrals in any fundamental sense.
We are allied with countries because we want to
help preserve the independence of states. Our

chief interest in the so-called unalined countries
is in their genuine safety and genuine independ-
ence — so that they can work with us in places
like the United Nations.

And what happens in your neighborhood, in
your schools, in your own universities — what
happens there — is a part of the strength which
ties us with these other people. So we can
look into the future with a great deal of confi-
dence, even though there is a lot of hard work
to be done and still some burdens to bear in this
business. We have got a million men in uni-
form outside the continental United States
ashore and afloat, and they have got to have
our support, support in a lot of ways, including
foreign aid, to see if we can get this job done
without comitting them to combat, if possible.
We have got to have our space program. We
have got to have a good lusty defense budget for
the foreseeable future.

Now, it's going to mean some taxes, a good
many taxes. But I don't think that the Amer-
ican people are going to be too much concerned
about packing a load for the purposes to which
this country is committed.

Again thank you very much, fellows, for
being here.

Second Round of Civil Aviation
Talks With Canada Concluded

Press release 338 dated July 24

Canadian and United States delegations con-
cluded on July 23 at Washington a further
round of talks concerning the renegotiation of
the Air Transport Agreement now in force be-
tween the two countries.^ Substantial progress
was made on a number of important questions
during the meetings, including application of
the recommendations made by Prof. Jolm
Kenneth Galbraith in his report to the President
last year. Both delegations have now under-
taken to report to their Governments on the
results achieved and, following further study,
to meet again at the earliest practicable date
with a view to concluding the negotiations.

' For background, see Bulletin of May 25, 196!4,
p. 844.

188

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President Speaks to American
Field Service Students

Following is the text of remarks made hy
President Johnson on the south lawn of the
White House on July 20 when he greeted some
2,800 American Field Service students from 59
countries who were preparing to return home
after completing their senior year in high school
in the United States.

White House press release dated July 20

I suppose I should introduce myself. I am
the father of Lynda and Luci Johnson — and I
am known as the man wlio is the Wiiite House
dogs' best friend.

It is good to have you with us. Nothing
makes a house happier than young people, and
this house is a very happy home right now with
you on hand.

I know that during the past year each of you
has made life much happier, much more re-
warding, for the American families with whom
you have lived. I hope you will take back to
your own lands even half as much enrichment
as you are leaving behind in our land.

You have been in the United States during a
year history will never forget — and you will
always remember. You have seen our system — •
and our people — tested by a terrible tragedy.
But you have also seen that system and this
people respond nobly, w^ith great courage and
great common sense.

I believe there is an example in tliis for all
the world.

People in other countries sometimes forget
what we in America can never forget: that
America has been built by sons and daughters
of every continent and every country.

Men may try to tell you that peace among
nations and neighbors is not possible, that old
animosities can never be forgotten, that old sus-
picions and prejudices can never be overcome,
that old rivalries and struggles can never be laid
aside. When any tell you that, you tell them of
America.

Here in this diverse land of 190 million
people — people with the blood of your own
ancestors in. their veins — we have forgotten and

overcome and laid aside divisions of the past.
We live together in 50 States as one people — one
people, united and indivisible.

If such unity can be accomplished here, it can
be accomplished everywhere. And we believe
that you will, in your own times, be leaders for
peace and justice around the world.

I don't know what impressions you may have
brought here, or what impressions you may be
taking away now. But I hope you will convey
to your families, friends, and fellow country-
men one fact about America: that almost no-
body in America thinks tliat much in America
is as good as it should be or could be — even,
sometimes, including its President.

Free expression, self-criticism, constant self-
examination are the great strengths of free peo-
ples — and great sources of the energy from
which progress comes. You have seen this
process at work this year. We have been deal-
ing with problems in our society which have
existed 100 years or more. But we are making
I^rogress — toward fulfilling the rights of all the
people, toward opening greater opportunity,
toward building better cities, toward building a
more prosperous economy, toward making life
better.

America is not an old, contented, complacent
land — ready to stand still. America is young,
as you are young, with its future before it, as
your future is before you.

Your land and this land have much to do
together. I am sure you will be leaders in
those great works.

On this happy evening I know there is in the
hearts of all of us one note of sadness. One
week ago today the man who had done so much
for 40 years to foster and nurture this program
passed away in his sleep — Director General
Stephen Galatti. Mr. Galatti was a remark-
able American — and a remarkable citizen of the
world. Through the fruits of this program,
his influence will live on for many generations.

Tonight I would like to announce that I am
conferring upon Mr. Stephen Galatti, Sr., a
Presidential Citation, which reads as follows:

Trusted Counselor, Friend, and Inspiration for
Young People Throughout the World, he selflessly
devoted his life to the cause of Peace by laboring Ure-

AtTGUST 10, 1964

739-452—64 3

189

lessly to foster understanding today among the youth
who will lead the nations of the world tomorrow.

If Mr. Galatti's son, Stephen, Jr., will come
forward, I would like to present this Presiden-
tial Citation to him at this time.

Prime Minister of Malaysia
Visits Washington

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Ma-
laysia visited the United States July 21 to Au-
gust ^, WGIf.. He met with President Johnson
and other U.S. officials during his stay at Wash-
ington July 2£-£4- Following are an exchange
of greetings between President Johnson and
Prime Minister Eahman on July £2, an ex-
change of toasts at a luncheon at the White
House that day, and the text of a joint com-
munique released on July 23.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JULY 22

White House press release dated July 22
President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen:
It is my great personal pleasure and my privi-
lege on behalf of the people of America to wel-
come you this morning to the United States.

AVe remember happily your visit to our coun-
try 4 years ago.^ We are very proud to welcome
you back again today, this time as the leader
of the new nation of Malaysia.

Our two countries are far removed from one
another, but we here in the United States are
very much aware of the outstanding leadership
that you have offered during these midcentury
decades. We have greatly admired the courage
by which you led your native land to a decisive
victory over Communist terrorism. We have
no less admired and applauded the vision with
which you have worked to secure the blessings
of liberty for all of your people.

In times of trial and in times of hope, you
have manifested the highest order of responsi-
bility and foresight toward the best interests of

* Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1960, p. 783.

your people. The impressive mandate of your
recent elections is a great tribute from your
people to you.

For myself, I welcome this opportunity to
add through personal conversation to the under-
standing already achieved by our personal cor-
respondence. Mr. Prime Minister, we in
America share with you and your people the
same hopes for the future and the same devo-
tion to peace and the same desire to see the lot
of mankind made better throughout the world.
I am hopeful and I am confident that our dis-
cussions together will be to the profit of the
great cause in which both of our countries ear-
nestly labor together.

Prime Minister Rahman

Mr. President, thank you very much, indeed,
for your warm and cordial welcome. I have
looked forward to this moment for some time,
because I am very happy to have the chance
at last to meet you personally. It is always a
privilege to meet the President of the greatest
democracy in the world, particularly when you
have heard so much of his work in the cause
of freedom and peace. In the past we have
had contacts through the normal diplomatic
channels, but as you have rightly said, there is
a world of difference between the correspond-
ence and the pleasure of having personal
conversations.

Remembering with heartfelt pleasure my last
visit to the United States, I have always
cherished the hope of returning some day; so
when your invitation reached me I was very
happy indeed to accept. I know that you are
rather preoccupied with national affairs at
present, but in spite of that j-ou were good
enough to ask me to come at this time. It was
a considerate move on your part, and I appre-
ciate it most sincerely.

I most heartily endorse the sentiments you
have expressed of our mutual hopes of peace
and happiness in the world. I come from an
area of the world that is beset with all kinds
of troubles. To the north there is trouble, to
the east there is trouble, and now there is
trouble coming from the south of my country.
These troubles threaten to encircle the two

190

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BTJLLETIN

countries in Southeast Asia that have so far
remained free.

To us small nations, America forever stands
out as a pillar of hope, a guarantor of our
rights as free nations. Therefore, Mr. Presi-
dent, I believe there should be no embargoes
on friendship and good will between men and
nations.

I wish to thank both you and the American
people and at the same time to convey the very
warm good wishes of the nations and people
of Malaysia to our American friends.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, JULY 22

White House press release dated July 22

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Am-
bassador, Governor Harriman, ladies and
gentlemen: In this house, none are so welcome
as those leaders who have chosen the path of
freedom and democracy. Our guest today is
such a leader. He guided his native Malaysia
to independence. He led his people to a de-
cisive victory over Communist guerrillas.

He took the lead in the formation last year
of the nation of Malaysia. In all of this, he
has kept faith with democracy.

He has sought for his people food mstead of
bullets, clothes instead of uniforms, homes m-
stead of barracks.

Malaysia's success shines as an example for
many lands.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and your people
have our respect and our faith. We are very
glad that you are here today. There are many
choices for the world today. There is the choice
of perpetual war or permanent peace. There
is the choice of order or chaos. There is the
choice of the rule of law or the rule of the
jungle.

The American people have made their
choice — for peace, for order, and for the rule of
law.

We are proud to support those whose choices
are the same. We support our friends with all
of the resources of our nation. We of this
generation are determined that men shall live

in a world where aggression will not go unpun-
ished, where terror will not go unchallenged,
where irresponsibility will not be left to run
rampant.

Our course — the course of the United States —
has been chosen freely. It will not be lightly
changed.

The people of Malaysia have likewise made
their choice freely, and it likewise will not be
changed.

Your Excellency, we of the United States
extend to you our congratulations. We wish
for your people a future of peace and progress.

Now I should like to ask all of you to join me
in a toast to His Majesty the King of Malaysia,
and to the friendship between the Malaysian
and American people — long may it endure.
To His Majesty.

Prime Minister Rahman

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excel-
lencies, ladies and gentlemen : I wish to thank
you, Mr. President, very much indeed for the
glowing compliments you have paid to the na-
tion and the people of Malaysia and to me, sir.
This is a most pleasant luncheon in my honor.

It is always heartwarming to know that the
successes we have achieved during the sliort
years of independence, both in overcoming the
Communist terrorism that plagued our country
for nearly 12 long years and in being able to
build a democratic and, as you say, a prosperous
nation, are admired and appreciated, as you say,
by other covmtries of the free world. To win
praise from the United States— the redoubtable
champion of democracy, the bastion of strength
in tlie free world — is to me praise indeed.

Malaysia may be small— and it is small in
size and population — but our people, as you
know, are great in heart.

We know, however, that success cannot feed
upon itself; otherwise, it dwindles and dies.
So success must always be the basic ground for
greater efforts, and that is what we are endeav-
oring to do in Malaysia today despite external
difficulties and troubles.

We are well aware that although we have won
the struggle against communism in our own

AUGUST 10, 1964

191

country, the menace still exists and may strike
us again.

I think it is true to say that Malaysia has
proved two important truths : first, that through
unity and cooperation democracy can and does
work in Asia; second, that a truly successful
democracy, prosperous and progressive, think-
ing first and always of the welfare and well-
being of the people, is the only effective answer
to the insidious intrusion of communism.

From our own experience we have learned
that it is not practical to be neutral in this
struggle. In our view, the state is made for
men and not men for the state. That is why
we are proud to belong to the free world.

My last visit to the United States coincided
with the election campaign. This time I have
arrived between national conventions and at a
time when you are so preoccupied. I can only
thank my stars that IMalaysia's elections are not
on so vast a scale as yours. Nevertheless, we
have just emerged from the elections and are
not quite yet recovered from the effects of it.
I can well understand, with your huge country
and with voters by the millions, what you will
have to go through in the next few months.
Wlien I was here last I came to know what
American presidential elections mean, and all
I can say is that I am a happy man that I don't
have to stand for the elections.

I wish you all the luck. However, the whole
world will be waiting and watching the elec-
tions in the United States. I shall say no more
for fear of treading on dangerous ground ; so I
will content myself by wishing every success
to the voters.

The great interest the United States has
shown in our progress and development in Ma-
laysia is a source of satisfaction to us. I appre-
ciate very deeply the help that you have given us
in various ways and in various forms, such as
providing technical assistance in the form of
experts under the Colombo Plan and for the
excellent work being done by dedicated men and
women of the Peace Corps. In fact, I would
like to see more members of the Peace Corps
serving in Malaysia, especially doctors and
engineers. Those whom I have had the pleasure
of meeting have said to me, and I think they are

sincere, that they are very happy to be in Ma-
laysia — so why not, Mr. President, send more
of them?

We were getting on very well indeed with our
tremendous plans for development since the
struggle against the Communists, and the help
we obtained from our friends has proved most
valuable to us.

As you said, Malaysia has been a beacon to
other lands and a beacon that does shine but,
unfortunately, it can also attract insects and
pests. Some of these are harmless, but others
are very harmful. Unfortunately, the glow
from our beacon has attracted quite the wrong
kmd of attention as well, where both the Com-
munists and now our next-door neighbors, the
Indonesians, plainly consider us a tasty morsel
to tempt the appetites of the giants. I think
they are doing just a little bit more than just
that, but I would not like to bore you, sir, in
our pleasant company by telling all that was
happening.

As far as I am concerned, we have done every-
thing humanly possible to humor them, but
nothing can satisfy them until, I am afraid,
they have devoured us.

But I know I can trust you to stop them
from devouring us and getting the help from
our friends in the free world. I hope that the
beacon can then continue to shme in order to
guide others to safety, security, peace, and
happiness.

In the meantime, we must push ahead with
development, because this is an essential ele-
ment in our effort to provide higher standards
of life and a richer future for our nation.

So we look to freedom-loving people for
understanding and support, and that is why I
am so especially glad to hear your warm praise
today.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I do most sin-
cerely appreciate both your kindness and your
hospitality and all of the nice things j'ou have
said about my country.

Your Excellencies, to the President, Mrs.
Johnson, I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to
join me in a toast to the President of the United
States and to the lasting friendship between
America and the Malaysian people.

192

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JULY 23

White House press release dated July 23

The President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of Mahiysia met on July 22 and
23 to discuss matters of mutual interest and
recent developments in Southeast Asia.

President Johnson and Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Kahman welcomed this, their
first meeting, and the opportunity it presented
to become personally acquainted and to review
major problems in Southeast Asia. The Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister discussed the Com-
munist threat to and activities in Laos and
Vietnam and reaffirmed their support of the
cause of freedom in those countries. The
President noted with appreciation the contri-
bution Malaysia has made to the common cause
in Vietnam by providing equipment, framing
and advice based on her own experience in com-
bating Commimist terrorism. In turn the
President made clear that all Southeast Asian
countries, including Malaysia, could i-ely on the
firm intent of the United States to resist Com-
munist aggression against Free Asian nations.

The Prime Minister reviewed developments
in Malaysia with the President and progress
made thus far in furthering the economic and
social progress of its people. The Prime Minis-
ter also expressed appreciation for the contri-
bution of American Peace Corps Volunteers in
this task.

The President informed the Prime Minister
of his special interest in Malaysia's impressive
achievements in the fields of education, eco-
nomic growth and rural development. The
President noted with admiration the Prime
Ministers objective of a happy and prosperous
nation upholding the principles of justice, free-
dom and democracy.

The Prime Minister outlined for the President
the origins of the Malaysia concept and the his-
tory of its formation, and in this context re-
viewed the current activities by a neighboring
state in violation of the territorial integrity of
Malaysia.

The Prime Minister recounted his determined
and various efforts to seek an amicable and
honourable solution to the problem including the
recent tripartite meeting in Tokyo. He also in-

formed the President of the discussions at the
recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer-
ence in London.

The President re-affirmed the support of the
United States for a free and independent Malay-
sia, and for Malaysia's efi'ort to maintain her
security, preserve her sovereignty and continue
her dcveloiDment in peace and harmony.

The President agreed to provide military
training in the United States for Malaysian
personnel, and to consider promptly and sym-
pathetically credit sales, under existing arrange-
ments, of appropriate military equipment for
the defense of Malaysia.

The President expressed his strong hope that
a peaceful and honorable way out of the current
and dangerous situation could be found, and his
appreciation for the earnest endeavors of the
Prime Minister to this end. The President and
the Prime Minister agreed that, while firmness
in self-defense is indispensable, it is better to
talk than fight.

The President and the Prime Minister found
in the common devotion of the United States
and Malaysia to the principles of democratic
government and individual freedom a bond of
understanding which is certain to bring their
two countries into a constantly closer relation-
ship, and agreed to maintain close contact on
problems of mutual interest.

U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield Nuclear
Device Underground in Nevada

Following is the agreed text of a joint U.S.-
U.K. announcement released simultaneously on
July 18 at Washington and London.

White House press release dated July 18

The United States and the United Kingdom
tested a low-yield British nuclear device under-
ground at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's test site in Nevada yesterday (July 17).

The test was requested by the British Gov-
ernment and was conducted under the Agree-
ment for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic
Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, which

ATJGTJST 10, 1964

193

has been in effect between the two countries
since August 4, 1958.^

Both governments were satisfied that substan-
tial technical and military benefits could be
obtained by testing a British nuclear device
underground as part of a continuing nuclear
research program. The test was carried out
within the framework of the limited nuclear
test ban treaty of August 19G3.

U.S., New Zealand, and Australia
Reaffirm Ties of Friendship

Secretary Rusk teas host at a dinner at the
Department of State on July 17 honoring the
participants in the meeting of the ANZUS
Council at Washington July 17-18? Follow-
ing are the substantive portions of remarks made
at the dinner hy Secretary Ev^k, New Zealand
Prime Minister Keith J. Ilolyoake, and Austra-
lian Minister for External Affairs Paul
Hasluck.

Secretary Rusk

This nation feels special ties with Australia
and New Zealand. So do I, personally. As
far as Australia is concerned, I am from
Georgia, and I recall that Georgia and Australia
were competing with each other for the prod-
ucts of the prisons of Britain at an early stage
in our histoiy.

And if I had to name the country which has
cost me most personally, it would be New Zea-
land. Because during the last war when I was
a Colonel on the General Staff and had to brief
our Chiefs on the progress on the war in Africa,
I, as did our Chiefs, became deeply impressed
with the performance of the 2d New Zealand
Division. I remember General Marshall,
morning after morning, would say: "Where's
the 2d New Zealand? Has it been committed
yet?" And during that period, I took an oath
that if I ever ran across a member of the 2d New
Zealand Division, I would buy him a drink.
And then I proceeded myself to the China-

• For text, see Buli-etin of July 28, 1958, p. 161.
' For text of a final cominuni(iue released on July 18,
see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.

Burma-India Theater and stopped in Cairo at
a time when the entire division was on leave!

This association is so close, so natural, so ob-
vious, that it is almost difficult to explain why
ANZUS had to be made formal. I was there
in September 1951 when we signed the ANZUS
Treaty. And I think all of us felt at that time
with Dean Acheson that it simply "puts into
words strong ties and purposes already in ex-
istence." ^ It was almost a part of the nature
of things that we and Australia and New
Zealand would have this kind of relationship
among us.

But it goes beyond that. We have been com-
rades in arms in two world wars, plus the
Korean episode. I remember in that dramatic
week of the outbreak of the Korean war, after
President Truman had decided that we should
have to do something about this North Korean
aggression — I remember [New Zealand Am-
bassador] Carl Berendsen's coming in straight-
away like a shot to see me and simply saying,
"Wliat do you want from New Zealand?"

Well, this is the kind of thing that is im-
portant to a people like the United States, car-
rying very substantial burdens all over the
world. Association with others in tliese joint
enterprises is a matter of the greatest possible
importance to us in these various situations.
You may be interested in running back with us
to 1951, to remember what Carl Berendsen said
on that occasion of the signing : '

The treaty . . . rests upon the solid basis of com-
mon interests and ideals, upon the regard and the
affection of the respective peoples, upon their common
desire for peace and upon their common determination
to resist aggression. It reflects also the inescapable
facts of geography on the one hand and, on the other,
the especial perils to which the Pacific may be exposed
in the course of this worldwide conflict between liberty
and slavery with which the whole of mankind is today
oppressed.

And that was said 13 3'ears ago.

And Percy Spender, now the distinguished
President of the International Court, then Am-
bassador, said on that occasion, on behalf of
Australia : '

The treaty . . . expresses in formal language the
close ties of fellowship, understanding, and comrade-
ship between us. But it does much more than that.

' For text, see iUd., Sept. 24, 1951, p. 495.

194

DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

It marks the first step in the building of the ramparts
of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area
of the Pacitie Ocean. This day we here and now declare
to the world that our three peoples share a common
destiny. We publicly proclaim our intention and deter-
mination that that destiny shall be that we endure as
free peoples and that we with other free peoples shall
so labour that liberty shall not perish from the earth.

Things don't change a great deah "Wlio can
doubt in 1964 that we share a common destiny?
In this struggle between coercion and freedom,
our vital common interests are worldwide and
our fortunes literally inseparable. But we
share, at the present time, a direct concern and
special responsibilities, through ANZUS and
SEATO and other arrangements, for the se-
curity of Southeast Asia. And those challenges
will continue to test our mettle. 'Wliile we shall
persist untiringly in our efforts toward peace
and to bring about through peaceful means a
decision on the part of Hanoi and Peiping to
leave their neighbors alone, the United States
will not waver in honoring its commitments
under the ANZUS pact or our other interna-
tional agreements. And we shall continue to
help those who struggle and fight to defend
their own freedom.

And I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister
and Mr. Hasluck, that we find in this serious
situation both comfort and strength in such al-
lies and friends as Australia and New Zealand.
Together, and in cooperation with other peo-
ples who love liberty, we shall, as we antic-
ipated in 1951, continue to strive for a peaceful
world and a brighter future for ourselves and
for our children.

And so this 13th meeting of the ANZUS
Council is a very special and happy occasion for
us — an experience in comradeship which is, I
think, literally unique among nations, partic-
ularly in this vast area of the Pacific Ocean.
Thank you very much.

Prime Minister Holyoake

Well, it is marvelous, what you have done in
these few, brief years in this wonderful country.
I suppose there has never been an example in
all the world's history of responsibility and
leadership — world responsibility and world
leadership — being virtually thrust upon a peo-
ple. And I say that advisably, not that you

shirked your duty, but because responsibility
was thrust upon you in such a short space of
time. And certainly, even if some of you might
quarrel with that postulation, none of you will
quarrel with the statement that I now make:
that never in all the history of the world has
world leadership been exercised in such respon-
sible fashion as it is being exercised by the
United States of America at the present time.
There is no question whatever about that. The
leadership you have given, the wealth you've
poured out, the responsibility you shared, cheer-
fully, the load that you carry as taxpayers—
I'm very conscious of the taxpayer, the man who
hands out, so cheerfully, his millions and bil-
lions of dollars to help the world.

Looking back, I make bold to say this, that if
anybody had prophesied 20 years ago or even
12 or 15 years ago that any nation in the world
would have given the leadership, given the help,
the succor, militarily, in every other way that
this great United States of America has now
given — if we would have prophesied that 12 or
15 years ago, we'd have been laughed at — none
would have believed it. It's the phenomenon
of our times. And because of this, we are proud
and grateful to be your friends, to be numbered
amongst your friends. We're proud and we're
grateful that we should be associated with you.
I'm speaking of New Zealand, a country of only
2.6 million people. But we're proud and grate-
ful to be associated with you in the many ways
we are — in SEATO, in ANZUS, in many other
ways. Of course we have a common heritage,
a common goal. We're in ANZUS because we
wanted to play our part. And, as you know,
the ANZUS Treaty lays it down that, if the
United States of America is attacked, we'll
come immediately to your aid. And I'm certain
that millions of American people sleep more
happily in their beds each night, being assured
of that fact. Of course, I'm bound to say that
perhaps we in New Zealand are more conscious
of this and sleep more comfortably in our beds,
knowing tliat the converse applies — if we're
attacked at any time, the United States with
her tremendous strength would come to our
aid. . . .

I say again and may I say finally : there's a
tremendous love for and admiration of the

AUGUST 10, 1964

195

people of the United States of America in our
country in New Zealand. We'll always be
proud and grateful for your friendship and the
opportunity of our associations with you, the
opportunity of serving, wliether it is in war or
whether it is in peace, in any capacity in which
it is considered that we're able to serve with you.
Tliank you very, very much for the oppor-
tunity of being with you tonight.

Mr. Hasluck

I was very moved, and I'm sure that all the
Australians present were moved, by the state-
ments made by the Secretary of State. And
they certainly found a very clear echo in our
minds. The ANZUS Treaty to us is some-
thing which means more than the formal docu-
ment. It is in a sense the little sort of charter
that we hang on the wall to show that we are the
members of a particular association for whicli
we hope to qualify in our own right and an
association which we value very much.

ANZUS, in the sense that in any extremity
we are in alliance with the United States of
America, means a great deal to the very stark
fact of our own survival — a fact of which we are
very conscious in our part of the world, living,
as we are, a comparatively isolated European
community in close proximity to the Asian
Continent. Our chances of survival depend
very much on our own national integrity and
our own national vigor, and equally depend on
the strength of the alliances that we can form
with lilte-minded people overseas. So when
we think of ANZUS we do think quite starkly
of the fact of our own survival.

But it goes a long way beyond that. It's not
only that we are members of ANZUS because
we think this is going to help us to survive and
to live the sort of life that we want to live and
build the sort of society that we want to build
in our part of the world. We believe that,
through our membership in ANZUS, beyond
the borders of Australia we can make some con-
tribution to the security of the whole region, we
can help to remove fear that hangs like a
shadow over a wliole region, and by so doing
we can make our small contribution toward the
peace and security of the world. I'm sure that
every Australian is strongly behind his Govern-

ment in its resolution to make what contribution
it can to that great cause.

We are not a great country in the numbers
of our population, but I believe tliat, larger
than our population, is tlie way in wliich we
have developed our resources — the industrial,
technological, scientific, and other assets wliich
we have built up there. And I believe in the
character of our people: that we are fit to be
a sturdy ally — and can be valued as such.

Our links witli New Zealand are very close
and very intimate. There's always a sort of
friendly rivalry between us. It's never quite
certain whether we are the outlying island of
New Zealand or whether New Zealand is the
outlying island of Australia. But we joke
about each other, and we can joke in this
friendly fashion. But I would like every
American to realize that down in that corner
of the world, side by side, you have these two
like-minded English-speaking people dedicated
to the same causes as those to which you are
dedicated, willing to make their contribution
to the same struggles in which you are giving
leadership.

And I'd like every American also to realize
that, on our part, we are greatly touched and
we are moved in the depths of our being by
both the realism and the resolution with which
the postwar United States of America has ac-
cepted the burdens of leadership of the free
world. We know it's not an easy task. One
of the memories that we have as Australia from
the days when Great Britain was giving that
sort of leadership is a memory of the loneliness
of great powers. No American can hope to be
100 percent popular around the world. No
American can expect to receive gratitude
around the world.

Britain went through this sort of thing in
the last century — the berated power, the power
that was always denigrated, the power that was
always scoffed at, but the power that kept the
peace of the world. And it's part of your bur-
den, not only to do the great things which you
are doing in all quarters of tlie glol)e but to
have the fortitude and the strength of your own
principles to endure the misunderstanding and, I
with patience, to survive the misrepresentation
which seems to be always the fate of great

196

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

powers. But if ever — and this may sound a
little particular — but if ever any American in
that sense of loneliness feels that America is
misunderstood, that the great effort that
America is making on behalf of world peace

is not appreciated, I do hope that they'll think
that down there in Australia and in New Zea-
land there are a few of your comrades who
do imderstand you, who do stick with you.
Thank you very much.

American Policy in Africa

&y /. Wayne Fredericks

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '

For many years Africa played a minor role
in the drama of international affairs. In the
wake of the past decade's wave of freedom and
independence for former colonies, however, the
new nations of Africa have graduated to more
prominent and more demanding roles on the
world stage.

This remarkable development offers an im-
pressive set of challenges, of opportunities, and
of problems for Americans who work both in
the public and private sectors. Those chal-
lenges, opportunities, and problems, in turn,
have reshaped United States policy toward the
countries and peoples of Africa.

You in Minnesota have been in the vanguard
of Americans who recognize the immediacy of
Africa's problems. Against that background,
let me review for you some of the most impor-
tant challenges Africa poses for American for-
eign policy today.

The first important challenge Africa presents
to Americans — and vice versa — is the challenge
to be understood. Africa's nations, and her
nations to be, figure daily in the news. But
more often than not, what we read about those
developing lands centers on the conflicts and
crises, rather than on the continent's growing
cooperation and progress. Like so many

'■ Address made at the University of Mlimesota, Min-
neapolis, Minn., on July 7.

others, Americans need to look behind the head-
lines of revolts, of border clashes, of mutinies
and uprisings.

Those are disquieting developments. They
do bespeak instability. Some of them are clear
threats to the peace m Africa. But they do not
represent the complete picture.

The challenge to know Africa better carries
with it the responsibility for Americans to view
the developments there in perspective. We
must have some comprehension of the true
causes of unrest threatening certain African
nations. This challenge calls for an open mind
to view objectively the considerable progress
being made against formidable odds. A good
hard look will indicate that much of this uni-est
is caused by the wide discrepancy between the
needs and hopes of the people and the shortage
of skills and capital required to move ahead
rapidly.

Helping Africa Speed Its Development

Africa's new wave of independence has
ushered in remarkable advances in many parts
of the continent. But the overall situation is
still one which creates great expectations among
the peoples of the new nations. As you may
know, the average annual income on the Afri-
can Continent is only $120. Its literacy rate
is only 15 percent. One out of five Africans

AUGUST 10, 1964

197

dies before reaching his teens. Agricultural
productivity is low. Malnutrition and disease
are widespread. Transportation and communi-
cations facilities are inadequate.

On the other hand, Africa has vast and under-
exploited resources, such as unparalleled poten-
tial for hydroelectric power and agricultural
production. Most important, Africa has human
determination. The tremendous energies of its
peoples have been turned to the economic and
social development of their homelands. But
the encouraging efforts at self-help found in
every African nation are not enough to do the
job with the necessary speed. Outside assist-
ance is required. This, then, is a second im-
portant challenge — that of helping Africa
speed its economic and social development.

U.S. Policy of Cooperation

The third important challenge is closely re-
lated to the other two. It consists of the for-
mulation and execution of sound, effective, and
mutually advantageous American foreign
policy toward the various nations of Africa.
As you can imagine, many problems complicate
the pursuit of this objective.

U.S. foreign policy in Africa is predicated
upon a long-range view of African develop-
ments. Economic growth, political stability,
and true independence are sought by Africans.
These goals, if achieved, protect American in-
terests as well. "\'\niile we, as a people, do have
moral and humanitarian impulses to help less
fortunate nations, we also are bound to the
African Continent because the maintenance of
peace and stability there is directly related to
our own security and to peace in the world.

The United States respects the African peo-
ples' desire for freedom, dignity, a more abun-
dant life, and for African unity. "VVe liave
sought to focus our programs of assistance to-
ward the most effective ways of helping Afri-
can nations obtain the professional and skilled
personnel required to strengthen their econo-
mies, improve their public administration, and
safeguard their independence. American as-
sistance also is calculated to improve the pro-
ductivity and general well-being of individual
Africans.

Our policy in Africa is one of cooperation,

not domination. We have no desire to replace
the mutually beneficial relationships existing
between African and European nations in many
parts of the African Continent. Europe's as-
sistance to Africa is several times greater than
our own. As it is the desire of African nations
to continue to seek outside help, we seek to har-
monize our aid with that of other free-world
nations who play a more principal role in financ-
ing African assistance.

For the past 3 years, the United States Gov-
ernment has contributed rougUy one- fourth of
the $2 billion in external economic assistance
which Africa has received from government
sources. This is exclusive of the very impor-
tant contributions made by U.S. foundations,
religious organizations, and other pri\ate
groups. In fiscal years 1962, 1963, and again
this year, our Government proWded approxi-
mately $500 million in economic assistance to
34 African comitries. Surplus food, under the
Food for Peace program, accounted for a siz-
able portion of the total amount. Other free-
world governments provided some $1,200 mil-
lion, and the Sino-Soviet bloc extended some
$200 million in credits every year except 1963.

The United States also supports the goal of
African unity. The desire for unity — either
pan-Africanism or i-egional cooperation — is
dear to the heart of every African leader.
They believe that some form of mutual coopera-
tion is necessary and proper to Africa's politi-
cal, economic, and social development. The
United States is glad to see the lively interest
Africans are taking m cooperative endea\-ors.
We believe this course can contribute impor-
tantly to a stable and strong continent.

A major development in continental African
cooperation is the Organization of African
Unity. Although the OAU was not formed
until the conference of African chiefs of state
of May 1963, when most African governments
were less than 4 years old, it already has re-
corded several remarkable accomplisliments.
The OAU helped end last fall's hostilities be-
tween Algeria and Morocco. It has played an
important role in bringing about a cease-lire
on the Ethiopian-Somali frontier.

The United States respects the desires of

198

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

African leaders to keep the cold war out of
Africa. We respect their posture of nonaline-
ment in the East- West struggle, which is part
of the foreign policy of most African nations.
We believe tliat African coimtries, as they in-
crease their ability to protect their independ-
ence, will remain truly nonalined and reject
the subordination that communism demands.

At the same time, we cannot underestimate
the current threat and thrust of Sino-Soviet
efforts in Africa. From January 1954 to June
1963, the Sino-Soviet bloc expended, as dis-
tinct from obligated, a total of $1.5 billion in
economic aid to less developed countries outside
of the bloc itself. Of that amoimt, approxi-
mately 30 percent, or some $450 million, went
to Africa, including the United Arab Republic.
I might point out, for comparative purposes,
that during that same period only some 6 per-
cent of all U.S. economic aid went to Africa,
although today the total has climbed to about
10 percent.

In addition, the Communists in the last few
years have established a diplomatic, economic,
or cultural presence in many independent
African states. Other Communist teclmiques
to undennine Africa's freedom involve student
training, cultural exchanges, informational
programs, and economic ties.

Yet, in spite of — or perhaps in part because
of — international conununism's major efforts in
Africa, the Communists have to date failed to
subvert or capture any African country as a
satellite. Open Communist interference in
African domestic affairs and overt attempts to
sway African nations have helped to arouse
African suspicions of Communist goals.

The most important factor in precluding
Communist success, however, has been Africa's
increasing awareness of the divergence between
the aspirations of international comm u n i sm
and the aspirations of the African nations.
However, we cannot be — and we are not —
complacent about the Communist threat to
Africa. It is there ; it is real ; it is dangerous.

The Problem of the Congo

In Africa, U.S. foreign policy objectives in-
volve coming to grips with problems of con-
siderable dimensions.

One problem of great importance is that of
the Congo. Only 4 years ago this vast and po-
tentially rich nation in the heart of Africa came
to independence. Shortly thereafter its peace
and progress were disrapted by secessionist at-
tempts in three of its provinces — Katanga,
Kasai, and Orientale — and the Communist bloc
sought to exploit the disorder for its own pur-
poses. This nearly led to an East-West con-
frontation. Only through United Nations ef-
forts was such a showdown averted.

The initial decision to support a U.N. opera-
tion in the Congo was made in 1960 by the
Eisenhower administi-ation. This decision was
reaffirmed and implemented by the Kemiedy
administration's Congo policy during 1961,
1962, and 1963, until the Congo was reunited.

United States policy, in my judgment, has
been successful. Although the Congo today is
far from trouble free, the crisis which began
when it achieved its independence on Jime 30,
1960, is now over. "Wlien the Katangese seces-
sion movement collapsed in January 1963, an
unliappy chapter in the short history of that
fledgling nation ended.

During that entire period the United States,
despite considerable mismiderstanding here in
our own country of the issues involved, firmly
and steadfastly supported the efforts of the
United Nations to carry out its various man-
dates. The substance of those U.N. man-
dates was to help the Congo maintain its politi-
cal independence and territorial integrity and
to assist that nation in the restoration and
maintenance of law and order. Tlie speed and
skill with which the U.N. moved into the Congo
situation as a stabilizing force — with no com-
parable experience to draw upon, I might add —
made that operation a major contribution to-
ward the maintenance of world i^eace and
security.

Today, the Congo is an independent nation
with its boundaries intact. Maintenance of law
and order is still a problem but no longer a mas-
sive threat to Congolese internal security. Civil
war in the Congo has been averted and big-
power confrontation in central Africa avoided.
Commimist aims, which came perilously close
to succeeding in the early days of independence,
have been thwarted.

199

Four years ago almost to the day, United Na-
tions forces entered the Congo in response to
an appeal from the Congolese Government.
The last imits of the United Nations forces left
Leopoldville only last week. Hundreds of U.N.
personnel continue to work there as teachers
and teclinicians assisting the Congolese people
in the gi-eat task of nation building. Belgian
technical assistance is equally large. The Con-
golese are striving for the development of their
own constitutional processes and are now con-
ducting a referendum on a new constitution.
This referendum began on June 25 and is sched-
uled to be completed by July 10. So far, the
vote has been overwhelming in favor of accept-
ance of the new document, which was developed
by a representative commission which sat for 3
months early this year.

Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula's Cabinet
submitted its resignation at the end of June
coincidental with the expiration of the Funda-
mental Law on the same date. President
[Joseph] Kasavubu asked Mr. Adoula and his
Cabinet to continue as a caretaker government
until a new government is appointed which,
under the new constitution, will be charged with
governing the country until elections for parlia-
ment can be held. These are to take place within
6 to 9 months after the new constitution is ap-
proved. Mr. []\Ioise] Tshombe, who recently
returned to the Congo after a year's absence
abroad, has been asked by the President to form
a Cabinet.

The United States has followed developments
in the Congo very closely over the past 4 years
and will continue to do so in the future, for the
Congo has a key role to play in sub-Saliaran
Africa. It has gone through many vicissitudes,
and its travail is not yet over as its leaders
struggle with many problems in the economic,
social, educational, and security fields as well
as the primary one of creating a true sense of
national unity.

No one, of course, can know with certainty
what the future holds, but I, for one, am person-
ally optimistic that the efforts of the United
Nations and other countries in providing as-
sistance to the Congo are bearing fruit in in-
creasing the resources available to tlie Congolese
leaders to meet and overcome their difficulties.

U.S. Support for Self-Determination

Another difficult and urgent aspect of our
African relations has been that of demonstrat-
ing to African nations our will to provide at
home the type of freedom and democracy we
advocate and support in Africa — and elsewliere
overseas.

The enactment last week of the 1964
Civil Rights Act offers dramatic evidence of
the determination of all branches of the Fed-
eral Government, and of Negro as well as other
Americans, to eradicate segregation and dis-
crimination. Although the act's effect cannot
yet be fully measured, it already has begim to
make significant changes in traditional patterns
of segregation.

There are racial problems in Africa, too. Al-
though there has been racial or tribal strife in
various parts of Africa, tlie most difficult of the
racial and colonial problems lie in the southern
end of the continent, where colonialism and
a-partheid are now being confronted by a show
of African determination. Ever smce the Addis
Ababa summit meeting of May 1963, which
gave birth to the Organization of African
Unity, African nations one after another have
intensified their attacks on South Africa's
apartheid policy, upon Portuguese policy in
Africa, and on the policy of the white-minority
government of Southern Rhodesia. They will
undoubtedly pursue these matters at the OAU
meeting to be held at Cairo later this month.

United States policy supports the aspirations
for self-determination of the peoples of those
parts of Africa still not independent, and we
have welcomed the emergence of independent
African nations. Now, with Malawi (Nyasa-
land) achieving independence yesterday [July
6] and Zambia (Noi'thern Rhodesia) scheduled
for independence in October, the world faces
Africa's hard core of resistance to political
change.

This hard core is found in Southern Rho-
desia, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea,
and the Republic of South Africa, which ad-
ministers neighboring South-West Africa under
a League of Nations mandate.

What is our policy toward these areas?
Simply stated, the United States supports the
aspirations for self-determination and for polit-

200

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ical participation in their governments of the
peoples of those parts of Africa.

Malawi, Zambia, and Southern Rhodesia

First, let me turn to an area that was for a
dozen years known as the Federation of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland. Last December 31, the
political experiment that brought the three
coimtries of Northern Ehodesia, Nyasaland,
and Southern Ehodesia together officially
ended. Each is now moving ahead separately.

Yesterday, Nyasaland became a member of
the Commonwealth and is now known as Ma-
lawi. It is a country small in size, heavily
populated, and primarily agricultural in econ-
omy. It is stable politically, however, and has
come to independence under the leadership of
its U.S.-educated Prime Minister, Dr. H.
Kamuzu Banda. Malawi faces some difficult
tasks in the economic development field, and
we are endea\oring to lend a hand through our
AID [Agency for International Development]
program and through our Peace Corps volun-
teers. There also are encouraging indications
that other friendly countries are going to coor-
dinate their assistance efforts with ours. As
Malawi is a former British possession, the
United Kingdom understandably is playing the
leading role in assistance, but we expect to play
a role in helping Malawi strengthen its inde-
pendence through economic growth.

Northern Rhodesia also is moving toward in-
dependence, having just completed an agree-
ment with the Britisli on the final form of its
constitution. By mutual consent, independence
will come on October 24, at which time the
country will become Zambia, a republic within
the British Commonwealth.

Hardly any state on the African Continent
came to independence under more auspicious
circumstances than those under which Zambia
will begin its nationhood. It has one of the
most viable economies in Africa, thanks to
its position as one of the top three copper pro-
ducers in the world. However, it is seriously
short of the trained manpower needed to enable
key positions to be filled by Africans. Our
princij^al assistance efforts, therefore, are de-
voted to meeting requests from the Government
to till this need. We are making major efforts

in the fields of education to assist in the train-
ing of personnel who will be needed in the pro-
gram of Africanization of key positions.

The situation in the third coimtry of the for-
mer Federation — Southern Rhodesia — we view
with many misgivings. Progress there is
blocked by a double stalemate — first, between
the United Kingdom and the Southern Rho-
desia Government and, second, between the
Southern Rhodesia Government and the prin-
cipal African nationalist leaders. At the pres-
ent time, nearly 400 of the key African nation-
alist leaders are being held in one form of
detention or another by the Government of
Southern Rhodesia — most of them without
trial. The situation is tense, and, imless pres-
ent trends are reversed, it could become even
more serious in the near future.

The present regime is believed to be seeking
independence at an early date under the exist-
ing form of government which, as a practical
matter, would assure control of the government
and the economy by the small white European
minority for a long time to come. In a country
of more than 3.5 million Africans and only
some 200,000 Europeans, there naturally is
much opposition from the African majority
and from other nations to this proposal. For
example, Soiithem Rhodesia is to be excluded
from the July Commonwealth Prime Ministers
conference at London for the first tune. There
is a strong indication of British Commonwealth
opposition to any attempt by the Southern
Rhodesian Government to obtain independence
under a white minority.

The future of Southern Rhodesia is essen-
tially a question for the British Government.
But when the Southern Rhodesian question is
discussed in various U.N. bodies, as it fre-
quently is these days, we must and do make clear
our desire to see the development of a solution
acceptable to both races in the colony.

Angola and Mozambique

The Portuguese territories of Angola and
Mozambique, situated on Africa's west and east
coasts, represent another difficult southern
African problem. Portugal views those terri-
tories as "overseas provinces" and feels very

AUGUST 10, 1964

201

strongly that it should be permitted to govern
them without outside interference.

For their part, the Africans look upon the
territories as "colonies" and feel very strongly
that they should become independent as soon as
possible. We in the United States are deeply
committed to self-determination for all people.
"We believe Portugal should recognize publicly
that the principle of self-determination is ap-
plicable to its territories. Our policy is to en-
courage both Portugal and the Africans to
come to a workable understanding.

Talks between Portugal and several African
nations took place last year under U.N. auspices
but broke down over an inability to agree on
what constituted self-determination. In May,
however, the Secretary-General indicated in a
report to the Security Coimcil that he was con-
sulting with Portugal and African representa-
tives on the possibility of the talks being
resumed.^ We would very much like to see an
amicable solution result from a continuation
of such talks. The alternative to an amicable
settlement is a serious one. There already has
been fightmg between nationalists and Por-
tuguese forces in Angola and Portuguese
Guinea. Clearly, we want to see peaceful pro-
gress on the question of the Portuguese terri-
tories instead of further conflict.

South-West Africa

The most intractable problems in southern
Africa are those of South Africa and South
Africa's administration of the former German
colony of South-AVest Africa. South Africa's
mandate over South-AVest Africa, which was
assigned by the League of Nations after AVorld
AA^ar I, is currently the subject of a contentious
case before the International Court of Justice.
Two African coimtries that were members of
the League of Nations — Ethiopia and Liberia —
have asked the Court to judge whether South
Africa has lived up to its obligations.

A South African Government Commission,
the Odendaal Commission, proposed early tliis
year that South-AVest Africa be divided into a
white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands."
The Commission also advocated large-scale in-
corporation of the territory's administrative

* U.N. doc. S/5727.

structure into the Kepublic's governmental de-
partments. Spokesmen of the South African
Government endorsed the broad principles of
the Odendaal Commission's report, but the Gov-
ernment has decided not to iniplement con-
troversial proposals of the Commission before
the judgment of the Court is rendered.

South Africa's Apartheid Policy

Apartheid, a policy of group separation of
races in the Eepublic of South Africa itself, is
a tragic philosophy involving both whites and
nonwhites whose families sometimes have lived
in the area for generations and who together
have built one of the highest standards of living
in Africa. The conflict between nonwhite
aspirations and official policy is already having
extensive repercussions elsewhere, especially in
newly independent Africa and in the United
Nations.

The Kepublic of South Africa has been in
the news quite a bit lately because of further
incidents reflecting its determination to main-
tain its policy of apartheid.

In June eight leaders in the resistance to
apartheid — black, white, and Indian — were sen-
tenced to life imprisonment in the widely pub-
licized Rivonia trial.

In May, Albert Luthuli, President General
of the African National Congi-ess and winner
of the Nobel Peace Prize, was restricted to part
of his local district for a second 5-year period.
Nothing he says or writes can be published in
South Africa, and he cannot have any visitors
from outside his local area without special gov-
ernment permission. I

A few days ago, the controversial 90-day de-
tention clause was extended for an indefinite
period up to 1 year. Under this clause, police
may arrest without charge and hold in solitary
confinement any person suspected of having in-
formation about certain types of political
offenses or about plans to conunit them. Per-
s'ons can be arrested and held for successive 90-
day periods. As many as three terms in a row,
separated only by moments, have been imposed
on the same individual.

The entire body of legislation restricting peo-
ple's rights, opportunities, and activities has
created understandable bitterness and opposi-

202

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tion to apartheid, particularly among the black
Africans, Asians, and Coloreds, who are people
of mixed blood. But it also has developed a
growing body of white South African opinion
that feels apartheid is becoming destructive of
the very values it purports to preserve. There
are many churchmen, teachers, businessmen,
editors, journalists, politicians of all parties,
and many other troubled white opponents of
the present policy of apartheid. Large num-
bers of South African lawyers, doctors, schol-
ars, and others protested against the extension
of the 90-day detention clause as an invasion of
civil and human rights. Si^okesmen of major
religions — Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, and Prot-
estant — appealed to the Govermnent to let it
lapse.

We can sympathize with the desires of those
people who are concerned with the true values
of Western civilization and wish to moderate
their nation's restrictive policies. In view of
our own race relations, we also can understand
the very real problems with which South
Africa is faced. At the same time, we believe
there must be a change of direction — some move-
ment toward finding a solution to South Africa's
problems — and we think one of the first steps
is to provide an opportunity for meaningful
discussion of South Africa's race problem
among people of all races and to begin to work
out steps providing for political participation
in a society based upon government by consent
of the governed.

South Africa could have much to offer Africa
and the world. But instead it is becoming in-
creasingly isolated. South Africa has the most
highly developed economy in Africa. It has a
great reservoir of skills, of educated people, of
technological know-how. With its substantial
industries, great mineral resei-ves, and other
basic components of industrial development, im-
f ettered by its policy of apartheid, South Africa
would be well endowed to play a leading role
in economic and social development in Africa
and elsewhere. Instead, the countries of Africa
are largely closed to South Africa. That coun-
try has been forced out of several international
organizations dealing with African scientific,
economic, and social welfare problems. Instead
of being a leader in this formative period of

African history. South Africa is becoming more
and more isolated from the continent of which
it is a part.

We believe South Africa's participation in
African affairs would be a profoundly favor-
able development for aU of Africa and, indeed,
for the world. But we also know it cannot
happen as long as apartheid continues to be the
official policy of South Africa. We are com-
mitted to use our best efforts to encourage South
Africa to abandon apartheid.

In summary, then, over tlie years the United
States has developed a fimdamental African
policy to encourage Africa's political, economic,
and social development and to assist in the
growth of peaceful, stable, and independent na-
tions on that continent. We know that peace
and security are indivisible, and we want to
help establish and maintain societies in Africa
that can make their own positive contributions
to world peace and progress.

NASA and Western Europe Agree
on Scientific Satellite Project

NASA ANNOUNCEMENT

The first joint satellite agreement between
the European Space Eesearch Organization
(ESRO) and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration was announced on July
21 by the two agencies.

The organizations have signed a memoran-
dum of understanding for a pi'oject involving
two scientific satellites, reflecting further exten-
sion of the U.S. program encouraging coopera-
tive space efforts with other countries. These
two satellites bring to 13 the number launched
or planned under the program.

ESRO, which came into formal existence in
March 1964, is the nine-nation West European
group formed to conduct scientific space re-
search utilizing the capabilities of its member
countries.

Membership includes Belgium, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and

AUGUST 10, 1964

203

the United Kingdom. Italy is expected to join
when the Italian Government has ratified the
ESKO convention. Austria has observer status.

ESRO plans include soimding rocket and sat-
ellite experimentation and the establishment
of several centers and a launching site in its
member countries.

Under the NASA-ESRO memorandum of
understanding, the first satellite, to be known
as ESEO I, is to contain eight experiments to
study high-latitude particles (especially in au-
roral phenomena) and their effects on the polar
ionosphere. The second, ESRO II, is to meas-
ure solar and cosmic radiation. It also will
contain eight experiments.

Both satellites will be launched on NASA
Scout rocket boosters into near-polar eccentric
orbits. The launchings are tentatively sched-
uled during 1967 from the Air Force Western
Test Range.

Responsibilities for the project will be di-
vided between the two agencies as follows :

—ESRO will provide the experiment instru-
mentation ; design, construct, and test the space-
craft ; provide ground checkout and launch sup-
port equipment; track and acquire data from
the spacecraft within the capability of its pro-
jected network ; and reduce and analyze all data.

—NASA will train ESRO personnel as is
mutually determined, provide the Scout launch-
ing vehicles, and conduct the launching opera-
tions. NASA will also provide necessary sup-
plemental tracking and data acquisition
support.

As with all NASA international cooperative
projects, each agency will bear the cost of dis-
charging its responsibilities. The scientific re-
sults and findings will be made available to the
world scientific community.

The NASA-ESRO agreement brings to 13
the international cooperative satellites provided
for under NASA memoranda of understanding.
These include three joint U.S.-U.K. satellites,
of which two have been successfully launched
(Ariel I, April 1962; Ariel II, March 1964) ;
five U.S.-Canadian satellites, the first of
which — Alouette I — was launched in September
1962; two satellites to bo launched in 1965-67
under the joint U.S.-Italian project San Marco ;
and FR-1, the cooperative U.S.-French satel-
lite to be launched next year.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Memoeandum of Undeestandino Between the Eubo-
PEAN Space Reselabch Oeoanisation and the
United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administeation

1. The European Space Research Organisation
(ESRO) and the United States National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) affirm a mutual
desire to undertake a cooperative program of space
research by means of satellites. The objectives are to

(a) perform an integrated study of the polar iono-
sphere vpith particular emphasis on auroral events and

(b) measure solar and cosmic radiation.

2. It is planned to accomplish this cooperative pro-
gram through the preparation, launching, and use of
two satellites which are scheduled tentatively for
launching in 1967.

(a) The polar ionosphere satellite, to be known as
ESRO I, will contain experiments to perform an inte-
grated study of high latitude particles and their effects
on the polar ionosphere, including optical, heating,
ionization, and large scale dynamic effects involving
currents and magnetic perturbations. It will also in-
clude a beacon experiment for measurements of the
total electron content between the satellite and ground
observers. A near-polar eccentric orbit within the capa-
bility of the present Scout launch vehicle is planned
for ESRO I.

(b) The solar astronomy and cosmic ray satellite,
to be known as ESRO II, will contain experiments to
measure solar and cosmic radiation including X-rays,
He II line, Lyman Alpha, trapped radiation, solar and
Van Allen belt protons, cosmic ray protons, alpha par-
ticles, and high energy electrons. A near-polar eccen-
tric orbit within the capability of the present Scout
launch vehicle is planned for ESRO II.

3. It is understood that this program is experimental
in character and therefore subject to change in accord-
ance with altered technical requirements and oppor-
tunities.

4. ESRO will be responsible for the following:

(a) Providing the experiment instrumentation.

(b) Designing, constructing, testing, and delivering
to the launch site two flight qualified spacecraft for
each mission.

(e) Supplying spacecraft ground checkout and
launch support equipment.

(d) Providing such tracking and data acquisition
support as may be within the capability of the pro-
jected ESRO network.

(e) Reducing and analyzing the data.

(f) Supporting such trainees as may be assigned
pursuant to 5(a) below.

5. NASA will be responsible for the following:

(a) Making available project-related training for
periods providing mutual benefits within the limits of
resources in facilities and personnel.

(b) Reviewing the acceptance tests of satellite

204

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN

flight units and the results of these tests. Final de-
termination of the suitability of flight units for launch-
ing will be by joint ESRO/NASA decision.

(c) Providing the Scout launch vehicles, including
heat shields and spacecraft tie-down and separation
mechanisms, required for launching the two satellites.

(d) Conducting the launch operations, including
tracking to the point where an initial orbit is
established.

(e) Supplying necessary additional tracking and
data acquisition support, with reimbursement by ESRO
of any incremental costs such as those occasioned by
special equipment and data tapes.

6. ESRO and NASA will each bear the cost of dis-
charging its respective responsibilities including the
costs of travel by personnel and transportation
charges on all equipment for which it is responsible.

7. It is intended that this project proceed by mutual
agreement between ESRO and NASA. The responsi-

bility for accomplishing this will rest with project man-
agers to be named by ESRO and NASA. Assisted by
a Joint Working Group with appropriate membership,
the ESRO and NASA project managers will coordinate
the agreed functions and responsibilities of each agency
with the other.

8. ESRO and NASA will use their best efforts to
arrange for free customs clearance of equipment re-
quired in the program.

9. ESRO and NASA will exchange all scientific in-
formation resulting from this cooperative program and
make the results freely available to the world scientific
community.

P. AUGET

For the European Space
Research Organisation

July 8, 1964

Hugh L. Dryden

For the National Aero-
nautics and Space Ad-
ministration

The New Implications of Industrial Competition

hy David E. Bell

Administrator, Agency for International Develofment ^

It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you
today at this New England Conference on Mod-
ernization for AVorld Competition. The United
States foreign assistance program, with which
I am associated, is deeply involved in one aspect
of the problem you are considering here — tliis
is the expansion and strengthening of the econ-
omies of less developed countries of Asia, Af-
rica, and Latin America. I believe this work
has some significant implications for the sub-
ject of your conference.

The first point I should like to emphasize is
that the fundamental purpose of our economic
assistance to less developed coimtries is to help
them achieve economic strength and independ-
ence,

' Address read for Mr. Bell by Deputy Administrator
William S. Gaud before the New England Conference
on Modernization for World Competition at Boston,
Mass., on June 10.

This fundamental theme of helping other
countries to become economically stronger — to
get on their own feet so that our aid can come
to an end — has guided our foreign aid efforts
since the days of the Marshall Plan. There is
no need for me to recall here the striking suc-
cess of the Marshall Plan, imder which the
coimtries of Western Europe were restored to
economic health in 4 or 5 years and by the early
fifties were able to make strong economic prog-
ress without any further economic aid from us.

Wlaat is not so well known is that a substan-
tial number of other countries have by now fol-
lowed in the footsteps of Western Europe.
They have achieved with our help basic eco-
nomic momentum, and our aid has been brought
to an end or is being brought to an end.

American economic assistance has terminated
altogether in some 17 countries, including the
Marshall Plan coimtries plus Japan, Spain,

AUGUST 10, 1964

205

Yugoslavia, and Lebanon. We have identified
14 more countries in wliich the transition is now
in process from economic aid in the form of soft
loans and grants to economic self-support and
the end of the need for aid.

A clear-cut example is the Republic of China
on Taiwan. Fifteen years ago the economy of
Taiwan was almost wholly dependent upon the
United States for its economic livelihood. Over
these last 15 years, however, a highly successful
development program has been carried out. In
the field of agriculture, a successful land re-
form program was executed and improved
methods, markets, and supplies such as fertil-
izers were made available to the Taiwanese
farmers. Today the productivity of tlie farm-
ers of Taiwan is second only to that of Japan.
Education and health services have been ex-
panded. Transportation and power facilities
have been enlarged. Particularly in the last
few years, a lively and thriving industrial sec-
tor has been emerging.

For the last several years the gross national
product of Taiwan has been rising at more than
5 percent per year. A most significant and most
necessary element of the progress of Taiwan
has been a rapid expansion of exports, which
have been going up 10 or 12 percent per year
for the last several years. In the present year,
1964, Taiwan exports are expected for the first
time to reach half a billion dollars.

Most important of all, the combination of
these various factors has meant that the process
of self-sustaining economic growth has become
established. There is no doubt that in Taiwan
today there has been achieved the necessary
minimum of trained and experienced leader-
ship, public and private, the necessary mini-
mum of capital facilities, and the framework
of incentives, laws, and attitudes which will re-
sult year after year in a predictable rise in the
gross national product. United States aid has
given Taiwan the initial boost that was needed,
and the people of Taiwan can take it from there.

Wliat happened 10 years ago in Western
Europe and Japan, what is happening today
in Taiwan, Greece, Israel, Mexico, Venezuela,
and other countries — this is what we want to see
happen throughout the less developed parts of
the world. We Avant through U.S. aid to help
give an initial boost which will allow these coun-

tries thereafter to make progress with their
own resources, without special assistance, rely-
ing on normal access to world trade and world
capital markets.

We are making headway in that direction.
Quite a few comitries — even though they are
not yet near the end of the need for foreign
aid — are making solid headway. India, Paki-
stan, Turkey, Nigeria, Colombia, Cliile — in aU
these comitries the process of economic develop-
ment is visible. Agricultural and industrial
productivity are rising; education is spreading;
governmental and private leaders are learning
to handle the many difficult problems that arise
when economic and social progress occurs.

Please note that I am describing only the
beginnings of the process of economic moderni-
zation. When a period of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth has begun, and foreign aid has
been ended, the average standard of living in
a country is still quite low and the major prog-
ress in living standards is still to come. Far
more economic progress has been made in West-
em Europe and in Japan since economic aid
to those areas ended than took place previously.
The same thing will be true in each of the less
developed countries as they reach the point of
rapid and self-sustained economic progress.

For example, the per capita income in Taiwan
today, according to the best estimates, measures
about $150 per year — compared to $2,500 per
year per capita in the United States. Even
allowing for the well-known deficiencies of such
comparative statistics, the gap between these
two figures is enormous. But the point I am
stressing at the moment is that the people of
Taiwan are now in a position to acliieve a steady
and rapid rise in their own incomes and liv-
ing standards, without the need for economic
aid. Year by year into the future, we can ex-
pect to see per capita income rise in Taiwan as
economic growth continues in its benign up-
ward spiral.

Opportunities for Trade and Investment

This brings me to the second main point I
would like to make this noon. As our foreign
aid programs are successful in promoting eco-
nomic growth, the countries we are assisting not
only bex"ome stronger economies; they also be-
come better markets for our exports and better

206

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

destinations for our private business investment
overseas.

This has been evident in Western Europe,
where U.S. exports have more than doubled in
the last 10 years. It has been evident in Japan,
where U.S. expoi-ts have quadrupled since 1950.
The very rapid rise of U.S. private investment
in Europe and in Japan is well known.

But I call your attention to the fact that
similar opportunities are appearing today in
some of the less developed countries — and will
appear tomorrow in many more. As Taiwan's
exports have risen from a quarter-billion dol-
lars 3 years ago to a half-billion dollars today,
it has become an increasingly attractive market
for exports from the United States and from
other countries and an increasingly attractive
destination for U.S. investment overseas.

Moreover, now that Taiwan has entered a
stage of continuing economic progress, it will
become a steadily better market. From the
viewpoint of the American businessman, inter-
ested in exports or in investment abroad, we
have seen only the beginnings of the opportimi-
ties that will be offered in Taiwan. Many
American businessmen are already making
plans to take advantage of these increasing
opportunities, and I hope that through meetings
such as this one the word will spread ever more
widely.

Paving the Way for New Markets

The third point I should like to stress here is
that the foreign aid program helps to open up
U.S. export opportunities by increasing famili-
arity with U.S. products and establishing com-
mercial relationships.

A striking example of how the aid program
has led to the creation of new export markets
is the case of coal. Before AVorld War II, U.S.
coal was not normally exported to European
markets. During the Marshall Plan, however,
large amounts of coal were exported to Europe
under foreign aid financing. Aid financing of
coal exports has long since been reduced vir-
tvially to zero. But the markets have remained.
Recently the Coal Exporters Association of the
United States submitted a statement to the
President's Wliite House Conference on Export
Expansion pointing out that 28 million tons

out of the 40 million tons of U.S. coal exported
in 1962 — approximately $285 million worth —
was an outgrowth of export business established
as a result of our foreign aid progi-am.

This is a classic case where U.S. aid financing
has paved the way for a new market which
thrived after aid was discontinued.

We believe that foreign aid today is opening
up many such markets, particularly where the
opportunities afforded by aid financing are vig-
orously followed up by export-minded Ameri-
can businessmen. As most of you know, it is
AID policy at present, and has been since 1959,
to require that foreign aid appropriations be
spent in the United States for U.S. goods and
services, with relatively small exceptions. At
present, over 80 percent of the funds being
committed under the foreign aid program are
going directly to U.S. suppliers of goods and
services.

As a result of this policy, the volume of aid-
financed procurement in tlie United States has
increased dramatically for many commodities.
For example, in calendar year 1963, foreign aid
financed exports of $180 million of iron and
steel mill products, $292 million of machinery
and equipment, $84 million of chemical and re-
lated products, $52 million of railway and other
transportation equipment.

For some commodities, aid now finances a
substantial percentage of the total value of U.S.
exports. In calendar 1963, for example, aid
financed 46 percent of the total U.S. export of
fertilizers; 37 percent of the total exports of
railway transportation equipment; and 31 per-
cent of U.S. exports of iron and steel mill
products.

Our figures on the geographic distribution
of foreign aid procurement indicate that Massa-
chusetts has shared significantly in this busi-
ness. Incomplete figures show that, since Jan-
uary 1962, AID has financed the procurement
of well over $20 million worth of commodities
from Massachusetts producers. Moreover, AID
technical services contracts in Massachusetts,
in effect as of March 31, 1964, totaled over $19
million.

I should like to stress very strongly a point
which, I take it, should be obvious. The market
demand I have just been describing — ^that is,
the market demand financed by foreign aid ap-

AUGUST 10, 1964

207

propriations — is inherently temporary. None
of us want to see foreign aid extended for any
country a moment longer than is necessary.

Whether these temporary markets turn into
permanent ones depends primarily on the effec-
tiveness with which American businessmen
follow up the opportunities thus opened to
them. If they ship under the foreign aid pro-
gram to less developed countries first-class mer-
chandise; if they follow along with stocks of
spare parts and supplies; if they establish
marketing and service arrangements — in short,
if they apply in the less developed countries
the same vigorous competitive practices they
follow in the United States, then they can look
forward to solid and growing markets abroad.
If, however, they take the opposite attitude and
sit back and wait for the follow-on orders to
arrive, I am sure they will be disappomted.
There are plenty of energetic salesmen from
Germany, France, Britain, Japan, striving to
obtain business in the less developed countries.
American businessmen can compete with them —
but not just by sitting in an office on Route 128.

Accordingly, I urge the businessmen in this
audience and throughout the United States who
are now enjoying or who would like to take
advantage of export markets under the foreign
aid program to consider themselves in a tem-
porarily fortunate position. These are oppor-
tunities which, if vigorously pursued, can open
many doors and generate a great deal of trade
in the future.

Balance of Payments

The final point I should like to emphasize
this noon relates to the other side of the trade
coin. As any businessman knows, the United
States can export only to people who can afford
to pay for exports. People who want to import
from the United States must be in a position
to obtain dollars with which to pay for those
imports. Trade is a two-way street.

There has been a good deal of concern ex-
pressed from time to time that if we help other
countries expand their economies this will harm,
not help, the United States. The evidence is
overwhelming that this fear is unwarranted.
Year after year since the end of World War II,
the economies of Europe and Japan have grown

steadily stronger. Simultaneously, year after
year, U.S. exports to those countries and to
other parts of the world have grown — and have
stayed well ahead of U.S. imports.

The balance-of-payments problems of the
United States have not reflected an adverse bal-
ance of trade. Quite the contrary, our favor-
able balance of trade has remained substantial ;
it has exceeded $4 billion in each of the last. 4
years. We have had, and continue to have, a
difficult balance-of-payments problem, but this
reflects tlie extent of our desires and commit-
ments in the world. We want to fuiance a large
volume of investment abroad, large tourist ex-
penditures, and large military and other gov-
ernment outlays abroad — and our favorable
trade balance has not been large enough to cover
all those requirements. A number of steps have
been taken to meet this situation, and the U.S.
balance of payments looks a good deal healthier
today than it did 3 or 4 years ago.

The lesson to be derived from this experience,
however, is not to turn our backs on the policies
of economic expansion around the world which
we have been following since the Second World
War. Quite the contrary, the record of these
last 20 years has demonstrated that the U.S.
economy is amply strong and healthy enough
to hold its own in a competitive world. U.S.
exportei-s have been steadily increasing their
volumes, and U.S. investors have been steadily
expanding their interests abroad. American
businessmen who apply the ideas being discussed
at this conference — the best and most modem
ideas about research, about marketing, about
modernization — can be confident of their ability
to operate successfully in an expanding and
growing world economy.

We in the United States have much to gain
from a dynamic international economic policy.

In the narrowest terms of economic self-
interest, it is to our advantage to open up sources
of raw materials we do not ourselves have, to
find sources of more economical supplies for
items for which we are high-cost producers,
and to transfer our workers into industries
where productivity is greatest and wages can be
highest. It is to our own interest to invest
our capital overseas when it can j-ield com-
petitive returns. In short, our economy is
strong enough and competitive enough to reap

208

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ill practice the rewards of the expansion of the
market and the division of hvbor which econo-
mists have been preacliing since the days of
Adam Smith.

But tliere are broader reasons whicli require
us to support an expansionist international
economic policy. Tlie bulk of the world's
population is living today under conditions of
hunger, disease, and poverty which are a shame
and a reproacli to a world blessed with modem
science and technology. It is not simply a
matter of sound business for us to help
overcome those conditions. It is also a matter
of fundamental humanitarian concern — and a
matter of our own national security in the
broadest sense of that term. For we cannot
expect to have the kind of stable and progres-
sive world in which free institutions can sur-
vive and flourish unless the people of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America can look forward
to economic and social progress, earned by their
own work in independence and self-respect.

Consequently, the task of modernizing primi-
tive economies can and should be thought of
as part of the great effort to extend the free
society. And the efforts of American exporters
and investors to advance their own competitive
interests by providing better values in the
market place are an integral part of the process
of international development on which our own
future depends so heavily.

Major difficulties confront us in seeking to
achieve international development. Resources
are unevenly distributed. Population growth
rates are high. Moscow and Peiping seek to
frustrate free and democratic development.
But the strong interests of the United States —
and of free men everywhere — impel us to stick
to the job. I am confident we can succeed.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Rafael Sancho-Bonet as Deputy Chief of Protocol,
effective July 29. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 337 dated July 23. )

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna oonvention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and supplementar.v protocols.
Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into
force September 30, 19til. TIAS 4891.
Accessioti deposited: Japan, April 28, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon te.9ts in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Peru, July 20, 1964.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into
force June 1, 1928 ; for the United States March 6,
1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Trinidad and Tobago, May 14, 1964.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of in-
dustrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2,
1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London
June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done
at Lisbon October 31. 1958. Entered into force Jan-
uary 4. 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification of accession: Trinidad and Tobago,
July 1, 1964.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles.

Ef-

fected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17,
1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964.

Panama

Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace
corps program in Panama. Effected by exchange of
notes at Panama October 30, 1963.
Entered into force: July 6, 1964.

Turkey

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17,
1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964.

' Not in force.

AUGUST 10, 1964

209

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, except in the case of free publications, which
may ie obtained fnym the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Status of the World's Nations (Revised). A concise
reference guide, second in a series prepared by The
Geographer, giving official nomenclature, area, popula-
tion, and capital city of all independent states. In-
cludes some quasi-independent states and "irregular
categories." Geographic Bulletin No. 2 (Revised).
Pub. 7573. 22 pp. 250.

Foreign Affairs Outline— 1965 : International Coopera-
tion Year. Article based on an address by Harlan
Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs, before the Conference
Group of U.S. National Organizations for the United
Nations at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7638. International
Organization and Conference series 52. 5 pp. 50.

Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet de-
scribing the history, functions, and goals of the Depart-
ment. Pub. 7644. Department and Foreign Service
series 124. 16 pp. 150.

The Making of Foreign Policy— An Interview With
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, vrith minor
editorial changes, of a television program first broad-
cast on January 12, 1964, on which Secretary Rusk
answered the questions of Professor Eric F. Goldman of
Princeton University. Pub. 7658. General Foreign
PoUcy series 190. 33 pp. 20(*.

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Text
of an address made by President Johnson at the Pan
American Union on the occasion of the installation of
Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as chairman of the Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.
Pub. 7669. Inter-American series 87. 12 pp. 150.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963. Six-
teenth annual report to the United Nations on the ad-
ministration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963. Pub. 7676.
International Organization and Conference series 53.
279 pp. $1.

America as a Great Power. Pamphlet based on an ad-
dress made by President John.son before the Associated
Press at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7688. General Foreign
Policy series 193. 22 pp. 15<t.

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. Article by Under Secretary
George W. Ball, based on a speech made before the
Omicron Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va. Pub.

7690. Inter-American series 88. 22 pp. 150.

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 6 — United States Policy
in Viet-Nam. Article based on an address by Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the James For-
restal Memorial Awards dinner of the National Secu-
rity Industrial Association at Washington, D.C. Pub.

7691. Far Eastern series 125. 8 pp. Limited
distribution.

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 7— The Alliance for Prog-
ress. Article based on an address by Thomas C. Mann,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
before the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs at
Washington, D.C. Pub. 7697. Inter-American series
89. 6 pp. 50.

Visas — Abolition of Fees. Agreement with Yugo-
slavia. Exchange of notes — Dated at Belgrade
December 30, 1963, March 27 and April 4, 1964. En-
tered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5564. 3 pp. 5i.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of the Congo — Signed at L4opoldville April 28,
1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. With ex-
change of notes. TIAS 5565. 14 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo-
slavia — Signed at Belgrade April 27, 1964. Entered
into force April 27, 1964. With exchange of notes.
TIAS 5566. 9 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade April

27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. With
exchange of notes. TIAS 5567. 7 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade April

28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. TIAS

5568. 4 pp. 50.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of
February 4, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Signed at La Paz April 27, 1964. Entered into force
April 27, 1964. TIAS 5569. 4 pp. 50.

Indus Basin Development Fund. Agreement with
Other Governments, supplementing the agreement of
September 19, 1960 — Signed at Washington March 31,
and April 6, 1964. Entered into force April 6, 1964.
TIAS 5570. 6 pp. 50.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo-
slavia, amending the agreements of January 5, 1955;
November 3, 1956 ; December 22, 1958 : April 28, 1961 ;
and December 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Belgrade April 15, 1964. Entered
into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5571. 6 pp. 50.

Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of
Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Republic of
China — Signed at Taipei April 23, 1964. Entered into
force April 23, 1964. TIAS 5572. 15 pp. 100.

Corrections

Bulletin of June 29, 1964. p. 098: The bot-
tom line in the left-hand column should read,
"but defined his policy of the 'good neighbor'
as :".

Bm,LETiN of July 13, 1964, p. 56: The last
sentence in the first full paragraph in the right-
hand column should read, "But at least it pro-
vides a means for the two countries to work
out useful arrangements regarding future border
difficulties."

210

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX Avgust 10, 1964 Vol. LI, No. 1311

Africa. American Policy in Africa (Fred-
ericks) 197

American Principles. Some Thoughts on the
Conduct of P''oreign Policy (Rusk) .... 185

American Republics

OAS .\i)iiroves Rio Treaty Measures Against

Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174

President Praises OAS Action Condemning

Cuban Aggression 184

Atomic Energy. U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield Nu-
clear Device Underground in Nevada . . . 193

Australia. U.S., New Zealand, and Australia
Reaffirm Ties of Friendship (Rusk, Holyoake,
Hasluck) 194

Aviation. Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks

With Canada Concluded 188

Canada. Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks

With Canada Concluded 188

Cuba

OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against

Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174

President Praises OAS Action Condemning

Cuban Aggression 184

Department and Foreign Service. Designations

(Sancho-Bonet) 209

Economic Affairs. The New Implications of In-
dustrial Competition (Bell) 205

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President

Speaks to American Field Service Students . 189

Europe. NASA and Western Europe Agree on
Scientific Satellite Project (memorandum of
understanding) 203

Foreign Aid. The New Implications of Indus-
trial Competition (Bell) 205

International Organizations and Conferences

OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against
Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174

President Praises OAS Action Condemning

Cuban Aggression 184

Malaysia. Prime Minister of Malaysia Visits
Washington (texts of greetings, toasts, and
joint communique) 190

New Zealand. U.S., New Zealand, and Aus-
tralia Reaffirm Ties of Friendship (Rusk,
Holyoake. Hasluck) 1^

Presidential Documents

President Praises OAS Action Condemning

Cuban Aggression 184

President Speaks to American Field Service

Students 189

Prime Minister of Malaysia Visits Washington . 190

Protocol. Saneho-Bonet designated Deputy

Cbief 209

Publications. Recent Releases 210

Science. NASA and Western Europe Agree on
Scientific Satellite Project (memorandum of
understanding) 203

Treaty Information

Current Actions 209

N.VS.V and Western Europe Agree on Scientific
Satellite Project (memorandum of under-
standing) 203

Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks With

Canada Concluded 188

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield
Nuclear Device Underground in Nevada . . 193

'Name Index

Bell, David E 205

Fredericks, J. Wayne 197

Hasluck, Paul 106

Holyoake, Keith J 195

Johnson, President 181, 189, 190

Rahman, Tunku Abdul 190

Rusk, Secretary 174, 185, 194

Sancho-Bonet, Rafael 209

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: July 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office

of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,

20520

No.

Date

Subject

*331

7/20

U.S. participation in international
conferences.

*332

7/20

Program for visit of Prime Minister
of Malaysia.

333

7/22

Rusk: meeting of OAS foreign

ministers.

*334

7/22

Program for visit of President of
Malagasy Republic.

i335

7/22

Cleveland: "The Fraternity of the

Impatient."

*336

7/23

Knox sworn in as Ambassador to
Dahomey (biographic details).

*337

7/23

Sancho-Bonet designated Deputy
Chief of Protocol (biographic
details).

338

V/24

Second round of air talks with
Canada concluded.

t339

7/23

Harriman : Eastern Canadian
American Assembly, Quebec.

*340

7/24

Cultural exchange (Turkey).

*341

V724

Rusk: death of Mrs. Richard I.
Phillips.

*342

7/24

Program for visit of President of
Malagasy Republic.

ted.

* Not prin

tHeld for

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

^^^

THE

DEPARTMENT

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LI, No. isn

August 17, 196^,

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE
Address hy Secretary Rv^h 2H

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 31 £21

THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND LEADERSHIP
IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

hy Under Secretary Harriman 237

U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL AIEETS AT GENEVA
Statements hy Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland
and U.S. Representative Franklin H. Williams 241

For index see inside back cover

The Pursuit of Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk ^

It is a very genuine personal pleasure for me
to join you in celebrating the 50th anniversary
of the founding of the American Field Service.
From its beginning in 1914 as a volunteer am-
bulance service with the French armies, through
its active service with the Allied armies in the
Second World War, and — most of all — during
the postwar years in which it initiated and de-
veloped a splendid high school student ex-
change program, the American Field Service
has devoted itself to promotmg understanding
and friendship among the peoples of the world.

When you began your teenage exchange pro-
gram by bringing 50 students to this country
for the school year 1947-48, probably not many
people foresaw how rapidly that program would
grow. But it is one of the glories of our society
that if one plants a good idea, or a sound insti-

" Made at the 50th anniversary dinner of the Ameri-
can Field Service at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 2 (press
release 355 dated Aug. 1). For the text of remarks
made by President Johnson at the White House on
July 20 to a group of American Field Service exchange
students, see Bitlletin of Aug. 10, 19G4, p. 189.

tution, thousands of willing hands will come
forward to tend and nurture it. To have
brought more than 16,000 yoimg people from
some 65 comitries into schools and homes m more
than 2,000 American communities, and to have
enabled nearly 10,000 young Americans to study
and live with families abroad — these are very
substantial accomplislmaents. These are among
what Raymond Fosdick has caDed "the infinity
of threads which bind peace together."

Many of you here tonight are among this
great corjjs of international ambassadors.
Others of you represent the even larger number
of persons, here and abroad, whose contribu-
tions have been indispensable to the program's
success : parents, host families, school and com-
munity representatives, and volvmteer workers.
And beyond all of you stand millions of other
people in this country and elsewhere who have
been touched by this program, if only by getting
acquainted with a student from abroad, in
school or in a neighbor's home.

Many of us in the Department of State and
our overseas posts have a close working re-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1312 PUBLICATION 7721 AUGUST 17, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Seriricea, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and Interested
agencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other offleers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is included concerning treaties
and International agreements to which
the United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial In the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $10 ;
foreign .$15 : single copy, 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19,
1961).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and Items contained
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin
is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

214

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lationship with your organization and have
tried to give you as much assistance as possible.
I shall not attempt to add to your chairman's
tribute to Stephen Galatti. The American
Field Service was fortunate to have as its Di-
rector General for nearly 30 years a man of his
vision, wisdom, and gentleness. We all regret
that he could not have lived to take part in this
anniversary celebration, for which he had
planned and prepared for more than a year.
Surely we can all agree that his most fitting
memorial will be tlie continuation of this great
progi'am and our devotion to the ideals he be-
queathed to us.

A World of Peace and Brotherhood

Stephen Galatti was working to acliieve a
world m which all mankind can live together
in peace and brotherhood. That kind of world
is the abiding dream of the American people
and the ultimate goal of their foreign policy.

The primary objective of our foreign policy
is, in the familiar but ever-stirring phrase, to
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." In earlier days we could
do that by keeping ourselves apart from the rest
of the world ; we felt relatively safe behind our
ocean ramparts. But today we can be safe only
to the extent that our worldwide environment
is safe. Our worldwide environment will be
permanently safe only if men succeed in estab-
lishing a decent world order, the kind of world
order set forth in the preamble and articles 1
and 2 of the United Nations Charter : a world
of independent nations, each free to choose its
own institutions, but cooperating with others,
a world in which all international disputes are
settled by peaceful means, a world subject to
the rule of law.

To arrive at such a decent world order is the
the overriding preoccupation of our foreign
policy. And if all governments were agreed
on that goal, we could rapidly attain it. But,
unhappily, there are powerful forces which do
not want that kind of world, which seek to
dominate and regiment all of mankind.

The great issue of our time is which of these
two concepts of a world order will prevail : free-
dom or coercion. And here let me say again
something I have said on several occasions : The

Communist goal, proclaimed in doctrine and
supported in action, is world domination. Both
of the mam branches of the Communist move-
ment have the same goal — even though they
may di ft" er over tactics. They have made it clear
that by "peaceful coexistence" they mean a con-
tinuing attempt to spread their system over the
earth by all means short of the great war which
would be self-defeating. No one has to convince
us the contest between freedom and Communist
imperialism is for keeps. For this struggle is
our first order of busmess in the State Depart-
ment. And it must never cease to be our first
order of business until a worldwide victory for
peace and for freedom has been secured.

Our pui'pose must be to win that victory with-
out a great war if possible. We will defend our
vital interests, and those of tlie free world, by
whatever means are required. But a military
orgy is not a rational path to a decent world
order of free men. No sane man could regard
the incineration of most of the Northern Hemi-
sphere as a triumph for freedom.

Several Main Lines of U.S. Policy

In moving toward a world in which both
peace and freedom are secure, we pursue simul-
taneously several main lines of policy.

We seek to prevent the Communists from ex-
panding their domains. The primary purpose
of our military forces is to make resort to force
by our adversaries unprofitable, dangerous, and
futile. In the last 31^ years our nuclear deter-
rent has been greatly amplified and a substan-
tial part of it made relatively invulnerable to
attack. Our military power is almost literally
unimaginable. So is the devastation which
would result in even a few hours of all-out war.

In difiicult situations it is easy to say that we
should either have a big war or should quit.
There have been many clashes since the Second
World War that could have mushroomed into
a third world war if sobriety had not exercised
a restraining influence. It is important that
our allies remain assured both that we are loyal
and determined in our common commitments
and that our military forces are directed and
controlled by steady hands.

We must maintain not only a formidable
nuclear deterrent but other types of military

AUGUST 17, 1964

215

force. We have in fact strengthened substan-
tially our conventional forces and given them
more mobility. In addition, we have improved
our capacity to help our allies in dealing with
aggression by guerrilla warfare and the in-
filtration of arms and military men across na-
tional frontiers.

We are very gratified by the decisions taken
by the foreign ministers of the American Re-
publics at their meeting which ended a week
ago today.^ They voted to sever diplomatic
relations with Castro's Cuba — as most of them
already had done. They decided to break trade
relations between the American Republics and
Cuba, except for foodstuffs and medicine and
medical equipment. And they decided to inter-
rupt sea transportation between the American
Republics and Cuba.

These decisions were the response of the
American Republics to Castro's efforts to de-
stroy democracy in Venezuela. They made it
clear, we think, that Castro has no future in
this hemisphere or in Cuba. We believe that
the Cuban people welcome these measures
against a regime which has betrayed them and
prevents them from enjoying their close tradi-
tional ties with the other peoples of this
hemisphere.

In Southeast Asia we have taken further
steps to assist the Government and people of
South Viet-Nam to repel the Communist ag-
gressors. The defeat of this aggression is es-
sential to the security of Southeast Asia and
as a demonstration that Communist expansion
by guerrilla warfare, infiltration of weapons,
and military men cannot succeed.

Next door, in Laos, we support the govern-
ment of Prince Souvanna Phoiuna and are in-
sisting upon full compliance with the Geneva
accords of 1962,' which have been flouted by
Hanoi and Peiping. The essence of those ac-
cords is very simple: Let everyone leave the
Laotians alone and let them work out their
own future for themselves — independent,
neutral, and secure.

We also support the cause of freedom by
helping the developing countries to move ahead

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk and text of
the Final Act, see ihid., Aug. 10, 19G4, p. 174.
" See p. 218.

economically and to overcome the social and
political problems wliich feed discontent. And
we do what we can to help settle disputes
within the free world.

Search for Means To Reduce Tensions

Meanwhile, we search for means of reducing
the danger that hostility between the two worlds
may lead to a general war. The Soviet leader-
ship appears to recognize a common interest
with us in preventing a mutually destructive
thermonuclear exchange. We liave managed
to reach a few limited agreements with Moscow.
And we should like to reach more — although
little progress in controlling arms is possible
without reliable inspection and verification.

We are not justified in relaxing our efforts in
the slightest. But we shall continue to search
earnestly for further useful agreements. As
President Johnson has said : "Our guard is up,
but our hand is out." *

There is another important element in our
policy toward our divided world. It is to give
the ordinary people of the world a chance to as-
sert their concern for peace. This is why we
are encouraged by signs of growing interest in
more national autonomy and more personal
freedom among Communist countries, by move-
ment away from seclusion and toward more nor-
mal contacts between their peoples and the
peoples of the free world.

Economic problems are evident throughout
the Commimist world. Failures in food pro-
duction are endemic and obviously are not
quickly curable under collective systems of agri-
culture. Industrial growth has slowed down.
The gap in living standards between their sys-
tem and the more advanced coimtries of the
free world is growing wider. But their peoples
aspire to a better life and are asking for per-
formance on the promises made to them for so
long. This rising consumer demand is requir-
ing careful decisions about the allocation of
limited resources. Naturally, we would rather
see them put more resources into improving
the living standards of their peoples than into
the promotion of their world revolution.

The Communist world is also torn by a great

* Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 607.

216

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETDT

dispute between Moscow and Peiping and by
strong national impulses among their smaller
members. Most of the Eastern European na-
tions are increasing their trade and other con-
tacts with the West.

These are not dramatic changes, but they are
movements toward a little more national — and
personal — freedom of action and expression.

We think it would be very shortsighted not to
recognize these trends and do what little we can
to encourage them. We do not tliink it is in
the interest of the United States or the cause of
freedom to insist that all people who bear the
Communist label are alike or that there is no
possibility of evolution within that world.

There is another interest, shared around the
world despite the deepest differences, which
deserves our attention. It arises from the con-
frontation between frail man and a hostile
universe. This is a struggle in which all men
are potential allies. It is the struggle against
disease, natural catastrophe, the assault of na-
ture upon our food and other requirements. It
lays the basis for cooperation in medicine,
meteorology, the basic sciences, the peaceful
exploration of outer space, the desalinization of
sea water. These are enterprises which hold
out large practical benefits for all mankind as
well as the hope that slowly and steadily the
common interests of the race can take control
over the tendency of man to destroy himself.

Thus our policy toward the Communist states
has several facets : to halt aggression, to reduce
the danger of a great war, to encourage evolu-
tion toward more open societies, and to find ele-
ments of common interest based upon the human
condition.

Building Free-World Strength

At the same time, we are building the
strength of the free world. We are expanding
and improving our partnerships with other
economically advanced nations of the free
world — with Western Europe, Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, and others.

We are helping less developed coimtries to
move ahead economically and socially toward
human dignity and political stability. There
are more than 80 of these coimtries, and they
contain nearly half the world's population.

The economically advanced countries are too
strong and healthy and prosperous for the
Communists to seize by force or subversion.
Therefore they are addressing themselves to
the less developed countries. They have emu-
lated our foreign aid programs with substantial
resources. And the leading Communist slogan
is "Yanks, go home." By that they mean not
only our military forces but our foreign aid
programs.

Foreign aid remains, as it has been throughout
the postwar period, an indispensable instrument
of our foreign policy. We would wish to help
these coimtries even if there were no such thing
as a cold war. But the Communist threat
makes our aid imperative if freedom is to sur-
vive and ripen in vast areas of the world. And
surely it is better to save freedom by helping
new nations to get on their feet than to wait
until it can be saved only by committing Amer-
ican youths to combat.

Another of our constant objectives is the
strengthening and improvement of international
institutions — some regional, some specialized,
and, most important of all, the United Nations.
Early this year, I suggested some ways for im-
proving the procedures of the United Nations
General Assembly and making it a more re-
sponsible body.^ The United Nations com-
mands our continuing support. As President
Jolmson said to the General Assembly last De-
cember : ^ ". . . more than ever we support the
United Nations as the best instrument yet de-
vised to promote the peace of the world and
to promote the well-being of mankind."

"Unpartisan" Nature of U.S. Policies

These basic policies I have been talking about
are in no sense partisan. They have been de-
veloped and supported over the postwar years
by leaders of both parties — by four successive
Presidents, by the major presidential candidates
in four successive elections, by leaders of both
parties in Congress, and by the American
people. They have been national policies — bi-
partisan or, as the late Senator Vandenberg, one
of their chief architects, preferred to put it,
"unpartisan."

' /6((f., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112.
• Ibid., Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

AUGUST 17, 1964

217

The United States Senate ratified the United
Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2. NATO,
the Eio Pact, ANZUS, SEATO, and our other
alliances were ratified by overwhelming bi-
partisan votes. Aid to Greece and Turkey, the
Marshall Plan, our foreign aid programs over
the years, have been voted by bipartisan majori-
ties. The test ban treaty was approved by the
Senate by a vote of 80 to 19.

Over the years these national policies have
produced good results. The winds of freedom
are blowing strong. The simple ideas and
ideals to which we are committed are shared by
men and women around the globe — the ideas
and ideals of freedom, of human rights, of gov-
ernment with the consent of the governed, of
the sort of world projected in the United Na-
tions Charter. We have more allies in this
struggle than we sometimes think. As the
Prime Minister of Malaysia [Tunku Abdul
Raliman] said the other evening in Washing-
ton : '

It may be fashionable for some people or leaders of
some countries to find fault with America, but this is
the price of greatness which America has to pay.
You should realize that deep, really deep down, in
their hearts . . . most Asian nations, except the Com-
munist, have the highest regard, the highest respect and
admiration, for your country.

A few nights earlier the Minister for Ex-
ternal Affairs of Australia [Paul Hasluck]
said : *

... I'd like every American ... to realize that
... we are greatly touched and we are moved in the
depths of our being by both the realism and the
resolution with which the postwar United States of
America has accepted the burdens of leadership of the
free world. We know it's not an easy task. ... No
American can hope to be 100 percent popular around
the world. No American can expect to receive grati-
tude around the world.

Britain went through this sort of thing in the last
century — the berated power, the power that was always
denigrated, the power that was always scoffed at, but
the power that kept the peace of the world. And it's
part of your burden, not only to do the great things
which you are doing in all quarters of the globe but to
have the fortitude and the strength of your own prin-

' In remarks made on July 22 at a dinner given by
Secretary Rusk in the Prime Minister's honor. For an
exchange of greetings and toasts and a joint communi-
que with President Johnson, see ibid., Aug. 10, 1964,
p. 190.

' Ibid., p. 196.

ciples to endure the misunderstanding and, with
patience, to survive the misrepresentation which seems
to be always the fate of great powers.

Not all our friends are so outspoken. But, as
the Prime Minister of Malaysia indicated, down
in their hearts most people in the world under-
stand, respect, and share what America stands
for. They know and trust the decent commit-
ments and intentions of the American people.
Most of them want the kind of world we want —
not because we want it but because they want it
too.

U.S. Supports Preconditions
for Conference on Laos

Following is the text of a U.S. statement
handed hy Secretary Rush on July 30 to Soviet
Charge d''Af aires G. M. Komlenko., together
ivith a Soviet statement handed to Under Secre-
tary Ball on July 26 hy Mr. Komienho.

U.S. STATEMENT OF JULY 30

Press release 349 dated July 31

The Government of the United States shares
the concern of the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics over the deteriorating
situation in Laos, as expressed in tlie Soviet
statement handed to the United States Govern-
ment on July 26.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the
United States Government placed great store in
the understandings regarding Laos reached by
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev
at Vienna in June 1961 ' and the Geneva Agree-
ments on Laos which followed.^ The United
States Government believed that peace could be
restored to Laos if foreign interference were
ended there and the people of that country were
left alone to work out tlieir own destinies on the
basis of a policy of neutrality. The Geneva
Agreements provided a sound basis for such a
policy and placed responsibility upon the Inter-
national Control Commission and the Co-Chair-
men of the Geneva Conference to see to it that
the parties lived up to their obligations.

' Bulletin of June 26, 1961, p. 999.
= Ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

218

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

From the very beginning, however, the Pathet
Lao and North Viet-Nam, backed by the Chinese
Communists, refused to comply with their obli-
gations. North Vietnamese military forces
were not withdrawn from Laos under ICC
supervision. North Viet-Nam continued to use
and, indeed, increased their use of Laotian terri-
tory to infiltrate military personnel and supplies
into South Viet-Nam. The Pathet Lao, with
North Vietnamese support, have repeatedly
violated the cease-fire, most recently in their un-
provoked attacks against and seizure of neutral-
ist positions on the Plain of Jars, which were the
subject of a report to the Co- Chairmen by the
International Control Commission dated Jime
20. The Pathet Lao has refused to cooperate
with the International Control Commission and
with the Government of National Union.

These repeated violations of tlie Geneva
Agreements have occurred in the face of the
special responsibility which Article 8 of the
Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality
of Laos places on the Co-Chairmen to exercise
supervision over the observance of the Agree-
ments. At the same time, the International
Control Commission has been unable effectively
to deal with these violations largely because of
the refusal of the Pathet Lao to allow the Com-
mission to exercise free access to areas under
Pathet Lao control and also the failure of its
Polish member to participate in the Conunis-
sion's activities in a positive mamier.

The Soviet Government's statement makes
certain allegations regarding United States ac-
tivities in Laos which are contrary to fact. The
United States withdrew all 666 of its military
advisory personnel from Laos under ICC super-
vision in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of
the Geneva Protocol. In the face of the ag-
gressive attacks launched by the Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese in May on the Plain of
Jars in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agree-
ments, the United States responded to Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's request for as-
sistance by initiating reconnaissance flights.
These flights were undertaken to obtain infor-
mation not otherwise available as to the inten-
tions and dispositions of the attacking forces in
view of the forced withdrawal of the Interna-
tional Control Commission from the Plain of
Jars and the imminent threat which the attacks

posed to the whole of Laos including the Gov-
ernment of National Union and the entire
Geneva settlement.

Not only did the United States not support
the military coup attempted in April, but it
took inmiediate and effective steps to support
the Government of National Union under Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma. The United
States Ambassador in Vientiane worked in close
harmony with the Soviet Ambassador at that
time ; and the attitude and actions of the United
States Government with respect to the at-
tempted coup are well known to the Soviet
Government.

The United States continues to exert every
effort to resolve the Laotian problem by peace-
ful means in accordance with the 1962 Agree-
ments. In this connection, the United States
Government participated in consultations at
Vientiane called for by Prime Minister Sou-
vanna Phouma imder j^aragraph 4 of the Dec-
laration on the Neutrality of Laos.^ The
United States regrets that the Soviet Govern-
ment did not join in those consultations. In
addition, as the Soviet Govenmient will recall,
the United States has given its support to the
proposal of the Polish Government for diplo-
matic talks among the Lao parties, the Co-
Chairmen and members of the International
Control Commission. The United States Gov-
ernment has been disturbed to note the rejec-
tion of these proposals by the Pathet Lao, the
North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists.
The United States continues to believe that a
preliminary conference of the general type sug-
gested by the Polish Goverimient offers the best
hope of dealing with the current problems on
the diplomatic level.

The United States Government notes that,
in its statement, the Soviet Government pro-
poses the convening of an international con-
ference on Laos in August. As the Soviet Gov-
ernment is undoubtedly aware. Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma, in a communique of May
24, 1964, addressed himself to a similar pro-
posal. In his statement, the Prime Minister ex-
pressed a willingness to attend such a conference
if, first, a cease-fire were effected in Laos under
International Control Commission supervision

' For text of a joint communique released at Vien-
tiane on June 29, 1964, see ibid., July 20, 1964, p. 88.

AUGUST 17, 1964

219

and the Pathet Lao withdrew from those areas
which it illegally occupied by virtue of its May
attacks. The United States Government be-
lieves the position of the Prime Minister is
justified and fully supports this position.

In sum, the United States Government re-
mains of the view that the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ments provide a sound basis for resolution of
the Laotian question. Wliat is needed above
all is compliance with those Agreements by
those who have thus far ignored their commit-
ments. Nevertheless, the United States is pre-
pared to attend a conference such as that
proposed by the Soviet Government if Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's preconditions are
met and it is thus demonstrated that there is
some reason to believe that such a conference
may serve a useful purpose.

Department or State,
Washington, July 30, 196^.

SOVIET STATEMENT OF JULY 26

Unofficial translation

In connection with the continued deterioration of
the situation in Laos the Soviet Government, as one of
the parties to the Geneva accords on Laos, feels obli-
gated to call the attention of all the states which are
parties to the above-mentioned accords to the following.

Lately it has become increasingly obvious that cer-
tain states have embarlsed on a course of flagrant
intervention in the internal affairs of Laos and viola-
tion of the Geneva accords, which, as is well knovra,
obligate the states which are signatories thereto to
respect the Independence and neutrality of Laos.

Contrary to the Geneva accords the United States
has left its military personnel and various military and
semlmilitary organizations and services in Laos, con-
tinuing to give unilateral military aid to the reaction-
ary forces of the country. With the support of the
United States these forces carried out a military coup
in Vientiane last April, which brought about an ex-
treme aggravation of the domestic political conditions
In the country and paralyzed the operation of the coali-
tion government, the establishment of which was in
Itself an advance on the road to realization of those
principles which are laid down in the Geneva accords.
As a result there arose the threat of a complete break-
down of the accords signed at Geneva.

In flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Laos,
United States aircraft are conducting reconnaissance
flights above the territory of the country and are ex-
posing to bombing and bombardment the areas con-
trolled by the Pathet Lao. The numerous representa-
tions made by the Soviet Government, as co-chairman

of the Geneva Conference on Laos, to the Government
of the U.S.A., with an apiJeal to discontinue interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of Laos and violations of
the Geneva accords, have not achieved their purpose.
In spite of the repeated representations of the co-
chairmen, resumption of negotiations between the three
political forces of Laos for a peaceful settlement in
the country in accordance with the Geneva accords
has still not been implemented.

The Soviet Government was the first to support the
proposal of Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of
Cambodia, for convening a new international confer-
ence of 14 states concerning Laos. Considering the
tense situation in Laos, the Soviet Government pro-
posed that such a conference be held at Geneva in
June 1964. However, the proposal for calling a con-
ference at that time has not met with the support of
the U.S.A. and certain other states.

Under various unfounded pretexts the proposal of
the Polish People's Republic for conducting consulta-
tions with the participation of the three political forces
for the purpose of planning a new international con-
ference on Laos has also been rejected.

The Soviet Government can no longer reconcile it-
self to such a situation when the Geneva accords on
Laos are thwarted, when certain states, which have
signed the accords, evade the discussion of the danger-
ous situation in Laos which has been created and
which threatens the peace and security not only of
that country but of the entire area of Southeast Asia
as well. Such a position is also dictated by the fact
that in the situation thus created the co-chairmen of
the Geneva Conference have been placed in a false
position, preventing them from fulfilling the functions
imposed upon them.

The Soviet Government therefore addresses a pro-
posal to the governments of all countries which signed
the Geneva accords on Laos to convene in August of
this year an international conference of 14 states on
Laos to discuss urgent measures which would insure
a peaceful settlement in Laos in accordance with the
Geneva accords of 1962, strict and unswerving ful-
fillment of these accords by all the states concerned.
Such a conference could be held in Geneva or in another
city acceptable to all the participants of the confer-
ence. This new proposal has been dictated by the sin-
cere desire to contribute to the implementation of
the Geneva accords.

For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared, just as
before, to contribute to the efforts directed toward
expediting the convening of the said international
conference. A negative attitude toward this proposal
on the part of other states will place the Soviet Gov-
ernment in a position where it will be compelled to
consider in general the question of the possibility of
fulfillment by the Soviet Union of the functions of
co-chairman, since under the conditions of gross and
systematic violation of the Geneva accords by certain
states, the role of co-chairmen loses all useful signifi-
cance and becomes fictitious.

220

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 31

Press release 350 dated July 31

Secretary Rusk: I would like to note that
our friends of the Oxford-Cambridge tennis
team are my guests here this afternoon. We
welcome them and hope that they will enjoy
their visit to this country.

I am pleased to hear that the Senate today
gave strong bipartisan approval to legislation
which permits us to fulfill our obligations under
the International Coffee Agreement.^

The passage of this legislation is important,
both to the American consumer and to coffee-
producing countries in Latin America as well as
in other places.

The good health of the coffee industry is a
key factor in the economic and social progress
of 30 countries in Latin America, Africa, and
the Far East. In Latin America alone it
accounts for more than 50 percent of the
exports of 6 Latin American nations.

Great hardship has been suffered by coffee
consumers and producers alike because of the
wide fluctuations in coffee prices in recent years.
In 1954, for example, the price rose above 90
cents. The present price is around 47 cents,
which is approximately average over the last
lb years.

The Coffee Agreement will not raise coffee
prices. A recent rise was due to a major crop
failure of the Brazilian production. But wliile
it will not raise prices, it should narrow the
price swings. It should bring stability to Latin
American economies and protect the American
consumer against skyrocketing prices.

Thanks to the positive action by the Senate
and similar favorable action earlier by the
House of Kepresentatives, the United States

* For background, see Butletin of Aug. 6, 1962, p.
234; Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667; Jan. 27, 1964, p. 143; and
Mar. 23, 1964, p. 459.

will soon be able to cooperate fully to make the
International Coffee Agreement a success.
Your questions, gentlemen.

Consistency in Main Lines of U.S. Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Goldwaterh state-
ments, rightly or wrongly, have been widely
interpreted abroad, particularly in the press
abroad, as indicating there would be consider-
able change in U.S. foreign policy were he
elected. This press comment presumably re-
-flects to some extent ofjicial feelings abroad. I
am wondering if you could tell us whether this
hampers or inhibits the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy in the next few months, particularly on
projects of a long-range nature.

A. Well, we have not yet entered the most
active part of the campaign and public dis-
cussion, so the details of policy are yet to be
clarified.

I have no doubt that our friends abroad will
be watching our discussions here and in the
course of our election with the greatest of in-
terest, because what happens here is of con-
siderable importance in many, many countries
in other parts of the world. But this is a deci-
sion which we are making here at home our-
selves, as Americans. This is our decision.
And this is not something that our friends
abroad can make for us.

I don't anticipate in these next several months
any significant change in our foreign policy.
Tlie main foreign policies of the United States
are those that are adopted and approved by the
people of the country and their leaders, in the
broadest sense on a bipartisan basis. I think
that if we were to bend those policies in any
significant way the American people would bend
them back in the course of our discussion.

ATJGTJST 17, 1964

221

I suppose that there may be certain questions
quite apart from the character of the debate in
our own country, the nature of the discussion,
of a long-range sort which could be affected by
the fact that we are in an election period. But
at the moment I could not give examples of such
matters.

Our job is to get on with the national busi-
ness. And there has been a remarkable con-
sistency in the main lines of policy since 1945.
And my own personal responsibility is to get
on with that job during this 2 or 3 months'
period ahead of us.

Q. Mr. Secretary., hut isn't the point of the
questions that have been raised the fact that,
while there ha^ been in the past, ever since
World War II, a basic bipartisan trend of
United States foreign policy, in this case the
opposition candidate is cormnitted to basic
changes in that policy?

A. Well, I think that is something which
may emerge in the course of the public discus-
sion in the months ahead. But nevertheless,
I think the main lines of American policy are
well known and have very strong support
throughout the country and on a bipartisan
basis. And I would not expect major devia-
tions from those well-established policies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the Republican
critics have suggested that as a government we
would be more successful in diplomati-c nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union if we adopted a
tougher stance. For example, it has been sug-
gested that, if we used our diplomatic relations
with Russia as a threat, we might extract con-
cessions or advantages for the United States.
What do you think of this approach?

A. Well, where our vital interests and the
vital interests of our allies are concerned, the
United States is just as tough and just as stub-
bom as is necessary to protect our vital inter-
ests. And that has been, I think, eminently
demonstrated time after time.

I think we ought to bear in mind that when
the other side considers that their vital interests
are at stake, they are going to be stubborn, too.
And I think it would be unrealistic to suppose
that they will roll over and play dead on the
basis of anything that we say and do that might
affect their vital interests.

Now, the problem arises where there are con-
flicts of interest. These have to be approached
with care and persistence in an attempt to re-
solve the conflict or to work out some basis on
which these two parts of the world can live to-
gether. This is why, after the signing of the
nuclear test ban treaty last year, we have at-
tempted to find other points where some ad-
vance, small or large, could be made. These
efforts have not been marked with great success.
But nevertheless the effort has to be made.

But we ourselves would not yield to pressures
against our vital interests or threats against our
vital interests. We have to be cautious about
supposing that others would do the same.

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, the South Yietnajnese to-
day are accusing the Red Chinese of having
directed a strike involving North Vietnamese
regulars against a hmrdet in the Mekong Delta.
What is this Government's information about
that involvement?

A. I haven't seen any information to that
effect in any of the reports that have come to
me. I do see the daily operation reports. I
have seen the ticker to which you refer. But
I have had nothing at all from Saigon in that
matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection would
you care to give los an assessment of General
[Nguyen'] Khanhh first 6 months in office in re-
gard to the progress or othenoise of the war in
South Viet-Nam?

A. I think that in his first 6 months he took
over a very difficult situation with imagination,
with vigor. He was a very capable field com-
mander, when he himself was a corps com-
mander, and he has injected new energy into
the military effort against the "Viet Cong.

He has had to reorganize his government, both
in Saigon and in the provinces in some detail.
That has taken some time. In any such trans-
fer of responsibilities — there has been perhaps
some confusion, but that is being worked out.
I think he understands the broad-scale nature
of the pr