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Given By 










%hh - 19o5 

Vol. LI, Nos. 1306-1331 

July 6-Dec. 28. 1964 




of Issue 






1- 36 





37- 72 


























































of Issue 



































































Corrections for Volume LI 

The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call 
attention to the following errors in Volume LI : 

July 13, page 56: The last sentence in the first 
full paragraph in the second column should read 
"But at least it provides a means for the two 
countries to work out useful arrangements re- 
garding future border difficulties." 

September 7, page 338: The paragraph begin- 
ning at the top of the righthand column should 
read "Now, we have had a continuing prog^ram of 
assistance to Indonesia. Because of Indonesia's 
policy of what they call 'confrontation' with 
Malaysia, the volume. . . ." 

October 19, page 551: The first line of the 
third full paragraph should read: "Between April 
and August 1959. . . ." 


Publication 7917 

Released November 1965 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printlns Office, 
Washington, D.C., 20402 -Price 30 cenU 


Volume LI: Numbers 1306 - 1331, July 6 - December 28, 1964 

Abel, Elie, 268, 394, 616 

Abu Simbel, temples of, 645 

Acheson, Dean, 441 

Adebo, S. O., 827 

Advisory Commission on International Educational 

and Cultural Affairs, 485 
Africa (see also individual countries) : 
Communist economic and educational aid (Rusk), 

East Africa, sigrnificant developments (Williams), 

Economic Commission for, U.N.: Rusk, 501; 

F. H. Williams, 251 
Newly developed nations: 

Economic and social progress (Rusk), 499 
Problems of: Rusk, 499; Williams, 41 
Potential wealth (Williams), 51 
Propaganda (Williams), 733 

Technical aid program increased (Williams), 920 
U.S. assistance programs: Harriman, 332; 

Hutchinson, 915; Rusk, 500 
U.S. principles (Harriman), 330 
Volta Dam project (Duke), 343 
Agency for International Development: 
Aid to underdeveloped countries: Bell, 376; Free- 
man, 383 
Brazil, U.S. loan under Alliance for Progress, 59 
Foreign aid program: 

Annual report, 1963 (Johnson), 675 
Financial assistance to credit institutions: Dil- 
lon, 878; Glaessner, 881 
Widening programs in housing, agriculture, and 
cooperatives (Glaessner), 883 
Growth of (Mann), 479 
New markets for U.S. products (Bell), 207 
Review of accomplishments (Dillon), 880 
Services encouraging investment of private capital 

abroad (Rusk), 651 
Two forms of institution building (Hutchinson), 
Aggression : 
Communist attack on U.S. destroyers (Johnson), 

259, 260, 261 
Philippines, effect of armed attack against, 632 
Southeast Asia, U.S. response to: Johnson, 79, 

262, 300; McNamara, 265; Rusk, 264 
U.S. Congress, joint resolution, 268 

Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas pro- 
grams (see also Food for Peace) : 
Agreements with: Chile, 168, 861; Congo 
(Leopoldville), 453, 493; Ecuador, 690; 
Greece, 294, 861; Guinea, 294, 894; Indonesia, 
390; Iran, 102, 646, 894; Israel, 69; Korea, 
69; Paraguay, 494; Tunisia, 168; United 
Arab Republic, 168, 494; Viet-Nam, 294, 646; 
Yugoslavia, 798 
Public Law 480, importance of (Rusk), 426 
Agriculture : 

EEC bargaining problems (Herter), 119 
Farmer ownership of land (Freeman), 387 
Imports, appendix to tariff schedules (proclama- 
tion), 122 
Role in economic development: Bell, 376; Free- 
man, 383, 387; Rostow, 664; Rusk, 574, 651 
Trade in agricultural products, Europe (Rusk), 
766, 769 
Agriculture, Department of, role in world rural 
development: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383; Rusk, 
AID. See Agency for International Development 
Air Force, Army, Naval missions, U.S., agreement 

with Chile, 762 
Air navigation and transport. See under Aviation 
Aircraft. See Aviation 

Airmail, universal postal convention (1957) provi- 
sions re : Algeria, 34 ; Kenya, 833 
Ajavon, Robert, 461 
Al-Sowayel, I. A., 461 

Food for Peace program (Harriman), 332 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 325, 390, 452, 832 
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress 
Alliance for Progress: 

Accomplishments and rate of progress: Harriman, 
884; Johnson, 705; Mann, 479, 597, 706, 898; 
Rostow, 310; Rusk, 851 
Aid in development of financing institutions 

(Dillon), 878 
Brazil, U.S. loan agreement, 59 
Ceremony opening exhibits at Pan American 

Union (Mann), 305 
Chile, technical assistance projects (Rusk), 635 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council 

review of progress (Mann), 898 
Joint communique (Johnson-Orlich), 81 



Alliance for Progress — Continued 

Principles and purpose: Bell, 823; Harriman, 885; 
Mann, 479; Rostow, 306; M. W. Williams, 748 
Problems confronting: Mann, 594; Rostow, 308 
Social security, 7th inter-American conference on 

(Merriam), 320 
Structure of (Rostow), 307 
U.S. delegations, 859 

U.S. views and support: Bell, 823; Harriman, 
885; Johnson, 804; Mann, 595; Rusk, 852 
America Illustrated, USIA publication, 909 
American Field Service, remarks to students (John- 
son), 189 
American governments, change in attitude toward 

Cuba (Rusk), 175 
American Republics. See Latin America and Organi- 
zation of American States 
American States, Organization of. See Organization 

of American States 
American Veterans of World War II and Korea, 

traditional policy of (Rusk), 362 
AMVETS. See American Veterans of World War 

II and Korea 
Andean Indian Program, scope of (Tubby), 741 
Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie, 78 
Anderson, Robert B., 54 
Antarctic treaty: 

Inspections under (Rusk), 403, 406 
U.S. views (Johnson), 402 
Antarctica : 

Agreements on conservation of flora and fauna: 

Entry into force, 34; South Africa, 646 
Research and exploration 1961-1964, under Ant- 
arctic treaty, 404 
Anti-Semitism, U.N. action urged (Williams), 421 
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) Council 
Announcement of, 43 
Policy toward Southeast Asia, 146 
Remarks (Rusk), 194 
Apartheid : 

U.N. condemns apartheid, resolution, 33 
U.S. views: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree, 
761 ; Williams, 53 
Arab-Israel dispute (Talbot), 703 
Argentina : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144 
Trade negotiations proposed, 369 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 566, 925 
Armaments (see also Disarmament, and Nuclear 
Weapons) : 
Control and reduction of (Timberlake), 413 
Cost of maintaining world freedom (Duke), 346 
Development and changes since 1950 (Rusk), 363 

Comparison (Hughes), 8 
MRBM buildup (Rostow), 41 
Armed forces: 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 
Armed forces 

Armed Forces — Continued 
Treatment in time of war, Geneva conventions 
(1949), relative to: Jamaica, 605; Niger, 
Rwanda, Uganda, 134 
Armed forces, U.S.: 

Air Force, Army, Naval missions, agreement with 

Chile, 762 
Maintaining strategic advantage: Hughes, 8; 

Rusk, 215, 464 
Ships. See Ships and shipping 
Asea, Solomon Bayo, 582 

Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see aha 
ANZUS Council, Southeast Asia Treaty Organi- 
zation, and individual countries) : 
Asian views of U.S. (Rahman), 218 
Chinese Communists' nuclear strength, effect on 

security in Asia (Bundy), 616 
Communism, major problem in Asia (Bundy), 535 
Economic and social development, problems and 
progress in: Bundy, 534, 538; F. H. Williams, 
Far East: 

Economic and military changes since 1950 

(Rusk), 363 
U.S. encouragement for defensive alliances 
(Rusk), 363 
Newly independent nations, nationalism in 

(Bundy), 541 
Southeast Asia: 

ANZUS, review of position and stand in Asia 
and Pacific (13th Council meeting commu- 
nique) , 146 
Conferences, conditions for success (Rusk), 219, 

Geneva accords. See Geneva accords 
Neutrality, U.S. opposition (Bundy), 338, 339 
Soviet position and responsibilities (Rusk), 270 
U.N., resume of activity (Sisco), 58 
U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 278 
U.S. Military bases, importance of (Bundy), 

U.S. policy, views and position: Bundy, 334; 
Johnson, 259, 302, 632; Rusk, 216, 225, 227, 
235, 267, 268, 580; Stevenson, 273 
Atlantic alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organ- 
Atlantic Community (see also Atlantic partnership, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 
Common objectives (Johnson), 866 
Interdependence of Europe and America: John- 
son, 846, 868; Rostow, 39 
Political and economic problems (McGhee), 23 
Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin 

America (Rusk), 652 
Atlantic partnership: 

Need for a united Europe: Ball, 773; Rostow, 40 
Value of cooperation : Rostow, 42 ; Rusk, 768 



Atomic energy, peaceful uses of: 

Agreements re application of safeguards: Argen- 
tina, 925; Austria, 325; China, 566; Greece, 
69; IAEA, 69, 325, 326, 529, 566, 605, 925; 
Philippines, 529; Thailand, 605; U.S., 69, 
325, 326, 529, 566, 605, 925; Viet-Nam, 925 
Agreements re civil uses of: Argentina, 566; 
Brazil, 422, 762; China, 326; France, 453; 
Israel, 358; Philippines, 798; Portugal, 326, 
798; U.K., 102, 894; Viet-Nam, 326 
International cooperation, need for increased 
(Seaborg), 779, 786 
\ Prospects for growth of nuclear power uses (Sea- 
borg), 779 
Remarks (Johnson), 411 
Third International Conference: 
Progress reported (Seaborg), 519 
U.S. papers and exhibits (Seaborg), 408 
Atomic Energy Agency, International: 

Accomplishments and responsibilities (Seaborg), 

Research, training, and technical assistance pro- 
grams, review and U.S. contribution to (Sea- 
borg), 522 
Role of IAEA (Seaborg), 781, 784 
Safeguards system, 27; review (Seaborg), 520 
Senate confirms nominations to IAEA General 

Conference, 520 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 

Application of IAEA safeguards to the bilateral 
agreements : 

1955: China, U.S., 566; Philippines, U.S., 529 
1957: Thailand, U.S., 605 
1959: Austria, U.S., 325; Viet-Nam, U.S., 925 
1962: Argentina, U.S., 925 
1964: Greece, U.S., 69; U.S., 326 
Statute amended : Cameroon, 168 ; Kuwait, 893 
U.S. nuclear reactors placed under IAEA safe- 
guards, 27 
Atomic energfy information. See under North At- 
lantic Treaty 
Atoms-for-peace program (Seaborg), 782 
Australia : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 460 
ANZUS Council meeting, 43, 146 
Australian-American Educational Foundation, es- 
tablishment, joint announcement, 311 
Educational exchange agreement signed, 442 
Exchange of greetings (Holyoake, Rusk), 194 
Overseas Telecommunications Commission, 358 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 358, 390, 890 
Austria : 

Austrian assets agreement, administration of 

(Executive order), 60 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 325, 566, 690, 890 
(Reisepass only) 
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic 

Aviation : 

Air transport: 

Canada, renegotiation with, 188 

Civil air transport negotiations concluded with 

Mexico, 133 
Italy-U.S. begin consultations, 855 
Japan-U.S. consultation recessed, 313 
Aircraft, F-104G Starfighter, 21 
Soviet charges of U.S. overflights, exchange of 

notes, 483 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 
Air services transit agreement, international 

(1944): Somali Republic, 69; Rwanda, 133 
Air transport agreements with: India, 798; 
Italy, 253; Mexico, 357, 494; New Zealand, 
60, 69 
Aircraft : 

Convention for unification of rules, precau- 
tionary attachment of: Algeria, Senegal, 
Convention on international recognition of 

rights in: Algeria, 452 
Convention on offenses committed on board 

aircraft: Ireland, Spain, 797 
Double taxation on earnings from operation 
of, U.S.-Mexico agreement for relief of, 326 
Carriage by air: 

Convention (1929) for unification of certain 
rules re: Algeria, 390; Cuba (with reserva- 
tion), 797; Syrian Arab Republic, 390; 
Western Samoa, 422 
Protocol amending: Algeria, 390; Brazil, 797; 
Canada, 390; Mali, 422; Senegal, 797; 
Syrian Arab Republic, 390 ; Western Samoa, 
Civil aviation, international: 

Convention (1944) on: Malawi, 494; Zambia, 

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 
61 on sessions of ICAO assembly: Chad, 
France, Kenya, Somalia, 690 
Protocol amending article 50(a) re ICAO 
Council membership: Chad, Kenya, So- 
malia, 690 
Protocol re requests for extraordinary meet- 
ings: Austria, Chad, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, Jamaica, Kenya, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Somalia, Syrian Arab Re- 
public, 690 
U.S. International Aviation Month, 1964, procla- 
mation, 314 

Baird, Joseph M., 313 
Balaceanu, Petre, 305 
Balance of payments: 

Deficit, effect on economy (Mann), 595 

Latin America (Harriman), 886 

U.K., prospects for improving (Johnson), 848 




Balance of payments — Continued 

Effect of international travel (Mace), 888 
Status of and efforts to improve: Bell, 208; 
Dillon, 445, 753; Johnson, 751; Roosa, 669 
Ball, George W., addresses, remarks, and statements: 
Atlantic partnership, U.S. views, 626, 773 
Communism, lessening hold on bloc countries, 625 
Congo, rescue operations in, 843 
Cyprus, U.S. objectives, 301, 477 

Annual ministerial meetings of OECD, 847 
Economic policies of the U.S., 848 
Propositions fundamental to U.S. policies, 625 
Television interviews, 301, 843 
U.N., major roles of and factors affecting, 626, 

U.S., responsibilities as a global power, 473 
Barnett, Robert W., 586 
Barrenechea, Norberto, 144 
Battle, Lucius D., 110, 254 
Belgium : 

Congo, joint U.S.-Belgium rescue operations, 840, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 294, 452, 566, 797, 

861, 890 
Embassy in Viet-Nam proposed (Lodge), 435 

Bell, David E., 205, 376, 821 
Benton, William, 715 


Air access, U.S., U.K., France reaffirm rights of 
free access, 44, 368 

Berlin passes (McGhee), 141 

Germany-U.S. talks, summary, 849 

Soviet attitude (Rusk), 225 

U.S. position: 44; Ball, 773; McGhee, 871, 872, 
875; Rusk, 655 

Western position defined, tripartite agreement 
(June 1964), 44 
Bill of Rights Day, proclamation, 887 
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for 
unification of rules re: Algeria, 325; Peru, 894 
Black, Eugene, 441 
Blevins, Merrill M., 418 
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 369 
Bolle, Maarten, 334 
Bolivia : 

Passport agreement, 890 

U.S. renews relations, 901 
Bonsai, Philip W., 856 
Book burning: Rowan, 908; Rusk, 905 
Bradley, Omar, 441 
Branco, Castelo, 435 
Brazil : 

AID loan, 59 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144 

Economic progress (Rusk), 225 

"Kennedy Round", 369 

Brazil — Continued 

Supports U.S. attitude and actions in Maddoz 
attack (Branco), 435 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 566, 762, 797, 832, 
833, 861, 890 

U.S. support and friendship (Johnson), 436 
British Guiana, U.S.-U.K. agreement extending 

technical assistance, 134 
Brookhaven Research Reactors, 27 
Brosio, Manlio, 275, 673 
Brown, Ben Hill, Jr., 894 
Brown, Winthrop G., 254 
Bulgaria, 78 
Bundy, William P.: 

Chinese Communists' nuclear device, effect on 
security in Asia, 616 

East Asia, development of and U.S. policy, 534 

Indonesia, U.S. aid to, 338, 450 

Japan, role in Asia and U.S. policy, 536 

Southeast Asia, U.S. role in, 334 

Television interviews, 334, 616 
Bureau of Mines, U.S., 358 
Burma, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 530 
Business, parallel roles with diplomacy (McGhee), 

Butterworth, W. Walton, 170 

Calendar of international conferences and meetings 

(see also subject) , 28, 148, 355 

Neutrality, U.S. views (Bundy), 338 
Passport agreement, 890 

Poisonous chemicals, U.S. answers charges: Ste- 
venson, 319; Yost, 274 
U.N. Cambodia-Viet-Nam report, U.S. remarks 

(Stevenson), 527 
U. N. observers recommended to settle border prob- 
lem (Rusk), 270 
U.S. Ambassador (Kidder), confirmation, 134 
U.S.-Cambodia talks proposed, 856 
Cameroon : 

Railroad construction, 722 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 452 
Campbell, Persia, 313 
Campobello Park, 312, 390 
Camus, Albert (quoted), 347 
Canada : 

Columbia River Treaty: 

Canadian-U.S. cooperative development, 494 
Exchange of notes, 509 
Proclamation, 507 

Ratification ceremonies (Johnson, Pearson), 504 
Haines Road, winter maintenance, 926 
Issues exempted from interest equalization tax, 

Executive order (Johnson), 442 
Meetings : Johnson-Pearson, 504 ; Rusk-Martin, 472 
Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense (U.S.- 
Canada) 4th meeting, report of, 45 



Canada — Continued 

North Pacific fisheries, U.S.-Canada-Japan talks 

resumed (Johnson) , 441 
Overseas Telecommunication Corporation, 358 
St. Lawrence Seaway, supplementary toll agree- 
ment, and text of notes (Martin-Butterworth), 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 134, 169, 188, 358, 390, 

452, 494, 513, 530, 646, 890, 926 
U.S.-Canadian cooperation summarized (Harri- 

man), 237, 240 
Water levels and pollution studies by IJC re- 
quested, joint U.S.-Canadian, 598 
Captive Nations Week, proclamation, 63 
Carlson, Paul, 838, 839 
Castro, Fidel: 

Decline of Cuban economy under Castro (Mann), 

Efforts of American Republics to sever relations 

with (Rusk), 216 
Intervention in Venezuela (Rusk), 175 
Probable effect of sanctions on Castro influence 

(Rusk), 231 
Totalitarianism under (Mann), 550 
Use of subversive tactics (Mann), 551 
Castro, Raul H., 606 
CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 

Central America (see also individual countries) : 
AID assistance for development banks (Glaessner), 

Common Market, 81 

Sea-level canal site study approved (Johnson), 554 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, 

Ceylon : 

Educational exchange agreement signed, 443 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 453, 890 
U.S. Ambassador, confirmed (Lyon), 254 
Chad, international civil aviation, convention (1961) 

on, protocol amending art. 50(a) of, 690 
Charter of the United Nations. See United Nations 

Chase, Milton, 231 
Chemicals, poisonous, Cambodian charges : Stevenson, 

319; Yost, 274 

Development projects (Rusk), 634 
Maule River project (Rusk), 636 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 762, 861, 890 
China : 

U.N. representation, question of (Rusk), 772 
U.S.-Japanese views contrasted (Barnett), 590 
China, Communist (see also Communism) : 

Congo, interference in: Ball, 844; Harriman, 333; 

Rusk, 399 
Disarmament unlikely (Rusk), 772 
Geneva Accords, need for Chinese to conform 
(Rusk), 226 

China, Communist — Continued 

Gulf of Tonkin, attacks in (Rusk) , 269 

Military and political policies and problems 

(Bundy), 325, 535 
Nuclear device: 

Political Implications: Bundy, 536, 616; Johnson, 

611; Rostow, 40; Rusk, 614, 658 
Probable effect on Chinese economy (Rusk), 658 
U.S. views (Rusk), 614 
Nuclear test: 

Contamination of atmosphere (Johnson) , 612 
Probable trends of Chinese policy: Johnson, 612; 

Rusk, 615 
U.S. awareness of capability: Johnson, 612; 

Rusk, 542, 614 
U.S. defense commitments reaffirmed: Johnson, 

612,613; Rusk, 614 
U.S. military and other policy, as affected by: 
Bundy, 616; Johnson, 612; Rusk, 542, 614 
Southeast Asia: 

Aggression in: Bundy, 337; Rusk, 226; 466 
U.S. warnings (Rusk), 225, 772 
U.S. policy (Bundy), 536 

Viet-Nam, combat aircrafts in action in (Bundy), 
China, Republic of: 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 326, 925 
U.N. representation, question of (Rusk), 772 
Churchill, Sir Winston, 856 
Churin, Aleksandr I., 145 
CIAP. See under Alliance for Progress 
Civil rights: 

Africa judges U.S. by (G. M. Williams), 732 
U.S. dedication to cause of (Johnson), 78, 300 
U.S. steps to insure (F. H. Williams), 420 
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva convention 
(1949) relative to treatment of: Jamaica, 605; 
Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, 134 
Civilians. See Congo: U.S. hostages 

Cuba, U.S. nationals claims against, 674 
Greece, agreement for refunding certain indebted- 
ness to U.S., 134 
Rumania, final payment under 1960 agreement, 92 
U.S. nationals, agreement with Yugoslavia, 792; 

text of agreement, 830 
Vesting provision on American interests abroad, 
study requested, 675 
Clark, Bob, 231 

Classified information, agreement with Italy for safe- 
guarding, with annex for general security pro- 
ceedings, 294 
Classified patent applications, agreements re: Ger- 
many, 34; Sweden, 861 
Clayton, Will (quoted), 19 
Cleveland, Harlan, 351 
Coffee, international agreement, 1962: 

Current actions: Belgium, 168; Finland, 494; 
Ghana, 646; Luxembourg, 726; Venezuela, 566 



Coffee, international agreement, 1962 — Continued 
Importance and effects of (Rusk), 221 
Senate inaction (Rusk), 554 
Coffin, Frank, 722 
Cold war, changes in (Hughes), 7 
Collective security (see also Mutual defense) : 

Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. See ANZUS 

and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Japan-U.S. (Bundy), 536 
Not affected by Chinese nuclear capabilities: 

Bundy, 616; Johnson, 612, 613; Rusk, 614 
Western Hemisphere. See Organization of Ameri- 
can States 
Collisions at sea, international regulations for pre- 
Current actions, 452 

U.S.-Soviet exchange of notes re Soviet violation, 
Colonialism, U.S. policy: Harriman, 332; Rusk, 440 
Columbia : 

Passport agreement, 890 

Private Investment Fund, success of (Glaessner), 
Columbia River. See under Canada 
Columbia Storage Power Exchange, 613 
Columbus Day, 1964, proclamation, 597 
Commercial treaties. See Trade: Treaties 
Commodity trade problems. See Ag:riculture : Trade 

and individual commodity 
Common markets. See name of market 
Communications satellites (see also Radio and Tele- 
communication) : 
Global commercial communications satellite: 

Agreements establishing interim arrangements: 
Current actions : Australia, 253, 358 ; Belgium, 
253, 566; Canada, Denmark, France, 253, 
358; Germany, 253, 530; Ireland, 253, 605; 
Israel, 894; Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 253, 
358; Norway, 390; Portugal, 726; Spain, 
358; Sweden, 566; Switzerland, 253, 494; 
U.K., 253, 358; U.S. 253; Vatican City, 253, 
Statement, signing of agreements (Johnson), 348 
International conference on, 281 
Scheduled, 167 
Text of agreements, on interim arrangements, 

U.S. delegation named, 168 
India, proposed as site of ITU tracking station 

(Tubby), 745 
Syncom III (Plimpton), 757 
Japan-U.S. TV link: Johnson, 591; Rusk, Shiina, 
U.S. exhibits in Eastern Europe (Rowan), 910 
Communications Satellite Corporation, 281, 358 
Communism (see also China, Communist; Cuba; 
Sino-Soviet dispute, and Soviet Union: 

Communism — Continued 

Aggression and subversive activities (see also 
under China, Communist, Cuba, Geneva ac- 
cords) : Hughes, 14; Rostow, 39 
Southeast Asia (Rusk), 224, 235 
U.S. policy: Johnson, 259, 262; Rusk, 263, 267 
Constant threat of: Bell, 822; Harriman, 239; 

Rostow, 39; Rusk, 217 
Decreasing influence of: Ball, 625; Duke, 347; 
Harriman, 240; Johnson, 546; McGhee, 717, 
874; Rusk, 216, 233, 366, 465; Wright, 819 
Effect in shaping U.S. policy: Johnson, 611; Mc- 
Ghee, 874 ; Rusk, 235, 364, 366, 464, 618 
Economic theories, failure in practice: Freeman, 

386; Mann, 550; Rusk, 366, 467, 574, 850 
Failure to attract newly independent nations : Ball, 

695; Johnson, 646 
Laos, obligations of Communists (Rusk), 269 
Lessened hold on Eastern Europe: Hughes, 12; 
McGhee, 717, 874; Rostow, 39; Rowan, 908; 
Rusk, 465 ; Wright, 819 
Need to find points of agreement (Rusk), 222, 464 
U.S. policy and position (Rusk), 467 
Use "targets of opportunity" (Hughes), 14 
World, objectives : Ball, 625 ; Bell, 822 ; Harriman, 
238; Hughes, 7; Mann, 549; Rusk, 177, 215, 
235, 463 ; Stevenson, 919 
Conference of Nonalined Nations, 577, 680 
Conferences and organizations, international. See 
International organizations and conferences and 
Congo, Republic of the (Brazzaville), Chinese Com- 
munist embassy (Harriman), 333 
Congo, Republic of the ( Leopold ville) : 

Basically an African problem (Rusk), 428 
Communist involvement : Ball, 844 ; Harriman, 333 ; 

Rusk, 399 
Congo francs, U.S.-U.N., agreement, 494 
Government leaders and Chinese Communist in- 
fluence (Ball), 844 
OAU talks: 

Effect of (Rusk), 428 
U.S. cooperation, 563 
Problems and effect on development: Fredericks, 
199; Harriman, 332; Rusk, 428; Williams, 52 
Telecommunication services expanded (Tubby), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 453, 494 
Tshombe, Moise 

U.S.-Belgium rescue operations, 843 
U.S. views on his return: Ball, 844; Harriman, 
333; Rusk, 224 
U.N. aid (Harriman), 332 

U.S. hostages, negotiations re safety and rescue: 
Gbenye, 839; Godley, 839, 840; Rusk, 838; 
Stevenson, 840, 842; authorized by Congo 
(Tshombe), 843 



Congo, Republic of the (Leopoldville) — Continued 
U.S. position: Ball, 843; Johnson, 845; Steven- 
son, 840 
Withdrawal of rescue mission (Stevenson), 891 
U.S. policy: Fredericks, 199; Rusk, 224, 399, 400, 
428, 502 
Congress, U.S.: 
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 64, 
122, 147, 280, 317, 354, 407, 554, 600, 754, 
820, 857 
Foreign policy and regulation of international 

shipping, hearing (G. G. Johnson), 314 
House Committee on Banking and Currency: 
U.S. balance of payments, effect of interna- 
tional travel (Mace), 888 
Legislation : 

Cuban claims bill (H. R. 12259) signed, 674 
Food for Peace program extended, and disap- 
proval of two provisions (Johnson), 677, 678 
Sea-level canal site bill, approved (S. 2701), 

U.S. beef imports, disapproval of limitations 
(Rusk), 226 
Legislation, proposed: 

Appropriations asked, for U.S.-Mexico flood 

project, 544 
Coffee agreement, inaction regretted (Rusk), 

Immigration laws, revision urged (Rusk), 98, 

276, 471 
Indonesia, State Department opposes end of 
aid to (McCloskey), 313 
Presidential messages, letters, and reports. See 

under Johnson, Lyndon B. 
Southeast Asia: 

Congressional resolution signed (Johnson), 302 

U.S. measures to repel attack, text of joint 

resolution, 268 

Conservation of living resources of the high seas, 

convention on: Dominican Republic, 530; 

Uganda, 605 

Consular convention and protocol, agreement with 

Japan, 102, 168 
Consular relations, Vienna convention (1963) on 
and optional protocol: Tunisia, 209; Upper 
Volta, 566 
Consultants on world problems, panel members 

named (Johnson), 441 
Contiguous zone and territorial sea, convention 
(1958) on: Dominican Republic, 325; Uganda, 
605; U.S., 452 
Continental shelf, convention (1958) on the: Domin- 
ican Republic, 530 ; Uganda, 605 
Cook, Mercer, 134 

Copyright convention, universal (1952), and proto- 
cols 1, 2, 3: Guatemala, 390; New Zealand, 
Cook Islands, Tokelau Islands, 358 
Costa Rica: 

President, visit to U.S. and joint communique, 81 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 422 

Cotton textiles: 

Agreements with U.S. re trade in: Greece, 209, 
290; Hong Kong, 517; India, 530; Italy, 358; 
Spain, 69, 794, 798; Turkey, 209, 292, 358; 
Yugoslavia, 602, 646 
Long-term arrangements (1962) re international 
trade in: Finland, 494 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 818 
Court of Justice, International. See International 

Court of Justice 
Cowles, John, 441 
Creel, Robert C, 69 

Cuba (see also Castro and Org:anization of Ameri- 
can States) : 
Aggressive and subversive activities: Harriman, 
238; Hughes, 8, 14; Johnson, 81; Mann, 551; 
Rusk, 174, 175, 224, 325 
American Republics united front against (Rusk), 

178, 216, 232, 578 
Assets in U.S., study of vesting provision of 

claims bill requested (Johnson), 674 
Communism no benefit to (Rusk), 365 
Decline of Cuban economy under Castro (Mann), 

Exile government, U.S. position (Rusk), 398 
Intervention in Venezuela (Rusk), 174, 224 
Missile crisis, compared with present conditions in 

Viet-Nam (Rusk), 270 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 690, 797, 890 
U.S. position and views (Rusk), 852 
Cuban claims bill, purpose (Johnson), 674 
Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization, 

U.N., 253, 646 
Cultural property, convention (1954) and protocol 
for protection during armed conflict, Cyprus, 
Cultural relations and prog^rams (see also Educa- 
tional exchange) : 
Rural development in less developed nations, value 

of (Bell), 376 
Treaties, agreements, etc. 

Inter-American cultural relations, convention 

(1954) for promotion of, Costa Rica, 390 
UNESCO constitution, Kenya, 253 
Customs (see also Tariff policy) : 
Road vehicles, private, convention (1954) on tem- 
porary importation, Japan, 69 
Touring, convention re customs facilities : Tangan- 
yika and Zanzibar, 797 
Cyprus : 
Agreements re protection of cultural property, 

Basically a Turkish-Greek Cypriot problem 

(Rusk), 399 
Greeks expelled by Turks, caused by Cjrprus situ- 
ation (Stevenson), 564 
Increased importation of arms (Stevenson), 65 
Kjrrenia Pass situation (U Thant quoted), 65 
Passport agreement, 890 
Possibility of war spreading (Ball), 301, 477 



Cyprus — Continued 

Talks and joint communiques: Johnson-Inonu, 48; 

Johnson-Papandreou, 49 
U.N. efforts and role: 
Address (Rusk), 428 

Cease-fire resolution (Stevenson), 318, 561 
Peace-keeping force: 

Extension approved by Security Council 

(Stevenson), 65 
Financing (Stevenson), 562 
U.S. support (Yost), 563 
U.S. ambassadors, consultation with (Rusk), 428 
U.S. position and efforts for peace: Ball, 301, 477; 
Johnson, 299; Rusk, 399, 428; Stevenson, 65, 
561; Talbot, 703 
Czechoslovakia, convention (1962) on international 
civil aviation, agreement on protocol re amend- 
ment, 690 

Dahomey, U.S. Ambassador (Knox), confirmation, 

de Valera, Eamon, personal comments on (Duke), 

Dean, Arthur, 441 

Defense areas, U.S., agreements with U.K., 390 
Denmark : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 168, 253, 294, 358, 
452, 690 
Department of State. See State Department 
Desalination : 

Combination nuclear power desalting plants, 

future of (Seaborg), 521 
Importance (Johnson), 231, 723 
International symposium, 1965, announcement of 
first symposium and Secretary General 
(Blevins) appointed, 417 
Israeli-U.S. joint study: 

Report and recommendations, (Johnson), 231, 

724, 725 
U.S. representatives named, 231 
Nuclear desalting projects: 
Future of (Seaborg), 521 
New projects (Seaborg), 780 
Soviet-U.S. talks and agreements, 144, 828, 829, 

U.S. position on nuclear desalting (Seaborg), 
d'Estaing, Valery G., 323 
Detente (McGhee), 871 

Development loans (see also Foreign aid. Interna- 
tional Bank, and International Development 
Association), Brazil, 59 
Dillon, Douglas: 

Alliance for Progress, development of financing 

institutions, 878 
Balance of payments, 445, 753 
Expanding U.S. economy, 444 

Dillon, Douglas — Continued 

Recommends increased fund quotas to IMF, 446 
Diplomatic relations and recognition: 
Bolivia, relations renewed, 901 
Governments in exile (Rusk), 398 
Vienna convention (1961) and protocols: Ecua- 
dor, 832; Germany, 925; Japan, 133; Tunisia, 
168; United Arab Republic, 133; U.K., 529 
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign 

Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation 
of credentials: Argentina, 144; Australia, 460 
Brazil, 144; Honduras, 582; Luxembourg, 109 
Malawi, 369; Nepal, 869; Netherlands, 109 
Philippines, 144; Rumania, 305; Saudi Arabia, 
461; Togo, 461; Uganda, 582 
Disarmament (see also Armaments, Eighteen-Na- 
tion Committee on Disarmament, Nuclear 
weapons, and Outer space) : 
Chinese Communist position (Rusk) , 615, 772 
18-Nation Disarmament Committee. See Eighteen 

Nation Disarmament Committee 
Nuclear vehicle freeze proposed (Timberlake), 

Soviet position (Rusk), 615 
U.S. position (Hughes), 8 
Discrimination. See Racial discrimination 
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-19^5, 
Series D, Volume XIII, The War Years, June 
23-December 11, 1941, published, 833 
Dominican Republic, treaties, ag^reements, etc., 253, 

325, 530, 890 
Double taxation, U.S., agreements and conventions 
for avoidance of: 
Estates of deceased persons, Greece, 69, 134 

Japan (1954), 253, 326, 401, 422, 453 

Japan (1957), 253, 401, 422 

Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles (1954), 

253, 326, 566, 601, 606 
Philippines (1964), 601, 606 
Sweden (1939), 253, 326, 452, 453, 530 
Ships and aircraft, Mexico, 326 
Drugs, narcotic: 

Manufacture and distribution of: 

Convention (1961) limiting and regulating: 
Ruanda, 452; Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 253 
Protocol (1948) bringing under international 
control drugs outside scope of 1931 conven- 
tion: Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 762 
Opium, convention (1912) reg;ulating production, 
trade, and use of: Rwanda, 69 
Duke, Angier B.: 

Freedom's hopes and dilemmas, 340 
Protocol and peacekeeping, 736 
Dulles, Allen W., 441 
Dungan, Ralph Anthony, 894 
Dunne, Finley P. (quoted), 343 



East Africa Common Market, 53 
East-West relations {see also Europe, Eastern) : 
Germany-U.S. talks, summary of positions, 847 
Peripheral nature of (McGhee), 871, 872 
Trade relationships (Wright), 815 
Eban, Abba (quoted), 342 
ECA. See Economic Commission for Africa 
ECAFE. See Economic Commission for Asia and 

the Far East 
ECE. See Economic Commission for Europe 
ECLA. See Economic Commission for Latin America 
Economic and Social Council, U.N. : 
Documents, list of, 68, 132, 252, 452 
Human rights, U.N. role in protecting and ex- 
panding (F. H. Williams), 418, 787 
Purpose and role of: Cleveland, 241, 244; Steven- 
son, 814 ; F. H. Williams, 248 
Status of women in family law, report on U.N. 

seminar (Tillett), 128 
Suggestions for improving (Cleveland), 241 
Technical assistance program for 1965-1966 

(Williams), 920 
U.S. representative, confirmation (F. H. Wil- 
liams), 134 
Economic and social development (see also Eco- 
nomic and technical aid. Foreign aid programs, 
and Less developed countries) : 
Adjustments in economy, limiting conditions to 

(Roosa), 670 
Africa. See under Africa 
Asia, regional cooperation in (Bundy), 540 
Chile, programs for (Rusk), 634 
Effect of monetary cooperation on economic 

growth: Johnson, 848; G. G. Johnson, 711 
Factors of economic growth: Bell, 379, 823; G. G. 

Johnson, 714; Mann, 900; Rostow, 668 
Gains since 1950, contrasted with Communist 

economy (Rusk), 366 
Importance of development of underdeveloped 

areas, 151 
Interdependence of factors and need for balanced 

development: Bell, 823, 824; Rostow, 665 
Italy, recent changes in pattern of economy 

(Roosa), 672 
Japan, progress and problems (Bamett), 586 
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress 
Malnourished people, importance of care to 

(Duke), 344 
Netherlands, recent changes in pattern of eco- 
nomics (Roosa), 672 
Private investment, U.S. efforts to increase: Bell, 
207, 825; Johnson, 676; Rusk, 573, 651, 770 
Private sector, importance of: Harriman, 886; 

Mann, 901 
Social security conference (Merriam), 320 
Trade, U.S. efforts to increase: Freeman, 384; 

Rusk, 572, 770 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 
recommendations, 159 

Economic and social development — Continued 
U.N. science and technology progrrams, accom- 
plishments and promise (Stevenson), 812 
U.S. position and views: Bell, 376; Cleveland, 
246; Freeman, 383; Mann, 775; Rusk, 572, 
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries 
(see also Agency for International Develop- 
ment, Agricultural surpluses. Alliance for 
Progress, Economic and social development. 
Food for Peace, Foreign aid programs. Inter- 
national Bank, International Development Asso- 
ciation, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, and United Nations: Tech- 
nical assistance programs) : 
Africa, U.S. aid to (Hutchinson), 915 
Technical assistance program for 1965-1966 

(Williams), 920 
U.S. agreements with U.K., 134 
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., progress of: 

Rusk, 501 ; F. H. Williams, 251 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 

U.N., work praised (Williams), 250 
Economic Commission for Europe, U.N., primary 

tasks (F. H. Williams), 249 
Economic Commission for Latin America, U.N.: 
Progress of (F. H. Williams), 251 
Exports increased (Mann), 899 
Economic policy and relations, U.S. (see also indi- 
vidual countries) : 
Domestic economy: 

Favorable state of (Dillon), 444 

Important economic issues listed (Johnson), 751 

Interdependence of public and private needs 

(Stevenson), 811 
1964 gains (Johnson), 653, 848 
Results of trade liberalization policy on U.S. 

economy (Johnson), 752 
Waste, "war on" (Johnson), 653 
Foreign economic policy: 
Gross national product, free world and Com- 
munist, growth compared (Rusk), 366 
Role of U.S. in world economy (Rusk), 571 
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social Council, U.N. 
Ecuador, treaties, agreements, etc., 606, 690, 832, 890 
Education (see also Cultural relations and programs, 
and Educational exchange) : 
Africa. See Africa 
Foreign affairs. See Foreig:n Service Institute and 

National academy of foreign affairs 
Land-grant colleges, 376, 383 

Need in less developed countries: Bell, 376; Free- 
man, 383 
9% million teachers needed to meet UNESCO's 

goal (world-wide) (Duke), 347 
Role of educational systems (Rostow), 667 
Technological training needed (Rusk), 437 
Educational and cultural affairs, international: 
Technical assistance: 



Educational and cultural affairs, international — 

British Guinea, U.S.-U.K. agreement extending 

aid program, 134 
Value and type of U.S. assistance to less devel- 
oped countries: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383 
Educational exchange program, international (see 
also Cultural relations and Education) : 
Advantages and results (Battle), 110 
Advisory Commission, second annual report to 

Congress, 485 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: Australia, 311, 390, 
442; Ceylon, 443, 453; Paraguay, 726; Yugo- 
slavia, 831, 833 
Two-way value (Rusk), 438 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Constitution of: Iceland, 646; Kenya, 253 
Nubian temples, efforts to preserve, 645 
U.S. delegates to 13th session appointed, 715 
EEC. See European Economic Community 
Egypt. See United Arab Republic 
Eight-Power Working Group, preparation of MLF 

charter, 847 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: 

Conference (1964) accomplishments (Johnson), 

U.S. position and proposals (Foster), 123, 524 
El Salvador: 

Nuclear weapon test ban, agreement, 894 
U.S. Ambassador (Castro) , confirmation, 606 
Embassies : 

Belgian embassy opened in Viet-Nam (Lodge), 435 
Cuban, centers of subversion (Rusk), 232 

Damage to, and book burning deplored (Rusk), 

Embassy at Zanzibar converted to consulate, 91 
Engelhard, Charles W., 723 

ESRO. See European Space Research Organization 
Estates of deceased persons, avoidance of double 

taxation, agreement with Greece, 69, 134 
Ethiopia, 890, 894 
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community), 

agreement with U.S. (Seaborg), 785 
Europe (see also Atlantic partnership, European 
headings, individual countries, and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 
Central Europe, U.S. policies affecting (McGhee), 

871, 874 
Eastern Europe: 

Changing relationships with U.S.: Rostow, 39; 

Rusk, 107 
Effect on East-West trade (Wright), 817 
Factors contributing to growing independence: 
Hughes, 12; McGhee, 717, 874; Rostow, 39; 
Rowan, 908; Rusk, 465; Wright, 819 

Europe — Continued 

Radio Free Europe (Johnson), 876 

Tourism, long-range economic effects (McGhee), 

U.S. exhibits, reaction to (Rowan), 910 
U.S. policy (McGhee), 720 
Economic assistance, effect of U.S. aid: Johnson, 

676; Rusk, 363 
Economic development, role of U.N. Economic 

Commissions (F. H. Williams), 249 
Negotiations for political union, U.S. position 

(Rusk), 432 
Nuclear weapons, conditions for obtaining (Ros- 
tow), 41 
Shipping rates, reaction to dual rate contracts 

(G. G. Johnson), 315 
Unification, U.S. views and support (Rusk), 363, 

766, 768 
U.S. policy toward: Ball, 848; Johnson, 867 
Western Europe: 

Basic common interests with U.S. (Rostow), 38 

Economic rehabilitation (McGhee), 20 

Future involvement in world affairs (Rostow), 

Political relationships, changes in (McGhee), 19 
Soviet Union, continued threat (Rostow), 39 
European Atomic Energy Community agreement 

with U.S., 785 
European Common Market: 

Stimulated trade and economic growth: Duke, 341; 

McGhee, 22 
U.S. position on reciprocal concessions (Rusk), 769 
European Economic Community: 
Industrial exceptions list, U.S. postpones GATT 

talks, 754 
Internal bargaining problems (Herter), 119 
Political effects of (McGhee), 22 
U.S. interest and policy: Ball, 848; Johnson, 868 
European Space Research Organization, joint satel- 
lite agreement with NASA, 203; (text) 204 
Executive orders: 

Austrian assets agreement. Attorney General 

authorized to administer (11158), 60 
Canadian issues to be exempt from interest equal- 
ization tax (11175), 442 
Trade negotiations. Public Advisory Committee 
membership increased (11159), 92 
Executive Service Corp, International (Rusk), 651 
Export-Import Bank, Rumania, credit guarantees 

(Johnson), 26 
Exports (see also Imports and Trade) : 
Coffee. See Coffee 

Latin America, increases in (Mann), 899 
Recommendations by U.N. Committee on Trade 

and Development, 154 

Agricultural, need for expanding market (Free- 
man) , 384 



Exports — Continued 

Beef exports, disapproval of Senate legislation 

(Rusk), 226 
Efforts to encourage exports (Rusk), 770 
Expansion of: Johnson, 675; Rusk, 572 
Role of AID in creating new markets (Bell), 207 

Belgium, agreements re convention (1901) as sup- 
plemented, 294, 861 
Brazil, agreements re convention (1961) and pro- 
tocol, 832, 861 

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Inter- 
national Rice Commission, amended constitution 
of, Guatemala, 861 
Far East. See Asia 
Ferguson, Allen R., 855 

Finance Corporation, International (Rusk), 652 
Finland : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 452, 494, 566, 890 
U.S. ambassador, confirmed (Thompson), 254 
Fish and fisheries: 

Fishing and conservation of living resources of the 
high seas, convention (1958) : Dominican Re- 
public, 530; Uganda, 605 
Japan-U.S. king crab fishing agreement, 829, 861 
North Pacific fisheries : 

Negotiations Canada, Japan, U.S., resumed 

(Johnson), 441 
U.S. position on (Johnson), 441 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, protocol to inter- 
national convention (1949) re harp and hood 
seals: Denmark, 253; Portugal, 646; Spain, 
358; U.S., 69, 168 
Whaling convention (1946), international, amend- 
ments to schedule of, 646 
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N., Inter- 
national Rice Commission, amended constitution : 
Guatemala, 861 
Food-f or-Peace Program : 
Objectives and value: Harriman, 332; Johnson, 

677; Renter, 678; Rusk, 426 
Semiannual report summarized, second half fiscal 

year 1964, 678 
Undesirable provisions of 1964 bill (Johnson), 678 
Foreign affairs, consultants on: Johnson, 663; Rusk, 

Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also Agency for In- 
ternational Development, Economic and technical 
aid, and Peace Corps) : 
Africa (Hutchinson), 915 
Communism, weapon against (Rusk), 332, 573 
Liberia (Trimble), 914 
Need for and objectives: Bell, 205, 376, 380, 821; 

Harriman, 330; Rusk, 464 
Self-help, importance of: Bell, 206, 822; Mann, 596 
U.S. policy: Cleveland, 247; Hutchinson, 918; 
Johnson. 675 

Foreign aid programs of other governments: 

Belgium, aid to Congo, 332 

Compared with U.S. aid (Bell), 824 

Multilateral aid programs, need for continuance 
and expansion (Tubby), 746 

U.N. aid to Congo (Harriman), 332 
Foreign policy, U.S. (see also Historical summary, 
and under Communism) : 

Bipartisan nature: Johnson, 302; Rusk, 82, 
217, 221, 233, 234, 362, 397, 398, 399, 431, 
463, 578 

Congressional documents relating to foreign 
policy, lists, 147, 280, 317, 407, 554, 600, 754, 
820, 857 

Continuity and stability (Johnson), 653 

Flexible nature of (Hughes), 6 

Food-for-Peace program, eff'ects of (Johnson), 677 

Interdependence of all problems (Ball), 476 

Need for firmness (Rusk), 222 

Not subject to election-year pressures (Rusk), 
222, 576 

Presidential campaign, problems created by, 398 

Principles, objectives, and problems: Ball, 625; 
Bundy, 534, 541; Harriman, 330; Johnson, 
79, 508, 543, 545; Rostow, 306; Rowan, 907; 
Rusk, 3, 75, 215, 217, 234, 440, 498, 501, 557, 
559, 618, 656, 852 

Republican platform (Rusk) 233 

Responsibilities as a global power (Ball), 473 

Stabilizing element of post-war world (Rusk), 
Foreign Service (see also State Department) : 

Ambassadors, appointments and confirmations, 46, 
69, 101, 134, 254, 606, 894 

Marine Corps, working partnership (Rusk), 643 

USIA career Foreign Service officers part of FSO 
corps (Johnson), 663 
Foreign Service Institute, science and technology 

seminar, 674 
Foreign students in the U.S. (see also Educational 
exchange) : 

Malawi, 680 

University enrollments, (Battle), 116 
Foreign trade. See Trade 
Foreign travel to U.S.: 

Agreement extending certain foreign passports 
beyond expiration date: Australia, Austria 
(Reisepass only), Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany 
(Reisepass and Kinderausweis) , Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Korea, 
Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malagasy Re- 
public, Malaya, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 



Foreig:n Travel to U.S. — Continued 

U.A.R., U.K. (including Jersey and Guernsey 
and its Dependencies), Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Eastern Europe, encouragement of foreign travel 

(McGhee), 718 
U.S. efforts to encourage (Mace), 888 
Foster, William C. : 

Disarmament Conference, U.S. proposals at, 525 
Nuclear test ban, U.S. position, 526 
Nuclear weapons, proposed cutoflf of production of 
materials and delivery vehicles, 123 

Berlin, free air access right reaffirmed, 368 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 325, 358, 452, 453, 
690, 726, 890 
Fredericks, J. Wayne, 197 
Free World: 

Freedom, forward-moving process (Duke) , 344 
Growing prosperity, flexible use of power (Duke), 

Interdependence of (Ball), 476 
Problems and dangers confronting (Rusk), 467, 

U.S. building free-world strength : Ball, 473 ; Rusk, 
Freedom : 

U.S. policy toward victory for (Rusk), 463 
Universal need (Rowan), 907 

World-wide trend to national independence, essen- 
tials of (Duke), 340, 344 
Freeman, Orville L., 383 
Fulbright, Senator (quoted), 115 

Galatti, Stephen, 189, 215 

Gardiner, Robert, 251 

Gardner, John, 381 

GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general agreement on 

Gbenye, Christophe, 839 

General agreement on tariffs and trade. See Tariffs 

and trade, general agreement on 
General Assembly, U. N.: 
Accomplishments (Sisco),55 
Documents, lists of, 68, 252, 451, 828, 859, 921 
Financial crisis: 

Article 19, issues and implications: Rusk, 577; 

Stevenson, 687 
Basis of U.N. authority (Rusk), 576 
Congo operation (ONUC) (Stevenson), 682 
Legal and binding obligations of U.N. members: 

Rusk, 577; Stevenson, 687 
Middle East operation (UNEF) (Stevenson), 

No-vote agreement during discussions of consti- 
tution (Stevenson), 891 
Soviet position: Ball, 699; Rusk, 576; Stevenson, 

682, 683 
U.S. efforts toward solution (Stevenson), 688 

General Assembly, U.N. — Continued 

Financing of future peacekeeping operations (Ste- 
venson), 891 
19th Session: 

Provisional agenda, 491 
Supplementary list, 789 
Outer space, U.N. position and views, 757 
Soviet Union, world objectives (Stevenson), 919 
Geneva accords: 

ANZUS Council views, 146 

U.S. and Laos support and Communist nonsup- 

port, 4, 47, 216, 219, 223, 226, 262, 264, 430, 


U.S. position (Bundy), 337, 339 

Geneva, center of multiagency projects (Tubby), 740 

Geneva convention (1958) on the continental shelf: 

Dominican Republic, 530 
Geneva conventions (1949) relative to treatment of 
prisoners of war, wounded and sick, armed 
forces and civilians in time of war: 
Current actions: Jamaica, 605; Niger, Rwanda, 

Uganda, 134 
Violations against, in Congo, 846 
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen-Na- 

tion Disarmament Committee 
Germany : 

Berlin. See Berlin 

Foreign policy documents (1918-1945), volume re- 
leased by Department, 833 
Reunification : 

Tripartite declaration for German reunification, 

U.S. position: Ball, 773; Johnson, 543, 867; 
McGhee, 142, 871, 873 
Germany, Federal Republic of: 

All-German television network broadcast of Secre- 
tary Rusk interview, 106 
Franco-German relations improving (McGhee), 140 
Multilateral force, views, 575 
Non-military help to Viet-Nam promised (Lodge), 

Passport agreement (Reisepass and Kinderaus- 

weis), 890 
Rusk-Schroeder talks, summary of, 847 
Soviet charges against, U.S. disapproval of (John- 
son), 368 
Soviet-German talks, U.S. views (Rusk), 431 
Trade with Eastern Europe: McGhee, 720; Rusk, 

107; Wright, 819 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 530, 690, 894, 925 
U.S. views (McGhee), 138 
Ghana, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 646, 726 
Gilpatric, Roswell, 441 
Glaessner, Philip, 881 
Godley, G. McMurtrie, 839, 840 

Great Lakes, water levels and pollution studies by 
IJC requested, 598 



Greece (see also Cyprus) : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 134, 209, 294, 462, 

861, 890 
U.S. regrets expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul 
(Stevenson), 564 
Greenfield, James L., 389 

Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 861, 890 
Guinea, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 890, 894 
Gyani, General (quoted), 65 

Hague conference (1951) on private international 

law, statute on, U.S., 762 
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 79 
Harriman, W. Averell, addresses and statements: 

Africa, U.S. policy, 330 

Alliance for Progress, purpose and U.S. support 
for, 884 

Canada-U.S. common objectives in international 
field, 237 
Hasluck, Paul, 195 

Health (see also World Health Organization), medi- 
cal research (Rusk), 620 
Hensley, Stewart, 394 
Herbert, Nicholas, 334 
Herman, George, 614 
Herter, Christian A., 119 
Hightower, John, 394 
Historical summary: 

American independence: Johnson, 461; Rusk, 74 

Antarctica and Antarctic Treaty, 403 

Cold war, since World War II (Hughes) , 7 

Development of U.S. economic poKcy by Adams and 
Jefferson (Rusk), 571 

Pearl Harbor (Rowan), 906 

Post-war Europe (McGhee), 19 

State Department, established and named (Patter- 
son, Langley) , 370 

United Nations (Ball), 694 

U.S. social development (Mann), 775 

World in 1937 (Ball), 623 

World, since 1950, U.S. foreign policy (Rusk) , 363 
HoflFman, Paul, 441 
Holyoake, Keith J., 195 
Honduras : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 582 

Nuclear test ban treaty, 566 

Passport agreement, 890 
Hong Kong, cotton textile agreements with U.S., 517 
Hornig, Donald F., 145, 321 
■"Hot-line" (Rusk), 364, 368, 398 
Hughes, Thomas L., 6 
Human rights: 

Role of U.N. (Williams) , 787 

U.N. Social Committee accomplishments on (Wil- 
liams), 419 

U.S. position: Rusk, 75; Williams, 787 

Urgency of need for protecting (Williams), 418 

Human Rights Conference, proposed, U.S. view 

(Williams), 789 
Human Rights Day, proclamation, 887 
Human Rights Year, International (Williams), 787 
Hungary, growth of freedom under Wechsberg 

(Duke), 347 
Hutchinson, Edmond C, 915 

IAEA. See Atomic Energy Agency, International 
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction 

and Development 
ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICC. See International Control Commission 
Iceland, treaties, agreements, etc., 646, 861, 890, 926 
ICJ. See International Court of Justice 
ICY. See International Cooperation Year 
IDA. See International Development Association 
IPC. See International Finance Corporation 
Ikeda, Hayato, 26 
lUueca, Jorge, 54 

IMF. See Monetary Fund, International 
Immigration (see also Visas) : 

National-origin basis eliminated in proposed law 

(Rusk), 471 
Revision of current laws urged (Rusk), 276, 471 
Tonga, Kingdom of, quota set (proclamation), 443 
U.S. policy (Rusk): Asia, 278; Jamaica and 
Trinidad, 279 
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariff policy, 
U.S.; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; 
and Trade) : 
Agricultural, appendix to U.S. tariff schedules 

(proclamation), 122 
Cotton velveteen fabrics, agreement with Italy, 

Import-export trade gap in developing countries, 

U.S. imports, impact on American business 
(Rusk), 470 
Income, conventions for avoidance of double taxation. 

See Double taxation 

Chinese Communists' nuclear device, effect on mili- 
tary situation (Bundy), 616 
Effect of conditions in India and Pakistan on 

Southeast Asia (Talbot), 702 
Need for rural development (Bell), 376 
Nuclear energy, decision on use of (Rusk), 579 
Satellite tracking station project (Tubby), 746 
Soviet assistance promises overlap U.S. (Rusk), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 530, 690, 798, 890 
Indonesia : 
Agreement re agricultural commodities, 390 
Desirability of continuing U.S. aid, 313 
Malaysia dispute, need for peaceful settlement 

(Rusk), 429, 472, 579 
Requests for books, (Rowan), 909 
U.S. aid to (Bundy) , 338, 450 



Industrial exceptions list, GATT negotiations, 754 
Industrial property, convention (1883) for protec- 
tion of: Trinidad and Tobago, 209 
Inflation, causes and dangers (Mann), 594 
Information Agency, U.S. See United States Infor- 
mation Agency 
Information, classified, ag^reement with Italy re 
safeguarding, with annex for general security 
proceedings, 294 
Inonu, Ismet, visit to U.S. and joint communique, 

48, 49 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, 898 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza- 
tion, conference on, current action, Philippines, 
International Air Services transit agi-eement (1944) : 

Rwanda, 133; Somali Republic, 69 
International Atomic Energy Agency. See Atomic 

Energy Agency, International 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment, financial statement: 
Fiscal years 1964, 332 
First quarter, fiscal year 1965, 790 
International Control Commission, responsible for 

supervision of Geneva accords (Rusk), 4 
International cooperation : 

Effect of monetary cooperation on economic 

strength: Johnson, 848; McGhee, 22 
U.S. responsibility: Johnson, 80; G. G. John- 
son, 711 
Outer space programs (Plimpton), 755 
U.S. responsibility for and leadership in (Harri- 

man), 237 
Value of and necessity: Hughes, 16; Johnson, 
80; Rusk, 619; Tubby, 740 
International Cooperation Year (1965) : 

Cabinet committee and chairman named (John- 
son, Rusk), 857 
Proclamation, 558 
Scope of work (Stevenson), 813 
Statements: Johnson, 555; Rusk, 557 
International Court of Justice : 

Statute of: Malawi, Malta, Zambia, 894 
U.S. support and views (Rusk), 802 
Value of advisory opinions (Rusk), 803 
International Development Association, subscriptions 

for replenishment of resources, 119 
International Executive Service Corps, 651 
International Finance Corporation. See Finance Cor- 
poration, International 
International Hydrological Decade, plans for U.S. 

participation, 321 
International Labor Conference, 48th session, U.S. 

delegation, 67 
International law: 

Private international law, statute of Hague con- 
ference (1951) on, U.S., 762 
Role in world affairs (Rusk), 802 

International Monetary Fund. See Monetary Fund, 

International organizations (see also subject) : 
Calendar of meetings, 28, 148, 355 
Universal copyright convention, protocols 1, 2, 3: 
Guatemala, 390; New Zealand, Cook Islands, 
Tokelau Islands, 358 
International Rice Commission, amended constitu- 
tion, Guatemala, 861 
International Telecommunication Union: 
Congo, success of ITU efforts (Tubby), 745 
Present role and future problems (Tubby), 743 
Investment of private capital abroad : 

Expansion and efforts to encourage: Johnson, 

676; Rusk, 573, 770 
Guarantees, agreements re: Liberia, 690; Mali, 

294; Mauritania, 690 
Importance to less developed countries : Bell, 825 ; 
Rusk, 651 
Iran, treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 646, 894 
Iraq, 894 
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 452, 605, 

797, 890 
Iron Curtain, 819 
Israel : 

Arab-Israel dispute, U.S.-U.N. efforts at settle- 
ment (Talbot), 703 
Desalination : 

Report on joint U. S.-Israel survey, 725 
U.S. team named for desalination talks in 
Israel, 231 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 134, 358, 452, 797, 
890, 894 
Italy, treaties, agreements, etc., 34, 253, 294, 358, 

566, 855, 894, 925 
ITU. See International Telecommunication Union 
Ivory Coast: 

Passport agreement, 890 
Radio regulations, 926 

Jacobson, Jerome, 617 
Jamaica : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 494, 605, 690, 798, 

U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 278 
Japan : 

Civil air transport consultations, recessed, 313 
Economic and social development, progress in: 

Bamett, 587; Bundy, 538 
Income tax protocol enters into force with U.S., 

Japan-U.S. differences in dealing with communist 

world (Harnett), 589 
Japan-U.S. friendship and common views: Bar- 

nett, 586 ; Bundy, 538 
Japanese-Chinese common viewpoint (Barnett), 

King crab fishing agreement with U.S.: 
Joint announcement, 829 



Japan — Continued 

King crab fishing agreement with U.S. — Continued 

Remarks (Rusk, Takeuchi) and text, 892 
Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 358 
Korea, relationship to security of Japan (Bundy), 

537, 540 
North Pacific fisheries talks to resume (Johnson), 

Prime Minister Sato to visit U.S., 912 
Role as a major nation: Bamett, 586; Bundy, 539 
Scientific cooperation, U.S.-Japan committee on 

(Rusk), 61 
Security of, importance to U.S. (Bundy), 536 
Shipping regulations, position on (G. G. Johnson), 

Trade relations, U.S. and China (Bundy), 540 
Transpacific telephone cable (Johnson, Ikeda), 26 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 84, 102, 133, 168, 209, 

253, 326, 358, 390, 422, 452, 453, 861 
TV transmission by Syncom III satellite: John- 
son, 591; Rusk, Shiina, 592 
Japan, Research Institute of, 534 
Johnson, G. Griffith: 

Chairman, International Conference, Global Com- 
mercial Communications Satellite System, 
168, 281 
Statements : 

International economic cooperation, progress 

and prospects, 708 
Shipping and U.S. foreign policy, 314 
Johnson, Lyndon B.: 

Addresses, statements, etc.: 

Aggression and U.S. preparedness, 259, 260, 

262, 461, 653 
Alliance for Progress: 
Progress during 1964, 705 
U.S. views and support, 804 
American Field Service students, 189 
Atlantic community, interdependence of U.S. 

and Europe, 846, 866 
Atomic Energy, Third International Confer- 
ence on the Peaceful Uses of, U.S. technology 
and future, 411 
Chamizal settlement ceremony, 545 
Chinese Communists test first nuclear device, 

Civil rights, 300 
Columbia River Treaty: 
Ceremonies, 504 

Ratification, (Executive order), 509 
Communications satellite agreements signed, 

Communism, lessening influence of, 546 
Communist attack on U.S. destroyers, 259 
Congo, treatment and rescue of U.S. hostages, 

Cuban claims bill signed, study of vesting provi- 
sion requested, 674 

Cyprus, U.S. peace efforts, 299 

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 

Desalination : 

Importance, 60, 723 
Study requested, 230 

Disarmament Conference (1964) accomplish- 
ments (quoted), 524 

Domestic economy: status, gains, factors aflfect- 
ing, 653, 751, 848 

Food-for-Peace Program, 677 

Foreign Service officers, USIA, 663 

Galatti, Stephen, Presidential citation, 189 

Germany, U.S. desires reunification of, 543 

International cooperation, 508, 555 

International Cooperation Year (1965), cabinet 
committee named, 857 

Israel-U.S. desalination study, 724 

Japan, TV transmission link via Syncom III, 

Mexico-U.S. mutual friendship and support, 805 


Role of, 582, 584 

U.S. confidence in, 478 

North Pacific fisheries negotiations resumed, 441 

Nuclear test ban treaty, first anniversary, 228 

Nuclear war, dangers of, 458 

Nuclear weapons, U.S. position on use and con- 
trol, 460 

OAS action on Cuban aggression praised, 184 

Peace, U.S. efforts toward world peace, 298 

Peace Corps, need for enlarging, 735 

Personnel of highest caliber sought for inter- 
national agencies, 388 

Philippines, joint defense, 632 

Radio Free Europe, value to Eastern Europe, 

Ranger VII moon photographs sent to world 
leaders, 348 

Sea-level canal site study approved, 554 

Southeast Asia, U.S. position in, 302 

Soviet Union: 

Change in leadership, 610 

Water desalination, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. study 

considered, 60 
Weather information exchange agreement, 791 

Tariff commission study on stainless steel flat- 
ware requested, 63 

Trade liberalization, U.S. policy, 752 

United Kingdom: 

Balance-of-payments position, 848 
Labor Party victory, 613 

United Nations: 

19th anniversary, 697 
U.S. views and support, 303 

U.S. foreign policy, problems, goals, 79, 462, 
543, 545, 653, 663 

U. S. S. Sam Raybum commissioned, 877 

Viet-Nam : 

General Maxwell D. Taylor named ambassa- 
dor to, 46 



Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 

Viet-Nam — Continued 

Report on meeting with Congress and Gov- 
ernment officials, 432 
U.S. policy, 259, 260, 262, 299 

World problems, consultants, panel members 
named, 441 
Correspondence and messages: 

African Heads of State, conference of, grreet- 
ings and expressions of friendship, 147 

Brazil, mutual friendship and support, 436 

Brosio, Manlio, congratulations on election as 
NATO Secretary General, 275 

Churchill, Sir Winston, greetings on 90th birth- 
day, 856 

Japan, transpacific telephone cable linkage in- 
augurated, 26 

Labor, role in economic progress, 852 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, resignation as Ambassa- 
dor to Viet-Nam accepted, 47 

Malta, congratulations on achieving independ- 
ence, 503 

NATO, U.S. views and support, 673 

Nonalined Nations, Conference of, U.S. support 
for world peace, 581 

Wilson, Harold, congratulations on election as 
Prime Minister, 613 

Zambia, congratulations on achieving independ- 
ence, 722 
Executive orders. See Executive orders 
Foreign policy views of (Rusk), 107 
Meetings with: 

Brosio, Manlio (NATO Secretary General), 583 

Heads of State and officials of, remarks and 
joint communiques: Costa Rica, 81; Greece, 
49; Malagasy, 229; Malaysia, 190; Mexico, 
805; Philippines, 628; Turkey, 48; U. K., 902 

U Thant, 303 
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress: 

Agency for International Development, 1963 
annual report, 675 

Antarctica, international cooperation and U.S. 
policy, 402 

Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 261 

Europe, effect of U.S. aid to, 676 

Food for Peace report to Congress, 678 

Foreign assistance program report, fiscal year 
1963, 675 

Mexico-U.S. flood project, additional funds re- 
quested, 544 

NATO 144b agreement with U.S. approved, 
exchange of atomic information, 95 

Private industry, increased business abroad 
(1963), 675 

Rumania, credit guarantees for, 26 

Trade Agreements Program, 8th annual report, 

U.N., U.S. participation in, 349 
Proclamations. See Proclamations 

Johnson, Mrs. Lyndon B., Campobello Park cere- 
monies, 312 
Johnson, U. Alexis, 46 
Jordan, agreement re nuclear test ban treaty, 168 

Kalb, Marvin, 771 

Kashmir dispute (Talbot), 702 

Kennedy, John F. : 

Principles of (Cleveland), 248 
U.S. position on Ryukyus Islands, 536 
"Kennedy Round": 

Blumenthal holds talks in Latin American coun- 
tries, 369 
Opportunities for trade expansion: G. G. John- 
son, 712, 714; McGhee, 24; Rusk, 470, 767, 
Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia- 
tions, members appointed, 313 
Significance of concept (Rusk), 771 
Kenya, treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 325, 566, 690, 

Khanh, Nguyen: 

Leadership of, 394, 471 

Progress toward new provisional government in 

Viet-Nam (Taylor), 433 
U.S. attitude toward and support: Rusk, 222; 
Taylor, 434 
Khatri, Padma B., 869 
Khrushchev, Nikita S.: 

Dominant figure in Soviet policy: Johnson, 610; 

Rusk, 655 
Principles, as expressed in U.N. (Stevenson), 490 
Retirement, 657 
Kidder, Randolph A., 134 
King crab fishing agreement. See Japan 
Kistiakowsky, George, 441 
Knox, Clinton E., 134 
Kohler, Foy D., 108 

Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 358 
Korea, Republic of: 

Essential to security of Japan (Bundy), 537, 540 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 168, 253, 890 
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Brown), 254 
U.S.-Korea exchange pledges of cooperation 
(Bundy, Lee Ton Wong), 542 
Kosygin, Aleksai N., 657 
Kuwait, IAEA statute, agreement, 893 

Labor Organization, International: 

Conference, 48th session, U.S. delegation, 67 
Constitution, current action, Zambia, 925 

Lambert, Tom, 334 

Land-grant colleges, 376, 383 

Land tenure reform (Freeman), 387 

Langton, Baden, 654 


Change in government, U.S. position, 219 
Communist intervention: Johnson, 262; Rusk, 3, 
226, 365, 772 



Laos — Continued 

Conference on Laos, proposed : 
Preconditions for, 219 
Soviet responsibilities (Rusk), 269 
U.S. position (Rusk), 270 
Geneva accords: 

ANZUS Council, position of, 146 

Geneva accords, 1962: Johnson, 262; Rusk, 4, 

219, 430, 580 
Soviet obligations not affected by change in 
leadership (Rusk), 657 
Neutrality (Bundy), 338 
Passport agreement, 890 
Soviet statement (July 26), text, 220 
Strategic and political importance (Rusk), 4 
U.S. position: Bundy, 339; Johnson, 47; Rusk, 
216, 264, 772 
Larson, Arthur, 441 

Latin America {see also Central America, Organiza- 
tion of American States, and individual coun- 
tries) : 
AID loans: 

Increase in U.S. aid during 1963 (Johnson), 675 
Loans to credit institutions (Glaessner), 881 
Role of CIAP (Rostow), 306 
Balance of payments: Harriman, 886; Mann, 595 
Capital markets in, development of (Dillon), 879 
Coffee trade problems. See Coffee 
Common market, advantages of (Mann), 900 
Communism in and efforts against: Hughes, 13, 

15; Mann, 549, 551 
Development banks, vital role of (Harriman), 886 
Economic and social development: 

Industrialization stages (Rostow), 310 
Interdependence of (M. W. Williams), 747 
Population, problems caused by increase 

(Mann), 808 
Rate of progress: Mann, 479, 594, 706; F. H. 
Williams, 251 
Exports, increases in (Mann), 899 
Inter-American solidarity (Mann), 552 
Monetary and budgeting problems (Mann), 594 
Scientific manpower shortage (Rusk), 635 
Social progress, U. S. views and support (Mann), 
Law, international. See International law 
Law of the sea (see also Geneva conventions and 
Safety of life at sea) , conventions on, 325, 452, 
529, 605 
Leadership, qualities of free- world leaders (Duke), 

League of Nations, compared with U.N. (Steven- 
son), 30 
Lebanon, passport agreement, 890 
Ledesma, Oscar, 144 
Leibman, Morris, 441 
Leif Erikson Day, 1964, proclamation, 401 

Less developed countries (see also Newly independ- 
ent nations) : 
Agricultural development: 

Importance of: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383; Ros- 
tow, 664; Rusk, 574, 651 
Land reform effects (Freeman), 387 
Communism, constant threat of: Bell, 822; Har- 
riman, 239; Rostow, 39; Rusk, 217 
Economic and social development. See Economic 
and social development and Economic and 
technical aid 
Education, need for increased: Battle, 112; Bell, 

376; Freeman, 383 
Exports, decline, 154 
Food for Peace Program, extension bill sig^ned 

(Johnson), 677 
Foreign aid, value of (Bell), 822 
Health problems (Tubby), 742 
International Monetary Fund, U.S. recommends 
general enlargement of quotas (Dillon), 446 
Problems of development: Ball, 626; Bell, 379; 

Cleveland, 245; Rostow, 668 
Role of Japan in (Bundy), 539 
Self-help essential (Bell), 823, 824 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, rec- 
ommendations, 154 
U.S. efforts to increase trade with and private in- 
vestments in: Freeman, 384; Rusk, 572, 770 
U.S. private investment, opportunities and effect 
of: Bell, 207, 825; Rusk, 651 
Liberia : 

Treaties, ag^reements, etc., 34, 452, 690 
U.S. foreign aid and economic development (Trim- 
ble), 914 
Libraries: Rowan, 908; Rusk, 905 
Lisagor, Peter, 394 
Load line convention, international (1930): Algeria, 

Lodge, Henry Cabot : 

Purpose of proposed visit to European capitals 

(Bundy), 334 
Resigns as Ambassador to Viet-Nam, 46 
Viet-Nam, result of talks with European govern- 
ments re, 435 
Lovett, Robert, 441 
Luthuli, Albert, 54, 202 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 109 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 326, 726, 890 
Lyon, Cecil B., 254 

Macapagal, Diosdado, 628 

Mace, Charles H., 888 

Madagascar, Safety of Life at Sea, international 
conference (1960) on, re regrulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 452 

Maddox incident. See under Ships and shipping 

Magalhaes, Juracy M., 144 

Malagasy Republic: 

Passport agreement, 890 



Malagasy Republic — Continued 

Visit of President Tsiranana to U.S., 229 
Malawi : 

Convention (1944) on international civil aviation, 

Immigration quota established (Johnson), 753 
U.N. membership: 
Admission to, 894 

Statements: Stevenson, 919; Yost, 680 
U.S. ambassador, confirmed (Gilstrap), 101 
Malaya, passport agreement, 890 
Malaysia : 

Indonesia dispute: 

Indonesian parachutists (Rusk), 429 
Soviet veto of U.N. resolution, U.S. views (Ste- 
venson) , 489 
U.N. role (Stevenson), 448, 472 
U.S. desire for peaceful settlement (Rusk), 579 
Nuclear test ban treaty agreement, 168 
Visit of Prime Minister Rahman to U.S., 190; 
joint communique (Johnson-Rahman), 193 
Mali, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 422, 833 
Malta : 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pro- 
visional application, 894 
Independence, U.S. congratulations re (Johnson), 

U.N. membership: 894; Stevenson, 919; Yost, 759 
Mann, Thomas C, addresses and statements: 
Alliance for Progress: 

Developments and factors affecting, 597, 898 
Exhibits at Pan American Union, 305 
Organization and purpose, 479, 593 
Text of progress report, 706 
Cuba, economic and political failures of Castro, 

Latin America: 

Communism, efforts against, 549 
Economic and social development: 
Agencies, 479 
Population increase: 
Effect of, 807 
U.S. views and support, 777 
Mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperative agree- 
ment between U.S. and Dominican Republic, 530 
Marine Corps, working partnership with Foreign 

Service, (Rusk), 643 
Marriage : 

Convention (1962) on, current actions: Denmark, 
690; Dominican Republic, 762; Finland, 566; 
Mali, 422; New Zealand, 133; Sweden, 133; 
Western Samoa, 566; Yugoslavia, 168 
U.N. seminar on status of women in family law 
(Tillett), 130 
Marshall Plan: McGhee, 19; Wright, 818 
Martin, James V., Jr., 453 
Martin, Paul, 169 
Mathis, John M., 313 

Mauritania, Investment Guaranty Program agree- 
ment, 690 

Mayobre, Jose A., 251 
McCloskey, Robert J., 606 
McCloy, John, 441 
McDonald, David L., 662 

McGhee, George C, addresses and statements: 
Business and diplomacy, parallel roles of, 18 
Central Europe, changes and progress in, 870 
Eastern Europe: 

Growing independence, 716 
U.S. policy, 720 
Germany, responsibilities of and U.S. position, 138 
McNamara, Robert S., 265 
McPherson, Harry C, Jr., 294 
Merriam, Ida C, 320 

Meteorological research agreement with U.S.: Ja- 
maica, 798; Peru, 358 
Meteorological satellites: 

Asset to proposed World Weather System (Plimp- 
ton), 757 
Data exchange agreement, NASA-Soviet Union 
(text), 792 

Chamizal ceremonies (Johnson) , 545 
President Mateos, visit to U.S., 545 
President-elect Ordaz, visit to U.S., 805 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 326, 357, 494, 890 
U.S.-Mexico flood control project (Johnson), 544 
Military mission, agreement with Liberia amending 

and extending agreement of 1951, 34 
Mines, U.S. Bureau of, agreement with Australia 

for services of research chemist, 358 
Missile launchers, proposed inspection (Timberlake), 

Mixed-manned ship demonstration: McDonald, 662; 

Nitze, 660; Rusk, 662 
MLF. See under 'NATO 
Monaco, passport agreement, 890 
Monetary Fund, International: 

Purpose and effectiveness: G. G. Johnson, 710, 

713 ; McGhee, 22 
Review of functions, 323 

U.S. recommendations for general quota enlarge- 
ment (Dillon), 446 
Mongolian People's Republic, international telecom- 
munication convention (1959), with annexes, 
Moscoso, Teodoro, 441 
Mulford, Stewart, 231 
Multilateral force. See under North Atlantic Treaty 

Mutual defense : 

Philippines (Johnson), 632 

Reaffirmed after Chinese nuclear test (Johnson), 
612, 613 
Mutual defense assistance agreements: Japan, 168; 
Luxembourg, 726; Norway, 530 

NAG. See North Atlantic Council 
Narcotics. See Drugs, narcotic 



NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Meteorological satellite and conventional data ex- 
change agreement with Soviet Union, 791; 
text of agreement, 792 
Scientific satellite agreement with ESRO, 203; 
text of agreement, 204 
National Freedom from Hunger Week, proclama- 
tion, 388 
National-origins principle (Rusk), 276 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Naval ships. See Ships 

Near and Middle East. See individual countries 
Nepal : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 869 
Nuclear weapon test ban agreement, 605 
Netherlands : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 109 

Income tax protocol ratified, 601 

Proposed aid and education for Viet-Nam 

(Lodge), 435 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 253, 326, 358, 452, 494, 
566, 606, 690, 833, 890, 926 
Neutrality, U.S. position on (Bundy), 338, 339 
New Zealand: 

Air transport services agreement signed, 60 
Prime Minister Holyoake, visit to U.S., 195 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 133, 168, 358, 690 
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed 
countries) : 
Development of free institutions, importance of 

(Duke), 345 
Nationalist upsurge (Bundy), 541 
Problems compared with early U.S. (Rusk), 77 
U.S. position: Ball, 476; Johnson, 722 
Nicaragua, international telecommunication conven- 
tion (1959) with annexes, 325 
Niger : 

Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment of pris- 
oners of war, wounded and sick, armed forces, 
and civilians in time of war, 134 
Nuclear test ban treaty agreement, 134 
Nigeria : 

Economic advances in (Rusk), 501 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 690, 890 
Nimbus I, value of data (Plimpton), 757 
Nitze, Paul H., 661 
Nonalined nations, conference of: 

Nuclear test ban, interest in (Rusk), 580 
U.S. views: Johnson, 581; Rusk, 577 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

Agreement re cooperation on atomic information: 
Belgium, 134, 797; Canada, 134, 646; Den- 
mark, 134, 294; France, 134, 726; Germany, 
134; Greece, 134, 861; Iceland, 134, 861; Italy, 
134, 566; Luxembourg, Netherlands, 134; 
Norway, 294, 690; Portugal, 294, 390; Turkey, 
134, 566; U.K., 134; U.S., 134, 566 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Continued 
Armed forces: 

F-104G Starfighter (McGhee), 21 
Need for continued mobilization (Rostow), 39 
Possible responses to Soviet MRBM buildup 
(Rostow), 41 
Atomic energy information, agreement between 
parties to NATO for cooperation re, text, 96 
Canada, Johnson-Wilson joint communique, 903 
Cyprus, possible effects of spread of war (Ball), 

Germany-U.S. talks, summary of positions, 847 
MLF. See under Nuclear weapons, multilateral 

Nuclear weapons: 

Alternative proposals for use of MRBM (Ros- 
tow), 41 
Consultations under existing treaties (Rusk), 

Multilateral force: 

Eight-Power Working Group, 847 
German views, 575, 847 
National manning and ownership, 41 
U.S. position and support: 367; Ball, 774; 
Johnson, 847; Nitze, 661; Rostow, 41; Rusk, 
Unity in Atlantic alliance, basis for: Ball, 626; 
Rostow, 42 
Role of Europe (Rostow), 39 
Tests: See Nuclear weapons tests 
Orig^inal purpose and results of (McGhee), 20 
Political consultations, U.S. views (Rostow), 42 
Problems, same as in Southeast Asia (Rusk), 108 
Role of: Brosio, 584, Rostow, 38 
Secretary General: 

U.S. support for (Johnson, Rusk), 275 
Visit with President Johnson, 582 
Strategy of flexible response, 226 
U.S. position and views (Johnson), 93, 478, 547, 
582, 584, 673 
North Pacific Fisheries. See under Fish and fisheries 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See under Fish and 


Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 358, 390, 452, 530, 

690, 890 
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Tibbetts), 254 
NS Savannah, agreements concerning: 

Ireland, legal liability for loss or damage arising 

from operation in, 294 
Use of ports and territorial waters: Italy, 894; 

Portugal, 926; Spain, 253 
Visits to: Denmark, Sweden, 168; U.K. territory, 
Nubian monuments, 645 

Nuclear defense or deterrent, NATO and Europe. 
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Nu- 
clear weapons, Multilateral force 



Nuclear ener^. See Atomic energy, NS Savannah, 

and Nuclear headings 
Nuclear reactors: 

Plutonium production increases (Seaborg), 781 

Agreement, U.S.-IAEA, 27, 69 
History and future of (Seaborg), 782 
Nuclear test ban treaty (1963) : 

Anniversary statement: Johnson, 228; U.S.-Soviet 

joint statement, 270 
Current actions: Austria, 168; Dominican Repub- 
lic, 253; El Salvador, 894; Germany, 894 
Honduras, 566; Iraq, 894; Italy, 925; Japan 
34; Jordan, 168; Korea, 253; Malaysia, 168 
Nepal, 605; Netherlands, 494; Niger, 134 
Peru, 209; San Marino, 134; Surinam, 494 
Tobago, 168; Togo, 925; Trinidad, 168 
Soviet compliance (Rusk), 225 
U.S. views and support: Foster, 526; Johnson, 
Nuclear war: 

Accidental war, measures for reducing dangers of 

(Johnson), 459 
Power of bombs as a deterrent to war: Bundy, 
617; Johnson, 459; Rowan, 907; Rusk, 464, 
Nuclear weapons: 

China, Communist. See under China, Communist 
Dissemination of, need for international agree- 
ment on (Johnson), 367 
Measures to halt spread (Foster), 526 
Proliferation of, problems (Rusk), 657 
Safeguards, advantages of international over bi- 
lateral, 521 
Soviet-U.S. capabilities compared (Hughes), 8 
Strategic advantage, need for U.S. to maintain 

(Hughes), 9 
U.S. position: 

Partial disarmament (Foster), 124 
Use of, 367 
U.S. proposal to reduce fissionable materials, with 
verification and implementation procedures: 
Foster, 123; Timberlake, 413 
Nuclear weapons tests (see also under China, Com- 
munists) : 
Cessation of: Europe (Rostow), 41 
Chinese Communist attitude (Rusk), 612, 655, 
657; and effect of Soviet attitude (Rusk), 654 
U.K., U.S. test low-yield nuclear device in Nevada, 

joint announcement, 193 
U.S. position (Johnson) , 613 

OAS. See Organization of American States 

OAU. See Organization of African Unity 

OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development 
OEEC. See Organization for European Economic 


Oil, pollution of sea by, convention (1954) for pre- 
vention of, Italy, 34 
Olympio, Sylvanus (Duke), 343 
Opium. See under Drugs, narcotic 
Ordaz, Gustavo Diaz, 806 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- 
opment : 
Annual ministerial meeting (Ball), 847 
Convention (1960) on, and supplementary proto- 
cols, Japan, 209 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation 

(McGhee), 20 
Organization of African Unity : 

Aid from U.S. discussed, 553 

Hostages, appeal for protection and rescue of, 

838, 840, 842 
Result of OAU talks (Rusk), 428 
U.S. views (Johnson), 147 
Organization of American States: 

Cuban crisis, efforts and role (Rusk), 216, 578 
Rio Treaty, U.S. confidence affirmed, 271 
U.S. cooperation, 82 
Venezuela, Cuban interference in: 
Report of OAS committee (Rusk) , 176 
Resolution, text, 179 
Orlich, Francisco J., 81 
Outer space (see also Satellites, earth) : 
Cooperative efforts, international: 

Soviet-U.S. cooperation needed (Rusk), 365 
Success of and increase in (Plimpton), 755 
Exploration, legal problems (Plimpton), 758 
Proposed space programs and space launching con- 
trol (Timberlake), 415 
Radar capabilities, U.S., to detect missiles (John- 
son), 46 
Ranger VII, moon photographs (Johnson), 348 
U.N. Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, rec- 
ommendations and proposed meeting (Plimp- 
ton), 756 
U.S. position (Johnson), 462 

Vehicle tracking and communications station, 
agreement with U.S. re establishment and 
operation of, Nigeria, 294 

Pakistan : 

Kashmir dispute (Talbot), 702 

Rural public works program in East Pakistan, 
success of (Bell), 379 

Treaties, ag^reements, etc., 452, 890 
Panama : 

Agreement on Peace Corps program, 209 

Anderson-Illueca talks to continue, 54 

Panama Canal talks resumed, 887 

Sea-level canal site study approved (Johnson), 
Papandreou, George, 49 , 

Paraguay: i 

Trade agreement with U.S., proclamation, 120 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 494, 726 



Passports. See Foreign travel to U.S. 

Patent applications, classified, agreement amending 

1959 agreements, Germany, 34 
Peace : 
Addresses (Rusk), 215, 656 
Role of U.N. (Ball), 694, 700 
U.S. efforts (Johnson) 80, 298 
Peace Corps program: 

Agreements re establishment of: Kenya, 566; 

Panama, 209 
Need for increase in size (Johnson), 735 
Pearson, Lester B., 505 
Perkins, James, 441 
Personnel, selection for international agencies 

(Johnson), 388 
Trade negotiations, proposed, 369 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 209, 358, 452, 890, 894 
Petroleum, agreement (1964) with Korea, 168 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 144 
Educational, social, and economic progress, 630 
Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. support reaffirmed, 


Common views, 632 
Visit to U.S., 628 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 529, 601, 798, 890, 

U.S. commitment to security of (Rusk), 580 
Phillips, Richard I., 606 
Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 430 

Piqua Organic Moderated Power Reactor, placed un- 
der IAEA safeguard, 27 
Plimpton, Francis T. P., 486, 755 
Poland : 

PL 480 assistance, restrictions on (Rusk), 426 
Trade with U.S., reasons for increase (Wright), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 452 
Trend toward independence (McGhee), 717 
Pollution of internal water: 

Great Lakes area study requested, 598 
Red River study requested, 599 
Pollution of sea by oil, convention (1954) for pre- 
vention of: Ghana, 726; Italy, 34 
Portugal, treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 326, 390, 

452, 646, 726, 798, 890, 926 
Postal convention (1957) universal, with final pro- 
tocol, annex, regulations of execution and pro- 
visions re airmail: Algeria, 34; Kenya, 833 
Power sources, scientific research programs in 

(Rusk), 620 
Presidential election, U.S. (Rusk), 236, 237 
Prisoners of war: 

Geneva conventions (1949) relative to treatment 
of: Jamaica, 605; Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Treatment of. See under Congo, Hostages 

Private development banks, conditions for success 

of: Dillon, 878; Glaessner, 882 
Private enterprise: 

Accomplishments (Rusk), 650 
Role of (Rostow), 667 
Proclamations by the President: 
Bill of Rights Day (3631), 887 
Captive Nations Week, 1964 (3594), 63 
Churchill, Sir Winston, Day (3630), 856 
Columbia River Treaty, 507 
Columbus Day, 1964 (3621), 597 
Human Rights Day (3631), 887 
Immigration quota for Tonga (3613), 443 
International Cooperation Year, 1965 (3620), 558 
Leif Erikson Day, 1964 (3610), 401 
Malawi immigration quota (3626), 753 
National Freedom from Hunger Week (3606), 388 
Pulaski Memorial Day (3605), 354 
Trade agreements with Parag^uay and U.A.R. 

(3596), 120 
U.S. International Aviation Month, 1964 (3602), 

U.S. Tariff schedules on agricultural products, 

appendix corrected (3597), 122 
Von Steuben Day (3615), 472 
Warsaw Uprising Day (3603), 271 
Protocol, international conference of protocol chiefs 
suggested, to agree on basic rules (Duke), 738 
Public Law 480. See Agricultural surpluses and 

Food for Peace 
Agreement for exchange of official publications: 

Ethiopia, 894 
Congressional documents relating to foreign poli- 
cy, lists, 64, 122, 147, 280, 317, 354, 407, 554, 
600, 754, 820, 857 
Convention (1958) re international exchange of: 

agreement, Brazil, 566 
State Department: 
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918- 
1945, Series D, Volume XI 11, Th-e War Years, 
June 23-December 11, 19U, published, 833 
Lists of recent releases, 34, 70, 210, 254, 326, 

453, 530, 798, 833, 862, 926 
State Department Bulletin, 25th anniversary, 2 
Treaty with Norway for exchange of official pub- 
lications, 358 
United Nations: lists of current documents, 68, 
132, 252, 275, 325, 357, 450, 529, 565, 790, 828, 
859, 921 
USIA, America Illustrated, 909 
Pulaski Memorial Day, proclamation, 354 

Racial discrimination (see also Civil Rights) ; 
Anti-Semitism (Williams) , 421 
Apartheid: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree, 

761; Williams, 53 
ILO constitution, proposed changes, 68 



Racial discrimination — Continued 
U.S. immig^ration policy (Rusk), 278 
U.S. progress in eliminating: Johnson, 300; Rusk, 
77 ; Williams, 419 
Radar capabilities, U.S., to detect missiles in outer 

space (Johnson) , 46 
Radio : 


(1959) Annexed to international telecommuni- 
cation convention. See under Telecommunica- 
tion convention (1959) 
(1959) Partial revision: China, 925; France, 
325; Group of territories represented by 
French Overseas Post and Telecommunica- 
tion Agency, 833; Iceland, 925; Ivory Coast, 
925; Jamaica, 494; Kenya, 325; Mali, 833; 
Netherlands, 925; Senegal, 833; Sierra Leone, 
925; South Africa, 798; Tanganyika, 325; 
Territory of South West Africa, 798; Uganda, 
325; Vatican City State, 925. 
Work of ITU (Tubby), 744 
U.S. agreement with Costa Rica re reciprocal 
authorization for licensed amateur operators, 
Radio Free Europe: Johnson, 876; Rowan, 908 
Rahman, Tunku Abdul, 190, 218 
Ranger VII, photographs of moon sent to world 

leaders (Johnson) , 348 
Rash, Bryson, 394 

Rayburn, Sam, tribute to (Johnson), 877 
Red River pollution study requested, 599 
Refugees, universal copyright convention (1952), 
protocol 1, re application to works of: Guate- 
mala, 390; New Zealand, 358 
Republican platforms, foreign policy (Rusk), 233, 

Research : 

Nuclear power, U.S. research: Johnson, 411; Sea- 

borg, 408 
Spectrographic research agreement, 358 
Reuter, Ernst, 870 
Renter, Richard W., 503, 678 
Rhodesia, U.S. views, 721 

Rice Commission, International, amended constitu- 
tion: Guatemala, 861 
Ricketts, Claude V., USS, 660 
Road traffic: 

Convention (1949) on, with annexes: Japan, 390; 

Rwanda, 494 
Convention (1954) on custom facilities for tour- 
ing: Tanganyika, Zanzibar, 797 
Road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on tem- 
porary importation: Japan, 69 
Roosa, Robert V., 669 
Roosevelt Campobello International Park : 
Agreement for establishment, Canada, 390 
Ceremonies at, 312 

Rostow, Walt W., addresses and statements: 
Alliance for Progress, August 1964, 306 
Economic development in changing societies, 664 
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, 38 
Increase in national movements (quoted) 341, 342 
Major issues in and international responsibility 

for guerrilla warfare, 346 
U.S. representative to CIAP named, 859 
Roth, William M., 853 
Rowan, Carl T., 906 
Rubadiri, James D., 369 
Rumania : 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 305 
Credit guarantees for U.S. services (Johnson), 26 
Growing spirit of independence (Rusk), 465 
Safety of life at sea, convention (1960) on, re 

preventing collisions at sea, 453 
Trade with U.S. increased (Wright), 819 
Rural Development, International, conference on, 

addresses: Bell, 376; Freeman, 383 
Rusk, Dean: 

Addresses, remarks, and statements : 

Africa, problems of, and U.S. aid to, 499 
AID, encouragement to private investment 

abroad, 651 
Alliance for Prog^ress, review of accomplish- 
ments, 851 
Armed forces overseas, purpose for, 464 
Asia, Southeast: 

Conmiunist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 263, 

267, 268 
Problems arising from Chinese Communist 

policy, 772 
U.S. position, 82, 84, 226, 580 
Berlin, U.S. position unchanged by Soviet lead- 
ership change; 655 
Book burning and damage to U.S. embassies 

deplored, 905 
Chile, science and development in, 634 
China, Communist: 

Attempts to influence Congo politics, 399 
Nuclear test: 
Capacity, 542 
Political and other effects, 614, 655, 657, 

658, 659 
Probable effect on Chinese policies and 
economy, 658, 772 
Cleveland, Harlan, 857 
Coffee agreement. Congress inaction, 554 
Communism : 

Economic failure of, 850 
U.S. policy toward, 463, 464 
Congo : 

OAU meeting, 428 

Political developments and U.S. position on, 

83, 224, 399, 428, 502 
Treatment of U.S. citizens protested, 838 

Aggressive and subversive activities, 174, 224 



Busk, Dean — Continued 

Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued 
Cuba — Continued 

Eflfectiveness of OAS measures against, 216, 
231, 578 

Exile government, 398 

Steps taken to isolate, 365 

U.S. views, 233, 270, 852 
Cyprus : 

Basic issues, 88, 399 

U.N. role, 428 
Declaration of Independence, principles, 74 
Disarmament, Communist attitude, 615, 655, 772 
Economic policy, U.S., 366, 571 
Education essential for international under- 
standing, 437 
Elected office, not a candidate for, 225, 236 
Electoral period, U.S. problems during, 398, 430 

Eastern Europe, trends toward national free- 
dom, 107, 465 

Need for strong modem Europe, 363, 432, 768 
Food for Peace program, importance of, 426 
Foreign aid, need for and U.S. objectives, 217, 

Foreigrn policy advisors, 430 
Foreign policy, U.S.: 

Bipartisan nature, 221, 431, 576 

Democratic and Republican platforms re- 
viewed, 233 

Factors affecting, 363, 618 

Influence on world peace, 658, 654, 656 

Objectives, 106, 185, 362, 395, 498, 558, 852 
Geneva accords, U.S. support and Communist 

violations, 4, 219, 223, 226, 264, 430, 581 
Germany, Erhard-Khrushchev talks, 431 
Governments in exile, problems of recognition, 

Immigration : 

Advantages of proposed bill, 471 

Revision of present law urged, 276 
India : 

Nuclear energy, peaceful purposes only, 579 

Soviet assistance promises overlap U.S., 471 
Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 429, 472, 579 
International Coffee Agreement, 221 
International Cooperation Year (1965), 557 
International Court of Justice, value of advisory 

opinions, 803 
International law, need for further expansion, 

International relations, major problems of, 107 

King crab fishing agreement, 892 

Satellite communication with, 592 
Kennedy Round, significance of, 700, 767 

Situation in, 3, 269, 365 

Soviet commitments, 657 

Rusk, Dean — Continued 

Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued 


Indonesian parachutists incident, 429 
U.S. position, 472 

Marine Corps, working partnership with For- 
eign Service, 643 

Martin, Paul, 472 


Multilateral force, 575, 661 

Nuclear weapons, consultations under treaties, 

Problems of coordination of policy, 108 

Newly independent nations, U.S. position and 
aid, 498, 651 

Nonalined countries, conference of (Cairo), 577, 

Nuclear weapons tests, need for on-site inspec- 
tion, 655 

Nuclear war, dangers of, 464 

Peace, goal of U.S., 214 

Private investment abroad, less developed coun- 
tries' interest increased, 651 

Scientific research, importance of international 
cooperation, 619 

SEATO, work and accomplishments of, 400 

Sino-Soviet rift, effect on Southeast Asia, 223 

Soviet Union: 

Change in leadership, 655, 656 
Response to suggestion for conference on 
Laos, 218 

State Department Bulletin, 25th anniversary, 2 

Trade, U. S. policy, 767 

Trade Expansion Act, purpose of, 470 

Trade unions, role in economic and social prog- 
ress, 849 

U.K. Labor party effect on U.K. foreign policy, 

United Nations: 

Communist China, representation not recom- 
mended, 772 
Peacekeeping operations, basic constitutional 

issue, 576, 577 
Role in : Congo, 83 ; Viet-Nam, 85 

United Nations Charter, 440 

Viet-Nam : 

Negotiations and prospects for, 429 
Situation, 222, 235, 396, 427, 468, 471 
U.S. position and views, 82, 84, 86, 226, 236, 
394, 576 

Wool textile agreements, international, lack of 
progress on, 429 
Correspondence : 

Antarctic Treaty, inspections under, 403 

NATO, greetings to Manlio Brosio, 275 

ANZUS Council, 194 

Germany, Rusk-Schroeder talks, simimary of 
positions, 847 



Rusk, Dean — Continued 
Meetings — Continued 

U.S.-Japan Science Committee on Scientific Co- 
operation, 61 
News conferences.transcripts of, 82, 221, 468, 575 
Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 106, 231, 
268, 394, 614, 654, 771 
Rwanda, treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 452, 494 
Ryan, Robert J., 134 
Rjrukyu Islands: 

Political Adviser to U.S. High Commissioner (Mar- 
tin), desigrnated, 453 
Strategic importance (Bundy), 536 

Safety of life at sea : 

Convention (1960) on: Belgium, Burma, Cam- 
eroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, 
452; Liberia, 34, 452; Madagascar, 452; 
Netherlands, including Surinam and Neth- 
erlands Antilles, 452, 833; Norway, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por- 
tugal, 452; Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Union 
of Soviet Socialistic Republics, United Arab 
Republic, 453; United Kingdom, 69, 453; 
United States, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 453. 
Soviet violations, U.S. charges and exchange of 
notes, 482 
St. Lawrence Seaway, agreement with Canada on 

tolls, 134; text, 169 
Salvage at sea, convention (1910) for unification 

of rules re : Algeria, 325 
San Marino, nuclear test ban treaty, 134 
Sancho-Bonet, Rafael, 209 
Sanctions against South Africa, 31, 33 
Sansom, George (quoted), 590 
Samoff, David (quoted), 619 
Satellites, earth: 

Communications satellites. See Communications 

Meteorological satellites. See Meteorological satel- 
NASA-ESRO agreement, 203 
U.S. measures re protection against armed satel- 
lites (Johnson), 462 
Sato, Eisaku, 912 

Saudi Arabia, ambassador to U.S., credentials, 461 
Scali, John, 231, 655 
Schurmann, Carl W. A., 109 

Science (see also Atomic energy, Nuclear weapons, 
Outer space, and Satellites) 
Accelerating rate of scientific advances (Ball), 

Opportunities of modem science and technology 

(Stevenson), 811 
Potential consequences of free international ex- 
change of discoveries in (Rusk), 619 
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization 

Scientific cooperation, U.S.-Japan Committee on, 

meeting, Washing^ton, 1964, 61 
Seaborg, Glenn T. : 
Atomic energy, developments and progress, 779 
Confirmed as U.S. representative to 8th IAEA 

Conference, 520 

Programs and future of, 519 
Safeguards system, 781 
International Conference on Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energ^y, 3d meeting: 
Chairman of U.S. delegation, appointed, 412 
Review of nuclear power in U.S., 411 
U.S. papers and exhibits, 408 
Seals. See under Fish and fisheries 
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
Secretary of State (see also Rusk, Dean), non-in- 
volvement in U.S. political campaign (Rusk), 398 
Security Council, U.N.: 

Accomplishments of and U.S. support for (Sisco), 

Cyprus, U.S. support of U.N. position: Steven- 
son, 31, 562; Yost, 563 
List of documents, 68, 252, 275, 325, 450, 529, 

565, 790, 828, 859, 921 
Resolutions : 

Extension of peacekeeping force in, 67 
Immediate cease-fire called for, 318 
South Africa, apartheid policy condemned, 33 
South Africa, committee to study use of sanc- 
tions, 33 
Soviet position on peacekeeping operations 

(Stevenson), 683 
U.N. membership, recommendations: 
Malawi (Yost), 680, 681n 
Malta (Yost), 759n 
Zambia (Yost), 759n 
Veto power, Soviet use of (Stevenson), 450n, 489, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 797, 832, 833 
U.S. Ambassador (Cook), confirmation, 134 
Senghor, Leopold (quoted), 499 
Shiina, Etsusaburo, 592 
Ships and shipping: 

Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers; USS 
Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy: 258; 
Bundy, 335, 336; Johnson, 259, 260, 261; Mc- 
Namara, 265; Rusk, 263, 267, 268; Steven- 
son, 272 
Text of U.S. joint resolution, 268 
Regulation : 

U.K. Shipping contracts and commercial docu- 
ments bill (G. G. Johnson), 317 
U.S. foreign policy and regulation of interna- 
tional shipping (G. G. Johnson), 314 
Soviet interference: 
Duxbury Bay, exchange of notes, 482 
SS Sister Katingo, U.S. protests, 145 



Ships and Shipping — Continued 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 

Double taxation on eamingfs from operation of, 

agreements with Mexico for relief of, 326 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or- 
ganization, convention on, Philippines, 925 
NS Savannah, agreements re: Denmark, 168; 
Ireland, 294; Italy, 894; Portugal, 926; Spain, 
253; Sweden, 168; U.K., 294 
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 726, 926 
Sino-Soviet dispute: 

Chinese nuclear bomb: Bundy, 616; Rusk, 657 
U.S. views: Ball, 625; Bundy, 339, 537, 616; Har- 
riman, 239; Hughes, 11; McGhee, 719; Rusk, 
223, 615, 657 
Sisco, Joseph J., 55 

Slavery convention (1926) as amended: Argentina, 
566; Jamaica, 390; Switzerland, 325; Turkey, 
325; Uganda, 566 
Social security, 7th inter-American conference on 

(Merriara), 320 
Somalia, international convention (1954) on civil 

aviation, protocols, 690 
Soto, Ricardo Midence, 582 
South Africa (see also Africa) : 

Apartheid: Fredericks, 200; Stevenson, 29; Tree, 

761; Williams, 53 
Detention clause (Williams), 54 
Luthuli, Albert, restrictions on (Williams), 54, 

Problems of (Rusk), 502 
Sanctions proposed, U.S. position (Stevenson), 31, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 646, 798 
U.S. position and views: Fredericks, 200; Rusk, 
503; Stevenson, 32 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, work of and 

accomplishments: Bundy, 540; Rusk, 400 
South- West Africa: 

Radio regulations (1949), 798 
U.N. Subcommittee report, U.S. views (Tree), 760 
U.S. policy (Fredericks), 202 
South Pacific Commission, amending 1947 ag^reement 
establishing: Australia, France, New Zealand, 
U.K., U.S., 646 
Soviet Union (see also Communism) : 

Berlin, Soviet position on (Rusk), 44, 225, 368 
Change of leadership: Johnson, 610; Rusk, 655, 

656, 657 
Communist bloc, changing attitudes of individual 
states: Ball, 625; Duke, 341; McGhee, 717 
Desalination : 

Talks on joint study and representatives, 60, 144 
Text of agreement, 829, 861 
Disarmament, lack of interest (Rusk), 615 
Economy, drains on (Hughes), 10 
European resurgence has changed objectives of 

(Duke), 341 
Foreig:n aid program: Hughes, 10; Rusk, 471 

Soviet Union — Continued 

Erhard-Khrushchev talks (Rusk), 431 
Responsible for continued division of (McGhee), 

U.S. disapproval of Soviet charges (Johnson), 
"Hot-line", purpose (Rusk), 364, 369, 398 

Neutrality violated (Rusk), 4, 218 
Responsibilities toward: 269; Rusk, 657 
Soviet allegations re U.S. activities, 219 
Text of Soviet statement, 220 
Meteorologrical satellite and conventional data ex- 
change agreement with NASA (text), 792 
Policy of exploitation of vulnerable areas (Duke), 

Safety at sea convention, 453 
SAM missile sites in Cuba, problem of (Rusk), 

United Nations: 

Attitude toward U.N. projects (Tubby), 747 
Financial crisis, actions and arguments: Rusk, 

576; Stevenson, 683 
Security Council, use of veto in: 450n; Steven- 
son, 489, 682 
United States: 

Aircraft, alleged overflights, 483 
Exhibits, favorable reaction to (Rowan), 910 
Ships, interference with, 145, 482 
U.S.-Soviet relations: Kohler, 108; Rusk, 222 
Veto on Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, U.S. views 

(Stevenson), 489 
Weather information, agreement with U.S. to 

exchange data (Johnson), 791 
World, objectives. See under Communism 
Cotton textile agrreement with U.S., text, 794 
Technical aid to Viet-Nam promised (Lodge), 435 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 253, 358, 453, 566, 
797, 798, 890 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: 
Deputy (Blumenthal) holds talks in Latin Amer- 
ican countries, 369 
GATT notified date of negotiations on industrial 

exceptions list, 754 
Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia- 
tions, members appointed, 313 
Roster of technical representatives established, 517 
Spectrographic research, U.S.-Australia agrreement 

for services of research chemist, 358 
Spiewak, Irving, 231 
Stainless steel flatware, Johnson asks tariff study 

on, 63 
Standardization, International Organization for 

(Tubby), 743 
State Department (see also Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, Foreign Service, and Peace 
Corps) : 



State Department — Continued 

Appointments and desi^ations, 67, 69, 209, 412, 

453, 606, 646, 857, 858, 859 
Assistant Secretary of State, confirmation : Green- 
field, 389; McPherson, 294 
Bulletin, anniversary statement on (Rusk), 2 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, goals 

and work of (Battle), 111 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, 

confirmation (Phillips), 606 
Established and named (Patterson and Langley), 

Political adviser to Ryukyu Islands (Martin), 453 
Publications. See under Publications 
Stateless persons and refugees, universal copyright 
convention, protocol 1: Guatemala, 390; New 
Zealand, 358 
Status quo (Rowan), 907 
Steinmetz, Maurice, 109 

Stevenson, Adlai E., addresses, letters, and state- 
ments : 
Cambodia-U.N.-Viet-Nam report, U.S. comments 

on, 527 
Cambodian charges, investigation requested, 319 
Communist attacks on U.S. destroyers, 272 
Congo, negotiations re U.S. nationals and rescue 

operations, 840, 842, 845, 891 
Cyprus, U.N. peace efforts and U.S. support for, 

64, 318, 561 
International Cooperation Year (1965), 813 
Malawi, U.N. membership, 919 
Malaysia-Indonesia dispute, 448 
Malta, U.N. membership, 919 
Science and technology, future of, 810 
South Africa, problems of, and U.S. position, 29 
Soviet Union: 

U.S. regrets veto of Malaysia issue, 489 
World, objectives, 919 
Turks expel Greeks from Istanbul, U.S. regret, 

United Nations: 

Financial crisis, 681, 826 
No-voting agreement, 891 
Science and technology projects, 812 
U.S. peace aims, 273 
Zambia, U.N. membership, 919 
Strategic Air Command (Johnson), 585 
Sullivan, William H., 894 
Summit meetings (Rusk), 615, 659, 660 
Surinam, treaties, agreements, etc., 452, 494 
Sweden : 

Income tax convention for the avoidance of double 

taxation, effective date, 452 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 133, 168, 253, 326, 453, 
566, 861, 890 
Sweet, Sidney S., 313 

Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 325, 494, 890 
Syrian Arab Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 390, 
690, 890 

Taiwan : 

Economic growth in (Bell), 206 
U.S. foreign aid program (Bell), 823 
Takeuchi, Ryuji, 590, 892 
Talbot, Phillips, 701 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, treaties, agreements, etc., 

253, 325, 762, 797, 894 
Tariff Commission, U.S., stainless steel flatware 

study requested, 63 
Tariff policy, U.S. {see also Economic policy and 
relations; Tariffs and trade, general agreement 
on ; and Trade) : 
Agricultural imports, correction to appendix of 

schedule, 122 
Europe: Cleveland, 245; Rusk, 766 
Japan, tariff and quota problems (Bamett), 588 
Problems arising from UNCTAD recommenda- 
tions (Cleveland), 246 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on : 

Accomplishments: G. G. Johnson, 710; McGhee, 

Ag:reements, declarations, proces-verbal, and pro- 
Accessions to, current actions on: 

Iceland, provisional: Austria, Brazil, Den- 
mark, Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Rhodesia, Sweden, United 
States, 798 
Spain, protocol for: Austria, 566 
Tunisia, provisional: Australia, Finland, New 
Zealand, Norway, United Arab Republic, 
Yugoslavia, provisional: Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Southern Rhodesia, 
Sweden, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 798 
Article XXXVI, Part IV, draft, 922; notes 

and supplementary provisions, 925 
Article XXXVII, Part IV, draft, 923; notes 

and supplementary provisions 925 
Article XXXVIII, Part IV, draft, 924 
Geneva tariff conference (1960-61) : 

Protocol embodying results of, Nigeria, 690 
Poland, declaration on relations between con- 
tracting parties and Poland: United Arab 
Republic, 168 
Provisional application of, protocol of: 
Malawi, 494; Malta, Tanganyika and Zanzi- 
bar, 894; Togo, 102 
Rectifications and modifications to texts of 
schedules: 5th-9th protocols: Cuba, 102 
Industrial exceptions list, 754 



Tariffs and trade, general agreement on : — Continued 
International tariff negotiations: 

Latin America, Blunienthal holds talks in, 369 

Role of industry (Roth), 855 

Roster of technical representatives established 

(Herter), 517 
U.S. views: 754; Johnson, 752; Rusk, 768 
Trade Negotiations, Public Advisory Committee: 
Advisers appointed, 313 
Membership increased, 92 

Canadian issues exempt from interest equaliza- 
tion taxes (Johnson), 442 
Double taxation, conventions for avoidance of. 
See Double taxation 
Taylor, Maxwell D., 433 
Technical assistance and cooperation. See Economic 

and technical assistance 
Telecommunication (see also Communications and 
Radio) : 
International convention (1959) : 

Current actions: Brazil, 833; Burma, 530; Iran, 
390; Nicaragua, 325; Mongolian People's Re- 
public, 494 
Radio regulations: (1959), partial revision, 
with annexes and additional protocol: Den- 
mark, 34; France, 325; French Overseas Post 
and Telecommunications Agency, 833; Jamai- 
ca, 494; Kenya, 325; Mali, 833; Senegal, 833; 
South Africa, 798; South- West Africa, 798; 
Tanganyika, 325; Uganda, 325; U.S., 134 
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to 
international telecommunications convention 
(1959) : current action, Senegal, 833 
Future of (Sarnoflf), 619 

Loran-C agreement (1964) and Associated 
Monitor Control Station: Canada, 530 
Transpacific telephone cable inaugurated (John- 
son, Ikeda) , 26 
Telecommunication Union, International. See Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union 
Territorial sea and contiguous zone : 
Convention (1958) on, 325, 452, 605 
NS Savannah, use by. See NS Savannah 
Thailand, passport agreement, 890 
Thompson, Tyler, 254 
Tibbetts, Margaret Joy, 254 
Tillett, Gladys A., 128 
Timberlake, Clare H., 413 
Tito, Mrs. Broz, 343 
Tito, Marshal, 343 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 461 
President Olympio (Duke), 343 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 890, 925 
Tonga, Kingdom of, immigration quota determined 

(Johnson), 443 
Tonkin, Gulf of. See Ships and shipping: Commu- 
nist attacks 

Touring, convention re customs facilities: Tangan- 
yika and Zanzibar, 797 
Tourism, Eastern Europe (McGhee), 718 
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses. Customs, 
Economic policy, Exports, Imports, and Tariff 
policy) : 
Balance of payments. See Balance of payments 
Barriers, reduction of: 
Europe (Rusk), 227 

U.S. position: Cleveland, 245; Rusk, 769 
East- West trade relationships, (Wright), 815 
EEC. See European Economic Community 
Expansion of, efforts for: 

U.N. Trade and Development Conference: 
Final Act, text of preamble and recommenda- 
tions, 150 
U.S. views on U.N. recommendations (Cleve- 
land), 245 
U.S. position: Bell, 206; G. G. Johnson, 709; 
Johnson, 517, 752; Rusk, 571 
Japan: Barnett, 589; Bundy, 540 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Trade Ex- 
pansion Act 
Treaties, on cotton textiles : 

Agreements with U.S. re trade in: Greece, 209, 
290; Hong Kong, 517; India, 530; Italy, 
358; Spain, 69, 794, 798; Turkey, 209, 
292, 358; Yugoslavia, 602, 646 
Long-term arrangements (1962) re interna- 
tional trade in: Finland, 494 
U.S. trade: 

Agricultural imports, correction to appendix of 

schedule, 122 
Europe, relations with: McGhee, 22; Rusk, 227, 

Industrial exceptions list, U.S. prepared to post- 
pone GATT talks, 754 
Latin America, volume of, and U.S. trade policy 
(Mann), 900 
Trade agreements with: 

Paraguay, supplementary agreements and partial 

termination of, proclamation, 120 
United Arab Republic, agreement supplementary 
to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
proclamation, 120 
Trade and Development Conference, U.N. See under 

Trade: Expansion of 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: 
8th annual report (Johnson), 516 
Objectives and importance of (Rusk), 470 
Trade Negotiations, Public Advisory Committee. See 
under Tariffs and trade, general agreement on 
Trade unions, role in economic and social progress 

(Rusk), 849 
Treasury Department, 715 

Treaties, agreements, etc., international (for indi- 
vidual treaty, see subject), 34, 102, 133, 168, 
209, 253, 294, 325, 357, 390, 422, 452, 494, 529, 
566, 601, 646, 690, 726, 762, 797, 832, 861, 893, 



Tree, Mrs. Marietta P., 600, 760 

Trimble, William C, 912 

Trinidad, U.S. immigration policy (Rusk), 279 

Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 

Tshombe, Moise: 

U.S. position on: Harriman, 333; Rusk, 224 
U.S.-Belgium rescue operations authorized by 
Congo government, 843 

Tsiranana, Philibert, visit to U.S., 229 

Trusteeship Council, U.N., list of documents, 275 

Tubby, Roger W., 740 

Tunisia, treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 209, 890 

Turkey (See also Cyprus) : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 209, 325, 566 
U.S. regrrets expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul 
(Stevenson), 564 

U.A.R. See United Arab Republic 
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union 
U Thant: 

Role in nuclear test ban treaty, 270 
Visit to Washington, 304 
Uganda : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 582 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 325, 605 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Vienna con- 
vention (1961) on diplomatic relations, 133 
UNCTAD. See Trade: Expansion of 
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization, U.N. 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet 

United Arab Republic: 

Arab-Israel dispute, U.S.-U.N. efforts to settle 

(Talbot), 703 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 133, 168, 169, 453, 

494, 890 
U.S. Ambassador confirmed (Battle), 254 
United Kingdom: 

Balance of payments, prospects for improving 

position (Johnson), 848 
Berlin, reaffirms free air access rights to, 368 
Import surcharges, 714 
Indonesia-Malaysia, defense commitments (Rusk), 

Labor party victory: Johnson, 613; Rusk, 659 
Nuclear device tested in Nevada, U.K.-U.S. joint 

release on, 193 
Shipping contracts and commercial documents bill 
becomes law in U. K. (G. G. Johnson), 317 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 102, 134, 294, 358, 390, 

453, 529, 797, 890, 894 
Viet-Nam, European countries assure aid to 
(Lodge), 435 
United Nations: 
Accomplishments, problems, and role of: Ball, 
626, 694; Cleveland, 351; Duke, 736; Rusk, 
217; Stevenson, 813; Talbot, 701; F. H. Wil- 
liams, 787 

United Nations — Continued 

Agreement re grant of Congo francs, accruing to 
U.S. under agricultural commodities agree- 
ment, 494 
Charter. See United Nations Charter 
Conference on Trade and Development. See un- 
der Trade: Expansion of 
Congo (Rusk), 83 

Cyprus situation, Soviet Union abstains from vot- 
ing on (Ball), 301 
Documents, lists of, 68, 132, 252, 275, 325, 357, 

450, 529, 565, 790, 828, 859, 921 
Financing of peacekeeping operations : 
Soviet views: Rusk, 576; Stevenson, 683 
U.S. concern and position: Plimpton, 486; 
Sisco, 57; Stevenson, 66, 681, 826; Steven- 
son-Adebo letters, 825 
U.S. memorandum (text) , 681 
General Assembly. See General Assembly 
Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, U.S. calls for U.N. 

negotiations (Stevenson), 448 
International Court of Justice, effect of advisory 

opinions issued by, 803 
League of Nations-U.N. compared (Stevenson), 30 
Membership, admission to : Malawi, Malta, Zambia, 

19th anniversary, remarks (Johnson), 697 
Role of U.N. seminars (Tillett), 128 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, recom- 
mendations in field of outer space (Plimpton), 
Security Council. See Security Council 
South-West Africa, U.S. disapproval of U.N. re- 
port on (Tree), 760 
Soviet veto (Stevenson), 450n, 489, 682 
Soviet views: 

Lack of support of aid programs (Tubby), 747 
Principles opposed to U.N.: Ball, 301, 626; 
Rusk, 463 
Special Fund, accomplishments of (Stevenson), 

Technical assistance programs: 
Congo (Harriman), 332 
Need for continuance and expansion (Tubby), 

740, 746 
OPEX (operational, administrative and execu- 
tive) personnel, requests for (F. H. Wil- 
liams), 920 
U.S. financial support (F. H. Williams), 827 
U.S. representatives to U.N., confirmation, 600 
U.S. views and support: Ball, 478; Johnson, 80, 
304, 349; Rusk, 217; Stevenson, 827; Tal- 
bot, 701 
United Nations Charter: 

Principles and objectives: Ball, 694; Rusk, 440; 

F. H. Williams, 418 
Statute of: Malawi, Malta, Zambia, 894 
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 
(Tillett), 128 



United Nations Economic and Social CounciL See 

Economic and Social Council 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Orgranization. See Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, U.N. 
United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid 

(Stevenson), 30 
United Nations Special Fund, 813 
United States citizens and nationals : 
Protection of: 

Congo, treatment of hostages, 838, 839 
U.S. position and efforts to protect, 840, 842 
Yugoslavia, claims against, text of agreement, 
762, 830 
United States Information Agency : 
Role building peace (Rovcan), 906 
U.S. exhibits in Eastern Europe (Rowan), 910 
United States International Aviation Month, 1964, 

U.S.-Japan Science Committee on Scientific Co- 
4th meeting (Rusk), 61 
Text of joint communique, 62 
USS Maddox, See under Ships and shipping 
USS Sam Raybum commissioned (Johnson), 877 
USS Claude V. Ricketts, 660 
Universities, role in world rural development: Bell, 

376; Freeman, 383 
Upper Volta, Vienna convention on consular rela- 
tions re settlement of disputes, 566 
Uruguay : 

Joint U.S.-Uruguayan Trade Committee meeting, 

Passport agreement, 890 

Vatican City State, treaties, agreements, etc., 358, 

Venezuela : 

Cuban intervention: Mann, 551; Rusk, 174, 224; 

resolution, text, 179 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 566, 890 
Viet-Nam : 

Agricultural output increasing with U.S. aid, 869 
Aid from countries other than U.S.: 
Desirability of (Rusk), 227 
U.K. aid (Lodge), 435 
Communist aggression and subversion: 870; 
Bundy, 537; Johnson, 47, 260, 262; Rusk, 4, 
226, 235, 236, 428 
ANZUS Council position on, 146 
Attacks on U.S. destroyers, USS Maddox and 
USS C. Turner Joy: 258; Bundy, 335, 336; 
Johnson, 259, 260, 261; McNamara, 265; 
Rusk, 263, 267, 268; Stevenson, 272 
Geneva accords, need to return to (Bundy), 335, 

Internal politics and need for stable government: 
Duke, 345; Rusk, 222, 395, 396, 427, 466, 468, 
659; Taylor, 433, 434, 869 

Viet-Nam — Continued 

Negotiated settlement, question of: Lodge, 436; 

Rusk, 397, 429, 439 
Neutrality, question of (Bundy), 338 
Religious factions and effects of: Rusk, 396, 470; 

Taylor, 434 
Situation, compared with Cuban missile crisis 

(Rusk), 270 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 294, 326, 453, 646, 925 
U.S. ambassador appointed (Taylor), 46 
U.S. military support: Bundy, 336; Rusk, 82, 223, 

224, 228, 396, 904; Sisco, 58; Taylor, 434 
U.S. objectives and peace efforts: Bundy, 336, 537; 
Johnson, 46, 299, 436, 869; Rusk, 82, 365, 394, 
466, 469, 576; Taylor, 434 
Viet-Nam, North, aggression and subversion in Viet- 
Nam. See Viet-Nam : Communist aggression 
Visas {see also Immigration) : 
Quota reserve pool (Rusk), 277 
Visas by mail (Mace), 889 
Von Steuben Day, proclamation, 472 
Vorster, B. J. (Williams), 53 

Wadsworth, James, 441 

Waller, John K., 460 


Communist policy of harassment (Hughes), 9 
U.S. strength a deterrent to war (Johnson), 877 

Ware, Caroline F., 313 

Warsaw Uprising Day, proclamation, 271 

Water Desalination. See Desalination 

Weather : 

Scientific research, programs in (Rusk), 619 
Soviet-U.S. agreement on exchange of information 
(Johnson), 791 

Weaver, George L-P., 67 

Weights and measures, conventions (1875) (1921) : 
South Africa, 422 

Wellman, Harvey R., 646 

West Indies, U.S.-U.N. agreements on defense areas, 

Western Europe. See Europe: Western Europe 

Western Hemisphere: 

Alliance for Progress, background for (Rusk), 363 
Measures against Castro regime (Rusk), 174 
Women, status of, U.N. seminar (Tillett), 128 

Western Samoa, treaties, agreements, etc., 422, 566 

Whaling. See Fish and fisheries 

Wheat agreement (1962), international, current ac- 
tions: Ecuador, 606; Sierra Leone, 726 

WHO. See World Health Organization 

Williams, Franklin H., 134, 248, 419, 787, 827 

Williams, G. Mennen, 51, 730 

Williams, Murat W., 747 

Wilson, Harold, 902 

WMO. See World Meteorological Organization 

Women, measures to improve status in Western 
Hemisphere, U.N. seminar (Tillett), 128 

Wool textiles ag^reement, international (Rusk), 429 

World Bank. See International Bank 



World cooperation on basic research (Rusk) , 217 
World Health Organization, role of (Tubby), 741 
World Meteorological Organization, work of (Tubby), 

World peace. See Peace 
World problems, consultants on, 441 
World Weather System, U.S. support (Johnson), 791 
Wright, Robert B., 815 

Yankee nuclear power reactor, 27 

Yost, Charles W., 274, 563, 680, 759 

Yugoslavia : 

Changing trade patterns (McGhee) , 717 

Claims agreement re U.S. nationals concluded, 830 

Yugoslavia — Continued 

Educational exchange agreement signed, 831 
Effect of independence, 718 
PL 480 assistance, restrictions on (Rusk), 426 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 168, 453, 602, 646, 762, 
798, 833 

Zambia : 

Independence (Johnson), 722 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 762, 925 

U.N. membership; 759n, 894, 919; Yost, 759 

U.S. gifts to (Engelhard), 723 
Zanzibar, convention on narcotic drugs, 253 





y I 











V ''■ 


Yol. LI, No. 1306 

July 6, 1964 


Address iy Secretary Busk 3 



iy Ambassador George C. McGhee 18 



Statements ty Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson and Text of Resolution 29 

by Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research 6 

For index see inside bach cover 

The 25th Anniversary of the Department off State Bulletin 

statement hy Secretary Rusk 

On July 1st of this year the Department of State passes a special milestone — the 25th anniversary of 
its official periodical, the Department of State Bulletin. 

The Bulletin is unique. No other government in the vrorld publishes so complete a current record of 
its foreign policy. In making public this weekly compilation of documents, the United States Government 
recognizes that a well-informed public is vital to democracy and that the people have a right to know what 
their Government is doing and saying on specific issues. As I have said many times, I feel strongly that 
our ability to pursue effectively any major course of foreign policy is in direct relation to the degree of 
public understanding of and support for such policy. 

In the 25 years since the Bulletin first appeared on July 1, 1939, the world has experienced immense 
political, economic, and social changes. Faithfully and accurately, week by week, the Bulletin has set 
down for the historical record this country's stand on these changes. 

The first issue contained, among other documents, a statement by Secretary Hull on the peace and 
neutrality legislation being considered by the Congress and a message from President Roosevelt on the 
importance of trade in promoting a stable world. The Bulletin of December 13, 1941, carried the President's 
address to the Nation on that fateful December 7 Sunday and his message declaring war against Japan ; 
it also included the declarations of war against the United States by the Axis Powers. The historic 
message of President Truman recommending a program of aid to Greece and Turkey to withstand 
Communist imperialism and the historic speech of Secretary Marshall which led to the Marshall Plan to 
rebuild war-torn Europe were printed in full in the Bulletin, as were President Eisenhower's open-skies 
proposal and President Kennedy's call for an Alliance for Progress in the Americas. 

The Department first began to publish an official periodical on October 5, 1929. It was a small 
pamphlet called Press Releases, which, for the first time, made available to the public in printed form on 
a weekly basis the Department's daily mimeographed releases. 

The Department of State Bulletin is the successor to that publication and to a monthly called Treaty 
Information. After consultation with persons and organizations outside the Government who used one or 
both of those pamphlets, the Department decided to combine them in a single periodical. And so, for a 
quarter of a century, the Bulletin has served a wide range of readers — the scholar who requires complete 
and accurate texts for his research, the specialist seeking reliable citations, the student struggling with his 
term paper, and the citizen who simply wants a firsthand source of information on TT.S. foreign policy. 

In its 25 years the Bulletin has served them all well. I am sure scholar and layman will join me in 
this anniversary salute to a highly respected arm of our public affairs program — the Department of State 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
asencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
forelcn relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Forelprn 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on forelcn policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is Included concerning treaties 
and International asreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative ninte- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington. D.C., 
20402. Price ; 52 issues, domestic $8.50. 
foreign $12.25 ; single copy. 25 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
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NOTB : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 


Why Laos Is Critically Important 

Address hy Secretary Rush ^ 

As President [Joltn E.] Sawyer noted in in- 
viting me, this is the I75th anniversary of the 
Department of State, as well as your I75th 
commencement. We are not exactly the same 
age, however, because you, on occasion, have 
held more than one commencement a year. But 
in our early days we were about the same size — 
perhaps you were a little larger. At your first 
commencement, I am informed, you had four 
graduates, one professor, and four tutors. Our 
first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, had 
one chief clerk, three ordinary clerks, and a 
French translator. As late as 1800 there were 
only 10 men in the Department, including the 
Secretary. And your undergraduates prob- 
ably outnumbered our diplomatic missions 
overseas. For, when Jefferson stepped down 
as Secretary of State, we had representatives in 
only 5 countries — and as late as 1800 in no more 
than 12. 

Of necessity, we grew more than you did in 
the next century and a quarter. But in my 
student days the Department of State and our 
Foreign Service were still relatively small. 
And we didn't have a very active foreign policy. 
For, after the First World War, we had re- 
treated into isolation and felt comfortably se- 
cure behind the oceans. We paid dearly for 
the lesson that what happens across the oceans 
can affect us vitally. But even at the end of 
the second and most destructive of world wars, 
we were slow to realize the fundamental change 
in our relationship to the rest of the world 

' Made at commencement exercises at Williams Col- 
lege, Williamstown, Mass., on June 14 (press release 
282 dated June 13; prepared text). 

brought about by nuclear warheads and the 
growing range of airplanes and rockets. 

Today, we can be secure only to the extent 
that our total environment is secure — and by 
"total environment" I mean the land, waters, 
and earth of the entire world and adjacent areas 
of space. 

Today, thermonuclear war could destroy 
much of the Northern Hemisphere in hours. 
Even small wars are dangerous — because they 
may easily grow into great wars. Wliat hap- 
pens halfway around the world may affect our 
security quite as much as what happens on our 
doorstep. Universal peace is no longer just 
a noble ideal; it is essential to the survival of 
civilization and the human race. A peaceful, 
decent world order is the central goal of our for- 
eign policy. If we are ever to achieve that goal, 
aggression must be treated as intolerable ; those 
who practice or plan for aggression, in whatever 
form, must be taught that aggression is not 
only futile but costly to the aggressor. And if 
mankind is to achieve a stable peace, govern- 
ments must keep their word — solemn interna- 
tional agreements can no longer be regarded as 
scraps of paper. 

Background of Situation in Laos 

With these self-evident truths in mind, I 
should like to review briefly the background 
of a situation nearly halfway around the world, 
in a landlocked, poor, rugged country about 
the size of Great Britain but containing only 
two or three million people. I refer to Laos. 
Laos is the scene of Commimist aggression, bad 
faith, and duplicity. 

JTTLT 6, 1964 


Why are we concerned about Laos? First, 
because of its location. On the north and 
northeast it has nearly 1,100 miles of border 
with Communist China and Communist North 
Viet-Nam. It also shares 1,750 miles of border 
with four non-Communist countries, including 
Thailand, the heartland of Southeast Asia, and 
South Viet-Nam, which is resisting an aggres- 
sion directed and supplied by Communist North 
Viet-Nam with the support of Communist 

In 1949 the French granted Laos independ- 
ence within the French Union. But the North 
Vietnamese Communists managed to attract a 
few Lao dissidents by pledges of military help 
and teclxnical advice. In September 1950 the 
North Viet-Nam radio announced formation of 
the "resistance government of the Pathet Lao." 
Later broadcasts claimed that this government 
had a "national assembly," had picked a "prime 
minister," and had formed a "people's libera- 
tion army." All this occurred not in Laos but 
in North Viet-Nam. 

In 1953 North Vietnamese forces invaded 
Laos, taking with them their puppet Pathet Lao 
government and troops. Wlien the Indochinese 
war was brought to an end by the Geneva agree- 
ments of 1954,^ the Communists controlled two 
provinces of Laos. But under those agreements 
Laos was to be one country, the Pathet Lao 
forces were to be integrated into the Royal Lao 
Army, and all foreign military forces were to 
be withdrawn, excepting limited forces and two 
bases reserved for France. Those pledges were 
signed by the Communist regimes of North Viet- 
Nam and mainland China as well as by the 
Soviet Union and Poland. 

But, because of Pathet Lao intransigence, 
those agreements did not bring peace and unity 
to Laos. And, in 1960, fighting among non- 
Communist elements gave the Communists new 
opportunities. Wlien President Kennedy took 
office, the Soviet Union was airlifting arms and 
ammunition from Hanoi to Communist and 
neutralist forces in northeast Laos and on the 
strategic Plaine des Jarres. And we were sup- 

porting the Government forces in the Mekong 

The 1962 Geneva Accords 

The Soviet Union, however, indicated that it 
desired an independent and neutral Laos.' 
And we had no wish beyond a free Laos that 
could live at peace with its neighbors. Subject 
to a cease-fire we agreed to negotiate. Finally, 
new accords were signed in Geneva m July 

All participants "solemnly declared" their 
respect for the sovereignty, neutrality, and ter- 
ritorial integi'ity of Laos. They agi'eed, among 
other things, to: (1) withdraw all foreign 
troops in the presence of international inspec- 
tors; (2) prohibit introduction of military 
forces in any capacity; (3) withhold any war 
materiel from Laos except as "the Eoyal Gov- 
ernment of Laos may consider necessary"; (4) 
not use the territory of Laos to intervene in the 
internal affairs of other countries. 

Responsibility for general supervision of the 
accords was given to an International Control 
Commission (ICC) composed of representatives 
of Canada and Poland with India as chairman. 

And all agreed also to svipport a Government 
of National Union composed of three factions, 
with the neutral leader Prince Souvanna 
Phouma as Premier. 

The 14 governments which made these pledges 
included Communist China and Communist 
North Viet-Nam as well as the Soviet Union 
and Poland. 

Record of Communist Aggression and Deception 

Wliat happened? The non-Communist na- 
tions complied with the agreements. North 
Viet-Nam and its Pathet Lao puppets did not. 
We promptly withdrew our 600-man military 
aid mission. North Viet-Nam kept several 
thousand troops and military teclmicians in 
Laos. North Vietnamese cadres are tlie back- 
bone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. 

'For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State publica- 
tion 6446), p. 750. 

" For background, see Bulletin of July 2, 1962, p. 12. 

' For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 
and an accompanying protocol, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, 
p. 259. 


This was, and is, of course, a major violation 
of the Geneva accords. 

Later, North Viet-Nam sent additional forces 
back into Laos — some of them in organized bat- 
talions — a second major violation. 

The North Vietnamese have continued to use, 
and improve, the corridor through Laos to rein- 
force and supply the Viet Cong in South Viet- 
Nam — a third major violation. 

The Communists have continued to ship arms 
into Laos as well as through it — another major 

The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese 
Communists have compounded these interna- 
tional felonies by denials that they were com- 
mitting them. 

But there was another major violation which 
they could not deny. They barred freedom of 
access to the areas under their control, both to 
the Lao Government and to the International 
Control Commission. The Royal Lao Govern- 
ment, on the other hand, opened the areas imder 
its control to access not only by the ICC but 
by all Lao factions. 

The Commimists repeatedly fired at person- 
nel and aircraft on legitimate missions under 
the authority of the Royal Lao Government. 
They even fired on ICC helicopters. They re- 
peatedly violated the cease-fire agreement. 
And this spring they launched an assault on 
the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, driv- 
ing them off the Plaine des Jarres, where they 
had been since early 1961. 

Tliis, in bare simimary, is the Communist 
record of aggression, bad faith, and deception 
in Laos. 

A Communist takeover in Laos would be as 
unacceptable as a Communist takeover in South 
Viet-Nam. The rest of Southeast Asia would 
be in jeopardy, and saving it would be much 

more costly, in blood and treasure, than turn- 
ing back the aggressors in Laos and South 
Viet-Nam. The loss of Southeast Asia as a 
whole to the Communists would be intolerable. 

Need for Compliance With Present Agreements 

The Commmiist assault on Laos, like that 
on South Viet-Nam, involves the larger ques- 
tion of whether anyone is to be permitted to 
succeed in aggression by terror, guerrilla war- 
fare, and the infiltration of arms and military 
personnel across national frontiers. If they 
are allowed to gain from these assaults in South- 
east Asia, the Commimist advocates of militancy 
everywhere will feel encouraged. 

Also at stake is the fundamental question of 
whether solemn international contracts are to 
be perforated. All who believe in peace and in 
buildmg a decent world order and rule of law 
have an interest in seeing that no government 
be allowed to gain from breaking its promises. 

There is talk of negotiating new political 
settlements in Southeast Asia. But political 
settlements were reached in 1954 and 1962. The 
Geneva accords of 1962 were precisely agree- 
ments to neutralize Laos. No new agreements 
are required. All that is needed is compliance 
with the agreements already made. 

The prescription for peace in Laos and Viet- 
Nam is simple : Leave your neighbors alone. It 
is in the vital interest of the free world that 
Peiping and Hanoi — and all Communists 
everywhere — learn, once and for all, that they 
cannot reap rewards from militancy, aggression 
by seepage, and duplicity. For our part, we 
certainly do not intend to abandon the peoples 
of Laos or Viet-Nam or other countries who are 
trying to remain free from Communist domina- 

JULY 6. 1964 

Making the World Safe for Diversity 

hy Thomas L. Hughes 

Director of Intelligence and Research ^ 

General [Andrew P.] O'Meara, distinguished 
representatives of the armed forces of the 
Americas, and fellow citizens of the American 
Kepublics : Wlien I was invited to be with you 
this morning, I was asked to try to give you a 
broad picture of worldwide problems and poli- 
cies as viewed from Washington. 

As I thought about how best to comply with 
General O'Meara's request, various alternative 
titles occurred to me : "The Dilemmas of a De- 
polarizing World," or "The Changing Shape 
of Conflict," or "The Predicaments of Partial 
Success," or "The Distractions of Diversity," 
or "The Continuing Communist Challenge." 

In any case what I have to say this morning 
will have much to do with all these themes. 
For any overview of the world political situa- 
tion today is bound to consider the new dimen- 
sions of complexity and variety that now affect 
the Communist and non-Communist worlds 
alike. Indeed, on our side they are the prod- 
ucts of the very diversity for which we have 
been fighting and working to make the world 

Impressions of Diversity 

It was a year ago this month, in his famous 
speech at American University,^ that President 
Kennedy spoke of making the world "safe for 
diversity." Since then it has become clearer 
than ever before that we live at a floodtide of 
diversity and change in all the continents. 

Of course there is the continuing fact that 
we are still confronted with an authoritarian 
ideology which seeks our destruction and which 

is inventive in the means of pursuing it. But 
there is also the human fact of the "revolution 
of rising expectations" sweeping the southern 
continents. There is the psychological fact of 
cold- war battle fatigue. There is the physical 
fact that we are riding the crest of a revolution 
in science and technology. Tliere is the frus- 
trating fact that all of this is occurring in a 
world of some 120 countries, of some 120 for- 
eign policies, of some 120 sets of national goals 
or national appetites. 

New forms of nationalism are expressing 
themselves just at a time when international 
organizations are both more plentiful and more 
necessary than ever before. In many parts of 
the world the psychological awkwardness of the 
contest continues between the Communists, who 
say they will uproot the status quo, and the rest 
of us, who say that we do not really favor the 
status quo actually. Differing views of the 
world are seen from the different national capi- 
tals — the big pictures and the little pictures 
blurring one another even as they overlap in the 
varying perspectives of Mexico City, Tokyo, 
Baghdad, Leopoldville, Ottawa, Paris, and 
Saigon. In some parts of the world old ideolo- 
gies are dying. In other parts the tlirust for 
new ideologies is a prime political fact. 

Leaders, governments, and people, respond- 
ing to their own political necessities and cur- 
rent national needs, are moving ahead on dif- 
ferent historical schedules. The last 12 months 

' Address made at a conference of officers of the Latin 
American armed forces, sponsored by the U.S. South- 
ern Command, in the Panama Canal Zone on June 8. 

' Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2. 


alone have unpredictably seen the advent of 
new administrations in Washington, London, 
Rio, Bonn, Rome, and New Delhi. There are 
no generally accepted international political 
timetables. Indeed, many of us must operate 
daily in a host of situations where it is clear 
that this generation of the world's political 
leaders are, understandably but often, out of 
phase with one another. Incidentally these 
asymmetrical facts of life have a great deal 
to do with the relevance which one nation's mil- 
itary, scientific, technological, political, and 
economic experience has for other nations — 
even for its good friends and allies. 

On our part the "illusion of American om- 
nipotence" is an illusion we have long since 
overcome, if indeed it ever existed. There was 
also a time when some people thought that we 
North Americans tended to look out on the 
world seeing only two kinds of people: Rus- 
sians and potential manpower that we and the 
Russians could compete for. If ever true, 
those days too are gone. The thoughtful citi- 
zens of the United States increasingly imder- 
stand that it is a rather honorable thing to be 
in an historical situation where we cannot save 
ourselves without helping others save them- 
selves as well. 

Two years ago Washington was preoccupied 
with the ominous threat of a direct nuclear con- 
frontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
in the crises over Berlin and Cuba. Today, 
while we can never neglect the possibility that 
such direct crises will return abruptly, we 
nevertheless find ourselves worrying much more 
of the time about crises in which the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. are far less directly involved — 
crises like Cyprus, Zanzibar, the Congo, and 
Kashmir, not to speak of Laos and South Viet- 
Nam, where the U.S.S.R. claims to have little 
involvement and less influence. 

In a sense the tide of the cold war has defi- 
nitely turned. There is an unmistakable move- 
ment away from a bipolar confrontation of the 
two superpowers toward a more diversified 
world. We are moving from a period of dan- 
gerously abnormal simplicity into a period of 
more relatively normal diversity. 

But freedom's struggle against conmiunism 
is far from over and far from won. Indeed, 

to the extent that the Communist threat and 
the danger of nuclear war have been major 
factors in imifying the free, non-Communist 
world, our very success in completing phase 
one of the struggle against communism threat- 
ens to complicate matters by eroding our unity 
for the new phase which has now begun. 

I should like to examine some of the prob- 
lems posed by this decomposition of the bipolar 
world. It is a problem very much on our minds 
in Washington, and I suspect it is very much 
on the minds of your governments as well. I 
take it that the main purpose of this inter- 
American conference is, in fact, to provide a 
forum for a mutually profitable discussion of 
the new dimensions of our ongoing struggle 
with international communism. 

Let us review some of the essential elements 
of this struggle as they affect the world politi- 
cal scene. 

Containment: Its Success and Obsolescence 

In the wake of World War II the issue was 
stark and clear. Freedom was directly and im- 
minently threatened by Stalinist-directed ex- 
pansionism. Admittedly, our concept of con- 
tainment was, strictly speaking, a negative 
one. It was designed to muster the necessary 
strength to bar the way to Communist expan- 
sion. While Moscow saw its historic mission as 
one of making over the world on a Communist 
model, the United States and other countries 
who joined in a series of defensive alliances set 
themselves the opposite goal. Our objective 
was not to force our institutions upon other 
countries but to help preserve freedom of choice 
against those who would deny that freedom. 

Broadly speaking, the policy of containment 
has both succeeded and become obsolete. The 
conspicuous forward motion of conventional 
Commimist armies has been stopped. Uni- 
formed Communist troops have not spilled in 
force over borders since June 1950 in Korea. 

The bedrock of containment has been the mili- 
tai-y strength of the free world and, in partic- 
ular, the ability of the United States to deter 
Soviet use of nuclear weapons. We have had 
no illusions about Soviet magnanimity for the 
weak, and when, in the late 1950's, the Soviets 
used their Sputnik and their newly developed 

JULY 6, 1964 

ICBM to challenge us to an arms race, our 
determination stiffened. 

We set about building a nuclear force which 
could withstand any Soviet attack and then 
retaliate with devastating effect. Sophisticated 
U.S. strategic weapons systems, long in develop- 
ment and only shortly behind the operational 
readiness dates of the more simplified Soviet 
program, were rushed to completion. Polaris 
submarines, largely immime from enemy at- 
tack, were deployed in the oceans around the 
U.S.S.R. The alert status of SAC [Strategic 
Air Command] bombers, both on the ground 
and airborne, was further improved. U.S. 
intercontinental missiles, notably the solid- 
fueled, quick-reacting Minuteman, were in- 
creasingly dispersed and hardened. This year 
we are spending approximately $8 billion more 
on defense than we were in 1960. 

There can be no question today that our 
second-strike capability is credible to the 
Soviets. They know as well as we do that the 
United States Air Force has 540 strategic 
bombers on alert which could, in the face of a 
surprise missile attack, take off for their targets. 
In contrast we estimate that the Soviets could 
place over the United States, on two-way mis- 
sions, no more than approximately 120 heavy 
bombers plus perhaps an additional 150 medium 
bombers over Alaska and our Northwest. To- 
day our Air Force has some 750 ICBM's on 
launchers. The Soviets have less than one- 
fourth that number in operation. We have 192 
Polaris missiles deployed. The Soviets have 
substantially fewer submarine-borne missiles in 
operation. Those they do have cannot be 
launched while the submarine remains sub- 
merged, and they have a range of less than a 
third of Polaris's 1,500 miles. 

Clearly a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union 
would have to be an irrational decision. No 
one can guarantee against that, but the likeli- 
hood of it has receded. 

Yet if our nuclear strength is a relatively firm 
hedge against nuclear attack today, it is by no 
means a cure-all for the host of remaining polit- 
ical problems. Nuclear threats cannot be in- 
voked lightly. The United States could employ 
its nuclear forces only upon the gi-avest provoca- 
tion. Even assuming for an instant that an 

American surprise attack on the Soviet Union 
were not morally repugnant, as every American 
President of the nuclear age has declared it to 
be, it would still have to be ruled out on grounds 
of impracticality. Even in the most optimistic 
appraisal of the potential results of a nuclear 
exchange, i.e., one in which the U.S. was as- 
sumed to have the advantage of striking first, 
the casualties to the West would still number 
in the tens of millions of lives. 

Maintaining a Strategic Advantage 

We recognize that for the foreseeable future 
a major portion of our military expenditures 
will have to continue to be devoted to maintain- 
ing our strategic advantage. But the largest 
items in our mammoth defense budget are con- 
sciously being appropriated in the profound 
hope that the weapons systems which they 
finance will never be used. Thus our nation's 
leaders of both political parties are willing to 
cope with the domestic problems of spending 
billions of dollars on missiles which, if our 
policies are successful, will not be laimched. 

We intend our strategic advantage not only 
to deter actual Soviet aggression but to limit 
Soviet ability to use nuclear weapons for pur- 
poses of intimidation. The Cuban missile crisis 
showed to what lengths the Soviet Union might 
go in order to improve its strategic leverage 
upon both North and South America — although 
the relatively careless manner in which the 
Soviets attempted to install their offensive mis- 
siles, and the speed with which they withdrew 
them, suggest strongly that the Communist 
leaders in Moscow miscalculated badly the risks 
they thought they were running. We think that 
the Cuban crisis taught the Soviets a lesson, and 
we do not expect them to miscalculate so rashly 

Since, however, the purpose of our nuclear 
forces is to deter aggression and contribute to 
the avoidance of nuclear war, we have no desire 
to amass megatons as a miser hoards gold. We 
are deeply interested in probing every possible 
approach to effective arms control if it would 
afford a safer means to assure stability and 

Our interest in arms control and disarmament 


is sometimes misunderstood. I wish to assure 
any of you who may be worried that this effort 
is one we are undertaking with our eyes wide 
open. We know what we are doing. The tenta- 
tive steps already taken in the direction of arms 
control are designed to create more security, not 
less. We have far too great an investment in 
our present military strength ever to jeopardize 
it without proportionate gain. We have no in- 
tention of gambling with it whimsically or 

We will, however, look both to continued 
improvement of our own defenses and to re- 
sponsible disarmament measures to the degree 
that either points to our main objective : increas- 
ing the safety of the free, non-Communist 
world. We recognize that an imchecked arms 
race, together with the possible spread of in- 
creasingly devastating weapons to more and 
more covmtries, takes us further away from the 
kind of security wliich might otherwise even- 
tually be ours under an international peace- 
keeping system providing a reliable means of 
effective, enforcible arms control. 

The Need for Flexibility 

In the meantime, as the likelihood of a sur- 
prise nuclear attack, or even a surprise conven- 
tional attack, by the Soviets has decreased, the 
necessity for a more diversified and rapidly 
reacting capability to meet local crises has be- 
come more important. A variety of threats 
requires a variety of possible responses. We 
realize all too well that the so-called nuclear 
stalemate does not rule out the possibility of 
other forms of Communist military aggression. 
We ourselves have been committed to develop- 
ing forces capable of an increasingly flexible 
response to the variety of military threats which 
fall short of general nuclear war. As a result, 
U.S. military options have steadily increased, 
U.S. ability to meet less-than-outright aggres- 
sion has improved, and U.S. "command and 
control"' capabilities to insure reliability and 
conformity to our larger national objectives 
have become more sophisticated. We have 
aided, and will continue to aid, other free, non- 
Communist countries in building up their own 
defenses to meet the new conditions. Thus the 
free, non-Commiuiist world will possess gradu- 

ated capabilities both to deter Communist or 
Communist-sponsored external threats at vary- 
ing levels of intensity and to respond to the 
diversified aggression of Communist-supported 
internal insurgency. 

Pursuing this policy of graduated deterrence 
and flexible response, we have consciously been 
promoting a worldwide mobility of our forces — 
not only strategic but tactical as well. Thus, 
while our strategic strike forces remain ready 
for action on an instant's notice, our tactical 
aircraft, ground forces, and naval units are in- 
creasingly able to bring U.S. military elements 
to virtually any part of the world where they 
may be needed. Tactical fighter aircraft take 
off in the Far East and land a few hours later 
in Arizona. Army divisions are moved by air 
to Europe and back again, without losing their 
operational readiness. American naval power 
from either the Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans 
can go on short notice to patrol the Indian 
Ocean. The U.N. peacekeeping force now on 
Cyprus was transported there largely by Ameri- 
can air power. 

I think we should be quite clear about the 
purpose of all this. If, as Mr. Khrushchev has 
declared, deliberate nuclear war is imthinkable, 
and if deliberate conventional war between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is also less likely because 
it may so easily turn into a nuclear war, it 
does not follow that international violence is 
unthinkable. In fact, to the degree that the 
Communists forsake or postpone the use of 
major violence to achieve their ends, the danger 
of lesser levels of violence is probably increased. 

Thus at the same time as the Cuban crisis we 
had a sudden, limited attack with conventional 
forces by Communist China upon India, in the 
isolated and forbidding terrain of the Hima- 
layan Moimtains. Thus there have been guer- 
rilla training, sabotage planning, and infiltra- 
tion and subversion of free Latin American 
countries proceeding from Cuba. Thus harass- 
ing actions short of violence, as well as acts of 
suspicious but anonymous violence, occur in 
much of the non-Communist world. 

Often these situations produce requests for 
immediate, on-the-spot U.S. action. Often 
they bear within themselves the potentialities of 
escalation to vastly destructive proportions. 

There has been nothing yet to indicate that the 
Communists will leave their neighbors in peace, 
or that they will refrain from deliberate sub- 
version and the fomenting of violence in other 
countries, or that they will restrain themselves 
from infiltrating cadres to stiffen and direct 
guerrilla warfare in violation of international 

The fact that Communist military aggression 
from within a coimtry is becoming more fre- 
quent, and the fact that it is more complicated 
to deal with, do not make it less dangerous. By 
far the greater part of the Viet Cong forces in 
South Viet-Nam are South Vietnamese, and 
the preponderance of Viet Cong weapons come 
not from Communist countries but from cap- 
ture, purchase, and local manufacture. Thus, 
while controlling tlie war from Hanoi, the Com- 
munists are able to claim that the conflict in 
South Viet-Nam is internal, and even, with their 
customary hypocrisy, that it is a war of resist- 
ance against American imperialism. In Laos 
similar tactics are being pursued, with the same 
objective of gaining control over the entire 
country. In Cuba the revolution was ostensibly 
led by non-Communist Cubans. Certainly it 
was supported by millions of non-Communist 
Cubans. It was only after the revolution suc- 
ceeded that the relationship with Moscow be- 
came overt. 

This is in truth a more sophisticated and 
dangerous form of aggression, when the leaders 
of an aggressive war cannot be located, when 
their sources of supply can rarely be interdicted, 
when enemy forces are usually not outsiders, 
and when truces do not halt the conflict. These 
factors reinforce the underlying wisdom of 
policies designed to foreclose, at level after level 
on the scale of military violence, the options 
open to the Communists for using force to gain 
their purposes. These policies must proceed. 
They are more important than ever now that 
outright military aggression across national 
boundaries appears less likely than previously. 
For, while Communist methods have changed, 
and the natvire of the Communist threat is 
changing. Communist objectives remain un- 
changed. Indeed the increased diversification 
and sophistication of the Communist military 
threat has been matched by a diversification and 

sophistication of the economic and political 
threats as well. 

Soviet Economy: Perseverance Through Strain 

I mentioned what seems to me to have been 
the Soviet miscalculation in the Cuban missile 
crisis in 1962. There was another earlier Soviet 
miscalculation in 1958, in the first flush of new- 
found optimism over Sputnik. Soviet leaders 
apparently assumed that they would not only 
be able to mount a new strategic challenge to 
the free world but that at the same time they 
could continue a rapid and balanced rate of 
economic growth sufficient to provide for con- 
sumer needs at home and effective economic aid 

As it happened, the Soviet planners were 
proved wrong. Moscow's own statistics show 
how, under the pressure of a Soviet-initiated 
arms race and as a result of other flaws in the 
Soviet economic system, national income growth 
rates declined from an average of 9.5 percent 
per year between 1956 and 1959 to 6 percent in 
1962 and 4.5 percent last year. At the same time 
the Soviet leadership had been promising more 
prosperity to its citizenry and whetting existing 
appetites for consumer goods. The result has 
been an ongoing debate in the Soviet hierarchy 
over the proper allocation of resources for new 
investment. The principal claimants — military 
expenditures, heavy industry, and consumer 
goods including agriculture — have tended to be 
relatively evenly matched. It has been a 
debate which no one has really won. Even 
though the economic situation deteriorated bad- 
ly as a result of crop failures recently, the 
tendency has been to postpone any radical 
changes in the structure of the Soviet economy. 

It is possible that these economic strains were 
a major factor last year in the Kremlin's will- 
ingness to conclude the limited test ban agree- 
ment and thus initiate a period of reduced ten- 
sions. At the same time, it would be imrealistic 
for us to assume that the Soviet Union is so 
poor that it has no freedom of choice in assess- 
ing its own priorities. For example, it might 
seem that, pressed as they are, the Soviets would 
cut back on foreign aid programs. Yet precisely 
at this time of economic adversity, Moscow is 



once again showing its willingness to tighten 
its belt if that is necessary to take advantage 
of political opportunities. Soviet commitments 
in foreign economic aid are rising again. New 
commitments in the first 5 months of this year 
are in excess of $600 million. The record high 
in the past was $859 million for all of 1959. 

Moreover, in the aid field, as elsewhere, 
Moscow's flexibility is often enhanced by the au- 
thoritarian nature of its government. Its ca- 
pacity for making rapid decisions at tactically 
useful moments contrasts with our own .sober 
and methodical requirements which flow from 
our democratic form of government, from our 
Congress, and from our Bureau of the Budget. 
Thus the U.S.S.R. has the ability to offer addi- 
tional credits to countries even though previ- 
ous ones are not fully used, as it has recently 
done for the steel mill at Bone, Algeria. The 
U.S.S.R. has agreed to aid projects and an- 
nounced firm commitments to them even before 
preliminary cost estimates, detailed surveys, or 
feasibility studies by the Soviets are made — 
Egypt's Aswan Dam and India's proposed 
Bokaro steel mill are examples. In both these 
cases the U.S.S.R. has benefited doubly by pick- 
ing up projects previously considered by the 
U.S. which we, for one reason or another, were 
unable to assist. 

In addition the U.S.S.R. aid authorities are 
able, when political needs require, to offer grants 
to recipients who, for political or economic 
reasons or both, hesitate to become obligated 
to Moscow for credits. Nepal, Yemen, and 
Kenya have been beneficiaries recently of this 
practice. Moreover, there is no strong outcry 
in the Soviet leadership or the Soviet press when 
the Kremlin permits comingling of Soviet aid 
with "Western assistance. Today, for instance, 
the Soviets are building a school in Ethiopia 
which will be staffed by teachers being trained 
in the U.S. 

Soviet flexibility is also illustrated by an oc- 
casional extension of an open line of credit for 
a fixed amount without any specific projects 
being mentioned. The $100 million credit ex- 
tended last fall to Algeria was merely for 
"economic development." Thus the Soviet 
economic offensive continues, flexible and 

The Communist Rift 

The growing rift between Moscow and Pei- 
ping is also, of course, contributing to pro- 
found changes in the Communist world. 
Viewed broadly, a falling out among our po- 
tential enemies is a welcome development and 
one which, like so many other recent develop- 
ments, calls for flexible responses on our part. 
But the Sino-Soviet rift, like the other changes, 
does not mean that the net Communist threat 
is receding everywhere or anywhere. On the 
contrary, the rift may diversify and intensify 
the threat at least in some areas, just as the 
ingredients and forms of the challenge will cer- 
tainly be heavily conditioned by it. 

The vilification of one another by the Soviet 
and Cliinese Communists is having far-reach- 
ing effects upon the international Communist 
movement. Not even the epochal struggle be- 
tween Stalin and the Trotskyites had such 
effects — the Trotskyites were outcasts from the 
start without the advantage of command over 
the most populous state in the world. 

Tliese effects cut two ways. On the one 
hand, the dispute has seriously tarnished the 
image of Communist unity as well as the au- 
thority and universality of Communist dogma, 
both of which have traditionally been essential 
to the elan of the Communist movement and its 
appeal to potential supporters. After all, a 
worldwide argument among Communists about 
fundamentals makes it painfully clear that 
Marxism is hardly a scientific method capable 
of producing clear answers to social problems. 

On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet recrimi- 
nations have greatly accelerated the fragmen- 
tation of control within the world Communist 
movement. Loosened controls have permitted 
Communist states and parties to pursue their 
objectives with greater freedom. Indeed, some 
of them are likely to benefit by the removal of 
prior handicaps. Local Communist leaders 
will have a wider range of choice and a freer 
hand in pursiiing those policies which they re- 
gard as most effective in their own national 

As each attacks the other and defends its 
own position, Moscow and Peiping are bidding 
for the support of Communists throughout the 

JULY 6, 19G4 


world. The Soviets still have the backing — 
in one degree or another — of most party lead- 
ers and organizations, although the degree of 
support for Soviet tactics has tended to be more 
aixd more qualified. Even those parties most 
opposed to the Chinese Commimists' theoretical 
propositions have been reluctant to support the 
Soviets in any effort to impose sanctions on the 
Chinese, lest their own freedom of action be 
curtailed by a resurgence of tightened control 
within the movement. The Chinese have 
gained the support of half a dozen foreign par- 
ties and have been actively supporting the for- 
mation of new Chinese-oriented Commimist 
organizations. Above all, the mere existence 
of a rival Chinese line has weakened the estab- 
lished Soviet authority and encouraged greater 
independence among and within all parties. 

In Hungary the other day, IQirushchev said 
that communism now stood for "better goulash 
and better ballet." While we may take it for 
granted that communism still means more than 
that to Kiirushchev himself, it surely means 
more than that to Mao. 

We may in one country or another find our- 
selves faced with rival Communist parties — 
one Moscow-oriented and the other Peiping- 
oriented, one seeking to infiltrate the existing 
government or a broadly based opposition by 
-means of united-front tactics, while the other 
takes the road of revolutionary violence. We 
may face two or more enemies in a given situa- 
tion instead of one. 

This erosion of Connnunist unity does not by 
any means end the dangers of communism, but 
we should not gloss over it as insignificant. 
The result for us may be a two- front struggle, 
but it is not a deliberate deception contrived or 
arranged between the two Communist capitals. 
Instead, the whole Communist tradition of doc- 
trinal discipline authoritatively interpreted, of 
party discipline rutUessly enforced on an iden- 
tifiable membership, of a disciplined worldwide 
subversive order of battle supported by a single 
power center wliich ultimately decides on tim- 
ing and tactics — this whole Connnunist tradi- 
tion is itself undergoing contradictions and is 
at the verge of breaking up. In the process 
of breaking up, the splinters may become ex- 
ceedingly sharp. 

For instance, competition with Communist 
China imijoses upon the Soviet Union a new 
need to demonstrate to critical Communist au- 
diences that the Soviet Union is not derelict in 
its revolutionary duty. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that a new emphasis on national lib- 
eration movements has appeared in Soviet pub- 
lic statements in the past 6 months. The extent 
to which Moscow will translate into action its 
avowed support for violence for these purposes 
remains to be seen. But at the least, the Soviet 
Union may be less likely to counsel restraint 
to those who champion violence, a factor which 
adds to the probabilities that the Conamunist 
challenge is an abiding, not a subsiding, one. 

The Disarray of Safety 

Returning to our side of the Iron Curtain, we 
should note that holes are now being poked into 
it from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If con- 
tainment was a negative policy — a policy of 
blocking communism's outward thrust into the 
free world — we now have an opportunity, a 
marginal but growing one, to pursue a positive 
policy of influencing developments in certain 
parts of the Commmiist world. In some ways 
we can contribute to the evolution of healthier 

I have in mmd particularly the resurgence of 
nationalism in Eastern Europe. In part be- 
cause of the weakening of controls within the 
bloc as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the 
countries of Eastern Europe are increasingly 
able to pursue their own interests and to seek 
better relations with the West. We should not 
expect too much. But by judiciously respond- 
ing to their approaches, we can aid these coun- 
tries in their efforts to detach themselves a little 
further from Soviet control — and to move to- 
ward policies of their own which may become 
more expressive of their national mterests than 
of old-style Communist ambitions for world 

Yet in order to do so, we shall once more have 
to pursue increasingly flexible policies. Of 
course, one man's flexibility is another man's 
inconsistency. Doubtless there will be those 
who find elements of inconsistencj' in a policy 
which treats different Communists differently. 



Indeed, the problem of coping with such seem- 
ing inconsistencies will be with us more and 
more. For if we continue to succeed in moder- 
ating the Communist threat, and in encouraging 
individual Communist countries to pursue less 
dramatically threatening policies toward us, we 
shall move into a period in which the whole 
pattern of international politics, familiar since 
World "War II, will tend to blur. 

Basically, containment was a simple policy, 
and, because the threat of nuclear war was so 
compelling, it tended to claim everyone's atten- 
tion. Because containment was essentially a 
defensive policy, it tended to reinforce a con- 
servative outlook, more often than not putting 
us in the position of reacting to others' initia- 
tives. Our fundamental objective then as now 
was not to impose our political attitudes or in- 
stitutions upon others but to help other coun- 
tries preserve their freedom of choice against 
Communist expansion. 

Today, at the moment of our success, we are 
finding that the very diversities we have sought 
to preserve are emerging in public, claiming 
attention themselves, and creating the appear- 
ance of considerable divisiveness among friends. 
The world seems to be less sharply divided into 
the Communist and the free. The once satellite 
countries of Eastern Europe are somewhat freer 
than they used to be. They are, says Ivliru- 
shchev, "too big to spank." Benefiting by the 
contrast with Peiping, Moscow itself seems 
milder. Our preoccupation with the Soviet 
threat appears to many to be lessening. Al- 
liances seem less secure. It has become some- 
thing of a journalist's cliche to talk of the 
"disarray" in NATO and the OAS. 

As the process of diversification continues in 
both the Communist and non-Communist 
worlds, thoughtful commentators worry that 
our alertness to Communist actions and our 
capacity to counteract them may wane. The 
warning is appropriate. These dangers exist, 
and we must guard against them. Let us hope, 
however, that they add up more to appearances 
than reality — that they are surface manifesta- 
tions, not of decay, but of the growing pains of 
the Atlantic and American communities. 

Tiie question for all of us in the free, non- 
Communist nations is how to operate in this 

possibly safer, more diverse world. In the dayr 
to-day business of foreign affairs one becomes 
almost nostalgic for the terror of the cold war. 
Things were more easily organizable then. 
Fear tended to cement alliances more closely, 
and policy could afford the luxury of slogans, 
and simplification. But these were the inci- 
dental benefits of our proximity to Armaged- • 
don. Now, with the process of depolarization 
coinciding with the arrival of an apparently 
safer world, we shall have new opportunities, 
as well as new dangers. It is important not 
to jeopardize the opportimities, just as it is, 
essential not to indulge in self-delusion or false 
optimism over the prospects of a sudden epi- 
demic of peace. 

The Revolutionary Situation 

Here in the free, non-Communist world, as we 
concentrate more and more on internal sub- 
version and the counterinsurgency measures 
necessary to counteract it, there are several 
things of which we should beware. 

Let us beware of any lingering notion that 
the United States has the solution for everyone 
else's problems. No country in the world is 
less isolationist today than we. But we cannot 
come in and settle your problems for you. We 
know as well as you do that after all is said 
and done, after all our aid has come and gone, 
the problems remain yours, not ours. 

Let us beware of any residual notion that it 
benefits a country to keep its Communist 
threat — that a local Communist menace can be 
a natural resource, like oil or diamonds, easily 
convertible into U.S. support. The day is gone, 
if it ever existed, when an alleged Communist 
menace would trigger an automatic Pavlovian 
response in Washington. In the months and 
years ahead, the United States will not neces- 
sarily respond most to those who have the most 

Let us beware of thinking that all internal 
violence can be charged off to Commimist in- 
fluence, when that influence may often be merely 
one element among others. We cannot make 
the world behave the way the words behave. 
It will be increasingly important for us in our 
own minds to separate Commmiists from non- 

JTJLT 6, 1964 


Communists at a time when the Communists 
are trying harder than ever to cloud over that 
distinction. We must avoid becoming en- 
tangled in the very confusions -which the Com- 
munists themselves will be working overtime to 

For all of us engaged in the fight against com- 
munism there will be a new premium on the 
carefulness of our own analysis, the accuracy 
with which we choose our targets, and the wis- 
dom which we employ in our tactics. In each 
situation we confront we must try to identify 
clearly the real problem, the real enemy, and the 
real opportunity. 

Let us beware of giving the Communists more 
credit than they deserve. There are two sides 
to this notion of Communist "targets of oppor- 
tunity." The Communists may have chosen 
the target, but the society concerned, by its 
previous lack of action, has provided the oppor- 
tunity. There is something else about the 
phrase that bothers me. Even the notion of a 
"target of opportunity" somehow makes the 
problem seem small, episodic, surprising, unex- 
pected, and manageable by minimum effort. 
The phrase does not convey the endemic, his- 
toric, pervasive scale of the native-born revolu- 
tionary situations which actually confront much 
of the free, non-Communist world. Many of 
these are situations not in any sense dependent 
upon Communist sponsorship or inspiration, 
situations which would have been here to plague 
us if Marx, Lenin, Mao, or Khrushchev had 
never been born. 

Infiltration is indeed a new form of aggi'es- 
sion. Guerrillas, saboteurs, organizers, agita- 
tors, are indeed a new dimension of the threat. 
But in a larger sense, ideas are no respecters 
of boundaries. The fact that danger crosses a 
frontier should cause us to look at the condi- 
tions which attract the infiltrator in the first 
place, which make him choose this coimtry 
rather than another as his target. Let us be- 
ware of thinking that people inside vulnerable 
societies can be insulated from revolutionary 
danger just by posting guards in the watch- 
towers on the frontiers, along the coastlines, and 
in the airport waiting rooms, or by making the 
customs officials more vigilant. 

Likewise the probable new push of the Soviet- 

oriented wings of the Communist parties to- 
ward popular- front activities will require even 
greater discrimination, sensitivity, and political 
skill to combat. But the fact that popular 
fronts can once more be organized should itself 
constitute an early warning of danger, as well 
as a confession of past failure to meet real prob- 
lems. It means that that particular society is 
already sufficiently sick and many of its people 
sufficiently frustrated for such a regrouping on 
the left to occur. It means that the objective 
situation itself is a stormy petrel of genuine 
danger, of serious disease in the body politic, of 
growing odds against any kind of "stability." 

In Cuba the revolution came first and the 
deliverance to communism came afterward. 
The Communists do not have to get out in 
front. They do not necessarily advertise them- 
selves in advance. They count heavily on our 
own errors. 

So above all let us beware of thiiiking that 
the problems which have attracted Communist 
attention are therefore somehow not real prob- 
lems, or that once the Communists have been 
rounded up, jailed, or deprived of their civil 
rights, the problems themselves will somehow 
go away. In all likelihood these problems are 
not synthetic or artificial. In all likelihood 
they will not go away imtil they are met. In 
all likelihood we ignore them at our peril. In 
all likelihood there is no ultimate postponement 
except at the cost of a worse and more final 

Much depends on how we look at the world. 
Security, after all, has meaning only for those 
who have something to preserve. Some people 
who have things to preserve take a deeply pessi- 
mistic view, regarding the status quo as sub- 
stantially nonviable, impossible to perpetuate 
much longer. If we take this view, then most 
of what we do becomes a deliberate holding op- 
eration and we hope only to escape at the end, 
luckily with our relics, lives, and perhaps our 
fortunes, but just in time. In the meantime 
our spiritual climate becomes reduced to the 
sheer enjoyment of one more banquet feast, 
knowing that the handwriting is already on the 

A more enlightened conservative view holds 
out the hope for prolonging the status quo by 



adjusting it under various rules of enlightened 
expediency. This way protest may be placated 
and the predictable upheaval will perhaps be 
put off to the successor generation. 

But the real conservatives in today's world 
are likely to be more radical. Looking at the 
world with their eyes open, they have a non- 
doctrinaire appreciation of both the enormous 
problems and the remaining opportunities — op- 
portunities for partnership, joint venture, and 
genuine cooperation before time rims out. 
They realize that radical measures are essential 
if anything is to be conserved, and they know 
that not everything is worth conserving. They 
will deliberately separate themselves from the 
latter distractions, work hard to broaden the in- 
digenous centers of society, and concentrate 
their efforts in those points and places which 
are key- — not only because of their potentiality 
for influence but also because of their capacity 
for democratic leadership. 

I can think of no propositions more widely 
accepted in Washington than these. Our As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Inter- American 
Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, who regretted very 
much indeed that he could not be here today, 
and whose special greetings I bring to you, had 
this to say less than a month ago : ^ 

I should like to state in the very beginning — and to 
say it very clearly — that the Government and people of 
the United States do not forget that their own nation 
was born in revolution. Nor can we forget that the 
process of social, economic, and political change in our 
country has been continuous since 1776. It still goes 
on. We still seek that kind of change which will bring 
about the greatest good for the greatest number of our 

We therefore have a natural sympathy and affinity 
for those governments who seek change and progress. 
Those governments which institute bold, soundly con- 
ceived programs of reform designed to achieve 

national and individual freedom, 
a high and sustained level of economic growth, 
a greater degree of social justice, and 
equal opportunity for all to rise as high in society as 
their talents and efforts will take them, 

will find warmhearted sympathy in Washington. 

That Secretary Mann's position is supported 
in depth by the highest authority of the United 

States Government is equally clear. President 
Johnson himself recently said : * 

To struggle to stand still in Latin America Is Just 
to "throw the sand against the wind." 

We must, of course, always be on guard against Com- 
munist subversion. But anticommunism alone will 
never suffice to insure our liberty or fulfill our dreams. 
That is going to take leadership, leadership that is 
dedicated to economic progress without uneconomic 
privilege, to social change which enhances social jus- 
tice, to political reform which widens human freedom. 

Likewise at his meeting with the ambassadors 
at the White House on May 11, 1964, to review 
the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson 
proclaimed : ° 

... we will continue to join with, you to encourage 
democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations 
from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle. 

But the charter of the alliance is not confined to 
political democracy. It commands a peaceful, demo- 
cratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It 
calls upon us to throw open the gates of opportunity 
... to the poor and to the oppressed. It asks that privilege be ended and that unfair power be 

The President said, "We say now, if a peaceful 
revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is 

The Latin American Frontline 

President Johnson was addressing himself to 
this hemisphere — to those "20 nations . . . who 
take strength from the ricliness of their diver- 
sity." ^ And what he said has particular rele- 
vance to this hemisphere because of the chang- 
ing world challenge we have been discussing 
this morning. For at the height of the cold war, 
the American Republics were geographically 
not on the frontlines. Although presumably 
no one wanted to be closer to the frontlines, 
there was a feeling in some quarters that less 
attention was being paid to our hemispheric 
problems because of their distance from the 

The converse is true under today's conditions 

' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 857. 

* Ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726. 

' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 854. 

' For an address by President Johnson on the third 
anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, see ibid., Apr. 
6, 1964, p. 535. 

JULY 6, 1964 


of nuclear stalemate. Today the problems con- 
fronting this hemisphere move more and more 
to the forefront. They become less and less 
distinguishable from the problems which the 
new forms of Communist aggression present 
worldwide. Vast oceans protect us less against 
these new forms than they did against the old. 
Targets for Communist attention in the Amer- 
icas are now as inviting as they are anywhere 
in Africa, or the Middle East, or in South and 
Southeast Asia. 

Indeed, Latin America may appear to Mos- 
cow and Peiping to be especially valuable ex- 
perimentally. In a sense the Communists may 
think they can risk more in Latin America. 
Cuba was a risk. The Communists lost gravely 
there in October 1962, but they by no means 
lost everything. Moreover, there is a special 
advantage which the Communists think they 
see in this hemisphere. They hope to manip- 
ulate in a direct way whatever specific anti- 
United States feeling they can find. They tell 
themselves that they can find it here in the West- 
em Hemisphere more than elsewhere, and they 
would like to exploit the opportunity for as 
much as it is worth. 

This hemisphere of ours has a rich and polit- 
ically honored tradition against "intervention" 
from the outside, a feeling which we North 
Americans came to respect after a few unhappy 
and misguided attempts to infringe upon it our- 
selves in the Central American and Caribbean 
areas two generations ago. Yet as Communist- 
inspired threats to the peace and violations of 
human rights begin to occur increasingly within 
countries, rather than by direct aggression 
across borders, the ambit of our common in- 
terest grows. It does so in spite of our deep 
convictions for "sovereignty" and against "in- 
tervention." We all in fact have a stake in each 
successful popular government in the hemi- 

In this connection the international commu- 
nity too will have to address itself increasingly 
to new, imaginative, and legal means for the 
internal safeguarding of our common interests. 
Recent United Nations activities in the Congo, 
Cyprus, and now Cambodia are hopeful exam- 
ples of international action legitimatizing inter- 
national intervention, just as the OAS action 

at the time of the Cuban missile crisis provided 
a necessary legal basis for inspection-by-recon- 
naissance over Cuba against a threat which 
endangered the whole hemisphere. 

Then too there is another form of interna- 
tional involvement going on which will affect 
us more and more — an increasing internation- 
alization of specialists. Military experts and 
advisers from various countries will be called 
upon, often under international auspices, for 
service in a variety of ways in foreign lands. 
Increasing attention is being paid to the new 
role of armies in transitional societies: the ac- 
tive furtherance in an orderly manner of the 
processes of progressive change. Successful 
experience in Latin America could become an 
invaluable laboratory for useful transplanta- 
tion elsewhere. 

But most of all, this new, diverse, differen- 
tiated world confronts us all with choices — 
with opportunities for deliberate preferences 
in the reordering of our priorities. 

For you as for us, there will be decisions on 
the proper allocation of resources to and within 
your military budgets. There will be decisions 
on how to shape and keep power appropriate to 
your real needs. 

For you as for us, it will be necessary to warn 
against overoptimism, false assumptions, and 
temptations toward collective streaks of inde- 
cisiveness. There will be the problem of act- 
ing when action is required, at the same time 
as we resist impulses for cheap victories, short- 
term results, simple slogans, and easy solutions. 

For you as for us, there will be the necessity 
to follow several policies at once, taking initia- 
tives all the while we hedge against their fail- 
ure. There will be certain inherited and 
declining situations which seem to have gone 
beyond the point of reversal or arrest. There 
will be new claims on your attention and new 
appeals for your support. 

For you as for us, answering the demand for 
economic and social progress will become essen- 
tial, not only as an ideological preference but 
as a strategic necessity. In the struggle we 
face, economic growth and social reform are as 
critically important as military strength itself. 
We in the United States are still committed 
wholeheartedly to all three. 



As the leaders of the American armed foi-ces, 
you have a unique chance to influence these de- 
velopments in a favorable direction. In many 
cases you alone can provide the crucial margin 
of influence which will spell success or failure. 
You know, better than most otliers, that power 
cannot indefinitely become a substitute for peo- 
ple. In the very natui-e of your work you have 
opportunities to set the course of your countries 
toward progress rooted in popular involve- 
ment, motivation, training, civic action, and 
citizenship — identifying yourselves with, and 
working among, the people whom armies and 
navies and air forces are supposed to serve. I 
laiow that there is a growing appreciation in 
Washington and elsewhere that many of you 
are already doing just that. 

Everywhere all of our efforts are increasingly 
mixing civilian and military ingredients. Com- 
bating subversion is a typical case in point. But 
the subversion of the Communists cannot be 
met by subverting the constitution in the proc- 
ess. In the long sweep of history the subversion 
of the right may be just as dangerous in terms 
of probable results for the hemisphere as the 
subversion of the left. The situation itself is 
revolutionary. We have tlie choice of joining 
the revolution and channeling it into the most 
constructive possible paths, or opposing it and 
delivering its leadership to forces whicli can 
destroy most that we hold dear. Mucli of what 
I have said, indeed, adds up to a requirement 
for a "revolution from above." 

Predicament and Prophecy 

So I return to my beginning. The searching 
questions remain : Can we cooperate as well 
without the cementing fear of imminent nuclear 
catastrophe? Can we continue to organize for 
the "common defense" at the time when that 
defense is becoming more complicated? Can 
we join in creating the only lasting immimity 
against aggression from without or within — 
the quick and effective building of better 

Of course there are still a good many ways in 
which the world can stumble into world war III. 

We could all be brought up short again by a 
sudden new crisis pitting us against the 
U.S.S.R. once more on familiar cold-war lines. 
But in the absence of such a crisis, all of us who 
clierish freedom will have to work harder to- 
gether if we are to maintain our unity and co- 
hesion in tliis new world witli its emerging 
diversities and its requirements for flexibility. 
We shall have to consult one anotlier more fre- 
quently and have to search harder for new and 
more imaginative forms of cooperation. We 
can less and less rely on our enemies to do our 
political thinking for us. 

From all over the world this many-sided 
challenge is taking on a new urgency : Act now, 
white men, brown men, black men, Asians, Afri- 
cans, Europeans, and Americans. Act now, to- 
gether, creatively, ahead of chaos, so that this 
new opportunity is not lost, so that the tragic 
debacles of China and Indochina and Cuba 
need not become a pattern of an even larger 
tragedy. Act now, for in the next 10 years posi- 
tive ideas, dedicated people, and peaceful action 
may do wliat no extra amount of guns, bombs, 
and bloodshed can ever accomplish later. 

As we consider the challenge to this hemi- 
sphere, we can remember with profit the lesson 
of Bolivar's life and work — that revolutions 
can stagnate if they are not followed by the re- 
lease of creative social energy. In the despair 
of his last days on earth, the Liberator la- 
mented : "To serve a revolution is to plow the 
sea." "We must fearlessly lay the foundation 
of South American liberty," he had warned at 
an earlier moment of victory. "To hesitate is 
destruction." His warning, unheeded, had be- 
come prophetic. 

And so too the time has come for each of us, 
in his own way, in his own position of responsi- 
bility, in his own American Eepublic, to lieed 
the words of Lincohi, as poignant for our own 
generation as tliey were a hundred years ago : 

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inade- 
quate to the stormy present. The occasion is 
piled high witli difficulty, and we must rise with 
the occasion. As our case is new, so we must 
think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall 
ourselves, and then we sliall save our country." 

JULY 6, 1964 
735-162— e 


The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy 
in an Era of Expanding Frontiers 

hy George G. McGhee 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 

That the American Bankers Association has 
accorded a diplomat a place in the crowded 
schedule of its monetary conference seems to me 
an encouraging sign of our times. This op- 
portunity to meet and talk with you is very 
welcome, since it is my firm belief that represen- 
tatives of private endeavor such as you, and 
representatives of government such as I, do 
indeed have much in common to discuss. This is 
why I have chosen as my subject "The Parallel 
Roles of Business and Diplomacy in an Era of 
Expanding Frontiers." 

As I hope to show, we have entered tliis era 
by having together progressively broken down 
barriers between nations to the flow of trade, 
capital, and ideas. Another barrier which we 
would, in my view, do well to dismantle com- 
pletely is the notion that public policy and pri- 
vate activity have their own spheres of action 
and that these spheres are, so to speak, separated 
by a fence. It happens that I have spent some 
years on each side of that figurative fence, as 
a businessman as well as a government servant. 
This experience has convinced me that any arbi- 
trary division of public and private interests 
does not correspond to the realities of the second 
half of the 20th century. To plan wisely for 
the period ahead, we need a better and a broader 
concept of the respective functions of business 
and government and how they interact. 

In these remarks I shall try to outline such a 

' Address made at the 11th annual monetary con- 
ference of the American Bankers Association at 
Vienna, Austria, on May 19. 

concept. In brief, the proposition I submit to 
you is that: There is but one sphere of action 
for both business and government and that is 
the whole complex world of today, in which the 
affairs of nations and individuals alike are inter- 
locked. Within that sphere, the interests and 
objectives of business and government do not 
diverge but run parallel. It is the task of gov- 
ernment to provide a framework of public pol- 
icy within which private endeavor can bring 
its full energies to bear on the challenge of 
building a safer and more prosperous free so- 
ciety. In overwhelmLng measure, however, the 
actual work of building must lie in the hands 
of private businessmen. 

It is the responsibility of government to act 
when there is any distortion in the relations be- 
tween nations which prevents private enterprise 
from fulfilling its normal role. Reciprocally, it 
is tlie responsibility of private enterprise to use 
its opportunities wisely and on its own to seek 
further avenues for economic progress with 
imagination and perseverance. 

It is not a question of one leading and the 
other following. At times, governments must 
act before the pent-up potential of private en- 
deavor can be released. At other times, it is 
business which, through its exploration of new 
territories, creates the in:ipetus for an adjust- 
ment of public policy. Opportmiities for initi- 
ative change from one to the other as conditions 
change in the world sphere in wliich both busi- 
ness and govenmient operate. The present mo- 
ment of history — and it is my hope that I shall 



be able to convince you of this — is, in my judg- 
ment, one in which the Western World must look 
chiefly to you, and to your colleagues in busi- 
ness, to take the initiative. 

I would like to illustrate the parallelism be- 
tween the actions of business and government 
by reviewing the contributions of both to the 
extraordinary progress made by the Western 
World since the war. I think we can be justly 
proud of the achievements of both. Diplomacy 
has succeeded in creating a new framework of 
economic stability and freedom. Business has 
responded by buildhig a greatly strengthened 
productive base and by creating a new network 
of international business relationships — within 
this framework. Business and diplomacy have, 
in this historic era, performed complementary, 
not competitive, roles. One would have been 
meaningless without the wholehearted support 
of the other. 

The Concept of International Cooperation 

Virtually all of the major diplomatic deci- 
sions taken in the industrial West since the war 
have been linked by a conmion purpose, even 
though the link is not always obvious. The 
majority of Western statesmen have put aside 
notions of narrow national advantage to pur- 
sue — with a large measure of success — the new 
concept that greater advantages are attainable 
through international cooperation. Such men 
as Schuman and Momiet in France, Bevin in 
the United Kingdom, Spaak in Belgium, De 
Gasperi in Italy, Adenauer and Erhard in Ger- 
many — and Marshall and Clayton in the United 
States — have already won a place in history as 
creators of such a concept. 

This radical change in the political relation- 
ships within the Western World was possible, 
however, only because businessmen as well as 
statesmen worked to achieve it. In essence, 
the new policy represents a declaration of faith 
on the part of governments in the willingness 
and ability of private enterprise to accept new 
challenges. It calls upon busmessmen to ex- 
change the assurance of protection in limited 
national markets for the oppoi'tunity to com- 
pete m broader markets. It relies upon the 
talents and imagination of business to give sub- 

stance to the dream of a new Europe and a new 
kind of partnership between J^urope and 

But let us go back to the beginning. The war 
left in its wake a bewildering array of interre- 
lated problems. Europe lay in economic chaos. 
The social and political structure of many 
European nations had been destroyed or se- 
verely shaken. The wealmess of Western Eu- 
rope encouraged internal political division and 
whetted Communist appetites for subversion 
and aggression. The need for action was po- 
litically urgent. 

Considered in purely economic terms, the im- 
mediate problem in Europe was a shortage of 
both private and public capital for reconstruc- 
tion. Furthermore, it was not only the basic 
facilities of industry which needed rebuilding. 
The entire payments system had broken down. 
As Will Clayton described the situation in his 
famous memorandum of May 1947 to General 
Marshall : 

Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political posi- 
tion reflects the economic. One political crisis after 
another merely denotes the existence of grave economic 
distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly 
starving. More consumer's goods and restored con- 
fidence in the local currency are absolutely essential 
if the peasant is again to supply food in normal quan- 
tities to the cities. . . . 

The Marshall Plan and the OEEC 

The first step was a political one : a recogni- 
tion on the part of the United States that action 
was needed because the fate of Western Europe 
was important to Americans. To meet the sit- 
uation the United States lamiched the Marshall 
Plan. I want to emphasize, however, that the 
purpose of the Marshall Plan was not just to 
rebuild Europe with government funds. It was 
to restore that part of the framework for eco- 
nomic activity which had been damaged. The 
injection of capital did, indeed, produce the 
desired effect of reactivating the payments sys- 
tem and thus released the enormous energies of 
the private sector. Farmers could again send 
their produce to the consumer markets with con- 
fidence that the currency they received in pay- 
ment would remain stable and could be ex- 
changed for goods which the cities could again 

JULY 6, 1964 


manufacture. Raw materials again flowed to 
factories. The international payments system 
began to work again. The Marshall Plan was 
a vivid example of the complementary roles of 
government and private business activity. 

I am sm-e most of you appreciate, however, 
that the Marshall Plan also had positive polit- 
ical goals. One aim was to halt the Communist 
drive to enter and subvert governments, revive 
the popular-front concept, and capture control 
of non-Communist organizations of all kinds. 
The Marshall Plan helped to restore faith in 
democratic institutions by showing that they 
were able to respond effectively to urgent needs. 
It gave the lie to Lenin's dogma that, because of 
the inherent contradictions of capitalism, capi- 
talist states cannot cooperate for a constructive 
purpose but must inevitably fall into conflict. 

It is of interest to note statistics which show, 
in some measure, the political effect which eco- 
nomic rehabilitation, in concert of course with 
other factors, had in Western Europe. In 
France, the number of seats held by Commu- 
nists in the National Assembly decreased from 
163 in 1946 to 103 in 1951. In Italy, the Com- 
munist Party's share of the vote fell from 31 
percent in 1948 to 23 percent in 1953. In Bel- 
gium and Holland, Communist strength deteri- 
orated markedly from the high point of 1945- 
46 to a level at which it constituted no threat 
to orderly government in the early fifties. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Com- 
munist Party dropped from 5.7 percent of the 
vote in 1949 to 2.2 percent in 1953. 

The Marshall Plan also had a second political 
goal. It looked beyond the chaos of the moment 
toward the creation of a new kind of Europe, 
one free of the national rivalries which twice 
had plunged the world into war. The plan was 
framed, by the f arsighted statesmen who guided 
it, to give impetus to political integration in 
Western Europe. It was also intended to de- 
velop among Europeans the habit of working 
together toward common goals. 

But here again, the objective was not simply 
that of integi'ating governmental aims but of 
establishing a framework within which private 
interests could act with greater freedom and 
confidence. Today one need only contemplate 
the growing number of European-wide business 
concerns which got their start under the Mar- 

shall Plan to realize how private business has 
responded to the idea of a European- wide eco- 
nomic entity. 

One of the major instruments of postwar eco- 
nomic policy has been the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation — the OEEC. 
This organization embraced 17 European coun- 
tries, with the United States and Canada par- 
ticipating as associates. The OEEC was 
founded in Paris in 1948, in a period of general 
shortages, internal price controls, and rationing. 
Foreign trade was subject to a restrictive regime 
of quotas. As long as these restrictions were 
maintained, tariffs played only a secondary role 
in limiting trade. 

Most countries, in the early postwar years, 
were obliged to try to balance their trade on a 
rigid bilateral basis. From its inception, the 
OEEC worked to break down these walls of 
protectionism. As one of its first acts, it 
adopted a Code of Liberalization. Each mem- 
ber of the OEEC midertook, on a regional basis, 
progressively to dismantle its quantitative re- 
strictions to trade. In order to lubricate this 
process of liberalization and to facilitate multi- 
lateral settlements, the European Payments 
Union was founded. 

Private initiative throughout Western Eu- 
rope responded quickly to these new opportuni- 
ties for trade and investment. Exports to 
member countries rose from $7.6 billion in 1948 
to $13.5 billion in 1953. During the same period 
the real gross national product of the area ad- 
vanced from $132 billion to $172 billion a year, 
a gain of over 30 percent. These exports and 
imports are but the statistical expression of the 
cumulative effects of the activities of tens of 
thousands of private manufacturers and trad- 
ers, whose energies had been released by govern- 
mental action. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Political and economic measures, however, 
were not of themselves sufficient to meet the total 
problem that the Western nations faced at that 
time. In fact, they could not have succeeded 
had not the governments concerned also taken 
unprecedented politico-military steps to defend 
the Atlantic community from the threat of So- 
viet aggression. 



The Czeclioslovakian coup d'etat and the Ber- 
lin blockade, in 1948, shattered postwar hopes 
of East-West cooperation. America and Eu- 
rope had to look urgently to their defenses. 
Their response was in the pattern set by their 
experience of cooperation in economic matters. 
They created the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, an alliance unique in history in that it 
placed national forces, in peacetime, under inter- 
national command. NATO provided the shield 
of security and the sense of confidence which 
were vital to Europe's reconstruction and the 
continuing dynamic development of the Atlantic 

The sharing of defense responsibilities among 
the NATO partners has vastly increased the 
security of each — and of all. At the same time 
it has permitted the Atlantic community con- 
fidently to devote large resources to productive 
purposes, despite the constant external threat. 
This has been possible because NATO has suc- 
cessfully met that threat. Twenty-five NATO 
divisions — representing no fewer than seven 
NATO nations — guard the eastern bastions of 
Atlantic freedom. The presence in Germany 
of the equivalent of six divisions of American 
troops testifies to the United States' energetic 
fulfillment of its own NATO commitments and 
to America's recognition that the defense of 
Europe and the United States is inseparable. 

There is, however, no cause for complacency. 
Advances in military science, and the continued 
presence of powerful Soviet armies in Eastern 
Europe, require continual modernization and 
further strengthening of NATO's military 
might, particularly its conventional forces. In 
the nuclear field, too, the formation of a seaborne 
multilateral force — now under consideration by 
eight nations — will provide an important diver- 
sification and strengthening of the NATO deter- 
rent and a means whereby Europe may play a 
more extensive nuclear role in its own defense. 

Like most of the postwar institutions we have 
created, NATO also fulfills a multiple purpose. 
In its early years NATO was necessarily pre- 
occupied by the menace of military aggression 
in Europe. Since that period, however, devel- 
opments in the world political situation have 
compelled the alliance to take a broader view 
of its responsibilities in meeting the total threat 
to our democratic institutions. The members 

of the alliance have made NATO an effective 
forum for political consultation. Day by day, 
in the North Atlantic Council, the representa- 
tives of 15 nations exchange views and infor- 
mation on a wide variety of international issues 
affecting the vital interests of the free world. 
Like the Marshall Plan, NATO has also given 
additional scope to private enterprise and has 
provided a new stimulus to its ingenuity. For 
reasons of security and gi-eater rationalization 
of effort, NATO has encouraged as broad a 
production base as possible — embracing large 
segments of the private sector. Wliile there are 
many examples of cooperative production ef- 
forts which have given the alliance new and 
better weapons, one of the most outstanding is 
certainly the imprecedented common effort to 
produce the F-104G Starfighter. In this vast 
program, which has now involved expenditures 
of over $3 billion, such famous names in air- 
craft manufacture as Lockheed, Fiat, Messer- 
schmitt, and Fokker have combined their tech- 
nical skills to contribute to the common defense 
of the West. 

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

Another early postwar achievement of di- 
plomacy was the establishment in 1947 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — the 
GATT. Not only did the GATT keep under 
strict surveillance the application of the quanti- 
tative restrictions and exchange controls which, 
at that time, were the operative barriers to 
trade. Looking ahead to the era in which 
quotas would be eliminated, the GATT began 
a series of multilateral negotiations to reduce 
tariffs. The tariff negotiations under GATT 
were lengthy and difficult — the most recent con- 
ference, the so-called Dillon Round, lasted 
almost 2 years. They acliieved, however, very 
substantial reductions in tariff levels on a world- 
wide basis. 

There is still considerable work to be done 
under the GATT, not only in the tariff field 
but also in removing nontariff obstacles to trade. 
The most immediate and important challenge 
ahead is the Kennedy Round negotiations, 
which have just had their formal opening at 
Geneva.^ The success of these negotiations is 

°For background, see Bulletin of June 1, 1964, 
p. 878. 

aXTLY 6, 1964 


an imperative not just for the Atlantic nations 
but for the whole free world. 

The Process of "Building Europe" 

The postwar development of international 
cooperation also encouraged Europeans to take 
steps, among themselves, toward more compre- 
hensive economic and political unification. M. 
Schuman's proposal in 1950 for a Coal and Steel 
Community was the first step in this direction. 
After the failure of the proposal for a Euro- 
pean Defense Community in 1954, European 
statesmen again sought new ways of achieving 
progress toward European political unification. 
The result was the Treaty of Rome of 1957, 
establishing both the European Economic Com- 
munity and EIIRATOM. 

The United States Government welcomed 
and supported the establisliment of both these 
communities. Our support was primarily 
based on their importance as leading toward an 
eventual political union of Europe. We also 
recognized, however, that the establishment of 
a unified European economic area, although it 
posed risks of discrimination against us, would 
ultimately result in a greatly increased flow of 
trade and investment between Europe and 
America — to the economic advantage of both. 

On both sides of the Atlantic we are having 
problems of adjustment as this new European 
entity is being created. This process of re- 
ciprocal adjustment will continue and will pro- 
vide headaches for us all. However, we must 
not let our difficulties cause us to lose sight of 
the larger economic and political advantages. 
It was, in fact, the stimulus of the EEC which 
prompted the establishment of the European 
Free Trade Association — and the United States 
Trade Expansion Act — both important steps 
toward reducing trade barriers in the Western 

The process of "building Europe," as the 
proponents of European unity call it, is far 
from complete. Yet it is certainly more than 
begun. It is universally recognized that the 
European Economic Conmiunity has had the 
political effect of drawing its members closer 
together. There have been checks in the move- 
ment toward unity. A major one was the 
failure of the negotiations for British entry into 

the EEC. Indeed, there is not at present full 
agreement among Europeans on either the mem- 
bership or the nature of the Europe of the 
future they are seeking to create. It seems 
clear, however, that a great majority of Euro- 
peans favor further steps toward integration, 
and I am confident that, in the long run, this 
desire will find fruition in a great political 
act of union. 

In the meantime, much freer movement of 
goods, labor, and capital among the Common 
Market countries has made it possible for the 
first time to rationalize production on a Euro- 
pean-wide basis and thereby to benefit directly 
almost 200 million consumers. A more com- 
plete "division of labor" within Europe has 
been achieved. American private traders have 
also participated substantially in the new oppor- 
tunities that have been created in the Common 
Market area. This is shown by the fact that 
U.S. exports to the Common Market rose from 
about $2.4 billion in 1958 to something like $3.9 
billion in 1963. 

Moreover, many American firms, desiring to 
share in the rapid growth of the Common 
Market, have invested heavily in building new 
manufacturing and assembly plants in the EEC 
area. These investments have brought about 
a healthy cross-fertilization of ideas and pro- 
duction techniques across the Atlantic. Most 
Common Market countries recognize, as do the 
Germans, that these investments stimulate com- 
petition and increase productivity within 
Europe. They help provide new markets for 
European manufacturers. They also have the 
important effect of accelerating the overall eco- 
nomic integration taking place within the At- 
lantic world. 

International Monetary Cooperation 

An important goal of more than a decade of 
postwar economic diplomacy was the achieve- 
ment of currency convertibility within the At- 
lantic world. This goal had been set at the 1944 
monetary conference at Bretton Woods. There 
the twin institutions — the International Mone- 
tary Fund and the World Bank — were estab- 
lished with the view to bringing about a new 
multilateral monetary order in the postwar 
period. With the economic gains I have de- 



scribed, most European members of the Atlantic 
community -were able by 1958 to announce full 
or partial convertibility of their currencies. 

Primarily because of its profound impact, the 
advent of currency convertibility has brought 
in its wake some difficult problems of adjust- 
ment. However, the postwar habit of consulta- 
tion has continued to expand — particularly in 
the field of international monetary cooperation. 
I have in mind the periodic discussions within 
the IMF itself; the Economic Policy Committee 
and Working Party III of the OECD, the 
successor of the OEEC ; the monthly meetings 
in Basel of central bankers; the cooperative 
study of the world's payments system now 
underway by the Group of Ten ; ^ and the Lon- 
don gold pool. This cooperation has made it 
possible to respond effectively, and sometimes 
with lightning rapidity, to the new strains of a 
convertible world. 

Within this larger framework, the Common 
Market as an institution has also begun to at- 
tack the problem of inflation on a Community- 
wide basis. The measures announced last 
month in Brussels will certainly assist in assur- 
ing more stable monetary conditions among the 
Six. It is a concomitant of its successful inte- 
gration in trade that the Common Market 
achieve an increasing degree of integration in 
fiscal and monetary policies — looking toward 
the full economic union scheduled for 1970. 
In this instance, inflationary pressures through- 
out Europe, but particularly in Italy, provided 
the problem and the stimulus. The Community 
has recognized that, when a member suffers 
difficulties of this kind, the matter is of con- 
cern to the whole Community. 

All these achievements of postwar diplo- 
macy—the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, NATO, 
the GATT, the Common Market, and currency 
convertibility — have one vital element in com- 
mon : the recognition that decisions of one coun- 
try affect the interests of others. The recogni- 
tion of interdependence in economic matters, 
and the establishment of rules and institutions 
aimed at reducing or eliminating national eco- 
nomic barriers, contrast sharply with the "beg- 
gar thy neighbor" attitude which prevailed be- 
tween the two world wars. It was this attitude 

* For background, see ibid., Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615. 

that contributed greatly to the spreading of the 
Great Depression throughout Europe and North 
America during the 1930's. It is interesting and 
instructive to recall that, here in this lovely city 
of Vienna, the depression was triggered in Eu- 
rope when self-defeating decisions taken outside 
Austria caused the failure of the Kreditanstalt. 

While this complex of postwar institutions 
has prevented many of the abuses of former 
times, its greatest value has been in the scope 
it has given to private initiative. We on the 
govermnental side are proud that we have been 
able to create this institutional framework. 
You on the private side can, in my opinion, be 
equally proud of the dramatic way in which you 
have responded to the opportunities thus opened 

Your accomplishments and those of your col- 
leagues and clients have indeed been remark- 
able. Tlie combined GNP of the Atlantic area 
rose from about $450 billion in 1950 to almost 
$1,000 billion last year. The foreign trade of 
the Atlantic nations has almost doubled during 
the past 10 years — from roughly $50 billion in 
1953 to over $90 billion today. The new eco- 
nomic activity this trade reflects has provided 
20 million additional jobs since 1950. These 
new figures demonstrate the rapid increase in 
prosperity made possible by an international 
rationalization of private productive effort. 

But this is by no means the entire story. The 
increasing integration of our economies has 
certainly brought us all closer together in a 
number of ways. How far the process has gone 
in affecting our daily lives was impressed upon 
me recently when my daughter asked me 
whether I had heard the latest definition of 
what it is to be a typical American. A typi- 
cal American, she said, is a man who drives 
home from an Italian movie in his German car, 
sits down on his Danish furniture, and writes 
with his Japanese ballpoint pen on Irish sta- 
tionery to his Congressman, complaining about 
too much gold outflow from the United States. 
Our movement toward Atlantic integration has, 
however, not only given us greater prosperity 
and fullness of life ; it has created greater imity 
and through greater unity greater strength. 

I am, of course, well aware that serious politi- 
cal and economic problems still confront the 
Atlantic community. Our diplomacy does not 

JXTLT 6, 1964 


take them lightly. Considered in isolation 
from the general trend of our affairs, some 
of them seem formidable. In economic mat- 
ters, the Europe of the Six is able to speak 
with one voice and the United States is able 
to consult and negotiate with this entity to our 
mutual advantage. There is, however, no 
representative at the international conference 
table who speaks for Europe on the political 
plane. There one hears many voices — some- 
times strident voices — representing purely 
national interests. The major Continental Eu- 
ropean powers are often not in accord. Consul- 
tation with us thus becomes a process much 
more complex and much less fiixitful than it 
could be if Europe were a political entity. As 
a result, Europe's collective "weight" in world 
affairs is much less than it should be. 

Those who focus their gaze only on the diffi- 
culties we are encountering will find the catalog 
discouraging. Let me point out, however, that 
a good many of our current concerns are the 
product, not of stagnation in the Atlantic com- 
munity, but of its tremendous achievements. 
We would not be worrying about imperfections 
in the organization of Europe and an Atlantic 
partnership if we had not already advanced such 
a long way toward establishing both. In the 
perspective of almost two decades of develop- 
ment, the state of our Atlantic world gives busi- 
nessmen and diplomats alike just reason for 
pride — and for confidence in the future. 

The Atlantic World and the Developing Nations 

We all know that we cannot stand still. We 
on the government side must continue to cope 
with new problems as they arise and to seek to 
create even greater opportunities for private 
endeavor. However, I submit that, at the pres- 
ent stage, the function of diplomacy within the 
Atlantic community consists more of striving to 
perfect existing institutions and concepts than 
of creating new ones. The key internal politi- 
cal forces which will shape our future have 
already been set in motion. 

Indeed, the real challenge to our diplomacy 
today lies in a new direction. It is to make 
possible the expansion of our horizons beyond 
the confines of our Atlantic world, to our rela- 

tions with the vast areas and peoples of the de- 
veloping countries. Here diplomacy is begin- 
ning a new chapter of history. Here, during 
the decades ahead, the task of both diplomacy 
and private business is to establish a new dimen- 
sion to their cooperation. 

Wliile we recognize that we have much to 
learn about the complicated process of develop- 
ment, it seems to me that some of the basic 
principles that have worked so well in bringing 
prosperity and integration to our Atlantic 
world are applicable. Large transfers of public 
as well as private capital will be required; 
security against the threat of invasion or sub- 
version must be assured ; impediments to trade 
must be reduced or eliminated ; stable monetary 
conditions must be attained ; and above all there 
will need to be created a governmental and insti- 
tutional framework which gives scope and stim- 
ulation to private enterprise. In meeting the 
challenges of the less developed world, there will 
be a need for all of the energy and creativeness, 
as well as the patience and understanding, which 
both diplomacy and business can provide. 

A successful Kennedy Round will in itself 
create new opportunities for a further substan- 
tial expansion of trade— not just among the 
Atlantic nations but between us and tlae develop- 
ing world. The success of this effort, of course, 
not only depends on the diplomatic skills of the 
various nations represented at the conference 
but the extent to which private businessmen 
throughout the West support these negotiations 
and take advantage of the new trade opportuni- 
ties which the negotiations will create. 

In providing for the future, we must also be 
prepared to work cooperatively to strengthen 
the processes for adjusting payments balances 
between countries. Much remains to be learned 
as we seek to develop a dependable adjustment 
mechanism within the context of payments 
freedom. We cannot, however, safely rely upon 
the outcome of uncoordinated policies or the re- 
sultant of random forces to do the job for us. 

Another major task both for the Atlantic na- 
tions and the developing countries is to insure 
the continuing stability of the world's payments 
system and the adequacy of international li- 
quidity. This matter, as you know, is currently 



being studied by the Group of Ten. Since Sec- 
retary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon and 
Under Secretary [of the Treasury Eobert V.] 
Eoosa will surely have much to say to you on 
this subject, I will do no more than mention it 
as a further important area in which the inter- 
ests of government and business coincide. 

Other government problems will remain. 
New ones will doubtless emerge. Broadly 
viewed, however, the Kennedy Round tariff re- 
ductions and the further strengthening of the 
international payments system will bring the 
Atlantic community to the threshold of a new 
era, in which a major responsibility for further 
economic expansion will rest in private hands. 
To maintain what has been achieved, and to 
build upon it, will be a task for you, for your 
European colleagues, and for your clients on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 

This task will not be easy. It involves much 
more than the exploitation of new trade op- 
portunities. The maintenance of our newly 
won freedoms requires economic statesmanship 
of the highest order — combined with a long- 
term perspective. The high degree of integra- 
tion we have achieved cannot survive if our 
private firms cry for national protection when- 
ever they feel the pinch of competition. Our 
industrial associations cannot just be pressure 
groups for new restrictions on trade, denounc- 
ing a product because it is "foreign" — or because 
it was produced elsewhere with less expensive 
labor. Such attitudes can destroy the precious 
framework of freedom which we in govern- 
ment have in the postwar years striven so hard 
to build, and which you in business have so 
strongly supported. 

Pattern of Parallel and Reciprocal Roles 

Summing up, we have traced the roles of 
government and business in the postwar years. 
The pattern which emerges is one of parallel 
and reciprocal actions. I hope you will grant 
that, in the dark days following the war when 
the economic weather was so bad as to be con- 
sidered almost hopeless, diplomacy demon- 
strated its ability to act courageously and de- 
cisively. With an improvement in climate, pri- 

vate enterprise responded vigorously and 
boldly. Further diplomatic moves, some of 
which are still in train, have again enlarged the 
sphere of potential private achievement. Now, 
again, the next move is up to you. 

Within the business community, you bankers 
will have an especially important part to play. 
You are more than just the financiers of trade 
and industry. You are also the advisers and 
counselors of business leadership. In two 
important ways, your advice will be influential 
in determining whether we of the Western 
World rise fully to the challenges we face. 

One is the opportunity you have to stimulate 
responsible discussion of the problems and po- 
tentialities which lie ahead both for business 
and for government. You can do much to 
insure that questions of business and govern- 
mental policy are considered in an Atlantic- 
wide perspective — indeed, in a free-world per- 
spective, which is their true context today. 

The other and even more important service 
you can perform is to aid business in identifying 
and grasping the myriads of opportunities for 
private enterprise which have been created by 
parallel public and private action in the postwar 
years. If you can assist in guiding the ener- 
gies of private enterprise into the channels 
which now lie open to receive them, you will 
indeed help to make this era of expanding 
frontiers an era of triumph for free men. 

Your vision must leap over oceans and na- 
tional boundaries. You must advise your 
clients in Chicago — or Topeka — of opportuni- 
ties in Frankfurt — or Lagos — just as your pred- 
ecessors advised Eastern investors of oppor- 
tunities in California. Some day you and your 
European colleagues will find it as natural to 
carry on business intercontinentally as you now 
find it to deal with your fellow bankers 
throughout the United States. 

A wide field for achievement lies before you. 
I am confident that you will, as you pursue your 
task, find your Government at your side — not 
hindering but ready to help you over the diffi- 
cult paths. I am confident that you, for your 
part, will discharge your own responsibilities 
with broad vision and high purpose. 

JITLT 6, 1964 


U.S. and Japan Inaugurate 
Transpacific Teleplione Cable 

Following is an exchange of remarks between 
President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minis- 
ter Hayato Ikeda on June 18 inaugurating a 
new transpacific telephone cable from Hawaii 
to Japan. 

White House press release dated June 18 
President Johnson 

This is an historic and happy occasion. The 
new cable between our countries is another wel- 
come step toward transforming the Pacific from 
a barrier to a bridge between Asia and America. 

I am sure better communications will mean 
even better understanding between our peoples. 

We are proud this symbol of the strong bonds 
of friendship between the United States and 
Japan is being placed in service this year when 
the Olympic games focus the eyes of the world 
on your country and your capital city. 

May I take this opportunity to express to you 
and your countrymen the sympathy and con- 
cern of my countrymen for the suffering and 
sorrow inflicted by the earthquakes this week. 

We are proud to work with your country in 
the labors of the free world, Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, and it is my great pleasure to talk with 
you in this way tonight. 

Prime Minister Ikeda 

Thank you very much for your gracious mes- 
sage, Mr. President, which I just listened to 
on this newly installed means of commimica- 

Today the transpacific cable for which both 
Japan and the United States have long yearned 
is successfully opened. We can indeed congrat- 
ulate ourselves for this achievement. In behalf 
of the people and Government of Japan, I 
should like to express my heartfelt felicitation 
to yon, Mr. President, and to the people of the 
United States. 

The rapid progress made in the field of science 
and technology has brought about revolutionary 
changes in the field of electric telecommunica- 
tions. The role such changes have played in 

the advancement of man's well-being is immeas- 

In political, economic, cultural, and other 
areas of our endeavors, the relations between 
Japan and the United States have become closer 
than ever. This newly created physical bond 
across the Pacific, in addition to the recent de- 
velopment in the satellite communications, will 
enable our peoples even more to deepen our 
mutual understandings and encourage our coop- 
erative works. The fact that we can now 
exchange our voices between Tokyo and Wash- 
ington more clearly and speedily than ever will 
benefit greatly not only the relations between 
Japan and the United States but also our com- 
mon effort to achieve peace and prosperity in 
the world. 

Mr. President, we deeply appreciate the 
sympathy you and the people of your country 
have extended to us on the earthquake disaster 
in northwest Japan. 

Being grateful to share with you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, the privilege of being the first user of this 
cable, I should like to extend on this occasion 
my greetings to you, Mr. President, and to con- 
vey the deep feelings of friendship and good 
wishes of the Japanese people to the people of 
the United States. 

President Announces Determination 
On Credit Guarantees for Rumania 

Follotohig is the text of a letter from, Presi- 
dent Johnson to Carl Hayden., President pro 
tempore of the Senate. An identical letter xoas 
sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

White House press release dated June 15 

June 15, 1964 
Dear Mr. PREsroENT: In compliance with 
Title III of the Foreign Aid and Related Agen- 
cies Appropriation Act, 1964, this is to inform 
you that I have determined that it is in the 
national interest for the Export-Import Bank to 
issue guarantees in connection with the sale of 
United States products and services to Rumania. 
This determination is in addition to the deter- 



mination relating to agricultural products of 
which I informed you on February 4, 1964 ' and 
is intended to cover all types of United States 
products and services. 

Tliese guarantees will be limited to sales on 
short and medium term credits. 

The Export-Import Bank will report the 
individual guarantees to the Congress as they 
may be issued. 


Lyndon B. Johnson 

Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors 
Placed Under IAEA Safeguards 

Ths UjS. Ato-mic Energy Com/mission re- 
leased on June 11 the following announcement, 
which had ieen distributed to the public media 
that day at Vienna by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 

The Board of Governors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency today [June 11] ap- 
proved an agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and tlie Agency 
whereby four reactors in the United States will 
be placed under Agency safeguards against 
diversion to nonpeaceful ends. 

The four reactors concerned are the Yankee 
Nuclear Power Station in Howe, Massachusetts ; 
the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor; 
the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor; and 
the Piqua Organic Moderated Power Reactor.^ 
The most important of these is the Yankee 
Power Reactor, both because of its size and the 
fact that it is the first power plant with a ther- 
mal capacity of more than 100 megawatts to be 
placed under the IAEA expanded safeguards 
system which was finally approved by the board 
in February of this year. 

Tlie Yankee Reactor, owned by the Yankee 
Atomic Electric Company, is a pressurized, 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 24, 1964, p. 298. 

" The two research reactors are located at Brook- 
haven National Laboratory on Long Island in New 
York, and the Piqua reactor is located at Piqua, Ohio. 

light water nuclear power plant producing elec- 
tricity for the New England area. It is fueled 
with slightly enriched uranium, and its annual 
plutonium production is estimated at over 80 
kilograms. The output has been raised to 600 
megawatts thermal (175 MWE) although it 
was originally designed for only 392 megawatts 
thermal. The plant is privately owned and 

The International Atomic Energy Agency 
Director General was informed in April of this 
year that the United States intended to invite 
the Agency to apply its safeguards to this facil- 
ity, and this intent was also announced by the 
U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Con- 
ference in Geneva.^ 

An agreement for such an application of 
IAEA safeguards has in the meantime been 
drafted by the U.S. authorities and the Agency 
secretariat, and the board today approved the 
agreement which will be in force for five years. 
The Yankee Reactor will be open for inspection 
"at all times", but it has not yet been decided 
if Agency inspectors will make frequent inspec- 
tion trips from Vienna or have an inspector 
stationed at the facility. 

The Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor 
with a capacity of 20 MWT will also be open for 
inspection at all times because of its large in- 
ventory of highly enriched fuel. The Medical 
Research Reactor in Brookliaven has a capacity 
of 3 M^VT and the Piqua Power Reactor of 45.5 
MWT ; the latter started to produce electricity 
in November 1963. 

The last three reactors have been inspected 
by IAEA under its safeguards system since 
mid-1962, but the agreement covering this phase 
was drawn up mainly to make it possible for the 
Agency staff to gain experience in the practical 
application of safeguards. The agreement now 
approved by the board covers full safeguards 
arrangements in accordance with the Agency 

The cost of the safeguards arrangements 
under this agreement will be borne by IAEA. 

' For text of a statement made by Adrian S. Fisher 
on Mar. 5, see Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641. 

JULY 6, 1964 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^ 

In Session as of June 30, 1964 

Conference of the 18- Nation Committee on Disarmament .... Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

Scheduied July Through September 1964 

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Bangkok 


14th International Film Festival Karlovy Vary, Czecho- 

BIRPI Industrial Property Seminar for Latin America Bogotd 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program: Geneva 

5th Session. 

27th International Conference on Public Education Geneva 

5th European Civil Aviation Conference Strasbourg 

ANZUS Council: 1 1th Meeting Washington 

IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session London 

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 10th Tokyo 


PAHC Permanent Executive Committee and the Darien Sub- Mexico, D.F . . . . 


U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session Geneva 

IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th London 


U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Telecommunication Experts: 2d Tokyo 


17th International Film Festival Locarno 

lA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Santiago 


South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commis- Wellington 


8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Vina del Mar, Chile . 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th London 


ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok 

UNESCO International Conference on Youth Grenoble 

Meeting of the P.artics to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of Ottawa 

the North Pacific Ocean. 

3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Geneva 


17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh 

South Pacific Commission: Regional Education Seminar Noumea 

ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session Montreal 

3d FAO Regional Conference for Africa Tananarive 

ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Costs . Geneva 

ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference Madrid 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: lOtli Session . . . Washington 

U.N. ECA Industrial Coordination Conference in West Africa . . . Bamako, Mali . . . . 

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- New York 


IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcommittee on London Sept. 21 

Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain. 

July 1- 

July 4- 

July 6- 
July 6- 

July 6- 
July 6- 
July 13- 
July 13- 
July 13- 

July 13- 

July 13- 
July 20- 

July 22- 

July 22- 


Aug. 1- 
Aug. 4- 

Aug. 4- 
Aug. 23- 
Aug. 31- 

Aug. 31- 

August or Sep 

Sept. 1- 
Sept. 3- 
Sept. 7- 
Sept. 7- 
Sept. 8- 
Sept. 15- 
Sept. 15- 

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 19, 1964. Following is a list of abbre\iations: 
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for 
the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture 
Organization; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation 
Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Orga- 
nization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication 
Union; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congress; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United 
Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health 
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 


U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session 

2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Health . . . 

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry . . . 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session 

FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session 

BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee 

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Meeting . 

International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly .... 

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Session. 

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting . . . 

Inter-American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Directing 

lA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports 

PAHO Directing Council: 15th Meeting 

Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Educa- 

U.N. ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage 

UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference 

UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session 

UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Survey 

Geneva Sept. 21- 

Beirut Sept. 21- 

Geneva Sept. 21- 

Rome Sept. 22- 

Auckland Sept. 22- 

Geneva Sept. 28- 

Geneva Sept. 28- 

Geneva Sept. 28- 

Copenhagen Sept. 28- 

Caracas Sept. 30- 

Manila September 

San Jos6 September 

Montevideo September 

Lima September 

Mexico, D.F. September 

Santiago September 

Paris September 

Cairo September 

Paris September 

Toulouse September 

U.N. Security Council Condemns Apartheid in South Africa; 
Sets Up Committee To Study Sanctions 

Following are two statements made hy Am- 
bassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representa- 
tive, in the Security Council, together with a 
resolution adopted hy the Council on June 18. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4415 and Corr. 1 

I want to express the appreciation of my dele- 
gation to the distinguished Ambassador of 
Norway and to the other conferees who have 
produced the resolution that has just been in- 
troduced after prolonged and careful consid- 
eration. Pending the introduction of a resolu- 
tion, we have refrained from speaking at this 
session of the Security Council on the subject 
of apartheid. However, now that a resolution 
is before the Council for action, I should like to 
take the liberty of expressing the views of my 
Government on the subject of racial discrimina- 

tion in the Republic of South Africa and on the 
resolution that has been mtroduced. 

The apartheid policies of the Government of 
South Africa not only offend the principles set 
forth in the charter; they challenge our deter- 
mination to uphold these principles, and they 
challenge the ability of the United Nations to 
find the best means of influencing the course 
of South African history toward peaceful 

South Africa's racial policies have forced 
upon the United Nations the task of trying to 
persuade a member state to alter a course of 
action wliich affects not only its own peoples 
but the racial situation in the world at large. 
The United Nations' task is not only to help 
the majority of the peoples of South Africa to 
fulfill their legitimate aspirations but also to 
avoid a racial conflict which could seriously 
trouble peace and progress in Afi-ica and 
throughout the world. 

JTILY 6, 1964 


Ever since the seventh session in 1952, the 
Assembly first, and then the Security Council, 
have sought to express the United Nations' con- 
victions and impress its influence upon a situa- 
tion which, because it involves violations of the 
charter and because it may become even more 
serious, is a situation of international concern. 

In the world of today no nation can be en- 
tirely "sovereign," no nation can ignore the im- 
pact of its national acts on the rest of mankind. 
In a recent address delivered at the University 
of California, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations in comparing the evolution of 
the League of Nations and the United Nations 
stated this idea very clearly: "The basis," he 
said, "of both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations is the pledge by sovereign 
states to cooperate, a pledge which involves 
some measure of sacrifice of sovereignty in the 
common interest .... We are now moving- 
away quickly from the world of compartmenta- 
lized self-sufficiency into a world where Imman 
solidarity daily becomes more essential." 

In the second place, Mr. President, in their 
continuing concern for the situation in South 
Africa, the member states of this organization 
have adhered to the concept that the freedom of 
men anywhere is the concern of men every- 
where. This concept is not only expressed in 
the 55th article of our charter and in the Decla- 
ration of Human Riglits but is inscribed on the 
hearts of men of good will universally. 

Finally, Mr. President, the member states of 
the United Nations have considered the policy 
of apartheid to be a racial issue and therefore of 
concern to all men. They consider it racist in 
its origins, arrogant in its implementation, and, 
in its consequences, potentially dangerous for 

For many years the United States Govern- 
ment has urged the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa, both within and outside the 
United Nations, to abandon this policy. 

I would add, Mr. President, that opposition 
to apartheid in this country springs from the 
very roots of our historical and political ideals. 
It is intensified by the determined efforts we 
have now set in motion in this country to realize 
fully the society these ideals prescribe, one 
which affords equal and just treatment to all our 

citizens without regard to race or religion, and 
without discrimination of any kind. 

New Developments in South Africa 

Since last the Security Council turned its at- 
tention to the question of apartheid, new de- 
velopments in South Africa have increased our 
concern. Just last week we learned with pro- 
found regret of the life sentences imposed on 
eight of the defendants in the Rivonia trials, in- 
cluding some of the most prominent leaders in 
the struggle against apartheid, although we 
were, of course, relieved that death sentences 
were not imposed. The sentences and the ac- 
tions that led to them are yet another distressing 
sign of the tragic interaction between repres- 
sion and violence which in South Africa today 
continues to frustrate any progress toward con- 
ciliation and negotiation. The basic philosophy 
of the laws under which the defendants were 
charged, the law under which persons are de- 
tained for the purpose of providing evidence, 
and the whole legislative and administrative 
machinery which takes away the rights of all in 
trying to preserve them for a minority, is cause 
for deep concern. 

Since the Security Council last considered 
apartheid, the promulgation of new laws of the 
kind described in the report of the Special Com- 
mittee on Apartheid, the further additions to 
the military forces of South Africa that might 
be used for internal suppression, and the pas- 
sage by the Soutli African Parliament of the dis- 
criminatory Bantu Laws Amendment bill, all 
these indications give us little hope that the 
Government is changing its view of the status 
of non whites in South Africa. 

Tliere is no doubt in our minds that seeds of 
violence are planted by each one of these repres- 
sive acts based upon the repugnant philosophy 
of apartheid. There is an increasingly dan- 
gerous interaction between repression and vio- 
lence, and time is running out in which to turn 
the spiral down — toward a peaceful solution. 
The moving statement of Nelson Mandela, 
spoken in his defense at the Rivonia trial, pre- 
sented to the world the anguish and frustration 
of those struggling against the mjustices of 
South Africa's racial policies. 



Since the adoption of the Security Council's 
resolution of 4 December/ the Council has re- 
ceived two reports from the Special Committee 
on Apartheid ^ and the report of the Secretary- 
GeneraP which contained the report of the 
group of experts which he appointed under the 
terms of that resolution. We have examined the 
various conclusions and recommendations of 
these bodies with care. While we have a number 
of reservations about certain aspects of these re- 
ports, and in particular do not subscribe to the 
recommendations in paragraph 121 of the report 
of the group of experts, we share the intense 
concern which they reflect. 

We very much regret tliat the South African 
Government did not choose to afford the group 
of experts an opportunity to visit South Africa 
and thus to enhance the objectivity and accu- 
racy of their report. Such a visit would, we 
think, have facilitated the group's task. 

Their report places particular emphasis on 
the need for what they term a "National Con- 
vention'' to help to bring about a peaceful reso- 
lution of the situation. The United States has 
consistently held that the ultimate solution in 
South Africa must be worked out by the peoples 
of South Africa themselves, worked out on the 
basis of a free and equal exchange of views be- 
tween all segments of the population, worked 
out on the basis of give and take. 

The first link in such consultation must be the 
establishment of communication. We would 
hope the South African Government for its 
part would respond favorably to such a concept, 
would cooperate with the United Nations, and 
would seek such assistance, both within and out- 
side the United Nations, as might be usefiil. 

We also see merit in the concept of a special 
training and education program for South 
Africans to be established under the auspices of 
the United Nations. Such a program would 
afford to those South Africans who liave chosen 
to leave their country, or who have little access 
to higher education within their country, a 

' For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on 
Dec. 4 and text of the resolution, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 20, 1964, p. 92. 

' U.N. docs. S/5621 and S/5717. 

' U.N. doc. S/5658 and Corr. 1. 

chance to pursue their studies elsewhere. The 
United States is prepared to examine oppor- 
tunities to contribute to such a program, both 
financially and in terms of scholarship and other 
facilities at American educational institutions. 
There is much interest throughout the world in 
such a program and much willingness to help in 
providing educational opportunities for South 
Africans. In the past, however, there has been 
some difficulty in finding the best way of apply- 
ing offers of assistance. We would envisage 
that such a program, if established, would pro- 
vide a useful central point for administering 
effectively educational assistance for South 

U.S. Position Concerning Sanctions 

Much has been said here in the Council and 
elsewhere on the question of sanctions. My 
Government continues to believe that the situa- 
tion in South Africa, though charged with som- 
ber and dangerous implications, does not today 
provide a basis under the charter for the appli- 
cation by the Security Council of coercive meas- 
ures. Nor can we support the concept of an 
ultimatum to the South African Government 
which could be interpreted as threatening the 
application of coercive measures in the situation 
now prevailing, since in our view the charter 
clearly does not empower the Security Council 
to apply coercive measures in such a situation. 

However, the group of experts has suggested 
that a study of sanctions be undertaken. My 
Government has given this proposal serious and 
prolonged consideration and would be prepared 
to support the initiation of a properly designed 
study and to participate in it. But — and let 
me be explicit — our willingness to see such a 
study go forward under certain circumstances 
or our willingness to participate in such a study 
represents in no way an advance commitment 
on the part of my Government to support at 
any specific time the application under the 
charter of coercive measures with regard to the 
South African situation or any other situation ; 
nor should this position be interpreted as re- 
lating to our view of the situation in South 
Africa today or what it may become tomorrow. 
We do feel that such a study, if agreed to by 

JTXLT 6, 1964 


the Security Council, could make a contribu- 
tion to a fuller understanding on the part of 
the Council. Wliile our support for such a 
study, and agreement to participate in it, is 
without any commitments or implications as to 
our future actions, we think that if and when 
a situation arose in which sanctions might be 
appropriately considered imder the charter — a 
situation which does not today exist — the avail- 
ability of a detailed, practical, and expert study 
would have considerable utility. 

Mr. President, like other members of the 
United Nations, we continue to search for prac- 
tical means of bringing about in South Africa 
the changes we all seek. In a spirit of fairness 
we must search for means and steps which 
would have a practical and beneficial effect on 
the present situation. This has been the spirit 
of the resolutions adopted by the Council last 
August * and December, and we believe that it 
is the spirit of the resolution just introduced 
by the distinguished representative of Norway. 
Needless to say, we will continue to adhere to 
the past resolutions of the Security Council, 
and we will continue to search for ways of im- 
pressing upon the Government of South Africa 
the conviction of our Government and people 
that only through a policy of justice and equity 
for all its peoples can it look forward to a 
peaceful future. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4416 

I want to intervene briefly to express once 
again the appreciation of the United States 
delegation both to the sponsors of this resolu- 
tion and to the several delegations wliicli have 
worked so hard and so long to reach an agree- 
ment on its terms. As the representative of 
Norway said the day before yesterday in intro- 
ducing the resolution, it represents a compro- 
mise but we feel a valid comiaromise which may 
well prove helpful toward the solution of this 
stubborn problem which has vexed the world 

* For U.S. .statements made in the Security Council 
on Aug. 2 and 7, 1963, and text of a resolution adopted 
on Aug. 7, see Bulletin of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333. 

community and our debates for so many years. 
Mr. President, I am afraid that the distin- 
guished representative of Morocco has mis- 
understood my statement of the day before 
yesterday. "Wliat I said was that my delega- 
tion could not subscribe to the recommendations 
of the group of experts contained in paragraph 
121 of the report. I call to your attention that 
that paragraph reads in part as follows: 

If no satisfactory reply is received from the South 
African Government by the stipulated date. ... we 
recommend that the Security Council . . . then take 
the decision to apply economic sanctions in the light 
of the result of the examination recommended . . . 

Wliat we cannot subscribe to, Mr. President, is 
the concept of an ultimatum to South Africa 
that, unless it complies with the recommenda- 
tions for a convention by a stipulated date, eco- 
nomic sanctions will automatically be applied, 
regardless of the factual situation. 

Secondly, I am sorry that the Soviet Union 
could not support a resolution calling for a 
study of measui-es which might be taken by this 
Coimcil in accordance with the charter to in- 
fluence the repugnant racial policies of South 
Africa. In our opinion another rhetorical 
cold-war attack on the United States, which 
could have been copied from a hundred similar 
attacks by the Soviet Union, is not a substitute 
for some positive action about the sad situa- 
tion in South Africa. 

As I said the other day, the United States 
will continue to search for practical means 
which will assist in bringing about the changes 
that I am sure we all seek. TVe will not only 
use our best efforts to implement effectively 
this present resolution, but we will continue to 
adhere to past resolutions. Paragraph 12 of 
the resolution that we have just adopted re- 
affirms provisions contained in resolutions 
adopted in August and December last. At 
those times my Go\'ernment defined its position 
on these questions and affirmed its adherence 
to these provisions. I wish to reaffirm United 
States adherence to these provisions with, of 
course, the same understanding set forth in 
August and December by the representutive of 
my Government. 



Finally, Mr. President, let me express the 
hope, which I am sure is common to all of the 
representatives here present, that when we next 
meet on this question we will be able to perceive 
more improvement in the racial situation in 
South Africa than we have heretofore. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the question of race conflict in 
Soutli Africa resulting from tlie policies of apartheid 
of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 
brought to the attention of the Security Council by 
fifty-eight Member States in their letter of 27 April 

Being gravely concerned with the situation in South 
Africa arising out of the policies of apartheid which 
are contrary to the principles and purposes of the 
Charter of the United Nations and inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as well as South Africa's obligations under the 

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the 
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Sec- 
retary-General pursuant to the Security Council 
resolution of 4 December 1963 ( S/5471) , 

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 
T August 1963 (S/5386), 4 December 1963 (S/.5471) 
and 9 June 1964 ( S/5761 ) , 

Convinced that the situation in South Africa is con- 
tinuing seriously to disturb international peace and 

Deploring the refusal of the Government of the Re- 
public of South Africa to comply with pertinent Secur- 
ity Council resolutions. 

Taking into account the recommendations and con- 
clusions of the Group of Experts, 

1. Condemns the apartheid policies of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of South Africa and the legis- 
lation supporting these policies, such as the General 
Law Amendment Act, and in particular its ninety-day 
detention clause ; 

2. Urgently reiterates its appeal to the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of South Africa to liberate all 
persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other re- 
strictions for having opposed the policies of apartheid ; 

3. Notes the recommendations and the conclusions 
in the Report of the Group of Experts ; 

^ U.N. doc. S/5773 ; adopted by the Council on June 18 
by a vote of 8 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Czecho- 
slovakia, France, U.S.S.R.). 

4. Urgently appeals to the Government of the Re- 
public of South Africa to : 

(a) renounce the execution of any persons sen- 
tenced to death for their opposition to the policy of 
apartheid ; 

(b) grant immediate amnesty to all per.sons de- 
tained or on trial, as well as clemency to all persons 
sentenced for their opposition to the Government's 
racial policies ; 

(c) abolish the practice of imprisonment without 
charges, without access to counsel or without the 
right of prompt trial ; 

5. Endorses and subscribes in particular to the main 
conclusion of the Group of Experts that "all the 
people of South Africa should be brought into con- 
sultation and should thus be enabled to decide the 
future of their country at the national level" ; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consider what 
assistance the United Nations may offer to facilitate 
such consultations among representatives of all ele- 
ments of the population in South Africa ; 

7. Invites the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa to accept the main conclusion of the Group of 
Experts referred to in paragraph 5 above and to co- 
operate with the Secretary-General and to submit its 
views to him with respect to such consultations by 30 
November 1964 ; 

8. Decides to establish an Expert Committee, com- 
posed of representatives of each present member of the 
Security Council, to undertake a technical and prac- 
tical study, and report to the Security Council as to 
the feasibility, effectiveness, and implications of meas- 
ures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the 
Security Council under the United Nations Charter; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to the 
Expert Committee the Secretariat's material on the 
subjects to be studied by the Committee, and to co- 
operate with the Committee as requested by it ; 

10. Authorises the Expert Committee to request all 
United Nations Members to co-operate with it and to 
submit their views on such measures to the Committee 
no later than 30 November 1964, and the Committee 
to complete its report not later than three months 
thereafter ; 

11. Invites the Secretary-General in consultation 
with appropriate United Nations specialized agencies 
to establish an educational and training programme 
for the purpose of arranging for education and train- 
ing abroad for South Africans ; 

12. Reaffirms its call upon all States to cease forth- 
with the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, 
ammunition of all types, military vehicles, and equip- 
ment and materials for the manufacture and main- 
tenance of arms and ammtinition in South Africa ; 

13. Requests all Member States to take such steps as 
they deem appropriate to persuade the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa to comply with this 

JXTLT 6, 1964 



Current Actions 


Agreement amending and extending the agreement of 
January 11, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2171, 3140, 
3955, 4460, 4733), relating to a military mission to 
Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia 
December 17, 1963, and April 24, 1964. Entered 
into force April 24, 1964. 



Recommendations, including agreed measures for con- 
servation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted 
at Brussels June 2, 1964, at the Third Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting. Enters into force 
upon notification of approval by all governments 
whose representatives are entitled to participate in 
Antarctic treaty consultative meetings. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 15, 1964. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 
1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the 
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. 
Acceptance deposited: Italy (with reservations) , May 
25, 1964. 

Postal Services 

Universal postal convention with final protocol, an- 
nex, regulations of execution, and provisions re- 
garding air mail with final protocol. Done at Ot- 
tawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 

1959. TIAS 4202. 
Adherence: Algeria, May 28, 1964. 

Safety of Life at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 

1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. 
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, May 26, 1964. 
Enters into force: May 26, 1965. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional pro- 
tocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.' 
Notification of approval: Denmark, May 4, 1964. 



Agreement amending the agreement of March 9 and 
May 23, 1959 (TIAS 4369), approving the procedures 
for reciprocal filing of classified patent applications 
in the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn 
January 14 and May 28, 1964. Entered into force 
May 28, 1964. 


' Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, V.8. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Offlce of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Informational Media Guaranties. Agreement with 
Pakistan, amending the agreement of February 12 and 
May 1, 19.54, as amended. Exchange of letters — Dated 
at Karachi August 10, 1962, and April 15, 1963. En- 
tered into force April 15, 1963. TIAS 5535. 4 pp. 5^. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Portugal, amending the agreement of 
March 19, 1960. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lisbon 
June 3 and December 4, 1903. Entered into force De- 
cember 4, 1963. TIAS 5536. 4 pp. 5(J. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan. 
Signed at Amman February 11, 1964. Entered into 
force February 11, 1964. With exchange of notes. 
TIAS 5537. 10 pp. 10«S. 

Weather Stations — Continuation of Cooperative Me- 
teorological Program. Agreement with Mexico. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Mexico February 14, 1964. 
Entered into force February 14, 1964. Operative Janu- 
ary 1, 1964. With memorandum of understanding. 
TIAS 5540. 13 pp. lOi^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan. 
Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered into force 
March 2, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5541. 
9 pp. 104. 

Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. 

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Ottawa March 6, 1964. Entered into force March 6, 
1964. TIAS 5543. 2 pp. 5«(. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sudan, re- 
lating to the agreement of March 17, 1959. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered 
into force March 2, 1964. TIAS 5544. 3 pp. 5^. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Norway, amending the agreement of May 25, 
1949, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Washington March 16. 1964. Entered into force 
March 16, 1964. TIAS 5545. 6 pp. 5«(. 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Administrative Expendi- 
tures. Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex B 
to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Brussels February 6 and March 11, 
1964. Entered into force March 11, 1964. TIAS 5546. 
3 pp. 5^. 



INDEX July 6, 1961^ Vol. LI, No. 1306 

American Republics. Making the World Safe 

for Diversity (Hughes) 6 

Atomic Energy. Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors 

Placed Under IAEA Safeguards 27 

Communism. Making the World Safe for Di- 
versity (Hughes) 6 

Congress. President Announces Determination 
on Credit Guarantees for Rumania (text of 
letter) 26 

Disarmament. Making the World Safe for Di- 
versity (Hughes) & 

Economic Affairs 

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy 
in an Era of Expanding Frontiers (McGhee) . 18 

President Announces Determination on Credit 

Guarantees for Rumania (text of letter) . . 26 


Making the World Safe for Diversity (Hughes) . 6 

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy 

in an Era of Expanding Frontiers (McGhee) . 18 

Human Rights. U.N. Security Council Con- 
demns Apartheid in South Africa ; Sets Up 
Committee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson, 
text of resolution) 29 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 28 

Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors Placed Under IAEA 
Safeguards 27 

Japan. U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Transpacific 

Telephone Cable (Ikeda, Johnson) .... 26 

Laos. Why Laos Is Critically Important 

(Rusk) 3 

Military Affairs. Making the World Safe for 

Diversity (Hughes) 6 

Presidential Documents 

President Announces Determination on Credit 

Guarantees for Rumania 26 

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Transpacific Tele- 
phone Cable 26 


Recent Releases . . ; 34 

The 25th Anniversary of the Department of 

State Bulletin (Rusk) 2 

Rumania. President Announces Determination 
on Credit Guarantees for Rumania (text of 
letter) 26 

South Africa. U.N. Security Council Condemns 
Apartheid in South Africa ; Sets Up Commit- 
tee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson, text of 
resolution) 29 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 34 

U.S.S.R. Making the World Safe for Diversity 

(Hughes) . 6 

United Nations. U.N. Security Council Con- 
demns Apartheid in South Africa; Sets Up 
Committee To Study Sanctions (Stevenson, 
text of resolution) 29 

Viet-Nam. Why Laos Is Critically Important 

(Rusk) 3 

Name Index 

Hughes, Thomas L g 

Ikeda, Hayato , 26 

Johnson, President 26 

McGhee, George O ig 

Rusk, Secretary 2, 3 

Stevenson, Adlai E 29 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.. 

Release issued prior to June 15 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 282 of June 13. 


No. Date 

*283 6/15 

*284 6/17 

t285 6/17 

*286 6/18 

»287 6/19 

*288 6/19 

U.S. participation in international 

Sullivan : foreign policy conference, 

Cleveland (excerpts). 
Williams: "Africa South of the 

G. Lewis Jones to direct FSI senior 

seminar (biographic details). 
Program for visit of Turkish Prime 

Program for visit of Greek Prime 


*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 







Foreign Relations of tlie United States 
1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa 

The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^3, Volum 
/F, The Near East and Africa. 

Most of the content of this volume relates to wartime problems, particularly the defense of th 
Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particula 
interest are those on United States policy regarding the postwar political organization of Greece, th 
problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward th 
entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa (publi 
cation 7665) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic< 
Washington, D.C, 20402, for $4 each. 




Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United State* 

194s, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa. 





(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 


__ _ ___ i 


JUL 2^ 1984 







L JUL '^< '"^v 

\' B. a ».. / 

Vol LI, No. 1307 

July 13, 1964- 



by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 38 


Text of Tripartite Declaration 44 


6y Assistant Secretary Williams 61 


hy Joseph J. Sisco 55 

For index see inside hack cover 

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance 

hy W. W. Rostoio 

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Plannvng Council ^ 

I have come today to share witli you some 
thoughts about the future of Europe and the 
Atlantic alliance. It is natural that we should 
all address ourselves to this subject because we 
have been passing through a period of pause 
and of debate. The reasons for the pause and 
the debate are clear enough. 

First, the outcome of the Cuba missile crisis 
brought to an end a period of intense crisis 
and confrontation with the Soviet Union, which 
began with the laimching of the Sputnik at the 
end of 1957 and continued down to October 
1962. The central front has been quiet now 
for some time. 

Second, the failure of British entry into the 
Common Market early in 1963 raised funda- 
mental questions about the future of European 
organization as well as the future character of 
relations between Europe and the United States. 

' Address made before the Assembly of tie Western 
European Union at Rome, Italy, on June 24 (press re- 
lease 292 dated June 23) . 

Essentially, what we have all been discussing, 
in the light of these and other events, are two 
questions : 

Are NATO and the Atlantic comiection still 
necessary, now that the confrontation with the 
U.S.S.K. in Central Europe has abated? 

Is European integration still feasible and de- 
sirable, given the course of affairs within 
Europe over the past year and a half? 

And it is to those two questions that I shall 
address myself this morning. 

Our Agenda 

It may be usefid to begin by trying to set 
down the agenda Western Europe and the 
United States must address. Only by assessing 
the tasks with wliich history confronts us can 
we judge whether they can best be dispatched 
in partnership between the United States and 
a uniting Europe or in some other way. 

Here are some of the critical problems that 
we must grip effectively in the days and months 
and years ahead. 


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First, there is the need for defense. Soviet 
military capabilities remain as formidable as 
they ever were. Soviet armies are still poised 
just beyond the Elbe, with powerful reserves 
capable of being summoned promptly from the 
East. Hundreds of Soviet missiles are still tar- 
geted on Western Europe. We demonstrated 
in the Berlin and Cuban crises that power exists 
in the West capable of neutralizing this Soviet 
military establishment and capable of render- 
ing fruitless Soviet efforts to exploit that power 
for diplomatic advantage. That demonstra- 
tion, however, would not have been fully effec- 
tive without integrated Western military power 
and the higliest degree of political concert in the 
West. If we dilute or fracture that integrated 
power, or if we fragment that political unity, 
I have no doubt that we would see a revival of 
the pressures and methods of the period 1958-62. 
The first task of the West remains the continued 
mobilization not merely of collective Western 
strength but also the collective will to defend 
the vital interests of the West. For the oldest 
and most basic reasons, therefore, we still need 
a vital NATO. 

Second: The growing strength, confidence, 
and pride of Western Europe require that Eu- 
rope share more substantially the burdens and 
responsibilities in the field of nuclear arms. I 
have in mind here both aspects of that problem : 
sharing in the process of deterrence and sharing 
in the process of moving as rapidly as condi- 
tions permit toward a world of effective arms 
control. These are, literally, life-and-death is- 
sues for all our peoples, and the wholesome fact 
of European revival requires that Europe play 
a large role in resolving them. 

Third: The forces of nationalism and human- 
ism are on the rise within the Communist world 
at a time when it is being subjected to the strains 
of the Sino-Soviet split. This hopefid histori- 
cal movement jjoses for all of us searching ques- 
tions and responsibilities, for none of us has 
ever accepted the notion that Europe ends on 
the Elbe. How shall we move peacefully to- 
ward the application of the principle of self- 
determination in Germany? Wliat shall our 
policy be toward an increasingly assertive and 
liberal Eastern Europe ? Wliat shall our policy 
be toward the Soviet Union itself ? 

Fourth: The great continental regions to the 
south of us — Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Latin America — are moving to modernize their 
societies and to assert, the dignity of their status 
on the world scene. The future of those of us 
who live in the rich and comfortable northern 
parts of the free world — the future of our chil- 
dren and grandcliildren — will substantially de- 
pend on the outcome of these powerful revolu- 
tionary impulses. Specifically, there is the 
question: How can we best help these peoples 
to the south through trade and aid — and, I 
would add, through human comradesliip — in 
this momentous and challenging era of transi- 
tion? How can we help them through this 
great historical adventure in ways which maxi- 
mize the chance that they emerge as independ- 
ent and increasingly democratic societies. The 
recent United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development in Geneva dramatizes the eco- 
nomic dimensions of this problem vividly. It 
will evidently rise on our common agenda in 
the future. 

Fifth: The changes to the south of us have 
posed for them and for us a searching set of 
regional conflicts. Some of the new nations— 
or newly assertive nations — have reacted 
against what they regard as imfair or unsat- 
isfactory postcolonial settlements. This clash 
of nationalism within regions of the developing 
world has yielded a set of dangerous problems : 
in Southeast Asia, within the Indian subcon- 
tinent, in the Middle East, in Africa, and even 
in the Mediterranean. Although these clashes 
arise from strong nationalist impulses, every 
one of them is subject to the most active ex- 
ploitation by the Commimists. Each is capa- 
ble of producing dangerous degeneration in re- 
gional conditions or war itself. These clashes — 
whether they are resolved pacifically or lead to 
violence — vitally concern us all. From this 
concern, and from the capability which we share 
for affecting the issue, flows another major task 
for the West. 

Sixth: In Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean, 
and in Africa the Communists are still pressing 
the teclmique of what they call wars of national 
liberation. In particular, there are those 
among the Communists who believe that the 
training of men for insurrection, their illegal 
infiltration across frontiers, and their supply 

JTTLT 13, 19G4 


with arms and money are the last best hope 
for the extension of Communist power. We 
in the West have been forced to frustrate a 
whole array of Communist aggressive tech- 
niques since Stalin launched his offensive 
against tlie West in 1946. We now must dem- 
onstrate that we can sterilize and render futile 
this method of aggression, which President 
Jolmson has designated "a deeply dangerous 
game." ^ On our success or failure in tliis task 
may depend whether the years ahead are years 
of war or of peace, for surely we in the West, 
who have faced down so many threats to vital 
positions over the years, will not passively ac- 
cept their loss by this low-grade but dangerous 
form of aggression. 

Seventh: We shall confront the implications 
in the foreseeable future of the acquisition by 
Communist China of a nuclear capability. 
That capability is likely to be of limited direct 
military significance and easily capable of de- 
terrence by arms available to the West. Never- 
theless, it will pose for us all the possibilities 
of nuclear confrontation with a second Com- 
munist power, and it may set in motion im- 
portant ijolitical and psychological problems, 
in Asia and elsewhere, of concern to us all. 
Shaping the ways in which we will meet these 
problems is a major task for the West. 

European Unity and Atlantic Partnersiiip 

I return now to the question that I posed at 
the start: the future of the Atlantic alliance 
and of European organization. 

One way of putting this question is this: 
Would it be wiser for us to face the array of 
problems that I described, each of us on his own, 
or shall we face these problems together? Is 
there a sufficient basis of common interest among 
us to come to grips with them on the basis of 
partnership between the United States and a 
imiting Europe ? Or shall we each devise poli- 
cies which reflect narrow national interests and 
concerns in approaching them ? 

So far as we in Washington are concerned, 
we are convinced that the problems of defense ; 
nuclear deterrence and arms control ; the linked 

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the 
University of California at Los Angeles on Feb. 21, 
1964, see Buixetin of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 399. 

problems of German imity, policy toward East- 
em Europe, and the Soviet Union ; the problems 
of trade and aid with the developing countries ; 
the problems of regional instability ; the problem 
of Communist insurrectional aggression; and 
the problem of the Chinese Conununist nuclear 
capability should all be gripped as nearly as 
possible on a communal basis. 

And we believe, now as in the past, that the 
best way to move toward a communal basis is 
by going forward toward both European unity 
and Atlantic partnership. 

We need European unity because, if Europe 
accepts as a legitimate part of the Atlantic 
agenda the array of global issues to which I re- 
ferred earlier, it is much more likely to come to 
grips with them effectively on a united rather 
tlian a fragmented basis. 

This is evident when we look at the problems 
and opportunities we face in Eastern Europe. 
It is already clear from the experience of the 
postwar generation that European unity has not 
merely been a source of strength in the face of 
Communist pressure, not merely a source of 
mutual confidence and prosperity; it has also 
been a demonstration to the governments and 
peoples of Eastern Europe of the continued 
viability of the West and a powerful pole of 
attraction to them. 

None of us can now foresee the kind of Europe 
which will emerge in time from the processes 
of change going forward to the East. Our 
broad objectives in that area are, I believe, 
shared on both sides of the Atlantic. We wish 
to see the present division of Germany and 
Europe ended by peaceful steps. We wish to 
assist in constructive ways in the evolution of 
nations now imder Communist rule. There can 
be little doubt that this objective will best be 
advanced by the emergence of an integrated 
Europe which pursues in unity a constructive 
policy toward the East. 

The same principle holds good when we look 
at problems and opportunities in the southern 
half of the globe. We are talking here about 
regions whose population in 1980 will be, as 
nearly as we can calculate, 2.3 billion human 
beings: 410 million in Africa, 1.4 billion in free 
Asia, 145 million in the Middle East, 375 mil- 
lion in Latin America. Wliatever their vicissi- 
tudes, these peoples will and should advance in 



the generation ahead in their ability to absorb 
and use the tools of modern science, technol- 
ogy, and industry. 

In working with these peoples — in trying to 
deal constructively with the problems they pose 
for the world commmiity — it is hard to believe 
that the classic nation-state of Europe, with a 
population of 50 or 60 million, can, by itself, 
be an effective unit. To deal with the problems 
before us, Europe must generate a global vision 
of its interests and possibilities, and that global 
vision is only likely to emerge as Europe moves 
toward integration — as it achieves a unity suffi- 
cient to concert the use of its enormous ma- 
terial, political, cultural, and spiritual 

But even an integrated Europe will lack — as 
does my own country — the power, by itself, to 
meet many of these problems : the problems of 
defense, of effective policy toward the Com- 
munist nations, and of sustaining the cause of 
freedom to the south. 

These are tasks which can only be success- 
fully dispatched if Europe and the United 
States address them in closest concert. It was 
in recognition of this need that wise statesmen 
on both sides of the Atlantic have wished, since 
the war, to parallel progress toward European 
unity with progress toward an increasingly inti- 
mate Atlantic partnership. 

But this partnership can only flourish if it is 
solidly based on a genuine European and Amer- 
ican desire to share fully both the burdens and 
the responsibilities of power. This will in- 
volve changes for both Europe and the United 
States. Since the war my country has carried 
the lion's share of both the burdens and respon- 
sibilities. Now it must learn to share the re- 
sponsibilities on a basis of equality and mutual 
respect. And Europe must come to share the 
burdens in the degree that its growing resources 

This is what partnership between the two 
great continents means and requires. 

Making Partnership Work — the Nuclear Issue 

To illustrate the sharing of burdens and re- 
sponsibilities let me discuss two fields in which 
new common action is urgently needed : nuclear 
defense and political consultation. 

I turn first to nuclear defense. 

The Soviet Union lias built up a powerful 
array of RIRBM'S threatening Europe. In the 
face of this threat General [Lyman L.] Lem- 
nitzer, like General [Lauris] Norstad, has pro- 
posed that MRBM's be deployed to Allied 
forces in the European area. 

There are, broadly speaking, three ways in 
which we could resj^ond to this proposal. 

We could refuse outright. This could 
weaken the notion of Atlantic partnership by 
indicating that we were unwilling to extend it 
to the field of strategic weapons. It would 
weaken the concept of European unity by leav- 
ing untouched the present divisive gap between 
those major European powers which have a 
share in ownership and operation of strategic 
weapons and those which do not. This gap 
seems unlikely soon to wither away by itself. 
And if we cannot respond to the natural desire 
of major European countries to play a larger 
role in strategic deterrence by constructive 
measures, pressures for a further extension of 
individual small national programs may grow, 
with all the attendant dangers. 

Alternatively, we could agree to deploy 
MRBM's under the same "two key" system that 
was used for first-generation IRBM's and that 
is still used for shorter range tactical nuclear 
weapons on the central front. Under this sys- 
tem, the missiles are nationally owned and 
manned by the Allied coimtry buying the mis- 
siles, and the warheads would be released for 
use by bilateral decision of that country and 
the United States. However, creation of such 
new nationally manned and owned strategic 
missile forces could stimulate fears and rivalry 
in the West and be troubling in terms of East- 
West relations. 

If we are not to refuse MRBM's, and are not 
to deploy them under national manning and 
ownership, the alternative is to deploy them 
under multilateral manning and ownership. 

That is the origin of the proposed multilat- 
eral missile fleet. 

Creation of this force may prove to be a criti- 
cal turning point in the affairs of the alliance. 
There is little doubt in our minds that the role 
of Europe in the operation of strategic nuclear 
weapons will expand. The question is: Shall 

JULY 13, 1964 


we proceed in this field on an integrated basis, 
or shall the alliance fragment on this fimda- 
mental issue along national lines ? 

We in Washington have learned how power- 
fully the nuclear problem shapes political atti- 
tudes within nations and among nations. We 
think further fragmentation of our nuclear ca- 
pabilities and policies will weaken the alliance 
at its foundations. On the other hand, we are 
confident that a decision to go forward with the 
MLF [multilateral force] will serve as the basis 
for greater unity in the alliance, not merely in 
the field of military policy itself but in the field 
of arms control and in other areas. 

Nations joined in an integrated nuclear ven- 
ture are bound to be drawn closer together in 
ways that none of us can now fully foresee. 
They will have to detennine common positions 
on arms control negotiations affecting this ven- 
ture; they will be taking part in such negotia- 
tions as countries with a tangible stake in the 
outcome, not as bystanders. They will have to 
consult closely about the conditions under which 
the force would be placed in a state of alert or 
used, and this will inevitably involve them in 
intimate consultation about a variety of political 
situations which bear upon the availability or 
use of nuclear weapons. 

In short, in deciding whether to go forward 
with the MLF we are decidmg not merely how 
to shai-e nuclear power ; we are taking decisions 
which will influence the future political organi- 
zation of the West. We are choosing between 
national approaches and a new step toward inte- 
gration in the deepest sense of the word. 

It is because this fundamental issue is involved 
that we have wished to leave the structure of the 
MLF sufficiently flexible to adjust as Europe 
moves toward unity. As the European Action 
Committee indicated in its recent statement, the 
MLF could be the begmning of a true partner- 
ship between the United States and Europe in 
the nuclear field. 

Making Partnership Work — Political Consultation 

The second field of forward movement m part- 
nership I wish to discuss is that of political con- 
sultation. This bears on many of the tasks I 
mentioned earlier. Our efforts to advance Ger- 
man unity and constructive evolution in Eastern 

Europe, our attempts to sustain the cause of 
freedom and progress in the less developed coun- 
tries — all of these must be gripped through more 
effective processes of political consultation. 

Evidently our perspectives on these problems 
within the Atlantic area are not identical. 
Evidently, if we are to devise common policies, 
we must consult with a new intensity over a 
much wider range than in the past, understand- 
ing that consultation means assumption of re- 
sponsibility and of risk as well as the mutual 
giving of advice. We are anxious to see the 
agenda of the Atlantic alliance expanded in 
ways which would pennit us increasingly to grip 
these problems on a communal rather than a 
separate basis. 

We hold this view for two reasons. 

First, we are convinced that our common in- 
terests in the face of these problems are far 
more weighty than our differences and that 
serious and sustained consultation could bring 
us toward roughly common conclusions as to 
appropriate courses of action. 

Second, we are convinced that, without such 
movement toward concert on the problems which 
confront us on a global basis, our unity on the 
minimum essential and continuing tasks of 
NATO could be endangered. We have all seen 
over the years problems arising outside the 
NATO area itself which put strams on the 
NATO alliance internally. We have thus far 
successfully weathered such strams. But it 
would be unwise for us not to reckon that a suc- 
cessful North Atlantic alliance will require in 
the future a much higher degi'ee of concert on 
global problems than was required over the past 
15 years. 

It is for these two fundamental reasons — the 
existence of basic common interests and the dan- 
ger of not building our policy upon them — that 
we are prepared to attack the problem of extend- 
ing political consultation within the Atlantic 

This means being willing to go forward in 
closer consultation with those countries that are 
ready and willing to proceed. This may some- 
times be less than all 15 NATO nations, if some 
wish to remain aloof. Some problems will, per- 
haps, be dealt with in smaller groujDS, but all 
NATO members should be kept generally 



It means being willing to bring policymaking 
officials from home governments, who are 
directly concerned with the problems under dis- 
cussion, together as often as necessary — a proc- 
ess which has proved of critical importance in 
the development of the European Commmiity. 

It means being willing to strengthen the role 
of the Secretary General and the international 
staff, as necessary to make these procedures 
work. We are all impressed with the role played 
by the commissions in the European Communi- 
ties, and by the Secretary-General in the U.N. 
as catalytic agents in the process of agreement. 
There are lessons to be learned here as we seek 
to improve Atlantic political consideration. 

And, finally, it means being willing to struc- 
ture this consultation in ways that will enable 
Europe to achieve growing influence as it moves 
toward unity. The consultation that we envis- 
age would do just this. To the extent that Eu- 
ropean nations could concert among themselves 
about the issues under discussion, their ability 
to affect the agi'eed outcome would surely be 

Progress Toward a New, Stable World Order 

As we assess the changes that have taken 
place over the past year and a half, and as we 
scan the horizons ahead, we in Washington be- 
lieve that we were all wise when we committed 
ourselves after the war to work toward both 
European imity and an intimate Atlantic con- 
nection. It is perhaps worth recalling that we 
did this not merely to meet Stalin's direct and 
brutal challenge. On both sides of the Atlantic 
the movement for European unity and the At- 
lantic partnership reflected an acknowledgment 
of errors made by all of us between the two 
world wars. These two pieces of architecture, 
in which a generation of men on both sides of 
the Atlantic have invested their best talents, 
reflect an awareness of the tragic mistakes we 
made between the wars in returning to old- 
fashioned nationalism. It is not too much to 
say that the Second World War was an unneces- 
sary product of those mistakes. 

Now there are forces at work in the world 
which could lead us in one of two directions. 
There are forces of fragmentation and of vio- 
lence which, in many quarters of the globe, could 

easily get out of hand, plunging us from a pre- 
carious peace into chaos. But there are also 
forces now m play which could take us toward 
peace and stability in the generation ahead. It 
does not lie outside our common capabilities 
to organize in the next generation a new world 
order to replace that which was shattered in 
1914 and never replaced. 

The time for pause and debate is drawing to 
a close. In the MLF, in the Kennedy Round, 
and in the array of issues and opportunities pre- 
sented to us from outside the NATO area itself 
we are confronted with matters which require 
decision. We believe that what our common 
interests demand is a new surge of energy and 
determination to solve these problems in 
common — a phase of rapid forward movement 
in both Atlantic and European unity. We be- 
lieve that the possibilities of building a new and 
stable world order in the generation ahead de- 
pend on such forward movement in the face of 
our agenda. 

Progress toward that objective — and there 
can be no other rational objective in a 
nuclear age — requires continued Western unity, 
patience, dedication, and conunon effort. If we 
in the Atlantic world emerge from this period 
of pause and debate with a new surge of energy 
and creativeness with respect to both Western 
unity and the Atlantic alliance, I believe we 
have it in our power to make the Berlin and 
Cuba crises of 1961 and 1962 a nearly bloodless 
but decisive turning point in the cold war. We 
could move on together to a peaceful resolution 
of the cold war, which would not merely pre- 
serve but enlarge and enrich that common West- 
em heritage which can only be maintained in 
the second half of the 20th century if we work 
together in common loyalty to that heritage. 

ANZUS Council To Meet 
at Washington 

Press release 294 dated June 24 

The Governments of Australia and New Zea- 
land have accepted the invitation of the United 
States Government to hold a meeting of the 
ANZUS Council in Wasliington on July 17 and 

JULY 13, 1964 


18, 1964. Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake 
will represent New Zealand, Minister of Exter- 
nal Affairs Paul Hasluck will represent Austra- 
lia, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk will 
represent the United States. 

The last of these annual meetings was held on 
June 5 and 6, 1963, in Wellington, New Zealand.^ 
The ANZUS Council meetings rotate each year 
among the capitals of the signatory nations and 
provide the medium for discussion and ex- 
change of views in implementation of the 
ANZUS pact. 

Right of Unrestricted Air Access 
to Berlin Reasserted by U.S. 

Following is the text of a Department state- 
ment read to nexos correspondents on June 23 
hy Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office 
of News, in response to inquiries about Tass 
reports on Soviet notes delivered to the embas- 
sies of the United States and Great Britain at 
Moscoio on June 20. 

We did receive a note conceniing flights from 
the United States to Berlin. We are studying 
the note and will be consulting with our allies 
who have received similar notes. The notes 
say that tlie flights are "illegal" in the absence 
of agreement between the airline and the au- 
thorities of the so-called "German Democratic 
Eepublic," and that the Soviets will withhold 
as to these flights what they term their "guar- 
antee of flight safety." 

The rights of the three Western Powers to 
air access to and from Berlin arise from the 
Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and have been 
confirmed by Four Power agreements estab- 
lishing the Berlin air corridors. These rights 
of access are for unrestricted flight by Allied 
aircraft and are without restriction as to the 
origin or destination of such flights. 

The three Western Powers, pursuant to Four 
Power agreements and procedures of long 
standing, file flight plans in the Berlin Air 
Safety Center and pass them to the Soviets 

' Bulletin of June 24, 1963, p. 967. 

solely for their information, so that they may 
adjust their own flights accordingly. 

These agreements do not call for any state- 
ment by the Soviets of a "guarantee of flight 

These flights are continuing on a normal 
basis. The U.S. Government will hold the So- 
viet Government responsible for the safety of 
all American aircraft in the Berlin air 

Tliree Western Powers Reaffirm 
Desire for German Reunification 

Following is the text of a tripartite declara- 
tion which was released simultaneously at Lorv- 
don, Paris, and Washington on June 26 and 
was also made available at Bonn, where, in a 
separate declaration, the Federal Republic of 
Germany expressed its support for tJie aims of 
the tripartite declaration. 

Press release 300 dated June 26 

The Governments of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, after consult- 
ing with the Government of the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, wish to state the following with 
regard to the agreement signed by the Soviet 
Union and the so-called "German Democratic 
Republic" on June 12, 1964. This agreement, 
among other things, deals with questions re- 
lated to Germany as a whole and to Berlin in 

1. As the Soviet Government was reminded 
before the signing of this agreement, it is clear 
that any agi'eement which the Soviet Union 
may make with the so-called "German Demo- 
cratic Republic" cannot affect Soviet obliga- 
tions or responsibilities under agreements and 
arrangements with the Three Powers on the 
subject of Germany including Berlin and ac- 
cess thereto. The Three Governments consider 
that the Soviet Union remains boimd by these 
engagements, and they will continue to hold the 
Soviet Government responsible for the fulfill- 
ment of its obligations. 

2. West Berlin is not an "independent politi- 
cal unit". Within the framework of their re- 
sponsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, 



the Four Powers have put the German capital, 
the city of "Greater Berlin," under their joint 
administration. Unilateral initiatives taken 
by the Soviet Government in order to block the 
quadripartite administration of the city cannot 
in any way modify tliis legal situation nor 
abrogate the rights and responsibilities of the 
Four Powers in regard to Berlin. Wliile re- 
serving their rights relating to Berlin, the 
Three Western Powers, taking account of the 
necessities for the development of the city, have 
authorized, in accordance with the agreements 
of October 23, 1954, the establisliment of close 
ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, including permission to the Fed- 
eral Republic to ensure representation of Ber- 
lin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin. 
These ties, the existence of which is essential to 
the viability of Berlin, are in no way incon- 
sistent with the quadripartite status of the city 
and will be maintained in the future. 

3. The Three Governments consider that the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many is the only German government freely and 
legitimately constituted and therefore entitled 
to speak for the German people in international 
affairs. The Three Govermnents do not recog- 
nize the East German regime nor the existence 
of a state in eastern Germany. As for the pro- 
visions related to the "frontiers" of this so-called 
state, the Three Governments reiterate that 
within Germany and Berlin there are no fron- 
tiers but rather a "demarcation line" and the 
"sector borders" and that, accordmg to the very 
agreements to which the agreement of June 12 
refers, the fmal determination of the frontiers 
of Germany must await a peace settlement for 
the whole of Germany. 

4. The charges of "revanchism" and "milita- 
rism" contained in the agreement of June 12 are 
without basis. The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Gennany in its statement of Octo- 
ber 3, 1954, has renovmced the use of force to 
achieve the reunification of Gennany or the 
modification of the present boundaries of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. This remains 
its policy. 

5. The Three Governments agree that the 
safeguarding of peace and security is today more 
than ever a vital problem for all nations and 

that a just and peaceful settlement of outstand- 
ing problems in Europe is essential to the estab- 
lisliment of lasting peace and security. Such 
a settlement requires the application in the 
whole of Germany of the principle of self-deter- 
mination. This prhicii^le is reaffirmed in the 
United Nations Charter, which the agreement 
of June 12 itself mvokes. By ignoring this 
principle, the agreement of June 12 seeks to 
perpetuate the arbitrary division of Germany, 
which is a continuing source of international 
tension and an obstacle to a peaceful settlement 
of European problems. The exercise of self- 
determination, which should lead to the reunifi- 
cation of Germany in peace and freedom, re- 
mains a fimdamental objective of the Three 

6. The Three Governments are convinced that 
such a settlement should be sought as soon as 
possible. This settlement should include pro- 
gressive solutions which would bring about Ger- 
man reunification and security in Europe. On 
such a basis, the Three Governments are always 
ready to take advantage of any opportunity 
which would peacefully reestablish Gennan 
unity in freedom. 

U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews 
Current Defense ProbSems 

Joint C omraunique 

Press release 297 dated June 25 

The Canada-United States Ministerial Com- 
mittee on Joint Defense met today [Jmie 251 
at the Department of State. 

Today's meeting, the fourth since the Com- 
mittee's establishment in 1958, grew out of dis- 
cussions last year at Hyannis Port between 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pear- 
son.^ In keeping with the need for continuing 
close cooperation between the two countries in 
defense matters, President Johnson and Prime 
Minister Pearson decided during their talks last 
January,^ that the Ministerial Committee on 

' Bulletin of May 27, 1963, p. 815. 
" For text of a joint communique, see xbiA., Feb. 10, 
1964, p. 199. 

JTJLY 13, 1964 


Joint Defense should meet during the first half 
of 1964. 

Previous meetings were held at Paris in 1958 ; 
Camp David, United States in 1959 ; and Monte- 
bello, Canada in 1960.^ 

Among the subjects discussed by the Min- 
isters were the changing nature of the threat to 
the North American continent and measures to 
meet that threat; the current developments in 
NATO ; the desire of both comitries for an ef- 
fective arms control and disarmament program ; 
and international peacekeeping activities. 
Particular attention was given to a review of 
the defense production sharing progi-am under 
which industiy in the two countries is utilized 
on a continental basis so as to meet most equita- 
bly the equipment needs of mutual defense. 

The United States was represented by Secre- 
tary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the 
Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Secretaiy of De- 
fense Robert S. McNamara, and the United 
States Ambassador to Canada W. Walton 
Butterworth. Canada was represented by 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul 
Martin, Minister of National Defence Paul 
Hellyer, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon, 
Associate Minister of National Defence Lucien 
Cardin, Minister of Defence Pi-oduction Charles 
Drury, and the Canadian Ambassador to the 
United States C. S. A. Ritchie. 

President Names New Ambassador 
to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy 

Statement hy President Johnson ^ 

On June 19 Ambassador Lodge [Heni-y Cabot 
Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 
Viet-Nam] informed me that he must return 
to private life as soon as possible. I have in- 
formed Ambassador Lodge that I must, of 
course, respect his decision, and accordingly I 
have accepted his resignation to take effect as 

' The first meeting was held at Paris in December 
1958 during the regular annual ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council ; for texts of communiques 
issued at the close of the second and third meetings, 
see iUa., Nov. 30, 1959, p. 789, and Aug. 1, 19G0, p. 172. 

' Read by the President at his news conference on 
June 23. 

soon as he returns. This nation has been most 
fortunate to have Ambassador Lodge's distin- 
guished and dedicated service in a post of the 
highest importance for the last year. 

I intend to nominate General Maxwell D. 
Taylor to be Ambassador to the Republic of 
Viet-Nam, succeeding Ambassador Lodge. 
General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, is an officer of outstanding quality. 
His remarkable career has shown a devotion to 
democracy, commitment to freedom, and under- 
standing of the ways of Communist terrorism 
and subversion which in my opinion fit him in 
an unusual measure for this new and demanding 

I also intend to name Mr. U. Alexis Johnson 
[Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs], whose nomination as Career Ambas- 
sador is now before the Senate, to hold the new 
post of Deputy Ambassador to the Republic of 
Viet-Nam. Mr. Johnson will proceed to Saigon 
immediately and will act as the chief of our 
mission there until General Taylor's arrival. 

Mr. Jolmson is an outstanding career diplo- 
mat, the Department's most experienced author- 
ity on Southeast Asia, with experience both in 
the field and in senior posts in the Department 
of State ; he is ideally qualified to support Gen- 
eral Taylor in the management of the American 
team m Viet-Nam. 

I am deeply pleased that these two distin- 
guished Americans have agreed, on short notice, 
to take up these new assignments — I got their 
agreement late yesterday and last evening — and 
I am satisfied that together they will give the 
United States the best possible field leadership 
in support, of our embattled friends, the people 
of South Viet-Nam. 

I wish to annoimce that I intend to nominate 
General Earle G. "Wlieeler to take the place of 
General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 

Let me take a moment to read you Ambas- 
sador Lodge's letter and my reply: 

June 19, 1964 
Dear Mk. President : Herewith I tender my resig- 
nation as Ambassador to Vietnam. I do so entirely 
for personal reasons. 

My thanks go to you for your unfailing devotion 
to problems connected with American policy in Viet- 
nam, for your guidance, courtesy, consideration and for 



enabling me to have this opportunity to serve the 
United States. And my heartfelt gratitude goes to 
the late President Kennedy, who appointed me. 

Although in a dangerous iwsition, the Republic of 
Vietnam is on the right track and the Vietnamese are 
to be commended for their determination not to sub- 
mit to any foreign domination, whatever the source. 
Persistent and patient execution of existing civil and 
military plans will bring victory — provided hostile ex- 
ternal pressures are contained, which I am sure they 
can be. This is indeed a time to persist and not to get 
discouraged or impatient. I am sure we will persist. 

With respectful regard, 
Very sincerely yours, 

Henky Cabot Lodge 

June 23, 1964 
Deae Ambassador Lodge : I accept with deep regret 
your resignation as Ambassador to Viet Nam. I hereby 
authorize you to make your farewell call to General 
Khanh and to depart at your convenience thereafter. 
I hope to see you at once on your return, to hear your 
final report and to offer best personal wishes on your 
return to private life. 

Your readiness to assume the duties of American 
Ambassador to Viet Nam in a time of danger and dif- 
ficulty was in the great tradition of disinterested pub- 
lic service. Those who carry on after you will find 
encouragement in your example. Your departure will 
mean no change in the steadfast determination of the 
United States to support the Government and the peo- 
ple of South Viet Nam in their struggle for peace and 
security, which means an end of Communist terror and 
an end of external aggression. As you say, we will 


Lyndon B. Johnson 

I have stated our policy as I see it in Viet- 
Nani on other occasions, and statements to the 
press which I read, the letter that enunciated 
that policy written by President Eisenhower on 
October 1, 1954, and released on October 25, 
1954.^ I have referred to it in various public 
addresses, but for your benefit and the benefit 
of the American people, I would like to make a 
brief statement restating that policy for those 
that may not have gotten it, or in order to at 
least repeat it. 

The policy of the United States toward South- 

' For a statement by President Johnson on June 2, 
in which he read the letter of Oct. 1, 1954, from Presi- 
dent Eisenhower to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh 
Diem, see Buixetin of June 22, 1964, p. 953. 

east Asia remains as it was on June 2d, when I 
summarized it in four simple propositions: 

First, America keeps her word. 

Second, the issue is the future of Southeast 
Asia as a whole. 

Third, our purpose is peace. 

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a 
struggle for freedom on every front of human 

In these last weeks there has been particular 
concern with Laos. There again the problem 
is caused by the aggressive acts of others and by 
their disregard for their given word. Our own 
actions, and what we have said about them, are 
governed by the legitimate desires of the Gov- 
ernment of Laos. Wliere the International Con- 
trol Commission has been kept out, our airmen 
have been sent to look — and where they are fired 
on, they are ready to defend themselves. This 
armed reconnaissance can be ended tomorrow 
if those who are breaking the peace of Laos 
will simply keep their agreements. We specifi- 
cally support full compliance by everyone with 
the Geneva accords of 1962. 

I have said before that there is danger in 
Southeast Asia. It is a danger brought on by 
the terrorism and aggression so clearly, if secre- 
tively, directed from Hanoi. The United States 
intends no rasliness and seeks no wider war. 
But the United States is determined to use its 
strength to help those who are defending them- 
selves against terror and aggression. We are a 
people of peace — but not of weakness or 

I sliould like to repeat again that our purpose 
is peace. Our people in South Viet-Nam are 
helping to protect people against terror. They 
are also helping — and they will help more — in 
increasing agricultm-al production, in expand- 
ing medical help, and building a sense of hope. 
They are helping — and they will help more — 
to give confidence to those who seek to help 
themselves, and modern equipment to those who 
can use it, and friendly counsel to those who are 
giving leadership. These are proud people, 
and the task of building their peace and prog- 
ress is their own; but they can coimt on our 
help for as long as they need it and want it. 

JULY 13, 1964 


President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation 
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece 

President Johnson held talks regarding the 
situation in Cyprus with the Prime Minister of 
Turkey, Ismet Inonu, who visited Washington 
Jwne 22 and 23, and with the Prime Minister of 
Greece, George Papandreou, who was in Wash- 
ington June 24--26. Following are texts of ex- 
changes of greetings and joint communiques 
released at the close of the visits of the two 
Prime Ministers. 


Exchange of Greetings, June 22 

White House press release dated June 22 


Mr. Prime Minister, it is a pleasure to meet 
with you again and to welcome you once more 
to our United States. The American people 
remember with deep appreciation your visit 
here last year in our national hour of sorrow 
upon the death of our beloved President, Jolin 
F. Kemiedy. For myself, I shall never forget 
my own visit to your country 2 years ago and 
the great outpouring of friendship for America 
which your people demonstrated so generously 
in your cities and your coimtryside. 

From that visit I remember especially the 
conversations we were privileged to have to- 
gether, Mr. Prime Minister. I was inspired by 
both your vision and your determination to lead 
Turkey toward the fulfillment of the dreams of 
the great Ataturk, at whose side you once 

The history of your land is ancient ; the his- 
tory of our land is young. Yet Turkey and 

the United States have much in conmion. We 
share alike a zeal to safeguard our mdepend- 
ence, to uphold democratic values under the 
rule of law, and to seek after those solutions 
which will be peaceful and permanent. We 
are not only good friends, but we are close allies. 
We have marched together in arms. We stand 
together as partners in NATO. We work to- 
gether as associates in CENTO. 

We welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, as a 
leader of a nation united with us in a deter- 
mination to preserve world peace and, through 
collective security, to stand steadfast against 
the tlireat of Commimist aggression. Above all, 
Mr. Prime Minister, we welcome you as a friend 
who comes representmg a strong and stalwart 
people for whom the American people have only 
the warmest feelings of friendship and respect. 
I am confident that in our discussions this 
friendly spirit will prevail, as we work together 
toward the solutions of problems which trouble 
us all. 


Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and my- 
self I wish to thank you from the bottom of 
our hearts for this sincere and splendid wel- 
come. I liave no doubt that the people of 
Tui'key look upon this \'isit as anotlier occasion 
to cement the deep-rooted and lasting friend- 
ship between our two countries. Our two peo- 
ples have always been conscious of having com- 
mon ideals and of having linked our destinies. 

We in Turkey believe that friendship between 
coimtries is based not on transitory interests 
but on a common faith in ultimate justice and 
unwavering principles. 



Mr. President, friendships are proved in try- 
ing times. If my visit can help to brmg better 
imderstanding of the problems and issues that 
now interest our part of the world, my mission 
will be useful. 

We believe in peace, but we also know that 
peace cannot be lasting unless it is based in 
justice. For your great country we in Turkey 
have always borne the most sincere feelings of 
esteem, confidence, and good will. 

For Mrs. Johnson and yourself, Mr. Presi- 
dent, my wife and I have such deep personal 
regard that your gracious welcome is both 
touching and overwhelming. We are happy 
and honored to be the guests of a great Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

To you, Mr. President, to your gracious wife, 
and to those of the great American public who 
can hear me, on behalf of ourselves and the 
people of Turkey, I say, once again, thank you. 

Joint Communique, June 23 

White House press release dated June 23 

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey and Presi- 
dent Jolmson have discussed all aspects of the 
problem of Cyprus. Both leaders welcomed 
the opportunity presented by the Prime Minis- 
ter's visit at the President's invitation for a 
full exchange of views. 

The discussion, proceeding from the present 
binding effects of existing treaties, covered ways 
in which present difficulties might be adjusted 
by negotiation and agreement. The urgent 
necessity for such agreement upon lasting solu- 
tions was underlined. 

The Prime Minister and the President also 
considered ways in which their countries could 
strengthen the efforts of the United Nations ^ 
with respect to the safety and security of the 
commvmities on Cyprus. 

The cordial and candid conver.sations of the 
two leaders strengthened the broad understand- 
ing already existing between Turkey and the 
United States. 

The President and the Prime Minister ex- 
pressed their conviction that their peoples are 
devoted to common democratic principles, to 
individual freedom, to human dignity and to 
peace in justice. 

' See p. 64. 


Exchange of Greetings, June 24 

White House press release dated June 24 


Mr. Prime Minister, it is a proud privilege 
for me to welcome you to the United States this 
morning and to express my deep personal ap- 
preciation for your coming to our country at 
this time. 

This country and your country are bound 
together by ties that are both ancient and mod- 
ern. The founders of these United States drew 
deeply from the wisdom and the ideals of an- 
cient Greece in formulating the concepts of our 
own free and democratic society. In this 20th 
century, your country and mine have stood 
stalwartly together to defend those enduring 
ideals against aggi'essors and to advance their 
fulfillment among our people. 

We are friends in freedom; we are allies in 
NATO for peace; we are coworkers in the 
common labors of progress and prosperity. 
These are strong and welcome bonds. We are 
bound together also, Mr. Prime Minister, by 
close and lasting ties of kinship. Americans 
harbor a very warm afl'ection for those of your 
countrymen and their dependents who have 
honored us through the years by coming to live 
in our midst as neighbors, as friends, and as 
leaders in American life. 

In recent months, occasions of grief have 
brought us close together in moments of na- 
tional sorrow. Last November Queen Frederika 
came to our country as a representative of your 
country at the time of the tragic death of Presi- 
dent Kennedy. Only a short time later, Mrs. 
Jolmson made a sad mission of mourning to at- 
tend the fimeral of your beloved King Paul, 
whom we had been privileged to meet so happily 
on our visit to your land only 2 years ago. 

Today I am confident that your visit and the 
talks that we shall have together will again 
affirm the close and cordial relations between 
Greece and the United States. With diligence 
and understanding, we shall seek to chart a 
course that will preserve the union and harmony 
of free nations, militantly opposed to Commu- 
nist aggression. 

JULY 13, 1964 


We in America know that the people of 
Greece yield to no other people in the world 
in their devotion to freedom and independence 
and in their desire to keep the peace won and 
maintained by such great sacrifice from free 
men in our times. 

Mr. Prime Minister, it is to that cause of peace 
that our efforts are dedicated today. 


Mr. President, I thank you for your kind 
welcome. I regard it as a great privilege that 
upon your friendly invitation I find myself in 
the Capital of the mighty American democ- 
racy, the great friend and ally of Greece, and 
before this famous mansion which has housed 
so many illustrious promoters of human achieve- 
ment, of liberty and justice. 

I am happy that I shall be given the oppor- 
tunity to become personally acquainted with the 
present great leader of the United States, the 
champion of peace, as well as with members 
of his administration and of the Congress of 
the United States. 

Your concern for the maintenance of peace 
and freedom is shared by the Greek nation and 
by myself. Greece has always tried for the 
promotion of peace. A people that has suf- 
fered as much as ours from the violence of war 
and the reverses of liistory can only long for 
peace, but no peace can be durable without jus- 
tice and no settlement of problems can be right 
and just if it is not based on democracy and 

In the past there existed a distinction between 
the world of ideals and the world of politics, 
between a policy based on idealism and a policy 
based upon realism. Nowadays they have 
merged into one, and the policy is today the 
more positive the more it is in consonance with 
ideas. This constitutes the glory of our times, 
the glory of the free world whom you are called 
upon by history to lead. 

My country does not forget that the United 
States, through the doctrine which bears the 
name of one of your great predecessors. Presi- 
dent Truman, has been instrumental in the 
defense of Greece against aggression, as well 
as in the rehabilitation of the country, ex- 
hausted and devastated by cruel years of war. 

Greece also feels proud to be represented in 
your great democracy by a number of citizens 
of Greek descent who constitute a living link 
between the two nations, and of our national 
cultural ties to the world of American 

Mr. President, I welcome this opportunity to 
bring to you and to the people of the United 
States the cordial salute of the people of 

Joint Communique, June 25 

White House press release dated June 25 

During the visit to Washington of the Prime 
Minister of Greece conversations were held be- 
tween Mr. George A. Papandreou and the Pres- 
ident of the United States, the Secretary of 
State, and other officials of the United States 

The conversations, which were conducted in 
an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordial- 
ity, have contributed to the strengthening of the 
close ties between Greece and the United 

The visit provided the opportunity to the 
Greek Prime Minister and the President of the 
United States to review various aspects of the 
international situation and to discuss subjects 
of mutual interest. 

The President of the United States and the 
Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful 
exchange of views on the Cyprus situation. 
Both expressed full support of the efforts 
undertaken by the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
the establishment of peace in the island and 
for rapidly finding a permanent solution. The 
Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the 
Greek position on the problem. He empha- 
sized that a permanent solution should be based 
upon the principles of democracy and justice. 
The two leaders reiterated their determination 
to make every effort to increase the understand- 
ing among allies. 

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep 
appreciation for the generous support of the 
United States Government and people in the 
hard struggle of the Greek people for their 
freedom and welfare. 



Africa South of the Equator 

hy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

In this second half of the 20th century, we 
have been privileged to witness one of the great 
movements in world history — Africa's march 
to freedom and independence. Today there are 
34 independent nations in Africa, and others 
are on their way. Thirty of those new nations 
achieved independence in the last 12I/2 years, 
and all but two — Algeria and the Congo — made 
the transition in relatively peaceful circum- 

This march has brought to many lands a tri- 
umphant flowering of human dignity, and it has 
reinvigorated international affairs in the world 
of free men. But it also has brought new 
trials and tribulations to many of those new 
nations, as they struggle to break through the 
shackles of poverty, ignorance, and disease to 
catch up with the more developed portions of 
the world. 

Africa is an immense continent. It is more 
than three times the size of the United States, 
yet it has a population of only some 265 million 
people. The continent faces severe handicaps. 
Its people have an annual per capita income of 
only $120; 85 percent of its inhabitants are 
illiterate; and its health problems are charac- 
terized by the fact that one out of five children 
dies before reaching his teens. Africa has few 
people with technical and other middle skills 
and few managers and professional people. As 
a result, most of the continent's productivity is 
low. Africa also is handicapped by a shortage 
of industry and by an inadequate network of 

' Address made before a Department of State for- 
eign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18 
( press release 285 dated June 17 ) . 

transportation, communications, and other serv- 
ices left by the former colonial powers. 

Nevertheless, I believe Africa has a promising 
future, despite the very real difficulties wliich 
have manifested themselves in economic and 
political ups and downs. The continent is rich 
in both human and material resources, although 
they are greatly in need of development. 

Both will be developed, however, because it is 
in the interest of Africa and the world, includ- 
ing the United States, that they be developed. 
Our assistance, and that of other free- world na- 
tions, not only provides Africans with an 
alternative to Communist overtures, but it plays 
the positive role of helping Africans improve 
their well-being and develop a peaceful and 
prosperous continent. 

Africa's mineral resources are well known, 
and their importance to the United States is 
substantial. Africa is the source of 60 percent of 
the world's gold and 90 percent of its diamonds. 
It produces three-fourths of the world's cobalt 
and significant amoimts of petroleum, iron ore, 
and bauxite. In addition, it is an important 
source of such vital modem metals as copper, 
chrome, manganese, antimony, and uranium. 

The continent's hydroelectric potential is 
estimated at 40 percent of the world's water- 
power supply, but it is so far little developed. 

African agriculture is still almost marginal 
on the whole. It produces only about 5 percent 
of the world's agricultural products, although 
it has more arable land than the United States, 
which produces 16 percent. Where modern 
agriculture is practiced, however, agricultural 
productivity rises sharply. 

JULT 13, 1964 


Africans have been quick to see the desirabil- 
ity of continental and regional cooperation — 
to settle political disputes through the Organi- 
zation of African Unity, to maximize economic 
growth by elimination of trade barriers, to plan 
regional enterprises through the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Africa and other regional or- 

All of this activity is reflected in concrete 
progress in various parts of the continent. In 
trade, for example, African exports increased 
42 percent between 1952 and 1961. Ethiopia's 
gross national product increased annually by 
4.8 percent between 1957 and 1961, to take an- 
other example. In the important field of edu- 
cation, Nigeria allocated 19.4 percent of its 
budget to education and Ghana 18 percent in 
fiscal year 1963. These few statistics indicate 
that Africans ai-e trying — and succeeding in 
their efforts — to make economic and social 

There are areas, however, where there is much 
unfinished business in Africa. Many of these 
areas are below the Equator, and I would like 
to discuss three with you today — the Congo, 
East Africa, and South Africa. In the inter- 
est of time, I will omit such important areas 
as the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Portu- 
guese territories, but I am prepared to comment 
on those countries in the question period if you 

The Congo 

Just 4 years ago this month, the large Repub- 
lic of the Congo came to independence and al- 
most immediately was engulfed in civil war. 
Three of its then-six provinces — Kasai, Katan- 
ga, and Orientale — attempted to secede, and 
the Communist bloc was doing all it could to 
fan the flames of disorder. The Congolese Gov- 
ernment decided to ask for U.N. assistance in 
reuniting the country and preserving its terri- 
torial integrity, and the United States fully sup- 
ported such action. Through the medium of the 
United Nations, an East- West confrontation 
and Communist penetration were averted in 
Central Africa. When the Katangese secession 
movement collapsed in January 1963, a period 
was put to that unhappy chapter in the short 
history of the fledgling Congo Republic. 

The end of secession was not the end of the 
Congo's problems, however. The nation still 
faces grave problems which will grow more 
acute with the withdrawal of U.N. forces in the 
next 12 days. Today the question of the Con- 
go's continued existence as a geographic entity 
settles squarely on the shoulders of the Con- 
golese themselves, and we are increasing our 
efforts to help the Congolese protect their in- 
ternal security. Today there are two serious 
revolts against the authority of the Central Gov- 
ernment — one in Kwilu Province in the west, 
which began in January, and the other in Kivu 
in the east, which began in April. 

A third area of potential difficulty is Katanga 
in the south. Elements of former rebel chief 
Moise Tshombe's gendarmes, once 12,000 strong, 
are still present in outlying areas of Katanga 
Province or are just across the border in the 
Portuguese territory of Angola. Those forces, 
which probably include some mercenaries, rep- 
resent a latent threat to the Congo Government. 

We are watching Congolese developments 
very carefully. Wliile there is little doubt that 
Communists outside the Congo are encouraging 
the Kwilu and Kivu revolts — and some of the 
leaders of those revolts have contacts with Com- 
munists — communism as a force behind the 
revolts is almost nonexistent. Much of today's 
trouble is due to tribal differences, economic 
dissatisfaction, and opposition to tlie Central 

We are most anxious to assist the Congolese 
Government to develop its ability to preserve 
internal security. For more than a year now, 
the United States has been providing military 
equipment, such as ground and air transporta- 
tion, to help in the training of the Congolese 
National Army. Our efforts have been linked 
with those of Belgium, Israel, and Italy, who 
are performing the actual training of the Army. 

On the economic side, there are still serious 
problems for the Congo to face, but I was 
pleased to find many signs of a clear economic 
upturn and an encouraging growth of business 
and financial confidence during my brief visit 
to the Congo last month. Of particular sig- 
nificance, relations between the Congolese and 
the Belgians have improved greatly in recent 
months, and an important Belgian aid program 
recently was announced. 



Today there are some 50,000-60,000 Belgian 
educators, technicians, businessmen, clergy, and 
persons with other specialties presently working 
in the Congo and assisting the Congolese people. 
The giant copper and cobalt mining company, 
Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, is back in 
full production as well. Although noting that 
its 1963 profits were down, largely as a result 
of exchange losses caused by the devaluation of 
the Congolese franc last November, its recent 
annual statement added that order and security 
in Katanga had improved and that its 1964 cop- 
per production should be as high as last year's. 

East Africa 

Turning to East Africa, there have been many 
interesting and significant developments re- 
cently in that part of the continent. Probably 
the most striking was the recent formation of 
the United Eepublic of Tanganyika and Zanzi- 
bar. The change of government in Zanzibar 
last January was an explosive issue which 
created problems for the mainland governments 
of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. Wliile 
the revolt was initially one of the dissatisfied 
black African majority against the ruling Arab 
minority, pro-Communist elements played an 
important part in the revolution. They then 
moved into key posts in the revolutionary gov- 
ernment, where they began to work closely with 
the Chinese and Soviet bloc Communists. The 
United Eepublic, which was formed in May, is 
a new governmental arrangement developed by 
the Zanzibaris and Tanganyikans themselves to 
better meet their mutual needs and aspirations. 
We feel it is an excellent example of the way 
Africans work out solutions to African prob- 
lems on their own initiative. 

East Africa has long been noted for its 
regional cooperation. An East African Com- 
mon Market, shared by Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika, has existed since 1922. This Com- 
mon Market is directed by a body known as 
the East African Common Services Organiza- 
tion (EACSO). A closely related organiza- 
tion, the East African Currency Board, ad- 
ministers a common currency for the East 
African countries and Aden. Through EAC- 
SO, the 25 million people of the area's countries 
share a common tax administration, common 

research facilities, and common services in such 
fields as telecommunications, postal facilities, 
customs, tariffs, civil aviation, railways, and 

In recent months the distribution of regional 
revenues and the location of East African in- 
dustry became the subject of intense criticism, 
and there was a possibility that the Common 
Market might break up. Last month at a meet- 
ing in Nairobi, however, the three heads of 
state — Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote, and 
Julius Nyerere — agreed upon a new East Afri- 
can Common Market agreement to redress 
existing imbalances. 

Traditionally, Kenya has dominated the en- 
tire East African market. Under the new 
agreement, Kenya will restrict its exports to 
Uganda and the United Republic in fields 
where those countries have unused capacity in 
existing plants and where they want to expand 
their industries. In addition, an allocation of 
new industries is to be worked out under which 
each of the three countries will produce certain 
types of products exclusively for the entire East 
African market. We believe tliis is an impor- 
tant step in giving added impetus to the al- 
ready high degree of cooperation in East 

South Africa 

In the Republic of South Africa, apartheid 
is a tragic problem involving both whites and 
non whites whose families have lived in the area 
for centuries, building up one of the highest 
standards of living in Africa. The deadlock 
between nonwhite aspirations and the white- 
controlled Govenmient's attempt to hold the 
line is already having extensive repercussions 
elsewhere, especially in newly independent 
Africa and the U.N. 

The Republic of South Africa is much in the 
news recently because of incidents connected 
with its policy of repression. 

Last week eight leaders in the resistance to 
apartheid — black, white, and Indian — were 
sentenced to life imprisonment in the widely 
publicized Rivonia trial. 

Last week Justice Minister [B. J.] Vorster 
announced in the South African Parliament 
that he intended to recommend renewal of the 

JTJLT 13, 1964 

786-160 — 64- 


controversial 90-day detention clause. By this 
clause the police may arrest without charge and 
hold in solitary confinement any person sus- 
pected of hairing information about certain 
types of political offenses or about plans to com- 
mit them. Persons can be arrested and held for 
successive 90-day periods ; and as many as three 
terms in a row, separated only by moments, have 
been imposed on the same individual. This 
clause must be reproclaimed by the State Presi- 
dent by June 30 to remain in effect. Should it 
be allowed to lapse, as Mr. Vorster said he might 
recommend later, at least for a while, the law 
says it can be reproclaimed again at any time 
for periods not to exceed 12 months without re- 
newal. Large numbers of South African law- 
yers, doctors, scholars, and others have pro- 
tested against the clause as an invasion of civil 
and human rights. Spokesmen of all major 
religions — Moslem, Protestant, Jewish, and 
Catholic — have appealed to the Government to 
let it lapse. 

On May 23, two South African policemen 
entered a small general store in South Africa's 
Natal Province and served notices of renewed 
and intensified restrictions on the proprietor of 
the store, an elderly Zulu ex-chief — the famed 
Albert Luthuli, President General of the 
African National Congress and winner of the 
Nobel Peace Prize. Five years ago he was 
served with two notices restricting Mm to liis 
local district on the groimds that his activities 
invited hostility between black and white and 
furthered the objects of communism. Now he 
is restricted for another 5 years and limited to 
Groutville, a small mission reserve. Nothing 
he says or writes can be published in South 
Africa except by special permission, and he 
cannot have visitors from outside this small 
farming reserve except by permission of the 

All three of these matters — the Rivonia trial, 
the 90-day detention clause, and the restrictions 
on Chief Luthuli — have brought many letters 
of protest to our Congressmen and Senators, 
as well as to the executive branch, from both 
individual Americans and organizations. Our 
leading labor and church organizations have 
issued official statements deploring the cycle 
of increasing repression and violence in South 

While our desire — together with our efforts — 
to get the races together in South Africa stems 
from principle and morality, it arises equally 
from a major interest in the security of the 
United States. The hard fact of the matter is 
that the LTnited States has an important in- 
terest in peace and stability everywhere. And 
we have a particular concern in South Africa 
to prevent giving the Communists an oppor- 
tunity for subversion and to prevent the possi- 
bility of setting race against race. 

So, in brief conclusion, the continent of Africa 
is challenged to bring new order in those areas 
where there is adversity. There have been 
troubles and there will be others, but some of 
them have been solved and more than a little 
progress has been made. Despite the preva- 
lence of problems, I am optimistic for the long- 
run future of the continent. 

United States and Panama 
Continue Discussions 

Department Statement 

Press release 291 dated June 23 

Ambassadors [Jorge] lEueca and [Robert 
B.] Anderson annoimced today [June 23] that 
they have been conferring on a continuing basis 
with reference to the procediiral matters in- 
volved in the meetings between the Panamanian 
and United States delegations in order to re- 
solve any differences that might exist between 
the two coimtries.^ 

They are formulating the substantive prob- 
lems which will be the subjects of their pro- 
ceedings. There is a liigh degree of cordiality 
and understanding between the two delegations, 
each appreciating the problems of the other. 
Meetings will continue on a day-to-day basis. 
At such times as there are significant develop- 
ments appropriate news releases will be made 
m order to keep the people of both Republics 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 




The Resurgence of the United Nations Security Council 

iy Joseph J. Sisco 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

As I was scanning a large Midwest news- 
paper recently, a poem caught my eye. It was 
one of those rhymes in which the words have 
been shoehomed into the meter that plague 
most newspaper editors and their readers alike, 
but this one had a ring of reality to it. With 
apologies to lovers of fine literature in the audi- 
ence, I'd like to read it to you now : 

I'm so weary of chaos in Laos 

I'm so weary of fights in Algiers 

I'm so weary of Castro — and all that fiasco 

Of violence, fury and fears. 

I'm gonna go out to my garden 

There contemplate wind, sun and sky 

And good things of earth — that have real worth 

In a world gone so sadly awry. 

Though some will question the merit of this 
little verse as poetry, I doubt whether many of 
us, including the people who have addressed 
you from this platform today, would deny hav- 
ing shared the sentiment at one time or another. 
It has a certain attraction to those of us who 
burn the midnight oil night after night in the 
Department of State, coping with the profu- 
sion of crises that keep popping around the 
globe and which, more likely than not, wind 
up in the United Nations. Every crisis these 
days seems to have a U.N. angle. 

"In the Good Old Days" 

The U.N. used to be largely a seasonal busi- 
ness. Today it's strictly year round. In fact, 
I get the feeling at times that we are somewhat 
in the same fix as the newly successful busi- 
nessman who was questioned by the tax col- 

lector about his earnings for the year. "Young 
man," he said, "I've been so busy making it I 
haven't had time to count it yet !" 

In the early histoiy of the United Nations 
there was an annual lull between sessions of the 
General Assembly and we had time to count 
the crises. But look at what happens now. 

The 18th General Assembly, which ended last 
fall, was a phenomenally busy one. The As- 
sembly considered over 100 items — peacekeep- 
ing, peacemaking, colonial issues, human rights, 
U.N. finances, economic development, and 
others — involving the interests, aspirations, and 
policies of 112 countries. More and more, com- 
mittees of the Assembly are meeting during 
what used to be the off season. 

And there are more international confer- 
ences, too. The U.N. Trade and Development 
Conference of 119 members has just wound up 
a 3-month session. This is only the beguining 
of a dialog between developed and developing 
countries about their economic and trade 

But the most dramatic thing is that we have 
had over 100 sessions of the Security Council 
since last June. There have been very few pe- 
riods in the history of the United Nations when 
the Council has been busier. 

So it's fair to ask just what this frenetic ac- 
tivity is all about and what it means for us as 
Americans. In short, I think it's time to take 
stock, even if, like the businessman, we can't 

' Address made before a Department of State for- 
eign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18. 

JtTLT 13, 1964 


really afford to stop what we're doing to count 
what we've done. 

Council Action During the Past Year 

Since last June the Security Council has con- 
sidered nine major issues. I need hardly re- 
mind you of the outstanding ones; almost by 
definition they are the most intractable and most 
dangerous conflicts around the world. 

Early this year the Security Council estab- 
lished the U.N. Force for Cyprus. This week 
it is meeting to extend the mandate of the Force 
and the mediator for an additional period of 

In April the Council called on the Secretary- 
General to provide assistance to Yemen and the 
United Kingdom, who are having differences 
over the Yemen-Aden border. 

In another series of meetings the Security 
Council focused once again on the Kashmir 
dispute — exhorting the parties to work out their 
differences and to use the third-party help of 
the Secretary-General. 

Just 2 weeks ago the Council established a 
U.N. Commission made up of Brazil, the Ivory 
Coast, and Morocco to look into the Cambodian- 
South Viet-Nam border situation and to come 
up with recommendations within 45 days on 
how to make the poorly defined border more 

And just this week the Council is again air- 
ing the South African apartheid issue.^ 

You might ask: Does all this motion mean 
progress toward a more peaceful world? The 
answer to this question depends on the yardstick 

If by progress we mean long-range solutions 
at one fell swoop, the answer is obviously "no." 
If by progress we mean success in avoiding 
something worse, the answer is just as obviously 

The U.N. Force and the U.N. mediator have 
not provided the final answer to the critical 
Cyprus issue. But the U.N. presence has at 
least helped to keep a lid on the situation so that 
through mediation and the helping hand of in- 

' See p. 64. 

^For background, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, 
p. 1002. 

* Ibid., July 0, 1904, p. 29. 

terested countries a more lasting solution can 
be found without blowing up the eastern Medi- 
terranean world in the process. 

The U.N. coromission dealing with the Cam- 
bodian-South Viet-Nam border cannot be ex- 
pected to solve the difficulties in Southeast Asia. 
But at least it provides a means for the two 
countries to work out useful arrangements re- 
terranean world in the process. 

Kashmir still escapes solution, as it has for 
over a decade. But the Council is a place where 
the parties can talk instead of fight — and where 
they can be pressed to get together and try again 
for a solution. 

The troubles between the United Kingdom 
and Yemen over Aden may not dissolve sud- 
denly. But at least the U.N. is ready to help 
the parties if they desire. 

The Council's action obviously will not end 
apartheid in South Africa. But the Council 
can at least marshal world opinion in favor of 
meaningful consultations between all parties 

This all illustrates that there are no quick 
panaceas in international politics. The long 
and drawn-out problems are toughest both for 
citizen and policymaker. Diplomacy consists 
of tough, day-by-day decisions designed to keep 
conflicts from becoming crises and crises leading 
to incidents and incidents erupting into war ; it 
consists of actions by ourselves or in conjunction 
with allies or within the framework of regional 
or world organizations to seek peaceful resolu- 
tion of threats to the peace and prompt restora- 
tion of peace when it is broken. 

Some of the situations I mentioned are still 
in the headlines ; others have moved to the back 
pages or out of the news altogether. And we 
were involved in each of them — a reflection of 
our position as a world power. 

Why the Resurgence of the Council 

For many years the intended role of the Secu- 
rity Council was hampered by one veto after 
another cast by the Soviet Union. In 1950 it 
became necessary to pass the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution to provide a meclianism for 
the General Assembly to act quickly when the 
Council could not act. Many observers began 
t-o talk of the demise of the Security Coimcil as 



though it had become a vestigial organ, like the 
human appendix. Its current resurgence is 
therefore all the more interesting at tliis time. 

Tliere are good reasons why the Security 
Council is more than ever in the thick of things. 

First, desj^ite the principle of sovereign equal- 
ity among the member states, everyone knows 
that there are very great differences in power 
and influence and responsibility in the worka- 
day world of nations. Tlie framers of the 
charter realized this perfectly well when they 
designed the Security Council and gave it pri- 
mary responsibility for keeping the peace. As 
you know, the five major powers of the postwar 
world were made permanent members and the 
six other members are elected on a rotating basis 
to provide a broad geographic representation. 

So tlie composition of the Security Council 
gives recognition to tlie reality of disparate na- 
tional strengths and assigns major responsibility 
to the major powers — wliich plainly is the way it 
ought to be. 

We face the question of expansion of the 
Council within the next year. With a hundred- 
percent increase m tlie size of the U.N. mem- 
bership since the charter was signed, it is imder- 
standable that the new members consider they 
are not adequately represented on tlie Council. 
Since the suggested increase of the Security 
Council from 11 to 15 would require the first 
charter amendment, it must be viewed m the 
context of the whole constitutional development 
of the United Nations, including the importance 
we attach to the principle of collective financial 

Second, tlie Security Council is small enough 
to make prompt and effective action possible 
and flexible enough to cope with a wide variety 
of peacekeeping problems. In practice the 
Council has approached the cases brought be- 
fore it not from the point of view of rigid legal 
norms — which was one of the characteristic 
failures of the League of Nations — but as the 
highly political body it is, seeking the best 
agreement it can reach by debate, negotiation, 
and compromise — the very stuff of practical 
political action. 

Third, the renewed primacy of the Security 
Council in peacekeeping matters is a reflection 
of the growing realization that maintenance of 
the peace is in the common interest of all U.N. 

members, whatever their ideological and other 
differences may be. It is also a recognition by 
the small powers that in many of the tough 
problems big-power involvement is necessary. 
All but a handful of states committed to mili- 
tant violence are gradually accepting the idea 
that any serious breach of the peace raises the 
danger of ultimate nuclear annihilation, that all 
states therefore share a common interest in 
peaceful resolution of the inevitable disputes 
that will plague the world for a long time to 
come, and that international peacekeeping ma- 
chinery offers a safe and effective way to deal 
with such disputes. 

It is worth noting that since the Lebanese 
crisis in 1958 the Soviet Union has not blocked 
a U.N. peacekeeping operation with a veto. Re- 
gardless of the fundamental differences which 
remain, there seems to be greater recognition of 
the utility of the U.N. as a buffer, as a third 
party which can help avoid big-power confron- 

More than 40 nations already have con- 
tributed troops to the various U.N. peacekeeping 
forces in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo, 
and Cyprus ; and other nations, including espe- 
cially our own, have contributed logistical sup- 
port and other services. 

I do not think it is too much to hope that we 
may be approaching something like an inter- 
national consensus — with the consijicuous ex- 
ception of Communist China — on the need for 
peaceful settlement of disputes among nations 
and on the corollary need for international ma- 
chinery to keep the lid on dangerous situations 
while solutions are being worked out at the 
conference tables. 

This in general is why the United States wel- 
comes the new-foimd vigor and relevance of the 
Security Council and hopes that it will continue 
to play its role as the major instrument of the 
world community for keeping and repairing 
world peace. 

And this is why the United States has sup- 
ported improvements in the peacekeeping ma- 
chinery of the United Nations, why we welcome 
the recent steps by the Canadians, the Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands, and just recently 
by Iran, to earmark troops for U.N. emergency 
service, and why we shall continue to press for 

JTJLT 13, 1964 


adequate planning, training, resources, and fi- 
nancing so that the U.N", can have a flexible 
callup system when forces are needed. The 
peace of the world should never go up in smoke 
and nuclear debris for want of a few thousand 
men or a few million dollars in the nick of time. 
We have, on several occasions, been uncom- 
fortably close to that outrageous predicament 
and do not want it ever to happen again. 

Let me be clear about one other thing. The 
peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations 
is not in any sense a substitute for national de- 
fense capabilities or the regional machinery 
such as the Organization of American States or 
NATO. It is supplementary and complemen- 
tary to national and regional responses to con- 
flict and crisis. 

The Charter of the United Nations explicitly 
confirms the inherent right of all states to na- 
tional defense. The charter also recognizes ex- 
plicitly the competence of regional organiza- 
tions and, in fact, exhorts parties to disputes 
to try to solve them within a regional frame- 
work before bringing them to the Unit«d 

So instead of restricting the options open to 
us in dealing with threats to peace and secu- 
rity — as some people seem to fear — the peace- 
keeping machinery of the United Nations ex- 
tends the range of available options for U.S. 
policy and action. In tliis significant sense, the 
U.N.'s capacity to defend the peace is part of 
our own capacity to defend the peace — an asset 
which is no less valuable to us because it is 
shared with the other members of the U.N. 

The United Nations and Soutlieast Asia 

Now let me turn, finally, to Southeast Asia, 
which concerns all of us these days. 

The U.N. has, in fact, been in business in 
Southeast Asia more than most people think. 

The Security Council overrode Soviet opposi- 
tion and sent a commission to Laos in 1959, 
which helped quiet matters temporarily. 

U Thant's representative has been busy try- 
ing to ease relations between Thailand and 

When some doubted the feelings of people in 
Sabah and Sarawak toward union with 

Malaysia, a U.N. commission sent out a survey 
team and confirmed that they favored it. 

The U.N. worked out and helped administer 
a peaceful solution to the conflict between In- 
donesia and the Netherlands over the former 
colony of Dutch West New Guinea. 

The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East has developed a broad blueprint 
for the Lower Mekong Basin, and some work 
has already been done on projects along the 
tributaries of the Mekong. If the Communists 
would stop their aggression against their South- 
east Asian neighbors, such regional economic 
development schemes could bring great benefits 
to Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and 

The Assembly sent a group this past fall to 
South Viet-Nam to make an impartial inquiry 
into alleged violation of human rights. 

And, as was mentioned previously, the U.N. 
is in business on the Cambodian-South Viet- 
Nam border issue. 

Today we hear criticism that the United Na- 
tions is not doing enough — that it should take 
on the peacekeeping job in that whole troubled 
peninsula that used to be Indochina. 

Wliy isn't the U.N. doing more ? 

This question has to be considered in histori- 
cal context. The recent history of Southeast 
Asia is one of trying to make the Geneva agree- 
ments on Viet-Nam and Laos work the way they 
were supposed to work. 

The military assistance which this Govern- 
ment is giving to the Government of Viet-Nam 
is not an alternative to a political settlement ; it 
is in support of a political settlement reached 
long ago. That settlement lias been violated 
deliberately and systematically by regimes out- 
side the Eepublic of Viet-Nam to the point 
where the independence of Viet-Nam — formally 
guaranteed by the signatories of the Geneva 
agreement — is threatened. 

So there is no question of military action 
versus political settlement; the military action 
that is taking place is to enforce a political set- 
tlement long since reached but long since 
breached by Viet-Nam's northern neiglibors. 
We help the Vietnamese defend themselves 
against armed subversion from the outside to 
prove, once and for all, that aggression simply 



does not pay. As Secretary Eusk said 
recently : ° 

All that is needed to restore peace in Laos and Viet- 
Nam is for the Communists to live up to the agree- 
ments they have already made. All that is needed is 
for the Communists to stop their aggressions, to go 
home, to leave their neighbors alone. 

It is manifest that the members of the U.N. 
would not agree to take this job off our hands 
and let us go away and forget it. Our power 
and determination are needed to persuade the 
Communists that it is in their interest to stop 
aggression and start keeping the promises they 
made at Geneva in 1954 and 1962. If this hap- 
pens, the nations of the area will need inter- 
national help in protecting their independence 
and developing their economies. The U.N. 
might have a role to play here as the situation 

All this suggests, in conclusion, that if the 
United Nations has been busy in recent months, 
it is unlikely to be less busy in the months and 
years ahead. If the Security Council does not 
set a new record for meetings held or crises dealt 
with in each succeeding year, it at least is likely 
to deserve the role of primary peacekeeping 
organ assigned it by the founding fathers. 

And it is in the peacekeeping field that the 
U.N. has best served the interests of the United 
States and the cause of peace. If we are ever 
to have a secure system of world order, it will 
grow from a surer system of settling more and 
more kinds of disputes, in more and more parts 
of the world, without recourse to arms. And 
this, after all, is the purpose — and the prom- 
ise — of a charter the Senate ratified by 89 votes 
to 2, and a United Nations Organization which, 
19 years later, we find increasingly worthy of 
our growing support. 

United States Agrees To Lend 
Brazil $50 Million 

U.S./U-N. press release 4420 dated June 24 

The United States and Brazil on June 24 
signed an Alliance for Progi'ess agreement 
under which the United States will loan Brazil 

' Ibid., June 8, 1964, p. 886. 

$50 million in support of that nation's program 
of stabilization, development, and reform. 
The loan, from the U.S. Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, provides for repayment 
over 40 years, including a 10-year grace period. 
Interest is at % percent during the grace 
period and 2 percent per year during the 
remaining 30 years. 

The signing of the agreement took place in 
New York, due to the presence there of U.S. 
and Brazilian officials. 

The loan is additional to understandings now 
being reached for the financing of various spe- 
cific projects designed to promote the economic 
development and social progress of the Brazil- 
ian peojDle, and supplements the supply of U.S. 
agricultural products to Brazil under the Food 
for Peace program. 

Brazil also expects to obtain debt relief 
through negotiations taking place in Paris with 
the United States, Japan, and European credi- 
tors. Such negotiations are expected to be con- 
cluded in the near future. 

The $50 million loan wiU be used so as to gen- 
erate a cruzeiro counterpart which can be used 
for noninflationary financing of basic activi- 
ties such as maintaining the expanding employ- 
ment and increasing agricultural productivity. 
Specifically, these counterpart funds will be 
used predominantly to finance low-cost hous- 
ing, for working capital for industry, and to 
expand agricultural credit for medium and 
small farmers, who have limited access to the 
credit market. 

Within the spirit of the Charter of Punta del 
Este, the Brazilian Government is formulating 
a comprehensive program of development, sta- 
bilization, and reform which can serve as a basis 
for later discussions with international institu- 
tions and the governments of the United States 
and other friendly countries of Brazilian needs 
for external assistance. 

A number of measures in line with the objec- 
tives of development, stabilization, and reform 
have already been taken, such as those designed 
to reduce the budgetary deficit, to increase for- 
eign exchange earnings, to expand private in- 
vestment, to institute a large-scale program of 
low-cost housing, and to increase agricultural 

JTTLT 13, 1964 


U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint 
Study on Desalting of Sea Water 

Statement hy President Johnson ^ 

I am happy to announce that the United 
States and the Soviet Union have agreed to ex- 
plore the possibility of scientific cooperation on 
methods of desalting sea water, including the 
possible use of nuclear power. As an initial 
step, the meeting of U.S. and So^'iet representa- 
tives will be held in Washington on July 14 
and 15 of this year. The purpose of the initial 
meeting will be, first, to discuss the general 
problem of desalting; two, to i-eview the present 
activities and plans of the two coimtries in this 
area; three, to consider possible areas of coop- 
eration. The representatives will then advise 
their respective governments as to the best way 
to proceed. 

The chairman of the U.S. delegation will be 
Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the 
President for Science and Technology. He 
succeeded Dr. Jerome Wiesner. The U.S. dele- 
gation will also include representatives of the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. 
Department of the Interior. 

I hope that this meeting will lead to effective 
scientific cooperation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union and what could become a 
very important activity of great economic sig- 
nificance to many areas of the world. 

Attorney General To Administer 
Austrian Assets Agreement 

Desiqnatino the Attobney General as the Officer 


Austrian Assets Agreement of January 30, 1959 
Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me 
by Article I of the Agreement entitled "Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Repub- 
lic of Austria Regarding the Return of Austrian Prop- 
erty, Rights and Interests," which was signed at 
Washington on January 30, 1959,^ and was ratified by 

the United States on March 4, 1964, pursuant to the 
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States 
on February 25, 1964, I hereby designate the Attorney 
General of the United States as the officer authorized 
to administer and give effect to the provisions of that 

The Attorney General is authorized to delegate any 
of the functions conferred upon him by this order 
to any ofiicer or employee of the Department of Justice. 

As used in this order, the term "functions" includes 
duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and 

The White House, 
June 22, 196Jt. 

U.S. and New Zealand Sign 
Air Transport Agreement 

Press release 293 dated June 24 

The United States and New Zealand on 
June 24 signed a bilateral air transport serv- 
ices agreement in Wellington. The agreement, 
which was initialed ad referendum on March 11, 
1964,^ was signed on behalf of their Govern- 
ments by K. J. Holyoake, Prime Minister of 
New Zealand, and Herbert B. Powell, United 
States Ambassador to New Zealand. 

The new agreement replaces the 1946 air 
transport services agreement between the 
United States and New Zealand.^ In addition 
to bringing up to date several articles of the 
1946 agreement, the new agreement incorporates 
certain amendments to the routes which were 
exchanged between New Zealand and the 
United States in 1946. The routes agreed upon 
will permit an airline designated by New 
Zealand to operate to Los Angeles via the So- 
ciety Islands or via Honolulu, and to operate 
the "Coral Route" in the South Pacific via 
American Samoa. The United States airline 
will be able to operate to and beyond Auckland 
and Christchurch via, inter alia, the Society- 

'Read by the President at his news conference on 
June 23. 
" No. 11158 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 7981. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5577^ 
'For background, see Buixetin of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1573^ 

4645, 4789, 5085, and 5374. 



U.S.-Japan Science Committee 
Concludes Fourth Meeting 

The United States-J a-pan Committee on 
Scientific Cooperation met at Washington, D.C., 
June 23-26. Following are an announcement 
of the meeting, remarks made hy Secretary Ru,sk 
hefore the Committee on June 23, and the text 
of a joint communique released at the close of 
the meeting on June 26. 


Tlie Department of State announced on June 
22 (press release 289) that the United States- 
Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation 
would hold its fourth series of meetings at 
Washington, D.C., June 23-26.^ The Commit- 
tee, composed of distinguished scientific leaders 
of the two countries, advises the respective Gov- 
ernments on ways of strengthening cooperation 
between the United States and Japan. At its 
forthcoming meeting, the Committee will study 
a report from the two Governments on the 
status of the cooperative science program con- 
ducted under its aegis. It will consider possible 
new areas of scientific cooperation. The Com- 
mittee is also expected to discuss ways in which 
the scientists of both countries can combine their 
knowledge and efforts in research which could 
lead toward prediction of the time and place of 
earthquakes and tidal waves, problems of vital 
importance to both Japan and the United States. 

The United States-Japan Committee on 
Scientific Cooperation is one of three high-level 
U.S.-Japan consultative bodies which Prime 
Minister Ikeda of Japan and President Ken- 
nedy, during Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to 
Washington in Jime 1961, agreed to establish 
to strengthen the partnership between the 
United States and Japan.- The other commit- 
tees are the Cabinet-level Joint United States- 
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af- 
fairs and the United States-Japan Conference 
on Cultural and Educational Interchange. 

^ For names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese 
delegations, see Department of State press release 289 
dated June 22. 

' For text of a joint communique, see Bulletin of 
July 10, 1961, p. 57. 

The Committee on Scientific Cooperation has 
held three meetings to date : December 1961 in 
Tokyo, May 1962 in Washington,^ and May 
1963 in Tokyo. The Committee and its co- 
operative science program, administered on the 
United States side by the National Science 
Foundation, has already achieved scientific co- 
operation of benefit to both countries. The 
Committee has concentrated on the promotion 
of the exchange of scholars and scientific in- 
formation and materials, and the encourage- 
ment of joint research projects in specified 
scientific areas. These areas include: earth 
sciences of the Pacific area, animal and plant 
geography and ecology of the Pacific area, 
medical sciences, and hurricanes and typhoons. 
Geophysical studies of Pacific volcanoes and 
deep-sea seismic studies are among the coopera- 
tive research projects initiated to date. Japa- 
nese and American scientists have also met to 
discuss such subjects of common concern as can- 
cer chemotherapy and education in the sciences. 


I have the liveliest personal interest in the 
work of this joint Committee on Scientific Co- 
operation. I am very pleased to be with you 
at this fourth joint session of the U.S.-Japan 
Committee on Scientific Cooperation. I have 
just this moment left President Johnson, who 
asked me to extend to you his personal greetings 
on behalf of the U.S. Government. For me it 
is a special pleasure to see a number of old 
friends. In a former capacity I enjoyed many 
close associations in the scientific community 
both in the U.S. and Japan. 

Wlien they met in June 1961, Prime Minister 
Ikeda and the late President Kennedy agreed 
on the importance of a closer relationship be- 
tween our two countries especially in the fields 
of economic, cultural, and scientific affairs. 
Both Prime Minister Ikeda and President 
Kennedy felt that each of us had a great deal 
to do for each other, that we have much to learn 
from each other. 

' For texts of joint communiques Issued at the close 
of the first and second meetings, see ibid., Jan. 8, 1962, 
p. 66, and June 11, 1962, p. 954. 

JTXLT 13, 1964 


President Johnson is dedicated to that same 
objective. One of his first decisions as Presi- 
dent was to ask Prime Minister Ikeda to re- 
schedule the third meeting of the U.S.-Japan 
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 
postponed by the tragic event of last November 
while the American delegation was en route 
over the Pacific. This was done in spite of the 
heavy pressures of legislative demands upon 
both your Cabinet and upon ours.* As I said 
in Tokyo in January,^ notliing can testify better 
to the reality of the partnership that exists be- 
tween our two countries. That partnership is 
rooted in common interests and purposes and 

The efforts of this Committee have been 
watched with a great deal of interest by both 
Governments. In the short space of less than 3 
years your discussions and recommendations 
have underlined the importance of scientific re- 
search to national development. It was the 
marriage of education with research and ex- 
perimentation that explained the dramatic de- 
velopment of our own country in the past 50 
years. So both our countries, as well as many 
others, have a strong practical interest in your 
efforts to develop means, for example, of pre- 
dicting the time and place of earthquakes and 
tidal waves. You have f oimd many other areas 
of useful cooperation, and we are confident you 
will find still others. 

Our Governments realize this partnership 
that exists between us should not be exclusive or 
narrow. For they know neither of our coim- 
tries can achieve enduring prosperity and peace 
apart from the rest of the world. Among our 
most common interests is that of building a de- 
cent world order. This includes, among other 
things, helping the developing countries to 
modernize their economic and social systems. 
For men everywhere have come to believe that 
modern science and teclinology can make pos- 
sible a decent standard of living for all. That 
reliance is important because in the next two or 
three decades we shall discover whether science 

' For text of a joint communique releiised at the 
close of the third meeting of the Joint United States- 
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, see 
ma., Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235. 

»/6i(?., p. 230. 

and teclinology can provide an answer which in 
the past has been provided by aggression, in- 
vasion, the taking of resources from other 
peoples. Neither stability nor moral satisfac- 
tion is to be found in a world which is divided 
between a few rich and very many poor. 

So your Committee has great responsibilities 
and great opportunities. It is a genuine pleas- 
ure to have you with us once again, and I wish 
you continuing success in extending cooperation 
in science between our two coimtries. To the 
extent that we can do so, we spin the infinity 
of threads that bind people together and 
remind ourselves that, despite our trivial 
differences, frail man, confronted with a some- 
times hostile physical universe, is boimd to- 
gether more importantly by the fact of his 
humanity than he is separated by the emotions 
and the fears among men themselves. So this 
is the great prospect; this is the great vision 
which scientific cooperation can meet. It cuts 
across ideological lines. 

Just today we have announced cooperation 
with the Soviet Union on the desalination of 
sea water.^ One-third of our own country 
needs advances in this field. International co- 
operation, certainly, is needed because it is time 
for man to think of himself as man and to 
try to cooperate witliin the family of man. It 
is too late to take another view. We cannot 
afford to consult our historical fears, our am- 
bitions, our appetites. We must think of our- 
selves as men. 


The fourth meeting of the United States-Japan 
Committee on Scientific Cooperation was held at the 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 23-26, 
1964. Dr. Harry C. Kelly. Head of the United States 
Delegation, and Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, Head of the 
Japanese Delegation, served as Co-Chairmen of the 

The Committee expressed its confidence that the 
joint enterprises undertaken by scientists of the two 
nations during the past three years have established 
a firm basis for exjianding scientific cooperation be- 
tween the United States and Japan. The work already 
underway shows that international cooperation in the 
sciences contributes not alone to the advance of knowl- 

' See p. 60. 



edge but also to the improvement of understanding 
among nations and the attainment of world i)eace. 

The Committee received reports from panels in each 
of the seven areas of cooperation and agreed to trans- 
mit several of the recommendations to their govern- 
ments. The names of Panels serving the seven areas 
in which activity has been sponsored by the Committee 
for the past three years are : 

(1) Exchange of Scholars. 

(2) Exchange of Scientific and Technical Informa- 
tion and Materials. 

(3) Earth Sciences of the Pacific Area. 

(4) Animal and Plant Geography and Ecology of 
the Pacific Area. ( The name of this Panel was changed 
to "Biological Sciences"). 

(5) Medical Sciences. 

(6) Education in the Sciences. 

(7) Hurricane and Typhoon Research. 

As an addition to the joint research projects already 
underway, the Committee agreed to recommend to the 
respective governments that drug abuse be designated 
an appropriate field for joint research in the area of 
the medical sciences, since the abuse of drugs is a 
growing problem in both countries, and its pattern in 
the U.S. and Japan has certain features in common, 
differing from that in many other countries. 

The next meeting of the Committee will be held in 
Tokyo in June, 1965. 

Captive Nations Week, 1964 


Wheeeas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 
(73 Stat. 212) authorizes and requests the President of 
the United States of America to issue a proclamation 
each year designating the third week in July as "Cap- 
tive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and 
independence shall have been achieved for all the 
captive nations of the world ; and 

Whereas the cause of human rights and personal 
dignity remains a universal a.spiration ; and 

Whereas this nation is firmly committed to the 
cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and 

Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to 
the people of the captive nations the support of the 
Government and the people of the United States of 
America for their just aspirations : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby designate 
the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations 

I invite the people of the United States of America 
to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and 
activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion 

to the just aspirations of aU people for national inde- 
pendence and human liberty. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this eighteenth day 

of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hun- 

[seal] dred and sixty-four, and of the Independence 

of the United States of America the one 

hundred and eighty-eighth. 


By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

President Asks for Tariff Study 
on Stainless Steel Flatware 

White House press release dated June 23 

The President on June 23 requested the 
Tariff Commission to begin an investigation 
for the purpose of advising him on the probable 
economic effects of a change in special tariff re- 
strictions on imports of stainless steel table flat- 

The restrictions on stainless steel flatware 
were first imposed on November 1, 1959,^ after 
an escape-clause investigation established the 
need for such action. Tlie situation in the in- 
dustry has since been reviewed each year by the 
Commission, the most recent review having 
been completed in the fall of 1963 under the 
provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
The act also provides, in section 351(d) (2), for 
a full-scale review of the probable economic 
effect of the "reduction or termination" of re- 
strictions should the President or the Tariff 
Commission call for one. 

The Commission's annual review indicated 
that there have been improvements in domestic 
production and sales of stainless steel flatware 
since the escape-clause action went into effect, 
and that in the same period imports have been 
reduced to about half their previous volume. 

The President, in referring the case to the 
Tariff Commission, annoimced that the Com- 

' No. 3594 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 7971. 

' Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1959, p. 727. 

JULY 13, 1964 


mission's annual review had been submitted to 
him by his Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, Christian A. Herter, and was ac- 
companied by the views of the interagency 
committees responsible to Governor Herter's 


Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Food for Peace : Nineteenth Semiannual Report on Ac- 
tivities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Con- 
gress, as Amended, Outlining Operations Under the 

Act During the Period July 1 Through December 31, 

196.3. H. Doc. 204. Undated. 139 pp. 
Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council 

on International Monetary and Financial Problems 

During the Period January 1-June 30, 1963. H. 

Doc. 297. April 14, 1964. 90 pp. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502. 

Part VII (including appendix and index). May 

5-6, 1964. 180 pp. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Report of the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 11380. H. Rept 

1443. June 1, 1964. 75 pp. 
Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Report on 

hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Rept. 1442. 

June 1, 1964. 19 pp. 
Establishing the Roosevelt Campobello International 

Parli. Report to accompany H.R. 9740. H. Rept. 

1466. June 9, 1964. 12 pp. 
Ninth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, June 11, 

1964. Report of the United States House delegation 

to the conference held in Paris, November 4-8, 1963. 

H. Rept. 1478. June 11, 1964. 51 pp. 
Aircraft Engines. Report to accompany H.R. 1608. 

S. Rept. 1081. June 16, 1964. 3 pp. 
Certain Wools. Report to accompany H.R. 2652. S. 

Rept. 1082. June 16, 1964. 3 pp. 
Instant Coffee. Report to accompany H.R. 4198. S. 

Rept. 1084. June 16, 1964. 4 pp. 
Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 7480. S. 

Rept. 1085. June 16, 1064. 3 pp. 
Double Taxation of Certain Tobacco Products. Report 

to accompany H.R. 8268. S. Rept. 1086. June 16, 

1964. 5 pp. 
Certain Particleboard. Report to accompany H.R. 

8975. S. Rept. 10S7. June 16, 1964. 3 pp. 
Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 10463. S. 

Rept. 1089. June 16, 1964. 5 pp. 
Temporary Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From 

Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H.R. 

10466. S. Rept. 1091. 5 pp. 
Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 

10468. S. Rept. 1092. June 16, 1964. 2 pp. 
Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 

10.537. S. Rept. 1093. June 16, 1964. 3 pp. 
Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 

9311. S. Rept. 1094. June 16, 1964. 3 pp. 
Roosevelt Campobello International Park. Report to 

accompany S. 2464. S. Rept. 1097. June 19, 1964. 

12 pp. 

Security Council Votes Extension 
of Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 

Following is a statement made hy U.S. Repre- 
sentative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council on June 19^ together ivith the text 
of a resolution adopted unanimously hy the 
Council on June 20. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4417 dated June 19 

Before proceeding to tlie substance of my re- 
marks, may I first express the appreciation of 
my Government to tlie Secretary-General for 
his statesmanlike efforts in behalf of peace in 
the Eastern Mediterranean during these past 
few montlis. Tlie recruitment and deployment 
in Cyprus of a peacekeeping force of between 
six and seven thousand men with all of the at- 
tendant problems of negotiations, logistics, 
headquarters, staffing, command arrangements, 
and force directives is an operation of consid- 
erable magnitude and difficulty. The United 
Nations has met this test in a manner worthy 
of its best traditions. In mounting tliis peace- 
keeping operation and in the selection of per- 
sonnel to direct the operation in the field, the 
Secretary-General has once again demonstrated 
his instinct for finding the right man for the 

General [P. S.] Gyani, Commander of the 
United Nations Force, and General [R. M. P.] 
Carver, his deputy, have been both skillful and 
patient in dealing with the complex and frus- 
trating problems which the United Nations 
Force has encountered. We are hopeful that 
General [K. S.] Thimayya, a distinguished 
compatriot of General Gyani and for whom we 
have the highest regard, will find it possible 
to respond favorably to the Secretary-General's 
request that he replace General Gyani, who we 
understand finds it necessary to leave Cyprus. 



The Secretaiy-General's Special Representa- 
tive, Seiior Galo Plaza, has labored with ex- 
traordinary energy, dedication, and quick gi-asp 
of the situation to resolve some of its most dif- 
ficult aspects. Also in response to the resolu- 
tion that we adopted on March 4,' the Secretary- 
General designated a distinguished Finnish 
diplomat. Ambassador Sakari Tuomioja, who 
continues his patient efforts to find a peaceful 
solution and an agreed settlement of the political 
problem confronting Cyprus. For his success, 
as we have so often repeated, restoration of 
tranquil conditions on the island is imperative. 
For this reason particularly, we all owe a debt 
of gi-atitude to those states — Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zea- 
land, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — whose 
soldiers and police make up the United Nations 
peacekeeping force. Without their persever- 
ance there would be little hope for a return to 
law and order, for improvement in the relations 
between the communities, and for an ultimate 
solution of the conflict in the interest of world 

But the United Nations Force has made prog- 
ress since it became operational about 3 months 
ago. There have been encouraging forward 
steps — eliminating fortifications, arrangements 
for harvesting the crops, and so forth — in the 
implementation of the program outlined in the 
Secretai-y-General's April 29 report.^ Never- 
theless it is clear, as the Secretary-General has 
stated in his rei:)ort to us of June 15,^ that the 
withdrawal of the Force at this time would lead 
to an early resumption of the fighting, which 
might well develop into a still more serious con- 
flict. With the mandate to restore normal con- 
ditions uncompleted, my Government believes 
that the first order of business in this Council 
is to assure an extension of the United Nations 
Force in the island. For this reason we heart- 
ily support the resolution placed before the 
Comicil by the distinguished representative of 
Brazil. I tliink it is clear that whatever short- 
coming may exist in the mandate of the Force, 
it is unlikely that we could agi-ee at this time 
on any changes in the balanced resolution so 
laboriously constructed in February. 

^ For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 19C4, p. 466. 
"^ U.N. doc. S/56T1 and Corr. 1. 
' U.N. doc. S/5764 and Oorr. 1. 

The mandate of the Force permits it to take 
firm action where necessary. And it is heart- 
ening to note that with increasing firmness the 
fighting has subsided. For example, with re- 
spect to the situation in the Kyrenia Pass area, 
the Secretary-General's report states: 

Although better armed with heavy weapons and 
In greater numerical strength, there are no signs of the 
Greek Oypriots resuming their attaclis in the St. Hila- 
rion area, and the location of permanent UNFICYP 
posts with the forward troops of both sides has clearly 
acted as a deterrent to any positive offensive action. 

In the light of recent incidents which have en- 
dangered the lives of men of the Force, it has been 
made clear to both sides that a repetition of such 
incidents will result in the removal of any post used 
as a base for fire against troops of UNFICYP, u.sing 
force if necessary after due warning has been given. 

Mr. President, we applaud such resolute pur- 
pose, and we believe that continued vigorous 
implementation of the mandate will contribute 
more and more to law and order if — and I 
emphasize if — the parties will avoid further 
acts and utterances that aggravate the fears and 

In this connection we find the increased im- 
portation of arms most serious. The greater 
the quantity of arms wielded by the two sides, 
the more difficult is the task of the peacekeepers. 
The Secretary-General has expressed his grave 
concern on that score in his report. The units 
in the Force and the Force Commander have 
done likewise. On May 28, 1 remind the Coim- 
cil, General Gyani stated : 

One of the major obstacles in the way of the United 
Nations force is the irresponsible and senseless con- 
duct of armed men of both communities who do not 
appear to have any discipline or to be responsible to 
any established authority, but have been acting on 
their own reckless initiative, regardless of the un- 
fortunate and serious consequences of their acts. Too 
many unauthorized people in Cyprus are carrying too 
many weapons. In the hands of these thoughtless and 
irresponsible elements these weapons become a major 
factor in the delay in a return to normal life. It is 
absolutely essential that these elements of the popu- 
lation, both Greek Cypriote and Turk Cypriote, should 
be restrained and disciplined and their weapons re- 
moved from them. Until such action is taken, violence 
and a sense of insecurity will necessarily pervade the 
country and the tasks of the United Nations will be 
correspondingly made more difficult and its chances of 
success limited. 

Mr. President, I welcome the statement by 


the representative of the Soviet Union here this 
afternoon that weapons do not help in the solu- 
tion of conflicts. 

We believe that the competitive inflow of 
arms into Cyprus aggravates the tension be- 
tween the two communities in the island, a ten- 
sion which is reflected at the very center of gov- 
ernmental decisionmaking. The two elements 
of the Government, whose cooperation is the 
very basis of the nation's constitution, are not 
acting together and are presenting the United 
Nations and its members not only with danger- 
ous military possibilities but with bafiling legal 
and political problems. 

As to whether pai-ticular actions by public 
oflScials or governmental bodies relating to con- 
scription or to arms importation are constitu- 
tional, it seems to us it is not for us or any organ 
of the United Nations to decide. But it is all 
too clear that, whatever may be the constitu- 
tional situation, the importation of arms into 
an island already stuffed with armament, and 
the raising of armed forces beyond original in- 
tention or current requirements by anyone, are 
clearly contrary to the letter and the intent of 
the Security Coimcil resolution of March 4. 
The Secretary-General himself raises a ques- 
tion about these actions ; and, in our view, they 
are more than questionable. Wliether from the 
standpoint of internal security in Cyprus or 
United Nations responsibility there, those ac- 
tions are certahily of dubious legality, unhelp- 
ful and unwise. 

The United Nations Force, in order to succeed 
in implementing its mandate, must have the full 
cooperation of the two communities in Cyprus. 
And in this connection we are deeply shocked 
over the practice of taking hostages and par- 
ticularly the incident involving the apparent 
abduction and disappearance of members of the 
United Nations Force. 

If the United Nations is to pacify Cyprus, 
it must have much greater cooperation from 
the two communities — cooperation not just in 
the fields included in the program the Secre- 
tary-General outlined in his report of April 29, 
but cooperation to stop the increase of arma- 
ments on the island. 

This applies also to all members of the 
United Nations, as operative paragraph 1 of the 
March 4 resolution makes clear in these words : 

Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with I 
their obligations under the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, to refrain from any action or threat of action 
likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Re- 
public of Cyprus, or to endanger international 
peace. . . . 

This responsibility applies, we believe, par- 
ticularly to the parties to the international 
agreements with respect to Cyprus. For this 
reason a favorable atmosphere for the work of 
the United Nations, both of its force on Cyprus 
and its mediator, requires that all states, and 
these states in particular, refrain from any type 
of military action, support, or supply which 
adds to tension on the island. 

We have heard, Mr. President, the charges 
by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cy- 
prus [Spyros Kyprianou] that the threat of 
military intervention by Turkey is the basic 
cause of tension and violence in the island. We 
have heard, on the other hand, the charges by 
the distinguished representative of Turkey 
[Orhan Eralp] that continued armed attacks 
by Greek Cypriots on Turkish Cypriots and 
unconstitutional action by President Makarios 
and his Government in conscripting new forces 
and in seeking heavy arms abroad are what 
threaten peace and provoke possible interven- 
tion. It is not our purpose, nor is it feasible 
for the Security Council at this time, to sift all 
of these charges and to discover the truth. 
There is doubtless truth on both sides. It is 
inescapably clear, however, that the actions 
of each party cited by the other are in fact 
creating mistrust and fear, undermining rather 
than building confidence between the two com- 
munities, making infinitely more difficidt a just 
and final solution, and, indeed, threatening not 
only to raise to appalling proportions the con- 
flict in Cyprus but even to destroy peace in the 
Eastern INIediterranean. 

Mr. President, these dire eventualities must 
not occur. This is the obligation of the United 
Nations peacekeeping force, and most pai'ticu- 
larly this is the responsibility of the parties di- 
rectly concerned. Wo appeal to them that, 
rather than leveling bitter charges against each 
other, they consider prayerfully what each can 
himself do to lower tension and to restore con- 
fidence. It is never too late for magnanimity, 
and ultimately it is only by magnanimity and 



mutual concession that this grievous problem 
will be resolved. 

It is not for my Government to say what that 
solution should be. We do believe, however, 
that the parties should take steps without de- 
lay which can set the stage for a negotiated 
solution acceptable to all concerned. We do not 
expect a solution can be reached without con- 
cessions and sacrifices or that it can be entirely 
satisfactory to either side, but a solution must 
be found. It should be lasting, just, and with- 
out humiliation to any of those concerned. The 
process of achieving such a solution must begin 
and without delay. The first and most urgent 
step, it seems to us, is the passage of the resolu- 
tion before us. 

Before concluding, Mr. President, I should 
like to caU to the Council's attention para- 
graphs 126 and 127 of the Secretary-General's 
report, in which he notes that financial pledges 
have been received sufficient to cover the cost 
of the first 3 months of the United Nations 
Force operation, but that more than $7 million 
in additional pledges will be required to cover 
the cost of a further 3 months. Mr. President, 
only a relatively small number of coimtries — 
some 20 to date — have carried the financial bur- 
den of supporting the United Nations operation 
in Cyprus. My Government, in response to the 
Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary con- 
tributions, pledged $2 million toward the cost 
of the first 3 months' operation, and it also 
transported most of the United Nations con- 
tingents to Cyprus at no cost to this organiza- 

The maintenance of international peace and 
security is set foith in article 1 of the Charter 
of the United Nations as its first purpose. 
Wlien peace is threatened anywhere, it should 
certainly be the concern of all members of this 
organization. I would, therefore, appeal ur- 
gently to all members to respond to the request 
of the Secretary-General so that the success of 
this operation on Cyprus may not in any way 
be prejudiced by lack of financial support. 

Finally, Mr. President, in view of the critical 
situation, we hope that the Council will proceed 
to vote as quickly as possible on the joint draft 
resolution now before us so as to give the Secre- 
tary-General adequate time to make the nec- 

essary administrative, financial, and other 
arrangements for the extension of the United 
Nations Force on Cyprus. 


The Security Council, 

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General 
(S/5764) considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the 
Security Council resolution of 4 March 19&i (S/5575) 
for an additional period of three months to be useful 
and advisable, 

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Secretary- 
General for his efforts in the implementation of the 
Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 
13 March 1964,= 

Expressing its deep appreciation to the States that 
have contributed troops, police, supplies and finan- 
cial support for the implementation of the Security 
Council resolution of 4 March 1964, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 
13 March 1964 ; 

2. Calls vpon all Member States to comply with the 
above-mentioned resolutions ; 

3. Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General 
(S/5764) ; 

4. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the 
Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an 
additional period of three months, ending 26 Septem- 
ber 1964 (S/5575). 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

International Labor Conference 

The Department of State announced on 
June 25 (press release 296) that the United 
States would be represented by the following 
tripartite delegation at the 48th session of the 
International Labor Conference at Geneva, 
June 17-July 9.^ 
Repeesenting the Government of the United States 


George L-P "Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
International Affairs 

' U.N. doc. S/5778 ; adopted unanimously on June 20. 

' U.N. doc. S/5603. 

^ For names of the advisers to the tripartite delega- 
tion, see Department of State press release 296 dated 
June 25. 

JULY 13, 1964 


George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of State 

Substitute Delegates 

John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

Roger W. Tubby, Ambassador, U.S. Mission, Geneva 

Congressional Advisers 

Kenneth Keating, U.S. Senate 

Bobert P. Griffin, House of Representatives 

Alternate Congressional Advisers 
Albert H. Quie, House of Representatives 
Adam Clayton Powell, House of Representatives 
James Roosevelt, House of Representatives 

Representing the Employers of the United States 


Richard Wagner, Chairman of the Executive Commit- 
tee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Vice Chairman 
of the Board, Champlin Oil and Refining Co., 
Chicago, 111. 

Representing the Workers of the United States 

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, Inter- 
national Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C. 

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz is at- 
tending the meeting as a "visiting minister." 

These annual meetings have as their purpose 
the discussion of means of improving working 
conditions and Labor standards throughout the 
world. At this year's conference special atten- 
tion will be focused on proposals to amend the 
ILO constitution so as to provide for suspension 
of countries found by the United Nations to be 
pursuing a declared policy of racial discrimina- 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
listed ielmo) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed, publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Cambodia-South Viet-Nam Border Dispute: Letters 
from the representative of Cambodia : S/5728, June 2, 
1964, 5 pp.; S/5765, June 1.5, 1965, 2 pp.; S/5770, 
June 17, 1964, 1 p. Note of President of the Se- 
curity Council designating members of Committee 

of Experts, S/5749, June 5, 1964, 1 p. Letter from 
the representative of United Kingdom, 8/5777, 
June 19, 1964, 2 pp. 

Letters from the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey 
on the Cyprus dispute : S/5740, June 3, 1964, 3 pp. ; 
S/5743, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5744, June 5, 1964, 
4 pp. ; S/5746, June 5, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5747, June 5, 
1964, 2 pp.; S/5748, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5753, 
June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5754, June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; 
8/5755, June 8, 1964. 3 pp.; S/5762, June 10, 1964, 
2 pp. ; S/5766, June 15, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5768, June 16, 
1964, 3 pp.; S/5774, June 18, 1964, 6 pp.; S/5779, 
June 22, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5781, June 23, 1964, 3 pp. 

Reports by the Secretary-General on the United Na- 
tions Operation in Cyprus: S/5764, June 15, 1964, 
40 pp. and map ; S/5764/Corr. 1, June 16, 1964, 1 p. ; 
S/5764/Add. 1, June 19, 1964, 2 pp. 

Letters and report on question of apartheid in South 
Africa: S/574.5, June 5, 1964, 1 p.; S/5658/Add. 3, 
June 8, 1964, 5 pp. ; S/5757, June 9, 1964, 1 p. ; S/5759, 
June 9, 1964, 1 p. 

Letters from the representatives of Haiti and the Do- 
minican Republic on border incidents : S/5750, 
June 8, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5750, June 9, 1964, 1 p.; 
S/5763, June 10, 1964, 1 p. 

General Assembly 

Report on the Implementation of the Current Pro- 
gramme for 1963 (Including the Complementary As- 
sistance Programme and Other Projects), submitted 
by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 
A/AC.96/229. April 15, 1964. 48 pp. 

Note on the Situation of Refugees in Nepal submitted 
by the High Commissioner. A/AC.96/241. May 4, 
1964. 10 pp. 

International Law Commission. Report on the Sixth 
Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee (Cairo, February-March 1964) by 
Bduardo Jimtoez de Ar^chaga, Observer for the 
Commission. A/CN.4/172. May 11, 1964. 20 pp. 

Measures To Implement the United Nations Declara- 
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. Report of the Secretary-General. 
A/5698. June 8, 1964. 39 pp. 

Opening Date of the Nineteenth Regular Session of 
the General Assembly (November 10, 1964). Note 
by the Secretary-General. A/5708. June 15, 19(54. 
5 pp. 

Letter dated June 3, 1964, from the representative of 
Kuwait to the Secretary-General on the Question of 
Aden. A/AC.109/83. June 17, 1964. 3 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Economic Commission for Latin America. Social De- 
velopment of Latin America in the Postwar Period. 
E/CN.12/600. April 15, 1964. 169 pp. 

Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Structure 
and Activities of the United Nations and the Spe- 
cialized Agencies in Schools and Other Educational 
Institutions of Member States. Report of the Secre- 
tarv-General and the Director-General of UNESCO, 
E/3S75, April 15, 1964, 266 pp., and Corr. 1, May 27, 
1964, 8 pp. 

Social Commission. Report on the World Social Situ- 
ation : Planning for balanced social and economic 
development in the United Arab Republic. E/CN.5/ 
346/Add. 10. April 24, 1964. 62 pp. 




Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards. Signed 
at Vienna June 15, 1964. Enters into force on the 
date on which the Agency accepts the initial inven- 
tory of materials, equipment, and facilities which 
are within the scope of the Agency safeguard system. 
Signatures: Greece, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 

Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964. 


International air services transit agreement. Done at 

Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for 

the United States February S, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 

Acceptance deposited: Somali Republic, June 10, 


Load Line 

International load line convention. Done at London 
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 
47 Stat. 2228. 
Accession deposited: Algeria, April 11, 1964. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of 
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu- 
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914, 
for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 

Notification received that it considers itself iound: 
Rwanda, May 5, 1964. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the International Convention of Febru- 
ary 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at 
Washington July 15, 1963.' 
Ratification advised hy the Senate: June 23, 1964. 

Safety of Life at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, I960.' 
Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, June 11, 



Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as 
amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, 4694, 5128), for co- 
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Washington June 22, 19(>4. Enters into 
force on the date on which each Government shall 
have received from the other written notification 
that it has complied with all statutory and consti- 
tutional requirements for entry into force. 


Protocol supplementing convention of February 20, 
1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance of double tax- 
ation and prevention of fiscal evasion of taxes on 
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Athens Febru- 
ary 12, 1964.' 
Ratificatimi advised hy the Senate: June 23, 1964. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Agreement for the application of safeguards to United 
States reactor facilities. Signed at Vienna June 15, 
1964. Enters into force on the date on which the 
Agency accepts the initial inventory of facilities 
and materials to be placed under Agency safeguards. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington June 23, 1964. Entered into force June 
23, 1964. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of March 18, 1964 (TIAS 5547). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Seoul June 15, 1964. En- 
tered into force June 15, 19(34. 

New Zealand 

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Welling- 
ton June 24, 1964. Entered into force June 24, 1964. 

Air transport services agreement of December 3, 1946, 
as supplemented (TIAS 1573, 4645, 4789, 5085, 5374). 
Terminated: June 24, 1964 (replaced by agreement 
of June 24, 1964, supra). 


Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in 
cotton textiles of July 16, 1963 (TIAS 5427). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington June 15 
and 17, 1964. Entered into force June 17, 1964. 


' Not in force. 

* With a declaration. 


Robert C. Creel as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs, effective June 24. (For biographic 
details, see Department of State press release 295 
dated June 26.) 

JULY 13, 1064 



Recent Releases 

For sale iy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 201,02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, ichich 
viay ie obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington D.C., 20520. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Peru. 
Signed at Lima February 13, 1964. Entered into 
force February 13, 1964. With excliange of notes. 
TIAS .5539. 17 pp. 100. 

Education— Educational Foundation and Financing 
of Exchange Programs. Agreement witli Iceland. 
Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into 
force February 13, 1964. TIAS 5542. 10 pp. 100. 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witti the Re- 
public of Korea. Signed at Seoul March 18, 1964. 
Entered into force March 18, 1964. With exchanges 
of notes. TIAS 5547. 10 pp. 100. 
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Bolivia, re- 
lating to the agreement of September 23, 1955. Ex- 
change of notes— Signed at La Paz March 4, 1964. 
Entered into force March 4, 1964. TIAS 5548. 3 pp. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China, 
amending the agreement of October 19, 1963. Ex- 
change of letters— Signed at Taipei February 3 and 
March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. 
TIAS 5549. 3 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of 
November 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes — 
Dated at Lisbon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered 
into force April 3, 1964. TIAS 5550. 5 pp. 50. 

Boundary Waters — Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspen- 
sion of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with 
Canada, continuing the agreement of July 3 and 
13, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa March 
31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964. TIAS 
5551. 2 pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ivory 
Coast. Signed at Abidjan March 10, 1964. Entered 
into force March 10, 1964. With exchange of notes. 
TIAS 5552. 9 pp. 100. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Protocol 
with Japan, amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, 
as amended. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. 
Entered into force April 21, 1964. TIAS 5553. 5 pp. 

Technical Cooperation — Continued Application to Tan- 
ganyika of the U.S.-U.K. Agreement of July 13, 1951. 
Agreement with Tanganyika. Exchange of notes — • 
Dated at Dar es Salaam December 9, 1963. Entered 
into force December 9, 1963. TIAS 5554. 2 pp. 50. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Belgium and Luxembourg, amending the 
agreement of October 8, 1948, as amended. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Brussels April 2, 1964. And ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Luxembourg March 12 and 
April 2, 1964. Entered into force April 2, 1964. TIAS 
5555. 11 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia. 
Signed at Tunis April 7, 1964. Entered into force 
April 7, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5556. 
14 pp. 10^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, 
amending the agreement of December 6, 1962, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington 
April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. 
TIAS 5557. 2 pp. 50. 

North Pacific Fur Seals. Protocol with Canada, 
Japan, and U.S.S.R., amending the Interim Convention 
of February 9, 1957. Signed at Washington October 8, 

1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964. TIAS 5558. 
20 pp. 150. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington April 15, 

1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5559. 
6 pp. 50. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica. 
Plxchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 31 
and April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964. 
TIAS 5560. 3 pp. 5^. 

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Ivory Coast 
Exchange of notes — Dated at Abidjan April 5 and 21, 
1962. Entered into force April 21, 1962. TIAS 5561. 
4 pp. 50. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Release issued prior to June 22 which appears 
in this issue of the Eut.t.f.tin is No. 285 of June 

No. Date Subject 

289 6/22 U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific 

Cooperation (rewrite). 
*290 6/22 U.S. participation in international 

291 6/23 Discussions with Panama. 

292 6/23 Rostow : "Europe and the Atlantic 


293 6/24 Air transport services agreement 

with New Zealand. 

294 6/24 ANZUS Council meeting. 

*295 6/26 Creel designated Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs 
(biographic details). 

296 6/25 Delegation to International Labor 

Conference (rewrite). 

297 6/25 Canada-U.S. Committee on Joint 


*298 6/26 Program for visit of President of 

Costa Rica. 
300 6/26 Tripartite declaration on Soviet 
agreement with East Germany. 

*301 6/26 Harriman : St. Lawrence Seaway 
commemorative luncheon, Muske- 
gon, Mich, (excerpts). 

*Not printed. 



INDEX July 13, 196Jf Vol. LI, No. 1307 

Africa. Africa South of the Equator (Wil- 
liams) ~. 51 

Australia. ANZUS Council To Meet at Wash- 
ington , . 43 

Austria. Attorney General To Administer Aus- 
trian Assets Agreement (text of Executive 
order) 60 


Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re- 
asserted by U.S 44 

U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport 
Agreement 60 

Brazil. United States Agrees To Lend Brazil 

$50 Million , 59 

Canada. U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews Ctir- 
rent Defense Problems (text of joint com- 
munique) u . 45 

Claims and Property. Attorney General To Ad- 
minister Austrian Assets Agreement (text of 
Executive order) 60 

Congo (Leopoldville). Africa South of the 
Equator (Williams) 51 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 64 


President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation 
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece 
(exchanges of greetings and joint communi- 
ques) 48 

Security Council Votes Extension of Peacekeep- 
ing Force in Cyprus (Stevenson, text of reso- 
lution) 64 

Department and Foreign Service. Designa- 
tions (Creel) ,....> 69 

Economic Aflfairs 

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38 
President Asks for Tariff Study on Stainless 

Steel Flatware ^ . 63 


Captive Nations Week, 1964 (text of proclama- 
tion) 63 

Creel designated Deputy Assistant Secretary . . 69 
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38 

Foreign Aid. United States Agrees To Lend 
Brazil $50 Million 59 

France. Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire 
for German Reunification (text of tripartite 
declaration) , 44 


Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re- 
asserted by U.S. 44 

Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for Ger- 
man Reunification (text of tripartite declara- 
tion) , . 44 

Greece. President Johnson Discusses Cyprus 
Situation With Prime Ministers of Turkey 
and Greece (exchanges of greetings and joint 
communiques) 48 

International Organizations and Conferences 
ANZUS Council To Meet at Washington ... 43 
International Labor Conference (delegation) . . 67 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Science Committee Con- 
cludes Fourth Meeting (Rusk, text of joint 
communique) 61 

Labor. International Labor Conference (dele- 
gation) 67 

Laos. President Names New Ambassador to 

Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy 46 

Military Affairs 

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38 
U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews Current De- 
fense Problems (text of joint communique) . . 45 

New Zealand 

ANZUS Council To Meet at Washington ... 43 
U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport 
Agreement 60 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Europe 
and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) .... 38 

Panama. United States and Panama Continue 
Discussions 54 

Presidential Documents 

Attorney General To Administer Austrian As- 
sets Agreement 60 

Captive Nations Week, 1964 63 

President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation 
With Prime Ministers of Turkey and 
Greece 48 

President Names New Ambassador to Saigon, 

Reiterates U.S. Policy 46 

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De- 
salting of Sea Water 60 

Publications. Recent Releases 70 


U.S.-Japan Science Committee Concludes Fourth 

Meeting (Rusk, text of joint communique) . . 61 

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De- 
salting of Sea Water (Johnson) 60 

South Africa. Africa South of the Equator 

(Williams) 51 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions . , 69 

U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport 

Agreement . , 60 

Turkey. President Johnson Discusses Cyprus 
Situation With Prime Ministers of Turkey 
and Greece (exchanges of greetings and joint 
communiques) 48 


Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 38 

Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Re- 
asserted by U.S . . . 44 

Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for Ger- 
man Reimification (text of tripartite declara- 
tion) . . . . , 44 

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on De- 
salting of Sea Water (Johnson) 60 

United Kingdom. Three Western Powers Re- 
affirm Desire for German Reunification (text 
of tripartite declaration) 44 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 68 

The Resurgence of the United Nations Secu- 
rity Council (Sisco) 55 

Security Council Votes Extension of Peacekeep- 
ing Force in Cyprus (Stevenson, text of reso- 
lution) 64 

Viet-Nam. President Names New Ambassador 

to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy . . . , . 46 

Name Index 

Creel, Robert C 69 

Inonu, Ismet . . , 48 

Johnson, President 46, 48, 60, 63 

Johnson, U. Alexis 46 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 46 

Papandreou, George . 48 

Rostow, W. W 38 

Rusk, Secretary 61 

Sisco, Joseph J 55 

Stevenson, Adlai E 64 

Taylor, Maxwell D 46 

Williams, G. Mennen 5X 



U.S.GOVERNMEN" . ..,^ w 








1965: International Cooperation Year 

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International 
Cooperation Year." This 5-page pamphlet discusses this theme by pointing out that "international 
cooperation is a fact of life . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century." 

As the pamphlet suggests, "Perhaps we can make two things of the Year: a massive opportunity 
for public education about America's role in international cooperation, and a chance to speed up some 
very concrete tasks on international institution building, by including them as special targets to shoot 
for in 1965." The article concludes by listing 10 specific targets at which we might aim. 



Please send me 





copies of 1S65: International Cooperation Year. 

Enclosed find $ 


(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt of Documents) 


<i-' «^V_ - vj 








July 20, 1964 


Address by President Johnson 79 


Address hy Secretary Busk 74- 



Statement hy Secretary Busk 98 



Message of the President to the Congress and Text of Agreement 93 

For index see inside 'back cover 

The Universal Appeal of the Declaration of Independence 

Address hy Secretary Rush ' 

It is an exceptional honor to speak here, in 
this historic place, on this historic day. I am 
mindful tliat I am following in the immediate 
footsteps of two Presidents whom I have had the 
high privilege of serving as Secretary of State. 
President Kennedy spoke here 2 years ago 
today ,^ and President Jolmson, as Vice Presi- 
dent, a year ago. 

All of us, as Americans, have a deep feeling 
about the Hall in which were born the two 
fundamental documents of our national life: 
the Declaration of Independence and the Con- 
stitution. As Secretary of State, I have special 
further interest in this neighborhood, because 
very near here — at 13 South Sixth Street — 
stood the first home of the Department of For- 
eign Affairs of the United States, which later 
became the Department of State. 

For Americans this annual festival is — and, 

' Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on 
July 4 (press release 313 dated July 3) . 
" For text, see Bulletin of July 23, 1962, p. 131. 

let us hope, always will be — glorious, an occa- 
sion for reviewing our national achievements, 
for pride and gratitude, and for sober reflection 
on the unfinished business of freedom. But we 
who celebrate tliis day in 1964 can draw courage 
and hope from tlie fact that just 2 days ago a 
great civil rights bill has become the law of the 
land — a bill designed to make all our citizens 
free, just as 188 years ago here we made our 
nation free. 

The Fourth of July is important to us as the 
anniversary of our national independence. 
We would celebrate it even if as a nation we 
were much less than we are. And other na- 
tions would join us in celebrating it, if only 
because we were the first colony in the modern 
world to break away. 

But the importance of the Fourth of July 
does not lie, exclusively or primarily, in the fact 
that we won our national independence and be- 
came a great military power with formidable 
material accomplishments. It lies rather in the 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by tlie Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public aud interested 
agencies of the Government with iufor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreipn relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Interna- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Price : 52 issues, domestic $S.50 ; 
foreign $12.2.'): single copy. 25 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19. 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as tlie 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



ideas and ideals about men and their relation- 
ships to each other to wMch we have been com- 
mitted since our national birth. It is these 
which make the Fourth of July a date of his- 
toric significance. 

The great document of July 1776 was a dec- 
laration not only of independence but of repre- 
sentative government and of the rights of man. 

The burden of complaint of the American 
colonists was that a tyrannical king was depriv- 
ing them of their historic rights. And, in fact, 
the British jjeople had been building their liber- 
ties, bit by bit through centuries, in their de- 
velopment of the common law and the evolution 
of parliament and the legislative bodies of the 
American Colonies. 

The Rise of the Democracies 

But the Declaration did not rest its case solely 
on the particular violations of limited liberties 
previously won. It proclaimed the gi-eat gen- 
eral propositions : 

. . . that aU men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inialienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 

These principles were set forth not as the 
special property of the inhabitants of the Brit- 
ish Colonies in Nortli America but as universal 
truths, applicable to all men and for all time. 
And, over the decades, the appeal of these prin- 
ciples has endured and broadened. 

The strength of those simple notions, the will- 
ingness of men to fight for them, has brought 
down one despotism and one empire after 
another. Those were the ideas which inspired 
the rise of the democracies of Western Europe, 
the liberators of Latin America, and the evolu- 
tion of the British Commonwealth. Since the 
Second World War they have led to the creation 
of more than 50 new nations. 

The basic propositions of our Declaration of 
Independence may be found in the constitutions 
of many countries. And some of them are em- 
bodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 
Its preamble says the "peoples of the United 
Nations" are "determined ... to reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 

and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small. . . ." Article 55 speaks of "respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-deter- 
mination of peoples" and pledges the United 
Nations to promote "universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion." 

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the various conventions on specific human 
rights subscribed to by members of the United 
Nations help to promote human rights. 

Unhappily these principles and commitments 
are often breached. Unfortunately, also, many 
nations, both old and new, which call themselves 
republics or democracies are not. 

But these ideas and ideals have gripped the 
minds of ordinar;v' men and women in all parts 
of the world. Their translation into practice 
may be slow and imeven — and marked by set- 
backs here and there — but it continues. 

The most powerful opponents of these basic 
ideas today are the leaders of the principal 
Communist states. But even the Commimists 
recognize the appeal of such words as "free- 
dom" and "democracy." They call their gov- 
ernments "republics" or "people's republics" or 
"democratic republics," although not one of 
them has a government chosen in a free election. 
They even apply the label of "wars of libera- 
tion" to the sort of gangster wars of terror and 
aggression they are waging against the people 
of Laos and South Viet-Nam. 

In the Conununist world we can see the cen- 
trifugal force of national traditions and inter- 
ests. Most of the smaller Communist states of 
Eastern Europe are reacliing out for more 
autonomy. And within at least some of the 
Communist states we can see persistent, if still 
limited, yearnings for more personal liberty — 
for more freedom to speak and travel and act, 
for better protection against arbitrary pimish- 
ment, for more influence on the decisions of 
those who rule. 

The commitments which our forebears made 
for us to history in Independence Hall — in the 
Declaration and in the Constitution — are both 
our driving force as a nation and the central 
concern of our foreign policy. The prime ob- 

JTJLY 20, 19G4 


jective of our foreign policy, as of our military 
power, is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our Posterity." 

Making the Total Environment Secure 

We can no longer secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity by isolat- 
ing our nation, our continent, or our hemisphere 
from the rest of the world. The speed of mod- 
ern communications and transportation and the 
range and destructiveness of modem weapons 
have erased the margins of distance and time 
which until the end of the Second World War 
contributed greatly to our security. 

Today we can be secure only to the extent 
that our total enviromnent is secure — and by 
total environment we mean not only the land, 
waters, and air of the earth but space as far out 
as instruments can be projected capable of af- 
fecting significantly human affairs. 

Our endeavors to make our total environment 
more secure move simultaneously along several 

First of all, it is essential to repel — and to 
do all we can to prevent- — aggression by what- 
ever means. To deter aggression, we maintain, 
with our allies, massive retaliatory forces and 
increasingly strong and mobile conventional 
forces. And as President Jolmson has made 
clear, we are determined to help those who are 
victims of such aggressions as are now going on 
in Southeast Asia — guerrilla warfare and ter- 
rorism directed from the outside and sustained 
by infiltrating trained men and arms across 
national frontiers. We shall soon be meeting 
with our partners in the Organization of Ainer- 
ican States to take additional steps to insure 
that Cuba does not serve as an effective base 
for that type of aggression in Latin America. 

Wliile we do our part in deterring and 
repelling aggi-ession, we also seek areas of agree- 
ment — and of cooperation — with our adver- 
saries. We believe that the Soviet leaders rec- 
ognize a common interest with us in reducing 
the dangers of a great war. We most earnestly 
hope that they will open their doors, as we are 
willing to open ours, to the sort of inspection 
which will make possible genuine progress in 
reducing armaments. At the same time, we 

heartily favor increasing contacts between our 
people and those of the Eastern European 
states and the Soviet Union. And we welcome 
cooperative undertakings such as the work on 
desalmization of water on wliich Soviet scien- 
tists and our own recently agreed.^ 

In President Jolinson's words, ". . . our 
guard is up but our hand is out." * He has 
made it clear that we will continue to discuss 
any problem, to examine any proposal, to make 
any agreement, to take any action, which might 
lessen the danger of war without impairing the 
interests and security of the free world. 

Building the Free World 

However, foreign policy is not concerned 
solely with our adversaries. We apply our- 
selves night and day to the great task of build- 
ing the free world. 

Two years ago today. President Kennedy 
spoke here on the grand theme of "interde- 
pendence" — with particular emphasis on our 
hopes for a closer and stronger Atlantic part- 
nership "as a nucleus for the eventual union 
of all free men." A closer and even more effec- 
tive partnership with other advanced nations 
of the free world— those of the Atlantic and 
Japan and others in the Pacific — remains a 
major goal of our policy. 

We are equally interested in closer and more 
effective partnership with other free nations — 
in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. All 
of the advanced nations of the free world have 
an immense stake in seeing the developing coun- 
tries make economic, social, and political prog- 
ress in freedom. I 

The peoples of the new nations and of many 
older ones are aflame with expectations of a 
better life. Many have discovered what others 
had learned earlier — that national independence 
does not automatically bring economic and so- 
cial improvements. But all of them are deter- 
mined to move ahead. The whole world knows 
that modem teclmology enables men to rise 
above bare subsistence. 

Few, if any, of the new nations are as favor- 
ably situated as we were when we won our inde- 

» Ibid., July 13, 1964, p. 60. 
' Ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726. 



pendence. AVe had already been educated in 
political and even economic independence to a 
notable degree before our Kevolution. We had 
before us a rich contment, capable of producing 
an array of items much wanted on the world 
market. We had no ancien regime to contend 
with within our boundaries. We had a fairly 
homogeneous and only tolerably contentious 
people. We were underpopulated to such a de- 
gree that our normally liigh regard for the 
individual man had economic as well as philo- 
sophic support. Moreover, we had many tal- 
ented and educated leaders. 

To the new nation of the late 20th century, 
the American's story must sound improbably 
easy. Many comitries now emerging must im- 
provise educational systems after independ- 
ence. Many must struggle to sell commodities 
on a world market where demand is not ade- 
quate and prices are sagging. Many have social 
tensions and constant political instability at 
home. Some have limited resources. Many are 
heavily populated. Few have an adequate sup- 
ply of leadership and trained men for the many 
roles independence requires. And to advance 
economically they must master quickly difficult 
teclinologies and comjjlex problems of organiza- 
tion and administration. 

How should we, the prototype of new nations, 
regai'd our successors in the stream of develop- 
ing nations? With imderstanding, since they 
are now where we were once. With patience, 
since their tasks are even harder to solve than 
were our own. With support, as we were as- 
sisted by older nations during our own begin- 
nmgs. And with confidence in ideas and ideals 
which have inspired the rise of the peoples of 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa to the "sepa- 
rate and equal station to which the Laws of 
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." 

These are not simple requirements. The 
winds of freedom blowing around have kicked 
up quite a storm, and the United States is often 
buffeted. But since the storm really began on 
these shores, let us ride with it, with grace and 
poise. If the new nations request advice, we are 
here to offer our services. If they ask for and 
can use assistance, it is clearly in our interests 
to provide it. Through our aid programs, 

through the Peace Corps, through the Alliance 
for Progress, through the activities of American 
companies overseas, through the activities of 
our churches, and foundations, and other pri- 
vate institutions — through these, and many 
more chamiels, including the millions of Ameri- 
cans who go abroad as tourists, let us con- 
stantly demonstrate the meaning of a free so- 
ciety and our abiding interest in freedom for 

In judging the performance of others, let us 
never forget that democracy is a difficult system 
to operate. Very few nations have been able to 
make it work consistently. But people keep 
coming back to it, keep trying to make it work, 
because government with the consent of the gov- 
erned is that form of government fully consist- 
ent with the dignity of man. 

Improving Our Own Society 

While we help others to move ahead eco- 
nomically and socially and to achieve political 
stability in freedom, we must keep everlast- 
ingly at the task of improving our own society. 
A nation with our pledges to ourselves and to 
mankind cannot tolerate discriminations based 
on religion, race, or color. A nation with our 
productive capacity cannot tolerate slums, 
whether rural or urban. And we must begin 
to attack our pockets of poverty in a more sys- 
tematic way, as President Jolinson has pro- 
posed, even though we shall not wipe them out 

We owe these tilings to ourselves. I am in- 
terested in them as a citizen, but also as Secre- 
taiy of State. For whatever improves our 
national life also strengthens freedom in the 
world struggle in which we are engaged. We 
are the trustees, the leaders, of the cause of 
freedom. Our enemies rejoice in our blemishes. 
The friends of freedom, who are a gi-eat major- 
ity of mankind, expect us to set a splendid 

The ultimate objective of our foreign policy 
is a decent world order — the kind of world out- 
lined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of 
the United Nations Charter. Week by week, 
and day by day, we are working our way toward 

JTJLT 20, 1964 


that goal — developing the institutions of inter- 
national cooperation, of peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, weaving the infinity of threads 
that bind peoples around the world closer to- 
gether, building, bit by bit, the common law 
of mankind. 

The ideas and ideals we stand for and have 
done so much to nurture and defend in the 
last 188 years are, we believe, shared by a great 
majority of the human race. As President 
Jolmson put it, in signing the Civil Eights Act, 
"Today in far comers of distant continents the 
ideals of those American patriots still shape 
the struggles of men who hmiger for freedom." 
They give us allies and friends among ordinary 
men and women everywhere — including behind 
the Iron and Bamboo Curtauis. They have 
never had greater validity or wider support 
than they have now. They are the most power- 
ful ideas on earth, and the stoi-y of 2,000 yeai-s 
of striving points to the victory of freedom. 

Mrs. Anderson Addresses Bulgarian 
People on U. S. Independence Day 

Followmg is a translation of an address in 
the Bulgarian language made hy Mrs. Eugenie 
Anderson, Atnerica/n Minister to Bulgaria, for 
broadcast on July 4 from Sofia over Bulgarian 
television and radio. 

Press release 312 dated July 2, for release July 4 

Good evening. Once again I have the pleas- 
ure to speak to you, the Bulgarian people, on 
America's Independence Day.^ I appreciate 
this opportunity and wish to tliank the Bul- 
garian Government for this courtesy. 

As the American Minister in Sofia, I bring you 
peaceful and friendly greetings from President 
Johnson and the American people. On this 
day we celebrate the cause of freedom, and we 
greet all those peoples who, like ourselves, want 
to help build a world free of war and want. 

' For the text of an address made by Mrs. Anderson 
on .Tilly 3, 1963, see Bulletin of July 22, 1963, p. 141. 

Now I have been living in your beautiful 
country for nearly 2 years. During this time I 
have visited many of Bulgaria's historic shrines. 
I have wandered the old streets of Kopriv- 
shtitsa. I have stood in the churches of the 
martyrs at Batak and Penishtitsa. I have 
visited your Constitution Hall at Tumovo. 
These famous places have evoked my admiration 
for Bulgaria's struggle for its independence. 

As you know, my country also achieved its 
independence from foreign domination less than 
200 years ago. Our nation was founded on the 
revolutionary principles of equality, freedom, 
and justice. 

We are still engaged in fulfilling these ideals. 
We are striving to improve our democracy. 
Just 2 days ago President Johnson signed an 
historic law. This will strengthen our Consti- 
tution's guarantee of equal opportunities to all 
Americans irrespective of race, creed, or 
national origin. 

Also we are working to provide ever better 
living conditions for our own people. But we 
believe that our nation, and indeed all humanity, 
can tlirive only in a peaceful world. This must 
be a world which offers all men hope for improv- 
ing their lot, for escaping privation and 
drudgery. We want to cooperate in lifting the 
ancient burdens of mankind. 

Only a few months ago, we Americans — and 
all those who cherish freedom and peace — lost a 
valiant friend. Wlien John F. Kennedy was so 
suddenly taken from us, we felt as if a light had 
gone out. Now President Jolinson has won the 
trust and affection of t\\& American people. 
The same purposes for which President Ken- 
nedy lived are shared by our new President and 
by the American people. Today, President 
Jolinson fights for peace, human rights, and a 
decent livelihood for the world's needy people. 

And so, in closing, on behalf of President 
Jolmson and the American people, we reafBrm 
our unchanging commitment to peace, freedom, 
and human welfare. In this spirit we celebrate 
American Independence Day, and in this spirit 
we wish the Bulgarian people well. 



The Single Goal of Peace 

Address hi/ President Johnson 

Following are the foreign policy portions of 
an address made iy President Johnson at a 
Swedish celebration at Minneapolis, Minn., on 
June 28. 

WMte House press release dated June 28; as-delivered text 

The Bible coimsels us : "To everything there 
is a season, and a time to every purpose under 
tlie heaven ... a time of war, and a time of 

So I come today to speak to you in the hope 
that, after decades of war and threats of war, we 
may be nearing a time of peace. Today, as al- 
ways, if a nation is to keep its freedom it must 
be prepared to risk war. When necessary, we 
will take that risk. But as long as I am Presi- 
dent, I vsdll spare neither my office nor myself 
in the quest for peace. That peace is much 
more than the absence of war. In fact, peace 
is much the same thing in our world commimity 
as it is here in your community, or in the small 
community of Jolmson City, Texas, where I 
gi'ew up. 

If, in your town, every morning brings fear 
that the serenity of the streets will be shattered 
by the sounds of violence, then there is no peace. 
If one man can compel others, unjustly and un- 
lawfully, to do what he commands them to do, 
then your community is not a place of peace. 
If we have neither the will nor a way to settle 
disputes among neighbors without force and 
violence, then none of us can live in peace. If 
we do not work together to help others fulfill 
their fair desires, then peace is insecure. For 
in a community, as in the world, if the strong 
and the wealthy ignore the needs of the poor 
and the oppressed, frustrations will result in 
force. Peace, therefore, is a world where no 

nation fears another, or no nation can force 
another to follow its command. It is a world 
where differences are solved without destruc- 
tion and common effort is directed at common 

Such a peace will not come by a single act or 
a single moment. It will take decades and gen- 
erations of persistent and patient effort. That 
great son of Sweden, Dag Hammarskjold, once 

The qualities it requires are just those which I feel 
we all need today — perseverance and patience, a firm 
grip on realities, careful but imaginative planning, a 
clear avrareness of the dangers — but also of the fact 
that fate is what we make it. . . . 

With these qualities as our foundation, we 
follow several goals to the smgle goal of peace. 
And what are those goals? First is restraint 
in the use of ix)wer. We must be, and we are, 
strong enough to protect ourselves and our al- 
lies. But it was a great historian who re- 
minded us that: "No aspect of power more 
impresses men than its exercise with restraint." 

We do not advance the cause of freedom by 
calling on the fidl might of our military to solve 
every problem. We won a great victory in 
Cuba because we stood there for many days, 
firm without using force. In Viet-Nam we are 
engaged in a brutal and a bitter struggle try- 
ing to help a friend. There, too, we will stand 
firm to help maintain their own freedom and 
to give them counsel and advice and help as 

Second is the search for practical solutions 
to particular problems. Agreements will not 
flow from a sudden trust among nations. Trust 
comes from a slow series of agi-eements. Each 

JULY 20, 1964 


agreement must be fashioned as the products 
of your famous craftsmanship are fashioned, 
with attention to detail, with practical skills, 
with faith in the importance of the result. 

And so, even while we are caught in conflict 
in one part of the world, we labor to build the 
structure of agreement which can bring peace to 
all the rest of the world. In this way we have 
signed a treaty already ending nuclear tests in 
the atmosphere. Already we have cut back our 
production of atomic fuel and weapons. 
Already we have established a "liot line" be- 
tween Washington and Moscow. Already we 
are meeting with the Soviets to pool our efforts 
in making fresh water from the oceans. These 
agreements, by themselves, have not ended ten- 
sions or they have not ended war. But because 
of them we have moved much closer to peace. 

And tlie third point that I want to bring up 
is respect for the rights and fears of others. 
We can never compromise the cause of freedom. 
But as we work in our world community we 
must always remember that differences with 
others do not always flow from a desire for 
domination. They can come from honest clash 
of honest beliefs of goals. And in such cases 
our strength does not entitle us to impose our 
interest. Rather, our desire for peace compels 
us to seek just compromise. And we must also 
recognize, although this is very hard to do, 
that other nations may honestly fear our inten- 
tions or the intentions of our allies. There is 
no need for such fear. For we in America 
seek neither dominion or conquest. But where 
it exists, we must work to dispel that fear. 

Tlie fourth point that I want to make is 
cooi^eration in solving the problems which are 
greater than immediate conflicts. Most of our 
neighbors in the world live in the midst of 
himger and poverty. Most of our neighbors 
live in the midst of disease and ignorance. We 
are proud of the fact that here in America, 
across the world, American workers and Amer- 
ican food and American capital are building 
industry and are expanding farms, are educat- 
ing the young and are caring for the sick and 
are feeding the hungry. 

We will continue to seek such cooperation. 
No peace and no power is strong enough to 
stand for long against the restless discontent 

of millions who are without hope. For peace 
to last, all must have a stake in its benefits. 

Fifth is the ability to adjust disputes without 
the use of force. It is, in short, the pursuit 
of justice. We can find guidance here in our 
own country's historic pledge to the rule of law. 
That is a pledge to abide by the law and to 
accept its settlements. It is a pledge to submit 
to courts and to be satisfied by court decisions. 
It is a pledge to respect, uphold, and always 
obey the law of the land. For if any take griev- 
ances and disputes into their own hands, the 
safety and the freedom of all is in peril. "Due 
process" is the safeguard of our civalization. As 
a President of the United States and as an 
individual citizen, I stand totally committed to 
the integrity of justice and the enforcement of 
the law. But legal government depends upon 
law-loving and law-abiding citizens. Today the 
key to peace in our own land is obedience to the 
great moral command that no man should deny 
to another the liberties the Constitution creates, 
as the law defines those liberties. And it rests 
on the even more hallowed rule that, whatever 
our disagreements, we treat others with the 
peaceful respect that we reserve and desire for 
ourselves. So, too, we seek a world commimity 
in which answers can win acceptance without the 
use of force. For this purpose, all the ma- 
chinery of international justice is useless unless 
it is infused with the good faith of nations. 
On a worldwide basis, we place much hope in 
the United Nations. 

Twenty years after World War I the Le<ague 
of Nations was discredited. Twenty years after 
World War II the United Nations is, thank 
God, a stronger force for peace than ever be- 
fore. Our support — the steadfast support of 
nations like Sweden — has made that possible. 
And let any of those who might choose to 
criticize the United Nations always remember 
that where the United Nations has gone, from 
Iran to the Congo, the Communists have not 
conquered. Tliis is not because the United Na- 
tions supports our cause or becaiise it exists just 
to help us against our enemies. It is because the 
United Nations is on the side of national in- 
dependence, on the side of peaceful justice, of 
self-determination, of himian freedom ; and that 
is (he side tliat we are on, too. 



Tliese are the several tasks — these are the 
several paths that we take to peace. At times 
in the solitude of my office, peace seems dis- 
couragmgly distant. My days are often filled 
with crisis and conflict. Yet each time that I 
come here among the people of my country I 
feel new hope and renewed faith. There was a 
legendary figure who, each time his feet touched 
the earth, redoubled his strength. Your friend- 
sliip and your warmth and your wishes are 
equally the source of my strength. 

I want to remind you finally, as I finish, that 
it is with the people and not with their leaders 
that the final question whether the liberties and 
the life of this land shall be "preserved to the 
latest generations." If you can do this, if you 
do do this, then our cliildren's children will 
gladl)' remember us in the ancient phrase: 
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be 
called the children of God." 

President Orlich of Costa Rica 
Visits Washington 

President Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica 
visited Washington June 30-July 2. Following 
is the text of a joint communique released on 
July 1 at the close of talks hetween President 
Johnson and President Orlich. 

White House press release dated July 1 

The President of Costa Rica, Francisco 
Orlicli, and President Johnson have concluded 
friendly discussions on matters of mutual con- 

The two Presidents discussed the Alliance 
for Progress and the contribution it is making 
toward the economic and social development of 
the Hemisphere. They expressed their satisfac- 
tion with its achievements in Central America 
and the Hemisphere since President Kennedy's 
visit to San Jose, and reaffirmed their faith in 
the goals of the Alliance. They noted especially 
the intimate relationship which exists between 
the practice of effective representative democ- 
racy and the achievement of social and economic 
progress, and they renewed their determination 

to encourage democratic ideals tlirougliout the 
Hemisphere. President Jolmson expressed his 
admiration for the leadership which Costa 
Rican people have given over the years, by their 
example, to the accomplishment of this objec- 

President Orlich reviewed the efforts of the 
Central American countries to promote their 
economic well-being through the Central Amer- 
ican Common Market. President Jolinson ex- 
pressed gratification that these efforts had al- 
ready made a significant contribution to the 
economic development of Central America. The 
two Presidents discussed the participation of 
private enterprise in the Central American 
Common Market, and the fundamental impor- 
tance of cooperation between the i^ublic and 
private sectors in creating sound and healthy 
conditions in which each can make its most ef- 
fective contribution. They agreed that a re- 
sponsible and vigorous private sector is an essen- 
tial element of a free and democratic society, 
and is indispensable to the success of the Central 
American Common Market and the Alliance 
for Progress. 

President Orlich outlined the economic sit- 
uation in his country, and expressed apprecia- 
tion for the understanding and friendly cooper- 
ation of the United States. He gave special 
praise to the United States Navy Seabees, who 
are cooperating with Costa Rica to relieve flood 
conditions, which have been seriously aggra- 
vated by the eruption of Irazu Volcano. Presi- 
dent Jolmson assured President Orlich of the 
continued and sympathetic cooperation of the 
United States in the present natural disaster 
afflicting Costa Rica, and of the desire of the 
United States to help Costa Rica achieve fur- 
ther economic and social progress in keeping 
with the Charter of Punta del Este. 

The Presidents noted the continued efforts of 
svibversive agents trained in Cuba and other 
Communist countries to create unrest and un- 
dermine democratic governments in Latin 
America. They agreed that each country must 
adopt effective measures to defend itself against 
such activities, and that the Organization of 
American States should take meaningful steps 
to demonstrate the collective will of the Ameri- 
can Republics to resist such aggi-ession. 

JULY 20, 1964 


The Presidents concluded their talks by ex- 
pressing satisfaction that relations between 
their two countries had reached a high level of 
mutual understanding and respect. They 

pledged themselves to continued cooperation 
within the Organization of American States to 
achieve the objectives of the Alliance for 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1 

Press release 307 dated July 1 

Secretary Rush : Before those boxes get roll- 
ing let me make an administrative comment. 
There is no special significance in the timing of 
this press conference. I have not had one in 
some time. But I do plan to take next week 
off and get a few days' rest. I gather that many 
of you will be traveling to San Francisco to take 
account of the events out there ; and so it may be 
a little time before we can have another one, 
and so I thought I'd put myself at your dis- 
posal today. So with that and without a pre- 
pared statement, why not begin ? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you mentioned San 
Francisco, one of the most discussed issues 
around toion today is tohether the conflict in the 
policies in Viet-Nam is a suitable subject for 
political debate this year. What is your view as 
Secretary of State? 

A. Oh, I think the situation in Southeast Asia 
is proper for public discussion. It is a major 
commitment of the United States to do what we 
can to assist the countries of Southeast Asia to 
maintain their security and their independence. 
We have a large involvement there of men. We 
invested very large resources in the security and 
independence of southeastern Asia. These are 
matters of public interest which deserve public 

It has not been my experience thus far in 
meeting with congressional committees in ex- 
ecutive session or otherwise that these are issues 
that lend themselves to partisan debate. We are 
all stockholders in these problems. Both parties 
are stockholders. 

Viet-Nam was divided in 1954. Southeast 
Asia was exposed to infiltration and penetration 
from North Viet-Nam during the fifties. We 
all have a stake in the outcome. We all are in- 
terested in the right solutions. But I have not 
felt that the balances of judgment on these mat- 
ters have turned on partisan lines. 

These are serious questions to wliich, I think, 
serious leadership of both parties ought to ad- 
dress themselves in terms of the national interest 
and the interest of the American people. 

So I would suppose that there will be in the 
weeks and months ahead, as there has been in 
the months past, a very lively public discussion 
of these matters. I do not quite see where the 
basis is for making these discussions specifically 
partisan in character, because they are not parti- 
san issues in that sense. 

Future of the Congo 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United Nations is pull- 
ing its forces out of the Congo after 4 years, and 
the Secretary-GeneraVs report ^ was not opti- 
mistic about the future, and there are a number 
of predictions of widespread chaos to follow. 
I wonder if you could give us your assessment 
of the future of that area. 

A. Well, first, I think we ought to recall 
that, for the past 4 years or more, after Presi- 
dent Eisenhower made the decision that the 
Congo problem as far as the United States was 
concerned ought to be a problem for the United 
Nations, the United Nations has undertaken a 
^•erv large peacekeeping operation in tlie Congo 

' U.N. doc. S/5784. 



with a large investment both of men and mate- 
rials. And just yesterday wo saw the repatri- 
ation of the last of the United Nations military 
forces in the Congo. 

This has been a remarkable achievement these 
past i years on the part of the United Nations 
in preserving the peace and providuig a vast 
amount of technical assistance and training and 
giving that country, wliich is as large as the 
United States east of the Mississippi, a chance 
to evolve in unity without complete disruption, 
without vast civil wars; and so this has been a 
major contribution. 

Now, at the present time the Congo is at a 
very important moment. Its government has 
resigned, as expected, in connection with a con- 
stitutional position. There is a referendum on 
the constitution underway, which I think will 
end on July 10. I presume that at that time 
there will be formed a provisional government, 
after which more permanent arrangements will 
be worked out. 

President [Joseph] Kasavubu and the 
Congolese leaders are carrying a very heavy re- 
sponsibility at the present time to try to find a 
solid political basis on which this vast country 
with its many tribes and many traditions and 
many differences can work together in harmony. 
We do not despair of that at all despite the fact 
that there are obviously some very serious prob- 
lems involved. But the present situation, which 
changes almost on an hourly basis, is that con- 
versations and consultations are going on 
among the Congolese leaders to see if they can 
find a consensus on the basis of which a govern- 
ment can be formed which can lead this vast 
and potentially progressive and prosperous 
country into the future. 

Meanwhile the U.N. resolutions remain in ef- 
fect. One of these resolutions requests member 
governments to be of assistance to the Congo 
as they try to work out their problems. And 
we therefore hope that all governments on the 
outside will be completely sympathetic and help- 
fid to the Congolese leaders in trying to meet 
their difficult situation. It is obviously a situa- 
tion on which one cannot go very far in predic- 
tion. But we do believe that the Congolese 
leaders can find a basis for moving ahead now 

and taking advantage of the base which was 
provided by 4 years of relative peace and con- 
siderable strengthening of the administrative, 
technical, and educational apparatus of the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps you could clarify 
this aspect of the Congo situation for the 
record, sir. For a considerable period of the 
U.N. activity there, the V.N. — part of the U.N. 
operations and part of the United States^ con- 
cern was directed against Moise Tshombe and 
the Katanga separatist situation. I realize that 
the United States position was that the concern 
was with the separatist element of that and 
there was no United States position that the 
United States was opposed to Tslwmbe in the 
Central Government. Could you clarify the 
present attitude of the United States toward 
that general situation? 

A. Well, let me remind you that there were 
some difficulties at one time between Mr. 
Tshombe and the U.N. over the issue of the 
secession of Katanga and that we were sup- 
porting the U.N. on that issue, and, therefore, 
there was some tension between us and Mr. 
Tshombe and his colleagues, who were support- 
ing secession. 

But on the other hand, even at that time, in 
January 1963, we said that we understand that 
the object of the U.N. is to be a peaceful 
Katanga, reintegrated into the Congolese state 
in the Congo. "There is no desire to deny Mr. 
Tshombe a place in the future political life of 
the Congo, but this will depend on the Congo- 
lese people and on Mr. Tshombe himself." ^ 

Now, in reminding you of what we have said 
before on that point, I would caution you that 
I do not have in front of me a list of all the 
other Congolese leaders about whom you might 
ask similar questions on which our answers 
might be similar. In other words, my comment 
today is not especially related to Mr. Tshombe. 

Basically, we feel that this is an internal po- 
litical matter for the Congolese and that it is 
for the leaders of the Congo — the authentic 
leaders of the Congo — from the various dis- 

°For a Department statement of Jan. 4, 1963, see 
Bulletin of Jan. 21, 1963, p. 91. 

JULY 20. 1964 


tricts, provinces, tribes, traditions, now to pull 
themselves together and form a government 
that can lead that country into the future. 

U.S. Objective in Southeast Asia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to Southeast 
Asia, in tlie event that the Communist forces do 
not heed advice to halt aggression there, what 
further steps do you feel it is necessary for the 
United States to take to preserve the security 
and freedom of these cov/atries? 

A. Well, I find it very difficult to talk with 
any precision about the future. I realize that 
everyone's interest focuses upon the future. 
That is perfectly understandable. 

Wliat is very simple is our purpose in South- 
east Asia. I think the present facts in South- 
east Asia are very clear and are generally 

Now, the reason why we cannot be clear about 
the future is that there are many governments 
and authorities participating in the writing of 
this scenario — the governments and peoples of 
Southeast Asia; the governments members of 
SEATO, of which we are a prominent member ; 
the authorities in Khang Khay, tliat is the 
Pathet Lao authorities in Laos, in Hanoi, 
Peipijig, Moscow; the three governments on 
the ICC [International Control Commission]. 

Therefore, without being in a position to 
know what these various scenario writers are 
gomg to be doing and deciding, it is not possible 
for just one of us to put together a picture of 
the future. 

What seems to me to be very simple is that 
the United States' objective, as President John- 
son stated at his press conference,^ and again 
in his speech on Sunday,* is peace in Southeast 
Asia. That is why we are there. We want a 
peace that will leave the peoples of Laos and 
South Viet-Nam and other countries of that 
region in control of their own destinies. It is 
just as simple as that. A peace that will — in 
which the countries of that area, particularly 
Hanoi and Peiping, will leave their neighbors 
alone. A peace that will make it possible for 

* For a statement made by President Johnson at a 
press conference on June 23, see xbiH., July 13, 1964, 
p. 46. 

* See p. 79. 

the United States to be content with the secu- 
rity of the peoples and governments of that 

And so we have to thiuk about how we can 
best obtain it. 

Now, peace, obviously, is not obtained by 
gomg out and looking for war, although there 
is always the risk of further development in 
dangerous confrontations of this sort. 

Peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia 
without any extension of the fighting. There- 
fore, the first objective of our policy and our 
desire in Southeast Asia is to exploit that possi- 
bility. I say that it ought to be, because there 
are firm agreements, precise agreements, sub- 
scribed to by all those involved in this present 
situation, which were intended to provide peace 
and which could provide peace if they were 
lived up to. 

Peace, on the other hand, cannot be attained 
by acquiescence to aggression. And there is 
aggression in South Viet-Nam, and aggression 
in Laos, in contravention of solemn agreements. 
In both cases this aggression is inspired and 
supplied by the Communist regime in Hanoi, 
with the political backing and help of the Com- 
munist regime in Peiping. 

This violates solemn international commit- 
ments of 1954 and 1962. And so it has to be, 
I think, an object of our policy to make it 
possible for that kind of aggression to be suc- 
cessfully resisted by the people of Southeast 

A third element is the fact that peace in those 
circumstances cannot be obtained by military 
power alone. The Conununists know it. They 
are working on that basis. We know it. We 
are working on that basis. 

And that is why the United States' support 
of the Republic of South Viet-Nam is based 
not on military activity alone but on a broatl- 
based program of economic and i^olitical and 
sociological support for the people and the 
Government of South Viet-Nam. 

And that is why our policy in Laos is based 
on diplomatic efforts to sustain the government 
of Prince Souvamia Phouma and the strength- 
ening of the forces which are opposing the 
Communist Pathet Lao.^ 

" See p. 8S. 



One of the most encouraging elements in that 
situation is that we see no indication, no serious 
indication, of any widespread interest among 
the people of Southeast Asia for any answer 
coming out of Hanoi. 

The problem that the villager in the country- 
side faces in South Viet-Nam is, for example, 
whether he is free to cooperate with the Gov- 
ernment without liaving his throat cut at night. 
Because the Viet Cong are not engaging in any 
serious way the armed forces of South Viet- 
Nam — they are attacking the people and the 
elementary structure of government in the 
coiuitryside, the undefended, unarmed elements 
of the population — the district leader, the 
schoolteacher. And therefore the problem of 
the armed forces is to find and fix in order to 
be able to fight these elusive, hard core of Viet 
Cong^ who may number in the range of some 
30,000, remforced by some volunteers from the 
not, shall we say, professionals. 

But there is no popular wave of interest in 
the political solutions that are offered by Hanoi, 
no desire to pick up communism as a way of 

The problem is that of combining the steady 
building of the structure of life in the country- 
side with the minimum security that makes that 
possible so that life can go on. And in much 
of the country, certainly more than half of the 
country, this is possible and is moving on. 
There are some critical provinces in the delta 
area, for example, where this is not yet pos- 
sible, and a great deal of effort is being ex- 
pended and will be expended on those particular 

And so we are backing to the fullest extent 
the willingness, the readiness, the desire, the 
ability of the peoples of Southeast Asia to work 
out their own way of life. 

Our objectives there, again, are very simple. 

Tlie future is clouded with uncertainty. But 
this is of necessity the case. 

I know that everyone would like to see the 
future clearly. So would we in government. I 
am sure other governments would like to do the 
same. But perhaps mercifully that is withheld 
from ordinary human beings, and we don't have 
the crystal balls that will tell us what all those 
involved in this situation will be doing and de- 
ciding in the next weeks and months. 

But our own purposes and determinations 
there are very simple. 

The U.N. Role in Southeast Asia 

Q. Mr. Secretary., how do you reply to men 
like Senator [Wayne'] Morse who say that the 
United States is an outlaw nation and has he- 
come, in his words, the greatest threat to peace 
in the world hecause nre have not turned the 
Southeast Asia problem over to the United Na- 
tions for settlement? 

A. Well, we had discussions of that in com- 
mittee and elsewhere. 

The United States is pressing for full com- 
pliance with solemn agreements — agreements, 
as in the case of Laos, which have been subject 
to major, persistent, callous violations by the 
other side. All that we want in this situation 
is compliance with those agreements in Laos. 
They were designed for the neutrality, the inde- 
pendence, and the security of that country. 

Now, we, therefore, believe that both our pur- 
poses and our action are in fidl accord with 
international law and international practice in 
these situations. "We are faced by opponents 
who have shown historically a contempt for 
commitments and agreements. So I would not 
suppose there is any real point on the question 
of our being an outlaw. 

As far as the United Nations is concerned, 
the United Nations has been involved in South- 
east Asia in a variety of ways. In 1959 the 
Security Council sent a commission to Laos. 
A U.N. representative has been working for 
some time on the border problems between Cam- 
bodia and Thailand. Last year the General 
Assembly sent a mission of inquiry, you will 
recall, to look into alleged violations of human 
rights in Viet-Nam. 

There is a very substantial U.N. activity going 
on in connection with the development of the 
Lower Mekong Basin, involving several of these 
states. And just 4 weeks ago the Security Coun- 
cil authorized a committee of inquiry to see 
what should be done to avoid further incidents 
on the frontier between Cambodia and South 

" For background, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, 
p. 1002. 

JULY 20, 1964 


Now, on this last instance, the Cambodian 
commission of inquiry, Hanoi and Peiping have 
blasted the very idea of such a commission. 
The Viet Cong along the Cambodian border 
have said that they can't guarantee the safety 
of this commission if they come into areas — 
so-called "liberated" areas — of South Viet-Nam. 
In other words, the other side is saying to the 
United Nations, "Stay out of it ; we are not go- 
ing to let you function." 

The U.N. Charter presupposes that, if there 
is existing machinery for the settlement of dis- 
putes (you might wish to look at article 33), 
the full resources of existing machinery should 
be utilized and exhausted before these matters 
come to the United Nations. Now, there was a 
14-power conference on Laos, for example, and 
those governments are in contact with each other 
in considerable detail about what can be done to 
restore the peace and to bring about compliance 
with the Geneva accords. 

I should thmk that it would be expected that 
if you were to go to the United Nations today, 
for example, on Laos, you would be told to use 
the existing machinery to the fullest and report 
back, or something of that sort; that those who 
have signed the agreement should consult among 
themselves and try to find an answer. 

Further, in the absence of a decision by 
Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbore 
alone, then someone has to assist these coimtries 
in the actual engagement of the enemy, that is, 
the aggressor. 

In general, there has only been one instance, 
and a very special instance, in which the United 
Nations forces, as such, have been able to take 
on what amounted to a combat situation. That 
was in Korea, which was possible because at that 
time the Soviet Union was not sitting at the 
Security Council table and was not there to 
cast a veto. 

I doubt very much that the United Nations 
would be able to put forward forces that would 
give the kind of support that is required in 
Southeast Asia, in the absence of a decision by 
Hanoi and Peiping to come off of it and to abide 
by agreements. 

U.N. forces are extremely valuable in peace- 
keeping operations, in peace-watching opera- 
tions. But operations which are in the presence 

of the kind of fightmg going on in Southeast 
Asia would be something that, I think, the 
United Nations would find very difficult. But 
I would add that, just as the Cambodian case 
came to the Security Council, it is entirely pos- 
sible that some of these other situations might 
come to the U.N. at some point. But the ques- 
tion of timing, and under what circumstances, 
and with what prospect of success, and in the 
light of what proposed United Nations action — 
these matters can be better assessed. 

I don't, at the moment, believe that either the 
Laotian question or the South Vietnamese ques- 
tion can be measurably moved toward a peace- 
ful solution simply by throwing them overnight 
into the U.N. Security Council. 

Optimism on Situation in Soutli Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Atrbbassador [Henry 
Cabot'l Lodge returned from, his post in Saigon 
with some qualijxed o-ptimism about the situa- 
tion in South Viet-Nain. I wondered, sir, if 
you share that sense of optimism,? 

A. Yes, I must say that I do. I am one of 
those people in town who read every day the 
complete and detailed operational report that 
comes in every day fi'om South Viet-Nam — re- 
ports that cover the military operations, the 
political and psychological situation. And I 
must say that, as I read those reports on a day- 
by-day basis, I find myself wondering about the 
morale of the Viet Cong. 

Now, we know tliis is a mean and distressing 
and frustrating kind of contest in which the 
South Vietnamese are engaged and in which we 
are engaged, in wliich we are losing men every 
week. But because it is frustrating for us does 
not mean that it is entirely pleasant for the 
other side. And I think they have very serious 
problems — not only in fact, in terms of losses, 
disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am 
not pessimistic about the situation. It is diffi- 
cult, it is going to take some time, it is going 
to take more of the heroic job being done by 
South Vietnamese and Americans and others 
in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of 
despair whatever. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated a reasonably 
relaxed hands-off attitude toward the possible 



emergence of M. Tshoinbe as a figure in the 
Central Government. Would you feel equally 
relaceed about Mr. [Antoine] Gisenga''s 7'elease 
and return to political life? 

A. Well, I wondered whether I should com- 
ment at all about Mr. Tshombe as an individ- 
ual, because I would be inviting a list of other 
personalities there. 

"VVhy don't we just wait and see how these 
consultations among Congolese leaders will 
work out? If it is Mr. Gizenga, then I can 
think of another dozen that can be named. I 
don't want to go into a political glossary of the 
Congo at a time when they are all discussing 
with each other. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. Some of the confusion and concern in this 
country about Southeast Asia seems to stem, 
from the fact that the administration bloivs 
hot and cold on the issue. Last week the em- 
2)hasis seemed to be on our willingness to go to 
war to protect our interest and position in 
Southeast Asia. This xoeek the evnpJmsis seems 
to be on our passion for peace and the fact that 
there are no military solutions out there for tlie 
problem. How do you explain what seems to 
be very inconsistent about the approach here? 

A. "Well, I don't want to engage myself in 
a debate about the problems faced by you gen- 
tlemen when you are reporting stories on the 
pressures of deadlines and so forth, but let me 
point out to you that these changing fads may 
be changing trends in the way in which entire 
speeches are reported. For example, when the 
President was speaking the other day, I saw 
fewer references than I would have suspected — 
than I would have expected — to his sentence in 
which he said, ". . . as long as I am President, 
I will spare neither my office nor myself in the 
quest for peace," " in connection with the pre- 
ceding sentence that talked about the necessity 
for risking war. 

I tliink if you take full paragraplis — and 
I am thinking now of the President's Jime 23d 
statement, his opening statement on Viet- 

' See p. 79. 

Nam — that the context has been complete. I 
think everyone knows that what we want is 
peace out in that part of the world. Everyone 
knows that it's a risky and dangerous situation. 
Everyone knows that much depends upon what 
others are going to decide, just as well as on 
what we do. 

Now, I don't know how you can parse the 
future any more precisely than tliat. Let's see. 
But there is no doubt about our own objective 
there. And I'm not aware of any differences 
of weight being given week by week to these 
various elements in the situation. The pur- 
pose remains the same. 

Supervision of South Viet-Nam Borders 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech today Ambas- 
sador Lodge said the proper supervision of the 
borders between South Viet-Nam and its neigh- 
bors toas absolutely essential for ending aggres- 
sion in Viet-Nam and achieving peace in South- 
east Asia. Do we have any new measures., or 
any new ways of carrying out old mesawres, 
which will effectively meet this need of super- 
vising the borders? 

A. You will recall at the Security Council 
when this question came up we proposed as one 
of the solutions there a U.N. force on the order 
of, say, 1,200 men which would be able to assist 
in watching and policing those borders, in order 
that those frontiers would not be violated in 
either direction, that Cambodia's neutrality 
would be fully guaranteed not only against the 
South Vietnamese armed forces, who might 
have been involved in one or two incidents 
across those borders, but against the Viet Cong, 
who have abused those borders. 

But there was not sufficient support in the 
United Nations to constitute that kind of force. 
\Vliat was done was to send a commission of 
three members — the Ivory Coast, Brazil, and 
Morocco — to go out and have a look at this 
border situation and make recommendations. 
Now, we know that the authorities in Saigon 
have not the slightest interest in committing 
incidents across the border of Cambodia. We 
also know that the Viet Cong operate — they 
cross back and forth across those borders, and, 
when the Viet Cong and the forces of South 

JULT 20, 1964 


Viet-Nam get into a scrap along those borders, 
the fighting can go across the border. And this 
creates a great distress, quite understandably, 
in Phnoni Penli. 

So we would like to see effective steps taken 
to insure the integrity of those borders from 
any quarter. And we know that Saigon would 
welcome such steps, because it would be a great 
relief from their point of view. And this would 
be an additional insurance to Prince Sihanouk 
that no one is plotting against the integrity of 
the borders of Cambodia, because this just isn't 
in the picture — that is, no one in the 

The Cyprus Situation 

Q. Mr. Secretary., how do you visualise pre- 
cisely Mr. [Dean] Acheson^s role in the Cyprus 
situation, and how do you visualise precisely 
General de GauUe^s role in the Cyprus situa- 

A. Well, I'm not entirely clear that either one 
of them has a very operational role at the 
moment. Wliat we have been concerned with is 
that there be peace on the island that would give 
all the parties a chance to get in touch somehow 
with each other, primarily through the United 
Nations media, to try to find a permanent solu- 
tion of that baffling and dangerous situation. 

Now, two of the parties involved are NATO 
members — Greece and Turkey — and it may be 
that friends of Greece and Turkey can be of 
some assistance in helping the U.N. mediator 
find some points of common interest or common 
contact in this situation. But this is a matter 
that is still for discussion and still under ne- 
gotiation. And I think there is very little that 
I can add this afternoon on that point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. As far as General de Gaulle is concerned, 
I'm not informed of any particular role that he 
is playing or plans to play. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we havenH heard much 
about Cuba here recently. Could you give us 
your latest report on the progress of Soviet 
troop withdrawals from Cuba, and also has the 
Soviet Union directly or indirectly given the 

United States an idea of how they plan to dis- 
pose of those SAM Tnissiles in Cuba? 

A. No. I can only refer you to what the Presi- 
dent said in his recent press conference 
[April 23]. The Soviet military personnel, we 
believe, are leaving the island steadily, that 
there are further withdrawals. We are not 
getting into the numbers game that you re- 
member of some months ago. 

But on your last point, as to whether the 
Soviets have informed us about the disposition 
of the SAM sites, they have not informed us 
of the dispositions they have made or have in 

Gentlemen, as you know, I have a ceremony 
coming up in a few minutes in comiection with 
the 40th anniversary of the Rogers Act estab- 
lishing the Foreign Service. So if you will ex- 
cuse me, I think I will withdraw. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Consultations Held at Vientiane 
on Situation in Laos 

Joint Conn/mu/nique ^ 

On May 26, 1964 the British Charge d'Af- 
f aires in Vientiane, acting as representative of 
the British Co-Chairman of the International 
Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian 
Question held at Geneva in 1961/62, and in re- 
sponse to a request from the Prime Minister of 
Laos in a letter of May 19 addressed to the 
representatives of both Co-Chairmen, invited 
representatives of each of the signatory powers 
to attend consultations under Article 4 of the 
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed 
at Geneva on July 23, 1962.= The consultations 
opened at the British Embassy in Vientiane on 
June 2 and the final meeting was held on June 
29. They were presided over by the British 
Charge d'Affaires. 

2. Heads of Mission representing the Gov- 
ernments of Canada, Thailand, the U.S.A. and 

^ Released at Vientiane, Laos, on June 29. 

'For text, see Buixetin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 



the Kepublic of Vietnam took part in the con- 
suhations on the basis of this invitation. 

3. The Ambassador of India also partici- 
pated in the consultations on the understanding 
that : 

(A) He regarded the consultations merely as 
informal consultations among ambassadors of 
certain Geneva powers in Vientiane; 

(B) He did not regard the ambassadors' 
meetings in Vientiane as consultations en- 
visaged under Article 4 of the Geneva Dec- 
laration, nor as a substitute for a 14-power 
international conference which his Government 
strongly supported ; 

(C) His participation would be aimed at, 
besides an exchange of views on the situation in 
Laos, the convocation of 14-power consultations 
under Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration and/ 
or an international conference. 

The Ambassador of India was consequently 
unable to associate himself with any statement 
in the nature of a finding on the military situa- 
tion as set out in paragraph 6 below or with any 
proposal concerning matters of which the 
I.C.S.C. [International Commission for Super- 
vision and Control in Laos] was or should be 
seized, in view of India's status as a supervisory 
power and chairman of the I.C.S.C. He ex- 
pressed the view that the Commission was the 
only body charged by the Geneva Conference to 
make investigations into violations of the cease- 
fire and to furnish appropriate reports to the 
Co-Chairmen. He also expressed the view that 
the Commission should be requested to make a 
speedy investigation into the present military 
situation and to report urgently to the Co- 
Chairmen of the Geneva Conference if it had 
not already done so. 

4. The consultations were intended to provide 
for an exchange of views between the partici- 
pating countries aimed at finding ways and 
means to bring about an improvement in the sit- 
uation in Laos, and as a means of supporting 
and strengthening tlie Government of National 
Union. The Prime Minister [Prince Souvanna 
Phouma] held regidar and frequent exchanges 
with the chairman of tlie consultations and the 
Laotian Government made available any infor- 
mation requested by the consultants ; in this way 

the Government was associated with the con- 
sultations, maintaining contact and showing its 
continuing interest in the proceedings. The 
Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction with 
the work carried out during the consultations. 

5. The representatives agreed that the dete- 
riorating military situation in Laos presented a 
grave threat to the peace of South-East Asia. 
They agreed to call on the Co-Chairmen in the 
way each thought appropriate, to do everything 
in their power to urge all parties concerned to 
bring about an immediate cease-fire throughout 
the Kingdom and withdraw all forces to the 
positions which they held before the recent 
fighting. The cease-fire and withdrawal should 
be controlled and verified by the I.C.S.C. 

6. During the meeting a detailed assessment 
of recent developments in the military situation 
was made by the representatives of Canada, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the Kepublic of Vietnam. (India did 
not participate in this assessment for the reasons 
set out in paragraph 3 above.) On the basis 
of this assessment the five representatives con- 
demned the recent Pathet Lao attacks on the 
neutralist forces of General Kong Le, attacks 
clearly made with North Vietnamese assistance, 
as being in flagrant violation of the Geneva 
Agreements. In the course of this study evi- 
dence was produced concerning the use by NortJi 
Vietnam of Laos teiTitory to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Eepublic of Vietnam. 
The conclusions of the assessment and the action 
whicli these representatives are recommending 
in the way each thinks appropriate to the Co- 
Chairmen are set out in the document annexed 
to this communique. 

7. The representatives were agreed that the 
Geneva Agreements, if carried out in a con- 
structive spirit, provide the necessary frame- 
work to assure the sovereignty, independence, 
neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the 
Kingdom of Laos. They considered, in rela- 
tion to the work of the I.C.S.C. and the duties 
imposed on it by the Geneva Protocol, certain 
recommendations that might be made to the 
Commission by the Co-Chairmen under Article 
8 of the Protocol. They considered in partic- 
ular recommendations relating to : the resump- 

JULY 20, 1964 


tion of full participation in the work of the 
Commission by the Polish Commissioner; the 
importance of the continued and effective func- 
tioning of the Commission in full enjoyment 
of security and immunity for members of the 
Commission and its personnel; the provision 
of all facilities to the Commission to move with- 
out hindrance in Laos for the purpose of carry- 
ing out investigations; and the according of 
maximum co-operation by the Koyal Laotian 
Government and all political groups in Laos to 
the Commission in order to enable it to perform 
its functions under the Geneva Agreements. 

8. The representatives looked forward to a 
stabilization of the political situation in Laos 
which would ensure the willing co-operation of 
all the principal political groups in the country 
and enable the Government of National Union, 
with Prince Souvanna as Prime Minister, to dis- 
charge its responsibility for the execution of the 
cease-fire as contemplated under Article 9 of 
the Protocol to the Geneva Declaration on the 
Neutrality of Laos. To this end they expressed 
the hope that an early meeting could be held be- 
tween the leaders of the political parties and 
urged the Co-Chairmen to use their influence to 
bring this about. 

9. The meeting also discussed on an explora- 
tory basis and without commitment the nature 
of prior conditions that would be necessary if 
agreement were ultimately to be reached on the 
holding of a new international conference on 
the Laotian question. In this context refer- 
ence was also made to other proposals for con- 
sultations on the Laotian question. 

Caix fob Ceasefire and Withdrawal ' 

The undersigned representatives of the signatories 
of the Geneva Accords meeting in Vientiane have, at 
the request of the Prime Minister of Laos, studied re- 
cent developments in the military situation in Laos 
with particular attention to the breaches of the terms 
of the Geneva declaration on the neutrality of Laos 
on July 23, 1962 and the protocol to this declaration. 
They have reached the following conclusions : 

(1) There has been a general offensive by Pathet 
Lao forces in the Plain of Jars area and eastern Xieng 

' Signed on June 20 by the representatives of Canada, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

Khouang province which started at the beginning of 
February 1964, culminated in a large scale attack 
launched on May 16, and is still continuing. This gen- 
eral offensive is in accordance with the pattern of 
encroachment by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese 
forces which has been observed since the signature of 
the Geneva agreements in July, 19(52. 

(2) The Neutralist forces of General Kong Le are at 
present grouped in areas to the west and south of the 
Plain of Jars, where they are continuing to resist at- 
tacks. Pathet Lao propaganda that these forces have 
been wiped out is thus demonstrably untrue. 

(3) Though the Neutralist forces of General Kong 
Le have suffered some individual desertions, there were 
no defections of units as claimed by the Pathet Lao. 

(4) The so called "true Neutralist" forces of Colonel 
Deuane are not numerically strong enough nor have 
they the equipment to have launched unaided an attack 
of the scale tiat has taken place against a much larger 
force, well equipped and supported by artillery, tanks, 
and attack and transport aircraft of the Royal Laotian 
Air Force, not to mention causing the displacement of 
thousands of refugees. 

(5) There is therefore no truth in the allegations 
that the recent fighting has been between different 
Neutralist factions. 

(6) There is indisputable evidence of North Viet- 
namese involvement in the offensive. This has taken 
the form of North Vietnamese fighting cadres as well 
as extensive logistic support. A study of the Pathet 
Lao forces, the undeveloped area from which they are 
forced to recruit and the lack of any industrial capa- 
bility within their territory shows clearly that they 
have been, and still are, incapable of producing the 
sophisticated weapons used by them, or the trained 
technicians or soldiers to serve these weapons. Bear- 
ing in mind the growth of the Pathet Lao forces from 
very small beginnings to their present strength, it is 
obvious that this could only have taken place with tie 
use of instructors from outside and with the inclusion 
of foreign cadres within their organisation to ensure 
their continuous and progressive efficiency. All Pathet 
Lao road communications run into North Viet Nam and 
it Is self-evident that such cadres and logistic support 
come from North Viet Nam and are trained North 
Vietnamese soldiers and technicians. 

(7) As a result of their recent operations the Pathet 
Lao and their allies are in a tactically advantageous 
position from which to conduct further military opera- 
tions and are in fact continuing their offensive. 

(8) There is furthermore firm evidence of the sys- 
tematic use of Lao territory by tlie North Vietnamese 
for the infiltration of men and arms into South Viet 
Nam. This evidence concerned freqtu'nt occasions be- 
tween July 23, 1962 and April 19G4 on which large 
parties of North Vietnamese cadres and combatants 
passed through Laotian territory in breach of Article 
2(1) of the Geneva declaraticm and of Articles 4 and 
6 of the protocol to this declaration. 



2. In the light of these conclusions and of the great 
dangers inherent in the present situation for the sov- 
ereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial 
integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and for the peace of 
South-East Asia as a whole, and acting on behalf of 
their governments, the representatives call for an im- 
mediate end to the fighting throughout Laos. 

3. The representatives agreed to invite the co-Chair- 
men in the way each thought appropriate: 

(a) To address an urgent appeal for an immediate 
ceasefire to all parties in Laos ; 

(b) To call for a withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces 
to the positions held on February 1, 1964 ; 

(c) To call all North Vietnamese forces to withdraw 
from Laotian territory and to desist from any further 
use of Laotian territory for the purpose of interfering 
in the internal affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam ; 

(d) To call on the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control to submit a report on the sit- 
uation without delay ; 

(e) To provide general guidance to the International 
Commission for Supervision and Control to assist it 
in its duties to control and verify the ceasefire and 
withdrawal under (b) and (c) above, and to report to 
the co-Chairmen on the action it takes (drawing atten- 
tion to any hindrance encountered in the carrying out 
its duties) on the observance of the ceasefire and on 
the progress made with and date of completion of the 
withdrawal ; 

( f ) To call on the Royal Lao Government authorities 
and on all military commanders and other persons 
exercising authority in any area of Laos which the 
Commission judges it necessary to visit in carrying out 
the request at (e) to give the Commission every assist- 
ance in its task. 

missions in Dar-es-Salaam that diplomatic rep- 
resentatives who had presented their creden- 
tials to President [Julius] Nycrere of Tangan- 
yika before April 26 are now regarded Jis 
being accredited to the United Republic of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar and that there is no 
need to present fresh credentials. 

Frank C. Carlucci, who has been the Ameri- 
can Charge in Zanzibar, will remain as U.S. 

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits 

Malagasy Republic and Malawi 

The Department of State announced on July 1 
(press release 305) that Assistant Secretary 
Williams would depart that day for a 1-week 
visit to the Malagasy Republic and to Malawi. 
He will visit the Malagasy Republic on July 3 
and 4 before going to Nyasaland on July 5 as 
a member of the official U.S. delegation to the 
ceremonies in which Nyasaland becomes the 
independent nation of Malawi. 

U.S. Presents Independence 
Gifts to Malawi 

U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar 
Converted to Consulate 

Press release 302 dated June 29 

The State Department announced on June 29 
that on June 27 the United States Embassy, 
Zanzibar, was converted to a consulate. 

This action came in response to a request 
from the Government of the United Republic 
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar that aiTange- 
ments be made by those comitries having em- 
bassies in Zanzibar to convert their embassies 
to consulates. 

The Government of the United Republic of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar has also informed 
the American Embassy and other diplomatic 

Following is the text of a statement made hy 
Rufxhs E. Clement, Personal Representative of 
the President of the United States, at the pres- 
entation of the United States'' independence 
gifts to Malawi at Blantyre, Malawi, on July If.. 
Dr. Clement is president of Atlanta University. 

Press release 314 dated July 3, for release July 4 

It is a great privilege and a joy for me to 
be here in this lovely land, among the people 
of Malawi, as we celebrate your great move into 
the community of independent nations. 

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago this 
day, July 4, 1776, the United States of America 
shed its colonial bonds. As Americans at home 
and abroad commemorate our national in- 
dependence, I have a special honor. President 

JULY 20, 3 964 


Lyndon B. Jolanson has asked me, as his Per- 
sonal Representative and as America's Special 
Ambassador, to present to you, Mr. Prime 
Minister [Dr. H. Kamuzii Banda], our coun- 
try's independence gifts to the people of 

Our gifts are radio broadcasting equipment 
and mobile health facilities, which are intended 
respectively to expand Malawi's mass communi- 
cations and popular education services and to 
help increase the physical welfare and general 
well-being of your people. 

Mindful of Malawi's need for nationwide 
communications, we are presenting to you two 
medium-wave radio broadcasting transmitters, 
as well as relay equipment and towers. To help 
assure eifective operation of these installations, 
my country's gifts also comprise a certain num- 
ber of related teclinical training scholarships. 

With these new facilities, which will begin 
operation next October, Malawi will have a 
greatly increased capacity to see that its citizens 
in all regions know more about their homeland 
and about the events shaping their continent 
and the world in which we live. A related and 
equally important potential of this broadcast 
equipment is that of popular instruction by 
radio, which accords with Malawi's educational 
development program. 

Mindful of your desire to improve the health 
and thereby the productive capacity of your 
people, our gift of a mobile medical unit com- 
bines a self-sufficient X-ray unit with mobile 
medical clinic facilities. 

These gifts reflect the United States' desire 
to help Malawi speed its development. Politi- 
cally and economically strong nations in Africa, 
we believe, are in the best interests of the people 
of Africa and of the United States. 

In its careful pursuit of independence, 
Malawi has clearly indicated its desire for a 
nationhood in which all of its people's welfare 
will be increased. It is with much pleasure 
that I now present these gifts to the Govern- 
ment and people of Malawi. May they serve 
you well. 

Rumania Makes Final Payment 
Under 1960 Financial Agreement 

Press release 308 dated July 2 

On July 1 the Rumanian Govermnent made 
a payment of $500,000 to the Government of 
the United States, thus completing its payment 
obligations under a financial agreement con- 
cluded between the United States and Rumania 
on March 30, 1960.^ 

The 1960 agreement provided for Riunanian 
payment of $24,526,370 on a lump-sum basis in 
settlement of the claims of U.S. nationals aris- 
ing out of war damage, nationalization, and 
commercial and financial debts. The lump-sum 
settlement included $22,026,370 in assets of the 
Rumanian Government and Rumanian corpora- 
tions which had been blocked in the United 
States during World War II, and $2,500,000 to 
be paid by the Rxunanian Government to the 
U.S. Government in five installments between 
July 1, 1960, and July 1, 1964. 

President Increases Membership 
of Trade Negotiations Committee 


Amendment op Executive Order No. 11143, Relating 
TO THE Public Advisory Committee fob Trade 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President 
of the United States, it is ordered that Executive 
Order No. 11143 of March 2, 1964" (29 F.R. 3127), be, 
and it is hereby, amended by substituting "45 mem- 
bers" for "40 members" in subsection (b) of Section 1 
thereof (48 CFR § 2.1(b) ). 

The White House, 

'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4451. 

' No. 11159 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 8137. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 506. 




United States and NATO Members Sign New Agreement 
for Cooperation in Exchange of Atomic Information 

Following are texts of a message to the Con- 
gress from President Johnson concerning a 
neio agreement between the parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding 
atomic information, togetlier with accompany- 
ing documents and the text of the agreement. 


White House press release dated June 30 

Letter of Transmittal 

To the Congress of the United States : 

On May 16, 1964, the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission jointly recommended to me, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of State, a pro- 
posed new agreement to provide for cooperation 
in the exchange of atomic information with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its 
member nations. 

The new agreement will supersede an exist- 
ing agreement executed in 1955,^ and will do 
two things : 

a. It will extend the types of information 
which we can exchange with NATO. This ex- 
panded area of information is needed to enable 
our Allies to make effective use of nuclear de- 
livery systems being provided them by the 
United States under bilateral procedures and 
agreements following creation of NATO atomic 
stockpiles in 1957. 

b. It will permit NATO member countries 
to share in information which the U.S. has 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3521. 

hitherto been exchanging only with the NATO 
organization itself under the 1955 agreement. 
This will make these countries' role in alliance 
plannmg in the nuclear field more effective. 

This new agreement thus represents a logical 
and useful step in our continuing and varied 
efforts to ensure wider Allied participation in 
NATO nuclear defense. Such wider partici- 
pation is necessary on both military and politi- 
cal grounds. It is needed to enhance the ef- 
fectiveness of NATO defense. On political 
grounds, it is needed to reinforce NATO co- 
hesion by meeting our Allies' legitimate desire 
to make a constructive contribution to nuclear 

Therefore, I have authorized the Secretary 
of State to execute this new agreement between 
the Government of the United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its 
member nations to provide for the cooperation 
relevant to the exchange of atomic information 
for NATO planning purposes. 

In accordance with the Atomic Enei-gy Act 
of 1954, as amended, I am submitting to each 
House of the Congress an authoritative copy 
of the signed agreement, together with a letter 
from the Secretai-y of State, a copy of the joint 
letter from the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
recommending my approval of the agreement, 
and a copy of my approval memorandum. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
June 30, 196 ^. 


Letter to the President From Secretary Rusk 

June 22, 1964 
Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to 
forwai'd to you with a view to its transmission 
to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Infor- 
mation [Energy] Act of 1954, as amended, an 
authoritative copy of an agreement between the 
Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty for co- 
operation regarding atomic information. 

The Agreement was signed on behalf of the 
United States on June 18, 1964, pursuant to the 
authorization granted in your memorandum of 
May 19 to the Secretaiy of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
A copy of this memorandmn was transmitted 
to the Department of State. 

A total of ten nations have signed the Agree- 
ment and the remaining member states are ex- 
pected to sign in the near future. 
Faithfully yours. 

Dean Rusk 

Letter to the President From Chairman of Atomic 
Energy Commission and Secretary of Defense 

May 18, 1964 
Dear Mr. President: There is hereby sub- 
mitted for your consideration and approval a 
proposed agreement between the Government 
of the United States and the other parties to 
the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation re- 
garding atomic information. 

The proposed Agreement would supersede 
the "Agreement Between the Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regard- 
ing Atomic Information" signed in Paris on 22 
June 1955. In 1958, the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 was amended by Public Law 85-479 
to permit increased cooperation with our allies. 
While the 1955 Agreement played an impor- 
tant part in enabling the United States to com- 
municate to NATO certain atomic information 
necessary to the Alliance, the proposed new 
Agreement will provide for more extensive co- 
operation by permitting the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the individual NATO 
member nations to receive the kind of atomic 
information that is necessary to an increasing 
understanding and knowledge of and participa- 
tion in the political and strategic consensus 

upon which the collective military capacity of 
the North Atlantic Alliance depends. 

This agreement establishes an improved 
framework luider which such cooperation may 
be carried out. In accordance with the pro- 
visions of Section 144b. of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, Article I of the Agree- 
ment provides that the United States will, while 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization con- 
tinues to make substantial contributions to the 
mutual defense and security, cooperate by com- 
municating to the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization and its Member States, while they 
continue to make such contributions, atomic in- 
formation in accordance with this Agreement, 
provided the United States Government deter- 
mines that such cooperation will promote ana 
will not constitute an imreasonable risk to its 
defense and security. 

Article II provides tliat other NATO nations 
will, to the extent they determine necessary, 
transmit atomic information of their own origin 
and of the same types as provided for in the 
proposed Agreement under terms and condi- 
tions the same as, or similar to, those in the 
proposed Agreement. 

Article III of the Agreement provides for 
the communication of atomic information 
necessary to the development of defense plans, 
the training of personnel in the employment of 
and defense against atomic weapons and other 
militai-y applications of atomic energy; the 
evaluation of the capabilities of potential ene- 
mies in the employment of atomic weapons and 
other military applications of atomic energy; 
and the development of compatible delivery sys- 
tems for atomic weapons. 

Article IV of the Agreement stipulates that 
the cooperation under the Agreement will be 
carried out by the United States in accordance 
with its applicable laws, and makes clear that 
there will be no transfer under the Agreement of 
atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic 
weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic 
weapons systems involving Restricted Data. 
This Article also provides that the information 
conunmiicated by the United States shall be used 
exclusively for the preparation or implementa- 
tion of NATO defense plans or activities and 
the development of deliverj' systems in the 


department of state bulletin 

common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Article V of the proposed Agreement outlines 
the procedures for the safeguarding of informa- 
tion commimicated under the Agreement. It 
is significant to note that the infonnation trans- 
mitted under the Agreement shall not be com- 
municated or exchanged by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization or persons under its juris- 
diction to any unauthorized persons or beyond 
the jurisdiction of that organization except that 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may 
communicate, unless it is otherwise specified by 
the United States, information to its member 
nations as is necessary to carry out functions 
related to NATO missions. This article also 
provides that the member nations will not com- 
municate information received under this agree- 
ment to unauthorized persons or beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Member States concerned. 
Member States may, however, communicate such 
information to the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization or, when authorized by the United 
States, to other Member States requiring the in- 
formation for functions related to NATO 

Article VI provides that other provisions of 
the Agreement notwithstanding, the United 
States may stipulate tlie degi-ee to which any 
atomic information made available under the 
Agreement may be disseminated to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization or its Member 

Under Article XI the proposed Agreement 
would supersede the 1955 NATO Agreement 
and all information previously transmitted 
under the tenns of the 1955 Agreement would 
be considered to have been communicated under 
the new Agreement. 

The new Agreement would remain in force 
until terminated by unanimous agreement of 
the parties or superseded by another agreement. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
making and the NATO Member States, in 
participating with the United States in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are 
making substantial and material contributions 
to the mutual defense and security. It is the 
view of the Department of Defense and the 
Atomic Energy Commission that this Agree- 

ment is entirely in accord with the provisions of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It 
is the considered opinion of the Department of 
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission 
that the performance of the proposed Agree- 
ment will promote and will not constitute an 
imreasonable risk to the common defense and 
security. Accordingly, it is recommended that 
in accordance with Section 123b. of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, you : 

A. Determine that the performance of the 
proposed Agreement will promote and will not 
constitute an imreasonable risk to the common 
defense and security of the United States ; and 

B. Approve the proposed Agi-eement and au- 
thorize its execution for the Government of the 
United States in a maimer designated by the 
Secretary of State. 

The Secretary of State concurs in the fore- 
going recommendations. 

Respectfully yours, 

Glexn T. Seaborg 


Atomic Energy 


Robert S. McNamara 

Secretary of Defense 

Memorandum of Approval 

May 19, 1964 
Memorandum for The Secretary or Defense 
The Chairman, Atomic 
Energy Commission 

Subject : New NATO 144b Agreement 

In your joint letter to me of May 18, 1964, 
you recommended that I approve a proposed 
new NATO 144b Agreement between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America and 
all other member states of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, for cooperation relevant 
to the exchange of atomic infonnation for 
NATO planning purposes. 

Having considered your joint recommenda- 
tions and the cooperation provided for in the 
proposed new agreement, including security 
safeguards and other terms and conditions of 
the agi'eement, I hereby : 

(1) deteiTuine that the performance of this 
proposed new agreement will promote and will 



not constitute an imreasonable risk to the com- 
mon defense and security ; and 

(2) approve the proposed agreement and au- 
thorize its execution for the Government of the 
United States in a manner designated by the 
Secretary of State. 

Ltndox B. Johnson 




The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
Washington on 4th April, 1949, 

Recognising that their mutual security and defence 
requires that they be prepared to meet the contin- 
gencies of atomic warfare, and 

Recognising that their common interest will be ad- 
vanced by making available to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and its member states informa- 
tion pertinent thereto, and 

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was prepared 
with these piiri)oses in mind, 

Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

Agree as follows : 

Article I 
In accordance with and subject to the requirements 
of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, the Government of the United States of 
America will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation continues to make substantial and material 
contributions to the mutual defence and security, co- 
operate by communicating, from time to time, to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member 
states, while they continue to make such contributions, 
atomic information in accordance with the provisions 
of this Agreement, provided that the Government of 
the United States of America determines tliat such 
co-operation will promote and will not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to its defence and security. 

Abticle II 
Paralleling the undertaking of the Government of 
the United States of America under this Agreement, 
the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization will, to the extent they deem necessary, 
communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Orguniza- 
tion, including its military and civilian elements, and 
to member states atomic information of their own 
origin of the same types provided for in this Agree- 
ment. The terms and conditions governing these com- 
munications by other member states will be the subject 

of subsequent agreements, but will be the same or 
similar to the terms and conditions specified in this 

Abticle III 
The Government of the United States of America 
will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, including its military and civilian elements, 
and to member states of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization requiring the atomic information in con- 
nection with their functions related to NATO missions, 
such atomic information as is determined by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America to be neces- 
sary to: 

( a ) the development of defence plans ; 

(b) the training of personnel in the employment 
of and defence against atomic weapons and other 
military applications of atomic energy ; 

(c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential 
enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and 
other military applications of atomic energy ; and 

(d) the development of delivery systems compatible 
with the atomic weapons which they carry. 

Article IV 

1. Co-operation under this Agreement will be carried 
out by the Government of the United States of America 
in accordance with its applicable laws. 

2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer 
by the Government of the United States of America of 
atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, 
or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems in- 
volving Restricted Data. 

3. The atomic information communicated by the 
Government of the United States of America pursuant 
to this Agreement shall be used exclusively for the 
preparation or implementation of NATO defence plans 
and activities and the development of delivery systems 
in the common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Article V 

1. Atomic information communicated pursuant to 
this Agreement shall be accorded full security protec- 
tion under applicable NATO regulations and proce- 
dures, agreed security arrangements, and national 
legislation and regulations. In no case will the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization or its member states 
maintain security standards for the safeguarding of 
atomic information less restrictive than those set forth 
in the pertinent NATO security regulations and other 
agreed security arrangements in effect on the date this 
Agreement comes into force. 

2. The establishment and co-ordination of the se- 
curity programme in all NATO military and civilian 
elements will be effected under the authority of the 
North Atlantic Council in conformity with procedures 
set forth in agreed security arrangements. 

3. Atomic information communicated by the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America pursuant to this 
Agreement will be made available through channels for 



communicating atomic information now existing or as 
may be hereafter agreed. 

4. Atomic information communicated or exchanged 
pursuant to this Agreement shall not be communicated 
or exchanged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthor- 
ized persons or, except as provided in paragraph 5 of 
this article, beyond the jurisdiction of that 

5. Unless otherwise specified by the Government of 
the United States of America, United States atomic 
information provided to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization may be communicated by the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization to its member states as 
necessary to carry out functions related to NATO mis- 
sions, provided that dissemination of such atomic in- 
formation within such member states is limited to those 
specific individuals concerned with the NATO missions 
for which the information is required. Member states 
agree that atomic information so received from the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or otherwise pur- 
suant to this Agreement will not be transferred to un- 
authorised persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the 
recipient member state ; however, such information 
may be communicated to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization or, when authorised by the Government 
of the United States of America, to other member states 
requiring the information for functions related to 
NATO missions. 

Article VI 
Other provisions of this Agreement notwithstanding, 
the Government of the United States of America may 
stipulate the degree to which any of the atomic infor- 
mation made available by it to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization or member states may be dis- 
seminated, may specify the categories of persons who 
may have access to such information, and may impose 
such other restrictions on the dissemination of infor- 
mation as it deems necessary. 

Article VII 

1. A Party receiving atomic information under this 
Agreement shall use it for the purposes specified herein 
only. Any inventions or discoveries resulting from 
possession of such information on the part of a recipi- 
ent Party or i)ersons under its jurisdiction shall be 
made available to the Government of the United States 
of America for defence purposes without charge in 
accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed 
and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the pro- 
visions of Article V of this Agreement. 

2. The application or use of any information com- 
municated under this Agreement shall be the responsi- 
bility of the Party receiving it; the Party communi- 
cating the information does not provide any indemnity 
or warranty with respect to its application or use. 

Article VIII 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to 
supersede or otherwise affect bilateral agreements be- 

tween Parties to this Agreement providing for co-oper- 
ation in the exchange of atomic information. 

Article IX 
For the purposes of this Agreement : 

(a) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilising 
atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting 
or propelling the device (where such means is a sepa- 
rable and divisible part of the device), the principal 
purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, 
a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device. 

(b) "Atomic information" to be provided by the 
Government of the United States of America under 
this Agreement means information which is designated 
"Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" by 
the Government of the United States of America. 

Article X 

1. This Agreement shall enter ilito force upon receipt 
by the Government of the United States of America of 
notification from all Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty that they are willing to be bound by the terms 
of the Agreement. 

2. The Government of the United States of America 
will inform all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, 
and will also inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation, of each notification and of the entry into force 
of this Agreement. 

3.. This Agreement shall remain in force until termi- 
nated by unanimous agreement or superseded by 
another agreement, it being understood, however, that 
termination of this Agreement as a whole shall not 
release any Party from the requirements of this Agree- 
ment to safeguard information made available pur- 
suant to it. 

Article XI 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI (4) of 
the Agreement between the Parties to the North At- 
lantic Treaty for Co-oiJeration regarding Atomic In- 
formation, signed in Paris on 22nd June, 19.5."), the pres- 
ent Agreement shall upon its entry into force supersede 
the above-mentioned Agreement, it being understood, 
however, that information communicated under that 
Agreement shall be considered for all purposes to have 
been communicated under the provisions of this Agree- 

Article XII 

This Agreement shall bear the date on which it is 
opened for signature and shall remain open for signa- 
ture until it has been signed by all the States Parties 
to the North Atlantic Treaty. 

In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives 
have signed the present Agreement on behalf of their 
respective States, members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and on behalf of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Done at Paris this 18th day of June 1964, in the Eng- 
lish and French languages, both texts being equally 

JULY 20, 1964 


authoritative, in a single original which shall be depos- 
ited in the archives of the Government of the United 
States of America. The Government of the United 
States of America shall transmit certified copies 
thereof to all the signatory and acceding States. 

Foreign Policy Aspects 
of U.S. Immigration Laws 

Statement hy Secretary Busk ^ 

I appreciate this opportimit.y to appear be- 
fore yoii to discuss a very important problem. 
I refer to the effect on the operation of our 
foreign policies of the national-origins system 
which is the basis of our immigration laws. 

The administration has proposed in H.R. 7700 
and S. 1932 the progressive elimination of the 
national-origins system from our immigration 
laws. I should like to discuss with you the 
foreign policy aspects of our immigration laws 
and of the administration's proposals from the 
point of view of the Department of State. 
Others will discuss internal or national aspects 
of the achnmistration's proposals. 

Under the national-origins system, the j^ri- 
mary objective was to maintain the etlmic bal- 
ance among the American population as it 
existed in 1920. This system preserves prefer- 
ences based on race and place of birth in the 
admission of quota inmiigrants to the United 
States. This results in discrimination in our 
hospitality to different nationalities in a world 
situation which is quite different from that 
which existed at the time the national-origins 
system was originally adopted. 

Since the end of World War II, the United 
States has been placed in the role of critical 
leadership in a troubled and constantly chang- 
ing world. We are concerned to see that our 
immigration laws reflect our real character and 

What other peoples tliink about us plays an 
important role in the achievement of our foreign 

^ Made before the subcommittee on immigration and 
nationality of the Committee on the Judiciary 
on July 2 (press release 309) . 

policies. We in the United States have learned 
to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of 
their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity, 
and all the other factors which truly determine 
a man's value to society. We do not reflect this 
judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold 
to immigration laws which classify men ac- 
cording to national and geograpliical origiti. 
It is not difficult, therefore, to underetand the 
reaction to this policy of a man from a geo- 
graphical area, or of a national origin, which 
is not favored by our present quota laws. Ir- 
respective of whetlier the man desires to come 
to the United States or not, he gets the impres- 
sion that our standards of judgment are not 
based on the merits of the individual — as we 
proclaim — but rather on an assumption which 
can be interpreted as bias and prejudice. In- 
asmuch as our immigration laws are regarded 
as the basis of how we evaluate others around 
the world, their effect on people abroad, and 
consequently on our influence, can readily be 

There have been times in the past when we 
have been accused of preoccupation with the 
peoples of the West to the neglect of Asian 
peoples in the Far East. Unfortunately, the 
national-origins system gives a measure of sup- 
poi-t and credence to these observations. 

Progressive Liberalization of Iminigration Laws 

Actually, Mr. Chairman, we are not (juite as 
prejudiced as we sometimes appear. Congress 
has progressively liberalized our immigration 
laws to permit the reunion of families. We ad- 
mit the native-born from our sister Republics 
in the Western Hemisphere on a nonquota basis 
witliout discrimination as to origin or place of 
birth. Congress has also found it desirable 
over the years to pass special laws providing 
for the admission, generally on a nonquota 
basis, of immigrants of different races and 
circumstances who have been uprooted and dis- 
placed by political upheavals. In these special 
laws we have exhibited a generosity of spirit 
and a complete absence of concern about the 
origin, race, and place of birth of tlie refugees 
whom we have achnitted to our shores under 
circumstances of need. 

I don't have to remind you, Mr. Chairman, 



and the members of tlie committee, of the fine 
record Congress established in passing tlie Dis- 
placed Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Eelief 
Act in 1953, and the "Fair Share" Refugee- 
Escapee Act in 1960. These acts, for all prac- 
tical purposes, exempted refugees from the 
quota restrictions which would have delayed 
their entry into this country for many yeai-s. 

JNIore recent legislation has clearly reflected 
the intent of the Congi-ess to relieve pressures 
created by quota restrictions. On five separate 
occasions since 1957 the Congress granted non- 
quota status to quota immigrants who had been 
waiting for visas for an extensive period of 
time. Wliile I shall not indulge in a statistical 
presentation, I should like to remind this com- 
mittee that, as a result of this liberalizing policy 
of the Congress, only 34 percent of the 2,599,349 
immigrants who came to the United States from 
1953 through 1962 were quota immigrants. 

What is needed, basically, is to bring our im- 
migration laws into line with the real character 
and disposition of the American people, who 
are at heart and in fact hospitable, kindly dis- 
posed, and interested in all races and cultures. 
This is so because we know from actual experi- 
ence that immigi-ants previously admitted, re- 
gardless of race and place of birth, have made 
their distinctive contribution to what is America 

President Kennedy, in a special message to 
the Congi-ess on July 23, 1963, said : - 

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am 
recommending relates to the national origins system 
of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it hag been used 
to determine the number of quota immigrants per- 
mitted to enter the United States each year. Accord- 
ingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals 
with many problems which require remedial action, it 
concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our 
quota immigration system. The enactment of this 
legislation will not resolve all of our important prob- 
lems in the field of immigration law. It will, how- 
ever, provide a sound basis upon which we can build 
in developing an immigration law that serves the na- 
tional interest and reflects in every detail the principles 
of equality and human dignity to which our nation 

President Jolmson m January 1964 said : ^ 

This bill applies new tests and new standards which 
we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer 
specifically to : What is the training and qualification 

of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of 
a citizen would he make, if he were admitted? What 
is his relationship to persons in the Unitetl States? 
And what is the time of his application? These are 
rules that are full of common sense, common decency, 
which operate for the common good. 

That is why in my state of the Union message last 
Wednesday [January 8, 1964],' I said that I hoiked that 
in establishing preferences a nation that was really 
built by immigrants — immigrants from all lands — 
could ask those who seek to immigrate now : What can 
you do for our country? But we ought to never ask: 
In what country were you born? 

The Administration's Proposals 

The administration's proposal would elimi- 
nate the national-origins system on a gradual 
basis by reducing all established quotas by 20 
percent each year for 5 years. The present 
total of quota authorizations would be main- 
tained, except initially all minimum quotas and 
subquotas would be increased from 100 to 200. 
These minimum quotas would have the 20-per- 
cent reduction each year applied to them. 

A quota reserve pool is established by section 
2 of the bill before the committee, under which 
all numbers would be allocated by the fifth 
year. In each of the 5 years constituting the 
period of transition, the pool would consist of 
(1) the numbers released from national-origin 
quotas each year, under the 20-percent progres- 
sive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned 
to the old quotas but unused the previous year 
because insufficient demand for them existed 
in the assigned quota area. 

Experience has shown that we have approxi- 
mately 50,000 \\sa. numbers annually which are 
unused and are not available for reallocation 
to other quota areas. These unused numbers 
are chiefly from the United Kingdom and Irish 

In tlie fifth year all quota allocations would 
be made from the quota reserve pool, which 
would then become a worldwide quota. So 
that no one country could enjoy a dispropor- 
tionate amoimt of numbers from the pool 
based on registrations of relatively long stand- 
ing, the bill provides that no one country could 

= For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298. 
' For text, see ihid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211. 
* Hill., .Tan. 27, 1964, p. 110. 

JULY 20, 19G4 


receive more than 10 percent of the total author- 
ized quota numbers. 

A strict "first come, first served" basis of al-i 
locating visa quotas would create some prob- 
lems in certain countries of Northern and West- 
ern Europe, which under the national-origins 
system enjoyed a situation where quota num- 
bers were readily available to visa applicants. 
To apply the new principle rigidly would re- 
sult, after a few years, in eliminating immi- 
gration from these countries almost entirely. 
Sucli a result would be undesirable, not only 
because it frustrates the aim of the bill that 
immigration from all countries sliould continue 
but also because many of the comitries so af- 
fected are our closest allies. At a time when 
our national security rests in large part on a 
continual strengthening of our ties with these 
countries, it would be anomalous indeed to re- 
strict opportunities for their nationals here. 
Therefore the bill allows the President to re- 
serve up to 50 percent of the pool reserve for 
allocation to qualified immigrants who coidd 
obtain visas under the present system but not 
under the temis of the bill before the commit- 
tee, and whose admission would further the na- 
tional security interests in maintaining close 
ties with their countries. 

Policy on Asian Immigration 

Also involved in this is the issue of our immi- 
gration policy toward Asian persons, to which 
I now wish to address myself. Perhaps the 
most discriminatory aspect of the present law 
is the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle, which 
requires persons of Asian stock to be attributed 
to quota areas not of their plac« of birth but 
according to their racial ancestry. This fea- 
ture of the present law is indefensible from a 
foreign policy point of view. It represents an 
overt statutoiy discrimination against more 
than one-half of the world's population. 

Here again our request is not that the Con- 
gress drastically depart from existing policy, 
but rather that it pursue to a conclusion a de- 
velopment which began more than 20 years ago. 
As your committee is well aware, the Congress, 
at the request of President Roosevelt, elimi- 
nated in 1943 the Chinese Exclusion Laws and 
established for the first time a quota for the 

immigration of Chinese persons. This well- 
considered and cautious beginning of a revision 
of our policy of excluding Asian persons has 
been followed by progressively liberal amend- 
ments to our laws. In 1952 the drafters of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated 
race as a bar to naturalization and thereby to 
immigration. Asian spouses and cliildren of 
American citizens were given the same non- 
quota status as enjoyed I^y any person of 
non-Asian ancestry. The only discriminatory 
features affecting Asian persons which then 
remained were the establishment of an upper 
limit of 2,000 for the so-called minimum quotas 
in the Asian area, and the rule that the quota 
of an Asian person born outside the Asian 
sphere be governed by ancestry rather than by 
place of birth. The Congress in 1961 removed 
the 2,000 limit on the number of Asian immi- 
grants from minimum quota areas. The only 
remaining discriminatory provision of the law 
now, therefore, is the one requiring that an 
Asian person be charged to an Asian quota even 
if he were born outside the Asian area in a 
quota or nonquota country. 

The restrictive effect of this rule has been 
significantly tempered during tlie last decade as 
a result of the special legislation to which I 
referred earlier. The very liberal policy which 
found expression in these special measures, as 
distinct from the letter of the general law, is 
best illustrated by the volume and composition 
of immigriition from some of tlie major coun- 
tries of the Far East. During the 10-year 
period from 1953 to 1963, a total of 119,677 im- 
migi'ants came to tlie United States from China, 
Japan, and the Philippines. 109,65-4 of these 
were nonquota inmiigrants, and less than 10 
percent were quota inmiigrants. These facts 
may startle those who read in our immigration 
laws that Japan has an annual quota of 185, the 
Philippines a quota of 100, and that China has 
a total of 205 quota numbers a year. Any in- 
crease in the volume of immigration resulting 
from the proposed amendments would be rather 
limited against the actual volume of Asian im- 
migration into the United States between 1953 
and 1963. "We deprive ourselves of a powerful 
weapon in our fight against misinformation if 
wo do not reconcile here too the letter of the law 



with the facts of immigration and thus erase the 
unfavorable impression made by our old quota 
limitation for Asian persons. 

I urge you most earnestly to eliminate this 
last vestige of disci-imination against Asian per- 
sons from our immigration laws. This action 
would bring to a logical conclusion the progres- 
sive policy the Congress has followed since 1943. 

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 

Consistent with the foregoing, I should like 
to urge you to accord equal status to all immi- 
grants born in our American sister Republics. 
It has always been the policy of the Congress 
to recognize the common bond uniting the 
Americas by exempting from any quota restric- 
tions those immigrants who were bom in inde- 
pendent countries of the Westeni Hemisphere. 
Wlien the Congress in 1952 formulated the per- 
tinent provisions of the Immigration and Na- 
tionality Act, it included in the list of nonquota 
countries all those which were independent at 
that time. Meanwhile, our neighbors in the 
Caribbean — Jamaica, and Trinidad and To- 
bago — have become independent. The wording 
of the law required that we proclaim for each of 
these areas quotas of 100. We have had serious 
representations from these countries concerning 
these quota restrictions which are interpreted 
as discriminatory measures. Jamaica and 
Trinidad are among our best friends in this 
hemis|)here, and their friendship is of consider- 
able significance to us. 

Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American 
Affairs Thomas C] Mann will expand upon 
this in later testimony. Mr. Abba P. Schwartz, 
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Con- 
sular Affairs, will also present a statement on 
the refugee aspects of the administration's 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, without going into 
the economic aspects of the administration's 
proposals, on which others will testify, I wish 
to conclude with a few general considerations. 

Present-day immigration is very different in 
volume and makeup from the older migration 
on which most of our thinking is still based; 
and its significance for this country is consider- 
ably different. Immigration now comes in 
limited volume and includes a relatively high 

proportion of older people, females, and persons 
of high skill and training. 

The significance of immigration for the 
United States now depends less on the number 
than on the quality of the immigrants. 

The explanation for the high pi-ofessional 
and teclmical quality of present immigration 
lies in part in the nonquota and preference pro- 
visions of our immigration laws that favor the 
admission of highly qualified migrants. But 
still more it depends on world conditions of 
postwar economic and social dislocations, dis- 
criminations, and insecurities in various parts 
of the world that have disturbed social and 
occupational strata not normally disposed to 
emigrate and have attracted them to the greater 
political freedom and economic opportunity 
offered in the United States. Under present 
circumstances the United States has a rare op- 
portunity to draw migrants of high intelligence 
and ability from abroad; and immigration, if 
well administered, can be one of our greatest na- 
tional resources, a source of manpower and 
brainpower in a divided world. 

It should be emphasized that there has been 
no relaxing of the qualitative criteria for ad- 
missibility to the United States, and that no 
relaxation of these mental, moral, economic, and 
ideological criteria is proposed in S. 1932 or 
H.R. 7700. 

I urge you, Mr. Chainnan, and members of 
this committee, that you give most careful con- 
sideration to the President's proposals em- 
bodied in H.R. 7700 and S. 1932. 



The Senate on July 1 confirmed the following nomi- 
nations : 

Sam P. Gilstrap to be Ambassador to Malawi. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
June 26.) 

U. Alexis Johnson to be Career Ambassador. 

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see De- 
partment of State press release 311 dated July 2.) 

JXTLY 20, 1964 



Consular Convention Ratifications 
Exchanged by U.S. and Japan 

Press release 306 dated July 1, for release July 2 

Instruments of ratification of the consular 
convention between the United States and 
Japan, signed at Tokyo on Marcli 22, 1963, were 
exchanged on July 2 in Wasliington. The ex- 
change was made by Secretary Rusk and the 
Japanese Ambassador, Eyuji Takeuchi, in a 
brief formal ceremony at the Department of 
State. This action completes the procedures 
required for bringing the convention into force. 
By its terms, the convention will enter into 
force on August 1, 1964, 30 days after the ex- 
change of ratifications. 

The convention defines and establishes the 
duties, rights, privileges, exemptions, and im- 
munities of consular officers of each countiy in 
the territory of the other country. The con- 
vention with Japan is comparable to consular 
conventions concluded by the United States 
with other friendly countries in recent years. 

Current Actions 



Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 188.3, as 
revised, for the protection of industrial property. 
Dated at The Hague November 6, 192.5. Entered into 
force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 
1931. 47 Stat. 1789. 

Notification that it considers itself hound: Niger, 
September 10. 1903. 

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of in- 
diustrial property of Marcli 20, 1883, revised at 
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 
1911, at The Hague November (>, 192."), at London 
June 2, 19.34. and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. En- 
tered into force January 4, 19(52. TIAS 4931. 
Adherence deposited: Niger, June 5, 19C4. 


General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes 
and schedules and protocol of provisional applica- 
tion. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. 
TIAS 1700. 

Admitted as contracting party (irith rights and ob- 
ligations dating from independence) : Togo, March 
20, 19<>4. 

Cuba on May 25, JOS.'i, signed the following: 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 19.57.' 

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 



Agreement amending the agreement of April 3, 19.56 
(TIAS .3.571), providing for disposition of equipment 
and materials furnished by the United States under 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of Jan- 
uary 30 and February 9, 1951 ( TIAS 2293) . Effected 
by exchange of notes at Taipei June 3, 1964. En- 
tered into force June 3, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and As.sistance 
Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 USC 1701- 
1709), with exchange of notes of November 18, 1963, 
and June 11, 1964. Signed at Tehran November 17, 
1903. Entered into force November 17, 1963. 


Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo 
March 22, 1963. 

Ratifications e.iehangcd: July 2, 1964. 
Enters into force: August 1, 1964. 

United Kingdom 

Amendment to the agreemenl of June 1.5, 19.55. as 
amended (TIAS 3321, 33.59. 300S, 4078. .5397), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Sigued at Washington June 29. 19<>4. Enters into 
force on the date on which each Government shall 
have received from tlie other written notification 
that it has complied with all statutory and constitu- 
tional requirements for entry into force. 

' Not in force. 



I NDEX July 20, 1964. Vol. LI, No. 1308 

American Principles. The Universal Appeal of 
the Declaration of Independence (Rusk) . . 74 

Atomic Energy. United States and NATO Mem- 
bers Sign New Agreement for Cooperation in 
Exchange of Atomic Information (.Johnson, 
McNamara, Rusk, Seaborg, text of agree- 
jnent) 03 

Bulgaria. Mrs. Anderson Addresses Bulgarian 

People on U.S. Independence Day 78 

Cambodia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of July 1 82 

Claims and Property. Rumania Makes Final 

Payment Under 1960 Financial Agreement . . 92 

Congo (Leopoldville). Secretary Rusk's News 

Conference of July 1 82 


Confirmations (Gilstrap, U. Alexis Johnson, 
Taylor) 101 

Foreign Policy Aspects of U.S. Immigration 

Laws (Rusk) 08 

United States and NATO Members Sign New 
Agreement for Cooperation in Exchange of 
Atomic Information (Johnson, McNamara, 
Rusk, Seaborg, text of agreement) .... 93 

Costa Rica. President Orlich of Costa Rica 
Visits Washington (test of joint com- 
munique) 81 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Gilstrap, U. Alexis Johnson, 
Taylor) , 101 

U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Converted to Con- 
sulate , . 91 

Economic Affairs. President Increases Member- 
ship of Trade Negotiations Committee (text 
of Executive order) 92 

Immigration and Naturalization. Foreign Pol- 
icy Asjiects of U.S. Immigration Laws 
(Rusk) 98 

Japan. Consular Convention Ratifications Ex- 
changed by U.S. and Japan 102 

Laos. Consultations Held at Vientiane on Situa- 
tion in Laos (text of communique) .... 88 

Malagasy Republic. Assistant Secretary Wil- 
liams Visits Malagasy Republic and Malawi . 91 


Assistant Secretary Williams Visits Malagasy 

Republic and Malawi 91 

Gilstrap confirmed as Ambassador 101 

U.S. Presents Independence Gifts to Malawi 

(Clement) , 91 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. United 
States and NATO Members Sign New Agree- 
ment for Cooperation in Exchange of Atomic 
Information (Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Sea- 
borg, text of agreement) 93 

Presidential Documents 

President Increases Membership of Trade Nego- 
tiations Committee 92 

President Orlich of Costa Rica Visits Wash- 
ington 81 

The Single Goal of Peace 79 

United States and NATO Members Sign New 
Agreement for Cooperation in Exchange of 
Atomic Information 93 

Rumania. Rumania Makes Final Payment 

Under 1060 Financial Agreement ..... 92 

Tanganyika. U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Con- 
verted to Consulate 91 

Treaty Information 

Consular Convention Ratifications Exchanged by 

U.S. and Japan 102 

Current Actions 102 

United States and NATO Members Sign New 
Agreement for Coojieration in Exchange of 
Atomic Information (Johnson, McNamara, 

Rusk, Seaborg, text of agreement) 93 

United Nations 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1 . . 82 

The Single Goal of Peace (Johnson) .... 79 


Consultations Held at Vientiane on Situation in 

Laos (text of communique) 88 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1 . . 82 

The Single Goal of Peace (Johnson) ..... 79 

Taylor confirmed as Ambassador 101 

Zanzibar. U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Converted 

to Consulate 91 

Name Index 

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 78 

Clement, Rufus B 91 

Gilstrap, Sam P loi 

Johnson, President 79, 81, 92, 93 

Johnson, U. Alexis lOl 

McNamara, Robert S 94 

Orlich, Francisco J 81 

Rusk, Secretary 74,82,94,98 

Seaborg, Glenn T 95 

Taylor, Maxwell D 101 

Williams, G. Mennen 91 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases, June 29-July 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 


U.S. participation in international 

U.S. Embassy in Zanzibar becomes 

40th anniversary of Foreign Service. 
Exchange of notes with Canada on 

Seaway tolls. 
Williams visits Malagasy Republic 

and Malawi (rewrite). 
Exchange of ratifications of consular 

convention with Japan. 
Rusk : news conference of July 1. 
Rumania makes final payment under 

1960 financial agreement. 
Rusk : statement on immigration 

Battle: "The Need To Explore 

Inner Space" (excerpts). 
Taylor sworn in as Ambassador to 

Viet-Nam (biographic details). 
Anderson : U.S. Independence Day, 

Sofia, Bulgaria. 
Rusk : Independence HaU, Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 
Clement : independence gifts to 


*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bth-letin. 





























Superintendent oi 






1965: International Cooperation Year 

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International 
Cooperation Year." This 5-page pamphlet discusses this theme by pointing out that "international 
cooperation is a fact of life . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century." 

As the pamphlet suggests, "Perhaps we can make two things of the Year: a massive opportunity 
for public education about America's role in international cooperation, and a chance to speed up some 
very concrete tasks on international institution building, by including them as special targets to shoot 
for in 1965." The article concludes by listing 10 specific targets at which we might aim. 





E>ncloeed find $ 

(casli, check, or money order pay- 
able to Snpt of Documents) 


Please send me copies of 1965: International Cooperation Tear, 











Yol. LI, No. 1309 

July 87, J964 



by Assistant Secretary Battle 110 



Statements by William G. Foster 123 


Article by Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett 128 

For index see inside back cover 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on German Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
between Secretary Rusk and Gerd Ruge of the 
All-German Television Network {First) re- 
corded at Washington and hroadcast at Ham- 
burg, Germany, on July 9 as part of a documen- 
tary entitled '"'' Change in the White House — the 
Evolving of American Policy.'''' 

Q. Has there been any change in the process 
of policy and decisionmaking under President 
Johnson? Has President Johnson stressed 
different foreign policy questions from those 
which were important under President 

A. Well, under our constitutional system an 
enormous responsibility falls upon the Presi- 
dent of the United States, and of course each 
President is going to have differences of style 
and differences in his own personal method of 
operation. Well, all Presidents will lean very 
heavily upon the great departments of govern- 
ment and, in the case of foreign policy, upon 
the Department of State. But these differences 
don't affect very much the imderlying basic 
policy of the American people. These policies 

turn upon the kind of country we are, the kind 
of people we are, what we hope for in the 
world ahead of us, on the one side, and then, on 
the other side, the shape of this turbulent world 
scene outside the United States. These policies 
are bipartisan in character. They have been 
consistent since World War II. 

Let me illustrate. The American people 
really do believe that governments derive their 
just power from the consent of the governed. 
This is why we react instinctively to colonial 
questions as we do. This is why we are so 
deeply concerned about what is happening in 
Eastern Europe and why we believe in the self- 
determination of the German people. This is 
why we can get along so much better with 
democracies than with dictatorships, and this 
is why we are concerned about some of our own 
problems in our own society and with not 
living up to this basic idea. 

Another elementary notion in our foreign 
policy is to be found in the United Nations 
Charter. The underlying crisis of our day 
is the picture of the world as devised in the 
United Nations Charter under attack from the 


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Communist notion of a world revolution. Now, 
we are deeply committed to the United Na- 
tions Charter kind of world. We have some 
differences in policy, but these are basically 
nonpartisan in character. 

President Johnson took over after our tragedy 
last November with great understanding of the 
main lines of American policy. He had been 
personally involved in them for the last 15 years, 
and he is active with an energy and a sure hand 
that has given great confidence to all people. I 
think he feels the human aspects of foreign 
policies as much as any President I have seen. 
Because he really does know that foreign policy 
involves every home and every community and 
every country, and his own personal background 
leads liim to feel these matters very deeply be- 
cause he knows that policy is people, and he 
feels that very strongly. As I say, he is a man 
of great energy who doesn't rest imtil he knows 
we liave done everything that we can to bring 
a little peace and decency into a particular 

Q. Do you feel that the present state of 
detente in international relatione is any different 
or any more lading than earlier periods of 
relaxation of tension? 

A. This word detente is a very confusing 
word, and I think we have to be very careful 
about it, because there are those who think that 
we have entered an entirely new chapter. I 
myself don't find that in the present situation. 
It is true that there have been certain agree- 
ments — the nuclear test ban treaty — there is a 
little more trade, perhaps. And we have some 
certain agreements about outer space, a little 
more cooperation, a little more sobriety perhaps 
between the NATO countries, on the one side, 
and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other. 
We still have very large and potentially dan- 
gerous questions unresolved — for example, Ger- 
many and Berlin, Cuba, Southeast Asia — so that 
this struggle, this underlying struggle between 
the forces of freedom and the forces of coercion 
is still with us. Mr. Khrushchev has said there 
is no ideological coexistence, and that means 
that the Communists have not abandoned their 
idea of the world revolution; and so long as 
that is true I think it's very hazardous to speak 

about a detente as though the major problems 
have been solved. They have not been. We 
must use the time we have to try to prepare 
ourselves to find solutions to some of these prob- 
lems. But those solutions have not been yet 

Germany and Eastern Europe 

Q. In xvhat ways can relations with the East- 
em European nations be developed? What can 
Germany'' s role 5e in this process? How would 
this process influence the prohlems of Berlin 
and of a divided Germ/iny? 

A. Oh, I think so. I think the great interest 
all of us have in an area like Eastern Europe — 
and I would include the Soviet Union in this — 
is to try to reinforce the natural and instinctive 
and decent relationships between the people 
themselves. I think one can say with a fair 
confidence that the people of the Warsaw Pact 
countries and the people of the NATO countries 
would like to see peace established, and it is the 
problem of the governments to try to find a way 
to bring about this great desire of people 
on both sides of the Curtain. But there are 

Now, I would think that the smaller coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe do show signs of a nos- 
talgic historic interest in their ties with the 
main center of Western civilization in Western 
Europe. They are part of Europe; they feel 
it from the cultural, scientific, educational im- 
petus and from their background; and to a 
lesser extent they are interested in improving 
their relations with the United States. I think 
this is all to the good. I think one of the most 
important things which happened in the last 
2 years has been the improvement of the rela- 
tions between the Federal Republic and a num- 
ber of the Eastern European countries. This 
is good, not just because here are fellow Euro- 
peans coming into contact with each other; it 
also is a means to reduce that fear of Germany 
which is in the background of the European 
history for the past 50 years. 

So, I think, these are the constructive ideas 
and, as these movements go forward, people's 
attitudes will change and new opportimities 
wUl open up. Now, we know that after 17 

JTJLY 27, 1964 


years of tension that tension has not moved 
toward the reunification of Germany. We 
can't guarantee that a reduction of tension will 
move in that direction, but the more normally 
people can feel toward each other the greater 
are the opportunities to bring up a lasting 
solution to some of these difficult problems. 

Consultation on Problems of Common Interest 

Q. In what ways can the -process of coopera- 
tion and consultation in the Western alliance 
he improved in regard to prohlems of common 
interest in Europe, Southeast Asia, and other 
parts of the world? 

A. Well, I think that — in the first place, let 
me say, I believe that the NATO alliance today 
is just as unified as ever on the central issue of 
security in respect to threats from the East. 
I think there is no problem on that point what- 
ever, and today NATO is stronger in military 
terms than it has ever been in its history. But 
there are some problems of coordination of 
policy. There is the question as to how Europe 
is going to organize itself, and, until that ques- 
tion is answered by Europeans, then we cannot 
be certain as to what the eventual organization 
of NATO ought to be. There are some difficult 
questions arising because in NATO there are 
those who carry very heavy responsibilities in 
other parts of the world — the United States, 
Britain, France, and others. 

We, ourselves, have 42 allies around the globe. 
Now, we believe, sitting where we do and with 
our responsibility, that the interest of the free 
world in the security of free nations is indivisi- 
ble. Therefore we would hope that the NATO 
countries would recognize that, in an area like 
Southeast Asia, what we are trying to do there 
is exactly what we have wanted to do and have 
tried to do successfully in Europe. It is to help 
free countries maintain their security and inde- 
pendence. Now, Europe is a long way away 
from Southeast Asia, and I think in NATO we 
have not yet found a way to develop common 
policies based upon the indivisible interest of 
the free world right around the entire globe. 
We are improving, we have discussed at great 
length, and consultation goes forward, but, as 
yet, we have not found a completely satisfactory 
answer to this rather difficult question. 

Ambassador Kohler Makes Fourth 
of July Address on Moscow TV 

Following is a translation of an address in 
the Russian language made hy American Awr- 
hassador Foy D. Kohler for broadcast on Mos- 
cow television on July 4- 

Good evening, friends. I am grateful for the 
opportunity to speak briefly to you about what 
our national holiday, the Fourth of July, means 
to Americans in the Soviet Union and elsewhere 
around the world. 

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago 
today, delegates from the Thirteen American 
Colonies, meeting in Philadelphia, voted to de- 
clare these colonies free and independent states. 
Already in a state of armed rebellion against the 
British King, they listed their grievances and 
proclaimed their intention to be free. They 
closed their Declaration of Independence with 
these great words : 

And for the support of this declaration, with a firm 
reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we 
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes 
and our sacred Honor. 

Thus began the independent life of the United 
States of America. John Adams, one of the 
revolutionaries, wrote, "The river is passed, and 
the bridge cut away." The American experi- 
ment had begun. Since that Fourth of July, 
1776, the American people, like other people who 
look into their revolutionary past for inspira- 
tion, have always paid special homage to this 
day. Abraham Lincoln, the great emancipator 
of the slaves, once remarked tliat all his politi- 
cal philosophy sprang from the thouglits and 
the ideals of the makers of the American Revo- 
lution. That American philosophy is nowhere 
better summarized than in the words of the 
Declaration itself. "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident," it proclaims, "that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness. Tliat to secure tliese rights, Gov- 
ernments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the 

It therefore seems to us particularly fitting 
that the great congressional debate of our day 



on the question of civil rights has reached a pos- 
itive conclusion on the eve of the Fourth of July. 
When the Senate passed the civil rights bill, 
President Johnson said : ' 

. . . this bill Is a renewal and a reinforcement, a 
symbol and a strengthening of that abiding commit- 
ment to human dignity and the equality of man which 
has been the guiding purpose of the American nation 
for 200 years. 

I am happy to inform you that the day before 
yesterday this bill was signed into law. 

We thus take pride in what representative 
United States Government has accomplished 
this Fourth of July in connection with one of 
the most urgent of American national problems. 
The debate, it would be noticed, took place in 
the American tradition begun in 1776 — pub- 
licly, open to the eyes of the world, and with due 
regard for the processes of law. 

Americans also take heart today in the fact 
that their Government and political system have 
survived the deep and dreadful shock occasioned 
by the violent death of a beloved and respected 
leader. The vitality and continuity of the 
American system have been vividly demonstrat- 
ed since that fateful day in November. With- 
out losing a step and with the overwhelming 
support of the American people, our new Presi- 
dent has moved with vigor and imagination to 
carry forward President Kennedy's passionate 
search for justice without violence at home and 
for peace with honor abroad. 

I know that in this quest for peace we have 
a common goal. As American Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union and as an American citizen 
who has long known and respected the Soviet 
people, I am personally pleased to note — and 
to have participated in — the various small, but 
hopeful, steps we have taken during the past 
year to improve United States-Soviet relations. 
These include, between ourselves, such steps as 
the establishment of the direct line between 
Washington and Moscow, the conclusion of a 
new exchanges agreement, the signing of a con- 
sular convention, a series of agreements to ex- 

' For text of an address made by President Johnson 
at San Francisco, Calif., on June 19, 1964, see White 
House press release dated June 19. 

plore the possibilities of increased scientific co- 
operation in such varied areas as space research 
and desalination; and, with others, such steps 
as the agreement to ban nuclear tests and to 
refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons. 

We believe we must continue to work hard to 
improve understanding between our two great 
peoples. We look forward to the day when there 
will be a free movement of our people back 
and forth. We would like to receive far more 
Soviet citizens in the United States. We have 
much to share with each other, and the ex- 
changes that take place today of writers, 
artists, musicians, doctors, scientists, students, 
athletes, and engineers are only a fraction of 
what we should be doing. 

Americans by nature tend to be optimists. 
We are also realists and do not underestimate 
the seriousness and complexity of the problems 
that divide us in many parts of the world. But 
let me assure you that we have faith that we can 
and must resolve these differences without war. 
Only peace will give our two peoples the chance 
to realize in full measure the rights in which we 
believe, and the basic aspirations I am sure we 
share, for "life, liberty and the pursuit of hap- 
piness" for all. That is the hope of all Ameri- 
cans as we celebrate the 188th anniversary of 
the American Kevolution. 

Letters off Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Luxem- 
bourg, Maurice Steinmetz, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Johnson on July 7. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 318 dated July 7. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Netherlands, Carl Willem Alwin Schurmann, 
presented his credentials to President Johnson 
on July 7. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Department 
of State press release 317 (revised) dated July 7. 

JULY 27, 1964 


The Need To Explore Inner Space 

hy Lucius D. Battle 

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Ajfairs ^ 

I am very glad to be with you here and am 
grateful for the warmth of your welcome. 

We are nearing the Fourth of July, with its 
peremiial appeal to public speakers — frequent 
or infrequent. But what I plan to say has more 
to do with a national "Declaration of Inter- 
dependence" this country has made in recent 
years than with our historic Declaration of In- 
dependence. Though that great revolutionary 
document, with a message which still reverber- 
ates around the world, always suggests ample 
and inviting themes. 

One real, and personal, reason for welcoming 
your invitation lies in the fact that I have just 
completed 2 years in the job I hold — with re- 
sponsibility for the educational and cultural 
programs of the Department of State. This is 
not long enough to know everything I would 
like to know about this extremely varied and 
sensitive activity. I say "sensitive" because it 
deals with people primarily, with their minds, 
their aims and aspirations, their various skills 
and talents, present and potential. But 2 years 
is a logical time for assessment. 

Let us look at the scope and shape and mean- 
ing, as I see them, of the complex area we call 
educational and cultural affairs. Let us see how 
these activities have come to play a significant 
role in our foreign relations. 

Now for a word about a word: "interface.'' 
I understand that "interface" is a technical term 
in geometry. Looking back on my schoolboy 

^Address made at the first of the series of 1964 
World Affairs Previews at the summer session at the 
University of Nehraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on July 2 (ex- 
cerpts released as press release 310) . 

days, I do not recall my jousts with geometry 
with any special enthusiasm. But I'm told 
"interface" has become a meaningful word in 
the great enterprises of aerospace, too. It has 
an imaginative use, I think, in the titles for this 
series of talks.- For it invites our attention — 
in the idea of a common boundary, or interface, 
between subjects — to the increasing inter- 
connections and interactions between education 
and foreign policy in this country and to their 
implications for all of us today. 

There is growing recognition of this rela- 
tively new, and relatively undeveloped, area of 
our foreign relations. We in international edu- 
cational activities are grateful to this university 
for its leadership in this field — a leadersliip we 
have known before in other forms, both institu- 
tional and individual. 

And so you have staked out tlie subject and 
provided the occasion, and I thank you for doing 
both. I take it my role is to be a sort of guide 
for a tour over the common ground where edu- 
cation and foreign policy meet — and to be open 
for questions when the tour ends ! 

As a veteran of many after-dinner and after- 
luncheon speeches, I have learned of the utility 
of the summary at the outset of what a speaker 
intends to say. Not just the generalities I have 
so far used, but a specific synopsis — like those 
some magazines use at the beginning of an 
article. I have done this a number of times, 
usually with good effect. But not always. Not 
so long ago, after completing an address which 

"The seneral topic assignwl to Mr. Battle was "Edu- 
catiou/Foreigu Policy Interface." 



I had begim with a brief synopsis, a member 
of the audience came up to me. He compli- 
mented me warmly on my synopsis and then 
said: "But you didn't say what you said you 
were going to say !" Apparently I had drifted 
off my announced wavelength. I will try to 
keep a steady signal, loud and clear, here today. 
Wliat, then, is my synopsis ? And what is the 
title— "The Need To Explore Inner Space" — 
all about ? Here it is. 

A Synopsis 

1. Our ultimate security lies in the minds of 
men — in "inner space." Wars will not start in 
outer space; if they come, they will start in 
inner space — in men's minds, in ignorance, in 
prejudice, in overweening pride. 

2. Educational exchanges and related activi- 
ties play a imique and a key role in reaching 
men's minds ; they enable people to see and hear 
for themselves. They assist the formation of 
attitudes and approaches based on understand- 
ing, rather than fixed answers which may be 
obsoleted in an evolving, changing world. 
They encourage informed attitudes in place of 
horseback opinions and other glib and perhaps 
glittering answers. It is the essence of success- 
ful diplomacy in our time — a time when more 
people have more to say about their diplomacy 
and participate more fully themselves as "citi- 
zen diplomats"' — to recognize that the road to 
peace requires great endurance and persistence. 
Attitudes and approaches based on understand- 
ing, and adaptable to new facts or requirements, 
offer the best prospect of enabling us resolutely 
to stay the course. 

Educational exchanges and related activities 
have the further advantage of providing a lad- 
der for the national, as well as indi^adual, 
advancement so much desired throughout the 
world — not only in emerging and newly devel- 
oping lands, but in more mature societies as 

3. I want to tell you something of the Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which I 
have the honor to head. It conducts programs 
and initiates new activities where needed, but 
its essential function is that of a blending or 
f rising agency. 

It blends or fuses the resources and skills 

within government. That is, it gives policy 
guidance and coordination to other agencies and 
departments having programs in international 
education. It also blends or fuses with govern- 
ment programs and activities the resources and 
skills of the great private sector, outside gov- 
ernment., where this is mutually desirable. 
Through these varied activities, the Department 
is able to acliieve a stronger total effort than it 
could alone, or than individual organizations 
could achieve alone. 

4. In conclusion, education and foreign policy 
do have a common boundary, do interact, in the 
world today. 

We do not suppose the influence of educa- 
tional exchanges and related activities on world 
peace can be instant. But we believe it can be 
important, over time. With passage of the 
Fulbright Act in 1946 and subsequent legisla- 
tion, this country has written a "Declaration of 
/nj'frdependence" through exchanges — a decla- 
ration that mutual exchanges can do much to 
bring about mutual imderstanding. 

For exchange is an influence working for 
mutual understanding — in men's minds, in that 
inner space where we know the ultimate course 
of our civilization on this little outpost in stellar 
space will inevitably be determined. 

Public Interest in International Affairs 

So ends my synopsis. Now, any of you who 
feel this is enough can nod off for an early af- 
ternoon siesta — for the remainder of these 
remarks. If you want to hear more, that is all 
right too. In fact, I will be very pleased. So 
for those now ready to take the grand tour, let 
me say that I will try to keep on the track, as I 
indicated earlier, and move at a good pace. 

First of all, why do we come together in the 
summer of 1964 to talk about "education and 
foreign policy"? We would not have done so 
two decades ago. What has happened in the 
world in 20 years? Wliy are activities we 
group under the convenient banner of "educa- 
tion" meaningful to all of us, individually, and 
hopeful as a means of greater understanding 
among nations ? 

The period since World War II has seen a 
profound deepening of citizen involvement 
in international activities. Diplomacy is no 

JtTLT 27, 1964 


longer conducted between governments alone; 
whole peoples are now vastly more involved : 

— through travel ; 

— through eyewitnessing or hearing, by tele- 
vision or radio, great international events as 
they actually take place ; 

— through growing familiarity with the work 
of peacekeeping machinery, such as the United 
Nations ; 

— through having foreign students and other 
foreign visitors in their communities and in 
their homes ; 

— through participation in nongovernmental 
organizations — church groups, fraternal asso- 
ciations, world affairs councils, colleges and 
imiversities, labor unions, community hospital- 
ity centers, women's clubs, and many more — 
that conduct or support international educa- 
tional activities. 

You can think of many other examples for 
such a list. 

By and large, the widening spread of informa- 
tion and understanding among the peoples of 
the world is making government more and more 
responsive to what people know and how people 
feel. There is, therefore, a broadening base for 
foreign policies in many parts of the world. 
This is an important new element in diplomacy. 

We can see the growth of public interest and 
participation in international affairs in States 
like Nebraska and others of the Midwest. Ne- 
braska's international roots run deep. Two 
centuries ago there were English, Spanish, and 
French claims to this territory. In 1763 Span- 
ish claims were recognized, later French. It 
became part of the United States, as you know, 
in Thomas Jefferson's great real-estate trans- 
action, the Louisiana Purchase. Later, the 
waves of immigration from Germany, Sweden, 
what is now Czechoslovakia, and from other 
European countries formed strong connections 
between the Old World and the New. 

Geography played a part in the relative weak- 
ening of many of these connections in the late 
19th and 20th centuries. Our seaboards held 
their ties to the Old World more firmly than 
did many sections farther inland. For one 
thing, trade and travel to east coast and west 

coast ports — the great flow and counterflow of 
persons and of goods — helped to keep fast and 
enlarge the traditional connections of our 
coastal areas with other parts of the world. 

So there came a time when many Americans 
let it be known that they preferred to be let 
alone, and to go it alone. These views were per- 
haps most marked in the period between the 
wars. Involvement in international affairs for 
many persons consisted largely of the simple, if 
painful, act of paying taxes. 

How far the pendulum has swung since 
World War II is dramatically apparent to all 
of us. The United Nations, the atom bomb, the 
Strategic Air Command, the jet airplane, Ful- 
bright scholarships. Sputnik, emerging nations, 
outer space, Telstar — these few words are 
enough to evoke the whole new world of the 
postwar era. 

Growing Concern for Education 

So it is in such a world — a world in great 
tension in spite of, and to a degree because of, 
its great technological advances — that we have 
seen education become a more central concern 
in all our thinking, individual, national, and 

We have come to realize, as individuals, that 
the increasingly complex and technical processes 
of our lives can be managed successfully only 
by enlarging the educational opportunities for 
all our citizens. 

We have come to realize, too, as nations — in 
the early stages of development and in advanced 
stages as well — that education is truly a ladder 
of national growth and progress, and perhaps 
mankind's last best hope of peace on earth. 

Confidence in the efficacy of education to help 
individuals and nations achieve their goals is 
probably the most widely accepted of all the 
common beliefs of men today, the world around. 
This is true in nations on both sides of the 
various curtains — Iron, Bamboo, and any other. 
It is truly a great current of our time. 

It is now but a simple step to see that inter- 
national education offers opportunities for de- 
veloped nations to assist the less developed. And 
it offers the less developed a means of rising 
to higher levels of economic and social stability, 



where they can strengthen the whole structure 
of world security. 

Viewed in these broad, historical terms, the 
wide-ranging system of exchange we know 
today appears to have been foreordained and 
inevitable. Exchange of people and through 
them of knowledge was clearly one of the most 
hopeful means available to the hand of man for 
building — slowly, but securely — ^the foundations 
of enduring peace. 

Ironically, perhaps, these means to peace were 
first found in war — or in the aftermath of war, 
in foreign currencies held to our credit in other 
countries from the sale of surplus war materials. 
The Fulbright Act of 1946, which made use of 
these funds, was truly a case of "beating swords 
into plowshares." 

Exchanges between nations could, however, 
be no overnight solution to problems of misun- 
derstanding and distrust. They could not be 
expected to bring political problems to neat 
solutions. But they could help to build mutual 
understanding. They could ease man's prog- 
ress on what Secretary Rusk has called "the 
toilsome path to peace." ' And they could per- 
haps do more. No one can say where the limits 
may lie when men first identify the interests 
they share and then go on to find new areas of 
agreement they find they can share. This is the 
kind of hope that lies at the base of President 
Johnson's call to continue to "build bridges," 
as he said, "across the gulf which has divided us 
from Eastern Europe." * 

But this is only a part of the almost world- 
wide system of exchanges we have developed in 
this country in less than 20 years. 

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Let me describe it in terms of what my bureau 
does. The bureau's activities touch, in some de- 
gree at least, much of the whole field — the work 
of private organizations, agencies of the U.S. 
Government, and multigovemmental organiza- 
tions like UNESCO [United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. 
We can get a general view of the field, as well as 
a closeup of my bureau. 

• BuiXETiN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 530. 

* Ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 922. 

There is one simple guide I would like to 
offer to give a clearer picture of what my bu- 
reau, essentially, is. You know of government 
lending agencies we have had — the Reconstruc- 
tion Finance Corporation, the Home Owners 
Loan Corporation, and others. You know, too, 
of mending agencies — the Marshall Plan for 
Western Europe, for example, and the Ameri- 
can Red Cross, which operates under congres- 
sional charter, and others. You hear, too, of 
spending agencies. 

I would like you to think of our bureau as a 
blending agency. For it is our principal func- 
tion to blend or fuse public and private sources 
of support, or "moneypower," and private and 
public sources of manpower. All activities, 
however varied in sponsorship or support, are 
pointed steadily toward the goal of furthering 
mutual understanding. 

The total complex of State Department activ- 
ity in this field is centered in CU, as our bureau 
is known in Department shorthand. A Divi- 
sion of Cultural Relations was first established 
in 1938. Our bureau, as such, goes back only 
about 5 years, however. It has had Assistant 
Secretary status only 3 years. 

It is one of the larger bureaus in the Depart- 
ment. We have approximately 400 employees 
and an annual budget of approximately $56 
million, a substantial portion of which still 
comes from foreign-currency balances owned by 
the United States in other countries. 

We conduct exchanges with 135 countries 
and territories. With 48 of these countries 
there are agreements providing for binational 
commissions — sometimes called United States 
Educational Foundations — which help to ad- 
minister overseas the exchanges authorized un- 
der the Fulbright-Hays Act. 

We also serve as the coordinating point in 
the Government for all of the activities in inter- 
national education conducted by some 25 agen- 
cies. Seven of these agencies, which have the 
principal programs, come together periodically 
as members of the Interagency Council on In- 
ternational Educational and Cultural Affairs. 
Sitting with me on this Council are the U.S. 
Commissioner of Education, the Director of the 
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Direc- 
tor of the Peace Corps, and representatives of 

JULY 27. 1864 


the Agency for International Development 
(AID), the Bureau of the Budget, and the 
Defense Department. 

A "People Program" 

But let us not get lost in bureaucracy. Let 
us remember that we are engaged primarily in 
conducting a people program. Most of our 
money goes into grants to enable people to 
study, or teach, or lecture, or conduct research, 
or observe our society, or meet with and talk 
with their counterparts in other countries, or 
pursue some other academic or related informa- 
tional purpose. People are the carriers of the 
ideas, the aims and aspirations, the question- 
ings and curiosities we seek of each other. 

In proper academic fashion, I ought to go to 
a blackboard for the next few minutes and put 
down some figures. I want you to see, in 
quantitative terms, what I mean when I say 
this is a people program. 

In fiscal year 1963 we exchanged some 8,300 
persons — 5,800 coming to the United States and 
2,500 going from the United States. Counting 
about 2,000 renewal grants for that year, we had 
roughly 10,300 people under our grants, in 
varying degrees of support. 

Since 1949, the total of grantees under State 
Department programs has been about 85,000. 
Some 60,000 have come here in that time, and 
some 25,000 Americans have gone to other coun- 
tries. These are impressive figures for such a 
program in such a short time — impressive, too, 
as evidence of the steady congressional and pub- 
lic support this program has had since its in- 

During 1963, on the academic side, we sent 
out several categories of Americans to study, 
to teach, to lecture in a university, to conduct 
advanced research — to a total of about 2,000. 

Among nonacademic categories, we send out 
American specialists — representatives of a wide 
variety of fields, including athletic coaches. Su- 
preme Court Justices, Nobel Prize winners in 
varied fields, professors, and others. All are 
selected to discuss or demonstrate their particu- 
lar specialties, in the context of American aims 
and ideals, with their counterparts and others 
interested abroad. Some 300 such specialists 
went abroad for us in 1963. 

We also send out performing arts groups — 
professional and amateur — to demonstrate 
abroad our cultural achievements and our inter- 
est in these arts. Some 646 people visited 427 
cities in 90 countries imder this program in the 
same fiscal year. It will be of special interest 
to you here that almost half the number of per- 
fo liners — nearly 300 — were in musical groups 
from college and university campuses, from 
Maryland to California. These young, talented 
amateurs have demonstrated not only a high 
competence in their art but a great capacity for 
meeting young people in other countries on their 
own terms, both musically and as representa- 
tives of their generation and their nation. 

We also bring in people from other countries. 
The academic program runs to about 2,000 for- 
eign students and about 2,400 in the categories 
of teachers, lecturers, research scholars, and 
educational travel grantees. In general, they 
come to study, to visit as members of a student 
group, to teach in or study our educational sys- 
tem, to lecture in a imiversity, to conduct ad- 
vanced research, or to gain practical profes- 
sional training. 

In addition, we bring in foreign leaders and 
foreign specialists, about 1,250 in 1963. This is 
an extremely important category of our ex- 
changes, because these grants enable leaders 
from other countries to observe our "open so- 
ciety" at firsthand, to base their impressions 
upon observable fact rather than upon incom- 
plete or distorted information. 

Exchanges in an Open Society 

Our open society lends itself peculiarly well 
to exchanges. It gives exchange a maximum 
opportunity to be effective. This works advan- 
tages both ways. Our visitors learn from us, 
and we learn from our ^^sitors. No society can 
be sufficient unto itself in the realm of ideas, 
any more than in the realm of trade. Hence, we 
continue to be dependent on the importation of 
ideas, new Imowledge, new insights, new ap- 
proaches from other countries. Ajnerica has 
always encouraged free trade in ideas, in schol- 
arship, in literature, in science. Foreign visitors 
can be welcome carriers of ideas and insights, 
and good exponents and defenders of them. On 
their visits here their American hosts and col- 



leagues have the opportunity to discuss ideas 
with them. Through the friendly confrontation 
of exchange, the ideas that divide can often be 
cut away, or at least cut down in size and effect; 
and the ideas that unite can be given greater 
force and effect. 

At the celebration of the 15th anniversary of 
our exchange agreement with the Netlierlands, 
at The Hague in May, Senator Fulbright said 
that "probably the most valuable gift we have 
to offer other nations is the example of our will- 
ingness to debate, to dissect, to disagree, to take 
unpopular positions. This is the essential, the 
tiiie meaning of our open society and perhaps 
the greatest validity of the argument for expos- 
ing other people to it. . . ." And he added : 

Restraint and responsibility among nations, even as 
among people, must develop from tlie widest possible 
exposure to men and ideas. It was these considerations 
I had in mind when I first sought support from my 
Congress for exchange programs. They seem even more 
valid today, and as I look to the future, they are com- 

Exchange of persons and related activities 
not only reflect our open society ; they also help 
to sustain it and to encourage a climate of free 
discussion elsewhere. Exchange is a force 
that works on the side of open societies — to 
help to keep them open or to help them become 
more so. 

We have now toured some of the prmcipal 
parts of our exchange program. If I could 
merely list the principal categories of people 
we send out, and those we bring in, as I have, 
my task in describing the bureau's wide-rang- 
ing array of activities would be fairly easy. 
But there is much more to educational and cul- 
tural affairs, and there is no convenient label 
for the broad bracket of activities I must, at 
least, mention. Let me refer to a few : 

We assist some 100 American-sponsored ele- 
mentary and secondary schools overseas — insti- 
tutions to meet the needs of Americans abroad 
and also to serve as demonstration centers of 
American educational methods and ideals. 

We participate actively in multilateral orga- 
nizations. Among those are UNESCO, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the Organization 
of American States (OAS). Our work with 
OAS, of course, places particular emphasis on 

programs of the Alliance for Progress. 

We have a general responsibility for the de- 
velopment of the Center for Cultural and Tech- 
nical Interchange Between East and West- — 
the East- West Center in Honolulu. Tliis effort 
to provide a scholarly meeting ground for 
Asians and Americans has had the strong lead- 
ership of President Johnson, Congressman 
Kooney of New York, and others who have seen 
in the creation of the Center an opportunity 
to put the values of exchange into concrete and 
enduring fonn in the mid-Pacific. 

These are only some of the so-called related 
activities that go along with our basic educa- 
tional and cultural exchange programs. And 
I should record clearly one more fact, that 
CU serves as an initiating agency, with a view 
to seemg that gaps in our total international 
educational effort are adequately filled. One 
example is the initiative taken to provide better 
screening, orientation, and counseling services 
abroad for prospective foreign students, before 
they leave their home countries. Later prob- 
lems of social or academic adjustment can be 
minimized, if not averted, by more adequate 
services at the application and admission stages. 

Through this whole complex pattern of ac- 
tivity, we make a contribution to encouraging 
the easy, natural interchange of ideas and of 
people that forms one of the more promising 
conditions for peace. 

We know there is progress. We know, for 
example, that people talk more freely across 
all barriers than they did only a few years 

At the time the telegraph cable was put 
through to India in 1870, John Ruskin ex- 
pressed doubts whether there had been any- 
thing really significant to say on the new copper 
wire, "either to India or to any other place." 

No one would ask today, when the new under- 
seas telephone cable is put through to Japan 
in a service inaugurated by President Jolmson 
and Premier Ikeda,^ what meaningful and man- 
ifold uses there would be for this new facility. 
International dialog and discussion — even to 
the point of an international "Town Meeting 
of the Woi"ld" via Telstar — has come to be an 

° Ihid., July 6, 1964, p. 26. 

JXTLT 27, 1964 


accepted part of the whole pattern of an in- 
creasingly close-knit world. 

I believe we have more to say, in terms of 
our idea of the kind of world we want to see; 
and I believe we are recognizing more and more 
that we have much to learn from other coun- 
tries and other peoples. Certainly the interest 
of American institutions in establisliing over- 
seas campuses and centers, and of Americans 
in many fields of activity in participating in 
international conferences and seminars, is 
greater than ever before. 

Activities of the Private Sector 

The preeminent source of strength for our 
total international effort in educational and cul- 
tural affairs is the private sector. Within it 
our system of higher education is a major re- 
source base. In both numbers and diversity, 
this system is imparalleled in the world. More 
than 1,800 colleges and universities in this coun- 
try, for example, have foreign students en- 
rolled; the total number is approximately 
75,000. Your university here is one with a 
substantial enrollment of foreign students from 
many lands. 

Like its sister land-grant institutions, 
Nebraska has many other forms of direct inter- 
national involvement. Since 1958, as many of 
you know, the university has held an AID 
[Agency for International Development] con- 
tract, now in excess of $3 million, for assistance 
to Ataturk University in Turkey in the devel- 
opment of its programs in agriculture, engi- 
neering, business administration, and educa- 
tion. Since the end of last month Nebraska 
has had a new Peace Corps training project 
on its campus. This group of volunteers wUl 
go to Bolivia after 10 weeks of training. Your 
campus has also been the site of significant meet- 
ings over the last 2 years on the international 
role colleges and universities should play. 

Nebraska furnishes an excellent example, too, 
of a program in which our bureau has a co- 
operating and supplementing role. The un- 
dergraduate program in Latin American studies 
in the College of Arts and Sciences includes, 
as you know, an exchange program with El 
Colegio de Mexico, in Mexico City. As a part 
of a two-way exchange, selected Nebraska un- 

dergraduates are enabled to pursue their studies 
for a full academic year at this institution. 
The second such group left for Mexico late in 
June. Here is a splendid cooperative arrange- 
ment, one in which the broad and diversified 
program offered at Nebraska is significantly 
supplemented by residence and study in Mexico. 
The Department of State, through the bureau 
I head, has been pleased to assist this program 
through grants to cover costs of transportation, 
tuition, and a living allowance. Here is an ex- 
ample very close at hand of the blending or 
fusing function of which I spoke earlier. 

Your Chancellor [Clifford M. Hardin] has 
been a national leader in international educa- 
tional planning. The university's sons and 
daughters have contributed importantly. One 
is my friend and colleague, William J. Crockett, 
the very able Deputy Under Secretary of State 
for Administration. I would also mention 
two brothers, Theodore Sorensen, who has made 
a distinguished contribution to public under- 
standing of foreign as well as domestic issues 
through his close association with President 
Kennedy, and Thomas Sorensen, who has dis- 
charged with great skill the difficult and de- 
manding responsibilities of Deputy Director 
for policy and plans for USIA [United States 
Information Agency]. 

The international role of institutions like 
Nebraska is great, and growing. Projections 
prepared at the Fund for the Advancement of 
Education suggest that by 1985 some 80 percent 
of the country's college and university students 
will be in publicly supported educational in- 
stitutions. Today's figure is about 60 percent. 
If this projection for 1985 proves correct, then 
the international role of the great State institu- 
tions will be steadDy enlarging over the next 
two decades. 

My visit to Lincoln and later today to Omaha 
suggests one other base, besides that of higher 
education, on which much that we do depends. 
That is the base provided by community activity 
in the arts. The encouragement given by Amer- 
ican communities to furthering opportunities in 
music, drama, and other performing arts — as 
well as in the visual arts — provides a foundation 
for the projection abroad of American interest 
and achievement in these fields. Tliis kind of 



activity also enables our visitors to see for them- 
selves what the sense of commiinity means to 
Americans — how they create and sustain their 
local cultural institutions. You can be proud 
of what has been created here, with the Shel- 
don Memorial Art Gallery, which I visited this 
morning, as a tnily outstanding example. 

"VVe all have much work still to do, of course, 
to make our society what it can be. The chal- 
lenge of the "great society," of which President 
Johnson has spoken, is "to enrich and elevate 
our national life, and to advance the quality of 
our American civilization." ® Realization of 
these goals will require the fuller participation 
of our citizens in their community and national 
life — their responding to, as he said, "a chal- 
lenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward 
a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches 
the marvelous products of our labor." 

How Do We Know Exchanges Are Effective? 

How do we know that this relatively new ac- 
tivity of educational and cultural exchange has 
been worth the effort? How do we know ex- 
changes are effective ? 

Probably the most convincing single docu- 
ment is a report, titled A Beacon of Hope, by the 
U.S. Advisory Commission on International 
Educational and Cultural Affairs.' Early in 
1963 this Commission reported to Congress on 
interviews with foreign grantees in 20 countries 
and with other informed persons here and 
abroad. The report deals with the Department 
of State's programs and program activities. I 
can do no better than read to you the concluding 
paragraph of this report : 

Looking back at the program's first 14 years as a 
world-wide activity of the Department of State, we 
believe that the Congress and the American people can 
feel pride and deep satisfaction that, although some 
improvements are yet to be made, the exchange pro- 
gram they conceived has proved so effective to their 
purposes. As it has developed in the course of these 

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the Uni- 
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on May 22, 1964, 
see White House press release dated May 22. 

' A limited number of copies of the report are avail- 
able upon request from the office of the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on International Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, Room 4513, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20.520. 

years, it has established itself as a basic ingredient of 
the foreign relations of the United States. There is 
no other international activity of our Government that 
enjoys so much spontaneous public approval, elicits 
such extensive citizen participation, and yields such 
impressive evidences of success. In a time when most 
international activities seem almost unbearably com- 
plex, hazardous and obscure in outcome, the success 
of educational exchange is a beacon of hope. 

But we have no airborne magnetometers or 
Geiger coimters to tell us when we have struck 
a rich vein of success in an exchange effort, or 
a streak of what may be lean ore, at best. There 
are no computers, no machinery, for this kind 
of measurement. We can only depend on our 
reports from the field and from our grantees, 
and from the "debriefings," as we call them, of 
many who have gone overseas for us and come 
through Washington to tell us of their experi- 

Such evidence does add up. It comes to us in 
the form of a Gene Kelly, back from West 
Africa, where his French-speaking ability added 
a further asset to his already substantial store 
of personal qualifications. The appreciative 
crowds that pressed in on Mr. Kelly in his 
many scheduled and unscheduled appearances 
left little doubt that he was, as one post officer 
put it in his report, "a smash success." 

John Steinbeck left tangible records of his 
impact in the Soviet Union and in Finland. 
One is a chair in a student dormitory in Lenin- 
grad University with the inscription cut on the 
back : "Here sat John Steinbeck, November 12, 
1963." The occasion was a several hours' meet- 
ing with Soviet students. And in Finland the 
record shows exacting and exhausting days of 
interviews, radio and television appearances, 
meetings with writers and educational groups, 
autographing sessions, and the like. As the 
word of "no more names" went out to a group 
still waiting for autographs, a little lady came 
up with a well-thumbed copy of Of Mice and 
Men. She asked for an autograph for her neph- 
ew, who was ill in bed, she said, and who had 
asked her to take to Mr. Steinbeck the copy of 
the book on which the boy had written a school 

The autographing session was resumed — for 
the benefit of the boy, and for the others in line. 

Wilma Rudolph, the track star, visited 




African countries and attended the African 
Friendship Games at Dakar. She drew enthu- 
siastic press and post reports for the popularity 
resulting from her athletic reputation and from 
the modest personality she displayed to crowds 
of admirers. 

From Omaha, Lorena B. Hahn, formerly 
United States Representative to the United Na- 
tions Commission on the Status of Women, has 
three times been a representative of the United 
States, through our bureau, in overseas mis- 
sions — to the Near East, Africa, and the Far 
East in 1954, to Europe in 1956, and to the Far 
East in 1957. 

The nearly 300 American college and univer- 
sity students who have gone abroad for us in the 
last 6 months sang or played in 198 cities in 49 
countries. No one who attended the debriefings 
of these groups — or read their own accounts or 
the reports written by the posts visited — can 
doubt the strong, positive impact these young 
Americans made. 

Foreign leaders who have visited this coun- 
try give us evidence of the value of their visits. 
Julius Nyerere, now President of the United 
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was a 
"foreign leader" visitor a couple of years ago. 
Twelve of the 20 members of Chancellor 
Erhard's Cabinet — including Foreign Minister 
Gerhard Schroeder and Defense Minister Kai- 
Uwe von Hassel — were grantees in years past. 
So, too, was a young man named Willy Brandt, 
now Mayor of Berlin. And there are many 

A Declaration of Interdependence 

There are only a few leading ideas I would 
like to emphasize and reinforce before I con- 

Our times have made possible tliis new edu- 
cational component of our foreign policy; 
indeed, they have made it imperative. 

It has become possible because for the first 
time in history the Western World now has both 
the compassion and the capacity to assist less 
privileged nations, through education, along the 
road of social and economic progress. 

It has become imperative because for the first 
time in history survival is no longer a comfort- 

able, philosophical issue. It has become an 
operational one. 

So what happens in the minds of men is vital 
to us all. Men have shaped the future in varied 
ways. A man by the name of Lincoln, a cen- 
tury ago, saw the gathering storm over slavery 
and was ready to pour the balm of his great 
understanding, sympathy, and charity into the 
wounds of a bitter civil war. A half-century 
later a man fired a bullet into an Austrian 
Archduke in a town in the Balkans, the first shot 
of World War I ; and another man, Wilson by 
name, was pouring into the mainstream of the 
American democracy the ideas of the "new 
freedom." These were ideas for domestic devel- 
opment that influenced the later accomplish- 
ments of other men, like Senator George W. 
Norris, who also left a marked impact on our 
national life. 

The crucial importance of what goes on in the 
minds of men — for good or ill — is clear beyond 
question. The opportmiities to reach men's 
minds — to make information and understand- 
ing available to them — are unprecedented today. 
The effectiveness of exchanges and related activ- 
ities in doing this job is well demonstrated. 

We therefore move ahead in the work of inter- 
national education in the confident belief that 
education can be decisive over time. It can be 
the ultimate determinant of whether foreign 
policy is mformed by knowledge and under- 
standing or inflamed by prejudice and passion, 
by dictatorial or demagogic leaders. 

Education can, in fact, be the ultimate deter- 
rent — for our ultimate security truly lies in the 
minds of men. 

Happily, we are committed to the further ex- 
ploration of this "inner space." We are com- 
mitted through acts of Congress, and we are 
committed through the voluntary participation 
of the many thousands of organizations and 
individuals who play some part in the total ef- 
fort we make through exchanges. As these op- 
portunities expand in an ever more interdepend- 
ent world, we will need to reach new levels of 
citizen participation. 

In our national commitment to this course I 
believe we have made over the last two decades 
a national "Declaration of /n^erdependence" — 



a statement of faith in the slow processes of edu- 
cation to serve the ends of mutual luiderstand- 
ing. The programs of exchange we conduct 
have already become, in Secretary Rusk's words, 
"one of the most powerful, altliough quiet, ele- 
ments in our foreign policy." 

These are some of the ways in which I think 
education and foreign policy relate and inter- 
act. This is what I think our programs are 
really all about and what the commitment the 
University of Nebraska and hundreds of other 
American colleges and universities have made is 
all about. The bureau I have the honor to head 
plays a part in weaving or fusing the public 
and private sectors more closely together — in 
helping to create and sustain a kind of common 
enterprise in which we all have a part and in 
which, I believe, we can all take pride. 

U.S. states Position on Question 
of Unified EEC Grains Price 

Followmg is the text of a statement released, 
at W ashing ton on July 3 hy Christian A. Eer- 
ter, the Presidents Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations. The statement was broad- 
cast simultaneoiish/ in Germany hy Deutsch- 
landfunk as part of a recorded interview with 
Mr. Herter. 

1. A unified grains price decision now is not 
indispensable as far as the United States is 
concerned. We believe that negotiations on in- 
dustrial products, agricultural products other 
than grains, and even on grains, could be car- 
ried right up to the concluding stage in Geneva 
without a unified grains price decision if the 
EEC [European Economic Community] nego- 
tiator were in a position to negotiate on these 

2. In the view of the United States, the prob- 
lem seems to lie therefore not in Geneva but 
in Brussels. It seems to have become an indis- 
pensable element in the internal bargaining sit- 
uation with the EEC that the imified grains 
price decision be made now and that in the 
absence of such a decision the EEC represent- 

atives will be unable to enter into negotiations 
on virtually any matter in Geneva. 

3. Unless the capabilities of the EEC to nego- 
tiate on industrial products and on agricultural 
products including grains is restored in one way 
or another, the timetable and even the final re- 
sults of the Kennedy Round could be put in 
serious jeopardy. The preparations for the 
tabling of exceptions lists (which in the view 
of the United States must be done simultane- 
ously for industry and agriculture) must be 
resumed at the latest by the end of the summer 
holidays if we are to meet the target date of 
November 16. In view of the already serious 
delays in the past, such further delays in the 
progress of the Kennedy Round would seri- 
ously endanger the negotiations. That would 
create a situation where the negotiations might 
well fail or at best be seriously impaired. 

4. As far as the United States is concerned, 
the question of a unified grains price can in 
any case not be seen in isolation. While the 
United States wishes to see the lowest possible 
grains price in the Community, it is clear that 
any such price now being considered is so high 
as to require assurances for the maintenance of 
grain imports. 

New Resources To Be Contributed 
for Replenishment of IDA Funds 

The International Development Association 
announced on July 7 that formalities looking 
toward the replenishment of its resources in the 
amount of $750 million had been completed. 
This was accomplished on June 29 with the 
formal notification to IDA by 12 governments 
that they would contribute new resources to the 
organization aggregating more than $600 mil- 
lion, which was a condition prescribed by IDA's 
Board of Governors when the replenisliment 
was authorized in September 1963. 

The new funds will be available for commit- 
ment in new development credits by IDA over 
a period extending to at least June 30, 1966. 
Payment is to be made in three equal annual in- 
stallments, the first not due imtil November 

JULY 27, 1964 


1965, one year after the final payment on the 
subscription to IDA's initial resources. 

The following list shows the 12 governments 
wliich had given formal notification to IDA by 
June 29, together with the amoimts of their 
contributions ; Belgiimi, which gave notification 
on July 2, is included in the list : 

($ U.S.) 

Australia 19, 800, 000 

Austria 5,040, 000 

Belgium 8, 250, 000 

Denmark 7, 500, 000 

France 61, 872, 000 

Germany 72, 600, 000 

Italy 30, 000. 000 

Japan 41, 250, 000 

Luxembourg 375, 000 

Norway 6, 600, 000 

Sweden 15, 000, 000 

United Kingdom 96, 600, 000 

United States 312, 000, 000 

Four other governments are taking steps 
toward formal notification that they will con- 
tribute the amounts proposed for them. The 
four are : 


Canada 41, 700, 000 

Finland 2, 298, 000 

Netherlands 16, 500, 000 

South Africa 3,990,000 

In addition, the Government of Kuwait has 
decided to participate in the replenishment of 
IDA resources, with a contribution of $3.36 

Initial subscriptions to IDA, together with 
three supplementary contributions by Sweden 
totaling more than $15 million, have amounted 
to more than $790.9 million in freely convertible 
currency. With its new commitment of $15 
million, Sweden's contributions to IDA will 
have totaled $40,225,000, or nearly four times 
the amount of its initial subscription. 

IDA was established in 1960 by member 
governments of the World Bank. IDA's 
Articles of Agreement authorize it to make 
development credits on terms bearing less 
heavily on the balance of payments of recipient 
countries than do conventional loans. All of 
the development credits so far extended by IDA 
have been repayable in foreign exchange over 
50 years, free of interest. To help meet IDA's 
administrative costs, a service charge of three- 
fourths of 1 percent per annum is payable on 
amounts withdrawn and outstanding. 

IDA so far has extended credits amounting 

to $778,350,000 for economic development 
projects in 22 countries. It has lent $395.85 
million for the development of railways, high- 
ways, and telecommunications; $132.8 million 
for irrigation, land improvement, flood control, 
and other projects to increase the output of food 
and other agricultural products; $85.5 million 
for the construction of schools and of municipal 
water and sewerage systems; $57.7 million for 
the development of electric power facilities; 
and $106.5 million for the development of 

Trade With Paraguay 

and the United Arab Republic 


Pboclamation op Aobeements With Paraguay and 
THE United Abab Republic Relating to Teade 
Agreements and op the Termination in Part or a 
Trade Agreement Proclamation Relating to Para- 

Table of Contents 

part i — purposes 
PART n — identification and justification 

(A) Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bi- 
lateral Agreement 

(1) Identification 

(2) Determination 

(B) Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclama- 

(1) Identiflcation 

(C) United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplemen- 
tary to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(1) Identiflcation 

(2) Determination 

part hi — proclaiming part 

(A) Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bi- 
lateral Agreement 

(B) Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclama- 

(O) United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplemen- 
tary to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

Part I — Purposes 

The purposes of this proclamation are: 

(a) Paraguay — To proclaim portions of two agree- 
ments with Paraguay, amending the bilateral trade 
agreement with Paraguay, which contain no new tariff 
concessions by the United States but under which 
Paraguay may participate in the Latin American Free 
Trade Association without violating tie bilateral trade 

( b ) Paraguay — To proclaim the termination of those 
portions of the trade agreement proclamation relating 

» No. 3596 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 9419. 



to the bilateral trade agreement with Paraguay which 
concern the schedules of tariff concessions contained 
In that agreement. 

(c) United Arah Republic — To proclaim an agree- 
ment for the provisional accession of the United Arab 
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade involving the application of the general provi- 
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
but no tariff concessions. 

Pabt II — Identification and Justification 

A. Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral 


1. Identification — Numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the agreement of April 2, 1962 (TIAS 5000), and un- 
numbered paragraph 3 of the agreement of June 26, 
1963 (TIAS 5390), between the United States and Para- 
guay, relate to and modify the application of the gen- 
eral provisions of the trade agreement of September 12, 

1946, between the two countries (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2689) .' 

2. Determination — I have determined that it is re- 
quired or appropriate (A) on and after April 2, 1962, 
that the trade agreement with Paraguay of Septem- 
ber 12, 1946, shall be applied as supplemented by 
numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement of 
April 2, 1962, and (B) on and after June 26, 1963, that 
that trade agreement shall be applied as further supple- 
mented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agreement 
of June 26, 1963. 

B. Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclamation 
1. Identification — The proclamation of March 10, 

1947, proclaimed the trade agreement of September 12, 
1946, between the United States and Paraguay, as sup- 
plemented by an exchange of notes of September 12, 
1946, relating to duties and surcharges on certain prod- 
ucts in Schedule I of the trade agreement. Unnum- 
bered paragraph 1 of the agreement of June 26, 1963, 
between the United States and Paraguay, terminated, 
effective June 30, 1963, Articles VII through XII, the 
references in Article XVII to Articles XI and 
XII, and Schedules I and II of that trade agreement 
of September 12, 1946. Unnumbered paragraph 2 of 
the same agreement of June 26, 1963, terminated the 
supplementary exchange of notes of September 12, 1946. 

C. United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplementary 

to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

1. Identification — The Declaration of November 13, 
1962,' on the Provisional Accession of the United Arab 
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade* became effective for the United States on 
May 3, 1963 (TIAS 5309) . 

2. Determination — I have determined that it is re- 
quired or appropriate, on and after May 3, 1963, that 
those provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and agreements supplementary thereto 
which have heretofore been proclaimed shall be applied 
as supplemented by the Declaration of November 13, 
1962, regarding the United Arab Republic. 

Pabt III — Pboclaimino Pabt 

Now, THEBEFORB, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States of America, acting under the au- 
thority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes 
of the United States of America, including Section 350 
(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 
U.S.C. 1351(a)(6)), do hereby proclaim that: 

A. Paraguay — Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral 

On and after April 2, 1962, the trade agreement be- 
tween the United States and Paraguay, described in 
Part II (A)(1) of this proclamation, shall be applied 
as supplemented by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agree- 
ment of April 2, 1963, and on and after June 26, 1963, 
that trade agreement shall be applied as further sup- 
plemented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agree- 
ment of June 26, 1963. 

B. Paraguay — Partial Termination of Proclamation 
On and after June 30, 1963, the Proclamation of 

March 10, 1947, proclaiming the trade agreement be- 
tween the United States and Paraguay, as supple- 
mented shall be terminated insofar as it relates to 
those provisions, described in Part II (B)(1) of this 
proclamation, which were terminated by the provisions 
of the agreement of June 26, 1963, described in Part 
11 (B)(1). 

0. United Arab Republic — Agreement Supplementary 
to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

On and after May 3, 1963, those provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as supple- 
mented, described in Part II (C) (1) of this proclama- 
tion, shall be applied as supplemented by the Declara- 
tion on Provisional Accession of the United Arab Re- 
public, described in Part II (C) (1). 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be aifixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this sixth day of 

July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 

[seal] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the 

United States of America the one hundred and 


By the President : 

Geobge W. Ball, 

Acting Secretary of State. 

' The trade agreement was proclaimed by the procla- 
mation of March 10, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2688). 
[Footnote in original.] 

" For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 184. 

' That agreement of October 30, 1947, was proclaimed 
by Proclamation 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat, 
(pt. 2) 1103), which proclamation has been supple- 
mented by subsequent proclamations. [Footnote in 

JULY 27, 1964 


Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules 
on Agricultural imports Corrected 


Proclamation CJoerectino Pabt 3 op the Appendix to 
THE Tariff Schediiles OF THE UNITED States With 
Respect to the Importation of Agricultural Com- 

Whereas headnote 1 to part 3 of the Appendix to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat), 
as published at the direction of the President pursuant 
to section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of 
1962, states that part 3 covers "the provisions pro- 
claimed by the President pursuant to section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended * * * im- 
posing * * * quantitative limitations on articles im- 
ported into the United States • * »" ; and 

Whereas the references to seed rye in headnote 2(d) 
in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States are obsolete because there are no current 
import restrictions imposed on seed rye under section 
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended; 

Whereas, by Proclamation No. 3019 of June 8, 1953 ' 
(3 CPR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 189) which was issued 
pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the President imposed 
import quotas on certain dairy products, subject to 
allocation and license requirements administered by 
the Secretary of Agriculture, including an annual ag- 
gregate quota of 496,000 pounds upon imports of dried 
buttermilk, which was also applicable to dried whey; 

Whereas item 950.01 in part 3 of the Appendix to 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States includes dried 
buttermilk but does not include dried whey as being 
subject to the aforementioned annual quota of 496,000 
pounds ; and 

Whereas, pursuant to section 102(3) of the Tariff 
Classification Act of 1962, the President proclaimed the 
additional import restrictions set forth in part 3 of the 
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States 
( Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963,' paragraph 
numbered 3; 3 CPR, 1963 Supp., p. 73) in the erro- 
neous belief that the quota specified in item 950.01 for 
dried buttermilk was the effective restriction "pro- 
claimed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Ad- 
justment Act" as provided in section 102(3) of the 
Tariff Classification Act of 1962 ; and 

WHEaiEAS the United States Tariff Commission has 
advised me that in the preparation of part 3 of the 
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States 
pursuant to title I of Public Law 768, 83d Congress, and 
the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, it inadvertently 

overlooked the fact that the aforementioned quota pro- 
visions of Proclamation No. 3019 applied to dried whey 
as well as to dried buttermilk ; and 

Whereas it would be contrary to the Intent and pur- 
pose of, and the procedures prescribed by, section 22 of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the 
Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to permit these errors 
to remain uncorrected : 

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and 
in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the 
Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim 

(a) headnote 2(d) of part 3 of the Appendix to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 441) 
is hereby amended by deleting "seed rye or" from the 
first line thereof and "of 56 pounds each for rye and" 
from the seventh line thereof ; and 

(b) the superior heading immediately preceding item 
950.01 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules 
of the United States (77A Stat. 442) is hereby amended 
to read as follows : "Dried milk, dried cream, and 
dried whey provided for in part 4 of schedule 1 :" ; 
and the article description for item 950.01 is hereby 
amended by deleting "item 115.45" and inserting in 
lieu thereof "items 115.45 and 118.05". 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 

and caused the Seal of the United States of America 

to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this seventh day of 

July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 

[seal] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the 

United States of America the one hundred and 


LyM.i W '^Al.tvC*. . 

' No. 3597 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 9421. 

* For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1953, p. 919. 

" For text, see iUd., Sept. 23, 1963, p. 478. 

By the President : 

Qeoroe W. Ball, 

Acting Secretary of State. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Economic Policies and Practices. Paper No. 5, Unem- 
ployment Programs in Sweden. Materials prepared 
for the Joint Economic Committee. Undated. 51 
pp. [Joint Committee print] 

Administration of National Security. The American 
Ambassador. A study submitted by the Subcom- 
mittee on National Security Staffing and Operations 
to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. 
June 15, 1964. 16 pp. [Committee print] 



U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Verification Provisions To Halt 
Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use 

Folloto'mg are tv)o state7nents made before the 
Conference of the 18-Nation Commnittee on Dis- 
armmnent at Geneva by William C. Foster, 
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency and chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the Conference. 


First, let me welcome, on behalf of my dele- 
gation and myself, Ambassador [R. K.] Nehru 
of India on his return to our Conference. We 
are very happy to see him here again. 

Second, Mr. Chairman, in conformity with 
the agreed agenda whicli you have amiounced 
today, the United States will talk in general 
about collateral measures. We feel that the 
most important collateral measures put before 
this Conference deal with the nuclear arms 
race. The United States has already presented 
a broad range of measures in this area ; and we 
have approaclied the problem by suggesting 
measures which would both halt the nuclear 
arms race and reverse it.^ 

As I pointed out in my statement at the 188th 
meeting [June 9],^ our approach to collateral 
measures is to seek early agreements which 
would stop the production and the proliferation 
of more and bigger weapons. In addition, we 
have developed proposals which would begin 

^ For texts of statements made by Mr. Foster and by 
Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of tlie U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, during the session 
of the Conference which convened Jan. 21, 1964, and 
recessed Apr. 24, see Bulletin of Mar. 2, 1964, p. 3.50 ; 
Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376 ; Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641 ; and May 11, 
1964, p. 756. 

' For text, see ma., June 29, 1964, p. 1004. 

to reduce the number of weapons already 

In this area of nuclear armaments we ap- 
proached tlie problem in two different ways. 
First, we dealt with the carriers of such 
weapons- We proposed a freeze of offensive 
and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. 
As a means of reducing the numbers of strategic 
vehicles, the United States has made a proposal 
for the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 jet 
bombers. Both the strategic vehicle freeze and 
the jet bomber destruction could be carried out 
under verification provisions less burdensome 
than those which would have to accompany gen- 
eral and complete disarmament. 

The second United States approach to the 
problem of nuclear arms has been to suggest 
measures which deal with the stockpiles of 
nuclear explosives themselves. To stop in- 
creases in these stockpiles, we have proposed a 
cutoff of the production of fissionable material 
for weapon uses. This is a logical companion 
measure for the strategic nuclear delivery ve- 
hicle freeze. One measure freezes the number 
and characteristics of the carriers; the other 
freezes the amount of fissionable material avail- 
able for bombs and warheads which are carried. 

We have also made a proposal to reduce the 
stockpiles of nuclear explosives for use in 
weapons. To this end the United States has 
proposed the transfer of significant amounts 
of fissionable material to nonweapon use. 

The nuclear ai-ms race is thus attacked on 
two fronts. The strategic vehicle freeze and 
bomber destruction would not only halt the 
increase but actually begin a decrease in the 
numbers of delivery vehicles. The cutoff and 
transfer proposals would not only halt the in- 
crease but actually begin a decrease in the size 

JULY 27, 1964 


of nuclear stocks on both sides. 

Today, within this group of measures, I 
should like to emphasize the cutoff. We be- 
lieve that it holds promise ; and I say that for 
two reasons. First, it is in this general area 
that the most recent steps have been taken by 
both sides. The announcements by the major 
nuclear powers last April of cutbacks in fission- 
able material production ' do lend weight to 
our hope that we may be able to take further 
significant steps. Secondly, the United States 
approaches negotiations in this area with a 
great deal of flexibility. In essence, our pro- 
posals cover the full range — from the cutbacks 
which have recently been announced by the 
three nuclear participants at this Conference, 
through further plant-by-plant shutdowns with 
verification, to a complete cutoff with verifica- 
tion. We are thus prepared to consider and 
accept a wide range of possible alternatives. 
For that reason we are hopeful that further 
results can be achieved. 

Basic Elements of U.S. Position 

I should now like to review the basic elements 
of the United States position on a cutoff, some 
of which have been presented before and some 
of which have not. 

We are prepared to accept a complete, verified 
cutoff of the production of fissionable material 
for use in nuclear weapons. We are willing to 
accept this as a measure separate from and 
prior to agreement on stage I of general dis- 
armament and the establishment of an interna- 
tional disarmament organization as envisaged 
in the United States draft treaty outline.* 

We believe that the verification involved for 
such a measure could be limited in scope. 

We believe that, in addition to nuclear 
powers, nonnuclear powers may wish to accede 
to a cutoff agreement. 

The implementation of a cutoff such as this 
would have two principal advantages : 

First, it would slow the arms race by lim- 
iting the quantity of fissionable material avail- 

' For an address by President Johnson before the 
Associated Press at New York City on Apr. 20, 1964, 
see iUd., May 11, 1964, p. 726. 

* For text, see ihid.. May 7, 1962, p. 747. 

able for use in nuclear weapons of all kinds. 
Fissionable material which could be made into 
weapons would still be produced as a by- 
product in reactors designed for electric power 
production, propulsion, or other uses. There 
is no way to avoid this. But this material 
would be reserved for peaceful uses imder ade- 
quate safeguards if the cutoff were adopted; 
and reactors whose only function was to make 
fissionable material for weapons would be shut 
down. The cutoff would thus stop production 
of the vital explosive ingredient for use in nu- 
clear weapons. It would halt the production 
of fissionable material for use in the f uU range 
of nuclear weapons. This range extends from 
strategic bombs and warheads to tactical battle- 
field weapons. It extends from strategic anti- 
ballistic missiles to various types of shorter 
range air defense rockets. 

Second, it would help to inhibit the further 
spread of nuclear weapons. It would put fixed 
limits on the amounts of nuclear material avail- 
able for national nuclear weapons programs in 
many areas of the world. It would reinforce 
the existing incentives against the transfer to 
other nations of fissionable material for use in 

In our view a cutoff arrangement should in- 
clude the following basic undertakings: 

First, each party would agree to halt, pro- 
hibit, and prevent the production, at facilities 
under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable 
material for use in nuclear weapons. 

Second, each party would also agree to re- 
frain from rendering assistance to anyone for 
the purpose of production anywhere of fission- 
able material for use in nuclear weapons. 

Third, each party would agree to accept ap- 
propriate inspection. 

Fourth, the agreement should contain a with- 
drawal clause, perhaps one similar to that in- 
corporated in the partial test ban treaty .' Such 
a clause would serve to guard agaiiist occur- 
rences related to the subject matter of the 
agreement which might affect adversely the 
security position of the parties. 

As I pointed out earlier, verification of a 
cutoff could be relatively limited in scope. It 
would deal with three kinds of facilities hav- 

' For text, see iUd.. Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239. 



ing functions related to the production of fis- 
sionable material: (1) those which were de- 
clared and completely shut down; (2) those 
which were declared and continued to produce 
fissionable material for non weapon purposes; 
and (3) those, if any, which were not declared 
but which might be engaged in clandestine 

A plant-by-plant shutdown might in the be- 
ginning be verified on a plant-by-plant basis. 
Inspection thus would be even less at the outset 
than it would be in a complete cutoff. 

In August 1962 the United Kingdom delega- 
tion submitted an interesting paper on the con- 
trol of fissionable material production in gen- 
eral and complete disarmament.* Paragraphs 
1 through 26 of that paper deal with control 
of a cutoff in such circumstances. I can assure 
representatives that the control provisions 
which we have in mind for the cutoff as a sep- 
arable, pre-stage-I measure would be less than 
those envisaged in that paper for general dis- 
armament. This is true because, as a separable 
measure, the risk of small diversions of fission- 
able material by one of the nuclear powers is 
less significant than it would be under general 
disarmament. As the United Kingdom paper 
makes clear, large, hidden nuclear production 
plants would be difficult to construct and con- 
ceal, given limited but sufficient inspection 
rights to deter such activity. 

In future statements we shall explore in more 
d,etail the verification provisions of such a 

Transfer of U-235 to Nonweapon Use 

In addition to the cutoff the United States 
has proposed the transfer of significant quan- 
tities of weapon-grade U-235 to nonweapon 
purposes. Such an arrangement could be made 
only in connection with a cutoff agreement. 
However, the cutoff agreement itself could be 
implemented alone. 

We have indicated at past meetings that we 
would consider the transfer of amounts in excess 
of the originally proposed figure of 50,000 kilo- 
grams of weapon-grade U-235. We have also 
indicated that if the Soviet Union felt that the 
transfer of equal amounts would involve in- 

• ENDC/60. 

equities for it, the United States was prepared 
to consider transferring some reasonable, larger 
amount than the Soviet Union. As an example 
of such an arrangement, we have indicated that 
we would be willing to transfer 60,000 kilo- 
grams to the Soviet Union's 40,000 kilograms 
of weapon-grade U-235. 

At the 166th meeting [February 13] of this 
Committee, I pointed out that this proposal 
was no mere gesture. Some of the figures on 
its magnitude are worth repeating. The cost 
of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is 
$720 million. If completely fissioned, it would 
release about 1,000 megatons of TNT equiva- 
lent, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent 
for every man, woman, and child on earth. 

The unilateral announcements made in April 
by the nuclear powers represented here have put 
us on the path to the cutoff and the eventual 
reduction of explosive materials available for 
nuclear weapons. It is our earnest hope that 
these steps can be followed with agreements for 
a complete or partial cessation of production of 
this material and for meaningful transfers of 
fissionable material to nonweapon purposes. 


Last week I described our proposal for a cut- 
off in the production of fissionable material for 
weapon purposes and its potential effect on 
nuclear stockpiles. Today I should like to dis- 
cuss the verification provisions which we would 
propose for nuclear powers under a separate 
cutoff agreement. The appropriate verification 
procedures for nonnuclear powers need further 
study, and therefore I will not touch on them 

At our 188th meeting I set forth our general 
philosophy in regard to verification. I men- 
tioned the extensive research in this area under- 
taken by the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. That research seeks to devise systems 
which reconcile the need for adequate verifica- 
tion with the desire to protect the sensitive facil- 
ities of inspected parties. 

The inspection system we have designed for 
a cutoff agreement recognizes that certain sen- 
sitive facilities may be involved. It represents 
a concrete expression of our philosophy. 

JTJLT 27, 1964 


To establish the scope of the inspection sys- 
tem, we started with its puqDOse. That purpose 
is to provide a high degree of assurance that no 
significant increase in existing stockpiles of 
materials for weapon use could result under the 

We are not asking for inspection for its own 
sake or in order to spot minor inaccuracies. Our 
inspection requirements have been guided by 
our security needs. As I pointed out last Thurs- 
day, under a complete cutoff as a separate meas- 
ure, small diversions of fissionable materials by 
nuclear powers would be less significant than 
under general disarmament. 

The inspection system we propose is designed 
with all those thoughts in mind. It seeks only 
that amount of inspection necessary to guard 
against significant diversions by the parties. 

The system which we propose would subject 
three types of facilities to inspection: U-235 
separation plants, which produce enriched 
uranium; nuclear reactors, which also produce 
fissionable material; and chemical-separation 
plants, which isolate the products of reactor 
operations. There would be no need to inspect 
mines or refineries. Nor would there be any 
requirement to inspect nuclear stockpiles. 

Operation of Inspection System 

The system would operate in the following 
manner. First, each nuclear power would de- 
clare all U-235 separation plants, chemical-sep- 
aration plants, and reactors. 

Under the cutoff agreement, a nuclear state 
would probably close many fissionable-material 
plants rather than maintain them in partial 
operation. The declarations would, therefore, 
specify, by individual identification and loca- 
tion, plants to be shut down and plants to 
continue allowed production. 

Such declarations would not reveal informa- 
tion concerning the storage or deployment of 
nuclear weapons. Nor would tliere be a state- 
ment of the amount of fissionable material 
presently available to each party for use in 
weapons. The declarations would include the 
amoimt of fissionable materials required for 
allowed purposes and the production schedules 
for each facility which would remain in opera- 
tion. Production requirements would be stated 

according to categories of allowed purposes. 
These would include research, power and pro- 
pulsion reactors, explosions for peaceful pur- 
poses, and transfers to other states or to inter- 
national organizations for allowed purposes. 

Eacli nuclear power could question the accu- 
racy of another's declaration. If a satisfactory 
explanation were not received, the questioning 
power would have the right to withdraw from 
the agreement. 

The next step after the submission of dec- 
larations would be the inspections themselves. 
These would be of three kinds : 

First, to check that shutdown plants did not 
resume operation ; 

Second, to guard against overfulfillment or 
diversion of production at the declared operat- 
ing plants; and 

Third, to insure that no undeclared plants 
were engaged, contrary to the agreement, in 
clandestine production of fissionable material 
for use in weapons. 

Implementing Inspection Procedures 

I should now like to sketch briefly for the 
Committee how each kind of inspection might 
be implemented. 

Let us begin with the simplest : the observa- 
tion of a facility which had been shut down 
completely. This would require an initial in- 
spection to identify the plant and to insure 
cessation of production. Thereafter only occa- 
sional inspections would suffice to confirm the 
shutdown status. The procedure can be simple, 
because reopening any significant part of a 
shvitdown production complex is a very difficult 
and time-consuming process. Irregular inspec- 
tions, undertaken without too much advance 
notice, would inhibit resumption of operation. 

Procedures for monitoring allowed produc- 
tion at declared facilities are also relatively 
simple and less intrusive than might at first be 

First, to see that U-235 separation plants 
produced U-235 in declared amounts only, in- 
spectors would require ground access to the 
perimeter of the process buildings. They would 
measure the electrical input to the plant. They 
would check the perimeter uranium input, de- 



clared product output, and uranium tails for 
uranium and U-235 content. They would not 
enter the actual separation plant. By such a 
perimeter examination, the inspectore could 
gage the amount of fissionable material avail- 
able for allowed uses. By these procedures 
they would also be able to estimate the produc- 
tion potential accurately enough to guard 
against diversion of significant quantities. Of 
course, if the U-235 product were stored for 
future peaceful use, the U-235 input and output 
at the storage sites would have to be recorded 
and the sites monitored. 

Second, to inspect nuclear reactors maintained 
in operation. International Atomic Energy 
Agency procedures could be used. Under a 
cutoff agreement, nuclear powers could agree 
to accept IAEA or similar inspection on a 
phased basis, starting with reactors of 100 or 
more thermal megawatts. Since tlie fissionable 
product of the reactors would be processed in 
declared chemical-separation plants, there 
would be added assurance against its diversion 
to prohibited uses. 

Third, to monitor chemical-separation plants, 
the inspectors would require complete access to 
the facilities at all times. Tliis is because the 
plutonium, the U-233, and the enriched uraniimi 
fuel — all possible products of chemical separa- 
tion — are all also potentially useful in weapons. 

Inspectors of a chemical-separation plant 
would maintain a system of records, check re- 
ports on materials and use of the facility, and 
insure that all material was accomited for. 
Plutonium, U-233, and enriched uranium would 
be monitored in storage or used imder safe- 
guards consistent with those I have been de- 
scribing. But a nuclear power could choose a 
substitute for this particular inspection pro- 
cedure. It could place mider international 
safeguards an equal amount of the same type 
of fissionable material as that to be processed 
in the chemical-separation plant. Of course, 
the substituted material could not previously 
have been imder international safeguards. By 
making an independent measurement of the 
feed to the plant — that is, of all the material 
to be processed in the plant — the inspectors 
could determine the quantity of fissionable ma- 
terial to be substituted. 

By those three methods, it would be possible 
to verify that fissionable materials were 
produced at declared facilities according to 
agreed allowances. 

Finally, we would have to insure that no 
undeclared facilities were producing fissionable 
materials. For this purpose, we propose that 
the parties allow a limited number of inspec- 
tions of suspected clandestine facilities. Nor- 
mally such inspection would require internal 
access to the suspected facility. However, if it 
were considered particularly sensitive, appro- 
priate external inspection might suffice. The 
guiding principle would be that a nuclear jwwer 
could take any reasonable precaution to pro- 
tect its sensitive facilities as long as the in- 
spectors were satisfied that no prohibited ac- 
tivities were occurring. 

The procedures I have described are designed 
for declared plants, both operating and shut 
down. They would also cover undeclared 
plants. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency might undertake the inspection of the 
declared plants. We are prepared to explore 
that possibility with the Agency. For unde- 
clared plants, we propose adversary inspection : 
We inspect you, and you inspect us. 

These procedures would constitute a reliable 
verification system for the complete cutoff with- 
out involving excessive mtnision. There would 
be no inspection of mines and refineries and no 
inspection of existing nuclear weapon stock- 
piles. As much as possible, inspection would 
take place on the periphery of those plants to 
be inspected. 

We have also proposed a partial cutoff, on a 
plant-by-plant basis. Verification of such a 
cutoff would at the outset be even more lunited, 
involving only inspection of shutdown plants. 

We have submitted today, as a Conference 
document, a paper containing the system I have 
just outlined, with some additional details.' 
We hope it will be studied by this Committee. 
We recognize that the technical aspects of the 
proposed verification system are somewhat 
complex. For this reason, we neither expect 
nor desire an immediate reaction, although we 
do hope to hear the considered views of the 
members of the Committee in due course. 





Existing Law and Measures To Improve the Status of Women 
in tlie Western Hemispliere 


ly Gladys A. Tillett 

One of the durable satisfactions of serving as 
U.S. Kepresentative on the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women is partici- 
pation in a United Nations regional seminar. 
Here standards which have been recommended 
to the Commission at its annual sessions are dis- 
cussed in relation to the progress and problems 
of women in the region. As the head of the 
U.S. delegation to the United Nations Seminar 
on the Status of Women in Family Law, held at 
Bogota, Colombia, December 3-17, 1963, it was 
my privilege to participate with women leaders 
from nearly all countries in this hemisphere in 
a discussion of existing law and practice and of 
measures to improve the status of women 
throughout the Americas. 


The success of the Bogotd seminar was as- 
sured by the high qualifications of the partici- 
pants, who came from 25 countries and ter- 
ritories in the Western Hemisphere : Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Kica, 
Dominican Kepublic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Marti- 

• Mrs. Tillett is the U.8. Representative 
on the Commission on the Status of 
Women of the Economic and Social Cotm- 
cil of the United Nations. She was head 
of the V.S. delegation to the V.N. Seminar 
on the Status of "Women im, Family Law. 

nique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Puerto Kico, St. Lucia, Surinam, Trini- 
dad and Tobago, the United States, and Uru- 
guay. As in all U.N. seminars, the participants 
were named by their governments as experts in 
their field and they came uninstructed. 

The host coimtry, Colombia, had an impres- 
sive delegation, headed by an attorney who had 
formerly served as Senator and Cabinet Minis- 
ter; the other Colombian members held high 
posts in government or national life. 

Mexico's participant was a Justice of the 
Mexican Supreme Court. She had two alter- 
nates: one the head of a department in the 
Mexican Ministry of Government and also 
Chairman of the U.N. Commission on the 
Status of Women, and the other a well-known 
practicing attorney in Mexico City. 

Five other countries — Argentina, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua — also 
sent judges, and Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama 
sent distinguished professors of law or social 
service. The participant from Canada has been 
a member of the Senate of her country for 
many years. 

The participant from the Dominican Republic 
was one of its ambassadors to the United Na- 
tions, and was also President of the Inter- 
American Commission of Women. Others held 
high professional positions — in the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru, in the 
Ministries of Finance of Haiti and Paraguay, in 
the Ministry of Development and Welfare of 
Jamaica. The participant from Uruguay was 



the chief of the Department of Architecture in 
the Ministry of Public Works. Honduras sent 
its Vice Minister of Education, and Trinidad 
and Tobago its Education Officer. St. Lucia 
sent a former member of its Legislative Council, 
and Martinique and Surinam sent experts in 
social rehabilitation. 

Serving as alternates on the U.S. delegation 
were Mrs. Eliska Chanlett, the U.S. delegate 
on the Inter- American Commission of Women, 
and Mrs. Alice A. Morrison, Chief of the Divi- 
sion of Legislation and Standards in the Wom- 
en's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sent Mrs. 
Cardona de Lopez-Baralt of its Department of 

With one exception, all the countries repre- 
sented sent women participants. This was in 
contrast to the situation in an earlier seminar on 
family law which I attended in Tokyo in 1962,^ 
where half the participants were men, including 
three supreme court justices and a number of 
high officials in Departments of Justice. 

In preparation for both the Tokyo and 
Bogota meetings I had traveled widely, in the 
Far East and in Latin America, on a Depart- 
ment of State specialist grant. During these 
trips I talked with high officials about seminar 
plans, conferred with leaders of nongovernmen- 
tal organizations entitled to send observers, and 
met many of the distinguished representatives 
who later attended the seminars. 

Altogether, some 20 international women's 
organizations recognized as consultants by the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council attended 
the Bogota seminar and joined in the discus- 
sions. They included such groups as the Inter- 
national Commission of Jurists, the Internation- 
al Federation of Women Lawyers, the World 
Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, the 
YWCA, the Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom, and the Friends World 
Committee. The International Council of Wo- 
men sent its international President, Mrs. Craig 
Schuller, as representative. The International 
Federation of Business and Professional Wo- 
men was represented by U.S. Federal Court 
Judge Sarah T. Hughes of Dallas, Tex., who 

administered the oath to President Lyndon B. 

The Government of Colombia provided facil- 
ities for the seminar and made the preparatory 
arrangements. The United Nations provided 
secretariat services including simultaneous 

As in the Status of Women Commission and 
all other United Nations bodies, documentation 
was provided in advance. There were three 
major papers. One, prepared by the United 
Nations, dealt with U.N. action thus far; the 
second, prepared by Miss Gladys Harrison, 
formerly Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare, dealt with "The Status of Women in 
Family Law in the United States and Can- 
ada"; and the third, prepared by Miss Maria 
Lavalle Urbina of Mexico, dealt with the 
"Status of Women in Latin American Family 
Law." In addition, participants provided 
nearly 20 working papers on the laws in their 
own countries. The United States paper was 
prepared by my alternate, Mrs. Morrison. 

Opening of the Seminar 

At the opening session attended by the For- 
eign Minister of Colombia and many other dig- 
nitaries, the participants observed a minute of 
silence in memory of the late President, John F. 
Kennedy. Throughout the session there were 
many expressions of the high regard and affec- 
tion in which he was held and of appreciation 
for his imaginative leadership in improving 
the life of all the people in the hemisphere. 

Judge Hughes, in acknowledging these trib- 
utes in a later session, said: 

Personally and as a citizen of the United States I 
wish to thank our distinguished President for her trib- 
ute in her opening remarks to our beloved President 
Kennedy, whom I deeply admired for his courage, his 
wisdom, and his concern for the people of the world 
and particularly of Latin America. 

I realize it is not on the agenda, but I should like 
to assure the people of Central and South America that 
President Johnson believes in hemispheric solidarity 
and in the Alliance for Progress. He will support the 
alliance in the same way as President Kennedy, realiz- 

'Mrs. Tillett attended the Tokyo seminar as U.S. 

'For the report, see U.N. doc. ST/TAC/HRA8. 
Earlier U.N. seminars on the status of women in family 
law are reported in Nos. 11 and 14 of this series. 

JULY 27, 1964 


ing that the growth of Latin America and its develop- 
ment are necessary, if we in the United States are to 
progress. He believes in the individual rights of men 
and women and strongly supports the United Nations 
and its program of human rights. I have known and 
been a friend of President Johnson and his wife for 
many years. 

The officers who were elected at tlie first 
plenary session served as a steering committee 
throughout the seminar. Mrs. Esmeralda 
Arboleda de Uribe of Colombia was elected 
chairman. The three vice chairmen were Mrs. 
Maria Cristina Salmoran de Tamayo of 
Mexico, Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett of the United 
States, and Mrs. Julia Guarino Fiechter of 
Uruguay. Senator Muriel McQ. Fergusson of 
Canada and Mrs. Winifred Hewitt of Jamaica 
served as rapporteurs. 

In addition, discussion leaders were appointed 
for each of the items on the agenda. Miss Car- 
men Natalia Martinez Bonilla of the Dominican 
Republic was the leader on "Age of marriage, 
consent to marriage and registration of mar- 
riages"; Miss Ava Maria Vargas Dubon of 
Guatemala on "Effects of marriage on the per- 
sonal status of women"; Mrs. Alba Alonzo de 
Quesada of Honduras on "Effects of marriage 
on the property rights of women" ; Miss Maria 
Lavalle Urbina of Mexico on "Dissolution of 
marriage, annulment, separation"; Miss Emma 
Pilotin of Martinique on "Parental rights and 
duties" ; Mrs. Julia Uriona de Olmos of Bolivia 
on the "Legal status of unmarried women"; 
Miss Carmela Aguilar Ayanz of Peru on "In- 
heritance rights of women"; and Mrs. Emma 
Cardona de Lopez-Baralt of Puerto Eico on 
"Social factors affecting the status of women in 
family law." 

Early in the discussion the chairman pointed 
out that we were not there to enumerate the 
laws of our respective countries but to examine 
existing inequities and to see what can be done 
about them. To further the chairman's objec- 
tive of encouraging frank discussion, my first 
intervention made it clear that in the United 
States women have problems, too. 

In the matter of domicile, the agenda subject 
then under discussion, the basic principle estab- 
lished by law in most U.S. jurisdictions is that 
the domicile of the wife follows that of the hus- 
band. Today, as a result of this ancient rule, 

married women living separate from their hus- 
bands sometimes may be denied the exercise of 
their rights of citizenship — voting, running for 
political office, and jury service — on the basis 
that they lack the required legal domicile. My 
statement continued : 

I am happy to say that in recent years State laws 
have begun to recognize a separate domicile for mar- 
ried women. We have made some progress, but today 
there are only four States which appear to recognize 
a married woman's separate domicile for all purx)oses 
without imposing limitations. 

I pomted out also that an increasing number 
of States allow a married woman to acquire a 
separate domicile for certain specified purposes, 
such as voting, taxation, jury service, election 
to public office, and administration of estates. 

The chairman of the seminar expressed ap- 
preciation for my statement. She said that, 
since the representative of the major industrial 
country in the Western Hemisphere was willing 
to acknowledge the existence of "problems," 
she hoped that delegates from other countries 
would be willing to follow the U.S. example. 
Throughout the seminar, the frank discussion 
of legal discriminations and constructive ways 
of dealing with them was of great benefit to 
all participants. 

Hemispheric Problems 

The thread of concern running through the 
discussion was the need for improvement of 
family law as a means for affording legal recog- 
nition to the human dignity and rights of 

Many delegates reported that, while progress 
was being made in the elimination of discrimi- 
natory laws and customs, such progress was 
spotty. This was pointedly brought out early 
in the session by one participant, who prefaced 
her opening statement with the rueful comment 
that women seemed to have responsibilities, 
rather than rights. 

The two subjects on the agenda tliat gave rise 
to the most extended discussion were dissolu- 
tion of marriage and the legal status of im- 
married women. 

In the discussion of divorce, there was great 
interest in the measures being taken in the 
United States to help married couples settle 



their differences with the help of family coun- 
seling. I pointed out that family counseling is 
now taught in some major universities and that 
a number of States have enacted laws that make 
such counseling obligatoiy prior to the hearing 
of a divorce action. 

The discussion of divorce brought out wide 
variation in law and practice; some countries 
do not allow divorce on any grounds, while 
others recognize it as a means of dissolving 
marriage and allow the spouses to remari-y. It 
was recognized that effective legal protections 
during marriage must be available for the wife 
as a means of establishing sound family rela- 
tions and tliat such protections would also help 
reduce the emphasis on divorce. 

Many participants were in favor of raising 
the legal minimum age for marriage. It was 
felt that this would lead to more stable mar- 
riages and might also t«nd to decrease the 
demand for divorce. It was emphasized that 
a higher minimmn age would allow time for 
better education and training of the intending 
spouses. In this connection I stated that the 
United States is steadily making progress in 
raising the minimum age of marriage ; only four 
States now permit marriage of girls as young as 
14, and in these cases they must have parental 

I mentioned that many of our high schools 
and colleges offer courses in family living and 
that these are very popular with young people. 
In response to the interest tliis statement 
aroused, I added : 

A variety of methods are currently being used to 
promote the stability of marriage in the United States. 
One method is the training for family living taught 
in many of our high schools. In such courses teenage 
boys and girls are taught that marriage is a partner- 
ship to which both partners contribute different but 
equally imiwrtant skills. Formal training for family 
life helps instill attitudes of consideration and coopera- 
tion which are so important to a happy marriage. 

In addition, marriage counseling has attained the 
status of a profession in the United States. Several 
major universities provide courses to permit the award 
of a doctorate in this field. As an indication of the 
high standards in this profession, the Menninger 
Foundation of Topeka, Kansas, requires a graduate 
or profes.sional degree in one's chosen profession plus 
3 years of practical experience as a prerequisite for 
training in marriage counseling. Representatives of 
such professions as law, psychology, education, religion, 

and social service have completed training in marriage 

In my statement on parental rights and duties 
I noted that, in the United States, the father has 
primary responsibility for support of the cliil- 
dren both during marriage and after divorce. 
The seminar discussed at length the problem of 
support where fathers abandon their families. 
I also pointed out that provision is made to 
collect support money from the father, where- 
ever he goes, and to send it to the mother. 

Under the agenda item entitled "Legal status 
of immarried women," the discussion revolved 
almost entirely around the rights of the immar- 
ried mother and her child. It was felt that de 
facto unions often reflected lack of educational 
opportunities, a low level of economic develop- 
ment, and related factors. Numerous other 
problems were noted. 

During a session at which I presided, my 
alternate, Mrs. Chanlett, made a statement on 
the Alliance for Progress, pointing out the im- 
portance of women making use of its new re- 
sources for community development and for the 
improvement of family life. 

Seminar Followup 

Participants agreed on the need for legal re- 
forms to eliminate injustices against women 
and to strengthen the family as an institution. 

To follow up a seminar on family law it is 
important that an objective evaluation be made 
in each country of the progress of women in 
that coimtry. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt called 
attention to this need at an informal gathering 
of members of the U.N. Commission on the 
Status of Women in New York in the spring 
of 1962. She pointed out that the U.N. Com- 
mission on the Status of Women had set the 
pattern but that it is the responsibility of each 
country to make an examination of its own 
laws and customs to see how these measure up. 
She noted that the United States was then mak- 
ing a review through the Presidential commis- 
sion of which she was chairman. 

Other types of commissions have been estab- 
lished in various countries. At the Tokyo sem- 
inar frequent mention was made of the Pakistan 
Commission on Family Laws, which pro- 
moted numerous legal reforms in that coun- 

JULT 27, 1964 


try. In Singapore the appointment of such a 
commission led to the enactment of a new code 
of laws for women, known as the Woman's 

To help carry into effect conclusions reached 
by a U.N. seminar or by a commission or study 
group in an individual country, women's vol- 
untary organizations play an indispensable role. 
Through their study and action programs, they 
not only educate their own members but usually 
also reach a wide cross section of the public. 
Awareness of this fact was implicit in the dis- 
cussions at the Bogota seminar and recurred 
constantly in conclusions reached by the partici- 
pants. Such women's organizations are firmly 
established in Latin America and are increas- 
ingly important centers of strength and 
influence. They, and their counterparts in the 
United States and Canada, offer a ready means 
for stimulating improvements in the status of 
women in family law throughout the hemi- 
sphere. Their work will be of major impor- 
tance in putting the conclusions reached at the 
Bogota seminar into practical effect. 


The Bogota seminar strengthened my convic- 
tion as to the usefulness of U.N. regional semi- 
nars in improving the status of women. Espe- 
cially in situations where women face problems 
caused not alone by laws but by long-established 
customs, these seminars provide an invaluable 
opportunity for frank and free discussion of 
existing inequities and exchange of information 
on measures which have proved useful in elimi- 
nating them. Seminars serve as a valuable arm 
to the U.N. Commission on the Status of 
Women by focusing attention of national lead- 
ers and of men and women at the grassroots 
level on the basic principles developed by that 

Each series of U.N. seminars on the status of 
women deals with a major role of women. In 
today's world a woman has many roles. The 
adoption by the General Assembly in 1962 of a 
resolution suggesting the establishment of a 
long-term program for the advancement of 
women,' with particular emphasis on the de- 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/1777 (XVII). 

veloping countries, reflects the tremendous im- 
portance attached by governments of these coun- 
tries to the potential of women in economic and 
social progress. More and more countries are 
recognizing that they need women as well as 
men for purposes of national development and 
the raising of living standards. At its 17th 
annual session in March 1963, the U.N. Com- 
mission on the Status of Women voted to initi- 
ate a third series of seminars in 1965 on the role 
of women in economic development, with spe- 
cial emphasis on the developing countries. 

Governments and women's voluntary organi- 
zations look to the U.N. Commission on the 
Status of Women for leadership in the estab- 
lisliment of basic principles on all aspects of 
women's status. The recommendations devel- 
oped by the Commission at its annual meetings, 
based on factual information on existing law 
and practice, provide the guidelines for prac- 
tical action. Through regional seminars, these 
recommendations can find application in each 
of the participating coimtries and thus open 
the way for new avenues of service and oppor- 
tunity for women throughout the world. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publieations may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Economic and Social Council 

Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Pro- 
gramme of Technical Assistance: The Use of Ex- 
perts From Developing Countries. E/TAC/140. 
Rev. 1. April 27, 19C4. 6 pp. 

Technical Assistance Activities of the United Nations. 
Report of the Secretary-General. E/3870, May 11, 
1964, 179 pp.; Addendum, E/3870/Add. 1, June 10, 
1964, 167 pp. 

Inquiry Among Governments on Problems Resulting 
From the Reciprocal Action of Economic Develop- 
ment and Population Changes. Report of the Sec- 
retary-General. E/3.S9r). May 18, 1964. 89 pp. 

Future of the United Nations Water Resources De- 
velopment Centre. Note by the Secretary-General. 
E/3894. May 19, 1964. 2 pp. 

Interim Co-Ordinating Committee for International 
Commodity Arrangements. 1964 Review of Interna- 
tional Commodity Problems. E/3856. May 29, 1964. 
101 pp. 



United Nations Children's Fund. Children and Youth 
in Development Planning. Conclusions of a round- 
table conference held at Bellagio, Italy, April 1-7, 
1964. E/ICEF/498. June 'Z. li)(J4. 13 pp. 

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. 
Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Re- 
leased by Disarmament. Replies of governments. 
E/3898/Add. 1. June 3, 1964. 31 pp. 

Training of National Technical Personnel for Accel- 
erated Industrialization of Developing Countries. 
Report by the Secretary-General. E/3901, June 3, 
1964, 38 pp. ; E/3901/Add. 1. June 3, 1964, l.')8 pp. 

Recent Developments Relating to New Sources of 
Energy. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3903. 
June 3. 1964. 43 pp. 

Internationnl Co-Operation in Cartography. Interna- 
tional Co-Operation in the Standardization of Geo- 
graphical Names. Report by the Secretary-General. 
E'3!)07. June 3. 1964. 4 pp. 

Development of Natural Resources. Report on work 
being done in the field of nonagricultural resources. 
E/3904. June 15, 1964. 30 pp. 

Measnre.s To Implement the United Nations Declara- 
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis- 
crimination. Progress report by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral. E/3916. June 1.5, 1964. 2 pp. 

United Nations Development Decade. Relationships 
Among Planning Institutes. Report by the Secre- 
tary-General. E/3923. June 19, 1964. 9 pp. 

United Nations Training and Research Institute. 
Progress rei)ort by the Secretary-General. E/3924. 
June 19. 1964. 3 pp. 

route could apply to the U.S. Civil Aeronautics 
Board for permission to use the same aircraft 
for flights beyond Detroit to a city in Canada 
■without traffic rights between Detroit and such 
Canadian city. The United States would issue 
the necessary authorization if the point in 
Canada applied for were Montreal. 

The delegations also agreed that the present 
agreement should be extended to June 30, 1965. 

The agreements arrived at in these discus- 
sions, if approved by the two Governments, will 
be formalized through diplomatic channels be- 
fore the expiration of the existing agreement. 

The conversations were held in a spirit of 
friendship and cordiality. The Mexican dele- 
gation was headed by Alberto Acuna Ongay, 
Civil Aeronautics Administrator of the Depart- 
ment of Communications and Transport, and 
the U.S. delegation by William E. Kniglit, As- 
sistant Chief of the Aviation Negotiations Divi- 
sion of the Department of State. 


United States and Mexico Conclude 
Civil Air Transport Negotiations 

Press release 316 dated July 6 

The United States and Mexico recently con- 
cluded conversations designed to reacli an agree- 
ment on the regulations that miglit govern aero- 
nautical relations between the two countries 
after August 15, 1964, the date of expiration of 
the air transport agreement in force between 
Mexico and the United States.' 

During the discussions it was agreed on an ad 
referendum basis that Mexico would receive a 
route "Mexico City-Detroit" as the route here- 
tofore left unspecified in the present agreement. 
It was further agreed that the carrier desig- 
nated by the Mexican Government to fly the 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675 
and 5513. 

Current Actions 



International air services transit agreement. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for 
the United States February 8, 194.%. .TO Stnt. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Rwanda, July 6, 1964. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 

Ratifications depoxitcd: 3a\i!\r\, June 8, 1964; 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Hepiihlic (with a reser- 
vation and declaration ), June 12, 1964. 
AcceSHion deposited: United Arab Republic (with 
reservations I , June 9. 1064. 
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 
relations concerning acquisition of nationality. 
Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force 
April 24, 1964.' 

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic, June 9, 
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 
relations C(jncerning eomrmlsory settlement of dis- 
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1964. Entered into 
force Ajiril 24. 1964." 
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened 

' Not in force for the United States. 

JULT 27, 1964 


for signature at the United Nations December 10, 

Ratifications deposited: New Zealand, June 12, 1964 ; 
Sweden (with a reservation), June 16, 1964. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Energy 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. 
Done at Paris June 18, 1964. Enters into force upon 
receipt by the United States of notification from all 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are 
willing to be bound by the terms of the agreement. 
Signatures: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Nether- 
lands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
June 18, 1964; Italy, June 22, 1964; Denmark, 
June 25, 1964 ; Canada, June 30, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 

Ratifications deposited: Niger, San Marino, July 9, 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva 
1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.' 
Proclaimed by the President: July 7, 1964. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 
force October 21, 1950 ; for the United States Feb- 
ruary 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, 
Notifications received that they consider themselves 
bound: Niger, April 16, 1964; Rwanda, March 21, 
Adherence deposited: Uganda, May 18, 1964. 



Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 1959 
(TIAS 4192), governing tolls on the Saint Lawrence 
Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
June 30, 1964. Entered into force July 1, 1964. 


Protocol modifying and supplementing convention of 
February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance 
of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion 
of taxes on estates of deceased i)ersons. Signed at 
Athens February 12, 1964.' 
Ratified by the President: July 7, 1964. 

Agreement providing for the refunding of certain in- 
debtedness due from Greece to the United States. 
Signed at Athens May 28, 1964. Enters into force 
subject to legislation passed by the United States 
Congress and signed by the President. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington July 6, 1964. Entered into force July 
6, 1964. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 29 and 
July 12, 1954, as extended (TIAS 3152, 4290), for a 
technical assistance program in British Guiana. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 
22 and 29, 1964. Entered into force June 29, 1964. 


' Not in force. 


The Senate on July 8 confirmed the following nomi- 

Mercer Cook to be Ambassador to the Republic of 
Senegal. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 327 dated July 16.) 

Randolph A. Kidder to be Ambas.sador to the King- 
dom of Cambodia. (For biographic details, see White 
House press dated June 16.) 

Clinton E. Knox to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Dahomey. ( For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated June 9.) 

Robert J. R.van to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Niger. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated May 28) . 

Franklin H. Williams to be the representative of 
the United States on the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations. (For biographic details, see 
Department of State press release 323 dated July 10. ) 



INDEX July 27, 1961^ Vol. LI, No. 1309 


Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul- 
tural Imports Corrected (text of proclama- 
tion) 122 

U.S. States Position on Question of Unified EEC 

Grains Price (Herter) 119 

American Republics. Existing Law and Meas- 
ures To Improve the Status of Women in the 
Western Hemisphere (Tillett) 128 

Atomic Energy. U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Veri- 
fication Provisions To Halt Production of Fis- 
sionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use 
(Foster) 123 

Aviation. United States and Mexico Conclude 

Civil Air Transport Negotiations 133 

Cambodia. Kidder confirmed as Ambassador . 134 


Confirmations (Cools, Kidder, Knox, Ryan, Wil- 
liams) 134 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 122 

Dahomey. Knox confirmed as Ambassador . . 134 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Cooli, Kidder, Knox, Ryan, Williams) . 134 

Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Veri- 
fication Provisions To Halt Production of Fis- 
sionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use 
(Foster) 123 

Economic Affairs 

Apijendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul- 
tural Imports Corrected (text of proclama- 
tion) 122 

New Resources To Be Contributed for Replen- 
ishment of IDA Funds 119 

Trade With Paraguay and the United Arab Re- 
public (text of proclamation) 120 

U.S. States Position on Question of Unified EEC 

Grains Price (Herter) 119 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Need To 

Explore Inner Space (Battle) 110 

Europe. U.S. States Position on Question of 

Unified EEC Grains Price (Herter) .... 119 

Germany. Secretary Rusli Interviewed on Ger- 
man Television (Ruge, Rusk) 106 

Human Rights. Existing Law and Measures To 
Improve the Status of Women in the Western 
Hemisphere (Tillett) 128 

International Organizations and Conferences 

New Resources To Be Contributed for Replen- 
ishment of IDA Funds 119 

U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Verification Provisions 
To Halt Production of Fissionable Materials 
for Nuclear Weapons Use (Foster) .... 123 

Williams confirmed as U.S. representative, 


Luxembourg. Letters of Credence (Steinmetz) . 109 
Mexico. United States and Mexico Conclude 

Civil Air Transport Negotiations 133 

Netherlands. Letters of Credence (Schur- 

mann) 109 

Niger. Ryan confirmed as Ambassador .... 134 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary 
Rusk Interviewed on German Television 
(Ruge, Rusk) 106 

Paraguay. Trade With Paraguay and the 
United Arab Republic (text of proclama- 
tion) 120 

Presidential Documents 

Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricul- 
tural Imports Corrected 122 

Trade With Paraguay and the United Arab Re- 
public , 120 

Senegal. Cook confirmed as Ambassador . . . 134 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 133 

United States and Mexico Conclude Civil Air 

Transport Negotiations 133 

U.S.S.R. Ambassador Kohler Makes Fourth of 

July Address on Moscow TV 108 

United Arab Republic. Trade With Paraguay 
and the United Arab Republic (text of procla- 
mation) 120 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents ... 132 

Existing Law and Measures To Improve the 
Status of Women in the Western Hemisphere 

(Tillett) 128 

Name Index 

Battle, Lucius D 110 

Cook, Mercer 134 

Foster, William C 123 

Herter, Christian A 119 

Johnson, President 120, 122 

Kidder, Randolph A 134 

Knox, Clinton E 134 

Kohler, Foy D 108 

Ruge, Gerd 106 

Rusk, Secretary 106 

Ryan, Robert J 134 

Schurmann, Carl Willem Alwin 109 

Steinmetz, Maurice 109 

Tillett, Gladys A 128 

Williams, Franklin H 134 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 6-12 

Press releases may he obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20520. 

Release issued prior to July 6 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 310 of July 2. 


U.S. participation in International 

U.S.-Mexiean civil air transport 

Netherlands credentials (revised) 

Luxembourg credentials (rewrite). 

Program for visit of Prime Minister 
of Malaysia. 
Philippines credentials (rewrite). 
Argentina credentials (rewrite). 
Brazil credentials (rewrite). 

Williams sworn in as U.S. Repre- 
sentative on U.N. Economic and 
Social Council (biographic de- 

Kass sworn in as consultant (bio- 
graphic details). 













*324 7/10 

♦Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


CSB etc G 
— M^RE 







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Vol. LI, No. 1310 

August 3, 196k 


hy Ambassador George C. McGhee 138 


Text of Coinvmnique II/B 



Text of Preamble and Recommendations 150 

For index see inside back cover 

Some American Thoughts on Current Issues 

ty George C. McOhee 

Anibassador to the Federal Republic of Oermamy- 

Hard though it is to reconcile with these 
lovely surroundings, we have all come here to 
Tuetzing to work. Our task is quite simply to 
think and talk about the issues that confront 
the world today — which when done seriously 
is work indeed, but of the most stimulating sort. 
It is work which I am pleased and honored to 
share with you and your distinguished guests. 

Tuetzing, in a remarkably short time, has be- 
come closely associated with that type of infor- 
mal but informed discussion from which we 
can hope to derive a better understanding of 
today's problems — and hopefully some progress 
toward their solution. I have been fortunate in 
participating in similar conferences over a 
number of years. This type of gathering has 
no rival, in my opinion, in prodding us to re- 
examine long-held notions and to open our 
minds to new concepts. To me the real value 
of such meetings of minds is in the exchange of 

* Address made before a summer conference at the 
Evangelical Academy at Tuetzing, Germany, on July 16. 

ideas, in the free flow of conversation as we walk 
and talk along Tuetzing's lovely garden paths. 

I have decided, therefore, to make my re- 
marks quite informal. I hope you will tliink of 
them as a kind of conversation. Although I 
shall inevitably monopolize it for the first half 
hour or so, it will, I hope, continue with your 
comments and questions today and in smaller 
groups tomorrow. My purpose is to comment 
on four current questions arising out of the rela- 
tions between my country and Germany, to 
which I have devoted my attention as American 

These four are by no means the only impor- 
tant foreign policy matters affecting Germany 
with which my Government is at tliis time con- 
cerned, nor is there necessarily any direct rela- 
tionship among them. I will, moreover, make 
no attempt to indicate their relative importance 
nor to deal with them in all their aspects. Tliis 
I leave to your part of the "conversation." My 
purpose is, quite simply, to present an American 


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and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
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the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
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point of view which my German friends will 
not consider an intrusion into their exclusive 

The topics I have chosen are the following: 
(1) our worldwide responsibilities; (2) the 
future of Europe; (3) Berlin passes; (4) re- 
unification. You will agree, I think, that I have 
not sought to avoid the controversial. 

Our Worldwide Responsibilities 

Recently there appeared in a German news- 
paper a cartoon which depicted a poor little 
donkey, labeled Germany, which the American 
Uncle Sam was loading down with a variety of 
burdens — aid to Viet-Nam, troops for Cyprus, 
and the like. It appeared from the expression 
on the donkey's face that lie might be wondering 
"TVHiat next?" or "Is there no end?" 

Although it is true that there has in recent 
months been a proliferation of demands on Ger- 
man skills and resources, I believe that the 
image of Germany portrayed by the little 
donkey is, in 1964, grossly inaccui-ate. Ger- 
many is now strong, both politically and eco- 
nomically. Perhaps we in the United States 
have come to realize the implications of this 
sooner than you, because we have come to know 
how strength is measured in today's world. As 
a consequence we know how urgently the 
strength of Germany is needed. 

You have been remarkably successful in 
rapidly rebuilding, within a democratic frame- 
work, a nation which is economically much 
stronger than Germany has ever been before. 
It is, therefore, natural that the free nations 
look increasingly to the Federal Republic to 
assume a greater role in this or that — ofttimes 
to Germans seemingly remote — part of the 
world. The reputation "made in Germany" 
was not destroyed by Hitler in spite of his best 
efforts. In Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
in Eastern Europe the reputation of your skills, 
your energy, and your progress is very high. 
Many wish to take advantage of the experience 
which has contributed so importantly to your 
own success. 

A specific case in point is the recent appeal 
of the United States to its allies, in support of 
the Government of South Viet-Nam, to render 
appropriate assistance in stemming the tide of 

Communist aggression in that country. There 
are those in Germany who say, "Viet-Nam is 
far away. Why does it concern us ? Why was 
this call directed to us?" One answer, of 
course, is that the request went to all of our 
allies, of wliich 17, including the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, have already responded favor- 
ably. Basically, however, those who pose such 
questions fail to realize that the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany is, according to many indices, 
the second strongest nation in the free world. 
If the world struggle against communism is to 
succeed, this great strength is needed, not just 
in protecting Germany's own borders but wher- 
ever freedom is in jeopardy. 

There is wide support in Germany for a for- 
ward strategy in the defense of the NATO area. 
The defense of freedom in today's world re- 
quires a truly forward strategy. This entails 
increasing contributions, in formerly remote 
areas like Viet-Nam and central Africa, from 
countries which, like Germany, have only re- 
cently acquired the ability to contribute. The 
contribution need not, in every case, be a mili- 
tary one. Indeed, our Government did not sug- 
gest that Germany send military forces to South 

Freedom is, however, indivisible; what hap- 
pens in the Mekong Valley can have an impor- 
tant bearing on what happens in Berlin. Ag- 
gression anywhere must be made so expensive 
that those tempted to indulge in it will see the 
folly of their course. It is when those who have 
the greatest stake in freedom band together to 
defend it — wherever and whenever required — 
that we move toward our common goal. 

Sometimes it is urged that Germany's recent 
past makes it unwise for Germany to assume 
roles outside its borders. I see no reason why 
Germany should indefinitely remain the captive 
of the unfavorable aspects of its history. We 
in our country recognize that Germany is today 
a new Germany. Wliy should not Germans? 

Gei-many, indeed, has many advantages when 
it comes to dealing with problems affecting the 
new countries of Africa and Asia. Through the 
early loss of colonies, Germany has largely 
escaped involvement in the history of colonial- 
ism in the 20th century. This minimizes sus- 
picion of German motives in taking an active 
interest in these regions. To this advantage 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


must be added those of German teclinical and 
industrial know-liow, which enjoys worldwide 
respect, as do German scientific and cultural 

Nobody particularly enjoys being impor- 
tuned, but a man who has become rich soon finds 
that he has in the process become the target of 
increased demands. Those who have been con- 
tributing feel that he should be willing to help 
support the commimity which has made it pos- 
sible for him to prosper. His standing in the 
community will depend on his response. This 
is somewhat the position in which Germany 
now finds itself. 

That is why the United States, which is a 
strong but heavily laden beast of burden itself, 
looks increasingly to Germany for help. We 
have, moreover, foimd a very welcome response. 
The Federal Republic is doing much through- 
out the world, not just because we have asked it 
to but on its own initiative, in a clear recog- 
nition of where German interests and respon- 
sibilities lie. One example is the Federal 
Republic's foreign aid program, which is sub- 
stantial and is one of the few national programs, 
apart from our own, which is on a worldwide — 
not an area-of-interest — ^basis. 

The United States, in the discharge of its 
own worldwide responsibilities, devotes a sub- 
stantial percentage cf its gross national product 
to foreign economic and military assistance. It 
is our hope that the Federal Republic, with its 
growing resources, will increasingly make a 
comparable effort. If the developing world 
looks to Germany for more, it is in reality a 
flattering tribute to your strength and to your 
rapidly increasing influence ui the world. 

The Future of Europe 

We have been pleased in recent years to ob- 
serve a steady development of closer relations 
between Germany and its neighbors in Western 
Europe — a development signalized, in the case 
of France, by the conclusion of the Franco- 
German treaty in 1963. Through a highly suc- 
cessful series of official visits, Chancellor [Lud- 
wig] Erhard in recent months has further 
extended and strengthened fTiendly ties with 
other states of Europe. The Queen of England 
will visit Germany in the spring of 1965. 

It is not, in our view, any contradiction for 
European states to wish to draw closer together 
and, at the same time, to maintain or enhance 
their close relations with the United States. We 
do not consider it necessary for Germany to 
have to make a choice. The two go hand in 
hand. Yet I have often been asked for our 
views about this matter, and especially about 
the close relations between France and Ger- 
many. Not long ago I replied tliat if Franco- 
Gennan rapprochement had not already been 
achieved, I would, as U.S. Ambassador to Ger- 
many, be doing my best to promote it as an im- 
portant goal in the common interest. 

Lideed, the establislunent of close ties be- 
tween France and Germany has been a major 
objective of postwar U.S. foreign policy. It is 
axiomatic to every student of liistory that the 
elimination of Franco-German rivalry is a nec- 
essary precondition to the establislunent of a 
soimd European and world order. This ha-s 
been the conviction of Europe's outstanding 
postwar statesmen — men like Konrad Ade- 
nauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman. 
Realization that Franco-German enmity must 
disappear in turn brought agreement on the 
need for a unified Europe as the best means of 
acliieving this objective permanently. 

The United States strongly supported the 
establislmient of tlie European Coal and Steel 
Community, the European Defense Community, 
the European Economic Community, and 
EURATOM. We are convinced that a united 
Europe can be built on the heritage its nations 
share. Though there have been setbacks on the 
road to European political integration, the 
progress toward European economic integration 
in the last 10 years has been truly impressive. 

That progress has certainly not been achieved 
despite, or at the expense of, a close Franco- 
German relationship. The one could not have 
taken place in the absence of the other. Franco- 
German cooperation is a reality. The United 
States welcomes it as long as it does not exclude 
wider cooperation. The Atlantic community 
can, I believe, be increasingly strengthened by 
the friendship and close relationship between 
these two great countries, each of which has 
much to offer to the other — and to Europe. 

It is true that the signature of the Franco- 



German treaty came as a surprise to many 
Americans, particularly in the light of what 
had already been accomplished without a for- 
mal treaty. However, the preamble appended 
to the treaty by the German Bimdestag at the 
time of ratification fully answered any ques- 
tions we might have had, with a clear statement 
that the treaty would be used to further the 
common goals of the Western alliance. Fears 
which had been expressed that the Franco-Ger- 
man treaty might be used as a vehicle for a 
new power alinement in Western Europe have so 
far proved groundless. It is in the interest not 
only of Germany and France but of Europe and 
the whole Atlantic community that they remain 

I am persuaded that the United States and 
the Federal Republic are in accord on the major 
objectives that we are seeking in Europe: the 
strengthening of free Europe, the economic and 
political integration of Europe, and the solidi- 
fication of the Atlantic partnership. The 
United States would naturally view with con- 
cern the development of an inward-oriented 
Europe or a fragmented Europe, either of which 
would be inconsistent with these objectives. I 
am confident, however, that the goal our Gov- 
ernments have sought so long will prevail. 

The Berlin Pass Issue 

From the beginning of the talks on the issu- 
ance of passes to residents of West Berlin for 
visits to the Soviet sector over the last Christ- 
mas season, there have been conflicting reports 
on the attitude of the United States. It was 
then frequently stated in the press that the 
United States had reservations about the proto- 
col signed with the East Germans. More re- 
cently, I have seen reports that we favor pass 
arrangements and are pressing the Federal au- 
thorities to extend such negotiating contacts 
with the East German regime. 

I appreciate the deep emotional interest 
aroused among most Germans by the pass nego- 
tiations. How could it be otherwise when the 
outcome determines whether families who have 
been cruelly separated can see one another again, 
and whether the artificial division between one 
part of Berlin and the other will be lessened, 
even if only temporarily and in one direction? 

This issue reaches to the very heart of the Ger- 
man people. I think it is worth while, there- 
fore, now that talks are going on in Berlin on 
a further pass arrangement, to describe briefly 
the American attitude. 

A basic factor is that we consider the present 
division of Germany and of Berlin completely 
unjustified and unnecessary — a threat to sta- 
bility in central Europe. We welcome steps, 
once decided upon by the authorities in Bonn 
and Berlin, that can reduce this artificial divi- 
sion and bring Germans on one side of the wall 
closer to Germans on the other. We welcomed 
the massive visitation of West Berlin residents 
to East Berlin arranged over the holidays be- 
cause of the humanitarian benefits it brought. 

We all know, however, that there is more to 
the pass question than the joy of family re- 
unions. The visitations have involved discus- 
sions between representatives of the Berlin 
Senat and representatives of the East German 
regime. This circumstance poses complex and 
sensitive problems, some of which are of direct 
concern to the United States and others of more 
concern to the Germans. The United States, 
France, and Great Britain are responsible for 
the security of West Berlin. We have, and 
must retain, ultimate authority in the city in 
order to meet this responsibility. 

It is from this point of view that we must 
examine any pass arrangement. Would it un- 
dermine the rights and responsibilities of the 
Allies? Would it tend to alter the status of 
Berlin to that of a "third German state," in- 
dependent of Allied control and stripped of 
political and economic ties with the Federal 
Republic? These would be our concerns. 

If the Senat were negotiating independently, 
without our concuiTence, on a matter which 
could vitally affect Allied interests, Allied au- 
thority could be jeopardized. We therefore 
need to know what is going on at every stage of 
the negotiations, and we expect that our concur- 
rence will be obtained before positions are taken. 
The United States gave its concuiTence to the 
pass arrangement at Christmas because we con- 
sidered that Allied interests wei-e not adversely 
affected — neither the security of Berlin, nor its 
status, nor the position of the Allies. 

The discussions with the East Germans, and 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


their signature at the bottom of protocols, do, 
however, raise other far-reacliing problems, in- 
cluding the question of the extent to -n-hich the 
Federal Kepublic and the Senat should deal 
with representatives of the Ulbricht regime. 
This we have felt from the beginning is an area 
in wliich German authorities should define the 
German interest. The United States has not 
taken sides nor sought to influence the respon- 
sible authorities one way or the other. I can 
assure you that we are not disinterested in this 
matter, but in its present context and dmiensions 
we shall continue to regard it as primarily a 
question of concern to the proper German 


The announcement last month by the Soviet 
Govermnent that it had concluded a treaty of 
friendship and cooperation with the so-called 
"German Democratic Kepublic" has again called 
attention to the Soviet responsibility for the 
continued enforced division of Germany. This 
is of course a world problem and not just a 
tragedy for the German people, since, as Chan- 
cellor Erhard and President Jolmson stated in 
their communique of June 13,^ there can be no 
stability in Europe so long as Germany is di- 
vided. This statement should be a clear answer 
to those who accuse the United States of believ- 
ing that a detente (a word so vague that I wish 
it could be elimmated from our vocabularies) 
exists or can exist imtil this cause of tension is 
removed from central Europe. 

The United States has endeavored again and 
again since 1945 to make its position clear on 
the issue of German reunification. After the 
Soviet Union annoimced its treaty, we joined 
with the French and British to state our policy 
in a tripartite declaration.^ We declared that : 

... a just and peaceful settlement of outstanding 
problems in Europe is essential to the establishment 
of lasting peace and security. Such a settlement re- 
quires the application in the whole of Germany of the 
principle of self-determination. . . . The exercise of 
self-determination, which should lead to the reunifica- 
tion of Germany in peace and freedom, remains a 
fundamental objective of the Three Governments. 

' For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 992. 
• For text, see ibid., July 13, 1964, p. 44. 

The Three Governments are convinced that such a 
settlement should be sought as soon as possible. 

This is our policy, and although the Soviets 
have different views, they are fully aware of 
our own. 

After the Berlin crisis of 1961, wliich oc- 
curred shortly after the Kennedy administra- 
tion came into office, discussions among the 
Allies and exploratory talks with the Soviets 
largely engaged the attention of the President, 
Secretary of State, and other high officials for 
more than a year. Hours of probing conversa- 
tions with the Soviets revealed absolutely no 
basis for serious negotiations. 

We have never ceased to be ready to discuss 
the German question with the Soviet Union 
when we thought that there was anything to be 
gained, and we remain ready to do so, in coordi- 
nation with our German, French, and British 
allies. American consultations with the Fed- 
eral Reptiblic in this area have been exception- 
ally close, and, as you know, they are 

All of us who are concerned with German 
reimification, however, have a responsibility to 
ourselves, and a right to ask others, to maintain 
a strict intellectual honesty about this very vital 
problem. All of us know the same facts. All of 
us, Germans as well as Americans, know the 
same difficulties. It is very easy to say, "Why 
haven't you done something about reunifica- 
tion?" It is more difficult to say, particularly 
in the light of the fact that both Americans and 
Germans have renounced the use of force in 
achieving reunification, what in fact we should 
do about it right now. It is important that we 
continually reaffirm our objective by words and 
declarations, but we should be aware of the 
limitations of such words alone in moving the 
Soviets. Until the opportunity for a real for- 
ward movement toward reunification arises, let 
us not create doubts and conflicts between our- 
selves by unwarranted accusations of inactivity. 

In the meantime, the United States camiot 
defer efforts to solve other important problems 
which clearlj' do not affect the prospects for 
German reunification. Tlie German question 
is at this time unfortunately characterized by 
a face-to-face confrontation in which political 
positions are fixed. By contrast, affairs in some 



other parts of the world are in a greater state 
of flux, and our policy must deal with that fact. 
The intrusion of Communist force in Southeast 
Asia and the infiltration of Africa and Latin 
America are both active and not merely poten- 
tial cliallenges. Meeting them poses demand- 
ing tasks for us and the free world. At the 
same time, the imperatives of the nuclear age 
require that we make every effort, while there 
is still time, to halt the piling up of ever more 
destructive forms of armament. The fact that 
we make these efforts does not mean that our 
interest in European security, or German re- 
unification, is in any way diminished. 

"VVliat is the significance of the new Soviet 
treaty for the German question? On the face 
of it the treaty does not portend serious alarums 
or excursions. It may indeed reflect a more 
sober Soviet policy on Berlin, essentially de- 
flated of its aggressiveness of the period from 
1958 to 1963. "We must, of course, remain 
watchful of actions that may be taken in its 

The treaty is, however, largely declaratory 
in nature, and I cannot perceive that it has al- 
tered any essential element in the German situa- 
tion. To suppose it to be a new departure in 
Soviet policy, designed to perpetuate the status 
quo, is to attribute to the signing of a treaty 
the kind of binding legal significance it would 
have only in the free world. The Soviet Union 
has consistently been committed to the division 
of Germany. The treaty reafEmis the commit- 
ment, but it is nothing new. 

"We should not be unduly pessimistic about 
the prospects for German reunification. The 
present state of affairs will not persist indefi- 
nitely. Gloomy predictions that it will persist 
do not take into account the present course and 
tempo of the historical process, or the "Western 
capabilities of influencing them. Tlie most 
striking trends in Europe and within the Com- 
munist bloc were scarcely visible 10 years ago. 
"Western Europe is completing the transition 
into a unified economic complex of great poten- 
tial prosperity and attractive power to the East. 
The East European countries are slowly reac- 
quiring a measure of national independence. 
Increasingly they are turning toward contacts 
with "Western Europe and the United States. 

The Soviets doubtless still consider their pres- 
ence in East Germany important to their secu- 
rity and a lever to use to "solve" the German 
question on their terms. However, the Zone 
today would seem to be a wasting asset to the 
Soviets — an anachronism alongside an Eastern 
Europe where barriers are coming down. 
"Wlien tliis becomes more apparent, the con- 
tinued occupation could lose its essential raison 
d'etre to the Soviets. 

"We of the "West should in the future be able 
to exert increasing influence over developments 
in Eastern Europe. If we further our contacts 
there and promote the reentry of its states into 
peaceful and friendly interchange with us, we 
will progressively dismantle the mistaken prem- 
ises on which the division of Germany is based. 
If we cannot immediately solve the problem, 
we can at least attempt to change its context. 
This is what President Jolinson meant in liis 
Lexington speech of May 23,'' when he stated 
that wise development of relations with the na- 
tions of East Europe would speed reunification. 
This is a sound proposition, and it is far- 
sighted of your statesmen that they are putting 
it into practice so vigorously. 

U.S.-German Relations 

In closing, I would like to refer not just to 
specific issues in current relations between our 
two countries but to the very nature of these 
relations. I feel that this is often a matter of 
some concern in Germany, as it is in "Wasliing- 
ton. The complaint is heard here that German 
foreign policy is merely the tail which is 
dragged along behind the kite of American for- 
eign policy. You are certainly aware that on 
the other side of the Atlantic the opposite com- 
plaint is sometimes heard. Bonn is said to exer- 
cise a veto in critical areas of U.S. foreign 

I believe that both of these complaints are 
wrong; however, they point to the need to de- 
fine cai-efully the nature of the partnership be- 
tween the Federal Republic and the United 
States. The problem, as it might be phrased, 
is whether each partner should freely tell the 
other what he thinks should be done. My an- 

* Ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 922. 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


swer is yes, provided the partnership is founded, 
as our concept of it is, on the thesis that the 
United States and Germany are both sovereign 
nations, bound to consider, but free to reject, 
the advice of the other. 

The United States bears heavy responsibilities 
in the free world. If we falter, freedom fal- 
ters. Suppose, for example, that we had not 
taken the initiative in bringing aid to embattled 
Viet-Nam and in urging others to support the 
government there against Communist encroach- 
ment. The Federal Republic might be spared 
approaches from Wasliington to explain the 
urgency of the need for help, but who, in the 
long nm, would be the gainer? Not the Fed- 
eral Republic; certainly not the other free na- 
tions — only the Communists. I believe that the 
German people will increasingly realize this 
as they continue to assume tlie share of world 
responsibilities commensurate to their growing 

We, as your partner, welcome steps in this 
direction. There will be areas in which you 
yourselves will wish to take the initiative. In 
such cases we will look to you to advise us what 
should be done. Neither of us has a veto or a 
mandate to dictate the other's actions. As part- 
ners in a common endeavor of gigantic propor- 
tions, and of staggering implications as to the 
future of the free world, we shall, however, need 
increasingly to pool our ideas, our resources, 
and our determinations, in pursuit of our com- 
mon goals. This, I think, is the tme nature of 
our relationship. 

I commend my words to the spirit of imder- 
standing of Tuetzing. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Argentine Republic, Norberto Miguel Barrene- 
chea, presented liis credentials to President 
Johnson on July 9. For texts of the Ambassa- 
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release 321 dated 
July 9. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, 
Juracy Montenegro Magalhaes, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on July 9. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 322 dated July 9. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of the Philippines, Oscar Ledesma, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Johnson on j 
July 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release 320 dated July 9. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks 
on Desalting of Sea Water 


White House press release dated July 16 

Representatives of tlie United Stat&s and the 
Soviet Union met in Washington from July 14 
to 16, as previously agreed,^ to explore the pos- 
sibility of mutually beneficial scientific coopera- 
tion in the development of methods for desalt- 
ing sea water, including the possible use of nu- 
clear energy. The United States delegation 
was headed by Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special 
Assistant to the President for Science and Tech- 
nology. The Soviet delegation was headed by 
A. I. Churin, Chief Administrator of the State 
Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work. 

The representatives of the two countries dis- 
cussed the problems of desalting brackish water 
as well as sea water. Tliey reviewed the pres- 
ent activities and plans of the two countries 
relating to the scientific problems of desalting 
water, to technological methods for desalting on 
both small and very large scales, and on the 
development of reactors suitable for use in 
large-scale desalting processes. 

' For a statement by President Johnson, see Bulletin 
of July 13, 1964, p. CO. 



Certain possible forms of cooperation were 
identified during the meeting : 

1. The conduct, by each country, of scientific 
researcli and development work in the field of 
desalting sea water, including the utilization 
of atomic energy, in accordance to its own pro- 
gram and at its owa expense. 

2. The exchange, on a reciprocal basis, of 
scientific reports, including results obtained 
from work on pilot and demonstration plants. 

3. The arrangement, by mutual agreement, of 
symposia to discuss specific scientific and tech- 
nical problems and projects. 

4. The arrangement, on a reciprocal basis, 
of visits by teclinical experts to appropriate 
installations and laboratories. 

During their current visit here the Soviet 
delegation will be given the opportunity to visit 
several installations and laboratories engaged 
in developing desalting processes, as well as to 
related atomic energy installations in the U.S.A. 
The Soviet delegation has likewise invited an 
American delegation to visit similar mstalla- 
tions and laboratories in the Soviet Union. 

In the opinion of both delegations, the discus- 
sions of these problems were carried on in a 
business-like manner and were useful for both 

As a result of the discussions the delegations 
will report to their governments on the best 
means of cooperation in the field of desalting 
sea water, including utilization of atomic 


The White House announced on July 16 that 
the following representatives of the United 
States and the Soviet Union would attend the 
meeting on scientific cooperation in the desalt- 
ing of sea water, which was held at Washington, 
D.C., July 14^16. 

V.8. Representatives 

Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President 
for Science and Technology 

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department of 
the Interior 

Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commis- 

James T. Ramey, Member, Atomic Energy Commission 

John Calhoun, Assistant Secretary for Research and 
Development, Department of the Interior 

Ragnar Kollefson, Director, Office of International Sci- 
entific Affairs, Department of State 

C. F. MacGowan, Director, Office of Saline Water, 
Department of the Interior. 

U.S.S.R. Representatives 

Aleksandr I. Churin, Chief Administrator of State 
Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work 

Vitaliy A. Klyachko, Head of Laboratory, All Union 
Scientific Research Institute on Water Supply, 
Canals and Hydroelectric Construction 

Aleksandr I. Leypunskiy, Scientific Manager, Physical 
Power Institute 

Nikolay M. Sinev, Deputy Chairman, State Committee 
on Atomic Energy 

Georgiy M. Solovyev, Deputy Chief of Administration 
of State Committees on Scientific Research Coordina- 

Mikhail P. Vukalovich, Assistant Director of Moscow 
Power Institute 

Fedor P. Zaostrovskiy, Director, Scientific Research 
Institute, Chemical Machinery Construction. 

U.S. Protests to Soviet Union 
on Incident involving U.S. Vessel 

Depariment Statement^ 

The Charge of the Embassy of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgi M. Kor- 
nienko, was called to the Department this after- 
noon [July 17] to receive an oral protest from 
Acting Secretary for European Affairs Richard 
Davis regarding an incident involving the 
United States merchant vessel SS Sister Ka- 
tingo in the Black Sea. 

Mr. Kornienko was informed that according 
to the report of the ship's master, Artur H. 
Fertig of Wading [River], Long Island, a dis- 
pute over stevedoring charges had been referred 
to the Ministry of the Merchant Marine in 
Moscow, where it was confirmed that differences 
would be arbitrated and the ship would be per- 
mitted to sail after discharging its cargo of 
wheat. Local port authorities at Novorossisk, 
however, refused clearance and the ship sailed 
July 15 without permission. A Soviet patrol 

^ Read to news correspondents on July 17 by Robert 
J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, Office of News. 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


vessel followed the SS Sister Katingo outside 
the harbor, and, when the ship failed to heed 
an order to return to port, a Soviet naval craft 
fired three rounds across the bow of the ship. 
The SS Shter Katingo was then boarded, 
searched, and the captain ordered to pay a fine 
and sign papers, after wliicli the ship was per- 
mitted to continue its voyage to Istanbul. 

In making the protest, Mr. Davis noted that, 
while under international law Soviet authorities 
may have been within strictly legal rights in 
the particular circumstances to pursue, board, 
and search this vessel, the methods employed by 
the Soviet authorities were excessive and clearly 
outside the norms of acceptable behavior. 

The Soviet authorities were requested to un- 
dertake measures to prevent a repetition of this 

ANZUS Reviews Areas of 
Interest in Asia and Pacific 


Following is the text of a comrrvu/nique of the 
13th ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and 
United States Security Treaty) Coimcil meet- 
ing, which was held at Washington July 17-18. 

Press release 330 dated July 18 

The ANZUS Council held its annual meeting 
in Washington on July 17 and 18, 1964. The 
Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime 
Minister and Minister for External Affairs, 
represented New Zealand; the Honorable Paul 
Hasluck, ilinister for External Affairs, repre- 
sented Australia; and the Honorable Dean 
Rusk, Secretary of State, represented the United 

The Council expressed satisfaction that the 
pattern of regular annual meetings has been re- 
stored. It agreed that these meetings not only 
provide opportunity for full, frank exchanges 
of views on problems of common interests but 
serve to emphasize the importance of this defen- 
sive alliance of three nations which share a com- 
mon heritage, common institutions, common 
values, and common purposes. 

The Council noted with grave concern the 
continuing threat to peace in South and South- 

east Asia and the Pacific region posed by the 
aggressive North Vietnamese and Communist 
Chinese regimes. It reaffirmed the determina- 
tion expressed at its 1963 meeting ^ to cooperate 
with otlier countries equally determined to pre- 
serve their national independence by promoting 
the peace and security of the area. 

The Council gave particular attention to the 
aggression against South Viet-Nam which the 
Communist regime in Hanoi organized and is 
directing, supplying and supporting in flagrant 
violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 
1962. It agi'eed that the defeat of this aggres- 
sion is necessary not only to the security of 
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but 
as a demonstration that Communist expansion 
by such tactics will not be allowed to succeed. 
The Council noted with satisfaction that the 
members of ANZUS had increased their assist- 
ance to the Republic of Viet-Nam since the 
SEATO Council Meeting in April.^ It agreed 
that they should remain prepared, if necessary, 
to take further concrete steps within their re- 
spective capabilities to assure the defeat of this 
aggression. It expressed the hope that other 
nations who prize freedom will join in assist- 
ing the valiant people of South Viet-Nam to 
preserve their freedom. It affirmed its confi- 
dence that programs of political and adminis- 
trative reform, military action, pacification, and 
economic and social development instituted by 
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, 
together with the continued backing of the Free 
World, will enable the people of South Viet- 
Nam to achieve the peace, stability and better 
life which presently are denied to them by the 
Communist aggressors. 

The Council also devoted special attention to 
the threat to the security and stability of Laos 
brought about by Communist violations of the 
Geneva Agreements of 1962. It expressed its 
grave concern over the continued presence and 
intervention in Laos of North Vietnamese forces 
and over recent Pathet Lao attacks against Gov- 
ernment forces. It called for full compliance 

' For text of a communique, see BuiiETiN of June 24, 
1963, V. 967. 

"For texts of a statement by Secretary Rusk and a 
final communique, see Hid., May 4, 1964, p. 690. 



with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, 
including full support for Prime Minister Sou- 
vanna Phouma's demand that the Communist 
forces withdraw from the areas which they 
recently seized in violation of the Agreements. 

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in which 
all three nations are also members and to which 
they renewed pledges of support at the recent 
Manila Council Meeting, continues to make an 
essential contribution to the peace and stability 
of the region. 

The Council reaffirmed its continuing sup- 
port for Malaysia. It noted that two of its 
members are now giving aid, both in forces and 
in material, to assist Malaysian defense. Tlie 
Council recognized that in this region, as else- 
where, force must not be employed in violation 
of the territorial integrity of other nations. It 
expressed the hope that the independence of 
Malaysia would be respected and that peaceful 
relationships with neighboring states would be 
restored so that all could contribute to the 
peace, security and advancement of Southeast 
Asia and the Southwest Pacific. 

The Council noted with gratification the sub- 
stantial economic and social progress of most 
of the free nations of the Western Pacific, whose 
continuing advance contrasts sharply with the 
economic failures of the Communist states. It 
applauded the increasing cooperation between 
the more developed and the less developed na- 
tions of the Western Pacific in promoting 
economic and social progress and political 

The Council reviewed the efforts being made 
to move toward a total ban on nuclear testing 
and toward general disarmament and expressed 
the resolve of the members of ANZUS to con- 
tinue working individually and collectively to- 
ward these goals. It noted with regret that 
some governments have not yet signed the 
nuclear test ban treaty negotiated last year. 

Eeaffirming the value to the members of the 
regular, high level exchange of views afforded 
by the meetings of the ANZUS Council, the 
Ministers stated their intention to meet again 
within approximately one year, at a place to be 

U.S. Sends Message to Conference 
of African Leaders at Cairo 

Following is the text of a message from Presi- 
dent Johnson to President Gamal Ahdel Nas- 
ser of the United Arab Republic to be con- 
veyed to the Conference of African Heads of 
State, which convened at Cairo on July 17. 

White House press release dated July 17 

July 17, 1964 

I extend, through you, to the representatives 
of the nations and peoples of Africa gathered 
in Cairo, the friendly greetings of the Govern- 
ment and people of the United States of 

As the Heads of State and of Government 
meet again one year after creating the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity at that historic Addis 
Ababa gathering, we are impressed with the 
striking progress which has been made toward 
African unity in peace and freedom. 

Africa through the OAU has shown its ca- 
pacity to deal through peaceful means with 
African problems, including such disputes as 
have arisen among its members. In this way, 
within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter, African nations are making a vital 
contribution to world peace. 

As the OAU moves into its second year of 
activity, it will face new challenges which, I am 
sure, it will meet in the same spirit it has al- 
ready demonstrated in the momentous year just 
past. I and the people of the United States 
extend to this Organization our best wishes for 
continued progress toward your high auns. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Satellite Coniinvmlcations — 1964. Hearings before a 
subcommittee of the House Government Operations 
Committee. Parti. March 17-May 28, 19(54. 657pp. 

Foreign Assistance 1964. Hearings before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on S. 26.59, S. 2660, and 

AUGUST 3, 1904 


H.R. 11380, bills relating to foreign assistance. 
March 31-June 23, 1964. 628 pp. 

Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
Amended, the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955, 
as Amended, and the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 
1958, as Amended. Reports to accompany H.R. 
11832 and S. 2963. H. Rept. 1525 and S. Rept. 1128. 
June 30, 1964. 13 pp. each. 

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to ac- 
company S. 944. H. Rept. 1532. July 1, 1964. 4 pp. 

Rio Grande Canalization Project. Report to accom- 
pany S. 2370. H. Rept. 1533. July 1, 19C4. 6 pp. 

Emergency International Flood Control Works, Lower 
Colorado River. Report to accompany H.R. 7419. 
H. Rept. 1534. July 1, 1964. 12 pp. 

International Commission for Supervision and Control 
in Laos. Report to accompany S. 1627. H. Rept. 
1535. July 1, 1964. 9 pp. 

The Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 1964. 
Report to accompany H.R. 10485. H. Rept. 1536. 
July 1, 1964. 20 pp. 

Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To 
Authorize Additional Appropriations, and for Other 
Purposes. Report to accompany H.R. 11754. H. 
Rept. 1537. July 1, 1964. 3 pp. 

Report of the Fourth Conference of the Mexico-United 
States Interparliamentary Group, by Hon. Robert 

N. C. Nix, chairman of Representatives delegation. 
H. Rept. 1531. July 1, 1964. 26 pp. 

Meat Imports — Wild Birds and Wild Animals. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 1839. S. Rept. 1167. July 
2, 1964. 11 pp. 

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces 
Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services made by its Subcommittee on the Operation 
of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agree- 
ment, for the period December 1, 1961, through No- 
vember 30, 1962. S. Rept. 1171. July 8, 1964. 15 

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parlia- 
mentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 
339. July 8, 1964. 2 pp. 

Protecting Heads of Foreign States and Other Desig- 
nated Officials. Report to accompany S. 1917. S. 
Rept. 1179. July 9, 1964. 9 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Individual views of 
Senator Morse on H.R. 11380. S. Rept 1188, Part 
2. July 10, 1964. 25 pp. 

The Growing Strength of the Soviet Merchant Fleet. 
Prepared for the use of the Senate Commerce Com- 
mittee at the request of Chairman Warren G. Mag- 
nuson by the Legislative Reference Service of the 
Library of Congress. July 10, 1964. 46 pp. [Com- 
mittee print]. 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^ 

In Session as of July 31, 1964 

Conference of the IS-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

6th Round of GATT Tarifif Negotiations Geneva May 4, 1964- 

Scheduled August Through October 1964 

8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Vina del Mar, Chile Aug. 1- 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by London Aug. 4- 

Sea: 6th Session. 

ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok Aug. 4- 

International Seed Testing Association : Executive Commit- Edinburgh Aug. 10- 

tee Meeting. 

17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 16- 

U.N. Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law . . . Lom6, Togo Aug. 17- 

UNESCO International Conference on Youth Grenoble Aug. 23- 

South Pacific Commission: 2d Regional Education Seminar . Noumea, New Caledonia . . . Aug. 24- 

3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Geneva Aug. 31- 

Atomic Energy. 

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 16, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations : 
BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Proi)erty ; EGA, Economic 
Commission for Africa ; ECAFE. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ; ECE, Economic Commission 
for Europe ; FAO. Food and Agriculture Organization ; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; 
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council ; 
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICBM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; 
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, 
International Telecommunication Union; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; 
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; 
WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 



PAHO Directing Council: 15th Mooting Mexico, D. F Aug. 31- 

ICAO Legal Committee : 15th Session Montreal Sept. 1- 

3d FAO liegional Conference for Africa Tananarive Sept. 3- 

ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Geneva Sept. 7- 


ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference Madrid Sept. 7- 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 10th Session . Washington . . . ^ Sept. 8- 

IMCO Special Assembly Washington Sept. 8- 

Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Ottawa Sept. 9- 

Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. 

IAEA General Conference : Sth Regular Session Vienna Sept. 1 5- 

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary New York Sept. 15- 


IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 9th Session London Sept. 16- 

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Manila Sept. 17- 


U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session Geneva Sept. 21- 

2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Beirut Sept. 21- 


ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry. Geneva Sept. 21- 

IMCO CouncQ: 13th Session London Sept. 22- 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session . . Rome Sept. 22- 

FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session . . . Auckland Sept. 22- 

BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee Geneva Sept. 28- 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee Geneva Sept. 28- 

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session . . Geneva Sept. 28- 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Copenhagen Sept. 28- 


International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly. . Caracas Sept. 30- 

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting. San Jos6 September 

Inter- American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Montevideo September 

Directing Council. 

lA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports . . Lima September 

Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Santiago September 


ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage Paris September 


UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference . . . Cairo September 

UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session Paris September 

UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Toulouse September 

Survey Methods. 

U.N. EGA Industrial Coordination Conference on West Africa Bamako, Mali Oct. 5- 

U.N. ECA Subregional Industries Committee: 2d Ad Hoc Tangier Oct. 5- 


U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 22d Session Geneva Oct. 5- 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcom- London Oct. 5- 

mittee on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain. 

ILO Technical Meeting Concerning Certain Aspects of Labor- Geneva Oct. 5- 

Management Relations Within Undertakings. 

FAO Council: 43d Session Rome Oct. 5- 

ILO Meeting of Experts on Welfare Facilities for Industrial Geneva Oct. 5- 


UNESCO Executive Board: 68th Session Paris Oct. 5- 

12th General Conference on Weights and Measures .... Paris Oct. 6- 

5th Inter-American Indian Conference Quito Oct. 10- 

BIRPI Committee of Experts on International Classification Geneva Oct. 12- 

of Industrial Designs. 

U.N. ECE Governmental Experts on Rational Utilization of Geneva Oct. 12- 

Water Resources. 

FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 9th Session . . Curitiba, Brazil Oct. 13- 

South Pacific Commission: 26th Session Noumea, New Caledonia . . . Oct. 14- 

FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 11th Session Kuala Lumpur Oct. 16- 

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 12th Geneva Oct. 19- 

Plenary Assembly. 

U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners . . . Bangkok Oct. 19- 

U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 13th Geneva Oct. 19- 


7th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East Cairo Oct. 19- 

UNESCO General Conference: 13th Session Paris Oct. 20- 

4th FAO Regional Conference for Europe Salzburg Oct. 26- 

U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: Sth Session Bangkok Oct. 27- 

Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Pro- Geneva October 

gram for Refugees: 12th Session. 

1st FAO Regional Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa . . Nairobi October 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Adopts Final Act 

Representatives of 118 nations took part in 
a United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development which met at Geneva from March 
23 to June 16. Under Secretary of State 
George W. Ball headed the U.S. delegation} 
Followi/ng are the preamble and recommenda- 
tions contained in the Final Act which was 
adopted on Jwne 16? 


The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development has adopted this Final Act. 

Section I. Backgroujjt) 

1. The States participating in the Conference 
are determined to achieve the high purposes em- 
bodied in the United Nations Charter "to pro- 
mote social progress and better standards of 
life in larger freedom" ; ^ to seek a better and 
more effective system of international economic 
co-operation, whereby the division of the world 
into areas of poverty and plenty may be ban- 
ished and prosperity achieved by all; and to 
find ways by which the hiunan and material 
resources of the world may be harnessed for 
the abolition of poverty everywhere. In an 
age when scientific progress has put imprece- 

^ For a statement by Mr. Ball before the Conference 
on Mar. 25 and a message from President Johnson, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634. 

' In addition to the portion printed here, the Final 
Act (U.N. doc. E/CONF.46/L.28) includes: Annex A, 
showing the results of the voting; Annex B, contain- 
ing observations of delegations ; and Annex C, messages 
from heads of state and other communications. 

' Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. 
[Footnote in original.] 

dented abundance vtdthin man's reach, it is es- 
sential that the flows of world trade should 
help to eliminate the wide economic disparities 
among nations. The international community 
must combine its efforts to ensure that all coun- 
tries—regardless of size, of wealth, of economic 
and social system — enjoy the benefits of inter- 
national trade for their economic development 
and social progress. 

2. Recognizing that imiversal peace and pros- 
perity are closely linked and that the economic 
growth of the developing coimtries will also 
contribute to the economic growth of the devel- 
oped countries, realizing the danger of a widen- 
ing gulf in living standards between peoples, 
and convinced of the benefits of international co- 
operation with a view to helping the developing 
countries to reach a higher standard of life, 
the States signatories of this Final Act are re- 
solved, in a sense of human solidarity, "to em- 
ploy international machmery for the promotion 
of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples." ' 

3. In endorsing the decision to convene the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations was motivated by certain basic 
considerations. Economic and social progress 
throughout the world depends in large measure 
on a steady expansion in international trade. 
Tlie extensive development of equitable and 
mutually advantageous international trade cre- 
ates a good basis for the establishment of 
neighbourly relations between States, helps to 
strengthen peace and an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence and understanding among nations, 
and promotes higher living standards and more 
rapid economic progress in all countries of the 



world. Finally, the accelerated economic de- 
velopment of the developing countries depends 
largely on a substantial increase in their share 
in international trade. 

4. The task of development, which implies a 
complex of structural changes in the economic 
and social environment in which men live, is for 
the benefit of the people as a whole. The devel- 
oping countries are already engaged in a deter- 
mined attempt to achieve, by their own efforts, 
a breakthrough into self-sustaining economic 
growth which furthers social progress. These 
efforts must continue and be enlarged. Eco- 
nomic and social progress should go together. 
If privilege, extremes of wealth and poverty, 
and social injustice persist, then the goal of 
development is lost. If the social and cultural 
dimension of development is ignored, economic 
advance alone can bring no abiding benefit. 

5. The developing countries recognize that 
they have the primary responsibility to raise 
the living standards of their peoples; but their 
national exertions to this end will be greatly 
impaired if not supplemented and strengthened 
by constructive international action based on 
respect for national sovereignty. An essential 
element of such action is that international 
policies in the field of trade and development 
should result in a modified international divi- 
sion of labour which is more rational and equi- 
table and is accompanied by the necessary 
adjustments m world production and trade. 
The resultant increase in productivity and pur- 
chasing power of the developing countries will 
contribute to the economic growth of the indus- 
trialized coimtries as well, and thus become a 
means to world-wide prosperity. 

6. The issues before the Conference have been 
at once challenging and urgent. "While there are 
varying degrees of development, the joint in- 
come of the developing countries, with two- 
thirds of the world's population, is not much 
more than one-tenth of that of the industrialized 
covmtries. Moreover, the dramatic increase in 
the population of the developing countries 
multiplies the difficulties they face in assuring 
to their peoples even the simplest elements of a 
decent human life. The aim must be to create 
jointly new trade and new wealth, so as to share 
a common prosperity, and thereby avoid the 

waste and other unfavourable consequences of 
closed paths to development. The international 
community is called upon to join in a construc- 
tive and universal policy of co-operation for 
trade and development which will further 
economic progress tliroughout the world. 

7. The designation of the nineteen-sixties as 
the United Nations Development Decade was a 
recognition of deep world-wide concern with 
the urgent necessity of raising the standard of 
living of the developing countries and an ear- 
nest of the resolve of the United Nations, work- 
ing together, to accomplish this task. Wide 
concern has been expressed regarding the in- 
adequacy of the Decade's objective of a mini- 
mum rate of growth of aggi-egate national 
income of 5 per cent per annimi by 1970. To 
attain even this rate of growth it is essential 
that measures and action be taken by both the 
developing and the developed countries, includ- 
ing measures to raise the level and accelerate 
the rate of growth of earnings of the developing 
countries from trade, as a means of helping 
them to overcome their persistent external im- 

8. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development was convened in order to pro- 
vide, by means of international co-operation, 
appropriate solutions to the problems of world 
trade in the interest of all peoples and partic- 
ularly to the urgent trade and development 
problems of the developing countries. In a 
period when their need for imports of develop- 
ment goods and for technical knowledge has 
been increasing, developing coimtries have been 
faced with a situation in which their export 
earnings and capacity to import goods and 
services have been inadequate. The growth in 
import requirements has not been matched by a 
commensurate expansion in export earnings. 
The resultant trade gap, which gold and foreign 
exchange reserves have been inadequate to 
bridge, has had to be filled very largely by capi- 
tal imports. This in itself cannot provide a 
complete or permanent solution, and indeed the 
servicing of external debts and the outgoings 
on other "invisible" items themselves present 
severe burdens for developing countries. More- 
over, the terms of trade have operated to the 
disadvantage of the developing countries. In 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


recent years many developing countries have 
been faced with declining prices for their ex- 
ports of primary commodities at a time when 
prices of tlieir imports of manufactured goods, 
particularly capital equipment, have increased. 
This, together with the heavy dependence of 
individual developing countries on primary 
commodity exports has reduced their capacity 
to import. Unless these and other unfavourable 
trends are changed in the near future, the ef- 
forts of the developing coimtries to develop, 
diversify and industrialize their economies will 
be seriously hampered. 

9. Deeply sensible of the urgency of the prob- 
lems with which the Conference has dealt, the 
States participating in this Conference, taking 
note of the recommendations of the Conference, 
are determined to do their utmost to lay the 
foundations of a better world economic order. 

Section II. CoNSTmjTiosr and Proceedings 

10. Wlien, in the third week of December 
1961, the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions designated the current decade as "the 
United Nations Development Decade", it also 
asked the Secretary-General to consult members 
on the advisability of convening an interna- 
tional conference on international trade prob- 
lems. Both resolutions (1Y07 (XVI) and 1710 
(XVI)) sprang from the growing conviction 
that the economic aims of the Charter would 
best be furthered by a bold new programme of 
international economic co-operation ; and it was 
in this conviction that the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development had its 

11. The Cairo Conference on the Problems 
of Economic Development held in July 1962 
issued a Declaration (which was later welcomed 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 
resolution 1820 (XVII) ) strongly recommend- 
ing the early convening of an international con- 
ference on trade and development. The idea of 
such a Conference having gained ground, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations en- 
dorsed, on 8 December 1962 (resolution 1785 
(XVII) ), the decision taken in August 1962 by 
the Economic and Social Council (resolution 
917 (XXXIV)) whereby the Council resolved 
to convene this Conference and to establish a 

Preparatory Committee to consider its agenda. 
The Secretary-General was requested to invite 
all States Members of the United Nations and 
members of the specialized agencies and of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to take 
part in the Conference. The deliberation of the 
Preparatory Committee's three sessions * were 
fruitful : a detailed provisional agenda for the 
Conference was drawn up, and a report was 
prepared defining the problems to be examined 
and suggesting the directions in which possible 
solutions might be sought. At the Committee's 
request the secretariats of the United Nations 
family of organizations prepared many studies 
of the issues involved. Tlie Secretary-General 
of the Conference sought the advice of govern- 
ments and scholars, and prepared liis report en- 
titled Towards a New Trade Policy for Devel- 
opment [E/CONF.46/3]. Member States, in- 
dividually and in groups, also submitted useful 1 
fjroposals and suggestions to the Conference. ■ 

12. On 18 July 1963, the Economic and Social 
Council decided that the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development should be 
held in Geneva, beginning on 23 March 1964 
and continuing until 15 June 1964, and approved 
the provisional agenda drawn up by the Pre- 
paratory Committee (Economic and Social 
Council resolution 963 (XXXVI)). By its 
resolution of 11 November 1963 the General 
Assembly (resolution 1897 (XVIII)) noted 
the work of the Preparatory Conmiittee and of 
the Secretary-General of the Conference, wel- 
comed the Joint Declaration of the Developing 
Countries,^ and invited States to give serious 
consideration to it. The regional economic com- 

' The first session of the Preparatory Committee took 
place at United Nations Headquarters from 22 January 
to 5 February 1963 ; the second was held at the Euro- 
pean Office of the United Nations, at Geneva, from 
21 May to 29 June 1963; and the third session was 
at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 15 February 
1964. At its third session, the Committee decided that 
Informal closed meetings should be held prior to the 
opening of the Conference. These pre-Conference meet- 
ings were held in Geneva from 18 to 23 March 1964. 
[Footnote in original.] 

' The Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries 
was adopted at the same time as, and forms an annex 
to, the General Assembly resolution In question. 
[Footnote In original.] 



missions and other regional organizations con- 
sidered questions of trade and development and 
adopted important resolutions and declara- 
tions.* Meanwhile, as the practical arrange- 
ments for the Conference went forward, the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council were the principal forum for debates 
expressing the high hopes vested by the peoples 
of the United Nations in the Conference as a 
potential turning point in international co- 
operation in the field of trade and development. 
13. Aware of these high hopes, the represent- 
atives of the following one hundred and twenty ^ 
States gathered in Geneva from 23 March to 
16 June 1964 to take part in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development : 

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, 
Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam- 
bodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazza- 
ville), Congo ( Leopold ville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cvprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Re- 
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Slesico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Paki.stan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tanganyika,' Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United 

" See the reports relating to the Brasilia meeting 
convened by the Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica (E/CONF.46/60 and 71) and the Alta Gracia 
Charter approved by the Special Latin American Co- 
ordinating Committee of the Organization of American 
States, (E/CONF.46/100) the resolutions adopted by 
the Economic Commission for Africa (E/CONF.4G/S2) 
and by the Economic and Social Commission of African 
Unity at Niamey (E/CONP.46/107), the resolution of 
the Economic Commission for Europe (E/CONF.46/46) 
and the Teheran resolutions of the Economic Com- 
mission for Asia and the Far East (E/CONF.46/87). 
[Footnote in original.] 

' Somalia and Western Samoa were invited, but did 
not attend the Conference. [Footnote in original.] 

Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper 
Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, 

14. The inaugural address was delivered by 
the President of Switzerland; the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations also addressed 
the Conference; and messages of goodwill and 
good wishes for success were received from nu- 
merous Heads of State. After adopting its 
agenda and electing its officers — a President, 
twenty-seven Vice-Presidents, and a Rap- 
porteur — the Conference was addressed by its 
President and heard, over a period of twelve 
days, an address by its Secretary-General and 
a series of policy statements by heads of dele- 
gations, most of whom were Cabinet ministers, 
and by representatives of a number of inter- 
governmental economic organizations. Five 
Committees of the whole were established for 
detailed study of the items of the agenda. The 
General Committee of the Conference comprised 
the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Rap- 
porteur, and the Chairmen of the five Commit- 
tees. The Conference also established a Draft- 
ing Conmiittee for the Final Act. 

15. With a view to reaching agreement on 
the issues before the Conference, many infonnal 
meetings were held and important consultations 
conducted among groups of delegations. A no- 
table feature of the Conference was the fact that 
the delegations of the States signatories of the 
Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries 
co-ordinated their work with a view to enhanc- 
ing general co-operation among all delegations. 

SECTiO]sr III. Findings 

Tlie Conference has been guided by the fol- 
lowing findings : 

16. World trade has expanded substantially 
in recent years : the value of world exports has 
more than doubled since 1950. The principal 
impulse for this growth has been provided by 
the overall expansion of the world economy, 
aided by national and international action as 
well as enormous scientific and technical prog- 

' On 27 May 1964, as a result of the formation of the 
United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the 
delegations of Tanganyika and Zanzibar were recon- 
stituted as a unified delegation. [Footnote in original.] 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


ress and the social and economic changes in the 

17. The countries of the worid did not share 
proportionately in this expansion of interna- 
tional trade. While exports of developing 
countries rose from $19.2 billion to $28.9 billion 
between 1950 and 1962, that is by 50 per cent, the 
expansion of exports from these countries pro- 
ceeded at an appreciably lower rate than that 
of developed coimtries. As a result, the share 
of developing countries in world exports de- 
clined steadily from nearly one-third in 1950 
to only slightly more than one-fifth in 1962. 
Concurrently, the developed market economies 
increased their share from three-fifths to two- 
thirds, and the centrally planned economies 
from 8 per cent to 13 per cent. One of the rea- 
sons for the decline in the rate of expansion of 
world exports from 8.4 per cent per annum in 
the early fifties to rather less than 5 per cent in 
the early sixties is the inability of the develop- 
ing countries to attain a higher rate of export 

18. Tlie difficulties experienced by developing 
countries in increasing the sale of their products 
at remunerative prices in the markets of most 
of the liighly industrialized countries have 
placed a limit on the extent to which they can 
purchase capital goods and machinery from the 
developed countries, which in turn has contrib- 
uted to a slower rate of expansion of world 
trade than would have been the case if the de- 
veloping countries had been enabled to increase 
their exports at a faster rate. Further, measures 
having discriminatory or protectionist effects 
applied by certain developed coimtries have 
hampered the development of the trade of devel- 
oping countries and of world trade in general. 

19. The difficulties of developing countries 
were aggravated by deterioration in their terms 
of trade during the period 1950-1962. The 
slower growth in the quantity of exports of the 
developing countries and the adverse movement 
of their terms of trade were largely the reflexion 
of the present commodity composition of their 
trade, consisting, as it does, predominantly of 
the exchange of primary product exports for 
manufactured imports whose relative positions 
in world markets have undergone significant 
changes. World trade in manufactures has 

been increasing at an annual rate more than 
twice that of trade in primary products. Fac- 
tors contributing to the sluggishness of primary 
product exports include the low response of 
consumer demand for food to increases in 
income of consumers in the advanced coimtries 
where incomes and food consumption are al- 
ready high, the widespread use of substitutes 
and synthetics, and the increasing output of 
primary products in advanced countries which 
has been the result both of domestic policies, 
in many cases reinforced by protective barriers, 
as well as a general increase in productivity 
stemming from technological progress. These 
long-term trends have been accentuated by 
short-term fluctuations in export earnings 
caused by economic recessions and other factors. 

20. The deterioration in terms of trade and 
the sluggish expansion of the export quantiun 
of developing countries occurred at a time when 
their need for imported supplies to speed up 
the pace of their economic development sharply 
increased. There is a close link between the 
rate of economic growth and the available sup- 
ply of investment goods. The developing 
countries require a specific increase in the sup- 
ply of investment goods in order to achieve the 
Development Decade target. Since their do- 
mestic capacity to produce these goods is 
limited, a substantial amount of such goods has 
to be imported. Imports have to be financed 
through export receipts and inflows of capital 
from abroad. Thus, the resources required for 
a higher rate of growth would obviously have 
to be sought in additional export earnings and 
an increase in the net inflow of long-term public 
and private funds. 

21. The developing countries' surplus of ex- 
ports over imports in 1950 became a deficit in 
1962 of $2.3 billion, while their net payments 
for investment income and other invisibles were 
about $3.3 billion around 1960. This deficit 
was covered by the provision of aid and other 
capital flows. However, the gap between the 
import requirements of developing countries 
and their export earnings has been widening. 
According to United Nations Secretariat esti- 
mates, this gap could be of the order of $20 
billion a year in 1970, on the basis of a 5 per cent 
per annum rate of growth set as the target for 



the United Nations Development Decade, as- 
suming no change in the trends of the fifties 
upon which tliese estimates were based. 

22. In recent years, the developing countries 
have been turning increasingly to economic and 
social planning as the most effective means for 
accelerating their growth. Their plans, poli- 
cies and institutions are designed to achieve the 
transformation of tlieir economic and social 
structures and to provide for maximum sav- 
ing, investment and output to a pre-determined 
order of priorities for a targeted rate of g^o^vth. 
However realistic the plans drawn up by the 
developing coimtries may be, their realization 
is hindered bj' the instability of international 
markets for primary products and by condi- 
tions restricting the access of primary commodi- 
ties and semi-manufactures and manufactures 
to the markets of the developed countries. The 
continued dependence on the export of a single 
product or a few commodities whose prices 
have been declining in the past has made the 
realization of the development plans all the 
more difficult. The realization of economic and 
social development plans of the developing 
countries necessitates an appropriate change 
in the present structure of international trade 
in such a way as to afford them the opportunity 
of earning adequate and stable supplies of for- 
eign exchange. 

23. An overwhelming proportion — over two- 
thirds — of the import and export trade of de- 
veloping countries is with the developed market 
economies. Between 1950 and 1962 the total 
exports of the developed market economies to 
the developing countries increased by 98 per 
cent, rising from $10,650 million to $21,060 mil- 
lion. This contrasted with the exports of the 
developing countries to the developed market 
coimtries, which increased by 56 per cent, rising 
from $13,220 million to $20,660 million. 

24. The reason for the failure of exports of 
the developing countries to the developed 
market economies to expand at a faster rat« can 
be attributed to a number of factors. Refer- 
ence has already been made in the foregoing 
passages to contributory factors of a general 
character. Specific policies include price- 
support programmes, customs duties and in- 
ternal taxes and fiscal charges imposed on the 

consumption of tropical products, export sub- 
sidies on commodities of interest to developing 
countries, and liigher levels of tariffs imposed 
on processed products relative to those applied 
to such products when exported in their natural 
form. Tliese factors have contributed to the 
sluggishness of the demand for the products 
of developing countries and in the case of some 
commodities to tlie accumulation of surpluses 
which have tended to exercise a depressing ef- 
fect on world commodity prices. There is need 
for the elimination of these obstacles by na- 
tional and international action designed to im- 
prove access and expand market opportunities 
for the exports of primary products, semi- 
manufactures and manufactures of developing 
countries in order to increase their export 

25. Owing to its relatively recent origin, 
trade between developing countries and the cen- 
trally planned economies is so far limited to a 
relatively small number of countries and con- 
stitutes a small part of the trade turnover of 
developing coimtries as a whole. In 1962, 
$1,630 million, or 5.6 per cent of the total ex- 
ports of the developing countries went to the 
centrally planned economies, wliile imports 
from the latter into the former totalled $2,150 
million and formed 7.3 per cent of total imports. 
This trade has, however, shown a tendency to 
increase rapidly in recent years. Thus, in 
terms of value, the exports of the countries with 
centrally planned economies to developing 
coimtries increased from $405 million to $2,150 
million, or by 430 per cent, between 1950 and 
1962, while exports from the developing coun- 
tries to the countries with centrally planned 
economies showed an expansion from $610 mil- 
lion to $1,630 million, or by 167 per cent, over 
the same period. 

26. Tlie expansion in trade has been secured 
mainly through medium and long-term bilateral 
trade agreements which stipulate the quantity 
and/or the value of goods to be exchanged. In 
spite of the rapidity of growth in trade between 
the two groups of countries, there is still con- 
siderable scope for expansion, which can be 
secured through the removal of certain obstacles 
which prevent a faster rate of growth and by 
further positive measures taken by the inter- 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


ested countries. The major obstacles arise from 
the fact that trade relations have not yet been 
established between many developing countries 
and centrally planned economies, the need, in 
some cases, due to the bilateral trade system, for 
individual developing countries to balance their 
trade with individual centrally planned econo- 
mies, and the paucity of knowledge among pub- 
lic and private organizations of trade partners 
in some developing countries about the products 
and the trade policies and practices of the cen- 
trally planned economies. 

27. These problems can be solved and trade 
between countries of the two groups expanded 
at a more rapid rate through the establishment 
of normal trade relations between centrally 
planned economies and a larger number of de- 
veloping countries; through the gi-anting by 
countri&s with centrally planned economies to 
developing countries, within the framework of 
the former's foreign trade system, of special 
advantages conducive to the promotion of such 
trade; through the adoption by the centrally 
planned economies, within the framework of 
their long-term plans, of appropriate measures 
to secure the diversification and a proportion- 
ately increasing growth of their imports of 
primary, semi-manufactured and manufac- 
tured products from developed countries; and 
through increased utilization by centrally plan- 
ned economies, in addition to bilateral aiTange- 
ments, of multilateral trade and payment meth- 
ods, when these are considered to be of mutual 
advantage to all partners in the trade. Develop- 
ing countries for their part should accord the 
countries with centrally planned economies con- 
ditions for trade not inferior to those granted 
nomially to the developed market economy 

28. Trade between the centrally planned 
countries and the developed market economies 
has grown rapidly in recent years. The full 
potentiality of this trade, however, has not been 
realized because of administrative, economic 
and trade policy obstacles. Efforts to discover 
means to solve these problems and increase trade 
to the mutual benefit of all partners concerned 
and thus achieve levels of trade commensurate 
with the apparent possibilities, have shown in- 

creasing progress in recent years. 

29. Continuation of such efforts in whatever 
available forums, including within the frame- 
work of the future institutional arrangements 
recommended by the Conference, should result 
in progressively greater levels of trade between 
countries having different economic and social 
systems. It is recognized that such a develop- 
ment would be in the interest of world trade as 
a whole. 

30. While trade between developed countries 
is increasing and while the share of such ex- 
changes in total world trade is also rising, the 
level of trade between developing countries is 
very low and its importance in world trade has 
been decreasing. The expansion of inter and 
intra-regional trade is important to developing 
countries insofar as it provides them with wider 
markets for their products and enables them to 
further diversify their trade and to save on 
scarce foreign exchange. Hence, the establish- 
ment of closer and broader trade ties between 
developing countries is necessary. 

Seciion IV. Reasons and Considerations 

In drawing up its recommendations, the Con- 
ference has been guided by the following es- 
sential reasons and considerations : 

(31) Tlie development of equitable and 
mutually advantageous trade can promote 
higher standards of living, full employment and 
rapid economic progress in all countries of the 

(32) The fundamental problems of develop- 
ing countries are well identified and what is 
now required is a universal readiness to act and 
generally to adopt practical measures aimed at 
increasing exports and export earnings of 
developing countries and accelerating their 
economic development. 

(33) At the root of the foreign trade diffi- 
culties facing the developing countries and other 
countries highly dependent on a narrow range 
of primary commodities are the slow rate of 
gi'owth of demand for their exports of primary 
commodities, accounting for 90 per cent of their 
exports, the increasing participation of de- 
veloped countries in world trade in primary 
commodities, and the deterioration in the terms 



of trade of developing countries from 1950 to 

(34) During the period of structural read- 
justments of their economies, the developing 
countries will remain heavily dependent on 
commodity exports to meet growing import 
needs involved in the process of industrializa- 
tion and diversification. 

(35) Because of the outstanding importance 
of commodity trade for economic development, 
particularly of the developing coimtries and the 
special difficulties affecting trade in primary 
commodities, it is important and urgent that 
action bo taken over a wide front and on dy- 
namic and comprehensive lines so as to conduct 
a concerted attack on international commodity 

(36) There is accordingly a need for a delib- 
erate effort on the part of all industrialized 
countries to remedy the adverse tendencies in 

(37) This comprehensive action should in- 
clude international commodity arrangements as 
one of the means of stimulating a dynamic and 
steady growth of the real export earnings of the 
developing countries so as to provide them with 
expanding resources for their economic and 
social development and of securing overall 
stabilization in primary commodity markets. 
It is also necessary to accelerate the removal of 
existing obstacles and to forestall the creation 
of new obstacles to commodity trade. 

(38) Compensatory financing is an appro- 
priate solution to meet the serious residual 
problems caused by short-term fluctuations in 
the prices of and earnings from primary com- 
modity exports. For residual long-term prob- 
lems financial solutions should be sought. 

(39) The developing coimtries should not 
rely merely on the expansion of traditional ex- 
ports of primary products and raw materials. 
Promotion of industries with an export poten- 
tial in developing coimtries is essential. Diver- 
sification and expansion of exports of manu- 
factured and semi-manufactured goods are 
among the important means to assist the devel- 
oping countries to achieve in time a balance 
in their external accounts. 

(40) The establisliment and expansion in de- 
veloping countries of industries with an export 

potential call for a whole series of inter-related 
measures and action on the part of tlie develop- 
ing countries within the framework of overall 
planning, as well as by developed countries and 
appropriate international organizations. 

(41) The role of the public sector in the eco- 
nomic development of developing coimtries is 
recognized, as well as the role of private capital, 
domestic and foreign. 

(42) Developing countries face obstacles and 
difficulties in marketing their manufactures and 
semi-manufactures in the developed countries. 
In order to facilitate the industrial exports of 
developing countries, their products should have 
freer access particularly to the markets of the 
developed countries, but also to the markets of 
other developing countries. 

(43) Easier access to markets should be pro- 
vided not only for existing and traditional ex- 
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures, 
but also for a wider range of products in order 
to improve the opportunities for the establish- 
ment in the developing countries of a wider 
range of industries more technically evolved 
and producing industrial goods of higher de- 
grees of complexity. 

(44) Substantial imports of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures may involve some re- 
adjustment in the industrial structures of the 
developed countries. 

(45) A lowering of trade barriers would im- 
prove the competitive position of the develop- 
ing countries relative to that of domestic 
producers in the market of each developed coun- 
try, but it would not improve their competitive 
position in that market in relation to ex- 
ports from other developed countries. Special 
measures in favour of exports from devel- 
oping countries would be needed to bring 
about the required expansion of such exports. 

(46) In addition to the expansion of exports 
of manufactures to developed countries, the ex- 
pansion of such trade among the developing 
countries themselves would contribute towards 
solving the dilemma posed by the economic and 
technological requirements of modern industry 
on the one hand and the limited domestic 
markets of individual countries on the other. 
Because of the many forms which economic co- 
operation might have in various cases and the 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


problems which they might cause, it is con- 
sidered that a certain flexibility is needed. 

(47) The Conference has considered the gen- 
eral targets on which the international com- 
munity might focus in dealing with the problems 
of development through trade and international 
co-operation. A number of principles and 
criteria aimed at providing constructive guide- 
lines for policies in the various areas of inter- 
national financial and technical co-operation 
have been formulated. The major questions 
identified are as follows : 

(a) The need for higher growth rates for 
developing countries; measures to be taken by 
developed and developing countries, including 
measures to increase foreign exchange avail- 

(b) Guide-lines for international financial 
and teclinical co-operation; temis and condi- 
tions of aid, and the relation of trade and aid to 
maintain the continuity of sound development 
plans or programmes. 

(c) External debt problems. 

(d) The need and means for increasing the 
flow of financial resources to the developing 

(e) Compensatory finance; supplementary 
financial measures. 

(f) Aspects of shipping and all other in- 
visible items. 

(g) The need for periodic reviews. 

(48) There is wide recognition of the im- 
portance and gravity of the problem posed by 
the financing of development, in all its many 
complex aspects, and this recognition should 
form the basis for continuing reviews and action 
in this field. 

(49 ) There is also recognition of the need for 
greater and more systematic effoits by all par- 
ties involved, with a fair division of responsi- 
bilities among developed and developing 
coimtries, in order to engender the necessary 
co-operative efforts at the national, regional and 
international levels. 

(50) More specifically, there is wide agree- 
ment in some key areas which, though necessar- 
ily limited in scope, constituted forward steps. 
These areas include measures for accelerated 
growth in developing countries and increase in 
foreign exchange availabilities; guide-lines for 

international financial and teclmical co-opera- 
tion, compensatory financing and supplemen- 
tary financial measures, and for dealing with 
external debt problems; and some aspects of 
shipping in relation to the trade of developing 

(51) FinaUy, in some other areas, there is 
also agreement that specific measures which 
have been proposed shoulji be given further 
consideration or should be studied by the ap- 
propriate international organizations. 

52. In approaching the problem of institu- 
tional arrangements, the Conference has taken 
into account the fact tliat sustained efforts are 
necessary to raise the standards of living in all 
countries and to accelerate the economic growth 
of developing countries, and that international 
trade is an important instrument for economic 
development. The Conference has provided a 
imique opportunity to make a comprehensive 
review of the problems of trade and of trade 
in relation to economic development, particu- 
larly those problems affecting the developing 
countries. It has recognized that adequate and 
effectively functioning organizational arrange- 
ments are essential if the full contribution of 
international trade to the accelerated growth 
of the developing countries is to be successfully 
realized through the formulation and imple- 
mentation of the necessary policies. 

53. To this end, the Conference has ex- 
amined the operation of existing international 
institutions and has recognized both their con- 
tributions and their limitations in dealing with 
all the problems of trade and related problems 
of development. It believes that participating 
governments should make the most effective use 
of institutions and arrangements to which they 
are or may become parties, and is convinced, at 
the same time, that there should be a further 
review of both the present and the proposed 
institutional arrangements, in the light of the 
experience of their work and activities. The 
Conference has further taken note of the wide- 
spread desire among developing coimtries for 
a comprehensive trade organization, and has 
recognized that further institutional arrange- 
ments are necessary in order to continue the 
work initiated by this Conference and to imple- 
ment its recommendations and conclusions. 




Section I. Principles 

1. The Conference has recommended the fol- 
lowing General Principles to govern interna- 
tional trade relations and trade policies condu- 
cive to development : 

General Prineiple One 

Economic relations between comitries, includ- 
ing trade relations, shall be based on respect for 
the principle of sovereign equality of states, 
self-determination of peoples, and non-inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of other countries. 

General Principle Two 

There shall be no discrimination on the basis 
of differences in socio-economic systems. Adap- 
tation of trading methods shall be consistent 
with this principle. 

General Principle Three 

Every country has the sovereign right freely 
to trade with other countries, and freely to dis- 
pose of its natural resources in the interest of 
the economic development and well-being of its 
own people. 

General Principle Four 

Economic development and social progress 
should be the common concern of the whole 
international community and should by increas- 
ing economic prosperity and well-being help 
strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation 
among nations. Accordingly, all countries 
pledge themselves to pursue internal and exter- 
nal economic policies designed to accelerate eco- 
nomic growth throughout the world, and in 
particular to help promote in developing coun- 
tries a rate of growth consistent with the need 
to bring about substantial and steady increase 
in average income in order to narrow the gap 
between the standard of living in developing 
countries and that in the developed countries. 

General Principle Five 

National and international economic policies 

'The results of the voting on the Principles and 
Recoimnendations adopted by the Conference appear In 
Annex A. Observations and reservations appear in 
Annex B. [Footnote in original.] 

should be directed towards the attainment of an 
inteiTiational division of labour in harmony 
with the needs and interests of developing coun- 
tries in particular and of the world as a whole. 
Developed countries should assist the develop- 
ing countries in their efforts to sj^eed up their 
economic and social progress, should co-operate 
in measures taken by developing comitries for 
diversifying their economies and should encour- 
age appropriate adjustments in their own econ- 
omies to this end. 

General Principle Six 

International trade is one of the most impor- 
tant factors in economic development. It 
should be governed by such rules as are con- 
sistent with the attainment of economic and 
social progress and should not be hampered by 
measures incompatible therewith. All coim- 
tries should co-operate in creating conditions 
of mternational trade conducive in particular 
to the achievement of a rapid increase in the 
export earnings of developing countries and in 
general to the promotion of an expansion and 
diversification of trade between aU countries, 
whether at similar levels of development, at 
different levels of development, or having dif- 
ferent economic and social systems. 

General Principle Seven 

The expansion and diversification of inter- 
national trade depends upon increasing access 
to markets, and upon remunerative prices for 
the exports of primary products. Developed 
coimtries shall progressively reduce and, in ap- 
propriate cases, eliminate barriers and other 
restrictions that hmder trade and consumption 
of products of particular interest to developing 
countries and take positive measures such as 
will create and increase markets for the exports 
of developing countries. All coimtries should 
co-operate through suitable international ar- 
rangements on an orderly basis in implement- 
ing measures designed to increase and stabilize 
commodity export earnings, particularly of de- 
veloping countries, at equitable and remmiera- 
tive prices and to maintain a mutually accept- 
able relationship between the prices of 
manufactured goods and those of primary 


General Principle Eight 

International trade should be conducted to 
mutual advantage on the basis of the most 
favoured nation treatment and should be free 
from measures detrimental to the trading in- 
terests of other countries. However, developed 
comitries should grant concessions to all devel- 
oping countries and extend to developing coun- 
tries all concessions they grant to one another 
and should not in granting these or other con- 
cessions, require any concessions in return from 
developing countries. New preferential con- 
cessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be 
made to developing countries as a whole and 
such preferences should not be extended to de- 
veloped countries. Developing countries need 
not extend to developed countries preferential 
treatment in operation amongst them. Special 
preferences at present enjoyed by certain de- 
veloping countries in certain developed coun- 
tries should be regarded as transitional and 
subject to progressive reduction. They should 
be eliminated as and when effective interna- 
tional measures guaranteeing at least equivalent 
advantages to the countries concerned come into 

General Principle Nine 

Developed countries participating in regional 
economic groupings should do their utmost to 
ensure that their economic integration does not 
cause injury to, or otherwise adversely affect, 
the expansion of their imports from third 
countries, and in particular from developing 
coimtries, either individually or collectively. 

General Principle Ten 

Regional economic groupings, integration or 
other forms of economic co-operation should be 
promoted among developing comitries as a 
means of expanding their intra-regional and 
extra-regional trade and encouraging their eco- 
nomic growth and their industrial and agri- 
cultural diversification with due regard to the 
special features of development of the various 
countries concerned as well as their economic 
and social systems. It will be necessary to en- 
sure that such co-operation makes an effective 
contribution to the economic development of 
these countries, and does not inhibit the eco- 

nomic development of other developing coun- 
tries outside such groupings. 

General Principle Eleven 

International institutions and developed 
countries should provide an increasing net 
flow of international financial, technical and 
economic assistance to support and reinforce, 
by supplementing the export earnings of de- 
veloping countries, the efforts made by them to 
accelerate their economic growth through diver- 
sification, industrialization and increase of 
productivity on the basis of their national 
policies, plans and programmes of economic 
development. Such assistance, should not be 
subject to any political or military conditions. 
This assistance whatever its form and from 
whatever source, including foreign public and 
private loans and capital, should flow to de- 
veloping countries on terms fully in keeping 
with their trade and development needs. In- 
ternational financial and monetary policies 
should be designed to take full account of the 
trade and development needs of developing 

General Principle Twelve 

All countries recognize that a significant por- 
tion of resources released in successive stages 
as a result of the conclusion of an agreement on 
general and complete disannament imder effec- 
tive international control should be allocated to 
the promotion of economic development in de- 
veloping coimtries. 

General Principle Thirteen 

The Conference decided to include, as a 
separate part of the Principles adopted by the 
Conference, the Principles relating to transit 
trade of land-locked countries set forth below. 

General Principle Fourteen 

Complete decolonization in compliance with 
the United Nations Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples and the liquidation of the remnants of 
colonialism in all its forms is a necessary condi- 
tion for economic development and the exercise 
of sovereign rights over natural resources. 

General Principle Fifteen 

The adoption of international policies and 
measures for the economic development of tlie 



developing countries shall take into account the 
individual characteristics and different stages 
of development of the developing countries, 
special attention being paid to the less developed 
among them, as an effective means of ensuring 
sustained growth with equitable opportunity 
for each developing country. 

2. The Conference has recommended a 
number of Special Principles to govern interna- 
tional trade relations and trade policies con- 
ducive to development (see Annex A.I.I.) . 

3. The Conference has adopted the following 
recommendation on Principles relating to tran- 
sit trade of land-locked countries : 

The Conference, 

Having regard to the various aspects of the 
problem of transit trade of land-locked States, 

Considering that for the promotion of the 
economic development of the land-locked 
States, it is essential to provide facilities to 
enable them to overcome the effects of their 
land-locked position on their trade. 

Adopts the following principles together with 
the Interpretative Note : 

Principle I 

The recognition of the right of each land- 
locked State of free access to the sea is an essen- 
tial principle for the expansion of international 
trade and economic development. 

Principle II 

In territorial and on internal waters, vessels 
flying the flag of land-locked countries should 
have identical rights and enjoy treatment iden- 
tical to that enjoyed by vessels flying the flag 
of coastal States other than the territorial Stat«. 

Principle III 

In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on 
equal terms with coastal States, States having 
no sea coast should have free access to the sea. 
To this end States situated between the sea and 
a State having no sea coast shall by common 
agreement with the latter and in conformity 
with existing international conventions accord 
to ships flying the flag of that State treatment 
equal to that accorded to their own ships or to 
the ships of any other State as regards access to 
sea ports and the use of such ports. 

Principle IV 

In order to promote fully the economic de- 
velopment of the land-locked countries, the said 
countries should be afforded by all States, on 
the basis of reciprocity, free and unrestricted 
transit, in such a manner that they have free 
access to regional and international trade in 
all circumstances and for every type of goods. 

Goods in transit should not be subject to any 
customs duty. 

Means of transport in transit should not be 
subject to special taxes or charges higher than 
those levied for the use of means of transport of 
the transit country. 

Principle V 

The State of transit, while maintaining full 
sovereignty over its territory shall have the right 
to take all indispensable measures to ensure that 
the exercise of the right of free and unrestricted 
transit shall in no way infringe its legitimate 
interests of any kind. 

Principle VI 

In order to accelerate the evolution of a uni- 
versal approach to the solution of the special 
and particular problems of trade and develop- 
ment of land-locked countries in the different 
geographical areas, the conclusion of regional 
and other international agreements in this 
regard should be encouraged by all States. 

Principle VII 

The facilities and special rights accorded to 
land-locked countries in view of their special 
geographical position are excluded from the 
operation of the most-favoured-nation clause. 

Principle VIII 

The principles which govern the right of free 
access to the sea of the land-locked State shall 
in no way abrogate existing agreements between 
two or more contracting parties concerning the 
problems, nor shall they raise an obstacle as 
regards the conclusion of such agreements in 
the future, provided that the latter do not 
estabish a regime which is less favourable than 
or opposed to the above-mentioned provisions. 

Interpretative Note 
These Principles are inter-related and each 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


Principle should be construed in the context of 
the otlier Principles. 

4. In the light of its adoption of principles 
governing international trade relations and 
trade policies conducive to development, the 
Conference has recognized the necessity of 
achieving the broadest possible measure of 
agreement at the earliest possible moment on a 
set of Principles, and has recommended that 
the institutional machinery proposed by the 
Conference should continue efforts to that end 
(see Annex A.I.3) . 

Section II. International Commodity 

5. In order to deal with the problems facing 
the primary commodity trade of developing 
countries the Conference has recommended that 
the provisions outlined below should be con- 
sidered as means of increasing the export earn- 
ings of the developing countries by general 
measures as well as by specific measures related 
to individual commodities and, that, to this end, 
practical steps should be taken by governments 
concerned to implement at the earliest possible 
date those of the following provisions which are 
applicable in the light of certain considerations 
(see Annex A.II.l), as solutions of the urgent 
problems of developing countries. 

(a) Provisions for international conunodity 
arrangements with a basic objective of stimu- 
lating a dynamic and steady growth and ensur- 
ing reasonable predictability in the real export 
earnings of the developing countries so as to 
provide them with expanding resources for 
their economic and social development, while 
taking into accoimt the interests of consumers 
in importing countries, through remunerative, 
equitable and stable prices for primary com- 
modities, having due regard to their import 
purchasing power, assured satisfactory access 
and increased imports and consumption, as well 
as co-ordination of production and marketing 
policies (see Annexes A.II.l and A.II.2) : 

(b) Provisions for a progi'amme of measures 
and actions for the removal of obstacles (tariff, 
non-tariff and other) and discriminatory prac- 
tices and for expansion of market opportmiities 
for primary commodity exports and for in- 

creases in their consumption and imports in 
developed countries (see Annex A.II.l and 

6. The Conference has given general ap- 
proval to the establishment of a commission on 
commodity arrangements and policies within 
the framework of the continuing institutional 
machinery which will be established following 
the UNCTAD. The Conference has also gen- 
erally formulated terms of reference for the 
new commission and requested that they be 
given prompt and favourable consideration by 
the continuing institutional machinery (see 
Annex A.II.l). 

7. The Conference has also adopted recom- 
mendations for active measures to promote 
market opportimities for primary commodity 
exports and for increases in consumption and 
imports in both developed and developing 
countries. It has expressed the belief that food 
aid should become an integral and continuing 
part of international aid under the United 
Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations. It has also rec- 
ommended special action, both national and 
international, to deal with cases where natural 
products exported by developing countries face 
competition from synthetics and other substi- 
tutes. It has also recommended, infer alia, the 
study and preparation of a programme of ac- 
tion for the organization of commodity trade 
(see Annexes A.II.3, A.II.4, A.II.5, A.II.6, 
A.II.7 and A.II.8). 

8. The Conference has noted the heavy de- 
pendence of some developing countries on for- 
eign exchange earnings from the export of 
minerals and fuels, and has recommended that 
the developed countries should effectively re- 
duce and/or eliminate barriei-s and discrimina- 
tion to the trade and consumption of those 
products, particularly internal taxation, with 
a view to increasing the real income of the 
developing countries from the said exports. It 
has also recommended action to provide the 
developing countries producing minerals and 
fuels with an appreciable increase in the rev- 
enues which accrue to them as a result of the 
export of these natural resources (see Annex 





9. The Conference recognizes the urgent need 
for the diversification and expansion of the ex- 
port trade of developing countries in manufac- 
tures and semi-manufactures as a means of 
accelerating their economic development and 
raising their standards of living. It considers 
that individual and joint action by both devel- 
oped and developing countries is necessary to 
enable the latter to obtain increased participa- 
tion conuuensurate with the needs of their de- 
velopment in the growth of international trade 
in manufactured and semi-manufactured 

10. The Conference has adopted a series of 
recommendations designed to help in the pro- 
motion of industries with an export potential 
and in the expansion of their export trade in 
manufactures and semi-manufactures. These 
recommendations deal with the following 
questions : 

(a) Industrial development (see Annex 
A.III.l) , dealing with the creation of a special- 
ized agency for industrial development; 

(b) Industrial branch agreements on partial 
division of labour (see Annex A.III.2) ; 

(c) The establishment and expansion of in- 
dustries with an export potential (see Annex 

11. The Conference has recommended the 
adoption by governments participating in the 
Conference of certain guidelines in their foreign 
trade and assistance policies and programmes 
providing for increased access in the largest pos- 
sible measure to markets for manufactured and 
semi-manufactured products of interest to de- 
veloping countries, so as to enable these coun- 
tries to increase and diversify their exports of 
these products on a stable and lasting basis. 
These guidelines also include appropriate provi- 
sion by developing and developed countries for 
co-operation between governments and private 
groups to build up export production in devel- 
oping countries (see Annexes A.III.4, and 

12. The Conference has noted both the agree- 
ment signified by all developing coimtries and 

a great majority of the developed countries with 
the principle of assisting the industrial develop- 
ment of developing countries by the extension of 
preferences in their favour and the opposition 
to tliis principle expressed by some developed 
countries. The Conference has recommended 
that the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions establish a Committee of govermnental 
representatives to consider the matter with a 
view to working out the best method of imple- 
menting such preferences on the basis of non- 
reciprocity from the developing countries as 
well as to discuss further differences of princi- 
ple involved (see Annex A.III.5). 

13. The Confei-ence has adopted a recommen- 
dation based on the readiness of the centrally 
plamied economies to take action with a view to 
increasing through appropriate measures the 
import of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
from the developing countries (see Annex 

14. The Conference has adopted a recommen- 
dation outlining practical measures for promo- 
tion of trade in manufactures and semi-manu- 
factures among developing countries (see Annex 

15. The Conference has also adopted a recom- 
mendation calling on developed countries to 
take certain measures, inter alia^ on import pro- 
motion and industrial adjustment (see Annex 

Section IV. Financing for an Expansion of 
International Trade and Improvement of 
THE Invisible Trade of Developing Coun- 

16. On the main issues before the Conference 
on the financing of development, trade and in- 
visible transactions, a large consensus of agree- 
ment was reached, though complete agreement 
was not always achieved. 

17. The Conference recognizes the wide con- 
cern expressed regarding the inadequacy of the 
growth target of 5 per cent per annum set for 
the United Nations Development Decade. The 
Conference acknowledges the need for steps to 
be taken, by both developing and developed 
countries, to mobilize domestic and interna- 
tional resources for accelerated growth in de- 


veloping countries at rates even higher than 
envisaged for the Development Decade where 
feasible; and that the economic situations, poli- 
cies and plans of individual developing coun- 
tries be examined for this purpose with the 
consent of the country concerned. The Con- 
ference also recognizes in this connexion that 
the import capacity of developing countries, re- 
sulting from the combined total of export 
proceeds, invisible earnings and capital inflow, 
and taking into account the evolution of prices, 
should rise sufficiently, and the measures taken 
by the developing countries themselves should 
be adequate, so as to enable those higher rates 
of growth to be achieved ; and that all countries, 
developed and developing, should undertake, 
individually and in co-operation, such measures 
as may be necessary to ensure this. The Con- 
ference has also recommended that each eco- 
nomically advanced country should endeavour 
to supply, in the light of principles set forth in 
Annex A.IV.l, financial resources to the devel- 
oping countries of a minimum net amount ap- 
proaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of 
its national income, having regard, however, to 
the special position of certain countries which 
are net importers of capital (see Annex 
A.IV.2). The Conference has also adopted a 
recommendation providing, inter alia, that the 
rate of interest of government loans to the de- 
veloping countries should not normally exceed 
3 per c«nt (see Annex A.IV.3) . 

18. The Conference has adopted recommenda- 
tions concerning terms and conditions of finan- 
cial and technical co-operation provided by 
industrialized countries through bilateral and 
multilateral programmes of assistance to 
developing countries (see Annexes A.IV.l, 
A.IV.3 and A.IV.4). 

19. The Conference has proposed certain 
measures to deal with the increasing burden of 
accumulated debt and service payments in devel- 
oping countries, with the objective of facilitat- 
ing, whenever warranted and under appropriate 
conditions, the re-scheduling or consolidation 
of debts with appropriate periods of grace and 
amortization, and reasonable rates of interest 
(see Annexes A.IV.l and A.IV.5). It has also 
approved the possibility of deliveries on credit 

of industrial equipment reimbursable in goods 
(see Annex A.IV.6) . 

20. Tlie Conference has adopted the follow- 
ing recommendations proposing measures and 
studies concerning an increase in the volume or 
an improvement in the terms of financing for 
developing comitries : 

(a) Recommendations concerning a United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (see Annex 
A.IV.7), the gradual transformation of the 
United Nations Special Fund (see Annex 
A.IV.8) ; 

(b) The provision of aid for development on 
a regional basis (see Annexes A.rV.9 and 
A.IV.IO) ; 

(c) The promotion of the flow of public and 
private capital both to the public and private 
sectors in developing countries (see Annexes 
A.IV.11, A.IV.12 and A.IV.13) ; 

(d) Review of the use and terms of credit, 
export financing and marketing, and credit in- 
surance (see Annexes A.IV.14, A.IV.15 and 

21. Tlie Conference has recognized further 
that adverse movements in the export proceeds 
of developing countries can be disruptive of 
development. The Conference has, therefore, 
recommended that, as regards payments diffi- 
culties caused by temporary export shortfalls, 
members of the International Monetary Fund 
should study certain measures with a view to 
liberalizing the terms of the compensatory 
credit system operated by the Fund since Feb- 
ruary 1963 (see Annex A.IV.17). As regards 
longer-term problems, the Conference has rec- 
ommended (see Annex A.IV.18) : 

(a) That the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development be invited to study 
the feasibility of a scheme that would provide 
supplementary financial resources to developing 
countries experiencing shortfalls in export 
proceeds from reasonable expectations. The 
relevant economic circumstances for consider- 
ation would include the adverse effects of signif- 
icant increases in import prices. 

(b) That the continuing machinery rec- 
ommended by this Conference be invited to 
study and organize further discussions of con- 



cepts and proposals for compensatory financing 
put forward by the delegations of developing 
countries at the Conference, taking into account 
the effect of shortfalls in export earnings and 
adverse movements in the terms of trade. 

22. The Conference has also recommended 
a study of the international monetary issues 
relating to problems of trade and development 
with special reference to the objectives and 
decisions of this Conference (see Annex 
A.IV.19) . It has also approved a recoinmenda- 
tion on the participation of nationals of devel- 
oping coimtries in the process of policy 
fonnulation in international financial and 
monetary agencies (see Annex A.IV.20). 

23. The Conference has agreed on a draft text 
containing a common measure of understanding 
on shipping questions, and has recommended 
that appropriate intergovernmental procedures, 
including any committee that might be deemed 
necessary, be established to promote understand- 
ing and co-operation in the field of shipping, 
and to study and report on its economic aspects 
(see Annexes A.IV.21 and A.IV.22) . 

24. The Conference has also considered and 
recommended measures on insurance, tourism, 
technical assistance and transfer of technology, 
taking into account the need to improve the in- 
visible trade of developing countries (see An- 
nexes A.IV.23, A.IV.24, A.IV.25 and A.IV.26). 

Section V. iNSTiTrrnoNAL ARRAisTGEittENTs 

2.5. The Conference has recommended to the 
United Nations General Assembly that it adopt 
at its nineteenth session the following pro- 
visions, inter alia : 

(a) The present United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development should be estab- 
lished as an organ of the General Assembly to 
be convened at intervals of not more than three 
years and with a membership comprising those 
states which are members of the United Nations, 
the specialized agencies, or the I.A.E.A. 

(b) The principal functions of the Confer- 
ence shall be : 

( i ) To promote international trade, especially 
with a view to accelerating economic de- 
velopment, particularly trade between 
countries at different stages of develop- 

ment, between developing countries and 
between countries with different systems 
of economic and social organization, tak- 
ing into account the functions performed 
by existing international organizations; 

(ii) To formulate principles and policies on 
international trade and related problems 
of economic development ; 

(iii) To make proposals for putting the said 
principles and policies into effect and to 
take such other steps witliin its compe- 
tence as may be relevant to this end, hav- 
ing regard to differences in economic sys- 
tems and stages of development ; 

(iv) Generally, to review and facilitate the co- 
ordination of activities of other institu- 
tions within the United Nations system 
in the field of international trade and re- 
lated problems of economic development 
and in this regard to co-operate with the 
General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council in respect to the perform- 
ance of their Charter responsibilities for 

(v) To initiate action, where appropriate, in 
co-operation with the competent organs 
of the United Nations for the negotiation 
and adoption of multilateral legal instru- 
ments in the field of trade, with due re- 
gard to the adequacy of existing organs 
of negotiation and without duplication of 
their activities ; 

(vi) To be available as a centre for harmoniz- 
ing the trade and related development 
policies of governments and regional eco- 
nomic groupings in pursuance of Article 
1 of the United Nations Charter; and 

(vii) To deal with any other matters within 
the scope of its competence. 

(c) A permanent organ of the Conference, 
to be known as the Trade and Development 
Board, should be established as part of the 
United Nations machinery in the economic field, 
consisting of 55 members elected by the Con- 
ference from among its membership, with full 
regard for both equitable geographical distri- 
bution and the desirability of continuing repre- 
sentation for the principal trading states. 

(d) For the effective discharge of its func- 
tions, the Board should establish such subsidiary 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


organs as may be necessary, and in particular 
three committees — on commodities, manufac- 
tures, and invisibles and financing related to 

(e) Each State represented on the Confer- 
ence should have one vote. Subject to provi- 
sions to be determined by the General Assembly 
at its nineteenth session after consideration by 
it of a report and proposals to be made by a 
Special Committee to be appointed by the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations, decisions of 
the Conference on matters of substance should 
be taken by a two-thirds majority of the repre- 
sentatives present and voting, and decisions of 
the Board by simple majority. The task of the 
Special Committee shall be to prepare proposals 
for procedures within the continuing machinery 
designed to establish a process of conciliation to 
take place before voting and to provide an ade- 
quate basis for the adoption of recommenda- 
tions with regard to proposals of a specific 
nature for action substantially affecting the 
economic or financial interests of particular 

(f) Arrangements should be made, in ac- 
cordance with Article 101 of the Cliarter, for 
the immediate ostablislmient of an adequate, 
permanent and full-time secretariat within the 
United Nations Secretariat for the proper serv- 
icing of the Conference, the Board and its sub- 
sidiary bodies. 

(g) The Conference sliould review in the 
light of experience the effectiveness and further 
evolution of institutional arrangements with a 
view to recommending such changes and im- 
provements as might be necessary. To this end 
it should study all relevant subjects including 
matters relating to the establislmient of a com- 
prehensive organization based on the entire 
membership of the United Nations system of 
organizations to deal with trade and with trade 
in relation to development (see Annex A.V.I). 

26. The Conference has also recommended 
action concerning interim institutional arrange- 
ments, and the terms of reference of subsidiary 
organs of the Executive Council (see Annexes 

Section VI. Special Problems 

27. The Conference has requested the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations to appoint 

a committee of 24 members, representing land- 
locked, transit and other interested states as 
governmental experts and on the basis of equi- 
table geograpliical distribution. The said com- 
mittee is to be convened during 1964 to prepare 
a new draft convention dealing with transit 
trade of land-locked countries. The Confer- 
ence has recommended that the new draft con- 
vention be submitted for consideration and 
adoption by a conference of plenipotentiaries to 
be convened by the United Nations in the mid- 
dle of 1965 (see Annex A.VI.l) . 

28. The Conference has recommended that' 
international organizations set up by the de- 
veloping coimtries which are the principal 
exporters of non-renewable natural products 
be recognized and encouraged to enable them to 
defend their interests (see Annex A.VI.2). 

29. The Conference has also adopted a 
recommendation concerning expanded utiliza- 
tion of long-term trade agreements (see Annex 

30. The Conference has recommended non- 
discrimination in dealing with governmental 
trading organizations in foreign trade (see 
Annex A.VI.4) . 

Section VII. Programme of Work 

31. In addition to the Programme of Work 
implied in the recommendations referred to 
above, the Conference has recommended the 

(1) A study of the feasibility of rates of 
growth higher than those which have been 
experienced by most coimtries individually 
during the past decade, and even higher than 
those envisaged for the United Nations Devel- 
opment Decade, and of measures for developing 
and developed countries to take to achieve them 
(see Annex A.IV.2) ; 

(2) An overall economic and social survey 
of the depressed areas of the developing world 
and of special measures to make possible imme- 
diate action to secure a substantial improvement 
in the living levels of the populations of these 
areas (see Annex A.\n[.5) ; 

(3) A programme of work for the Commis- 
sion on Commodity Arrangements and Policies, 
or any equivalent body that may be established 
within the continuing machinery, for the devel- 



opment of appropriate guiding lines and pro- 
cedures for commodity arrangements and, in 
respect of commodities to which certain condi- 
tions apply, for commodity negotiations and 
export studies (see Annex A.II.S) ; 

(4) Further studies in the commodity field 
regarding promotion and marketing arrange- 
ments, and measures to deal with problems of 
substitution and various types of research 
aiming at an expansion of market opportunities 
for expoi-ts of primary commodities from de- 
veloping countries (see Annexes A.II.8 and 

(5) Work related to the provision of eco- 
nomic and teclinical assistance with a view to 
expanding the export earnings of developing 
countries from primary commodities, semi- 
manufactures and finished manufactures (see 
Annexes A.II.8, A.II.6 and A.II.5, Annexes 
A.III.4 and A.III.7 and Annex A.IV.25) ; 

(6) A study of methods of payment that 
would assist in promoting trade among develop- 
ing countries (see Annex A.II.6 and Aimex 
A.III.7) ; 

(7) The necessary economic and statistical 
studies of world trade, with special reference 
to the problems of developing coimtries (see 
Annex A.VI.5 and Annex A.II.8) ; 

( 8 ) The transmittal to the continuing United 
Nations trade macMnery which it is proposed 
to establish, for further consideration and 
action, a draft recommendation submitted by 
Czechoslovakia on measures for expansion of 
trade between countries having difi'erent eco- 
nomic and social systems (see Annex A.VI.6) ; 

(9) The transmittal to the continuing trade 
machinery, for further consideration and ac- 
tion, of draft recommendations on the policies 
and practices of regional economic groupings 
among developed coimtries and on the promo- 
tion of regional economic groupings among de- 
veloping coimtries, submitted by a number of 
developing countries (see Annex A.VI.7) ; 

(10) The transmittal to one of the organs to 
be set up by the Conference for further study of 
part III of the proposal concerning the use of 
subsidies for improving the competitive posi- 
tion of manufactures and semi-manufactures of 
developing countries (see report of the Second 
Committee, E/COXF.46/132, para. 24) ; 

(11) The elaboration of trade aspects of an 
economic programme of disarmament (see 
Annex A.VI.10). 

Global Communications Satellite 
Conference Held at Washington 

Press release 328 dated July 17 

An International Plenipotentiary Confer- 
ence on Interim Arrangements for a Global 
Commercial Communications Satellite System 
will be held at Washington beginning July 21 
with the U.S. Government as host. Delegations 
from 18 coimtries, including the United States, 
are scheduled to participate. 

The subject of the conference will be two in- 
terrelated proposed agreements. One is inter- 
governmental and contains the organizational 
principles as a basis for a global system of 
satellite connnunications. The other deals with 
the commercial, financial, and teclinical opera- 
tions and wiU be entered into by the designated 
communications entities of each country. 

Wlien all issues are agreed upon, the first 
agreement would be entered into by the U.S. 
Government as an executive agreement. The 
Communications Satellite Corporation, mider 
the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, is the 
designated entity of the United States and 
would be the signatory of the second agreement. 
Under the proposed international arrange- 
ments the Communications Satellite Corpora- 
tion will serve as manager of the global system 
on behalf of all participants in the international 
joint venture. 

There have been a number of conferences and 
talks with regard to the formation of the global 
commercial communications satellite system 
during the past year. The last conferences were 
held in London in June 1964. 

The Washington conference will be held in 
the international conference suite of the De- 
partment of State. The United States has in- 
vited delegations from Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Ke- 
public of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 

AUGUST 3, 1964 


All these countries have been participants in 
previous conferences and talks. However, the 
proposed agi-eements will be open for signature 
to any country which is a member of the Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union. Even if 
a country does not become a capital contributor 
or signatory, use of the system will be available 
to all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis. 

The U.S. delegation to the conference will be 
headed by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for Economic Affairs, and will 
include Leo D. Welch, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Communications 
Satellite Corporation, E. William Henry, 
Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, and Richard N. Gardner, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
amended. Done at New Yorli October 26, 1956. En- 
tered into force July 29, 19.57. TIAS 3873, 528-1. 
Acceptance deposited: Cameroon, July 13, 1964. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New Yorl£, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Belgium, June 29, 1964. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for 
signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962." 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, June 19, 1964. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
" Not in force. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention of February 
8, 1949 (TIAS 20S9), for the Atlantic 
fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at 
Washington July 15, 1963." 
Ratified hy the President: July 13, 1964. 
Ratification deposited: United States, July 13, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. TIAS .5433. 

Ratifications deposited: Austria, July 17, 1964: Jor- 
dan, July 10, 1964; Malaysia, July 16, 1904; Trini- 
dad and Tobago, July 14, 1964. 


Declaration on relations between contracting parties to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done 
at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force No- 
vember 16, 1960. TIAS 4649. 
Signature: United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964. 
Second proc^s-verbal extending declaration on provi- 
sional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12. 1963.' 
Signatures: Australia, April 21, 1964: Finland. May 
8, 1961; New Zealand, April 29, 1964; Norway, 
May 6, 1964 ; United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5195, 5252, 5304, 5342) , with related notes. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Santiago June 30, 1964. 
Entered into force June 30, 1964. 


Agreement concerning visits of the NS Savannah. 
Signed at Copenhagen July 2, 1964. Entered into 
force July 2, 1964. 


Agreement for Japan's contributions for United States 
administrative and related expenses during Japanese 
fiscal year 1964 under the mutual defense assistance 
agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Toliyo July 9, 19(54. En- 
tered into force July 9, 1964. 

Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo 
March 22, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1964. 
TIAS 5602. 
Proclaimed hy the President: July 10, 19(>4. 


Petroleum agreement of 1964, with agreed minute. 
Signed at Seoul May 12, 1964. 
Enters into force: September 3, 1964. 


Agreement concerning the visits of the NS Savannah 
to Sweden. Effected by exchange of notes at Stock- 
holm July 0, 1964. Entered into force July 6, 1964. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of April 7, 1964 (TIAS 5556). Effected 



by exchange of notes at Tunis July 7, 1964. Entered 
into force July 7, 1964. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of October 8, 19G2, as amended (TIAS 
5179, 5440, 5.579). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo June 30, 1964. Entered into force June 30, 

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes 
on St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls 

Press release 304 dated June 30 

The United States Embassy at Ottawa on 
June 30 exchanged notes with the Canadian De- 
partment of External Affairs approving an 
agreement supplementary to the January 29, 
1959, memorandum of agreement respecting the 
St. Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls.^ By this 
exchange the two Governments have agreed to 
extend the developmental period of the Seaway 
for 2 years until July 1, 1966. During this 
period no change in the original tariff of tolls is 


No. 101 

The Secretary of State for External Affairs 
presents his compliments to the Ambassador of 
the United States of America and has the 
honour to refer to an exchange of notes dated 
March 9, 1959, which made binding from April 
1, 1959, a memorandum of agreement dated 
January 29, 1959, between the St. Lawrence Sea- 
way Authority and the Saint Lawrence Sea- 
way Development Corporation respecting the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls. On 
IVIay 28, 1964, the Authority and the Corpora- 
tion signed a memorandum of agreement sup- 
plementary to their agreement of January, 1959. 
The Secretary of State for External Affairs has 

^ For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and 
text of the memorandum of agreement, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440. 

the honour to inform the Ambassador that the 
memorandum of supplementary agreement, a 
copy of which is attached and is incorporated 
in this note, has been confirmed by the Canadian 

Therefore, in accordance with the supple- 
mentary agreement, the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs has the honour to propose that 
Clause 7 of the agreement of January, 1959, be 
deleted and the following substituted therefor : 

"7. That the Authority and the Corporation, 
having caused the tariff to be reviewed, shall, 
not later than July 1, 1966, report to their re- 
spective Governments as to the sufficiency of the 
authorized tolls to meet the statutory require- 
ments, recommending a level of tolls related as 
realistically as possible to these requirements." 

If the United States Government approves, 
it is suggested that tliis note and the Ambassa- 
dor's reply shall constitute an agreement be- 
tween the two Governments giving effect to the 
foregoing proposal from July 1, 1964. 

Patjl Martin 
Ottawa, June 30, 1961^. 

Memorandum of Supplementary Agreement 

MENT made this 28th day of May, one thousand nine 
hundred and sixty-four. 

Between : The St. Lawrence Seaway Authobitt, 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Author- 

The Saint La ween ce Seawat Develop- 
ment CoBPORATioN, (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Corporation"). 

Whereas Clause 7 of the Memorandum of Agree- 
ment made on the 29th day of January, 1959, between 
the Authority and the Corporation respecting The St. 
Lawrence Seaway Tariff of Tolls provides "that the 
Authority and the Corporation shall, after five com- 
plete seasons of navigation have elapsed, and not later 
than July 1, 1964, report to their respective Govern- 
ments as to the sufficiency of the authorized tolls to 
meet the statutory requirements, and to cause the 
Tariff to be reviewed accordingly" ; 

And whereas the Authority and the Corporation, in 
conducting a joint review of the sufficiency of the 
tolls, are prepared to agree that : 

(a) The report by the Entities will be deferred from 
July 1, 1964 to July 1, 1966, and the developmental 
period of the Seaway will thereby be extended by two 
years and will be deemed to terminate at the end of 


the 1966 navigation season. Accordingly no change 
in tolls will be proposed at the present time. 

(b) The joint review will be continued and at the 
conclusion of this two-year extension, tolls proposals 
will be related as realistically as possible to the finan- 
cial requirements of the Seaway Entities. 

agree to recommend to their respective Governments 
that Clause 7 of the 1959 Agreement respecting tolls be 
deleted and the following substituted therefor: 

7. That the Authority and the Corporation, having 
caused the Tariff to be reviewed, shall, not later than 
July 1, 1966, report to their respective Governments 
as to the sufliciency of the authorized tolls to meet the 
statutory requirements, recommending a level of 
tolls related as realistically as possible to these 


R. J. Rankin 



J. H. McCann 



No. 387 

The Ambassador of the United States of 
America [W. Walton Butterworth] presents liis 
compliments to the Secretaiy of State for Ex- 
ternal Affairs and has the honor to refer to his 
note no. 101 of June 30, 1964, proposing that 
Clause 7 of the Agreement between the St. Law- 
rence Seaway Development Corporation and 
the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority dated 
January 29, 1959, be deleted and replaced with 
the provision contained in the Agreement of 
May 28, 1964 between the entities which is 
quoted in his note. 

The terms and conditions set forth in the 
above-mentioned note and the attached Mem- 
orandum of Supplementary Agreement are ac- 
ceptable to the Government of the United 
States, which concurs in the proposal that the 
note of the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs and this reply shall constitute an agree- 
ment between the United States and Canadian 
Governments giving effect to the joint proposal 

of the Corporation and the Authority from 
July 1, 1964. 

W. W. B. 

Embassy of the United States of America 
Ottawa, June 30, 196^. 


Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, tchich 
may ie obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C, 20520. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, 
amending the agreement of November 26, 1962. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at New Delhi April 17, 1964. 
Entered into force April 17, 1964. TIAS 5562. 3 pp. 


Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vlet-Nam, 
amending the agreement of January 9, 1964. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Saigon April 14, 1964. 
Entered into force April 14, 1964. TIAS 5563. 3 pp. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C, 

Releases issued prior to July 13 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 304 of Jime 
30 and 320, 321, and 322 of July 9. 

No. Date Subject 

*325 7/15 Ryan sworn in as Ambassador to 
Niger (biographic details). 

♦326 7/13 U.S. participation in international 

♦327 7/16 Cook sworn in as Ambassador to 

Senegal (biographic details). 
328 7/17 Conference on global communica- 
tions satellite system. 

♦329 7/17 Kidder sworn in as Ambassador to 

Cambodia (biographic details). 
330 7/18 ANZUS Council communique. 

*Not printed. 



INDEX August S, 1964 Vol. LI, No. 1310 

Africa. U.S. Sends Message to Conference of 
African Leaders at Cairo (Johnson) .... 147 

Argentina. Letters of Credence (Barrene- 

chea) 144 

Asia. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual In- 
terest in Asia and Pacific (text of com- 
munique) 140 

Australia. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual In- 
terest in Asia and Pacific (text of com- 
munique) 146 

Brazil. Letters of Credence (Magalhaes) . . 144 

Canada. U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on 
St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and 
memorandum of supplementary agreement) . 169 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 147 

Economic Affairs 

United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre- 
amble and recommendations) 150 

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on St. Law- 
rence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and memo- 
randum of supplementary agreement) . . . 169 

Germany. Some American Thoughts on Cur- 
rent Issues (McGhee) 138 

International Organizations and Conferences 

ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual Interest in 

Asia and Pacific (text of communique) . . 146 

Calendar of International Conferences and 

Meetings 148 

Global Communications Satellite Conference 

Held at Washington 167 

United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre- 
amble and recommendations) 150 

New Zealand. ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mu- 
tual Interest In Asia and Pacific (text of com- 
munique) 146 

Philippines. Letters of Credence (Ledesma) . 144 

Presidential Documents. U.S. Sends Message 
to Conference of African Leaders at Cairo . . 147 

Publications. Recent Releases 170 


Global Communications Satellite Conference 

Held at Washington 167 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Desalting of 

Sea Water (text of joint memorandum) . . 144 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 168 

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on St. Law- 
rence Seaway Tolls (texts of notes and memo- 
randum of supplementary agreement) . . . 169 


U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Desalting of 

Sea Water (text of joint memorandum) . . 144 

U.S. Protests to Soviet Union on Incident Involv- 
ing U.S. Vessel 145 

United Nations 

United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment Adopts Final Act (text of pre- 
amble and recommendations) 150 

Name Index 

Barrenechea, Norberto Miguel 144 

Johnson, President 147 

Ledesma, Oscar 144 

Magalhaes, Juracy Montenegro 144 

McGhee, George C 138 


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Vol LI, No. 1311 

August 10, 1964 


Statement hy Secretary Rv^k and Text of Final Act 174 


Remarks iy Secretary Rusk 185 


iy J. Wayne Fredericks 197 


ly David E. Bell 205 

For index see inside hack cover 

OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures 
Against Castro Regime 

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of 
Consultation in application of the Inter-Ameri- 
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held 
at Washington July 21-S6 to consider Vene- 
zuelan charges of Cuhan intervention and ag- 
gression. Following is a statement mude hy 
Secretary Rusk on July 22 and text of the Final 
Act, ivhich was signed on July 26. 


Press release 333 dated July 22 ; as-delivered text 

Mr. Chairman, fellow ministers: Yon have 
complimented us all, Mr. Chairman [Vasco 
Leitao da Cunha, Minister for Foreign Aifairs 
of Brazil], in your willingness to serve as our 
presiding officer, and your chairmanship gives 
great satisfaction to every colleague at this 

Five times in as many years the foreign min- 
isters of the American Republics have met to 
consider situations affecting the peace of the 

hemisphere arising in whole or in part from the 
interventionist activities of the Castro regime. 
This is a measure of the frequency with which 
our regional security system has had to act to 
thwart Castro's aggressive designs. 

In the face of continued Cuban aggression 
the time has now come to make it abimdantly 
clear to the Castro regime that the American 
governments in complete solidarity will no 
longer tolerate its efforts to export revolution 
through the classic Communist techniques of 
terror and guerrilla warfare and the infiltra- 
tion of arms and subversive agents. 

Origins of Cuban Aggression 

The pattern of Cuban aggression emerged 
soon after the Castro regime came to power in 
1959. You will recall the armed expeditions 
which set forth from Cuban territory against 
Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti 
during the first 6 months of that year. When 
itliis direct method of overthrowing govern- 
ments failed, the Cuban government turned to 


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the indirect technique of subversion. From the 
sending of armed hxnding parties, Castro shifted 
to training in subversive teclmiques, transfer of 
funds for subversive elements, dissemination of 
systematic and hostile propaganda, and the 
clandestine shipment of botli arms and men. 
The new pattern emerged in full bloom last 
year, when Castro made a major effort to dis- 
rupt the democratic elections in Venezuela and, 
beyond that, to destroy the democratic institu- 
tions of that country. 

Establishment of Communist Beachhead in Cuba 

But it took some time to "tool up" this new 
mechanism for indirect aggression. Mean- 
while, the Castro regime embarked upon an- 
other type of assault against the traditions and 
principles of the American community of na- 
tions: the establishment of the Communist 
system in Cuba itself and the facilitation of 
military intervention by an extracontinental 
totalitarian power in this hemisphere. 

I will not take the time here to go into all the 
details, but you will recall that by mid-1960 the 
construction of the apparatus of a Communist 
state in Cuba was well advanced. Likewise its 
ties with the Soviet bloc and with Commimist 
China were firmly established. Castro signed 
the first agreement with the Soviets in February 
1960 and with the Red Chinese in July. Cuba 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union in May 1960 and with the satellite coun- 
tries in succeeding months. On July 9, 1960, 
Premier Khrushchev made his offer to support 
Cuba with rocket power, and President [Os- 
valdo] Dorticos replied the following day, hail- 
ing, as he put it, "the message of solidarity 
spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet 
Union."' These words were shortly followed 
by deeds in the form of shipments of large 
quantities of Soviet arms. On January 2, 1961, 
Castro paraded these weapons for the world to 
see, and the flow of arms and the parades con- 
tinued in the years since. 

By August 1960, when the American foreign 
ministers met in San Jose for the Seventh Meet- 
ing of Consultation, Cuba clearly had become 
Communist and international communism had 
opened an important beachhead in the Western 

The Hemisphere's initial Response 

The response of the American governments 
to this flagrant challenge to hemisphere security 
fell short — surely we would have to say now — 
of the nature of the threat. Neither at the 
Fifth Meeting of Consultation in 1959 ^ nor the 
Seventh Meeting in 1960 " did the foreign min- 
isters act in a way to make clear to the Castro 
regime that the transformation of Cuba into a 
base of operations for international communism 
would not be tolerated by the American 

Tlie task of throwing up the hemisphere's de- 
fenses devolved on subsequent consultations 
beginning with the Eighth Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in January 1962 at Pmita del Este.' 

Transformation of the Hemisphere's Attitude 

The change in the hemisphere's attitude to- 
ward the danger represented by a Commimist 
Cuba became clearly discernible in the careful 
study made by the Inter- American Peace Com- 
mittee in November and December 1961. At 
the request of the Government of Peru the 
Committee examined, among other things, the 
Castro regime's relations with the Sino-Soviet 
bloc and Cuba's promotion of subversion and 
revolution in other American Republics. The 
Committee in its report arrived at these prin- 
cipal conclusions — and let us not forget this 
documentation of our hemisphere : 

1. The identification of tlie Government of Cuba with 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialism of the 
Soviet type, together with the rebuilding of the Cuban 
liolitical organization on the basis of the one-party 
system of government that is in accordance with that 
ideology, presuppose iX)sitions that are basically antag- 
onistic to the principle established in the Charter of 
the Organization . . . that 

The solidarity of the American States and the high 
aims which are sought through it require the political 
organization of those States on the basis of the effec- 
tive exercise of representative democracy. . . . 

3. The present connections of the Government of 
Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evi- 
dently incompatible with the principles and standards 
that govern the regional system . . . [and] will pre- 
vent the said Government from fulfilling the obliga- 

' Bulletin of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342. 
' Ibitl.. Sept. 12, 1960, p. 39.5. 
' Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


tions stipulated in the Charter of the Organization and 
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 

4. As regards the intense subversive activity in which 
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in 
America and the activities of the Cuban Government 
... it is evident that they would constitute acts that, 
within the system for the "political defense" of the 
Hemisphere, have been classed as acts of "political 
aggression" or "aggression of a nonmilitary character." 

Based in large part on the findings of the 
Peace Committee, the American governments 
took their first, historic stand against commu- 
nism in Cuba at the Punta del Este conference. 
Many of you were there. The fundamental deci- 
sions made then have been of major importance 
to us since. They stimulated a new awareness of 
the dangers inherent in the Communist offen- 
sive in America. They gave fresh impetus to 
efforts to develop internal security capabilities 
to combat subversion. They helped to fulfill a 
moral commitment of the Organization of 
American States to defend its basic purposes 
and principles against the open challenge of one 
of its members. And they served to pave the 
way for the swift, decisive, and equally historic 
decision taken by the American governments 
on October 23, 1962, which played such a sig- 
nificant role in forcing the Soviet Union to 
withdraw its offensive weapons systems from 

Cuban Intervention in Venezuela 

Tlie missile crisis removed whatever doubt 
remained concerning the Castro regime's status 
as a pawn of the Soviet bloc. It should have 
served as a warning to Castro and his followers 
that the American governments were united and 
firm in their resolve not to permit Cuba to be 
used as a base for the expansion of communism 
on this continent and that their patience was 
rumiing out. Again he did not heed the warn- 
ing. Instead, he redoubled his subversive of- 
fensive against the hemisphere. And he chose 
"Venezuela as a primary target. 

I would recall that in the summer of 1963 a 
Special Committee of the Council of the OAS, 
imder the distinguished leadership of Ambassa- 
dor [Juan Bautista] de Lavalle of Peru, com- 
pleted a detailed study of the Cuban effort to 

' Ihid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720. 

promote subversion in our countries. And in 
its report the Committee noted that : 

Immediately after the October crisis, spokesmen of 
the Cuban Government began making a series of 
speeches openly advocating armed insurrection in 
Latin America as a means of introducing economic ■ 
and social changes based on the communist system. ■ 
Although this does not constitute a position that is 
entirely different from that hitherto held by the Castro 
regime, the frequency, intensity, and origin of these 
I)rovocations are such that they lead the Committee 
to conclude that the Cuban regime has begun a new 
phase of promoting and encouraging violent subversion 
in other countries of the hemisphere. 

The Committee also called attention to what 
it described as "two facts that are intimately 
related to the policy enunciated by the Cuban 
leaders." "One of these," the Committee stated, 
"is the tactic of bringing hundreds of persons to 
Cuba from all the countries of the hemisphere 
in order to indoctrinate them and train them 
in the techniques of subversion. The second is 
the well-known plan of sabotage, terrorism, and 
guerrilla action that has been unleashed in cer- 
tain countries, particularly in Venezuela, and 
the impetus that the Cuban communist leaders 
have given to tliis movement." 

In further explanation of its conclusion on 
Venezuela the Committee added : 

There is no doubt that the Castro regime has se- 
lected Venezuela as its primary objective. This was 
indicated by the communist spokesman Bias Roca in 
his speech on January 24, 1963, commemorating the 
fifth anniversary of the fall of P^rez Jimenez : "When 
the people of Venezuela achieve victory, [he said] 
when they gain full independence from imperialism 
. . . then all America will be inflamed, all America 
will advance, all America will be freed once and for 
all from the ominous yoke of Yankee imperialism. 
If their struggle is a help to us today, [he said] their 
victory will be an even greater help. Then we shall 
no longer be a solitary island in the Caribbean con- 
fronting the yanquee imperialists, but rather we shall 
have fl base of support on the mainland." 

And try they did — until they came up against 
the resolute will of the leaders and the people 
of Venezuela. The Cuban effort is detailed in 
the report of the OAS Investigating Commit- 
tee, which serves as the basis for our action. 

The Committee found these to be the chief 
manifestations of the Castro regime's interven- 
tion in Venezuela : 

a. A hostile and systematic campaign of propaganda 



against the Government of Venezuela, as well as the 
incitement to and support of the communist subversion 
that is being carried out in that country ; 

b. Training, in all kinds of subversive activities, of 
numerous Venezuelan citizens, who traveled to Cuba 
for that purpose ; 

c. Reniittance of funds through these travelers and 
other channels, for the purpose of maintaining and in- 
creasing subversive activities, and 

d. The provision of arms to guerrilla and terrorist 
groups operating in Venezuela, as shown by the ship- 
ment of arms discovered on November 1, 1963, on the 
Paraguauii Peninsula, and the plan for the capture 
of the city of Caracas. . . . 

The evidence to support these findings is 
clearly and convincingly set forth in the report. 
The facts established by the Investigating Com- 
mittee leave no doubt whatsoever of Cuba's part 
in this conspiracy against Venezuela. 

I know of no greater tribute to democracy 
in this hemisphere, Mr. Chairman, in modern 
times — and no greater rebuff to the sinister de- 
signs of the Castro regime — than the manner 
in which the Venezuelan people went to the polls 
on December 1, 1963. 

Based on this experience, it is my firm convic- 
tion that we have a solemn responsibility both 
to the Venezuelan people and to our own peo- 
ples not to permit the Castro regime to mount 
another subversive assault against any Ameri- 
can Republic. Our governments acted reso- 
lutely against a dictator of the right who 
plotted to assassinate President [Romulo] 
Betancourt in 1960.= They unanimously 
agreed on sanctions. I now ask: Can we do 
less against a dictator of the left who tried to 
assassinate democracy in Venezuela ? 

Likelihood of Continued Cuban Subversion 

By its very nature international communism 
is aggressive and expansive. We see it at work 
in all parts of the world, constantly probing 
and testing for weak spots which it might ex- 
ploit. In modern dress it marches in the guise 
of diplomatic relations, trade missions, and cul- 
tural exchanges, and peace movements, and 
youth organizations, and the like. It flies the 
false ideological banners of "peaceful coexist- 
ence" and "wars of national liberation." But 
no one should be deceived. 

' IMd., Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355. 

We in the United States are under no illu- 
sion as to the designs of the Communists against 
us and the free world. We know that the Com- 
munist menace is deadly serious, that they seek 
their goals through varied means, and that de- 
ceit is a standard element in their tactics. 

We are fully aware — and should be — that 
Moscow, as well as Peiping and Habana, re- 
mains committed to the Communist world 
revolution. Chairman Khrushchev tells us 
frankly and bluntly that coexistence cannot ex- 
tend to the ideological sphere, that between us 
there will be continued competition and con- 
flict. Castro said on July 26 last year that in 
Latin America the course to follow is violent 
revolution waged by fighting revolutionaries, 
that the correlation of forces in the world had 
changed in favor of those seeking change 
through armed struggle, and that when revolu- 
tionaries in other Latin American countries 
know how to fulfill their duty they will have 
the decided support of the Soviet Union and 
all the socialist camp, including Cuba. 

Last week the Cuban government, following 
the practice of other Communist governments, 
announced its slogans for this year's July 26 
celebration. It is no accident, and indeed it is 
highly pertinent to our deliberations, that 
among the slogans this one appears : "Long live 
the heroic struggle of the Venezuelan people." 
In plain language that means : "Long live the 
struggle against the heroic Venezuelan people." 

We should have no illusions about Castro's 
continuing purpose to export the Cuban revolu- 
tion. He came to power with the design of 
converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra 
of the Americas. That apparently remains his 
design. His temperament and ambition, the 
dynamics of his internal situation, the counsel 
of those whom he serves and those who serve 
him — all compel him to promote subversion as 
a means for breaking out of his insular position. 

After years of self-righteous protestations 
that Cuba exported its revolution by example 
only, Castro in a recent press interview finally 
acknowledged that Cuba had been supporting, 
and will continue to support, subversive groups 
in other countries. Tliis admission, it is true, 
adds nothing to what we had already learned 
through experience. It does serve, however, to 

AUGUST 10, 19 64 


underscore Castro's purpose to give the hemi- 
sphere no respite in his relentless campaign to 
foment subversion whenever and wherever 
conditions permit. 

In this interview Castro also tried to put 
Cuba's subversive activities on the bargaining 
counter. I wish to make one point very clear : 
that as far as the United States is concerned, 
the encouragement and support of subversion 
by the Castro regime against other countries of 
this hemisphere is not a subject for bargaining. 
It simply must stop. And when it does, the 
hemisphere will know it without the need for 
discussions with the Castro regime. 

Task of This Meeting 

As I stated at the outset, I regard our task 
as being to determine what measures should 
now be taken to impress on the Castro regime 
that the hemisphere will no longer permit its 
subversive acts against the American Republics. 
In my opinion there are three types of measures 
which we can take to drive this point home. 

One should represent the American com- 
munity's reaction to Castro's efforts to destroy 
democracy in Venezuela. Certainly this inter- 
vention should not be allowed to go without 
imposition of sanctions. 

I want to make it very clear that the United 
States considers that the adoption of sanctions 
by the foreign ministers would be directed ex- 
clusively against the Castro regime and not 
against any other state or people. I hope this 
can be made clear in the Final Act of this con- 
ference. Rather our concern is that we not fail 
in our obligations to a sister Republic which has 
been made the victim of aggression and, indeed, 
which even today continues to spend its blood 
and treasure to combat Castro Communist sub- 
version and to defend democracy and freedom. 
To respond to the call of our sister Republic for 
collective action is our paramount obligation. 

The second type of measure would carry the 
community's clear warning to the Castro regime 
that if it persists in acts of subversion in other 
American Republics the full weight of the re- 
gional security system will be applied. This 
should serve as a deterrent, and I trust the 
Castro regime will heed such a message. 

Awareness that subversion, supported by ter- 
ror, sabotage, and guerrilla action, as practiced 
by the international Communist movement, is 
as dangerous a form of aggression as an armed 
attack has been very slow in developing in this 
hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the 
world. I think it is fair to say that until very 
recently there has been a lack of sufficient under- 
standing of this point everywhere, and this has 
led to uncertainty in some quarters as to 
whether our regional security system possesses 
an adequate mechanism for dealing with Com- 
munist subversion. 

In the opinion of my Government there is no 
doubt that the Rio Treaty* clearly recognizes 
multiple forms of aggression and provides effec- 
tive machinery for defending against them. 
The preamble states that the treaty is intended, 
among other things, "to provide for effective 
reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks 
against any American State, and in order to deal 
with threats of aggression against any of them." 
Article 3 provides for mutual assistance in meet- 
ing an armed attack against any signatoi-y ; arti- 
cle 6 specifically recognizes the existence of 
"aggression which is not an armed attack"; and 
finally, article 9, while defining unprovoked 
armed attack and invasion by the armed forces 
of a state as aggi-ession, opens ■with the very 
significant wording: "In addition to other acts 
which the Organ of Consultation may charac- 
terize as aggression. . . ." And thus we feel 
that the Rio Treaty specifically recognizes the 
existence of various forms of aggression and, 
most importantly, recognizes the authority of 
the Council of the Organization of American 
States, or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, to 
characterize them as such. Article 3 of the Rio 
Treaty spells out procedures for prompt action 
in the event of armed attack, and article 6 does 
the same for a wide variety of situations falling 
short of armed attack. 

A third type of measure should urge our o^vn 
governments and those of other free-world 
comitries to take appropriate steps in the field 
of trade with Cuba. This is appropriate be- 
cause the Communist threat to this hemisphere 
is a threat also to otlier parts of the free world. 

* For text, see ibid., Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565. 



I should like to mention two matters which, 
although not directly related to the subject of 
this meeting, nevertheless have an important 
bearing on our deliberation. 

Message to the Cuban People 

The one is that we should remember that the 
Cuban people, both inside and outside their 
troubled homeland, will be following our delib- 
erations with greatest interest. They should 
know tliat they have not been forgotten and that 
our desires for a free Cuba remain unchanged. 
I know of no more eloquent and concise expres- 
sion of these desires than that which President 
Kennedy and the Presidents of the Central 
American Republics and Panama included in 
the Declaration of San Jose in March 1963.' 
As a restatement of my Government's views on 
this point and in tribute to the memory of the 
late President, I should simply like to repeat a 
portion of that declaration to which other col- 
leagues have already generously alluded : 

The Presidents declare that they have no doubt that 
the genuine Cuban revolution will live again, and its 
betrayers will fall into the shadows of history, and the 
martyred people of the oppressed isle of the Caribbean 
will be free from foreign Communist domination, free 
to choose for themselves the kind of government they 
wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the 
Hemisphere in the common undertaking to secure for 
each individual the liberty, dignity, and well-being 
which are the objectives of all free societies. 

Progress and Freedom 

In line M-ith the final thought of that state- 
ment, I think we should never lose sight of the 
fact that our central task in this hemisphere is 
to promote progress with freedom. This is the 
vision of the Alliance for Progress. This is 
the path our governments have set for them- 
selves under the Charter of Punta del Este. As 
President Johnson said last May in discussing 
the alliance with the ambassadors of your 
respective countries: ^ 

In devotion to democracy, we are guided by the 
command of Bolivar that we must fearlessly lay the 
foundations of South American liberty : to hesitate is 

Our charter charges each American country to seek 

' For test, see ibid., Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515. 
' Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 854. 

and to strengthen representative democracy. Without 
that democracy and without the freedom that It 
nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise, 
destroying the dignity of the spirit it is really meant 
to liberate. So we will continue to join with you to 
encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of 
free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic 

I close, Mr. Chairman, with one final word, a 
word I know to be from both the Government 
and from the people of the United States to our 
friends throughout the hemisphere, a word on 
which my fellow countrymen are imited, on a 
nonpartisan basis. 

Wlien our Founding Fathers signed our 
Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Frank- 
lin made the famous remark, "We must all hang 
together, or assuredly we shall all hang 

Today it is Venezuela which is under attack. 
Is thei-e any one of us who can say with assur- 
ance, "It cannot be my country tomorrow"? 
So let's say to our brothers in Venezuela, its 
government and its brave people, "We are with 
you in full solidarity and will act with you to 
insure the safety of your democracy." 

And let's say to the Castro regime, "Your 
interference in the affairs of other countries in 
this hemisphere must stop — must stop and stop 
now." This is the basis on which the attitude 
of the United States will rest when we come to 
the resolutions which will be before us. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. 



Ninth Meeting op Consultation of Ministers of 

TION IN Application of the Inter-Amebican 
Treaty of Recipeocal Assistance 

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, was held at the headquarters of the Orga- 
nization of American States, the Pan American Union, 
in Washington, D.C., from July 21 to 26, 1964. 

The Council of the Organization of American Sthtes 
convoked the Meeting by a resolution adopted on 
December 3, 1963, which reads as follows : 

Whereas : 
The CouncU has taken cognizance of the note of the 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, by means 
of which his government requests that, in accordance 
v?ith Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, the Organ of Consultation be 
immediately convoked to consider measures that must 
be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and 
aggression on the part of the Cuban Government affect- 
ing the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of 
Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic 
institutions ; and 

The Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, has 
furnished information to substantiate his requests, 

The Council of the Organization of American States 

Resolves : 

1. To convoke the Organ of Consultation in accord- 
ance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance, to meet on the date and at 
the place to be fixed in due time. 

2. To constitute itself and act provisionally as Organ 
of Consultation, in accordance with Article 12 of the 
aforementioned treaty. 

3. To inform the Security Council of the United 
Nations of the text of this resolution. 

At the meeting held on the same day, December 3, 
1963, the Council of the Organization, acting provision- 
ally as Organ of Consultation, adopted a resolution, 
whereby a committee was appointed to investigate the 
acts denounced by Venezuela and to report thereon. 
The committee, which was composed of representatives 
of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States 
of America, and Uruguay, presented its report at the 
meeting held on February 24, 1964, by the Council, 
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation. 

With respect to the date and place of the Meeting, 
the Council of the Organization of American States 
at its special meeting on June 26, 1964, adopted the 
following resolution : 

Whereas : 

On December 3, 1963, the Council of the Organiza- 
tion convoked the Organ of Consultation in accordance 
with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, stating that it would meet at a 
place and at a time to be set in due time. 

The Council of the Organization of American States 
Resolves : 

1. That the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Con- 
sultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance, shall be held at the head- 
quarters of the Organization of American States. 

2. To set July 21, 1904, as the date for the opening 
of the meeting. 

The organization of the Meeting of Consultation 
and its deliberations were governed by the Regulations 
of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Applica- 
tion of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As- 
sistance, approved by the Council of the Organization 

of American States at the meeting held on July 29, 

In accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of 
the Regulations of the Meeting, a closed preliminary 
session was held on the morning of July 21. On that 
occasion, the matters to be dealt with at the opening 
session were considered, and the order of precedence of 
the members of this Meeting of Consultation was es- 
tablished by lot, as follows: 

Chilb His Excellency Mr. Julio Philippi 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
CoLOMBLi His Excellency Mr. Fernando GCmez 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
BoLTVLi. His Excellency Mr. Fernando Itu- 

rralde Chinel 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Guatemala His Excellency Mr. Alberto Herrarte 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Venezuela His Excellency Mr. Ignacio Iribarren 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Brazil His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da 

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
El Salvador His Excellency Mr. H^tor Escobar 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Uruguay His Excellency Mr. Alejandro Zo- 

rrilla de San Martin 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Dominican His Excellency Mr. Jos6 A. Bonilla 

Republic Atiles 

Special Delegate 
Ecuador His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Es- 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Costa Rica His Excellency Mr. Daniel Oduber 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Paraquat His Excellency Mr. Raul Sapena 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Haiti His Excellency Mr. Ren6 Chalmers 

Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and Worship 
Nicaragua His Excellency Mr. Alfonso Ortega 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Panama His Excellency Mr. Galileo Solis 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Mexico His Excellency Mr. Vicente Sdnchez 

Special Delegate 
Peru His Excellency Mr. Fernando 

Scliwalb LApez-Aldana 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 



United States His Excellency Mr. Dean Rusk 

OF America Secretary of State 
Aboentina His Excellency Mr. Miguel Angel 

Zavala Ortiz 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Honduras His Excellency Mr. Jorge Fidel 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency, Dr. Jos6 A. Mora, Secretary General 
of the Organization of American States also partici- 
pated in the Meeting. 

Finding it necessary to return to his country, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, by note dated 
July 23, 1964, addressed to the Secretary General of the 
Meeting, appointed Mr. Celso Pastor de la Torre, 
Peruvian Ambassador to the United States of America, 
as Special Delegate to the Meeting. 

Mr. Jos6 Rolz-Bennett also attended the Meeting as 
representative of the Secretary-General of the United 

In accordance with Article 27 of the Regulations, on 
July 21, the Secretary General of the Organization 
of American States, Mr. Jos6 A. Mora, installed tie 
opening session, at which His Excellency Mr. Vasco 
Leitao da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of Brazil, was elected President of the Meet- 
ing. At the same session, His Excellency Mr. Galileo 
Solis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, was 
elected Vice President of the Meeting. In accordance 
with the same article, Mr. ■\\1Lliam Sanders, Secre- 
tary of the Council of the Organization of American 
States, acted as Secretary General of the Meeting. 
Mr. Santiago Ortiz, Director of the Office of Council 
and Conference Secretariat Services, acted as Assist- 
ant Secretary General. 

His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, and His Excel- 
lency Mr. Alejandro Zorrilla de San Martin, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, addressed the inaugural 
session held on the same date. 

In accordance with the Regulations, the Meeting 
appointed a Credentials Committee composed of the 
Foreign Ministers of Peru, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. 
It also appointed a Style Committee composed of 
representatives of Colombia, Brazil, Haiti, and the 
United States of America. 

In accordance with the provisions of Article 20 of 
the Regulations, a General Committee was formed, 
composed of all the members and charged with con- 
sidering the topics and submitting their conclusions 
to a plenary session of the Meeting for approval. 
His Excellency Mr. Fernando G6mez Martinez, Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, and His Excel- 
lency Mr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of Argentina, were designated as Chairman 
and Rapporteur of the General Committee, respectively. 

This Final Act was signed at the closing session 
held on July 26. His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Escudero, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, and His Ex- 

cellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, President of the Meeting, 
addressed the same session. 

As the result of its deliberations, the Ninth Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
approved the following resolutions and declarations: 

Application of Measures to the Present Government 


The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro- 
cal Assistance, 

Having seen the report of the Investigating Com- 
mittee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council 
of the Organization of American States, acting pro- 
visionally as Organ of Consultation, and 


That the said report establishes among its con- 
clusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the 
target of a series of actions sponsored and directed 
by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to sul)- 
vert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the 
democratic Government of Venezuela through terror- 
ism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare," and 

That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of inter- 
vention and aggression, conflict with the principles and 
aims of the inter-American system, 

Resolves : 

1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investi- 
gating Committee constitute an aggression and an 
intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba 
in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of 
the member states. 

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government 
of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention 
against the territorial Inviolability, the sovereignty, 
and the political independence of Venezuela. 

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures : 

a. That the governments of the American states 
not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with 
the Government of Cuba ; 

b. That the governments of the American states sus- 
pend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with 
Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical 
equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian 
reasons; and 

c. That the governments of the American states 
suspend all sea transportation between their countries 

' Adopted by a vote of 1.5 to 4 (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, 
Uruguay). Venezuela was not eligible to vote. 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be 
necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature. 

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of 
American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds 
of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted 
in the present resolution at such time as the Govern- 
ment of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger 
to the peace and security of the hemisphere. 

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should 
persist in carrying out acts that possess character- 
istics of aggression and intervention against one or 
more of the member states of the Organization, the 
member states shall preserve their essential rights 
as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either 
individual or collective form, which could go so far 
as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ 
of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace 
and security of the hemisphere. 

6. To urge those states not members of the Organi- 
zation of American States that are animated by the 
same ideals as the Inter-American system to examine 
the possibility of effectively demonstrating their soli- 
darity in achieving the purposes of this resolution. 

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organi- 
zation of American States to transmit to the United 
Nations Security Council the text of the present reso- 
lution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
54 of the United Nations Charter. 


Declaration to the People of Cuba '" 

Whereas : 

The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States declares that, "the historic mission 
of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and 
a favorable environment for the development of his 
personality and the realization of his just aspira- 
tions" ; and that "the true significance of American 
solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the 
consolidation on this continent, within the framework 
of democratic institutions, of a system of individual 
liberty and social justice based on respect for the 
essential rights of man" ; 

The Charter of the Organization declares that the 
solidarity of the American states and the high pur- 
poses toward which it is dedicated demand that the 
political organization of these states be based on the 
effective exercise of representative democracy ; 

The Charter also proclaims "the fundamental rights 
of the individual" and reaffirms that the "education 
of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom, 
and peace" ; 

The Declaration of Santiago, Chile," adopted by the 
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 

"Adopted by a vote of 16 to 0, with 3 abstentions 
(Bolivia, Chile, Mexico) . 
" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342. 

Affairs and signed by the present Cuban Government, 
proclaimed that the faith of peoples of America in 
the effective exercise of representative democracy is 
the best vehicle for the promotion of their social and 
political progress (Resolution XCV of the Tenth Inter- 
American Conference), while weU-planned and in- 
tensive development of the economies of the American 
countries and improvement in the standard of living 
of their peoples represent the best and firmest foun- 
dation on which the practical exercise of democracy 
and the stabilization of their institutions can be 
established ; 

The Ninth International Conference of American 
States condemned "the methods of every system tend- 
ing to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, 
and in particular the action of international com- 
munism or any other totalitarian doctrine" ; 

The present Government of Cuba, identifying itself 
with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has 
established a political, economic, and social system 
alien to the democratic and Christian traditions of 
the American family of nations and contrary to the 
principles of juridical organization upon which rest 
the security and peaceful harmonious relations of 
the peoples of the hemisphere ; and 

The exclusion of the present Government of Cuba 
from participation in the inter-American system, by 
virtue of the provisions of Resolution VI '^ of the 
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, by no means signifies any intention 
to deny the Cuban people their rightful place in the 
community of American peoples ; 

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro- 
cal Assistance, 
Declares : 

That the free peoples of the Americas are convinced 
that the inter-American system offers to the Cuban 
people unequaled conditions for the realization of their 
ideals of peace, liberty, and social and economic 
progress ; 

That the peoples belonging to the inter-American 
system are in complete sympathy with the Cuban peo- 
ple in all their sufferings, in the face of the total loss of 
their liberty both in the spiritual domain and in the 
social and economic field, the denial of their most ele- 
mentary human rights, the burden of their persecu- 
tions, and the destruction of a legal system that was 
open to improvement and that offered the possibility of 
stability ; and 

That, within this spirit of solidarity, the free peoples 
of America cannot and must not remain indifferent to 
or uninterested in the fate of the noble Cuban people, 
which is oppressed by a dictatorship that renounces 
the Christian and democratic traditions of the Ameri- 
can peoples ; and in consequence 


" For text, see ibid., Feb. 19, 19G2, p. 281. 



Expresses : 

1. Its profound conceni. for the fate of the brother 
people of Cuba. 

2. Its deepest hope that the Cuban people, strength- 
ened by confidence in the solidarity with them of the 
other American peoples and governments, will be able, 
by their own endeavor, very soon to liberate themselves 
from the tyranny of the Communist regime that op- 
presses them and to establish in that country a govern- 
ment freely elected by the will of the people that will 
assure respect for fundamental human rights. 

3. Its firm conviction that the emphatic condemna- 
tion of the policy of the present Cuban Government of 
aggression and intervention against Venezuela will be 
taken by the people of Cuba as a renewed stimulus for 
its hope there will come to prevail in that country a 
climate of freedom that will offer to man in Cuba a 
favorable environment for the development of his per- 
sonality and the realization of his just aspirations. 


Reqionai, and International Economic 
Coordination ^' 

Whereas : 

The objectives of liberty and democracy that inspire 
the inter-American system, threatened as they are by 
communist subversion, cannot be fully attained if the 
peoples of the states that compose it lack adequate and 
sufficient means for bringing about vigorous social 
progress and better standards of living ; 

The persistence of a situation in which the world 
is divided into areas of poverty and plenty is a serious 
obstacle to any possibility that may present itself in 
the American hemisphere for achieving an economically 
more just society ; 

Harmonious and decisive action is indispensable, in 
both the regional and the international spheres, to com- 
bat the causes of economic underdevelopment and so- 
cial backwardness, since prosperity and world peace 
based on the freedom of man cannot be achieved unless 
all the American countries attain equality in the eco- 
nomic and social field ; 

In particular, the continued existence of such a state 
of underdevelopment and poverty among large sectors 
of mankind, which becomes more acute in spite of the 
world increase in wealth and the advance of science 
and technology from which these sectors cannot derive 
full benefit ; encourages the subversive action of inter- 
national communism ; 

The countries of Latin America expressed their as- 
pirations in the Charter of Alta Gracia and declared 
their determined intention to work together to build 
a better world in which there will be a more equitable 
distribution of income; 

The Conference on Trade and Development, held 
recently in Geneva," provided a forum for a full dis- 
cussion of the problems of international economics 
and established the basis for adequate solutions to 
problems arising in the fields of raw materials, manu- 
factured products, and international financing ; and 

The instruments adopted at the two aforementioned 
meetings supplement and perfect those signed at the 
Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council held at Punta del Este in August 1961, 
and especially, the Charter of Punta del Este," 

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter- American Treaty of Recipro- 
cal Assistance, 

Declares : 

That the aims of unity and peace with liberty and 
democracy pursued in the struggle against interna- 
tional communism, which threatens the stability of the 
institutions of the inter-American system and of the 
countries that compose it, must be achieved by elimi- 
nating those obstacles that hinder social progress and 
economic development, and 

Resolves : 

1. To reaffirm the determined will of their peoples 
to work, in the regional and international spheres, 
for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the 
Charter of Alta Gracia and at the Conference on Trade 
and Development, which are in line with the aims and 
purposes of the Alliance for Progress. 

2. To request the Inter-American Economic and So- 
cial Council to continue the necessary studies in order 
to find adequate solutions to the problems involved. 


Diplomatic Relations Among the 
Member States '* 
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro- 
cal Assistance, 

Resolves : 

To transmit to the Council of the Organization of 
American States the draft resolution "Diplomatic Re- 
lations Among the Member States," presented by the 
Delegation of Argentina (OEA/Ser. F/II.9/Doc. No. 30, 
Rev. 2). 

Vote op Recognition " 

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 

" Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0. 

" For text of the preamble and the recommendations 
contained in the Final Act, which was adopted by the 
Conference on June 16, see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 1964, 
p. 150. 

"For background and texts of the Declaration to 
the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta 
del Este, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459. 

" Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0. 

" Adopted by acclamation. 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


President Praises OAS Action 
Condemning Cuban Aggression 

statement 62/ President Johnson 
White House presB release dated July 30 

The inter-American system demonstrated once 
again ttiis week its effectiveness and vitality by 
dealing resolutely with Cuban aggression against 
Venezuela. The speeches at the meeting showed 
general agreement on a verdict condemning 
Cuban aggression, and the final resolution made 
it abundantly clear that the hemisphere will not 
tolerate aggression by subversion. There was a 
genuine concern, which we shared, that although 
Venezuela was the target of Communist aggres- 
sion today, another country might be the target 
tomorrow, and that we must stand all for one 
and one for all. Many able diplomats contrib- 
uted to this encouraging result, but we Ameri- 
cans can be proud of our own Secretary Rusk 
and of Secretary Tom Mann [Thomas C. Mann, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs] and Ambassador Bunker [Ellsworth 
Bunker, U.S. Representative on the OAS Coun- 
cil], who backed him up. 

Resolves : 

To congratulate His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitao da 
Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 
on the wise and intelligent manner in which he guided 
the deliberations of the Meeting. 


Vote op Thanks " 
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in 
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 

Resolves : 

1. To express to His Excellency Mr. JosS A. Mora, 
Secretary General of the Organization of American 
States, its appreciation for all the attentions and 
courtesies extended to the delegates in connection with 
this Meeting. 

2. To place on record its gratitude to the Secretary 
General of the Meeting, Mr. William Sanders, and to 
all who collaborated with him, for the manner in which 
the advisory and secretariat services of the Meeting 
were organized and carried out. 

3. To offer its appreciation to the hemisphere and 
world press and other information media for the effi- 
cient service they rendered to the Meeting. 

Statement of Chile 

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of Resolution 

I, because of its doubts regarding the legality of the ' 
use of the term "aggression" in describing the acts. 
It voted negatively on paragraph 3, because it is firmly 1 
convinced that the measures agreed to are not appro- I 
priate to the particular case that has brought about 
the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recip- 
rocal Assistance. It also voted against paragraph 5, 
because it believes that there are discrepancies between 
the provisions of that paragraph and those of Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations and of Article 
3 of the Rio Treaty. VTith reference to its abstention 
on paragraph 6, its attitude is consistent with the atti- 
tude taken with respect to the measures called for in 
paragraph 3. 

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on 
the Declaration to the People of Cuba since, although 
agreeing with its basic content, it maintains relations 
with the Republic of Cuba and since it believes pre- 
cisely in the principle of nonintervention, it has deemed 
it preferable not to give positive support to this 

Statement op Mexico 

The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter 
of record in the Final Act, that the Government of 
Mexico : 

1. Is convinced that the measures provided for in the 
third paragraph of the operative part of Resolution I 
(which the Delegation of Mexico voted against) lack 
foundation inasmuch as the Inter- American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance does not envisage, in any part, 
the application of such measures in situations of the 
kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of 

2. Makes a specific reservation to the fifth para- 
graph of the operative part of the same resolution 
since it endeavors to extend, in such a way as to be 
incompatible with the provisions of Articles 3 and 10 
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
the right to individual or collective self-defense. 

3. Reiterates without reservations its "will to co- 
operate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles 
and purposes of a policy of peace," to which "is essen- 
tially related" the "obligation of mutual assistance and 
common defense of the American Republics," in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of paragraph five of the 
Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 

In witness whereof, the Ministers of Foreign Af- 
fairs sign the present Final Act. 

Done in the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 
United States of America, in the four oflicial languages 
of the Organization, on July twenty-six, nineteen 
hundred sixty-four. The Secretary General shall de- 
posit the original of the Final Act in the archives of 
the Pan American Union, which will transmit the 
authenticated copies thereof to the goverimients of the 
American republics. 

" Adopted by acclamation. 



Some Thoughts on the Conduct of Foreign Policy 

Remarks iy Secretary Rusk ' 

Gentlemen, I want to welcome you personally 
to the Department of State this morning and, 
as a member of the State Department Legion 
Post, to give you a special welcome on their 
behalf. Being a member of Boys Nation is 
a very real distinction, and I want to congratu- 
late you and the Legion for this very stimu- 
lating program. 

I was delighted to meet David Jolm Long, 
whom you have elected as your Secretary of 
State. That is the end of his political career ! 

But I want to take a moment or two just to 
give you some feel of what this foreign policy 
business is all about, not just my own side. I 
started with a meeting at 8 o'clock at breakfast 
with the Secretary of Defense and the head of 
our Disarmament Agency. We still have an 
arms race. There is not much prospect that 
that is going to turn downward, although it 
is not going up quite as fast as it perhaps might. 

I will be meeting all day with the foreign 
ministers of the Latin American countries.^ 
We are all together here in this hemisphere, 
while you are in town, to take some additional 
measures against Castro. 

I will be meeting with the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, who is visiting us at the moment.' 

And there will be a meeting tliis evening that 
will run until past bedtime. 

So life is busy. And the United States is 
busy. And the world is pretty turbulent. We 

' Made before Boys Nation at Washington, D.C., on 
July 23. 
= See p. 174. 
= See p. 190. 

will be going through a rather special season 
here the next 3 or 4 months while our people 
are engaging in the grand inquest of the Na- 
tion that occurs every 4 years to decide who 
shall be responsible for our Federal Govern- 
ment for the next 4 years. Tliis makes some 
difference abroad because, as is sometimes said, 
when Uncle Sam coughs, the rest of the world 
begins to sneeze. They are very much inter- 
ested in what we do here, how we conduct 
ourselves, and how we move in the world about 

But the point I want to emphasize to you is 
that foreign policy is not something which 
"those people in Washington" carry on with 
people from other countries in some abstract 
way uncomiected with your own afTairs. For- 
eign policy is about you. This is a point you 
must really get into your gizzards. It has to 
do with your home, the military service most 
of you are going to engage in, your chances 
for a decent future, and these days, indeed, the 
existence of the Northern Hemisphere. 

We know, here in the Department of State, 
that foreign policy is about people, and tliat is 
the brooding, overriding consideration in every- 
thing that we do, whether it's trade, or whether 
it's trying to get the Greek Cypriots and the 
Turkish Cypriots to find some basis of agree- 
ment on their little island, or whether it's trying 
to insist, as we are insisting, that Hanoi and 
Peiping leave their neighbors alone, or whether 
it's trying to work out some scientific coopera- 
tion with all countries, including Communist 
countries, on this matter of desalting sea water. 
This is all about what happens to individual 

ATTGUST 10, 1964 


Directions of U.S. Policy 

The second point I'd like to make is that our 
policy — that is, the directions of our policy, the 
objectives of our policy — are really very simple. 
I would suggest that if I were to ask you fel- 
lows to sit down on a pop quiz and write two 
pages about what you tliink the American peo- 
ple are trying to accomplish in the world, you 
would be able to do it very accurately, and most 
of you would be in agreement. 

Let me suggest two ways in which you can 
remind yourselves as to what our policy — our 
objectives — are. First reread the first part of 
the Declaration of Independence. How many 
of you have done that, say, in the last 6 months ? 
[Large show of hands.] Well, good for Boys 
Nation ! This is really very important. 

The American people really do believe that 
governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed. Now, the philoso- 
phers can play around with that and find prob- 
lems in it from a purely intellectual point of 
view, but the American people believe that that 
is the heart of political wisdom. And this is 
a scarlet tliread that runs through most of our 

For example, this is why the American people 
instinctively favor the independence of nations 
on these great colonial issues. We invented 
that idea. This is why it's easier for us to 
work intimately with a democracy than with a 
dictatorship. This is why we are so deeply 
concerned about what has gone on over the years 
in Eastern Europe. That is why we are so 
much concerned when here at home we fail to 
live up to the commitments of our own con- 
sciences and our own political basis. 

There isn't a country in the world that 
doesn't have problems, say, of discrimination, or 
failure to live up to the highest ideals. But we 
can't use that as an alibi. Everyone is watching 
us. They are expecting us to make good on our 
commitments. We are the only country in the 
world at the present time that is expected to bat 
a thousand in this business. And if we fail, 
those failures just rush aroimd the world at the 
speed of light and our enemies are joyful and 
our friends are distressed. So we have the 
pressure of history upon us to do the best job 

we can here in our own society. So this simple 
notion that governments derive their just pow- 
ers from the consent of the governed is an oper- 
ating principle of policy that you see at work 
all the time. 

Now, another thing that you might want to 
read, if you haven't recently, is the preamble 
and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations 
Charter. Those of us who participated in 
World War II came out of that war with the 
hope that perhaps mankind had it made finally. 
We had been scarred by the flames of that war. 
We were thinking long and deeply with other 
nations about what kind of world we ought to 
have. And on a bipartisan basis — almost 
imanimity in the Senate — we joined with other 
nations to sit down and write out those simple 
principles in the preamble and articles 1 and 2. 
One rogue govermnent stood in the way in 
1945 — Stalin's Soviet Union. I'm convinced 
that if Stalin had played ball with the United 
Nations according to his commitments, tliis 
could have transformed the course of history. 
But he didn't, he didn't. 

It reminds us, by the way, that we need 
strength, and great strength, if we are to make 
peace. I think it is probably correct to say 
that the drastic, far-reaching demobilization 
of the Western World that occurred at the end 
of World AVar II was perhaps the most serious 
mistake our people ever made. 

When I was a student in Germany many years 
ago, I was out on a lake in a canoe, and I went 
ashore for some lunch, and I pulled the canoe 
up on the beach and had my lunch. When I 
got back the canoe was gone. The water police 
putted aroimd in their motor boats, and after 
about an hour, they came back trailing the canoe 
and they said, "We have the thief. He will be 
punished. Here is your boat. Here is your 
canoe. But we are fining you five marks for 
tempting thieves." Because I had left the 
canoe up there without being locked or tied up 
or anything of that sort. 

So here is the problem for democracies on that 
matter of strength. I think it's entirely prob- 
able that after World War II, through de- 
mobilization, we tempted thieves. We exposed 
Stalin to the pressures of enormous temptations 
to reach out and grab. And he grabbed. And 



we have been rebuilding the strength of the 
free world ever since. 

But look at the preamble and articles 1 and 
2 of the United Nations Charter — an associa- 
tion of independent nations, voluntarily co- 
operating in their common interest across 
national frontiers, joining together in mutual 
defense, settling disputes by peaceful means if 
possible. I mean those are things that are 
pretty fundamental to policy on a bipartisan 
basis in this country. 

The Confrontation With Communism 

Now, let me say just a word about the kinds 
of problems we have, and then I will have to 
run, because I have foreign ministers over there 
waiting for a meeting. 

Very seldom do we, as the United States, have 
a bitter, painful, strictly bilateral issue with 
any other government. Most of our quarrels 
with other governments have to do with what's 
gouig to happen to somebody else. We had 
one of these bilateral issues not long ago with 
Panama. But these are extremely rare. Our 
general bilateral relations with most govern- 
ments in the world tend to be pretty good. 

But we do have many problems that arise 
out of this great confrontation between com- 
munism and the free world. This is the under- 
lying crisis of our day. The contest is be- 
tween the United Nations kind of world 
order on the one side and a Communist world 
revolution kind of world order on the other, 
and so many problems arise out of that 

You sometimes hear this word detente. Be- 
ware of it. It's a very tricky word. I got 
trapped myself in it not long ago in a press 
conference. I said that although there might 
have been some reduction in tension, it is in- 
correct to speak of a detente. One of the news- 
papermen present went to a dictionary and 
looked up detente., and it said, "A certain 
reduction in tension" ! 

It is true that we do not have in front of us 
at the moment a blazing crisis with the Soviet 
Union. But the big, dangerous, explosive 
problems are still with us. They have not been 
resolved. Germany, Berlin, Cuba, Southeast 

Asia — these big problems are there. "We are 
not in a state of settled peace. So we have got 
to do all that is required to take care of our 
vital interests. 

Other People's Quarrels 

There is a tliird range of questions, and that 
is what might be called other people's quarrels. 
I suppose there are 25 or 30 countries that we 
have relations with who have some sort of 
quarrel with their iimnediate neiglibors. And 
we get drawn into these quarrels, either because 
we are members of international bodies where 
they come up, such as the United Nations, or 
because our own interest requires us to take a 
hand to try to settle them, or because the parties 
themselves come to us asking for help, either to 
settle or at least to ask our support for their 
own particular point of view. 

At any given time, these are the things that 
occupy the greater part of our agenda. Well, 
we can't run away from these problems. They 
are there. The outcome is of interest to us. 
If there are two nations with whom we hope 
to be friends, such as Pakistan and India, and 
they themselves are in a bitter controversy 
with each other, then this cannot help but com- 
plicate our relations with both Pakistan and 
India. And so tliis is a problem. 

We receive every working day in this Depart- 
ment about 1,300 cables from our posts all over 
the world. This is official cables. We get 
telegrams from the public in addition to that ! 
[Laughter.] We send out a thousand cables a 
day, all of them signed "Rusk," and I see about 
six of them. [Laughter.] 

Building a Decent World Order 

Most of that business has to do with the on- 
going business of building a decent world order. 
Today we will be attending 15 to 20 inter- 
national meetings somewhere in the world — as 
a government. I don't have to count them be- 
cause that is true on every working day. And 
these meetings throughout the year cover a 
gi'eat variety of things — everything from the 
nuclear arms race to epidemiological control, 
or the allocation of radio frequencies, or basic 
education in the Amazon Valley, or whatever 
it might be. This is the great constructive 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


work in which governments and ordinary men 
and women all over the world are engaged. 

I'd like also to say that here is where our 
greatest strength lies. You know, of course, 
that this countiy has in the military field almost 
literally unimaginable strength. It is hard to 
conceive of what the world would be like if that 
strength were completely employed. So don't 
worry about strength. There is plenty of 
strength in the military field. 

But there is also a great deal of strength in 
what I referred to earlier, when I referred first 
to the Declaration of Independence. These 
simple, direct, human commitments of the 
American people are a source of the greatest 
strength of all in this country because these are 
commitments that we share with ordinary men 
and women in practically every other country, 
including the countries behind the Iron Curtain. 

These elementary commitments to a decent 
standard of living and to some personal dignity 
and to concern for family and a need for educa- 
tion and things of that sort^ — those are pretty 
universal. Those people who wrote our Decla- 
ration of Independence felt that those were 
deeply rooted in human nature and in the re- 
lation between man and God. I think they 
were right, because people have been thinking 
about these things for more than 2,000 years, 
and my guess is that something that has been 
worked on for 2,000 years can kick up some 
pretty fundamental ideas. 

But we never have to argue with people in 
other parts of the world on what the American 
people are after. This is the point I want to 
impress on you. We never spend any time, be- 
cause these decent commitments of the American 
people are known and recognized and respected. 
The complications come in how to get on with 
them in a complex and ticklish situation and 
how these general principles apply to a particu- 
lar situation. 

But these commitments are a source of our 
greatest alliances, because they mean that in 
times of crisis there is not so much neutralism 
as you would suppose. 

Don't worry about the difference between 
allies and neutrals in any fundamental sense. 
We are allied with countries because we want to 
help preserve the independence of states. Our 

chief interest in the so-called unalined countries 
is in their genuine safety and genuine independ- 
ence — so that they can work with us in places 
like the United Nations. 

And what happens in your neighborhood, in 
your schools, in your own universities — what 
happens there — is a part of the strength which 
ties us with these other people. So we can 
look into the future with a great deal of confi- 
dence, even though there is a lot of hard work 
to be done and still some burdens to bear in this 
business. We have got a million men in uni- 
form outside the continental United States 
ashore and afloat, and they have got to have 
our support, support in a lot of ways, including 
foreign aid, to see if we can get this job done 
without comitting them to combat, if possible. 
We have got to have our space program. We 
have got to have a good lusty defense budget for 
the foreseeable future. 

Now, it's going to mean some taxes, a good 
many taxes. But I don't think that the Amer- 
ican people are going to be too much concerned 
about packing a load for the purposes to which 
this country is committed. 

Again thank you very much, fellows, for 
being here. 

Second Round of Civil Aviation 
Talks With Canada Concluded 

Press release 338 dated July 24 

Canadian and United States delegations con- 
cluded on July 23 at Washington a further 
round of talks concerning the renegotiation of 
the Air Transport Agreement now in force be- 
tween the two countries.^ Substantial progress 
was made on a number of important questions 
during the meetings, including application of 
the recommendations made by Prof. Jolm 
Kenneth Galbraith in his report to the President 
last year. Both delegations have now under- 
taken to report to their Governments on the 
results achieved and, following further study, 
to meet again at the earliest practicable date 
with a view to concluding the negotiations. 

' For background, see Bulletin of May 25, 196!4, 
p. 844. 



President Speaks to American 
Field Service Students 

Following is the text of remarks made hy 
President Johnson on the south lawn of the 
White House on July 20 when he greeted some 
2,800 American Field Service students from 59 
countries who were preparing to return home 
after completing their senior year in high school 
in the United States. 

White House press release dated July 20 

I suppose I should introduce myself. I am 
the father of Lynda and Luci Johnson — and I 
am known as the man wlio is the Wiiite House 
dogs' best friend. 

It is good to have you with us. Nothing 
makes a house happier than young people, and 
this house is a very happy home right now with 
you on hand. 

I know that during the past year each of you 
has made life much happier, much more re- 
warding, for the American families with whom 
you have lived. I hope you will take back to 
your own lands even half as much enrichment 
as you are leaving behind in our land. 

You have been in the United States during a 
year history will never forget — and you will 
always remember. You have seen our system — • 
and our people — tested by a terrible tragedy. 
But you have also seen that system and this 
people respond nobly, w^ith great courage and 
great common sense. 

I believe there is an example in tliis for all 
the world. 

People in other countries sometimes forget 
what we in America can never forget: that 
America has been built by sons and daughters 
of every continent and every country. 

Men may try to tell you that peace among 
nations and neighbors is not possible, that old 
animosities can never be forgotten, that old sus- 
picions and prejudices can never be overcome, 
that old rivalries and struggles can never be laid 
aside. When any tell you that, you tell them of 

Here in this diverse land of 190 million 
people — people with the blood of your own 
ancestors in. their veins — we have forgotten and 

overcome and laid aside divisions of the past. 
We live together in 50 States as one people — one 
people, united and indivisible. 

If such unity can be accomplished here, it can 
be accomplished everywhere. And we believe 
that you will, in your own times, be leaders for 
peace and justice around the world. 

I don't know what impressions you may have 
brought here, or what impressions you may be 
taking away now. But I hope you will convey 
to your families, friends, and fellow country- 
men one fact about America: that almost no- 
body in America thinks tliat much in America 
is as good as it should be or could be — even, 
sometimes, including its President. 

Free expression, self-criticism, constant self- 
examination are the great strengths of free peo- 
ples — and great sources of the energy from 
which progress comes. You have seen this 
process at work this year. We have been deal- 
ing with problems in our society which have 
existed 100 years or more. But we are making 
I^rogress — toward fulfilling the rights of all the 
people, toward opening greater opportunity, 
toward building better cities, toward building a 
more prosperous economy, toward making life 

America is not an old, contented, complacent 
land — ready to stand still. America is young, 
as you are young, with its future before it, as 
your future is before you. 

Your land and this land have much to do 
together. I am sure you will be leaders in 
those great works. 

On this happy evening I know there is in the 
hearts of all of us one note of sadness. One 
week ago today the man who had done so much 
for 40 years to foster and nurture this program 
passed away in his sleep — Director General 
Stephen Galatti. Mr. Galatti was a remark- 
able American — and a remarkable citizen of the 
world. Through the fruits of this program, 
his influence will live on for many generations. 

Tonight I would like to announce that I am 
conferring upon Mr. Stephen Galatti, Sr., a 
Presidential Citation, which reads as follows: 

Trusted Counselor, Friend, and Inspiration for 
Young People Throughout the World, he selflessly 
devoted his life to the cause of Peace by laboring Ure- 

AtTGUST 10, 1964 

739-452—64 3 


lessly to foster understanding today among the youth 
who will lead the nations of the world tomorrow. 

If Mr. Galatti's son, Stephen, Jr., will come 
forward, I would like to present this Presiden- 
tial Citation to him at this time. 

Prime Minister of Malaysia 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Ma- 
laysia visited the United States July 21 to Au- 
gust ^, WGIf.. He met with President Johnson 
and other U.S. officials during his stay at Wash- 
ington July 2£-£4- Following are an exchange 
of greetings between President Johnson and 
Prime Minister Eahman on July £2, an ex- 
change of toasts at a luncheon at the White 
House that day, and the text of a joint com- 
munique released on July 23. 


White House press release dated July 22 
President Johnson 

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen: 
It is my great personal pleasure and my privi- 
lege on behalf of the people of America to wel- 
come you this morning to the United States. 

AVe remember happily your visit to our coun- 
try 4 years ago.^ We are very proud to welcome 
you back again today, this time as the leader 
of the new nation of Malaysia. 

Our two countries are far removed from one 
another, but we here in the United States are 
very much aware of the outstanding leadership 
that you have offered during these midcentury 
decades. We have greatly admired the courage 
by which you led your native land to a decisive 
victory over Communist terrorism. We have 
no less admired and applauded the vision with 
which you have worked to secure the blessings 
of liberty for all of your people. 

In times of trial and in times of hope, you 
have manifested the highest order of responsi- 
bility and foresight toward the best interests of 

* Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1960, p. 783. 

your people. The impressive mandate of your 
recent elections is a great tribute from your 
people to you. 

For myself, I welcome this opportunity to 
add through personal conversation to the under- 
standing already achieved by our personal cor- 
respondence. Mr. Prime Minister, we in 
America share with you and your people the 
same hopes for the future and the same devo- 
tion to peace and the same desire to see the lot 
of mankind made better throughout the world. 
I am hopeful and I am confident that our dis- 
cussions together will be to the profit of the 
great cause in which both of our countries ear- 
nestly labor together. 

Prime Minister Rahman 

Mr. President, thank you very much, indeed, 
for your warm and cordial welcome. I have 
looked forward to this moment for some time, 
because I am very happy to have the chance 
at last to meet you personally. It is always a 
privilege to meet the President of the greatest 
democracy in the world, particularly when you 
have heard so much of his work in the cause 
of freedom and peace. In the past we have 
had contacts through the normal diplomatic 
channels, but as you have rightly said, there is 
a world of difference between the correspond- 
ence and the pleasure of having personal 

Remembering with heartfelt pleasure my last 
visit to the United States, I have always 
cherished the hope of returning some day; so 
when your invitation reached me I was very 
happy indeed to accept. I know that you are 
rather preoccupied with national affairs at 
present, but in spite of that j-ou were good 
enough to ask me to come at this time. It was 
a considerate move on your part, and I appre- 
ciate it most sincerely. 

I most heartily endorse the sentiments you 
have expressed of our mutual hopes of peace 
and happiness in the world. I come from an 
area of the world that is beset with all kinds 
of troubles. To the north there is trouble, to 
the east there is trouble, and now there is 
trouble coming from the south of my country. 
These troubles threaten to encircle the two 



countries in Southeast Asia that have so far 
remained free. 

To us small nations, America forever stands 
out as a pillar of hope, a guarantor of our 
rights as free nations. Therefore, Mr. Presi- 
dent, I believe there should be no embargoes 
on friendship and good will between men and 

I wish to thank both you and the American 
people and at the same time to convey the very 
warm good wishes of the nations and people 
of Malaysia to our American friends. 


White House press release dated July 22 

President Johnson 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Am- 
bassador, Governor Harriman, ladies and 
gentlemen: In this house, none are so welcome 
as those leaders who have chosen the path of 
freedom and democracy. Our guest today is 
such a leader. He guided his native Malaysia 
to independence. He led his people to a de- 
cisive victory over Communist guerrillas. 

He took the lead in the formation last year 
of the nation of Malaysia. In all of this, he 
has kept faith with democracy. 

He has sought for his people food mstead of 
bullets, clothes instead of uniforms, homes m- 
stead of barracks. 

Malaysia's success shines as an example for 
many lands. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you and your people 
have our respect and our faith. We are very 
glad that you are here today. There are many 
choices for the world today. There is the choice 
of perpetual war or permanent peace. There 
is the choice of order or chaos. There is the 
choice of the rule of law or the rule of the 

The American people have made their 
choice — for peace, for order, and for the rule of 

We are proud to support those whose choices 
are the same. We support our friends with all 
of the resources of our nation. We of this 
generation are determined that men shall live 

in a world where aggression will not go unpun- 
ished, where terror will not go unchallenged, 
where irresponsibility will not be left to run 

Our course — the course of the United States — 
has been chosen freely. It will not be lightly 

The people of Malaysia have likewise made 
their choice freely, and it likewise will not be 

Your Excellency, we of the United States 
extend to you our congratulations. We wish 
for your people a future of peace and progress. 

Now I should like to ask all of you to join me 
in a toast to His Majesty the King of Malaysia, 
and to the friendship between the Malaysian 
and American people — long may it endure. 
To His Majesty. 

Prime Minister Rahman 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excel- 
lencies, ladies and gentlemen : I wish to thank 
you, Mr. President, very much indeed for the 
glowing compliments you have paid to the na- 
tion and the people of Malaysia and to me, sir. 
This is a most pleasant luncheon in my honor. 

It is always heartwarming to know that the 
successes we have achieved during the sliort 
years of independence, both in overcoming the 
Communist terrorism that plagued our country 
for nearly 12 long years and in being able to 
build a democratic and, as you say, a prosperous 
nation, are admired and appreciated, as you say, 
by other covmtries of the free world. To win 
praise from the United States— the redoubtable 
champion of democracy, the bastion of strength 
in tlie free world — is to me praise indeed. 

Malaysia may be small— and it is small in 
size and population — but our people, as you 
know, are great in heart. 

We know, however, that success cannot feed 
upon itself; otherwise, it dwindles and dies. 
So success must always be the basic ground for 
greater efforts, and that is what we are endeav- 
oring to do in Malaysia today despite external 
difficulties and troubles. 

We are well aware that although we have won 
the struggle against communism in our own 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


country, the menace still exists and may strike 
us again. 

I think it is true to say that Malaysia has 
proved two important truths : first, that through 
unity and cooperation democracy can and does 
work in Asia; second, that a truly successful 
democracy, prosperous and progressive, think- 
ing first and always of the welfare and well- 
being of the people, is the only effective answer 
to the insidious intrusion of communism. 

From our own experience we have learned 
that it is not practical to be neutral in this 
struggle. In our view, the state is made for 
men and not men for the state. That is why 
we are proud to belong to the free world. 

My last visit to the United States coincided 
with the election campaign. This time I have 
arrived between national conventions and at a 
time when you are so preoccupied. I can only 
thank my stars that IMalaysia's elections are not 
on so vast a scale as yours. Nevertheless, we 
have just emerged from the elections and are 
not quite yet recovered from the effects of it. 
I can well understand, with your huge country 
and with voters by the millions, what you will 
have to go through in the next few months. 
Wlien I was here last I came to know what 
American presidential elections mean, and all 
I can say is that I am a happy man that I don't 
have to stand for the elections. 

I wish you all the luck. However, the whole 
world will be waiting and watching the elec- 
tions in the United States. I shall say no more 
for fear of treading on dangerous ground ; so I 
will content myself by wishing every success 
to the voters. 

The great interest the United States has 
shown in our progress and development in Ma- 
laysia is a source of satisfaction to us. I appre- 
ciate very deeply the help that you have given us 
in various ways and in various forms, such as 
providing technical assistance in the form of 
experts under the Colombo Plan and for the 
excellent work being done by dedicated men and 
women of the Peace Corps. In fact, I would 
like to see more members of the Peace Corps 
serving in Malaysia, especially doctors and 
engineers. Those whom I have had the pleasure 
of meeting have said to me, and I think they are 

sincere, that they are very happy to be in Ma- 
laysia — so why not, Mr. President, send more 
of them? 

We were getting on very well indeed with our 
tremendous plans for development since the 
struggle against the Communists, and the help 
we obtained from our friends has proved most 
valuable to us. 

As you said, Malaysia has been a beacon to 
other lands and a beacon that does shine but, 
unfortunately, it can also attract insects and 
pests. Some of these are harmless, but others 
are very harmful. Unfortunately, the glow 
from our beacon has attracted quite the wrong 
kmd of attention as well, where both the Com- 
munists and now our next-door neighbors, the 
Indonesians, plainly consider us a tasty morsel 
to tempt the appetites of the giants. I think 
they are doing just a little bit more than just 
that, but I would not like to bore you, sir, in 
our pleasant company by telling all that was 

As far as I am concerned, we have done every- 
thing humanly possible to humor them, but 
nothing can satisfy them until, I am afraid, 
they have devoured us. 

But I know I can trust you to stop them 
from devouring us and getting the help from 
our friends in the free world. I hope that the 
beacon can then continue to shme in order to 
guide others to safety, security, peace, and 

In the meantime, we must push ahead with 
development, because this is an essential ele- 
ment in our effort to provide higher standards 
of life and a richer future for our nation. 

So we look to freedom-loving people for 
understanding and support, and that is why I 
am so especially glad to hear your warm praise 

Mr. President, in conclusion, I do most sin- 
cerely appreciate both your kindness and your 
hospitality and all of the nice things j'ou have 
said about my country. 

Your Excellencies, to the President, Mrs. 
Johnson, I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to 
join me in a toast to the President of the United 
States and to the lasting friendship between 
America and the Malaysian people. 




White House press release dated July 23 

The President of the United States and the 
Prime Minister of Mahiysia met on July 22 and 
23 to discuss matters of mutual interest and 
recent developments in Southeast Asia. 

President Johnson and Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Kahman welcomed this, their 
first meeting, and the opportunity it presented 
to become personally acquainted and to review 
major problems in Southeast Asia. The Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister discussed the Com- 
munist threat to and activities in Laos and 
Vietnam and reaffirmed their support of the 
cause of freedom in those countries. The 
President noted with appreciation the contri- 
bution Malaysia has made to the common cause 
in Vietnam by providing equipment, framing 
and advice based on her own experience in com- 
bating Commimist terrorism. In turn the 
President made clear that all Southeast Asian 
countries, including Malaysia, could i-ely on the 
firm intent of the United States to resist Com- 
munist aggression against Free Asian nations. 

The Prime Minister reviewed developments 
in Malaysia with the President and progress 
made thus far in furthering the economic and 
social progress of its people. The Prime Minis- 
ter also expressed appreciation for the contri- 
bution of American Peace Corps Volunteers in 
this task. 

The President informed the Prime Minister 
of his special interest in Malaysia's impressive 
achievements in the fields of education, eco- 
nomic growth and rural development. The 
President noted with admiration the Prime 
Ministers objective of a happy and prosperous 
nation upholding the principles of justice, free- 
dom and democracy. 

The Prime Minister outlined for the President 
the origins of the Malaysia concept and the his- 
tory of its formation, and in this context re- 
viewed the current activities by a neighboring 
state in violation of the territorial integrity of 

The Prime Minister recounted his determined 
and various efforts to seek an amicable and 
honourable solution to the problem including the 
recent tripartite meeting in Tokyo. He also in- 

formed the President of the discussions at the 
recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer- 
ence in London. 

The President re-affirmed the support of the 
United States for a free and independent Malay- 
sia, and for Malaysia's efi'ort to maintain her 
security, preserve her sovereignty and continue 
her dcveloiDment in peace and harmony. 

The President agreed to provide military 
training in the United States for Malaysian 
personnel, and to consider promptly and sym- 
pathetically credit sales, under existing arrange- 
ments, of appropriate military equipment for 
the defense of Malaysia. 

The President expressed his strong hope that 
a peaceful and honorable way out of the current 
and dangerous situation could be found, and his 
appreciation for the earnest endeavors of the 
Prime Minister to this end. The President and 
the Prime Minister agreed that, while firmness 
in self-defense is indispensable, it is better to 
talk than fight. 

The President and the Prime Minister found 
in the common devotion of the United States 
and Malaysia to the principles of democratic 
government and individual freedom a bond of 
understanding which is certain to bring their 
two countries into a constantly closer relation- 
ship, and agreed to maintain close contact on 
problems of mutual interest. 

U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield Nuclear 
Device Underground in Nevada 

Following is the agreed text of a joint U.S.- 
U.K. announcement released simultaneously on 
July 18 at Washington and London. 

White House press release dated July 18 

The United States and the United Kingdom 
tested a low-yield British nuclear device under- 
ground at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion's test site in Nevada yesterday (July 17). 

The test was requested by the British Gov- 
ernment and was conducted under the Agree- 
ment for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic 
Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, which 

ATJGTJST 10, 1964 


has been in effect between the two countries 
since August 4, 1958.^ 

Both governments were satisfied that substan- 
tial technical and military benefits could be 
obtained by testing a British nuclear device 
underground as part of a continuing nuclear 
research program. The test was carried out 
within the framework of the limited nuclear 
test ban treaty of August 19G3. 

U.S., New Zealand, and Australia 
Reaffirm Ties of Friendship 

Secretary Rusk teas host at a dinner at the 
Department of State on July 17 honoring the 
participants in the meeting of the ANZUS 
Council at Washington July 17-18? Follow- 
ing are the substantive portions of remarks made 
at the dinner hy Secretary Ev^k, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Keith J. Ilolyoake, and Austra- 
lian Minister for External Affairs Paul 

Secretary Rusk 

This nation feels special ties with Australia 
and New Zealand. So do I, personally. As 
far as Australia is concerned, I am from 
Georgia, and I recall that Georgia and Australia 
were competing with each other for the prod- 
ucts of the prisons of Britain at an early stage 
in our histoiy. 

And if I had to name the country which has 
cost me most personally, it would be New Zea- 
land. Because during the last war when I was 
a Colonel on the General Staff and had to brief 
our Chiefs on the progress on the war in Africa, 
I, as did our Chiefs, became deeply impressed 
with the performance of the 2d New Zealand 
Division. I remember General Marshall, 
morning after morning, would say: "Where's 
the 2d New Zealand? Has it been committed 
yet?" And during that period, I took an oath 
that if I ever ran across a member of the 2d New 
Zealand Division, I would buy him a drink. 
And then I proceeded myself to the China- 

• For text, see Buli-etin of July 28, 1958, p. 161. 
' For text of a final cominuni(iue released on July 18, 
see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146. 

Burma-India Theater and stopped in Cairo at 
a time when the entire division was on leave! 

This association is so close, so natural, so ob- 
vious, that it is almost difficult to explain why 
ANZUS had to be made formal. I was there 
in September 1951 when we signed the ANZUS 
Treaty. And I think all of us felt at that time 
with Dean Acheson that it simply "puts into 
words strong ties and purposes already in ex- 
istence." ^ It was almost a part of the nature 
of things that we and Australia and New 
Zealand would have this kind of relationship 
among us. 

But it goes beyond that. We have been com- 
rades in arms in two world wars, plus the 
Korean episode. I remember in that dramatic 
week of the outbreak of the Korean war, after 
President Truman had decided that we should 
have to do something about this North Korean 
aggression — I remember [New Zealand Am- 
bassador] Carl Berendsen's coming in straight- 
away like a shot to see me and simply saying, 
"Wliat do you want from New Zealand?" 

Well, this is the kind of thing that is im- 
portant to a people like the United States, car- 
rying very substantial burdens all over the 
world. Association with others in tliese joint 
enterprises is a matter of the greatest possible 
importance to us in these various situations. 
You may be interested in running back with us 
to 1951, to remember what Carl Berendsen said 
on that occasion of the signing : ' 

The treaty . . . rests upon the solid basis of com- 
mon interests and ideals, upon the regard and the 
affection of the respective peoples, upon their common 
desire for peace and upon their common determination 
to resist aggression. It reflects also the inescapable 
facts of geography on the one hand and, on the other, 
the especial perils to which the Pacific may be exposed 
in the course of this worldwide conflict between liberty 
and slavery with which the whole of mankind is today 

And that was said 13 3'ears ago. 

And Percy Spender, now the distinguished 
President of the International Court, then Am- 
bassador, said on that occasion, on behalf of 
Australia : ' 

The treaty . . . expresses in formal language the 
close ties of fellowship, understanding, and comrade- 
ship between us. But it does much more than that. 

' For text, see iUd., Sept. 24, 1951, p. 495. 



It marks the first step in the building of the ramparts 
of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area 
of the Pacitie Ocean. This day we here and now declare 
to the world that our three peoples share a common 
destiny. We publicly proclaim our intention and deter- 
mination that that destiny shall be that we endure as 
free peoples and that we with other free peoples shall 
so labour that liberty shall not perish from the earth. 

Things don't change a great deah "Wlio can 
doubt in 1964 that we share a common destiny? 
In this struggle between coercion and freedom, 
our vital common interests are worldwide and 
our fortunes literally inseparable. But we 
share, at the present time, a direct concern and 
special responsibilities, through ANZUS and 
SEATO and other arrangements, for the se- 
curity of Southeast Asia. And those challenges 
will continue to test our mettle. 'Wliile we shall 
persist untiringly in our efforts toward peace 
and to bring about through peaceful means a 
decision on the part of Hanoi and Peiping to 
leave their neighbors alone, the United States 
will not waver in honoring its commitments 
under the ANZUS pact or our other interna- 
tional agreements. And we shall continue to 
help those who struggle and fight to defend 
their own freedom. 

And I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister 
and Mr. Hasluck, that we find in this serious 
situation both comfort and strength in such al- 
lies and friends as Australia and New Zealand. 
Together, and in cooperation with other peo- 
ples who love liberty, we shall, as we antic- 
ipated in 1951, continue to strive for a peaceful 
world and a brighter future for ourselves and 
for our children. 

And so this 13th meeting of the ANZUS 
Council is a very special and happy occasion for 
us — an experience in comradeship which is, I 
think, literally unique among nations, partic- 
ularly in this vast area of the Pacific Ocean. 
Thank you very much. 

Prime Minister Holyoake 

Well, it is marvelous, what you have done in 
these few, brief years in this wonderful country. 
I suppose there has never been an example in 
all the world's history of responsibility and 
leadership — world responsibility and world 
leadership — being virtually thrust upon a peo- 
ple. And I say that advisably, not that you 

shirked your duty, but because responsibility 
was thrust upon you in such a short space of 
time. And certainly, even if some of you might 
quarrel with that postulation, none of you will 
quarrel with the statement that I now make: 
that never in all the history of the world has 
world leadership been exercised in such respon- 
sible fashion as it is being exercised by the 
United States of America at the present time. 
There is no question whatever about that. The 
leadership you have given, the wealth you've 
poured out, the responsibility you shared, cheer- 
fully, the load that you carry as taxpayers— 
I'm very conscious of the taxpayer, the man who 
hands out, so cheerfully, his millions and bil- 
lions of dollars to help the world. 

Looking back, I make bold to say this, that if 
anybody had prophesied 20 years ago or even 
12 or 15 years ago that any nation in the world 
would have given the leadership, given the help, 
the succor, militarily, in every other way that 
this great United States of America has now 
given — if we would have prophesied that 12 or 
15 years ago, we'd have been laughed at — none 
would have believed it. It's the phenomenon 
of our times. And because of this, we are proud 
and grateful to be your friends, to be numbered 
amongst your friends. We're proud and we're 
grateful that we should be associated with you. 
I'm speaking of New Zealand, a country of only 
2.6 million people. But we're proud and grate- 
ful to be associated with you in the many ways 
we are — in SEATO, in ANZUS, in many other 
ways. Of course we have a common heritage, 
a common goal. We're in ANZUS because we 
wanted to play our part. And, as you know, 
the ANZUS Treaty lays it down that, if the 
United States of America is attacked, we'll 
come immediately to your aid. And I'm certain 
that millions of American people sleep more 
happily in their beds each night, being assured 
of that fact. Of course, I'm bound to say that 
perhaps we in New Zealand are more conscious 
of this and sleep more comfortably in our beds, 
knowing tliat the converse applies — if we're 
attacked at any time, the United States with 
her tremendous strength would come to our 
aid. . . . 

I say again and may I say finally : there's a 
tremendous love for and admiration of the 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


people of the United States of America in our 
country in New Zealand. We'll always be 
proud and grateful for your friendship and the 
opportunity of our associations with you, the 
opportunity of serving, wliether it is in war or 
whether it is in peace, in any capacity in which 
it is considered that we're able to serve with you. 
Tliank you very, very much for the oppor- 
tunity of being with you tonight. 

Mr. Hasluck 

I was very moved, and I'm sure that all the 
Australians present were moved, by the state- 
ments made by the Secretary of State. And 
they certainly found a very clear echo in our 
minds. The ANZUS Treaty to us is some- 
thing which means more than the formal docu- 
ment. It is in a sense the little sort of charter 
that we hang on the wall to show that we are the 
members of a particular association for whicli 
we hope to qualify in our own right and an 
association which we value very much. 

ANZUS, in the sense that in any extremity 
we are in alliance with the United States of 
America, means a great deal to the very stark 
fact of our own survival — a fact of which we are 
very conscious in our part of the world, living, 
as we are, a comparatively isolated European 
community in close proximity to the Asian 
Continent. Our chances of survival depend 
very much on our own national integrity and 
our own national vigor, and equally depend on 
the strength of the alliances that we can form 
with lilte-minded people overseas. So when 
we think of ANZUS we do think quite starkly 
of the fact of our own survival. 

But it goes a long way beyond that. It's not 
only that we are members of ANZUS because 
we think this is going to help us to survive and 
to live the sort of life that we want to live and 
build the sort of society that we want to build 
in our part of the world. We believe that, 
through our membership in ANZUS, beyond 
the borders of Australia we can make some con- 
tribution to the security of the whole region, we 
can help to remove fear that hangs like a 
shadow over a wliole region, and by so doing 
we can make our small contribution toward the 
peace and security of the world. I'm sure that 
every Australian is strongly behind his Govern- 

ment in its resolution to make what contribution 
it can to that great cause. 

We are not a great country in the numbers 
of our population, but I believe tliat, larger 
than our population, is tlie way in wliich we 
have developed our resources — the industrial, 
technological, scientific, and other assets wliich 
we have built up there. And I believe in the 
character of our people: that we are fit to be 
a sturdy ally — and can be valued as such. 

Our links witli New Zealand are very close 
and very intimate. There's always a sort of 
friendly rivalry between us. It's never quite 
certain whether we are the outlying island of 
New Zealand or whether New Zealand is the 
outlying island of Australia. But we joke 
about each other, and we can joke in this 
friendly fashion. But I would like every 
American to realize that down in that corner 
of the world, side by side, you have these two 
like-minded English-speaking people dedicated 
to the same causes as those to which you are 
dedicated, willing to make their contribution 
to the same struggles in which you are giving 

And I'd like every American also to realize 
that, on our part, we are greatly touched and 
we are moved in the depths of our being by 
both the realism and the resolution with which 
the postwar United States of America has ac- 
cepted the burdens of leadership of the free 
world. We know it's not an easy task. One 
of the memories that we have as Australia from 
the days when Great Britain was giving that 
sort of leadership is a memory of the loneliness 
of great powers. No American can hope to be 
100 percent popular around the world. No 
American can expect to receive gratitude 
around the world. 

Britain went through this sort of thing in 
the last century — the berated power, the power 
that was always denigrated, the power that was 
always scoffed at, but the power that kept the 
peace of the world. And it's part of your bur- 
den, not only to do the great things which you 
are doing in all quarters of tlie glol)e but to 
have the fortitude and the strength of your own 
principles to endure the misunderstanding and, I 
with patience, to survive the misrepresentation 
which seems to be always the fate of great 



powers. But if ever — and this may sound a 
little particular — but if ever any American in 
that sense of loneliness feels that America is 
misunderstood, that the great effort that 
America is making on behalf of world peace 

is not appreciated, I do hope that they'll think 
that down there in Australia and in New Zea- 
land there are a few of your comrades who 
do imderstand you, who do stick with you. 
Thank you very much. 

American Policy in Africa 

&y /. Wayne Fredericks 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

For many years Africa played a minor role 
in the drama of international affairs. In the 
wake of the past decade's wave of freedom and 
independence for former colonies, however, the 
new nations of Africa have graduated to more 
prominent and more demanding roles on the 
world stage. 

This remarkable development offers an im- 
pressive set of challenges, of opportunities, and 
of problems for Americans who work both in 
the public and private sectors. Those chal- 
lenges, opportunities, and problems, in turn, 
have reshaped United States policy toward the 
countries and peoples of Africa. 

You in Minnesota have been in the vanguard 
of Americans who recognize the immediacy of 
Africa's problems. Against that background, 
let me review for you some of the most impor- 
tant challenges Africa poses for American for- 
eign policy today. 

The first important challenge Africa presents 
to Americans — and vice versa — is the challenge 
to be understood. Africa's nations, and her 
nations to be, figure daily in the news. But 
more often than not, what we read about those 
developing lands centers on the conflicts and 
crises, rather than on the continent's growing 
cooperation and progress. Like so many 

'■ Address made at the University of Mlimesota, Min- 
neapolis, Minn., on July 7. 

others, Americans need to look behind the head- 
lines of revolts, of border clashes, of mutinies 
and uprisings. 

Those are disquieting developments. They 
do bespeak instability. Some of them are clear 
threats to the peace m Africa. But they do not 
represent the complete picture. 

The challenge to know Africa better carries 
with it the responsibility for Americans to view 
the developments there in perspective. We 
must have some comprehension of the true 
causes of unrest threatening certain African 
nations. This challenge calls for an open mind 
to view objectively the considerable progress 
being made against formidable odds. A good 
hard look will indicate that much of this uni-est 
is caused by the wide discrepancy between the 
needs and hopes of the people and the shortage 
of skills and capital required to move ahead 

Helping Africa Speed Its Development 

Africa's new wave of independence has 
ushered in remarkable advances in many parts 
of the continent. But the overall situation is 
still one which creates great expectations among 
the peoples of the new nations. As you may 
know, the average annual income on the Afri- 
can Continent is only $120. Its literacy rate 
is only 15 percent. One out of five Africans 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


dies before reaching his teens. Agricultural 
productivity is low. Malnutrition and disease 
are widespread. Transportation and communi- 
cations facilities are inadequate. 

On the other hand, Africa has vast and under- 
exploited resources, such as unparalleled poten- 
tial for hydroelectric power and agricultural 
production. Most important, Africa has human 
determination. The tremendous energies of its 
peoples have been turned to the economic and 
social development of their homelands. But 
the encouraging efforts at self-help found in 
every African nation are not enough to do the 
job with the necessary speed. Outside assist- 
ance is required. This, then, is a second im- 
portant challenge — that of helping Africa 
speed its economic and social development. 

U.S. Policy of Cooperation 

The third important challenge is closely re- 
lated to the other two. It consists of the for- 
mulation and execution of sound, effective, and 
mutually advantageous American foreign 
policy toward the various nations of Africa. 
As you can imagine, many problems complicate 
the pursuit of this objective. 

U.S. foreign policy in Africa is predicated 
upon a long-range view of African develop- 
ments. Economic growth, political stability, 
and true independence are sought by Africans. 
These goals, if achieved, protect American in- 
terests as well. "\'\niile we, as a people, do have 
moral and humanitarian impulses to help less 
fortunate nations, we also are bound to the 
African Continent because the maintenance of 
peace and stability there is directly related to 
our own security and to peace in the world. 

The United States respects the African peo- 
ples' desire for freedom, dignity, a more abun- 
dant life, and for African unity. "VVe liave 
sought to focus our programs of assistance to- 
ward the most effective ways of helping Afri- 
can nations obtain the professional and skilled 
personnel required to strengthen their econo- 
mies, improve their public administration, and 
safeguard their independence. American as- 
sistance also is calculated to improve the pro- 
ductivity and general well-being of individual 

Our policy in Africa is one of cooperation, 

not domination. We have no desire to replace 
the mutually beneficial relationships existing 
between African and European nations in many 
parts of the African Continent. Europe's as- 
sistance to Africa is several times greater than 
our own. As it is the desire of African nations 
to continue to seek outside help, we seek to har- 
monize our aid with that of other free-world 
nations who play a more principal role in financ- 
ing African assistance. 

For the past 3 years, the United States Gov- 
ernment has contributed rougUy one- fourth of 
the $2 billion in external economic assistance 
which Africa has received from government 
sources. This is exclusive of the very impor- 
tant contributions made by U.S. foundations, 
religious organizations, and other pri\ate 
groups. In fiscal years 1962, 1963, and again 
this year, our Government proWded approxi- 
mately $500 million in economic assistance to 
34 African comitries. Surplus food, under the 
Food for Peace program, accounted for a siz- 
able portion of the total amount. Other free- 
world governments provided some $1,200 mil- 
lion, and the Sino-Soviet bloc extended some 
$200 million in credits every year except 1963. 

The United States also supports the goal of 
African unity. The desire for unity — either 
pan-Africanism or i-egional cooperation — is 
dear to the heart of every African leader. 
They believe that some form of mutual coopera- 
tion is necessary and proper to Africa's politi- 
cal, economic, and social development. The 
United States is glad to see the lively interest 
Africans are taking m cooperative endea\-ors. 
We believe this course can contribute impor- 
tantly to a stable and strong continent. 

A major development in continental African 
cooperation is the Organization of African 
Unity. Although the OAU was not formed 
until the conference of African chiefs of state 
of May 1963, when most African governments 
were less than 4 years old, it already has re- 
corded several remarkable accomplisliments. 
The OAU helped end last fall's hostilities be- 
tween Algeria and Morocco. It has played an 
important role in bringing about a cease-lire 
on the Ethiopian-Somali frontier. 

The United States respects the desires of 



African leaders to keep the cold war out of 
Africa. We respect their posture of nonaline- 
ment in the East- West struggle, which is part 
of the foreign policy of most African nations. 
We believe tliat African coimtries, as they in- 
crease their ability to protect their independ- 
ence, will remain truly nonalined and reject 
the subordination that communism demands. 

At the same time, we cannot underestimate 
the current threat and thrust of Sino-Soviet 
efforts in Africa. From January 1954 to June 
1963, the Sino-Soviet bloc expended, as dis- 
tinct from obligated, a total of $1.5 billion in 
economic aid to less developed countries outside 
of the bloc itself. Of that amoimt, approxi- 
mately 30 percent, or some $450 million, went 
to Africa, including the United Arab Republic. 
I might point out, for comparative purposes, 
that during that same period only some 6 per- 
cent of all U.S. economic aid went to Africa, 
although today the total has climbed to about 
10 percent. 

In addition, the Communists in the last few 
years have established a diplomatic, economic, 
or cultural presence in many independent 
African states. Other Communist teclmiques 
to undennine Africa's freedom involve student 
training, cultural exchanges, informational 
programs, and economic ties. 

Yet, in spite of — or perhaps in part because 
of — international conununism's major efforts in 
Africa, the Communists have to date failed to 
subvert or capture any African country as a 
satellite. Open Communist interference in 
African domestic affairs and overt attempts to 
sway African nations have helped to arouse 
African suspicions of Communist goals. 

The most important factor in precluding 
Communist success, however, has been Africa's 
increasing awareness of the divergence between 
the aspirations of international comm u n i sm 
and the aspirations of the African nations. 
However, we cannot be — and we are not — 
complacent about the Communist threat to 
Africa. It is there ; it is real ; it is dangerous. 

The Problem of the Congo 

In Africa, U.S. foreign policy objectives in- 
volve coming to grips with problems of con- 
siderable dimensions. 

One problem of great importance is that of 
the Congo. Only 4 years ago this vast and po- 
tentially rich nation in the heart of Africa came 
to independence. Shortly thereafter its peace 
and progress were disrapted by secessionist at- 
tempts in three of its provinces — Katanga, 
Kasai, and Orientale — and the Communist bloc 
sought to exploit the disorder for its own pur- 
poses. This nearly led to an East-West con- 
frontation. Only through United Nations ef- 
forts was such a showdown averted. 

The initial decision to support a U.N. opera- 
tion in the Congo was made in 1960 by the 
Eisenhower administi-ation. This decision was 
reaffirmed and implemented by the Kemiedy 
administration's Congo policy during 1961, 
1962, and 1963, until the Congo was reunited. 

United States policy, in my judgment, has 
been successful. Although the Congo today is 
far from trouble free, the crisis which began 
when it achieved its independence on Jime 30, 
1960, is now over. "Wlien the Katangese seces- 
sion movement collapsed in January 1963, an 
unliappy chapter in the short history of that 
fledgling nation ended. 

During that entire period the United States, 
despite considerable mismiderstanding here in 
our own country of the issues involved, firmly 
and steadfastly supported the efforts of the 
United Nations to carry out its various man- 
dates. The substance of those U.N. man- 
dates was to help the Congo maintain its politi- 
cal independence and territorial integrity and 
to assist that nation in the restoration and 
maintenance of law and order. Tlie speed and 
skill with which the U.N. moved into the Congo 
situation as a stabilizing force — with no com- 
parable experience to draw upon, I might add — 
made that operation a major contribution to- 
ward the maintenance of world i^eace and 

Today, the Congo is an independent nation 
with its boundaries intact. Maintenance of law 
and order is still a problem but no longer a mas- 
sive threat to Congolese internal security. Civil 
war in the Congo has been averted and big- 
power confrontation in central Africa avoided. 
Commimist aims, which came perilously close 
to succeeding in the early days of independence, 
have been thwarted. 


Four years ago almost to the day, United Na- 
tions forces entered the Congo in response to 
an appeal from the Congolese Government. 
The last imits of the United Nations forces left 
Leopoldville only last week. Hundreds of U.N. 
personnel continue to work there as teachers 
and teclinicians assisting the Congolese people 
in the gi-eat task of nation building. Belgian 
technical assistance is equally large. The Con- 
golese are striving for the development of their 
own constitutional processes and are now con- 
ducting a referendum on a new constitution. 
This referendum began on June 25 and is sched- 
uled to be completed by July 10. So far, the 
vote has been overwhelming in favor of accept- 
ance of the new document, which was developed 
by a representative commission which sat for 3 
months early this year. 

Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula's Cabinet 
submitted its resignation at the end of June 
coincidental with the expiration of the Funda- 
mental Law on the same date. President 
[Joseph] Kasavubu asked Mr. Adoula and his 
Cabinet to continue as a caretaker government 
until a new government is appointed which, 
under the new constitution, will be charged with 
governing the country until elections for parlia- 
ment can be held. These are to take place within 
6 to 9 months after the new constitution is ap- 
proved. Mr. []\Ioise] Tshombe, who recently 
returned to the Congo after a year's absence 
abroad, has been asked by the President to form 
a Cabinet. 

The United States has followed developments 
in the Congo very closely over the past 4 years 
and will continue to do so in the future, for the 
Congo has a key role to play in sub-Saliaran 
Africa. It has gone through many vicissitudes, 
and its travail is not yet over as its leaders 
struggle with many problems in the economic, 
social, educational, and security fields as well 
as the primary one of creating a true sense of 
national unity. 

No one, of course, can know with certainty 
what the future holds, but I, for one, am person- 
ally optimistic that the efforts of the United 
Nations and other countries in providing as- 
sistance to the Congo are bearing fruit in in- 
creasing the resources available to tlie Congolese 
leaders to meet and overcome their difficulties. 

U.S. Support for Self-Determination 

Another difficult and urgent aspect of our 
African relations has been that of demonstrat- 
ing to African nations our will to provide at 
home the type of freedom and democracy we 
advocate and support in Africa — and elsewliere 

The enactment last week of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act offers dramatic evidence of 
the determination of all branches of the Fed- 
eral Government, and of Negro as well as other 
Americans, to eradicate segregation and dis- 
crimination. Although the act's effect cannot 
yet be fully measured, it already has begim to 
make significant changes in traditional patterns 
of segregation. 

There are racial problems in Africa, too. Al- 
though there has been racial or tribal strife in 
various parts of Africa, tlie most difficult of the 
racial and colonial problems lie in the southern 
end of the continent, where colonialism and 
a-partheid are now being confronted by a show 
of African determination. Ever smce the Addis 
Ababa summit meeting of May 1963, which 
gave birth to the Organization of African 
Unity, African nations one after another have 
intensified their attacks on South Africa's 
apartheid policy, upon Portuguese policy in 
Africa, and on the policy of the white-minority 
government of Southern Rhodesia. They will 
undoubtedly pursue these matters at the OAU 
meeting to be held at Cairo later this month. 

United States policy supports the aspirations 
for self-determination of the peoples of those 
parts of Africa still not independent, and we 
have welcomed the emergence of independent 
African nations. Now, with Malawi (Nyasa- 
land) achieving independence yesterday [July 
6] and Zambia (Noi'thern Rhodesia) scheduled 
for independence in October, the world faces 
Africa's hard core of resistance to political 

This hard core is found in Southern Rho- 
desia, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, 
and the Republic of South Africa, which ad- 
ministers neighboring South-West Africa under 
a League of Nations mandate. 

What is our policy toward these areas? 
Simply stated, the United States supports the 
aspirations for self-determination and for polit- 



ical participation in their governments of the 
peoples of those parts of Africa. 

Malawi, Zambia, and Southern Rhodesia 

First, let me turn to an area that was for a 
dozen years known as the Federation of Rho- 
desia and Nyasaland. Last December 31, the 
political experiment that brought the three 
coimtries of Northern Ehodesia, Nyasaland, 
and Southern Ehodesia together officially 
ended. Each is now moving ahead separately. 

Yesterday, Nyasaland became a member of 
the Commonwealth and is now known as Ma- 
lawi. It is a country small in size, heavily 
populated, and primarily agricultural in econ- 
omy. It is stable politically, however, and has 
come to independence under the leadership of 
its U.S.-educated Prime Minister, Dr. H. 
Kamuzu Banda. Malawi faces some difficult 
tasks in the economic development field, and 
we are endea\oring to lend a hand through our 
AID [Agency for International Development] 
program and through our Peace Corps volun- 
teers. There also are encouraging indications 
that other friendly countries are going to coor- 
dinate their assistance efforts with ours. As 
Malawi is a former British possession, the 
United Kingdom understandably is playing the 
leading role in assistance, but we expect to play 
a role in helping Malawi strengthen its inde- 
pendence through economic growth. 

Northern Rhodesia also is moving toward in- 
dependence, having just completed an agree- 
ment with the Britisli on the final form of its 
constitution. By mutual consent, independence 
will come on October 24, at which time the 
country will become Zambia, a republic within 
the British Commonwealth. 

Hardly any state on the African Continent 
came to independence under more auspicious 
circumstances than those under which Zambia 
will begin its nationhood. It has one of the 
most viable economies in Africa, thanks to 
its position as one of the top three copper pro- 
ducers in the world. However, it is seriously 
short of the trained manpower needed to enable 
key positions to be filled by Africans. Our 
princij^al assistance efforts, therefore, are de- 
voted to meeting requests from the Government 
to till this need. We are making major efforts 

in the fields of education to assist in the train- 
ing of personnel who will be needed in the pro- 
gram of Africanization of key positions. 

The situation in the third coimtry of the for- 
mer Federation — Southern Rhodesia — we view 
with many misgivings. Progress there is 
blocked by a double stalemate — first, between 
the United Kingdom and the Southern Rho- 
desia Government and, second, between the 
Southern Rhodesia Government and the prin- 
cipal African nationalist leaders. At the pres- 
ent time, nearly 400 of the key African nation- 
alist leaders are being held in one form of 
detention or another by the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia — most of them without 
trial. The situation is tense, and, imless pres- 
ent trends are reversed, it could become even 
more serious in the near future. 

The present regime is believed to be seeking 
independence at an early date under the exist- 
ing form of government which, as a practical 
matter, would assure control of the government 
and the economy by the small white European 
minority for a long time to come. In a country 
of more than 3.5 million Africans and only 
some 200,000 Europeans, there naturally is 
much opposition from the African majority 
and from other nations to this proposal. For 
example, Soiithem Rhodesia is to be excluded 
from the July Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
conference at London for the first tune. There 
is a strong indication of British Commonwealth 
opposition to any attempt by the Southern 
Rhodesian Government to obtain independence 
under a white minority. 

The future of Southern Rhodesia is essen- 
tially a question for the British Government. 
But when the Southern Rhodesian question is 
discussed in various U.N. bodies, as it fre- 
quently is these days, we must and do make clear 
our desire to see the development of a solution 
acceptable to both races in the colony. 

Angola and Mozambique 

The Portuguese territories of Angola and 
Mozambique, situated on Africa's west and east 
coasts, represent another difficult southern 
African problem. Portugal views those terri- 
tories as "overseas provinces" and feels very 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


strongly that it should be permitted to govern 
them without outside interference. 

For their part, the Africans look upon the 
territories as "colonies" and feel very strongly 
that they should become independent as soon as 
possible. We in the United States are deeply 
committed to self-determination for all people. 
"We believe Portugal should recognize publicly 
that the principle of self-determination is ap- 
plicable to its territories. Our policy is to en- 
courage both Portugal and the Africans to 
come to a workable understanding. 

Talks between Portugal and several African 
nations took place last year under U.N. auspices 
but broke down over an inability to agree on 
what constituted self-determination. In May, 
however, the Secretary-General indicated in a 
report to the Security Coimcil that he was con- 
sulting with Portugal and African representa- 
tives on the possibility of the talks being 
resumed.^ We would very much like to see an 
amicable solution result from a continuation 
of such talks. The alternative to an amicable 
settlement is a serious one. There already has 
been fightmg between nationalists and Por- 
tuguese forces in Angola and Portuguese 
Guinea. Clearly, we want to see peaceful pro- 
gress on the question of the Portuguese terri- 
tories instead of further conflict. 

South-West Africa 

The most intractable problems in southern 
Africa are those of South Africa and South 
Africa's administration of the former German 
colony of South-AVest Africa. South Africa's 
mandate over South-AVest Africa, which was 
assigned by the League of Nations after AVorld 
AA^ar I, is currently the subject of a contentious 
case before the International Court of Justice. 
Two African coimtries that were members of 
the League of Nations — Ethiopia and Liberia — 
have asked the Court to judge whether South 
Africa has lived up to its obligations. 

A South African Government Commission, 
the Odendaal Commission, proposed early tliis 
year that South-AVest Africa be divided into a 
white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands." 
The Commission also advocated large-scale in- 
corporation of the territory's administrative 

* U.N. doc. S/5727. 

structure into the Kepublic's governmental de- 
partments. Spokesmen of the South African 
Government endorsed the broad principles of 
the Odendaal Commission's report, but the Gov- 
ernment has decided not to iniplement con- 
troversial proposals of the Commission before 
the judgment of the Court is rendered. 

South Africa's Apartheid Policy 

Apartheid, a policy of group separation of 
races in the Eepublic of South Africa itself, is 
a tragic philosophy involving both whites and 
nonwhites whose families sometimes have lived 
in the area for generations and who together 
have built one of the highest standards of living 
in Africa. The conflict between nonwhite 
aspirations and official policy is already having 
extensive repercussions elsewhere, especially in 
newly independent Africa and in the United 

The Kepublic of South Africa has been in 
the news quite a bit lately because of further 
incidents reflecting its determination to main- 
tain its policy of apartheid. 

In June eight leaders in the resistance to 
apartheid — black, white, and Indian — were sen- 
tenced to life imprisonment in the widely pub- 
licized Rivonia trial. 

In May, Albert Luthuli, President General 
of the African National Congi-ess and winner 
of the Nobel Peace Prize, was restricted to part 
of his local district for a second 5-year period. 
Nothing he says or writes can be published in 
South Africa, and he cannot have any visitors 
from outside his local area without special gov- 
ernment permission. I 

A few days ago, the controversial 90-day de- 
tention clause was extended for an indefinite 
period up to 1 year. Under this clause, police 
may arrest without charge and hold in solitary 
confinement any person suspected of having in- 
formation about certain types of political 
offenses or about plans to conunit them. Per- 
s'ons can be arrested and held for successive 90- 
day periods. As many as three terms in a row, 
separated only by moments, have been imposed 
on the same individual. 

The entire body of legislation restricting peo- 
ple's rights, opportunities, and activities has 
created understandable bitterness and opposi- 



tion to apartheid, particularly among the black 
Africans, Asians, and Coloreds, who are people 
of mixed blood. But it also has developed a 
growing body of white South African opinion 
that feels apartheid is becoming destructive of 
the very values it purports to preserve. There 
are many churchmen, teachers, businessmen, 
editors, journalists, politicians of all parties, 
and many other troubled white opponents of 
the present policy of apartheid. Large num- 
bers of South African lawyers, doctors, schol- 
ars, and others protested against the extension 
of the 90-day detention clause as an invasion of 
civil and human rights. Si^okesmen of major 
religions — Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, and Prot- 
estant — appealed to the Govermnent to let it 

We can sympathize with the desires of those 
people who are concerned with the true values 
of Western civilization and wish to moderate 
their nation's restrictive policies. In view of 
our own race relations, we also can understand 
the very real problems with which South 
Africa is faced. At the same time, we believe 
there must be a change of direction — some move- 
ment toward finding a solution to South Africa's 
problems — and we think one of the first steps 
is to provide an opportunity for meaningful 
discussion of South Africa's race problem 
among people of all races and to begin to work 
out steps providing for political participation 
in a society based upon government by consent 
of the governed. 

South Africa could have much to offer Africa 
and the world. But instead it is becoming in- 
creasingly isolated. South Africa has the most 
highly developed economy in Africa. It has a 
great reservoir of skills, of educated people, of 
technological know-how. With its substantial 
industries, great mineral resei-ves, and other 
basic components of industrial development, im- 
f ettered by its policy of apartheid, South Africa 
would be well endowed to play a leading role 
in economic and social development in Africa 
and elsewhere. Instead, the countries of Africa 
are largely closed to South Africa. That coun- 
try has been forced out of several international 
organizations dealing with African scientific, 
economic, and social welfare problems. Instead 
of being a leader in this formative period of 

African history. South Africa is becoming more 
and more isolated from the continent of which 
it is a part. 

We believe South Africa's participation in 
African affairs would be a profoundly favor- 
able development for aU of Africa and, indeed, 
for the world. But we also know it cannot 
happen as long as apartheid continues to be the 
official policy of South Africa. We are com- 
mitted to use our best efforts to encourage South 
Africa to abandon apartheid. 

In summary, then, over tlie years the United 
States has developed a fimdamental African 
policy to encourage Africa's political, economic, 
and social development and to assist in the 
growth of peaceful, stable, and independent na- 
tions on that continent. We know that peace 
and security are indivisible, and we want to 
help establish and maintain societies in Africa 
that can make their own positive contributions 
to world peace and progress. 

NASA and Western Europe Agree 
on Scientific Satellite Project 


The first joint satellite agreement between 
the European Space Eesearch Organization 
(ESRO) and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration was announced on July 
21 by the two agencies. 

The organizations have signed a memoran- 
dum of understanding for a pi'oject involving 
two scientific satellites, reflecting further exten- 
sion of the U.S. program encouraging coopera- 
tive space efforts with other countries. These 
two satellites bring to 13 the number launched 
or planned under the program. 

ESRO, which came into formal existence in 
March 1964, is the nine-nation West European 
group formed to conduct scientific space re- 
search utilizing the capabilities of its member 

Membership includes Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


the United Kingdom. Italy is expected to join 
when the Italian Government has ratified the 
ESKO convention. Austria has observer status. 

ESRO plans include soimding rocket and sat- 
ellite experimentation and the establishment 
of several centers and a launching site in its 
member countries. 

Under the NASA-ESRO memorandum of 
understanding, the first satellite, to be known 
as ESEO I, is to contain eight experiments to 
study high-latitude particles (especially in au- 
roral phenomena) and their effects on the polar 
ionosphere. The second, ESRO II, is to meas- 
ure solar and cosmic radiation. It also will 
contain eight experiments. 

Both satellites will be launched on NASA 
Scout rocket boosters into near-polar eccentric 
orbits. The launchings are tentatively sched- 
uled during 1967 from the Air Force Western 
Test Range. 

Responsibilities for the project will be di- 
vided between the two agencies as follows : 

—ESRO will provide the experiment instru- 
mentation ; design, construct, and test the space- 
craft ; provide ground checkout and launch sup- 
port equipment; track and acquire data from 
the spacecraft within the capability of its pro- 
jected network ; and reduce and analyze all data. 

—NASA will train ESRO personnel as is 
mutually determined, provide the Scout launch- 
ing vehicles, and conduct the launching opera- 
tions. NASA will also provide necessary sup- 
plemental tracking and data acquisition 

As with all NASA international cooperative 
projects, each agency will bear the cost of dis- 
charging its responsibilities. The scientific re- 
sults and findings will be made available to the 
world scientific community. 

The NASA-ESRO agreement brings to 13 
the international cooperative satellites provided 
for under NASA memoranda of understanding. 
These include three joint U.S.-U.K. satellites, 
of which two have been successfully launched 
(Ariel I, April 1962; Ariel II, March 1964) ; 
five U.S.-Canadian satellites, the first of 
which — Alouette I — was launched in September 
1962; two satellites to bo launched in 1965-67 
under the joint U.S.-Italian project San Marco ; 
and FR-1, the cooperative U.S.-French satel- 
lite to be launched next year. 


Memoeandum of Undeestandino Between the Eubo- 
PEAN Space Reselabch Oeoanisation and the 
United States National Aeronautics and Space 

1. The European Space Research Organisation 
(ESRO) and the United States National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) affirm a mutual 
desire to undertake a cooperative program of space 
research by means of satellites. The objectives are to 

(a) perform an integrated study of the polar iono- 
sphere vpith particular emphasis on auroral events and 

(b) measure solar and cosmic radiation. 

2. It is planned to accomplish this cooperative pro- 
gram through the preparation, launching, and use of 
two satellites which are scheduled tentatively for 
launching in 1967. 

(a) The polar ionosphere satellite, to be known as 
ESRO I, will contain experiments to perform an inte- 
grated study of high latitude particles and their effects 
on the polar ionosphere, including optical, heating, 
ionization, and large scale dynamic effects involving 
currents and magnetic perturbations. It will also in- 
clude a beacon experiment for measurements of the 
total electron content between the satellite and ground 
observers. A near-polar eccentric orbit within the capa- 
bility of the present Scout launch vehicle is planned 
for ESRO I. 

(b) The solar astronomy and cosmic ray satellite, 
to be known as ESRO II, will contain experiments to 
measure solar and cosmic radiation including X-rays, 
He II line, Lyman Alpha, trapped radiation, solar and 
Van Allen belt protons, cosmic ray protons, alpha par- 
ticles, and high energy electrons. A near-polar eccen- 
tric orbit within the capability of the present Scout 
launch vehicle is planned for ESRO II. 

3. It is understood that this program is experimental 
in character and therefore subject to change in accord- 
ance with altered technical requirements and oppor- 

4. ESRO will be responsible for the following: 

(a) Providing the experiment instrumentation. 

(b) Designing, constructing, testing, and delivering 
to the launch site two flight qualified spacecraft for 
each mission. 

(e) Supplying spacecraft ground checkout and 
launch support equipment. 

(d) Providing such tracking and data acquisition 
support as may be within the capability of the pro- 
jected ESRO network. 

(e) Reducing and analyzing the data. 

(f) Supporting such trainees as may be assigned 
pursuant to 5(a) below. 

5. NASA will be responsible for the following: 

(a) Making available project-related training for 
periods providing mutual benefits within the limits of 
resources in facilities and personnel. 

(b) Reviewing the acceptance tests of satellite 



flight units and the results of these tests. Final de- 
termination of the suitability of flight units for launch- 
ing will be by joint ESRO/NASA decision. 

(c) Providing the Scout launch vehicles, including 
heat shields and spacecraft tie-down and separation 
mechanisms, required for launching the two satellites. 

(d) Conducting the launch operations, including 
tracking to the point where an initial orbit is 

(e) Supplying necessary additional tracking and 
data acquisition support, with reimbursement by ESRO 
of any incremental costs such as those occasioned by 
special equipment and data tapes. 

6. ESRO and NASA will each bear the cost of dis- 
charging its respective responsibilities including the 
costs of travel by personnel and transportation 
charges on all equipment for which it is responsible. 

7. It is intended that this project proceed by mutual 
agreement between ESRO and NASA. The responsi- 

bility for accomplishing this will rest with project man- 
agers to be named by ESRO and NASA. Assisted by 
a Joint Working Group with appropriate membership, 
the ESRO and NASA project managers will coordinate 
the agreed functions and responsibilities of each agency 
with the other. 

8. ESRO and NASA will use their best efforts to 
arrange for free customs clearance of equipment re- 
quired in the program. 

9. ESRO and NASA will exchange all scientific in- 
formation resulting from this cooperative program and 
make the results freely available to the world scientific 


For the European Space 
Research Organisation 

July 8, 1964 

Hugh L. Dryden 

For the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Ad- 

The New Implications of Industrial Competition 

hy David E. Bell 

Administrator, Agency for International Develofment ^ 

It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you 
today at this New England Conference on Mod- 
ernization for AVorld Competition. The United 
States foreign assistance program, with which 
I am associated, is deeply involved in one aspect 
of the problem you are considering here — tliis 
is the expansion and strengthening of the econ- 
omies of less developed countries of Asia, Af- 
rica, and Latin America. I believe this work 
has some significant implications for the sub- 
ject of your conference. 

The first point I should like to emphasize is 
that the fundamental purpose of our economic 
assistance to less developed coimtries is to help 
them achieve economic strength and independ- 

' Address read for Mr. Bell by Deputy Administrator 
William S. Gaud before the New England Conference 
on Modernization for World Competition at Boston, 
Mass., on June 10. 

This fundamental theme of helping other 
countries to become economically stronger — to 
get on their own feet so that our aid can come 
to an end — has guided our foreign aid efforts 
since the days of the Marshall Plan. There is 
no need for me to recall here the striking suc- 
cess of the Marshall Plan, imder which the 
coimtries of Western Europe were restored to 
economic health in 4 or 5 years and by the early 
fifties were able to make strong economic prog- 
ress without any further economic aid from us. 

Wlaat is not so well known is that a substan- 
tial number of other countries have by now fol- 
lowed in the footsteps of Western Europe. 
They have achieved with our help basic eco- 
nomic momentum, and our aid has been brought 
to an end or is being brought to an end. 

American economic assistance has terminated 
altogether in some 17 countries, including the 
Marshall Plan coimtries plus Japan, Spain, 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


Yugoslavia, and Lebanon. We have identified 
14 more countries in wliich the transition is now 
in process from economic aid in the form of soft 
loans and grants to economic self-support and 
the end of the need for aid. 

A clear-cut example is the Republic of China 
on Taiwan. Fifteen years ago the economy of 
Taiwan was almost wholly dependent upon the 
United States for its economic livelihood. Over 
these last 15 years, however, a highly successful 
development program has been carried out. In 
the field of agriculture, a successful land re- 
form program was executed and improved 
methods, markets, and supplies such as fertil- 
izers were made available to the Taiwanese 
farmers. Today the productivity of tlie farm- 
ers of Taiwan is second only to that of Japan. 
Education and health services have been ex- 
panded. Transportation and power facilities 
have been enlarged. Particularly in the last 
few years, a lively and thriving industrial sec- 
tor has been emerging. 

For the last several years the gross national 
product of Taiwan has been rising at more than 
5 percent per year. A most significant and most 
necessary element of the progress of Taiwan 
has been a rapid expansion of exports, which 
have been going up 10 or 12 percent per year 
for the last several years. In the present year, 
1964, Taiwan exports are expected for the first 
time to reach half a billion dollars. 

Most important of all, the combination of 
these various factors has meant that the process 
of self-sustaining economic growth has become 
established. There is no doubt that in Taiwan 
today there has been achieved the necessary 
minimum of trained and experienced leader- 
ship, public and private, the necessary mini- 
mum of capital facilities, and the framework 
of incentives, laws, and attitudes which will re- 
sult year after year in a predictable rise in the 
gross national product. United States aid has 
given Taiwan the initial boost that was needed, 
and the people of Taiwan can take it from there. 

Wliat happened 10 years ago in Western 
Europe and Japan, what is happening today 
in Taiwan, Greece, Israel, Mexico, Venezuela, 
and other countries — this is what we want to see 
happen throughout the less developed parts of 
the world. We Avant through U.S. aid to help 
give an initial boost which will allow these coun- 

tries thereafter to make progress with their 
own resources, without special assistance, rely- 
ing on normal access to world trade and world 
capital markets. 

We are making headway in that direction. 
Quite a few comitries — even though they are 
not yet near the end of the need for foreign 
aid — are making solid headway. India, Paki- 
stan, Turkey, Nigeria, Colombia, Cliile — in aU 
these comitries the process of economic develop- 
ment is visible. Agricultural and industrial 
productivity are rising; education is spreading; 
governmental and private leaders are learning 
to handle the many difficult problems that arise 
when economic and social progress occurs. 

Please note that I am describing only the 
beginnings of the process of economic moderni- 
zation. When a period of self-sustaining eco- 
nomic growth has begun, and foreign aid has 
been ended, the average standard of living in 
a country is still quite low and the major prog- 
ress in living standards is still to come. Far 
more economic progress has been made in West- 
em Europe and in Japan since economic aid 
to those areas ended than took place previously. 
The same thing will be true in each of the less 
developed countries as they reach the point of 
rapid and self-sustained economic progress. 

For example, the per capita income in Taiwan 
today, according to the best estimates, measures 
about $150 per year — compared to $2,500 per 
year per capita in the United States. Even 
allowing for the well-known deficiencies of such 
comparative statistics, the gap between these 
two figures is enormous. But the point I am 
stressing at the moment is that the people of 
Taiwan are now in a position to acliieve a steady 
and rapid rise in their own incomes and liv- 
ing standards, without the need for economic 
aid. Year by year into the future, we can ex- 
pect to see per capita income rise in Taiwan as 
economic growth continues in its benign up- 
ward spiral. 

Opportunities for Trade and Investment 

This brings me to the second main point I 
would like to make this noon. As our foreign 
aid programs are successful in promoting eco- 
nomic growth, the countries we are assisting not 
only bex"ome stronger economies; they also be- 
come better markets for our exports and better 



destinations for our private business investment 

This has been evident in Western Europe, 
where U.S. exports have more than doubled in 
the last 10 years. It has been evident in Japan, 
where U.S. expoi-ts have quadrupled since 1950. 
The very rapid rise of U.S. private investment 
in Europe and in Japan is well known. 

But I call your attention to the fact that 
similar opportunities are appearing today in 
some of the less developed countries — and will 
appear tomorrow in many more. As Taiwan's 
exports have risen from a quarter-billion dol- 
lars 3 years ago to a half-billion dollars today, 
it has become an increasingly attractive market 
for exports from the United States and from 
other countries and an increasingly attractive 
destination for U.S. investment overseas. 

Moreover, now that Taiwan has entered a 
stage of continuing economic progress, it will 
become a steadily better market. From the 
viewpoint of the American businessman, inter- 
ested in exports or in investment abroad, we 
have seen only the beginnings of the opportimi- 
ties that will be offered in Taiwan. Many 
American businessmen are already making 
plans to take advantage of these increasing 
opportunities, and I hope that through meetings 
such as this one the word will spread ever more 

Paving the Way for New Markets 

The third point I should like to stress here is 
that the foreign aid program helps to open up 
U.S. export opportunities by increasing famili- 
arity with U.S. products and establishing com- 
mercial relationships. 

A striking example of how the aid program 
has led to the creation of new export markets 
is the case of coal. Before AVorld War II, U.S. 
coal was not normally exported to European 
markets. During the Marshall Plan, however, 
large amounts of coal were exported to Europe 
under foreign aid financing. Aid financing of 
coal exports has long since been reduced vir- 
tvially to zero. But the markets have remained. 
Recently the Coal Exporters Association of the 
United States submitted a statement to the 
President's Wliite House Conference on Export 
Expansion pointing out that 28 million tons 

out of the 40 million tons of U.S. coal exported 
in 1962 — approximately $285 million worth — 
was an outgrowth of export business established 
as a result of our foreign aid progi-am. 

This is a classic case where U.S. aid financing 
has paved the way for a new market which 
thrived after aid was discontinued. 

We believe that foreign aid today is opening 
up many such markets, particularly where the 
opportunities afforded by aid financing are vig- 
orously followed up by export-minded Ameri- 
can businessmen. As most of you know, it is 
AID policy at present, and has been since 1959, 
to require that foreign aid appropriations be 
spent in the United States for U.S. goods and 
services, with relatively small exceptions. At 
present, over 80 percent of the funds being 
committed under the foreign aid program are 
going directly to U.S. suppliers of goods and 

As a result of this policy, the volume of aid- 
financed procurement in tlie United States has 
increased dramatically for many commodities. 
For example, in calendar year 1963, foreign aid 
financed exports of $180 million of iron and 
steel mill products, $292 million of machinery 
and equipment, $84 million of chemical and re- 
lated products, $52 million of railway and other 
transportation equipment. 

For some commodities, aid now finances a 
substantial percentage of the total value of U.S. 
exports. In calendar 1963, for example, aid 
financed 46 percent of the total U.S. export of 
fertilizers; 37 percent of the total exports of 
railway transportation equipment; and 31 per- 
cent of U.S. exports of iron and steel mill 

Our figures on the geographic distribution 
of foreign aid procurement indicate that Massa- 
chusetts has shared significantly in this busi- 
ness. Incomplete figures show that, since Jan- 
uary 1962, AID has financed the procurement 
of well over $20 million worth of commodities 
from Massachusetts producers. Moreover, AID 
technical services contracts in Massachusetts, 
in effect as of March 31, 1964, totaled over $19 

I should like to stress very strongly a point 
which, I take it, should be obvious. The market 
demand I have just been describing — ^that is, 
the market demand financed by foreign aid ap- 

AUGUST 10, 1964 


propriations — is inherently temporary. None 
of us want to see foreign aid extended for any 
country a moment longer than is necessary. 

Whether these temporary markets turn into 
permanent ones depends primarily on the effec- 
tiveness with which American businessmen 
follow up the opportunities thus opened to 
them. If they ship under the foreign aid pro- 
gram to less developed countries first-class mer- 
chandise; if they follow along with stocks of 
spare parts and supplies; if they establish 
marketing and service arrangements — in short, 
if they apply in the less developed countries 
the same vigorous competitive practices they 
follow in the United States, then they can look 
forward to solid and growing markets abroad. 
If, however, they take the opposite attitude and 
sit back and wait for the follow-on orders to 
arrive, I am sure they will be disappomted. 
There are plenty of energetic salesmen from 
Germany, France, Britain, Japan, striving to 
obtain business in the less developed countries. 
American businessmen can compete with them — 
but not just by sitting in an office on Route 128. 

Accordingly, I urge the businessmen in this 
audience and throughout the United States who 
are now enjoying or who would like to take 
advantage of export markets under the foreign 
aid program to consider themselves in a tem- 
porarily fortunate position. These are oppor- 
tunities which, if vigorously pursued, can open 
many doors and generate a great deal of trade 
in the future. 

Balance of Payments 

The final point I should like to emphasize 
this noon relates to the other side of the trade 
coin. As any businessman knows, the United 
States can export only to people who can afford 
to pay for exports. People who want to import 
from the United States must be in a position 
to obtain dollars with which to pay for those 
imports. Trade is a two-way street. 

There has been a good deal of concern ex- 
pressed from time to time that if we help other 
countries expand their economies this will harm, 
not help, the United States. The evidence is 
overwhelming that this fear is unwarranted. 
Year after year since the end of World War II, 
the economies of Europe and Japan have grown 

steadily stronger. Simultaneously, year after 
year, U.S. exports to those countries and to 
other parts of the world have grown — and have 
stayed well ahead of U.S. imports. 

The balance-of-payments problems of the 
United States have not reflected an adverse bal- 
ance of trade. Quite the contrary, our favor- 
able balance of trade has remained substantial ; 
it has exceeded $4 billion in each of the last. 4 
years. We have had, and continue to have, a 
difficult balance-of-payments problem, but this 
reflects tlie extent of our desires and commit- 
ments in the world. We want to fuiance a large 
volume of investment abroad, large tourist ex- 
penditures, and large military and other gov- 
ernment outlays abroad — and our favorable 
trade balance has not been large enough to cover 
all those requirements. A number of steps have 
been taken to meet this situation, and the U.S. 
balance of payments looks a good deal healthier 
today than it did 3 or 4 years ago. 

The lesson to be derived from this experience, 
however, is not to turn our backs on the policies 
of economic expansion around the world which 
we have been following since the Second World 
War. Quite the contrary, the record of these 
last 20 years has demonstrated that the U.S. 
economy is amply strong and healthy enough 
to hold its own in a competitive world. U.S. 
exportei-s have been steadily increasing their 
volumes, and U.S. investors have been steadily 
expanding their interests abroad. American 
businessmen who apply the ideas being discussed 
at this conference — the best and most modem 
ideas about research, about marketing, about 
modernization — can be confident of their ability 
to operate successfully in an expanding and 
growing world economy. 

We in the United States have much to gain 
from a dynamic international economic policy. 

In the narrowest terms of economic self- 
interest, it is to our advantage to open up sources 
of raw materials we do not ourselves have, to 
find sources of more economical supplies for 
items for which we are high-cost producers, 
and to transfer our workers into industries 
where productivity is greatest and wages can be 
highest. It is to our own interest to invest 
our capital overseas when it can j-ield com- 
petitive returns. In short, our economy is 
strong enough and competitive enough to reap 



ill practice the rewards of the expansion of the 
market and the division of hvbor which econo- 
mists have been preacliing since the days of 
Adam Smith. 

But tliere are broader reasons whicli require 
us to support an expansionist international 
economic policy. Tlie bulk of the world's 
population is living today under conditions of 
hunger, disease, and poverty which are a shame 
and a reproacli to a world blessed with modem 
science and technology. It is not simply a 
matter of sound business for us to help 
overcome those conditions. It is also a matter 
of fundamental humanitarian concern — and a 
matter of our own national security in the 
broadest sense of that term. For we cannot 
expect to have the kind of stable and progres- 
sive world in which free institutions can sur- 
vive and flourish unless the people of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America can look forward 
to economic and social progress, earned by their 
own work in independence and self-respect. 

Consequently, the task of modernizing primi- 
tive economies can and should be thought of 
as part of the great effort to extend the free 
society. And the efforts of American exporters 
and investors to advance their own competitive 
interests by providing better values in the 
market place are an integral part of the process 
of international development on which our own 
future depends so heavily. 

Major difficulties confront us in seeking to 
achieve international development. Resources 
are unevenly distributed. Population growth 
rates are high. Moscow and Peiping seek to 
frustrate free and democratic development. 
But the strong interests of the United States — 
and of free men everywhere — impel us to stick 
to the job. I am confident we can succeed. 



Rafael Sancho-Bonet as Deputy Chief of Protocol, 
effective July 29. (For biographic details, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 337 dated July 23. ) 


Current Actions 


Consular Relations 

Vienna oonvention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964. 

Economic Cooperation 

Convention on Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development and supplementar.v protocols. 
Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into 
force September 30, 19til. TIAS 4891. 
Accessioti deposited: Japan, April 28, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon te.9ts in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Peru, July 20, 1964. 


Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as 
revised, for the protection of industrial property. 
Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into 
force June 1, 1928 ; for the United States March 6, 
1931. 47 Stat. 1789. 

Notification received that it considers itself bound: 
Trinidad and Tobago, May 14, 1964. 

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at 
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 
1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London 
June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done 
at Lisbon October 31. 1958. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 4. 1962. TIAS 4931. 

Notification of accession: Trinidad and Tobago, 
July 1, 1964. 



Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. 


fected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 
1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace 
corps program in Panama. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Panama October 30, 1963. 
Entered into force: July 6, 1964. 


Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 
1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964. 

' Not in force. 

AUGUST 10, 1964 



Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may ie obtained fnym the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Status of the World's Nations (Revised). A concise 
reference guide, second in a series prepared by The 
Geographer, giving official nomenclature, area, popula- 
tion, and capital city of all independent states. In- 
cludes some quasi-independent states and "irregular 
categories." Geographic Bulletin No. 2 (Revised). 
Pub. 7573. 22 pp. 250. 

Foreign Affairs Outline— 1965 : International Coopera- 
tion Year. Article based on an address by Harlan 
Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for Interna- 
tional Organization Affairs, before the Conference 
Group of U.S. National Organizations for the United 
Nations at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7638. International 
Organization and Conference series 52. 5 pp. 50. 

Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet de- 
scribing the history, functions, and goals of the Depart- 
ment. Pub. 7644. Department and Foreign Service 
series 124. 16 pp. 150. 

The Making of Foreign Policy— An Interview With 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, vrith minor 
editorial changes, of a television program first broad- 
cast on January 12, 1964, on which Secretary Rusk 
answered the questions of Professor Eric F. Goldman of 
Princeton University. Pub. 7658. General Foreign 
PoUcy series 190. 33 pp. 20(*. 

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Text 
of an address made by President Johnson at the Pan 
American Union on the occasion of the installation of 
Carlos Sanz de Santamaria as chairman of the Inter- 
American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. 
Pub. 7669. Inter-American series 87. 12 pp. 150. 

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963. Six- 
teenth annual report to the United Nations on the ad- 
ministration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963. Pub. 7676. 
International Organization and Conference series 53. 
279 pp. $1. 

America as a Great Power. Pamphlet based on an ad- 
dress made by President John.son before the Associated 
Press at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7688. General Foreign 
Policy series 193. 22 pp. 15<t. 

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. Article by Under Secretary 
George W. Ball, based on a speech made before the 
Omicron Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va. Pub. 

7690. Inter-American series 88. 22 pp. 150. 

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 6 — United States Policy 
in Viet-Nam. Article based on an address by Secre- 
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the James For- 
restal Memorial Awards dinner of the National Secu- 
rity Industrial Association at Washington, D.C. Pub. 

7691. Far Eastern series 125. 8 pp. Limited 

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 7— The Alliance for Prog- 
ress. Article based on an address by Thomas C. Mann, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
before the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs at 
Washington, D.C. Pub. 7697. Inter-American series 
89. 6 pp. 50. 

Visas — Abolition of Fees. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia. Exchange of notes — Dated at Belgrade 
December 30, 1963, March 27 and April 4, 1964. En- 
tered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5564. 3 pp. 5i. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of the Congo — Signed at L4opoldville April 28, 
1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. With ex- 
change of notes. TIAS 5565. 14 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia — Signed at Belgrade April 27, 1964. Entered 
into force April 27, 1964. With exchange of notes. 
TIAS 5566. 9 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade April 

27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 5567. 7 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade April 

28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. TIAS 

5568. 4 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of 
February 4, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at La Paz April 27, 1964. Entered into force 
April 27, 1964. TIAS 5569. 4 pp. 50. 

Indus Basin Development Fund. Agreement with 
Other Governments, supplementing the agreement of 
September 19, 1960 — Signed at Washington March 31, 
and April 6, 1964. Entered into force April 6, 1964. 
TIAS 5570. 6 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia, amending the agreements of January 5, 1955; 
November 3, 1956 ; December 22, 1958 : April 28, 1961 ; 
and December 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Belgrade April 15, 1964. Entered 
into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5571. 6 pp. 50. 

Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of 
Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Republic of 
China — Signed at Taipei April 23, 1964. Entered into 
force April 23, 1964. TIAS 5572. 15 pp. 100. 


Bulletin of June 29, 1964. p. 098: The bot- 
tom line in the left-hand column should read, 
"but defined his policy of the 'good neighbor' 
as :". 

Bm,LETiN of July 13, 1964, p. 56: The last 
sentence in the first full paragraph in the right- 
hand column should read, "But at least it pro- 
vides a means for the two countries to work 
out useful arrangements regarding future border 



INDEX Avgust 10, 1964 Vol. LI, No. 1311 

Africa. American Policy in Africa (Fred- 
ericks) 197 

American Principles. Some Thoughts on the 
Conduct of P''oreign Policy (Rusk) .... 185 

American Republics 

OAS .\i)iiroves Rio Treaty Measures Against 

Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174 

President Praises OAS Action Condemning 

Cuban Aggression 184 

Atomic Energy. U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield Nu- 
clear Device Underground in Nevada . . . 193 

Australia. U.S., New Zealand, and Australia 
Reaffirm Ties of Friendship (Rusk, Holyoake, 
Hasluck) 194 

Aviation. Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks 

With Canada Concluded 188 

Canada. Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks 

With Canada Concluded 188 


OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against 

Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174 

President Praises OAS Action Condemning 

Cuban Aggression 184 

Department and Foreign Service. Designations 

(Sancho-Bonet) 209 

Economic Affairs. The New Implications of In- 
dustrial Competition (Bell) 205 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President 

Speaks to American Field Service Students . 189 

Europe. NASA and Western Europe Agree on 
Scientific Satellite Project (memorandum of 
understanding) 203 

Foreign Aid. The New Implications of Indus- 
trial Competition (Bell) 205 

International Organizations and Conferences 

OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against 
Castro Regime (Rusk, text of Final Act) . . 174 

President Praises OAS Action Condemning 

Cuban Aggression 184 

Malaysia. Prime Minister of Malaysia Visits 
Washington (texts of greetings, toasts, and 
joint communique) 190 

New Zealand. U.S., New Zealand, and Aus- 
tralia Reaffirm Ties of Friendship (Rusk, 
Holyoake. Hasluck) 1^ 

Presidential Documents 

President Praises OAS Action Condemning 

Cuban Aggression 184 

President Speaks to American Field Service 

Students 189 

Prime Minister of Malaysia Visits Washington . 190 

Protocol. Saneho-Bonet designated Deputy 

Cbief 209 

Publications. Recent Releases 210 

Science. NASA and Western Europe Agree on 
Scientific Satellite Project (memorandum of 
understanding) 203 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 209 

N.VS.V and Western Europe Agree on Scientific 
Satellite Project (memorandum of under- 
standing) 203 

Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks With 

Canada Concluded 188 

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield 
Nuclear Device Underground in Nevada . . 193 

'Name Index 

Bell, David E 205 

Fredericks, J. Wayne 197 

Hasluck, Paul 106 

Holyoake, Keith J 195 

Johnson, President 181, 189, 190 

Rahman, Tunku Abdul 190 

Rusk, Secretary 174, 185, 194 

Sancho-Bonet, Rafael 209 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: July 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 

of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 







U.S. participation in international 



Program for visit of Prime Minister 
of Malaysia. 



Rusk: meeting of OAS foreign 




Program for visit of President of 
Malagasy Republic. 



Cleveland: "The Fraternity of the 




Knox sworn in as Ambassador to 
Dahomey (biographic details). 



Sancho-Bonet designated Deputy 
Chief of Protocol (biographic 



Second round of air talks with 
Canada concluded. 



Harriman : Eastern Canadian 
American Assembly, Quebec. 



Cultural exchange (Turkey). 



Rusk: death of Mrs. Richard I. 



Program for visit of President of 
Malagasy Republic. 


* Not prin 

tHeld for 

a later issue of the Bot.t.ftin. 








Foreign Relations of tlie United States 

1943, Volume II, Europe 

The Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume 
II, Europe. 

This volume contains documentation on the wartime relations of the United States with most of 
the friendly or neutral governments of Western Europe. Of special importance and interest are the 
comijilations relating to the overtlu'ow of the Fascist regune in Italy and the emergence of Italy as 
a cobelligerent ; the efforts of the United States to assure the maintenance of Spain's neutrality; Ameri- 
can concern over the disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces; attempts to reduce and divert the 
volume of trade between the Axis Powers and the European neutrals; and the political problems 
attendant upon tlie successful military operations in North Africa. 

PUBLICATION 7679 $3.75 




Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 

PUBLICATION 7679 $3.75 

Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943. 

Volume II, Europe. 










Vol. LI, No. isn 

August 17, 196^, 

Address hy Secretary Rv^h 2H 



hy Under Secretary Harriman 237 

Statements hy Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland 
and U.S. Representative Franklin H. Williams 241 

For index see inside back cover 

The Pursuit of Peace 

Address by Secretary Rusk ^ 

It is a very genuine personal pleasure for me 
to join you in celebrating the 50th anniversary 
of the founding of the American Field Service. 
From its beginning in 1914 as a volunteer am- 
bulance service with the French armies, through 
its active service with the Allied armies in the 
Second World War, and — most of all — during 
the postwar years in which it initiated and de- 
veloped a splendid high school student ex- 
change program, the American Field Service 
has devoted itself to promotmg understanding 
and friendship among the peoples of the world. 

When you began your teenage exchange pro- 
gram by bringing 50 students to this country 
for the school year 1947-48, probably not many 
people foresaw how rapidly that program would 
grow. But it is one of the glories of our society 
that if one plants a good idea, or a sound insti- 

" Made at the 50th anniversary dinner of the Ameri- 
can Field Service at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 2 (press 
release 355 dated Aug. 1). For the text of remarks 
made by President Johnson at the White House on 
July 20 to a group of American Field Service exchange 
students, see Bitlletin of Aug. 10, 19G4, p. 189. 

tution, thousands of willing hands will come 
forward to tend and nurture it. To have 
brought more than 16,000 yoimg people from 
some 65 comitries into schools and homes m more 
than 2,000 American communities, and to have 
enabled nearly 10,000 young Americans to study 
and live with families abroad — these are very 
substantial accomplislmaents. These are among 
what Raymond Fosdick has caDed "the infinity 
of threads which bind peace together." 

Many of you here tonight are among this 
great corjjs of international ambassadors. 
Others of you represent the even larger number 
of persons, here and abroad, whose contribu- 
tions have been indispensable to the program's 
success : parents, host families, school and com- 
munity representatives, and volvmteer workers. 
And beyond all of you stand millions of other 
people in this country and elsewhere who have 
been touched by this program, if only by getting 
acquainted with a student from abroad, in 
school or in a neighbor's home. 

Many of us in the Department of State and 
our overseas posts have a close working re- 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Seriricea, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other offleers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
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are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $10 ; 
foreign .$15 : single copy, 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



lationship with your organization and have 
tried to give you as much assistance as possible. 
I shall not attempt to add to your chairman's 
tribute to Stephen Galatti. The American 
Field Service was fortunate to have as its Di- 
rector General for nearly 30 years a man of his 
vision, wisdom, and gentleness. We all regret 
that he could not have lived to take part in this 
anniversary celebration, for which he had 
planned and prepared for more than a year. 
Surely we can all agree that his most fitting 
memorial will be tlie continuation of this great 
progi'am and our devotion to the ideals he be- 
queathed to us. 

A World of Peace and Brotherhood 

Stephen Galatti was working to acliieve a 
world m which all mankind can live together 
in peace and brotherhood. That kind of world 
is the abiding dream of the American people 
and the ultimate goal of their foreign policy. 

The primary objective of our foreign policy 
is, in the familiar but ever-stirring phrase, to 
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity." In earlier days we could 
do that by keeping ourselves apart from the rest 
of the world ; we felt relatively safe behind our 
ocean ramparts. But today we can be safe only 
to the extent that our worldwide environment 
is safe. Our worldwide environment will be 
permanently safe only if men succeed in estab- 
lishing a decent world order, the kind of world 
order set forth in the preamble and articles 1 
and 2 of the United Nations Charter : a world 
of independent nations, each free to choose its 
own institutions, but cooperating with others, 
a world in which all international disputes are 
settled by peaceful means, a world subject to 
the rule of law. 

To arrive at such a decent world order is the 
the overriding preoccupation of our foreign 
policy. And if all governments were agreed 
on that goal, we could rapidly attain it. But, 
unhappily, there are powerful forces which do 
not want that kind of world, which seek to 
dominate and regiment all of mankind. 

The great issue of our time is which of these 
two concepts of a world order will prevail : free- 
dom or coercion. And here let me say again 
something I have said on several occasions : The 

Communist goal, proclaimed in doctrine and 
supported in action, is world domination. Both 
of the mam branches of the Communist move- 
ment have the same goal — even though they 
may di ft" er over tactics. They have made it clear 
that by "peaceful coexistence" they mean a con- 
tinuing attempt to spread their system over the 
earth by all means short of the great war which 
would be self-defeating. No one has to convince 
us the contest between fr