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Given By 

Superintendent of 







U.S. Participation in the UN 

Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963 

This is the 18th annual report, covering U.S. participation ia the work of the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies for the year 1963. 

In his letter of transmittal, President Johnson reaffirms U.S. support of the United Nations as "the 
best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind." 
Further, he calls the 18th General Assembly "a faithful mirror of political reality" as "it dealt in an 
intensely practical way vdth current hmnan events." 

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation 
thereiu are fiilly described iu this 433-page volume. The appendixes contain U.N. charts and other 
organizational information, as well as information on U.N. publications and documentation. 







Please send me copies ot U.S. Participation in the UN — Report by the 

President to the Congress for the Year 19SS. 


Enclosed find $ 


(cash, cbeck, or money order pay- 
able to Sapt of Docnments) 

cm. STATE 





Vol. LI, No. 1319 

October 5, 196J^ 


Address Tyy President Johnson Jt58 


Address iy Secretar'y Busk 4^3 



iy Assistant Secretary Marm Ifld 

'by Under Secretary Ball 473 

For index see inside back cover 

The Direction and Control of Nuclear Power 

Address hy President Johnson ^ 

Nineteen years ago President Truman an- 
nounced : "The force from which the sun draws 
its power has been loosed." In a single, fiery 
flash the world as we had known it was forever 
changed. Into our hands had come much of 
the responsibility for the life of freedom, for 
the life of our civilization, and for the life of 
man on this planet, and the realities of atomic 
power placed much of that burden in the hands 
of the President of the United States. 

Let no one think atomic weapons are simply 
bigger and more destructive than other weap- 
ons — just another development like the airplane 
or the tank. The total number of Americans 
killed in battle from the Revolution until to- 
night is a little over 526,000 people. Today a 
single nuclear weapon can kill more than 

Our experts tell us as of today that a 

'Made at a dinner honoring "United States and 
Canadian Partnership in Progress" at Seattle, Wash., 
on Sept. 16 (White House press release (Seattle) ; 
as-delivered text). 

full-scale nuclear exchange between the East 
and the West would kill almost 300 million 
people around the world, and in the midst of 
that terror and tragedy we could expect that 
weapon after weapon would soon engulf a por- 
tion of mankind. A cloud of deadly radiation 
would drift and destroy, menacing every living 
thing on God's earth, and in those unimagin- 
able hours unborn generations would forever 
be lamed. 

Now, in the face of these facts, every Ameri- 
can President has drawn the same conclusion : 

President Harry Truman said : "Such a war 
is not a possible policy for rational men." - 

President Eisenhower said: "In a nuclear 
war tliere can be no victors — only losers." ' 

President Kennedy said: "Total war makes 
no sense ...."* 

And I say that we must learn to live with 
each other or we will destroy each otlier. 

" Bulletin of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 94. 
' Hid., June 6, 1960, p. 899. 
'/fiirf., Julyl,1963, p.2. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
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NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
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Periodical Literature. 



The Meaning of the Atomic Age 

Many foix-es liave coinerged to make the 
modern world. Atomic power is very high 
among those forces, but what has the atomic 
age meant for us who have come here to this 
dinner tonight? 

It means, I think, that we have a unique re- 
sponsibility, unique in history, for the defense 
of fi'eedom. Our nuclear power alone has de- 
terred Soviet aggression. Under the shadow 
of our strength, our friends have kept their 
freedom and have built their nations. 

It means that we can no longer wait for the 
tides of conflict to touch our shores. 

It means that great powers can never again 
delude themselves into thinking that war will 
be painless or that victory will be easy. Thus, 
atomic power creates urgent pressure for peace- 
ful settlements and for the strengthening of the 
United Nations. 

It means a change must come in the life of 
nations. Man has fought since time began, and 
now it has become clear that the consequences of 
conflict are greater than any gain, and man just 
simply must change if man is to survive. 

For Americans, it means that control over nu- 
clear weapons must be centralized in the hands 
of the highest and the most responsible officer 
of government — the President of the United 
States. He, alone, has been chosen by all the 
people to lead all the Nation. He, alone, is the 
constitutional Commander in Chief of the Na- 
tion. On his prudence and wisdom alone can 
rest the decision which can alter or destroy the 
Nation. The responsibility for the control of 
U.S. nuclear weapons rests solely with the 
President, who exercises the control of their use 
in all foreseeable circumstances. This has been 
the case since 1945, under four Presidents. It 
will continue to be the case as long as I am 
President of the United States. 

In this atomic age we have always been re- 
quired to show restraint as well as strength. At 
moments of decisive tests, our nuclear power has 
been essential. But we have never rattled our 
rockets or come carelessly to the edge of war. 
Each of the great conflicts of this century have 
begun when nations wrongly thought others 
would shrink before their might. As I and my 
predecessors have said, we may have to use nu- 

clear weapons to defend American freedom, but 
I will never let slip the engines of destruction 
because of a reckless and rash miscalculation 
about our adversaries. 

Steps To Lessen Danger of Nuclear Conflict 

We have worked consistently to bring nuclear 
weapons under careful control and to lessen the 
danger of nuclear conflict, and this policy has 
been the policy of the United States of America 
for 19 years now, under both Democratic and 
Republican administrations, and this will con- 
tinue to be the policy of the United States of 

First, we have worked to avoid war by acci- 
dent or miscalculation. I believe the American 
people should know the steps that we have taken 
to eliminate the danger of accidental attack by 
our strategic forces, and I am going to talk about 
that tonight. The release of nuclear weapons 
would come by Presidential decision alone. 
Complex codes and electi'onic devices prevent 
any unauthorized action. Every further step 
along the way from decision to destruction is 
governed by the two-man rule. Two or more 
men must act independently and must decide 
the order has been given. They must independ- 
ently take action. An elaborate system of 
checks and counterchecks, procedural and me- 
chanical, guard against any imauthorized nu- 
clear bursts. In addition, since 1961 we have 
placed permissive-action links on several of our 
weapons. These are electromechanical locks 
which must be opened by secret combination 
before action at all is possible, and we are ex- 
tending this system. The American people and 
all the world can rest assured that we have taken 
every step man can devise to insure that neither 
a madman nor a malfunction could ever trigger 
nuclear war. 

We have also worked to avoid war by mis- 
calculation. There may be little time for deci- 
sion between our first warning and our need to 
reply. If our weapons could be easily de- 
stroyed, we would have to make the final deci- 
sion in a matter of minutes. By protecting 
our power against surprise attack, we give our- 
selves more time to confirm that war has actu- 
ally begun. Thus, we have placed missiles in 
protected, underground sites. We have placed 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


missiles beneath the seas. And we have pro- 
vided constant and secure communication be- 
tween strategic forces and the Commander in 
Chief, the President of the United States. 

I do not want to fight a war that no one 
meant to begin. We have worl^ed to limit the 
spread of nuclear weapons. The dignity and 
the interest of our allies demands that they 
share nuclear responsibility, and we have pro- 
posed such measures. The secrets of the atom 
are known to many people. No single nation 
can forever prevent their use. If effective arms 
control is not achieved, we may see the day 
when these frightful, fearful weapons are in 
the hands of many nations. Their concern and 
capacity for control may be more limited than 
our own. 

So our work against nuclear spread must 
go on. 

Tliird, we have developed ways to meet force 
with appropriate force by expanding and mod- 
ernizing our conventional forces. We have in- 
creased our ground forces. We have increased 
our tactical air force. We have increased our 
airlift. We have increased our stock of the 
most modern weapons. 

Thus, we do not need to use nuclear power 
to solve evei-y problem. We will not let our 
might make us musclebound. 

Fourth, we have worked to damp down dis- 
putes and to contain conflict. In an atomic 
world, any spark might ignite the bonfire. 
Thus, our responses are firm but measured. 
We saw an example of that in the Tonkin Gulf 
just the other day.= Thus, we pursue peaceful 
settlement in many remote comers of the globe. 

Fifth, we constantly work toward aims con- 
trol. A test ban agreement has ended atmos- 
pheric explosions which were poisoning the 
atmosphere. We have established a "hot line" 
for instant communication betM^een the United 
States and Moscow in case of crisis. 

As President, I ordered a cutback of unnec- 
essary nuclear production, and this year we sub- 
mitted several major new proposals to the 
disarmament conference in Geneva. I will 
pursue with vigor all of those proposals. 

Tliese are only first steps. But they point 
the way toward the ultimate elimination of 

° For background, see iUd., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258. 

ultimate destruction. So long as I am your 
President, I intend to follow that course with 
all the patience at my conxmand. In these 
ways, for 19 dangerous years, my three prede- 
cessors have acted to insure the survival of the 
Nation, to insure survival of our freedom and 
to insure survival of our race. That will always 
be my policy, and this is the wish of the people 
of the United States. 

Conflict among nations will trouble tliis 
planet and will test our patience for a long 
time to come. And as long as weapons are nec- 
essary, wisdom in their control is going to be 
needed. The man who guides them holds in liis 
hands the hopes of survival for the entire 

As I exercise my cares every day and every 
night, I often think of those who have just be- 
giui and those who are yet mibom. I want 
them to have a chance. With all my power, 
and all the aid the Lord offers me, I will help 
give them that chance. And, I think, so will 
all of you. 

In many ways the world tonight is now in 
tlie valley of the shadow. But there is an old 
poem that ends: "... westward, look, the 
land is bright." From this Western shore to- 
night I believe we, too, can see a brightening 
land. Our country is moving forward. It is 
carrying with it the advancing ranks of free- 
dom. Somehow or other — optimist that I am — 
I just believe that peace is coming nearer. If 
this is so, we may one day see fulfilled the 
prophecy of the Bible: "The morning stars 
sang together, and all the sons of God shouted 
for joy." 

Thank you; good night. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Aus- 
tralia, John Keith Waller, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Jolmson on September 18. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 406 dated September 18. 



Saudi Arabia 

Tlie newly appointed Ambassador of Saudi 
Arabia, Ibrahim 'Abd Allah al-Sowayel, pre- 
sented iiis credentials to President Johnson on 
September 18. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 409 dated September 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the Ee- 
public of Togo, Robert Ajavon, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on September 
18. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of State 
press release 408 dated September 18. 

The Unity of the American People 

FoUowing is the foreign policy port/on of 
remarhs made hy President Johnson on the 
steps of the State Capitol at Sacramento, Calif., 
on September 17 (White House press release 
{Sacramento) dated Septeniber 17 ; as-delivered 
text) . 

In our history, this is a day of highest honor. 
On this day 177 years ago our forefather or- 
dained and established the Constitution of the 
United States. Over the years, our Union has 
grown — from the Atlantic seaboard to the mid- 
Pacific; from the Florida Keys to the Far 
North; from 13 States to 50 States; from 3 
million citizens to nearly 200 million now. 

On that same rock of the Constitution, our 
Republic still stands. It stands stable, it stands 
secure, never stronger, never more successful, 
never so pi'osperous, never more determined to 
defend freedom or to preserve peace. Our sys- 
tem is succeeding as none before — anywhere, at 
any time — have ever succeeded. 

Of all the ages that men have lived, this age 
of America is the best of all. This is the real 
truth about America now — and you know it. 
But others must know this, and others must un- 
derstand it. That is why I have come to Cali- 
fornia to speak to you as I do today. I want 
my voice to be heard around the world for I 
speak not for myself but for the people I serve — 

the strong, the sensible, the moral, the decent, 
and the peaceful people of the United States. 

In this century, time and time again, other 
men in other lands have misled themselves about 
what they have heard or what they have read 
from our land in national election years. From 
Hitler in 1940 to Castro in 1962, grave miscal- 
culations have been made about America at 
election time. Our seasons of debate have been 
miscalculated as seasons of distraction and 
diversion and division. 

Tliere must be no such miscalculation in 1964. 
To those who look to us in trust, to all who wish 
us well, and to any who wish us ill, I say this 
today : Do not misjudge America's readiness 
or America's will. Do not miscalculate the 
unity of all the American people. 

Our nation, conceived in independence and 
brought forth in unity, has not now come to a 
time of disunity, or division, or diversion. 
Through all our years America's cause has been 
the cause of all of mankind, and this is our 
cause still. Our purpose is to live in freedom 
in a world of peace — and that American pur- 
pose will never change. But this generation of 
Americans, bloodied in battle, matured in peril, 
living in times when life was never better but 
never in graver danger — we know that eternal 
vigilance is the price of liberty. 

We know, as Tom Paine put it, "Those who 
would reap the benefits of liberty must bear like 
men the hardships of defending it." This we 
are doing, and this we shall always do. 

Here in California I do not need to recite 
the facts of America's strength and power, for 
you are the real builders of that strength. "We 
are strong; we are the strongest nation on the 
earth. Our allies trust that strength. Our 
adversaries must respect it. Men of all lands 
can have faith in its wise use. But the condi- 
tion of our strength is never static. As dangers 
change, our strength must change, and we are 
matching new dangers with sure reply. 

Seven years ago America awakened one morn- 
ing to find a Soviet satellite orbiting the skies. 
We found that our adversaries had acquired 
new capabilities for the use, or the misuse, of 
space. This administration moved to meet that 
challenge. We sought and we supported a res- 
olution unanimously approved in the United 
Nations banning the use of weapons of mass 


destruction in outer space. We have stated that 
we have no intention of putting warlieads into 
orbit. We have no reason to believe that any 
nation now plans to put nuclear warheads into 
orbit. We have more effective systems today. 

At the same time, we recognize the danger 
that an aggressor might some day use armed 
satellites to try to terrorize the entire popula- 
tion of the world, and we have acted to meet that 
threat. To insure that no nation will be tempted 
to use the reaches of space as a platform for 
weapons of mass destruction, we began in 1962 
and 1963 to develop systems capable of destroy- 
ing bomb-carrying satellites. We have now de- 
veloped and tested two systems with the ability 
to intercept and destroy armed satellites cir- 
cling the earth in space. I can tell you today 
that these systems are in place, that these sys- 
tems are operationally ready, that these systems 
are on alert to protect this nation and to protect 
the free world. 

Our only purpose still is peace, but should 
another nation employ such weapons in space, 
the United States will be prepared and will be 
ready to reply. 

But this is not the only new development. 
We are constantly seeking means of protecting 
this nation and our allies. Today I am able to 
tell you, and I am able to say to the entire world, 
we have a major increase in our capacity to 
detect hostile launches against the free world. 
Previously our radar capability has been limited 
to the detection of objects within the line of 
sight, but now we have produced, and we are 
installing, our first facilities for operational 
"over the horizon" radar. This radar will 
literally look around the curve of the earth, 
alerting us to aircraft, and especially to mis- 
siles, within seconds after they are launched. 

This capability will give us earlier warning 
than ever before of any hostile launches against 
this country. This means more time to prepare 
for our retaliatory strike and more time for us 
to decide — to decide with prudence and rea- 
son — the scope and the extent of our retaliatory 
strike. This is another advance in our vigil of 

peace to fulfill our responsibility as the sentry 
of security for all the free world. 

Let me also say this for the people of this 
nation, to all, also, who may listen in the world : 
Long ago a great American patriot said to his 
countrymen, "AVe have one country, one Consti- 
tution, and one destiny." So let all understand 
that this is America today. We are not a na- 
tion divided, or dividing, or divisible. Our 
will and our work today is that the meaning of 
our counti"y and our Constitution, and our des- 
tiny, shall be the same for all Americans, re- 
gardless of their creed, or their color, or their 
origins. What men are in America is not de- 
termined by their pedigree or their purse, but 
by their soul and spirit and by their God-given 
worth. Others have in times past believed that 
abundance and comfort and contentment would 
make Americans flabby and soft and weak. I 
know this generation of Americans is lean and 
strong and wise. As we have no delusions 
about the dangers of the world, we have no 
illusions about our challenges here at home. 
We Imow that we have problems to meet, and 
we know that we shall meet those challenges. 

Our abundance will not produce arrogance. 
Success will not turn us into suspicion of one 
another. We will never trade the pursuit of 
happiness for the persecutions of hate. If we 
have new prosperity in our pockets, we carry 
priceless values in our hearts. 

Our fathers followed the sun westward to 
open a continent. Today we guide our course 
by the star of the Constitution that our fore- 
fathers fixed for us as we go forth to open the 
new age of civilization in America. Others 
searched for gold. We searcli and we seek 
after far more precious values. We seek peace 
and justice and decency for all mankind every- 
where. Our arms shall be always ready, but 
our hand shall be always extended to those who 
will join us in a pursuit of peace with honor. 

We live in a glorious time in a wonderful 
land. We have much to be thankful for. We 
can coimt our blessings, and they are many. 
We have much to protect, and to preserve, and 
to perpetuate. 



Toward Victory for Freedom 

Address hy Secretary Ritsk ' 

I am deeply grateful for your invitation. 

My first visit with the Economic Club of 
Detroit was in early 19-19, just as I was return- 
ing from a meeting of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly in Paris. During the first por- 
tion of that Assembly our delegation was led 
by Secretary of State Marshall; during the lat- 
ter portion our chairman was Mr. John Foster 
Dulles. That Assembly met while our 80th 
Congi'ess was in session; and I can never for- 
get that every bill reported by the Senate For- 
eigii Relations Coimnittee of that Congress, 
under the chainnanship of Arthur Vandenberg, 
was reported unanimously. Shortly after my 
visit with you I provided the principal staff 
assistance to Secretaiy of State Dean Acheson 
and to Mr. John Foster Dulles for the latter's 
brilliant negotiation of the Japanese Peace 
Treat}'. I mention these things in order to say 
to you that my own roots are deep in the bi- 
partisan policies of tlie United States in this 
postwar period. 

Our foreign policy, in the most fundamental 
sense, derives from the kind of people we are 
and hope to be and the shape of the world 
around us. Neither element, in the longer nm, 
turns upon partisan differences among us. 
That is why President Truman and Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, later President Eisen- 
hower and Senator Lyndon Johnson, found it 
both possible and necessary to work together in 
the national interest of us all. 

Today I should like to talk to you for a few 
minutes about the relations of the American 
people with the peoples of the Communist 

' Made before the Economic Club of Detroit at De- 
troit, Mich., on Sept. 14 (press release 395). 

world. I shall speak of problems which exist 
among governments as well, but the objectives 
of our own policy are determined by our peo- 
ple — so that is where I should like to put the 

We as a people have a deep concern about the 
people in the Communist world. It is partly 
because we are so deeply attached to the notion 
that governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed. It is also because 
many among us have personal, cultural, and 
historical ties to areas which are now under 
Communist control. 

Let us begin by recognizing, very simply and 
very clearly, the nature of commimism and the 
problems it poses for us. During and after 
World War II, the governments of the world 
sat down to construct a tolerable world order. 
They had been chastened by World War II, and 
all of us were tliinking long and hard about 
the kind of world in which we wanted to live. 
The result was the United Nations Charter, rat- 
ified by our Senate by a vote of 89 to 2. 

Unf ortmiately, we could not say, m the words 
of the GI, that we "had it made." For Jo- 
seph Stalin had taken up the cold war, then 
refused to join in the serious work of the United 
Nations, and launched the postwar Commmiist 
world once again upon a program of world 
revolution. There then was posed the under- 
lying and continuing crisis of our period of 
history — the struggle between those who would 
build a world society on the basis of the charter 
and those who would brush that world aside 
and substitute for it a world revolution of coer- 
cion. I know of no part of tlie Communist 
world which has turned away from this ultimate 
objective, no part which does not believe that the 

OCTOBER 5, 1!)04 


triumph of communism is inevitable. Those of 
us who are the heirs of the great drama of free- 
dom, wliich has been playing for centuries, have 
no doubt about the outcome of the contest be- 
tween freedom and coercion, so long as free men 
remember that freedom is not free but requires 
continuing dedication, effort, and sacrifice. 

Ours is not the first period of history in 
which men have confronted each other with 
incompatible objectives. But ours is the first 
period of history in which man's powers of de- 
struction have reached such imimaginable pro- 
portions that all are required to think hard 
about means as well as ends. There can and 
will be a victory of freedom, but there is little 
victory for anyone in a pile of cinders. It is 
simply too late for man to be governed by his 
primitive passions. At a time when the arms 
race is taxing his scientific capacity beyond its 
limits, his survival depends upon his bringing 
to bear his highest intelligence to resolve the 
great issues of war and peace. 

Elements of U.S. Policy Toward Communist World 

There are those who believe that we ourselves 
should erect a solid wall between ourselves and 
the peoples of the Communist world — a wall of 
implacable hostility and rigidity, a wall through 
which the winds of freedom caimot blow. I 
would suggest that if we are seriously concerned 
about a victory for freedom and if we under- 
stand that this victory should come through 
peaceful process if possible, then no single 
phrase can describe an imaginative and pro- 
ductive policy toward those countries which call 
themselves Communist. 

Such a policy requires several elements. The 
first and harsh requirement is that we join with 
other free peoples to prevent the further ex- 
pansion of the Communist world by force and 
violence, whether directly by marching armies 
or indirectly by terrorism and subversion. I 
put the emphasis on expansion by violence, be- 
cause I do not know of any Coimnunist regime 
which has come to power through the free 
choice of the peoples concerned, registered in 
an electoral process. I find no newly independ- 
ent country, emerging out of colonial status, 
which has turned to the new colonialism of the 
Communist bloc. This first requirement of pol- 

icy means that we must maintain the most pow- 
erful aggi-egation of military strength the 
world has ever known, a strength which wins 
the respect of our adversaries. That is why 
we have greatly increased that strength in the 
past 3 years, why we have so massive a nuclear 
capacity, why we have increased the size and 
flexible capability of our conventional forces, 
why we have substantially added to our mobil- 
ity, why we have assisted our friends in many 
parts of the world to strengthen their own de- 
fenses, and why we have given special attention 
to the problems of guerrilla war. 

A second requirement of policy is that we ad- 
dress ourselves, with men and material, to the 
strengthening of those peoples who have elected 
freedom and who are prepared to build the 
world of the charter. Wlien we respond to 
calls for assistance in settling disputes within 
the free world, we reduce opportimities for those 
who would fish in troubled waters. "Wlien we 
ask for half of your Federal tax dollar for our 
armed forces, we ask for 3 to 4 cents of it in 
foreign aid to try to achieve our objectives 
without the use of those armed forces if pos- 
sible. In dozens upon dozens of individual ac- 
tions on every working day throughout the 
year we are joined with other free peoples in 
getting on with the peaceful purposes of man 
in advancing his daily business in every field of 
human affairs. 

Third, while there can be no yielding to 
aggressive violence, we must continue to ex- 
plore with the Communist world the possibili- 
ties of reducing the dangers of conflagration 
and of finding elements of common interest, 
whether large or small, on which mutually ad- 
vantageous agreements can be based. We our- 
selves should not declare as a matter of doctrine 
that no such common interests can be foimd. 
It would seem elementary, for example, that 
both sides would wish to avoid a thermonu- 
clear war if possible. We would hope that a 
common interest can be found in turning the 
arms race downward in order that vast re- 
sources can be freed for the unfinished busi- 
ness of the peoples of both sides. This is why 
we concluded the limited nuclear test ban treaty, 
to which 107 nations have now subscribed. 
This is why the so-called "hot line," still fortu- 
nately imused, was established between Mos- 



cow and Washington. This is why we 
continue to search diligently for further steps 
in the reduction of arms, even though our delib- 
erations in Geneva have thus far yielded tlie 
most mmimum results. If we try to find addi- 
tional points of agreement, it is not because we 
forget that large and dangerous issues, such as 
Berlin or Cuba or Southeast Asia, are still with 
us and unresolved. It is simply because the 
search for possible agreement must be pursued 
if man is to make a rational effort on behalf of 
his own survival. 

Trends in Eastern Europe 

Every thinking man who follows the situa- 
tion in Eastern Europe today realizes that the 
area is in a state of active ferment. Trends of 
enormous potential significance are visible — 
trends toward national independence and more 
personal freedom. Another element of our 
policy is, therefore, to encourage such trends. 
We cannot ignore the aspirations of the many 
millions who live in Communist-controlled ter- 
ritory and who have made it repeatedly clear 
that they expect some changes to be made. We 
should not stand in the way of steps being taken 
by some of their governments to respond to 
these aspirations and requirements. 

Thus we have welcomed initiatives in Eastern 
Europe to improve relations with Western 
Europe and with the United States. It is not 
insignificant that the jamming of the Voice of 
America has almost vanished, that tourism is 
opening up on a two-way basis, that trade ties 
are being strengthened, that national decisions 
are reappearing, that the needs of consumers 
are being heeded, that scientists and scholars 
are reentering the international community, 
that creative and performing arts are begin- 
ning to flow back and forth. It is not neces- 
sary to think of liberation as the result of some 
cataclysmic clash of nations; one can begin to 
think of liberation through change and through 
the reappearance of historic ties which lie 
deeply in the hearts of the peoples concerned. 

I would caution against impatience. I^et us 
recall that we assisted Yugoslavia when Tito 
asserted its nationhood in defiance of Stalin in 
1948. Let us remember that he stopped the use 
of Yugoslav soil for the guerrilla aggression 

against Greece, that he reached an agreement 
with Italy on Trieste, that 75 percent of his 
trade is now with the West, that thousands of 
Yugoslav workers hold jobs in Western Eu- 
rope, that Yugoslavia is not a member of the 
Warsaw Pact, that it has developed its own 
economic structure in which most of its farm- 
land is in private hands. 

We have treated Poland somewhat differ- 
ently from other Soviet bloc states for some 
years — especially since 1956, when the Poles won 
a measure of national autonomy and domestic 
liberalization. Most of Polish agriculture re- 
mains in private hands ; religion is strong ; Po- 
land has restored a broad range of its historic 
ties with the West. The Polish people have 
a long and distinguished record of fighting for 
freedom and independence. 

As President Joluison said last month,^ the 
American people regard the history of Polish 
patriotism as a record that should serve to "in- 
spire people everywhere to rededicate them- 
selves to the cause of freedom and justice." 

Recently Rumania has begun to manifest a 
strong spirit of independence. Although its 
government remains dedicated to its Commu- 
nist doctrine, it has been emphasizing Ruma- 
nian traditions and culture and making its 
economic decisions on the basis of its own na- 
tional requirements. It has moved to improve 
its relations with its historic associates in the 
West, to enlarge the opportunities for travel 
and exchange, and to play its own role in the 
larger international community. Similar de- 
velopments have been noted, in varying degrees, 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 

Please note that I have been referring to 
trends — not to a new world already in existence. 
There remain deep differences between us and 
the governments of Eastern Europe. So long 
as they are committed to their world revolu- 
tion, we must not permit our hopes to deflect us 
from a clear understanding of reality. But as 
President Johnson put it, ". . . our guard is 
up but our hand is out." " If any nation comes 
to us, not as a member of an international con- 
spiracy but as a peaceful nation prepared to 

■ For text of a Presidential proclamation on Warsaw 
Uprising Day, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 271. 
= Ihid, May 11, 1964, p. 726. 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


improve relations, to improve the lot of their 
own peoples, and to join in supporting the prin- 
ciples of the United Nations Charter, we are 
prepared to seek out with them points of mutual 
interest and cooperation. 

Finally, our relations with Communist coun- 
tries must leave room for the fact that Homo 
sapiens shares a common struggle against a 
frugal and often hostile natural universe. Epi- 
demic diseases are not politically formed and 
attack capitalists and Communists alike. 
Wheat rusts are as hungiy in our own Midwest 
as they are in the new lands of Siberia. If 
man is to require the desalted water of the open 
seas or a deeper understanding of his own planet 
and of the vast spaces about it, surely there is 
room for cooperation in assuring the survival 
of the human race and in improving our lot on 
this tiny speck on the universe. 

Militancy of Hanoi and Peiping 

I have reserved until now a special comment 
about Communist China and North Viet-Nam, 
because of their proclaimed inilitancy and their 
active aggressions against their neighbors to 
the south. It is true that these are matters 
which are under debate within the Communist 
world itself and on which deep divisions are 
apparent. The fact remains that the free world 
is the immediate target of this militancy. The 
Communist aggressions in South Viet-Nam and 
the military activities of the Pathet Lao in Laos 
are directed, supported, and, in part, supplied 
from the north. And Peiping continues to in- 
sist upon the surrender of Formosa as the .sme 
qua non of any improvement in relations with 

Hanoi and Peiping must come to the decision 
to leave their neighbors alone — and sooner 
rather than later. For surely the world has 
long since learned that a course of aggression 
leads only to disaster and that the time to stop 
it is at the beginning. 

U.S. Policy in South Viet-Nam 

Our own policy in South Viet-Nam is clear. 
As President Johnson has said, the United 
States intends to avoid the extremes. We do 
not intend to withdraw from South Viet-Nam 
or to negotiate any bogus neutralization. Such 

a course would sentence the 14 million South 
Vietnamese to absorption into the Communist 
world. On the other hand, we do not intend 
to strike out rashly into a major war in that 

The course we are following — and have been 
following for many years under Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson — is the 
course of helping the Republic of Viet-Nam 
with our experience and our resources to put 
down the Communists' campaign of terror and 
subversion and to forge the machinery of stable 
government in their own country. 

This is a difficult course. It is costing us the 
lives of American fighting men. It is costing 
us much each day in money and resources. It 
taxes our ingenuity and tries our patience. But 
it is the policy of wisdom and, if we stick to it, 
of ultimate success. 

Last week the President and his advisers had 
the opportunity to reexamine and reassess this 
policy with Ambassador Taylor, who came back 
to AVashington after 2 months of running the 
American team in Viet-Nam.* This has led us 
to reaffirm that, for all the twists and turns of 
fortune that may still lie ahead, this policy is 
the wisest and the best. 

In the last 2 days we have seen an example of 
the kind of development that makes the Viet- 
namese problem so complex and so different 
from any that this covmtry has found itself in- 
volved in. Politics in South Viet-Nam are 
nothing like politics in this country. The key 
problems are fair treatment for Buddhists and 
Catholics alike and a proper balance between 
civilian and military leaders. The strivings 
there for stability and for security from Com- 
munist aggression are Vietnamese strivings and 
Vietnamese responsibilities. It was for the 
Vietnamese themselves over the past 48 hours 
to find ways to deal with the latest eruption of 
political imrest and get back to the business of 
forming a lasting government. 

Before the weekend unrest, the United States 
felt that the triumvirate regime under Premier 
[Nguyen] Khanli represented the best machin- 
ery for progress toward solving those key prob- 
lems through a broadly based government and 
eventual elect ions. The United States still feels 

• ni(L., Sept. 28, 1964. p. 432. 



that tlie triumvirate arrangement holds the most 
promise and is therefore gratified that the au- 
thority of this government has been reaffirmed. 
The Vietnamese leaders should now be able to 
return to their efforts to build a stable govern- 
ment and to continue with the war against the 
Viet Cong. 

Commitment to the Right of Self-Determination 

Let me return to a scarlet thread of American 
policy. Wlien we were uniting ourselves as a 
nation of some 3 million people determined to 
be free, Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that gov- 
ernments derive their just powers from the con- 
sent of the governed. Let us recall that our 
Founding Fathers considered it to be a proposi- 
tion for all mankind and not merely for the 
American Colonies. That remains our commit- 
ment and the basis of our concern with com- 
munism. It explains why we cannot be content 
until the peoples of Eastern Europe have regis- 
tered their consent — have recovered what 
Woodrow Wilson called the right of self-deter- 

As President Johnson said in Detroit a week 
ago: ^ 

We have worked to help the nations of Eastern Eu- 
rope move toward independence. This is their peo- 
ple's goal and this is our people's continuing resolve. 

I have no doubt that this is the dii'ection in 
\\hich they are moving. But we cannot help 
those peoples by inflicting a catastrophe upon 
them. Nor can we help them by policies which 
drive them together in an armed camp and 
snuff out the possibilities of the normal human 
relations on which people and freedom flourish. 
Thus we say to the Commimist world : 

— If you pursue your world revolution by 
forceful and violent means, we shall oppose you 
with whatever means are required ; 

— If you wish to compete peacefully, we ac- 
cept the challenge and are prepared to compare 
results ; 

— If you are prepared to work as a loyal mem- 
ber of the United Nations and support its char- 
ter, you will find us ready to do the same ; 

— If you are prepared to settle outstanding 
problems on the basis of the freely expressed 

^ For text, see White House press release dated 
Sept. 7. 

wishes of the people directly concerned, we be- 
lieve that many of them would disappear; 

— If you are prepared to look for points of 
possible agreement, whether large or small, 
which would be mutually beneficial, we are glad 
to join in that search ; 

— If you are ready to find a way to turn the 
arms race downward in order that all of us 
can better meet the great needs of our peoples, 
we shall make an earnest effort to find the way 
to do so ; 

— If you are prepared to broaden cooperation 
on those matters of common interest to the hu- 
man race as a whole, we are ready to play our 

"V^^iat I am saying is that free men should 
consult their faith and confidence and not their 
fears. Men do not choose tyranny if they have 
a choice. Further, in comparing results free 
men have nothing to fear. It has been dramat- 
ically demonstrated that regimentation is not 
the road to efficiency. In the economic field, 
for example, the North Atlantic community 
alone has a gross national product of more than 
$1 trillion — more than 21^ times that of the 
Soviet bloc. And the gap continues to widen. 
Communist China's gross national product is 
lower than it was in 1960. The economy of 
Castro's Cuba has gone from bad to worse, 
despite massive external aid. It is no accident 
that one hears from the Communist world dis- 
cussions of decentralization, initiative, incen- 
tives, enterprise, and even profits. 

"We continue to live in a world filled with 
grave dangers and with many difficulties to be 
overcome, but the world of freedom grows in 
strength, politically, economically, and mili- 
tarily^but most important of all, in the com- 
mitments of ordinary men and women around 
the globe. 

The simple notions of freedom which serve 
as guides to our policy appeal to the deepest in- 
terests as well as to the highest aspirations of 
man. To serve them requires effort. We can- 
not remain free if we suppose that life can be 
merely comfortable and easy. There are bur- 
dens to be borne and some of them are large, 
but there is no shortage of dedication nor of 
gallantry among those who know what freedom 
means; and I, for one, look forward to the fu- 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


ture with confidence and am grateful that we 
do not have the problems which confront those 
who would deny freedom to men who will insist 
upon it. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of September 14 

Press release 402 dated September 14 

Secretary Rusk: I am very happy to wel- 
come as our guests today to this press con- 
ference about 21 distinguished journalists who 
are here from 17 countries, as guests of our 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Aifairs. 
We hope that you will enjoy tliis session, 
whether I do or not. 

Earlier today I gave a speech in Detroit,^ 
which had in it some comments on some matters 
that may be of some interest to you; so I 
thought that we might get together for a little 
bit and see whether you had some questions. 
Having made my introductoiy statement at 
lunch today in Detroit, I think I won't bother 
you wiit-h a volimtary statement at this point. 

Recent Events in Saigon 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what in your judgment is 
the imfact of the uprising in Viet-Nam yester- 
day on the future prospects for getting on with 
the war? 

A. Well, we hope very much that the events 
of tlie last 2 days will underline the impoi'tance 
of the projected plan which the triumvirate an- 
nounced 10 days ago to constitute a council, 
broadly representative of the major elements 
in the population, whose task it will be in the 
weeks immediately ahead to devise a constitu- 
tion for the country which will make it possible 
for all elements in the country to be repre- 
sented, and to bring more civilians into the 
government to take on those tasks that are 
essentially civilian in character and permit the 
military leaders to concentrate more and more 
of their attention on the war against the Viet 

' See p. 463. 

We know this has been in their minds — in the 
minds of the military leaders for some time. 
And the machinery which was established under 
the leadership of the Acthig Chief of State, 
General [Duong Van] Minh, seemed to us to 
be a way to move on that purpose with dispatch. 

We do believe that it was important and 
gratifying that these recent incidents did not 
lead to armed conflict and to violence among 
elements of the armed forces, and we hope that 
these incidents will have a stabilizing effect and 
that people, having now seen this prospect of 
violence which was avoided, will now recognize 
the importance of getting on with it through 
consultation and movement toward a stable and 
more permanent constitutional system. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have a good, intel- 
ligible analysis of what the elements in the un- 
rest are in Saigon today? 

A. Well, if j'ou are referring to the events 
of these past 2 days, I think that it is fair to 
say that basically this came from the disgrun- 
tlement of certain officers in connection with 
their removal from command and their removal 
from office. We did not have any reason to 
suppose that the troops and the junior officers 
of the elements that were moved into Saigon 
from nearby areas had a political program in 
mind or that they were particularly aware of 
what was going on. But the officers who were 
primarily involved were officers who had been 
sacked by the Government in the course of the 
last week or so. And ob\aously they were not 
very happy about the situation. 

We do, however, again come back to the 
point that relatively small elements of the 
armed forces were involved, perhaps 8 to 10 
battalions, and that it was apparent that tlie 
armed forces were not prepared to follow them 
in a deeper, divisive, and violent disagreement 
within the armed forces. We found consider- 
able encouragement in that. 

Now, it is going to take some time to build the 
permanent kind of stable and constitutional 
government that they are looking for out there. 
I think that those of us who are concerned 
about this on a day-to-day matter — day-to-day 
basis — ought to pause and recall that for al- 
most 25 yeai"s South Viet-Nam has been in- 
volved in violence and disorder and the highest 



of tensions: the period of Japanese occupation, 
the war against the French occupation, the di- 
vision of the coimtry between Nortli and South, 
and the consolidation of the North as a Com- 
munist country, the tragic events that set group 
against group in the closing weeks of Presi- 
dent Diem's regime, and the changes that have 
occurred since. These have created residues of 
problems, and it is not easy to set aside all 
that is past in order to get together on the im- 
portant requirements of the future. 

So tliis is understandable, even though we, 
and I think the present leaders, are impatient 
to get all of that behind us and build the kind 
of government that can move the country on 
to the kind of future that is waiting for it, if 
it can have some peace internationally and 
some unity and confidence in the country 

Hope for Moratorium on Lesser Differences 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past, in connection 
toith similar incidents in Laos, perhaps even 
other countries, you yourself and other mem- 
Tiers of the administration have remarked 
pointedly that the United States cannot salvage 
a situation where there is no loill and no evi- 
dence on the scene that the people themselves 
are willing to help themselves. Have you 
begun to talk in these terms to the people in 

A. "Well, I think the important pomt which 
we have made in conversations and discussions 
is that we understand that there are reasons 
for some of these differences in the coiuitry. 
But these are differences which are of secondary 
importance compared to — with the overriding 
necessity of saving the country, establishing its 
security, maintaining its independence. And 
therefore we would hope that these lesser dif- 
ferences would be put on ice, that a moratorium 
would be declared on them, until the main job 
of building a secure and independent country 
has been accomplished. And we have tried to 
make that clear. And I think that we have 
made some headway on that point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoth General [Maxwell 
/?.] Taylor and former Ambassador [Henry 
Cabot] Lodge have said that if South Viet- 

Nam could establish tJie stable constitutional 
government you mentioned, the war against the 
Communists would be over. On that basis, 
then, would you say that the primary problem 
in South Viet-Nam is political and governmen- 
tal, rather than an actual military operation 
against the Communists? 

A. Well, I think you would have to interpret 
their remarks against the background of the 
l>roader view of what they themselves have of 
a situation. I think it isn't literally true that 
tlie moment a stable government is formed that 
tl\e problem of the Viet Cong would disappear. 
But what is time is that we are not aware of 
any important group in South Viet-Nam other 
than the Viet Cong itself that looks to Hanoi 
for an answer. 

These officers who led these battalions into 
Saigon Sunday [September 13] declared their 
determination to win the war against the Com- 
munists. But what is needed is the sort of 
structure which has been steadily building in 
the provinces for the past several months, the 
sort of structure which provides the admin- 
istrative skeleton of the country which insures 
that public services are operating efficiently, 
that the police are where they should be to pro- 
vide the elements of security so that those who 
cooperate with the Government need not fear 
unduly the attempts of the Viet Cong to break 
up that system. 

Now, there has been considerable headway in 
the provinces in this matter in the past several 
months and these events in Saigon have not 
brought about dislocation and changes in the 
provinces of the sort that cuts across the effort 
of the Government. But thus far there has not 
been the complete imity and the stability of 
the Government at the very top in Saigon 
among the top several dozen leaders with the 
full undei-standing of the people of Saigon. 
This problem is heavily concentrated in Saigon 
itself. And we hope now that these leaders will 
see the dangers of incidents such as that which 
has just occurred and will put lesser problems 
behind them and move toward the imity which 
is so urgently required. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel perhaps that we 
Americans, and the rest of the world as welly 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


have overestinuited American -power to infiu- 
ence this situation? 

A. Well, I think there may be some Amer- 
icans who expect miracles from the United 
States in these far-off and distant places. Let 
me remind you once again that there are a bil- 
lion and a half people in Asia, half of them in 
the Communist world, half of them in the free 
world. We are not going to find answers for a 
billion and a half people by simply saying to 
them, "Now, just move over and we Americans 
will settle these things for you."' That is not 
the way it's going to happen. 

We can help those Asians who are deter- 
mined to be free to develop the strength and 
the structure of the organization and the eco- 
nomic base, develop their public services, so 
that tliey have the strength and the capacity 
to meet their problems themselves. And this 
is what we have been trying to do for the past 
10 years in South Viet-Nam. 

After the division of the country. President 
Eisenhower determined to provide very sub- 
stantial assistance to South Viet-Nam. I point 
out to you that in the years 1956 to '59 some vei-y 
important progress was made economically and 
from the point of view of administration, and 
they were well on their way toward peace and 
toward prosperity. But then the North decided 
that this was perhaps getting too much for 
them and they decided in 1959 to renew their 
attempts to undermine and take over South 
Viet-Nam, and they publicly proclaimed that 
in 19fiO. 

So these pressures from the outside have to be 
met, have to be resisted. But these are matters 
which Asians themselves must have a full part 
in as their own problem. We can help and as- 
sist. And we can also be sure that these do not 
become matters of all-out, wholesale invasions 
with organized armed forces and things of that 
sort, that these people have a chance to — ^these 
14 million people in South Viet-Nam— have a 
chance to resolve their problems themselves. 

Problems of Buddhist Element 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the organized BuddMsts 
are "being spohen of as having a major veto 
-power in any future Vietnamese stability: {1) 
Do you think this is true; and (Z) , what do you 

think their objectives are, what are they seek- 

A. AYell, I would not want to offer a gen- 
eralization about 80 percent of the iDopulation 
of South Viet-Nam. 

Thei-e, of course, have been some problems in 
the past, as you know, some of them originating 
out of religious differences. Some of tliem per- 
haps have been stimulated during President 
Diem's regime. Some of them are more political 
in character, but political points of view which 
represent elements that have one particular re- 
ligious belief rather than another. And I 
would not want to call that necessarily a reli- 
gious difference. 

But, with 80 percent of the population Bud- 
dhist, it is very important that the Buddhist 
element, just as with the Catholic element, find 
a basis on which they work together to build 
and support a government which can build 
their country's security and independence. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. I will take one back here. 

Questions of Trade and Immigration 

Q. The EepubUean vice pre.^idential candi- 
date last week said that a ividespread loss of 
American jobs would result from both the Ken- 
nedy Round and amending the immigration 
lato. Woidd you comment on th is? 

A. Well, first, on the Kermedy Round, let me 
point out that we have been exporting at a rate 
of about $24 billion for the last several months, 
and exports mean jobs. We know that our own 
economy can expand as a part of an expanding 
world economy. 

One of the difficulties is that those who may 
find themselves somewhat paced by or in com- 
petition with imports usually, in our system, 
are more vocal and articulate than those who 
live on providing exports. So these matters do 
not readily come into balance in public 

But the Trade Expansion Act. which was 
passed by a very solid bipartisan majority, has 
as its purpose the expansion of world trade, in 
which we will sell more and bTiy more. And 
in those combinations, there will bo more jobs 
for Americans and more jobs for people in other 



As for the immigration law, the administi'a- 
tion's proposal - there has nothing to do with 
the quantity of immigrants coming into this 
country. Under existing law, we have about 
150,000 coming in under quotas. Our estimate 
is that the new — the proposed — bill might add 
net perhaps 13,000 or 14,000 additional immi- 
grants to those 150,000 or so. 

The purpose of that bill is to bring its under- 
lying philosophy into line with the actual prac- 
tice, the actual performance of the United 
States in this postwar period. 

"When we talk about national origins as a 
basis for an immigration law — and recall that 
only 35 percent of those who come into this 
country have come in on that basis and that as 
far as the Asian Triangle feature of that law 
is concerned, only 10 percent of those from that 
area have come in on the basis of our existing 
hiw, that 65 percent of our immigrants and 90 
percent of those f x-om Asian comitries liave come 
in through special action taken by the Congress 
to deal witli the immigration problem — then, 
what we are saying is, let us get our tlieoiy in 
line with our performance and let us remove 
this national-origins theoi-y, which is not well 
received by many of our own people as well as 
by most of the rest of the world, and put it on 
another basis. 

That is the purpose. It has nothing to do 
witli the scale of immigration, nor the standards 
with respect to the types of immigrants who 
would be admitted or tliose who have special 
preference. It has nothing to do with those 
things. It is to eliminate that national-ori- 
gins system. 

It makes it unnecessaiy for me to go to one 
of our own citizens wlio comes from a country 
witli a very small quota and say to him, "Well, 
you just barely are an American citizen; we 
don't want too many more like you, so we will 
have only 100 more of you a year," and also 
give offense to dozens and dozens of countries 
abroad, when it is imnecessary — and when the 
perfoi-mance of the country since World War 
II has been wholly in the other direction, and 
a much more acceptable and decent performance 

tlian the principle of our basic law would have 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are re-ports that a 
number of the younger generals made a num- 
ber of demands upon Khanh as a price for re- 
sisting the rel)el movement. Is this true, and, 
if so, does this mean that loe are likely to see 
a neu) form of leadership and a new realine- 

A. I saw some tickers on that. I wasn't very 
clear as to just what those references were. 
One of them indicated that these were some 
proposals made last Friday to General Khanh. 
I doubt that these had anything to do specifi- 
cally with this particular action over the week- 
end. But I will have to look further into that. 
I have just seen those tickers. This particular 
matter has not featured in our discussions of 
this matter with the Govermnent out there in 
the last 2 days. 

Aid to India 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, last week Soviet Rus- 
sia promised very sizable military assistance to 
India. I tlvink in June you did about the same 
thing. I toas wondering whether you would 
class this as one of the instances of agreement 
hy coincidence. 

A. Well, I do not believe this is coincidence. 
I believe that India in this instance has felt 
that under the pressures that were directed 
against it, in the attack directed against it in 
1962, when they needed to strengthen their 
armed forces — they asked us for certain assist- 
ance; we tried to provide certain assistance.' 
They asked the Soviet Union for some. In both 
cases that assistance was provided. But I think 
I would not want to follow that very far down 
the track at tliis point. 

The Malaysian Situation 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Britain is reported as hav- 
ing decided to retaliate in case Indonesia at- 
tacks Malaysia. Now, there are reports that 
you were informed. Is that true, sir — and if 
I may ask, what was your reaction^ 

' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 
298 ; Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211 ; July 20, 1964, p. 98 ; and Aug. 
24, 1964, p. 276. 

' For background, see ibid., Dec. 3, 1962, p. 837, and 
Dec. 10, 1903, p. 874. 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


A. Well, I saw a ticker just a few moments 
ago indicating — stating that we had advised 
the United Kingdom not to do a;, y, or z. This 
was attributed to authoritative sources. We 
have not given the British Government any 
advice about what it sliould or should not do 
in meeting its defense commitments to Malaysia. 
This is a very direct responsibility under very 
clear arrangements which they have as fellow 
Commonwealth members. And we — as we have 
indicated to the Security Council^— we hope 
very much that force will not be used as an 
instnmient of policy in this situation by In- 
donesia, that this matter can be settled by dis- 
cussion through peaceful processes; and we 
hope that the Security Council, which is now 
in session on this matter, can find a way to 
avoid further military confrontation. 

Discussions Witli Canada 

Q. Mr. Secretary., can you give us any infor- 
mation about the discussions in Canada with 
Mr. Martin [Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Paul Martin'] ? 

A. Well, I commented on that briefly after 
I saw him this morning. We had a meeting for 
about an liour and a half at his home in Wmd- 
sor. We seize every chance we can to get to- 
gether for a little working session. We pretty 
much boxed the compass of issues, not only those 
affecting our two countries but others around 
the world because Canada is very much involved 
in many of them, such as Cyprus and the South- 
east Asian problem. 

I did take the opportimity to express our ap- 
preciation to him and to the Canadian Govern- 
ment for the fact that we have brought the 
Columbia Eiver treaty to a conclusion. This 
is a special week for that, because we are laimch- 
ing those treaty arrangements. Our President 
and their Prime Minister are meeting this week 
to celebrate that fact. 

And I also expressed my respect for the effort 
that Canada has made in connection with the 
Cyprus matter : the provision of troops for the 
U.N. forces and the active role they played at 
the U.N. to try to find a peaceful settlement for 
that question. 

But there were a number of things. We 
didn't waste too much words; we covered a 
number of subjects in an hour and a half. 

Q. Mr. Secretary., thank you very much. 

Von Steuben Day 


Whereas many people of German descent and many 
German American organizations throughout the United 
States will celebrate the birth date of General Fried- 
rich Wilhelm von Steuben ; and 

Whereas, the American people of all national origins 
should commemorate the significant contributions 
which this great German patriot made to the gaining 
of our American independence and the establishment 
of our sovereignty ; and 

Whereas the name von Steuben serves as a reminder 
of the tremendous influence and important bearing the 
lives of the many other great German-bom American 
patriots have had upon the development and expansion 
of our nation ; and 

Whereas our nation is deeply indebted to the 8 mil- 
lion Germans who migrated to this country and to their 
estimated 26 million lineal descendants living today 
in virtually every community of our country : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JoHNSON, President of 
the United States of America do hereby designate Sep- 
tember 17, 1964 as von Steuben Day. I invite all the 
people of the United States to observe this day with 
appropriate ceremonies and activities. I suggest that 
programs commemorating the birth of von Steuben 
serve also as reminders of the contribution of the dedi- 
cated American citizens of German derivation. 

I ask those great patriotic organizations bearing von 
Steuben's name or the name of other patriots of hia 
nationality to stress in their celebrations the debt of 
gratitude which all Americans owe our Founding 
Fathers for the democratic principles and ideals of 
freedom which motivated their great decisions and 
which we today are dedicated to protect, to follow and 
to preserve for posterity. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of 
September in the year of our Lord nineteen 
[seal] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the 
one hundred and eighty-ninth. 


By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

♦ lUd., Sept. 28, 1964, p. 448. 

' No. 3615 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 13069. 



The Responsibilities of a Global Power 

hy Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Public discussions of foreign policy are ster- 
ile and irrelevant when they are based on asser- 
tions that deny the hard i-ealities of the modern 

One such assertion, often rejieated, is that 
foreign policy could really be a simple busi- 
ness if its practitioners would only follow a 
few simple principles. 

This, I can assure you, is an illusion — and a 
dangei-ous one at that. 

The conduct of foreign relations by the lead- 
ing power of the free world during a period of 
pervasive turmoil is anything but sunple. It is, 
in the nature of things, complex, subtle, and 
demanding. It is not neat. It lacks mathe- 
matical precision. To its practitioners, it is 
often frustrating. 

But it is vital business for all of us — since 
the stakes are no less than the peace and even 
the survival of the world. 

Obviously we Americans should clearly de- 
fine our foreign policy objectives. We have 
done so. Obviously we should proclaim the 
fundamental principles on which we act and 
take care that our actions are consistent with 
those precepts. This we have done also. 

But we should not be misled by rlietoric, and 
we should not confuse the simple platitude with 
the solution of complicated foreign policy 

Two Difficult Questions 

I make these comments as a prelude to dis- 
cussing two questions that are central to any 
serious discussion of our foreign policy. These 
questions are difficult. They cannot be answered 
by vague abstractions but only by a hard look at 
the underlying nature of today's world. 

The first question is one which all of us with 
official responsibility for foreign policy re- 

peatedly ask ourselves : Wliy is it necessary for 
the United States to be involved or committed 
in the far corners of the world ? Don't we carry 
an inordinate share of the free world's burden, 
and why should we? 

The second question, like the first, is trouble- 
some but quite as pertinent : Wliy do so many 
problems defy clear solutions? Why can't we 
use the vast power at our command to make 
other nations do what we want them to do ? 

We shall not find the answer to either problem 
by nostalgic references to an earlier era. These 
questions can be answered only in terms of the 
conditions and requirements of today's world. 
For whatever one may think or say, one fact is 
clear above all : The world today is wholly dif- 
ferent from what it was before the Second 
World War, and America's role in the world is 
wholly different. Anyone who fails to realize 
these facts will be befuddled by the problems we 
are encountering— and he will reach, not for the 
complex answer that has a chance to be right, 
but for the simple answer that is very likely to 
be wrong. 

Clianges in tlie Postwar World 

The great changes that have occurred in the 
last two decades are familiar enough. Their 
full implications are much less widely under- 

The first great postwar change was the Iron 
Curtain drawn between East and West bringing 
with it the cold war — a contest on a world scale 
between two major centers of power with com- 
peting ideologies. 

The second was the development of weapons 

^Address made before the Chicago Council on For- 
eign Relations at Chicago, 111., on Sept 18 (press re- 
lease 407). 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 



of nuclear destruction, together with rocketry 
and delivery systems. Today no corner of the 
world is immune fi-om the danger of nuclear 

The third was the dismantling of the great 
colonial systems, through which a handful of 
nations had ruled a gi-eat portion of the world's 
population, and their replacement by 50 or more 
new nations — some bom prematurely, almost all 
bom weak. 

The fourth is a process— still continuing— 
to bring about the unification of Western Eu- 
rope. Already Western Europe has achieved 
what one might call strategic unification, in the 
sense that there is unlikely to be again a great 
war between Western European powers. Eco- 
nomic unification is well underway, but politi- 
cal unity is still unrealized. 

The -fifth and most recent has been Commu- 
nist China's contest with the Soviet Union for 
a dominant role in the world revolution and 
the drive to extend Chinese influence into other 
developing areas of the world. 

Revised Power Arrangements 

Tliese epic developments — compressed within 
a fantastically short period of less than 20 
years — have drastically revised the power ar- 
rangements of the world. They have pro- 
foimdly affected all aspects of foreign policy. 

They have created a new concept of scale in 
world affairs. They have made it necessary 
for nations to command vast resources if they 
are to play a major world role. 

Alexander conquered much of the known 
world with only 30,000 armed men. Two and 
a half million Roman citizens ruled an empire 
that spread from the North Sea to the Arabian 
Desert. In modem times relatively small 
states have played major world roles through 
the leverage of colonial systems that have given 
them direct control over enomious resources 
and populations. 

But today the concepts — even the terminol- 
ogy — of past years that drew a distinction be- 
tween great and small powers require revision. 
Since the latter 1940's, crucial elements of world 
power have been heavily concentrated in two 
nations — the United States and the Soviet 

Union. Each is organized on a continent-wide 
basis. Each commands enormous material re- 
sources and the highly skilled manpower to put 
them to work. Each possesses modern and 
sophisticated teclinology and vast nuclear arma- 
ment. Each is a global power. One seeks a 
world of freedom, the other a world of coercion. 

And so there is no longer a concert of great 
powers in the 19th-century sense. Instead, two 
global powers each play a worldwide role. 

The Soviet Union still seeks to play that role 
by exercising power through direct political 
control of subject peoples — but its dominance 
over its satellites is inevitably weakening. 

A free- world nation — no matter how large — 
cannot, consistent with its own principles, exert 
direct political control over subject peoples. 
It must employ a full complement of political, 
economic, and moral resources. It must con- 
duct its affairs under the constant pressure of 
a competing power system. 

It must deal with nations deeply suspicious — 
for good historical reasons — of superior power, 
nations determined to stay disengaged from the 
global power struggle between East and West. 

Finally, it must, while maintaining massive 
defensive strength, seek to achieve its objec- 
tives without resort to force. Moreover, it 
must prevent, so far as possible, the employ- 
ment of force in conflicts between other nations 
that could spread into a major conflagration. 

The Wider Concerns of Today's World 

These are the conditions of today's world — 
the conditions under which the United States 
has been able to make its influence and leader- 
ship effectively felt. 

But the conduct of the world's business un- 
der these conditions is not easy. It requires 
immense resources. It also requires the will 
to employ them. It requires, in other words, 
a total world involvement that is possible only 
for a nation with the size and ability to meet 
competing challenges wherever they appear. 

The question is sometimes asked : "Wliy is the 
United States always in the middle of every 
international crisis? The answer I tliink is 
clear : Power is always exercised, not from the 
sidelines, but from the middle of a problem. 



I put special emphasis on this point since 
it reflects the critical diffei-ence between the 
position of the United States and the earlier 
traditional view of what it meant to be a world 
power. I can best express this by drawing a 
distinction between global responsibilities and 
far narrower interests. 

In the 19th century and as late as tlie 1930's, 
nations acted openly and unabashedly in pur- 
suit of narrowly defined mterests, although such 
interests sometimes embraced colonial posses- 
sions that covered wide stretches of the globe. 

The national interest which we in the United 
States pursue today is of quite a different order. 
It cannot be expressed merely in terms of the 
defense of bits and pieces of real estate with 
which we enjoy a special political or economic 
relation. It is necessarily focused on wider 
concerns — how freedom can be preserved from 
Communist aggression, how local conflicts can 
be prevented from leading to worldwide devas- 
tation, how to make the free world hum with 
the sounds of development and prosperity. 

Some nations not organized on a continental 
scale are reluctant to accept their share of this 
worldwide burden. To some extent this is a 
psychological problem. Since these nations re- 
gard themselves as lacking the resources that 
would permit them to play the role of global 
power, they often contribute less than they 
might to the common effort. 

Such nations are not indifferent to the world 
struggle, nor are they necessarily diffident about 
expressing their views on all aspects of woi-ld 
affairs. But to play a useful and effective role 
on the world stage it is not enough for a nation 
simply to make known its views. It must be 
willing to commit its share of resources to the 
solution of common world problems. When na- 
tional foreign policy positions are vigorously 
promoted without regard to their effect on re- 
sponsible efforts that other states are making, 
free-world interests may well be injured. 

America's Tasks as a Global Power 

From these comments emerges the hard core 
of an answer to my first question. The United 
States today is carrying a large part of the 
responsibilities of the free world because we 

must. If we did not play our present role, 
many essential responsibilities would not be met 
at all. 

"What are these major tasks that America 
lias assumed as the one global power in the free 
world? They are, it seems to me, the 
following : 

First., to provide the major share of the de- 
fense of free- world interests against an aggres- 
sive Commmiist state which is at once 
both ideological and imperialistic. 

Second, to contribute technology and re- 
sources to the economic and political develop- 
ment of the free nations that have arisen from 
the ashes of old colonial systems. 

Third, to use its prestige and moral leader- 
ship to prevent internecine quarrels between 
other free-world states and to bring about their 
settlement if they cannot be prevented. 

The United States is the only free- world na- 
tion with the power — and the prestige that de- 
rives from the responsible exercise of power — 
to pursue these purposes in eveiy continent and 
on every sea. This power remains effective only 
because the world knows that we are prepared 
to use it — and will ivy to use it wisely. 

Sharing World Responsibilities 

This does not mean that we should rest con- 
tent with arrangements as they are. We are 
continuing to seek ways and means of devising 
a more equitable sharing of responsibilities with 
other free- world states. 

Hopefully we can expand the sense of sharing 
in free-world problems by continuing to im- 
prove the scope and mechanisms of consultation 
within the Western alliance. We have made 
progress along tliis line, and we shall make 

But the key problem will remain that most 
of the Atlantic nations, as now organized, are 
too small to participate with full effectiveness 
in the gi-eat matters that affect the destiny of 
their own peoples. We might as well face the 
fact that full and effective reallocation of world 
responsibilities to reflect comparative wealth 
and resources will be possible only when other 
free-world industrial peoples have organized 
their political and economic affairs on a scale 

OCTOBER 5, 19 64 


adequate to the requirements of the modem 

The Drive Toward European Unity 

This point lias not been lost on our European 
friends. Mucli of the force beliind tlieir drive 
toward unity has derived from a deeply felt 
concern of the European peoples that they will 
be foreclosed from making tlieir appropriate 
contribution to world affairs so long as they are 
organized as national states that are small in 
mid-20th-century terms. 

Since the Schuman Plan was first proposed, 
Europe has made great strides toward unity. 
But over the last year and a half this drive has 
been checked by a counterrevolution of nation- 
alism. Signs of progress are, howevei', again 
perceptible, and the inescapable logic of unity 
remains a strong latent force. Hopefully, lost 
momentum will bo recaptured in the months 

The achievement of this objective is unfin- 
ished business of the first order of urgency. 

Diplomacy and National Pride 

This brings me then to the second question 
that I mentioned at the outset: Wliy cannot 
America always use her power decisively in deal- 
ing with problems around the world ? 

One answer to (his question has already been 
suggested in what I have said earlier. In this 
postcolonial era, business must be conducted be- 
tween sovereign governments on a basis of 
mutual self-respect. This is a point of great 
importance. Peoples who have only recently 
achieved their independence are fiercely sensi- 
tive to the danger of losing it or compromising 
it — as they should be, and as indeed we are 

We must treat these nations with respect if 
we expect them to develop the self-respect that 
is essential to responsible government. This 
does not mean paternalism. Nor is it a question 
of being nice to people — or of not hurting their 
feelings. We have a great stake in encouraging 
these new nations to preserve and develop their 
national pride, which is an essential and con- 
structive force in biiilding their societies. 

Dealing with flie now nations under these 
circumstances is often a delicate business. It is 

always a complex business. We can teach — at 
the same time that we are trying to learn. We 
can seek to persuade. We can help them to 
identify their own best interests. We can lead. 
But we would defeat our own interests- — and be- 
tray our own traditions of democi-acy and 
diversity — if we tried to coerce or compel them 
by force — except, of course, where their conduct 
threatens our vital national interests or the 
peace of the world. 

Leadership and Responsibility 

Another factor that conditions our dealings 
with other nations is that, as the global power 
of the free world, we Americans must take con- 
sistently responsible positions. We cannot af- 
ford to pursue narrow objectives that would 
\\eaken free- world defenses or impoverish 
other free- world countries or defeat larger free- 
world objectives. We cannot afford to sacrifice 
long-term objectives to short-range advantages, 
or to short-lived popularity. 

Responsibility in the conduct of foreign af- 
fairs is essential to our leadership of the fi-ee 
world. Those of us who are privileged to help 
the President with the conduct of American for- 
eign policy are sometimes tempted to envy the 
foreign office of some smaller nation that can 
indulge in the luxury of irresponsible action. 
Not being a global power, the consequences of 
its irresponsibility are limited. But for Amer- 
ica to act in the same fashion would produce 
consequences on a giant scale that could seri- 
ously endanger free-world interests. 

Interdependence: The Example of Cyprus 

The fact that, the policies and actions of a 
gigantic America are felt to the far corners of 
the earth — that a whisper in Washington is 
amplified to a shout halfway around the woi'ld — 
is only one of the sobering elements that condi- 
tion the employment of power. Another is the 
high degree of interdependence among na- 
tions — which is a special characteristic and 
quality of the modern world. Today tlie econ- 
omies of the free world are closel}' intertwined. 
So also are our political interests. Actions 
taken in one part, of the world can instantly 
and automatically atl'ect the well-being of peo- 
ples thousands of miles away. 



As a result, the United States can never ap- 
I^roacli any foreign policy problem in isolation. 
Almost every problem must be dealt with on a 
number of different levels. 

Tliis point is well tlemonstrated by the dilli- 
culties that we face in connection with Cyprus. 
There the United States has been tiying hard 
to heli> bring about a solution to a problem 
which, in its simplest tenns, is a neighborhood 
quarrel between 450,000 Greek Cypriots and 
100,000 Turkish Cypriots on a tiny Mediter- 
ranean island. If the Cyprus problem were 
merely a neighborhood quari-cl, America could 
ignore it. But such, unfortunately, is far from 
the case. This bloody feud has already had 
consequences far beyond the island. Its con- 
tinuance jeopardizes world peace and imperils 
a wide range of vital Western interests. I 
know of no better illustration of the complexi- 
ties of international affairs in the modern world 
than this seemingly simple dispute on a small 

First, as a result of ethnic ties and a compli- 
cated treaty structure, this local quarrel threat- 
ens to produce an armed conflict between Greece 
and Turkey. 

Second, it affects the relations of the Greek 
and Turkish Governments with the Government 
of Cyprus. 

Third, it concerns Great Britain as one of 
the guarantor powers with strategic bases on 
the island. 

Fourth, it involves the relationship of the 
Government of Cyprus to the British Common- 
wealth, of which it is a member. 

Fifth, it threatens the stability of one flank 
of our NATO defenses and consequently con- 
cei'ns all NATO partners. 

Sixth, because the Security Council has 
undertaken to keep peace on the island, the 
Cyprus problem has become an active item in 
the parliamentary diplomacy practiced in New 

Seventh, it has stimulated a new relationship 
between the Government of Cyprus and other 
nona lined countries with which it has recently 
sought to associate itself. 

Eighth, because of Archbishop Makarios' 
flirtations with Moscow, this local quarrel could 
bring about the intrusion of the Soviet Union 
into the strategic eastern Mediterranean. 

Each of these elements bears on the others. 
And one element quite often operates to frus- 
trate the effective utilization of others in the 
search for a solution. 

This recent phase of the Cyprus problem has 
occupied the day-and-night attention of some 
of the world's leading statesmen for many 
months — including the President of the United 
States. Intensive diplomacy has averted a suc- 
cession of crises — any one of which could well 
have led to bloody and dangerous war. This 
patient effort will, I am convinced, produce a 
final solution — but only after many more days 
and nights of delicate and painstaking diplo- 

In the 19th century the Cyi^rus problem 
might have been quickly disposed of by one or 
more great powers ordering up a few gunboats. 
But even in those days such an employment of 
force was hazardous, since it could — and all 
too often did — lead to larger conflicts. Today, 
world affairs are far more intricate and the 
dangers far gi'eater. Force is no longer a 
substitute for diplomacy. Any effort to resolve 
the Cyprus problem by force would be reckless 
in the extreme. 

The Pursuit of Universal Goals 

The lid has been kept on the turbulent island 
of Cyprus by the combined efforts of many 
nations. And so it is, indeed, in most of the 
dangerous crises of our time. Much of our di- 
plomacy from day to day is occupied with the 
constant effort to widen the community of the 
concerned, to si:)read the risks and share the 
burdens of keeping the peace. Some see this 
process — ^by which we always seem to be con- 
sulting others about the use of our jiower — as a 
frustrating restraint on the use of our power. 
The restraints are real and they are necessary, 
but as T.S. Eliot observed in one of his plays, 
"Human kind cannot bear very much reality." 

Yet every leader in every walk of life knows 
from his own personal experience that the leader 
must share with others the task of deciding what 
to do, or else he finds he is not a leader but a 
loner. The exercise of power is no different in 
international affairs: The strong must consult 
the weak if the strong presume to act on behalf 
of the weak. 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


In exercising our power and leadership here 
and there around the world, we have an enor- 
mous built-in advantage over the CJommunists. 
We really do share with most of mankind the 
purposes which are the very stuff of American 
democracy. I mean our commitment as a peo- 
ple to the dignity of the human person — to the 
rights of the individual— to the welfare of our 
children— to the pursuit of the good life of lib- 
erty in the good society — under humane govern- 
ment, responsive and responsible to those who 
are governed. 

Men from many lands have drawn together 
in the first few pages of the United Nations 
Charter the essential purposes we share with 
others — the aspirations for peace, and for rising 
standards of life in larger freedom, which are 
the aspirations proclaimed not just for Amer- 
icans but for "all men" in our own Declaration 
of Independence. 

And we really mean it. We really want other 
peoples to be free too, other nations to be inde- 
pendent too, other economies to be prosperous 
too. The peoples of other nations know this, 
by instinct or by observation of our behavior. 
And that is why so many peoples in so many 
places work with us in so many different kinds 
of international cooperation. 

They work with us, in short, because we have 
power, because we use our power with restraint, 
and because we pursue goals that are universal 

President Johnson Welcomes 
NATO Parliamentarians 

Remarks hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated September 18 

It is a great pleasure to welcome to the Wliit« 
House this morning the NATO Parliamen- 

They are concerned with a project that is of 
vital importance to all of the free world in the 
Atlantic alliance, and I am pleased that I was 
able to spend a few moments with them in the 
Fish Room. 

I know from what Congressman Wayne Hays 
of Ohio has told me how much the Parliamen- 
tarians have done to plan to insure that this 

great instrument of freedom will flourish and 
continue to keep the peace. 

The Parliamentarians not only understand 
the problems of the alliance but they have the 
capacity and the ability to translate the con- 
structive ideas into effective and practical poli- 
cies. The alliance owes a great deal to the 
vigorous and constructive leadership that these 
Parliamentarians have provided. 

We are proud of NATO's accomplishments. 
It has been tested many times, and each test has 
brought new confidence, new strength, and new 
stature for this great organization. 

I have participated in its formation, and I 
have contributed all I could to its support and 

NATO has done more than provide an effec- 
tive system of defense. In President Truman's 
words,^ it has permitted us ". . . to get on with 
the real business of government and society, the 
business of achieving a fuller and happier life 
for our citizens." 

I think it would be very dangerous for us to 
take this alliance for granted. Danger is less 
apparent now, but it certainly has not disap- 
peared. The building of an effective defense 
system is and must be a continuing task for all 
of our countrymen. 

There remains a great challenge, of course, 
to move on to the closest partnership. This re- 
quires understanding and cooperation. There 
will be differences between us at times on tac- 
tics and procedures. But over those differences, 
all of us are part of the democratic alliance. We 
really have built a fundamental union. We are 
determined to preserve our freedom. We are all 
committed to give further substance and pur- 
pose to the alliance, and here the Parliamentar- 
ians play a very important role. Their legis- 
lative experience and their political role gives 
us a special opportunity to insure that the goals 
of the alliance are achieved. 

The United States has made certain com- 
mitments both real and substantial, and we will 
meet them all. Let no one — ally or adver- 
sary' — ever doubt America's determination to 
fulfill its role in the alliance, to live up to its 

We are grateful for your contributions. Your 

' Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1949, p. 481. 



studies and your actions, your recommendations, 
and, most of all, your firm conmiitment to the 
purposes of NATO are invaluable as we seek 
to build a deepening partnership of free na- 

tions within the alliance. 

I am delighted that you could come here and 
exchange viewpoints with us. You have my 
best wishes for your every success. 

Organizing for Progress in Latin America 

hy Thomas C. Mann 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Ajfairs ^ 

I would like to say a few words today about 
iinpro\"ements which have been made in the ad- 
ministration of our foreign assistance program 
in Latin America and more recently of the Alli- 
ance for Progress — about some of the things 
that have been done to get a dollar's worth for 
every dollar spent for economic development 
and social progress in this hemisphere. 

Some years ago our aid programs for the 
developing nations consisted almost entirely of 
scattered teclinical assistance and were admin- 
istered by an agency which was separate and 
apart from the Department of State. It be- 
came apparent that total separation of the two 
departments concerned with activities in the 
outside world was not in the national interest, 
that assistance to the development efforts of 
other nations was a fundamental part of our 
foreign policy. 

These separate entities each had its own 
budget and persoimel system. Rivalries de- 
veloped when there should have been teamwork. 
Duplication of work and effort took place. 
There was no way speedily to resolve serious 
differences of opinion about how to deal with 
particular problems. Different philosopliies 
tended to develop with no easy way to recon- 
cile them. Some of those who were responsi- 
ble solely for finding solutions to political and 

economic problems were tempted to regard our 
foreign assistance program hirgely as a short- 
term political instnmient, of use primarily as 
a demonstration of our good will and of our 
presence ; they tended to avoid the longer term 
and harder questions of the extent to which our 
aid made sense in the context of the nation's 
own development efforts, and whether it would 
in fact be used to promote economic and social 
progress of the people. Others tended toward 
the other extreme — the use of assistance funds 
without regard to whether it would promote 
or impede the achievement of other United 
States foreign policy objectives. 

The first essential step toward better coordi- 
nation was taken some years ago wlien our tech- 
nical assistance work, at that time administered 
by the ICA [International Cooperation Ad- 
mmistration] , was brought within your De- 
partment of State. 

However, until 1961, a major element of our 
foi'eign assistance — development lending — re- 
mained in a separate agency. President Ken- 
nedy's first major overhaul of foreign assist- 
ance was to bring both technical and capital 
aid — grants and loans — into the new Agency 
for Inteniational Development.^ Tliis organi- 
zation change was designed to provide a single 
agency to administer our assistance effort as a 
imified whole. 

' Address made at a meeting of regional chambers of 
commerce at Brownsville, Tex., on Sept. 17 (press re- 
lease 404 dated Sept. 16) . 

- For background see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1961, p. 
507, and June 19, 1961, p. 977. 


Then, a year later, President Kennedy took 
another important step forward, again based 
on an important insight into our efl'orts in for- 
eign affairs. All our foreign policies, and all 
our work abroad — including our foreign assist- 
ance — must be operated as a coherent efl'oi-t. 
This is particularly true in the case of Latin 
America, where the Alliance for Progress, in 
1961, had set out a broad statement of princi- 
ples for economic and social development in the 
hemisphere which had quickly become basic 
and crucial to our whole foreign policy. In 
1962 the AID officials who worked on a par- 
ticular country were moved into offices adjoin- 
ing those occupied by Foreign Service pereon- 
nel working on the same country. This was 
called working "back to back." As a result 
AID and Foreign Service personnel working 
in the same area came to know each other and 
to consult more and coordinate better with each 
other. The Administrator of AID, David Bell, 
is one of the ablest and most dedicated public 
servants I have known in Washington, and un- 
der his direction extraordinary progress has 
been made in coping with the problems I 

President Johnson took an additional impor- 
tant step. He ordered that the Latin American 
bureau in the State Department and the Latin 
American division of AID be put under a 
single head.* 

After 6 months of trial, I am glad to be able 
to report to you that the coordination we have 
achieved exceeded our expectations. 

Because there is a single line of command, 
decisions can be quickly made and differences 
of opinion quickly resolved. Because all of the 
Department's Latin American personnel now 
have responsibility for all aspects of our rela- 
tions with our neighbors to the south, there is 
wider staff understanding of all our programs 
and all our policies — including our efforts to 
speed economic development and social progress 
throughout the hemisphere. All aid projects 
may now be weighed in all their aspects; no 
longer is it possible to decide a particular prob- 

lem from a compartmentalized rather than an 
overall point of view. 

Because AID/Foreign Service personnel 
have able, dedicated, experienced officers it has 
been possible in some cases to put AID per- 
sonnel, and in other cases Foreign Service per- 
sonnel, in overall charge of all country affairs, 
political, economic, and AID. Those officers 
who discharge functional responsibilities for 
the entire area are getting better geogi-aphic 
staff support. 

One of the visible signs of achievement is 
that it was possible in the first 6 months of 
1964 to obligate more money for more projects 
in Latin America than it was possible to do 
during the whole of 1963. But, more impor- 
tant, I believe that the quality of the projects 
api^roved was superior and contributed more 
directly to economic develoj^ment and social 
progi'ess in Latin America than ever before. 

Inter-American Committee 

And now I should like to talk about another 
equally important organizational improvement 
that has been made. 

The Charter of Punta del Este'' states that 
the alliance should 

. . . enlist the full energies of the peoples and gov- 
ernments of the American republics in a great coopera- 
tive effort to accelerate the economic and social devel- 
opment of the participating countries of Latin 
America .... 

If it is to succeed, tlie alliance must be a 
partnership. The energies of other govern- 
ments and other peoples as well as our own ef- 
forts are essential if we are to succeed. As 
President Joluison has said : ° 

Progress in each country depends upon the willing- 
ness of that country to mobilize its own resources, 
to inspire its own people, to create the conditions in 
which growth can and will flourish, for although help 
can come from without, success must come only from 
within. Those who are not willing to do that which 
is unpopular ajid that which is difficult will not achieve 
that which is needed or that which will be lasting. 

So the problems which President Kemiedy, 

• Ihid., Jan. 6, 1064, p. 9. 

* For text, sec ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 
" Ibid., Apr. 6, 1964, p. 537. 



and later President Jolmson, had to face -were 
these: How is the best way to go about mobiliz- 
ing an all-out effort under the alliance both in 
Latin America and in the United States? 
Wliat is the best way to coordinate the efforts in 
Latin America and our own efforts here at 
home ? 

At the Economic and Social Council meet- 
ing in Sao Paulo the delegates wisely created 
an Inter-American Coimnittee on the Alliance 
for Progress, now commonly known as CIAP 
for the initials of its title in Spanish.^ 

The CIAP, imder the able leadership of a 
distinguished Colombian, Dr. Carlos Sanz de 
Santamaria, working with some of the most dis- 
tinguished economists and statesmen in the 
hemisphere, including our own Walt Rostow, 
held its first meeting in Mexico City in July of 
this year. It began there its task of tiying to 
identify the obstacles in the way of more rapid 
hemisphere progress and to plan ways to elimi- 
nate them. Its final report of this meeting con- 
tains this statement : 

CIAP is fundamentally the expression of a multi- 
lateral concept of the Alliance and of the need to inten- 
sify the achievements of the Alliance through multi- 
lateral action. The efforts and sacrifices implied in the 
Alliance are mainly the responsibility of the Latin 
American peoples and they must assume a leading role 
in this undertaking. 

Since July the CIAP, in collaboration with 
the World Bank, the Inter- American Develop- 
ment Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and our own personnel, has imdertaken studies 
in depth of the economic and social problems 
in Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia, Vene- 
zuela, and the five Central American comitries. 
All of the rest of the countries within the alli- 
ance will soon be studied in a similar fashion. 

Unlike mathematics, the problem of develop- 
ment is not an exact science. There are wide 
variations in the problems which each country 
faces and in the steps which each country has 
taken to meet them. Each country makes its 
own plan for development, which is presented 
to the CIAP by a senior official, usually at the 
ministerial level. All aspects of the covmtry's 
economy, including monetary and fiscal policy, 
tax and land reforms, balance of payments and 

• IMd., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 937. 

budgetary problems, overall self-help efforts of 
the cotmtry, and estimates of internal resources 
available and external resources needed, are all 
considered within the context of a sensible plan 
for progress. 

I know of no better way than through the 
CIAP process of country-by-coimtry study to 
become acquainted with the problems which 
other nations face and to acquaint other peoples 
with the problems we face here at home. I know 
of no better way to bring about effective team- 
work and coordination so that we can achieve 
our common goals of creating a hemisphere in 
which all citizens may have equal opportunity 
and a better life within freedom. I have great 
hopes that in the future these studies through 
this multilateral mechanism will not only im- 
prove tlie efficiency and effectiveness of our AID 
program but that they will also speed progress 
throughout the entire hemisphere. 

U.S. National Committee 

Finally, I should like to mention another in- 
novation — the establishment in the United 
States of a national committee for the Alliance 
for Progress. National committees exist in 
many Latin American countries. These commit- 
tees are nongovernmental in character and are 
made up of representatives of the private sec- 
tor — the business coiranmiity — and representa- 
tives of education, agriculture, labor, and other 
sectors of the country which contribute to the 
total effort, under the alliance. President Jolm- 
son has encouraged the formation of such a com- 
mittee, and we are now in the process of con- 
sulting with representatives of tlie private 
sector as to its composition. Wlien this com- 
mittee is formed, we expect it not only to advise 
and assist those responsible for the administra- 
tion of our own AID program but also to help 
bring to the American people the message of the 
alliance and its achievements. 

In these and other respects we are trying to 
improve the Alliance for Progress so that the 
American people will get a better return for 
tlieir investment in hemisphere democracy, 
decency, and progress. The people in the Rio 
Grande Valley, who are so close to Latin Amer- 
ica and who know so much of its problems, are 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


in a special position to help us explain to our 
people the magnitude of the tasks and the op- 
poitunities which we face in building a better 
hemisphere for every American between the 
Straits of Magellan and the Great Lakes. I 
know we can continue to count on your support 
for this noble effort and that you share with me 
my confidence in the ultimate triumph of eco- 
nomic and political freedom. 

U.S. and Soviet Union Exciiange 
Notes on Interference With Ships 

Follovnng are two exchanges of notes be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Union 
regarding interference with ships in intema- 
tioiud waters. 


U.S. Note of April 22 

The Department of State requests that the 
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Ke- 
publics call to the attention of its Government 
the following recent serious violation by the 
Soviet merchant ship POLOTSK of the In- 
ternational Eegulations for Preventing Colli- 
sions at Sea, approved by the International 
Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London 
1948 and adliered to by the U.S.S.R. 

During daylight hours, shoilly after 2:00 
p.m., on April 9, 1964, while proceeding on the 
high seas in the waters of the soiithem end of 
the Eed Sea, the United States Navy Seaplane 
Tender DUXBURY BAY was harassed and 
placed in serious jeopardy of imminent colli- 
sion by the negligent and unlawful maneuvers 
of tlie Soviet merchant ship POLOTSK. 

At about 2 :20 p.m., local time ( 11 :20 G.M.T. ) , 
on April 9, 1964, in the approximate position of 
13°38' N^ 42°59' E, and while proceeding on 
the high seas in the waters of the Red Sea on 
course 159° true at a speed of 13 knots, DUX- 
BURY BAY was overtaken by the Soviet mer- 
chant vessel POLOTSK. POLOTSK ma- 
neuvered from a position of about 500 yards on 
the port quarter of DUXBURY BAY to with- 
in 230 yards off her port beam and then cut 

sharply across the bow of the United States 
Na\'y ship, clearing by a mere 10 yards. PO- 
LOTSK, thereafter, continued drawing ahead 
to a position of about 2,000 yards on the star- 
board bow of DUXBURY BAY. 

These radical maneuvers of POLOTSK were 
in clear and flagrant violation of Rule 24 of 
the International Rules for Preventing Colli- 
sions at Sea in that POLOTSK, as the overtak- 
ing ship, did fail to keep clear of the DUX- 
BURY BAY which was the privileged over- 
taken ship. On the contrary, POLOTSK 
created serious imminent risk of collision, jeop- 
ardizing the safety of the ship and the lives 
of the crew on board DUXBURY BAY. The 
navigational situation, moreover, was aggra- 
vated by the presence of the West German Tug 
and Tow (SURABAYA-1) in the vicinity 
which restricted and hampered maneuvering 
room of DUXBURY BAY. 

Despite the dangerous and unlawful actions 
of the Soviet ship POLOTSK against DUX- 
BURY BAY, the United States naval ship at 
all times complied with the International Regu- 
lations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1948, 
and successfully avoided collision. 

The Government of the United States, pro- 
testing the illegal actions of the Soviet mer- 
chant vessel POLOTSK which hazarded the 
safe navigation of DUXBURY BAY, requests 
that the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics undertake all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure compliance in 
the future by Soviet vessels with the Interna- 
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
"Washington, April £2, 1964. 

Soviet Note of August 5 

UnofBcial translation 

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics presents its compliments to the Department of 
State of the United States of America and, referring 
to the latter's note dated April 22, 1964, has the honor 
to state the following. 

As a result of a tliorough investigation conducted by j 
competent Soviet organizations, It has been determined 
that the American naval vessel Duxbury Bay (No. 38) 
sailed through the Suez Canal in the same group with 
the Soviet merchant vessel Polotsk and followed it into 
the Red Sea In a southern direction not far from it 
within range of visibility for a distance of five to ten 



miles. On Ainil 9, 1964 at 3200 hours noon Moscow 
time the Amei-ican naval vessel approached the Polotsk 
to starboard and astern and followed it at a distance 
of less than one mile on a parallel course. At 1300 
hours, when the Soviet vessel Polotsk was at a point 
13°48' N. Lat. and 42°55' E. Long., the American naval 
vessel caught up with the Polotsk and held on a parallel 
■ to starboard and to the stern [of the Soviet 
vessel] at a distance of 100 to 200 meters for 20 to 30 
minutes. After this, performing a dangerous 
maneuver, the vessel passed the Polotsk at a distance 
of 30 meters from the stem and crossed over to port 
and began to gain distance. 

The captain of the Soviet vessel Polotsk notified the 
proper Soviet organizations of this incident and in- 
formed them that the Polotsk did not change its course 
or its speed, being in the position of a vessel about to 
be overtaken, and acted strictly in accordance with the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea. This has been confirmed by the course chart and 
entries in the ship's log and engine log, and other 

The reference to difficulties in maneuvering by the 
Duxl)ury Baij which ostensibly occurred as a result of 
the presence in the immediate vicinity ©f the West 
Oerman vessel Sia-abaiija-l cannot be accepted because 
the towed floating dock Surahaiya-l, as has been de- 
termined, was at that time at a distance of five or six 
miles and therefore could not have complicated the 

In connection with the above the Embassy rejects 
the protest of the Department of State on this issue 
of the alleged irregular action of the Soviet merchant 
ship Polotsk as unfounded. 

At the same time the Embassy considers it neces- 
sary to invite the attention of the Department of State 
to a whole series of other cases where the activity of 
naval vessels of the U.S.A. maneuvering in dangerous 
proximity to Soviet vessels has created a threat to 
human life and to the safety of ship navigation. 

On April 25, 1904 at 1100 hours local time at a point 
19°50' N. Lat. and 75°11' W. Long, an American war 
vessel with the marking WBV approached the Soviet 
merchant vessel Leonid Leonidev to within a distance 
of 60 meters and, maneuvering in dangerous proxim- 
ity to it, asked for the port of loading and other 

On May 28, 1964 at 0430 hours Moscow time a patrol 
vessel of the U.S. Navy (No. 1033) at a point 25°11' 
N. Lat. and 79°5' W. Long, approached to a distance 
of less than 100 meters from the Soviet passenger 
steamer Turktneniya and repeatedly lit up the hull 
and the captain's bridge of the vessel with a powerful 
searchlight, blinding the navigating personnel and 
creating a danger of collision. 

On June 1, 1964 from 0100 hours to 1320 hours local 
time at a point 57°21' N. Lat. and 150°28' W. Long, 
the Stories, a vessel of the U.S. Coast Guard (No. 38), 
executed dangerous maneuvers close to the Soviet 
whaling mother ship Dalni Vostok, cutting across its 

course and approaching to within 50 meters of tlie 
Soviet vessel. 

Inviting the attention of the Department of State 
to these facts, the hopes that the authorities 
of the USA will take the proper measures to prevent a 
repetition of such dangerous and improper acts on the 
part of American vessels in the future. 

Wasiiinoton, August 5, L'XS'i. 


U.S. Interim Note, August 18 

The Embassy has been instructed by the 
United States Government to inform the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs that thorough investi- 
gations of alleged dangerously low overflights 
of Soviet vessels by United States aircraft are 
now being undertaken. Preliminary informa- 
tion which has been received fails to show any 
improper activity or movement by U.S. planes 
or vessels which endangered or hindered Soviet 
vessels. However, the Ministry may be as- 
sured that the Government of the United States 
will pursue a complete investigation of all 
charges raised in the Ministry's note and will 
inform the Soviet Government of the results. 

The United States Government wishes to 
recall, as frequently stated in the past in re- 
sponse to similar Soviet charges, that United 
States aircraft and vessels throughout the 
world are operating under the strictest instruc- 
tions in full accord with international stand- 
ards and practices. It is, of course, common 
practice for ships and aircraft to establish 
mutual identification in international waters. 
In accordance with tliis practice. United States 
patrol planes often seek to identify ships en- 
countered whose position and identity are not 
otherwise known. Pilots of these planes are 
under strict instructions, however, not to ap- 
proach closer than is necessary for this purpose. 

Moscow, August 18, 1964. 

U.S. Note of September 15 

Press release 403 dated September 15 

The Embassy of the United States of Amer- 
ica acknowledges the receipt of the note of the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 
August 3, 1964. 

The Embassy has been instructed by the 

OCTOBER 5, 19G4 


United States Government to inform the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the investiga- 
tion mentioned in tlie Embassy's interim note of 
August 18, 1964 of alleged dangerously-low 
o\erflights of Soviet vessels by United States 
aircraft and of charges of dangei'ous maneuvers 
by United States vessels in the Ministry's note 
No. 45 of August 3, 1964 and the Soviet Embassy 
note No. 24 delivered in Washington August 5, 
1964 has been completed. The investigations 
reveal that the Soviet charges are without foun- 

Detailed investigation of each of the Soviet 
charges found that in no case did American air- 
craft harass, endanger, or provoke any Soviet 
ships. The distances maintained by United 
States aircraft were at all times appropriate and 
in no instance constituted "dangei'ously-low 
overflights." In the one specific charge in the 
Soviet note of August 3 that two American mili- 
tary aircraft overflew the Soviet vessel 
"Frunze" at a height of 50 meters on June 27, 
investigation establishes that the Soviet charge 
is in error. The two United States aircraft at 
no time approached closer than an altitude of 
500 feet and a lateral range of 3,000 feet. The 
aircraft did not overfly the "Frunze" nor make 
any harassing or provocative maneuvers. In 
the incident in the Soviet note of August 3 in- 
volving the Soviet steamer "Dubna" on July 8, 
it has been established that no United States air- 
craft were in the area of the alleged incident 
and furthermore that the aircraft number cited 
in the Soviet note of August 3 is not a United 
States Government aircraft number. 

Detailed investigation of the shipping inci- 
dents protested in the Soviet notes of August 3 
and August 5 revealed the following: In the 
case of the Soviet vessel "Gruziya" on July 21, 
the American vessel at no time approached 
closer than 300 yards to the starboard of the 
vessel nor in any way created a threat of col- 
lision. In one incident of April 25 involving 
the Soviet merchant vessel "Leonid Leonidev" 
there was no United States Navy or United 
States Coast Guard ship in the area at the time 
and place specified. In both of the other cases 
in the Soviet note of August 5, United States 
vessels were in the vicinity of Soviet vessels, but 
did not engage in any dangerous maneuvers. 

The Soviet note charging that a Coast Guard 
vessel on June 1 approaclied within 50 meters of 
the Soviet vessel "Dalni Vostok," is in error. 
The Coast Guard vessel confirms, however, that 
it witnessed another ship, which was not of 
United States registry, nm parallel to the Soviet 
vessel and cut across the bow of the Soviet ship. 

United States commanders are under strictest 
instructions not to approach foreign vessels 
closer than is necessary for common practice 
of establishing identification in international 
waters. The United States adheres to the 
rights of all ships and aircraft to engage in 
peaceful operations in and over international 
waters without harassment and United States 
vessels and aircraft are instructed to perform 

On the other hand, on a number of occasions 
in recent months. United States vessels have 
encountered harassment by Soviet ships. 

In the last three months alone the following 
incidents occurred : On June 30 at a position of 
40°35' north and 65°43' west, the Soviet trawler 
"Rauda" P5054 with stern designation "251(5- 
Port Dayoda," maneuvered dangerously within 
150 yards of the U.S.S. "D.A. Joy" causing the 
United States vessel to sound the danger signal 
and use emergency speeds to avoid collision. 
On August 18, 1964 the Soviet vessel "Dubna," 
in passage between Cuba and Haiti, maneuvered 
irresponsibly near the U.S.S. "Dash" and 
created a dangerous situation. 

In bringing these incidents to the attention 
of the Soviet Government, the Government of 
the United States assumes that the Soviet Gov- 
ernment will take the necessary measures to 
assure that Soviet pilots and masters do not 
violate international practices. 

Moscow, September 15, 1964. 

Soviet Note of August 3 

Unofficial translation 

The Soviet passenger ship "Gruziya," bound for Cuba 
with passengers on board, July 18 on the Atlantic 
Ocean, at 32°12' north latitude, 62°32' west longitude, 
was subjected to an overflight by dangerously low fly- 
ing aircraft with identifying marks of military air- 
craft No. 151349. Continuous overflights of the Gru- 
ziya continued from 1515 hours to 1710 hours. On 
10 July at 29°2' north latitude, TO"?' west longitude, 
the Gruziya was again subjected to overflights by the 
same aircraft from 1652 hours to 17.34 hours. On 21 , 



July at 0145 hours at 25°3-l' north latitude, 79°28' 
west longitude, the U.S. naval vessel Kretchmer (No. 
329) approached the Gruziya and until 0307 hours 
maneuvered around the Soviet ship and not only in- 
terfered with the movement of the Gruziya but created 
a threat of collision, subjecting the lives of the passen- 
gers to danger. 

Such inadmissible activities by American military 
aircraft and vessels in connection with Soviet passen- 
ger and transport vessels are being carried out in 
international waters in various parts of the world — 
the Pacific, Atlantic, Mediterranean, North and other 

Thus on 18 June a four-motored U.S. military air- 
craft No. 150G09 made low-level flights over the diesel- 
electric ship "Lena" in the Atlantic, 29°40' north lati- 
tude. 5G°00' west longitude. American military air- 
craft numbered 147951, 148356, 141242, 145907 and 
145904 made repeated overflights of the Soviet passen- 
ger ship "Pobeda" from 23 through 30 June in the At- 

Two American military aircraft, 136605 and 136037, 
on 27 June made overflights of the ship "Frunze" at 
a height of 50 meters in the North Sea at .')7°40' north 
latitude and S°.55' east longitude. On July 8 U.S. mili- 
tary aircraft No. 8921-794 repeatedly flew at a low 
level over the Soviet steamer "Dubna," located in the 
Pacific Ocean at 29°13' north latitude and 131°44' 
east longitude. 

On 16 July the steamer "Dollnsk," located in the 
Mediterranean Sea 36''50' north latitude. 12°45' west 
longitude, was subjected to overflight by U.S. military 
aircraft No. 131529, which for 30 minutes flew over 
it at a dangerously low altitude. 

18 July U.S. military aircraft No. 140160 made re- 
peated overflights of the Soviet ship "Kamenets-Po- 
dolsk" in the Japan Sea at 44°14' north latitude and 
137°3S' east longitude. 

As is well known, the Soviet Government already has 
called the attention of the U.S. Government to the in- 
admissibility of such actions. However, the abovemen- 
tioned and many other facts demonstrate that U.S. 
authorities have not taken the necessary measures to 
stop these dangerous and provocative actions although 
it would seem the U.S. should be no less interested 
than the U.S.S.R. and other countries In the preserva- 
tion of the principle of free and secure navigation on 
the open seas. 

The Soviet Government protests against the afore- 
mentioned actions of U.S. military aviation and expects 
that necessary measures toward cessation of such ac- 
tions which disturb the freedom of the seas in inter- 
national waters and which can lead to serious con- 
sequences will be undertaken by the U.S. Government. 

Moscow, August 3, 1964. 

Advisory Commission Reports 
on Exchange Program 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 14 (press release 400) that the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on International Educa- 
tional and Cultural Affairs had that day for- 
warded to the Congress its second annual re- 
port on the programs operated under the 
Fulbright-Hays Act (Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961). ^ 

The report notes that, since the submission 
of the first annual report, later reprinted as A 
Beacon of Ilofe^ the Department of State has 
taken a number of effective steps in keeping 
with recommendations of the Commission. It 
has set up an Interagency Council on Inter- 
national Educational and Cultural Affairs, a 
Committee on English Language Teaching, a 
Committee on International AtMetics, and a 
study group on research in international edu- 
cation. In addition, it has vested the operation 
of overseas schools in an Overseas School Pol- 
icy Committee made up of the Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Administration, and the Assistant Adminis- 
trator of the Agency for International De- 

Other actions taken on the basis of recom- 
mendations in the first report have led to im- 
provement in the testing of the English lan- 
guage of persons coming to the United States 
on Government grants, as well as to a number 
of improvements in regard to placement, orien- 
tation, and programing of foreign students and 
other visitors. 

' H. Doc. 364, 88th Cong., 2d sess. For the names of 
the members of the Commission during the reporting 
period, see Department of State press release 400 dated 
Sept. 14. 

^ A limited number of copies of the report, A Beacon 
of Hope: The Exchangc-nf-Pcrsons Program, are avail- 
able upon request from the oflice of the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on International Educational and Cultural 
Affair.s, Room 4429, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20520. 

OCTOBEK 5, 1964 



U.S. Makes Proposal on Financing 
Peacekeeping Operations of U.N. 

Folloioing is the text of a statement made on 
Septemher H before the Working Group on the 
Examination of the Administrative and Budget- 
ary Procedures of the United Nations hy U.S. 
Representative Francis T. P. Plimpton^ togefJier 
with the text of a working paper on the financ- 
ing of U.N. peacekeeping operations suhmitted 
to the group hy the U.S. delegation on the same 


U.S./U.N. press release 4438 

Mr. Chairman [S. O. Adebo, of Nigeria] : At 
our opening meeting of this session of the 
Working Group on September 9, all of us were 
greatly impressed with the attitude of mind and 
deteiTnination of pui-pose with which you ap- 
proached the task before us. You pointed out 
clearly the magnitude of the difficulties facing 
this organization, despite the strenuous efforts 
which many of us have made to overcome them. 
You called upon all of us to persevere in our 
endeavors and to attempt to find a solution to 
these difficulties during this session, and you 
pledged your best efforts to assist us in achieving 
that objective. With your leadership, I am 
confident that this Working Group can make 
a significant contribution toward a solution of 
the critical financial problems facing our 

I was also greatly impressed, Mr. Chainnan, 
by the statement of the Secretary-General on 
September 9. He spoke to us in tenns which 
are basic to the success of this organization. 
He spoke of the need to find an accommodation, 
an agreement among conflicting points of view, 
which would result in providing this organiza- 
tion with the funds necessary to continue its 
activities. He emphasized that the success of 

attempts to reach agreement on new arrange- 
ments for the future depended very much on 
finding a foiTnula which also took care of the 
past, saying, ". . . failure to take care of the 
past may not leave us with much of a future." 
This is an obsei"vation with which we, and, I be- 
lieve, almost all members of this group, cannot 
but agree. 

The Secretary-General pointed out that the 
time within which we can seek solutions is now 
running out and that we must find solutions 
very soon. Yet he expressed optimism that we, 
as reasonable men, would be able to come up 
with answers to the difficult questions confront- 
ing us. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that all of us 
will approach this session with the same degree 
of courage and resolve that was evidenced in 
the Secretary-General's eloquent statement. 

This morning we heard the statement of the 
distinguished representative of Argentina, in- 
dicating the efforts which a gi'oup of develop- 
ing countries, members of this Working Group^ 
have made in an attempt to arrive at some con- 
sensus on future arrangements for initiating 
and financing U.N. peacekeeping operations. 
Wo all owe a debt of gratitude to these coun- 
tries. We have watched their efforts with great 
interest, and we know how diligently they have 
labored in an effort to find a basis for agree- 
ment among all states concerned. Indeed, 
membei-s of this group have been kind enough 
to share with us some of the ideas which they 
have developed, and I am certain that thej' will 
find certain of those ideas reflected in the work- 
ing paper which my delegation has placed be- 
fore the Working Group. 

This brings me, Mr. Chairman, to the work- 
ing paper, which I would like to introduce to 
you with a brief statement. 

The working paper represents an effort 
which has extended over the better part of the 
year to formulate new arrangements which will 
facilitate the initiation and financing of future 
peacekeeping operations and which will be 



both compatible with the responsibilities of the 
United Nations under the charter and fair to 
its members. "VVe have attempted to develop 
an approach which will help to overcome politi- 
cal disputes as to the past and at the same 
time make possible the carrying on of future 
peacekeeping operations with an assurance that 
the necessary funds will be provided. 

As I have mentioned earlier and as appears 
from the working paper before us, we have 
consulted widely in an attempt to an-ive at 
proposals which we could place before this 
group. "VYe have consulted with most of the 
delegations represented here today, including 
both those with whom we have agreed in the 
past and those with whom we have had differ- 
ences of opinion. We believe that this work- 
ing paper represents a reasonable approxima- 
tion of the kind of consensus which this group 
can hope to arrive at during this session, and 
it is offered as representing the views of a 
Government which hopes very much that such 
a consensus can be agreed to in the interest of 
the organization and all its membere. 

Turning to the contents of the working paper 
itself, I wish first of all to refer to certain 
principles stated in paragraph B of the paper. 
These principles, which we believe should guide 
us in establishing new procedures and methods 
for initiating and financing peacekeeping oper- 
ations which involve the use of military forces, 
are the following: 

1. Any new arrangements should make it possible to 
take due account of the interests and capacities of all 
Member States, but must not permit any State to ob- 
struct the United Nations in the discharge of its peace- 
keeping responsibilities. 

2. The Security Council has primary responsibility 
under the Charter for the initiation of peacekeeping 
operations involving the use of military forces. 

3. The General Assembly may recommend such peace- 
keeping operations, in the event that the Security Coun- 
cil is unable to act. 

■4. All Member States have a responsibility under the 
Charter to contribute to expenses of such United Na- 
tions peacekeeping operations when assessed by the 
General Assembly under Article 17. 

5. In apportioning expenses, account should be taken 
of any excessive burden which the cost of expensive 
operations might impose on the economies of developing 

6. United Nations procedures should be adapted to 
take into account the interests of those Members, in- 
cluding Permanent Members of the Security Council, 

that bear special responsibilities. Member States mak- 
ing large financial contriliutions for such peacekeeping 
operations should have an appropriate voice in the 
determination of methods of financing such operations. 

We make no claim of originality in formu- 
lating these principles ; indeed, they follow lines 
which have been overwhelmingly endorsed by 
members of this Working Group. 

Following the statement of principles in the 
working paper, there appears in paragraph C a 
listing of a number of interdependent elements 
which we believe should be included in any new 
ari-angements agreed upon for initiating and 
fuiancing future peacekeeping operations in- 
volving the use of military forces. 

The first element which we list is that which 
is embodied in article 2-i of the charter; namely, 
the primary responsibility of the Security Coun- 
cil for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. We believe that it would be well 
to agree that the General Assembly would not 
authorize or assume control of peacekeeping op- 
erations involving the use of military forces 
unless the Security Council had first considered 
the matter and had demonstrated an inability to 
take action. 

The next three items listed under part C of 
our working paper relate to a proposal to estab- 
lish a Special Finance Committee as a standing 
committee of the General Assembly. We visu- 
alize such a committee as being similar in com- 
position to the present Working Group of 21 
in that it would include the permanent members 
of the Security Council and a relatively high 
percentage of those member states in each geo- 
graphical area which are large financial con- 
tributors to the United Nations. We would ex- 
pect this comjjosition to be established by new 
rules of procedure of the General Assembly. 

So far as the role of this Special Finance Com- 
mittee is concerned, we would expect that the 
General Assembly would give it a status such 
that the Assembly, when faced with the task of 
apportioning expenses for peacekeeping opera- 
tions involving the use of military forces, would 
act only on the recommendations of the Special 
Finance Committee, adopted by a vote of two- 
thirds of the committee membership. We 
should also expect that, if the Assembly did not 
accept a particular recommendation of the 
Special Finance Committee, the committee 

OCTOBER 5, 1004 


would resume consideration of the matter with 
a view to recommending an acceptable alterna- 

When making recommendations to the Gen- 
eral Assembly, we should expect the Special 
Finance C!ommittee to consider various alterna- 
tive methods of financing, such as those which 
have been used and discussed in the past. It 
will be noted in paragraph C(5) of the working 
paper that we specifically include a special scale 
of assessments as one of the methods of assess- 
ment available to the Special Finance Commit- 
tee when considering the financing of peace- 
keeping operations involving the use of military 
forces. In our view such a special scale would 
provide that, over a specified amoimt, states 
having greater ability to pay would be allocated 
higher percentages than in the regular scale of 
assessments and states having less ability to pay 
would be allocated smaller percentages than in 
the regular scale. Members of the group are 
aware, of course, of the fact that because of 
existing legislation in my country, the United 
States delegation would require congressional 
approval before it would be able to vote for any 
particular special scale of assessments in which 
the United States share is in excess of one-third. 

It will be noted, Mr. Chairman, that the final 
paragraph of our working paper attempts to 
make clear our belief that, under the proposed 
new financing arrangements, the Secretary- 
General should continue to be able to act under 
tlie annual resolution on unforeseen and ex- 
traordinary expenditures in committing funds 
to finance the initial stage of a peacekeeping op- 
eration initiated by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly. We would expect, of 
course, that any commitments in excess of those 
authorized under the annual resolution on un- 
foreseen and extraordinary expenditures would 
be financed only on the basis of the recommen- 
dation of the Special Finance Committee. 

It will be readily apparent to those who have 
been considering this subject for the many past 
months that the proposals contained in our 
working paper do not purport to comprehend 
all possible approaches to the problem before 
us. We hope that others will come forward 
with their own comments, ideas, and proposals, 
for we can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we 

will respond to your exhortation that we : ". . . 
pursue our further work in a spirit of tolerance 
for one another's views, in the language of 
peaceful persuasion, ready to listen to others 
as well as anxious to make the most effective 
presentation of our own case." We sincerely 
believe that with that spirit it is possible at this 
session to find a basis for the agreement among 
all states represented at this table which the 
membership at large so ardently desires. 


u.N. doc. A/AC.113/30 

The United States delegation has the honour to 
present to the Working Group of Twenty-One the at- 
tached Working Paper containing suggestions for 
changes in the arrangements and methods for initiating 
and financing United Nations peacekeeping operations 
involving the use of military forces. 

Last March, as members of the Working Group are 
aware, the United States and United Kingdom delega- 
tions indicated that they were prepared to explore 
with other Members of the United Nations, in the first 
instance those represented in the Working Group of 
Twenty-One, ways to reinforce the capacity of the 
United Nations to undertake and finance such peace- 
keeping operations in the future. Accordingly the 
United States and United Kingdom delegations at that 
time suggested certain ideas for discussion, and ex- 
plored those ideas, informally and in broad outline, 
with various members of the Working Group, including 
the Soviet delegation. 

The attached Working Paper embodies the main 
lines of these ideas and the salient features of the sug- 
gestions then made, as modified by subsequent discus- 
sions. It is now submitted by the United States for 
consideration and discussion in the Working Group. 

These suggestions presuppose settlement in some 
manner of arrears for past peacekeeping operations. 
Such payments may take any number of possible forms 
so long as they conform to the United Nations Charter 
and Financial Regulations. 

Arrangements and Methods fob Initiating and 
Financing United Nations Peacekeeping Opera- 
tions Involving the Use of Miutaky Forces 

A. To preserve and reinforce the peacekeeping ca- 
pacity of the United Nations, it is in the interest of the 
entire membership of the Organization that there be 
established, within the framework prescribe<l by the 
Charter, generally acceptable new procedures and 
methods for the future initiation of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations involving the use of military 
forces and the obtaining of necessary financing for such 

These procedures and methods must safeguard the 



capacity of the United Nations to undertake and carry 
on successfully such future peacekeeping operations. 
Within the scope of this objective, they should also take 
account of the interests and capacities of all Member 
States and the special status under the Charter of cer- 
tain of them. 

B. In establishing such procedures and methods, par- 
ticular consideration should be given to the foUovring 
principles : 

1. Any new arrangements should make it possible to 
take due account of the interests and capacities of all 
Member States, but must not permit any State to ob- 
struct the United Nations in the discharge of its peace- 
keeping responsibilities. 

2. The Security Council has primary responsibility 
under the Charter for the initiation of iJeacekeeping 
operations involving the use of military forces. 

3. The General Assembly may recommend such peace- 
keeping oi)erations, in the event that the Security Coun- 
cil is unable to act. 

4. All Member States have a responsibility under the 
Charter to contribute to expenses of such United Na- 
tions peacekeeping operations when assessed by the 
General Assembly under Article 17. 

5. In apportioning expe.ises, account should be taken 
of any excessive burden which the cost of expensive 
operations might impose on the economies of developing 

6. United Nations procedures should be adapted to 
take into account the interests of those Members, in- 
cluding Permanent Members of the Security Council, 
that bear special responsibilities. Member States mak- 
ing large financial contributions for such peacekeeping 
operations should have an appropriate voice in the 
determination of methods of financing such operations. 

C. Arrangements for embodying these considerations 
in the initiation and financing of United Nations peace- 
keeping operations involving the use of military forces 
would include the following interdependent elements : 

1. All proposals to initiate such peacekeeping opera- 
tions would be considered first in the Security Council. 
The General Assembly would not authorize or assume 
control of such peacekeeping operations unless the 
Council had demonstrated that it was unable to take 

2. The General Assembly would establish a standing 
special finance committee. The composition of this 
committee should be similar to that of the present 
Working Group of Twenty-One : that is, it would in- 
clude the Permanent Members of the Security Council 
and a relatively high percentage of those Member 
States in each geographical area that are large finan- 
cial contributors to the United Nations. It would be 
constituted under and governed by firm rules of pro- 
cedure of the General Assembly. 

3. In apportioning expenses for such peacekeeping 
operations, the General Assembly would act only on a 
recommendation from the committee passed by a two- 
thirds majority of the committee's membership. 

4. In making recommendations, the committee would 

consider various alternative methods of financing, in- 
cluding direct fiDancing by countries involved in a dis- 
pute, voluntary contributions, and assessed contribu- 
tions. In the e\ent that the Assembly did not accept 
a particular recommendation, the committee would 
resume consideration of the matter with a view to 
recommending an acceptable alternative. 

5. One of the available methods of assessment for 
peacekeeping operations involving the use of military 
forces would be a special scale of assessments in which, 
over a specified amount, States having greater ability 
to pay would be allocated higher percentages, and 
States having less ability to pay would be allocated 
smaller percentages than in the regular scale of 

6. Pending action by the General Assembly on finan- 
cial arrangements for such a peacekeeping operation 
initiated by the Security Council or General Assembly, 
the Secretary-General would continue to be authorized 
under the provisions of the annual resolution on un- 
foreseen and extraordinary expenditures, to commit up 
to .$2 million (and with the concurrence of the Advis- 
ory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions up to .$10 million) to finance the initial stage 
of an operation. Commitments and expenditures above 
this initial amount could be made by the Secretary- 
General only after the General Assembly had adopted 
a financing resolution on the basis of a recommenda- 
tion of the special finance committee. 

U.S. Regrets Soviet Veto of U.N. 
Resolution on Malaysia Complaint 

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^ 

I want to thank the distinguished representa- 
tives of the Ivory Coast, of Morocco, and of Nor- 
way for again helping us to a conclusion of a 
controversy between two members of the United 
Nations which has been difficult for all of us 
because of the friendly relations that most of us 
enjoy with both. 

I cannot refrain from expressing at the con- 
clusion of our vote regret and surprise that the 
representative of the Soviet Union has pre- 
vented this Council from exercising its duty 
in a manner clearly considered essential by all 
of the Council members except the representa- 

^ Made in the U.N. Security Council on Sept. 17 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 4439). For a statement made by 
Ambassador Stevenson on Sept. 10, see Bulletin of 
Sept. 28, 1964, p. 448. 


tives of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. 

The situation brought to the urgent attention 
of this Council by Malaysia has already resulted 
in the use of force outside of the framework of 
the charter, the loss of life, the violation of the 
territorial integrity of a member of the United 
Nations, and the aggravation of already serious 
tensions between two member states which have 
endangered the peace for some time. Malaysia 
has come here in the exercise of rights and duties 
appertaining to all signatories of the charter. 
And the distinguished representative of Indo- 
nesia has frankly explained how and wliy his 
Government has seen fit to use force in this way. 

The overwlielming majority of the members 
of this Council after due deliberation and 
serious reflection have come to the conclusion 
that it was incumbent upon the Council in the 
discharge of its responsibilities to act prompt- 
ly — not just to bring an end to the use of force 
and the loss of life and the violation of the 
territorial integrity of a member, but also to 
ask the parties through a peaceful instriunent 
of their own making to seek to settle their dif- 
ferences peacefully around a conference table 
in the manner prescribed by the charter to 
which we have all pledged allegiance. 

I fear, Mr. President, although I hope to the 
contrary, that the refusal of your Government 
[U.S.S.R.] to allow this Council to exercise its 
minimum peacekeeping responsibilities under 
the charter in a clear and conspicuous case 
cannot but reflect on the prestige and diminish 
the influence of the Security Council of the 
United Nations. I also cannot help but note 
that this exercise of the veto seems to be in- 
consistent with the avowed desire of the Soviet 
Union to strengthen the peace through the 
United Nations and particularly through the 
Security Council. 

It is no secret that the Government of the 
Soviet Union has been contending for some 
time that a reactivation or a reemphasis on the 
role of the Security Council offers the best 
prospect for enhancing the effectiveness of the 
United Nations in keeping the peace. In a 
memorandum^ which was circulated to all 
United Nations members on July 10, for ex- 

■■■ U.N. doc. S/5811. 

ample, the Soviet Government suggested — and 
I quote : 

The enormous changes which have occurred in the 
world over the past decade, the expansion and con- 
solidation of peace-loving forces, give every reason to 
believe that if countries, and primarily the great 
Powers which are permanent members of the Security 
Council, demonstrate goodwill and a genuine desire to 
preserve the peace, much can be done to enhance the 
ability of the United Nations to thwart attempts to 
disturb the peace and to prevent conflicts by means of 
the peaceful procedures provided for in Chapter VI 
of the Charter, such procedures as negotiation, good 
offices, conciliation, etc. 

The Soviet i-ejection of the resolution pre- 
sented,'' a proposal which would have allowed 
this Council to exert its influence to — and I 
quote that language — "thwart attempts to dis- 
turb the peace and to pre^•ent conflicts by means 
of peaceful procedures" — is hardly designed to 
engender confidence in the position taken by the 
Soviet Government in its memorandum of July 

With your permission I would like also to re- 
fresh the Council's memory on the contents of a 
letter of December 31, 1963, from Chairman 
Khrushchev to President Johnson,* a letter 
which in the Chairman's own words was "dic- 
tated by the interests of peace, by a desire to 
contribute to the prevention of war." 

In his letter, Chairman Khrushchev pro- 
posed certain principles for inclusion in an in- 
ternational agreement— including, and I quote 
the words of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the Soviet Union : 

. . . recognition that the territory of states should 
not even temporarily be the object of any invasion, 
attack, military occupation, or any other forcible meas- 
ure directly or indirectly undertalien by other states for 
whatever political, economic, strategic, frontier, or 
any other considerations, 

... a firm declaration that neither differences in 
social or ix>litical systems, nor denial of recognition or 
the absence of diplomatic relations, nor any other pre- 
texts can serve as a justification for the violation by 
one state of the territorial integrity of another. . . . 

We were genuinely encouraged to have Chair- 
man Klirushchev publicly urge that "the ter- 

' U.N. doc. S/579:?. 

* For an exchange of letters between President John- 
son and Premier Khrushchev, see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 
19&4, p. 157. 



ritory of states should not even temporarily be 
the object of any invasion, attack, military oc- 
cupation, or any other forcible measure. . . ." 
We were truly gratified to have Chaii-man 
Khrushchev publicly embrace tlie principle that 
"neither differences in social or political sys- 
tems, nor denial of recognition or the absence 
of diplomatic relations, nor any other pretexts 
can senre as a justification for the violation by 
one state of the territorial integrity of another." 
I am now forced to wonder whether our grati- 
fication was not premature. The resolution 
which the representative of the Soviet Union 
has just vetoed and thus prevented the Council 
from adopting did no more — and could not have 
done less — than ask that the parties to the situa- 
tion before the Council conduct themselves in 
conformity with principles so clearly stated by 
Chainnan Khrushchev. It would seem difficult 
to explain how the Soviet veto today is con- 
sistent with the principles espoused by Chair- 
man Khrushchev last December. It goes with- 
out saying that despite this veto the Security 
Council remains seized of the problem brought 
before it by Malaysia and will continue to follow 
with the closest attention the manner in which 
the paities concerned henceforth carry out their 
obligations imder the charter, as those obliga- 
tions have just been imequi vocally defined by 
nine members of the Council. 

Provisional Agenda of Nineteenth 
Session of U.N. General Assembly' 

U.N. doc. A/5750 dated September 10 

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the dele- 
gation of Venezuela. 

2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 

3. Credential.s of representatives to the nineteenth 
session of the General Assembly : 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 

4. Election of the President. 

5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election 
of officers. 

6. Election of Vice-Presidents. 

7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 
12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United 
















' To convene at Headquarters. New York, on Nov. 10, 

Adoption of the agenda. 
General debate. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the 

Report of the Security Council. 
Report of the Economic and Social Council. 
Report of the Trusteeship Council. 
Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Election of non-permanent members of the Security 

Election of six members of the Economic and Social 

Appointment of the members of the Peace Observa- 
tion Commission. 

Admission of new Members to the United Nations. 
United Nations Emergency Force : 

(a) Report on the Force ; 

(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the 

Report of the Committee for the International Co- 
operation Year [resolution 1907 (XVIII) of 
21 November 1963]. 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo- 
ples : report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1956 
(XVIII) of 11 December 1963]. 
Installation of mechanical means of voting [reso- 
lution 19.")7 (XVIII) of 12 December 1963]. 
Question of general and complete disarmament : re- 
port of the Conference of the Bighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament [resolution 1908 
(XVIII) of 27 November 1963]. 
Question of convening a conference for the purpose 
of signing a convention on the prohibition of the 
use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons : report 
of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee 
on Disarmament [resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 
November 1963.] 

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo- 
nuclear tests : report of the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [reso- 
lution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963]. 
International co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space : report of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space [resolution 1963 (XVIII) 
of 13 December 1963]. 

The Korean question : report of the United Nations 
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilita- 
tion of Korea [resolutions 376 (V) of 7 October 
1950 and 1964 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963]. 
Actions on the regional level with a view to im- 
proving good neighbourly relations among Euro- 
pean States having different social and political 
systems [decision of 13 December 1963]. 
Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation [resolution 1896 (XVIII) of 
11 November 1963]. 

OCTOBER 5, 1964 


30. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United 44. 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near Bast [resolutions 302 (IV) 

of 8 December 1949 and 1912 (XVIII) of 3 Decem- 
ber lOa'J]. 45. 

31. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Poli- 
cies of apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa [resolution 1978 A 
(XVIII) of 16 December 1963] ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary -General [resolution 

1978 B (XVIII) of 16 December 1963]. 46. 

32. Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development [resolutions 1785 (XVII) of 8 
December 1962 and 1897 (XVIII) of 11 November 47. 

33. Accelerated flow of capital and technical a.ssistance 
to the developing countries : report of the Secre- 
tary-General [resolutions 1522 (XV) of 15 Decem- 
ber 1960 and 1938 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963]. 48. 

34. Establishment of a United Nations cajjital develop- 
ment fund : report of the Committee on a United 
Nations Capital Development Fund [resolution 
1936 (XVIII) of 11 December 1063]. 

35. Activities in the field of industrial development: 49. 

(a) Report of the Committee for Industrial Devel- 
opment [resolution 1940 (XVIII) of 11 Decem- 50. 
ber 1963] ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem]. 

36. The role of the United Nations in training national 
technical personnel for the accelerated industriali- 51. 
zation of the developing countries : report of the 
Economic and Social Council [resolution 1824 
(XVII) of IS December 1962]. 52. 

37. The role of patents in the transfer of technology to 
developing countries : report of the Secretary- 
General [resolution 1935 (XVIII) of 11 December 53. 

38. Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources re- 
leased by disarmament : 54. 

(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council 
[resolution 1931 (XVIII) of 11 December 
1963] ; 55. 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem]. 

39. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources : re- 
port of the Secretary-General [resolution 1803 56. 

(XVII) of 14 December 1962, swtion III]. 

40. Inflation and economic development : report of the 57. 
Secretary-General [resolution 1830 (XVII) of 18 
December 1962]. 

41. Population growth and economic development : re- 
port of the Economic and Social Council [resolu- 
tion 18.38 (XVII) of IS December 1962]. 5S. 

42. World campaign for universal literacy: report of 

the Secretary-General [resolution 1937 (XVIII) of 59. 
11 December 1963]. 

43. United Nations training and research institute: 
report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1934 

(XVIII) of n December 1963]. 60. 

Progress and operations of the Special Fund [reso- 
lutions 1240 (XIII) of 14 October 1958 (part B, 
paragraphs 10 and 54), 1833 (XVII) of 18 Decem- 
ber 1962 and 1945 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963]. 
United Nations programmes of technical co- 
operation : 

(a) Review of activities [resolution 1833 (XVII) 
of 18 December 19G2] ; 

(b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under 
the Expanded Programme of Technical A.ssist- 
ance [resolutions 831 (IX) of 26 November 
19,54 and 1947 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963]. 

Assistance in cases of natural disaster [Economic 
and Social Council resolution 1049 (XXXVII) of 
15 AugTist 1964]. 
World social situation : 

(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council 
[resolution 1916 (XVIII) of 5 December 
1963] ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem]. 
Housing, building and planning: 

(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council 
[resolution 1917 (XVIII) of 5 December 

1963] ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem]. 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. 

Measures to implement the United Nations Decla- 
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination : report of the Secretary-General 
[resolution 1905 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963]- 
Draft International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [resolution 
1906 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963]. 
Draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage. 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages [decision of 12 December 1963]. 
Measures to accelerate the promotion of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms [decision 
of 12 December 1963]. 

Manifestations of racial prejudice and national 
and religious intolerance [decision of 12 Decem- 
ber 1963]. 

Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance [decision of 12 
December 1963]. 

Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum [decision 
of 12 December 1963]. 
Freedom of information : 

(a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information 
[decision of 12 December 1963] ; 

(b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information 

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights 
[resolution 1900 (XVIII) of 12 IVcemlier 1963]. 
Draft Declaration on the Promotion among Youth 
of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Under- 
standing between Peoples [resolution ]9(>5 (XVIII) 
of 13 December 19(i3|. 
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 



transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 
United Nations : 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ- 
ation with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

61. Question of South West Africa : report of the Spe- 
cial Committee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
[resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963]. 

62. Special educational and training programmes for 
South West Africa : report of the Secretary-General 
[resolution 1901 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963]. 

63. Sjjecial training programme for Territories under 
Portuguese administration : report of the Secre- 
tary-General [resolution 1973 (XVIII) of 16 De- 
cember 1963]. 

61. Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for Inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories : report of the Secretary-General [reso- 
lution 1974 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963]. 

65. Question of Oman : report of the Aii Hoc Committee 
on Oman [resolution 1948 (XVIII) of 11 Decem- 
ber 1963]. 

66. Financial reports and accounts for the financial 
year ended 31 December 1963 and reports of the 
Board of Auditors : 

(a) United Nations; 

(b) United Nations Children's Fund ; 

(c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East ; 

(d) Voluntary funds administered by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1964. 
Budget estimates for the financial year 1965. 

69. Pattern of conferences : report of the Secretary- 
General [resolution 1987 (XVIII) of 17 Decem- 
ber 1963]. 

70. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership 
of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly : 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
and Budgetary Questions ; 

(b) Committee on Contributions ; 

(c) Board of Auditors ; 

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the 
appointments made by the Secretary -General ; 

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal; 

(f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee. 

71. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the 
expenses of the United Nations : report of the Com- 
mittee on Contributions. 

72. Audit reports relating to expenditure by special- 
ized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency : 

(a) Earmarkings and contingency allocations from 
the Special Account of the Expanded Pro- 
gramme of Technical Assistance ; 


(b) Earmarkings and allotments from the Special 

73. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the 
United Nations with the specialized agencies and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency : 

(a) Report of the Advisory Committee on Admin- 
istrative and Budgetary Questions ; 

(b) Inter-organizational ujachinery for matters of 
pay and per.s(mnel administration : reiwrt of 
the Secretary-General [resolution 1981 B 
(XVIII) of 17 December 1963]. 

74. Administrative and budgetary procedures of the 
United Nations : report of the Working Group on 
the Examination of the Administrative and Budget- 
ary Procedures of the United Nations [resolution 
1880 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963]. 

75. Personnel questions : 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the 
Secretary-General [resolution 1928 (XVIII) of 
11 December 1903] ; 

(b) Other personnel questions. 

76. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension 

77. United Nations International School : report of the 
Secretary-General [resolution 1982 (XVIII) of 17 
December 1963]. 

78. Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its sixteenth session. 

79. General multilateral treaties concluded under the 
auspices of the League of Nations : report of the 
Secretary-General [resolution 1903 (XVIII) of 18 
November 1963]. 

80. Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, 
dissemination and wider appreciation of interna- 
tional law : reiwrt of the Special Committee on 
Technical Assistance to Promote the Teaching, 
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of 
International Law [resolution 1968 (XVIII) of 
16 December 1963]. 

81. Consideration of principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Re- 
lations and Co-operation among States [res- 
olutions 1966 (XVIII) and 1907 (XVIII) of 
16 December 1963] ; 

(b) Study of the principles enumerated in para- 
graph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1966 
(XVIII) ; 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on methods 
of fact-finding [resolution 1967 (XVIII) of 16 
December 1963]. 

82. Consideration of steps to be taken for progressive 
development in the field of private international 
law with a particular view to promoting interna- 
tional trade [item proposed by Hungary (A/5728) ]. 

OCTOBER 5, 1904 



Admitted as contracting party (with rights and oMi- 
gations dating from independence) : Malawi, Au- 
gust 28, 1964. 
Long-teriri arrangements regarding international trade 
In cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9, 
1962. Entered into force October 1, 19(;2. TIAS 5240. 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, August 31, 1964. 

Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at 
Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force 
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487. 

Notification, that it considers itself tound: Rwanda, 
August 5, 1964. 


Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 
4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Malawi, September 11, 1964. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Finland, August IS, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, including Sur- 
inam and Netherlands Antilles, September 14, 1964. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force August 20, 1964. 

Signature: Switzerland, September 16, 1964.* 

Declaration of provisional application: Switzerland, 
September 16, 1964. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. 

Signature: Direction G^n^rale des PTT for Switzer- 
land, September 16, 1964. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Signed at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force .January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Mongolian People's Republic, 
August 27, 1964. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) 
with annexes and additional protocol. Done at 
Geneva November 8, 1963. Enters into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1905. TIAS 5603. 

Notification of approval: Jamaica (with reservation), 
July 3, 1964. 


General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes 
and sche<lules and protocol of provisional applica- 
tion. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 

' Subject to ratification. 



Treaty relating to cooperative development of the water 
resources of the Columbia River Basin, with annexes. 
Signed at Washington January 17, 1961. 
Ratifications exchanged: September 16, 1964. 
Proclaimed hy the President: September 16, 1964. 
Entered into force: September 16, 1964. 

Notes regarding the treaty between the United States 
and Canada relating to cooperative development of 
the water resources of the Columbia River Basin of 
January 17, 1961. Exchanged at Washington Jan- 
uary 22, 1964. 
Entered into force: September 16, 1964. 

Agreement concerning sale in the United States of 
Canada's entitlement under the treaty of January 
17, 1961, to downstream power benefits and desig- 
nation of entities by the Governments of Canada 
and the United States. Signed at Ottawa Septem- 
ber 16, 1964. Entered into force September 16, 1964. 

Congo (Leopoldville) 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreements of November 18, 1961, and February 23, 
1963, as amended (TIAS 4925, 5460, 5461). 
Effected by exchange of notes at L^poldville 
August 28 and September 4, 1964. Entered into 
force September 4, 1964. 


Agreement complementing route schedule annexed to 
the air transport services agreement of August 15, 
1960. as extended (TIAS 4675, 5513). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mexico August 14, 1964. 
Entered into force August 14, 1964. 

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of 
August 15, 1960, as extended and complemented 
(TIAS 4675, 5513). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Mexico August 14, 1964. Entered into force 
August 14, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1701-1709). with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Asuncion September 5, 1964. Entered into force Sei>- 
tember 5, 1964. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of October 8, 1962. as amended (TIAS 
5179, 5440, 5579. .5617). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Cairo July 20, 1964. Entered into force 
July 20. 1964. 

United Nations 

Agreement amending the memorandum of understand- 
ing of February 13, 1962 (TIAS 4949), concerning a 
grant to the Unilt'd Nations of Congo francs accru- 
ing to the United States under agriculturiil com- 
modities ngrccnients between the United States and 
the Repul)Iic of the Congo (Lt'oimldville). Effected 
by exchange of letters at New Vork August 'lo and 
26, 1904. Entered into force August 20. 1964. 



INDEX Octoher 5, 1964 Vol. LI, No. 1319 

American Principles 

The Uesponsiliilities of a Global Power (Bull) . 473 

Toward Victory for Freedom (Rusk) .... 463 

The Unity of the American People (Johnson) . 461 

American Republics. Organizing for Progress 

in Latin America (Mann) 479 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 14 468 

Toward Victory for Freedom (Rusk) .... 463 

Atomic Energy. The Direction and Control of 

Nuclear Power (Johnson) 458 

Australia. Letters of Credence (Waller) . . 460 

Canada. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 

of September 14 468 

Communism. Toward Victory for Freedom 

(Rusk) 463 

Cyprus. The Responsibilities of a Global Power 

(Ball) 473 

Disarmament. The Direction and Control of 
Nuclear Power (Johnson) 458 

Economic Affairs 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 14 468 

U.S. and Soviet Union Exchange Notes on Inter- 
ference With Ships 482 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Advisory 

Commission Reports on Exchange Program . 48.5 

Europe. Toward Victory for Freedom (Rusk) . 463 

Foreign Aid. Organizing for Progress in Latin 
America (Mann) 479 

Immigration and Naturalization. Secretary 

Rusk's News Conference of September 14 . . 468 

India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
September 14 468 

Indonesia. U.S. Regrets Soviet Veto of U.N. 
Resolution on Malaysia Complaint (Steven- 
son) 489 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 14 468 

U.S. Regrets Soviet Veto of U.N. Resolution on 
Malaysia Complaint (Stevenson) 489 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. President 
Johnson Welcomes NATO Parliamentarians 
(Johnson) 478 

Presidential Documents 

The Direction and Control of Nuclear Power . . 458 
President Johnson Welcomes NATO Parliamen- 
tarians 478 

The Unity of the American People 461 

Von Steuben Day 472 

Saudi Arabia. Letters of Credence (al- 

Sowayel) 461 

Togo. Letters of Credence (Ajavon) .... 461 

Treaty Information. Current Actions ... 404 


U.S. and Soviet Union Exchange Notes on Inter- 
ference With Ships 482 

U.S. Regrets Soviet Veto of U.N. Resolution on 
Malaysia Complaint (Stevenson) 489 

United Nations 

Provisional Agenda of Nineteenth Session of 

U.N. General Assembly 491 

U.S. Makes Proposal on Financing Peacekeeping 

Operations of U.N. (Plimpton, text of U.S. 

working paper) 486 

U.S. Regrets Soviet Veto of U.N. Resolution on 

Malaysia Complaint (Stevenson) 489 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 14 468 

Toward Victory for Freedom (Rusk) .... 463 

'Name Index 

al-Sowayel. Ibrahim 'Abd Allah 461 

Ajavon, Robert 461 

Ball, George W 473 

Johnson, President 458,461,472,478 

Mann, Thomas C 479 

Plimpton. Francis T. P 486 

Rusk, Secretary 463,468 

Stevenson, Adlai B 489 

Waller, John Keith 460 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

No. Date Snbject 

395 9/14 Rusk: "Toward Victory for Free- 

*396 9/14 U.S. participation in international 

*397 9/14 Phillips designated Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for Public Affairs 
(biographic details). 

*399 9/14 MeCloskey designated Director, Of- 
fice of News (biographic details). 
4(X) 9/14 Report of Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (rewrite). 

*401 9/15 Ball and McGill : Medal of Freedom 

402 9/14 Rusk: news conference. 

403 9/15 Reply to Soviet note of August 3. 

404 9/16 Mann : "Organizing for Progress." 
*405 9/17 U.S. delegation to Malta independ- 
ence ceremonies. 

406 9/18 Australia credentials (rewrite). 

407 9/18 Ball: "The Responsibilities of a 

Global Power." 

408 9/18 Togo credentials (rewrite). 

409 9/18 Saudi Arabia credentials (rewrite). 
*411 9/18 Cultural exchange (Europe, 


*Not printed. 

DSD etc G 


COPLEY square: 









U.S. Balance of Payments: Questions and Answers 

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has happened to it in recent years. With the help of charts and illustrations it describes U.S. efforts to 
expand exports and limit dollar outflows, and spells out some of the things we can — and cannot — do to 
improve our balance-of-payments situation. 




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Vol. LI, No. 1320 

Octoher 12, 1964 


Address hy Secretary Bush JfiS 



Statement by Glenn T. Seaborg 519 



Statement hy William, C. Foster 624 

For index see inside bach cover 

Freedom and Development 

Address hy Secretary Busk ^ 

It is an honor and pleasure to be with you 
today. This conference is concerned with 
Africa. Many of you m this audience have been 
concerned with Africa for a good many years. 
You and other Americans have done much to 
develop friendly and constructive relationships 
between the new nations of Africa and the 
United States. I know that you expect me to 
speak about our policies toward Africa. And I 
shall do so — within a broader context. For we 
must all take care not to let our policy in one 
area become segregated from the rest of our 
foreign policies. All of us, as Americans, have 
a vital stake in our policies as a whole. 

The abiding goal of American policy is a 
world of peace, fi'eedom, and justice — the sort 
of world envisioned in the preamble and articles 
1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, a docu- 
ment which emei-ged from the raging furnaces 
of two world wars. Our goal is: 

^ Made before the American Negro Leadership Con- 
ference on Africa at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 25 
(press release 415). 

— a world free of aggression — aggression by 
whatever means; 

— a world of independent nations, each with 
the institutions of its own choice but cooperat- 
ing with one another to their mutual advantage; 

— a world of economic and social advance for 
all peoples; 

— a world which provides sure and equitable 
means for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and which moves steadily toward a rule of law ; 

— a world in which the powers of the state 
over the individual are limited by law and cus- 
tom, in which the personal freedoms essential 
to the dignity of man are secure ; 

— a world free of hate and discrimination 
based on race, nationality, religion, or economic 
and social status ; 

— a world of equal rights and equal oppor- 
tunities for the entire human race. 

In working toward that goal we must do our 
best to make our own nation a gleaming ex- 
ample. As I said on more than one occasion, 
the most important single thing tlus Congress 


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could do on behalf of our foreign policy was to 
pass the Civil Riglits Act. 

We believe that the sort of world I have just 
sketched is the sort desired by a great majority 
of mankind, of all nations and races. But 
there are those whose goal is another kind of 
world — a world regimented imder communism. 
The contest between these two opposing con- 
cepts of world organization is the underlying 
crisis of our times. 

The first concern of our foreign policy must 
be, and is, to prevent expansion of the Commu- 
nist empires. For this purpose we maintain 
powerful and flexible military forces and have 
helped our allies to build their defenses. At the 
same time we search earnestly for areas of 
agreement with our adversaries — especially for 
measures which reduce the danger of a great 
war. We also do what we can to encourage 
trends toward national independence and more 
personal liberty witliin the Communist world. 

Wliile we do our share — and more — to protect 
the free world, we work incessantly to build its 
strength. We try to improve and expand our 
partnerships with the economically advanced 
nations of Western Europe and the Pacific. 
And we respond to requests from the less 
developed nations, old and new, for help in 
strengthening their economic, social, and po- 
litical systems. 

Government by the Consent of the Governed 

The American people are profoundly com- 
mitted to the idea that governments derive their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
That fundamental commitment explains why 
we usually get along better with other democ- 
racies than with undemocratic goverimients. 
It explains our concern about the lack of self- 
determination and government with the consent 
of the governed within the Communist em- 
pires — for no nation has chosen communism in 
a free election. It explains why we are deter- 
mined to see that every American shall enjoy 
in full his rights as a citizen and as a hiunan 
being. And it explains why we exerted our 
national influence in behalf of the independence 
movements within the old empires in Asia, 
Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. We have 
rejoiced in the rise of the former colonial peo- 

ples to independent nations — with what our 
Declaration of Independence called "the sepa- 
rate and equal station to which the Laws of 
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." 

The metamorphosis of old empires into new 
independent nations is one of the most signifi- 
cant developments of the 20th century. It is 
rapidly bringing to a close an epoch which 
began with the Age of Exploration. 

Problems of New African Nations 

Since the Second World War 31 new nations 
have emerged in Africa alone. Despite widely 
difl'ering periods of preparation for independ- 
ence, the transfer of power from Eurojjean to 
African hands was accomplished with relative 
ease. In only one case — Algeria — did the strug- 
gle for independence involve prolonged fighting. 
In only one mstance — the former Belgian 
Congo — was a new nation engulfed m major 
internal hostilities. 

In these early postwar independence years, 
however, a number of the new African nations 
have been experiencing a variety of problems. 
Most of these difficulties are inherent in the 
exciting process of building new nations. For 
independence does not automatically provide 
the skills necessary to administer a nation or to 
transform its institutions. It does not auto- 
matically bring into being literate and informed 
electorates. As President [Leopold] Senghor 
of Senegal said recently: 

Political independence, being the prerequisite of our 
freedom, is not the end, but indeed the beginning of our 
diflaculties. The tensions, the attempts at overthrowing 
governments, the revolutions, even the localized armed 
conflicts which have been shaking Africa in the last 
four years, are the most striking illustrations of this 
truth. Political independence and our admission to 
the United Nations Organization, whatever the moral, 
technical and material aid which they may bring us, 
cannot, by themselves, solve the serious problems which 
face us, and which are named : poverty, disease, 

Let me cite a few statistics : 

The average per capita income throughout 
Africa is only about 30 cents per day and is as 
low as 14 cents in some countries. 

There is only one doctor per 17,000 people in 
Africa, or i/^sth the ratio in this country. In- 
fant mortality in tropical Africa runs as high as 

OCTOBER 12, 19G4 


260 per 1,000 live births, or 10 times our rate. 

Only some 15 percent of Africans are literate, 
and only 40 percent of African school-age chil- 
dren are now attending primary school. 

The number of Africans with substantial 
experience in enterprise, management, and 
government is small. 

Africa has few skilled teclinicians and little 
capital ta develop industry. Industrial pro- 
ductivity per capita in developed nations is 
24 times the level in Africa. 

The average African farmer lias a produc- 
tive efficiency estimated at only about 4 percent 
of the North American farmer. Agricultural 
productivity is so low that nutritional deficien- 
cies prevail in many areas. 

Africa's leaders are under great pressure to 
solve their economic and social problems. Most 
of them came to office on a tide of popular sup- 
port, but they must make progress or make 
room for other leaders, often more extreme and 
willing to take greater risks. 

During the era of European predominance in 
the African Continent, the United States had 
relatively few official contacts there. But we 
have a big stake in the success of the new na- 
tions. And we know that what happens in 
Dakar, Durban, and Dar-es-Salaam alfects us 
just as surely as what happens in Bonn, Bang- 
kok, and Buenos Aires. 

U.S. Assistance Programs 

Just as we have supported self-determina- 
tion, just as we stand for the dignity and equal- 
ity of all peoples and nations, so we respond 
to the desires of the new nations to improve the 
life of tlieir citizens. 

As President Johnson said in liis first state 
of the Union message : ^ 

. . . We must strengthen the ability of free nations 
everywhere to develop their independence and raise 
their standard of living — and thereby frustrate those 
who prey on jwverty and chaos. To do this, the rich 
must help the poor — and we must do our part. 

Certainly, if we in the most affluent countiy 
the world has ever known need a poverty pro- 
gram for Americans, it is imderstandable that 
Africans new to independence are in need of 

' Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110. 

our assistance. How the United States can as- 
sist them in strengthening their freedom and in 
gaining a more abundant life is one of the im- 
portant questions on our national agenda. 

We are interested in doing what we can to 
help the new nations become viable and strong, 
both because Americans want to do wliat is 
morally right and because our own interests 
closely parallel their interests. There can be no 
peace for future generations unless there is a 
measure of stability and satisfaction around 
the world. 

Although the central responsibility of find- 
ing ways to overcome Africa's internal diffi- 
culties and to maintain true independence must 
lie with Africans, tliere are many ways in which 
the United States can help. 

Private American organizations have tradi- 
tionally been among Africa's friends; and 
today more than 50 private United States in- 
stitutions spend considerable sums for educa- 
tion, health promotion, and related activities in 
Africa. Our trade union movement has a fra- 
ternal relationship with African trade unions, 
and American religious groups of all kinds are 
helping in Africa. 

The United States Government's interest in 
helping Africa overcome its internal problems 
has been demonstrated by our pro^dsion of 
about $1.5 billion in assistance in the period 
1960-63. In 1963 alone we provided some $500 
million in various types of assistance, including 
surplus food, to 37 African nations; and some 
2,000 Peace Coqjs Volunteers are serving in 
African countries. Many African leaders have 
studied in our colleges and universities, and 
they include 22 who are now chiefs of state or 
cabinet ministers. And many Africans are now 
studying in the United States. 

On a per capita basis Africans get a larger 
share of the combined economic assistance of 
tlie United States and Europe than anj' other 
area of the world. In fact, Africa's per capita 
share is almost double the world average. 

Although I speak of what we have given to 
Africa, let me also take notice of what Africa 
gives to us. The United States has been richly 
endowed with aspects of Africa's ancient cul- 
tural heritage. "Wliile no one can be proud of 
the way Negro Americans were brought to our 



sliores, we can clearly be proud of tlie increas- 
ing contributions made to our society by that 
one-tenth of our population of African descent. 
African art, music, and dancing also have 
enriched our lives. And African art has come 
to us even more directly in the form of indige- 
nous sculpture and painting. The importance 
of tliis part of Africa's culture to our society 
was emphasized this year with the opening of 
a Washington museum of African art. 

Africa's Economic Progress 

Altliough most African nations started from 
a very low base, there have been heartening eco- 
nomic advances, both in many individual coun- 
tries and in terms of tlie continent as a whole. 

Gross national product in Liberia rose by an 
average of 5.3 percent annually between 1957 
and 1961, largely due to American investment. 
In the same period Ethiopia showed an annual 
GNP gain of 4.3 percent, Sudan 4.5 percent, and 
Nigeria 3.8 percent. These are impressive gains, 
althougli it is true that they started from a very 
low base and much remains to be done. 

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa 
and the 10th most populous in the world, showed 
a 29 percent gain in agricultural production in 
a decade. Our Agency for International Devel- 
opment is working with the Government of 
Nigeria on a nimiber of interesting pilot proj- 
ects designed to adapt some of the United States 
experience with farm teclinology to the agri- 
cultural methods of Nigeria and its neighbors. 

Agriculture is the chief economic pursuit in 
most of Africa, but important gains are being 
made in other fields. Oil production has 
momited rapidly in Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria. 
Electric power production, always an important 
measure of industrial progress and an impor- 
tant element in raising standards of living, is 
rising rapidly in many African countries, and 
the hydroelectric potential is enormous. 

One important economic instnmient which 
both promotes African unity and helps indi- 
vidual nations to help themselves develop eco- 
nomically is the [U.N.] Economic Commission 
for Africa. That organization is building a 
philosophy of regional economic growth and a 
program of regional projects to discourage nar- 

row, nationalist economic enterprises which 
would waste scarce African plant and capital. 
The EGA has created an African Develop- 
ment Bank, an Institute for Economic Develop- 
ment and Planning, and is working on regional 
industrial development schemes. It also en- 
visages an Afi-ican common market. All of 
these moves are worthy and needed efforts to 
make maximum use of Africa's resources in pro- 
grams designed to provide the greatest benefits 
for as many people as possible. 

Settling Local Disputes 

As elsewhere in the world there are various 
local disputes in Africa, some deep-rooted, 
others arising from boimdaries which are un- 
clear or which cut across tribal and other natural 
divisions. Such influence as we have is, of 
course, on the side of the peaceful settlement 
of these quarrels, which divert energies and 
resources of the peoples involved from their 
problems of internal development and provide 
openings for troublemaking by the Commu- 
nists. We should like to see these disputes 
composed by the Africans themselves. 

We have followed with admiration the as- 
sumption of responsibilities by the young Or- 
ganization of African Unity. In a year and a 
half the OAU has made important contributions 
in the Algeria-Morocco dispute, to Tanganyika's 
internal security, to the Ethiopia-Somali border 
problem, and currently is moving to assist the 
Congo. The United States strongly supports 
African imity and the efforts of Africans to 
settle African problems. 

Communist Efforts in Africa 

We must be concerned about the designs of 
imperialist Commimist states on the new Afri- 
can nations. To date the Communists have 
extended some $1 billion worth of aid to Af- 
rica — although much of this has not yet been 
drawn upon. And some 5,000 Communist tech- 
nical and economic personnel are in Africa. In 
addition, from 6,000 to 8,000 African students 
are in Communist countries; Communist diplo- 
matic, consular, and trade missions in Africa 
total nearly 150, and more than 300 hours of 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


Communist broadcasts are now beamed exclu- 
sively to Africa. 

These fi^ires do not include quantities of 
covert assistance to subversive Communist- 
front, trade imion, and other movements. Nor 
do they include books, pamphlets, press subsi- 
dies, motion pictures, and other propaganda 
tools. Those items are hard to measure pre- 
cisely, but we can take it for granted that their 
growth has kept pace with the rapid increase of 
money aid in recent years. 

The cost of this effort and the energy diverted 
from other demanding needs have meant a 
considerable sacrifice to the Commimists. 
Nevertheless, they obviously consider their ex- 
penditures woi-th making, because they would 
not invest time and money without expecting to 
achieve at least a part, of their objectives in 

Despite their efforts, however, there is no 
Communist satellite in Africa. One reason for 
the Communists' lack of success can be found 
in the strong economic, cultural, and other links 
that exist between African and Western nations. 
A second reason lies in the open division be- 
tween the Chinese and the Russians. And the 
third, and most important, is the attachment 
of Africans to their independence and their re- 
vulsion to any attempts to limit that freedom. 
This love of independence will contmue to mili- 
tate against Communist encroaclunents. Some 
African leaders already have felt the effects of 
Communist efforts at subversion and have 
learned from that experience. Others do not 
yet fully comprehend Communist purposes and 

The Communists' threat to African freedom 
remains a problem for those who love freedom. 
They still have ample opportunities for fishmg 
in troubled waters in those areas of Africa 
where important issues remain to be resolved. 

One such area is the Congo, where tribal dis- 
sension and economic discontent have led to a 
series of rebellions in recent months. For 4 
years the United States has supported the ef- 
forts of the United Nations and the Central 
Congolese Government to restoi-e unity, pre- 
serve territorial integrity, and promote internal 
security. Wo continue to provide assistance to 

that Government, just as we have done in the 

We are pleased to see the Organization of 
African Unity participating in efforts to help 
end the Congo's troubles. We wish nothing 
more than to see an effective African solution 
and wish to cooperate with the Organization of 
African Unity and the Government of the 
Congo toward this end. 

Unresolved Problems in Southern Africa 

Most of Africa's other unresolved problems 
lie in the southern end of the continent, where 
government by consent of the governed has not 
yet been achieved. This area includes the Re- 
public of South Africa, South-West Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese terri- 
tories of Angola and Mozambique. 

These are countries where colonies of Euro- 
peans have been in power over a period of many 
years. Yet the whites comprise a relatively 
small part, of the population — only some 4 mil- 
lion out of a total of approximately 36 million 

The question of working out government by 
consent of all the peoples in these countries is 
a complicated and many-sided problem. The 
Africans aspire to guide their own destinies 
and, indeed, are detennined to do so. At the 
same time, a minority among them is stoutly 
resisting political change, even though it is well 
aware that the many millions of Africans are 
moving inexorably to wrench themselves free 
from minority rule. 

The peoples of these areas face serious prob- 
lems of accommodation between races and, in 
some cases, problems of constitutional reform. 
Some sections of southern Africa show no in- 
tention of coming to grips with the problems 
of race and participation of nonwhites in polit- 
ical affairs. Others are making halting prog- 
ress toward the desirable goals of self-detenni- 
nation and nonracial societies. But even where 
progress is being made, there are genuine dif- 
ferences of opinion about the speed and meth- 
ods by which those goals are best attained. 

A peaceful reconciliation of divergent inter- 
ests in southern Africa could have a beneficial 
effect on the current balance of forces in the 
world. The alternative could well be tin un- 



wanted and unnecessary period of conflict which 
coukl sliatter the friendly and nmtually bene- 
ficial African-European relations that exist 
thi'oughout the continent today. It would be 
deeply unfortunate if the many European con- 
tributions to African development were de- 
stroyed through strife. 

U.S. Goals in Southern Africa 

The United States has a deep interest in 
events in southern Africa. In our dealings with 
those areas our position is based firmly on the 
belief that govenmients derive their just pow- 
ers from the consent of the governed. 

A major goal of our policy in southern Africa 
is to bring about a dialog among all the racial 
groups in those teiTitories. We would like to 
see all parties concerned work out the most mu- 
tually acceptable solutions to their problems 
through their own efforts. 

Another goal, in which we believe equally 
strongly, is that the rights of minorities must 
be recognized and safeguarded in whatever so- 
lutions are developed. In southern Africa 
there are, in addition to a large white minority, 
sizable minorities of Asians and Coloreds — peo- 
ple of mixed blood — all of whose rights must 
be assui'ed. 

How to effect a transition to government by 
the consent of the governed in an atmosphere 
of mutual trust and respect will require all the 
foresight, good will, and understanding that the 
peoples of southern Africa can muster. There 
is no easy solution to any of these jiroblems, and 
the highest degree of political skill, ingenuity, 
and leadership is required from all of the peo- 
ples of that area. 

Despite turmoil and difficult problems, we 
hold high hopes for Africa's long-term future. 
We expect to see the peoples of that continent 
play growing roles of responsibility in the 
world community we seek to build. You, as 
leading Americans of African ancestry, can do 
much to help the nations of Africa safeguard 
their freedom and independence and move for- 
ward economically, socially, and politically. 
You can do much to expand and deepen the 
fraternal relationships which we desire with 
them — and with all other peoples. We shall 
be happy to have your counsel. 

President Congratulates Malta 
on Independence 

White House press release dated September 19, for release 
September 20 

Following is the text of a letter of September 
18 from President Johnson to Dr. Giorgio Borg 
Olivier, Priine Minister of Malta. 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister : Congratulations 
and best wishes on the occasion of Malta's in- 
dependence. The establishment of Malta as an 
independent state is a tribute to you, the British 
Government, and the people of Malta. The 
United States has been deeply imjiressed by the 
leadership and courage you have provided in 
your country's efforts to achieve its independ- 
ence and secure its freedom. 

Malta is well known to us. We have wel- 
comed thousands of Maltese to our shores. Our 
mariners have been warmly received by your 
islands since the days of our own independence. 
In the field of science, the discovery of the im- 
dulant fever germ by Sir Themistocles Zammit 
epitomizes the development of Malta's many 
skills. Malta's unflinching steadfastness dur- 
ing World War II symbolized the strength of 
the Maltese throughout an epic history. We in 
the United States look forward to seeing the 
friendly ties already established between us 
grow stronger in the years ahead. 

I am happy to have Mr. Eichard W. Eeuter, 
the Director of the Food for Peace Program, 
as my representative and Special Ambassador 
at the independence ceremonies. He is a dis- 
tinguished United States public servant who 
has worked closely with me, and he has a par- 
ticular sympathy for the great principles of 
freedom for which you stand. Also represent- 
ing me will be INIr. Joseph Calleja, the Director 
of the Maltese Information Center in Detroit, 

I am confident that Malta's role as an inde- 
pendent member of the community of nations 
will be bright and constructive. We look for- 
ward to working together with you and your 
government and your people in the great causes 
of our time — the promotion of peace, freedom, 
and democracy. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 


U.S. and Canada Hold CoSumbia River Treaty Ceremonies 

On September 16 in ceremonies at the Inter- 
national Peace Arch at Blaine^ Wash., President 
Johnson proclaimed the Columbia River Treaty 
with Canada,^ a treaty relating to the coopera- 
tive development of the water resources of the 
Columbia River basin. Earlier that day at 
Oreat Falls., Mont., the President welcomed 
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada to 
the United States. From there they made an 
aerial survey of the Columbia River area, then 
flew to Vaticou/ver, B.C., where the Prime 
Minister welcomed President Johnson to Cana- 
da. FoUowing are the texts of their remarks 
at these cities and at the International Peace 
Arch, together with an exchange of notes be- 
tween the American Ambassador at Ottawa and 
the Canadian Secretary of State for External 


White House press release (Great Falls, Mont.) dated Sep- 
tember 16 ; as-delivered text 

President Johnson 

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguislied Mem- 
bers of the Congress, distinguished Governors : 
Welcome to the United States, Mr. Prime 
Minister, and welcome to Montana, whose 
majesty and western warmth should remind 
you of your own great country. 

In 1963, Mr. Prime Minister, you said of 
Canada : "We are so friendly that we feel that 
we can criticize the United States like a Texan 
does — and in the same idiom." This Texan 
hopes that you still feel that freedoin, for we 
welcome the comments and the counsel which 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 234. 

spring, as yours do, from friendship and vmder- 
standing, although I doubt that even with your 
grasp of languages you will be able to match 
the Texas idiom. 

Twenty-one years ago President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
met in Hyde Park. They agreed to work to- 
gether to defend this hemisphere and to defend 
democracy everywhere. From that day to this, 
we have followed the same path of partnership. 
Free people everywhere are more secure because 
of our cooperation in NOEAD [North Ameri- 
can Defense Command], in NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization], and in the 
United Nations. 

The freedom and richness of our lands, the 
hopes of the people they serve, depend upon 
the peace of the world that we live in. It is 
a symbol of our time that beneath the magnifi- 
cence of this Montana stand weapons that are 
powerful enough to devastate much of a con- 
tinent. Those of us who seek peace know that 
only wisdom and patience, and the fortitude of 
long effoi't, can bring us near to that goal. But 
we will always pursue that goal. 

You, Mr. Prime Minister, are a symbol of that 
effort. You have never wavered in tlie defense 
of freedom. But j'ou also have given much of 
your life so that free men might live in peace. 
You have done much for your people. You 
have carried the influence of Canada to the 
highest coimcils and to the most hazardous 
crises of the world. 

But we greet you not only as a great Cana- 
dian today. We welcome you as a man whose 
homo is found wherever man seeks fulfillment 
amid the peace that you, INIr. Prime Minister, 
have labored so long and so hard to build. 



Prime Minister Pearson 

Mr. President, distinguished Governors, dis- 
tinguished Membei-s of Congress, Members of 
Parliament, ladies and gentlemen : It gives me 
a very great pleasure to be on American soil 
once more and to receive such a kind and gener- 
ous welcome from you, Mr. President, and from 
your distinguished colleagues. 

This is a verj' brief visit, but it gives me time 
and opportimity to bring to you the warm good 
wishes of the Canadian people toward their 
American friends. You laiow, I feel like a 
neighbor dropping in to make a friendly visit. 
Indeed, that is what I am doing, because I just 
dropped in to pick up the President and take 
him back to Canada. 

This is the kind of relationship which exists 
between our two peoples. It is close, it is in- 
formal, it is important, and it is neighborly. 
Like leaning over a back fence to talk to your 
neighbor, but a back fence which neither neigh- 
bor wishes to pull down and which both are 
anxious to keep in good repair. Of course, 
there are differences of opinion and, at times, 
frustrations between even the best of neighbors, 
and we have them between our two countries, 
but they do not prevent a warm underlying 
friendship and understanding. 

Mr. President, you and I will be setting forth 
today on a fascinating and historic journey to 
explore from the air — I hope we will be able to 
see it; — the mighty Columbia Eiver and the re- 
gion of a great cooperative development, a de- 
velopment which agreement between our two 
governments made possible. To me, the Colum- 
bia River project is the kind of enterprise which 
best demonstrates the partnership between the 
United States and Canada. This is what our 
two countries are uniquely fitted to do, to join 
together in the constructive development of our 
continent's resources for the benefit of present 
and future generations, in a world in which I 
hope we will be at peace. 

The Columbia River Treaty is not only an 
achievement in itself but an earnest for the fu- 
ture. We must follow it up with other fruitful 
joint endeavors which will give substance to our 
friendship, which I am so proud to acknowledge 
this morning, and meaning to our good neigh- 

borhood, of wliich this happy meeting is a 
Thank you. 


Wbite House press release (Vancouver, B.C.) dated September 
16 ; as-delivered text 

Prime Minister Pearson 

Mr. President, Mr. Premier, distinguished 
guests from the United States, and friends: 
It is a very great pleasure, Mr. President, to 
welcome you to Canadian soil, as I have been 
welcoming you to Canadian airspace, and I am 
especially happy because this is the occasion of 
the ratification of a treaty - which will benefit 
both our countries and which is the result of 
friendly cooperation between them. 

It is, I think, appropriate that your first visit, 
as President, outside the United States should 
be to Canada, your nearest neighbor, your clos- 
est friend, and naturally, therefore, your most 
candid and constructive critic. 

It is the accepted convention that the first offi- 
cial visit of the head of a state or the head of a 
government to another country should be to the 
capital of that country, but you, Mr. President, 
are a Texan and, as such, not bound by conven- 
tions — at least that kind of convention. So your 
first visit to Canada, and your first visit as Pres- 
ident outside the United States, is to British 
Columbia, to Vancouver, where you are being 
greeted today by Premier Bennett and other 
distinguished citizens of this Province. 

It is fitting, I believe, that this should be the 
case, and it is a recognition of the surge of 
Canadian development west and north and of 
our interest and our destiny across the Pacific. 
In no iJart of Canada could your welcome be 
more sincere than in this great Province. But 
I assure you, Mr. President, that had you 
landed at our most eastern airport in New- 
foundland, 5,000 or more miles away, or at any 
place between, our welcome to you would have 

' American Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth and 
Canadian Minister for External Affairs Paul Martin 
exchanged instruments of ratification at Ottawa on 
Sept. 16. 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


been equally warm both for yourself and as 
President of the United States of America, 
the nation which bears today so much of the 
burden of insuring peace and promoting free- 
dom in the world, the nation which has led the 
free world through these troubled postwar 
years, the nation that is our good friend and 
our good neighbor. 

President Johnson 

Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. Premier 
Bennett, Honorable Ministers and Members of 
Parliament, citizens of British Columbia, my 
fellow Westerners, ladies and gentlemen: If 
you would indulge me just a moment, I should 
like to introduce to our Canadian friends the 
distinguished Americans who have come with 
me today to participate in this most enjoyable 
occasion and to commemorate this day. 

First of all, I should like to ask the distin- 
guished ehainnan of our Foreign Relations 
Committee of the United States Senate, Sena- 
tor J. William Fulbright, to stand, and his wise 
and beloved colleague. Senator George Aiken, 
a gi'eat friend of Canada. 

From our neighboring State of Montana, we 
have the great Majority Leader of the United 
States Senate, Mike Mansfield; his colleague, 
our friend Senator Lee Metcalf ; and Governor 

From Oregon we have Senator Morse, the 
distinguished member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee; Senator Neuberger; the fine yoimg 
Governor of Florida — of Oregon, Governor 
Hatfield. Governor, I hope you will pardon 
me, because I was in Florida yesterday, and I 
am going to be in Oregon tomorrow. 

From the State of Washington, we have 
Senator Warren Magnuson, Senator Henry 
Jackson, and Governor Rosellini. 

It is on rare occasions that we have a quorum 
of the Senate here in the middle of the 

From the great State of Nevada, we have 
Senator Alan Bible, Senator Howard Cannon, 
and Governor Grant Sawyer. 

And my own distinguished Secretary of the 
Interior, Mr. Stewart Udall. 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Premier, I want to 

thank you for your generous welcome. This 
trip to Vancouver is the first that I have taken 
outside of my own country since I became 
President last November. 

I think I will be guided by an old Chinese 
proverb: "T^Hien you enter a country, inquire 
as to what is forbidden ; when you cross a bound- 
ary, ask about the customs." Well, I have made 
careful inquiries, and I will eat the sabnon and 
praise the B.C. Lions. 

It is appropriate that this first trip should be 
to Canada. Our ties are old and they are 
strong. We are at once neighbors and friends, 
and partners and allies, and I am very glad my 
first stop is Vancouver. 

Here is that spirit of adventure and commit- 
ment — of building a nation — which is part of 
the West, which is my home also. I won't say 
that Vancouver reminds me of Texas. I will 
say, though, when I go home, that Texas re- 
minds me of Vancouver. 

Your Prime Minister has said that the great 
purpose of international statesmanship today 
must be to make possible a better life for all. 
Well, that is the purpose of this visit. The 
treaty we proclaim will lay a new foundation 
of prosperity for Canadians and Americans, for 
your West and for ours. 

We have achieved this partnership because 
we respect our differences. This continent is a 
richer and freer place for tliat respect. At the 
same time, we owe much to each otlier. We can 
never forget that the rich soil of American 
freedom has been washed with Canadian blood, 
shed in a common effort, against foreign enemies ; 
nor can we forget that you have an honest in- 
terest in our affairs. We will always stand with 
you in the defense of freedom. 

But I also tell you that, in the years to come, 
my country will spare no effort to achieve a last- 
ing peace for all of us. 

I hope to leani more about your coimtry. I 
hope to encourage my people to discover more 
of the richness of your culture, the values of 
your jDeople, and the promise of your destiny. 
But this much we already know : No nation in 
the world has had greater fortune than mine 
in sharing a continent with the people and the 
nation of Canada. 



And now, in the midst of a great drought in 
Texas, we welcome this great rain here. 


White House press release (Vancouver, B.C.) dated Septem- 
ber 16 ; as-delivered text 

President Johnson 

I proclaim this treaty from this day forward. 
Let it be observed by the Government and by the 
l^eople of the United States of America. 

Prime Minister Pearson 

Mr. President, Premier Bemiett, Governor 
Rosellini, distinguished guests, ladies and gen- 
tlemen : It is raining, and I was going to make 
a speech, but I think the best thing I can do is 
to cut my speech short and let you get in out of 
the rain. 

But before I do that, may I say how honored 
and privileged I am to be here, to participate in 
this impressive and moving ceremony with the 
President of the United States of America. I 
think the signing of this treaty is an important 
accomplishment, not only because it will be of 
great material benefit to our two countries and 
our two peoples in the development of the re- 
sources of this continent but because it is 
another illustration of friendship and good 
neighborhood and the way two countries can 
and should work together. 

Mr. President, we are grateful to you for 
coming to this border to make this possible. 
We are gi-ateful to you for bringing with you 
distinguished Members of Congi-ess and im- 
portant men in tlie political life of your coun- 
tiy. "VVe want you to know that you have been 
very welcome to Canada on this first visit to 
our counti-y. We would like you to come back. 
If you come back, you will see, Mr. President, 
that this treaty has indeed been a constructive 
one and that it is gomg to work to the benefit 
of both of our coimtries. For that we owe a 
debt of gratitude not only to the negotiators 
but to the Premier of this Pro\'ince, who worked 
with them to bring about this great day in the 
de\-elopment of this part of North jVmerica 
and a great day in international cooperation 
between our two countries. 

Thank you veiy much. 

President Johnson Proclaims 
Columbia River Treaty 


Whereas the treaty between the United States 
of America and Canada relating to cooperative 
development of the water resources of the Co- 
lumbia River basin wa.s signed at Washington 
on January 17, 1961 by their respective Pleni- 
potentiaries, the original of which treaty is word 
for word as follows : 

Whereas the Senate of the United States of 
America by their resolution of March 16, 1961, 
two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein, did advise and consent to the ratification 
of the aforesaid treaty : 

Whereas the aforesaid treaty was duly ratified 
by the President of the United States of America 
on March 23, 1961, in pursuance of the aforesaid 
advice and consent of the Senate, and was duly 
ratified on the part of Canada ; 

Whereas it is provided in Article XIX of the 
aforesaid treaty that the treaty shall come into 
force on the ratification date and in Article XX 
of the aforesaid treaty that the instruments of 
ratification shall be exchanged at Ottawa ; 

And whereas the respective instruments of 
ratification of the aforesaid treaty were duly 
exchanged at Ottawa on September 16, 1964 by 
the resi>ective Pleniixttentiaries of the United 
States of America and Canada ; 

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Lyndon 
B. Johnson, President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim and make public 
the aforesaid treaty to the end that the said 
treaty and each and every article and clause 
thereof may be observed and fulfilled, on and 
after September 16, 1964, with good faith by the 
United States of America and by the citizens of 
the United States of America and all other per- 
sons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. 

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the International Peace Arch, Blaine, 
Washington, this sixteenth day of Sep- 
[seal] tember in the year of our Lord one 
thousand nine hundred sixty-four and of 
the Independence of the United States of Amer- 
ica the one hundred eighty-ninth. 

IUyvJU«J^^ W .<U«- ■ 

By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


President Johnson 

Mr. Premier, Mr. Prime Minister, distin- 
gnisiied guests on the i)latform, ladies and 
gentlemen : There are many reasons why my 
first trip abroad as President should be to 
Canada. In 1839 J. Pinkney Henderson, the 
representative of the Republic of Texas to 
France and to England wrote that Great 
Britain might delay its recognition of the new 
republic for fear of the impact in Canada. But 
Canada remained loyal. Great Britain recog- 
nized Texas, and that recognition helped open 
the door to American union for Texas. 

Had that not happened, Mr. Prime Minister, 
had Texas stayed independent, classical diplo- 
macy suggests that we might very well today be 
concluding a treaty of mutual defense against 
the American influence. As a Texan, I can sym- 
pathize with the problems of living beside a 
wealthy and powerful and pervasive neighbor. 
That is just how the rest of the United States 
feels about Texas. 

More than 3 years ago President Kennedy 
came to Canada.^ He told your Parliament his 
trip was "an act of faith." He said it was faith 
in our capacity to meet common problems and 
in our common cause of freedom. Well, my trip 
today is a fulfillment and a renewal of that act 
of faith. It is both a resolution of a common 
problem and a strengthening of freedom's 

Lord Durham, in the famous report that laid 
the foundation for modem Canada, spoke of 
the possibility of establishing "partners in a new 
industry, the creation of happy human beings." 
That partnership is the purpose of this treaty 
that we have signed today. 

It will supply new electric power to millions 
of my countrymen. It will supply revenues to 
Canada, although I was somewhat shocked 
when I heard you read that cable about receiv- 
ing $253,999,884, and then to show you what 
the Canadians really went for — they went for 
that last 25 cents. 

It joins common purpose to common interest 
in pursuit of the welfare of the free people 
who share our continent. My country is grate- 
ful for the spacious spirit with which this 

• Bulletin of June 5, 1961, p. 839. 

generous design was conceived and the way it 
was carried out, even down to the last quarter. 
It is another landmark in the history of one of 
the oldest and most successful associations of 
sovereign governments anywhere in the world. 

What is the secret of this success? It begins 
with a truth: The only justifiable object of 
government is the welfare of individual men 
and women. It is a simple truth. But had 
others shared it with us, the world would have 
been spared many dark years. 

With this as the animating design, our 
partnership has been built on four pillars, and 
the success of that structure might well serve 
as a model to the world. 

The first pillar is peace. 

The second pillar is freedom. 

The third pillar is re.spect. One of my prede- 
cessors, Woodrow Wilson, said, "You cannot 
be friends upon any other basis than upon 
terms of equality." We maintain with each 
other the relationship we seek for all the world : 
cooperation amid diversity. 

Pericles said of a state that was much smaller 
than yours, "We have forced every sea and land 
to be the highway of our daring." In the 
founding of the United Nations, in the Middle 
East, in the Congo, in Southeast Asia, the world 
has responded to Canadian daring. You have 
followed not the highway of empire which 
helped destroy Athens but the more difficult 
path to peace which can save the world, and 
you have been a principal architect, Mr. Prime 
Minister, of that profound achievement. 

The fourth pillar is cooperation. This 
agreement is the latest in an impressive list. 
We have disarmed our border ; we have shared 
the costs of defense; we have divided power at 
Niagara; we have built the St. Lawrence Sea- 
way, and resolved scores of other problems. 
Difficulties that divide others have imited us. 

The reason is plain. We share interest and 
we share purpose. Wo come to the council 
table advised by reason, aware of each other's 
problems, anxious to find final agreement. You 
told us, Mr. Prime Minister, "As good neigh- 
bors we must be able to sit down and discuss 
(problems) realizing that solutions will not be 
found without hard work and without give and 
take on both sides." 

We both have problems we must solve within 




our borders. My country has a war to win on 
poverty. We must find justice for men of all 
races. "We must crush the forces of division 
which gnaw at the fabric of our miion. 

You have your own difficulties. We watch 
with friendly confidence in your capacity to 
merge differences in the grand dream of Cana- 
dian design. But there is also much, Mr. Prime 
Minister, which we share. 

In the world we seek peace and mounting ful- 
fillment for man. Here we work together, from 
ocean to ocean, in resources and science, to en- 
rich the life of our two peoples, to elevate the 
quality of our two societies. 

Franklin Roosevelt once said, "Democracy 
is the form of government which guarantees 
to every generation of men the right to imagine 
and to attempt to bring to pass a better world." 
Tliat has been the story of your life, Mr. Prime 
Mmister. It is also the strength of our two 
nations, and I believe that future generations 
will have cause for gratitude that two great 
democracies — Canada and the United States — 
shared the most generous continent which God 
has ever granted to man. 

Thank you. 


U.S. Note 

Ottawa, September 16, 1964 

No, 75 

SiK, I have the honor to refer to your note No. 140 
of September 16, 1964, regarding the disposal of the 
Canadian entitlement to downstream power benefits 
in the United States, in accordance with Article VIII 
(1) of the Treaty betweeen the United States of 
America and Canada relating to the cooperative devel- 
opment of the water resources of the Columbia River 
Basin, signed at Washington, January 17, 1961. 

I wish to advise you that the Government of the 
United States of America has designated the Adminis- 
trator of the Bonneville Power Administration, De- 
partment of the Interior, and the Division Engineer, 
North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers, Depart- 
ment of the Army, as the United States Entity for 
the purposes of Article XIV(l) of the Treaty. A copy 
of the designation is attached to this note. 

I wish also to advise that the Government of the 
United States of America confirms the proposals and 
understandings set forth in your note, and agrees 
that your note, together with this reply, shall con- 
stitute an agreement between our two Governments 

relating to the implementation of the provisions of the 
Treaty with effect from tlie date of the exchange of 
iuslrunients of ratification of the Treaty. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 


Enclosure : 
As stated. 

The Honorable 

Paul Mabtin, P.C, Q.C, 

Secretary of State for External Affairs, 



Pbovidinq for Certain Arrangements Under the 
Columbia River Treaty 

Whereas the treaty between the United States and 
Canada relating to cooperative development of the 
water resources of the Columbia River Basin (signed 
at Washington, D.C., on January 17, 1961; Executive 
C, 87th Congress, 1st Session) has come into force ; and 

Whereas Article XIV of such treaty (hereinafter 
referred to as the Treaty) provides for the designation 
of certain entities which are empowered and charged 
with the duty to formulate and carry out the operat- 
ing arrangements necessary to implement the Treaty, 
and authorizes the United States of Am erica to desig- 
nate one or more of such entities ; and 

Whereas Article XV of the Treaty authorizes the 
United States of America to appoint two members of 
the Permanent Engineering Board established by that 

Now, THEREFORE, by vlrtue of the authority vested 
in me by the Treaty and by the Constitution and 
statutes, and as President of the United States, it Is 
hereby ordered as follows : 

Part I. United States Entity 
Section 101. Designation of Entity. The Admin- 
istrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, 
Department of the Interior, and the Division Engineer, 
North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers, Depart- 
ment of the Army, are hereby designated as an entity 
under Article XIV of the Treaty, to be known as the 
United States Entity for the Columbia River Treaty 
(hereinafter referred to as the Entity). The desig- 
nated Administrator shall be the Chairman of the 

Sec. 102. Fnnctions of the Entity. The Entity shall 
have the fiuictions set forth therefor in Article XIV, 
and in other provisions, of the Treaty. 

Sec. 103. Departmental responsihilities. This order 
shall not affect (1) the respective responsibilities of 
the Department of the Army and the Department of 
the Interior for project operation and administration, 
(2) the respective responsibilities of the Secretary of 

* No. 1117T ; 29 Fed. Reg. 13097. 

OCTOBER 12, 19G4 


the Army and the Chief of Engineers for the super- 
vision and direction of the Department of the Army 
and the Office of the Chief of Engineers, or (3) the 
responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior for the 
supervision and direction of the Department of the 

Part II. United States Section, Permanent En- 
gineering Board 

Section 201. Appointment of memhers of the Perma- 
nent Engineering Board, (a) The Secretary of the In- 
terior and the Secretary of the Army shall each 
appoint one person as a United States member of the 
Permanent Engineering Board established by Article 
XV of the Treaty. 

(b) Each such person shall be selected from among 
appropriately qualified individuals, vi'ho at the time of 
appointment may be, but need not necessarily be, offi- 
cers or employees of the United States, and shall serve 
as a member of the Board during the pleasure of the 
appointing Secretary. 

Sec. 202. Alternate members. In addition to the two 
members to be appointed under the provisions of Sec- 
tion 201 of this order, there shall be two alternate 
United States members of the Permanent Engineering 
Board. The provisions of Section 201 of this order 
shall apply to the selection, appointment, and service 
of the alternate members. 

Sec 203. United States Section. The members and 
alternate members appointed under the foregoing pro- 
visions of this Part shall compose the United States 
Section, Permanent Engineering Board, Columbia Riv- 
er Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the United States 
Section. The member appointed by the Secretary of 
the Army under Section 201(a) of this order shall be 
the Chairman of the United States Section. 

Sec. 204. Assistance to the United States Section. 
With the consent of the respective heads thereof, de- 
partments and agencies of the Federal Government 
may, upon the request of the United States Section 
and to the extent not inconsistent with law, furnish 
assistance needed by the Section in connection with the 
performance of its functions. 

Part III. General 

Section 301. Reservation. There is hereby reserved 
the right to modify or terminate any or all of the 
provisions of this order. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
Septemher 16, 1964. 

Canadian Note 

Ottawa, September 16, 196^. 

No. 140 

ExoEu-ENCT, I have the honour to refer to the Treaty 
between Canada and the United States of America 
relating to cooperative development of the water re- 
sources of the Columbia River Basin signed at Wash- 

ington on 17 January 1961, to the Protocol attached 
to my Xote to the Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary 
of State of the United States of America, dated 22 Jan- 
uary 1964,'^ and to the exchange of instruments of rati- 
fication " of the Treaty which occurred today. 

I also have the honour to refer to the diseu.ssions 
which have been held between representatives of the 
Government of Canada and of the Government of the 
United States of America in connection with the Ex- 
change of Notes, dated 22 January 1904, regarding sale 
in the United States of America of Canada's entitle- 
ment under the Treaty to downstream power benefits.' 

My Government also understands that your Govern- 
ment has designated the Administrator of the Bonne- 
ville Power Administration, Department of the In- 
terior, and the Division Engineer, North Pacific Divi- 
sion, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, as 
the United States Entity for the purposes of Article 
XIV (1) of the Treaty, and I would inform you that 
the Government of Canada has designated the British 
Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, a corporation 
incorporated in the Province of British Columbia by 
the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Act, 
1964, as the Canadian Entity for the purposes of that 
Article. A copy of the designation is attached hereto. 

On the basis of those discussions the Government 
of Canada proposes that the Canadian Entitlement 
Purchase Agreement regarding the sale in the United 
States of America of the Canadian Entitlement under 
the Treaty to downstream ix)wer benefits entered into 
between the British Cohimbia Hydro and Power Au- 
thority and the Columbia Storage Power Exchange, the 
single purchaser referred to in the attachment to your 
Note of January 22, 19(>4, relating to the terms of the 
sale, a copy of which agreement is attached hereto, be 
authorized for the purposes of Article VIII (1) of the 
Treaty as a disposal of the Canadian Entitlement in 
the United States of America for the period and in 
accordance with the other terms and provisions set 
out in the Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement. 

My Government also understands that your Govern- 
ment pursuant to paragraph E. 5 In the attachment to 
Mr. Secretary Rusk's Note of January 22, 1964, relat- 
ing to the terms of the sale, has determined that the 
United States Entity shall enter into and that it has 
entered into the Canadian Entitlement Exchange 
Agreements which agreements assure unconditionally 
the delivery for the account of the Columbia Storage 
Power Exchange of an amount of power agreed be- 
tween the United States Entity and the Columbia 
Storage Power Exchange to he the equivalent of the 
Canadian Entitlement being sold under the Canadian 
Entitlement Piirchase Agreement, and that the United 
States Entity has succeeded to all the rights and obli- 
gations of the Columbia Storage Power Exchange un- 
der the Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement 
other than the obligation to \ts\y the purchase price, 

" Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 202. 

" Not printe<l here. 

' Bttlletin of Feb. 10, 191V4, p. 203. 



and further that the United States Entity has, pur- 
suant to Article XI of tlie Treaty, approved tlie use of 
the improved stream flow in the United States of 
America brought about by the Treaty by entering into 
Canadian Entitlement Allocation Agreements with 
owners of non-Federal dams on the Cohunbia River. 

My Government also understands that the two Gov- 
ernments are agreed that the Government of the 
United States of America undertakes that : 

(1) So long as the Canadian Entitlement Exchange 
Agreements remain in force, the United States 
Entity will perform all the obligations of the 
Columbia Storage Power Exchange under the 
Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement 
other than the obligation to pay the purchase 
price specified in Section 3 of the Canadian En- 
titlement Purchase Agreement ; 

(2) In the event the Canadian Entitlement is re- 
duced as a result of a failure on the part of the 
Canadian Entity to comply with Section 4 of the 
Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement and 
if the failure results other than from wilful 
omission by the Canadian Entity to fulfill its 
obligations under that agreement, the United 
States Entity will, without compensation, offset 
the effect of that failure by adjusting the opera- 
tion of the portion of the System described in 
Step I of paragraph 7 of Annex B of the Treaty 
which is in the United States of America to the 
extent that the United States Entity can do so 
without loss of energy or capacity to that por- 
tion of the System ; and 

(3) If the procedure described in paragraph (2) 
above does not fully offset the effect of the failure, 
then to the extent the entities agree thereon, an 
additional offsetting adjustment in the opera- 
tion of the portion of the System described in 
Step I of Annex B of the Treaty which is in the 
United States of America and which would re- 
sult in only an energy loss will be made if the 
Canadian Entity delivers to the United States 
Entity energy suflicient to make up one half that 
energy loss. 

(4) In order to make up any reduction in the Ca- 
nadian Entitlement, which reduction is to be de- 
termined in accordance with Section 6 of the 
Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement, the 
United States Entity will cause to be delivered 
the least expensive capacity and energy avail- 
able and, to the extent that it would be the least 
expensive available, will deliver, at the then ap- 
plicable rate schedules of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, any available surplus capacity 
and energy from the United States Federal Co- 
lumbia River System. 

The Government of Canada also proposes that : 

(5) Contemporaneously with the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification CSPE shall have paid 
to Canada the sum in United States funds of 

$2i>3,929,534.2,'5, being the equivalent of the sum 
of .?2r>4,400.00() in United States funds as of Oc- 
tober 1, 1964 adjusted to September 16, 1964 
at a discount rate of 414 percent per annum on 
the basis set out in the January 22, 1964 Ex- 
change of Notes between our two Governments 
relating to the terms of sale, which sum shall 
be applied towards the cost of constructing the 
Treaty projects through a transfer of the sum 
by Canada to the Government of British Colum- 
bia pursuant to arrangements entered into be- 
tween Canada and British Columbia. 

(6) No modification or renewal of the Canadian 
Entitlement Purchase Agreement shall be ef- 
fective until approved by the Governments of 
Canada and the United States of America, evi- 
denced by an Exchange of Notes. 

(7) The storages described in Article II of the 
Treaty shall be considered fully operative when 
the facilities for such storages are available 
and outlet facilities are operable for regulating 
flows in accordance with the flood control and 
hydroelectric operating plans. 

(8) As soon as practicable, the Canadian and United 
States Entities shall agree upon a program for 
filling the storage provided b.y each of the 
Treat.v projects. The filling program shall have 
the objective of having the storages described 
in Article 11(2) (a). Article 11(2) (b), and Arti- 
cle 11(2) (c) of the Treaty filled to the extent 
that usable storage, in the amounts provided 
for each storage in Article II of the Treaty is 
available by September 1 following the date 
when the storage becomes fully operative, and 
of having the storage provided by the dam de- 
scribed in Article 11(2) (a) filled to 15 million 
acre-feet by September 1, 1975. This objective 
shall be reflected in the hydroelectric operating 
plans and shall take into account generating 
requirements at-site and downstream in Canada 
and the United States of America to meet loads 
and requirements for flood control. 

(9) In the event the Unite<l States of America be- 
comes entitled to compensation from Canada 
for loss of downstream power benefits, other 
than Canada's entitlement to downstream power 
benefits, in respect of a breach of the obligation 
under Article IV (6) of the Treaty to commence 
full operation of a storage, compensation pay- 
able to the United States of America under 
Article XVIII(5)(a) of the Treaty shall be 
made in an amount equal to 2.70 mills per 
kilowatt-hour of energy, and 46 cents per kilo- 
watt of dependable capacity for each month or 
fraction thereof, in United States Funds, for 
and in lieu of the power which would have been 
forfeited under Article XVIII(5)(a) of the 
Treaty if Canada's entitlement to downstream 
power benefits had not been sold in the United 
States of America. The power which would 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


have been forfeited shall be Canada's entitle- 
ment to downstream power benefits attributable 
to the particular storage had it commenced full 
operation in accordance with Article IV (6) of 
the Treaty and shall consist of (1) dependable 
capacity for the period of forfeiture and (2) 
that portion of average annual usable energy 
which would have been available during the pe- 
riod of forfeiture assuming the energy to be 
available at a uniform rate throughout the year. 
Alternatively, Canada may, at its option, offset 
the power for which compensation is to be made 
by delivering capacity and energy to the United 
States Entity, such delivery to be made, unless 
otherwise agreed by the entities, during the 
period of breach and at a uniform rate. The 
option for Canada to provide power in place of 
paying money shall permit Canada to make com- 
pensation partly by supplying power and partly 
by paying money, as may be mutually agreed 
by the entities. 

(10) The Canadian Entity shall at reasonable inter- 
vals provide current reports to the United 
States Entity of the progress of construction 
of the Treaty storages. In the event there is a 
likelihood of delay in meeting the completion 
dates .set out in Section 4 of the Canadian En- 
titlement Purchase Agreement or a delay which 
will give rise to a claim under paragraph (9) 
hereof the Canadian Entity will advise of the 
probability of power being available to make 
the compensation required. 

(11) To the extent the Canadian Entity does not 
make compensation for a reduction in the Cana- 
dian Entitlement arising as a result of a fail- 
ure to comply with Section 4 of the Canadian 
Entitlement Purchase Agreement, Canada shall 
make such compensation and such compensa- 
tion shall be accepted in complete satisfaction 
of all claims arising out of the failure in respect 
of the reduction in the Canadian Entitlement 
for which such compensation was made. 

(12) For any year in which Canada's Entitlement to 
downstream power benefits is sold to Columbia 
Storage Power Exchange, the United States 
Entity may decide the amormt of the down- 
stream power benefits for purposes connected 
with the disposition thereof in the United States 
of America. This authorization, however, shall 
neither affect the rights or relieve the obliga- 
tions of the Canadian and United States Entities 
relating to joint activities under the provisions 
of Article XIV and Annexes A and B of the 
Treaty, nor shall it apply to determination of 
compensation provided for in the Canadian 
Entitlement Purchase Agreement or pursuant 
to paragraph (9) hereof or to determination of 
the power benefits to which Canada is entitled. 

(13) Any power delivered by the Canadian Entity or 

by Canada in accordance with the Canadian 
Entitlement Purchase Agreement or this Note 
shall be delivered at points of interconnection 
on the Canadian-United States border mutually 
acceptable to the entities. Appropriate adjust- 
ments shall be made to reflect transmission costs 
and transmission losses in the United States of 
(14) Any dispute arising under the Canadian En- 
titlement Purchase Agreement, including, but 
without limitation, a dispute whether any event 
requiring compensation has occurred, the 
amount of compensation due or the amount of 
any over-delivery of power is agreed to be a 
difference under the Treaty to be settled in 
accordance with the provisions of Article XVI 
of the Treaty, and the parties to the Canadian 
Entitlement Purchase Agreement may avail 
themselves of the jurisdiction hereby conferred. 

The Government of Canada therefore proposes that 
if agreeable to your Government this Note together 
with your reply thereto constitutes an agreement by 
our Governments relating to the Treaty with effect 
from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifi- 
cation of the Treaty. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Paul Maktin 

Secretary of State for 

External Affairs. 

His Excellency, 

W. Walton Buttekwobth, 

Ambassador of the United States 

of America, 


Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of 
the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His 
Excellency the Governor General on the 4th Septem- 
ber, 1964. 

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recom- 
mendation of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 
the Prime Minister, advise that Your Excellency may 
be pleased to designate the British Columbia Hydro and 
Power Authority, a corporation incorporated in the 
Province of British Columbia by the British Columbia 
Hydro and Power Authority Act 1964, as the Canadian 
entity for the puriJoses of Article XIV of a treaty dated 
January 17, 1961 at Washington, D.C. U.S.A. between 
Canada and the United States of America relating to 
co-operative development of the water resources of the 
Columbia River Basin, such designation to take effect 
on the date on which the Instruments of Ratification 
of the Treaty shall be exchanged. 


Clerk of the Privy Council 




This Agreement executed this thirteentli day of 
August, 1964, by and between Columbia Storage Powjm 
Exchange, a nonprofit corporation organized under the 
laws of the State of Washington, hereinafter referred 
to as "CSPE", 

British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, a 
corporation incorporated in the Province of British 
Columbia, Canada, by the British Columbia Hydro and 
Power Authority Act, 1964, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Authority". 

Whereas : 

A. The Governments of the United States of America 
and Canada are exchanging instruments of ratification 
of the Treaty Between Canada and the United States 
of America Relating to the Cooperative Development of 
the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin 
Signed at Washington January 17, 1961. By an 
Exchange of Notes dated January 22, 1964, the two 
Governments agreed upon the terms of a Protocol with 
effect from the date of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification of the Treaty aforesaid (which Treaty and 
Protocol are hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty"). 

B. Under the terms of the Treaty, Canada is entitled 
to receive from the United States one half of the annual 
average usable energy and one half of the dependable 
hydroelectric capacity which can be realized in the 
United States each year as a result of use of the 
improved stream flow on the Columbia River created 
by storage to be constructed in Canada. 

C. The Government of Canada and the Govern- 
ment of British Columbia have entered into an agree- 
ment dated 8 July, 1963, and a supplementary agree- 
ment dated 13 January, 1964, wherein it was agreed 
that all proprietary rights, title and interests arising 
under the Treaty, including all rights to downstream 
power benefits, belong to the Government of British 
Columbia, and providing that Canada shall designate 
the Authority as the Canadian Entity as provided for 
in Article XIV of the Treaty. Pursuant to such agree- 
ment Canada is designating the Authority as the 
Canadian Entity. 

D. The Authority Is, by virtue of an Order in 
Council of the Province of British Columbia, dated 
August 7, 1964, required and authorized to exercise 
all the rights and powers granted to the Canadian 
Entity and to perform all the obligations imposed on 
the Canadian Entity by the Treaty and to enter into 
this Agreement. 

E. CSPE is incorporated with the object of pur- 
chasing for a term of years Canada's rights to down- 
stream power benefits under the Treaty and incurring 
indebtedness to finance such purchase and disposing 
of such rights under such arrangements as may be 
necessary to retire the corporate indebtedness and to 
pay the necessary expenses of CSPE incidental thereto. 

F. The Governments of the United States of America 
and Canada, as contemplated by Article VIII of the 
Treaty and in pursuance of the Agreement of the two 
Governments contained in an Exchange of Notes dated 
January 22. 1964, relating thereto, are by an Exchange 
of Notes authorizing the disposition for a term of 
years within the United States of America of Canada's 
rights to downstream power benefits under the Treaty, 
which disposition when so authorized is to be effectu- 
ated by tliis Agreement in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the Treaty and documents supplementary 

Now, therefore, it is agreed : 
Section 1. Term 

This Agreement shall be effective when authorized 
by the Governments of Canada and the United States 
of America by an Exchange of Notes pursuant to the 
Treaty and shall terminate at midnight on March 31 

Section 2. Conveyance. 

(1) The Authority does hereby sell, assign, and 
convey unto CSPE, and CSPE does hereby accept, the 
entitlement of Canada, as described in Article V(l) of 
the Treaty, to the downstream power benefits deter- 
mined in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, 
save and except the entitlement of Canada to the 
downstream power benefits resulting from the con- 
struction or operation of the project referred to in 
Article IX of the Treaty, for the following periods 
of time : 

(a) The benefits resulting from the storage de- 
scribed in Article 11(2) (c) of the Treaty (here- 
inafter referred to as Duncan Lake storage) for 
a period of 30 years commencing April 1, 1968 ; 

(b) The benefits resulting from the storage de- 
scribed in Article 11(2) (b) of the Treaty (here- 
inafter referred to as Arrow Lakes storage) 
for a period of 30 years commencing April 1, 
1969 ; and 

(c) The benefits resulting from the storage de- 
scribed in Article 11(2) (a) of the Treaty 
(hereinafter referred to as Mica Creek stor- 
age) for a period of 30 years commencing 

April 1, 1973. 

(2) All of the entitlement to the downstream power 
benefits hereby conveyed for the aforementioned pe- 
riods of time, without the reductions provided for in 
paragraph 7 of Annex A of the Treaty is hereinafter 
referred to as "the Canadian Entitlement". 

(3) For the purpose of allocating downstream power 
benefits among the three Canadian storages provided 
for in the Treaty between April 1, 1998, and March 31, 
2003, the percentage of downstream power benefits 
allocable to each of the said storages shall be the per- 

OOTOBER 12, 1964 

745-329 — 64 3 



centage of the total of the Canadian storages pro- 
vided by that storage as set out in Article II of the 

Section 3. Payment by CSPE. 

Contemporaneously witi the exchange of the in- 
struments of ratification, CSPE is causing to be paid 
to Canada the sum, in United States funds, of 
$254,400,000.00 as of October 1, 1964, subject to ad- 
justment in the event of an earlier payment thereof 
to the then present worth at a discount rate of 4% 
percent per annum, which sum shall be applied towards 
the cost of constructing the Treaty projects through 
a transfer of the sum by Canada to the Government 
of British Columbia pursuant to arrangements entered 
into between Canada and British Columbia. The Au- 
thority acknowledges that the receipt by Canada of 
the said sum is consideration for all the covenants of 
the authority in this Agreement and particularly the 
covenants to construct and operate the Treaty projects 
and is a complete discharge of CSPE for the full pur- 
chase price for the sale effected in Section 2 of this 

Section 4. Covenants. 

(1) The Authority covenants and agrees with CSPE 
that it will undertake all requisite construction work 
in a good and workmanlike manner and that the stor- 
ages described in Article II of the Treaty shall be fully 
operative for power purposes under this Agreement by 
the following dates: 

(a) The Duncan Lake storage, April 1, 1968. 

(b) The Arrow Lakes storage, April 1, 1969. 

(c) The Mica Creek storage, April 1, 1973. 

To be fuUy operative the facilities for such storages 
shall be completed to the extent that storages are 
available and outlet facilities are operable for regulat- 
ing flows in accordance with flood control and hydro- 
electric operating plans as contemplated by the Treaty. 

(2) The Authority covenants and agrees with CSPE 
that it will operate and maintain the Treaty storages 
in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty and any arrange- 
ments made pursuant to the Treaty and that it wiU not 
take any action prohibited by the Treaty. 

Section 5. Flood Contbol. 

Nothing in this Agreement afCects or alters the ob- 
ligations, rights, and privileges of the entities under the 
Treaty relating to operation and compensation for 
flood control and without restricting the generality of 
the foregoing, it is expressly agreed that any reduction 
in generation in the United States brought about by 
operation for flood control under the Treaty or any 
flood control arrangements made pursuant to the 
Treaty shall not be a reduction in the Canadian En- 
titlement for which compensation is required under 
this Agreement 

Section 6. Compensation. 

In the event the Canadian Entitlement is reduced as 

a result of a failure to comply with Section 4 of this 
Agreement : 

(1) If the failure reeults other than from wilful 
omission by the Authority to fulfill its obligations 
under this Agreement, the United States Entity has 
agreed that it will, without compensation, offset the 
effect of that failure by adjusting the operation of the 
portion of the system described in Step I of paragraph 
7 of Annex B of the Treaty which is in the United 
States to the extent that the United States Entity can 
do so without loss of energy or capacity to that portion 
of the System. If the foregoing procedure does not 
fully offset the effect of the failure, then to the extent 
the entities agree thereon, an additional offsetting 
adjustment in the operation of the portion of the sys- 
tem described in Step I of Annex B of the Treaty which 
is in the United States and which would result in only 
an energy loss will be made if the Authority delivers 
to the United States Entity energy sufficient to make 
up one half of that energy loss. 

(2) If the effect of the failure is not entirely offset 
by the procedure specified in subsection (1) of this 
section, the reduction in the Canadian Entitlement 
shall be deemed to be one half of the difference in 
dependable hydroelectric capacity and average annual 
usable energy, capable of being produced by : 

(a) the Step II system as specified in Annex B of 
the Treaty for the year in which the reduction 
occurs, using the 30 year stream flow record 
provided for in Section 8 of the Protocol, with 
allowance in each of the 30 stream flow years 
for the effect of the Adjustment made in fol- 
lowing the procedure specified in subsection (1) 
of this section and 

(b) the same system for that year with the appli- 
cation of allowance in each of the 30 stream 
flow years for the effects of the occurrence 
causing the reduction 

and the dependable hydroelectric capacity and average 
annual usable energy for the purpose of paragraph (b) 
of this subsection shall be calculated on the basis of 
an operation for optimum generation in the United 
States in the light of the offsetting adjustments and in 
the light of the effects of the occurrence causing the 

(3) If the failure is the result of an occurrence to 
which the procedure specified in subsection (1) of this 
section is not applicable, the reduction shall be deemed 
to be one halt of the difference in dependable hydro- 
electric capacity and average annual usable energy, 
capable of being produced by : 

(a) the Step II system as specified in Annex B of 
the Treaty for the year in which the reduction 
occurs, using the 30 year stream flow record 
provided for in Section 8 of the Protocol, with 
no allowance for the effects of the occurrence 
causing the reduction and 

(b) the same system for that year with the appli- 
cation of allowance in each of the 30 stream flow 



years for the effects of the occurrence causing 
the reduction 

and the dependable hydroelectric caixaeity and average 
annual usable energy for the purposes of paragraph 
(b) of this subsection shall be calculated on the basis 
of an operation for optimum generation in the United 
States in the light of the effects of the occurrence 
causing the reduction. 

(4) The Authority shall make comi)ensation for re- 
ductions In the Canadian Entitlement, which reduc- 
tions are to be determined in accordance -with sub- 
sections (2) or (3) of this section, in amounts equal 
to the cost of replacing the reductions in the Canadian 

(5) The Authority may at its option, and in lieu of 
the monetary comi)ensation payable under subsection 
(4) of this section, make compensation by supplying 
capacity and energy in an amount equal to tie reduc- 
tion in the Canadian Entitlement determined in ac- 
cordance with subsections (2) or (3) of this section 
and adjusted to reflect transmission costs in the United 
States, delivery to be made when the loss would other- 
wise have occurred. The Authority may provide com- 
binations of money, capacity and energy that are 
mutually acceptable in discharge of its obligation to 
make compensation under this section. 

(6) The Authority shall give notice as soon as ix)ssi- 
ble after it becomes apparent to it that compensation 
may be due and will at that time indicate the amounts 
of capacity and energy which it anticipates it will be 
able to make available. 

(7) The United States Entity has agreed that, in 
order to make up any reduction in the Canadian En- 
titlement, it will cause to be delivered the least expen- 
sive capacity and energy available and, to the extent 
that it would be the least expensive, will deliver at 
the then applicable rate schedules of the Bonneville 
Power Administration any available surplus capacity 
and energy from the United States Federal Columbia 
River System. The cost of replacement referred to in 
subsection (4) of this section shall be determined as 
if the reduction was in fact made up as contemplated 
by the agreement referred to in the preceding sentence. 

(8) Compensation made in accordance with this 
section shall be accepted as satisfaction of all claims 
against the Authority with respect to the reduction in 
the Canadian Entitlement for which such compensation 
was made and with respect to the act or omission of 
the Authority from which the right to such compen- 
sation arose. 

(9) Any obligation to mitigate damages by the 
United States Entity, CSPE, the vendees of CSPE, and 
the owners of the non-Federal dams on the Columbia 
River in the United States is satisfied by compliance 
with this section. 

(10) If the Canadian Entitlement Exchange Agree- 
ments referred to in Section 10 are not in force, com- 
pensation for a reduction in the Canadian Entitlement 
in accordance with subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, is required only in respect of that part of the 

reduction in the Canadian Entitlement which CSPE 
and its vendees could have used and only in respect of 
costs that could not have been avoided had every rea- 
sonable effort to mitigate been made by CSPE and the 
owners of non-Federal dams on the Columbia River 
in the United States. 

Section 7. Reduction or the Canadian Entitlement 
IN Accordance With the Treaty. 
Any reduction in the Canadian Entitlement resulting 
from action taken pursuant to paragraph 7 of Annex 
A of the Treaty shall be determined in accordance with 
subsection (3) of Section 6 of this Agreement and un- 
less otherwise agreed, the Authority shall offset the 
reduction by supplying capacity and energy equal to 
the reduction, the energy to be supplied in equal 
monthly amounts. 

Section 8. Settlement op Disputes. 

Any dispute arising under this Agreement, in- 
cluding but without limitation a dispute as to whether 
any event requiring compensation has occurred, the 
amount of compensation due or the amount of any 
(iverdelivery of jKfwer, is agreed to be a difference 
under the Treaty to be settled in accordance with the 
provisions of Article XVI of the Treaty. Any deter- 
mination of compensation in money or power due shall 
be confined to the actual loss uictirred in accordance 
with the principles contained ia Section 6 of this 

Section 9. Exchanges op Capacity and Energy. 

(1) The Authority agrees that CSPE shall have 
and may exercise the rights of the Authority as the 
Canadian Entity relating to the negotiation and con- 
clusion with the United States Entity of proposals 
relating to the exchanges authorized by Article VIII 
(2) of the Treaty with resjject to any portion of the 
Canadian Entitlement. 

(2) It is agreed that no exchange of capacity for 
energy or of energy for capacity or modification in the 
delivery of energy in equal amounts each month as 
provided in the Treaty shall be taken into accoimt in 
the determination of compensation to be made by the 
Authority pursuant to this Agreement. 

Section 10. Exchange Agreements. 

The BonneviUe Power Administrator acting as the 
Administrator and for and on behalf of the United 
States Entity has by entering into Canadian Entitle- 
ment Exchange Agreements, assured unconditionally 
the delivery to the vendees of CSPE by appropriate 
exchange contracts of an amount of power agreed 
l)etween the United States Entity and CSPE to be 
the equivalent of the Canadian Entitlement, and the 
United States Entity, while those Agreements are in 
force, will succeed to all the rights of CSPE and its 
vendees to receive the entire Canadian Entitlement and 
all other rights of CSPE arising from this Agreement. 
CSPE therefore instructs the Authority, until other- 
wise notified, to make any compensation whether in 
power or money required to be made by Uie Authority 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


pursuant to Section 6 or Section 7 of this Agreement to President RepOrtS On Operation 

the United States Entity. CSPE agrees that any -r^^Aa Aa,-aaman*c Prnornm 

settlement of a claim for compensation or arrange- ©f Trade Agreements Program 

ment entered into pursuant to this Agreement by the , „ . 

United States Entity shall be binding on CSPE. Following is tfie text of a message from Presi- 

s ON 11 Payments ^^'"'^ Johnson transmitting to the Congress the 

(1) The Authority shall pay any amount in United eighth annual report on the operation of the 

States funds determined to be due in accordance with trade agreements program} 

the terms hereof within thirty days of receipt of an 

White House press release dated September 23 
invoice for such amount. 

(2) Should the Authority deUver power in excess ^o the Congress of the United States : 

of the amount required as compensation, then appro- j j^^^.^^ transmit the eighth annual report 

priate adjustments shall be made in kind or m money. ^^ ^^^^ ^^^,^tion of the Trade Agreements Pro- 
Section 12. Appeovals. j^^ -^^ accordance with Section 402(a) of the 

No modification or renewal of this Agreement shall ^^^^^^ Expansion Act of 1962. 
be effective until approved by the Governments of rr., , , ,„„„ • ^ ■ x- *. 

Canada and the United States of America, evidenced by Throughout 1963, intensive preparations went 

an Exchange of Notes. forward for the negotiations made possible by 

Section 13. Deliveries. this Act— the sixth round of trade negotiations 

Any power delivered by the Authority pursuant to under the auspices of the General Agreement 

this Agreement shall be delivered at mutually accept- on Tariffs and Trade. During this same year, 

able points of interconnection on the Canadian-United -[J g ^^d free world trade continued to set new 

States border. Appropriate adjustments shall be made records, and important steps were taken to ex- 

to reflect transmission costs and transmission losses in , Vc li 

X.. TT -i. ., c* .. pand our exports further, 

the United States. ^ ^ 

Section 14. Notices. * U.S. exports reached a new high of $22.3 

Any notices shall be in writing and shaU be deUvered billion, $5.1 billion more than our imports, 
or mailed prepaid as follows : • U.S. farm exports rose to $5.6 billion, an 

Columbia Storage Power Exchange, all-time record. 

20 N. Main Street • Free world trade continued to grow, with 

East Wenatchee, Washington, U.S.A. exports climbing to a record $135 billion. 

United States Entity • Further progress was made in freeing U.S. 

c/o Bonneville Power Administration exports of foreign restrictions. 

Po°rtUnd,^o?egon 97208 U.S.A. * Government-industry cooperation in the 

British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority promotion of our exports was stepped up, no- 

970 Burrard Street tably by the Wliite House Conference on Export 

Vancouver 1, British Columbia, Canada, Expansion in September 1963," and the subse- 

or such other address as may be signified by notice to quent establisliment of the Cabinet Committee 

the others. on Export Expansion.^ 

In witness whekeof, the parties have caused this • Tlie desire of the less-developed countries 

Agreement to be executed as of the day and year first to play a greater part in international trade 

above written. received increasing consideration by GATT and 

[seal] British Columbia Htdeo and Power ^J ^he United States. 

Attest Authority The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will, I am 

By sure, rank as one of the greatest monuments to 

Chairman President Kennedy's leadership, and I reaffirm 

By the commitment of my Admmistration to its 

Secretary full and vigorous implementation. 

[SEAL] Columbia Stoeaoe Power ■ H. Doc. 366, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 
■Attest Exchange « Bulletin of Oct. 14, 1963, p. 595. 
By ' /Sid., Jan. 6, 1964, p. 25. 



I hope that our friends in other countries will 
neither underestimate nor undei-value the 
strength of American support for trade liber- 
alization. "We are willing to offer the free na- 
tions access to our American markets — but we 
expect, and we must have, access to theirs as 
well. That applies to our agricultural as well 
as our mdustrial exports. 

These are not the kind of negotiations in 
which some nations need lose because others 
gain. Their success will be to the advantage 
of all. They offer the opportunity to build a 
partnership for progress and prosperity among 
the industrial nations of the free world, and be- 
tween them and the developing nations. 

At home, we are moving to eliminate poverty 
among all Americans. "We believe that a giant 
step can be taken against poverty everywhere 
if the free nations can work together to over- 
come needless obstacles to the flow of trade 
among them. 

Ltndon B. Johnson 

The "White Hotjse, 

September 23, 196J^ 

Technical Representatives Named 
for Trade Negotiations 

Christian A. Herter, the President's Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations, an- 
nounced on September 25 the establishment of 
a roster of tecluiical representatives of industry, 
agriculture, labor, and consumers in connection 
with the current international trade negotia- 
tions under the auspices of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' 

The chief function of these representatives 
will be to provide the American negotiators at 
the trade talks in Geneva with factual infor- 
mation (economic, technological, marketing, 
etc.) that is relevant to the negotiations. 

Unlike the Public Advisory Committee on 
Trade Negotiations,- appointed by the Presi- 
dent on March 2, the representatives on the 

" For a preliminary list of the names on the roster of 
technical representatives, see Office of the Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations press release 
dated Sept. 2.o. 

° Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 457. 

roster will not function as a group. Again un- 
like the Public Advisory Committee, they will 
give their advice as representatives of their 
economic interests, rather than as individual 

The technical representatives will serve with- 
out pay. More may be appointed in the future, 
as the needs arise. 

U.S. and Hong Kong Announce 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 414 dated September 23 

The United States Govermnent and the Gov- 
ernment of Hong Kong have reached agreement 
on the principles of an arrangement that will 
govern exports of cotton textiles from Hong 
Kong to the United States during the third 
year of the Geneva Long-Term Arrangement, 
which commences October 1, 1964. 

The purpose of the agreement is to provide 
for orderly exports from Hong Kong to the 
United States during the third year of the 
Long-Term Arrangements Regarding Interna- 
tional Trade in Cotton Textiles,^ which became 
effective on October 1, 1962, for a period of 5 
years. The new agreement concludes discus- 
sions conducted in Hong Kong between repre- 
sentatives of the two Governments. 

The new agreement continues restraints on 
the 36 categories of cotton textiles listed in the 
annex to this release. The agreed restraint 
levels in most categories represent a 5-percent 
increase over the corresponding restraint levels 
for the current textile year = in accordance with 
the provisions of the Long-Term Arrangement. 

The following are the principal points of the 
agreement : 

1. The restraint levels in the 36 categories of 
cotton textiles total 271.0 million square yards 
equivalent for the 12 months commencing Oc- 
tober 1, 1964. 

2. The Government of Hong Kong also agrees 
to limit the corduroy fabric content of apparel 
exports to the United States to a level of 7 mil- 
lion square yards for this 12-month period. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 
' For a joint U.S.-Hong Kong announcement of Nov. 
15, 1963, see iUd., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 933. 


This level reflects the historic pattern of Hong 
Kong's expoi-ts of these items. 

3. Within the export ceiling for category 26, 
the Government of Hong Kong has agreed to 
limit exports of cotton duck to a maximum of 
21.5 million square yards. 

4. The United States Government agreed to 
provide a certain degree of export flexibility 
among certain fabric categories as indicated in 
the annex. 

5. Hong Kong has agreed to discontinue 
classifying in category 52 nonblouse compo- 
nents of blouse sets. Most of these nonblouse 
components will be classified in category 51, 
which has a level of 1,605,858 dozen for the year 
beginning October 1, 1964. 

6. The two Governments agreed that the re- 
straint levels for categories 45 and 46 shown in 
the annex will be further adjusted to take into 
account the past trade in short-sleeved dress 
shirts reclassified under category 45. 

7. The Government of Hong Kong has agreed 
to continue to space exports of cotton textiles in 
the restrained categories to avoid undue con- 
centration of imports. 

8. The two Governments will continue to pro- 
vide each other data on exports and classifica- 
tion of cotton textiles in order to facilitate ad- 
ministration of the agreement. 

A list of the specific restraints on the 36 cate- 
gories of cotton textiles is provided in the an- 
nex below. 

Category Description 

1 Cotton yarn, carded, singles 

5 Gingham, carded 

6 Gingham, combed 
9 Sheeting, carded 

15 Poplin and Broadcloth, carded 

16 Poplin and Broadcloth, combed 

18 Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded 

19 Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded 

22 Twill and Sateen, carded 

23 Twill and Sateen, combed 

24 Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, yarn dyed, carded 

25 Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, yarn dyed, combed 

26 Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, other, carded 
27* Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, other, combed** 
28 Pillowcases, carded 

30 Towels, dish 

31 Towels, other 
36 Bedspreads and quilts 
39 Gloves and mittens 

41 T-shirts, all white, knit, men's and boys'\ 

42 T-shirts, other, knit / 

43 Shirts, knit, other than T-shirts and sweatshirts 

45 Shirts, dress, not knit, men's and boys' 

46 Shirts, sport, not knit, men's and boys' 

48 Raincoats, % length or longer, not knit 

49 Coats, other, not knit 

50 Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, men's and boys' 

51 Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, women's, girls' and infants' 

52 Blouses, not knit 

53 Dresses, including uniforms, not knit 

54 Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc., not knit, not else- 

where specified 

55 Dressing gowns, including bathrobes, beach robes, lounging gowns, dusters 

and housecoats, not knit or crocheted 

60 Pajamas and other nightwear 

61 Brassieres and other body-supporting garments 
62*** Wearing apparel, knit, not elsewhere specified 
64**** All other cotton textiles 

*Refer8 to Oxford-type cloth, combed yarn. 
**rarts of T.S.U.S.A. nos. 320.-90, 323.-90, 326.-90, 329.-90, 320.-94, 323.-94, 326.-94, and 329.-94. 
***Refers to knitted sweat shirts. 
****Rcfers to industrial wiping cloths. 

' Iloiig Kong has the right to transfer yardage for export between these categories provided exports in any one 
category will not exceed 2 million square yards. 

' Joint ceiling for categories 41 and 42 which previously had separate restraint levels. 

Restraint level 

216, 300 lbs. 


628, 126 syds. 

757, 050 syds. 


500, 051 syds. 


622, 250 syds.i 

594, 825 syds.' 

118, 965 syds.' 

675, 938 syds.' 


517,701 svds. 

702, 975 syds.i 

254, 153 svds.' 

248, 745 svds.' 


080, 177 svds. 


081, 500 svds. 

486, 675 nos. 

848, 890 nos. 


490, 550 nos. 

54, 075 nos. 

237, 037 doz. prs 

413, 438 doz.!" 

386, 350 doz. 

286, 650 doz. 

825, 825 doz. 

11,942 doz. 

45, 330 doz. 

771, 750 doz. 


605, 858 doz. 


119,037 doz. 

60, 637 doz. 

132, 300 doz. 

97, 650 doz. 

496, 124 doz. 


549,012 doz. 

314, 212 lbs. 


677, 100 lbs. 




Nuclear Energy for the Benefit of Man 

Statement hy Glenn T. Seahorg 

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission''- 

It is a pleasure and an honor to represent the 
United States for tlie fourth time at the Gen- 
eral Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and to address my fellow dele- 
gates to this conference. I extend congratula- 
tions to you, Ambassador [H. F.] Eschauzier 
[Netherlands], upon your election as president 
of the conference and to Director General [A. 
Sigvard] Ekhmd for his leadership of the 
Agency during the past year. 

Like many of you, I have been involved these 
last 2 weeks in productive discussions of nuclear 
de^-elopments with colleagues from countries all 
over the world. The Third International Con- 
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
was conducted with outstanding success in 
Geneva." I feel that special commendations are 
in order to the Agency's staff, to many of the 
members of this audience, and to many others 
for helping to make this conference an outstand- 
ing scientific and teclmical contribution to nu- 
clear progress. We in the United States espe- 
cially welcome the spirit of cooperation that was 
evident among individuals, governments, and 
international organizations during the 10-day 
meeting. It was also my honor to be in Sweden 
for the first visit to Sweden of the U.S. nuclear 

' Made before the General Conference of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna, Austria, 
on Sept. 15. Dr. Seaborg was U.S. Representative to 
the General Conference. 

■ For a statement made by Dr. Seaborg at Geneva 
on Aug. 29, see Bulletin of Sept. 21, 1964, p. 408. 

ship Savannah and to be the host for a visit and 
cruise on the ship by a group of delegates to 
the Geneva conference. I also had the good 
fortune to visit Brussels, where I had the i^riv- 
ilege of addressing and conferring with leaders 
of European nuclear industry. 

Out of these experiences and other develop- 
ments in the last year have come some general 
impressions that I know many of us share, and 
upon which I should like to comment briefly be- 
fore discussing the business of this meeting. 

There are two generalizations that are, I be- 
lieve, particularly pertinent for this conference. 
First, in this 25th anniversary year of t\\& dis- 
covery of nuclear fission, we have arrived on the 
threshold of the age of nuclear power. Second, 
the Agency has come of age in the past year, as 
a result both of its real accomplishments and 
the growth in urgency of its responsibilities 
that derive from the prospect of the early wide- 
spread use of nuclear power plants. 

The Age of Nuclear Power 

I should like to elaborate on these two gen- 
eralizations briefly. First, as the Geneva con- 
ference dramatically demonstrated, the time has 
arrived when we have the cajjability of produc- 
ing nuclear power economically. Specifically, 
there is widespread agreement that large nu- 
clear power plants with high-load factors can 
compete in many parts of the world. In my 
comitry we estimate that the cost of power from 
large reactors today is essentially the same as 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


Senate Confirms Nominations 
to IAEA General Conference 

The Senate on September 8 confirmed the fol- 
lowing nominations : 

Glenn T. Seaborg to be the representative of 
the United States to the eighth session of the 
General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 

Henry DeWolf Smyth, Frank K. Hefner, John 
Gorham Palfrey, James T. Ramey, and Gerald 
F. Tape to be alternate representatives of the 
United States to the eighth session of the Gen- 
eral Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 

that predicted for the late 1960's by the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission's report to the 
President made only 2 years ago ! 

Second, international tensions have dimin- 
ished perceptibly. An important factor in the 
relaxation of these tensions was the conclusion 
of the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in 
the atmosphere, in outer space, and under 
water.^ As a result, we have seen the growth 
in that favorable international climate which 
is conducive to the widespread exploitation of 
nuclear power in the world. 

Third, as a result of the arrival of economic 
nuclear power and the softening of interna- 
tional tensions, an atmosphere of confidence 
pervades the international nuclear community. 
The optimism I find today is rooted in the 
reality of experience. We feel we know what 
we can and cannot do in nuclear power tech- 
nology. The situation is imlike the almost un- 
limited optimism, based too much on guesses 
and hopes, which was widespread nearly a dec- 
ade ago. 

Finally, this Agency has made striking pro- 
gress in the development of experience in the 
critical matter of international safeguards. 
Acceptable, uniform international responsibil- 
ity in these functions, which are the province 
of the Agency, is an important basis of the high 
hope that nuclear energy can eventually satisfy 
the power needs of an energy-hungry world. 

These events are encouraging to me, as they 
must be to all of you. For 7 years the Agency, 
beset by nonnal growing pains and a difficult 

' For text, see ihid., Aug 12, 1963, p. 239. 

time in world affairs, has struggled toward 
goals that so often seemed to be forbiddingly 
far away. Today, as the Agency begins its 
eighth year, the vision and faith of the member 
nations and their representatives stand justi- 
fied. Major functions of the Agency in world- 
wide development of nuclear energy today have 
in large measure the texture of reality. 

I can best express my country's feelings about 
the meaning of the Agency's role in these events 
by repeating a portion of the message President 
Jolinson sent to the Geneva conference.* 
Speaking of past accomplishments and future 
prospects in nuclear power and desalination, 
President Jolinson said : 

As we move ahead we look to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to play an ever larger role In 
these peaceful efforts. Already it has set standards 
for the care and for the keeping of nuclear materials. 
This achievement has raised our hopes for a workable 
system of world law on nuclear energy. 

The telescoping of nuclear technology makes 
the work of the Agency not only more important 
but more urgent than ever. It is true that the 
new economics of large-scale nuclear power 
jjlants will not have a sudden, marked impact 
on the workload of the Agency. But we must 
anticipate that further technological achieve- 
ments will follow in the wake of those of the 
past year. I believe we have no time to lose in 
developing the precedents and procedures of 
world nuclear law and of equipping many na- 
tions with the technical competence to take ad- 
vantage of future technological advances that 
seem inevitable. 

Strengthening Safeguards System 

I should like now to turn to an examination 
of the progress of the Agency in the last year 
and to comment upon the work ahead, ily 
first comments will be an elaboration on my 
Government's enthusiasm for the progress that 
has been made on the strengthening of the 
safeguards system. 

At this time 17 countries receiving materials 
and equipment from the United States have 
agreed, in principle, to the application of 
Agency safeguards to the assistance being pro- 
vided. These include trilateral a<ri"ecments un- 

< For text, see ihid.. Sept. 21, 19ft4, p. 411. 



der wliich facilities and materials obtained 
from the U.S. have been made subject to Agency 
safeguards. They also include agreements un- 
der wliich both the supply of materials and the 
safeguards are the responsibility of the Agency. 
The arrangements cover several important re- 
search reactors, and power reactoi-s as well. 
We are also in favor of the concept whereby 
member states register with the Agency trans- 
fers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. 
The extension of the Agency's system to re- 
actors over 100 mwt. has resulted in an agree- 
ment to place our Yankee power reactor under 
Agency safeguards.^ The Yankee agreement 
shoidd make a substantial contribution to our 
mutual miderstanding of the problems of nu- 
clear materials control, and we hope that other 
member states will take similar action to help 
the Agency extend its statutory responsibilities. 
Under this agreement, the Agency also con- 
tinues to have safeguards responsibility for a 
smaller power reactor and two research reactors 
in the U.S. 

We are pleased with the progress that has 
been made to date on the general review of the 
Agency's safeguards system. We agree with 
what appears to be the Review Committee's 
preliminaiy assessment that the basic princi- 
ples of the present system are sound but that 
improvements in language and format are de- 
sirable. We also note that the Eeview Com- 
mittee is giving attention to some aspects of 
safeguards not yet incorporated, such as meas- 
ures relating to reprocessing. 

The worldwide development of the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy must proceed without 
thereby encouraging the proliferation of mili- 
tary nuclear developments. There are strong 
reasons for the Agency to play a central role in 
such controls. The practical advantages of in- 
ternational safeguards over bilateral agreements 
include uniform applicability, the prevention 
of weakening of safeguard standards to give 
commercial advantage to suppliers, and the re- 
duction of the niunber of inspection teams in 
countries having several suppliers. 

Parenthetically, we believe that our experi- 
ence to date has shown that the system involves 
no onerous burdens on the participating states 

• For background, see iUd., July 6, 1964, p. 27. 

and in no way interferes with the efficient opera- 
tion of their nuclear installations. 

Witli regard to the regulatory area, we com- 
mend the Agency for emphasizing the develop- 
ment of health and safety codes and practices, 
and for its increase in teclmical advice and 
short-term assistance to member states. We 
also wish to commend the Agency for estab- 
lishing a list of consultants available to mem- 
ber states to advise on health and safety meas- 
ures and proposed shipments of irradiated 

The increasing use of radioactive materials 
has also enhanced the importance of the Agen- 
cy's work in radioactive waste management. 
It continues to be our view that primary em- 
phasis should be placed on technical assistance 
to developing countries on pressing, practical 
problems of waste management, even at the 
cost of reducing the number of symposia and 
panel meetings. We reiterate our recommen- 
dation that the Agency promote more vigor- 
ously the establisliment of international waste 
burial grounds and the solution of associated 

All of these problems are becoming more sig- 
nificant as teclinology speeds us toward the day 
of extensive nuclear power. The Geneva con- 
ference, marked by a general recognition of 
the feasibility of greatly reduced capital and 
fuel cycle costs, underlined the urgency of 
working on these problems. 

Sea Water Desalination 

I should like to speak in some detail about 
one aspect of the new prospects of nuclear 
power in which the United States and other 
comitries are intensely interested, namely, the 
future use of large reactors for the dual pur- 
pose of power production and sea water 

The report released by the U.S. Office of 
Science and Teclinology this past April shows 
that very large combination nuclear power- 
desalting plants which could be operational in 
the period 1970-1975 could convert salt water 
to fresh water for municipal and industrial 
uses at a cost which compares favorably with 
the price of fresh water from other sources, 
while pi'oducing electricity at a relatively mod- 

DCTOBER 12, 1964 


erate cost. Moreover, this rei^ort foresees the 
possibility that irrigation water may be pro- 
duced, at a reasonable cost, in the 1980's. 

President Johnson offered, in his statement 
to the Geneva conference, United States coop- 
eration in helping other countries overcome 
water shortages. I am pleased to announce to 
this conference the offer my Government made 
at the Agency's Panel on Nuclear Desalting held 
in Geneva last week. We are prepared to do 
the following: first., to provide for the services 
of a nuclear desalination expert to the Agency; 
second, to make available orientation visits for 
Agency staff to U.S. facilities engaged in desalt- 
ing activities; and third, to consider nomina- 
tions by the Agency of qualified individuals 
from other member states for research and 
training opportimities in U.S. facilities engaged 
in the nuclear and conventional aspects of de- 

We are encouraged by the Agency's role in 
two desalting projects. First, the Agency has 
been the focal point for discussions between the 
United States and Mexico on a proposed study 
concerning the feasibility of installing a nuclear 
power-desaltmg plant near the Gulf of Cali- 
fornia to meet water and power needs in the 
area. Second, the Agency is acting as an ob- 
server in a joint survey now being performed 
by the U.S. and Israel to define the scope and 
requirements of a nuclear desalting project in 
Israel.'^ I shall also like to mention that our 
discussions in July with scientists from the 
U.S.S.E. ' have resulted in agi'eement for effec- 
tive scientific cooperation in developing methods 
for desalting sea water and brackish water, in- 
cluding the use of nuclear power for desalina- 
tion plants. 

Research and Development 

I sliould like now to turn to the research, 
training, and technical assistance programs of 
the Agency, the importance of which is magni- 
fied by tlie telescoping of nuclear power prog- 
ress. It is through these programs that the 
Agency can help member states acliieve the tech- 
nical competence necessary to take advantage of 
a ripening nuclear technology. I should like to 

" Iliiil., .luiie 29, 1964, p. 1001. 
' Ibi'l.. AiiE. 17, 1904, p. 2.m 

comment on several aspects of these activities. 

As a scientist I am especially gratified that 
consideration is being given to the first biennial 
progi-am in the Agency's historj'. Since re- 
search and technical assistance are long-range 
activities, progi-aming for a 2-year period will 
be a significant improvement for those pro- 
grams. The modest increases approved by the 
Board of Governors in the 1965 budget for re- 
search contracts and for the Seiberstlorf labora- 
tory are constructive. We are heartened by 
the priority that is being given to the award 
of contracts to research I'eactor centers and 
laboratories in developing countries, and to the 
research and educational opportunities avail- 
able under Agency agreements at the Interna- 
tional Center for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, 
the NORA reactor in Norway, and the marine 
biological project at Monaco. A model effort 
to stimulate research through member-state co- 
operation on a regional basis is the establish- 
ment for Asia and the Far East of an experi- 
mental program, built around the gift of a neu- 
tron crystal spectrometer by the Government 
of India, at the Philippines Atomic Energy 
Research Center near Manila. 

The utilization of research reactors continues 
to be one of the most promising fields of activ- 
ity for the Agency. An increasing number, 
about 45 percent, of the Agency's member coun- 
tries now have research reactors in operation 
or mider construction, and we support the 
Agency's plans for assistance in developing re- 
search programs, particularly for newly estab- 
lished centers in many of the member states 
tlirough such means as regional study group 

The United States will continue to provide 
experts for these undertakings and will main- 
tain the "sister laboratory" arrangements be- 
tween nuclear centers in the United States and 
nuclear reactor centers in developing countries. 

For the sixth consecutive year the United 
States, as a means of stimulating research and 
development, is pleased to renew for 1065 its 
oll'er to donate up to $50,000 worth of special 
luiclear material for use in Agency projects in 
researcli and medical therapy. In the fii-st 5 
years this offer was made, it lias been used to 
help research re^actor projects in five member 
states and tlie Agency's own laboratory. 



As another means of stimulating research and 
training, I annomice with pleasure that the 
United States is prepared to offer two kinds of 
assistance in the construction and operation of 
subcritical assemblies. Fii-st, we will provide 
the Agency with up-to-date teclmical informa- 
tion covering detailed design, fabrication, and 
operating characteristics of an inexpensive sub- 
critical assembly developed by an American 
firm at its own expense. Second, my Govern- 
ment will lease fabricated natural uranium 
slugs, which we liave on hand, for subcritical 
assemblies. Enriched uranium in unfabricated 
form, with a value up to $125,000, may also be 
leased under our existmg policies for use in sub- 
critical assemblies. 

Technical Assistance 

We believe the technical assistance activi- 
ties — embracing the provision of experts and 
equipment, training, and special missions — have 
evolved on a soimd basis. Unfortimately, short- 
ages of funds have prevented the Agency's 
meeting all of the worthwhile needs of member 
states. Nevertheless, during 1961, '62, and '63 
the Agency was able to grant about 1,400 fellow- 
ships for study in the various branches of nu- 
clear science. It sent out about 450 experts and 
visiting professors to assist member states in 
developing programs. It established the In- 
ternational Center for Theoretical Physics at 
Trieste, a regional isotope training center, and 
several joint re-search and training programs. 
It also approved in principle a second regional 
isotope training center. We believe the tech- 
nical assistance programs benefit significantly 
through coordination witli similar activities of 
WHO [World Health Organization], FAO 
[Food and Agriculture Organization], UN- 
ESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization], the U.N., and 
otiier agencies. Further benefits, particularly 
the best use of the Agency's limited funds, 
would come from the "counti-y program" ap- 
proach to technical assistance. We urge the 
secretariat to continue its steps toward full uti- 
lization of this tj'pe of programing. 

The greatest problem facing the Agency in 
connection with technical assistance is financial 
stabilit3\ Those of you who attended last year's 

General Conference may recall that we strongly 
urged the adoption of a statutory amendment to 
place the entire budget on an assessed basis in 
order to fulfill more effectively the Agency's re- 
sponsibilities in teclmical assistance and train- 
ins:. Although we concluded that there was 
not yet sufficient broad understanding of this 
amendment to achieve speedy ratification, we 
still regard a fully assessed budget as the best 
ultimate solution to financial stability. In the 
meantime, however, we urge all members who 
have not already done so to conti'ibute to the 
voluntary operating fund an amount that is at 
least equivalent to eacii member's percentage of 
the regular program. In addition, gifts in kind 
to the Agency for use in its approved programs 
will help carry out the programs in technical 
assistance and training. We shall continue, 
ourselves, to make available training oppor- 
tunities in our institutions, the services of our 
experts, and certain items of equipment, to the 
extent that we are able to do so. 

A summary of accomplishments demonstrates 
that the Agency begins its eighth year in far the 
strongest position in its history. In the past 3 
years the total approved budget has increased 
from about $81/3 million for 1962 to about $934 
million for 1964. Its research and technical 
assistance progi-ams have been meaningful; it 
has established important new laboratory, train- 
ing, and joint research programs; and it has ex- 
panded its safeguards responsibilities. Tlie 
meetings of the General Conference and the 
Board of Governors have been increasingly con- 
cerned with technical and administrative prob- 
lems and, most importantly, with virtually no 
unproductive and tangential political discus- 
sion. And this is only an arbitrary selection of 
evidences of Agency progress. 

This has been a year of fulfillment — a year of 
maturing. The economic breakthrough in large 
nuclear power reactors, the softening of inter- 
national tensions, the new mood of confidence 
in the world nuclear community, the progress of 
this Agency toward world nuclear law, and the 
demonstrated ability of this organization to 
give substantive help to nations developing nu- 
clear programs — all have contributed to the 
beginning of a bright new phase of exploitation 
of nuclear energy for the benefit of man. 


We must remember, however, that the strug- 
gles of the past have been but a prelude to the 
larger challenges of the future. With con- 
tinued devotion, good will, and a generous 

spirit, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
can hasten the time when nuclear energy, in its 
many forms, will help man conquer want and 
build a secure and peaceful world. 

Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
Recesses 1964 Session 

Statement hy William C. Foster 

Director, TJ^S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^ 

I regret the fact that it is necessary once 
again for me to conmient unfavorably on cer- 
tain statements made by the Soviet representa- 
tive [Semyon K. Tsarapkin]. It seems to me 
to be unf ortimate that near the end of his other- 
wise interesting statement this morning — at our 
last meeting of this session — he should choose to 
renew his Government's false charges against 
the policies of my own country as well as those 
of our allies, in particular the Federal Republic 
of Germany. It seems to me that this is not the 
way to improve the atmosphere or indeed the 
prospects for future negotiations. This is not 
the way to convince other nations that the Soviet 
Union sincerely desires to achieve mutual im- 
derstanding; this is not the way to lessen the 
tension or lay a basis for disarmament. The 
patience of the United States is great, but it is 
not unlimited. However, at this our last meet- 
ing of the session I do not intend to follow the 
example of the Soviet representative and en- 
gage in polemics. 

Message From P icTcfcrt Jc [ [ m 

At our first meeting this year I read a message 
from President Jolmson." It began : "There is 
only one item on the agenda of this Confer- 
ence — it is the leading item on the agenda of 
mankind — and that one item is peace." Today 
I should like to read another message from 
President Johnson, as follows : * 

Peace is still the one item on your agenda and the 
leading item on the agenda of mankind. 

Our Conference was formed because nations have 
learned that peace cannot be assured by military pre- 
paredness alone. They have learned that they must 
work together if our world is to be moved toward last- 
ing peace instead of war. 

War is senseless in the world of today when a single 
nuclear weapon can contain more explosive force than 
aU the bombs dropped in World War II. 

War is senseless when nations can inflict devastating 
damage and incalculable suffering on each other and 
the rest of the world in the space of an hour. 

I pledge the best efforts of which my country is ca- 
pable to prevent such a war. To this end — to deter 
aggression — my country is maintaining the most pow- 
erful defense force in its peace-time history. But in 
the world of today, the quest for peace demands much 
more than military preparedness. It demands the 
elimination of the causes of war and the building of a 
firm foundation for peace. 

In the quest for peace, this Conference has already 
played a significant role. 

Already the world is somewhat safer because of the 
efforts of the nations represented here. The air we 
breathe is no longer being contaminated by nuclear 
tests. Nuclear weapons are being kept out of space. 
Announcements have been made that planned produc- 
tion of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is 
being limited. Better means of emergency communica- 
tions exist to help prevent an unintended nuclear ex- 
change. For the first time, friends and adversaries 

' Made before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, 
on Sept. 17. Mr. Foster was head of the U.S. delega- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224. 

' Also released as White House press release dated 
Sept 16. 



alike have taken steps together to bring the nuclear 
arms race under control. 

Limited as they are, these achievements are cause 
for some satisfaction. They followed sixteen years of 
post-war disarmament talks which produced neither 
agreement nor the basis for agreement. 

The year lOtil saw the first steps to build the basis 
for later agreement. The McCloy-Zorin negotiations 
produced a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles to 
guide disarmament deliberations.* This was followed 
by agreement on the framework for this Conference." 
In my country, a new Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency was created to give new impetus toward the 
goal which we all share." This is a goal which the 
United States Congress described as "a world which 
is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and 
burdens of armaments ; in which the use of force has 
been subordinated to the rule of law ; and in which 
international adjustments to a changing world are 
achieved peacefully." 

This Conference began in 1962. In that year, your 
deliberations included three proposals which formed 
the foundation for the three forward steps taken in 
1963 — the nuclear test ban treaty,' the communications 
link between Washington and Moscow," and the United 
Nations resolution against nuclear weapons in space.* 

The year 1064 has witnessed announcements by my 
country, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom 
that the planned production of fissionable material for 
nuclear weapons would be limited.'" 

This year also brought more concrete proposals for 
safeguarded and realistic agreements than any other 
year since before World War II. These proposals have 
included urgently needed steps to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons. They have included measures to 
cease the production of fissionable materials for nu- 
clear weapons and to freeze the numbers and char- 
acteristics of strategic delivery systems. They have 
included plans to decrease the danger of war by acci- 
dent, miscalculation or surprise attack. 

This year has not witnessed agreement on any of 
these proposals. We hope that, like 1961 and 1962, it 
has witnessed the groundwork being laid for the agree- 
ments of the future. 

The road to peace is not an easy one. The concrete 
gains so far achieved required long and diligent effort. 
So will the accomplishments of tomorrow. 

As you recess temporarily your deliberations in 
Geneva, let each nation represented here resolve to 

' Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 

"For background, see Hid., Mar. 5, 1962, p. 3.5.5; 
Mar. 19, 1962, p. 465 ; Mar. 26, 1962, p. 494. 

" For background, see Hid.. Oct. 16, 1961, p. 646. 

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239. 

'md., July 8, 1963, p. 50. 

"Ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 753. 

" For an address by President Johnson before the 
Associated Press at New York City on Apr. 20, 1964, 
see ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726. 

continue at home its consideration of the proposals 
made at this Conference. Let each nation use this 
time for reflection. I^et each nation return to the re- 
convened conference prepared to take additional steps 
toward peace. 
Let us all contribute to building a safer tomorrow. 

I ask that that message from President John- 
son be circulated for the infonnation of the 

Conference's Role in Quest for Peace 

Now let me call the attention of members of 
the Committee to President Jolinson's remark 
that this Conference has already played a sig- 
nificant role in the quest for peace. My Gov- 
ernment has long believed that this Conference 
is an extremely useful fonmi for the exchange 
of views and the conduct of negotiations. As 
I have probably said to many of you, if it did 
not exist we should have to create something 
like it. 

During the first 2 years of our Conference 
differences over the manner of achieving dis- 
armament became increasingly apparent. Those 
differences arose over the need to provide bal- 
ance, verification, and peacekeeping machineiy. 
All three points featured in our consideration 
of nuclear delivery vehicles this year, and, in 
spite of this year's passage, "we do not seem 
closer to our goal. Yet the exchange of views 
has at least clarified the differences. 

The radical reduction in strategic armaments 
which the Soviet Union has proposed for the 
first stage of disarmament would be decidedly in 
its favor. It would upset the present balance 
and create more danger than it eliminated. No 
nation can be expected to risk war in order to 
achieve disarmament. There is no safe short- 
cut to the millennium. 

We must recognize the facts of the present, 
establish goals for the future, and move toward 
those goals in a step-by-step, evolutionary proc- 
ess. That is the approach of the United States 
plan for di.sarmament. That is also our ap- 
proach to collateral measures. 

The sharp disagreements over methods of 
achieving disarmament led the Conference this 
year to focusing greater attention on collateral 
measures. The United States presented pro- 
posals to the Conference wliich were intended 
to reduce the area of disagreement on all three 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


main points of disagreement — balance, verifi- 
cation, and peacekeeping. We designed those 
proposals so that they would not disrupt the 
present rough balance between the two sides. 
We designed them so that effective verification 
could be provided without as much inspection 
as that required for general disarmament. We 
designed tliem so that their adoption would not 
produce an immediate requirement for a sig- 
nificant strengthening of present institutions 
for keeping the peace. 

By planning our proposals to reduce the areas 
of difference on each of the three points of dis- 
agreement, we hoped to make them more ac- 
ceptable to all concerned. Moreover, by focus- 
mg on methods to halt the nuclear arms race 
and turn it aroiuid, we hoped to find the easiest 
way to lay a fomidation for disarmament. 

We proposed a freeze on strategic delivery 
vehicles for nuclear weapons.^^ To begin the 
actual disarmament j^rocess, we suggested the 
mutual destruction of substantial numbers of 
B^7 and TU-16 bombers.^^ 

We proposed a cutoff in the production of 
material for use in nuclear weapons.^^ To re- 
duce the stocks of those explosives available for 
weapons, we suggested the transfer of large 
quantities of such material to peaceful purposes. 

To halt the spread of nuclear weapons to na- 
tions not now controlling them, we called for 
agreement on four additional steps : ^* 

( 1 ) that nuclear weapons should not be trans- 
ferred into the national control of nations which 
do not now possess them ; 

(2) that all transfers of nuclear materials 
for peaceful purposes should take place under 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 
or similar safeguards; 

(3) that major nuclear powers should accept 
in an increasing number of their peaceful ac- 
tivitie.s the same safeguards as those they rec- 
ommend for nonnuclear powers; and 

(4) that an effectively' verified ban should 
be placed on all nuclear tests— those under- 
groimd as well as those above ground. 

" For background, see ibid.. Mar. 2, 19G4, p. 350 ; May 
11, V.WA, p. 750) ; Sept 21. 1964, p. 413. 
" Ibid., Apr. 20, 19(>4, p. 643. 
" Ibid., July 27, 1064, p. 123. 
"ibiW., Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376, and Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641. 

Finally, we suggested measures which would 
help to reduce the risk of war, increase the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
and improve the ability of the United Nations 
to mobilize peace forces for coping with limited 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

Having summarized the proposals made by 
my country this year, I should like to comment 
briefly on the joint memorandum which relates 
to one of them — the eight-nation memorandum 
on a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests.^^ 

We have long urged a comprehensive test ban 
to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
to countries that do not now possess them. Our 
support for such a ban was reaffirmed by Presi- 
dent Johnson in his message to the Conference 
of 21 January 1964. It was reiterated by my 
delegation as recently as 8 September, at our 
214tli meeting. 

We read the jomt memorandmn as proposing 
an agreement to ban all nuclear tests — an agree- 
ment which would provide verification satisfac- 
tory to both sides. The United States is, of 
course, not willing to accept a prohibition on all 
its tests unless it can have adequate assurance 
that the other side is actually adhering to the 
same restraint. 

The joint memorandum proposes an exchange 
of scientific and other infonnation between nu- 
clear powers. My delegation has repeatedly 
suggested that if the Soviet Union has infor- 
mation on how to detect and identify all under- 
ground events by using distant instrumentation 
it should supply that information to other gov- 
ernments. As far as my Government is con- 
cerned, it will gladly cooperate in an exchange 
which will give each side information available 
to the other on techniques for detection and 
identification of underground tests. 

The joint memorandum also suggests im- 
provement of detection and identification tech- 
niques, if necessary. Because ni}' Government 
has long believed that such improvement is nec- 
essary, we are continuing to caiTV out an exten- 
sive research program for this purpose. 

Tlie joint memorandum reflects the sincere 

" KNIKV145. 



desire of the eight nations to hasten the achieve- 
ment of a compreliensive test ban. That desire 
is sliared by my nation and, I believe, by most 
of the nations of the world. We believe the 
meniorandiini to be a most useful contribution 
to this Conference, another among tlie signifi- 
cant contributions made by the eight nations. 

The main reason for the adoption of a com- 
prehensive test ban is to erect a further obstacle 
to the spread of nuclear weapons to countries 
that do not now possess them. That is an inter- 
est wliicli we all share. One of our foremost 
concerns here is the danger of nuclear war. 
Think for a moment how that danger would be 
increased if 5, 10, or even 20 nations had nuclear 
weapons. Every increase in the number of na- 
tions having nuclear weapon capabilities multi- 
plies the chances of an accidental or uninten- 
tional nuclear exchange — an exchange the ef- 
fects of which would, as we all laiow, not be 
limited to the nuclear powers. 

That is why, out of all the proposals referred 
to by President Jolmson in the message I have 
just read, he placed in the "urgently needed" 
category steps to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons. That is why, in a speech which he 
made yesterday in Seattle, Washington,^" he 
said that our work against nuclear spread must 
go on. That is why my delegation has laid so 
much stress on nonproliferation this year; and 
that is why I hope we shall make early progress 
on nonproliferation when we meet again. 

Toward a Safer Tomorrow 

As we close our session this year, let me 
describe to you the kind of world which I think 
could be produced by future agreement on the 
collateral measures we have advanced this year. 
Those measures would prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons to nations which do not now 
possess them, halt the increases and reduce the 
stocks of the explosives and strategic vehicles 
for nuclear weapons, inhibit the production of 
new and improved strategic aircraft and mis- 
siles, limit the danger and devastation of a 
nuclear exchange, reduce the risk of both nu- 
clear and conventional war, improve the institu- 
tional machinery for keeping the peace, reduce 
still further the tensions between the two sides, 

' Bulletin of Oct. .5, 19&1, p. 458. 

and free vast resources to help satisfy the unmet 
needs of mankind. 

Those results would not produce the millen- 
nium, but they would help build the "safer 
tomorrow" of which President Johnson's mes- 
sage speaks. Moi-eover, they would open the 
door to disarmament and to a better world 
order, and they are achievable in today's world. 

Our labors here this year have not been in 
vain. Each of our govermnents understands 
better our common objectives and what we must 
do to achieve them. On behalf of my Govern- 
ment let me state that we look forward to a 
prompt resumption of our labors, with the 
sincere hope of achieving early agreement. 

In conclusion, I should like to thank my 
fellow chairman, Mr. Tsarapkin, and his dep- 
uty, Mr. [L. I.] Mendelyevich. I would also 
thank the other members of the Committee for 
the constant cooperation and help they have 
given to me and to my delegation. I should 
like also to thank the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General, Mr. [Dragoslav] Pro- 
titch, and his deputy, Mr. [W.] Epstein, and the 
whole stall' of the secretariat — in particular the 
interpreters, for their outstanding contribution 
and the patience they have shown to us during 
these many weeks. 

U.S. Comments on U.N. Mission's 
Cambodia-Viet-Nam Report 

Following is the text of a letter from Am- 
hmsador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Represent- 
ative to the United Nations, to the Acting 
President of the Security Council, Platon 
Dmitrievich Morozov. 

September 9, 1964. 

Dear Mr. PREsmENx: I have the honor to 
refer to the report of the Security Council Mis- 
sion to tlie Kingdom of Cambodia and the Re- 
public of Vietnam which was submitted to the 
President of the Security Council on July 27, 

After studying the report with great care 
and interest, my Government has come to the 
conclusion that the recommendations made in 
Part VI — particularly those looking toward the 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


establishment of a group of United Nations 
observers and tlie resumption of political rela- 
tions between Cambodia and Vietnam — offer 
genuine promise of reducing the incidents which 
have occurred along the common border be- 
tween Cambodia and Vietnam and, at the same 
time, other sources of recent tension between 
these two countries. My Government believes 
that the members of the Security Council Mis- 
sion should be commended for the wisdom they 
demonstrated in making recommendations 
wliich have two great merits : not only do they 
point in the direction of an improved future, 
but also they point to practical, albeit modest, 
ways in which the United Nations can again 
exercise its fundamental and indispensable 
peacekeeping responsibilities. My Govern- 
ment has noted with satisfaction that the Re- 
public of Vietnam, one of the two principal 
parties concerned, has exhibited a forthcoming 
attitude toward the recommendations of the Se- 
curity Council Mission. 

These recommendations stem from the Se- 
curity Council resolution of June 4, 1964 
(S/5741)^ — a resolution which was passed in 
response to a complaint brought before the 
Council on an urgent basis by the Eoyal Govern- 
ment of Cambodia. It has been, therefore, a 
source of both surprise and regret to my Govern- 
ment to note the attitude of the Royal Cam- 
bodian Government toward the report of the 
Security Council Mission. In addition to cast- 
ing aspersions upon the independence, objectiv- 
ity and impartiality of the members of the 
Security Council Mission, the Royal Cambodian 
Government has adopted an attitude toward the 
report which argues, on the one hand, that the 
Mission's recommendations are not responsive 
to the Cambodian complaint and, on the other 
hand, that the United Nations is not competent 
to judge what steps can be taken to ameliorate a 
situation brought to the Security Council by the 
Cambodian Government itself. Faced with this 
incongruous attitude of the Royal Cambodian 
Government, my Government has been per- 
plexed in its efforts to discern the motive be- 
hind the Cambodian complaint to the Security 

My Government has been surprised by a fur- 
ther element of incongruity ; namely, despite its 
contention that United Nations organs are not 
competent to suggest remedial measures for the 
unfortunate friction along the Cambodian- 
Vietnamese border, the Royal Cambodian Gov- 
ernment has continued to bring to the attention 
of the Security Council charges of alleged viola- 
tions of Cambodian territory or air space by the 
armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and 
the United States. One of these charges con- 
stitutes a very serious accusation to be leveled 
against any covmtry. I am referring, of course, 
to the Cambodian charge that the Republic of 
Vietnam and my Goveniment have recently en- 
gaged in chemical warfare against the civilian 
pojDulation of Cambodia. This charge was 
made in a cable to the Security Council Presi- 
dent from the Cambodian Foreign Minister 
(S/5839) and has been repeated elsewhere, 
often with differing details. 

My Government has repeatedly and categori- 
cally denied this Cambodian charge,- as has the 
Republic of Vietnam. Further, both my Gov- 
ernment and the Republic of Vietnam have pro- 
posed an impartial international investigation 
of the Cambodian charge. The Royal Cambo- 
dian Government has been unwilling to agree to 
such an impartial investigation. A letter of 
August 30 to the Security Council President 
from Foreign Minister [Huot] Sambath, while 
reasserting the charge, suggests that the request 
for an impartial inquiry has come "too late" and 
is "unacceptable under present circumstances" 
(S/5940) . An earlier official Cambodian state- 
ment, a communique from the Ministry of In- 
formation on August 16, stated inter alia that 
the assistance of "foreign bureaucrats" was not 
necessary in countmg the number of victims of 
the chemical warfare allegedly undertaken by 
the Republic of Vietnam and my Government. 
This, of course, was not what had been proposed. 
The proposal was, rather, that a qualified inter- 
national body be permitted to conduct an im- 
partial inquiry into completely unsubstantiated 
charges that many Cambodians died as a result 
of poisonous chemicals spread over Caml)()dian 

'■ For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 1004. 

^ For texts of U.S. letters of Aug. 3 nud 14. see ibid., 
Aug. 24, 1964, p. 274, and Aug. 31, 1964, p. 319. 



territory by the Eepublic of Vietnam and the 
United States. 

Although the reasons for tlie Cambodian at- 
titude may not be clear, it is apparent that the 
Koyal Cambodian Government is unwilling to 
subject its charges to the scrutiny of impartial 
investigation. In this connection, it is worth 
particular note that two of the occasions on 
wliich it is charged that South Vietnamese air- 
craft dispersed poisonous chemicals over Cam- 
bodian territory allegedly took place well before 
the Security Council Mission had arrived in 
Cambodia; another occasion allegedly took 
place while the Mission was visiting the Repub- 
lic of Vietnam. It is difficult to understand why 
the Royal Cambodian Government did not bring 
these alleged incidents to the attention of the 
Security Council Mission wliile it was in the 

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to re- 
iterate my Government's belief that the recom- 
mendations in the report of the Security Coun- 
cil Mission — assuming arrangements can be 
agreed on for their implementation — represent 
practical, although limited, steps by which the 
United Nations can exercise its peacekeeping 
responsibilities and contribute to a reduction of 
tension in Southeast Asia. My Government 
can only regret that the Royal Cambodian Gov- 
ernment does not look upon these recommenda- 
tions — which stemmed from its own urgent ap- 
peal to the Security Council — in a similar light. 

I should be grateful if you would have this 
letter circulated as a Security Comicil docu- 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

Adlai E. Stevenson 

Current U.N. Documents 

Mimeographed or processed doeuments (such as those 
listed beloir) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may 
he purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

The Cyprus Situation : 

Letters to the President of the Security Council from 
the representative of Cyprus. S/5914, August 25, 

1964, 6 pp.; S/5925, September 1, 1964, 2 pp.; 
S/5929, September 2, 1964, 2 pp. ; S/5963, Septem- 
ber 11. 11HJ4. .'i pp. 

Letters to the Secretary-General from the representa- 
tive of Turkey. S/.'IOIS, August 26, 1964, 1 p.; 
S/5917, August 27, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5931, Septem- 
ber 3, 1964, 3 pp. ; S/5',)44. September 9, 1964, 1 p. ; 
S/5958, September 11, 1964, 3 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the financial situation in respect of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, 
as at August 27, 1964. S/5918. August 27,' 1964. 

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the developing situation with regard 
to the projected rotation of Turkish national troops 
in Cyprus. S/5920. August 29, 1964. 3 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na- 
tions Operation in Cyprus. S/5950, September 10, 
1964, 68 pp. ; 8/5950/ Add. 1, September 14, 1964, 
maps showing deployment of UNFICYP, Septem- 
ber 1964, and distribution of Turkish Cypriot 

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the 
Security Council a memorandum submitted to 
him by the representative of Turkey on Septem- 
ber 10. S/5954. September 10, 1964. 2 pp. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the api^lication of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and the Philip- 
pines of July 27, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3316, 
4515), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna June 15 and September 18, 1964. 
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency 
accepts the initial inventory. 

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Philippines, United States. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations ; 

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 
relations concerning compulsory settlement of dis- 

Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force 
April 24, 19frl.' 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, September 
1, 19(>4. 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva .\pril 29, 
1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 

' Not in force for the United States. 

OCTOBER 12, 1964 


Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, August 
11, 1964. 
Convention on the continental shelf. Pone at Geneva 
April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. 
TIAS -<-)78. 

Ratiflcutixm deposited: Dominican Republic, August 
11. 19G4. 
Convention on fishing and conservation of Uving re- 
sources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, August 
11, 1964. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreciueut e.stablishiiig interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Signature: Federal Republic of Germany, Septem- 
ber 21, 1964. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 


Signature: Deutsche Bundespost for Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, September 21, 1964. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Ratification deposited: Burma, August 3, 1964. 



Agreement relating to the construction of a Loran-C 
Station and its Associated Monitor Control Station 
in Newfoundland. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ottawa September 16, 1964. Entered into force 
September 16, 1964. 

Dominican Republic 

Cooperative mapping, charting and geodesy agreement. 
Signed at Santo Domingo August 28, 1964. Entered 
into force August 28, 1964. 


Agreement amending the agreement concerning trade 
in cotton textiles of April 15, 1904 (TIAS 5559). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sep- 
tember 15, 1964. Entered into force September 15, 


Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 19.50 (TIAS 
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo Au- 
gust 25 and September 2, 19C4. Entered into force 
September 2, 1964. 


Convention supplementing convention and protocol for 
avoidance of double taxation and establishment of 
rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in 
income and other taxes of March 23, 1939 (.54 Stat. 
1759). Signed at Stockholm October 22, 1963. En- 
tered into force September 11, 1964. 
Proclaimed hij the President: September IS, 1964. 


' Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.V., 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington D.C., 20520. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Senegal — 
Signed at Daliar July 3, 1963. Entered into force July 
3, 1963. And amending agreement. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Daliar January 24, 1964. Entered 
into force January 24, 1964. TIAS 5599. 17 pp. 10^ 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iran — 
Signed at Tehran November 17, 1963. Entered into 
force November 17, 1963. With exchange of notes — 
Dated at Tehran November 18, 1963, and June 11, 1964. 
TIAS 5600. 10 pp. 10«f 

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Informa- 
tion for Defense Purposes — Filing Classified Patent 
Application. Agreement with Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, amending the agreement of March 9 and May 
23, 1959. Exchange of notes — Dated at Bonn and 
Bonn/Bad Godesberg January 14 and May 28, 1964. 
Entered into force May 28. 1904. TIAS 5001. 3 pp. 

Consular Convention and Protocol. Convention and 
Protocol with Japan— Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963. 
Entered into force August 1, 1964. TIAS 5602. 118 
pp. SO^" 

Aviation — Transport Services. Agreement with New 
Zealand — Signed at Wellington June 24. 1964. Entered 
into force June 24, 1964. TIAS 5605. 9 pp. 100 

Economic Cooperation — Ryuku Islands. Agreement 
with Japan. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tokyo 
April 25, 1964. Entered into force April 25. 1964. 
With agreed minutes. TIAS .5600. 12 pp. 10(? 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Disposition of Equipment 
and Materials. Agreement with China, amending the 
agreement of April 3, 1956. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force 
June 3, 1964. TIAS 5607. 7 pp. lO^". 

Saint Lawrence Seaway — Tariff of Tolls. Agreement 
with Canada, amending the agreement of March 9, 
1959. Exchange of notes — Dated at Ottawa June 30, 
1964. Entered into force July 1, 1964. TIAS 5608. 
3 pp. 5^ 

Technical Cooperation — Program in British Guiana. 

Agreement with I'nited Kingdom, extending the agree- 
ment of June 29 and July 12. 1954. as extended. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Washington June 22 and 
29, 1964. Entered into force June 29, 1964. TIAS 
5609. 3 pp. 54 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, 
ainending the agreoment of December 6, 19(i2, as 
.uiu'uded. Exchange of notes — Signed at Wasliington 
July 6. 1964. Entered into force July 0, 1904. TIAS 
5010. 2 pp. 5^ 



INDEX October 12, 196^ Vol. LI, No. 1320 

Africa. Freedom and Development (Busk) . . 498 

Atomic Energy 

Nuclear Energy for the Benefit of Man (Sea- 
borg) 519 

Senate Confirms Nominations to IAEA General 
Conference 520 

Cambodia. U.S. Comments on U.N. Mission's 

Cambodia-Viet-Xam Report (Stevenson) . . 527 


President Johnson Proclaims Columbia River 

Treaty (text of proclamation) 507 

U.S. and Canada Hold Columbia River Treaty 
Ceremonies (Johnson, Pearson, exchange of 
notes) 504 


President Reports on Oi>eration of Trade Agree- 
ments Program (Johnson) 516 

Senate Confirms Nominations to IAEA General 
Conference 520 

Disarmament. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee Rece-sses 19t>4 Session (Foster, 
Johu.son) 524 

Economic Affairs 

President Reports on Operation of Trade Agree- 
ments Program (Johnson) 516 

Technical Representatives Named for Trade Ne- 
gotiations 517 

U.S. and Hong Kong Announce Cotton Textile 

Agreement 517 

Hong Kong. U.S. and Hong Kong Announce 

Cotton Textile Agreement 517 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Eightet'u-Xation Disarmament Committee Re- 
cesses 1964 Session (Foster, Jolinson) . . . 524 

Nuclear Energy for the Benefit of Man (Sea- 

borg) 519 

Senate Confirms Nominations to IAEA General 
Conference 520 

Malta. President Congratulates Malta on In- 

deiieudence (text of letter) 503 

Presidential Documents 

Eighteen-Xation Disarmament Committee Re- 
cesses 1964 Session 524 

President Congratulates Malta on Independ- 
ence 503 

President Johnson Proclaims Columbia River 

Treaty 507 

President Reports on Operation of Trade Agree- 
ments Program 516 

U.S. and Canada Hold Coliunbia River Treaty 
Ceremonies 504 

Publications. Recent Releases 530 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 529 

President Johnson Proclaims Columbia River 

Treaty (text of proclamation) .507 

U.S. and Canada Hold Columbia River Treaty 

Ceremonies (Johnson, Pearson, exchange of 

notes) 504 

U.S. and Hong Kong Announce Cotton Textile 

Agreement 517 

United Nations 

Current U.X. Documents 529 

U.S. Comments on U.N. Mission's Cambodia-Viet- 

X'am Reix)rt (Stevenson) 527 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Comments on U.N. Mission's 

Cambodia-Viet-Nam Report (Stevenson) . . 527 

Name Index 

Foster, William C 524 

Hefner, Frank K 520 

Johnson, President 503, 504, 507, 516, 524 

Palfrey, John Gorham 520 

Peanson, Lester B 504 

Raraey, James T 520 

Rusk, Secretary 498 

Seaborg, Glenn T 519,520 

Smyth, Henry DeWolf 520 

Stevenson, Adlai E 527 

Tape, Gerald F 520 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 21-27 

Press releases may be obtainetl from the OfBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20.120. 

No. Date Sabject 

*410 9/21 U.S. participation in international 

t412 9/21 Mann : "The Western Hemisphere's 

Fight for Freedom." 
t413 9/23 Mann : "The Alliance for Progress : 

A Challenge and an OpiK)rtunity." 

414 9/23 Cotton textile agreement with Hong 


415 9/25 Rusk: "Freedom and Development." 
*416 9/25 Program for visit of NATO Secre- 
tary General. 

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Yol. LI, No. 1321 


October 19, 1964 


Address hy President Johnson 54S 



Remarks hy President Johnson and Secretary Busk 
aTid Text of Proclamation 555 


iy Assistant Secretary Mann 51i9 


hy Assistant Secretary Bundy 534 

For index see inside hack cover 

Progress and Problems in East Asia: An American Viewpoint 

by William P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

I am pleased and honored to have been in- 
vited to address this distinguished gathering. 
The research, analyses, and public information 
activities of the Eesearch Institute of Jajjan, 
mider the able leadership of Mr. [Saiji] 
Hasegawa, have made a notable contribution to 
international understanding in Japan and thus 
to the strengthening of Japan's free- world ties. 

Your institute has often provided a forum m 
which the views of your countrymen and mine 
could be forthrightly stated iii the interests of 
closer understanding. It is with this in mind 
that I would like to speak to you today about 
East Asia, its progress and its problems, as we 
in America see them today. 

Five Basic Elements of U.S. Policy 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently set 
forth the five basic elements of our foreign 

' Address made before the Research Institute of 
Japan at Tokyo on Sept. 29 (press release 422). 

policy. They apply fully in East Asia and are, 
I think, shared by Japan and by other free na- 
tions of the area. I should like to use them as 
the outliiie of my remarks today : 

1. Security through strength — the efforts of 
individual free- world nations, supported where 
necessary by external military assistance, and 
backed by th& strategic nuclear power of the 
United States — which we earnestly hope we 
shall never need to use — and by our greatly im- 
proved and far more mobile conventional and 
counterguerrilla forces. 

2. Progress through partnershii^ — the closer 
association of the more industrialized nations of 
Western Europe, North America, and Asia — 
specifically Japan — both in strengthening their 
own economic ties and in working together to 
assist the less industrialized nations of the free 

3. Revolution in freedom — harnessing the 
great and potentially constructive forces of na- 
tionalism and carrying out the revolution of 


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modernization without sacrifice of independence 
and freedom. 

4. Community under law — tlie gradual emer- 
gence of a genuine world community based on 
cooperation and law, through the establishment 
and development of sucli organs as the United 
Nations, the World Court, tlie World Bank and 
Monetary Fund, and other global and regional 

5. Tlirough perseverance, peace — no goal is 
more important than peace to the American 

Coping With the Communist Threat 

All of these objectives stand squarely in the 
way of communism's goal of recasting the world 
in its ovm image. A central task of our for- 
eign policy is, thus, to cope with the Commu- 
nist threat — particularly that of Coirmiunist 
China — while at the same time working in posi- 
tive terms to promote the economic, social, and 
political progress of the free nations. 

Communist China's foreign policy is fash- 
ioned by men whose whole life has been one of 
struggle, who are thoroughly wedded to a fun- 
damentalist concept of communism, who have 
grown rigid and intransigent even in the face of 
overwhelming proof that the 19th-century doc- 
trines of Karl Marx are hopelessly inadequate to 
meet the 20th-century problems of China. Mon- 
umentally convinced of the correctness of their 
position, they view all who disagree with them, 
including even the Russians, as old and bad and 
decadent. Neutralists are tolerated only to the 
extent that they are moving in the direction de- 
sired by Peiping. 

I do not claim to know what their precise 
goals are. Are these goals to be defined in ter- 
ritorial terms, and, if so, what territories? Or 
could their goals be better described in terms of 
tlieir quest for power and status and of gaining 
control and influence over other nations? Or 
are their goals directed more at exploiting the 
divisions and the difficulties of the countries of 
the free world, especially those in bordering 
areas? I suspect that all these and other ele- 
ments are involved. But in any event the rec- 
ord of Communist China's behavior in recent 
years — against the offshore islands, Tibet, and 

India — should leave us in no doubt of her mili- 
tant and expansionist outlook. 

More recently we have evidence in the con- 
tinuing statements of Chinese Communist 
leaders, expressed most forcefully in the course 
of their ideological dispute with the Soviet 
Union. They say (as in their June 14, 1964, 
letter to the Soviet Communist Party) that 
"two-thirds of the world's population need to 
make revolution." They add that the revolu- 
tion must be violent: "Violent revolution is a 
universal law of proletarian revolution. To 
realize the transition to socialism the proletariat 
must wage armed struggle, smash the old state 
machine, and establish the dictatorship of the 

Now it may be argued that the leaders of Com- 
munist China do not really mean all that they 
say, but I think it is a good rule of thumb to 
believe most of what dictators say about their 

Finally, we should note that the severest in- 
dictments of Chinese Communist bellicosity 
come from the Soviet Union itself, and, because 
of the close relationship that until recently 
marked Moscow-Peiping affairs, the Soviet 
Union may be in a good position to judge what 
Communist Cliina is up to. 

To say that Communist China is fundamen- 
tally militant is not inconsistent with the view 
that she may be tactically cautious when con- 
fronted with major force. Unquestionably our 
United States strategic and conventional capa- 
bilities, supplementing the efforts of free Asian 
nations, have made Communist China reluctant 
to embark on the older fomis of naked aggi-es- 
sion. Instead they prefer what Premier Khru- 
shchev has called "wars of national liberation" — 
support to guerrillas, training of saboteurs, and 
the creation of Communist-dominated "national 
fronts." Fortunately Japan and other coun- 
tries with internal stability and strength are not 
susceptible to this type of aggression. 

I do not say that this will always be the pic- 
ture of the policy of the Asian Communist na- 
tions. They confront tremendous internal 
problems. Like Communist countries every- 
where they have not yet foimd the answer to the 
basic problem of agricultural production, much 
less of carrying out a true industrial or scientific 

OCTOBER 19. 1964 


revolution along the lines on which you in Japan 
have led the way. If their leaders were reason- 
able, or even pragmatic, the Conununist nations 
of Asia should recognize that they cannot afford 
to embark on outside adventures that draw upon 
resources so urgently needed at home. 

Thus we do not rule out the possibility that 
the passage of time will bring about desirable 
changes in the outlook of Communist China, 
North Korea, and North Viet-Nam. But 
clearly this cannot come about unless Commu- 
nist expansionism is deterred and completely 
frustrated and unless, too, the conduct of all our 
relationships with Communist China gives her 
no encouragement that a continued militant 
course can be accepted. 

So long as Peiping, as well as Hanoi and 
Pyongyang, continue on their present course, I 
see no basic change in United States policy to- 
ward mainland China. It is inconceivable to 
me that, at a time when Communist China is 
stridently proclaiming a militant revolution- 
ary thesis and bearing out its threats with ac- 
tions that undermine the security of nations 
both in Asia and Africa and even in the Amer- 
icas, we should relax our guard. It remains 
the first requirement of our policy to help main- 
tain adequate free-world military strength in 
order to deter aggression or, where aggression 
or threats to the peace occur, to be able to cope 
with such threats effectively. Without such ca- 
pability to keep the peace, there can be no peace. 
Nor can there be any real progress in improving 
the well-being and satisfying the aspirations of 
the people in Asia. From this general policy 
there follow a number of specific applications 
that bear on the relations between Japan and 
the United States : 

1. We believe that the Treaty of Mutual Co- 
operation and Security ^ concluded between us 
in 19G0 still remains fundamental to our com- 
mon security. The very fact that we have never 
needed to invoke the treaty in defense against 
an attack is proof of its worth. There are 
those who, for one reason or another, would like 
to see our defensive arrangements altered or 
terminated. Admittedly it would be to our ad- 
vantage if Japan's security could be assured 

without the enormous drain of money and man- 
power which the maintenance of our bases here 
involves. But so long as Japan's Commmiist 
neighbors openly proclaim their desire to impose 
their own economic and political system upon 
the rest of Asia, our mutual security arrange- 
ments would seem essential and the United 
States will continue to cooperate with the Japa- 
nese people in the defense of Japan. 

We believe that the presence of our men here 
gives credibility to our pledge to defend Japan 
in a way that no mere commitment on paper 
could achieve. We do not, in short, see any 
need to alter the fimdamental concept of our 
existing security arrangements until there is real 
evidence that the threat of aggression has dis- 
appeared from the Far East. 

2. The importance of Okinawa to the security 
of East Asia remains imchanged. In his state- 
ment of March 1962 President Kennedy set 
forth United States policies for the Eyukyus,* 
which remain unchanged under President Jolm- 
son. In that statement, you will recall. Presi- 
dent Kennedy reaffirmed the importance the 
United States attaches to our military bases in 
the Ryukyus. He went on to say that he rec- 
ognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japa- 
nese homeland and looked forward to the day 
when the security interests of the free world 
will permit their restoration to full Japanese 
sovereignty. He then outlined several courses 
of action to increase the autonomy granted to 
the Ryukyuan people, to improve their well- 
being, and to enhance the cooperation of Japan 
and America in programs of assistance to the 
islands. Two new jomt committees have re- 
cently been set up to implement this latter pur- 
pose, and it has been made clear that these 
committees are only a beginning step, not a 
limiting boundary.* I feel confident that the 
cooperation between Japan and the United 
States in the Ryukyu Islands will permit the 
continuance of the essential role of the islands 
in free-world defense and at the same time will 

' For text, sec Bulletin of Feb. 8, lOGO, p. 184. 

" For text of a stateuient by President Kennedy on 
the occasion of his siKning of an amendment to Execu- 
tive Order 1071.% relating to the administration of the 
Ryukyu Islands, see White House press release dated 
Mar. 19, 1962. 

* Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 753. 



contribute to the welfare of the people and to 
the solidarity of relations between our two 

As you know, our new High Commissioner in 
the Ryukyus, General [Albert] Watson, was 
able to visit Japan on his way to take up his 
post in Okinawa and had higlily profitable dis- 
cussions witli the leaders of your Government. 
We expect to stay in close touch with the Gov- 
eriunent of Japan on this matter and to con- 
tinue to work toward the objectives laid down 
by President Kennedy. 

3. We continue to believe that the security 
of South Korea is essential to the security of 
Japan. We will continue to support the re- 
quired level of the Armed Forces of the Repub- 
lic of Korea, and these, supplemented by our 
own forces, will be maintained at a level ade- 
quate to prevent repetition from any quarter of 
the attack of 1950. Concurrently, we continue 
to attach fundamental importance to the eco- 
nomic development and welfare of the Republic 
of Korea as an integral part of its security and 
of that of Japan and the United States as well. 

4. With regard to your own defense effort 
here in Japan, our grant military assistance 
is now naturally drawing to a close and is now 
represented by our cooperative efforts particu- 
larly in the field of air defense and teclmical 
equipment for your naval self-defense forces. 
It is natural and inevitable that Japan should 
assume the burden of her own defense to an 
increasing degree, but at the same time we wel- 
come the continuing consultation made possible 
by our close and cooperative relationships under 
the treaty. 

5. We recognize the profound implications 
of the Sino-Soviet rift and the possibility that 
it may lead to greater tension between the 
U.S.S.R. and Communist China in the northern 
regions. But we doubt that the U.S.S.R. has 
yet abandoned her Communist expansionist 
aims, and certainly not to the point where in 
the foreseeable future she could be relied upon 
to play a constructive role in assisting other 
nations to defend themselves against Commu- 
nist China. There may be a long-term hope in 
this direction, but let us recognize always that 
the differences between the U.S.S.R. and Com- 

munist China are still concerned primarily not 
with their basic objectives but rather with the 
degree of violence to be employed to achieve 
those objectives. And let us recognize too that, 
to the extent that Soviet policy has changed or 
may change in the future, this will be in large 
part due to the fact that we, in partnership with 
other free-world nations, have maintained a 
military posture adequate to deter and to defeat 
any aggressive action. 

A word further about the situation in South- 
east Asia, especially in South Viet- Nam. Here 
the aim of our policy is to assist the Government 
of South Viet- Nam in maintaining its independ- 
ence and its control over the territory allotted 
to it by the Geneva accords of 1954. We do not 
aim at overthrowing the Communist regime of 
North Viet-Nam but rather at inducing it to 
call off the war it directs and supports in South 

We believe it essential to the interests of the 
free world that South Viet-Nam not be per- 
mitted to fall under Communist control. If it 
does, then the rest of Southeast Asia will be 
in grave danger of progressively disappearing 
beliind the Bamboo Curtain and other Asian 
coimtries like India and even in time Australia 
and your own nation in turn will be threatened. 
If Hanoi and Peiping prevail in Viet-Nam in 
this key test of the new Communist tactics of 
"wars of national liberation," then the Commu- 
nists will use this technique with growing fre- 
quency elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin 

To prevent a Communist takeover we are 
pursuing within South Viet-Nam a counterin- 
surgency approach — involving economic and 
political measures quite as much as military — 
similar to that which was successfully used to 
defeat Commimist rebellions in Malaya and the 
Philippines. Some have urged neutralization, 
but the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam 
has specifically rejected such a solution for that 
area. Neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone 
would, therefore, simply be a step toward a 
Communist takeover, as the Communists them- 
selves know in pushing it as an interim course 
for South Viet-Nam. Negotiations would 
serve no purpose as long as Hanoi and Peiping 
disregard the agreements they signed in 1954 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


and 1962 on Viet-Nam' and Laos.« Expansion 
of the war outside South Viet-Nam, while not 
a course we want or seek, could be forced upon 
us by the increased external pressures of the 
Communists, including a rising scale of infiltra- 

The present situation in South Viet-Nam is 
difficult. No new nation has ever had a harder 
task— to build and maintain a stable government 
and at the same time to ward off a highly sophis- 
ticated and intensive subversive effort backed by 
substantial military force but focusing pri- 
marily on the very apparatus of government 
itself. It is no wonder that South Viet-Nam 
has had difficulty in coping with these twin 

We have welcomed the recent action of your 
Government in making a substantial increase in 
its economic assistance to South Viet-Nam. We 
for our part are determined to go on doing 
everything we usefully can to assist that 

In sliort, our resolve to help defend the na- 
tions of Southeast Asia, and of East Asia as a 
whole, is unshakable. President Johnson put 
it quita simply in his first speech last Novem- 
ber — in that hour of tragic loss: ". . . let all 
the world know and none misunderstand that 
I rededicate this Government ... to the honor- 
able and determined execution of our conunit- 
ments to our allies. . . ." ^ 

Need for Economic and Social Progress 

But I do not want to leave the impression 
that we regard communism as the only major 
problem facing Asia. Security is fundamental. 
But economic and social progress remains an 
equally important need for the welfare of na- 
tions and of the individuals who must always 
be our primary concern. 

The headlines in the newspapers today some- 
times create the impression that the whole of 
East Asia is in turmoil. It is true that we face 
serious problems in Southeast Asia todaj', but 

"For texts, see American Foreign Policy. 1!)')0-I9')'): 
Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State publica- 
tion (U4r>), p. 7r>o. 

"For text, see BuLurriN of \vv^. 13, liK)2, p. 2'M. 

' Ibid., Dec. IG, l!)(i3, j). !>10. 

we faced at least equally serious ones 10 years 
ago after Dien Bien Phu, when the Iluks were 
still active hi the Philippmes, and the jungle 
insurgents were in Malaya. Problems and dan- 
gers are always with us. They are a fact of life 
in our rapidly changing world. 

Meanwhile, over the past several decades 
there has been progress in the Far East of a 
slow, steady, unsensational kind which will, I 
firmly believe, have far more long-range signifi- 
cance than the problems with which we are so 
deeply concerned today. In most of the coun- 
tries of free Asia there has been a notable de- 
gree of improvement in what the economists call 
"human resources" but what I still like to call 
"people." People are, by and large, healthier. 
They are better educated. They live longer. 
Students have far more opportunities for ad- 
vanced and specialized studies at home and 

Within the last 15 years there have been some 
remarkable success stories — Japan, the Re- 
public of China, and, despite some remaining 
weaknesses, the Republic of Korea, the Philip- 
pines, Thailand, and even South Viet-Nam in 
the 1954-59 period. 

Undoubtedly, however, Japan has provided 
the outstanding example of progress during the 
past 10 years. Tliis progress extends well be- 
yond the material things of life, beyond the 
economic growth wliich has surpassed that of 
any other nation in the postwar era. Japan's 
progress has also been in the arts, in health, 
education, and broadening intellectual horizons 
in all directions. 

The United States has ties of friendship, con- 
fidence, and nuitual interest with many Far 
Eastern countries but none of which we are 
prouder and which we cherish more than those 
with Japan. Our friendship began long before 
the war, survived the war, and is now almost 
unique between two great nations of different 
historical and cultural background. 

Inevitably, in view of the breadth of our re- 
lations, we have problems. Sometimes United 
States actions run counter to what Japan con- 
siders its best interests. But neither of us, be- 
cause of this reality of intemational life, loses 
sight of the larger picture of our common de- 
votion to a world of freedom under law, of 



our vast and steadily growing trade, of our 
vital mutual security ties, and of our proven 
friendship. I have not the slightest doubt, as 
I hope that you do not, that the negotiation 
process, with each side taking account of tlie 
other's views, is simplj' an outwai'd expression 
of this status. 

The Tolcyo Olympics, for which you have 
prepared so well, have focused world attention 
on Japanese endeavors in still another field. 
The people of America look forward eagerly 
to watching telecasts of the Olympics via Syn- 
com III, a triumph of U.S. -Japanese coopera- 

Aiding the Developing Nations 

But we must look beyond the tremendous 
progi-ess that has been made in the reconstruc- 
tion and development of the more industrialized 
nations and in our growing common bonds. 
The other part of the common task before us 
is the lielp the industrialized nations must give 
to tliose in less advanced stages of progress. 

Ten years ago we heard much about the revo- 
lution of so-called "rising expectations," about 
economic breakthroughs and claims that indus- 
trialization and modernization could be achieved 
in a relatively short period of time. Since then 
people have learned progress is a good deal 
more difficult than they had thought. Cer- 
tainly there is nothing automatic in the process, 
even given hard work and outside support. No 
doubt this has been accompanied by a feeling 
of letdown, but in the long run it is a healthy 
thing that aspirations be tempered with reality. 
It is well that we learn now, rather than later, 
that there are no shortcuts to modernization, 
that nation-building cannot be achieved by 
sleight of hand and by mere hope. 

Basic to any nation's successful gTowth is 
success in primary production — that is, in agri- 
culture, in social reforms, in the spread of edu- 
cation, and, above all, in hard work sustained 
over the long period required for significant 
progress. At the same time we must recognize 
that giving aid to developing nations is a mat- 
ter of enlightened self-interest. The aid given 
by ourselves and others must be used wisely. 

In this effort, too, Japan is now a full ):)artner. 
Together with other industrialized nations the 

United States has welcomed the recent acces- 
sion of Japan to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. We know that 
Japan must rightfully play a leading part in 
that organization. 

I might say again that I noted with consid- 
erable interest and enthusiasm the point made 
by Foreign Minister [Etsusaburo] Shiina last 
Thursday, in which he stated that the relations 
between the United States and Japan have now 
entered a new phase of interdependence and 
shared responsibilities. We have long felt that 
Japan has a major role to play not only in Asia 
but on tiie world scene, and we welcome her 
moves toward assuming the responsibilities to 
which her great energy, skill, and resources en- 
title her. Solution of the Asian problems I 
have mentioned today is an immediate and vital 
matter for Japan. It is within Japan's power 
now to contribute to the creation of a stable, 
peaceful, and prosperous Asia througli her vast 
array of technical competence and through her 
experiences in rapid modernization. 

The United States, Japan, and other mem- 
bers of GATT [General Agreement on TariflFs 
and Ti-ade] have considered measures for the 
expansion of trade with and between the devel- 
oping countries. Japan is aware of the difficul- 
ties: Since 1960 Japan's total trade increased 
40 percent while its trade with developing coun- 
tries rose by less than 25 percent. We need to 
continue our exploration of ways that trade 
policies in combination with technical and de- 
velopment assistance can help to support rising 
national income and living standards in develop- 
ing countries in Asia. 

It is even more in your interest than ours, I 
believe, to insui-e that Asia be composed of free 
and friendly trading partners. It would be 
more of a blow in the long run to Japan than to 
the United States if her smaller Asian neighbors 
should fall under the dark shadow of militant 
communism. I am gratified that so many peo- 
ple in Japan are fully aware of this fact and 
tliat Japan today faces the difficult problem of 
her relationship with the Communist countries 
not, as some critics claim, on the basis of defer- 
ence to American wishes but on the basis of a 
realistic appraisal of her own interests and 
responsibilities. It is also gratifying to note 

OCTOBER 19, 19G4 


that Japan continues to place great importance 
on its relations with the Government of the 
Eepublic of China and on trade with Taiwan. 
At a time when Japan's total credit resources 
remain limited, it is also worthy of note that 
there is a growing awareness in Japan that it 
is in Japan's own interests to direct its credit 
resources to the countries of the free world 
which have a long-range intent and capability 
of being trading partners with Japan. 

Regional Cooperation 

A third aspect of economic and social progress 
is the heartening development of regional co- 
operation in various forms, apart from purely 
political collaboration or defensive arrange- 
ments. The Colombo Plan, ECAFE [U.N. 
Economic Commission for the Far East], 
SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] 
economic efforts, the Asian Productivity Orga- 
nization, and bilateral efforts of various kinds 
have made positive contributions to the collec- 
tive welfare of the area in a way that had not 
been even dimly conceived a generation ago. 
By way of example, I might cite the Mekong 
Coordination Committee, tlie SEATO Grad- 
uate School of Engineering in Bangkok, the 
SEATO-planned meteorological and aeronauti- 
cal telecommunications network between Bang- 
kok and Manila, and the construction of the 
Asian highway from the Turkish border to 

Besides this type of developing effort., in- 
creasing regional trade and cultural exchange 
has been a characteristic of the overall progress 
of East Asia. Even more spectacular has been 
the growth of student exchange both with other 
nations and within the region. This j'ear nearly 
22,000 students from East and Southeast Asia 
are attending American institutions of learning. 
Several thousands more are studying in the 
major nations of non-Communist Europe. 
Many of these young people now studying 
abroad will be tomorrow's leaders, and already 
they have begun to move up into positions of 
responsibility and to apply the skills they have 

Japan, too, has been active for a number of 
years in the student exchange field. I note that 
in May 1962 the overwhelming majority of the 

5,770 foreign students in Japan were from 
Asian countries. This number, which has con- 
tinued to grow since that time, does not include 
United States-assisted training of technicians 
from third countries, a progi-am that recognizes 
Japan's vast potential as a center of technical 
know-how for export to all Asia. 

Also over the past decade there have been 
an increasing number of international gather- 
ings among business and professional groups, 
among scientists and educators, all of whom 
have been drawn together by the bonds of com- 
mon and professional interests. Wlio can say 
what these contacts and meetings have produced 
in the way of wider understanding? Wlio can 
say to what extent the foundations are being 
laid for greater regional unity ? 

We can all take satisfaction from these ex- 
amples of cooperation among neighbors in Asia, 
but we cannot overlook the need for expanding 
such cooperation. The security of others has 
an important bearing on the security of each of 
us, and this is especially evident in the close re- 
lationship between Japan and the Republic of 
Korea. As a great power Japan bears special 
responsibilities to settle outstanding problems 
with its smaller and heavily burdened neighbor. 
The Republic of Korea stands as a bulwark 
against the forces of aggression that threaten the 
peace of the Far Eixst, and the situation of 
Japan is vitally connected with the ability of 
the Korean people to maintain their independ- 
ence and to develop a strong and prosperous 
economy. A normalization of relations be- 
tween these two great countries would be an im- 
portant contribution to the cause of peace in 
Asia. I loiow that the leaders of Japan and of 
the Republic of Korea have devoted much 
thought and effort to the solution of tliis prob- 
lem, and I wish them all success in this under- 
taking. I shall be traveling to Seoul in a few 
days and will express this same thought to our 
friends there.^ 

Nationalism and tlie Community of Law 

I come next to the closely related points 
stated by Secretaiy Rusk — of revolution in free- 
dom and community under law — as they relate | 

to East Asia. 

8 See p. 542. 



Tlie first of these is really the channeling of 
the nationalist upsurge in the newly independ- 
ent non-Communist countries of East Asia. 
They seek to assure their complete independence 
from outside domination and control and to as- 
sert their identity as individual nations and spe- 
cifically as Asian nations. These desires are 
wholly natural, and it is natural too that these 
new nations should seek to develop wholly new 
relationships with the Western nations that once 
dominated them. 

Constructively channeled, nationalism can be 
not only the best guarantor of national unity 
and independence but can release the energies 
and animate the sense of purpose wliich are so 
essential to a nation's drive toward moderniza- 
tion. Misdirected, it creates strife between 
nations and retards internal progress by divert- 
ing attention from essential constructive tasks 
to corrosive emotional issues. We admire the 
nations that demonstrate the self-respect and 
will to improve their destinies. We under- 
stand their feelings toward colonialism, having 
once been colonies ourselves. We would like to 
help where we can and where we are mvited. 
We have little sympathy, though, with the 
senseless kind of "anticolonialism" which is 
stirred up for its own sake, long after the threat 
of colonialism has disappeared from the Asian 
scene. Normal relationships with the so-called 
older countries are clearly a prerequisite to the 
type of development and progress the new coun- 
tries seek. 

There is also an increasing disposition on the 
part of the newer nations to settle their prob- 
lems amongst themselves their own way. This 
too is as it should be. Because nationalism 
burns so high in Asia today, it is clear that our 
diplomatic efforts must be redoubled toward 
avoiding dangerous confrontations and toward 
healing international differences. I do not 
quarrel with those who advocate Asian solutions 
for Asian problems. The task of an outside 
peacemaker is a rather thankless one, and there 
is no profit in becoming a diplomatic clearing- 
house for other nations' problems. But we are 
prepared to do our part, particularly when 
called upon to promote the cause of progress and 
peace with justice. 

There are those on the world scene today who 

say that there are just wars or who would con- 
done the use of force in mternational relations 
outside the framework of the United Nations 
Charter. Such practices may have been toler- 
able in the past, although they were never praise- 
worthy. But in today's world the danger of the 
conflict spreading and the nature of modern 
weapons alone make any resort to the use of 
force far more dangerous than in the past. 
None of us can condone its use today, whether by 
a Communist or any other country. 

And this is part of the community of law to 
which we must be moving if mankind is to 
survive. Change there will be; change there 
must be. But it must come through evolu- 
tionary channels and through the settlement of 
outstanding differences rather than by the out- 
moded methods of conflict and aggression. 

Through Perseverance, Peace 

And so I come to the last of Secretary Rusk's 
points — through perseverance, peace. As we 
look at what has happened in East Asia in the 
last decade, we can I think take enormous com- 
fort from the tremendous strides that have been 
made where nations have been left alone to pur- 
sue their national destinies in their own way. 
We in the United States have been proud to 
play a major part in assisting in the secuiity and 
progress of the free nations of East Asia. We 
believe that the policies that we have all de- 
veloped in common over the last decade are 
sound. I am happy to say that in my country 
these policies have a solid bi^Dartisan 

In conclusion let me say that I do not believe 
that man will allow himself to be regimented 
and subjected to an inhuman philosophy. Con- 
formity, regimentation, obliteration of individ- 
uality, and restraints on freedom are contrary to 
man's own nature. Perhaps because we are a 
nation made up of peoples drawn from the four 
corners of the earth, we believe all the more in 
a world safe for diversity. Perhaps because we 
are a nation whose founders came to our shores 
seeking freedom, we believe all the more in pre- 
serving freedom for all. But we seek diversity, 
not divisiveness. We seek liberty, not license. 
For the new nations of Asia, building societies 
out of many divergent elements is extremely 

OCTOBER 19, 19G4 


difficult. It is not for us to decide just how 
this task can be accomplished. But where free 
nations look for our help, it is our opportunity 
to be of assistance to them. In lending a helping 
hand we have no ulterior motives other than 
promoting their security, which is our security, 
their well-being, which is our well-being, and 
moving toward the realization of their hopes 
and aspirations, which are also ours. 

United States and Korea Reaffirm 
Policy of Cooperation 

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs, visited at Seoul, 
Korea, October 2 and 3. Folloioing is the text 
of a joint statement released at Seoul on Octo- 
ber 3 at the conclusion of talks betioeen Mr. 
Bundy and Korean Foreign Minister Lee Tong 

Foreign Minister Lee Tong Won of the Re- 
public of Korea and Mr. William P. Bundy, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs, met today and exchanged views on mat- 
ters of mutual concern to the Govenunents of 
both countries. They reaffirmed the friendship 
between their two countries and pledged their 
Governments to continued cooperation in the 
common interest. 

1. They reviewed the results of the meeting 
held on August 17 between Foreign Minister 
Lee and Ambassador Brown, and reaffirmed the 
contents of the statement ^ released following 
that meeting. 

2. Mr. Bundy expressed his Go^'ermnent's 
support for the efforts of the Korean people 
and Government to maintain constitutional in- 
stitutions and democratic processes. He also 
paid tribute to the people and the Government 
of Korea for their contribution to the collective 
security of the free world and the solidarity of 
free nations in the Far East. 

3. The Foreign Minister recounted recent de- 
velopments with regard to relations between the 
Republic of Korea and Japan. The Foreign 
Minister and Mr. Bundy agreed that normaliza- 

' Not printed here. 

tion of relations between Korea and Japan 
would be an important contribution to the cause 
of peace in Asia and expressed the hope that 
public opinion in Korea on this matter would 
recognize the national interest on a suprapar- 
tisan basis. They expressed the hope that nego- 
tiations for normalization of those relations 
could be resumed at an early date. Mr. Bundy 
repeated earlier U.S. expressions of willingness 
to assist in appropriate ways to bring about a 
successful conclusion of this longstanding 

4. Mr. Bimdy reiterated assurances given 
previously that the basic policy of the United 
States Gov^emment of extending military and 
economic aid to Korea would be continued after 
the normalization of relations between Korea 
and Japan. It was agreed that cooperation be- 
tween Korea and the United States will con- 
tinue to be directed toward maintaining 
Korea's security and independence, promoting 
a self-supporting economy, balanced economic 
growth, and financial stability. 

5. The Foreign Minister and Mr. Bundy ex- 
changed views with respect to the military as- 
sistance program. It was agreed that the re- 
quirements for military assistance would be 
periodically reviewed and that the United 
States will continue to give careful considera- 
tion to the Korean Government's needs and 
views in this regard. 

U.S. Comments on Peiping's 
Nuclear Capacity 

Statement by Secretan^ Rush 

Press release 423 dated September 29 

For some time it has been known that the 
Chinese Communists were approaching the 
point M-here they might be able to detonate a 
first nuclear device. Such an explosion might 
occur in the near future. If it does occur, we 
shall know about it and will make the informa- 
tion public. 

It has been known since the 1950's that the 
Chinese Communists have been working to 
develop a nuclear device. Tliey not only failed 



to si<!:n but strongly opposed the nuclear test 
ban treaty which has been signed by over 100 
countries. The detonation of a first device does 
not mean a stockpile of nuclear weapons and 
the presence of modern deli\-ery systems. The 
United States has fully anticipated the possi- 
bility of Pei ping's entry into the nuclear weap- 
ons field and has taken it into full account in 
determining our military posture and our own 
nuclear weapons program. We would deplore 
atmospheric testing in the face of serious efforts 
made by almost all other nations to protect the 
atmosphere from further contamination and to 
begin to put limitations upon a spiraling arms 

Four Principles of American 
Foreign Policy 

Remarks iy President Johnson ^ 

I am delighted to have a chance to meet briefly 
with you gentlemen and to thank you for under- 
taking to sei"ve as members of a panel of private 
citizens to work with us in the quest for peace. 
You gentlemen sj^mbolize a tradition which 
goes back for a quarter of a centuiy — the tradi- 
tion of nonpartisan service on matters of war 
and peace. I see Democrats who have served 
in Republican administrations, Republicans 
who have served with Democratic administra- 
tions, and a number of men who have held office 
under both parties. And these party affilia- 
tions really don't matter veiy much compared 
to the common concern and the great operating 
principles of our American foreign policy. 

There are four of these principles, and you 
gentlemen have worked for all four of them : 

The frsf is that the United States must be 
strong in her arms and strong in her will. 
When I look at General Bradley and Dr. Kistia- 
kowsky and Mr. Dulles, when I think of Mr. 
Lovett, who can't be with us today, I am looking 

' Made before an advisory panel of private citizens 
at the White House on Sept. 23 (White House press 
release). For a statement made by the President on 
Sept. 9, in which he named the members of the panel, 
see BurxETiN of Sept. 28, 1964, p. 441. 

at men who played a great role in building the 
strength we now have. We have kept on in this 
same tradition in the last 4 years, and we believe 
the balanced strength of the United States has 
never been greater than it is today. 

But there is always work to be done to keep 
our defenses strong and up to date, and we look 
forward to the advice and comisel which you 
gentlemen will bring in coming discussions of planning for the future. 

Second, the United States yields to no one in 
her loyalty to friends and allies. With us today 
we have Mr. Acheson, Mr. McCloy, and Mr. 
Hoffman, architects of the recovery of Europe 
and the Atlantic alliance. Western Europe has 
never been more secure and the future of Atlan- 
tic freedom never more bright than it is today. 
The leaders of that continent rightly seek a 
growing role in the common cause of freedom. 
The differences and difficulties which lie ahead 
of us are the product of success, not failure. As 
we go on in this great work, our friends in 
Europe will be encouraged in the knowledge 
that we shall have advice like yours to guide us. 

I am particularly glad to have the help of such 
men as Mr. Acheson and Mr. McCloy as our 
minds turn to the future of Central Europe and 
as we renew our determination to work for the 
freedom and reunion of the people of divided 
Germany. One of the gi'eat achievements of 
the last generation is that we have built mutual 
trust between democratic Germany and the 
United States, while never forgetting the proper 
interests of other allies or even the legitimate 
concerns of adversaries. In that tradition we 
shall continue, with your help. 

And we shall show equal good faith to other 
friends and allies in other continents as well. 
Today this determination finds its hardest test 
in the difficult and demanding task of helping 
a young nation to grow and defend itself against 
Commimist terror and domestic disorder — the 
Republic of Viet-Nam. 

We are not discouraged by difficulty, nor will 
we let ourselves be deflected by partisan critics. 
In Viet-Nam today, the best of Americans, from 
private to Ambassador, are making their sacri- 
fice in this hard cause on the spot. They too 
will be encouraged to know that the Govern- 
ment in Washington can call on men like you 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


for help and counsel as this 10-year-long com- 
mitment of three administrations is continued. 

Third, the United States has been not merely 
the strongest of all nations, and the most reliable 
of allies, but the leader in proving that we ac- 
cept the responsibilities of the rich and strong. 
Li the Marshall Plan, which Mr. Hoffman ran, 
and the World Bank, where Mr. Black and Mr. 
McCloy achieved so much, and later still in the 
Alliance for Progress, where Mr. Moscoso will 
always be remembered, we have been willing 
and ready to help free men to help themselves. 

And I agree with what General Eisenhower 
used to say year after year — that these programs 
are a great bargain for our own national se- 
curity. Year after year, as the Democratic 
Majority Leader, I worked to support the Re- 
publican President in defending these pro- 
grams, which have no constituency of their own. 
The freedom of Europe, the great hopes of India 
and Pakistan, the new glow of confidence in 
South America, are the product of this national, 
bipartisan effort. 

Fourth, and finally, the policy of the United 
States is not simply peace through strength, but 
peace through positive, persistent, active effort. 

For 20 years, in five administrations, we have 
been first in our support for the United Na- 
tions — and many of you, like Mr. Cowles, Mr. 
Leibman, Mr. Larson, and Mr. Wadsworth, have 
been among its most determined friends. 

For 20 years, in the age of the atom, we have 
been first in the search for effective disarma- 
ment. Mr. Acheson, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Mc- 
Cloy have played great roles in that continumg 

For 20 years, in crisis after crisis, we have 
sought the way of reason and restraint. No 

gi'eat power in all history has a better record of 
respect for the rights of others. 

So we are strong in our defenses, loyal in our 
alliances, responsive to the needs of others, and 
passionate in the positive search for peace. 
This is the kind of people we are — this is the 
kind of service you have given. This is the 
foreign policy which wnll continue, with your 
help, in the years ahead. 

President Asks Additional Funds 
for U.S.-Mexico Flood Project 

White House press release dated September 24 

President Johnson on September 24 asked 
Congress for a supplemental appropriation of 
$300,000 to implement recent legislation au- 
thorizing U.S. participation in a joint project 
with Mexico to eliminate a flood threat to the 
Yuma Valley in Arizona, the Imperial Valley 
in California, and the Mexicali Valley in 

The proposed appropriation will cover U.S. 
participation in the emergency clearing of vege- 
tation and sediment deposits in the lower Colo- 
rado River as authorized by Public Law 88-411, 
approved August 10, 1964. 

The project is intended to insure the flood- 
carrying capacity of the channel, thus eliminat- 
ing a substantial flood threat to the surround- 
ing areas. It will be achninistered by the Inter- 
national Boundary and Water Commission of 
the Department of State. 

The proposed $300,000, when added to 
amounts previously requested, will not raise the 
total request above the totals proposed in the 
1965 budget. 



Ceremony at Mexican Border Marks Settlement 
of Chamizal Dispute 

Following is the text of an address made hy 
President Johnson at El Paso, Tex., on Septem- 
her 25, during ceremonies at which he and Presi- 
dent Adolf o Lofez Mateos of Mexico unveiled 
a marker indicating the new houndary in the 
Chamizal tract} 

White House press release (El Paso, Tex.) dated September 
25 : as-delivered test 

Mr. President Lopez Mateos, Mrs. Lopez Ma- 
teos, Governor [John] Connally [of Texas], 
Mrs. Connally, Senator [Ralph W.] Yarbor- 
ough [of Texas], Ambassador [Antonio] 
Carillo Flores [Mexican Ambassador to the 
U.S.], Ambassador [Vincente] Sanchez Ga- 
vito [Mexican Ambassador to the OAS], ladies 
and gentlemen : There are days when a shaft of 
light cuts through the darkness and brightens 
the deepest hopes of man. This is such a day. 

Two free and growing nations have resolved 
an old and divisive grievance. It is 100 years 
since the roaring summer floods of the Rio 
Grande remade this land. Then we were both 
dedicated to extending liberty in the face of 
extreme danger. We were both led by men 
whose greatness has endured the estimate of 
history — Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juarez. 

Lincoln commanded my nation "to do all 
which may achieve a just and lasting 
peace. . . ." Juarez reminded us : " Respect for 
the rights of others is peace." The goals of 
these men have guided us to this day. 

We approached the coimcil table with respect 
for each other's rights and determined to achieve 
a just and lasting settlement. Thus we 
triumphed over a problem which has troubled 
relations for half a century. 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1963, p. 
480, and Jan. 13, 1964, p. 49. 

In that connection, I want to pay imusual 
tribute today to our former Ambassador to 
Mexico, our present Assistant Secretary of 
State in charge of Latin American relations, 
the very able and the very devoted friend of 
both Mexico and the United States, Mr. Tom 

It is a great thrill to be here on the border of 
these two countries. It was a great pleasure 
to see so many of my old friends from both na- 
tions. I particularly enjoyed meeting one of 
the men who has done much to promote tlie 
friendship of Mexico and the United States 
throughout his public life, Judge Ewing 
Thomas, son of your own town of El Paso. 

So, to Ambassador Carillo Flores and Ambas- 
sador Mann, and Mr. President Lopez Mateos, 
let me say : Let Chamizal stand as a symbol to 
all the world that the most troublesome of prob- 
lems can yield to the tools of peace, and let us 
never forget, let us always remember, that an- 
other great man whose visionary statesmanship 
made this settlement possible was John Fitz- 
gerald Kennedy. 

Progress of Freedom and Peace 

Let me take a moment on this occasion to re- 
view the progress of freedom and peace, for 
these are really the twin stars for both of our 
great nations. I would also like, Mr. President, 
to talk to my people about the attitudes and 
policies toward the world, of which this settle- 
ment is another shining symbol. 

For almost 20 years the world has lived with 
the ambitions of tyranny and lived with the 
threat of war, and they are still with us. But 
I believe that reasonable men of every party 
and every nation can agree our world has really 
become a safer place for freedom. 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


In Latin America countiy after country has 
chosen the course of democratic development. 
The followers of communism have made no new 
conquest, and their numbers have actually 
dwindled. Our Alliance for Progress is an ef- 
fective instrument of social justice, of which 
you spoke so eloquently, and of economic prog- 
ress for all the nations of this hemisphere. I 
know much of its success r&sts on the fact that 
it has the same goals as the continuing Mexican 
revolution which you, Mr. President, have done 
so much in your tenn of office to advance, and it 
thrills me more, Mr. President, than you Imow, 
to realize that here at the end of your term we 
could meet on an occasion like this, stronger in 
friendship, happier in achievement, than when 
we met before you took office as President of 
Mexico a few years ago. 

Yes, much of the good will and the peace that 
exists now between our countries and this hemi- 
sphere is due to your own understanding and 
your own effoi-ts in that direction. And liere 
in America we have found peaceful roads to the 
solutions of differences, from Chamizal to 

In Africa not one of 20 new nations has 
chosen communism. Ninety percent of African 
trade, as we meet here today, is with the West. 
Ninety percent of its students sent ovei"seas 
have come to the West. All this in a continent 
that many feared a few years ago would fall 
easy prey to Communist ambitions. 

In the Middle East, only a few years ago, it 
seemed that Communist subversion was nearing 
success. Today those nations are stronger in 
their independence than ever before. And 
Israel has grown in freedom. 

In Asia the giant of India has endured a pow- 
erful assault and a painful transition. Free 
Japan is flourishing again, and Chinese aggres- 
sion, by force and by threat, has failed to sub- 
due its neighbors. 

In Eastern Europe steadily widening cracks 
are already appearing in the Communist em- 
pire. Nation after nation has sought new ties 
with the West and new independence from Mos- 
cow. And Ave will continue to encourage this 
movement, not through empty slogans or threats, 
out through patiently building bridges of inter- 
est and understanding. 

The greatest enemies of freedom in the world 
are ignorance and disease, and in both Mexico 
and the United States we are redoubling our 
efl'orts to fight both of these dreadful barnacles. 
Western Europe today has never been stronger. 
Its people now reach for new heights of abun- 
dance. There are differences, but they come 
from strength and they come from self-con- 
fidence, not from weakness, not from fear. And 
there is no difference in our resistance to Com- 
munist ambition or our devotion to freedom. 

The Soviet Union is increasingly absorbed in 
the disappointments of its economy and dispute 
with former comrades. Our strength is con- 
vincing them that they actually have nothing to 
gain by war. Increased willingness to reach 
agreement has brought the test ban treaty in 
which so many peace-loving nations like your 
own have joined, one of many first steps to- 
ward the day when really the fear of war can 
finally be banished from this earth. 

I do not wish to paint too bright a picture. 
There is another side of the coin. Every con- 
tinent carries danger and uncertainty. There 
are unsolved problems, there are unresolved 
conflicts, from Cyprus to Viet-Nam, from the 
Congo to Cuba. Tomorrow's bitter headlines 
could very well shatter today's briglit hopes. 
But if we look beyond the problems of the 
moment to the larger pattern of events, we see 
a world where freedom is stronger and where 
lasting peace is nearer. I believe that we have 
cause to hope that the great forward movement 
of history is in step with the deepest hope of 
man. This is not the product of a single period 
and certainly not the product of a single Presi- 
dent. It is the sum of a hundred achievements 
and acts of courage by every administration, 
since the first nuclear blast ended one world and 
started another. Nor is it the product of a 
single nation. It rests fundamentally on the 
devotion to freedom of countries which share 'f 
common hopes around the world. 

Cardinal Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy 

The foreign policy of the United States has 
been guided by three cardinal principles, and 
these are the principles that we intend to^ 

First is determination backed by strength. 



The United States is the most powerful coun- 
try in the history of tlie world. Its might is 
strong enough to deter any rational aggressor 
and is flexible enough to meet any threat from 
any source. But I must caution you, and I must 
remind you, that strength must be matclied 
by courage and wisdom if it is to protect free- 
dom. And where freedom has been under at- 
tack, the United States has moved to meet those 
attacks. "We have never rattled our rockets, 
we have never played the part of a bully, we 
have never taken reckless risks. We have never 
pressed our adversaries to the point where nu- 
clear assault was their only alternative. But 
America has always and will always stand firm. 
To our own citizens and to our friends from our 
neighboring coiuitry today I would remind you 
that this is not an accident of the moment. 
This was true of President Truman in Greece 
and Turkey. This was true of President Eisen- 
hower in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits. 
This was true of President John Kennedy in 
the Cuban missile crisis. And it was and it 
is true in the Gulf of Tonkin. 

Second is sacrifice of our own resources and 
our own efforts in order to build the strength 
of others. One of the most stimulating and 
inspiring experiences of my entire public life 
occurred to me on the streets of Eome just a 
few months ago when I was Vice President and 
I was driving down the streets of that beautiful 
city. A priest came running from his school- 
room, followed by other teachers, and 300 or 400 
little boys. He had seen the American flag 
flying on the Vice President's car. He threw 
himself in front of this car, and the brakes had 
to take a screeching halt and we came to a stop. 
He dashed up to the door, and he said, "I just 
could not let the American flag go by, because 
never in the history of all mankind have any 
people demonstrated so much compassion and 
so much humaneness. Never have the victors 
treated the vanquished as the United States has 
treated us." And then he turned and looked at 
the Rome skyline that had been rebuilt since 
World War II, and he pointed to the magnifi- 
cent buildings that towered that skyline and to 
the smokestacks where industry was tliriving, 
and he said, "There, together, we rebuilt this 
land. I want you to go back, and on behalf 

of the 400 little children in my school say tliank- 
you to all the people of the United States for 
the sacrifices they made in order that we could 
build again." 

In my moments of depression, when things 
seem not to go so well and some people tell 
me all the things that are wrong with my coun- 
ti-y and my beloved land — and few of them ever 
remind us of the things that are right — I get 
consolation and comfort, from thinking about 
what the people, the little people, of the other 
places of the world and the other continents — 
of the gratitude they feel for the understanding 
that has been ours. From the Marshall Plan 
to the Alliance for Progress, the people of the 
United States have freely given of their abmi- 
dance to the progress of other nations. We 
have done tliis because it is right — it is right — 
it is right that the strong and the rich should 
help the M-eak and the poor. 

And this great leader wlio honors us with 
his presence today, President Lopez Mateos, has 
recognized that principle and put it into effect 
in America. And as long as I am President 
of the United States, I am going to recognize 
it here. He and I both know that the world 
is safer for others when othere have the strength 
to keep their own freedom. Tlie NATO alli- 
ance is a tribute to the vision of this policy, and 
around the world our influence has been on the 
rise as others have leanied we seek not to dom- 
inate but to help, we seek not to rule but to 
cooperate, we seek not to demand their sub- 
mission but to assist their freedom. Next 
Tuesday I am going to welcome to the Wliite 
House a great leader of the world who is com- 
ing there representing NATO [NATO Secre- 
tary General Manlio Brosio]. He and I are 
going to get in my plane. Air Force One, and 
fly out to the Strategic Air Forces to see Gen- 
eral Power so that he can see with his oAvn eyes, 
and he can tell the people of NATO, that our 
mission is peace m the world and we have the 
strength to accomplish that mission. 

Third, we have patiently searched for those 
areas of common interest which might lead to 
fruitful agreement. A difference in language, 
a difference in environment, a difference in re- 
sources, a difference in people, a difference in 
customs — all of those are problems that make it 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


difficult sometimes to understand the other fel- 
low. But Americans try to follow the Golden 
Rule : Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you. And we have tried to find a basis for 
reaching agreements that step by step would 
ultimately lead us to be able to live without 
fear La this world of our time. 

The test ban treaty is a product of this proc- 
ess. The Chamizal settlement is a product of 
this process. Lasting peace will come from the 
careful, the patient, and the practical search 
for these solutions. It is easy to become impa- 
tient and impulsive. It is easy to tell the other 
fellow that "Here is our ultimatum, and you 
do as we say or else." But that will never be 
the policy of this country under my leadersliip. 
Our Government is not a government of ulti- 
matum. Our Government is a government of 
respect for the rights of others and the at- 
tempt to understand their problems. We have 
the strength and we have the self-confidence to 
be generous toward our friends and to be un- 
afraid of our adversaries. There is no reason 
why we should tremble in our boots. There is 
no reason why we should become so frightened 
that we would frighten others into a nuclear 

A nation strong in its might, a nation that is 
secure in its own beliefs, a nation that is stead- 
fast in its own goals, should never be afraid to 
sit down at the council table with any other na- 
tion. That is what the great President of Mexi- 
co said to me before he took the oath of office 
as President. We discussed some of the prob- 
lems, including the Chamizal. We discussed 
building dams for the benefit of both of our 
people. We discussed the problem of health, of 
education, of transportation, in his country and 
in mine. We agreed that we could march bet- 
ter shoulder to shoulder, arm in arm, than we 
could by threatening and intimidating each 

It is only the weak and the timid that need 
fear the consequences of communication and 
discussion. The United States has never been 
such a nation, and we will never be such a na- 
tion. The Presidents of the last 20 years have 
all been willing to go anywhere, to talk to any- 
one, to discuss any subject, if their efforts could 

strengthen freedom and advance the peace of 
the world. And I pledge you here today I 
will go to any remote corner of the world to 
meet anyone, any time, to promote freedom 
and to promote peace. 

President Lopez Mateos, the Chamizal is a 
very small tract of land, but the principle is 
a very great one. Let a troubled world take note 
that here, on this border, between the United 
States and Mexico, two free nations, imafraid, 
have resolved their differences with honor, with 
dignity, and with justice to the people of both 

President Lopez Mateos, the statesmanship 
that you have evidenced in this settlement could 
well serve as a model for great leaders the 
world over. 

As we meet here, we live in a vei-y compli- 
cated world — more than a hundred different 
nations with a hundred different histories, each 
with its own dreams and each with its own de- 
sires. There are rich nations and poor nations. 
There are strong nations and weak nations. 
There are white and black, slave and free, friend 
and enemy. We cannot abandon all of those 
who disagree with us. To do so would only 
leave them at the mercy of communism. We 
cannot force and bully all others to think and 
act as we do in the United States. We can rec- 
ognize their just interests and still protect our 
own. We can stand fast in freedom's cause, 
and that I guarantee you is what we are going 
to do. 

Mr. President, we can and we will welcome 
the challenge of working toward a peace on a 
hundred different fronts, Ln a hundred different 
ways, for as long as the task may take. In 
this way, and this way only, we can make steady 
progress toward freedom and peace and toward 
the fulfillment of man. The struggle for peace 
is rarely dramatic. There are no marching 
bands, and there are few swift victories. But 
I believe that this generation has an opportimity 
for greatness given to no other nation at no 
other time. Other great leaders have built vic- 
torious empires, and they have conquered vast 
territory. But those achievements have crum- 
bled under the relentless erosion of time and 
change. So, working together with all the free 



nations in this hemisphere, we can help build 
an order of peace and progress which will en- 
dure for generations. No people have ever had 
a greater challenge. And, Mr. President, to 
you and the people of your country, and to my 

fellow countrymen, I say to you today, as pro- 
phetic as I know how t/O be, that I genuinely and 
earnestly believe that no people in all liistory 
have ever been more ready to meet the chal- 
lenge of peace and more prepared to acliieve it. 

The Western Hemisphere's Fight for Freedom 

iy Thomas C. Mann 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ' 

Although the Communist bloc did not acquire 
their Cuban beachhead in the Western Hemi- 
sphere until 1959, Communists have for several 
decades been at the job of infiltrating Middle 
and South American institutions. 

Gradually over the years they succeeded in 
creating in each and every country small, disci- 
plined parties wliich loudly proclaimed their 
nationalism but which in fact were and are fifth 
columns organized, trained, fijianced, and di- 
rected from abroad. In earlier days these Com- 
munist gi-oups, operating imder various names, 
were totally obedient to Moscow. Today some 
of them take their orders from Moscow, some 
from Peiping, and some Habana. Their tactics 
differ but they share a common goal: world 
domination. This goal was made clear by Marx 
as early as 1848 and has been reiterated by every 
Commmiist leader since Marx. In the words of 

The revolution which has been victorious in one 
country (Russia) must regard itseLf not as a self- 
suflicient tasli, but as an aid, a means for hastening 
the victory of the proletariat in all countries. 

Communist parties have succeeded in many 
countries in infiltrating teachers organizations, 
schools and imiversities, the lower and middle 
echelons of government bureaucracies, the arts. 

^ Address made before the Dallas Council on World 
Affairs at Dallas, Tex., on Sept. 21 (press release 412). 

the press, intellectual groups, and labor unions. 
Prmcipally through skillful use by Commimist 
leaders of their assets in schools and universities 
and by huge amounts of Communist propa- 
ganda, Marxist-Leninist political and economic 
doctrines gained a number of adherents and a 
certain degree of respectablity in some coimtries. 
This is precisely what the Communists set out 
to achieve. In the words of Lenin : 

Every "peace program" is a deception of the people 
and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is 
to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and 
to support, aid and develop the revolutionary struggle 
of the masses that is starting everywhere (ferment 
among the masses, protests, . . . strikes, demonstra- 
tions . . . ). 

The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism 
must be combined with the ability to make all the 
necessary practical compromises, to "tack", to make 
agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to 
accelerate . . . (world revolution). 

Communism is indeed a danger to freedom in 
the Western Hemisphere. It threatens the in- 
dependence of every American Eepublic in the 
same way it threatens the nations of Africa, 
Asia, and throughout the world. It is as true 
now as it was in our revolutionary days that 
"eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." 

But I should like today to bring you a mes- 
sage of faith in the vitality and strength of the 
forces of freedom in the Western Hemisphere — 
a message of confidence in the certain triumph 
of our cause. 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 

746-012 — 64 3 


Decline of Cuban Economy 

One reason we have for confidence is that 
Castro's experiment lias proved before the en- 
tire hemisphei-e that while Communist doctrine 
promises a utopia for the masses, communisna 
has in fructlce lowered rather than raised the 
standard of living of the Cuban people. 

In the 51/^ years which have transpired since 
January 1959, Cuba's gross national product 
has declined about 15 percent and per capita 
income by over 20 percent. Cuba's main export 
crop, sugar, was produced at the rate of 6.8 
million tons in 1961; in 1963 it was only 3.8 
million tons. For the first time in their liistoiy 
the Cuban people must queue w.^ to receive 
meager rations of food and clotliing. 

When Castro seized power, per capita income 
in Cuba was about 13 percent higher than in 
the rest of the Caribbean basin. By contrast, 
today the per capita income of the free peoples 
who live in the basin is 13 percent higher than 
that of the Cubans. 

We continue to work for a better and wider 
understanding by our friends and allies that the 
Castro regime should not be rescued by free- 
world trade and credits. We cannot accept 
that an affluent Castro regime will spend less to 
finance subversion in the liemisphere than would 
a bankrupt regime. 

Equally important in the decline of the 
Cuban economy is the incredibly bad manage- 
ment of the Castro regime. When communism 
destroyed incentives on the part, of the Cuban 
people to work and to produce, the people chose 
to work less and to produce less. The Cuban 
experiment in communism underscores once 
again a basic error in the Marxist economic 
theory that the individual will sacrifice the wel- 
fare of his family to theoretical concepts about 
the general welfare. It proves once again that 
personal incentive is an indispensable element 
of economic progress — that the rate of economic 
growth is related to the degree of human effort 
which people are willing to put into their 
jobs — that communism is, in economic terms, 
impracticable because it cannot provide this 

The enormity of Castro's economic failure 
also reveals another basic flaw in Marxist eco- 
nomic doctrine by proving once again that a 

Communist-type bureaucracy simply camiot 
efficiently manage even a relativelj' simple econ- 
omy such as Cuba has. Even if the Communist 
bureaucrats were capable of making the many 
decisions which each farm or factoiy requires 
on a day-to-day basis — and they are not — poli- 
tics and graft and bureaucratic fear of mistakes 
would still prevent the system from becoming 

Not only have Castro's policies led to eco- 
nomic failure — they have destroyed Cuba's 
economic independence. Cuba used to be free 
to trade as it wished and to borrow, when it 
needed to borrow, from whichever country it 
preferred. Now it is almost totally dependent 
on the Sino-Soviet bloc for both trade and aid. 
Castro has received over a billion dollai-s from 
the bloc in a futile effort to shore up his 

And what political price have the Cuban peo- 
ple had to pay for the privilege of enduring 
these economic failures ? Untold numbers have 
been shot for wanting freedom. Nearly 350,000 
Cubans have fled into exile. JNIany thousands 
of others pass their days in Castro's prisons for 
alleged "political" crimes. Aside from those 
who live relatively well because they have 
found favor with Castro — and who, as in all 
Commmiist countries, constitute the new priv- 
ileged class of socialism — Cubans still on the 
island live in fear and dread of the familiar 
Conunmiist intelligence system organized on a 
block-by-block basis as a vast network to spy 
on the Cuban people. 

The fear, the terror, the brutality, the loss of 
individual political liberty, the loss of political 
and economic independence, the destruction 
root and branch of democratic institutions are 
there for all to see. 

But there is more than economic failure and 
political tyranny. The whole hemisphere can 
see today in Cuba what Eastern Europe and 
Asia had seen earlier at close hand : a new kind 
of total tyranny over the mind of man. As 
Djilas correctly said: 

. . . the stifling of every divergent tliought, the ex- 
clusive inono|X)ly over thinking for the purpose of 
defending their personal interests, will nail the coni- 
niiniists to a cross of shame in history. 

But there is more. Without Castro's favor 
one loses the rijrht to work for tlie Communist 



state, now virtually the only employer, nor may 
he obtain lodging or ration cards to enable him 
to have shelter and food. This is the meaning 
of totalitarianism : It is total dependence on the 
favor of the tyrant for even the necessities of 
everyday life and, indeed, for life itself. 

All of this is tlie result of nearly 5 years' ef- 
fort to make Cuba the "showcase of commu- 
nism" in this hemisphere. 

The Fight Against Subversion 

Another reason we have for confidence in the 
ultimate triumph of freedom is the failure of 
Castro to make good his boast that he would 
"convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the 
Sierra Maestra of the hemisphere." 

Between April and August 1960 the Castro 
regime promoted armed invasions of Panama, 
the Dominican Kepublic, and Haiti. They 
were all failures. 

Then, under the guidance of his Soviet and 
Chinese Commmiist masters, Castro's campaign 
to destroy representative democracy in the hem- 
isphere became more sophisticated and more 
dangerous. The new tactic was to overthrow 
free governments by subversion from within, 
using and expanding on the Communist appara- 
tus which already existed in every country. 

National Communist parties and movements 
began to be financed through Habana as well 
as directly from Moscow and Peiping. A mas- 
sive and lavishly financed propaganda cam- 
paign was launched which included the creation 
of Prensa Latina, a new Communist wire serv- 
ice. Large amounts of propaganda material 
were exported to Middle and South America. 
Large quantities were printed in this hemi- 
sphere. Selected Communist youth groups 
from many countries were brought to Cuba, 
given training in terrorism, sabotage, and guer- 
rilla warfare, and then returned to the countries 
from whence they came to organize and lead 
campaigns of subversion. Material and finan- 
cial assistance were supplied these subversive 

By these means Castro brought to our hemi- 
sphere an intensification of the teclinique of 
subversion which has been the weapon of com- 
munism around the world. 

Priority Mas first given to Venezuela. And 

it was in Caracas in November 1963 that Castro 
met his fii-st major defeat in his program of in- 
ternal subversion and teiTor. More than three 
tons of anns were found on the beaches of Vene- 
zuela, the plans for seizing Caracas by surprise 
were laid bare, and the subversion by Castro was 

Brazil was the next priority. Here the Com- 
munist design was to infiltrate the Goveriunent 
and quietly take over from within. But the 
people of Brazil became aware of the design. 
They rallied to the banner of freedom from all 
walks of life. President Castello Branco, in 
•speaking of the Brazilian revolution, described 
it as "a fimdamental choice, wliich is translated 
into cultural and political adJierence to the 
Western democratic system." Because the peo- 
ple of Brazil chose to continue their democracy, 
communism in Latin America was set back for 
the second time in less than a year. 

Recently in Chile commmiism suffered 
another setback when the candidate which it 
backed was overwhelmingly defeated in free 

The fight against subversion in this hemi- 
spliere — the fight for our New World ideals — is 
not a fight for the narrow selfish advantage of 
any country. There is no servile government 
today in this hemisphere save that which is part 
of the Communist bloc and therefore subject to 
Communist discipline. There can be no con- 
formity or unifonnity, and much less can there 
be servility, between proud, free, and sovereign 

We know that each government's first con- 
cern is, as it should be, for its own national 
political, economic, and social progress and for 
the well-being, security, and true independence 
of its own people. We sympathize with the de- 
sire of others to be free because we insist on 
freedom for ourselves — ^because our people want 
only to be good neighbors with all like-minded 
nations, to do our part in the great cooperative 
effort which is the Alliance for Pixjgress, and to 
help build a community of free, strong, inde- 
pendent American states, each capable of play- 
ing its full role in the common search for a bet- 
ter and more secure hemisphere. 

But perhaps it will not be taken amiss if I 
say that we are not at all sorry when we see 

OCTOBER 19. 19 04 


a neighbor put out a lire in his house. Fires 
have a way of spreading. And I am sure that 
all of our friends know they can continue to 
count on us for help if they should be threat- 
ened by Commimist subversion. As President 
Johnson said clearly last April,^ "Our first task 
must be, as it has been, to . . . frustrate . . . 
(Cuba's) efforts to destroy free govern- 
ments. . . ." 

The events which I have mentioned were, 
each in their own way, victories for freedom, 
for hemisphere solidarity, for the ideals on 
which all the New World governments were 
founded, and, above all, victories for the peoples 
who achieved them. 

The Communists always underestimate the 
spiritual strength of free peoples, their devo- 
tion to their religion, their love of country, 
their deep attachment to their culture and way 
of life, and their loyalty to the principles of 
political and economic freedom and social jus- 
tice. Some people in this hemisphere may be 
fooled for a time by communism, but the ma- 
jority of the people will not embrace it as long 
as freedom of choice exists. 

Inter-American Solidarity 

The third reason for confidence which I offer 
for your consideration is this : The inter- Ameri- 
can system has demonstrated again that it has 
the will and the ability to take meaningful 
collective action against Communist subversion. 

In January 1962, the Foreign Ministers voted 
to exclude the Castro regime from participation 
in the OAS.' The basis for exclusion was a 
Mexican thesis that there is an incompatibility 
between communism and the principles on 
which the inter- American system rests. 

In October 1962 — in an hour of clear and 
present danger to the hemisphere and to our 
country in particular — there was unanimous 
support for the decision that American states 
could take, individually or collectively, what- 
ever measures were necessary to remove the 
threat which Soviet offensive missiles and 
bombers in Cuba represented.'' 

" Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 726. 
= Ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 
* Ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720. 

And in July 1964, the Foreign Ministers of 
the hemisphere, by a large majority, voted that 
the subversive attempt of Castro against the 
Government of Venezuela, even though it was 
in the form of 20th-century subversion rather 
than a 19th-century-style "armed attack," was 
an "aggression" within the meaning of article 
6 of the Eio Treaty.^ Thereby the Foreign 
Ministers took a giant step forward by serving 
notice on Castro — in language which he should 
be able to imderstand and heed — that the sub- 
version against the national institutions of 
democracy in this hemisphere will not be 

Last July the Foreign Ministers also voted 
to sever diplomatic, consular, and trade rela- 
tions with the Castro regime. In doing so they 
made it much more difficult for Castro to con- 
vert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the 
hemisphere. It will not be so easy now for him 
to promote subversion from diplomatic sanc- 
tuaries or to use trade with the hemisphere 
to promote Communist aims. 

The decisions of these three meetings were 
each another body blow to Castro's announced 
intention of exporting communism by subver- 
sion, force, and violence. The hemisphere col- 
lectively took action not against any American 
government save that of Commimist Cuba, not 
in a militaristic spirit but rather in self-defense 
against proven acts of aggression. But its 
decisions were forthright and clear. 

Finally, I should like to say that we would 
deceive ourselves if we did not understand — 
and imderstand clearly — that the tasks we face 
in this hemisphere are formidable. Our own 
security, hemispheric defense, inter- American 
solidarity, the achievement of the political, 
economic, and social goals of the alliance — all 
of this and more is at stake. Each nation, in- 
cluding our own, will need leadership and dis- 
cipline and wisdom to achieve our objectives. 

But as we say this let us also say that the 
Communists are not 10 feet tall. We approach 
the future, as our forefathers did before us, 
with courage rather than fear, with confidence 
rather than uncertainty, and with an abiding 
faith in the validity and vitality of freedom 
and in its certain triumph. 

' Ibid., Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174. 




OAU Commission on Congo Talks 
With Department Officers 

Delegates representing the Ad Hoc Commis- 
sion on the Congo of the Organization of Af- 
rican Unity were in Washington September 
£5-30, during which time they talked ivith offi- 
cers of the Department of State. Following 
are texts of a Department statement of Sep- 
tember 23 and a joint press communique re- 
leased at the close of the talks. 


The United States has been informed that a 
delegation representing the Congo reconcilia- 
tion commission of the Organization of African 
Unity intends to come to the United States to 
discuss American military assistance to the Con- 
go. We have instructed our Ambassador in 
Nairobi [Kenya], William Attwood, to make 
clear to the OAU Commission that we are 
anxious to cooperate with the OAU in every 
appropriate way. We attach great importance 
to the success of its efforts to contribute to a 
solution of the Congo problem. 

However, we could not agree to discuss our 
aid to the Congo without the participation by 
the Congo Government, at whose request our 
aid is being given. We have, therefore, asked 
our Ambassador to indicate to the Commission 
that, if the Government of the Congo is willing 
to participate in such discussions, U.S. repre- 
sentatives will be prepared to meet with repre- 
sentatives of the Government of the Congo and 
the OAU Commission at a mutually agreed time 
and place and on the basis of a previously agreed 

Limited U.S. military assistance to the Congo 
is at the request of the sovereign Government 
of the Congo to assist it in maintaining law 
and order. For a number of years we have been 
providing assistance to the Congo through the 
United Nations and also on a bilateral basis. 
Tlie United States has given similar assistance 
to other African nations at their request. 

* Read to news correspondents by Robert J. McClos- 
key, Acting Director of the Office of News. 


Press release 424 dated September 30 

The Special Delegation sent to Washington 
by the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo and 
composed of the following members: 

Mr. Joseph Murumbi, Minister of State, Gov- 
ernment of Kenya and Head of the Delega- 

Mr. Kojo Botsio, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of Ghana ; 

Mr. Louis Lansana Beavogui, Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, Eepublic of Guinea; 

H. E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the 
United Arab Republic; and 

Mr. Gralien Pognon, Assistant Secretary- 
General, Organization of African Unity, 

met with Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Secre- 
tary of State, together with the Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for African Affairs, Mr. G. Men- 
nen Williams, and discussed the plans of the 
O.A.U. Commission to support and encourage 
the efforts of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in the restoration of na- 
tional reconciliation. 

The Delegation stated that it had come to the 
United States on a goodwill mission. It also 
made it clear that it was not the Commission's 
intention to raise with the United States mat- 
ters affecting the sovereignty of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 

In welcoming these assurances, the Secretary 
of State asked the Delegation to convey to the 
Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Jomo Ken- 
yatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, the sympathet- 
ic understanding of the United States Govern- 
ment that he is engaged in a most significant 
undertaking in the service of Africa, to the suc- 
cess of which the United States attaches great 
importance. The Secretary of State stated that, 
with this in mind, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc 
Commission should be assured of the desire of 
the Government of the United States to cooper- 
ate with the Commission in every appropriate 
way in carrying out the mission entrusted to it 
by the O.A.U. 

The Delegation welcomed these assurances 
of cooperation from the Government of the 
United States. 


The Delegation and the Secretary of State 
agreed that tlieir discussions have been helpful 
in clarifying the views of the Commission and 
of the United States Government and in estab- 
lishing a general framework for cooperation 
between them. 

The Delegation on behalf of the Chairman of 
the Commission expressed its appreciation to 
the Secretary of State for the cordial atmos- 
phere in which the talks were conducted and for 
the spirit animating the United States Govern- 
ment in its relations with the O.A.U. 


President Approves Bill for Study 
of Sea-Level Canal Site 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated September 24 

I have approved a bill [S. 2701] to provide for 
an investigation and study to determine a site 
for the construction of a sea-level canal con- 
necting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 

The Panama Canal was a great engineering 
achievement. It has served world commerce 
for 50 years. It has been a major source of in- 
come for Panama's economic and social develop- 
ment. It has been a key link in our security 
arrangements. But if we are to meet the chal- 
lenges of the future, we must begin now to think 
in tenns of the long-range needs of the United 
States, Latin America, and the rest of the 
world for a sea-level canal across the American 

Construction of a sea-level canal presents 
formidable obstacles even after a suitable site 
is selected. There are enormous technical prob- 
lems and complex and interrelated political, mil- 
itary, and economic considerations that must be 
weighed. Under this bill the task will be un- 
dertaken by a five-member commission, ap- 
pointed by the President, with annual reports 
on the progress of the Commission's work sub- 

mitted to the Congi'ess through the President. 
This authorization will permit the study to 
get underway. Equally important, however, is 
appropriation of necessary implementing 
funds. I urge that the Congress act promptly 
on the supplemental request of $5 million for 
this purpose for the fiscal year 1965. 

Secretary Regrets Congressional 
Inaction on Coffee Agreement 

Statement hy Secretary Rush 

Press release 431 dated October 3 

I regret that the Congi-ess did not act this 
session on legislation to implement the Inter- 
national Coffee Agreement.^ I think it highly 
important that this measure be promptly enact- 
ed when the new Congress convenes in Janu- 
ai-y. Meanwhile, the United States will carry 
out its responsibilities under the agreement 
within the limits of existing legislation. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 1st Session 

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Transportation 
Study. Hearings before a special subcommittee of 
the Senate Commerce Committee. Part 1. Decem- 
ber 10, 1963-February 25, lOtM. 239 pp. 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

World Communist Movement. Selective chronology, 
1818-1957, prepared by the Legislative Reference 
Service of the Library of Congress. H. Doc. 356. 
Volume II, 1946-50, December 27, 1963, 203 pp.; 
Volume III, 1951-53, March 16, 1964, 290 pp. 

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Transportation 
Study. Hearings before a special subcommittee of 
the Senate Commerce Committee. Part 2. Febru- 
ary 26-May 12, 1964. 345 pp. 

Lessons From Foreign Labor Market Policies. Com- 
piled for the Subcommittee on Employment and 
Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare. Volume 4 of Selected Readings in 
Emjiloyment and Manpower. Undated. 211 pp. 
[Committee print] 

* For a statement made by Under Secretary Harri- 
man before the Senate Finance Committee on Feb. 25 
in support of implementing legislation, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 459. 




President Johnson Proclaims 1965 as International Cooperation Year 

Follcnmng are remarks made hy President 
Johnson and Secretary Rusk at White House 
ceremonies on Octoier 2 during which the Pres- 
ident proclaimed 1965 as International Coop- 
eration Year in the United States, together with 
remarks made by Mr. Busk at a luncheon at 
the Department of State later that day and the 
text of the proclaTnation. 


White House press release dated October 2 ; as-delivered text 
President Johnson 

If you have never been late to a meeting, you 
won't understand my position, but I do ask 
your indulgence and I do thank you very much 
for what I hope is your understanding. I have 
been nmning late all morning. I didn't know 
we had as many Majority Leaders in the Con- 
gress as we have. They are all hoping that 
they can go home this week. I am hoping that 
they go home, too. 

I have just left more expresidents of the 
American Bar Association than I ever realized 
existed, but since they were "Lawyere for John- 
son," I am glad they were there. I had to meet 
with them, so please forgive me, and I promise 
to ti-y not to be so tardy in my public appoint- 
ments in the future. 

I am very proud to welcome this most dis- 
tinguished assembly of most distinguished 
Americans. I regret that one of the most dis- 
tinguished of all cannot be with us tills morn- 
ing — Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. He is 

othenvise engaged in Cleveland and Chicago in 
a pursuit that I regard as no vice. 

You have come here and we are brought 
together by a A^ery old and a very honored 
American interest — the interest of fosterhig in- 
ternational cooi^eration instead of international 
conflict. We are here today to pix>claim 1965 
as International Cooperation Year in the United 
States of America. 

This observance will be commemorated 
around the world by the members of the United 
Nations. For the United States, cooperation 
with other nations and other peoj^les is always 
uppermost in our minds and is the first aim of 
our policies, the central instrmnent of our for- 
eign policy, and it is the central goal of adminis- 
trations of both parties — the great leaders of 
which many are in the room today. 

I know that the American people would not 
have it otherwise. The value of international 
cooperation and understanding is recognized by 
all of us. The extent of cooperation that is 
in existence is realized by too few. Today the 
United States participates in some 80 inter- 
national organizations. We take part, in nearly 
600 international conferences, and we faithfully 
honor 4,300 treaties and agreements that we 
have made with other nations in the world. 

Two ix>ints are clear : 

First, international cooperation is simply not 
an idea nor an ideal. We think it is a clear ne- 
cessity to our survival. The greater the nation, 
the greater is its need to work cooperatively 
with other people, with other countries, with 
other nations. 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


Second, international cooperation is no longer 
an academic subject; it is a fact of life, as I 
have just illustrated. Our challenge is not to 
debate the theory or the concept, but our chal- 
lenge is to improve and to perfect and to 
strengthen the organizations that already exist. 

In 1965 it is the hope of your Government 
that International Cooperation Year may be 
used for a useful review and purposeful plan- 
ning. For this end I am appointing a special 
Cabinet committee to direct this work and to 
develop all possible proposals for the future. 

It is my thought that we can find many areas 
to encourage much more progressive and pur- 
poseful labor among the nations of the world. 
This is what we shall be doing. I have asked 
you here this morning to make a special appeal 
to you and to request your labors, too. I hope 
that each of you will help me and the Secretary 
of State and others of your Government to carry 
the story of international cooperation and or- 
ganization to the American people. 

Public understanding, public support, is vital 
and basic to our success in striving for world 
understanding and cooperation. You can't be 
a statesman unless you get elected, and it is 
pretty difficult for us to be successful in a move- 
ment of this kind if we do not have the broad, 
solid support of the people, because under our 
system they are the masters. 

More than that, I hope that your talents may 
be turned to systematic study of the next steps 
that private organizations may take to further 
this cooperation. There is more extensive in- 
terest in this on the private level than I think 
there has ever been before. Business organiza- 
tions, farm organizations, labor unions, univer- 
sities, church bodies, women's groups, profes- 
sional societies, are all expanding their interests 
and their operations abroad and are all con- 
cerned with what is happening in the other 120- 
odd nations in the world to an extent that has 
never been equaled before, I say pridefully and 

There is much going on in this field in this 
country and throughout the world. There is 
much energy and enthusiasm and interest to do 
even more if we have the right kind of leader- 
ship. So your task is to help bring these to- 
gether, how to harness these resources and chan- 

nel them in the proper direction. Those with 
the experience and background that you have 
must make known what is going on, what the 
next steps are, and how those with time and 
resources can most usefully join these labors. 

In this day and in this age man has too many 
common interests to waste his energies, his tal- 
ents, and his substance in primitive arrogance 
or destructive conflict. In short, you are going 
to have to be the captains of a movement to lead 
people to love instead of hate. You are going 
to have to be the leaders in a movement to guide 
people in preserving humanity instead of de- 
stroying it. You are going to be the leaders in 
a crusade to help get rid of the ancient enemies 
of mankind^ — ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and 
disease — because we know that these things must 
go, and we also know from our past that, if we 
do not adjust to this change peacefully, we will 
have to adjust to it otherwise. 

As a great leader said in this room not many 
years ago, if a peaceful resolution is impos- 
sible, a violent revolution is inevitable.^ So I 
believe that the true realists in the second half 
of this 20th century are those who bear the 
dream of new ways for new cooperation. 

You will be frowned upon. Some will call 
you an idealist. Some will call you a crackpot, 
and some may even call you worse than that. 
They may say you are soft or hard or don't un- 
derstand what it is all about in some of these 
fields. But what greater ambition could you 
have and what greater satisfaction could come 
to you than the knowledge that you had entered 
a partnership with your Government that had 
provided the leadership in the world that had 
preserved humanity instead of destroyed it? 

So this year and next year and in the years 
to come, international cooperation must be an 
enduring way of life in the community of man. 

If I am here — I am speaking now politically 
and not physically ; I don't anticipate any vio- 
lence — but if I am here, I intend next year to call 
a White House conference, and I want all of 
you to start thinking about it now. I want you 
to talk to your friends about it. I want to call 
a Wliite House conference to search and explore 
and canvass and thoroughly discuss every con- 

* For remarks made by President Kennedy on Blar. 
13, inC2, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962. p. 539. 



ceivable approach and avenue of cooperation 
that could lead to peace. That five-letter word 
is the goal of all of us. It is by far the most 
important problem we face. It is the assign- 
ment of the century for each of you, and if we 
fail in that assignment, everything will come to 

If we succeed, think how wonderful the year 
2000 will be, and it is already so exciting to me 
tliat I am just hoping that my heart and stroke 
and cancer committee can come up with some 
good results that will insure that all of us can 
live beyond 100 so we can participate in that 
glorious day when all the fruits of our labors 
and our imaginations today are a reality. 

It now gives me a great deal of pleasure to 
sign the proclamation designating 1965 as the 
International Cooperation Year in the United 
States of America. I am very proud tliis morn- 
ing that I am a citizen of a country and the 
leader of a nation that can have voluntarily as- 
sembled in the first house of this land the quality 
and quantity of talent that faces me now. To 
each of you, for the time you have taken and 
have waited, for the money you spent in coming 
here, for the thought that you have given, but 
more important, for what you are going to do, 
on behalf of the Nation, I say we are grateful. 
Thank you very much. 

[At this point the President signed the proclamation.] 

I suppose that the most indispensable part 
of every man's life is his family, that they give 
him comfort, strength, and inspiration when 
he needs it most, but next to my family, I know 
of no person that is more beloved or for whom 
I have greater respect and admiration and gen- 
uine confidence than the great and distinguished 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. 

Secretary Rusk 

Tliank you very much, Mr. President. 

It is a high privilege for me to join you here 
in such distinguished company. I note with 
very special satisfaction the presence here today 
of Governor Harold Stassen, because he is the 
living representative of that extraordinary 
group who, in 1945 in San Francisco, signed on 
behalf of the American Government and the 
i\jnerican people the Charter of the United Na- 

tions — Secretary of State Stettinius, Senator 
Tom Connally, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Governor Harold 

We dare not let time erode the meaning of 
what they did there. It is not just that they laid 
the foundations for the great bipartisan foreign 
policies of the American people in this postwar 
period. They inscribed there the long and sober 
thoughts of the American people about our rela- 
tions with the rest of the world, thoughts which 
we developed in the agonies of a great war, 
thoughts which culminated in the hope and the 
determination to find some way to relieve man 
of the scourge of war. 

And what some thought at that time was a 
lofty expression of the human spirit has now 
become the elementary necessity for human sur- 
vival, and that is why we dare not let time erode 
what they did. 

There have been those from time to time to 
say that one of our problems in this country is 
that foreign policy has no constituency. It has 
been said, and quite truly, that the President of 
the United States carried a lonely responsibility. 

But, in another sense, neither one of those is 
entirely true because a President knows that for- 
eign policy from here on out touches every home 
in the country, every family, every farm, every 
factory, every school, and that the decisions 
which the President must make in relation to 
the rest of the world draw into liis study every 
citizen of the country. 

So, Mr. President, when we look around the 
room here and see those who in their organiza- 
tions represent tens upon tens of millions of 
American people, we know that they are the con- 
stituency of a reasonable and just foreign policy 
in relation to the rest of the world. 

Peace and freedom are not free. Both will 
require diligent work. Both will require our 
highest intelligence. Both will require the 
most dedicated commitments. And that is what 
this year of international cooperation is all 

As the Keeper of the Great Seal of the United 
States, it is my privilege to read the proclama- 
tion which the President is today issuing and 
to countersign that proclamation. 
[At this point Secretary Rusk read the proclamation.] 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 



International Cooperation Year 

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly has 
designated the year 1965 as International Cooperation 
Year; and 

Whereas the year 1965 also marks the twentieth 
anniversary of the United Nations ; and 

Whereas international cooperation is essential to 
the achievement of a i^eaceful world order; and 

Whereas international organizations are vital in 
the modem world and provide the necessary founda- 
tion for a peaceful world community ; and 

Whereas the world has moved rapidly toward inter- 
national cooperation and organization in recent 
years— especially within the family of the United Na- 
tions agencies ; and 

Whereas the movement for international coopera- 
tion has had, and will continue to have, the enthusiastic 
support of the Government of the United States of 
America ; and 

Whereas it is highly desirable to assess this devel- 
opment and examine promptly what further steps can 
be taken in the immediate future toward enhancing 
International cooperation and strengthening world or- 
ganization : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby 

— proclaim the year 1965 to be International Coopera- 
tion Year in the United States of America ; 

— rededicate the Government of the United States to 
the principle of international cooperation ; and 

— direct the agencies of the Executive Branch to ex- 
amine thoroughly what additional steps can be taken 
in this direction in the immediate future. 

I also call upon our national citizen organizations to 
undertake intensive educational programs to inform 
their memberships of recent progress in international 
cooperation and urge them to consider what further 
steps can be taken. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this second day of 
October In the year of our Lord nineteen hun- 
[seal] dred and sixty-four, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the one hun- 
dred and eighty-ninth. 


By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 


I said earlier this morning that there is some 
connection between international cooperation 
and the survival of the human race. I'd like 
to emphasize that when we talk about inter- 
national cooperation we are not talking about 
sentiment. We are not talking about disem- 
bodied, lofty ideals. We are talking about the 
harshest requirements of our period of history. 

Nuclear weapons are present in a competitive 
situation. A nuclear exchange can occur. The 
existence of the Northern Plemisphere is at 
stake. Decisions could be made by governments 
which would be the last decisions made by orga- 
nized governments in most of the Northern 

I cannot tell you today, as we look forward to 
International Cooperation Year in 1965, that 
there are no dangers. Those dangers are there 
and are very real. There has been some pause, 
some growing sense perhaps of prudence, a sense 
of responsibility in the conduct of world affairs, 
some sense of the enormous stakes that are in- 
volved in the way in which we handle difficult 
and dangerous problems. 

But the difficult and dangerous problems per- 
sist. There is no final solution to Germany 
and Berlin. It is hard to see how a jjermanent 
peace can be achieved in Central Europe unless 
the peoples in that area have a genuine access to 
the notion of self-determination. Cuba remains 
an explosive question, and in late July the for- 
eign ministers of this hemisphere exhausted the 
peaceful remedies, the peaceful sanctions avail- 
able to the governments of this hemisphere, in 
an effort to get the signal to Habana that their 
attempts to interfere in the affairs of other coim- 
tries must cease and must cease now. 

In Southeast Asia there is an ovem-iding qties- 
tion as to whether there are those who will not 
leave their neighbors alone. And that decision 
must be to leave their neighbors alone or there 
will be very, very dangerous and far-reaching 
consequences of a failure to come to that decision 
and promi)tly. 

So it is not a quci^tioii of working on mter- 
national cooperation in a world in which there 

' No. 3620 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 1.3627. 

' This is the substantive portion of remarks included 
in press release 428 dat<>d Oct. 2. 



is no danger. It is precisely because of the 
nature and depth and scope of the danger that 
we must, as luiman beings, seek some basis for 
international cooperation. In other ■wor-ds, in 
the face of hostility we must try to find some 
elements of common interest, some ties that tie 
human beings together. And this is what Inter- 
national Cooperation Year is all about. 

I have said on many occasions that we have 
1,;]00 cables coming into the Department of 
State on any working day and a thousand ca- 
bles going out on any working day. About 85 
percent of that business has to do with inter- 
national cooperation, with building a decent 
world order, with searching out and finding and 
acting upon those common interests among 
ordinary human beings. That 85 percent is the 
unlviiown, the hidden part, of our foreign rela- 
tions. It gets veiy little attention. 

If my friends in the press will forgive me, 
you imderstand the reaction from your city desk 
when they say, "No blood, no news." This 85 
percent of our busmess gets little attention. 

The last calendar year we attended about 550 
international confei'ences as a United States 
Government. Only about 110 of those were 
even mentioned in the American pi-ess. So 
there is an enormous hidden iceberg, if you like, 
of an awful lot of people trying to build that 
decent world order which is the basic purpose 
of the American people. 

But then I'm stimulated from time to time 
to recognize that even that part of it is only 
a small fraction of the total relations of the 
American people, and that is where you people 
come in. Because the American people have 
an enormous complex of constructive relation- 
ships with people in other countries outside the 
framework of intergovernmental relations. 

Look at trade. Almost 45 billions of trade 
at the cuiTent rate in both directions — almost 
45 billions of trade going in both directions — 
an enonnous linkage between the ordinary citi- 
zens of this country and the citizens of other 

And those great international communities 
of science and scholarship, of arts, of sports, 
and all of the other normal human activities in 
which the American people are linking them- 
selves to people m other countries and where it 

is the duty of the Government to encourage but 
to stay out of the way. 

And so when we approach an International 
Cooperation Year, we are not talking just about 
government. There may be things which gov- 
ernment can do and should do to build upon 
this conce})t. We are talking about a people, 
an entire people, every one of whom has some 
reason to be in contact with people in other 
countries in the course of a year. 

I come back to the first idea — this matter of 
danger and what it means to live in a nuclear 
world. It is too late to be primitive. It is 
too late to look at world events through one's 
immediate glandular reactions. It is too late 
to look for the simplified and anachronistic 
formula about how to search for peace. Be- 
cause there is just no future there — no future. 

The problem is to be in touch with those with 
whom you have the deepest disagreement in 
order to find out whether there may not be some 
common interest on which you can build a little 
something — a little something. The small 
things accumulatively can be as important as 
the big things. And the small things can make 
a difference. 

Today, as we meet here, the United States 
Government is now meeting in 23 international 
bodies somewhere in the world on some subject : 
a coal committee, a meeting on protection of 
intellectual property, a meeting on the fonna- 
tion of an international research center on can- 
cer, a meeting on hydrometeorology, a meeting 
on civil aviation planning, et cetera, et cetera. 

The time has come in man's history when he 
must peel all the peeling off the banana, ignore 
national frontiers, put to one side the most 
distressing, dangerous, and difficult questions 
and ask himself what is required of Homo sa- 
piens if we are to continue to inhabit the same 

And on that I would say nothing is too small 
as a contribution to the answers to that question. 

From time to time I am asked by perhaps stu- 
dents or people that I visit in various communi- 
ties, "What can I do as a citizen to contribute 
to peace, to international relations, to oiu' for- 
eign policy?" The answer has to be to "start 
from where you are," because at that point there 
are dozens of opportunities. 

OCTOBER 19. 1964 


What is the situation in your community 
about the c^reat commitments of the American 
dedication to freedom? Is it a gleaming com- 
munity? Is it a community for which we have 
to apologize to our friends from abroad ? Is it 
a community which mutes our voice when we 
talk about freedom abroad? What about the 
visitor to that community from another coun- 
try? Is he welcomed and relaxed? Is he at 
home? Is he welcomed in the friendliest fash- 
ion ? What about the members of that commu- 
nity who travel abroad? Do they travel with 
a chip on their shoulder? Or do they travel 
with the intention of finding understanding — 
not to find liking? You may be disliked, but 
find the basis of knowledge on which you know 
why you do or do not like a situation in a par- 
ticular country. 

Judgments about the great issues of public 
policy on which people are called upon to make 
a judgment in electing representatives in gov- 
ernment — local, state, and national. All these 
things involve a citizen in the conduct of our 
foreign relations, and these are the things which 
give so much weight to what so many great 
national organizations do. 

We follow very closely your resolutions and 
your attitudes toward foreign policy questions. 
We study them with great interest and great 
sincerity and great sobriety. And we hope you 
will keep sending to us those positions that you 
take as organizations on these great issues. 

But what we are just as much interested in is 
what you, in your own situation, are doing in 
terms of this vast activity of the American 
people and their contacts with people in other 
parts of the world. Because these are the ways 
in which people find out what the American 
people are all about. And therein lies the 
greatest strength of the American people. 

If there are foreigners here, perhaps you will 
forgive me a little presumption, but I person- 
ally believe that it is a matter of the greatest 
historical importance that a nation which has 
lit«rally unimaginable power — that has power 
beyond the scope of the human mind to grasp 
in terms of its impact if it were fully used — 
that a nation which has unimaginable power is 
committed to the simple propositions to which 

the American people have been committed since 
World War II. This is almost something new 
in history. And this is the basis of our great 
strength in dealing with people around the 

And this is why, in hundreds and hundreds 
of meetings throughout the year, they find out 
what we are all about. And that is why you 
don't find ordinary people in different parts of 
the world thinking we are trying to take some- 
thing away from them that belongs to them. 
And that is why in moments of great crisis you 
don't fuid nearly so much neutralism as one 
might suppose, because what you people repre- 
sent, what your own organizations and members 
represent, is the very stuff of our society, shapes 
our foreign policy, gives direction to the Presi- 
dent and Secretary of State, and explains what 
we are all about to people in other parts of the 

That is the basis of confidence with wliich we 
move forward. And that is why in an Inter- 
national Cooperation Year, from the smallest 
thing to the largest, this is a national under- 
taking for citizen and government, for orga- 
nizations at the national level and at the local 
chapter, wherever there are those who can put 
their minds to the question : How can man save 
himself and how can man reach out a hand, even 
in the midst of danger, to try to make a little 
sense out of a troubled world situation ? 

Now, we have limited time, but I would not 
wish us to move forward from here without a 
commitment from me that we shall be in touch 
with you again. If you leave today without a 
sense of organization to move forward on these 
mattei-s, we shall be in touch with you. We are 
not trying to make a single monolithic struc- 
ture of this matter of the International Cooper- 
ation Year. But we shall be in touch with you 
in a variety of ways. 

But before we adjourn, I would like to intro- 
duce two of my colleagues. First, Mr. Eobert 
Benjamin of the United Nations Association, 
and then my very distinguished colle^igue and 
jiersonal friend, Harlan Cleveland, who is head 
of the office which I myself once upon a time 
had the pleasure of heading, who is in charge of 
our work in international organization affaire. 



Security Council Continues 
U.N. Force in Cyprus 

On September 25 the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously approved a resolution ex- 
tending the mandate of the U.N. Force in 
Cyprus for 3 months. Following are texts of 
a statement made in the Council on September 
17 by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson 
and a statement vnade by Deputy U.S. Repre- 
sentative Charles W. Yost following the vote. 


U.S./D'N. press release 4440 

We are fortunate in our consideration of the 
item now on our agenda to have the excellent 
report presented by the Secretary-General.^ It 
is a thorough and well-organized presentation 
of the pertinent facts, in the opinion of my 
Government. The report contains forthright 
judgments and conclusions on the major aspects 
of the task which the Coimcil assigned to the 
Secretary-General and to the peacekeeping 
force in its IVIarch 4 resolution.^ And it pro- 
vides an excellent basis for continuing the op- 
eration. In our view, the Secretary-General, 
his special representative in Cyprus, the com- 
mander of the United Nations Force on Cyprus, 
and their respective staffs, both here and in Ni- 
cosia, are to be warmly commended not only for 
their vigorous efforts but also for providing the 
Security Council with such an informative 

Particularly impressive in the Secretary- 
General's accomit is the chronicle of persistent 
efforts in every field which have been made to 
reach agreement witli the authorities in Cyprus 
and the leaders of the two communities. We see 
where agreements and pledges have been sought 
but not yet obtained, where they have been ob- 
tained and observed, and, unfortunately, also 
where they have been obtained and not fully 
lived up to by the parties. This careful ac- 
counting to the Council will be, we hope, kept 
current by the Secretary-General to the greatest 

extent possible. In this way the Council may 
be kept fully aware of the degi-ee of cooperation 
the force this Council has created is receiving 
from the parties concerned. As a useful exam- 
ple of this practice, we not© in particular the 
annex to the Secretary-General's report in- 
cluded just yesterday. This contains both an 
account of recent events and a very welcome 
statement by President Makarios that the re- 
grettable practice of calculated restriction of es- 
sential supplies to certain areas of the island 
will henceforth cease. 

We see no place in the civilized behavior of 
modem nations for governments to institute in- 
ternal economic blockades against minorities in 
their midst. Tlie decision to lift the internal 
blockades in Cyprus is as necessary as it is 

Mr. President, the military situation, as de- 
scribed in the Secretary-General's report, re- 
mains particularly worrisome and precarious. 
The description in the report of the serious out- 
break of fighting wliich occurred a month ago 
and the repeated efforts made to stop it are a 
vivid reminder of the very narrow margin be- 
tween that tragic and senseless engagement and 
its extension into a wider conflict. Apropos of 
this engagement, we continue to oppose and de- 
plore, as I said here in the Council on June 19,^ 
"the importation of arms into an island already 
stuffed with armaments." We most energeti- 
cally deplore any use of force on the island by 
the parties to the Cyprus dispute. In partic- 
ular, we deplore the use of heavy arms pur- 
portedly purchased for external defense, in vio- 
lation of specific pledges made to the United 
Nations. In the presence of a lightly armed 
U.N. force commissioned by this Council to pre- 
vent a recurrence of fighting, and positioned 
between the forces of the two communities, the 
use of such weapons is indefensible. We also 
most emphatically deplore any air attacks on 
the island launched from outside Cyprus. In 
tliis connection, the United States has never 
agreed to the use of arms furnished under U.S. 
military assistance agreements for any purposes 
not specified in those agreements, and this 
applies to all such weapons furnished to any 
signatory of any such agreements with the 

' U.N. doe. S/5950 and Add. 1 and 2. 

' For text, see Buixetin of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466. 

' Ibid., July 13, 1964, p. 64. 

OCTOBER 19, 1964 


United States. In the instance in question, the 
agreement of the United States for the use of 
these weapons was neither sought nor given. 

In our view acts of violence and bloodshed are 
equally repreliensible and inhumane whether 
launched from the ground or from the air. 
Photographs of murdered Greeks or murdered 
Turks are equally shocking and gruesome. 

To say that actions of both types aggravate 
the situation in terms of the March 4 resolution 
would be a gross understatement. They risk the 
broadening of hostilities; they are tragic in 
their consequences to combatants and noncom- 
batants alike. 

We can be thankfid that the dedication and 
discipline of the troops of the U.N. force, and 
the energetic efforts of the force commander in 
policing the cease-fire which the Council voted 
on in August,* have helped to overcome this re- 
cent perilous situation. But it is clear that the 
danger remains great and that the force needs 
and deserves the utmost cooperation from the 
governmental authorities and communities on 
Cyprus, and from all member states, in partic- 
ular those directly involved in the Cyprus ques- 
tion, if it is successfully to carry out its prin- 
cipal mission of preventing a recun-enc« of 

In addition, the commander and his forces, 
as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 
July 22 memorandum,^ must be able to move 
freely and inform themselves about the Island 
of Cyprus if they are to position themselves in 
a timely manner and to exercise the fimctions 
the Secretary-General has carefully defined for 
them in his report to the Council. Limitations 
on the U.N. force beyond those in the status-of- 
forces agreement, or disrespect for the U.N. 
troops or for the authority which the Secretary- 
General lias vested in their commander. General 
[K. S.] Thimayya, cannot, I believe, be comite- 
nanced by any members of this organization. I 
therefore wholly endorse what has already been 
said hero about support for the U.N. comman- 
der's authority and commend the energy and 
wisdom with which he has exercised it in his difficidt task. Furthermoi-e I can state 
that my Government fully supports the recom- 

* Ibid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 318. 
" U.N. doc. S/.'-h'HS. 

mendations now accepted in this Council by the 
main parties concerned — that the mandate of 
the force be extended for an additional 3 

I believe the Comicil should all be gi-ateful 
for the persevering efforts of the U.N. staff in 
Cyprus to reestablish normal conditions. The 
catalog of their fmstrations in these efforts is 
a monument to the complexity of tliis problem 
and a tribute to their persistence and resource- 
fulness. As I have already said, we heartily 
welcome the recent message from President 
Makarios annexed to this report and hope it 
will help generate an atmosphere in which these 
efforts will receive greater response.. That 
chapter in the Secretary-General's report en- 
titled "Economic Restrictions," we trust, has 
been definitively closed, and we hope all citizens 
of Cypnis, as well as citizens of Greece and 
Turkey, resident in each other's nations will 
henceforth receive just, humane, and generous 

I cannot conclude my remarks without touch- 
ing on a subject which is not only painful to my 
Government but also, judging from his report, 
to the Secretary-General. That is the subject 
of fmances. We tried, in the March 4 resolu- 
tion, to meet this problem without further com- 
plicating or prejudicing the more fundamental 
issue of financing United Nations peacekeeping 
across the board. ^ly Government has, I be- 
lieve, participated generously in the financing 
of United Nations activities in Cyprus on the 
voluntary basis undertaken pursuant to the 
Council's resolution. Of the estimated $12.5 
million which the force will cost for the first 6 
months, we have pledged up to $4.3 million and 
in addition have provided, at no cost to the 
United Nations, airlift for some 4,700 troops 
to the value of about $1 million. Contributions 
in line with their financial abilities by other 
members of this Council, as well as by other 
United Nations member states in the European 
and the Mediterranean region, including espe- 
cially those whose interest in a peacefid solution 
is enhanced by their proximity to Cypnis, would 
have solved the financing problem for the United 
Nations Force in Cyprus. Lacking such con- 
tributions the Secretary-General is now in the 
awkward position of being asked to sustain a 



foi'ce for which, despite the financial support of 
their troops undertaken by Canada, Ireland, 
and the United Kinodom, pledged funds are 
inadequate. We strongly urge that all members 
of the Council which have unanimously estab- 
lished this pearckeeping operation set an ex- 
ample by contributing the financial means with- 
out which the operation cannot succeed. 

If the Security Council decides to authorize 
the continuation of the force, I will promptly 
announce the extent to which my Goverrmient 
is willing to provide continued financial support 
for the operation. I earnestly hope that this 
pledge will be quickly followed by comparable 
pledges from all who have a sincere interest in 
the United Nations and in its peacekeeping role. 
And I am frank to say that I believe those who 
have particularly insisted on the primacy, or 
even exclusive authority, of the Security Coun- 
cil in the peacekeeping field might well assume 
a particular responsibility to contribute to an 
operation duly authorized b}' the Security Coun- 
cil and financed by arrangements set forth in a 
Security Council resolution. There has been no 
financial contribution for this important Secu- 
rity Council action from the foremost proponent 
of the principle of the exclusive responsibility 
of the Security Council for United Nations 

The peacekeeping task in Cyprus will end, I 
fear, only with the achievement of a permanent 
agreed solution — a solution of the type this 
Council in its March 4 resolution correctly 
called for. To be applicable, this cannot be a 
solution legislated in the abstract. It must be a 
solution negotiated between the parties whose 
representatives recognized each other's intei'est 
in the island by jointly affixing their signatures 
to the treaties at Nicosia in 1960. '\\^latever 
may be the present position of these govern- 
ments regarding those treaties, this recognition 
of interest could not and cannot now be 
scratched from history. It is for this reason, I 
believe, that the Council in its March 4 resolu- 
tion clearly indicated the parties which would be 
involved in mediation and negotiation. 

These were the parties assiduously and pa- 
tiently consulted by the accomplished Finnish 
statesman, the late Sakari Tuomioja. This dis- 
tinguished man, who in the time given him gave 

so generously of his talents both to his country 
and to the Morld, spared no effort in his final 
task. He did not live to complete it. The most 
fitting tribute we can give to his memory is, I 
believe, to rededicate ourselves, with the aid of 
the new mediator appointed by the Secretary- 
General to tiiis task. My Government, which 
had the utmost respect for Mr. Tuomioja and 
deeply regrets his untimely passing, will con- 
tinue to be at the disposition of his most able 
successor. We congratulate the Secretary- 
General and the parties concerned for having 
agreed to the choice of Mr. Galo Plaza for this 
task. We wish the new mediator evei-y success 
in his difficult task. 

Mr. President, I believe this Council can be 
satisfied that the difficult task it has given to 
the executive organ of the United Nations has 
been undertaken with such diligence and dedi- 
cation. The task is not over. The need for 
continuing to work on it is apparent. We must 
follow its execution closely. The Secretary- 
General, the commander of the forces on the 
island, and the mediator will need the full sup- 
port and cooperation of the members of our 
oi'ganization. The nations which have offered 
their troops, their police forces, their medical 
personnel, have given an example of cooperation 
and support which, we hope, no members or 
friends of this organization and particularly 
no permanent members of this Council will 
hesitate to follow. 


U.S./tJ.N. press release 4442 

My delegation welcomes the resolution which 
this Council has just passed. We believe that 
the parties principally concerned and the mem- 
bers of the Council have adopted a wise course 
in agreeing to extend the mandate of the United 
Nations in Cyprus in order to establish con- 
ditions in which a solution may be reached. 

As Governor Stevenson stated in his speech 
to the Council last Thursday, we believe the 
Secretary-General's report to the Council is an 
excellent assessment of the problems the foi'ce is 
faced with and we particularly welcome the fact 
that the Council in its resolution has taken due 
note of it. The Secretaiy-General's judicious 

OCTOBER 19, 19 4 


conclusions are thereby a matter of record in 
this Council. 

Governor Stevenson earlier this •week said 
that we would inform the Council about our 
contribution for the force when the resolution 
was adopted. The United States has already 
contributed $4.3 million of the estimated $12.5 
million cost of the first 6 months of the U.N. 
force's operations. In addition, we have, in view 
of the shortfall resulting from lack of other 
contributions, furnished without charge to the 
United Nations about $1 million worth of air 

Now that the force has been extended for 3 
montlis, at a cost estimated by the Secretary- 
General at $7,050,000, I am authorized to state 
that my Government will contribute up to $2.3 
million for the forthcoming 3-month period. 

The Secretary-General has just a moment 
ago reemphasized the fact that he cannot carry 
on this operation unless the necessary funds are 
provided. We would strongly urge that other 
states which have generously contributed their 
troops, their police, their doctors, their facili- 
ties or equipment, and their fimds continue to 
do so in proportions at least equal to their past 
efforts. We particularly urge that states which 
liave not hitherto seen fit to make voluntary 
contributions to this U.N. operation now do so. 
Since the operation has been unanimously ap- 
proved by the Security Council, it would not 
appear that any member state could have any 
objection of principle to making such a contri- 
bution. Yet if members of this organization 
are not prepared to provide financial support 
even for U.N. operations to which there can be 
no objection of principle, U.N. peacekeeping 
will all too soon grind to a halt and one of the 
great and essential objects for which the United 
Nations was created will ignominiously lapse. 

Finally, I should like to mention two pieces 
of welcome news which the Secretary-General 
has just conveyed to us. 

First, he has told us that an agreement has 
been reached in regard to the rotation of a part 
of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus. This was 
a particularly delicate and potentially hazard- 
ous issue, and the Governments concerned are to 
be congratulated for the wisdom and restraint 
they have shown in settling it in an amicable 

manner. The Secretary-General is also to be 
congratulated for the mediatory role which he 
has so successfully played. 

Second, the Secretary-General has given us 
the pleasure of learning that our former col- 
league. Ambassador Bernardes of Brazil, is ta 
serve as his personal representative in Cyprus. 
As the Secretary-General pointed out. Ambas- 
sador Bernardes played an important role in the 
adoption of the resolution under which the U.N. 
force in Cyprus was first established. I can- 
not conceive of a person more highly qualified 
to represent the Secretary-General in Cyprus 
and to assist him in carrying out the resolution 
which this Council has adopted. 

U.S. Expresses Regret Regarding 
Expulsion of Greeks From Istanbul) 

Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative in the Security Cov/ncU ^ 

My Government deeply regrets what we have 
heard here today about the expulsion of Greeks 
from Istanbul, about military deployment on 
the frontiers, and other evidence of further de- 
terioration of the relations between two nations 
in the eastern Mediterranean which in recent 
years have demonstrated a remarkable ability 
to overcome a turbulent history and live to- 
gether in peace, llie close relationship be- , 
tween the United States and Greece and Tur-J 
key causes us to view with particular regret the 
rising tide of bitterness and misunderetanding 
which is the offspring of the Cyprus problem 
that has already occupied so much of our 
thought and concern. 

The expulsion of Greek nationals from Is- 
tanbul, which the distinguished representative 
of Greece has brought to the attention of the 
Council, seems to us a sad sequel to the com- 
munal hostility in Cyprus. It is almost an 
axiom, however, of history that people of one 
nation resident in the territory of another often 
become innocent victims of any sudden increase 
in tension or suspicion between those countries. 

'Made in the Security Council on Sept. 11 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 4437) . 



Even while acting entirely within the letter of 
the international agreements, as we believe the 
•Government of Turkey has done in this case, 
uprooting and deporting innocent and harm- 
less people from their long-term homes is a 
spectacle that touches the humane instincts and 
evokes the profound sympathy of all of us. 

Therefore we, too, would urge the Govern- 
ment of Turkey to give very careful considera- 
tion not only to the effect of its actions on its 
neighbor but to the human hardships visited 
on those individuals who are innocent of any 
hostile intention toward the country in which 
they have chosen to reside. 

I cannot, of course, ignore the circumstances 
which have brought about the present unhappy 
and explosive state of relations between Greece 
and Turkey. The cause and effect are apparent 
to all. The recent action toward the Greek 
nationals in Istanbul is the consequence, or one 
of them, of the treatment of Cypriots of Turk- 
ish origin in recent months in Cyprus. This 
Council is already familiar with the earlier re- 
ports of hostage-taking, the destruction of 
Turkish homes, stores, villages, and the Secre- 
tary-General's report released today ^ refers to 
"hardship experienced by many Turkish com- 
munities in Cyprus by the economic restrictions 
which have been imposed by the Government of 
Cyprus." And again it further states that the 
economic restrictions "in some instances have 
been so severe as to amount to veritable 
siege. . . ." 

Human rights, IVIr. President, are a two-way 
street and apply to human beings wherever they 
are — in Turkey, in Greece, or in Cyprus. 

The Government of Greece, I am sure, de- 
plores this situation as much as we do, and I 
3arnestly hope it will do everything in its power 
to ameliorate the plight of the Turkish 

Perhaps it is not possible for the parties to 
jquate the concern of Greece for Greek nationals 
n Istanbul with the concern of Turkey for 
ithnic Turks in Cyprus. But the fact is, Sir. 
President, that it is only by mutual concern 
or each other's citizens or ethnic brethren, as 
;ndeed for each other's interests, that the Gov- 

' U.N. doc. S/59o0 and Add. 1. 

ernments of Greece and Turkey will succeed in 
settling the sharp differences which have arisen 
between them — the principal one, of course, be- 
ing the question of Cyprus. 

So I can but echo what has been so well said 
by the preceding speakers here in the Council 
this afternoon, that my Government earnestly 
hopes that neither Turkey nor Greece in their 
bilateral relations, especially as to innocent peo- 
ple, will do anything further to aggravate a 
situation for the solution of which they have 
such a heavy responsibility to themselves and 
to the world community. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Question of Greek-Turkish Relations : 
Letters to the Secretary-General and the President 
of the Security Council from the representative of 
Greece. S/5933. September 5, 1964, 2 pp. ; S/5934, 
September .5, 1964, 1 p. ; S/5&41, September 8, 1964, 
1 p.; S/.5946, September 9, 1964, 4 pp.; S/5947, 
September 9, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5951, September 10, 
1964, 8 pp. 
Letters to the President of the Security Council and 
the Secretary-General from the representative of 
Turkey. S/5935, September 6, 1964, 2 pp. ; S/59.57, 
September 11, 1964, 7 pp. ; S/5968, September 14, 
1964, 2 pp. 
Report by the Secretary-General transmitting replies 
received from various governments concerning their 
actions pursuant to the Security Council resolution 
(S/5761) on the question of race conflict in South 
Africa resulting from policies of apartheid. S/5913. 
August 2.5, 19G4. 17 pp. 
Letter dated August 27 to the President of the Security 
Council from the representative of Yemen, charging 
armed aggression by British forces on town of Al- 
baidha. S/5919. August 28, 1964. 1 p. 
Letter dated August 31 to the President of the Security 
Council from the acting representative of the United 
Kingdom protesting, on behalf of the Government of 
South Arabia, artillery action by Yemeni forces and 
denying that "forces on the Federal side of the bor- 
der in the Baidha area" fired on Yemeni territory. 
S/5922. August 31, 1964. 2 pp. 
Note by the Secretary-General, enclosing a letter dated 
August 27 received by the President of the Security 
Council from the Permanent Observer of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam in relation to the report submitted 
by the Security Council Mission to the Kingdom of 
Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam. S/5921. 
August 31, 1964. 7 pp. 

)CT0BEE 19, 19G4 



Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by tlie 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and China of 
July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3.307, 4176, 4514, 
5105), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atom- 
ic energy. Signed at Vienna September 21, I'.liH. 
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency 
accepts the initial inventory. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Venezuela, August 27, 1964. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations ; 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular 

relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 


Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 

Ratification, deposited: Upper Volta, August 11, 1964. 

Cultural Property 

Convention for protection of cultural property in event 

of armed conflict, and regulations of execution ; 
Protocol for protection of cultural property in event of 

arme<l conflict. 

Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force 
August 7, 1956.= 

Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 21, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 

marriage and registration of marriages. Opened for 

signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.' 

Accessions deposited: Finland (with a reservation), 

August 18, 1964 ; Western Samoa, August 24, 1964. 

North Atlantic Treaty— Atomic Information 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic informa- 
tion. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.' 
Notifications received that they are inlling to 6e 
bound by terms of the agreement: Italy, Septem- 
ber 14, 1964 ; Turkey, September 18, 1964 ; United 
States, September 25, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Honduras, October 2, 1964. 


Convention concerning the international exchange of 
publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. 
Entered into force November 23, 1961.'' 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, August 11, 1964. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 196-1. Entered into 

force August 20, 1964. TIAS .5646. 

Signatures: Sweden, September 28, 1964;' Belgium, 
September 29, 1964.' 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 


Signatures: Kungl. Telestyrelsen for Sweden, Sep- 
tember 28, 1904; R^gie des T^Wgraphes et Tele- 
phones for Belgium, September 29, 19&4. 


Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 2.5, 
1926," as amended (TIAS 3.532). Entered into force 
March 9, 1927 ; for the United States March 21, 1929. 
46 Stat. 2183. 
Accession deposited: Uganda, August 12, 19&4. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade and institutions and practic-es similar 
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. En- 
tered into force April 30, 1957.' 

Accession* deposited: Argentina, August 13, 1964; 
Uganda, August 12, 1964. 


Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
July 1, 1963. Entered into force August 29, 1963. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, August 10, 1964. 



Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1962 (TIAS 
5125), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. 
Entered into force: September 29, 1964. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace 
corps program in Kenya, with related notes. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Nairobi August 26, 1964. 
Entered into force August 26, 1964. 


Protocol modifying and supplementing extension to the 
Netherlands Antilles of the convention for avoidance 
of double taxation and prevention of liscal evasion 
with respect to income and certain other taxes_of 
April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1S55, 3366, 3367). 
Signed at The Hague October 23. 1!K!3. 
Ratifications rxcUanncd : September 2S, 19C>4. 
Entered into force: September 28, 1".)64. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the Ignited States. 

"Subject to ratification. 



INDEX October 19, 196^ Vol. LI, No. 1321 

Africa. OAU Commission on Congo Talks With 
Department Officers (Department statement, 
joint press communique) 553 

American Republics 

President Approves Bill for Study of Sea-Level 
Canal Site (Johnson) 554 

The Western Hemisphere's Fight for Freedom 

(Mann) 549 

Asia. Progress and Problems in East Asia : An 

American Viewi)oint (Bundy) 534 

Atomic Energy. U.S. Comments on Peiping's 
Nuclear Cajjacity (Rusk) 542 

China. U.S. Comments on Peiping's Nuclear 

Capacity ( 542 

Communism. The Western Hemisphere's Fight 
for Freedom (Mann) 549 

Congo. OAU Commission on Congo Talks With 
Department Officers (Department statement, 
joint press communique) 553 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 554 

President Approves Bill for Study of Sea-Level 

Canal Site (Johnson) . 554 

President Asks Additional Funds for U.S.-Mexico 

Flood Project 544 

Secretary Regrets Congressional Inaction on 

Coffee Agreement (Rusk) 554 

Cuba. The Western Hemisphere's Fight for 

Freedom (Mann) 549 

Cyprus. Security Council Continues U.N. Force 
in Cyprus (Stevenson, Tost) 561 

Economic Affairs. Secretary Regrets Congres- 
sional Inaction on Coffee Agreement (Rusk) . 554 

Foreign Aid. Progress and Problems in East 

Asia : An American Viewpoint ( Bundy ) . . 534 

Greece. U.S. Expresses Regret Regarding Ex- 
pulsion of Greeks from Istanbul (Stevenson) . 564 

Japan. Progress and Problems in East Asia : 

An American Viewpoint (Bundy) .... 534 

Korea. United States and Korea Reaffirm 
Policy of Cooperation (text of joint 
statement) 542 


Ceremony at Mexican Border Marks Settlement 
of Chamizal Dispute (Johnson) 545 

President Asks Additional Funds for US.- 
Mexico Flood Project 544 

Presidential Documents 

Ceremony at Mexican Border Marks Settlement 
of Chamizal Dispute 545 

Four Principles of American Foreign Policy . . 543 

President Approves Bill for Study of Sea-Level 

Canal Site . t . . . 554 

President Johnson Proclaims 1965 as Intema- 

national Cooperation Tear 555 

Treaty Information 

Ceremony at Mexican Border Marks Settlement 

of Chamizal Dispute (Johnson) 545 

Current Actions 566 

Secretary Regrets Congressional Inaction on 

Coffee Agreement (Rusk) 554 

Turkey. U.S. Expresses Regret Regarding 
Expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul (Steven- 
son) 5(^1 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 565 

President Johnson Proclaims 1965 as Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year (Johnson, Rusk, 
text of proclamation) 555 

Security Council Continues U.N. Force in Cy- 
prus (Stevenson, Yost) 561 

U.S. Expresses Regret Regarding Expulsion of 

Greeks from Istanbul (Stevenson) .... 564 

Name Index 

Bundy, William P 534,542 

Johnson, President .... 543, 545, 554, 555, 558 

Lee Tong Won 542 

Mann, Thomas C 549, Secretary 542,554,557,558 

Stevenson, Adlai E 561, 564 

Yost, Charles W 563 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 28-October 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to September 28 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 412 of 
September 21. 

No. Date Subject 

*417 9/28 Harriman: Far East-American 
Council of Commerce and Indu.s- 
try. New York ( excerpts ) . 

*418 9/28 U.S. participation in international 

t419 9/28 Supplemental income tax protocol 
with Netherlands enters into 

'*420 9/28 Program for visit of the President 
of the Philippines. 

*421 9/28 Cultural exchange (U.S.S.R., Ger- 
many, Italy). 

422 9/29 Bundy : "Progress and Problems in 

East Asia : An American View- 

423 9/29 Rusk: Chinese Communist nuclear 


424 9/30 Joint press communique with Ad 

Hoc Commission on the Congo. 

*425 10/2 Program for visit of the President 
of the Philippines. 

*426 10/2 Amendments to program for visit of 
the President of the Philippines. 

'*427 10/3 Harriman : Zionist Organization of 
America, Washington, D.C. (ex- 
cerpts ) . 
428 10/2 Rusk: International Cooperation 

Year ceremonies. 
431 10/3 Rusk: International Coffee Agree- 

•Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the BtrLLETiN. 



Superintendent of 
u.s. government printing office 





The Alliance for Progress 

Democracy vs. Dictators in Latin America 

These two pamphlets, based on recent addresses by Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of Sfc 
for Inter- American Affairs, outline United States policy toward Latin America and call upon all I 
American peoples for continued dedication to assure the success of the Alliance for Progress progn 
and to make democracy a reality throughout the hemisphere. 


w ^ ^ ^ MB Bw ■— H ^ a^ M ^ ^ ^ M ^ ^ «■ ■« ^ ^ ^ ^~ ^ *a a^ aw ^ ^ _* ^ ^ ^ ^ hb ■■ • 

Please send me copies of The Alliance for Progress, Publication 71 

5 Cents. 

Please send me copies of Democracy vs. Dictators in Latin An - 

Publication 7729, 5 Cents. 




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(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Bapt of Docniuents) 










Vol. LI, No. 1322 

October 26, 1964, 

Address by Secretary Husk 670 



by Robert W. Bamett 586 


by Assistant Secretary Mann 693 

For index see inside back cover 

Trade, Investment, and Peace 

Address hy Secretary Ritsh^ 

I have come today to share with you some 
thoughts about the role of foreign economic 
policy in preserving our security and enliancing 
our prosperity. As we look to the future, this 
element of our relationship to the rest of the 
world will continue to grow in importance. 
Rapid and far-reaching change in the world 
economy is here for all of us to see. We must 
be prepared to treat change as a challenge to 
the wise use of our skills and resources. 

We have impressive assets for this task. We 
are today the strongest nation m the world — 
in our military position, in our industrial capa- 
bilities, in our agricultural productivity, in our 
financial resources, and, above all, in the well- 
bemg of our citizens. These achievements tes- 
tify both to the vitality and efficiency of our 
competitive system and to the hvunan values of 
our society. 

'Made before the Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 5 (press release 

But we might well remember that our start 
on this fortunate course goes back to the first 
days of the Republic. We were a trading na- 
tion — and that gave us a legacy which has been 
an abiding strength and a continuing measure 
of our mettle. 

We started out, as you know, with the world 
outlook of a newly independent, agricultural, 
imderdeveloped comitry in critical need of for- 
eign markets, foreign manufactures, foreign 
teclmology, and foreign capital. It is not sur- 
prising, therefore, that economic relations were 
the central preoccupation of our first ministers 
to Europe after we won our independence — 
Jolm Adams in Great Britain and Thomas Jef- 
ferson in France. Their diplomatic corre- 
spondence of 175 years ago is alive with their 
concern in these matters. For example: 

— They sjient much of their time negotiating 
commercial treaties on the most- favored-nation 

—They negotiated hard to remove discrimina- 


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tions against our products in foreign markets 
and to reduce barriers on a reciprocal basis. 

—They were thorougWy familiar with tlie 
commercial possibilities of the 13 States and 
sought to promote exports of products in which 
M-e had a comparative advantage and a new 
tecluiology of sorts to offer to Europe. Indeed, 
they were responsible for the first United States 
export promotion drive. That prototype of 
our current export promotion programs cen- 
tered on efforts to broaden the European mar- 
ket for American whale oil and whale oil 

— They obtai:ied credits abroad to facilitate 
the trade of our merchants. 

— And they negotiated loans in European 
capital markets to meet debt-servicing and 
other obligations of our then impoverished 

These men were convmced that economic re- 
strictions were a threat to our political inde- 
pendence. They took as a basic premise that our 
nation could more effectively realize its poten- 
tialities as part of the world economy rather 
than in economic isolation. In essence, both 
men saw beyond the trials of the moment and 
framed policy recommendations consistent with 
their exciting vision of the Nation's future and 
of their belief in its ability to compete abroad 
and to benefit from that competition. 

Growth in Free-World Economy 

Adams and Jefferson would take the same 
position today— all the more so from the van- 
tage point of a "have" nation, and not only the 
richest "have" nation in history but one with 
vast and inescapable responsibilities for defend- 
ing and strengthening peace and freedom 
throughout the world. 

By our very size we are heavily involved in 
the world economy and our actions inevitably 
affect not only our own well-being but the af- 
fairs of other nations. Let us remind ourselves 
why this is so. The United States has barely 
6 percent of the world's population. In 
comparison : 

—We produce about 30 percent of the world's 
total output of goods and services. 

—We have at our disposal almost 40 percent 
of total world consumption of energy. 

—We account for one-third of the world's in- 
dustrial production. 

—We produce close to one-fifth of the world's 
agricultural output, and our agricultural stocks 
are the world's major contingency food resei-ve. 
— Our foreign trade is approximately 18 per- 
cent of total world trade. 

— And our capital market is the major source 
of fmids for both the industrial and the develop- 
ing countries of the free world. 

Over the past three decades these underlying 
realities have exei-t«d growing influence on our 
actions and brought us back to our outward- 
looking traditions. Each administration dur- 
ing this period, irrespective of party, has seen 
the urgent need to rebuild and expand the inter- 
national economic order and has worked ener- 
getically toward that end. 

Looked at in this way, there has been a central 
purpose in the complex of great actions in for- 
eign economic policy that began with the recip- 
rocal trade legislation and continued in the post- 
war period with the Bretton Woods agreements, 
setting up the International Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund; the Marshall 
Plan; Point 4; the foreign aid programs; the 
Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American 
Bank ; and the Trade Expansion Act. Without 
these actions, much of the world almost cer- 
tainly would have sunk into chaos or Commu- 
nist domination, and, at the very best, what re- 
mained of the free world would be caught in the 
morass of bilateral trade arrangements, quotas, 
exchange controls, and high tariffs erected in 
the 1930's and extended as a consequence of the 
Second World War. 

In the full sense, the choice and the responsi- 
bility rested with the United States. We exer- 
cised that choice and that responsibility affirm- 
atively by leading the way toward a more open 
system of international trade and payments and 
a more rational and mutually beneficial inter- 
national economic environment. 

The results have been dramatic— for the free 
world as a whole and for us. For the first time 
in this century, world trade has grown faster 
than world income. Over the past decade, 
trade has almost doubled. Tlie value of goods 
moving into and out of free-world countries has 
now reached $300 billion a year. And an im- 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


mense interchange of capital, ideas, and tech- 
niques has gone with it. Eising demand in one 
country has expressed itself in stronger export 
markets in other countries. The growing vol- 
ume of trade has contributed to productivity, 
because countries could specialize somewhat 
more on what they do best, because imports 
carry technology and technology is not the mo- 
nopoly of any one country, and because the 
pressure of increased competition is an incentive 
to find new ways of cutting costs. In all these 
respects, ties among free countries have 
strengthened in the postwar period and the free 
■world has become more interdependent — to the 
advantage of all. The enlarged flow of private 
capital and aid funds and the opening up of 
trade have been powerful stimulants to the re- 
covery and sustamed growth of the free- world 

Tlie effects have been no less remarkable for 
the United States. As Europe and Japan re- 
covered from the damage of the war and pros- 
pered, they became stronger markets for our 
own products. Similarly, the gradual rise in 
per capita incomes of the developing countries 
of the world has increased their import require- 
ments from all industrial countries, and par- 
ticularly the United States. Our exports have 
risen by more than $7 billion in the past decade. 
They have been a consistently buoyant force in 
our economy — particularly when demand was 
strong in Western Europe and Japan and slack 
at home. 

This sharp rise in our exports has been par- 
ticularly noticeable in certain important sectors 
of our economy. The product of one out of 
every four acres of our harvested cropland is 
exported abroad. We sell abroad from one- 
fourth to one-third of our production of impor- 
tant types of machinery, including construction 
equipment, mining equipment, oilfield equip- 
ment, textile machinery, and metal-cutting ma- 
chine tools. Foreign markets are very impor- 
tant to our aircraft manufacturing industry; 
they make possible longer production runs, 
lower unit costs, and, ultimately, lower air fares 
in domestic as well as foreign travel. As a 
whole, manufactured goods comprise more than 
half of our total export sales, including the 
varied products of our sophisticated teclmology. 
Selling computers abroad may be a far cry from 

selling whale oil candles, but the principle is 
the same. 

Our imports also have risen during this pe- 
riod and have been equally important to our 
economy and our well-being. They have 
brought to our industry a variety of raw mate- 
rials that we do not produce at all or produce 
in inadequate quantity, as well as variety and 
ijiterest in our own diet. 

Our total trade — exports and imports — is 
now more than $42 billion a year and provides 
jobs for well over 4 million workers. 

Impressive as they are, these statistics do not 
point to a resting place, let alone a stopping 
point. Neither we nor other free-world indus- 
trial countries can afford to equate prosperity 
with existing levels of protection. We must 
not view our own or any other markets as spe- 
cial economic preserves removed from reason- 
able world market competition. Let us remem- 
ber that those who cannot sell to us cannot buy 
from us. 

The signs all point to a more challenging and 
more rewarding horizon. Free-world exports 
are growing by more than $10 billion a year. 
If we persevere with other countries on a course 
toward freer trade, each year will see the crea- 
tion of even larger marketing opportunities. 
Strong American political leadership will be 
necessary to realize these opportunities, and a 
dynamic American economy will be necessary 
to take advantage of them. 

Trade and the Less Developed Countries 

I turn now to another major focus of our 
foreigii economic policy: the less developed 
countries. Let us remind ourselves that these 
contain three-fourths of the people in the free 
world; that their average per capita income is 
only $140 a year; and that only 35 percent of 
them are literate. But these peoples have come 
to realize that they are not doomed by Provi- 
dence to live on the edge of starvation, that 
modern technology makes it possible for man to 
enjoy a decent standard of living. They are 
determined to achieve a better life for them- 
selves and their children. And they are ur- 
gently pressing their leaders for substantial 
economic and social progress. 

They would benefit now from a more open 
trading system and will gain all the more as 



they build their industries. But, at present, 
they form the least dynamic sector in world 
trade. Their central problem is to mobilize, 
in growing amount and in proper combination, 
the investment capital, the human skills, and 
the natural resources, to imderwrite a sustained 
increase in the productivity of their people. 

We sympathize deeply with their aspirations. 
And we understand their problems — especially 
when we recall our own beginnings and our 
long experience as a capital-importing nation. 

In President Johnson's words, "What we de- 
sire for the developing nations is what we desire 
for ourselves — economic progress which will 
permit them to shape their own institutions, and 
the independence which will allow them to take 
a dignified place in the world community." ^ 

We would want to help these peoples to make 
progress even if there were no such thing as 
communism. We would want to help, not only 
because that is our nature as a people but be- 
cause we know that, in the long run, there can- 
not be much stability in a world composed of a 
few who are rich and many who are poor. 

But what we would want to do anyway be- 
comes urgent against the background of the 
underlying crisis of our time — the global strug- 
gle between Communist imperialism and free- 
dom. Both major branches of the Commimist 
world are concentrating their efforts on the 
less developed areas of the world. They make 
the most of ignorance, frustration, and turmoil. 

In dealing with the persistent Communist of- 
fensives in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 
our foreign aid programs are of the utmost 
value. And let us remind ourselves that their 
total cost is only 3 or 4 cents out of our Federal 
tax dollar — only 7 or 8 percent of what we spend 
on our military defenses, less than v:e are spend- 
ing on the exploration of space. We have nearly 
2,700,000 men under arms — nearly 1 million out- 
side the continental United States. Surely it is 
worth 3 or 4 cents of our Federal tax dollar to 
win this contest in the developing areas without 
committing our young men, in large numbers, 
to combat ! 

And if there should be any who think that 
is too much to pay for that purpose, let me point 

' Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 726. 

out that more than 90 percent of our foreign 
aid is in the form of American goods and serv- 
ices. Our aid programs help our agriculture, 
our metallurgical industry, our chemical indus- 
tiy, and our machinery and machine tool in- 
dustries. They are helping to develop tastes 
and future markets for American products. 
And more than half of our economic aid is in 
the fomi of repayable loans. 

Moreover, we are not alone in this business 
of extending aid. The countries which we 
helped to their feet through the Marshall Plan 
have joined us to help others. So have Japan 
and, on a smaller scale, other nations in the 

In 1963 the long-term capital flow to the de- 
veloping countries from the United States 
amounted to $4.8 billion and the flow from 
other industrial free-world countries totaled 
$3.4 billion. These figures include both govern- 
ment-to-government aid and private investment 
capital. The disturbing fact is that the private 
investment portion has not grown for some 

It is essential to increase the flow of private 
capital to the developing countries. There is 
no quicker or better way of transferring tech- 
nology and organizational skills. 

Leaders in some of the new countries, espe- 
cially those whose experience with capitalism 
has been primarily in furnishing it raw materi- 
als, do not yet understand what private enter- 
prise can accomplish. But other countries 
which started out under the influence of more 
or less socialistic dogmas have been learning 
from experience. 

American business is becoming increasingly 
alert to the great difi'erences in conditions and 
outlook among the developing countries and is 
adjusting to these individual situations. The 
work of the Business Council for International 
Understanding typifies tliis constructive trend. 
This group of American businessmen met in 
New Delhi this spring with some of their In- 
dian counterparts and with Indian government 
officials most concerned with industry and for- 
eign investment. From this meeting, I am sure 
tliat American businessmen gained a better ap- 
preciation of the opportunities and require- 
ments for doing business in India and the 
Indians gained a better appreciation of how 

OCTOBER 2G, 1964 


they could profit from American private invest- 
ment and how they could attract it. 

This administration is intent on doing its 
share to encourage this trend. Our Department 
of Commerce provides extensive services to 
American firms interested in investing in the 
developing countries. And our missions over- 
seas report on investment opi>ortmiities and 
offer knowledgeable assistance on local condi- 
tions to American businessmen who go abroad 
to look mto these situations. 

We believe a more powerful incentive is 
needed. For this reason, on March 19, 1964, 
President Johnson recommended ^ and sent to 
Congress a tax credit bill as one measure to 
"utilize private initiative in the United States — 
and in the developing coimtries — to promote 
economic development abroad." Through this 
tax incentive we hope to increase the amount of 
American private investment in the less devel- 
oped countries, emphasize the role of the pri- 
vate sector, and promote the transfer of needed 
teclmical and managerial skills. 

Raising Agricultural Productivity 

Looking ahead, I believe tliat perliaps the 
greatest area of challenge will be in agricul- 
ture — the most basic of all industries. Most of 
the developing countries will need to put more 
emphasis on improving their agriculture and 
on making their rural areas a more active mar- 
ket and stimulus for manufacturing. Private 
investment and the private sector are central to 
the realization of these goals. 

Certainly collectivist methods cannot do the 
job. Every Communist nation has suffered 
from chronic difficulties in food production — 
difficulties inherent in collectivized agi'iculture, 
central direction of industrial production, and 
other features of Communist economic organi- 
zation. The people of the developing countries 
have become increasingly aware that commu- 
nism is not a shortcut to economic progress — 
that it is, in fact, terribly inefficient. 

The need for more emphasis on agriculture 
and for stronger incentives and better tech- 
nology to raise agricultural productivity would 
seem self-evident. Roughly three-fourths of 

" For text of the President's message on foreign aid, 
see ihid., Apr. 0, 19C4, p. 518. 

the people in these coimtries are employed in 
agriculture or allied activities. In one way or 
another the farmer must have the organization, 
the equipment, and the impulse to better his 

An even more fundamental necessity under- 
lies this proposition. Agricultural production 
in the developing areas, and in Asia and Latin 
America particularly, is growing less rapidly 
than popidation. In fact, for the past few years 
grain requirements have been growing by 8 mil- 
lion metric tons a year while production has 
been stagnant. As a result, countries in these 
regions are becoming more, rather than less, de- 
pendent on imports. This is an unliealthy situ- 
ation, and it could beeome an untenable one. 
If current trends aroimd the world continue, 
the point will not be too far off when world 
food stocks will simply not be enough to meet 
minimum needs in the deficit areas. Indeed, 
food imbalances could become so huge that the 
necessary supplies, even if they were available, 
could not physically be moved around the 
world or even properly distributed within the 
food-short countries. 

The solution must lie, in large part, in a rise 
in grain output in the developing countries. 
And since additional land can no longer be 
brought into production in most, of these comi- 
tries, it will be essential to increase yields per 
acre. Developing and industrial countries to- 
gether will have to apply to this task the kmd 
of effort, planning, and determination that the 
modem world now applies to the conquest of 

There is a large gap in grain yields per acre 
between the most productive and the least pro- 
ductive agricultural countries. To narrow this 
gap will require a systematic and comprehen- 
sive program, including : 

— a large-scale technical research effort tai- 
lored to individual soils and climates, 

— massive quantities of fertilizer and other 
capital inputs, 

— new methods to control water for irrigation, 

— the organizational ability to apply tJiese 
teclmiques effectively to the land, 

— adequate price incentives, 

— more fann credit, 

— better marketing arrangements, and 



— the inflow of low-priced manufactured in- 
centive goods from urban industries. 

American companies, American experience, 
and American teclmology can play an enor- 
mously helpful role. The astomiding increases 
in grain yields that continue to be achieved in 
American agriculture are the result of effective 
teamwork between the American farmer and 
American industrial companies. We should be 
able to apply the same techniques in the develop- 
ing countries. We have made the greatest 
advances in agricultural chemistry, our farm 
extension service has been a model for other 
countries to follow, our companies are experi- 
menting widely with the desalting of sea water, 
and our great distribution companies and their 
catalogs pioneered the way toward making 
urban-rural trade an important stimulus to 
economic growth. 

I have been talking about our foreign eco- 

nomic policies. At the risk of reviving an old 
phrase which left a bad taste, we might call 
these policies "dollar diplomacy — modem 
style." But the emphasis must be on "modern 
style," for these policies are as far removed from 
the old "dollar diplomacy" as modern capitalism 
is from the primitive capitalism which Karl 
Marx obsei-ved. 

Our foreign economic policies today are 
designed to strengthen our economy and, in the 
words of the preamble of our Constitution, to 
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity" — not by exploiting anyone 
else but by moving forward together with others 
toward a better life. Our goal in President 
Jolmson's words is "a world of peace and justice, 
and freedom and abundance, for our time and 
for all time to come." * 

■* For text of President Johnson's state of the Union 
message of Jan. 8, 1964, see ibid.. Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 8 

Press release 442 dated October S 

Secretary Rusk: Good morning, gentlemen. 
I have no opening statement. I am ready for 
your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary., Chancellor Erhard has 
{ndlcated the United States and Germany might 
consider forming the multilateral nuclear fleet 
hy themselves if the other allies decide not to go 
along. Would the United States do this? 

A. Well, this is a contingency that has not yet 
arisen. We and the Gennan Government agree 
that the multilateral force should be a force 
which has the participation of a considerable 
number of NATO countries. As you know, 
there is a working group of eight nations that 
has been meeting in Paris to look into this 
matter. Our own target continues to be that 
that was stated in the joint communique of 
Chancellor Erhard and President Jolmson in 

1 For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 992. 

June of this year,^ in which they said that they 
were agreed that the proposed multilateral 
force would make a significant addition to this 
military and political strength — that is of 
NATO — and that efforts should be continued to 
ready an agreement for signature by the end of 
the year. 

Now we are at the end of the first week in 
October. That group in Paris is working con- 
tinuously. We still have the purpose of going 
ahead with that force with the participation of 
a considerable number of NATO countrias, and 
I am sure that that is the objective both in 
NATO and both — and in Bonn and in Wash- 
ington. Therefore I think that these contin- 
gencies, alternative contingencies, have not 
arisen, our purpose continues to be the same, 
and I am optimistic about the outcome. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, while we are on the suhject 
of NATO and nuclear iveapons, Senator Gold- 
water says that the NATO Commander in Chief 

OCTOBER 26. 1964 


has some authority to use nuclear weapons. Is 
that correct? 

A. Well, I am not going to embroider on what 
the President has said in his Seattle speech.^ 
This is a matter for the President and for the 
Secretary of Defense, and my task as Secretary 
of State is to keep this problem very much on the 
hypothetical list, because my purpose is to try 
to work out our relations with other countries 
to protect the vital interests of the United States 
without having that issue come to the front. 
But I have nothing to add whatever to what the 
President said m his Seattle speech on that 

Q. Mr. Secretary., there have been reports 
jrom Saigon, in fact even some lohlspering here 
in Wa.shinfffon, to the effect that the administra- 
tion is now considering some major turn in its 
policy toward South Viet-Nam but is holding 
any decision off until after the election. I 
wonder, sir, if you have any comment on this? 

A. Yes. I should like to hit that one just as 
hard as I possibly can. South Viet-Nam is a 
major issue of war and peace. The question of 
whether Hanoi and Peiping will leave their 
southern neighbors alone is a major issue. This 
is not a matter which any President of the 
United States can deal with in electoral terms, 
and I can tell you — and I hope it is not an indis- 
cretion — that the President has made it very 
clear to his own principal advisers that the de- 
cisions that are required with respect to Soutli 
Viet-Nam have nothing to do with the Ameri- 
can elections. No President can take such a 
view on such a far-reaching and basic issue of 
war and peace. And so our policy is to do 
everything that we can to assist the Vietnamese 
to meet this problem. 

We cannot with certainty predict the future, 
because there are those in Hanoi and Peiping 
who are helping to write the scenario on this 
problem, but we are deeply committed to the 
security of Southeast Asia and to the security 
of South Viet-Nam. This has notliing to do 
with our electoral process liere. We are not 
concealing anything or postponing or marking 

•/&M., Oct. 5. 1964, p. 458. 

time or refusing to make the decisions that are 
required by that situation because there is an 
election going on in this country. No Presi- 
dent could do that. Republican or Democratic, 
and there is just nothing in that kind of talk 

U.N. Peacekeeping Assessments 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, with the U.N. session 
due to open in November, the United States 
and the Soviet Union appear to be headed on 
a collision course over the matter of the peace- 
keeping assessments and loss of vote. Do you 
see any prospect for resolving this issue? 
And, secondly, if this issue is not resolved 
amicably, loould you anticipate tlmt it could be 
a blockade to other East-West adjustments? 

A. Well, Mr. [Murrey] Marder, first let me 
emphasize that this is not an issue between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. This 
is an issue between the Soviet Union and cer- 
tain other countries who have not paid their 
assessments in accordance with the decisions 
of the General Assembly and all the rest of the 
United Nations. The attitude of the Soviet 
Union on this matter is somewhat like the 
troika proposals. Their attitude deeply affects 
the constitutional structure of the United Na- 
tions. Now, the ability to assess contributions 
is the only mandatory authority which the ■ 
General Assembly possesses, and this is the only 
mandatory authority in which the great bulk 
of tlio United Nations membership participates. 
Every small country member of the United 
Nations has a stake in this constitutional issue 
in the United Nations itself; so the issue here 
is not a bilateral issue between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The question is 
whether the United Nations is going to con- 
tinue on the basis of the charter, and article 19 
is very precise and specific on this point. 

So that we hope very much that some arrange- 
ment can be made by which this issue is re- 
moved. We are not asking for or looking forj 
some disagreeable aiid bitter confrontation on 
this point. But we do recognize that this point 
is essential to the future integrity and structure' 
of the United Nations and that every member; 
has a stake in it. Now we hope that somehow 



some arrangement can be made, some payments 
made, some solution found before the General 
Assembly opens in November. But we have no 
doubt whatever that there is involved here a 
basic constitutional issue for the United Na- 
tions as a whole. It is in no sense a bilateral 
issue between the United States and the Soviet 

Q. Well, sir, just to follow that xip, on the 
second part of that question, while it is not 
essentially a bilateral issue between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, if in fact this is- 
sue is not agreed to in the United Nations would 
the net effect of the disagreement he a general 
impediment to measures to reach further dimi- 
nution of tension between East and West? 

A. Well, I think it is too soon yet to comment 
on that. You will recall that, in the troika pro- 
posal when the Soviet Union found itself faced 
with the near unanimity of the entire United 
Nations, they found a way to modify their atti- 
tude. And I think that it is important for the 
overwhelming majority of the United Nations 
to make it clear that on this issue, this basic 
constitutional issue, some adjustment in the 
Soviet position will have to be found. 

I can't predict for you what will happen a 
month from now when the General Assembly 
opens, but of course this is an issue which will be 
there — unless it is solved before then — it will be 
there when the hammer falls for the opening 
of the General Assembly, because it will arise 
in connection with the first vote cast in the pro- 
ceedings of the General Assembly. 

Q. Mr. Secretary/, some of the nonalined coun- 
tries attending the Cairo conference suspect that 
it is the United States that is behind Mr. 
Tshombe^s [Moise Tshombe, Prime Minister of 
the Republic of the Congo'\ insistence upon be- 
ing seated there. Would you care to comment 
on this, sir? 

A. Well, the question — the precise answer to 
your question is that we are not behind anything 
in this particular situation. But we are quite a 
few thousand miles away in a situation that is 
changing from hour to hour, and I would pre- 
fer not to comment on it any further. I think 
it is of some concern, some importance, that in 

an international meeting delegates undertake to 
determine who siiall represent governments in- 
vited to the meeting, because if that principle 
were followed very far it could go a very long 
way and give rise to a great many complications 
in the very structure of international affairs. 
But we are not involved in this particular 
episode, and I think it is better for me not to say 
very much about it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a moment ago in connec- 
tion with this U.N. problem, you mentioned 
the — you used the words '■'' arrangement'''' and 
'■'' adjustment.'''' Just to clarify your view, 
xoould the United States support any solution 
that loould be anything less than full com- 
pliance with the assessments and full pay- 

A. No. I think there has to be an applica- 
tion and enforcement of article 19 of the char- 
ter. That is a basic attitude not only of our 
Government but of a great many others. 

Eemember that the World Court decision on 
this subject was ratified, approved by a major- 
ity of something like, I think, 75 to, what was 
it, 15 or 17, in the General Assembly.' And 
the World Court decided that these were proper 
assessments, they are part of the regular ex- 
penses of the organization, and that they were 
compulsory upon members. So that there is 
no question whatever about our view and the 
view of what we consider to be a very substan- 
tial majority of the United Nations on tliis 

Public Support for Main Lines of U.S. Policy 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have done a good deal 
of speaking within the country. I wonder if 
you could reflect upon that for a minute and tell 
us what parts of the administration'' s foreign 
policy seem to puzzle or perplex people most 

'The General Assembly on Dec. 19, 1962, adopted a 
resolution (U.N. doc. A/RES/1854(XVII.) ) accepting 
the opinion of the International Court of Justice by a 
vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions ; for bacliground 
and texts of two resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly on Dec. 19 on financing peacelvceping opera- 
tions, see Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30. For back- 
ground and texts of seven resolutions on financing 
adopted on June 27, 1963, at the fourth special session 
of the General Assembly, see iUd., July 29, 1963, p. 17a 

OCTOBER 20. 1964 


as reflected in the questions that you get as you 
go around the country? 

A. "Well, I felt, as I have been around the 
coiuitry in the last 3i/^ years, that there con- 
tinues to be a very broad public support for the 
main lines of the bipartisan policy of the 
United States in this postwar period — support 
for the United Nations; support for our great 
alliances; support for foreig;n aid, although 
people would be glad to be relieved of that bur- 
den if it were possible to be relieved; support 
for trade expansion, for the Peace Corps, for 
the Alliance for Progress, and all these other 
great elements in our bipartisan policy. 

Now, it is true that we are carrying heavy 
burdens, but freedom has never been free and 
those burdens are necessary. And I have my- 
self gotten the impression in my discussions 
with groups, both in public sessions and in pri- 
vate conversations, that most of the American 
people understand the requirements of this 
present world situation. I have not myself 
encountered, shall I say, bitter partisan aspects 
on this matter, although I'm sure that those 
with whom I have talked include supporters of 
both principal candidates. But when you can 
sit down in a quiet conversation with people, I 
think you will find that reason normally 

I could illustrate that in another way, Mr. 
[Max] Frankel. I have attended now perhaps 
at least 200 executive sessions of congressional 
committees to talk about difficult and complex 
and sometimes dangerous foreign policy issues. 
Not once have the judgments of those commit- 
tees divided along partisan lines— not once. 

Now, there have be«n differences of view be- 
cause many of these problems involve on -balance 
decisions, almost knife-edge, hairline decisions, 
because they are complicated and difficult. But 
those differences of judgments have not fol- 
lowed partisan patterns in these executive ses- 
sions where you can talk out the full difficulty 
and the full agony of these situations. 

I don't really l)elieve, despite the fact that 
we are in a vei-y, shall we say, lively electoral 
campaign, I don't really believe that the princi- 
pal issu&s in our relations with the rest of the 
world are partisan in character or accepted by 
the American people as being partisan in char- 

OAS Cooperation on Cuban Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes? 

Q. Mt. William Miller, the gentleman against 
tvhom, for one brief shining moment you were 
considered a jjossible oppanent, has brought up 
the issue of the Cuban situation again, saying 
th-at our policy doesni't offer anything to the 
people in Cuba who want freedom there. I 
wonder if you could revieio whether you believe 
our policy tliere is bearing fruit? 

A. Well, that invites a considerable essay, 
because the present administration was not re- 
sponsible for the prevention of a Communist 
Cuba. We were confronted with the problem 
of cure, and the cure is more difficult than 

But we felt that it was verj' important to 
work in harmony with and in solidarity with 
the other members of this hemisphere, that this 
should not be treated as solely a bilateral prob- 
lem, partly because to the extent there was a 
problem it was more of a problem for many of 
our neighbors than it was for the United States, 
given our ix)wer and given the solidarity and 
integrity of our own political institutions. 

We have been very much encouraged by the 
attitude of the rest of the hemisphere toward 
this problem. Whereas in the autumn of 1960 * 
it was not possible for the hemisphere even to 
refer to Cuba as the source of a tlireat, in the 
meetings of foreign ministers at Punta del Este 
in l^Q'i,^ at the time of the Cuban missile crisis,^ 
and at the end of July — in Washington — of this 
year,' it was veiy clear tliat the hemisphere 
has moved to the full recognition of the nature 
of this threat to the hemisphere and has taken 
steps to deal with it and meet it. 

Now, I think it's very important that we 
move on an OAS [Organization of American 
States] basis, and I believe that has been sug- 
gested also by some of the candidates on the 
other side. But that carries with it the obli- 
gation to consult witli and act in solidarity with 

' For backKrouncl, soe ibid., Sept. 12, 19C0, p. 395. 
" Ihid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 
" Ibid., Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720. 
' Ibid., Auft. 10, 1964, p. 174. 



the otlier members of the hemisphere m all 
aspects of this problem. 

Now, in the most i-ecent meeting of the foreign 
ministers/ we applied what miglit probably be 
considered the remaining peaceful measures 
with respect to Cuba, to make it clear to Castro 
that his attempt to interfere in other countries 
of this hemisphere must stop and must stop 
now. We hope very much, all of us in the 
hemisphere, that that message gets through and 
is taken seriously, because it was a most serious 

As you luiow, 19 of the 20 members of the 
hemisjDliere have broken relations with Castro. 
Trade has been broken between the hemisphere 
and Castro, except in foodstuffs and medicines. 
Sea transportation has been interrupted except 
as required for humanitarian purposes. And 
other countries in other parts of the world have 
been asked by the hemisphere to consider what 
steps they can take to express their solidarity 
with this hemisphere in dealing with this 

Now, if the Cuban government continues with 
any program of interference with other coun- 
tries in this hemisphere, then I thinlv we shall 
have a very serious situation and we shall have 
to deal with it on a hemispheric basis. 

India's Nuclear Capacity 

Q. Mr. Secretary, loithin the last week India 
has said, in light of some possibilities of Chinese 
nuclear explosion, that it can change its policy 
and start developing nuclear toeapons loithin 
a year or 18 months if they consider it necessary. 
What would the United States attitude he to- 
ward this development if India does decide it 
was necessary to change its policy? 

A. Well, it is my impression that the Prime 
Minister [Lai Bahadur Shastri] and other of- 
ficials in the Indian Govenmient have indi- 
cated that their attitude moves in the other 
direction. It is true, as I think all of us know, 
that India has the capacity to move, and to 
move fairly promptly, into the nuclear weap- 
ons field. They have the necessaiy capacity 
in nuclear physics, they have the necessary in- 
dustrial plant. But they have indicated that 

they do not intend to go down this trail. 

Wo feel that India's decision to direct its 
exploitation of nuclear energy to peaceful pur- 
poses only is a great contribution to world 
peace and to the welfare of humanity, both in 
India and throughout the world. India's pol- 
icy, which was restated by Prime Minister 
Shastri just yesterday, sharfjly contrasts with 
that of Communist China. 

You see, here's a country that is among those 
who could move in this direction and they have 
announced that they do not intend to move in 
this direction. And that is a course of re- 
sti'aint and moderation which looks toward 
the longer range possibilities of jDeace. You 
see, it's not just a question of whether one 
other nuclear power comes into being. The 
question is what happens if 15, 20, 25 nuclear 
powers come into being. And it is important 
that all govermnents look at this as a very 
sober problem, as to how we deal with this 
Pandora's box that was opened some 20 years 

Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 

Q. Mr. Secretary, particularly in the light of 
the talks here this week with President Maoa- 
pagal of the Philippines, would you assess or 
reassess for us how you see the situation between 
Indonesia and Malaysia 'and, also, whether you the concern of the Philippine Govern- 
ment that they, too, may become a target for 
Indonesian infiltration or interference of some 

A. Well, on the first point, it has been our 
hope all along that such issues as exist between 
Malaysia and Indonesia can be settled by peace- 
ful processes. We joined with eight other mem- 
bers of the Security Council in expressmg our 
very deep concern about the armed actions taken 
by Indonesia against Malaysia." 

We see no reason, looking at it objectively 
from a distance, as to why these two countries 
need to be in any soi-t of armed conflict with 
eiach other. We think it is very important that 
the normal processes of peaceful settlement be 
employed for whatever disputes exist and that 

"/ft id. 

"For background, see iUi., Sept. 28, 1064, p. 448, 
and Oct. 5, 1964, p. 489. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


all parties act in accordance with the charter. 
On the second part of your question, I point 
out that our own defense arrangements with 
the Philippines are very far-reaching, are with- 
out qualification, and that if there is an attack 
on the Philippines from any quarter, that is an 
attack on the United States. And I would 
think that it would be very reckless, indeed, for 
anyone to suppose that there is any doubt what- 
ever about our commitment to the security of 
the Philippines. 

Conference of Nonalined Nations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been several years 
since the neutralists or nonalined leaders have 
gotten together, as they are now in Cairo. Can 
you say whether you see any new trends in the 
direction of that movement or any new tone 
in the content of the discussions that are going 
on now in Cairo? 

A. Well, quite frankly, I haven't had vei-y 
much infonnation yet on just how those discus- 
sions are going. They have not yet made pub- 
lic pronouncements in a communique or in res- 
olutions passed, at least that I am aware of. 
Aiid, as you know, a certain episode involving 
the Congo has taken the newspaper play away 
from the other things that might be considered 
by that conference. 

So that, perhaps, if this press conference were 
being held tomorrow, I might be able to be 
more responsive to your question. But it is 
too early yet, I think, to say. 

As you Icnow, President Johnson sent a mes- 
sage '" to the conference which outlines our at- 
titude toward it. We hope they have a good 
meeting and that they deal responsibly with 
some of the very large issues that are before 
the world community. 

We may get some indication from that meet- 
ing as to attitudes on questions that will un- 
doubtedly come up before the next meeting of 
the General Assembly. But it is too soon yet 
for me to comment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Prime Minister 
Shastri proposed that a delegation he sent to 

" See p. 581. 

China to try to dissuade the Peiping govern- 
ment from detonating some kind of nuclear de- 
vice. I loonder, sir, if it would be the position 
of the U.S. Government to support this kind 
of general approach to the Chinese, to dissuade 

A. Well, this is a nonalined conference. And 
it is not for me to get in the way of a nonalined 
conference by expressing a view on this matter. 

But I do recall that almost all of the members 
of this conference now meeting in Cairo have, 
in times past, expressed their very great inter- 
est in the elimination of nuclear testing and, 
particularly, nuclear testing in the atmosphere. 
This has been made clear at the United Nations. 
Their spokesmen at the Geneva disarmament 
conference made this clear. I think all of them 
who were there, or practically all of them who 
were there, have signed the nuclear test ban 

So I would suppose that the prospect of the 
resumption of atmospheric testing would be a 
matter of deep concern to them. How they 
would deal with it is for them to judge. 

Yes, sir. 

Viet-Nam and Laos 

Q. Mr. Secretary, going hack to an earlier 
question on Viet-Nam and forgetting the elec- 
tion date for a minute, do you foresee a shift 
in the administration policy toxoard a deeper 
involvement in the political, military, and eco- 
nomic situation there; of course, assuming that 
President Johnson is reelected? 

A. Well, it is not for me to try to predict 
the future. As I say, on a day-by-day and 
week-by-week basis, we make the necessary de- 
cisions in consultation with the South Viet- 
namese Government that we feel are required 
by the situation. 

But, since there are others who are writing 
the scenario for the future, I don't want to 
undertake to be a prophet here. I do want to 
make it very clear, however, that we are not 
going to pull away from our connnitmcnts to 
the security of Southeast Asia, and specifically 
South Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have seen General 



Phoumi Nosavan this xoeek. I wonder if you 
could tell us your evaluation of the situation 
in Laos after the Paris conference, and what 
i& going on there now? 

A. "Well, we regretted that the talks, which 
have been going on in Paris, have not thus far 
sliown any determination on the part of the 
other side to comply with the Geneva accords 
of 1962." As you know, deputies remain in 
Paris, and there is a possibility of additional 
contacts; and some of the principals are now 
back in Laos, and they might have contacts 

But our policy continues to be in support of 
the Geneva accords of 1962. It is our very 
deep conviction that, if all the foreigners would 
leave the Laotians alone, they would work out 
their own atfairs without violence and there 
would be no threat to any of their neighbors. 

We see no reason why, if there is a modicum 
of good will on the other side, we could not 
pick up the 1962 accords and bring about the 
full implementation of those accords, because 
the underlying policy of those accords must 
leave the Laotians alone so that they could 
work out their own affairs in their o\va way. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

A. Thank you. 

President Johnson Sends Message 
to Nonalined Nations Conference 

Following is the text of a message from Pres- 
ident Johnson to the Conference of Nonalined 
Nations, which opened at Cairo, United Arab 
Republic, on October 5. 

White House press release dated October 5 

October 5, 1964. 
Peace in our troubled world is the hope of 
all men of good will. All governments that 
would faithfully serve their people, that would 
strive to realize their dreams, must have the 
unwavering quest of peace as a primary con- 
cern. So the delegations gathered in Cairo 
have an opportunity in their deliberations to 

" For texts, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 

help advance this gi-eat common of man- 

You have recognized this opportunity — and 
this cliallenge — by making the safeguarding 
and the strengthening of world peace your first 
order of business. Every positive step taken 
to settle international disputes peacefully — or 
to eliminate their causes before tliey reach 
crisis proportions — brings us all closer to the 
goal we share. 

As you all know, the United States has been 
in the forefront of those seeking to strengthen 
world peace through sensible and safeguarded 
measures of disarmament. We pledge our- 
selves anew to this great task. 

The United States enjoys friendly relations 
with nearly all nations represented at your con- 
ference. The United States shares with all 
your peoples the same basic values and aspira- 
tions — for human rights and the dignity of the 
individual, for freedom from all forms of ex- 
ploitation or domination by outside forces, for 
the right of each nation, in every area of the 
world, to develop political and economic sys- 
tems of its own choosing, and to realize its own 
dreams in its own way. 

Unfortunately, these legitimate national 
aspirations are still denied to many peoples. 
Unfortunately, aggression often masks itself in 
new forms of imperialism while attacking the 
imperialism of the past. Unfortunately, the 
centuries-old problems of poverty, illness and 
illiteracy continue to afflict a high percentage 
of the human race. 

The United States has joined with most of 
you in the past in trying to deal with these 
difficult and complicated problems by peaceful 
means. We hope to continue and expand this 

A year ago this week, one of our most im- 
portant accomplishments — the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty — went into effect. We Americans 
are proud of the role that President Kennedy 
and the United States Government played in 
obtaining that Treaty. It was a great step for- 
ward — but it was not enough. We will not be 
satisfied until the awesome power of the atom 
is harnessed for peace alone, and men can live 
out their lives with assurance that they will not 
be suddenly obliterated in the night. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


John F. Kennedy is no longer with us. We 
mourn his loss, and work to make real his 
dreams for a better world. Another gi-eat 
peacemaker, Jawaharlal Nehru, has also been 
taken from us, but his visions for a better world 
were never more alive. 

"We Americans live in a diversified society. 
We are a nation of many minority groups — 
from almost every land. For tliis reason, we 
cherish as a guiding principle the right of men 
and of groups to hold diverse views so long, of 
course, as the expression of those views does not 
interfere with the security or the welfare of 

We defend that principle among ourselves. 
We support and respect its application in our 
relations with all responsible governments. 

Finally, we gi-eet you as fellow members of 
the United Nations, which has done so much 
to guard the peace and to point the way to a 
better world order. Tliere we join together in 
a parliament in which the strong and the weak, 
the rich and the less prosperous, the old and 
the new nations share the floor, the platform 
and the responsibility in common cause. These 
are rights to be cherished by us all as we sustain 
and strengthen our organization to better serve 
us all tliis year, next year, and into our common 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Honduras, Ricardo Midence Soto, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on October 6. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 436 dated October 6. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Uganda, 
Solomon Bayo Asea, presented his credentials 
to President Jolmson on October 6. For texts 
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release 434 dated October 6. 

President Johnson Meets With 
NATO Secretary General 

ManUo Brosio, Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaby Organization^ visited the 
United States September 27-30. During his 
visit he met luith President Johnson, Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Rob- 
ert S. McNamara. Secretary of the Treasury 
Douglas Dillon, and other Goveimment officials. 
On September 29 President Johnson gave a 
luncheon at the White House in his honor. 
Later that day Mr. Brosio accompanied the 
President on an inspection trip to Offutt Air 
Force Base, Omaha, Nebr. Folloiuing are their 
excliange of toasts at the luncheon and their re- 
marks on departing from, Offutt Air Force Base. 


White House press release dated September 29 

President Johnson 

Mr. Secretai-y General, distinguished guests: 
I am very pleased today to welcome Secretary 
General Brosio to this house. 

He has come as the chief officer of the NATO 
alliance and as the representative of half a bil- 
lion people united in the defense of freedom 
under the North Atlantic Treaty. 

It gives me pride and a great amoimt of pleas- 
ure to have the opportunity to have assembled 
in this room some of the chief arcliitects of this 
great imion and some of the men who have 
played such an important part in its develop- 

We are particularly honored to have the dis- 
tinguished ambassadors from the member coun- 
tries, our own respected General [Lauris] Nor- 
.stad, who served with such distinction, our 
former distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. 
[Dean] Acheson, Mr. [Walter] Lippmann, and 
others who have followed the development of 
this great organization tlu'ough the years. 

Secretary General Brosio comes here today 
as our friend. He has served with great distinc- 
tion as Ambassador of the Italian Republic to 
this country. His country's readiness to let such 
a talented public servant go to work for NATO 



is real evidence of the deep interest and tlie very 
vital role that his country, Italy, plays in this 
very great alliance. 

NATO owes much to the distinguished line of 
men who have served in the high oflice of Secre- 
taiy General. 

NATO is a vast organization, but it is also a 
most intimate alliance. 

In 15 years it has grown impressively in con- 
fidence, in strength, and in character. It is the 
most successful and the most peaceful alliance 
in liistory. 

For us in the United States NATO is a tested 
and a recognized cornerstone of United States 
foreign policy. It has and it will continue to 
have the strongest bipartisan support from the 
leaders of this Government. 

After 15 years the Atlantic area is more se- 
cure than ever. Aggression and threats to free- 
dom in Europe have been turned back. 

All our peoples can take pride in what we 
have really achieved. 

But the real task of defending liberty and 
freedom is never done. The security of our 
alliance is only assured so long as we remain 
determined and strong and insist on protecting 
our people and their values. 

I would have you know again that America's 
commitment to this alliance is real, firm, and 
substantial. It was not given lightly. The 
considered American decision in 1949 to par- 
ticipate in NATO — and some of the legislators, 
like Senator [Clinton] Anderson, are in this 
room today who participated in its creation — 
represented a most historic break with isola- 
tionism in this country. Now and in the future 
this commitment remains as firm as facts and 
strength can make it. 

Allied defense is indivisible. American se- 
curity depends on the security of tlie alliance as 
a whole, and the alliance m turn depends upon 
the strategic strength of the United States. We 
believe that all of our adversaries imderstand 
this, and we hoije so do the free peoples of the 

As our beloved and distinguished Secretary 
of State has said so many times, this nation 
does not seek to dominate anyone. Within our 
alliance there is room for the efforts of us all, 

and there is room for new patterns of shared 
responsibility. We are ready and willing and 
anxious — and eager — to work together with all 
of our friends to make doubly sure that our 
strength will be as clear tomorrow as it is today. 

America seeks a growing partnership of 
freedom, a partnership that is based on shared 
respect of reality and shared responsibility for 
effective defense. 

NATO's strength has increased by virtue of 
the additional sacrifices that the Congress and 
our own country have made in the field of build- 
ing our own strength in the last few years under 
the unique and highly skilled leadership of our 
great Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. 

Mr. Secret ai-y General, we in the United 
States — all of us — believe in NATO, and that 
is why we have taken this occasion to come here 
and in our own little way honor NATO and 
honor j'our presence in this house. 

We all know that yours is a vital role in a 
very vital organization. We are confident that 
the affairs of this alliance have been placed 
in good hands, in your hands, and while you 
are Secretary General, and as long as you are, 
we in America look forward to a period of the 
closest possible cooperation and support. 
■% ^ So, my distinguished guests, I ask all of you 
to join me in a toast to Secretary General 
Brosio, who serves a dynamic alliance and 
through it serves the great cause in which all 
of us believe so strongly — the cause of peace, 
the cause of freedom, and the cause of justice 
for all of the people of the world. 

Secretary General Brosio 

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, the Am- 
bassadors, gentlemen: I will say only a few 
words because I am really and deeply moved. 

I am moved, Mr. President, by the honor you 
have done me today in inviting me to this lunch 
in the company of such a distinguished group 
of businessmen in the United States and in 
many allied and friendly countries. 

I remember, Mr. President, when I saw you 
the first time, and then I had the opportunity 
of meeting you several times at the Senate of 
the United States. I remember my first meet- 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


ing with you in your office when I called on you 
as Leader of the Majority. I admired you then 
as I admire you now. 

I am moved because I am back here in Wash- 
ington where I worked over 6 years for my 
country and for the friendship between the 
United States and Italy, moved because around 
here are so many people who cooperated with 
me then, assisted me with their advice, with 
their opinions, with their moral support. 

Now I come here in a different capacity. I 
am no more the representative of one ally in 
the NATO alliance, but I am the servant of the 
15 countries of the alliance. 

You were so kind, Mr. President, as to use 
the word "leadership." Leadership of the al- 
liance belongs to the countries and especially 
to the countries who more deserve it by the 
effort they contribute to its strength and to its 
moral power. I am only, as I said, a faithful 
servant, and I hope I will always be. 

Certainly I am proud that an Italian has been 
chosen for this post, and I am glad that a Euro- 
pean has been chosen again for this post, as it 
has been three other times. 

I am proud to follow such remarkable men as 
Lord Ismay, as Paul-Henri Spaak, and as Dirk 

The North Atlantic Alliance is essentially the 
mutual defense of Europe and America, and it 
is good that a European represents the alliance 
at this post of Secretary General, because there 
is great hope for the alliance, Mr. President, in 
the possibility that Europe through a larger 
and larger and to a deeper and deeper degree of 
unity may contribute better with more strength, 
with more authority, to these alliances of ours 
which should and will remain as the essential 
pillar of our freedom and of our peace. 

I am deeply conscious of this. The only 
contribution I am sure to bring to the alliance 
is a part of the little experience, through the 
confidence of my Government, I have gathered 
in different countries in the last 18 years. The 
only contribution I am really sure to bring to 
the alliance is the contribution of a loyalty with- 
out reserve, of a conviction without limitations, 
and with an entire dedication and a will to give 
all my energies to the consolidation, to the con- 
tinuation, and to the success of these alliances. 

I entirely share your opinion, Mr. President, 

that the ultimate goal of the alliance apart 
from defense is peace. 

I am profoundly convinced that, if pence has 
been preserved with freedom in Europe and in 
our area, that has been due to the strength and 
to the unity of the alliance; and as long as the 
strength and the unity will continue, we will be 
safe, and today, if something happened in a dif- 
ferent direction, we would be in danger. 

These are the feelings which move me today, 
and I owe this visit to your great country which 
has given such an amazing contribution with 
such generosity, with such a wisdom, to our al- 

I am glad that I am here, and I assui'e you, 
Mr. President, that this day has confirmed my 
conviction that I will always find here full 
support and full comprehension. 

I am not saying just the usual words of com- 
pliment if I say that my talks these days with 
the most responsible people of the United States 
Government have been extremely frank, ex- 
tremely useful, and we have tried to get into the 
main problems of the alliance as deeply as we 
could, with the sole intent of understanding each 
other and seeing generally what should be done 
and in which direction we are going to move in 
the future. 

I believe that this will be the good direction 
and that with your help, Mr. President, with the 
help of your country, we will succeed. We will 
succeed in our tasks in defense of peace and in 
defense of freedom. 

May I thank you, Mr. President, and may I 
thank all of the gentlemen here who have hon- 
ored me with their presence. May I assure 
them and assure you, Mr. President, that I will 
leave this country encouraged and determined 
even more to fulfill my duties unflinchingly and 
to be worthy of the great honor which has been 
done to me and of the great confidence which 
has been shown for me. 


White House press release dated September 29 

President Johnson 

General [Thomas S.] Power, General [Cur- 
tis] LeMay, ladies and gentlemen: The Secre- 
tary General and I have now completed almost 



2 liours of liard work with this brilliant and 
dedicated staff of tlie Strategic Air Connnand. 
I think that both of us have gained fresh under- 
standing of the intimate relation between the 
strategic strength of the United States and the 
defense of the North Atlantic alliance. We 
have had presented in some detail the military 
facts and figures which support the great and 
simple political reality that is set forth in our 
treaty, namely that the defense of one is the 
defense of all. 

AYe have learned again what we already 
knew, that the strength and the skill of (his 
command are absolutely vital to the peace of 
the Atlantic world. We recognize that the mis- 
sion of this command is peace, and we had re- 
lated to us this afternoon the capacity, the num- 
bers, the procedures, the overall plans, and the 
great amount of thinking that has gone into 
accomplishing that mission, namely preserving 
the peace. This day has thus brought new en- 
couragement to me, and I hope also to my 
friend, the distinguished Secretary General. 

So we are grateful to all of you and to the 
State of Xebraska for all that we have seen. 
We also thank you for your distance from 
Washington — on the plane ride out and back, 
Mr. Brosio and I are finding a chance for some 
quiet conversations together concerning the 
future ne«ds and the future hopes of our great 
alliance. The success of NATO is evident in 
every member country, in peace and prosperitj', 
and in confidence in the future. Yet our very 
success creates new problems for tomorrow. 

The work of freedom is i-eally never done, 
and as we go back to these discussions let me 
thank all of you again for this very jDrofitable 
afternoon in Omaha. I have been here several 
times during the 13 years that General Power 
has been connected with the Strategic Air Com- 
mand, and I have had numerous briefings from 
him and from his staff. I feel, as I believe most 
Americans do, deeply in his debt, and tlie debt 
of the dedicated men who serve with him, for 
their love of rountrj' and for their proficiency 
to accomplish tlie mission assigned them. I 
want to tliank the members of the families of 
the men assigned to this command. They are 
called upon to make many sacrifices, and just 
as their men's mission is peace, I guess they 
sacrifice with a smile, because wherever I go 

and I see the Strategic Air Force, I am stimu- 
lated and inspired. 

Since General LeMay is here with us today, 
all of you really represent a great monument to 
his thinking and to his ])lanning. Now that 
we realize the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating and you have preserved the peace now 
for almost 20 years, I think you can return to 
your homes this evening with a proper and jus- 
tified "well done" from your Chief. Inciden- 
tally, just to show you that I really mean it, I 
added a good deal to my budget this year by 
insisting on a pay raise for all of you. 

Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Brosio, would have 
something that he would like to say to you now. 

Secretary General Brosio 

Thank you, Mr. President. 

General Power, ladies and gentlemen of 
Omaha : I want only to say that I am very 
happy to be back in Omaha again. I have been 
here a few j^ears ago, that is in 1957, when Gen- 
eral LeMay was still commander here. I am 
very glad to be back tonight. 

I have seen new, interesting things; I have 
learned a lot. But I am above all very deeply 
honored to have had the opportunity of coming 
tonight on the invitation and in the company of 
the President of the United States. This is a 
thing I am Jiot going to forget so easily. 

I have seen really the contribution to the de- 
fense not only of the United States but also of 
Europe by this central base and command of the 
Western World which is absolutely indispensa- 
ble and decisive. That convinces me and con- 
vinces all Europeans, I think, of the absolute 
necessity of continuing the close links which 
tie us in our essential Atlantic alliance. I also 
share entirely what the President of the ITnited 
States has told you just now — that all this huge 
preparation, which needs an enormous amount 
of intelligence, of skill, of patience, and of cour- 
age, is intended only to defend peace, is intended 
primarily to prevent war. And in these 15 
years of life of the Atlantic alliance, thanks to 
this preparation, thanks to our unity and soli- 
darity, peace has been preserved. I am sure we 
will be able to preserve it with the same methods 
and with the same spirit for the future in the 
interest of the freedom and the welfare of the 
people of the United States and Europe. 



The New Role of Japan in World Affairs: An American Policy View 

by Robert T7. Bamett 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ' 

President [Harold C] Case, members of the 
planning committee, ladies and gentlemen: I 
am deliglited to be in Boston, which, on author- 
ity of Chris Rand, we must thinli of as the new 
Athens of the Western World. I am honored 
to participate in Boston's Japan Week. 

The distinguished Ambassador from Japan, 
Eyuji Takeuchi, has preceded me in this week's 
program and given you, off the record, a diplo- 
mat's view. Experienced observers of and par- 
ticipants in business with Japan — Mr. Dudley 
T. Colton, Mr. Robert W. Grimble, Mr. Charles 
Schwarzler, Mr. Fumiliiko Togo, and Mr. Eli 
Goldston — will follow me. Your general chair- 
man, Mr. Prescott C. Crafts, will siun up these 

You now want me to discuss "The New Role 
of Japan in World Affairs : An American Policy 
View." The Japanese have something to say 
about this, and I will not be didactic. 

Ambassador Takeuchi endears himself at the 
Department of State by his genius for sticking 
to the point and for confining business to an 
allotted time. I have observed Ambassador 
Takeuchi and Secretary Rusk together. "And, 
Mr. Secretary, liow much time do we have?" he 
will ask. Sometimes it is 10 minutes, at others 
unlimited. In lean, direct language he state;? 
his case or sets the problem. When he must de- 
part, the Ambassador and the Secretary will 
have rounded off a solution or defined a new 
problem. There are no loose ends to what both 
know was done or must be done. 

' Address made before a Conference on Doing Busi- 
ness Vl'ith the New Japan, at Boston University, Boston, 
Mass., on Oct. 6. 

I promise to keep within my time. But I 
cannot assure you that I will stick to the point 
or leave no loose ends. 

Let me say, first, something about partners. 
For that, in a word, is the role Washington 
hopes the new Japan will play with us. 

Wlien the Emperor of Japan ordered his peo- 
ple to lay down their arms on August li, 1945, 
the United States and a prostrate and 
bewildered Japan became engaged in a momen- 
tous joint venture. Some — for a while — looked 
upon Japan, I fear, as a wholly-owned United 
States subsidiary. We have passed far bejond 
that relationship, if indeed anyone ever sup- 
posed it really existed; Japan is our full partner 

General partners in business share unlimited 
common liability, and none can, except by some 
showing of special wisdom or talent, control 
decision by another. Today Tokyo and Wash- 
ington are general partners in a sliared and dis- 
turbing environment to which eacli brings dif- 
ferent kinds of wisdom and capability. Neither 
seeks to control the other. This is as it sliould 
be. So long as Washington's partnership with 
Tokyo is elastic and understanding, the free 
world can enjoy margins within which to absorb 
predictable setbacks and capabilities, over time, 
to exploit effectively hoped-for breakthi"oughs 
in the Pacific area as a wliolc. A fractured 
Tokyo- Wasliington partnership would, on the 
other hand, produce an earthquake in tlie power 
balance of the entire world, the consequences of 
which no one could foretell or contemplate with 

Just this April, Japan became, with our 
wholehearted support, a full member of the 



OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] — hitherto an "Atlantic" 
community of industrialized societies. Tal- 
ented representatives began making that long 
trip from Tokyo to Paris and back to partici- 
pate in OECD business. From them Euro- 
peans heard, and began to digest with new 
interest, facts and figures of Japan's cuiTcnt 
economic performance, future outlook, and 

Japan's gross national product is $60 billion. 
For a decade it has maintained a continuing 9.4 
percent rate of growth. Exports as a percent- 
age of GNP are 10 percent, compared to 16 per- 
cent for Germany, 14 percent for the United 
Kingdom, 4 percent for the United States. 
Eeserves are fairly thin and stand at about 
$1,900 million. Long-term investment funds 
are unavailable from local resources. Medium- 
and short-term come at a high 9-percent inter- 
est rate. Its industrial production is fourth in 
the free world. Japan's shipbuilding exceeds 
that of all countries; its crude-steel production 
is surpassed only by the United States and West 
Germanj^ ; its synthetic fiber production is sur- 
passed only by the United States. Chemicals, 
metal products, and machinerj' made up $677 
million of Japan's $1,500 million exports to the 
United States in 1963. $1,619 million of the 
United States total $1,704 million exports to 
Japan in 1963 were made up of fuels, chemicals, 
machinery, and raw materials. The United 
States enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with 
Japan of some $200 million in 1963. Japan, 
next to Canada, is the United States' most im- 
portant foreign market, and for Japan the 
United States is both its most important source 
of imports and outlet for exports. And so on 
and on. Later today you will hear more about 
these and other indicators of Japan's economic 
powers and vulnerabilities. 

Tokyo, Host to the Bank and Fund 

But this kind of knowledge did not prepare 
Japan's OECD visitors for the impact of Tokyo 
in the flesh, when on September 5 they as- 
sembled for the Bank and Fund meetings.^ And 
these OECD visitors were but a part of the 
2,000 representatives of ministries of finance, 
foreign affairs, planning agencies, and private 

financial and economic organizations, who came 
to Tokyo from the world over, from comitries 
affluent and poor. 

From Haneda airport to Tokyo city, these 
visitors were whisked over a multilane super- 
higliway whicli passes high over a teeming city. 
From their limousines they could glimpse sleek 
cars on Japan's new monorail, moving swiftly 
along with quiet, serpentine grace. English 
is the language of the Bank and Fund. At 
airport, shop, and hotel, the barrier of language 
had been lowered ; everyone doubted that Paris 
or Rome or Moscow could have matched this lin- 
guistic accomplishment. At the Okura, and Hil- 
ton, and Tokyo Prince, and Tokyo Otani — not 
to mention the venerable and history-laden Im- 
perial — luxurious facilities like those we know 
in the Waldorf or Claridge's or the Maurice 
were administered with the grace and thought- 
fulness of a Swiss iimkeeper. Datsuns, Toyo- 
pets, Nissans, swarmed streets and boulevards — 
not a rickshaw was in sight. But our Japanese 
hosts had arranged a city-wide transportation 
net of buses and limousines to move delegates 
quickly from where they stayed to business 
sessions in the Heiean room at the Okura. Min- 
uscule portable radios were available for all, 
who could then move through a hall or corridor 
and still listen to proceedings in the language 
of their preference. 

Those who strayed away from the predictable 
paths of conference activity found even greater 
surprises in things seen and heard. All of us 
will be seeing on live TV from Tokyo in October 
the breathtaking architecture of Kenzo Tange, 
who designed the two great indoor stadiums for 
water sports and contests like basketball and 
boxing, just erected for the XVIII Olympic 
games. Tokyo TV viewers saw videotape from 
San Francisco of a graduate of Tokyo's Big 
Leagues — Masanori Murakami — pitching for 
the Giants. Japanese sports fans know that 
Japan is the only country entering every event 
in the Olympics. Both the United States and 

- The Boards of Governors of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, 
and the International Derelopment Association mot at 
Tokyo Sept. 7-11, 1064. For text of a statement made 
by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon on 
Sept. 8, see Bulletin of Sept. 28, 1964, p. 444. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


the U.S.S.R. have failed to qualify for soccer 
and field hockey. 

Though they are now in full, smooth opera- 
tion, in February the Tokyo Otani and the 
Tokyo Prince did not exist. Nor did the many 
wide new boulevards which now cut through 
the heart of the city. Surely one of the most 
fascinating music stores in the world is the 
Nippon Gakki on the Ginza — Schirmer's and 
Liberty's and Sam Goody's rolled in one. There 
you hear musical instruments of all kinds, 
mostly made in Japan, being sampled by stu- 
dents, artists, and amateurs, who together pro- 
duce a cacophony of Samisen, Vivaldi, Louis 
Armstrong, and Beatles — amplified and all. 
The Mikado matches the Lido, and Tokyo's 
Symphony, our best. A porcelain-like Geisha, 
in traditional dress and makeup, admitted 
through my Japanese-speaking host that she 
"twisted," of course, but everyone was "skiing" 
these days. "Rashomon" and "Gate of Hell" 
are but two familiar samples of an art which has 
seized upon modern forms to express the elu- 
sive, haunting truth sought by Ono No Ko- 
machi, that !)th-century poet who wrote: "A 
thing which fades with no outward sign is the 
flower of the heart of man in this world!" 

Few visitors who were in Tokyo last month 
would now care to challenge what was put so 
convincingly in a monograph jointly published 
in March 19fi3 by our Committee for Economic 
Development and by the Keizai Doyukai 
(Japan's CED). Our CED said: 

It is our general view . . . that tliere is notliius 
in Japan's situation that malies it unduly hard for 
her to accept the responsibilities or full partnership 
with the other ma.ior industrial powers. At the same 
time, we see no reason why .Tajian's industrial trading 
partners should not extend to her the benefits of full 
partnership in the Free World economic system. 

Tlie Keizai Doyukai, at that time, expressed 
the same thought a little differently: 

The Keizai Doyukai . . . believes that the i)rineipk's 
of protective trade contradict the principle of Japan's 
equal partnership with the Free nations of the world 
and that if Japan wishes — and we sincerely do — to be 
an equal partner with them, Japan should discontinue 
the remaining restrictive measures in Its economic re- 
lations with those countries which are all designed to 
protect Japan and its domestic industries from keen 
international competition. 

Knowing of Japan's progression in April to 

article VIII status under the IMF — removal of 

restraints on current foreign exchange trans- 
actions — and having seen the streets and shops 
of Tokyo, its docks, and its factories, Europe 
can now consider credible that the wage and 
welfare of the Japanese worker is on a par witli 
his counterpart in Italy and France, and the 
capabilities and vulnerabilities of Japan's econ- 
omy like its own. 

U.S. -Japanese Economic Problems 

In passing from today to forecast of the 
issues of tomorrow, I cannot do better than to 
quote Yoshizane Iwasa, President of I lie Fuji 
Bank and leader of the Japanese Economic 
Mission to the LTnited States, who was in your 
city last spring. Following that visit he wrote : 

I believe that both Japan and the United States will 
face the following important economic problems after 
next year — 

The first is the policy concerning world trade as 
indicated in the Kennedy Round negotiations of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

The second problem concerns economic aid to lesser 
developed countries which was discussed at the I'nited 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development held 
in Geneva recently. 

The third is a problem of the balance of interna- 
tional payments and international liquidity. 

The fourth problem that can he pointed out is that 
concerning East-West trade. 

Washington knows that, in fact, these are our 
basic and common economic problems. "We are 
reassured that negotiators from Tokyo and 
Washington express views on them in ^•al•ious 
forums of international discussion which are 
nearly identical. 

Still we have had our problems. Foreign 
Minister Ohira's visit to Washington in August 
1963 was clear evidence of the initial alarm — 
and foreshadowed the continuing resentment — 
Japan has experienced in being confronted 
with our recently adopted interest eciualization 
tax legislation. Japan still finds difficult to 
understand a grant to Canada of an exemption 
from that law,^ and not to Japan. Japan seeks 
extension of its aviation rights in the Fnitod 
States, and its public construes our rcsjionses 
as unreasonably protectionist. Japan is con- 
cerned over tlie effect of the Bartlett Act on its 

' For background, see ihid., Aug. 12, 1903, p. 256. 




traditional king crab fishing industry in tiu' 
Bering Sea. All Japanese are apprehensive all 
the time over all ramifications of United States 
"Buy America" and "Ship America" practices 
and policies. Tokyo wishes that it did not have 
to be concerned with subjecting to voluntary 
restrictions 30 percent of its exports to the 
United States. On our side, we take exception 
to evidences of Japan's resistance to U.S. direct 
investment, quotas it applies to U.S. exports 
of cars, photographic film, and certain kinds of 
machinery. But discussion and negotiation 
have kept these strains and disputes within 
manageable limits. We can continue if neither 
partner becomes blinded by notions of self- 
virtue. We have witli Japan no problems more 
troubling — or even as troubling — as many of 
those we have with the Europe;))! Economic 
Community and others in the Atlantic conmui- 

Tlie path ahead cannot be trouble free. Dif- 
fering economic calculations, political pres- 
sures, history, and differing intuitions into the 
imponderable realities of our times have in- 
jected into our free-world relations the creative 
refreshment of diversity. What the Commu- 
nist world — confronted by the basic imity, the 
growing strength, and the resolution of the free 
world — has been obliged to bend to, in its suf- 
ferance of growing polycentric tendencies, has 
been, right along, one of our principal values 
and sources of strength. 

In this connection, let me speak especially of 
the problem of East-West relations to wliich 
Mr. Iwasa referred. As to trade, Washington 
and Tokyo do view differently the mix of peril 
and advantage in expansion of free-world eco- 
nomic ties with Communist countries. Alike, 
Tokyo and Washington abide by the rules of 
embargo on sale of strategic materials laid 
down by COCOM [Consultative Group— Coor- 
dinating Committee] in Paris. Tokyo makes 
none of the distinctions we do, however, in 
treating member states of the Communist world 
differently. For countries of this world, we 
shape and apply controls to take account of 
conduct M'ithin and conduct toward others — 
even each toward others in it. Our restrictions 
are less severe for Yugoslavia, Poland, and 
Eumania than for the U.S.S.E.; less severe for 

the U.S.S.R. than for Communist China, North 
Korea, and North Viet-Nam, with which we 
have no economic relations of any soit and 
against whom we ap[)ly the Trading With the 
Enemy Act of 1931. Tokyo differs with us in 
attitude toward long-term credits; within the 
past month it has extended credits to the 
U.S.S.R. more generous in terms than we con- 
sider wise from the standpoint of free-world 
security; and private traders are selling a $20 
million vinylon plant to Peiping. We would 
prefer to see such credits and transactions re- 
served for less developed countries. 

We may also diifer in assessment of strategic 
danger. Washington is always alert to Mos- 
cow's intention — it wants to replace "capital- 
ism" by "communism'' — and highly respectful 
of its capability, nuclear and industrial, but 
we incline to agree with Moscow's condcnma- 
t ion of Peiping's militancy and seemingly reck- 
less advocacy of war. In Peiping we see cause 
for a large part of our $()00 million military 
assistance programs in the Far East. It is to 
meet the challenge of Maoist evangelism that 
Washington looks for the support of friendly 
and capable allies in the crisis of Southeast 
Asia. In the United Nations and elsewhere we 
try to forestall free-world actions that Peiping 
could construe as acquiescence in, or approval 
of, its militant intmsion into the affairs of its 
neighbors and its troublemaking in far places 
of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. 
Not alone the free-world countries but the peo- 
ple of China themselves would suffer, we think, 
from enhancing at this time the prestige of 
Peiping's pi'esent leaders. 

Japan helps the people of Viet-Nam with 
medical teams, transport equipment, techni- 
cians, et cetera. It demonstrates bj' its aid pro- 
grams and in many other ways its concern over 
poverty in less developed countries and its de- 
termination to preserve free-world values and 
interests everj'where. Tokyo does not recog- 
nize Peiping, nor has it voted for Peiping's ad- 
mission into the United Nations. It recognizes 
and tries to maintain friendly relations with 
Taiwan. It seeks "normalization" of relations 
with South Korea. Almost without plan, it has 
begun, or tried to begin, to facilitate — by 
example, by investment, by trade, by oifer of 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


marketing cooperation — economic growth in 
these two talented societies and to help create 
systems which will surpass, by all indicators of 
economic success, their Communist neighbors. 
The people of new Japan have turned their 
backs abruptly on a great-power status based 
on military tradition and strength. Again a 
great power, the new Japan is only on the 
threshold of endeavors — some of which may in- 
volve risks of waste or failure — which its people 
should approve. 

Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda may have 
tried to foreshadow new responsibilities Japan 
will be taking up when he told the Bank and 
Fund delegations: 

By .seeking to increase our imports of primary prod- 
ucts and our exports of manufactured goods and by 
steadily expanding our assistance to the developing 
countries, we wished to contribute our share to the 
peace and prosperity of the world. . . . Japan is a 
country with long historical traditions and a rich cul- 
tural heritage and, at the same time, a country filled, 
I think, with youthful energy ever and actively seeking 
to explore new horizons. 

Japan and China 

N"o one can visit Japan for long without being 
aware of its special interest in mainland China, 
as deep as our own, but different in perspective. 
Ambassador Takeuchi gives us insight into this 
perspective when ho said before the Common- 
wealth Club in San Francisco on February 25 : 

Continental China was, you might say, the fount 
of Japanese culture. Before the second World War, 
the Chinese continent was an important source of raw 
materials for the Japanese economy and at the same 
time an important market for Japanese products. The 
Japanese recall with regret the time when they sent 
their troops to the Chinese mainland, over a sustained 
period, to occupy the laud and to inflict damages and 
imiwse upon its people. As Prime Minister Ikeda 
said recently in his speech to the Diet, the Japanese 
people are conscious, day and night, of the presence 
of 700 million Chinese on the China mainland sepa- 
rated from us only by a narrow .s-trip of water. The 
Japanese people have always known from history that 
these Chinese were by nature peace-loving, highly in- 
telligent, and that for many centuries they succeeded, 
time and again, in freeing themselves from the op- 
pression of foreigners and foreign culture. 

The Japanese press and public do not view 
quite as wo do tlic links wo are persuaded exist 
between Peiping and Hanoi, Hanoi and the Viet 

Cong, nor share our feai-s and anxieties about 
Peiping's conduct. 

Reflective Americans date their knowledge of 
China mainly from the early 19th-century voy- 
ages of New England's clipper ships and the 
evangelistic drive which took our first mission- 
aries across the Pacific. Today they are raw 
from the disillusiomnents and Communist be- 
trayals of 1915—49, the wounds of Korea, and 
deep conviction that except for Cliina the Com- 
munist siege of Saigon could more swiftly be 
turned back. 

The Government of Japan is as aware as we 
of a common security problem. But for the 
people of Japan — presented with today's head- 
lines — it is not only the mass, the proximity, and 
the melancholy recollection of military adven- 
ture that obsesses imagination; China's past 
glory echoes deep in Japan's racial memory, and 
has for a thousand years. 

In his classic, Japan, A Cultural History, Sir 
George Sansom writes of Japan's borrowings 
from Tang Dynasty China — the early 7th cen- 
tury A.D., or about 150 years before the time of 
Charlemagne — and describes that Cliina in these 
terms : 

Politically, China was at this moment perhaps the 
most powerful, the most advanced and best adminis- 
tered country in the world. Certainly, in every ma- 
terial aspect of the life of a state she was overwhelm- 
ingly superior to Japan. The frontiers of her empire 
extended to the borders of Persia, to the Caspiau Sea. 
to the Altai Mountains. She was in relations with the 
people of Annam, Cochin China, Tibet, the Tarim 
Basin and India ; with the Turks, the Persians, and the 
Arabs. Men of many nations appeared at the court of 
China, bringing tribute and merchandise and new ideas 
that influenced her thought and her art. Persian, and 
more remotely, Greek influence is apparent in much of 
the sculpture and painting of the time and period. 

We need not discuss the extent of these various alien 
influences, we need only notice that their presence must 
have been a stimulus to invention and creation in many 
provinces of life, and at the same time remember that 
the bulk of China was so great, her strength so formi- 
dable that they could easily be absorbed without dis- 
turbing the balance or the individuality of her own 
culture. Along the streets of Chang-an there passed in 
those days Buddhist monks from India, envoys from 
Kashgar and Samarkand, Persia, Annam, Tonkin. Con- 
stantinople, chieftains of nomadic tribes from the Si- 
berian plains, officials and students from Korea and, in 
now increasing numbers, from Japan. It is easy to 
imagine the effect upon the eyes and minds of these last 
of a capital so rich in interest and excitement, their de- 



spair at the sight of such profusion, their proud resolve 
to rival it if hands and courage and restless ambition 
could eke out their country's material shorlconiiiigs. 
No doubt with that tireless curiosity and patient atten- 
tion to detail which characterized their study of other 
alien civilizations, with which they later came into 
contact — those of Portugal, of Holland, and later of 
the industrialized Occident of the 19th Century — the 
Japanese .set themselves to observe and report on every 
aspect of China's life, and to consider what features 
they might profitably adopt in their own country. 

Could we but imagine today a proud Mexico 
city, capital of a troubled South American con- 
tinent populated by 700 million people of a 
single racial strain — and related to ours — a 
common language and intermingled racial 
memory, and ornamented with the monuments 
of London, Rome, and Athens, rich with the 
patina of time, we might appreciate the hold 
Peiping has had upon the imagination of the 
Japanese people. Is it surprising that the 
Japanese sometimes become inattentive to 
Americans who lecture them too dogmatically 
about China? "We may regard Japan compla- 
cent. They may often think that Americans 
wait poorly. 

So long as Japan's perspectives and ours, 
Japan's knowledge and ours, Japan's experi- 
ence and ours, can be exchanged and combined 
in ever deepening understanding of the formi- 
dable problems of our era — not least of all, those 
in and with China — the free world possesses 
assets far greater than an arithmetical sum of 
our separate strength. 

To sum up : Japan has emerged from its war- 
time devastation and dislocation to become a 
proud equal in eveiy way of the societies of 
the advanced industrialized countries of the 
world today. Japan can compete and stand 

Tokyo and Washington look out upon the 
international trading community with similar, 
if not identical, views on what is needed to 
create a worldwide nondiscriminatory, competi- 
tive environment. 

Both countries are troubled by the widening 
gap between the affluent and less developed 
countries of the world and are exploring meth- 
ods by trade and by aid to close it. 

Both Tokyo and Washington are alert to the 
financial and fiscal policies of major countries 
around the world and have devoted their best 

talent to evolving international mechanisms for 
forestalling potentially calamitous fluctuations 
in production, trade, and payments trends 
worldwide — in the less dev'eloped countries no 
less than in those more developed. 

Both countries have deep and somber experi- 
ence with the peoples and institutions of the 
Communist world, both in Europe and in Asia. 
Both realize that, in a nuclear age, the patient 
search for safety must move along varied and 
precarious paths. 

Within the frame of its dynamic and still 
rapidly developing economic system, the people 
of Japan are experiencing an improvement of 
welfare and a flowering of scientific, artistic, 
intellectual creativity which is the envy of 

In the context of these vast areas of common 
interest and purpose, our occasional disputes 
should remain but pinpricks, provided we ac- 
cord to each other the respect and tolerance due 
to true partners. 

And so I conclude: Japan does have a new 
destiny in the world at this point in midcen- 
tury — not to control or to follow but to dedicate 
itself to fulfillment of the promise in its present 
system of social, political, and economic free- 
dom so that neighbors will emulate, participate, 
and share in its rewards. 

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate 
Television Link Via Syncom III 

Folloxoing are texts of statements hy Presi- 
dent Johnson, Secretary Eusk, and Foreign 
Minister Etsusaburo Shiina of Japan broadcast 
on October 7 as part of a program inaugurating 
the transmission of television communications 
between the United States and Japan through 
the satellite Syncom III. 

White House press release dated October 6, for release Octo- 
ber 7 

President Johnson 

This broadcast which carries my voice and 
my image to your television sets in Japan and 
in the U.S. has been made possible by our new 
communication satellite Syncom III. This 
amazing satellite and the facilities in Japan and 
in the U.S. which make its operation possible 

OCTOBER 2 6. 19f>t 


are the product of the vision and inventiveness 
of our scientific communities — both government 
and private. 

I welcome the opportunity to applaud this 
latest triumpli in tlie application of science to 
the field of communications. It opens for us 
new vistas of friendship and understanding in 
the fields of education, cultural exchange, busi- 
ness, and entertainment. 

I think it most fitting that this system could 
come into operation as the XVIII Olympic 
games take place in Tokyo. The youth of the 
world will be assembled there to engage in 
sports. Some of these events had their begin- 
nings in ancient Greece and others in ancient 
Asia. For a few days Tokyo will be the scene 
of a quest for excellence among the young peo- 
ple of the world. Upon them all of our hopes 
must rest. 

It is heartening that the Olympic games — a 
symbol of peaceful competition among na- 
tions — can now be seen simultaneously by those 
actually present and by peoples throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. 

The U.S. and Japan can be deeply gratified, 
I believe, to have shared this diiimatic expres- 
sion of partnership that binds them m many 
fields. I now look forward to seeing satellite 
systems extend throughout the world. It can 
be a great contribution to international under- 
standing — a vital stejipingstone toward lasting 

Secretary Rusk 

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a pleasure for 
me to join with you in this greeting to mark 
the beginning of a new system of communica- 
tion between Japan and the United States. 
The success of the Syncom III project is an- 
other inspiring step in man's great progress 
in the field of communication. 

To the navigable ocean, a broad highway 
of access, and to the older air waves, we have 
now added a new a\'enue through air and 
space. This is the longest continuous com- 
munication link in the history of mankind. 
It is the forerunner of a global conununica- 
tions .satellite system, connecting the Americas 
with Asia across the Pacific, and then by air 
with Europe across the Atlantic. 

We look forward with lively interest to the 
transmission of Olympic television by Syncom 
III. This achievement will be an outstanding 
demonstration of the technological capabili- 
ties — and constnictive partnership — of our two 
countries. It will further reinforce the bonds 
of understanding and partnership between us. 

We look forward to the exchange of other 
television programs among Japan, the United 
States, and Canada. The complex arrange- 
ments for these exchanges involve the coopera- 
tive eiforts of many participants — both private 
enterprises and governments. They constitute 
a significant international accomplishment and 
are a source of deep satisfaction to my Gov- 
ernment, as they must be to yours. 

The growth of international understanding 
is a child of communication. In this sense 
every major technological breakthrough in this 
field can be regarded as a step toward peace. 

The challenges of our age are vast and 
varied. The partnership between Japan and 
the United States, of which the Syncom III 
project provides exhilarating testimonj-, is an 
important source of our confidence that free 
men can meet those challenges with success. 
Let us continue to move forwai'd together 
toward a brighter futui'e for ourselves and 
our children, in a world of freedom, justice, 
and peace. 

Foreign Minister Shiina 

I am very happy today to be able to take 
part in this program inaugurating the trans- 
mission of television communications between 
the United States and Japan through the com- 
munications satellite Syncom III. 

Over the past several years, the progress 
made in the field of space development — and 
particularly in the area of communications 
satellites — has been enormous. As a result of 
this progress, it has now become possible for 
the United States and Japan to exchange tele- 
vision programs across the Pacific Ocean. In 
recognition of such an achievement I should 
like to take this occasion to commend highly 
and warmly the Secretary of State and all 
those agencies and individuals in tlie United 
States Government, and tliose in the private 
sector of the Nation as well, whose elTorts, 



talents, and resources have made possible the 
event taking place today. 

Just as the United States and Japan have 
worked together for the establishment of world 
peace and the improvement of the conditions 
of human life, so, I am sure, will the success 
of television exchange through this communi- 
cations satellite contribute greatly to the com- 
mon efforts we have made toward deepening 
the ties of mutual esteem and understanding 
between our two countries. 

The Olympic games will open for the first 
time on Asian soil, in Tokyo on October 10th. 
The actual events of this festival, in which 

youths fi'om all countries of the world are to 
participate, will be relayed by means of this 
satellite to your country' as well as to Canada. 
It is highly appropriate, I feel, that the first of 
the programs which will be transmitted through 
Syncom III are to be telecasts of these Olympic 
games — which is a festival well disposed to ad- 
vance the cause of peace and good will among 
all nations of the world. 

It is my sincere hope that through this new 
means of communicating with each other, the 
peoples of the United States and Japan will en- 
joy a future of increased mutual respect, under- 
standing, and cooperation. 

The Alliance for Progress: A Challenge and an Opportunity 

iy Thomas O. Mann 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs^ 

The other day I spoke in Dallas^ about the 
very considerable progress that has been made 
in the last few months against Communist sub- 
version in the Western Hemisphere. Today I 
should like to speak about the economic aspects 
of a subject which is intimately related to this 
struggle — the Alliance for Progress. 

As a fourth-generation Texan perhaps I shall 
be permitted to say to fellow Texans that our 
history, our geographical location, our juris- 
prudence, which draws from the civil as well as 
the common law, our cultural heritage, our eco- 
nomic ties, our traditions of free enterprise and 
liberal trade give us all a special interest in 
Latin America and, I hope, a clear understand- 
ing that the destiny of our country is closely 
Imked with that of our neighbors to the south. 

In the past it was possible for nations to think 
in terms of isolation and withdrawal from the 

^ .\cldress made before the Houston Council on World 
Affairs at Houston, Tex., on Sept. 23 (press release 

' Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 549. 

outside world. All of us may sometimes have 
nostalgic thoughts about how much simpler life 
would be if we did not have to bother about the 
problems of others, if we could somehow pass on 
to others the responsibilities which we did not 
seek but which our military and economic 
strength have thrust upon us. But in our more 
thoughtful moments we know, deep down in 
our minds and hearts, that now and in the fu- 
ture we live in an interdependent hemisphere 
which is part of an interdependent world. Two 
world wars have taught us this. Whatever en- 
dangers the political independence of any 
American Republic threatens freedom in all 
the others. Wliatever impedes economic and 
social progress and creates situations of politi- 
cal unrest in one presents practical, concrete 
problems for all the rest. 

The Alliance for Progress recognizes this 
interdependence. The preamble of the Charter 
of Punta del Este recites: ^ 

' For text, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our 
decision to unite in a common effort to bring our people 
accelerated economic progress and broader social jus- 
tice within the framework of personal dignity and 
political liberty. 

The Development Problem 

Let. us look at the nature of the development 

Twenty-one free and sovereign nations exist 
in Middle and South America with a popula- 
tion and a landmass greater than our own. 

Our gross national product reached $600 bil- 
lion in 1963. The gross national product of the 
other American Republics is between $60 billion 
and $75 billion. 

The average annual individual income of our 
people is about $2,500 and is steadily rising. 
The average annual individual income in the 
other American Republics is around $300 a year. 
It is not rising as fast as it should. 

Not only do these contrasts exist in an age of 
rising expectations, but the Americas face a 
population explosion unprecedented in liistory. 
There are now 200 million Latin Americans. If 
present trends continue, this number will double 
in the next two decades. 

A high and sustained rate of economic growth 
in all of Middle and South America is not there- 
fore merely a desirable goal. It is an impera- 
tive. Each country must, for example, rapidly 
expand production of food that its people con- 
sume, or there will be hunger. Each nation 
must rapidly increase the number of job oppor- 
timities, or there will be rising unemployment. 

There is another important element in the 
problem that deserves mention. In recent 
decades it was possible for Latin American gov- 
ernments to postpone taking economic and social 
measures which were clearly needed simply by 
borrowing money from abroad. This is no 
longer feasible in some cases simply because 
countries are finding it increasingly difficult to 
service additional "hard" loans and short-term 
supplier credits. Excluding Venezuela, Latin 
American countries must use 20 percent of their 
export earnings to pay their foreign debts. In 
consequence, a number of countries have been 
obliged to request a "stretchout" of their pay- 
ment obligat ions. 

Every one of our sister Republics therefore 

faces the necessity of taking those measures 
necessary to create conditions propitious for 
rapid growth and progress — and of taking them 

Wliat are they ? Each coimtry is, of course, 
different from all the rest. Each has its own 
particular problems, and each wants to follow 
its own path. 

TVe do not wisli to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other countries. But perhaps it will 
not be taken amiss if, without intending to refer 
to any particular countrj', I try to outline some 
of the economic problems which seem to me to 
impede the achievement of the alliance goals in 
the Western Hemisphere. This opens up such 
a wide vista that I shall be able to mention only 
a few. 

In listing the problems, and in making brief 
generalized comments about them, I do not in- 
tend to be doctrinaire. After all, the acid test 
of any development policy is not whether it fits 
a particular economic theorj' but whether it 
works — whether it produces equality of oppor- 
tmiity and a better life for the people. 

Monetary Policies 

Common to several countries — not all of them 
by any means — is the old problem of chronic, 
galloping inflation. This kind of inflation can 
achieve short periods of growth. But it cannot 
achieve the high and sustained level of progress 
which the situation demands. 

This kind of inflation robs the wage earner. 
It disrupts orderly processes in the economy. It 
destroys incentives for domestic private savings. 
It discourages private-sector investment in job- 
and-goods-producing farms and factories. It 
promotes flights of capital to safer havens 
abroad. It raises interest rates on loans needed 
for economic and social progress to incredibly 
high interest rates and very short terms, thus 
denying loans to those who need them most. 
The speculators, not the people, profit from 

One of the principal causes of inflation is large 
budgetary deficits which governments attempt 
to cover by printing more money. And, in turn, 
one of the principal causes of these, large budg- 
etary deficits is that government-owned enter- 
prises — not necessary social projects, but enter- 



prises wliich are supposed to earn a profit or at 
least to pay tlieir own way — all too often run 
very large operating deficits. 

These operating deficits of government-owned 
enterprises impede economic and social progress 
by draining off domestic tax savings urgently 
re*[uii'ed for development. Tighter control over 
national and autonomous agency budgets is ob- 
viously part of the answer to the problem of 
inflation. Lower operating costs and increased 
efficiency in government-o\vned enterprises 
which must compete for world markets are also 

Another part of the answer to the problem 
of budgetary deficits is to increase tax revenues. 
This is one of the reasons the alliance charter 
speaks of the importance of tax reform both 
in the sense of better tax collection methods and, 
in many countries, modem tax policies. 

A dynamic economy and accelerated social 
progress are compatible with fiscal and mone- 
tary responsibility ; indeed fiscal and monetary 
irresponsibility is incompatible with the 
achievement of the goals of the alliance. The 
proof of this is that those countries in this hemi- 
sphere wliich control uaflation and follow sound 
monetary and fiscal policies are those which 
have the highest growth rates and are making 
the fastest progress toward social justice. 

Another problem common to several comi- 
tries— again, not all — is the familiar chronic 
balance-of-payment deficit. Wlienever this oc- 
curs the nation is unable to import the capital 
goods which it needs for development. Since 
the need to import, will grow rather than dimin- 
ish in the foreseeable future, it will obviously be 
necessai-y for nearly all countries to begin now 
to divei-sify and expand those exports for which 
there is a foreign market. Policies which dis- 
; courage exports are archaic and should be re- 
I formed as quickly as is feasible. 

Another common problem is the need to in- 

i crease rapidly the production of food for in- 

j temal consumption, to create a fair and efficient 

1 system of land tenure, and to improve food 

storage, food processing, and food marketing 

facilities. Tliere is no task more important or 

urgent than this. In doing this, coimtries will 

j not only assure their people of adequate food 

' supplies but they will be giving the fanner a 

way to improve his standard of li^dng and, by 

increasing his purchasing j^ower, increase na- 
tional markets for national industries. 

How to get the private sector to make its full 
contribution to economic and social progress 
is another i)roblem connnon to many comitries. 

At least 70 percent of gross domestic invest- 
ment in Latin America comes fi'om the private 
sector. Obviously, if tlie domestic private sec- 
tor is not making its full contribution to de- 
velopment, the goals of the alliance will not be 

If the domestic private sector is to make its 
contribution, government policies must give a 
basis for confidence that agreements and con- 
tracts will be respected, property rights pre- 
served, and adequate incentives given to capital 
which is invested in entei-prises which contribute 
to grow-th. For its part, the domestic private 
sector has a responsibility to repatriate its capi- 
tal, to invest in ways which will contribute to 
progress, to seek fair rather than excessive 
profits, to compete rather than expect special 
privileges and monopoly positions. What is 
needed is teamwork and trust between govern- 
ment and business so that each can make its 
maximum contribution to the welfare of their 
peoples. As the Under Secretary of State, 
Mr. Ball, recently pointed out : * 

Nations that elect to pursue policies that tend to 
eliminate the private sector . . . should be aware that 
they are denying themselves a source of capital that 
could otherwise greatly speed their own economic 

The Importance of Self-Help 

These are some of the problems that can only 
be solved by mtemal policies, attitudes, and 
measures taken by the govermnent concerned. 
They therefore fall into the category that in 
recent years has been increasingly referred to 
as "self-help." 

Unless conditions favorable to development 
are created by each countiy, all the aid from and 
trade with the outside world will not achieve 
the goals of the alliance. Indeed, there have 
been occasions in the past where aid has served 
only to postpone constmctive self-help measures 
and to increase the external debt that future 
regimes have to pay. 

' Ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


That is why our policy is one of stepped-up 
emphasis on the importance of self-help. For- 
eign assistance, for its own sake, will never 
result in real development; foreign assistance 
is helpful only when others are ready and will- 
ing to institute the changes, reorganize their 
own societies and economies, rationalize their 
tax and budget policies, reform their agricul- 
ture, and change their societies in ways which 
open the door to growth. "We must be con- 
vinced that a government and a nation is pre- 
pared to do everything it reasonably can to put 
its own economic house in order before we can 
justify the commitment of our own resources. 

But I would like to say with equal emphasis 
that it would be a tragic mistake, harmful in the 
extreme to our national interests, if we were to 
put ourselves in a straitjacket by limiting the 
use of loans to specific projects undertaken only 
after general reforms have been accomplished. 
There have been, and could well be in the future, 
moments in the rapid unfolding of events in 
Latin America when we must be in a position 
to provide general support in limited amounts 
and for a limited period to new governments 
prepared to commit themselves to serious pro- 
grams of development and refonn. Program 
loans for the importation from the United 
States of essential capital goods and raw ma- 
terials are also of direct benefit to the private 
sector, permitting businessmen to get on with 
the job of increasing production. 

These considerations apply with particular 
importance to Brazil, for example, which has 
been a trusted and valued friend of our country 
in good times and bad. We cannot turn our 
backs on the gallant efforts of the present gov- 
ernment to bring order out of the chaos created 
by its predecessor. All we have a right to ask 
is that it match our efforts, step by step, by 
taking every feasible measure of self-help. 

But in all cases our lending must be more ivnd 
more related to self-help. Our assistance pro- 
gram can only be effective if it supplements the 
efforts of others to progress. As President 
Johnson said a year ago : * 

. . . for the job before us, our resources are not com- 
fortably abundant. What we have to work with is 

• Ibid., Sept. 9, 1963, p. 401. 

enough only if we carefully and wisely use it to create 
the growth now which will free the growth of the 

Trade and Aid 

At the same time it needs to be repeated again 
and again that even those countries which are 
doing their level best to help themselves will not 
be able to progress fast enough to keep up with 
their growing populations unless we also do our 
part. Our policies on trade and aid are crucial. 
Cordell Hull said in 1936 : 

For generations humanity has built its life upon 
recognition of the primary fact that trade is the life 
blood of economic activity. 

And why is that so ? Wlien pressure groups 
in our country seek quotas and high tariffs to 
protect them from competition, they are asking 
for an indirect government subsidy which the 
American consumer pays for in the form of 
higher prices. 

There are, to be sure, exceptional cases where 
limited protection of particular industries 
serves the national interest. But the general 
rule is that the nation loses from protectionism. 
Our exporters lose ; all Americans who produce 
for export lose because nations which cannot 
earn dollars by selling their products to us 
cannot buy from us. The American consumer 
loses. The American worker loses. 

The point which I want to emphasize is that 
a departure from the liberal trade policies we 
have followed since the great depression of the 
1920's and 30's would not only harm us: It 
would foredoom tlie alliance to failure and 
create in tliis hemisphere — in our neighbor- 
hood — all the economic, political, social, and 
security problems which flow from himger, 
resentment, despair, and hopelessness. 

As we ask Latin America to take self-help 
measures let us, then, also resolve to do our part 
by participating with our friends in a mutually 
advantageous trade. 

Our second task is to continue, through our 
aid program, to make it possible for all Ameri- 
can nations which are doing their part to obtain 
loans on terms which they can repay. 

Our aid program in Latin America is justi- 
fied by our tradition of humanitarianism. It 
is not a giveaway. It is an investment in free- 
dom, in decency, in progress in our own neigh- 



borhood. It is part and parcel of our defense 
effort. It is required by our security interests. 

Evidences of Progress 

In spite of the problems to wliich I have re- 
ferred, we are making progress imder the 

Tlie majority of the American Republics are 
progressing toward new horizons of economic 
achievement and social justice. Seven have be- 
gun major tax-reform programs, and others 
will soon follow. A majority have undertaken 
important agrarian programs. Eight coun- 
tries have established development banks, and 
nine have passed legislation for savings and 
loan associations, both types of institutions de- 
signed to mobilize domestic savings and to use 
them creatively. 

But beyond figures of this kind, the alliance 
partnersliip is moving forward on many fronts. 
Eepresentatives of 17 of our land-grant colleges 
and of 14 of our States, as well as our own 
Foreign Service personnel (who come from 
every State in the Union) are working side by 
side with their counterparts in 21 countries. 
Under the first 3 years of the alliance they have 
participated in programs which have built more 
than 23,000 classrooms, 220,000 houses, 2,900 
miles of roads, made 200,000 agricultural credit 
loans, built more than 1,000 water supply and 
sewage systems serving 15 million people, helped 
in this year alone to feed more than 2-4 million 

We are participating, too, in programs of 
teacher training, rural and urban electrifica- 
tion, training in tax and customs administra- 
tion, rural cooperatives, and in other programs 
which ai'e all ingredients of progress. 

In all this we are partners in an historic ef- 
fort under the Alliance for Progress, an effort 
which joins progressive and forward-looking 
people of the hemisphere in a common program 
which is dedicated to one overriding purpose 
and one purpose only : the improvement of the 
condition of human life in Latin America. "We 
seek no political or economic advantage. We 
have no territorial ambition. We do not seek 
to impose our will on others. We seek only to 
join hands in the reform and development of 
this, our hemisphere, so that each nation can 

talce its rightful place in the community of 
nations — free, democratic, self-confident, and 
able to provide for its own people the jobs, 
schools, and decent life to which all men in this 
century are entitled. 

And, finally, I should like to say that I am 
not one of those Miio seem to believe that the 
United States is ahvays wrong and that we are 
responsible when things we obviously do not 
and cannot control do not go well in every 
country in the hemisphere. There is no need 
for this great country of ours to be constantly 
on the defensive as if we were suffering from 
some giant complex. 

The United States is prosperous not because 
we exploit others but because the great major- 
ity of our people are dedicated, honorable, and 
industrious; because we have made reasonably 
good use of the natural resources which Provi- 
dence gave us; because we have been blessed 
with responsible leaders who have put country 
above selfish advantage; because we seek equal- 
ity of opportunity for all within a democratic 
framework of political and economic freedom. 

If all Americans in this hemisphere remain 
true to their traditions, the future of the New 
World will be as bright and shining as it was in 
the visions of Jefferson, Juarez, and Bolivar. 

As President Johnson said last Novem- 
ber 26 : » 

"The accomplishments of the years to come 
will vindicate our faith in the capacity of free 
men to meet the new challenges of our new day." 

Columbus Day, 1964 


Whereas four hundred and seventy-two years ago 
Christopher Columl)us embarked on a daring voyage 
into an unknown sea and discovered a new world ; and 

Whereas, in the ensuing centuries, the continents of 
the world have been brought closer together in time 
and space by means of modern communications and 
transportation ; and 

Whereas closer relationships between the peoples of 
the world have increased our awareness of the need for 
a just and lasting peace ; and 

Whereas the vision, courage, and dedication of 
Columbus are a constant inspiration to us, both as 

' Ibid., Dec. 16, l!)fi3, p. 912. 
' No. 3C21 ; 29 Fed. Reg. 13795. 

OCTOBER 26. 1964 


individuals and as a Nation, as we seek a new world of 
peace and understanding ; and 

Whereas, in recognition of our debt to Columbus, 
the Congress of the United States, by a joint resolution 
approved April 30, 1934 (48 Stat. 657), requested the 
President to proclaim October 12 of each year as 
Columbus Day for the observance of the anniversary 
of the discovery of America : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby designate Mon- 
day, October 12, 1964, as Columbus Day; and I invite 
the peoijle of tiis Nation to observe that day in 
churches, schools, and other suitable places with appro- 
priate ceremonies in honor of the memory of 
Christopher Columbus. 

I also direct that the flag of the United States be dis- 
played on all public buildings on Columbus Day in 
honor of the great explorer. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to 
be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this third day of 
October in the year of our Lord nineteen 
[seal] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the 
one hundred and eighty-ninth. 

By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

U.S. Requests Three IJC Studies 
on Water Levels and Pollution 


The Department of /State announced on 
October 8 {press release Ul) that it had trans- 
mitted on October 7 two letters to the Inter- 
national Joint Commission, United States and 
Canada, requesting reports on water levels and 
pollution in the Great Lakes area. Following 
are the texts of the letters. 

Water-Level Conditions in Great Lakes 

OCTOHEK 7, 1904 

SiR.s: In order to detenniuo wlietlier meas- 
ures within tlie Great Lakes Basin can be 
taken in the public interest to reguhite further 

the levels of the Great Lakes or any of them 
and their connecting waters so as to reduce 
the extremes of stage which have been ex- 
perienced, and for the beneficial effects in 
these waters described heremider, the Govern- 
ments of Canada and the United States have 
agreed to refer the matter to the International 
Joint Commission for investigation and report 
pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909. 

It is desired that the Commission study the 
various factors which affect the fluctuations 
of these water levels and determine whether 
in its judgment action would be practicable 
and in the public interest from the points of 
view of both Governments for the purposes 
of bringing about a more beneficial range of 
stage for, and improvement in 

a) domestic water supply and sanitation, 

b) navigation, 

c) water for power and industry, 

d) flood control, 

e) agrictilture, 

f) fish and wildlife, 

g) recreation, and 

h) other beneficial public purposes. 

In the event that the Commission should find 
that changes in existing works or that other 
measures would be practicable and in the public 
interest in light of the foregoing pui-poses, it 
should indicate how the various interests on 
either side of the boundary would be benefited 
or adversely affected thereby. The Commis- 
sion should estimate the cost of such changes in 
existing works or of such other measures and 
the cost of any remedial works that might be 
found to be necessary and make an appraisal of 
the value to the two comitries, jointly and sepa- 
rately, of such measures. For the purpose of 
assisting the Commission in its investigations 
and otherwise in the perfonnance of its duties | 
under this Reference the two Governments will 
upon request make available to the Connnission 
the services of engineers and other specially 
(jualified personnel of their governmental agen- 
cies and such information and technical data as 
may have been ac<|uired or as may be acquired 
by them during the coui-se of the investigation. 

Tlio two Governments have agreed that when 



the Commission's report is received they will 
consider whether any examination of further 
measures which might alleviate the problem 
should be carried out, including extending the 
scope of the present Reference. 

The Commission is requested to submit its re- 
port to the two Govermnents as soon as may be 

Very truly yours, 

For the Secretary of State : 
William E. Tyler 
Assistant Secretary 

Pollution in Great Lakes Area 

October 7, 1964 
Sirs : I have the honor to infoi-m you tliat the 
Governments of the United States and Canada 
have been infonned that the waters of Lake 
Erie, Lake Ontario and the international sec- 
tion of the St. Lawrence River are being pol- 
luted by sewage and industrial waste discharged 
into these waters. Having in mind the pro- 
vision of Article IV of the Boundary Waters 
Treaty signed January 11, 1909, that boundary 
waters and waters flowing across the boundary 
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury 
of health or property on the other side, the two 
Governments have agreed upon a joint Refer- 
ence of the matter to the International Joint 
Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Arti- 
cle IX of said Treaty. Tlie Commission is re- 
quested to inquire into and to report to the two 
Governments upon the following questions : 

(1) Are the waters of Lake Erie, Lake On- 
tario, and the international section of the St. 
Lawrence River being polluted on either side 
of the boundary to an extent which is causing 
or is likely to cause injuiy to health or property 
on the other side of the boundary? 

(2) If the foregoing question is answered in 
the affirmative, to what extent, by what causes, 
and in what localities is such pollution taking 

(3) If the Commission should find that pol- 
lution of the character just referred to is taking 
place, what remedial measures would, in its 
judgment, be most practicable from the eco- 
nomic, sanitary and other points of view and 
what would be the probable cost thereof ? 

In the conduct of its investigation and other- 
wise in the performance of its duties under 
this Reference, the Commission may utilize 
the services of engineers and other specially 
qualified persomiel of the technical agencies 
of the LTnited States and Canada and will so 
far as possible make use of information and 
technical data heretofore acquired or which 
may become available during the course of 
the investigtion. 

The two Governments are also agreed on the 
desirability of extending tliis Reference to 
other boundaiy waters of the Great Lakes 
Basin at an appropriate time. The Commis- 
sion is requested to advise the Governments 
when, in its opinion, such action is desirable. 

The Commission should submit its report 
and recommendations to the two Governments 
as soon as practicable. 

Very tnily yours, 

For the Secretary of State: 
Willl^m R. Tyler 
Assistant Secretary 


The Department of State announced on 
October 9 {press release ^43) that it had trans- 
mitted on October 1 a letter to the International 
Joint Commission, United States and Canada, 
requesting a report on pollution in the Red 
River. Following is the text of the letter. 

October 1, 1964 
Sirs : The Governments of the United States 
and Canada have been informed that the wa- 
ters crossing the international boundaiy in the 
Red River are polluted by sewage and industrial 
wastes. Having in mind the provisions of Arti- 
cle IV of the Boundaiy Waters Treaty signed 
January- 11, 1909, that boundary waters and 
waters flowing across the boimdary shall not be 
polluted on either side to the injury of health 
or property on the other side, the two Govern- 
ments have agreed upon a joint reference of 
the matter to the International Joint Conmiis- 
sion, pursuant to the provisions of Article IX 
of said Treaty. The Commission is requested to 
inquire into and to report to the two (lovern- 
ments upon the following questions : 


1) Are the waters referred to in the preceding 
paragraph being polluted on either side of the 
international boundary to an extent which is 
causing, or likely to cause, injury to health or 
property on the other side of the boundary? 

2) If the foregoing question is answered in 
the affirmative, to what extent, by what causes, 
and in what localities is such pollution taking 
place ? 

3) If the Commission should find that pollu- 
tion of the character just referred to is taking 
place, what remedial measures would, in its 
judgment, be most practical from the economic, 
sanitary and other points of view and what 
would be the probable cost thereof ? 

For the purpose of assisting the Commis- 
sion in making the investigation and recom- 
mendations provided for in this Reference, the 
two Governments will, upon request, make 
available to the Commission the services of en- 
gineers and other specially qualified personnel 
of their governmental agencies, and such infor- 
mation and teclinical data as may have been ac- 
quired by such agencies or as may be acquired 
by them during the course of the investigation. 

It would be appreciated if the Commission 
would submit its report and recommendations 
to the two Governments as soon as practicable. 
Very truly yours, 

Dean Eusk 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Administration of National Security. Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on National Security Stafiing and 
Operations of the Senate Government Operations 
Committee. Part 9. June 25, 1964. (M pp. 

Economic Policies and Practices. Paper No. 6, Sub- 
sidies to Shipping by Eleven Countries. Materials 
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. July 
l(i, 19G4. 30 pp. [Joint Committee print] 

Claims of U.S. Nationals Against the Government of 
Cuba. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on II.U. 10327, H.R. lOuSG, H.R. 10720, H.R. 
12259, and H.R. 122G0. July 2S-August 4, 19G4. 
176 pp. 

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. 
Message from the President transmitting the annual 
report of the corporation for the year ended Decem- 
ber 31. 1003. H. Doc. 332. August 3, 1904. 28 pp. 

Interest Equalization Tax Act. Conference report to 
accompany H.R. 8000. H. Rept. 1810. August 15, 
1904. 19 pp. 

Wild Animals— Meat Imports. Conference report to 
accompany H.R. 1839. H. Rept. 1824. Undated. 
8 pp. 

Extension and Amendment of Public Law 480. Report 
to accompany S. 2687. S. Rept. 1467. August 18, 
1964. 52 pp. 

Foreign Decorations. Report to accompany H.R. 
12342. S. Rept. 1520. September 1, 1964. 3 pp. 


Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 19th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on October 2 confirmed the fol- 
lowing to be representatives and alternate rep- 
resentatives of the United States to the 19th 
session of the General Assembly of the United 


Adlai E. Stevenson 
Russell B. Long 
Frank Carlson 
William C. Foster 
Francis T. P. Plimpton 

Alternate Representatives 

Charles W. Yost 
Franklin H. Williams 
Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett 
Richard N. Gardner 
Charles P. Noyes 

Senate Confirms Mrs. Tree 
for U.N. Trusteeship Council 

The Senate on October 2 confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Mrs. Marietta P. Tree to be the repre- 
sentative of the United States on the Trustee- 
ship Council of the United Nations, vice Sydney 
R. Yates, resigned. 




Income Tax Protocol Enters 
Into Force With Netherlands 

Press release 419 dated September 28 

On September 28 Secretary Rusk and Ambas- 
sador Carl W. A. Schurmann of the Nether- 
lands exchanged the instruments of ratification 
of the protocol, signed at The Hague on October 
23, 19G3, modifying and supplementing the 
extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the 
convention between the United States and the 
Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income and certain other 

The income tax convention with the Nether- 
lands was signed at Washington on April 29, 
1948, and was brought into force by the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification on Decem- 
ber 1, 1948.1 On June 15, 1955, there was 
signed at Washington a protocol modifying and 
supplementing the 1948 convention for the pur- 
pose of facilitating extension to the Netherlands 
Antilles. ^ That protocol was brought into 
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion on November 10, 1955. Thereaftei", by vir- 
tue of a notification given by the Netherlands 
Government and acceptance thereof by the 
United States Government, the application of 
the 1948 convention, as modified and supple- 
mented by the 1955 protocol, was extended to 
the Netherlands Antilles, with operative effect 
from January 1, 1955. 

The new protocol provides for changes in the 
United States tax rate on dividends, interest, 
and royalties received from United States 
sources by Netherlands Antilles investment 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1855. 
'TIAS 3366. 

companies owned by persons who are not resi- 
dents of the Netherlands or the Netherlands 

U.S. and Philippines Sign 
Income Tax Convention 

Press release 433 dated October 5 

On October 5, 1964, Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of the Philippines, Mauro Mendez, 
and the Philippine Secretary of Finance, Rufino 
G. Hechanova, signed a convention between the 
United States and the Philippines for the avoid- 
ance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. 

The purpose of the convention is similar to 
that of income tax conventions presently in force 
between the United States and numerous for- 
eign countries, namely, to eliminate as far as 
possible double taxation resulting from the tax- 
ation of the same item or items of income by 
both countries. 

The provisions of the convention deal with 
exemptions or credits with respect to taxes on 
various types of income, including commercial 
and industrial profits, interest, income from real 
property, gains upon transfers of controlled 
corporations, personal service income, remu- 
neration of teachers, remittances to students and 
trainees, government salaries or wages, and 
charitable contributions. The convention also 
contains provisions for cooperation between 
officials of the two countries in the exchange of 
information and for the prevention of fiscal 

The convention will be submitted to the U.S. 
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. 

The convention will be brought into force by 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. 

OCTOBER 26, 1964 


U.S. and Yugoslavia Conclude 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 430 dated October 5 

The Governments of the United States and 
Yugoshivia announced on October 5 the con- 
clusion of a bilateral agreement covering trade 
in cotton textiles between the two countries for 
a 3-year period extending from January 1, 1965, 
to December 31, 1967. 

The agreement is designed to provide a frame- 
work for the development of Yugoslavia's cot- 
ton textile trade with the United States. It 
was concluded by an exchange of notes between 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Af- 
fairs G. Griffith Jolmson and the Chief of the 
Yugoslav Delegation for Textile Negotiations, 
Mihailo Stevovic. 

This agreement resulted from a series of bi- 
lateral talks held in Belgrade and Wasliington 
between representatives of the Governments of 
Yugoslavia and the United States. The Unit- 
ed States was represented in these talks by rep- 
resentatives of the Departments of Commerce, 
Labor, State, and Treasury. The talks led to 
an understanding between the two Governments 
on the future pattern of cotton textile trade be- 
tween Yugoslavia and the United States. 

The principal features of the agreement are as 
follows : 

1. The agreement covers all exports of cotton 
textiles from Yugoslavia to the United States. 

2. The Govenunent of Yugoslavia agrees to 
limit exports of cotton textiles to an aggregate 
of 15.1 million square yards during calendar 
year 1965. A set of conversion factors is speci- 
fied in an annex to the agreement to express vari- 
ous cotton textile items in terms of a square 
yard equivalent. 

3. Witliin this aggregate, exports of apparel 
(categories 39-63) are not to exceed 1.5 million 
square yards equivalent. 

4. Within the aggregate limit and tlie groiq) 
ceiling for apparel, the agreement also provides 
for specific export ceilings with regard to 12 
specific items of cotton textiles. 

5. The square yard equivalent of export short- 
falls in categories with specific export ceilings 
may be used in categories not given such specific 
ceilings, provided the group ceilmg for apparel 
is not exceeded. 

6. The two Governments agree to consult in 
the event Yugoslavia plans to export cotton 
textiles during any calendar year in excess of 
300,000 or 350,000 square yards equivalent in 
specified categories of cotton textiles not given 
specific ceilings. 

7. All ceilings of the bilateral agreement will 
be increased by 5 jDercent per annum, beginning 
with the second year of the agreement. 

8. Except for seasonal items the Government 
of Yugoslavia will use its best efforts to space 
exports evenly over the agreement year. 

9. The two Governments will exchange such 
information and statistical data on cotton textile 
trade as are required for the effective imple- 
mentation of the agreement. 

10. Tlie export levels established by the bi- 
lateral agreement will supersede, as of Jan- 
uary 1, 1965, the restraint actions taken by the 
United States Government over the past 12 
montlis with regard to cotton textile exports 
from Yugoslavia pursuant to articles 3 and 6 (c) 
of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding In- 
ternational Trade in Cotton Textiles.^ 


U.S. Note 

October 5, 1964 
Sir : I refer to the discussions in Belgrade and Wash- 
ington between representatives of the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concern- 
ing exports of cotton textiles from Tugoslavia to the 
United States. 

As a result of these discussions, I propose tlie fol- 
lowing agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles 
between Yugoslavia and the United States. 

1. The Government of the Socialist Federal Repub- 
lic of Yugoslavia shall limit its exports to the United 
States in all categories of cotton textiles for tlie twelve- 
month period beginning January 1, li)G5, to an aggre- 
gate limit of ir>.l million s(iuaro yards equivalent. 

2. Within this aggregate limit, tlie following specific 
ceilings shall apply: 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 



Category Million square yarda 

1-2 .G (equivalent) 

9 5.0 

15-16 1.5 

18-19 2. 1 

22 1.0 

Duck (part of 26) 1.65 

31 1.0 (equivalent) 

3. Within the aggregate limit, exports of apparel 
(Categories 39-63) shall not exceed 1.5 million square 
yards equivalent. Within this group limit on apparel 
exports, the following specific ceilings shall apply : 

Category Level 

48 4,500 Dozen 

49 10,000 Dozen 

4. The square yard equivalent of any shortfalls oc- 
curring in the categories subject to specific ceilings 
may be used for exports in categories not given specific 
ceilings, provided, however, that total exports of ap- 
parel. Categories 39-63, shall not exceed the group limit 
specified in paragraph 3. 

5. Within the aggregate limit, any specific ceiling, 
now provided for under paragraphs 2 and 3 or nego- 
tiated at some future date, pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 6, may be exceeded by not more than 5 
percent; provided, however, that total exports of ap- 
parel. Categories 39-63, shall not exceed the group 
limit specified in paragraph 3. 

6. The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia shall enter into consultations with the 
United States Government in the event exports, in any 
calendar year, in any category not given a specific ceil- 
ing, are planned to be in excess of the following levels : 

(a) Categories 3 through 8, 
10 through 14, 17, 20, 21, 
23 through 25, 26 (other 
than duck), 27 through 
30, 32 through 44, 47, 52 

through 04 350,000 square yards 

equivalent ; 

(b) Categories 45, 46, 50 and 

51 300,000 square yards 


The United States Government shall agree to enter into 
such consultations and, during the course thereof, shall 
provide the Government of the Socialist Federal Re- 
public of Yugoslavia with information on the condi- 
tion of the United States market in the categories in 
question. Until agreement is reached the Government 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall 
limit its exports in the categories in question at an 
annual level not in excess of 350,000 square yards 
equivalent for any of the categories enumerated in 

(a) above and not in excess of 300,000 square yards 
equivalent for any of the categories enumerated in 

(b) above. 

7. The levels established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 
6 of this agreement shall be increased by five percent 
lor the calendar year 1966. For the calendar year 

1967. each of these levels shall be increased by a 
further five percent over the levels for the calendar 
year 1966. 

8. With the exception of seasonal items, (he Gov- 
ernment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia shall use its best efforts to space evenly its 
annual exports under this agreement. 

9. In the implementation of this agreement, the 
system of categories and the rates of conversion into 
square yard equivalents listed in the Annex hereto 
shall apply. 

10. Each Government agrees to supply promptly all 
available statistical data relating to trade in cotton 
textiles requested by the other Government. In par- 
ticular, the Government of the Socialist Federal Re- 
public of Yugoslavia .shall supply the most current 
export data to the Government of the United States, 
and the Government of the United States shall supply 
the most current import data to the Government of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

11. The United States Government agrees not to 
invoke, beginning January 1, 1965, the procedures of 
Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done 
at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to limit importation of 
cotton textiles from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and agrees to discontinue all exi>ort re- 
straints imposed pursuant to the provisions of those 
Articles as of that date. 

12. The Governments agree to consult on any ques- 
tion arising in the implementation of this agreement. 
In particular, in the event that, because of a return to 
normalcy of market conditions in the United States, 
the Government of the United States relaxes measures 
it has taken under the Long-Term Arrangement with 
respect to categories given ceilings herein, consulta- 
tion may be requested by the Government of the So- 
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to negotiate 
removal or modification of those ceilings. 

13. This agreement shall continue in force through 
December 31, 1967; provided that either Government 
may propose revisions in the terms of the agreement 
no later than 90 days prior to the beginning of a calen- 
dar year ; and provided, further, that either Govern- 
ment may terminate this agreement effective at the be- 
ginning of a new calendar year by written notice to 
the other Government given at least 90 days jmor to 
the beginning of such twelve-month period. 

If these proposals are acceptable to the Government 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this 
note and your note of acceptance " on behalf of the 
Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia shall constitute an agreement between our Gov- 
ernments, effective January 1, 1965. 

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my high consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 

G. Griffith Johnson 

Assistant Secretary 

' Not printed here. 

OCTOBER 26, 1904 



Cotton Textile Categories and Conversion 


4. 6 
4. 6 




































Yarn, carded, singles 
Yarn, carded, plied 
Yarn, combed, singles 
Yarn, combed, plied 
Gingham, carded 
Gingham, combed 
Sheeting, carded 
Sheeting, combed 
Lawn, carded 
Lawn, combed 
Voile, carded 
Voile, combed 

Poplin and broadcloth, carded 
Poplin and broadcloth, combed 
Typewriter ribbon cloth 
Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 

80 type, carded 
Print cloth, shirting type, other 
than 80 x 80 type, carded 
Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, 

Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, 
Twill and sateen, carded 
Twill and sateen, combed 
Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, 

Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, 

Woven fabric, other, carded 
Woven fabric, other, combed 
Pillowcases, carded 
Pillowcases, combed 
Dish towels 

Hose and half hose 

T-shirts, all white, knit, men's 

and boys' 
T-shirts, other, knit 
Shirts, knit, otiier than T-shirts 

and sweatshirts 
Sweaters and cardigans 
Shirts, dress, not knit, men's 

and boys' 
Shirts, sport, not knit, men's 

and boys' 
Shirts, wotk, not knit, men's 

and boys' 
Raincoats, % length or longer, 

not knit 
Other coats, not knit 














Other towels 

Handkerchiefs, whether or not 

in the piece 
Table damask and manufac- Lb. 

Sheets, carded 
Sheets, combed 
Bedspreads and quilts 
Braided and woven elastics 
Fishing nets and fish netting 
Gloves and mittens 

























1. 084 

1. 084 


3. 17 





36. 8 
22. 186 

24. 457 

22. 186 













Trousers, slacks and shorts Doz. 

(outer), not knit, men's and 

Trousers, slacks and shorts Doz. 

(outer), not knit, women's, 

girls' and infants' 
Blouses, not knit Doz. 

Dresses (including uniforms), Doz. 

not knit 
Playsuits, washsuits, sunsuits, Doz. 

creepers, rompers, etc., not 

knit, n.e.s. 
Dressing gowns, including bath- Doz. 

robes, beach robes, lounge 

robes, housecoats and dust- 
ers, not knit 
Undershirts, knit, men's and Doz. 

Briefs and undershorts, men's Doz. 

and boys' 
Drawers, shorts and briefs, Doz. 

knit, n.e.s. 
All other underwear, not knit Doz. 
Pajamas and other nightwear Doz. 
Brassieres and other body- Doz. 

supporting garments 
Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s. Lb. 

Wearing apparel, not knit. Lb. 

All other cotton textiles Lb. 

17. 707 

17. 797 



9. 2 




4. 6 

4. 6 

Apparel items exported in sets shall be recorded 
under separate categories of the component items. 

First U. S. Letter 

OCTOREB 5, 1904 

Sib : I refer to your letter of October 5, 19G4, which 
reads as follows : 

"I have the honor to refer to the agreement effectet 
by an exchange of notes toda.v between the Govern 
ment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* 
and the Government of the United States of Americti 
concerning exports of cotton textiles from Yugoslavia! 
to the United States. 

"With regard to currently restrained categories ii 
which the restraint levels are now filled, the Govern ; 
ment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslaviti 
may wish to initiate exports prior to January 1, 19G5 ii 
order to pre.serve an orderly pattern of exports to th(j 
United States. Accordingly, the Government of tin! 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now request) 1 
that the Government of the United States agree to in^r 
mit entry of exports in these categories, up to 20 iier 
cent of the specific ceilings for these categories estabi 
lished for the first year of the bilateral agreement, ex 
ported from Yugoslavia in the period November H 
through December 31, 1964, whenever the Governmen: 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia advisa 
that these goods have been licensed for exiKirt againsi 
the specific ceilings of the bilateral agreement fo) 
calendar year 1965. Exports from Yugoslavia in thi 
period November 10 through December 31, 1964 ad 
niitted for entry into the United States in accordanci 
with the advice of the GovernnuMit of the Socialist Fed 
eral Republic of Yugoslavia would be applied againsi 



the specific ceilings of the appropriate categories dur- 
ing the first year of the bilateral agreement. It is un- 
derstood that the GoverutUfnt of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia would advise the United States 
of all such shipments at the time they are licensed for 
lexport to the United States. 

"The Government of the Socialist Federal Uepublic of 
Yugoslavia also requests that the Government of the 
United States now agree to consider favorably, on the 
same terms, similar problems which might arise with 
regard to other categories currently under restraint in 
which restraint levels are not now filled." 

I wish to assure you on the behalf of my Government 
that your proposal is acceptable to the Government of 
the United States. 

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my high consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 
G. Griffith Johnson 
Assistant Secretary 

Second U.S. Letter 

October 5, 1964 

Sib : I refer to the agreement, effected by an 
exchange of notes today, between the Government of 
ithe Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
iGovernment of the United States of America concern- 
ling exports of cotton textiles from Yugoslavia to 
the United States. 

As indicated in the attached tabulation,' 863,780 
square yards of cotton textiles of Y^ugoslav origin 
cla.ssified in category 9, are now held in bonded 
warehouse in the United States because these ship- 
ments are in excess of the restraint level of 4.1 
million square yards for that category applicable for 
the twelve-month period of January 3, 1964 to Janu- 
jary 2, 1965. 

I It is my understanding that the Government of 
|the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is agree- 
able to the release of these goods, to be charged 
against the export ceilings for category 9 estab- 
llished under the bilateral agreement effected today 
Ln the following manner: 

50 percent of the quantity released to be deducted 
from the ceiling for the first year of the agreement, 
beginning January 1, 196.5 and the remaining 50 
percent to be deducted from the ceiling for the second 
rear of the agreement, beginning January 1, 1966. 

If this understanding is correct, I would appreciate 
receiving confirmation' from the Government of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my high consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 

G. Griffith Joh.nson 

Assistant Secretary 

'Not printed here. 

X3TOBER 26, 1964 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement of March 27, 1957, as amended (TIAS 
3522, 3842, 4533, 5122), between the United States 
and Thailand for cooperation concerning civil uses 
of atomic energy. Signed at \'ienna September 30, 
1964. Enters into force on the date on which the 
Agency accepts the initial inventor}-. 
Sii/iiatiires: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Thailand, United States. 

Law o{ the Sea 

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 

1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 


Accession deposited: Uganda, September 14, 1964. 
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva 

April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1064. 

TIAS 5578. 

Accession deposited: Uganda, September 14, 1964. 
Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous 

zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 19.58. Entered into 

force September 10, 1904. TIAS 50;i9. 

Accession deposited: Uganda, September 14, 1964. 
Convention on fishing and con.servation of living re- 
sources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29. 


Accession deposited: Uganda, September 14, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 
Ratifieation deposited: Nepal, October 7, 1964. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered Into 

force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Siffnatiire: Ireland, October 5, 1964. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 


Signature: An Roinn Poist Agus Telegrafa for Ire- 
land, October 5, 1964. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
w-ounded. sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 
force October 21, 1950; for the United States 
February 2, 195G. TIAS 3304, 3362, 3363, and 3365, 
Notification given that it considers itself hound: 
Jamaica, July 17, 1964. 

' Not in force. 



International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for sig- 
nature at Wasiiington April 19 through May 15, 
1962. Entered into force .July 16, 1962, for part I 
and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part 
II. TIAS 5115. 
Accession deposited: Ecuador, September 29, 1964. 

Richard I. Phillips as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs, effective September 27. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 397 dated September 14.) 



Protocol modifying and supplementing extension to the 
Netherlands Antilles of the convention for avoidance 
of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion 
vfith respect to income and certain other taxes of 
April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1S55, 3.S66, 3367). 
Signed at The Hague October 23, 1963. Entered into 
force September 28, 1964. 
Proclaimed Vy the President: September 30, 1964. 


Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income. Signed at Washington October 5, 1964. 
Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of 



The Senate on October 2 confirmed the nomination 
of Raul H. Castro to be Ambassador to El Salvador. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated September 4.) 


Robert J. McCloskey as Director of the Oflice of 
News, effective September 27. (For biographic details, 
see Department of State press release 399 dated 
September 14.) 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 4-11 

Press releases ma.v be oljtained from the Oflice 
of News, Department of .State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to October 4 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 413 
of September 23 and 419 of September 28. 


U.S. participation in International 

Cotton textile agreement with Yugo- 

Rusk : "Trade, Investment, and 

Income tax convention signed witli 

Uganda credentials (rewrite). 

Rostow : "U.S. Policy in a Chang- 
ing World." 

Honduras credentials (rewrite). 

U.S. aid to preserve Nubian monu- 

Rostow : "Some Lessons of Eco- 
nomic Development Since the 

Lyon sworn in as Ambassador to 
Ceylon (biographic details). 

Leif Erikson Day ceremonies. 

International Joint Commission 
.studies of Great Lakes water 
levels and pollution. 

Rusk : news conference. 

IJC study of Red River pollution. 

Rusk : National Academy of 

Trade talks with Uruguay. 
















1438 10/7 

*439 10/7 

*440 10/8 
441 10/8 

442 10/8 

443 10/9 
t444 10/9 

t445 10/9 

*Xot printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bullehtn. 



INDEX Octoler 26, 196^ Vol. LI, ^'o. 1322 

Agriculture. Trade, Investinent. and Peace 

(Rusk) 570 

American Republics. Tlie Alliance for Progress : 
A Challenge and an Opportunity (Mann) . . 593 

Atomic Energy. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of October 8 575 

Canada. U.S. Requests Three IJC Studies on 
Water Levels and Pollution (texts of letters) . 598 


Confirmations (Castro) GOO 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 600 

Senate Confirms Mrs. Tree for U.N. Trusteeship 

Council , . . . 600 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 19th U.N. 

General Assembly 6(K) 

Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

October S 575 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Castro) 606 

Designations (McCloskey, Phillips) 606 

Economic Affairs 

Income Tax Protocol Enters Into Force With 
Netherlands 601 

The New Role of Japan in World Affairs : An 

American Policy View (Barnett) 586 

Trade, Investment, and Peace (Rusk) . . . 570 

U.S. and Philippines Sign Income Tax Conven- 
tion 601 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Conclude Cotton Textile 
Agreement (texts of agreement and related 
notes) , . . . . 602 

El Salvador. Castro confirmed as Ambassador . 606 

Foreign Aid. The Alliance for Progress : A 

Challenge and an Opportunity (Mann) . . . 593 

Honduras. Letters of Credence (Midence 

Soto) 582 

India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

October 8 575 

Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of October 8 575 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Octo- 
ber 8 , 575 


The New Role of Japan in World Affairs : An 
American Policy View (Barnett) 586 

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Television Link Via 
Syncom III (Johnson, Rusk, Shiina) . . . 591 

Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

October 8 575 

Malaysia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
October 8 575 

Netherlands. Income Tax Protocol Enters Into 

Force With Netherlands 601 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Senate Con- 
firms Mrs. Tree for U.N. Trusteeship Council . 600 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

I'resident Johnson Meets With NATO Secretary 

General (Brosio, Johnson) 582 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 8 . 575 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 8 . 575 
U.S. and Philiijpines Sign Income Tax Conven- 
tion 601 

Presidential Documents 

Columbus Day, 1964 597 

President Johnson Meets With NATO Secretary 

General 582 

President Johnson Sends Message to Nonalined 

Nations Conference 581 

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Television Link Via 

Syncom III 591 

Public Affairs 

McCloskey designated Director, Office of News . 606 
Phillips designated Deputy Assistant Secretary . 606 

Science. U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Television 
Link Via Syncom III ( John.son, Rusk, Shiina) . .591 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 605 

Income Tax Protocol Enters Into Force With 
Netherlands 601 

U.S. and Philippines Sign Income Tax Conven- 
tion 601 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Conclude Cotton Textile 
Agreement (texts of agreement and related 
notes) 602 

Uganda. Letters of Credence ( Asea ) .... 582 

United Nations 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Octol>er 8 . 575 
Senate Confirms Mrs. Tree for U.N. Trusteeship 

Council 600 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 19th U.N. 

General Assembly 600 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 

of October 8 575 

Yugoslavia. U.S. and Yugoislavia Conclude Cot- 
ton Textile Agreement (texts of agreement 
and related notes) .... 60? 

Name Index 

Asea, Solomon Bayo 582 

Barnett, Robert w' 586 

Brosio, Manlio 582 

Carlson, Frank 600 

Castro, Raul H (606 

Foster, William C isoo 

Gardner, Richard N 600 

.Tohnson, President 581, 582, 591, 597 

Long. Russell B 600 

Mann. Thomas C .593 

McCloskey, Robert J 606 

Midence Soto, Ricardo .582 

Noyes, Charles P 600 

Phillips, Richard I 606 

Plimpton. Francis T. P 600 

Rusk. Secretary 570,575,591 

Shiina, Etsusaburo 591 

Stevenson. Adlai E . 600 

Tillett, Mrs. Gladys A 600 

Tree, Mrs. Marietta P 600 

Williams, Franklin H 600 

Yost, Charles W 600 








The Alliance for Progress 

Democracy vs. Dictators in Latin America 

These two pamphlets, based on recent addresses by Tliomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of St 
for Inter-American Afi'airs, outline United States policy toward Latin America and call upon all 
American peoples for continued dedication to assure the success of the Alliance for Progress progr 
and to malie democracy a reality throughout the hemisphere. 


Please send me copies of The Alliance for Progress, Pubooatiok 7 

5 Cents. 

Please send me copies of Demooraey vs. Dictators m Latin Amer 

Publication 7729, 5 Cents. 




Kncloeed find $ 


(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 








Vol LI, No. 1323 

November 2, 1964. 



Address by Secretary Rush 618 


by Under Secretary Ball 622 



by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 637 

For index see inside hack cover 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leadership, 
Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British Government 

Address ty President Johnson ^ 

My fellow Americans: On Thursday of last 
week [October 15], from the Kremlin in Mos- 
cow, the Soviet Government announced a change 
in its leadership. On Friday of last week, Com- 
munist China exploded a nuclear device on an 
isolated test site in Sinkiang. Both of these 
important events make it right that your Presi- 
dent report to you as fully and as clearly and 
as promptly as he can. That is what I mean 
to do this evening. 

Events in Moscow 

Now, let me begin with events in Moscow. 
We do not know exactly what happened to 
Nikita Khrushchev last Thursday. We do know 
that he has been forced out of power by his for- 
mer friends and colleagues. Five days ago he 
had only praise in Moscow. Today we learn 

' Delivered from the White House by television and 
radio on Oct. 18 (White House press release; as-deliv- 
ered text). 

only of his faults. Yet the men at the top to- 
day are the same men that he picked for leader- 
ship. These men carried on the administration 
of the Soviet Government when he was absent 
from the Soviet capital, and that was nearly 
half of the time that he was in power. 

Mr. Khrushchev was clearly the dominant 
figure in making Soviet policy. After Lenin 
and Stalin, he is onlj' the third man in history 
to have made himself the undisputed master of 
Communist Eussia. There were times when he 
was guilty of dangerous adventure. It required 
great American firmness and good sense — first 
in Berlin and later in the Cuban missile crisis — 
to turn back his threats and actions without war. 
Yet he learned from his mistakes, and he was 
not blind to realities. In the last 2 years, his 
Government had shown itself aware of the need 
for sanity in the nuclear age. 

He joined in the nuclear test ban treat}'. He 
joined in the "hot line," which can help prevent 


The Department ot State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication ISHued by the Office 
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
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Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
preSH releases on foreign policy, Issned 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other oDleers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the Dnlted States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Inter- 
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herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
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a war by accident. He agreed that space should 
be kept free of nuclear weapons. In these ac- 
tions, he demonstrated good sense and sober 
judgment. We do not think it was these ac- 
tions tiiat led to his removal. 

We cannot know for sure just what did lead 
to this secret decision. Our intelligence esti- 
mate is that Khrushchev learned of the decision 
only when for him it was too late. 

There has been discontent and strain and 
failure, both within the Soviet Union and within 
the Communist bloc as a whole. All of this has 
been evident for all to see. These troubles arc 
not the creation of one man. They will not end 
with his removal. 

When I^nin died in 1924, Stalin took 4 years 
to consolidate his power. When Stalin died in 
1953, it was not Mr. Khrushchev who fii-st 
emerged. But two men now share top respon- 
sibility in the Soviet Union, and their exact rela- 
tion to each other and their colleagues is not 
yet very clear. They are experienced, but 
younger, men and perhaps less rooted in the 
past. They are said to be realistic. We can 
hope that they will share with us our great 
objective — the prevention of nuclear war. 

But what does all this mean for us in Amer- 
ica ? It means at least four things : 

First: We must never forget that the men 
in the Kremlin remain dedicated, dangerous 
Communists. A time of trouble among Com- 
munists requires steady vigilance among free 
men — and most of all among Americans, for it 
is the strength of the United States that holds 
the balance firm against danger. 

Second: There will be turmoil in the Com- 
munist world. It is likely that the men in the 
Kremlin will be concerned primarily with prob- 
lems of communism. This would not be all 
good, because there are problems and issues that 
need attention between our world and theirs. 
But it is not all bad, because men who are busy 
with internal problems may not be tempted to 
reckless external acts. 

Third: This great change will not stop the 
forces in Eastern Europe that are working for 
greater independence. Those forces will con- 
tinue to have our sympathy. We will not give 
up our hope of building new bridges to these 

President Johnson Receives Message 
From New Soviet Government 

statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 16 

Tliis morning I reoeived Ambassatlor [Ana- 
toliy F.] Dobrynin and talked with him for 45 
minutes. The Ambassador brought me a first 
message from the new Soviet Government. The 
message .stated the desire of the Soviet Govern- 
ment to continue in seelving for steps toward a 
more solid peac-e. I told the Ambassador that 
I welcomed this assurance and that the Soviet 
Government and all governments could rely on 
the determination of the United States to 
persevere steadfastly in its own proven deter- 
mination to serve the cause of peace and 
international understanding. I reviewed the 
developments which liave occurred in relations 
between the Soviet Government and the West 
in recent years and expressed the puri>ose of 
the United States to continue in the quest for 

Fourth: Our own course must continue to 
prove that we, on our side, are ready to get on 
with the work of peace. 

The new Soviet Government has officially in- 
formed me, through Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] 
Dobrynin, day before yesterday, that it plans 
no change in basic foreign policy. I spoke 
frankly, as always, to the Soviet Ambassador. 
I told him that the quest for peace in America 
had never been more determined than it is now. 

1 told him that we intend to bury no one and 
we do not intend to be buried. I reminded the 
Ambassador of the danger that we all faced 

2 years ago in Cuba. I told him that any So- 
viet Government which is ready to work for 
peace will find us ready in America. I said to 
the Ambassador that I would be ready to talk 
to anyone when it would help the cause of 
peace. I believe that this was a good beginning 
on both sides. 

Chinese Nuclear Explosion 

That same day the Chinese nuclear device 
was exploded at a test site near a lake called 
Lop Nor, in the Takla Makan desert of the re- 
mote central Asian province of Sinkiang. 
The building of this test site had been known 

X0\-EMBER 2, 1964 


Chinese Communists Conduct Nuclear Test 

statement by President Johnson 
White House press release dated October 16 

The Chinese Ommimists have announced that 
they conducted their first nuclear test today. By 
our own detection system we have confirmed that 
a low-yield test actually took place in western 
China at about 3 a.m., e.d.t. 

As Secretary Rusk noted on September 29,^ we 
have known for some time that the Chinese Com- 
munists had a nuclear development program which 
was approaching the point of a first detonation of 
a test device. 

This explosion comes as no surprise to the United 
States Government. It has been fully taken into 
account in planning our own defense program and 
nuclear capability. Its military significance should 
not be overestimated. Many years and great efforts 
separate testing of a first nuclear device from 
having a stockpile of reliable weapons with effec- 
tive delivery systems. 

Still more basic is the fact that, if and when 
the Chinese Communists develop nuclear weapons 
systems, free-world nuclear strength will continue 
to be enormously greater. 

The United States reaflirms its defense commit- 
ments in Asia. Even if Communist China should 
eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, 
that capability would have no effect upon the 
readiness of the United States to respond to re- 
quests from Asian nations for help in dealing with 

' Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 542. 

Communist Chinese aggression. The United States 
will also not be diverted from its efforts to help the 
nations of Asia to defend themselves and to advanc-e 
the welfare of their people. 

The Chinese Conmiunist nuclear weapons pro- 
gram is a tragedy for the Chinese people, who have 
suffered so much under the Communist regime. 
Scarce economic resources which could have been 
used to improve the well-being of the Chinese peo- 
ple have been used to produce a crude nuclear 
device which can only increase the sense of in- 
security of the Chinese people. Other Asian nations 
have wisely chosen instead to work for the well- 
being of their people through economic development 
and peaceful use of the atom. In this way they 
have made a great contribution to the jteace and 
security of the world. 

The Chinese Communist nuclear detonation is a 
reflection of policies which do not serve the cause 
of i)eace. But there is no reason to fear that it will 
lead to immediate dangers of war. The nations of 
the free world will recognize its limitecl significance 
and will persevere in their determination to pre- 
serve their independence. 

We join all humanity in regretting the contamina- 
tion of the atmosphere caused by the Chinese Com- 
munist test. We will continue in our own efforts 
to keep the atmosphere clean. We wall pursue with 
dedication and determination our purpose of achiev- 
ing concrete practical steps on the road that leads 
away from nuclear armaments and war and toward 
a world of cooperation, development, and peace. 

to our American intelligence for several years. 
In recent weeks the rapid pace of work there 
gave us a quite clear signal that the long and 
bitter efforts of this regime were leading at last 
to a nuclear test. At first, in the 1950's, Eussia 
helped the Chinese. This assistance in the 
spread of nuclear weapons may now be regarded 
with some dismay in Moscow. We believe that 
this help was ended in 1960 as the quarrel 
among the Communists grew sharper. Soviet 
teclmicians left suddenly, with their blueprints 
under their arms, and the unfinished facilities 
were just left there standing and the expected 
supplies were cut off. But tlie Red Chinese 
kept to their chosen purpose, even as tlieir eco- 
nomic plans collapsed and the suffering of their 
people increased. 

Our o^^^^ distinguished Secretary of State, 

Mr. Rusk, gave timely warning as the prepara- 
tions at Lop Nor advanced,^ and when the test 
occurred I at once told the world that this ex- 
plosion will not tui-n Americans and other free 
peoples from their steady purpose. 

No American should treat this matter lightly. 
Until this week, only four ijowers had entered 
the dangerous world of nuclear explosions. 
"N^ltatever their differences, all four are sober 
and serious states, with long experience as 
major powers in the modern world. Commu- 
nist China has no such experience. Its miclear 
pretensions are both expensive and cruel to its 
people. It fools no one when it offers to trade 
away its fii-st small accumulation of nuclear 
power against the mighty arsenals of those who i 

' Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 542. 



limit Communist Chinese ambitions. It shocks 
us by its readiness to pollute the atmosphere 
with fallout. But this explosion remains a 
fact, sad and serious. We must not, we have 
not, and we will not ignore it. 

I discussed the limited meaning of this event 
in a statement on last Fritlay. The world al- 
ready knows that we were not surprised; that 
our defense plans take full account of this devel- 
opment; that we reaffirm our defense commit- 
ments in Asia ; that it is a long, hard road from 
a first nuclear device to an effective weapons 
system; and that our strength is overwhelming 
now and will be kept that way. 

But what I have in my mind tonight is a dif- 
ferent part of the meaning of this explosion at 
Lop Nor. Communist China's expensive and 
demanding effort tempts other states to equal 
folly. Nuclear spread is dangerous to all man- 
kind. "WHiat if there should come to be 10 nu- 
clear powers, or maybe 20 nuclear powers? 
"Wliat if we must learn to look everywhere for 
the restraint which our own example now sets 
for a few ? "Will the human race be safe in such 
a day? 

The lesson of Lop Nor is that we are right 
to recognize the danger of nuclear spread, that 
we must continue to work against it — and we 

First: We will continue to support the 
limited test ban treaty, which has made the air 
cleaner. We call on the world — especially Red 
China — to join the nations which have signed 
that treaty. 

Second: We will continue to work for an 
ending of all nuclear tests of every kind, by 
solid and verified agreement. 

Third: We continue to believe that the 
struggle against nuclear spread is as much in 
the Soviet interest as in our own. We will be 
ready to join with them and all the world in 
working to avoid it. 

Fourth: The nations that do not seek na- 
tional nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they 
need our strong support against some threat 
of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it. 
I The two events I have discussed are large 
and full of meaning (and I will discuss them 
tomorrow with the legislative leaders ; they are 
coming here to the White House for a full and 

President Sends Congratulations 
to New U.K. Prime Minister 

Following is the text of a congratulatory mes- 
sage from President Johnson to Harold Wilson, 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 

White House press release dated October 16 

October 16, 1964 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister : My warmest con- 
gratulations on your election victory. As you 
enter the great office of Prime Minister, I want 
to extend my very best wishes for success for 
you and your government and the people of The 
United Kingdom. I look forward to the continu- 
ation of close and friendly cooperation, based 
on mutual confidence and respect, which has 
bound our countries so closely for so long. 
With warmest personal regards. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

complete briefing tomorrow afternoon) yet 
they do not change our basic policy. They just 
reinforce it. 

Victory of British Labor Party 

Now let me take a minute to say that the 
same thing is true about another important 
event this week. It is the victory of another 
party with another leader in Great Britain. 

The British Labor Party is the same party 
tliat held power when the Atlantic alliance was 
founded, when British and American pilots 
flew the Berlin airlift together, when English- 
men joined us in Korea. It is a party of free- 
dom, of democracy, and of good faith. Today 
it has the confidence of the British people. It 
also has ours. Tliey are our friends — as the 
Conservatives before them are our friends — 
and as governments of both parties have been 
friends for generations. 

We congratulate the winners. We send warm 
regards to the losers. The friendship of our 
two nations goes on. This is our way with all 
our trusted allies. 

This has been an eventful week in the affairs 
of the world. It is not the first such week, nor 
will it be the last, for the world has changed 
many times in the last 20 years. Great leaders 
have come and gone. Old enemies have become 
new friends. Danger has taken the place of 

NOVESIBER 2, 1964 


Through this period we have steadily moved 
toward a more hopeful world. We have moved 
toward widening freedom and toward securing 
a more lasting peace. We will continue in this 

What happens in other countries is impor- 
tant. But the key to peace is to be found in 
the strength and the good sense of the United 
States of America. Tonight we are the strong- 
est nation in all the world, and the world knows 
it. We love freedom, and we will protect it, 
and we will preserve it. Tonight, as always, 
America's purpose is peace for all men. 

Almost 11 months ago, at a still more fateful 

hour, just after I had assumed the Presidency, 
I spoke to all of the Congress and to our people 
of the purpose of America.^ Let me close to- 
night by repeating what I said then: 

We must be ready to defend the national interest 
and to negotiate the common interest. This is the 
path that we shall continue to pursue. Those who 
test our courage will find it strong, and those who seek 
our friendship will find it honorable. We will demon- 
strate anew that the strong can be just in the use of 
strength — and the just can be strong in the defense of 

Tliank you and good night to all of you. 

'Ibid., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 010. 

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bundy Interviewed on Red China's Nuclear Testing 

On October 16 Secretary Rusk was inter- 
vieioed hy George Herman on the Columbia 
Broadcasting Systeiri's television program ^''Tlie 
GoTTwrmnist Explosion,^'' and Assistant Secre- 
tary for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy 
was interviewed by EUe Abel on the National 
Broadcasting Gompany''s television program 
'■'■Red Ghina and the Bomb.'''' Following are 
transcripts of the two interviews. 


Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, you have said 
that you expected this development in Red 
Ghina. The President today said that it was 
cranked into their plans and expectat'wns ahead 
of time.^ How did you expect it? What plans 
were made? How did you figure it in? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have known for 
some years that the Chinese were working on a 
nuclear weapons system and that there would 
come a point when they would detonate their 
first device. More recently we have had very 

' See p. 610. 

clear indication and evidence that this could 
come at any time. On September 29 I an- 
nounced that we expected it at any time.- 

But for the past several years we have as- 
sumed that they would be going down this trail. 
They made it very clear that they were not 
going to sign a nuclear test ban treaty but they 
would try to equip themselves with nuclear 
weapons. And so we have taken this fully into 
account in our own defense plans with respect 
to nuclear weapons, both in production and in 
such tilings as deployment, so that there is no 
possibility whatever that there is any lack of 
security for the free world in the Pacific Ocean 
area as a result of the detonation of this first 
device by Peiping. 

Q. The President said today that he thought 
that this was not an iruiident leading immedi- 
ately or in the foreseeahle future to tear. Do 
you think, however, that it might lead to in- 
creased m,ilitancy by the Ghinese Communists? 
Might they be tougher now? 

A. Well, Peiping has been preaching the doc- 

' Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 542. 



trine of niilitancy and has been pressing in ac- 
tion — for exiiniple, tlieir pi-essures in Southeast 
Asia. They have pressed it to a point where 
tlieir attitude lias created veiy serious differ- 
ences, even within the Communist world, and 
of course it has created opposition and resist- 
ance on the part of the free world. I think we 
will just have to wait and see what ell'ect this 
will have on their attitude. If they continue 
their course of pressure and militancy, then of 
course some vei-y serious events are ahead. 

On the other hand, when they see one of these 
things go off, even the most primitive tyi>e, of 
device, and realize the scale on which nuclear 
war can occur if they invite such a war, this 
may also inject into their own thinking some 
caution that might not otherwise have been 

Q. You think that they were not fully aware 
he fore of the consequences of nuclear war? 

A. "Well, I think they have undoubtedly, as 
an intellectual matter, known — recognized what 
this destructive power can be. But I think also 
that those who see it firsthand might have a 
little different appreciation of what it might 
mean, particularly when what they have seen 
can be multiplied by the thousands and thou- 
sands of times if they invite the results of their 

Q. How about those who see it at first hand 
across the horder — China's neighiors? Do you 
think that this might weaken their determina- 
tion to resist Communist expansion? 

A. No, I don't think so. I think that these 
developing, sophisticated neighbors in that part 
of the world have a full understanding of the 
gap in power that exists in the world today. 
They have shown their determination to take 
care of their own independence and freedom, 
and I don't believe that this is going to have 
any influence in undermining their determina- 
tion to be independent. This is not something 
that will change that fundamental attitude. 

Q. Might there he some pressures from, our 
allies in the Far East for accommodation of the 
Chinese Communists'' call for a summit meet- 

A. "Well, this call for a summit meeting is a 
smokescreen. They used that at tiie time that 
they refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. 
But wo know from many signs that they are 
not seriously interested in disai-mament. They 
have made it very clear, for example, if I can 
quote them, that disarmament can be realized 
only after imperialism and capitalism and all 
systems of exploitation have been eliminated. 

Now, we have had some exchanges of words 
in the Warsaw talks that have been going on 
over the last 8 years on the subject of disarma- 
ment. No interest. No interest. This is an 
attempt on their part to pretend to be inter- 
ested in the serious measures of disarmament in 
order to meet the concerns of almost the entire 
rest of the world, particularly the Afro-Asian 
world, aljout their coming into the nuclear test- 
ing program and contaminating the atmosphere. 

I don't attach any serious sigiaificance to this 
call for a summit meeting for such a purpose. 
If they are interested in disarmament, then the 
first step from their point of view is to stop this 
course of aggression and pressure and mili- 
tancy. And if they would make it quite clear 
that they are prepared to leave their neighbors 
alone, then maybe steps in the reduction of the 
arms race can be seriously taken up. 

Q. Do you have any particular steps as sort 
of prerequisite steps? 

A. No. These questions of disarmament 
have been explored in great detail in Geneva, 
and they will be exjilored there further. But 
as far as China is concerned, we see no indica- 
tion that they are seriously interested. 

Q. I just wanted to ask you, if I could, sir, 
in light of the last 24- hours, do you see any con- 
nection in the headlines hetween — in the !34 
hours — the fall of Khrushchev and the Chinese 

A. No. I don't think so. I think some of 
the stresses and strains within the Commimist 
world, including the Moscow-Peiping dispute, 
might have had something to do with the sit- 
uation in Moscow. But I don't think that it 
has had, on its side, anything to do with the 
explosion of the device in Peiping. 

Q. Thank you. 

KOVEMBER 2, 1964 



Mr. Abel: Mr. Bunchj, it was jiist 17 days 
ago that Secretary of State Rusk alerted tlie 
world to the possibility of a Chinese bomb ex- 
plosion. Now that it has happened, what does 
this do to the security of those numberless small 
and rather weak countries in Asia that we are 

Mr. Bundy: Well, as you know, Mr. Abel, 
this was a test of a test device. The Commu- 
nist Chinese are surely many years away from 
having either any significant quantity of weap- 
ons or any adequate delivery systems; and in 
military terms the free-world nuclear posture, 
which is, of course, principally our own, is 
vastly superior to anything they could possibly 
have even over a period of 5 or 10 years. 

In the face of this military reality the ques- 
tion comes down to whether the nations of the 
world that are particularly — possibly — threat- 
ened by Communist China miderstand these mil- 
itary facts and are detei-mined to go on defend- 
ing themselves. We have no doubt at all on 
the first comit, and on the second count there 
is every indication that they are really very so- 
phisticated about this and miderstand that this 
in itself, and indeed for many, many years to 
come, has no real effect on the military balance, 
on their capacity to defend themselves, on our 
capacity to carry out our commitments in help- 
ing them do that. 

Q. Even without the nuclear bomb, hoiv- 
ever, the Chinese were the most formidable 
poxcer in Asia. Doesri't this — just the achieve- 
ment of this technological success — do a great 
deal for their prestige? 

A. Well, in terms of what it amounts to as 
an achievement, they had Soviet assistance in 
this field up to 1960, when the Soviets with- 
drew. And from the level the Soviets left them 
with to get to the level of being able to test a 
device in this fashion is actually not too long a 
step at all. And then there is the question of 
how much nuclear material they can produce. 
So it really isn't an outstanding thing to have 
taken 4 years from theories that are well un- 
derstood throughout the world, and indeed lane 
been for nearly 20 years, to achieve what they 
have done. 

I don't think it would have any very marked 
effect on their prestige. They do retain, 
of course, substantial military capabilities of 
the conventional sort, but I don't think it would 
have much to add to that, at least for many 
years to come. 

Q. I notice Indians Prime Minister [Lai 
Bahadur] Shastri today spoke of this develop- j 
Tnent as a danger and a menace to mankind. 
Now, his caimtry had been a rather recent vic- 
tim of Chinese aggression. What are we pre- 
pared to do to reassure the Indians? 

A. Of course we have specific alliance com- 
mitments throughout Asia with the countries 
that have wished that. As to India, of course 
India has chosen to pursue a policy free of al- ■ 
liances. But I think India, and any other | 
country that might be threatened by aggres- 
sion, well knows that the United States would 
take a very sympathetic attitude toward any 
country so threatened. I think that is the only 
way one can state it for the present. But I 
would think that India, like the other coimtries, 
must realistically understand that this doesn't 
have any real effect on the military situation 
and won't have at least for many, many years 
to come. 

Q. Do you see any possible connection be- 
tween this Chinese nuclear capacity, so dra- 
matically demonstrated noiv, and the events in 
Moscow yesterday — Mr. Khrushchev''s down- 

A. I would not see any. One can surmise — 
there is no real evidence — that differences of 
view as to the dispute between the Soviets and 
the Chinese Conununists may have played a 
part in the changes in the Soviet leadership that 
were announced yesterday, but it is hard to see 
how this explosion, even if it had been foreseen 
by the Soviets, could in itself have played any 
real part. 

Q. What about the Chinese appeal now for 
a summit conference? 

A. Well, we regard that as a pretty clear 
smokescreen, and I think the tipoff is that a 
very similar proposal was made by them in 
July liMi;^ just before the nuclear test ban treaty 
was signed between the British and the Soviets 
and ourselves. They are trying to devise a 



coverup for the fact that this kind of atmos- 
plieric testing is exactly what we 3 nations and 
the 104 other nations who have signed that 
treaty wished to see ended — atmospheric test- 
ing. They are trying to justify it and to put a 
peaceful coloration on it by a proposal that we 
believe to be, quite frankly, almost entirely, if 
not entirely, for propaganda purposes. 

Q. You will recall, Mr. Bundy, that the Rus- 
sians rather used to ■pooh-fooh the atomic homh 
before they possessed it. Stalin v^ed to say 
that it wouldnH change anything; imperialism 
toould he destroyed the minute we tried to use 
the homb. Do you exclude the possibility that 
the Chinese, once they learn about the bomb in 
this way, ivill develop a more sophisticated 

A. Xo, I think they might. As you know, 
they have been following a pretty militant policy 
for a great many years now, and the conse- 
quences of this could be very serious. But per- 
haps, as they see what nuclear power really is, 
tills will have a somewhat sobering effect, and 
as they realize that, whereas they had one device 
probably of not too great yield tested, other 
nations have power in being — oh, tens and 
thousands of times greater — this might have 
quite a sobering effect on them. I wouldn't 
exclude it, but I wouldn't suppose it would nec- 
essarily happen either way. They have got 
very strong doctrinal compulsions on this mili- 
tant policy. 

Q. Is it fair to say that you, at this moment, 
see no increase in danger to the security of our 
free-world allies in Southeast Asia as a result 
of this development? 

A. I think that is a fair statement. 

Q. You xoould just leave it at that? 

A. Well, I think obviously one would be con- 
cerned at the understanding of people that the 
situation is as we — and, I think, any group of 
people in the world who understand the facts 
of this matter — know it to be, so that one would 
be concerned that the understanding was as 
complete as it should be. But as far as any 
basic change in the situation, as I have said sev- 
eral times, I just don't think this basically does 
change the situation. 

Q. Does China's bomb in any way call for an 
increase in U.S. effort, expenditure, commitment 
in Asia? 

A. Well, as the President said today, we have 
for a long time taken this possible testing, and 
even what might follow from it in future years, 
thoroughly into account in our planning for our 
own nuclear capacity throughout the world, in- 
cluding particularly our deployments in the Far 
East; so it will not in itself, I believe — and I 
have not checked this, but this is my understand- 
ing of the Defense Department's position, from 
my past experience there — this will call for no 
change whatever. 

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Bundy. 

U.S.-Uruguayan Trade Committee 
Holds Talks at Washington 

The Department of State announced on Oc- 
tober 9 (press release 445) that the first meet- 
ing of the Joint Uruguayan-United States 
Trade Committee would take place in Wash- 
ington on October 12-13. The two Govern- 
ments agreed several months ago to establish 
this committee, which is expected to meet peri- 
odically to review matters of interest arising in 
trade between the two countries. 

The Uruguayan delegation was headed by 
Juan F. Yriart, Uruguayan Ambassador at 
Washington. Other participants included 
Benito Medero, member of the Uruguayan Hon- 
orary Commission on Agricultural and Live- 
stock Development, and Justo B. Otegui, Dep- 
uty General Manager of the Bank of the 
Republic of Uruguay, as well as members of 
the Uruguayan Embassy staff. 

The U.S. delegation was headed by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Af- 
fairs Jerome Jacobson. The delegation in- 
cluded Stanley Nehmer, Director, Office of In- 
ternational Resources in the Department of 
State, and Joseph A. Silberstein, Chief, Argen- 
tine-Paraguayan-Uruguayan Economic Affairs 
in the Department of State. Also participating 
were representatives of the Departments of Ag- 
riculture and Commerce and the Agency for In- 
ternational Development. 

NOVElVrBER 2, 19 64 


Man and Nature 

Address hy Secretary Rusk ' 

More than 35 years ago I began my frequent 
visits to tlie campus of this great university — 
initially with hostile intent, as a member of a 
Davidson team, but thei-eafter with the most 
peaceful of purposes. During my student 
days few even dimly perceived the world as it 
has come to be today. Three decades of change 
have been breathtaking in pace and have thrown 
us back upon our most elementary commitments 
to give us our direction amid the turbulence of 
passing events. 

Pandora's box of nuclear power has been 
opened. Man is reaching out into space. Sci- 
ence and technology have raced ahead on a 
thousand fronts and are hurling us into an un- 
knowable future at a speed which tests the very 
nature of man. The old empires which were 
led by those who believed in freedom have been 
transformed into a half hundred new nations. 
Imperialism is now a near monopoly of the 
Communist world. 

We in the United States have lost the great 
spaces which separated us, in our continental 
home, from the rest of the world. Rockets and 
fission and fusion have put us in the front line. 
And our productivity, combined with our basic 
commitments as a people, has compelled us to 
assume burdens of protecting the vital interests 
of the free world. 

Our foreign policy has ceased to be something 
remote. Its central objective is the survival of 
our nation and way of life. It is as close to 

• Made at a coiivooation of the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Oct. 12 (press release 
447). The Secretary also made extemporaneous 

eveiy one of you as your hopes for a decent life 
in a peaceful world. It will be in your living 
room, and walk with you wherever you go, for 
the rest of your lives. 

The miderlying crisis of our times arises from 
two fundamentally conflicting concepts of 
organizing the alfairs of men. One concept is 
a world of independent nations, each with its 
own institutions and culture, but cooperating 
with each other to preserve the peace and pro- 
mot© their mutual interests. That is the kind 
of decent world order envisaged in the preamble 
and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Char- 
ter. The other opposing concept is a world 
regimented under conmimiism. The contest be- 
tween these two concepts is as fundamental as 
any in man's histoiy. And it will continue un- 
til freedom prevails. 

But we must make freedom prevail — and tri- 
umph — without a gi-eat war, if possible. For 
there won't be much freedom anywhere if most 
of the Northern Hemisphere is reduced to a 
cinder heap. 

Shaping the Strategy of U.S. Foreign Policy 

Those stark, elementai-j' facts shape the strat- 
egy of our foreign jDolicy. They explain why 
we and our allies are determined to deter or de- 
feat aggression — aggression in any fonn. They 
explain why, at the same time, we search for 
agreements with our advei-saries to control and 
limit crises and to reduce the danger of thermo- 
nuclear war from miscalculation, misunder- 
standing, or uncontrollable escalation. They 
explain why we seek reliable agreements to cur- 
tail and turn down the arms race — balanced 



agreements whose perfomiance is verified by 
adequate international inspection. They ex- 
plain wliy we must tiy to reach even small 
agreements with our adversaries — for an ac- 
cumulating sum of small agreements can move 
the world a little closer to peace. They explain 
why we do what we can to promote the trends 
toward national independence and more per- 
sonal freedom within the Communist world, 
why we help to build the economic and social 
and political strength of the free world, why 
we try to help settle disputes within the free 
world — disputes which divert energies and re- 
sources from constructive tasks, threaten the 
peace, and give the Communists more oppor- 
tunities for troublemaking. 

Finally, they explain wliy, in our relations 
with Commujiist coimtries, we seek to take full 
account of the vital common interests of the 
human species — in sun^ival, in struggle against 
hostile natural forces, m expanding man's 
knowledge, and in improving liis lot on. this tiny 
speck in the universe. 

Epidemic diseases are not politically 
spawned. Wlieat rusts recognize no iron cur- 
tains. Hurricanes do not distinguish between 
Communist nations and free nations. And 
many of the things that man must do to enlarge 
his knowledge and to increase his well-being 
can be done best through international coopera- 

Thus we seek to engage the Communist na- 
tions in common endeavors with us and other 
free nations on behalf of man as man. 

Scientific infonnation flows across the Iron 
Curtain in both directions. Soviet and other 
Eastern European scientists have been return- 
ing to the international scientific community, 
by attending meetings and exchanging ideas 
with scientists of the free world. And they 
have joined in a number of specific cooperative 
enterprises. One of the newest and most im- 
portant of these is a study of more economical 
means of desalting water.^ This holds the 
promise of reclaiming large areas of the earth's 
surface for food production and habitation. 



background, see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 19(54, p. 

Potential Consequences of Scientific Discovery 

Scientists throughout the world are uncover- 
ing the secrets of nature at an imprecedented 
pace. Each new discovery expands the horizons 
for new exploration. Just as the era of geo- 
graphical discovery that began in the 15th cen- 
tury led to new and far-reaching changes in 
international i-elations, so does the present era 
of scientific discovery. 

Some of these discoveries are double edged. 
They can yield immense benefits to the human 
species, or they can destroy it. Wliich is to be 
the result depends on man himself. 

Let me try to be specific about a few of the 
potential consequences of scientific discoveries 
and teclinological advances. 

The revolution in communications, paced by 
the technology of the electronics industry, is 
rapidly eroding the possibilities of maintaining 
a closed society. 

Through a communications satellite we are 
able to see the Olympic games in Tokyo. ^ The 
"hot line" — the emergency line of communica- 
tion — between Moscow and Washington may be 
only the prelude to international consultations 
by television, with all the benefits or drawbacks 
that might entail. 

David Sarnoff says: "Our grandchildren's 
world will be one in which it will be possible 
to communicate with anyone, anywhere, at any 
time, by voice, sight, or written message, sepa- 
rately or as a combination of all three." He 
says ultrahigh and microwave radio frequencies 
and laser beams can provide billions of chan- 
nels, so that each person in the world can have 
his own, much as he can now have his own 
telephone number. 

The human species has a common interest in 
predicting and affecting weather. Weather 
satellites and telemetry and computers are im- 
proving man's capacity to give timely warnings 
of natural disasters originating in the atmos- 
phere. Great strides in exchanging data have 
been made through the institutions created by 
the World Meteorological Organization and 
other arrangements. We should like to see 
further steps taken to increase cooperation in 

' For background, see ihid., Oct. 26, 19&4, p. 591. 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


this area — such as the World "Weather Watch 
proposed by President Johnson in his address 
at Holy Cross College* and a freer exchange 
of information gathered by weather satellites, 
such as our highly successful Tiros and Nimbus. 

Although much damage and loss of human 
life have been averted by timely forecasting, 
we are only in the first stages of understanding 
how weather works and, hopefully, how we 
might somehow influence it. The increase in 
agricultural productivity that could come from 
a more even distribution of rainfall around the 
world is almost beyond computation. 

The atmosphere is the fluid element of a vast 
heat engine which absorbs energy in the tropics 
and releases it in temperate and polar regions. 
The interaction of the world's oceans with the 
atmosphere is an important element in this 
system. A better understanding of this inter- 
action is a prerequisite to man's efforts to com- 
prehend the behavior and motions of the atmos- 
phere, the end results of which are weather and 
climate. In the field of oceanography we have 
begun a series of such cooperative efforts which 
opens up the prospects of benefits in many 
fields. There is the International Indian Ocean 
Expedition, which, among other things, seeks 
to determine the effects of monsoon winds on 
ocean circulation and, in turn, the effects on 
biological productivity. We need to know 
more about the depths of the Indian Ocean and 
to examine the geological forces that created it. 
The chemical and physical properties of the 
waters and their dynamics need to be tabulated 
in thousands of observations. By the end of 
1965, when this program is completed, more 
than 40 ships from 12 countries will have par- 
ticipated and 8 other countries will have pro- 
vided scientific assistance. 

A similar program was carried out in the 
tropical Atlantic during 1963 and 1964. In 
that, 14 vessels from 7 nations participated, in- 
cluding 3 each from the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Other bilateral and multilateral 
projects in oceanography are under way in var- 
ious areas of the world. 

Man is rapidly extending his knowledge of 
the biological cycles and food and mineral re- 

* Ihid., June 29, 1964, p. 990. 

sources of the seas. Research is opening up 
prospects for large-scale sea farming of plant 
life, for scientific techniques of fishing to main- 
tain the highest productivity in the biological 
cycles of the seas, and for mining minerals from 
resources that far exceed the supplies available 
from laborious digging in the solid surfaces of 
the earth. 

The scientists dangle before us the possi- 
bilities of vast new sources of power. If a basic 
measure of man's progress is his ability to find 
means of extending the power of his hands, we 
may stand at the threshold of a new era. In 
the past, great forward surges have come from 
the discovery and harnessing of new fuels. Al- 
though estimates of the remaining sources of 
fossil fuels have tended to grow, there does seem 
to be a finite limit. We are now in the early 
stages of harnessing nuclear power. In certain 
types of reactors, the plutonium and thorium 
tliat are produced can be used to fuel other 
reactions. Some scientists predict that more 
than 95 percent of our electrical output will 
eventually come from nuclear power, as other 
uses for our fossil fuels surge to the front. 

Concern With Health of World's Population 

On the biological side, as we wrest from na- 
ture the secrets of the composition and growth 
of cells, we may learn to control genetic in- 
fluences in such a way as to reduce the trans- 
mission of disease and hereditary malforma- 
tions. Alongside the growth of our knowledge 
about genetics there are corresponding advances 
in our understanding of the nature and control 
of viruses. If our knowledge in these fields con- 
tinues to grow at the pace which it is now set- 
ting and if we learn to apply this knowledge in 
time and in the right places, the possibilities 
of greatly improving the health and longevity 
of the human race are dramatic. 

International cooperation is essential in the 
prevention and control of diseases. Several 
weeks ago a 6i/^-year-old boy from Africa with 
a serious disease peculiar to the tropics was air- 
lifted to New York and then moved to one of 
the most modern clinics of the National In- 
stitutes of Health. One might look upon this 
as a solicitous humanitarian gesture. It was 



that — but it was also much more. The affliction 
was rare — so rare that cases were almost im- 
possible to find within the United States — and 
yet the responsibility of our Public Health 
Service was great. The large numbers of 
Americans now working in Africa, in either offi- 
cial or private capacities, increase the dangers 
of bringing unfamiliar diseases back to the 
United States. It became imperative for our 
Public Health Service to understand the nature 
of the affliction that he had and how it might be 

Medical friends tell me that there are rel- 
atively few doctors in the United States who 
have ever seen or treated a case of cholera or 
plague or, perhaps more strikingly, of smallpox. 
Yet there are many areas of the world which 
are still subject to serious outbreaks of these 
and other diseases which have long since been 
virtually eliminated in our country. Modern 
means of transportation are such that the travel 
time from even the most remote spots on the 
globe to the United States usually is much less 
than the incubation period of the virus. 

Tlius it seems obvious that if our medical 
authorities are to do their job at home in the 
j)resent-daj^ world, they need to be deeply con- 
cerned with the health of the rest of the world's 
population. In this instance, as in many others, 
the deep humanitarianism of the American peo- 
ple is happily joined by considerations of sound 
common sense and elementary self-preservation. 

And then there are the challenges of outer 
space. Homo sapiens is reaching out from his 
earthly abode to the moon and the planets. He 
is devising marvelous instruments for probing 
the secrets of the universe. The challenges of 
the cosmos should unite all men in efforts to 
push forward the frontiers of knowledge. 

Need for Wisdom in Human Affairs 

The ingenuity and persistence of men in un- 
covering nature's secrets must be matched by 
wisdom in ordering human affairs so that the 
human species survives and can benefit from 
these accessions of knowledge. It is too late to 
be primitive in international relations, too dan- 
gerous to let emotions or slapdash decisions 
jjrevail over steady, informed judgment. 

We, as a Government and people, must work 
everlastingly at the task of making this world 
safe for the human species 

— by making aggression costly and futile, 

— by seeking agi-eements, even small ones, to 
reduce the danger of a thermonuclear exchange 
and move toward the control and reduction of 

■ — by encouraging trends within the Commu- 
nist world toward national independence and 
more personal freedom, 

— by expanding our partnerships with other 
economically advanced free nations, 

■ — by helping the developing nations to ad- 
vance economically, socially, and politically, 

— by strengthening international institu- 
tions — above all the United Nations, 

— by moving toward a world rule of law, 

— by drawing other nations — friends and ad- 
versaries alike — into cooperative undertakings 
on behalf of man as man. 

Great dangers still surround us, and difficult 
challenges lie ahead. But we are making prog- 
ress. The free world has gained in strength and 
vitality, both absolutely and in relation to the 
Communist world. Brick by brick, we are 
building the structure of a decent world order — 
a world in which all mankind can live in peace, 
freedom, and brotherhood. 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


An Appeal to Discontent 

iy Under Secretary Ball^ 

I am here tonight to say a few words on behalf 
of discontent. American education puts a high 
premium on encouraging the individual to ac- 
cept his environment and become a part of it. 
But the hard fact is that the world as now 
organized is not good enough. 

Certainly the world as now organized is not 
going to stay as it is. 

Most of you here tonight are, in a very real 
sense, members of the cold-war generation. 
You have lived the whole of your sentient lives 
in a world split between two great contending 

But because this is the world you have always 
known, do not assume tliat it is the world that 
will always be. Events have not stood still 
even in your short lifetime. If you ever doubt 
the speed with which the world is changing, 
I suggest that you ponder the fact that more 
than half the member states of the United 
Nations are younger than you. 

Let me illustrate my point with a reference 
to history. 

In 1937, at the request of President Roosevelt, 
the National Resources Committee prepared a 
forecast of probable inventions and technologi- 
cal developments over the next quarter century. 
This Committee — composed of leading scientists 
and engineers with free access to the resources 
of our universities and Government depart- 
ments — produced a long and careful report. I 
read it at the time with intense interest. It was 
filled with ideas that then seemed daring and 
unfamiliar. It envisaged developments in a 

' Address made at the College of Wooster, Wooster, 
Ohio, on Oct. 15 (press release 448). 

variety of fields ranging from aviation to 

Quite by accident, I discovered a copy of that 
report on my bookshelves last week. A reread- 
ing did not, of course, inspire the same fresh 
wonder as the first encounter. But I foimd it 
still higlily instructive — not, this time, for the 
predictions it contained but for the predictions 
it omitted. 

In spite of the fact that at the time it was 
regarded as a visionary document, it made no 
mention whatever of many of the developments 
that have most profoundly affected the life 
of all mankind — for example, nuclear energy, 
antibiotics, radar, the electronic computer, and 

To most of you the failure to foresee these 
major brealrthroughs may simply reinforce 
what is, I am sure, a deep undergi'aduate con- 
viction that all generations that preceded you — 
which include all men now over the age of 
50 — were either naive or incompetent. (I held 
such a view when I was an imdergraduate, 
and I'm not sure I wasn't right.) But if you 
think hard about this question, I venture to 
suggest that you will not be so smug. After 
all, taking account of the constantly accelerat- 
ing pace of scientific and technological advance, 
is it so strange that each new decade should 
confound the scientific soothsayers of the pre- 
ceding one ? 

You who have lived through the vaulting 
scientific achievements of the past period nuist 
know the answer to that question. You have 
learned to expect the unexpected. You Imow 
full well that the world of today is not like 
the world of yesterday, and you must laiow 



tliat it resembles even less what will be the 

world of tomorrow. 

You sliould also have learned a lesson in 

luunility — that, however great our American 

accomplishments in technology, science pays 
little attention to national borders. If there 
had been any question about that, the Soviet 
spac« adventure last Monday should have an- 
swered that. 

Political and Economic Changes 

But I shall not labor the obvious. I am .sure 
that all of you here regard the fast pace of tech- 
nology as an unavoidable fact of life. I sus- 
pect, however, that you have a far less clear 
perception of the equally great speed with 
which the political and economic shape of the 
world is being transformed. 

For, adventurous as we Americans may be 
in applauding the scope and range of scientific 
advance, we often tend to remain earthbound 
and conservative in our attitudes toward world 
politics. Breakthrouglis in science or engineer- 
ing are invariably exhilarating. We equate 
them with progress. But we cannot be certain 
as to the meaning of great jx)litical and struc- 
tural changes in world affairs. 

We don't much like such changes. Some of 
us try to ignore them because they are new— 
to talk and act as if they had never occurred. 
We find it hard to face the unsettling reality 
that our world is changing as rapidly in the 
relations between peoples and nations — which 
is the domain of foreign policy — as in the rela- 
tions between man and nature— which is the 
domain of science. 

These phenomena are not, of course, unre- 
lated. It seems clear enough in retrospect that 
the dominant currents of 19th-centuiy thought 
and action resulted in large part from the con- 
fluence and interplay of two major events : the 
French Revolution, which inflamed a continent 
with the egalitarian idea, and the Industrial 
Revolution, which shook the economic and 
social structure of Europe. 

Today we are again experiencing the conflu- 
ence and interplay of two revolutions— the 
teclmological revolution that has become so 
much a part of our life and the revolutionary 
consequences of two world wars which have 

wrought a vast transformation in the balance 
and distribution of world power. 

The World in 1937 

These latter two revolutions, which are still 
underway, have set in motion strong tides to 
beat against political and economic structures 
in all parts of the world. To understand the 
measure and scope of the changes they have 
produced, it may be useful to return again to 
the vantage point of 1937. Let us suppose that 
in that year President Roosevelt, in addition to 
commissioning a forecast of our scientific fu- 
ture, had also called upon our most distin- 
guished diplomats and political scientists to 
forecast the military, economic, and political 
shape of the world in 1964. What kind of a 
report would they have come up with ? 

To make this kind of a retrospective predic- 
tion requires that we reexamine the environ- 
ment of the time. How did we look at the 
world a quarter of a centuiy ago ? 

In 1937 the United States was suffering a 
resurgence of the isolationist spirit that had 
dominated our foreign policy since the found- 
ing of our country. In spite of our reluctant 
intervention in the First World War, many 
Americans were still hoping to stand aloof from 
the major affairs of the world. They preferred 
to leave those affairs to a small band of Euro- 
pean nations, which, through the leverage of 
great colonial systems, exerted mastery over a 
major portion of the globe. 

Only a j'ear before, in 1936, the leading Euro- 
pean powers had destroyed the League of Na- 
tions as an effective instrument of peace by 
refusing to apply economic sanctions against 
Mussolini, who was attacking Ethiopia. We 
had no voice at all in that decision. We had 
rejected the League of Nations. 

Only a year before, Hitler had occupied the 
Rhineland with his troops and guns in viola- 
tion of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties. 
Again we played no visible role. This was, we 
felt, "a European problem." 

Only a year before, the Spanish Civil War 
had provided a curtain raiser for the grim 
cataclysm that was to befall the world. Both 
the Fascist powers and the Soviet Union had 
engaged themselves in that war. But again our 



only response was a reaffirmation of the doctrine 
of nonintervention, reflecting the controlling 
dogma of the time that foreign wars were not 
our concern. We amended our neutrality laws 
to make it clear that we treated aggressor and 
victim alike. Neither side would get any help 
from us. 

The World Today 

That was the atmosphere in 1937. No one 
can say today what the statesmen of that time 
would have predicted about the next 25 years. 
But one thing is sui-e : They would have missed 
the target — and missed it widely. And we can 
be certain that anyone who might then have 
accurately predicted the world as it is today 
would have been labeled a dreamer, if not a 

Yet within 5 years America had put away its 
isolationism like last year's clothes. We were 
leading the greatest coalition in the greatest war 
in history. And in less than a decade the world 
had changed almost beyond recognition. The 
United States moved out of the wings — to star 
billing and the center of the stage. The Iron 
Curtain came down to split the world into two 
parts, each dominated by a great power center. 
The United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged, in a real sense, as the only two global 
powers. Each was organized on a continent- 
wide basis commensurate with the requirements 
of scale and resources demanded by the modern 
technological world. 

War had released long-pent-up forces — 
forces that brought about the dismantling of 
the great colonial systems through which a 
handful of European powers had run the world. 
The breaking up of these systems released pent- 
up energies throughout large areas of the globe. 
Out of the wreckage emerged more than 50 new 
nations, each determined to maintain its newly 
won independence and to secure a self-respect- 
ing standard of life for its people. 

Western Europe, which had for years sought 
the maintenance of peace through a precarious 
balance of power, began to move toward a new 
unity. It made great strides in organizing its 
economic affairs. Today Western Europe is on 
the eve of becoming a single mai'ket in which 
the factors of production can all move freely. 

Tomorrow it may become a great political en- 
tity comparable in resources to the United 
States— and capable of joining with us in a 
partnership for the advancement of freedom 
all over the world. 

Learning To Live With Danger 

For you and me as Americans, the most strik- 
ing aspect of all of these developments has been 
the emergence of the United States as the un- 
questioned leader of the free world, the trans- 
formation of our country from a spectator to 
the principal actor in the great world drama. 

This development is not the occasion for com- 
placency or self-congratulation. The redistri- 
bution of power and responsibility that has 
created American preeminence has been ac- 
companied by a corresponding redistribution of 
danger. Throughout most of our history, we 
Americans have felt safe in our own homes. 
Since 1814, when the British burned the Wliite 
House, no foreign power has dared to attack 
the continental United States. 

Yet today we face a disturbing paradox. We 
are the masters of more military and industrial 
power than any nation in history. Yet now, for 
the first time, we have had to learn to live, as 
President Kennedy said, "on the bull's-eye of 
Soviet missiles." = This is not a special fate 
reserved for Americans. No man in the entire 
Northern Hemisphere is safe from the destruc- 
tive power of weapons that are already aimed at 
him and ready to be fired. 

To live intimately with danger is an old story 
for most of the peoples of the world. For 
Americans it is a new experience, and not all of 
us have known what to make of it. 

Some have sought to explain this paradox by 
searching for a scapegoat. They have con- 
tended that a strong nation such as America 
could have been exposed to destructive forces 
only through betrayal. This in turn has led 
to suspicion and calumny not befitting our na- 
tional character. 

Others have sought to explain the paradox 
by putting the blame on governmental wealcness 
and ineptitude. 

But the fact is that no nation can lead the 

'Bulletin of Nov. 12, 19G2, p. 715. 



modern world without accepting the hazards of 
leadership. America cannot be the most re- 
sponsible nation in the world and still avoid 
the burdens of responsibility— and one of those 
burdens is learning to live responsibly -with 

Foundation of U.S. Policies 

When we look objectively at the world today, 
we must, I think, accept certain propositions as 
the foundation for our policies: 

First, America is unquestionably the most 
powerful nation in the world. This imposes on 
us a unique responsibility for helping to shape 
the destiny of free men. 

Second, we must exercise this responsibility 
with a constant awareness that irresponsible ac- 
tions could lead to world destruction. We have 
replaced the theological tlireat of hellfire by the 
ability to create it ourselves. 

Third, we live in a convulsive period of his- 
tory in which there is only one certitude — that 
the world tomorrow will not be like the world 

Taking account then of these three proposi- 
tions — the imperative of responsibility, the 
reality of danger, the certainty of change — what 
kind of a world can we look forward to? 

I shall not be so brave or so foolhardy as 
those intrepid scientists who in 1937 tried to 
forecast the world of 25 years in the future. I 
can, however, document my contention that we 
are in a time of pervasive change. I can go 
farther and identify major forces of change at 
work in all three areas of the world — in the 
Comnnmist bloc, in the less developed coimtries, 
and among the nations that form the Western 

Forces in Motion Within tiie Communist Bloc 

The most dramatic development within the 
Communist bloc has been the emergence of an 
aggressively competitive power center — Pei- 
ping — to challenge the claims of Moscow as the 
leader of international commimism. The schism 
between these two is widening. Eed China and 
the Soviet Union are engaged m a relentless 
struggle to establish dominance of the Commu- 
nist parties around the world, and, as this strug- 

gle proceeds, the invective grows louder and 
more shrill. 

Where this split may lead — what its ultimate 
implications may be — are questions that cannot 
be categorically answered today. 

Clearly Moscow and Peiping differ on the 
means to achieve the triumph of international 
communism. But there is no reason to suppose 
that they are not fully united on that end ob- 
jective. The free world would be reckless in 
the extreme if it did not recognize this fact. 

Apart from the Moscow-Peiping split other 
forces are in motion within the bloc. 

One is the slow erosion of the closed society. 
The Soviet Union's obsession with secrecy stems 
from two sources. It is a heritage from czarist 
Russia, and it expresses the lack of confidence of 
the Soviet leaders in the ability of communism 
to hold its own in the free marketplace of ideas. 

Yet, over the course of the next few years, 
there are reasons to believe that the Soviet Un- 
ion will find secrecy a wasting asset. The ex- 
tension of tecluiology is making it progressively 
more difficult to conceal the furtive activities of 
a state bent on world domination. It is making 
it harder to hide from the citizens of that state 
the achievements and attractions of freedom. 

As the societies of the bloc countries become 
less tightly sealed, they will be progressively 
more accessible to change — change that may 
blunt their aggressive purposes. These forces 
have been at work for some time in the Eastern 
European nations that are now held within the 
bloc by Soviet militaiy might. Over a period 
of time they should be felt more strongly in the 
Soviet Union. 

Meanwhile, the United States, in the interest 
of the free world, is pursuing policies that take 
account of these evolutionary changes — policies 
adjusted to the differences in attitudes and as- 
pirations of individual Communist states, poli- 
cies that encourage rather than defer the grad- 
ual lifting of the Iron Curtain. 

The Underdeveloped Nations 

In a second major area of the world — that of 
the underdeveloped nations — changes are also 
occurring. None of these countries is having 
an easy time. Nor is the near future likely to 
be much easier. Most of the new nations will. 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 

747-5T8 — 64 3 


in fact, face far greater problems 5 years from 
now than they do today. 

For, as they lose the initial momentum of in- 
dependence, they will come face to face with 
foi-midablo problems. How can they develop 
stable and self-sufficient societies? How can 
they achieve adequate standards of living for 
their people? 

The attainment of these goals will require 
more than the infusion of outside capital or the 
provision of technical help. In many cases it 
will mean a substantial realinement among the 
states themselves. In the 19th century bound- 
aries often tended to be fixed at points where 
the advance forces of one colonial power col- 
lided with another. Today such boundaries 
bear little relationship to either geography or 
etlmic reality. And economies built as ap- 
pendages to old colonial systems are often diffi- 
cult to adjust to the conditions of independence. 

We may, therefore, expect over the next few 
years substantial regrouping among the newly 
independent nations, the formation of economic 
blocs in order to make better use of available 
resources, and the creation of arrangements of 
mvitual help. 

Nor can we delay much longer in coming to 
grips with the hard issue as to how the north- 
south relationship — that between the industrial 
free world and the less developed countries — is 
to be worked out. Should it be through closed 
systems in which industrial nations or groups 
of nations have special commercial, economic, 
and even political relationships with less de- 
veloped nations or groups of such nations? Or 
should it be under a regime — which seems to us 
far better — in which the industrialized nations 
as a whole accept a collective responsibility for 
the advancement and well-being of the less 
developed countries? 

Hope for "Concert of the Atlantic Peoples" 

Finally, we can expect major improvements 
in cooperation among that handful of countries 
on the two sides of the North Atlantic that to- 
gether control 90 percent of the industrial 
power of the free world. 

Throughout the 19th century — from the Con- 
gress of Vienna to the First World War — the 
peace was kept by a small group of European 

nations that controlled most of the effective mili- 
tary and economic resources of the world. 
These powers were bound together by dynastic 
interlockings, by an adherence to Christianity, 
and by the possession of other common interests. 
They tried to act as a police force; they made 
sporadic efforts also to deal with economic 
problems. But the Concert of Europe, which 
served the 19th centui-y fairly well, proved 
clearly inadequate when subjected to the greater 
pressures and requirements of tlae industrial 
20th century. 

After the First World War, Woodrow Wilson 
sought by a League of Nations to fill the vac- 
uum created by the collapse of the Concert of 
Europe. But American isolationism contrib- 
uted heavily to the failure of the League. 

We Americans did not make the same mistake 
a second time. After the Second World War 
we took the lead in establishing the United 

Organized on a world basis, the United Na- 
tions was intended to cope not merely with 
arguments between small nations but with con- 
troversies between the great powers as well. 
But, as we all know, the assumption that the 
great powers could live together in relative har- 
mony and cooperate in policing the postwar 
world lasted hardly through the first General 
Assembly. For we soon found out that the 
Soviet Union had joined the United Nations in 
name only. And over the next 4 years, the Iron 
Curtain slammed down to fonn a cage around 
one-third of the world's population — enclosing 
a great landmass that stretched from the Bran- 
denburg Gate to the Yellow Sea. 

The United Nations was thus frustrated in 
serving as a forum for reconciling ditTerences 
among the great powers. This has not, of 
course, destroyed its usefulness — indeed, its in- 
dispensability — for it has found its postwar 
destiny in quite different and enormously effec- 
tive endeavors. 

But its usefulness has been limited by Com- 
munist intransigence. And, as Europe has re- 
gained its health and strength, the need has 
grown for organizing the industrial powers of 
tlie free world — on an Atlantic basis — to under- 
take in a modern and liberal spirit many of the 
peacekeeiDing tasks that the Concert of Europe 



had performed in an earlier day but in a modern 

Tlie lieart of the structure of the Atlantic 
world today is the Western alliance. NATO 
was conceived as an arrangement for the mutual 
defense of its members against a Communist 
drive westward. But NATO can no longer be 
regarded in such a limited context. More and 
more it must evolve as a mechanism by which 
the nations of the Western alliance can mobilize 
their collective strength for the performance of 
common tasks all over the world. 

Success along this line will depend in con- 
siderable part, of course, upon the speed with 
which the European peoples move toward a 
more modern organization of their own eco- 
nomic and political strength. 

Along with the transformation of colonial 
societies into independent states, perhaps the 
greatest single achievement of the postwar 
world has been the massive steps that Europe 
has taken toward unity — including the develop- 
ment of a conunon market. Within the last 
year and a half, the movement toward economic 
and political integration has been abruptly 
halted by a counterrevolution of nationalism. 
But recently there have again been signs that 
the momentiun toward a greater unity might 
be regained. 

This, of course, would be greatly in the 
American interest, for the effectiveness of an 
Atlantic partnership will depend in large part 
on the ability of the European peoples to work 
on an equal basis with us in carrying out our 
world responsibilities which we bear in com- 
mon. To do this Europe must unite. Only then 
can we have a modem "concert of the Atlantic 

Imperatives of the Changing World 

These are some of the forces of change at 
work in the world — in the Communist bloc, in 
the developing countries, and in the Atlantic 
nations. They are reshaping the world whether 
we like it or not. We cannot stop change. 
But we can work to direct its course. 

What is important is that we set our sights 
high — that we not be satisfied with an illusory 
status quo or be too nostalgic for a yesterday 
that never really was. Old habits of thought 

are hard to break, and in the affairs of govern- 
ments, policies tend to acquire a life of their 
own. They become vested interests. They 
mtcrf ere. They linger on. They impress their 
mark on events even when the conditions on 
which they were founded have radically altered. 

Such old liabits are pensioners we can ill 
afford. For even if we could maintain the 
world unchanged — which is manifestly not the 
case — we would still be failing our responsibil- 
ity. Deep in the American credo is a profound 
belief in the idea of progress, a conviction that 
it is the duty of man to make tomorrow better 
than today. That is why I have spoken to you 
tonight in favor of discontent. 

Oscar Wilde once wrote: ''Discontent is the 
first step in the progress of a man or nation." 
And if I have any anxiety about America and 
its future, it is that we are often too pleased 
with our lot, too ready to accept the easy com- 
forts of an easy life and to ignore the impera- 
tives of the changing world around us. Hard 
problems remain from one end of the globe to 
the other, and they are getting harder every 
day. We cannot shrink from our responsibility 
to meet them. 

Many of those problems are the byproducts 
of progress. We have created them by our own 
sublime curiosity. We have let loose the power 
of the exploding sun ; now we must learn how 
to manage it. We must keep gnawing away at 
the hard business of disai-mament while at the 
same time seeking to achieve a political climate 
in which this ancient dream can become a 
reality. Meanwhile, as a matter of simple pru- 
dence, we must secure and strengthen the shield 
that protects ourselves and the rest of the free 

Almost half of the nations on the earth are 
newly born. Some were born prematurely ; all 
were born weak. We must continue to help 
them meet their needs. As President Kennedy 
said, "If a free society cannot help the many 
who are poor, it cannot save the few who are 
rich." ^ 

We must continue with greater devotion than 
ever to tend to these and other tasks that con- 
stitute the world's business. At tlie same time, 

' For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address, 
see ihid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 


we must encourage other industrial states of the 
free world to organize themselves so that they 
can more effectively join with us m a great com- 
mon undertaking. 

Only if we do all these tilings and more can 
we begin to be satisfied witli the shape of the 
world. Only then will I ask you to forgo your 

President Macapagal of Philippines 
Visits United States 

President Diosdado Macapagal of the Repub- 
lic of the Philippines, accompanied hy Mrs. 
Macapagal, 7nade a state visit to tlie United 
States from October 3 to 15. He met with Pres- 
ident Johnson and otJier U.S. officials during 
his stay at Washington October 5 and 6. Fol- 
lowing are an exchange of greetings between 
President Johnson and President Macapagal 
on October 5, an exchange of toasts at a dinner 
at the White House that evening, and the text 
of a joint communique released on October 6. 

stand together here m independence and in 

We have peace and we prize it, but we prize 
freedom and honor more. If any break the 
peace and attack freedom, we are prepared and 
ready to give firm and appropriate reply. 

We shall remember always the price that free 
men paid in tlie Pacific for doing too little too 
lat«. We are determined that those words shall 
never be heard from free men again. 

Ten years ago in Manila the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization was formed. On that 
cornerstone the cause of freedom stands in 
Southeast Asia, and tlie United States stands 
steadfastly in its support. 

Mr. President, the success of your dynamic 
democracy shows to all that freedom is the wave 
of the future for Asia and for all the nations 
that rim the vast Pacific. 

The honor is ours today to have you here 
with us. In this house and wherever you go in 
this land, you will find the affection and the 
warmth of a nation that regards with great 
wannth and deep affection your nation and all 
of your people. 

Thank you. 


White House press release dated October 5 ; as-delivered text 

President Johnson 

]Mr. President, for the American people and 
for myself, may I say welcome to this land and 
to this city. Our comitry is honored for you 
because you come representing a people that 
Americans honor greatly. 

The United States enjoys friendsliip with 
many nations, but with your nation, Mr. Pres- 
ident, there is and there always will be a special 
friendsliip, a special quality of understanding 
between us. 

Our nations grew up together. We fought 
together for common beliefs. We work to- 
gether today for common goals. Our eyes are 
on the future, but our hearts will never forget 
the past. 

A part of the soul of America remains for- 
ever on Bataan and Corregldor. Our sons and 
your sons died together there so that we might 

President Macapagal 

Mr. President, from the bottom of my heart 
I thank you for the warmth and graciousness 
of your welcome and for the generous words 
that you have uttered about my country and 
the relations between us. I am certain that the 
sentiments that you have expressed are fully 
ajipreciated and reciprocated by our people. 

I come to the United States of America as 
President of the Philippines in response to an 
mvitation extended to me by the President of 
the United States, His Excellency Lyndon 
Joluison. I am profoundly aware of the honor 
of the invitation, and I am here to renew the 
friendship between my country and the United 
States. That friendship has a long history. 

As the representative of the Filipino people, 
I am proud to reaffirm the honorable auspices 
of that amity. It is based on a common com- 
mitment to ideals that have been sustained 
and mutnally affirmed by our two peoples in 
the ordeal of crucial struggles to maintain 
peace and to uphold freedom. 



This conunon commitment, Mr. President, 
we liave reaiSrmed in war. I consider it my 
distinct privilege in behalf of my people now 
to reassure its continuity in peace. 

!Mr. President, as I present the greetings 
of the Filipino people to you who symbolize 
the authority of the American people, I also 
wish in my people's name to pay homage of 
respect to the obelisk we see from this im- 
pressive "White House lawn because, to us in 
the Philippines, George Washington epitomizes 
the idea of freedom that is the rampart of 
this great democratic country and the guidmg 
inspiration of our history as a people. 

Thank you. 


White House press release dated October 5 

President Johnson 

Mr. President, Mrs. Macajjagal, distinguished 
guests: This house of the American people is 
honored tonight by the presence of the Presi- 
dent and First Lady of a land that Americans 
love — the Republic of the Philippines. 

Ten months ago, ]\Ir. President, you came on 
a mission of sorrow to the funeral of our be- 
loved President Jolin F. Kennedy. All Ameri- 
cans are grateful to you for that moving gesture. 

We are proud that you have returned tonight 
mider happier circumstances, on a mission of 

When we first met in Manila, our guest and 
I were both Vice Presidents. He has since suc- 
ceeded in being elected President, and, needless 
to say, I find that example commendable 

As we all know, our guest's election to his 
highest office has opened a new era in the Philip- 
pines. To liis people's courage and devotion to 
freedom, tlie President is adding a new dimen- 
sion of responsible statesmanship. He has been 
imremitting in his efforts to bring about Asian 
solutions to problems that threaten conflict 
an\ong Asian nations. 

In your land and in mine, Mr. President, new 
generations are at tlie helm. In all free nations 
new generations are on the threshold of leader- 
ship. Tliese new generations must test the ties 

among free allies and must judge for themselves 
their value and their strength, but I have no 
doubt what that decision will be. 

Those ideals which inspired so many people 
to reacli for independence are not Western 
values or Asian values. They are abiding hu- 
man values. The worth of those values is 
eternal. Our mutual devotion to them will be 

If freedom is to stand strong, free men must 
be devoted to strength, must be devoted to so- 
cial justice, to the digiiity of the individual, 
and to the love of peace. 

On these principles the Philippines has risen 
from the ruins of war to build an economy 
offering the people one of the highest stand- 
ards of living in all Asia. That economy is 
built on the foundation of free enterprise and 
on the fomidation of private initiative. 

The example of the Philij^pines shines to all 
nations seeking economic and social progress 
with freedom for the individual. 

Mr. President, the Philippines has always 
been in the forefront of the fight against ex- 
ternal challenge to the freedom that we so 
cherish. You have met and you have defeated 
Communist subversion in the Philippines 
itself. You were a founder member of the 
SEATO alliance. You have extended a help- 
ing hand to Laos and Viet-Nam as they resist 
the common peril. 

Tonight the independence of free men is no- 
where more threatened than in Southeast Asia. 
So I was greatly heartened when you told me 
personally this afternoon of your purpose to do 
all that you can to help meet this challenge. In 
turn I pledge again the fuU and continuing sup- 
port of the United States to the Philippine 
Republic and to other like-minded and true 

None can know just how long the fight for 
freedom in Southeast Asia will take, but we of 
the United States are resolved not to falter or to 
grow weary in the struggle. 

Our constant and continuing hope is that 
around the realm of the great ocean named for 
peace there will grow a great community of 
peace. Our effort is directed toward building 
such a community where free men can trade to- 
gether, where free men can work together and 

KOVEMBER 2, 1964 


prosper together in freedom, in peace, without 
war. In the creation of such a community the 
Philippines serve as a valuable bridge of un- 
derstanding between the East and the West. 

We are so happy to have the distinguished 
Ambassador from your comatry in our house 
tonight [Oscar Ledesma]. We honor him and 
have deep affection for him. We are also de- 
lighted to have our own Ambassador, Ambas- 
sador [William McC] Blair, return here with 
you. We think higldy of him, and we hope that 
he enjoys it in your comitry. 

So, Mr. President, we receive you in this 
comitry as the representative of an old and very 
valued ally. But we welcome you even more 
as the leader of the new Philippines and as a 
new leader for freedom's cause everywhere. 

So I ask all of you here tonight to join me in 
a toast to His Excellency the President of the 
Republic of the Philippines, to the continued 
friendship between the people of his republic 
and ours, and to the success throughout the 
world of freedom's cause. 

President Macapagal 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson : Mr. President, 
you and I are in a very peculiar situation at 
this moment. We are separated by a room and 
walls but still we can hear each other, and we 
are friends. 

Our two comitries are just like we are at this 
moment. They are in different places, sepa- 
rated by the vast Pacific Ocean, but they can 
hear each other's voices, and they're friends. 

There is really some similarity between the 
career of President Johnson and myself. Both 
of us were, first. Vice President, and then we 
became President. Now he is ninning for 
President. Next year I am running also for 
President, so I am very anxious about this elec- 
tion here because I confess I am very super- 
stitious about similarities. 

It is a great honor for my people and myself 
that you, Mr. President, have invited me to 
make this state visit to the United States. We 
regard this visit as a kind of family reunion. 
We share to the full the feeling of indestructi- 
ble friendship and the sense of common pur- 
pose between our two peoples which tliis re- 
union sei-vcs to confirm. 

We are deeply moved by the kind words which 
you, Mr. President, have uttered. Permit me 
to say that your generous references to me and 
my people are warmly reciprocated. They have 
struck in our hearts the deepest chords of re- 
spect, admiration, and affection. 

The ties that bmd the American people and 
the Filipino people are the ties in ideas and 
ideals — democracy, freedom, love for peace, and 
the rule of law — long shared in common. The 
strength of these bonds has in the past been 
subjected to the terrible ordeal of battle, and 
their durability to the strenuous tasks of peace. 

Let my presence here attest to the resolve of 
the Filipino people that these bonds of mutual 
dedication shall withstand any trials which tlie 
future may bring. 

It should be of interest to you and to the 
whole American people what the attitude of the 
Filipino people is toward the United States and 
the American people and how the Philippmes 
has been faring 18 years after the severance of 
our political ties. 

The Philippine attitude toward the United 
States during the last decade is premised on tlie 
basic heritage that you bequeathed to us. 

From Spain, which ruled over the Philip- 
pines for 377 years, we inherited, firstly, the 
Christian religion, so that 95 percent of our 
people are Christians, and secondly, a true ap- 
preciation of Western culture. 

From the United States, which ruled over us 
for 48 years, we in turn inherited the processes . 
of democracy and a system of mass public edu- 
cation which is unparalleled in colonial history. 
These are legacies which have become the | 
cornerstone of our vigor and future as a nation, 
considering that the success of democracy de- 
pends upon the level of enlighteimient and edu- 
cation of the people. 

To caiTy out its unprecedented policy of mass 
education, America sent himdreds of American 
schoolteachers to the remotest hinterlands and 
to the liills to educjite our children, with the re- 
sult that the Philippines today enjoys the sec- 
ond highest level of literacy in Asia and the de- 
sire for education has become a passion among 
our people. 

I myself am a product of the American piiblic 
school system hi tlie Philippuies. Coming from 



one of the humblest families, my only oppor- 
timity to acquire an education was the Ameri- 
can-establislied public schools. 

I have had the privilege and distinction of 
having been tutored by many American teach- 
ers during my school days. The fact that one 
who comes from among the poorest families 
could go through the public school system 
established in the Philippines to become Presi- 
dent of the Philippine Re2)ublic by virtue of 
a free and democratic election is concrete proof 
that democracy based on a system of mass 
education implanted by the United States in 
the Philippines possesses the efficacy to im- 
prove the lot of the common man in freedom. 
Thus, to us Filipinos, democracy and not com- 
munism is the system that can elevate the 
masses of Asia from poverty to a better life. 

Because of this basic American heritage of 
the processes of democracy and mass public 
education, the attachment and affection of the 
Filipino people today for the American people 
are as strong as e^•er, and, I dare say, these 
will continue to be as strong in the future. 

Our affinity and common ideals of democ- 
racy, freedom, love of peace, and the rule of 
law should render it relatively easier to thresh 
out problems pending between our two coun- 
tries in a just and honorable manner and on 
the basis of sovereign equality and mutual 

Indeed, we appreciate the blessings of de- 
mocracy so deeply that we are prepared to share 
in the responsibility of upholding, defending, 
and preserving freedom in our part of the 
world. This is the basis of the active partici- 
pation of the Philippines in Afro- Asian affairs, 
particularly our endeavor to bring about a 
peaceful settlement of the Malaysian-Indone- 
sian dispute. This is the basis of the Philip- 
pine support for American policy in South- 
east Asia, particularly in Viet-Nam. 

The retaliatory action ordered by you, Mr. 
President, in the Tonkin incident^ heartened 
the free nations of Asia because the struggle 
of the people of South Viet-Nam is essentially 
one that involves the right to govern them- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, 
p. 258. 

The fall of Viet-Nam to communism would 
endanger the security of its Southeast Asian 
neighbors, and your endeavor for freedom in 
that part of the world merits the support of the 
other free nations of Asia. We believe that 
these nations should be disposed under proper 
legal framework and within their capabilities 
to participate in the struggle to sustain the 
democratic cause in Viet-Nam. 

As to how the Philippines has been faring 
since its independence, I must say in all humil- 
ity that in our administration we have arrested 
and greatly reduced the rampant graft and cor- 
ruption that have plagued our Government since 
the end of the war. 

We have successfully restored free enterprise 
after 12 years of economic controls. We have 
finally succeeded in initiating a land reform 
program which abolishes the centuries-old ten- 
ancy system which enslaved our farmers in pov- 
erty and prevented our agro-industrial progress. 

To fight poverty we have launched a long- 
range 5-year socioeconomic program calculated 
to offer greater opportunities to our people for 
an improvement in their lives. 

We have done all these, and we are ready to 
do more, to prove the vitality of democracy as 
a way of life. We believe that should democracy 
fail in the Philippines — the only Asian coun- 
try which was formerly a colony of the United 
States — American leadership in Asia and else- 
where in the world for the cause of democracy 
and freedom will be less convincing and 
be weakened. On the other hand, the success 
of our efforts to improve the livelihood of our 
masses under freedom will enhance the cause 
of freedom and help lighten the enormous load 
of the United States in leading the free world. 

In your hands, Mr. President, as head of the 
American nation and leader of the free world, 
rests a heavy responsibility. That responsibil- 
ity is to insure the survival of man in a world 
of freedom. In your hands, too, lies the pow- 
er, moral as well as material, to discharge this 
responsibility with patience and wisdom where 
required, with strength and resolution when 
necessary. We who love freedom stand beside 
you. We who long for security pray for you. 
May the Almighty steady your hand and steer 
your heart as you guide America and lead the 
legions of free men everywhere. 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


In this spirit, may I ask all to join with me 
in a toast to the health and success of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, His Excellency Lyn- 
don B. Johnson, and to the enduring partner- 
ship for freedom of our two peoples. 


White House press release dated October 6 

The President of the United States and the 
President of the Philippines today concluded 
the fruitful discussions they have held over the 
past days. These talks dealt with Philippine- 
American relations and matters of international 
significance to both countries. They were the 
latest in the long history of exchanges between 
Presidents of the two countries and reflected 
the spirit of special friendship and cooperation 
which has existed between the Philippines and 
the United States over the years. The two 
Presidents expressed their confidence that the 
American and Philippine peoples would con- 
tinue to benefit from this close association in the 

The two Presidents exchanged views on the 
situation in Southeast xVsia and pledged tliem- 
selves to maintain the unity of commitment and 
purpose between their countries in defense of 
the right of the free nations of Southeast Asia 
to determine their own future. 

President Jolinson noted with deep apprecia- 
tion the response by the Philippines to the re- 
quests of the Government of Viet-Nam for aid 
in its defense against conmiunist subversion and 
aggression. The two Presidents agreed tliat it 
is of the utmost importance to free men through- 
out the world that communist force not be per- 
mitted to dictate their future. Noting the 
struggle of the people of South A-^iet-Nam 
against commimist aggression and its implica- 
tion for all free people, the two Presidents re- 
affirmed their intention to stand by the people 
of South Viet-Nam and reiterated their com- 
mitment to the defense of Southeast Asia under 
the SEATO Treaty. President Macapagal 
noted that pi'ompt and decisive action by the 
United States in the Gulf of Tonkin had once 
again confirmed American readiness and deter- 
mination to resist aggression in Southeast Asia 
to help assure its progress under freedom. 

President Johnson expressed his appreciation 
to President Macapagal for the latter "s efforts to 
bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute 
between Indonesia and Malaysia. Both Presi- 
dents agreed that it is vitally important that 
this dispute, wliich now threatens the peace and 
stability of the Southwest Pacific area, be 

The two Presidents recognized that the ag- 
gressive intentions and activities of Communist 
China continue to present an irtuninent threat 
in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. They 
reviewed, in this connection, the importance of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philip- 
pines and the United States in maintaining the 
security of both coimtries, and reaffirmed their 
commitment to meet any threat that might arise 
against their security. President Jolmson made 
it clear that, in accordance with these existing 
alliances and the deplojnnent and dispositions 
thereunder, any armed attack against the 
Philippines would be regarded as an attack 
against United States forces stationed there and 
against the United States and would instantly 
be repelled. 

The United States and the Philippines agreed 
to study their mutual requirements for security, 
to review existing programs, and to consider 
changes needed to achieve increased capability 
and flexibility in the Philippine response to ag- 
gression and threats of aggression. 

The two Presidents agreed that the relation- 
ship between their respective countries was a 
dynamic and flexible association with a history 
of past achievement and a heavy stake in a com- 
mon future. In the spirit of this alliance, the 
two Presidents agreed that any matter of mter- 
est to either party related thereto should be the 
subject of friendly and frank discussion, and 
each President invited the views of the other in 
this regard. 

The two Presidents likewise took cognizance 
of matters pertaining to Pliilippine veterans of 
World War II and agreed on the establishment 
of a joint commission to study this subject 

President Macapagal reviewed the economic 
progress made by the Philippines in recent 
years. President Johnson commended the land 
reform program, initiated bj' President Maca- 
pagal this year, as holding out renewed hope 



to the Philippme people for the solution of 
the land tenure problems which, for decades, 
had beset a major sector of its economy. Pres- 
ident Johnson noted jjast United States sup- 
port for Philippine agrarian reform and ex- 
pressed his hope that American assistance 
could continue in the future, particularly in 
the realization of the land reform objectives 
of the Philippines. 

Both Presidents discussed the disposition of 
the Special Fund for education, provided for 
in the Philippine War Damage legislation. - 
The}' agreed to consider plans including the 
possible formation of a joint committee which 
would ensure use of this fund to further edu- 
cational programs to the mutual advantage of 
the Philippines and the United States, among 
which educational programs pertaining to land 
reform would be eligible. 

President Macapagal explained the goals of 
his Socio-Economic Program and its objective 
of alleviating the i^light of the common man 
in the Philippines. President Johnson reiter- 
ated his belief that it was the responsibility 
of this generation everywhere to join the cam- 
paign against poverty and the ills associated 
with it and pledged American support for 
worthy projects contributing to the economic 
development of the Philippines. The two 
Presidents noted that one area of particular 
interest which could bring great benefit to the 
Philippine people was rural electrification. 
President Macapagal said that Philippine Gov- 
ernment plans envisage the establishment of 
generating and distribution electric systems in 
607 towns and 400 selected barrios. President 
Johnson observed that a team of American 
experts has arrived in the Philippines, and, 
working with private and public Philippine 
energy experts, would cooperate in developing 
plans for this nationwide system of expanding 
power generation and distribution with its spe- 
cial attention to rural areas. 

The two Presidents looked to developments 
in the trade between their respective coimtries 
and in the world trading community that could 
assure expanding markets for the leading ex- 
ports of the Philippines, including sugar, coco- 
nut products, abaca, lumber, minerals and 

' For background, see ibid., Aug. 19, 1963, p. 301. 

others. The Philippines expressed their readi- 
ness and willingness to supply additional sugar 
to the American market. 

In response to President Macapagal's report 
of the damage inflicted in the Philippines by 
recent typhoons. President Johnson indicated 
his Government's intention to donate 25,000 
tons of grain available under the Food for 
Peace Program. In addition, he pledged 
United States readiness to make available for 
purchase 100,000 tons of rice deliverable in 
1965 to the Philippine Government under 
Public Law 480, Title I. 

President Johnson and President Macapagal 
agreed that representatives of the two govern- 
ments would meet at a mutually agreeable date 
for negotiations leading to the solution of the 
current aviation problems. 

The two Presidents noted the major contribu- 
tion made by foreign private investment to the 
development and continued strength of their 
countries. President Joluison pointed out in 
this regard that United States economic rela- 
tions with the Philippines would be seriously 
impaired if an enforcement of the Philippine 
Retail Trade Nationalization Law were to prej- 
udice the position of long-established Ameri- 
can firms. He observed that the Government of 
the Philippines had committed itself that the 
United States firms would not be affected by the 
Retail Trade Nationalization Law. He ex- 
pressed confidence that the Government of the 
Philippines would uphold its long-standing 
commitments contained, i7iter alia, in a note of 
the Department of Foi-eign Affairs of August 4, 

The visit of President Macapagal was also the 
occasion for the signing of a treaty for the 
avoidance of double taxation and prevention of 
tax evasion.^ The two Presidents agreed that 
the treaty reaffirmed the historic ties between 
their countries and sti'engthened the revenue tid- 
ministration of their respective governments. 

The Presidents agreed that their Govern- 
ments should continue their studies of matters 
relative to the United States-Philippine Trade 

President Johnson and President Macapagal 
concluded that the imderstandings reached, as 

' Ibid., Oct. 26, 1964, p. 601. 

NOVEMBER 2, 19 64 


well as the personal relationship established 
during this visit, will contribute greatly to the 
good will and friendship wliich traditionally 
support Philippine-American relations and to 

the mutual effort of the two countries to uphold, 
defend and preserve the common ideals of de- 
mocracy, freedom and the rule of law which 
their peoples share. 

Science and Development in Cliile 

Address by Secretary Busk ^ 

It is a very great privilege for me to be here 
today to make a few remarks at this closing 
session of what has been a most stimulating and 
productive discussion. It is true, Mr. Chair- 
man, that science and diplomacy are becoming 
allied. During the past 2 years, for example, I 
have liad the privilege of sitting down with the 
senior officers of the Department of State to 
hear from a considerable niunber of distin- 
guished scientists what they are doing to us for 
the next decade, in order that we ourselves 
might try to anticipate some of the problems 
which they will be placing in our laps, out of 
their laboratories and their adventurous 

When the historian looks back upon this par- 
ticular period of history, he will describe it in 
many different ways, but he will surely say that 
this was a period in which scientific knowledge 
and technical capacity have exploded through- 
out the world. And I do not mean by that just 
that Europe and the Western Hemisphere, with 
long traditions in science, somehow spread this 
learning to other continents. Because the ex- 
plosion has occurred in Europe and in the West- 
ern Hemisphere just as much. 

I happen to have in my library the proceed- 
ings of the Georgia Medical College of 1837, 

' Made before a symposium on "The Image of Chile — 
Science anil Development," at the National Academy 
of Sciences, Washington, D.C., on Oct. 9 (press release 
444 ; as-delivered text) . 

because a great-uncle of mine was then a stu- 
dent. And a coimnencement speech was made 
by a distinguished doctor of that day, in which 
he pitied the students because the rapid advance 
of scientific and medical knowledge in the pre- 
ceding three or four decades had been so vast 
that he felt tliat they were faced witli the ini- 
jjossible task of learning all that needed to be 

That was 1837. But when we look at this 
steep curve of knowledge, we i-ecognize what 
this modem explosion means. Now, it means 
some different things : If applied to destruction, 
it means that man has never been in so much 
danger; it literally poses the question of the 
survival of man, and it tests his spirit, liis con- 
science, his prudence, liis judgment, as man has 
never been tested before in the history of the 
race. But it also means that great gates of op- 
portunity are opening up — that the great bur- 
dens which ordinary men and women have lived 
under throuohout the centuries now have a 
cliance of being lifted bj' scientific and techni- 
cal capacity, if man can find a way to bring 
that knowledge to bear and organize his life to 
make it fruitful. 

As a boy, I lived on a small red clay farm in 
North Georgia, at the very beginning of the 
technical revolution in our own agriculture. I 
can remember wlien the first county agents be- 
gan to come around to those small farms, talking 
about the most elementary notions of better 



crop management, fertilizer, a superior variety, 
the minimum of public health — simple house- 
hold hints based upon what was being learned 
in the land-grant universities which were estab- 
lished 100 years ago to assist this country in its 
own development. 

I take a good deal of courage and hope from 
the fact that I can remember the beginnings in 
at least one part of our own country. Because 
that means that we need not settle back into 
lethargy, under the notion that development re- 
quires centuries — that somehow we in the West 
took centuries for development, therefore the 
others need not expect too much too fast. 

We know tliat the dramatic and dynamic de- 
velopment of much of our own country has oc- 
curred within the lifetime of men now living — 
thus that science and teclmology can be brought 
to bear with relative rapidity, that one need 
not wait for centuries, or even too many dec- 
ades, to see what science and technology can 
begin to do to lift some of these age-old burdens 
from the shoulders of ordinary men and women. 

That is one of the reasons why I congratulate 
our American and Chilean scientists for having 
met during this week to talk about some of the 
relationships between science and development 
and to see what can be dra^vn out of these fields 
for the improvement of the lot of man. 

Science and the Alliance for Progress 

When the United States pledged its commit- 
ment to the Alliance for Progress in 1961, it 
recognized the central role which science and 
teclinology must play in the economic and social 
transformation which was envisaged under the 
alliance. The experience of the first years of 
the alliance has not lowered our assessment of 
the importance of science in this development 
process. But it has refined, to some extent, our 
thinking on how scientific endeavor most use- 
fully can spur economic growth. 

In Latin America generally, scientific talent 
is limited in quantity. Indeed, we ourselves 
continue short in scientific manpower, but 
throughout Latin Amei-ica, generally, it is only 
about 2.3 percent of tlie population wliich can 
be classified as professional or technical in any 
field. It has been necessary to establish priori- 

ties, and this lias led to extensive discussions 
between scientists and technologists, on the one 
hand, and those responsible for allocating na- 
tional resoui"ces. And, as a rule, the result has 
been the sound conclusion that short-range sci- 
entific and teclmical projects, however interest- 
ing in and of themselves, are less urgent than 
research and teaching institutions capable of 
promoting science and technology on a broad 

Much has been done and is being done in im- 
proving curricula, strengthening faculties, 
equipping laboratories with the most modem 
and sophisticated research devices, and provid- 
ing interchanges between United States and 
Latin American scientists and scientists from 
other parts of the world. And this symposium 
this week is symbolic of these efforts. 

There is general agreement, I believe, that 
Latin American countries need to put more em- 
phasis on improving their agriculture and on 
making their rural areas a more active market 
and a stimulus for manufacturing. Indeed, 
this is true of most of the developing areas of 
the world. The great imtapped markets of the 
future are not necessarily to be found in foreign 
trade. If our own experience means veiy much, 
it is that the great untapped markets have to 
do with the rising standards of living of our 
own people and of the people within the coun- 
tries looking for markets. 

As I pointed out in a speech on Monday of 
this week,^ agricultural production in the de- 
veloping areas, and particularly in Asia and 
Latin America, is growing less rapidly than 
population ; and if current trends continue, the 
point will not be too far off when world food 
stocks will simply not be enough to meet mini- 
mum needs in the deficit areas. 

Although Chile has a rich agricultural poten- 
tial, it has been a net importer of food for years 
and presently imports about 20 percent, or $125 
million, of its food needs, if my information 
is correct. Every dollar of increased food pro- 
duction has a potential of freeing a dollar of 
valuable foreign exchange to buy goods and 
services needed for the overall development of 
the country. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 26, 19&4, p. 570. 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


Development Projects in Chile 

The agricultural development project now 
being initiated in Chile is a good example of 
how applied science contributes to a total de- 
velopment strategy. This project seeks to in- 
crease farm production through research activ- 
ity and improved rural educational institutions. 
Closely correlated activities seek to stimulate 
food output and exports through changes in the 
agricultural credit and marketing systems and 
in overall national agricultural policy. 

Another effective application of science to 
Chile's economic priorities is the Maule Eiver 
project, so reminiscent to us in this country of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority here at home. 
By late 1967, a comprehensive regional develop- 
ment plan will be created for that river basin, 
to include an integrated and coordinated con- 
struction and financial schedule for individual 
projects. The multipurpose water resource 
plan will include uses for agriculture, industry, 
power, recreation, flood control, and conserva- 
tion. Related projects will cover agrarian re- 
form, transportation, marketing, education and 
training, housing, urban growth, community 
development, and public health. 

The manpower and educational planning 
project is the key to assuring that, in the future, 
human resources will make their optimum con- 
tribution to Chile's economic and social goals. 

I believe these three projects, among the other 
technical assistance activities with which we are 
concerned in Chile, are excellent examples of 
the cooperative endeavor we share under the 
Alliance for Progress. They are being imple- 
mented by Chilean institutions in collaboration 
with the Chile-California program and the 
United States Aid Mission in Santiago, with 
funds provided jointly by the Government of 
Chile and by the AID administration. And 
they are utilizing more fully than ever before 
the scientific capability of our two countries in 
the service of Chile's economic and social de- 
velopment under the Alliance for Progress. 

Cooperation between Chile and the United 
States extends over a wide range of scientific 
subjects, including, I understand, the sleep- 
wakef ulness mechanisms. This has a somewhat 
special appeal to me, for I have been told that 
science may make it possible to get along with 

less sleep. And, as I remarked on another oc- 
casion, I know some government officials who, 
of necessity, have already made considerable 
progress in that direction. 

The Earth Sciences 

I turn now to the second main discipline of 
these seminars — earth sciences. The same force 
that caused so much destruction in Chile during 
1960 manifested itself in Alaska only last year. 
This awesome power of nature disdains inter- 
national boundaries. Studies carried out in 
Chile on earthquake-resistant construction can 
have universal application. And development 
of techniques in instrumentation which might 
be able to sense the early onrush of earthquakes 
is as important in the Eastern Hemisphere as 
in our own Western Hemisphere. 

New tecliniques to determine the location and 
extent of as yet unfound ore deposits are of 
great significance in the economic development 
of a country such as Chile, which has poten- 
tially such a great mineral wealth. And I 
understand that studies of this type are being 
actively pursued by the Institute of Geologic 

Studies in physical oceanography ofTer many 
potential benefits. Perhaps we might come to 
the harnessing of the tides and the ocean cur- 
rents for jjower. But the exploitation of the 
plant and animal resources of the sea promises, 
I would suppose, even more rewarding benefits. 
In a world where much of the population goes 
to bed at night hungry and where protein de- 
ficiency is widespread, the potential benefits 
from harvesting the sources in the sea are spec- 
tacular. The successful conclusion of experi- 
ments now underway in Chile, producing fish 
protein concentrate on a pilot-plant scale, could 
be of great and far-reaching benefit to all of 

We need more research of methods of ni- 
fluencing the biological cycle of the sea and in 
techniques leading to fai'ming fish, rather than 
merely hunting them. Such programs migh 
pose a challenge for scientists in the Fish De- 
velopment Institute in Chile, and indeed are 
doing so. 

Progress in any of these scientific fields de- 
pends not so much on dollars as on manpower; 



the shortage still remains men — here, in Chile, 
and in almost every other country we know 

Day before yesterday, this symposium con- 
sidered scientific manpower and education. 
This necessity — the development of trained 
manpower, including scientists — is an essential 
component of Chile's great national goals, and 
it will continue to receive the closest attention, 
not only by Chilean authorities but by the 
United States, to the extent that we can be, 
or are asked to be, of any assistance. 

As you know, because of the particular im- 
portance of science and engineering in economic 
development, a special committee of the Pan 
American Union has been set up to investigate 
the science and engineering education programs 
in Latin America. Studies have already been 
carried out in several countries, and it is good 
to know that through the eiforts of Dean 
d'Etigny, who participated in Wednesday's 

symposium, the study for Chile has now been 

Let this meeting of scientists from Chile and 
the United States, gathered within the spirit of 
hemispheric cooperation, be interpreted by all 
as a certain sign that we stand together, ready 
to attack and overcome any scientific or tech- 
nological obstacles in the path of the economic 
and social progress of the peoples of the New 
World. Mr. Ambassador [Sergio Gutierrez 
Olivos], I congratulate you and your embassy 
and the Government of Chile and our friends 
here in the National Academy of Sciences for 
what has been a most compelling and instructive 
dialog here this week between the great scientists 
of our two countries. And I hope this will, 
itself, not only stimulate our common thinking 
as common members of the scientific and tech- 
nical community, as it might affect our two 
countries, but will spread from here and be of 
advantage to many in other parts of the world. 

U.S. Policy in a Changing World 

by W. W. Rostow 

Coimselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council'^ 

In my country when we think of Barcelona 
we tliink of one of the great centers of Medi- 
ten-anean. Western, and imiversal civilization. 
Quite specifically, I recall when I was last here 
in 1959 taking my children down to see the 
Santa Maria (wliich you have graciously sur- 
rendered for tlie time being to the New York 
World's Fair), which evokes so vividly Colum- 
bus' voyage. I confess that my wife and I were 
quite as moved as the children. And this must 
be so for every American. 

This ancient port has a special meaning for 
us and today continues to exert an important 

^ Address made before the Institute of North Aruer- 
iean Studies, Barcelona, Spain, on Oct. 6 (press release 

influence on the life of this small planet. As 
the pace of liistoiy accelerates, it is good to 
come to this old but still vital center of human 
wisdom to consider together some of today's 
pressing problems. 

I am particularly interested in discussing 
with you a problem of importance to all of us : 
This is the problem we face in determining our 
policies toward the developing nations of the 
world. I can think of no more appropriate 
place for a discussion of this theme tlian this old 
Mediterranean center from which sailed the 
ships and men who, starting almost 500 years 
ago, began the process of linking the world of 
Western Europe with that of other cultures. 

In opening our discussion this evening, I 


should like to do two things: first, to outline 
in broad terms how we in Washington define 
the strategy we jiursue on the world scene; 
second, to look in somewhat gi-eater detail at 
one dimension of that strategy — that part 
which is concerned with the relations between 
the more advanced part of the free world, lying 
mainly in the northern arc between Tokyo and 
West Berlin, and developing nations, mainly to 
the south, in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Latin America. 

Fundamental Forces 

Although the headlines are filled with news 
of crisis, and although the first duty of all our 
governments is to cope with such crises, a work- 
able strategy in the contemporary world must 
begin by defining the fundamental forces which 
we confront in the second half of the 20th cen- 
tury and which we must try constructively to 

These fundamental forces can be defined un- 
der the follovsdng major headings : 

— ^The revolution in militaiy technology, 
yielding a virtually uncontrolled competitive 
arms race and, at present, an imbalance of the 
offensive over the defensive in the field of nu- 
clear weapons ; 

— The revolution of modernization in Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East., 
including the modernization going forward 
in underdeveloped areas under Connnunist 
control ; 

— ^The revival of economic momentum and 
political strength in Western Europe and 
Japan ; 

— ^The revolution in science and technology, 
notably in international communications; 

— The paradoxical political revolution, 
marked simultaneously by the proliferation of 
ardent new nations and, at the same time, an 
intensified interdependence which requires the 
individual nation-state to cooperate increas- 
ingly with others in order to provide for its 
security and economic welfare; 

— The continuing compulsive commitment of 
the Communists to extend their power on the 
world scene to the maximum, by exjiloiling 
these fundamental forces. 

In the light of this view of what we confront 
in the world aroimd us, the strategj' of the 
United States may be defined as follows: 

First, we are strengthening the bonds of asso- 
ciation among tlie more industrialized nations 
which lie mainly in the northern portion of the 
free world: Western Europe, Canada, and 

Western Europe and Japan have been caught 
up in a remarkable phase of postwar recovery 
and economic gro^vth, a phenomenon especially 
obsen-able here in Barcelona. American mili- 
tary strength and American economic resources 
have sen'ed to protect and support Western 
Europe and Japan. Although they must still 
rely on the deterrent power of American nu- 
clear resources, they are evidently entering a 
phase where they wish to play a larger role on 
the world scene and they command the re- 
sources to do so. We are in the midst of a 
complicated process of working out new terms 
of partnership with Western Europe in every 

NATO is being rethought and Europe's role 
within it being redefined, in the light of the 
changing, more diverse and sophisticated na- 
ture of the Communist threat. 

New patterns of trade are being worked out 
within Europe, between Europe and the United 
States, between the whole Atlantic community 
and the rest of the world. 

Our policies with respect to economic growth 
and currency reserves are being discussed and 
alined in the Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development; and we are moving 
into a new partnerehip in the business of aid 
to the underdeveloped areas. 

Although Japan stands in a somewhat differ- 
ent relation to us than does Europe with respect 
to military affaii-s, in each of the other dimen- 
sions of alliance policj' — trade, reserves, ami 
aid — it is moving into a role of partnership with 
the industrialized north. 

Let me make one point quite bluntly. We do 
not envisage this association of the northern, 
more industrialized states as either an exclusive 
club or one designed to protect (he narrow in- 
terests of those who join m its entei-prises. 
Quite the contrary. It is an effort to group the 
assets these nations counnand and to generate 



global policies wliich will not merely protect 
the free-world conuminity but provide to the 
soutlieru continents resources and tmding op- 
portunities whicli will accelerate their develop- 
ment and draw tliem as soon as may be feasible 
mto full partnership on the world scene. 

The constructive steps that mark tlds process 
of tiglitening the north and of mobilizing its 
strength and resources for worldwide taskt do 
not usually make headlines miless— as is inevita- 
ble—there are phases of disagreement along the 
way ; but it is a rapidly developing piece of his- 
tory wliich will give to the cause of freedom a 
new strength, a new bone structure. 

Tlie second dimension of our strategy con- 
cerns our posture toward the revolution of mod- 
ernization going forward in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East— all areaJ 
wliere Spain has had much experience. 

"W^iat we sometimes call underdeveloped na- 
tions represent a wide spectnun with different 
problems marking each stage along the road to 
self-sustained growth. Some of these nations 
are well along that road ; others are just begin- 
ning. And, in the end, each nation, like each 
individual, is, in an important sense, unique. 
"Wliat is common throughout these regions is 
that men and women are determmed to bring to 
bear wlvat modern science and tecluiologj' "^an 
afford in order to elevate the standards of life 
of their peoples and to provide a firm basis for 
positions of national dignity and independence 
on the world scene. 

The United States is fimily committed to sup- 
port this effort. We look forward to the emer- 
gence of strong, self-confident nations which, 
out of their own traditions and aspirations, 
create their own forms of modem society. We 
take it as our duty— and our interest^to help 
maintain the integrity and the independence of 
this vast modernization process, in as far as our 
resources and our ability to influence the course 
of events permit. 

Working increasingly in partnership with 
our friends in Europe and Japan, our objective 
is to see emerge a new relation of nortli-south 
cooperation among self-respecting, sovereign 
nations to supplant the old colonial ties which 
are gone or fast disappearing from the world 

The third dimension of our strategy lies, of 
course, in East-West relations. There we pur- 
sue a two-sided policy. 

On the one hand, we are conscious tliat wo 
have not yet reached a state of peace or even 
detente with either Moscow or Peipino-. 

Our relations with Moscow have been rela- 
tively quiet since the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, 
but none of the critical issues of the cold war 
ha\-e been settled ; we must assume that Moscow 
will continue to probe for weak spots in the free 
world ; we must show by our preparedness and 
resolve that such probing will not lead to gains 
by Moscow. 

As we look at it in Washington, the struggle 
against communism is part of a larger and more 
constructive enterprise. The common mission 
of the nations of the free world is not merely to 
frustrate Communist aggression. Our mission 
IS to build with our friends a new world order 
to supplant that which was destroyed in 1914 
and never replaced. For a half century now, 
we have all lived in a world at war— or near 
war— and in recent years with a nuclear sword 
of Damocles over our heads. 

We are trymg to help build a community of 
free and independent nations, offering to their 
peoples rising standards of welfare, eacli proud 
of its uniqueness but respecting also the inter- 
dependence that is imposed upon us all on this 
small planet by modern communications and 
modern weapons. 

The struggle with communism, in the end, is 
a .struggle about how the world that is emerging 
in tliis second half of the 20th century shall be 
organized. We believe it should be organized 
on the basis of the principles written into the 
United Nations Charter in 1945— principles 
which extend to nations that mixture of indi- 
vidual freedom, diversity, and responsibility 
that underlies the humane tradition of the West. 
It is in that spirit that we make our contribu- 
tion to building the North Atlantic community, 
to building new relationships of mutual sup- 
port among the nations of this hemisphere, 
building new ties to Japan and to our other 
friends in the Pacific. It is in that spirit that 
we seek to draw the nations of Eastern Europe 
into the wider coimnunity of Europe and the 
world, as their will and capacity to express their 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


national aspirations increase. It is also in that 
constructive spirit that we look seriously but 
with caution to our relations with the Soviet 
Union, where we hope, step by step, in concert 
with our allies to find areas of agreement which, 
consistent with the needs of national security, 
would limit the dangers to all peoples repre- 
sented by an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. 

None of these consti-uctive possibilities will 
come to life if the Communists succeed, by what- 
ever method, in extending their power into the 
free world. On the other hand, we take it to be 
our task, working with our friends, to move to- 
ward the construction of a new world order as 
we defend the cause of freedom where it is 

Therefore, the first dimension of East- West 
policy has been and must be the maintenance 
of a full spectrum of military strength designed 
to make the launching of aggression against the 
free world as unattractive as possible and to 
permit us to deal with aggression when it occurs 
in ways which not only protect the vital inter- 
ests of the free world but do so in ways which 
minimize the likelihood of nuclear war. 

The other side of our approach to East-West 
relations goes beyond deterrence. We wish to 
exploit every tendency and impulse in the Com- 
munist world toward national independence and 
toward policies of greater humanity in order to 
draw countries of Eastern Europe — and, in- 
deed, the Soviet Union itself — toward closer and 
more normal relations with Europe and the 

The victory we desire is a victory for the 
fundamental principles of national independ- 
ence and human freedom — the principles incor- 
porated in the language of the United Nations 

Our strategy is, then, quite simple. We are 
working from day to day to bind up in closer 
partnership the industrialized nations of the 
north; to work with our friends in the north 
to create a new partnership between the more 
developed and less developed nations. Kecog- 
nizing and welcoming the new strength to be 
found in Western Europe and Japan, recogniz- 
ing and welcoming the impulse of the newer 
nations to modernize, we see a path ahead which 
would reconcile the great interests involved and 

gradually build a community of free nations. 
We intend to defend this community of free 
nations and to do so in ways which will minimize 
the possibility that a nuclear war will come 
about ; and we intend — with all the poise and in- 
sight we can muster — to draw the nations now 
under Communist regimes toward the free- 
world community both by ruling out the expan- 
sion of communism and by exploiting specific 
areas of overlapping interest which we believe 
will increasingly emerge as the strength, imity, 
and effectiveness of the free community are 

Growth in the Developing Nations 

Within this broad framework of strategy let 
me now say something more about its north- 
south dimension. 

We confront on the world scene, as I said 
earlier, the revolutionary movements of mod- 
ernization and nationalism in which more than 
a billion human beings in Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Latin America are now 
caught up. Behind these revolutions is what 
might be called a reactive nationalism ; that is, 
a widespread desire of nations that, in one way 
or another, have felt the power and weight of 
those who were technologically and industrially 
more mature, to free themselves from this kind 
of technical inferiority and in so doing to find 
a new role of dignity and status on the world 

Although other impulses enter into the moti- 
vation for economic growth in the developing 
nations, the desire for increased national status 
and dignity on the world scene appears a pre- 
dominant motivation. 

For an historian this is no surprise. Wlien, 
for example, Jefferson and Hamilton argued in 
the ITnited States in the late l&th century 
whether industrialization should be undertaken, 
Hamilton's critical argument was that without 
industrialization the ITnited States would be 
helpless in dealing with Great Britain and other 
more advanced European powers. 

Similarly, the impulse to industrialization in 
France, Germany, Japan, and Russia in the 
period from, say, 1815 to 1885 arose primarily 
froin this kind of reactive nationalism — from a 
desire to overcome a sense of relative inferioritv. 



In the contemporary world, of course, the 
reaction has been more explicitly against colo- 
nialism and its memories; but similar impulses 
are evident in less developed nations which long 
since escaped colonial rule but do feel weighed 
down by the burdens of relative underdevelop- 

All this yields a sense of impatience and frus- 
tration within developing nations. They are 
anxious to attain quickly a position of dignity 
and power on the world scene; but they con- 
front the arithmetic of power in a world of 
modern weapons. 

They desire urgently to see a rapid increase of 
national income and human welfare; but they 
confront the inherent difficulties of the modern- 
ization process which limit the pace at which 
development can proceed. 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising 
that we see in both the domestic politics of the 
developing nations and their international rela- 
tions reflections of this double frustration which 
sometimes takes the form — as if by what psy- 
chiatrists call transference — of bitter struggles 
withm their regions to alter boundaries or set- 
tlements laid down, in what is now regarded 
as an arbitrary or unsatisfactory way, as part 
of the colonial heritage. 

The Communists seek to take advantage of 
such frustrations. 

Conscious of the complexities and crosscur- 
rents inherent in the transition to moderniza- 
tion, it is Communist policy to heighten them. 
They aim to produce a failure of the political 
proc&ss and, amidst attendant confusion, to take 
over power. 

Specifically, Communist policy aims to 
heighten the typical anticolonial feeling that is 
likely to mark the early stages of moderniza- 
tion. They also encourage an exaggerated na- 
tional ism in order to achieve one or more of these 
results which sen-e Commimist mterests: the 
damaging of relations between developing na- 
tions and the more advanced democratic nations 
which must be an important source of external 
assistance; the heightening of regional conflicts 
which Communists can exploit; and the diver- 
sion of scarce energies, resources, and talents 
away from the constructive tasks of moderniza- 

In terms of welfare policy within a develop- 
ing nation. Communists (while adapting their 
stance to particular circumstance) generally 
project the view that no important movement 
toward economic and social development can 
occur until after there has been a successful 
Communist revolution. They seek to divert, 
thereby, the energies of the people away from 
concrete tasks of development into disruptive 
revolutionary activity, while heightening a sense 
disappointment with the pace and the uneven- 
ness of economic progress and forestalling the 
emergence of an effective national consensus. 

Finally, in areas where they think the tactic 
may prove fruitfvil — as recently in Venezuela — 
they seek to disrupt the efforts to move forward 
in the direction of effective political democracy, 
hoping to profit by the breakdown of public 

These tactics are rooted in a judgment that, 
unless communism manages to seize power dur- 
ing the complex and difficult transition to mod- 
ernization, a Conmnmist takeover will prove 
impossible. Communists sense that, once non- 
Communist methods have demonstrated that 
regular growth, social equity, and stable demo- 
cratic political practice are attainable and 
mutually consistent goals, an historic oppor- 
tunity will have passed them irreversibly by. 

The Communists are, then, the scavengers of 
the modernization process. They prey on every 
division, weakness, and uncertainty that is 
likely to beset a society in the process of its 
transformation to a modem mold. 

From the point of view of the United States, 
what we see, then, sitting in Washington, is a 
situation where the interplay of the revolutions 
of modernization and nationalism, with Com- 
munist efforts to exploit their inherent frustra- 
tions, poses a set of major problems. 

"\^niat is our policy ? 

Our first task, of course, is to assist those 
nations threatened by Commvmist aggression, 
direct or indirect, to maintain their independ- 
ence. For those nations located along the bor- 
ders of the Communist bloc, this has drawn the 
United States into a series of direct alliances 
designed to make clear that overt aggression 
by Communists against these nations would 
bring into play the full military power of the 

NOVEMBER 2, 1964 


United States. Our defense agreement with 
Spain is an important contribution to the secu- 
rity of the free world. 

Partly because of the success of the free 
world's effort in Korea, Communists have put 
tlieir major reliance since that time on tech- 
niques of ideological attraction, subversion, and 
guerrilla warfare. In Southeast Asia, in the 
Caribbean, and in Africa we are now under- 
going a critical test of whether we can make 
those techniques as sterile as we rendered the 
earlier techniques of Commimist aggression 
applied against Western Europe and Korea, 
and the attempt to install missiles in Cuba. 

Our second task in facing the problems posed 
in the developing regions to the south is that 
of assisting them to establish the longer run 
basis for their independence through programs 
of economic assistance and trade. Tlie balance 
we created in our initial response to Stalin's 
postwar offensive, in the form of the Tiiiman 
Doctrine on the one hand and the Marshall 
Plan on the other, remains relevant down to the 
present time. TVe must face, for example, the 
hard fact of Communist aggression in South- 
east Asia; but we must also conduct programs 
of assistance, which are at least as important, 
and use our influence to encourage the govern- 
ments in that region to get on with the tasks of 

Third, we seek to be of such assistance as we 
can in acliieving peaceful settlements of the 
regional conflicts which have threatened dis- 
integration in parts of Southeast Asia, the In- 
dian subcontinent, and the Middle East, and 
important parts of Africa. 

In trying to perform these functions — in 
trying to assist in tlie maintenance of the in- 
dependence of nations, in their modernization, 
and in keeping peace in the regions — the United 
States finds itself often in a rather complicated 
position. Our friends in the developing coun- 
tries are, in one part of their minds, pleased 
to receive our help and support; but, in an- 
other part of their minds, one of the major 
pui-poses of revolutions of nationalism and 
modernization is to achieve a higher degree of 
independence of the more advanced powci*s of 
(ho world and in ])articnlar a higher degree of 
independence of the United States. 

This ambivalence toward the United States 
we understand verj' well indeed. As I sug- 
gested earlier, we are, after all, the first of the 
nations to have broken away from colonialism 
and to have been forced to make its way on 
the world scene amidst more advanced powers 
toward whose struggles against one another 
we practiced a policy of isolation and reserve. 

But in the modern world, the intimacy of 
communications and the character of weapons, 
combined with the Communist assault on the 
foundations of AVestern life, require of us all 
a common objective; namely, that we all do 
what we can not merely to pursue conventional 
national interests but to contribute actively to 
the building of an orderly world community. 
Even though the modernizing nations in the 
Southern Hemisphere are understandably con- 
centrated on their absorbing domestic tasks, we 
hope to see them assume enlarged responsibili- 
ties for mutual support in defending their in- 
dependence, for mutual support in their tasks 
of development, for mutual supjiort in the set-| 
tlement of their intraregional conflicts. We 
welcome the impulse in Asia, Africa, and Latitt| 
America for the governments and peoples tc 
take a more active role in shaping their owi 
destiny. The interest of the United States is| 
not to build an empire; it is to play our par 
in building an orderly world community. 

We welcome the evidence that the reactive 
nat ionalism endemic in the southern continents 
is being converted into attitudes and roles of 
responsibility in regional and world affairsJ 
As we look ahead we can foresee the day when| 
the north-south distinction, arising from differ- 
ences in timing of the industrial revolution 
various parts of the world, will tend to disap^ 
pear. The capacity of nations even'where tc 
deal with the tools of modern science and tech-| 
nology will tend to become more equal as well 
as tlieir ability to shoulder the burdens and re- 
sponsibilities of the world connnunity. 

The commitment of the United States to the 
defense of freedom and the building of a stable 
world connnunity — a commitment of men, re-l 
sources, and political energy — will, I believej 
remain stal)le in the years ahead. 

But tills is a commit nient we all share. 



The Marine Corps and the Foreign 
Service: A Working Partnership 

Address hy Secretary Rusk ^ 

General Greene [Gen. Wallace ^I. Greene, 
Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps], other 
distinguished guests, friends and families of our 
graduating class : It is a very great honor, gen- 
tlemen, for me to be here today to welcome you 
into our Foreign Service for the Pi'esident and 
for the people of the United States. 

Since this is my first contact. General Greene, 
with the Marines for the last 2 weeks, I should 
like to begin by congratulating the Marine 
Corps on Billy Mills and his performance in 
Tokyo just the other day. I noted that the 
sports announcers and the sports writers re- 
ferred to him as an unknown. But I didn't 
quite understand why they should seem so sur- 
prised, because they did know that he was a 

It is a very gi-eat privilege to extend to the 
members of this class, as you finish your train- 
ing and embark upon your new assignments, 
the congratulations of the President as well as 
my own. 

As the prospective employer of this class, I 
have an understandable interest in your back- 
ground, in your motivation for wanting to be- 
come a part of our Foreign Service program, 
and in the job you will be performing with me 
and my colleagues. And, indeed, the interest 
here shown by the Departmental and Foreign 
Service personnel in this auditorium suggests 
that they, too, share the same interest. 

In applying for embassy duty, you have al- 
ready shown your desire for the unusual — and 
you may be assured that embassy duty is dif- 
ferent. It is often a test of character, of endur- 
ance, and of patience. Or there may be critical 
occasions calling for the steady nerves, the cour- 
age, and the resourcefulness for which the Ma- 
rine Corps is justly renowned. 

^ Made at the Department of State on Oct. 16 (press 
release 454 ; as-delivered text) during ceremonies mark- 
ing the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Marine 
Security Guard School and the graduation of the 66th 
class of Marine Corps embassy and consulate guards. 

You are an elite group within an elite corps. 
I am confident that the security of our diplo- 
matic and consular posts around the world will 
remain in good hands — that you will zealously 
protect our missions and our people, who, like 
you, are devoted and dedicated to the interests 
of our country. 

There is, in fact, a great similarity between 
our two great services. On the one hand, each 
is the oldest in terms of the growth of our na- 
tion. I like to think. General Greene, that we 
too were born in 1775, because we in the State 
Department claim that the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, under Benjamin Franklin, was 
a direct ancestor of our Department of State. 
Ever since then, we've enjoyed many close ties 
with the Marine Corps. The men and women of 
these organizations serve wherever assigned, 
selflessly and unstintingly, in the furtherance 
of our national interest. Like Marines, our 
Foreign Service employees serve as the "front- 
line" troops, but in an altogether different kind 
of battle. They, too, serve in places and under 
conditions which are almost unheard of or to- 
tally unknown to many people. Like Marines 
in wartime, the price our people may pay can be 
the supreme one. 

Before you leave, I urge each of you to visit 
the lobby at the diplomatic entrance and view 
the wall plaque on which are inscribed the 
names of the men of the Foreign Service who 
gave tlieir lives in the service of our nation. 
For many of them, I would like to borrow upon 
a characterization applied to Marines during 
World War II and say that their "uncommon 
valor was a common virtue." 

Last July we dedicated the south court of this 
building as a Memorial Court "to the memory of 
those who gave their lives for the cause of 
peace and friendship among nations." And 
around the fountain m the court we placed 
bronze plaques naming the groups of those to 
whom this Memorial Court is dedicated. One 
of those plaques bears the inscription: "U.S. 
Marine Guards." 

Incidentally, when you visit that court, that 
figure in the fountain does not represent the 
State Department. If it did, he would be carry- 
ing the world on his shoulders, instead of sit- 
ting on top of it. 

N0\T;MBER 2, 1964 


Your Corps and our Foreign Service express 
our basic national characteristics and purposes. 
We believe that a great majority of the ordinaiy 
people of this world share a common bond in 
maintaining and perpetuating peace and friend- 
ship. In what better way can we exjiress and 
promote these objectives than by the personal 
exchange of ideas with citizens of other nations 
on a mutual and friendly basis and in a cordial 
atmosphere ? Independently, or in concert with 
other members of the Foreign Service team, our 
Marines, as General Greene has pointed out, 
have made people in other lands aware of the 
lofty ideals of our country and of the warmth 
and generosity of our people. In fact, the "Ten 
Commandments for Marine Security Guards" 
in your handbook provide an excellent guide for 
all Americans who go overseas. 

To me and to my colleagues in tlie Foreign 
Seiwice, the Marine Security Guards are im- 
portant symbols of security — in more ways than 
one. Aside from the essential functions you 
play in helping to maintain the security of our 
missions overseas, your presence is a constant 
reassurance to us that "the Marines have landed 
and the situation is well in hand." In this pe- 
riod of numerous critical international tensions, 
even Foreign Service employees, dedicated and 
conflict-hardened as they are, like to sleep com- 
forted by the knowledge that our people, places, 
and things are in safe hands. They appreciate, 
as I do, the lonely vigil you often, of necessity, 
must undertake in performing your duties, and 
I assure you that we are constantly aware of 
the difficult nature of those duties. 

This formal arrangement between the Marine 
Corps and the Department of State is 16 years 
old. And the joint school from which you are 
graduating, while only 10 years old, is emblem- 
atic of the unity of purpose of our organiza- 
tions. It is another milestone in the long and 
historic association between our services since 
1775. We in the Department and the Foreign 
Service have been very pleased with this pai't- 
nership. Like other Americans who have seen 
the Marine Security Guards on duty, I feel a 
special affection for them, for I have personally 
seen — and may I say benefited — from our 
Marine Guards in action in at least 30 capitals 
all over the world. 

As I have visited with the Marine Guards 
in so many distant places, I have on occasion 
been reminded of the story of the jet flight 
across the Pacific where an old lady was sitting 
in the kibitzer's seat in the cockpit to watch the 
proceedings. She saw the copilot dozing a bit. 
The plane was on automatic pilot, and the pilot 
was simply looking out and aromid — nothing 
very much happening. And she said to him, 
"Captain, doesn't it get boring up here hour 
after hour like this?" And he said, "Yes, lady, 
but when it isn't, it's just the opposite." And 
tills is the way in which the duties of a Marine 
Guard can be transformed instantaneously from 
one type of service to another. 

You have been carefully selected and espe- 
cially trained for your tasks, which, indeed, 
I'equire all the basic qualities of a good diplo- 
mat. The central objective of our diplomacy, 
as of the military forces which support it, is to 
preserve the safety of our people and their way 
of life. Today we can be safe only to the extent 
that we can make the world as a whole safe 
for freedom. The heavy responsibilities of our 
foreign policy and of the men and women, both 
civilian and militarj-, who conduct and support 
it, is to win this world struggle without a devas- 
tating war, if possible. For a victory which 
would burn up most of the people and civiliza- 
tion of the Northern Hemisphere is not the sort 
of victory that we — or any sane person could — 

We are still surrounded by dangers, but 
through strength and firmness, coupled with 
good sense and intelligence and persistence, we 
are making progress toward a world that is 
secure for freedom. In this vital task, we in 
the Department of State and the Foreign Serv- 
ice are very glad and proud to have tlie Marine 
Corps, with its own great traditions, associated 
with us in this very special and intimate way. 

Just in the past day or two, we have had news 
from various parts of the world which reminds 
us once again that we have lived in a period 
of change in this postwar world. That has 
been true for the past 20 years. And change 
will continue to be the standing order of the 
day. But there is one very impoi'tant stabilizing 
element in this world situation, and tliat is the 
power and the purpose of the American people. 



General Omar Bradley once said many years 
ago, in reference to this changing course of 
events in the postwar world, ''Tlie time has come 
for us to chart our course by the distant stars 
and not by the liglits of each passing ship." 

The purposes of the American people are 
committed to freedom, committed to a decent 
world order, to peace. And tlioso purposes are 
baclied by unimaginable power — power in which 
you Marines and your associates in the Armed 
Forces are so major a part. 

That combination of decent purpose and 
great power provides a beacon unpervious to 
cliange, to which men who love freedom all over 
the world can loolj for their guidance. 

So, as you gentlemen go out to distant pai-ts 
of the world, wearing this great uniform, you 
will be carrj'ing with you the representation of 
the American people and those purposes that 
are so central to this nation, purposes which 
will win for j^ou in almost every instance the 
confidence and respect and the friendship of the 
foreign peoples among whom you serve- 
Good luck to vou. 

U.S. Aids International Campaign 
To Preserve Nubian Monuments 

Press release 437 dated October 6 

The international effort sponsored by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cviltural Organization (UNESCO) to preserve 
the Egj^ptian temples of Abu Simbel from inun- 
dation by the rising waters of the Aswan Dam 
has now received U.S. financial assistance. 

A grant in the equivalent of $12 million, in 
the fonn of Egv'ptian pounds owned by the 
United States in Cairo, is being made for de- 
posit to the Liternational Trust Fund created 
by the UNESCO Executive Committee of the 
International Campaign To Save the I\Ionu- 
ments of Nubia. The grant is being made by 
the Agency for International Development, 
following the Senate recommendation ^ that 

such a contribution be made from excess for- 
eign currency funds arising from the sale, un- 
der Public Law 480, of surplus agricultural 
commodities. On June 30 of this year the Unit- 
ed States owned Egyptian pounds in excess of 
its requirements in the sum of $75.9 million. 
In addition, more than $34 million in U.S.- 
owned Egyptian pounds had been previously 
set aside for loans to U.S. business operating 
in the United Arab Eepublic. This sum has 
remained unused for more than 3 years and can 
now, mider tlie terms of the agreement with the 
U.A.E.,^ be used for other purposes. It is from 
these funds that the contribution to Abu Simbel 
will be made. 

A contribution of approximately one-third of 
the estimated total cost of $36 million for the 
project had been pledged by the United States, 
subject to several conditions, at an international 
pledging conference last year. Pledges to the 
pi'oject by 47 member states and associate mem- 
bers of UNESCO, including the United Arab 
Republic and the United States, have reached 
a total of $28.8 million. While this total is still 
considerably short of the $36 million required 
to finish the project, it was seen nearly a year 
ago that the work could not be delayed if the 
temples were to be saved because of the im- 
pending rising of the waters this fall. The 
U.A.R. therefore decided to underwrite the re- 
maining cost of the project so work could be- 
gin eai'ly this year. The U.A.R. acted in the 
expectation that additional public and private 
contributions would be forthcoming to meet the 
total cost. 

A private American group, the American 
Committee To Preserve Abu Simbel, has been 
formed to receive private gifts from American 
institutions and individuals. With the avail- 
ability of U.S. fimds now assured, the commit- 
tee will undertake a campaign for private con- 
tributions to augment fmids already pledged by 
member states and associate members. 

' S. Rept. 1380, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 

" Funds for the Abu Simbel grant were generated 
from surplus agricultural commodities agreements be- 
tween the U.S. and the U.A.R. dated Dec. 24, 1958, and 
July 29, 1959. 



of October 19, 1964 




date in 


opening line of the sec 






subhead "The Fight 





" should read "1959." 

no\t;m:ber 2, 19 64 



Current Actions 

Signatures: Australia, France (ad referendum), New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, United States. 


Amendments of paragraphs 2, 4(1), 6(1), 6(3), 9(a), 
and 9(b) to the schedule to the international whal- 
ing convention of 1!H6 ( TIAS 1849) . Adopted at the 
16th meeting of the International Whaling Commis- 
sion. London, June 26, 19(>4. Entered into force 
October 1, 19(54, with the exception of paragraph 6(3) . 




Recommendations including agreed measures for con- 
servation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted at 
Brussels June 2, 1964.' 

Notification of approval: South Africa, October 7, 


Inteniational coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Ghana, September 9, 1964. 

Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entitic and Cultural Organization. Concluded at 
London November 16, 1945. Entered into force for 
the United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 
Signature and acceptance: Iceland, June 8, 1964. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Atomic information 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic informa- 
tion. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.' 
Notification received that it is willing to he hound 

1)11 terms of the agreement: Canada, October 12, 


Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the North- 
west Atlantic lisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 
2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at 
Washington July 15, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, October 2, 1964. 

South Pacific Commission 

Agreement amending the agreement of February 6, 
1947, establishing the South Pacific Commission 
(TIAS 2317). Done at London October 6, 1964.' 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Tehran September 29, 19(54. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 29, 1964. 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of January 29, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
4956). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran 
February 10 and September 1, 1964. Entered into 
force September 1, 19(54. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Saigon 
September 29, 1964. Entered into force September 
29, 1964. 


Agreement concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
Yugoslavia to the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington October 5, 19(54. 
Enters Into force January 1, 1965. 


' Not in force. 


Harvey R. Wellman as Director of the Office of 
Personnel, effective October 12. 



INDEX November 2, 196^. Vol. LI, No. 1323 

Atomic Energy 

Chinese Communists Conduct Nuclear Test 

(Johnson) 012 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leader- 
ship, Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British 
Government 610 

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bundy Interviewed on Red 

China's Nuclear Testing (114 

Chile. Science and Development in Chile 

(Rusk) (J34 


Chinese Communists Conduct Nuclear Test 

(Johnson) 612 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leader- 
ship, Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British 
Government 610 

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bundy Interviewed on Red 

China's Nuclear Testing 614 

Communism. U.S. Policy in a Changing World 

(Rostow) 637 

Department and Foreign Service 

Designations (Wellman) 646 

The Marine Corps and the Foreign Service : 

A Workiug 1'artner.ship (Rusk) 643 

Economic Affairs 

An Appeal to Discontent (Ball) 622 

U.S. Policy in a Changing World (Rostow) . . 637 

U.S.-Uruguayan Trade Committee Holds Talks 
at Washington 617 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Aids 
International Campaign To Preserve Nubian 
Monuments 645 

Europe. An Appeal to Discontent (Ball) . . 622 

India. Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bundy Interviewed on 
Red China's Nuclear Testing 014 

Philippines. President Macapagal of Philip- 
pines Visits United States (Johnson, Maca- 
pagal, jciint communique) 628 

Presidential Documents 

Chinese Communists Conduct Nuclear Test . . 612 

President Johnson Receives Message From New 
Soviet Government 611 

President Macapagal of Philippines Visits United 
States 628 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leader- 
ship. Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British 
Government 610 

President Sends Congratulations to New U.K. 

Prime Minister 613 


Man and Nature (Rusk) 618 

Science and Development in Chile (Rusk) . . 634 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 646 


An Appeal to Discontent (Ball) 622 

President Johnson Receives Message From New 
Soviet Government (Johnson) 611 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leader- 
ship, Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British 
Government 610 

Jlr. Rusk and Mr. Bundy Interviewed on Red 
China's Nuclear Testing 614 

United Arab Republic. U.S. Aids International 
Campaign To Preserve Nubian Monuments . 645 

United Kingdom 

President Reports on Change in Soviet Leader- 
ship, Chinese Nuclear Test, and New British 
Government (jio 

President Sends Congratulations to New U.K. 

Prime Minister (text of message) .... 613 

United Nations 

An Appeal to Discontent (Ball) 622 

U.S. Aids International Campaign To Preserve 

Nubian Monuments (j4g 

Uruguay. U.S.-Uruguayan Trade Committee 

Holds Talks at Washington 617 

Name Index 

Abel, Elie gig 

Ball, George W g22 

Bundy, William gjg 

Herman, (Jeorge gi4 

.Tohmson, President 610,611,612,613,628 

Macapagal, Diosdado 628 

Rostow, W. W g37 

Rusk, Secretary 614,618,634,643 

Wellman, Harvey R. •...•.... 646 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 
20.~>20. issued prior to October 12 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos 435 
and 437 of October 6 and 444 and 445 of Oc- 
tober 9. 


U.S. participation in international 

Rusk : "Jlan and Nature." 

Ball: "An Apijeal to Discontent." 

Harriman : Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute (excerpts). 

U.S.-Israel de.salting program. 

Marine Security Guard graduation. 

Harriman : Farm- Labor-Small 
Business Council, Muncie, Ind. 

Harriman : Purdue University 
( excerpts ) . 

Rusk: Marine Security Guard 
graduation (as-delivered text) 

Cleveland: U.N. Association and 
Central Washington State Col- 
lege (excerpts). 

Cleveland: Sunday Evening Fo- 
rum, Tucson, Ariz, (excerpts). 

















*456 10/17 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 





The Alliance for Progress 

Democracy vs. Dictators in Latin America 

These two pamphlets, based on recent addresses by Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of Sti 
for Inter-American Affairs, outline United States policy toward Latin America and call upon aU 1 
American peoples for continued dedication to assure the success of the Alliance for Progress progn 
and to make democracy a reality throughout the hemisphere. 


Please send me copies of The Alliance for Progress, Publication 7t 

5 Cents. 

Please send ine copies of Democracy vs. Dictators in Latin Amen 

I'UBLioATioN 7729, 5 Cents. 




FhidOftPd flnd $ 


(casb, check, or money order pay- 
able to Sapt. of Documenta) 








Vol. LI, No. 13U 

November 9, 196^ 


Address by Secretary Eusk 650 



by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 661^. 

by Under Secretary of the Treasury Robert V. Roosa 669 

For index see inside back cover 

Toward the Brotherhood of Man 

Address ly Secretary Ritsk^ 

It is a privilege to address this great meeting 
of young leaders. I understand that the some 
2,000 delegates at this meeting come from 81 
coimtries of the free world. And they repre- 
sent some 300,000 other Jaycees — the largest 
organization of young businessmen in the 

More important than your size are your com- 
mon commitments. You subscribe to a lofty 
creed : 

We believe 

That faith in God gives meaning and purpose to 
human life ; 

That the brotherhood of man transcends the sov- 
ereignty of nations ; 

That economic justice can best be won by free men 
through free enterprise ; 

That government should be of laws rather than of 

^ Made before the 19th World Congress of Junior 
Chamber International at Oklahoma City, Okla., on 
Oct. 19 (press release 457). Secretary Rusk also made 
some extemporaneous remarks. 

That earth's great treasure lies in human person- 
ality ; 

And that service to humanity is the best work of 

You are devoted to "service to humanity." 
The good works of the Junior Chambers of 
Commerce are visible throughout the free world. 
Your creed and your endeavors to live up to it 
go far to explain why Karl Marx and his fol- 
lowers went wrong. They thought only in 
terms of primitive capitalism— a capitalism 
which often ruthlessly exploited human labor. 
They did not understand the capacity of free 
and compassionate men to improve their 

You know that "economic justice can best be 
won by free men through free enterprise.'* 
What private enterprise, combined with suit- 
able governmental policies, can accomplish is' 
evident in all the economically advanced coim- 
tries of the free world. It is in these countries' 
that the ordinary man has achieved the highest' 
levels of well-being in all history. And con-i 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
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fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
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Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

I'nbllcatlons of the Department. United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of internationui relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
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ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C., : 
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Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
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NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
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source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



trary to Communist propcaganda, tlie gap in 
production and living standards between the 
Communist stat«s and these nations of the free 
world is growing wider. 

However, a large majority of the population 
of the free world does not yet enjoy the fruits 
of modem teclinology. All of us in the eco- 
nomically advanced nations have an interest in 
assisting the less developed countries to move 
ahead economically, socially, and politically. 
Our foreign aid programs frequently are cru- 
cial in determining whether a nation begins to 
move on the road toward self-sustaining 
growth. But government actions in the devel- 
oping coimtries will not be enough unless they 
encourage and are accompanied by private 

Reexamining Private Investment Activities 

Private mvestment is the surest and the 
quickest way of transferring capital, manage- 
rial skills, and technical know-how to these na- 
tions. Properly extended and properly re- 
ceived, private foreign investment can be the 
most effective weapon in the arsenal of economic 

I believe that all of us in the more developed 
countries need to reexamine both our precon- 
ceptions and our efforts in this area. We have 
not been doing enough. Sometimes we have 
been held back by outmoded cliches and sterile 
debates. We must learn more effective ways of 
investing in the newly independent countries, 
and how to manage these mvestments in ways 
appropriate to our time. In our coimtry, orga- 
nizations such as the Business Council for In- 
ternational Understanding are doing excellent 
work toward this end through educational and 
training projects, both in the United States and 
in other countries. 

On the other side of the coin, leaders in the 
developing countries must put aside old theories 
and fears based upon the limited experience of 
earlier times. Increasingly they are doing this. 
Increasingly they are recognizing that private 
foreign investment and the private sector are 
wonderfully efficient instruments for the effec- 
tive allocation of a nation's resources and for 
the organization of human energies. 

This trend was evident at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, which 

concluded its work in June of this year.^ One 
of its recommendations calls for a series of ac- 
tions by both the industrial and the developing 
countries to promote private foreign invest- 
ment in the developing countries. The con- 
ference adopted this recommendation by the 
resounding vote of 94 to 1, with 22 abstentions. 
And I would emphasize that the need for 
private initiative is nowhere greater than in 
the field of agriculture. The growing food im- 
balances in the poorer comitries of the world 
make it imperative that we all work together 
to increase their agricultural production, im- 
prove the lot of their farmers, and expand their 
rural markets. President Joluison emphasized 
this last week when he said that he would "pro- 
pose steps to use the food and agricultural skills 
of the entire West in a joint effort to eliminate 
hunger and starvation."^ Private companies 
have a key responsibility to apply their experi- 
ence, their teclmology, and their organization 
to this critical task. 

Developments Promising Expanded Private Action 

Let me give you some examples of develop- 
ments that promise to expand the role of pri- 
vate action in economic development. 
^ Firsts work is going forward on the Interna- 
tional Executive Service Corps. This busmess 
initiative, which the United States Government 
strongly supports, could become the business 
counterpart of the Peace Corps. I can think of 
no better way for American business to demon- 
strate its support for the private sector in other 
countries. And I believe it is significant that a 
number of the developing countries have shown 
a strong interest in this initiative. 

Second, over the past 2 years we have nego- 
tiated new investment guaranty agreements 
with 12 countries and expanded our agreements 
with 15 other countries. It is now possible for 
the United States Government to insure private 
investors against a variety of political risks in 
61 friendly countries and areas. These agree- 

' For background and text of the preamble and rec- 
ommendationa contained in the Final Act, see Btn.- 
LETiN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150. 

'For text of President Johnson's remarks at the 
annual dinner of the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foun- 
dation, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Oct 14, see White 
House press release (New York, N.Y.) dated Oct. 14. 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


ments in themselves evidence the interest of 
these countries in receiving United States pri- 
vate investments. During this year alone AID 
[Agency for International Development] has 
written contracts under these agreements for 
more than $500 million of new United States 
private investment — a record sirni for the 

Third, a great deal has been done to put more 
and better information at the disposal of United 
States firms interested in investing in the de- 
veloping countries. The Department of Com- 
merce has had a continuing program in this 
field. AID is strongly collaborating in this 
effort. It has recently established a busmess- 
men's information center which shows how in- 
vestments can be made in connection with spe- 
cific AID programs. It is also helping to 
finance investment surveys imdertaken by pri- 
vate United States firms considering invest- 
ments in particular countries. As another 
innovation, AID worked up a catalog of invest- 
ment opportimities in developing countries 
which brings together all available surveys for 
the guidance of potential United States 

Pick up any recent issue of the Department 
of Commerce's publication International Com- 
merce and you will find that interest in these 
ventures is not restricted to the American Gov- 
ernment or to American private business. 
Many of the developing countries are taking 
purposeful action to encourage private invest- 
ment. And many private business firms in these 
nations seek joint ventures or licensing agree- 
ments with United States firms. 

Fourth, and as another straw in the wind, 
two Central American countries took the of- 
fensive this year to attract private investment. 
They opened offices in New York specifically 
for this purpose, and they got results. Other 
Latin American countries are now considering 
the same move. 

Fifth, the continued growth of development 
banks and other credit institutions is strength- 
ening the private sector in developmg coun- 
tries. AID helps in this process by providing 

capital and te^lmical assistance. The Interna- 
tional Finance Corporation is also doing more 
in this field and has recently received authority 
to expand its activities. There is a serious 
shortage of this type of capital in the develop- 
ing countries, particularly in the field of agri- 
cultural credit and for industries associated 
with the development and expansion of rural 
markets. By helping to build up these capital 
resources, we strengthen the private sector in 
the developing countries and improve the en- 
vironment for foreign private investment. 

Sixth, there is the unfinished business of the 
tax-credit bill which President Johnson rec- 
ommended and sent to Congress on March 19, 
1964.* Tills measure could greatly increase 
U.S. private investment in the developing coim- 
tries. I have every hope that it will receive 
the urgent attention it deserves in the next 

Responding to Changing Attitudes 

These are among tlie changes I see taking 
place, both at home and abroad, in the climate 
governing private investment in the developing 
coimtries. I believe they call for an effective 
response by the business commimities in this 
country and elsewhere. One such response has 
been provided by the group of American, Cana- 
dian, European, and Japanese businessmen who 
started the Atlantic Community Development 
Group for Latin America. Tliis trail-breaking 
organization is just getting underway. Ulti- 
mately it could provide the basis for $200 mil- 
lion of joint- venture investments in Latin 

The stage seems to be set for the resurgence 
of private investment as a major instrument 
for economic development. I am convinced 
tliat attitudes are changing around the world 
and that we are all gaining a better mider- 
standing of how to work more effectively with 
each other. 

* For test of the President's foreign aid message, see 
Bulletin of Apr. G, 1964, p. 518. 



President Meets With Cabinet; 
Reviews World Situation 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 20 

We have just completed a 2-hour Cabinet 
meeting, and I will summarize briefly state- 
ments made at that meeting. 

Smce the significant developments in the 
world last week/ responsible officials of your 
Government have carefully evaluated their 
meaning for our coimtry. Out of our discus- 
sions and deliberations, certain conclusions have 
been reached for the present : 

First, the changes in the Communist world 
and in the free world do not at this time indi- 
cate sharp or sudden changes in the policies of 
the United States. 

Second, it is of the utmost importance that 
there be continuity and stability in the United 
States' policies and purposes during tliis period 
of international change. 

Third, we can pursue a course of reasonable 
and responsible watchfulness. We are able to 
do so because we are confident of our strength 
militarily, we are confident of our stability eco- 
nomically, and we are confident of the all-im- 
portant unity of our society on which our 
strength stands at home and abroad. 

Fourth, we do recognize that it is very im- 
portant for the United States to continue to 
be prepared for the long pull. Our responsi- 
bilities in this regard are clear : 

First, we must continue to maintain, to in- 
crease, and to strengthen our preparedness. No 
one must doubt our capacity for appropriate 
response to any challenge presented to free- 
dom anywhere in the world. 

Second, in actions as well as in words we 
must assure our allies and adversaries alike that 
we seek only peace in a world of honor and 
justice and individual dignity. 

Third, we must pursue those policies at home 
wliich will continue our domestic growth, our 
expansion, and our prosperity without reces- 
sion, depression, or inflation. Wliatever the fu- 
ture may hold, we can take special satisfaction 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 


from the strength afforded by the success of 
America's economy today. 

The picture of the economy in the third 
quarter is now nearly complete. We reviewed 
it in some detail in the Cabinet today. The 
great gains of the first half of the year have 
been extended. Compared to the third quarter 
a year ago, here are some of the key gains out- 
lined at the Cabinet meeting. 

Our gross national product is up $40 billion. 
The income of consumers, after taxes, is up $138 
per capita. Total nonfarm employment is up 
1.6 million. Total retail sales are up 7.2 percent. 
Business plant and equipment expenditures are 
up 11.4 percent. By preliminary estimate, cor- 
porate profits after taxes are up 21.7 percent. 
"\\niolesale prices are up only one-tenth of 1 

Fourth, considering the demands the future 
may impose upon us, it is more important than 
ever that in our governmental planning and 
programs we be relentless in our war on waste. 
I have asked each Cabinet officer to review his 
program and policies and see that we eliminate 
all waste possible and to report back to me. 
Progress must continue to overcome the deficits 
of the past and meet the challenges of the 
future, but that progress must go hand in hand 
with the self-discipline of fiscal prudence. 

Fifth, we must continue in every way open to 
us to perfect the unity of our people. Divisions 
and suspicions among our people will only open 
doors for those adversaries who seek to divide 
us and to weaken our leadership. There must 
be no misunderstanding of America's purpose 
and there must be no miscalculation of Amer- 
ica's will. 

In direct communications to new governments 
and in public statements here at home, we have 
sought to make clear that the objectives of 
United States policy are unchanging. Our first 
purpose is peace. We are prepared to defend 
peace and freedom and do it promptly against 
any act of hostility or aggression anywhere. 

We face the future hopefully in the confi- 
dence of the strength that we have all built 
together. But we face the future with a full 
sense of responsibility for the trust that we are 
privileged to bear for the cause of humanity and 
the cause of freedom everywhere. 

KOVEMBER 9, 1964 


Secretary Rusk Discusses World Developments 
on ''issues and Answers" 

Following is the transcript of an mterview 
with Secretary Rusk mi the American Broad- 
castmg Company''s radio and. television program 
^'■Issues and Answers" on October 18. 

Tlie Armoimcer: Secretary of State Dean 
Eusk, here are the issues : 

Is Khrushchev's fall from power bad news for 
the West? 

Do you foresee a siunmit meeting between 
President Johnson and the new Soviet leaders? 

Will a Red China with nuclear weapons tend 
to be more reckless in Asia ? 

For the answers to the issues, the Honorable 
Dean Eusk, Secretaiy of State. To interview 
Secretary Eusk, ABC news correspondent 
Baden Langton and ABC State Department 
correspondent Jolm Scali. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Issues 
and Answers." This has been a rather hectic 
week for you, what with the upheaval in Mos- 
cow, the Chinese nuclear explosion, and the 
British elections. What is your reaction to this 
series of events ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Scali, this has 
been a week full of imusual interest and import. 
We have seen the combination of preordained 
events in public life, such as the British election, 
with other events which were fully anticipated 
although not perhaps on the exact hour, such as 
the Soviet space shot at the beginning of the 
week and the Chinese nuclear detonation at the 
end of the week, along with the change in Mos- 
cow, which was not anticipated as to time or 
manner, either by Mr. Khrushchev or by the 
rest of the world. 

Those of us who came to Washington before 
Pearl Harbor are reminded once again, of 
course, that this has been a great period of 
change, this postwar world, and we have lived 

through many changes of this sort. But we 
have been impressed also with the fact that the 
steadying, the unifying, the stabilizing element 
in this postwar world has been the strength and 
the policy of the United States and the Amer- 
ican people. This has given direction to world 
events and has shaped the course of the attempt 
on the part of so many nations and so many 
people to organize a decent world order. 

My own general impression is that these are 
events that we must look at with the greatest 
interest — make preparations for what the future 
might hold — but this does not basically change 
the intent and the obligation of the United 
States to stay on course. 

General Omar Bradley, who is a very wise 
man, once said many years ago, in the midst of 
changes of a similar sort, that the time has come 
for us to chart our course by the distant stars 
and not by tlie lights of the passing ships. 
Well, this is our cue, I think, for this sort of 
situation. These are important changes, but the 
United States is in business, moving toward the 
objectives of the American people in which we 
are joined by most common, ordinary people in 
most parts of the world. 

U.S. Views on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

Mr. Larngfon: Mr. Secretary, what is your 
reaction to the statement by the new Soviet 
leaders calling for an end to all nuclear weap- 
ons tests? 

Secretary Rush: Well, we ourselves, as you 
know, in Geneva and elsewhere proposed that 
we have a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty 
that would lead to the elimination of under- 
ground testing as well as tests in the atmos- 
phere, at sea, and in outer space. A compre- 
hensive test ban treaty has been blocked thus 



far by the problem of on-site inspection. We 
do not believe that it is consistent with our 
security to enter into such commitments unless 
■we can be assured that the other parties are 
living up to such commitments, and this will 
require on-site inspection. Now, I have not 
seen any indication that tiie Soviet view on this 
particular point has changed, but as far as we 
are concerned, we are prepared to pursue that 
point. You see, back in 1945 and '6, the United 
States moved immediately, after the first nu- 
clear explosion, to try to bring these weapons 
under control and, indeed, to remove these 
weapons from the arsenal of mankind. This 
has been an objective of American policy 
through all of our postwar administrations. 
But we can't do it on a basis of leaving ourselves 
at the mercy of those who might sign such 
agreements and then violate them, and we have 
to have assurance that such agreements would 
in fact be effective. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretaiy, when you say we 
are ready to pursue that point, do you mean you 
are going to inquire of the Soviets to find out 
whether perhaps they have changed their mind 
on this and whether a new round of talks and 
a comprehensive test ban would be possible? 

Secretary Ru^k.-yVeW, I think if there has 
been any change in the Soviet view on this, this 
will soon become apparent because this has been 
a matter of discussion at the Geneva confer- 
ence, which has just recently adjourned, and 
undoubtedly will be a subject of discussion at 
the forthcoming United Nations General As- 
sembly. So this is not a subject which has 
died ; this is an active subject, provided effective 
safeguards can be arranged. 

Now, of course, the Chinese nuclear detona- 
tion would mean that the Chinese problem has 
to be taken into account on this. The rest of us 
are not going to sign an agi'eement eliminating 
all nuclear tests underground and otherwise 
unless the Chinese come aboard and stop all 
testing on their side. 

Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact 
that one of the first statements of the new Soviet 
leadership, namely, this call for a total test 
ban — couldn't you interpret this as a Moscow 
jab at the Chinese Communists, who obviously 
have to continue this ? 

Too Early To Speculate on Soviet Policy 

Secretary Rush: Well, I think it is a little 
early to anticipate exactly what might be meant 
by such a statement. We have had, as you know, 
through the Soviet Ambassador, and from 
echoes in other capitals, the general view from 
the new Soviet leadership that their policy will 
continue, that there are no dramatic changes 
anticipated, that they expect to pursue the 
policy of peaceful coexistence, that they would 
like to see a reduction in international tensions. 
But this has to be thought about in tenns of 
their standing policy on major questions. We 
don't have any way of knowing yet — I think we 
will before too long — as to whether there have 
been any changes in their interpretation of such 
things as peaceful coexistence or in their atti- 
tude toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban. 
I think it is much too early to speculate. 

Mr. Langton : Are you at all alarmed that the 
new team in Moscow has renewed the Soviet 
demand that we get out of Berlin and make the 
Western Sector an internationalized city? 

Secretary Rush : Oh, I think that is a part of 
their reaffirmation of the standing positions of 
the Soviet Union on major foreign policy ques- 
tions. I think the new leadership there knows 
just as well as we do that there are some very 
serious problems about the Berlin and German 
question but that as far as our commitment to 
West Berlin is concerned, it is complete and 
there can be no change in our responsibility for 
the security of West Berlin. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have had a few 
days in which to analyze and assess the signifi- 
cance of the upheaval in Moscow. On balance, 
would you say that it is good or bad news for 
the West? 

Secretari/ Rush: Well, I am not inclined to 
draw a judgment on that basis, for several rea- 
sons. Mr. IQirushchev was a man of, shall we 
say, effervescent personality; he attracted a 
great deal of personal attention. But behind 
Mr. Ivlirushchev was a collegiate responsibility 
for the Soviet Government, a committee, a group 
responsibility in the Presidimn. For example, 
in the past 7 years Mr. Iflirushchev had been 
away from Moscow 2% years, and we knew that 
when he was away from Moscow, whether on 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


vacation or traveling abroad, the Soviet Gov- 
ernment was still in business. The men who 
have succeeded him were his own deputies in 
the party and in the Government ; so tliat I don't 
think we can suppose that the change of a per- 
sonality, itself, means far-reaching changes in 
policy. And also let me remind you that, al- 
though on his 70th birthday Mr. Klorushchev 
was pictured as sort of an affable grandfather, 
remember, at the age of 68i^ he put missiles in 
Cuba and during the Khrushchev period we had 
very severe problems with the Soviet Union: 
the use of tanks in Hungary, the Berlin crisis on 
two or three occasions during that period, the 
missile crisis in Cuba. 

It is true that also, during that period, there 
was a Vienna agreement on Austria and there 
was the nuclear test ban treaty. But govern- 
ments are in business as governments, represent- 
ing the interests of their nations, and I would 
suppose that we ought not at tliis point to at- 
tach too much dramatic importance to the 
change in personality in a system that is as 
large and as highly organized as the Soviet 

Protecting Vital Interests of the Free World 

Mr. Langton: Do you think, then, there is 
any reason to believe that the new Soviet leader- 
ship will toughen its policy toward the West and 
try and get closer to Communist China ? 

Secretary Eusk: This is something we will 
have to, of course, watch in the months ahead, 
but from our point of view we are in the same 
position we have been before : If there are those 
who wish to find points of agreement, small or 
large, that can move us further toward peace, 
the United States is not only prepared to try to 
work out such agreements but on many occa- 
sions we have taken the initiative to find the 
possibility of such agreements. But if there are 
those who want to create crises and dangers, 
then we will have to meet those. 

In other words, let's see what happens. We 
are vitally concerned in what we believe to be 
the vital interests of the United States and the 
free world. Now, we are in a world in which 
there are 120 governments and regimes, each 
generating its own attitude and its own policy, 

but the policy of the American people is made 
in Washington and by the American people 
themselves. We are the ones who decide how 
we act in this world situation, and we shall stay 
on course. If there are possibilities for agree- 
ment, we will seize them — those opportunities. 
If there are dangers, we will meet them. And 
that is the way any responsible government of a 
great power like the United States must proceed. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, thank you very 
much. In just a moment, we will be back with 
more issues. {Announcement.) Mr. Secre- 
tary, do you subscribe to the school of thought 
which I know has existed in the past, namely, 
that anybody that came after Klirushchev was 
bound to be worse for us ? 

Secretary Rusk : Oh, I don't think so. Presi- 
dent Johnson will be commenting on the general 
implications of tliis change in liis address to the 
Nation this evening,^ but again, this is not just 
a question of personalities. This is a question 
of large powers, great states, with vital interests 
as each sees them, trying to find reconciliation of 
some, trying to press others. 

I think that, again, we have not had a bed of 
roses during the period when Mr. Elhrushchev 
was in charge of the Soviet Government, and we 
undoubtedly will have some very serious prob- 
lems with them. The big question is whether 
all of us, right around the world, recognize that 
the ordinary, common people of our respective 
countries have a great stake in trying to find 
some way to live in this world without war, and 
that means exploring possibilities of agreement, 
whether on small tilings or large. And if we 
have a crisis over one or another point, we shall 
have to deal with it. As President Jolinson has 
put it, our guard is up but our hand is out, and 
I think that is the basis on which we would 
approach any new government in the Soviet 

Mr. Langton: Do you see any one powerful 
man emerging from the Soviet hierarchy ? 

Secretary Rusk: I think it is much too soon 
to tell about that. I know a good many people 
who have studied the Soviet Union who think 
that one man has to be in a position of ascend- 
ancy there. I think we might bear in mind, 

' Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610. 



however, the possibility that the collective lead- 
ership at the very top, say the half dozen or 
a dozen men in the Presidium at the very top, 
have worked out a committee responsibility 
there, even during the Khrushchev period, 
which might continue on for some time into the 
future. I have noticed myself, as Secretary of 
State, that there have been times when Mr. 
Khrushchev has been far from Moscow but yet 
we have known that the Soviet Government was 
in business, and we know that Mr. [Aleksai N.] 
Kosygin was in charge, for example, when Mr. 
Khrushchev was away. We know this has not 
turned on where a particular personality might 
be at a given time, that there is a government 
which is in business and doing its job as it sees 
it. So I think we just have to wait and see. 

Mr. Scali: Do you accept the official explana- 
tion by the Soviets that Mr. Ivlirushchev retired 
because of age and health, or do you think per- 
haps other factors were involved too ? 

Secretary Rush: Oh, I think there is a general 
impr&ssion that Mr. Khrushchev did not retire 
in the sense in which we know it in our own 
country. I think the style and manner of his 
replacement makes that quite clear. Had he 
retired for health or age, I think there would 
have been much more of a demonstration for 
him, there would have been much more of a 
celebration of this occasion, there would not 
have been these later attacks on Mr. Khru- 
shchev's method of handling the Soviet 

No, I think we can assume, and should as- 
sume, that he was required by his colleagues to 
leave the government. 

Mr. Scali : Do you regard the new Soviet Gov- 
ernment as much committed to the 1962 agree- 
ment with us to make Laos a genuine neutral 
as was Nikita Khrushchev committed to it? 

Secretary Rush: Well, there is no question 
that the Soviet Government is committed to the 
Geneva agreement of 1962 on Laos. There was 
a signature to that agreement by the Soviet 
Government, and they do not relieve themselves 
of those obligations simply by a change of per- 
sonality at the top. 

Mr. Langton: One of the agreements we have 
been discussing seriously with the Soviets is one 

which would ban the distribution of nuclear 
weapons and materials and know-how to coun- 
tries which do not already have the bomb. Do 
you still intend to press ahead on that front 
with the new leadership ? 

Limiting Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

Secretary Rush: Well, we shoidd like to 
make some progress in that regard. Of course, 
one of the complicating factors has always been 
the known resistance of Peiping to have any- 
thing to do with any such agreement. They 
refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and 
were contemptuous of any efforts to limit the 
further proliferation of nuclear weapons be- 
cause they were working on them themselves 
and were determined to try to achieve them. 

But on the other hand, even though Peiping 
has exploded such a weapon or device, it still 
is important that these weapons not be distrib- 
uted generally around the world. The capacity 
to make them is now in the hands of at least 15 
or 20 coimtries. The cost of making them is 
continually coming down as tecluiology ad- 
vances, and, as has been pointed out many times, 
the problems of handling nuclear weapons will 
go up geometrically as more countries get them. 

So there would still be some point in trying 
to work out arrangements for limiting the fur- 
ther proliferation of these weapons. This has 
been explored by us for the last 2 or 3 years. 
Everybody has known that the general, central 
idea has been that those who have nuclear weap- 
ons would commit themselves not to give them 
to other nations and those who don't have them 
would agree not to receive them or manufacture 
them. We shall continue to work at that in the 
Geneva conference and elsewhere, but what the 
prospects are now, I could not really say. 

Mr. Langton: Do you see any sign that Mos- 
cow, now that the Eed Chinese have exploded 
their bomb, will reverse their earlier policy of 
not giving technical assistance to Eed China? 

Secretary Rush: Well, we have had the im- 
pression that they have not been giving assist- 
ance since about 1959 or 1960. Whether they 
should change that policy will depend on the 
future relations between Moscow and Peiping. 
I myself feel that it is in the veiy nature of 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


nuclear weapons that those who have them have 
an interest in others not having them and that 
those who have them have an interest in others 
not having more of them, and if I were a Rus- 
sian — just leave aside ideology, leave aside com- 
munism and that sort of thing — if I were a Rus- 
sian, I would not be very comfortable about the 
buildup in China of a large nuclear capability. 
And so I should think they would be very cau- 
tious about this. 

Chinese Nuclear Weapons Development 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretaiy, do you agree with 
Senator Goldwater, who said yesterday that he 
believes it will take 25 years for the Chinese to 
develop a supply of nuclear weapons, plus the 
means to deliver them ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am not sure I would 
be quite so optimistic in terms of naming a par- 
ticular period of years. We do know that the 
Chinese have limited capabilities, limited in 
terms of producing the necessary fuel for nu- 
clear weapons, limited in the industrial plant 
and sophistication and the trained manpower 
for going into a crash and major program of 
nuclear weapons development. But on the 
other hand, this is a matter of gi'eat political 
significance to Peiping and I think they will 
take a good deal out of the livelihood of the 
Chinese people to try to go ahead with this 
program as they can. 

One of the unfortimate things about this 
development in Peiping is that their gross 
national product has been going down in abso- 
lute terms and their population has been grow- 
ing very rapidly. In other words, they already 
are on a descending slope in terms of the liveli- 
hood of the Chinese people. Now, the more 
they divert resources into nuclear weapons 
programs and military budgets away from the 
needs of their rapidly growing population, the 
more that population is going to suffer. This 
is one of the reasons why we ourselves have 
tried so hard to find a way to turn down the 
spiraling arms race. It does mean a divergence 
of resources away from the unfinished business 
of the ordinary people in all of the countries 
concerned, and China, I think, would feel this 
very specifically. 

Mr. Scali: Do you expect the Chinese to con- 

duct further tests, and do you have any idea if 
and when this might happen ? 

Secretary Eusk: Well, I think we can't say 
that they won't. I think we have to say that 
they might very well. Indeed, from a purely 
political point of view, they might suppose if 
they conduct one they ought to conduct another 
one as soon as possible to get over this impres- 
sion that this one is a sort of a sole effort and 
they have exhausted their capability. But we 
have no direct information that this is likely to 
occur in the next few days. 

Mr. Langton: Have we through air samples 
and other tests been able to determine how big 
the explosion was ? 

Secretary Rn^h: The President may comment 
on that himself, but the general impression that 
it was an early device, comparable in general 
scale to our own first device, is accurate. 

Mr. Scali: Is there any sign that they have 
developed any shortcut or achieved any im- 
portant breakthroughs in this area ? 

Secretary Rusk: We see no evidence of that 
at the present time. 

3/r. Langton: From what you can see, do you 
think it will be the policy now of the Red 
Chinese to go ahead and develop a full arsenal 
of atomic weapons and grind down the Chinese 
population in the process, if they have to ? 

Secretary Rusk: 1 think they will imdoubt- 
edly try to build up a creditable nuclear weap- 
ons arsenal of some sort. This is a very major 
undertaking, requiring vast resources in the 
tens of millions scale, in terms of dollars, and 
how fast they can do that is something we can- 
not be sure about. We do know that they have 
relatively limited capabilities for throwing the 
weight of a sophisticated industrial system in 
behind this effort. 

Question of Peiping's Prestige in Asia 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, regardless of the 
fact that their first nuclear explosion is a crude, 
primitive device, when you take with it the fall 
from power of Nikita Khrushchev, isn't the 
overall effect to increase substantially tlie pres- 
tige of Mao Tse-tung throughout Asia and per- 
haps tempt them to he a bit more adventurous? 

Secretary Rusk: I tliink undoubtedly the nu- 
clear detonation and the removal of Mr. 



Khrushchev added to the prestige of Peiping 
to a degree and that Peiping will try to make 
the most of this. 

I do believe that there is another side to this. 
Here Peiping now appears in the whole world, 
and particularly in the Asian-African world, 
as the country which has upset tlie effort on the 
part of every other nation practically to end 
atmospheric testing, and I think this feeling 
that the policy of Peiping has set back the hopes 
of mankind significantly is something that will 
cut down on their prestige in many places. So 
I think in tlie short run we will see botli these 
factors at work. I have no doubt that Peiping's 
propaganda will try to make the most of this, 
but I think it will be resisted in a great many 

Mr: Langton: Is it possible now that the Red 
Chinese leadership, instead of growing more 
reckless as they become more of a nuclear jiower, 
will become more cautious when they are 
aware of the tremendous power of the nuclear 
weapons ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that is one of the 
hopes, because those who have had no direct 
experience with the power of these weapons tend 
to think of them in rather hypothetical terms. 
Now, as they try to proceed witli tlieir program, 
and they find out more about what this means, 
and they find out what the difference is between 
what they have any chance of obtaining for 
themselves and the vast scale on which the 
United States has organized its nuclear estab- 
lishment, I think that elements of caution might 
well come into their thinking on this. This 
certainly is a hope, and I might even say it 
would be an expectation over a period of time. 
In the short run, of course, they may feel a 
certain stimulus and an uplift, but I think the 
facts of life will sooner or later settle in upon 
them and induce some caution among them. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, would you think 
that the changes in government in Russia and 
in Britain, plus our own general elections, might 
be reason enough to delay the convening of the 
General Assembly session at the United Nations, 
which is due to begin November 10 ? 

Secretary Ritsh: Well, we have indicated that 
if the general membership felt that it was wise 
to postpone it for a brief period — 2 or 3 weeks. 

that sort of thing — we would be receptive to 
any such idea. I think that is entirely possible. 

Mr. Scali: On another area, there has been 
continuing speculation, as you probably know, 
that the shift in governments both in Britain 
and in Russia should be a signal for Mr. John- 
son, if he is reelected, to have (a) either a meet- 
ing with the Soviet Premier alone, or (b) some 
Western summit meetings. How do you go on 

Secretary Rusk: I would say that is a pos- 
sibility, but there is no specific planning or no 
specific contacts among governments on that 
subject. I think we still come back to the 
basic point that when you have meetings at 
that level it is important that there be good 
preparation for them and that summit meet- 
ings not be held under circumstances that would 
increase and exaggerate the differences rather 
than try to resolve them. 

Mr. Langton: Viet-Nam seems to have 
slipped from the news a bit lately. Has there 
been any improvement in the political and 
military fronts lately? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, as you know, there has 
been some very active fighting as the South Viet- 
namese anned forces have moved very aggres- 
sively against certain of the Viet Cong elements, 
particularly in the southern part of the country, 
but the most important thing that is going on 
in South Viet-Nam at the present time is the 
effort to build a government for the country as 
a whole, consolidating both the civilian and 
military leadership. 

The New British Government 

Mr. Scali: Tliank you, Mr. Secretary. In 
just a moment we will be back with more issues 
and answers. (AnnotMicement.) Mr. Secre- 
tary, a new British Labor government is in 
power now, but it has only a four-vote mai'gin 
in the House of Commons. Won't this tend to 
paralyze the British in foreign policy and make 
them a less reliable ally ? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think we shouldn't 
leap to that conclusion at all. The British Gov- 
ernment is going to lead Great Britain in pur- 
suit of the interests of Great Britain and the 
common interests of the West, and I think that 
you will find that that means that we will have 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


common interests with them right across the 
board on almost all questions. After all, it was 
a Labor government that was here when NATO 
was formed and when the Marshall Plan was 
started and during the first Berlin blockade and 
other matters. Indeed, before I came to my 
present job, my prmcipal service in government 
had been during a period when there was a 
Labor government in Great Britain, but Great 
Britain pursues a national foreign policy 
year in and year out on the whole, and I think 
there will be cooperation between the two 
parties on the great issues of national policy 

as they affect Britain's position in the world. 

Mr. Lang ton: In the last few minutes — do 
you see any chance of a summit conference be- 
tween the President and Mr. Wilson [British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson] ? 

Secretary Rusk: I have no doubt that at a 
time mutually convenient they will be having 
talks with each other, but just when is still to be 

Mr. Lang ton: Thank you very much. Secre- 
tary Rusk, for being our guest on "Issues and 

Secretary Rush: Thank you. 

Mixed-Manned Demonstration Ship Visits Washington 

Following are texts of remarks made by Sec- 
retary of the Navy Paul 11. Nitze, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, and Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations Admiral David L. McDonald on October 
20 at ceremonies aboard the U.S.S. Claude V. 
Ricketts when the guided-missile destroyer 
visited at Washington. The Ricketts is a dem- 
onstration ship based at Norfolk, Va., and 
manned by a mixed creio of officers and men 
from the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 

Secretary Nitze 

I am pleased to welcome to the guided-missile 
destroyer U.S.S. Claude V. Ricketts the dis- 
tinguished ambassadors and ministers from the 
NATO nations taking part in the Multilateral 
Force Working Group discussions in Paris.^ 

The United States Navy is proud to provide 

' Present at the ceremonies were Count Jean D'Ursel, 
Minister of the Embassy of Belgium ; Ileinrieh Knapp- 
stein, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many ; Pierre Calogeras, Counselor of the Embassy 
of Greece; Sergio Fenoaltea, Ambassador of Italy; 
Carl W. A. Schurmann, Ambassador of the Nether- 
lands ; Turgut Mencmoncio&lu. Ambassador of Tur- 
key ; and U. Stewart, Minister of the British Embassy. 

the Ricketts as a vehicle and a host for this 
remarkable demonstration of international na- 
val cooperation. 

When the Ricketts was commissioned 2i/^ 
years ago, the Navy knew that a fine warship 
had joined the fleet — a ship which could be 
expected to distinguish herself in the service 
of our nation. It could hardly have been an- 
ticipated, however, that she would be called 
upon to fill the important and unprecedented 
role in the life of our nation and our allies 
which she has now undertaken. 

This ship is engaged in demonstrating that 
a modern, complex warship can be successfully 
and efficiently manned by seamen from seven 
allied nations. Well over 100 officers and men 
from the Federal Kepublic of Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom are already aboard and are 
participating fully in the operation of the ship. 
Other officers and men from those nations are 
in this country for specialized training and will 
all be aboard bj' mid-December. "Wlien mixed- 
manning of the ship has been completed, there 
will bo as many crewmen aboard from the 
navies of our allies as there are from our own 

The purpose of this demonstration is to iso- 



late, in advance, and propose solutions to those 
problems of mixed-manning which will doubt- 
less arise during the course of the cruise. We 
are certain that, by the time this mixed-manning 
cruise ends, a stoi'e of experience will have been 
accumulated wliich will prove invaluable in the 
establishment of the MLF itself. 

During recent years, many men have devoted 
a great deal of time and attention to the develop- 
ment of the multilateral force. Ambassador 
[Thomas K.] Finletter and the ambassadors to 
NATO of the other nations represented here 
today have formed the Working Group in Paris 
which has applied itself so diligently to reach- 
ing an understanding concerning the details of 
the force. 

Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, the late Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations for whom this ship 
is named, was the Navy's most articulate spokes- 
man for the multilateral force, and he freely 
devoted his great energy and ability to further- 
ing its cause. Both as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense and as Secretary of the Navy, I have 
myself closely followed the progress of the 
MLF, for I believe in its validity as a militarily 
viable and a politically unifying force. 

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara 
has asked me to say on his behalf that the De- 
fense Department believes strongly in this 
unique joint U.S.-European venture. He told 
the NATO ministerial meeting last December 
that we are prepared to join in substituting 
MLF sea-based medium-range missiles for 
some of the longer range systems now included 
in our program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
General Lemnitzer [Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Su- 
preme Allied Commander Europe] have con- 
cluded that the MLF would be a militarily 
useful and effective force; and Secretary 
McNamara has also made known to United 
States congressional leaders his personal in- 
terest in and support for this important 

Yet there is one man, in particular, in the 
Government of the United States without 
whose wholehearted support the concept of a 
multilateral force could never have advanced to 
tliis point. The imaginative leadership of our 
Department of State has been essential to the 

progress of negotiations connected with the 
force. Our Secretary of State has, by devoting 
large amounts of his own time and effort to 
problems connected with the MLF, provided 
that leadership. We are honored to have him 
aboard today to join us in marking this signifi- 
cant milestone in the development of the MLF. 
Gentlemen, the Secretary of State of the 
United States, the Honorable Dean Rusk. 

Secretary Rusk 

Press release 460 dated October 20 

Today we are recognizing formally a promis- 
ing venture in Alliance military unity. 

The object of this venture, as is the object of 
NATO itself, is to strengthen peace. 

An effective North Atlantic partnership can- 
not be achieved all at once, by any single action. 
It will be formed over a period of time by a 
series of specific programs which strengthen 
ties among us all, on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Sharing responsibility for the nuclear deter- 
rent against war offers an opportunity for com- 
mon action in a matter of vital importance to 
each member of the alliance. Instead of de- 
ploying mediiun-range missiles to separate na- 
tionally manned and owned forces, eight nations 
have been discussing how they might be placed 
under common ownership and manning in a 
single force to be available to NATO. Over 
time, other weapons systems could be added to 
this force, and within its framework, nuclear 
consultation among North Atlantic allies could 
become more effective. 

The force could create a better balance of 
missile strength in Europe. And the MLF 
members, by virtue of their new role as owners 
and managers of nuclear weapons systems, could 
have an enhanced position in disai'mament 
negotiations, as countries with active and 
responsible roles in nuclear deterrence. The 
delivery systems would be held under mixed- 
manning and ownership, rather than imder 
national manning and ownership. This fact 
should improve the prospects for nonprolifera- 
tion of these awesome weapons. 

These are among the reasons why three suc- 
cessive American Presidents have supported 
this concept. Its bipartisan roots are attested 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


by the presence of my predecessor, foiiner Sec- 
retary of State [Christian A.] Herter, who first 
presented this concept to NATO in December 
1960,= by decision of then President Eisen- 

Mixed-manning and ownersliip of weapons 
will not automatically assure growth of the 
North Atlantic partnership, any more than 
pooling of coal and steel production 14 years 
ago assured Western European imity. But 
they will mark a major step forward and can 
help to build a framework for continuing 

President Johnson recently said: ". . . our 
Atlantic partnership is coming to a new and to 
a much greater time." ^ He spoke of its "re- 
markable achievements and unlimited promise." 
That promise can be fulfilled by creative actions 
which seek to extend the principle of partner- 
ship to new fields. 

Tliat, the MLF will do. 

This mixed-manned ship demonstration was 
conceived of personally by the late President 
Kennedy to give us experience in this new con- 
cept of military integration. It is not only 
tangible evidence of our earnest intent to pro- 
ceed toward ]\ILF. It will also give us useful 
operating practice. This ship's company is liv- 
ing proof that NATO ships can be effectively 
manned by differing nationalities. 

For this we owe much to the great naval 
officer for whom this ship is named. I know 
from firsthand observation that Admiral Claude 
Ricketts played an invaluable part in the crea- 
tive thinking which has gone into the MLF 

I congi-atulate the skipper and crew of the 
U.S.S. Claude V. Richetts on substantial prog- 
ress in demonstrating that effectiveness. 

In so doing you are fulfilling the richest tra- 
ditions of the maritime nations from which this 
ship's crew is drawn — traditions which in some 
cases date back to the pre-Christian era. Now 
we are embarked on another great age of ex- 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, lOCl, p. 39. 

" For text of an address made by President Johnson 
at Johns Hopkins University on Oct. 1, see White 
House press release dated Oct. 1. 

ploration, to discover new means of binding 
men and nations more closely to each other. 

In strengthening what has become the North 
Atlantic community, it will be playing a notable 
part in the great task of helping to create the 
conditions which can make peace possible. 

Admiral McDonald 

It is a privilege for me to add my remarks to 
the expressions of confidence and approval 
which you have just heard. Such recognition 
bespeaks the high regard our nation holds for 
the value of your efforts. 

Since my last visit to this ship, I have been 
pleased and proud to follow the progress of 
your unique mission. Beginning with your 
participation in Operation Sail in New York in 
July, where your presence symbolized the inter- 
national theme of that naval program, your 
training and operational activity as a part of 
the 2d Fleet has created an outstanding im- 
pression — in both the public view and in the 
critical eye of the Navy. 

To me, in the awareness of the world impor- 
tance of your mission, yours is a warm and 
heartening example of the ability of free men 
to unite in both ideals and individual effort, 
regardless of geographic or language back- 
ground. Here, I think, is proof that the 
strength of a navy is not so much in its ships but 
in the people who man those ships. Here is 
evidence for all the world that men of common 
purpose and professional kinship will find no 
barriers to delay their tasks. 

Through your efforts the concept which was 
greatly fostered by the untiring work of the man 
for whom your ship is named. Admiral Claude 
Ricketts, is now being demonstrated. 

For the future, as you continue your training 
operations in the Caribbean and in the Mediter- 
ranean, I am confident that this same unity of 
purpose and pride in your naval profession will 
enable you to achieve a signal success in the 
determined progress of free men to make a free 

It is for these reasons that I know I voice the 
hopes of many countries when I wish for you 
G^ute Reise [German], Kalo ta Xidi [Greek], 



lyi neyahetler dilenm [Turkish], Ooede Reis 
[Dutch], Buon Viuggio [Italian], and God 

USIA Foreign Service Officers 
To Become Part of FSO Corps 

Statement iy President Johnson 

White Uouse press release dated October 3 

I am pleased to announce an action taken by 
the Secretary of State and the Director of the 
United States Information Agency which will 
do much to provide the United States with a 
more flexible and effective Foreign Service. 

Under the new arrangement, the vast major- 
ity of USIA career Foreign Service ofBcers will 
become an integral part of the Foreign Service. 
Affected will be almost 900 officers now working 
for the Information Agency. The arrange- 
ment will : 

1. Provide a single pool of carefully selected, 
higlily trained talent from which both agencies 
may draw to fill key posts. 

2. Increase substantially the efficiency and 
the flexibility of those personnel available to 
represent the United States abroad. 

3. Permit a greater exchange of persomiel be- 
tween State and USIA, thus insuring that our 
officers acquire the wide range of experience and 
contacts so vitally necessary to the effective con- 
duct of foreign policy. 

4. Meet recommendations of the Herter Com- 
mittee, the Advisory Commission on Informa- 
tion, and various other study groups that USIA 
career officers be given the same rights and pre- 
requisites and be subjected to the same stringent 
judgment of performance as personnel already 
in the Foreign Service. 

5. Increase greatly the already high level of 
cooperation and joint planning between State 
and USIA. 

In my opinion, this action, which I whole- 
heartedly endoi-se, is a major step forward in 
our constant efforts to improve the efficiency of 
the Foreign Service of the United States — a 
Service that is vitally necessary in an era when 
the burdens of world leadership are heavy upon 

President Meets Witli Consultants 
on Foreign Affairs 

Statement iy President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 21 

I had my second meeting this morning with 
some of the most distinguished men in this 
country — members of my panel of consultants 
on foreign affairs.' Many of these men — like 
General [Omar] Bradley, Mr. [Allen] Dulles, 
Mr. [John J]. McCloy, Mr. [Robert] Lovett, 
Mr. [Paul] Hoffman, and Mr. [Dean] Ache- 
son — have played great parts in our bipartisan 
foreign policy over the last 20 years, and I 
value these opportunities to meet and talk with 
them frankly. 

Part of our business was to discuss the events 
abroad which have occurred in the last week,^ 
but my main purpose was to ask their help in 
thinking ahead to the great problems which 
this country will have to face after the coming 
election, whoever is chosen to go on. 

I asked these men to give me their counsel on 
thi-ee important matters : 

First: Our relations with Communist coun- 
tries. We must both defend freedom and 
advance the prospects of peace. 

Second: The affairs of the great Atlantic 
community. We intend to move on to greater 
achievement in a partnership which has gained 
so much in strength over the last 15 years. 

Third: The struggle to limit the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 

I expressed to the panel my own strong sense 
of urgent purpose in all three of these areas, 
and I have asked them to continue in working 
session with Secretary Rusk, Secretary Mc- 
Namara, and others of my senior advisers within 
the Government. 

I expect to meet again in the weeks ahead 
with the members of this panel, and I want to 
take this occasion to express my gratitude for 
their willingness to serve their country in tliis 

' For a statement by President Johnson on Sept. 9 
announcing formation of the panel, see Bitlletin of 
Sept. 28, 1964, p. 441. 

■ For background, see ihid., Nov. 2, 19C4, p. 610. 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


Some Lessons of Economic Development Since tlie War 

Vy TF. W. Rostow 

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^ 

It is more than a common courtesy to say 
that I am happy to be in Spain. Since some 
of your yomiger economists called on me at 
my miiversity (the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) in the 1950's I have been conscious 
of a new and serious thrust within this country 
to regather momentum and to move on fully 
to modernize the economic and social life of 
Spain. In coming here in 1959 — where I spent 
my last vacation — I was able to observe how 
the airplane and the automobile were leveling 
the historic barrier represented by the Pyrenees. 
One could almost feel, day by day, how Spain 
was drawing closer to Europe and the life of 
Europe was being enriched by new contacts 
with modem Spam. 

It was clear in the late 1950's that the life 
of this nation, which has contributed so much 
to the Atlantic heritage, was entering a new 
and exciting phase. Developments in the past 
several years have confirmed this fact. Aiid I 
am grateful, in these few days among you, to 
see a little for myself. 

I have come on this occasion primarily to 
learn rather than to teach. The subject of eco- 
nomic development is scientific in the sense that 
nations confront and must solve in the course 
of the stages of their development a fairly uni- 
form and quite definable sequence of problems. 
These we can state and study, arraying the vari- 
ous solutions sought at different times and 
places. Development economics is, essentially, 
a biological science. And it is possible for a 
development economist to come to a nation and 

' Address made before the Institute of Economic De- 
velopment, Madrid, Spain, on Oct. 7 (press release 438). 

ask, with a certain minimum background of 
information, quite relevant questions. But, ul- 
timately, nations, like individuals, are unique. 
Therefore, the right answers to those questions 
can only be found by the nation itself in terms 
of its own culture, history, and institutions and 
in terms of its own ambitions. 

Wliat I have to say, then, in discussing some 
problems of economic development with you, 
is not in any sense designed to be prescriptions 
for Spanish problems. My observations reflect 
an effort to derive from the first generation of 
postwar experience with development some gen- 
eral lessons for the decade and generation 
ahead. Only you can judge if these observa- 
tions bear on the Spanish scene and, if so, in 
what ways they might apply. 

New Perspective on Agricultural Development 

My first proposition is that agricultural de- 
velopment is vastly more important in mod- 
ernizing a society than we used to think. 
Development thought in the immediate post- 
war years tended to focus around a simple 
and quite true proposition ; namely, that pro- 
ductivity per man is generally higher in indus- 
try than in agriculture. It appeared to follow 
that the proper course for economic develop- 
ment was concentrated on industrial investment. 
Simple arithmetic suggested that every man 
transferi'ed from agriculture to industry raised 
the average level of productivity. It was some 
such hypothesis that led to the emphasis on in- 
dustrial development in postwar development 

This tendency was heightened, in some parts 
of the world, by an association of agricultural 



production with a colonial or neocolonial de- 
pendence on a single \ailnerable export crop. 

We can leave it to historians to judge whether 
the development programs that flowed from 
this perspective were distorted and whether a 
better balance between agricultural and indus- 
trial investment should have been sought. But 
there is, in retrospect, a certain rough justice 
in the pattern followed, because the moderniza- 
tion of agriculture does require a prior indus- 
trial base; and the developing nations of the 
world have now achieved, in many cases, an 
initial endowment of industrial skills and the 
capacity to organize industrial establishments. 

But when nations have acquired a minimum 
industrial base — and, of course, Spain has long 
since been in that position — the problem of 
agriculture must be looked at in a somewhat 
different way ; for a modernized agriculture be- 
comes a necessity for efficient industrialization 
itself. This relation derives from the fact that 
agricultural output is not merely a source for 
food which, if neglected, can force a nation into 
heavy dependence on imports costly in scarce 
foreign exchange. Agricultural output is also 
an important source of industrial raw mate- 
rials. It provides ways to earn foreign ex- 
change. And the agricultural population is an 
important potential market for industrial 

In addition, of course, a failure to modernize 
agriculture can produce two results — often at 
the same time — neither of which is socially and 
politically sound for the life of the nation. It 
may yield a rush of rural folk to the cities, in 
an effort to share somehow the advantages of 
modern life; or it can entrap in the countryside 
manpower badly needed for industrial develop- 
ment, leaving the nation split between a vital 
modern sector and an impoverished archaic tra- 
ditional sector. Neither urban slums nor a 
socially and psychologically divided nation is 
conducive to the well-being of a society. 

The modernization of agriculture is, of 
course, much more than a matter of bringing 
new teclmology to the farmer. Agricultural 
production — like industrial production — is a 
system which, when it is successful, embraces 
technology, credit, marketing arrangements, 
and incentives. Contemporary agriculture. 

efficiently pursued, is as "modern" an activity 
as industry itself. To modernize agriculture 
requires that the skills of organization devel- 
oped in the modern virban sectors of the society 
be brought systematically into play around the 
life of a farmer in such a way as to provide 
for him a technical, credit, and marketing 
environment in which his natural impulse to 
better his position can be effective. It requires 
also a suitable framework of law and regula- 
tions that favor both a rational land tenure 
system and a rational use of the land, based on 
economic criteria rather than government 

Beyond these considerations of national de- 
velopment policy, there is an even more basic 
reason why, on a world basis, agricultural pro- 
duction and policy will come to the center of 
the stage : Agricultural output is increasmg, in 
Asia and Latin America, at a rate less than the 
increase in population. With the passage of 
time we could be confronted with minimum 
food requirements which can be met neither 
from local production nor from the world's 
food surpluses. Evidently the world commu- 
nity will have to turn promptly and with vigor 
to reverse the current trend and to remove the 
shadow of massive famine from the path of 
the human family. 

For these convergent reasons, therefore, I 
have no doubt that development thought and 
policy in the decade ahead will focus much more 
systematically than it has in the past on the 
problem of agricultural production and produc- 
tivity as well as on the larger social question 
of bringing the rural sector of developing so- 
cieties more fully and satisfactorily into the 
web of modern life. 

Problems of Marketing and Distribution 

In this connection, I would also judge that we 
shall see a new attention paid to problems of 
marketing and distribution. A wise observa- 
tion was made a decade ago in a paper published 
by the OEEC in Paris: 2 

'Productivity in the Distributive Trade in Europe — 
Wholesale and Retail Aspects, pamphlet published by 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 
Paris, 3cl reprint, September 1957. 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 
748-267 — 64 3 


Distribution is a relatively neglected field of scien- 
tific study and investigation in Europe. In part this 
neglect springs from false thinking, that is thinking in 
the physiocratic tradition which would consider the 
process of distribution of goods and the provision of 
services as a more or less sterile activity as contrasted 
with the actual production of the goods. 

It is true that economists and planners, 
leaders in governments and in private sectors, 
have tended systematically to neglect the role of 
marketing and distribution in economic devel- 
opment. They have tended to assume that, if 
roads were built and technical assistance made 
available in the countryside, somehow, auto- 
matically, agricultural production would flow 
efficiently to the cities and manufactured prod- 
ucts would flow efficiently to the countryside 
through normal market mechanisms. They did 
not reckon carefully with the ancient, frag- 
mented, and deeply rooted marketing arrange- 
ments which one statesman recently described as 
a Chinese wall barring the cities and the coim- 
tryside from each other. I have no doubt that 
development strategy in the decade ahead re- 
quires a systematic effort to modernize urban- 
rural interchange. Old-fashioned marketing 
methods, with big markups and multiple inter- 
mediaries, yield a whole series of results which 
frustrate the development process as a whole. 

The prices actually paid to farmers are often 
too low, while the prices paid for foodstuffs in 
the cities are often too high. More than that, 
such barriers reduce the incentive of the farmer 
to shift into higher productivity cash crops; 
and, by thus reducing the income available in 
the countryside, the manufacturer is denied 
important potential markets. 

Since development is a process which takes 
place through time, it is, of course, impossible 
to bring riiral areas all at once into a close and 
efficient relation with the more modern urban 
sectors. On the other hand, marketing arrange- 
ments have been in most developing nations an 
arbitrary and unnecessary barrier to the mod- 
ernization of the countryside and to the devel- 
opment of adequate national markets for indus- 
trial products. 

The experience of the past decade has demon- 
strated to us the importance of another lesson, 
with implications for more developed and less 
developed nations alike ; namely, the need for a 

deep understanding within a society about the 
rate at which money wages can, appropriately, 
be raised. Labor benefits from the develop- 
ment process in two ways. First, there is in- 
creased demand for labor of higher skill. As 
the society modernizes, it yields more jobs of 
higher productivity with, quite appropriately, 
higher real wage rates. A first and basic bene- 
fit for labor flows directly from the changing 
structure of the working force. Second, as out- 
put per capita in a society increases, it is evi- 
dently appropriate that the working force fully 
share in this communal achievement. Great 
stakes, however, hinge on an imderstanding 
within the society and within the working force 
as to the rate at which money wages can be 
expanded in the common interest. The general 
rule is, of course, that the average increase in 
wages cannot safely exceed the average increase 
in productivity without risking the level of in- 
vestment or risking inflation. And the more we 
examine the consequences of inflation for devel- 
opment, the less attractive an environment it 
appears. It is least attractive for the industrial 
worker who has less capacity and resources to 
hedge against inflation than those with higher 

I may say, parenthetically, that, counter to a 
widespread myth, the development of the econ- 
omies of Western Europe and the United States 
in the 19th century did not take place in an in- 
flationary environment. There were, of course, 
certain brief intervals of inflation often asso- 
ciated with wars; but progress was mainly 
achieved in an environment of relatively stable 
money wages and falling prices. I am not 
necessarily commending this formula for the 
second half of the 20th century; but I believe 
that, after extensive experience, there is every 
reason for all elements in a society, including 
the industrial working force, to help design 
policies which avoid inflation. 

This, in turn, requires a common understand- 
ing among the major sectors of the society and 
a confidence that tlie benefits of development 
will be equitably shared. The workers, for ex- 
ample, must be confident tliat wages will not 
be allowed to drag behind. The achievement 
of this kind of consensus is, in fact, one of the 
fundamental requirements for a successful de- 
velopment program in the modern world. It 



is not easy to achieve; but, when achieved, it 
constitutes a unifying element in the life of a 
nation whose importance ti'anscends even its 
beneficial economic consequences. 

Educational Systems in Changing Societies 

In looking ahead to development policy for 
the next decade, I believe also that we shall give 
increased importance to problems of education. 
Most societies in the world developed educa- 
tional and cultural institutions — many of the 
highest distinction — before they were indus- 
trialized. And they developed patterns of pop- 
ular education to fit their cultural values and 
requirements of a preindustrial society. 

I can say, as an old teacher, that no institu- 
tions are more cautious with respect to innova- 
tion and more loyal to their long heritage than 
educational institutions. And I understand 
fully why this is so and should be so. This 
caution exists not only because professors retire 
at 65 and are quite powerful fellows. It exists 
because educational institutions must look far 
ahead, dealing as they do with the young, as 
well as look far back. They must try to instill 
abiding essentials, not adjust hastily to short- 
run demands or fancies. 

On the other hand, a nation's educational 
system is one of the fundamental elements 
which determine the path of its development. 
Development is a job done by men and women, 
not by abstract forces. They must be trained 
and motivated to do the jobs a society needs to 
have done. And in many parts of the world 
one can observe a costly lag between the stand- 
ards and purposes of the educational system and 
the imperatives of development. Men and 
women are trained for tasks for which require- 
ments may be decreasing, while inadequate 
numbei's are trained for tasks where opportuni- 
ties and requirements are rising; and academic 
freedom is a powerful force in promoting the 
flexibility required to meet these new require- 

One of the few experiences of the United 
States in economic development which is worth 
attention by other developing societies is the 
transformation in our educational system 
brought about, a century ago, by the Morrill 
Act. That piece of legislation used public land 

to finance a large number of agricultural, min- 
ing, and engineering schools. They were orig- 
inally created to meet the urgent needs of a 
rapidly growing society, at an early stage of 
development. But, as our society and its re- 
quirements changed, so did these institutions. 
Many of them have been transformed into mod- 
ern universities sharing the oldest scientific and 
humanistic traditions ; for example, the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Teclinology, of which I 
have the privilege of being a faculty member. 
I would certainly not commend to Spain or 
to any other country the particular method we 
devised through the Morrill Act. I would 
merely underline that the commitment of a so- 
ciety to rapid development raises important 
questions about the appropriate balance of its 
educational system, which justify thoughtful 
attention. And I would observe that it is 
clearly possible for a nation to adjust its edu- 
cational system to its changing requirements 
without losing the abiding cultural values it 
wishes and should wish to retain. 

Role of Public and Private Enterprise 

In one domain I believe the experience of the 

past generation now permits us greater clarity 
and consensus than might have been possible 
even a relatively short time ago ; namely, in the 
contentious field of the relation between public 
and private enterprise in the economy. 

No one seriously doubts that there is a large 
and irreducible function for the government in 
the economic development of a nation. There 
are essential economic and social overheads re- 
quired for a modern society which only govern- 
ment enterprise can provide ; for example, edu- 
cation, public health, certain types of housing, 
transport, et cetera. Only a government can 
responsibly manage the internal and external 
monetary balance of a nation. Indeed, Adam 
Smith recognized the legitimacy of this kind of 
role for government in the 18th century. Even 
a society as proudly capitalist as the United 
States accepted these state functions in the 19th 

On the other hand, we have largely freed 
ourselves, in the past decade, from the old de- 
bate, derived largely from Marxist analysis, 
over public ownership and operation of the 

N0VE5IBEK 9, 1964 


means of production. We have seen too much 
government ownership and operation to retain 
romantic views of its efficacy. The democratic 
socialist movement in Europe and elsewhere has 
come to accept the fact that private enterprise, 
in most fields of production and distribution, is 
vastly more efficient than public enterprise and 
that the large interests of a society in the compo- 
sition of output and price policy in the private 
sector can be achieved by indirect means. There 
is even a growing awareness of the legitimacy 
of the most basic of capitalist propositions; 
namely, that competition in the private sector 
is one of the most efficient ways of guaranteeing 
the public interest in the equity and efficiency 
of an economy. 

To be sure, each nation must and will strike 
its own balance between the role of the public 
and private sectors ; and these balances are and 
will be different, depending upon many unique 
circumstances. There is likely to be a marginal 
debate about this or that function. But this 
kind of debate is essentially pragmatic rather 
than ideological. It is a considerable historical 
fact that development economics and politics 
outside the Communist world has largely freed 
itself from the sterile and essentially mislead- 
ing debate which implied the necessity for 
choice between a publicly owned or privately 
owned economy. We are now in a position to 
pose sharply the same question to both public 
and private authorities; that is, whether they 
are using efficiently a nation's resources in direc- 
tions which advance the development process 
as a whole. In most cases I have examined in 
various parts of the world there are important 
potentialities for improvement in both sectors. 

Modernization of a Society 

Now, finally, if you would, a more general 
observation on the process of development. 

I can recall vividly in the 1950's learned schol- 
ars explaining to us economists that certain 
societies, because of their religious, cultural, 
social, and family structures, were incapable 
of organizing modern industrial societies. 
Modern industrialization was sometimes por- 
trayed as a unique product of the ethos of 
northwestern Europe and the Atlantic, requir- 
ing values and human relations which other cul- 

tures would reject, ruling themselves, therefore, 
effectively out of the world of modern science, 
teclmology, and industry. On the other hand, 
there were others who proclaimed that in- 
dustrialization, with its complex functional 
imperatives, linking men and institutions in 
new ways, would alter each society which un- 
dertook to absorb the fruits of modem science 
and technology in ways which would distort or 
even destroy its traditional cultural values. 

I think we can say with some confidence now 
that both propositions are unti-ue. National 
cultures are both more flexible and have more 
power of survival than was often supposed. 
One can observe throughout the world that 
many different kmds of societies, with the great- 
est possible differences in their history, culture, 
and tradition, are demonstrating a capacity to 
master and apply the tricks of modern technol- 
ogy ; but we can also see that in so doing they 
are retaining, and can retain for the future, a 
continuity with their most cherished traditions 
and values. 

These comforting facts stem from the fact 
that the modernization of a society, when it 
occurs, is and must be the work of a whole na- 
tional community. It is not the product of 
abstract forces or the work of a single class. 

In fact, one of the most inaccurate elements 
in Marx's historical analysis was the view that 
industrial development was the product of a 
class struggle. Taking the single case of British 
industrial revolution — and misinterpreting that 
case substantially — he projected the vision of 
industrialization as the handiwork of a handful 
of industrial capitalists who, as they moved for- 
ward to exploit profit possibilities, destroyed the 
old social and political as well as economic 

It is, of course, true that the making of a 
modern industrial society does involve shifts in 
the composition and relative power of groups 
within a society. The cities, with all they con- 
tain in men and institutions, grow in relative 
importance; new functions are undertaken by 
governments; and a new network of ties within 
the nation emerges. On the other hand, the 
modernization of a society is not the work of a 
single class or group. It requires for its success 
that all elements in a society contribute and 
share in its benefits — the industrialist and the 



government official, the worker and the farmer, 
the teacher and the doctor, and even the 

The modernization of a society is to be imder- 
stood, then, as a common human adventure in 
which nations seek to apply what modern sci- 
ence and technology can afford, in ways which 
meet their traditions and their ambitions for 

their people. Ultimately it is a process which 
permits tliem to emerge with dignity as effective 
members of an increasingly interconnected com- 
munity on this small planet. 

Approached in this way, modernization — 
providing challenges, tasks, responsibilities, and 
rewards for all — can be a unifying experience, 
widening the horizons of men and nations. 

Money Flows and Balance-of-Payments Adjustment 

hy Robert V. Roosa 

Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs ^ 

Last week, talking in Philadelphia, I had 
an opportunity to describe the steps being taken 
to unprove further the arrangements for inter- 
national financial cooperation — arrangements 
that have been expanded rather quickly in the 
past few years and for which we now need 
some more orderly regularization. Next week, 
at a meeting of the National Industrial Con- 
ference Board, I will have an opportunity to 
elaborate some of the arguments that can be 
made for, and against, various proposals that 
have been made for adding to international 
liquidity. I refer, of course, to suggestions for 
introducing in the future some new form of 
international reserve asset, to be used along- 
side gold and the foreign exchange which has 
supplemented gold, most notably the dollar, 
the pound sterling, and, for some parts of the 
world, the French franc. 

Today I propose to leave both cooperation 
and the creation of new reserve assets aside and 
take a look instead at some aspects of balance- 
of-payments adjustment. That means, of 
course, the processes through which countries 
in external deficit, or external surplus, get 

' Address made before the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, New York, N.Y., on Oct. 8. 

themselves back into equilibrium. And as all 
of you know so well, when the overall jiayments 
flow of a business, or a nation, can be so man- 
aged that current receipts closely balance 
current outpayments, the need for an idle bal- 
an^ce of working cash, or for drawing on credit, 
can be kept to a minimum. That is why any 
methods that can be relied upon to limit, and 
reverse, a tendency which one country or an- 
other develops toward heavy balance-of-pay- 
ments deficits, or another develops toward large 
surpluses, will also contribute importantly to- 
ward reducing the overall need for liquidity 

There is often a dangerous propensity among 
us to feel that more money is the adequate 
answer to any problem — until, of course, we 
find that an excess of money creates inflation 
and intensifies imbalance. In large or increas- 
ing amounts, liquidity may only mask over for 
a time, rather than help to resolve, the real 
disparities that develop among countries in the 
flow of trade and payments. In international 
affairs, as in the home economy, the need is for 
ample, but not superfluous, liquidity. And it is 
one of the built-in safeguards of a system based 
upon credit — credit that rests upon appraisal 
and judgment — that a reasonable balance can 
be foujid. The mechanism itself tends, with 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 

a measure of overall guidance from the financial 
authorities of government, to be self-adjusting. 

It is fully as important, moreover, to find 
ways of reducing balance-of-payments swings 
as it is to assure the reserves or credit facilities 
needed to finance imbalances over the period 
that correction back toward equilibrimn is tak- 
ing place. That is why the United States, after 
7 lean years of balance-of-payments deficits, 
must get back to equilibrium in real terms. 
This cannot be accomplished through any mir- 
ror trick of monetary magic. We must go 
through our own process of adjustment. 

I need not repeat today, much as I do wish 
to emphasize, the details of our current national 
balance-of-payments effort, as these have been 
working themselves out through larger exports, 
reduced governmental expenditures abroad, 
some inflow of capital to offset our large out- 
flows, and the interaction of many other forces. 
The fusion of private effort and Government 
stimulus has, at the gradual but determined 
pace which usually characterizes fundamental 
changes brought about through the market- 
place, produced reassuring results. 

We have, it now seems clear, been on the right 
path — promoting investment for greater pro- 
ductivity as the basis for price and cost stabil- 
ity, and evolving an unprecedented change in 
the "mix" of fiscal, monetary, and debt manage- 
ment policies as the Government's principal 
contribution toward this aim. Though the 
United States still has the most rugged part of 
that path yet to travel in order to reach real 
equilibrium, and though we are now at the stage 
for intensified rather than relaxed effort, it is 
possible to begin to read some lessons from tliis 

Tlie representatives of the various govern- 
ments which meet in Working Party III of the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] have recently been 
asked to make a special efl'ort to distill, from 
the experience of all these countries since con- 
vertibility became general at the end of 1958, 
any "rules of the game" that might improve 
the processes of balance-of-payments adjust- 
ment among nations. Witliout anticipating 
the results of that major undertaking, I would 

like to suggest some of the conclusions that 
seem, at least in my judgment, already war- 
ranted as to (1) the conditions that must be 
placed upon adjustment aims, (2) the nature of 
differences among countries for which any 
"rules" must be adapted, and (3) the methods 
which can appropriately and effectively be used 
to bring about equilibrium. 

The days of simple reliance upon monetary 
policy, for any and all cases, I am going to dare 
to suggest, may possibly be gone forever. 
While there will still be many cases of im- 
balance for which monetary policy can provide 
the principal corrective, and while it will no 
doubt play an active role in all, the patterns of 
its influence will probably be increasingly 
varied; the range of appropriate variations in 
interest rates may begin to narrow; and the 
complex industrialized economies may find 
their own free markets creating so many new 
forms of liquidity instriunents that the tradi- 
tional methods and criteria of monetary' control 
may have to be reexamined in a number of these 

Tliese are not meant as flat assertions, rather 
as provocative questions. But perhaps you 
may agree they are questions worth asking if I 
am able to sum up what I have in mind on the 
limiting conditions, the nature, and the methods 
of the adjustment processes which countries 
would now find sufficiently acceptable to be re- 
lied upon. 

Limiting Conditions 

One way of looking at the limiting conditions 
is to list the things which most countries simply 
cannot any longer deliberately set out to do. 

(a) They cannot intentionally, for more than 
a few months at most, attempt to stop their own 
domestic growth; few could dare attempt to 
turn it backward, though its upward pace can, 
of course, be altered. 

(b) They carmot deliberately, with the ex- 
ception of transitional or structural changes of 
comparatively short duration, increase un- 
employment^ — eitlier of men or of resources. 

(c) They cannot induce severe price deflation, 
with its imiilications not only for growth and 
employment, but also for profits. 



(d) They cannot for long pursue policies of 
intentional inflation, tlioiiirh this is a somewhat 
weaker constraint than that of deflation. 

(e) They cannot make frequent large changes 
in their exchange rates, once they have reached 
the stage of establishing a parity. 

Or, to put these conditions positively, most 
countries are now committed to support sus- 
tained domestic growth, to assure maximum 
employment, to avoid depression, to check ac- 
celerating booms, and to maintain fixed rates 
of exchange (within the narrow margins of 
variation permitted by the International Mon- 
etary Fund). 

Is it to be wondered that, in these circum- 
stances, once convertibility was reestablished 
among most of the industrialized countries, the 
earlier forms of monetary action, which so often 
relied upon correction through contraction, 
have been succeeded by approaches that have 
seemed to some of us, at times, a bit unorthodox ? 

The Nature of Significant Differences Among 

As approaches have changed, it has also be- 
come increasingly clear that there are wide 
differences among countries in their sensitivity 
to one mix of policies or another, and that any 
new "rules of the game," if countries are going 
to be able to live by them, will have to be 
adapted to such differences as the following : 

(a) Differences in the stage of development, 
of manpower and resources ; 

(b) Differences in the composition of product, 
as between raw materials and manufactures; 

(c) Differences in the proportion between ex- 
ternal transactions that flow through the bal- 
ance of payments and total transactions (that 
is, between foreign and domestic transactions) ; 

(d) Differences in internal market structure, 
in restrictive practices, or in domestic subsidies, 
not only for goods but also for various kinds of 
capital and credit; 

(e) Differences in comparative size, causing 
differences in the extent to which a given coun- 
try must take into account the effect of its own 
actions upon all others ; 

(f) Differences in the extent to which a coun- 
try's currency, or its credit facilities, or its 

capital markets, may be utilized by others, with 
a resulting convergence upon reserve currency 
countries, for example, of many of the pres- 
sures released or exerted by other countries. 

This is by no means an exhaustive list. It 
does starkly underline, however, the extent to 
which modern progress has meant a fanning out 
of countries into a number of general types, in 
contrast with earlier periods when all countries 
were much more nearly the same — and when 
perhaps two groupings could account for nearly 
all of them. I do not imply that progress has 
been synonymous with chaos, but I do ask 
whether we should not expect that our methods 
of maintaining viable balance among countries 
should have become as complex and varied as 
are their national economies and the commit- 
ments and priorities of their domestic economic 

■Methods of Adjustment 

If my questions have any validity, then, they 
suggest that the United States has been making 
the right kind of an attempt, whether or not we 
have found the right combination of answers, in 
our own balance-of -payments program over re- 
cent years. Trial and error can be expensive, 
if not destructive, so that neither we nor other 
countries can afford to hop about, changing 
the direction or emphasis of the attack on the 
U.S. deficit, or upon the German or French 
surpluses, for example. Wliat we can do — at 
the price of more wear and tear in transatlantic 
jet travel than may be sensible or sustainable 
for the long run — is to maintain close and con- 
tinuous contact with other countries, among 
whom the similarities may be somewhat greater 
than the differences, and to submit each other to 
persistent cross-examination and criticism, par- 
ticularly concerning our interactions upon each 

It is out of just such exposure that much of 
the stimulus for, if not the actual content of, a 
considerable part of our own mix of balance- 
of-payments policies has been evolved. And in 
the process we have, so far as the United States 
is concerned, found ourselves developing a se- 
ries of measures on the governmental side which 
could, quite imderstandably, be critically 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


viewed as patchwork improvisation. But there 
has thi'ougli it all been a pattern. Our starting 
premise has been price and cost stability. Our 
primary effort has been to use fiscal and mone- 
taiy measures to stimulate the productivity that 
will support growth and provide expanding in- 
comes and profits within the framework of price 
stability. At the same time, we have trimmed 
Government spending of dollars overseas, tried 
to spur exports, and where necessary put a brake 
upon an accelerating outflow of either short- 
term funds or long-term capital. Meanwhile, 
as the deficits gradually shrank, without im- 
posing harsh repercussions on others, we 
sought such means of financing the deficits that 
remained as would, over the longer rim, also 
make some contribution toward more diversified 
credit facilities for the international liquidity 
needs of the future. 

Wliat I think we also learned in this process 
(and this explains the title I have selected for 
these remarks) is that some of our traditional 
conceptions — of reliance solely, or mainly, upon 
the "tight money" that depends upon very high 
interest rates to overcome a deficit — are not 
likely very often to fit the needs of the United 
States economy, nor the conditions wliich most 
countries impose on the adjustment process, 
over the years ahead. And I suspect that some 
of the surplus countries are reaching similar 
conclusions, from the other side. 

For the impact of really tight money, or se- 
verely constricted credit, in the United States 
over these past several years would have been 
of doubtful assistance, to say the least, in 
progress toward adjustment in real terms, while 
perhaps attracting an inflow of funds that 
would have given us the superficial satisfaction 
of apparent balance. And conversely, easy 
money in the rapidly expanding economies of 
Europe would have fanned the inflation which 
their rising costs and wages were already caus- 
ing, leading at the same time to an outflow of 
funds that would have given a superficial im- 
pression that their underlying surpluses were 

The main reason for these paradoxical devel- 
opments is that our traditional views on the 
role of monetary policy in correcting interna- 
tional imbalance presumed a dillerent sort of 

world. Countries with external deficits were 
sujDposed to have full employment and rising 
prices; countries with external surpluses were 
supposed to have underemployment and com- 
paratively low prices. For these conditions, 
tight money could meet both the foreign and 
the domestic needs of the deficit coimtry; easy 
money could meet both the external and the 
internal needs of the surplus country. I do not 
want to say that such circumstances will not re- 
cur. Wliat I do say is that we cannot presume 
that tliis will be the only pattern. 

Within the past year there has been further 
sharp evidence of the new circumstances, and 
their significance. Take Italy and the Nether- 
lands as examples. Without doing justice to 
either, I may perhaps generalize that Italy's 
situation at the beginning of the year was one 
of rising external deficit coupled with severe 
inflationary pressure at home — on the surface, 
one of the classic cases. Yet Italy was also 
undergoing the most extensive structural 
readjustment, internally, of any of the lead- 
ing industrial comitries. The Government 
acted; the private sector responded. There 
were some new taxes; there was a firm control 
over credit, including limitation on foreign bor- 
rowing by Italian banks ; there was no increase 
in the discount rate. Following announcement 
of a tailored package of short-nm external cred- 
its, the situation was turned abruptly around. 
Italy is now in surplus. We all hope a lasting 
improvement has been accomplished. But to 
have relied entirely on further increases in in- 
terest rates, in the circumstances, would indeed 
have only caused an inflow of funds that might 
have defeated — not supported — the overall ef- 
fort to restore equilibrium. 

In the case of the Netherlands, without re- 
viewing all of the relevant storj^, a deficit had 
also developed early this year after some period 
of surplus on balance. The Government had, 
somewhat earlier, deliberately accepted a con- 
trolled degree of inflation as part of the correc- 
tive needed for restoring a balance in payments, 
but that seemed to begin to get out of hand. In- 
ternal restraint became necessary. The credit 
markets were tightened and interest rates raised 
to heights that had not been seen in the Nether- 
lands for some years. The result ? An unprece- 



dented volume of funds has been repatriated or 
invested in the Netherlands just as its balance 
of payments seemed to be moving back into equi- 
librium. Tight money has not, at least not un- 
mistakably, been the sole and satisfactory 

It is such experience that has persuaded so 
many of us that we must try to develop new 
methods, or new combinations of old methods, 
among most of the more industrialized countries 
over these past few years. It is certainly not a 
reason to turn toward selective controls of any 
kind, for the longer run, and certainly not to 
become restrictionist instead of expansionist in 
our outlook for freedom of trade and payments. 
It is to say, as Chairman Martin [William McC. 
Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Gov- 
ernors of the Federal Reserve Sj'stem] has said 
so often, that none of us can be isolationist in 
economic policy. And I would add, as I am sure 
he would, none of us can afford to be rigid in the 
development of economic policy. 

President Johnson Exchanges Letters 
With NATO Secretary General Brosio 

White House press release dated October 17 
Letter From President Johnson 

October 1, 1964 

Dear Mr. Secretary General : As you leave 
the United States,' I want to tell you again how 
pleased we were to have you here as our guest 
and for the opportunity for extended discus- 

I found our talks on the state of the North 
Atlantic Alliance and its future needs and hopes 
useful and rewarding. I was particularly 
pleased that you were able to join me in visiting 
the Strategic Air Command in Omaha for I 
think it gave both of us another opportunity 
to see how closely the strategic strength of the 
United States and the effectiveness of the 
Alliance are tied together. 

>Mr. Brosio visited the United States Sept. 27-30; 
for an exchange of toasts at the White House between 
President Johnson and Secretary General Brosio on 
Sept. 29 and their remarlis later that day at Offiitt Air 
Force Base, Omaha, Nebr., see Bulletin of Oct. 26, 
1964, p. 582. 

As I have emphasized several times, the 
United States is dedicated to NATO. The 
American commitment to the Alliance is firm 
and real. We in the United States remain 
ready, as I know you do, to work with all our 
allies to insure that ours is a growing partner- 
ship of freedom based on shared responsibility 
for the most effective defense of our people and 
our freedom. 

More personally, I would like you to know 
that your visit here gave us a new sense of con- 
fidence in your leadership and your dedication 
to a most challenging task. You have my as- 
surance that this Government will give you the 
closest possible cooperation as you carry on at 
the helm of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 

Good luck, and very best wishes. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Letter From Secretary General Brosio 

October 6, 1964 
Dear Mr. Prestoent: Upon my return to 
Paris, I would like you to know of my profound 
gratitude for the very warm welcome you gave 
me and for the highly useful and satisfactory 
discussions which took place during my visit to 
the United States. As a result, I am even more 
deeply convinced than before that there is no 
substitute for personal meetings in order to find 
a complete understanding. 

I am particularly grateful that you, at a time 
of hea\'7 personnal engagement in domestic af- 
fairs, were able to give me so much of your pre- 
cious time. It was a great honor for me to be 
your guest at the Wliite House in the midst of 
such distinguished company, and in your re- 
marks that day I found the most imequivocal 
assurances of American dedication not only 
to the ideal but also to the concepts of 
our Alliance. I need not emphasize the sat- 
isfaction with which I listened to your state- 

The visit to the Strategic Air Command 
headquarters demonstrated in a most concrete 
manner the substance of the American commit- 
ment to the defense of our freedom. It is an 
impressive experience to see directly the proof 
of American concern over the security not only 

NOVESIBER 9, 196 4 


of your country and people, but of the other 
NATO members as well. At this point I would 
like to pay tribute to the evident superior quali- 
ties of the men at Omaha who are entrusted 
with these grave responsibilities. 

In closing, Mr. President, I want to thank 
you both for your boundless hospitality and for 
the assurances of support in my tasks, a sup- 
port which I consider absolutely essential to 
the success of my mission. 

With warm regards, 

Manlio Brosio 

FSI To Offer Course on "Science, 
Technology, and Foreign Affairs" 

Press release 469 dated October 23 

On January 11, 1965, the School of Foreign 
Affairs of the Foreign Service Institute will 
inaugurate a pilot seminar on "Science, Tech- 
nology, and Foreign Aifairs." This course of 
4 weeks' duration to be conducted on an experi- 
mental basis is designed to provide a selected 
group of Foreign Service and Departmental 
officers and participants from other Govern- 
ment agencies with an increased understanding 
of the interaction between science, technology, 
and foreign affairs. It will strive to give par- 
ticipants an improved competence in assessing 
and dealing with scientific and technological 
factors which have a bearing on the formulation 
and execution of foreign policy. 

The first class will consist of approximately 
25 persons, about half to be drawn from the 
Department of State and the remainder from 
other governmental agencies. Lectures, semi- 
nars, and panel discussions will be supple- 
mented by field trips, assigned reading, and 
individual and group projects involving partic- 
ipation by class members. The case-study 
method will be used extensively in policy areas 
such as foreign economic assistance, national 
influence and prestige, arms control, and inter- 
national organizations. Lecturers and faculty 
participants with a wide variety of backgrounds 
and responsibilities will be drawn from Gov- 
ernment, universities, and industry. 


President Signs Cuban Claims Bill; 
Asks Study of Vesting Provision 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 17 

I have signed into law H.K. 12259. The basic 
purpose of this bill is to authorize the Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission to determine the 
amount and validity of claims of United States 
nationals against the government of Cuba. 

The Castro regime has expropriated over 
$1 billion worth of property of United States 
nationals in total disregard for their rights. 
These unlawful seizures violated every standard 
by which the nations of the free world conduct 
their affairs. 

I am confident that the Cuban people will not 
always be compelled to suffer under Communist 
rule — that one day they will achieve freedom 
and democracy. I am also confident that it will 
be possible to settle the claims of American 
nationals whose property has been wrongfully 
taken from them. 

This bill will provide for the adjudication of 
these claims of American nationals. I have 
signed it because of the importance of making 
such a permanent record while evidence and 
witnesses are still available. 

There is, however, another provision of this 
bill that requires further study. This provi- 
sion vests in the Federal Government ownership 
of certain assets of the Cuban government now 
held in the United States. These assets are 
already blocked and are thus of no further use 
to the Cuban government. The proceeds from 
the sale of the vested assets will not be available 
to American nationals whose properties were 
expropriated but will be used to pay for the 
expenses of administering the bill. 

The United States strongly adheres to the 
sanctity of property. The vesting of the prop- 
erty of foreign governments or nationals is not 
a step that we should undertake without careful 



I am, therefore, requesting the Secretary of 
State to make a full study to determine the effect 
of the vesting provision on American interests 
abroad and its implications for the conduct of 
our foreign relations. 

I am also requesting an opinion by the Attor- 
ney General concerning the precise scope and 
application of the vesting provision. The lan- 
guage of this provision is ambiguous concern- 
ing its possible application in various circum- 
stances. It is unclear, for example, whether the 
provision applies to the property of American 
nationals that was unlawfully expropriated by 
the Castro regime. Similarly, there is doubt 
whether it applies to certain properties in which 
other countries have substantial interests. 

In the light of these studies, I may find it 
necessary to propose amendatory legislation 
with regard to the vesting provision. The pres- 
ent bill provides for a 6-month waiting period 
before the vesting provision becomes operative. 
If I conclude that the amendatory legislation 
is required, I will propose it early next year so 
that it can become effective before the end of the 
6-month period. 

President Reports on Operation 
of Foreign Assistance Program 

Follow-ing is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Johnson transmitfinff to the Congress the 
annual report on the foreign assistance program 
for fiscal year 1963} 

White House press release dated October 3 

To the Congress of the United States: 

This report demonstrates the remarkable 
progress made in strengthening our foreign as- 
sistance programs and policies since 1961. 

The 1961 Act for International Development 
called for major changes in the operation and 
emphasis of these historic programs. For more 
effective direction, the activities of several agen- 
cies were brought together under the Agency for 
International Development. New guidelines 
were laid down for our aid programs as part of 
the bold effort to make the 1960"s the Decade of 

' H. Doc. 357, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 

This report for fiscal 1963 shows clearly the 
ways in which these new guidelines are being 
translated into concrete programs. They pro- 
vide the foundations for the lean, tightly-man- 
aged aid program we plan for fiscal 1965. I 
want to call your attention particularly, there- 
fore, to some significant features of this report 
which mark our progress during 1963 toward 
basic and continuing objectives of our foreign 
assistance policy. 

Interest-Bearing Loans Replace Grants 

As the 1961 Act directed, interest-bearing 
loans have replaced grants as the chief mecha- 
nism for assistance. Loans represented 57 per- 
cent of aid's commitments during fiscal 1963 — 
the highest proportion in the history of the for- 
eign assistance program. 

Aid Is More Selective 

Our aid became increasingly selective and 
concentrated in fiscal 1963 — a trend that has 
since been accelerated. Eighty percent of all 
economic assistance funds authorized that year 
were for just twenty countries. Sixty percent 
of total military assistance went to just nine key 

Aid to Latin America Increases 

To increase the impact of the Alliance for 
Progress, our aid to Latin America was sharply 
stepped up in fiscal 1963, reaching 23 percent of 
world-wide commitments, compared with 18 
percent the preceding year and an average of 
only 2 percent from 1948 to 1960. 

New Policies Protect the Dollar 

Policies designed to protect our balance of 
payments produced major results in fiscal 
1963 — a dramatic jump in the purchases of U.S. 
products. U.S. producers supplied 78 percent 
of all AID-financed commodities during the 
year, compared with 63 percent the preceding 
year, and less than 50 percent in earlier years. 

Increased Participation hy U.S. Industry 

Under these policies U.S. business and indus- 
try exported $855 million in AID-financed 
goods and equipment to Asia, Africa and Latin 
America during the year, and American ship- 

NOVEMBEK 9, 1964 


pingj firms were paid about $80 million to carry 
AID-financed commodities to their destinations 
in the less-developed countries. These dollars 
meant more jobs for American workers. 

As a result of the same policy, U.S. ships car- 
ried more than 80 percent of the total net AID- 
financed cargo that year, well in excess of the 
60 percent required by the Cargo Preference 

Private Organizations Play a Larger Role 

The 1961 Act also called for greater use of 
America's vast private resources in the battle 
against world poverty. During fiscal 1963, 
about one-fourth of all teclmical assistance was 
carried out not by AID personnel, but by Amer- 
ican colleges, universities, business, professional 
firms, and service organizations on contract 
with AID. 

More than 70 of our colleges and universities 
were at work in 40 countries under AID con- 
tracts, helping other people make progress in 
education, in health, in agriculture, in business 
and industry. 

During the year, there was a four-fold in- 
crease in cooperative programs designed to help 
private citizens organize savings and loan in- 
stitutions, credit unions, rural electric coopera- 
tives, housing and farm credit co-ops. These 
programs that go right to the people have 
continued to grow. To expand this significant 
work, AID relied heavily on contracts with 
experienced private groups such as the Credit 
Union National Association, the National 
League of Insured Savings Associations, the 
Cooperative League of America, and the Na- 
tional Rural Electric Cooperative Association. 

Increased Emfhasis on Private Enterprise 

In recognition of the fact that foreign invest- 
ors helped build our own nation's economy and 
that private capital must do most of the job for 
the developing nations, we increased efforts to 
encourage American investment in the less-de- 
veloped countries. Twelve countries signed in- 
vestment guaranty agreements during fiscal 
1963, bringing to fifty-five the nimiber of less- 
developed countries participating in this suc- 
cessful program. 

This year, for the first time, AID guaranteed 

a substantial amount of new U.S. private dol- 
lar investment in development banks organized 
to foster private enterprise in the less-developed 
countries. U.S. investors applied for guaranty 
coverage totaling $32 million for new or addi- 
tional investments in such banks. 

Significant Savings hy Improved Management 

Fiscal 1963 saw the beginning of significant 
economies in the management of aid programs 
by the Agency for International Development. 
Economies made in that year included savings 
of more than $900,000 by centralized purchase 
of DDT, $1,200,000 during the first six montlis 
of the fiscal year alone through tighter travel 
policies and regulations, and $34 million saved 
through an aggressive program to use 
Government-owned excess property in overseas 

EconoTnic Aid to Europe Terminated 

Major assistance to Europe under the 
Marshall Plan had ended by the mid-fifties, but 
a few smaller supplemental programs continued 
during the years after. Fiscal 1963 saw the last 
economic assistance commitment for Europe: 
a single grant of $125,000 authorized to finance 
the closing out of prior activities in Yugoslavia. 

Finally, let me point out this. It is particu- 
larly approjjriate that the same year wliich 
marked the termination of the historic and suc- 
cessful Marshall Plan for Europe was also the 
year in which our efforts in the less-developed 
countries began giving immistakable evidence 
of success. 

With our help, developed countries like Brit- 
ain, France and Japan recovered from the war 
rapidly and were soon in a position to give 
rather than receive assistance. But when we 
first extended America's helping hand to the 
less-developed countries a decade ago, there was 
no such promise of rapid results. "We knew it 
was right and necessary to help these poorer 
countries to a better life if we were to preserve 
our own good life and expand the family of the 
free. But only recently could we be certain 
that it was practical and only recently have 
been able to see with our ej'es the proof of our 
earlier vision. In fiscal 1963, for the first time, 
it became mimistakably clear that countries like 



Free China were ending their dependence on 
AID and that others would follow. 

We know today that the progress in control- 
ling diseases that have sapped men's strength 
to build and to work, the steady expansion of 
educational opportunities, the slow but persist- 
ent increase in national income and output in 
the countries we have aided are leading to fur- 
ther successes. We know that if our goal is still 
distant, our course is true. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
October 3, 19G4. 

President Signs Bill Extending 
Food for Peace Program 

Statement hy President Johnson ^ 

I am very happy to sign this bill. It will 
extend for 2 years legislation of enormous im- 
portance both to the United States and to the 
rest of the free world. It authorizes continua- 
tion of the Food for Peace program. This 
program makes possible the sharing of our 
abundance on a scale unparalleled in tlie his- 
tory of the world. It stands as a monument 
to the miracle wrought by the American 
farmer and to the generosity and practical 
wisdom of the American people. 

The Food for Peace program authorized by 
this law will permit us to use our agricultural 
abundance to combat malnutrition and hunger 
in the less developed countries and to promote 
their economic growth. At the same time, this 
program will help us to attain vitally im- 
portant economic and foreign policy objectives. 
It benefits all of the people, directly or in- 

During the past 10 years we have shipped 
$12.2 billion in food to needy people under 
Public Law 480. Our food has gone to over 

' Made Oct. 8 upon the signing of S. 2687, an act 
to extend the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954 (White House press release 
(Indianapolis, Ind.)). 

100 countries. It has relieved the hunger of 
many millions of men, women, and children. 

Most of us, in this rich land of ours, find 
it difficult to imagine what food assistance 
really means to the half of the people in the 
world who have too little to eat. This kind 
of assistance means a noon meal for 40 million 
foreign schoolchildren. It means emergency 
supplies when catastrophe strikes — drought, 
floods, hurricanes, earthquakes. To millions 
of people it means the difference between an 
inadequate and barely adequate diet. 

Our food also promotes economic growth 
in the less developed countries. It helps con- 
trol inflation. It generates local currencies, 
which the United States can grant to less 
developed countries to help them build their 
industry, their agriculture, their communica- 
tions, their schools, and their hospitals. 

The United States is also a prime beneficiary 
of the program. The Food for Peace program 
authorized by P.L. 480 makes constructive use 
of the abimdant production of our farmers and 
ranchers, thereby increasing their incomes. It 
stimulates business for American industry and 
creates jobs for American workers. It builds, 
through market promotion and economic de- 
velopment, the basis for expanded cash sales of 
American farm products. 

The Food for Peace program furthers our 
foreign policy objectives. It helps strengthen 
many other countries of the free world — which 
is certainly in our mutual interest. It creates 
good will for the United States. It gives all 
countries a chance to see how remarkably effi- 
cient our free agricultural system really is — 
especially when compared with the regimented 
and depressed farming of the Commimist world. 

This bill, however, contains several features 
which concern me. Of these, two provisions are 
particularly imdesirable. One seeks to give 
either the House Committee on Agriculture or 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and For- 
estry a veto power over certain proposed dis- 
positions of foreign currencies accruing from 
sales under P.L. 480. The other seeks to pre- 
vent the President from making certain loans 
at interest rates below a specified level unless 
he has concurrence of an advisory committee 
composed in part of Members of Congress 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


and in part of his own executive appointees. 

In recent years, four Attorney Generals of the 
United States have held that legislative provi- 
sions vesting in congressional committees the 
power to approve or disapprove actions of the 
executive branch are unconstitutional. The 
Acting Attorney General now advises me that a 
provision vesting such power in a committee 
made up m part of Members of Congress stands 
on no better footing. Both such provisions 
represent a clear violation of the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers. This is the 
position taken in similar cases by President 
Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and by myself. 

However, I appreciate the desire of the Con- 
gi'ess to be informed and to be consulted on the 
operation of aU aspects of the P.L. 480 progi-am, 
and I am directing that executive officials see 
that this is done. 

Two other provisions of the bill are disturb- 
ing. The first, by preventing any foreign cur- 
rency sales to any Communist countries, inhibits 
our ability to deal selectively with coimtries that 
may demonstrate a tendency toward political 
and economic independence from communism. 

1 note, however, that the effect of this restric- 
tion is somewhat offset by the authorization to 
make dollar sales on credit to such comitries. 
The second, by requiring that our surplus in- 
ventories of extra-long-staple cotton be offered 
for sale at world prices, could create serious 
problems in our foreign relations. I am direct- 
ing that this provision be administered with 
great care so as to minimize any hannful effects 
on the economies of the free-world coimtries 
which "are the principal exporters of this com- 

But the overriding fact is that the bill I have 
just approved will pennit the Food for Peace 
program to continue iminterrupted for another 

2 years. Both in its tangible and intangible 
benefits, this vital program deserves and, I be- 
lieve, enjoys the overwhelming support of the 
American people. It has and will continue to 
receive the wliolehearted support of tliis ad- 
ministration. If tlie past is any guide to tlie 
future, I am confident that Food for I'eaeo will 
represent a growing force in our efforts to ad- 
vance the cause of freedom throughout the 

President Sends Food for Peace 
Report to Congress 

White House press release dated September 21 

President Jolmson on September 21 sent to 
the Congress the 20th semiaimual report on 
Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) programs.^ 
The report covers the second half of fiscal year 
1964 (January 1-June 30) and marks the com- 
pletion of 10 years of U.S. overseas food assist- 
ance programs authorized by Public Law 480, 
the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954. 

In an accompanying memorandum to the re- 
port, the President's Special Assistant for Food 
for Peace, Kichard W. Eeuter, said: "Our 
bountiful farm abmidance represents a potent 
weapon for good in the war against liimger, 
poverty and disease both at home and abroad." 
Tlie Food for Peace progi'am, Renter stated, 
"shares our plenty with friendly peoples and 
nations of the world in a manner and to a de- 
gree wliicli supplements effectively the expand- 
ing world trade in agriculture, and helps the 
United States maintain its position as the 
world's leading exiDorter of food and fibers." 

In the fiscal year ended Jmie 30, 1964, the re- 
port points out, U.S. farm exports reached a 
new record high level of $6.1 billion, as $1 billion 
increase over the previous all-time high of the 
fiscal year 1963. The increase, the report em- 
phasizes, represented commercial sales rather 
than P.L. 480 sliipments. 

Food for Peace shipments for the last half of 
fiscal year 1964 totaled $825 million ; for the full 
fiscal year, $1,545 million — 25 percent of total 
U.S. agricultural exports. In (he ji receding fis- 
cal year, 1963, Food for Peace shipments 
amounted to $1,529 million — 30 percent of the 
$5.1 billion total agricultural exports for that 

In the past 10 years, the report states, $12.3 
billion M'ortli of agricultural products liave been 
shipped overseas under the Food for Peace pro- 
gram — 27 percent of total agricultural exports 
for the period. 

The President's report to the Congress cited 
tlie following highlights of the past 10 yeare 
of Food for Peace — "A Decade of Abundanoe" • 

' II. Doc. 3G5, 88th Cong., 2d sess. 



— 63 percent of the $12.3 billion worth of farm 
commodities shipped overseas in tlie past 10 
years imder tlie Food for Peace program have 
been sold for the local currencies of the recipi- 
ent countries — $9.9 billion wortli [including $2.2 
billion in ocean transportation] of farm prod- 
ucts to 49 coimtries. These sales for local cur- 
rencies (under title I of Public Law 480) for 
the period January-Jmie 1964 totaled $431 mil- 
lion ; for the full fiscal year, $616 million. 

— Sales for dollai-s of agricultural commodi- 
ties imder the Food for Peace program have 
totaled $262.7 million since the enactment of 
title IV of Public Law 480 in 1959, which pro- 
vides for long-term dollar credit sales as a means 
of helping countries to graduate from local cur- 
rency to dollar purchasing. Reflecting an 
increased emphasis on transition from local 
currency to dollar programs, almost half of this 
total was recorded in the $117.9 million in title 
IV sales agi'eements negotiated in fiscal year 
1964. Through June 30, 1964, the United States 
has received a total of $4.8 million in principal 
and interest i-epayments on credit previously 
extended under tins program. 

— -"U.S. agricultural abundance," the report 
states, "has proved to be one of our most valu- 
able resources in international development 
programs — to help the countries and the peo- 
ple of the free world help themselves to eco- 
nomic and social progress." Nearly two-thirds 
of the $9.9 billion in local currencias generated 
by title I sales in the past 10 years has been 
set aside for economic development — $4.9 bil- 
lion in loans, $1.8 billion in grants — contribut- 
ing to flood control, irrigation, and reforesta- 
tion projects; improvement of railroads, high- 
ways, bridges, docks, communications ; and con- 
struction of electric power facilities, hospitals, 
clinics, and schools. 

— "Local currencies generated by the sale of 
U.S. fai-m products," the report states, "have 
reduced by millions the outflow of U.S. dollars 
to finance overseas programs in the past 10 
years." Since 1954 Public Law 480 sales have 
produced more than $936 million in local cur- 
rencies for payment of regular U.S. expenses 
abroad : for U.S. government buildings ; Amer- 
ican-sponsored schools and centers; interna- 
tional student exchange; trade fairs; transla- 

tion, publication, and distribution of books and 
periodicals; educational, medical research, and 
vocational rehabilitation; sales for dollars to 
U.S. tourists ; fishery research ; military family 
housing; scientific translations. 

— Food for Peace has provided $208.8 mil- 
lion in local currencies derived from Public 
Law 480 sales in the past 10 years in private 
enterprise loans to 275 U.S. and local business 
firms for business development and trade ex- 
pansion in 23 countries. In the Januaiy-June 
1964 period 26 new loans in the amount of 
$29.5 million were approved, making a total 
of $64.5 million for 45 private enterprise loans 
for the fiscal year. 

• — Public Law 480-generated local curren- 
cies totalmg $99.4 million have been invested 
in the past 10 years in programs designed to 
develop new and expanding markets for U.S. 
farm products overseas (cotton, soybeans, 
poultry, wheat, feed grains, rice, meat, and 
milk) through cooperative programs with U.S. 
trade and agricultural groups, trade fairs and 
trade centers, and marketing research. 

—Representing a calculated shift from relief 
feeding to food-for-work community develop- 
ment programs, an estimated 1.8 million work- 
ers in 23 countries are receiving a supple- 
mentary wage of food for their contribution 
to local self-help projects. Including workers' 
families, over 8 million needy persons are 
now benefiting from these development pro- 
grams. During January-Juno 1964, 18 new 
food-for-work projects were authorized, bring- 
ing the total for the fiscal year to 30 programs. 

— Food for Peace title III donation programs 
in the past 10 years have provided $1.6 billion 
worth of food to millions of hungry men, wom- 
en, and cliildren in 112 coimtries. This food, 
identified in the local language as "donated by 
the people of the United States," is distributed 
by accredited nonprofit voluntary agencies such 
as CARE, Church World Service, Catholic Re- 
lief Services — as well as intergovernmental or- 
ganizations such as UNICEF. In the fiscal year 
1964, 225 such programs were approved to fur- 
nish food valued at $330 million to 73 million 
people in 110 coimtries. Forty million children 
are benefiting from school lunch programs made 
possible by Food for Peace. In Latin America, 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


as a result of an intensive "Operation Xinos" 
child-feeding Food for Peace program, the 
number of school children panicipating in 
school lunch programs has increased in the past 
year from 3 million to 10 million. 

— In the past decade 63 countries have re- 
ceived approximately $940 million worth of 
Food for Peace commodities for the relief of the 
victims of floods, earthquakes, droughts, and 
plagues and for the assistance of refugees. 
From Januarv-June 19&4 more than $50 million 

Avortli of U.S.-donated food was used for disas- 
ter and refugee relief in 11 countries — a total 
for the fiscal year of nearly $112 million in 22 

— In the past 10 years $1.7 billion worth of 
agricultural commodities have been exported 
under the barter provisions of Food for Peace in 
exchange for materials, goods, services, and 
equipment. Barter contracts negotiated during 
the period January-June 196i totaled $5S mil- 
lion; for the fiscal year 196i, $170 million. 


Security Council Recommends 
IVIalawi for U.N. IVIembership 

Statement by Charles W. Tost '■ 

It is an honor for the United States to vote 
for the admission of Malawi to the United 
Nations and a pleasure for us to welcome their 
delegation to the Security Council today. 

We expect that Malawi will have mucli to 
contribute to the work of this organization. 
The United Nations has not yet achieved the 
goals set for it in its charter. The path to 
world peace and the reconciliation of inter- 
national differences is not an easy or a short 
one. We in the United Nations can offer to 
new members therefore only the prospect of 
hard work in the service of yet unrealized hopes 
and ideals. 

But we do not doubt that Malawi will take up 
this challenge with the same spirit of wisdom 
and moderation wliich has guided it over the 
years from colonialism to independent nation- 
hood. The experience which Prime Minister 
[H. Kamuzu] Banda and our distinguished col- 
league with us here today, Ambassador [James 

' Made in the U.N'. Sectirity Council on Oct. 9 (U.S./ 
CN. press release 4448). Mr. Yost is Deputy U.S. 
RepresentatiTe In the Security CoonciL 

David] Rubadiri, have gained from the long, 
patient negotiation of Malawi's independence 
might serve us all as an example of moderation 
put to the service of strong conviction. Such 
qualities, we believe, should always hold an hon- 
ored place in the United Nations. 

The United States is particularly pleased to 
vote for the admission of [Malawi because of 
the long history of friendly relations which our 
two peoples have enjoyed. American citizens 
have been active in educational and religious 
affairs in Malawi for many years, and in re- 
turn many Malawians have studied and worked 
in the United States. More than 60 Malawians 
are now studying in American universities, 
many of them imder United States Government 
auspices. The most notable among past stu- 
dents was, of course, the present Prime Minister 
of Malawi, Dr. Banda, who received the degree 
of Doctor of Medicine from an American 

In Malawi itself a number of American Cath- 
olic and Protestant missionary organizations 
have long been active. In addition, the United 
States is happy to note that by the end of 196i 
as many as 200 United States Peace Corps vol- 
imteers wUl have been welcomed in Malawi, 
most of them in teaching and public-health 



The United States looks forward to increas- 
ing this friendly exchange between our two 
countries. Our long contacts with Malawi 
have led us to the belief that this nation will 
have much to say and to do in the councils of 
peace. We welcome it, therefore, to the United 
Nations, both as a friend and as a potential 
contributor to the great work which lies before 

United States Submits Memorandum 
on U.N. Financial Crisis 

Following is a letter from U.S. Represent- 
ative Adlai E. Stevenson to U.N. Secretary- 
General U Thant, together with the text of a 
UjS. memorandum. 

U.S./U.N. press release dated October 8 

October 8, 1964 

Excellency: I have the honor to enclose a 
Memorandum by the United States of America, 
dated October 8, 1964, concerning "The United 
Nations Financial Crisis." I would appreciate 
it if you would arrange to have the Memoran- 
dum circulated as an official document of the 
General Assembly. 

Tlie Memorandum deals with the serious ex- 
tent of the financial issue facing the Organiza- 
tion, the law on the issue as established by the 
International Court of Justice and the General 
Assembly, and the implications which a breach 
of the Charter on the question would entail. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances 
of my highest consideration. 

Adlai E. Stevenson 


A. The Financial Crisis 

The United States is vitally interested in the sur- 
vival of the United Nations as an effective institution, 

" The Council on Oct. 9 unanimously recommended 
that Malawi be admitted to membership in the United 

and is deeply troubled by the financial crisis facing 
the Organization. 

The crisis is painfully clear. The UN has a net 
deficit of $13i million. 

On June 30 the UN had on its books unpaid obliga- 
tions owed to governments and other outsiders total- 
ing some .$117 million. In addition, it owed to its 
own Worliing Capital Fund — which it is supposed to 
have on hand in order to keep afloat and solvent 
pending the receipt of assessments — $40 million. 
Other internal accounts were owed $27 million. 
Against this total of $183 million of obligations it had 
$49 million in cash resources, or a net deficit of $134 

What does this mean? 

It means that the UN does not have the money to 
pay its debts, and that it would be bankrupt today 
if it were not for the forbearance of the Member 
Governments to which it owes those debts. 

It means that, unless something is done, the United 
Nations will have to default on its obligations to 
Member Governments which, in good faith and in 
reliance on the UN's promises and good faith, have 
furnished troops and supplies and services to the UN, 
at its request, for the safeguarding of the peace. In 
so doing, these Governments incurred substantial addi- 
tional and extraordinary expenditures which the UN 
agreed to reimburse — an agreement which the Secre- 
tary General referred to in his statement at the open- 
ing session of the Working Group of 21 on September 
9 (Doc. A/AC. 113/29, p. 5) as " the commitment which 
the Organization has accepted, in its collective capacity, 
towards of its Members who have furnished the 
men and material for its successive peace-keeping 

Which are those Governments? 

The UN owes significant amounts to Argentina, 
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malay- 
sia, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, 
Tunisia, UAR, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, and 
the United States. It is to be noted that 19 of these 
29 countries are developing countries. 

As the Secretary General said at the opening session 
of the Working Group of 21 on September 9th (Doc. 
A/AC. 113/29, p. 5), these 29 Members "are surely 
entitled to expect the United Nations to keep faith 
with them." For the United Nations to keep that 
faith, it must get the money from its Members, for 
it has no other practicable source. 

These 29 countries will suffer if the UN is forced, 
by the default of the Members which owe it, into de- 
faulting to those which it owes; the entire organiza- 
tion will suffer if it does not honor its just obligations 
and becomes morally bankrupt. 

The 29 Members would suffer by a default, but the 
real sufferer would be the UN itself. How could an 
enfeebled and creditless defaulter maintain peace and 
security? Indeed, how could any institution that had 
committed such a breach of faith hope long to 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


survive as a credit-worthy and effective organization? 

As the Secretary General said at the opening session 
of the Worliing Group of 21, "failure to take care of 
the past may not leave us with much of a future." 

What lias caused this crisis? 

The crisis has been thrust upon the United Nations 
by those Jlembers which have refused to pay the assess- 
ments for the Middle East (UNEF) and Congo (ONUC) 
operations as voted by the General Assembly In accord- 
ance with the Charter. 

It is worthwhile recalling exactly how those opera- 
tions were authorized and exactly what they were. 

B. The Middle East Operation— UNEF 

UNEF grew out of the Suez crisis of 1956. The 
Security Council found itself unable to act because of 
vetoes by certain of the Permanent Members. Yugo- 
slavia then, on October 31, 1956, introduced the follow- 
ing Resolution (S/.3719) : 

"The Security Council, 

"Considering that a grave situation has been created 
by action undertaken against Egypt, 

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of 
its permanent members at the 749th and 750th meet- 
ings of the Security Council has prevented it from 
exercising its primary responsibility for the mainte- 
nance of International peace and security, 

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the 
General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly 
resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950 [Note: The 
Uniting for Peace Resolution] in order to make appro- 
priate recommendations." 

The Yugoslav Resolution was adopted 7-2-2, and the 
Soviet Union voted for the Resolution. 

Thus the Soviet Union supported the referral by the 
Security Council of the crisis to the General Assembly 
for "appropriate recommendations" under the very 
Uniting for Peace Resolution which the Soviet Union 
now tries to discredit. 

The "appropriate recommendations" began with 
Resolution 997 (ES-I), adopted 64-5-6 (the Soviet 
Union voting for), calling for an immediate cease-fire, 
and Resolution 998 (ES-I), adopted 57-0-19 (the 
Soviet Union abstaining), requesting the Secretary 
General to submit 

"a plan for the setting up with the consent of the 
nations concerned, of an Emergency international 
United Nations Force to secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms 
of the aforementioned resolution" (Res. 997) (empha- 
sis supplied). 

There followed Resolution 999 (ES-I), adopted 59-5- 
12 (the Soviet Union voting for), autliorizing the Sec- 
retary General to arrange for the implementation of 
the, and Resolution 1000 (ES-I ), which noted 
with satisfaction the Secretary General's plan (Docu- 
ment A/32S9) for the international force, and provided 
as follows : 

"1. Establishes a United Nations Command for an 
emergency international Force to secure and supervise 
the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the 
terms of General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-I) of 
2 November 1956 ;" 

The vote on the Resolution was 57-0-19. There was 
not a single vote against (the Soviet Union abstained). 

Further, the General Assembly, by Resolution 1001 
(ES-I), which was adopted 64-0-12. approved the 
Secretary General's second report. Document A/3302. 
That report specifically indicated (a) that UXEF was 
intended only to secure and supervise the cease-fire 
and the withdrawal of forces, and not to enforce the 
withdrawal, (b) that it was not an enforcement action, 
nor was UNEF a force with military objectives, and ■ 
(c) that no use of force under Chapter VII of the I 
Charter was envisaged. The Soviet Union abstained 
and did not vote against that resolution either. 

Yet now the Soviet Union contends that there was 
something illegal about an operation (a) which was 
recommended by the General Assembly pursuant to a 
referral by the Security Council voted for by the 
Soviets themselves, (b) which involved no enforcement 
or military action whatsoever but merely the securing 
and supervising of a previously agreed to cease-fire, 
(c) which was consented to by the government con- 
cerned, and (d) which was authorized by the Assembly 
without a negative vote by anyone. 

Rejecting the Soviet contentions, the International 
Court of Justice held (see under heading D 1 below) 
that UNEF was properly authorized by the Assembly. 

C. The Congo Operation — ONUC 

The United Nations operation in the Congo was 
authorized by the Security Council on July 13, 1960, 
by Resolution S/4387, reading in part as follows : 

"The Security Council . . . 

"2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to 
take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the 
Government with such military assistance, as may be 
necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese 
Government with the technical assistance of the United 
Nations, the national security forces may be able, in 
the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their 
tasks ;" j 

The Soviet Union voted for the Resolution, which * 
clearly gave the Secretary General discretionary au- 
thority, in consultation with the Congolese Govern- 
ment, to determine the make-up of ONUC. 

On July 18, 19G0, the Secretary General presented J 
to the Security Council his first report (S/4389) in \ 
which he recited the steps taken by him to invite Mem- 
ber States to furnish forces for ONUC. 

On July 22, 1960, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution S/4405, reading in part as follows : j 

"The Security Council, ... ' 

"Appreciating the work of the Secretary-General 



and the support so readily and so speedily given to 
him by all Member States invited by him to give 
assistance, . . . 

"3. Commends the Secretary-General for the prompt 
action he has taken to carry out Resolution S/-13S7 
of the Security Council and his first report ;" 

The Soviet Union voted for the resolution. 

In the face of this record, it is difficult to understand 
the Soviet Union's present claim (Soviet Memorandum 
of September 11, 1964, p. 5 ') that it was improper for 
the Secretary General to invite States to take part in 
ONUC — when he did so pursuant to direct Security 
Council authorization and approval, twice voted for 
by the Soviet Union itself. There was no "bypassing" 
of the Security Council (Soviet Memorandum, p. 5) ; 
on the contrary the Secretary General did exactly what 
the Council authorized him to do and commended him 
for having done ! 

On August 9, 1960, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution S/4426, confirming the authority given to 
the Secretary General by the two prior Resolutions and 
requesting him to continue to carry out his responsi- 
bility. The Soviet Union voted for that Resolution 

Furthermore, six months later, the Security Council 
on February 20. 1961, adopted Resolution S/4741 which 
broadened ONUC's mandate and reaffirmed the three 
earlier Security Council Resolutions and an inter- 
vening General Assembly Resolution. The Soviet Un- 
ion abstained. 

Finally, the Security Council on November 24, 1901, 
nine months later, adopted Resolution S/5002. which in 
effect again reauthorized the OXUC operation, recall- 
ing the earlier Security Council Resolutions (and in- 
tervening General Assembly Resolutions), and again 
broadened ONUC's mandate. The Soviet Union voted 
for the Resolution. 

Against this record of Security Council authoriza- 
tion and repeated reauthorization, it is difficult to un- 
derstand how the Soviet Union can now contend that 
the operation was not legal and was not validly au- 

As for the Soviet contention that ONUC was not con- 
ducted in accordance with the five Security Council 
Resolutions, it is enough to point out that ONUC was 
reauthorized by the Security Council's Resolutions of 
February 20. 1901, and November 24, 1961 — six months 
and fifteen months, respectively, after its inception. 

If the Security Council had felt that ONUC was not 
being properly conducted in accordance with its Reso- 
lutions, it could at any time have changed or given 
further explicit instructions. No such instructions 
were ever given or even suggested by the Security 
Council, and the record of Security Council authoriza- 
tion and reauthorization, and reaffirmation, of the 
ONUC operation, remains unchallenged. 

The International Court of Justice accordingly held 
(see under heading D below) that ONUC iias projjerly 

D. Soviet Legal Arguments 

Let us now consider the legal arguments which have 
been made by the USSR. 

It should first be noted that every one of the argu- 
ments put forward by the Soviet Union in its memo- 
randum of September 11, 1904, and elsewhere, was 
made by the Soviet Representative in his submission 
and argument before the International Court of Justice 
in the summer of 1962, when the Court considered the 
question of whether the UNEF and ONUC assessments 
voted by the General Assembly were "expenses of the 
Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, para- 
graph 2, of the Charter, and therefore binding obliga- 
tions of the Members. 

Every single one of those arguments was specifically 
rejected in the Court's Advisory Opinion of July 20, 
1962.- That Opinion was accepted on December 19, 
1902, by the General Assembly by the overwhelming 
vote of 76-17-8, after the Assembly had decisively 
defeated an amendment which would merely have 
taken note of the Opinion. 

Nevertheless, it may be useful to deal briefly with 
the Soviet contentions. 

1. The Claimed "Exclusive" Peacekeeping Rights of 

the Security Council 

The Soviet position is that the Security Council, and 
only the Security Council, has any right to take any 
action whatsoever with respect to the keeping of the 
peace, and that the General Assembly has no rights 
whatsoever in that area. 

It should first be noted that this argument has noth- 
ing to do with ONUC, which was authorized and re- 
authorized by the Security Council by repeated Resolu- 
tions, four out of five of which were voted for by the 
Soviet Union — it abstained on the fourth. Further, It 
will be remembered that UNEF was recommended by 
the General Assembly pursuant to the Security Coun- 
cil's referral of the problem to the General Assembly 
for its recommendations, by a resolution which the 
Soviet Union voted for. 

In any event, there is no basis for the contention 
that the Security Council has exclusive rights as to 
peacekeeping, and the General Assembly none. Article 
24 of the Charter gives the Security Council "primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security", but not exclusive authority. 

The Charter provisions set forth unequivocally the 
authority of the General Assembly in this regard. 
Subject only to Article 12, paragraph 1,' 

— Article 10 authorizes the General Assembly to dis- 

• U.N. doc. A/5729. 

' For a Department statement on the Court's opinion, 
see Bulletin of Aug. 13. 1962. p. 246. 

' That paragraph reads : "While the Security Coun- 
cil is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation 
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the 
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation 
vplth regard to that dispute or situation unless the 
Security Council so requests." [Footnote in original.] 

NOVEMBER 9, 19 64 


cuss and make recommendations on any questions or 
matters within the scope of the Charter ; 

— Article 11, paragraph 2, authorizes the General 
Assembly to discuss and make recommendations with 
regard to any questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security (except that any 
question on which "action" is necessary shall be re- 
ferred to the Security Council) ; 

— Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to rec- 
ommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any 
situation likely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations, including situations 
resulting from a violation of the purposes and prin- 
ciples of the United Nations ; and 

— Article 35 prov'ides that any dispute or situation 
which might lead to international friction or give rise 
to a dispute may be brought to the attention of the 
Security Council or of the General Assembly, whose 
proceedings are to be subject to Articles 11 and 12. 

The word "action" in the exception to Article 11, 
paragraph 2, clearly applies only to coercive or en- 
forcement action, and therefore not to recommenda- 
tions by the General Assembly. So the International 
Court of Justice held in its Advisory Opinion of July 
20, 1962, saying at pages 164-165 : 

"The Court considers that the kind of action referred 
to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforce- 
ment action. This paragraph, which applies not merely 
to general questions relating to peace and security, 
but also to specific cases brought before the General 
Assembly by a State under Article 35, in its first sen- 
tence empowers the General Assembly, by means of 
recommendations to States or to the Security Council, 
or to both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at the 
request, or with the consent, of the States concerned. 
This power of the General Assembly is a special power 
which in no way derogates from its general powers 
under Article 10 or Article 14, except as limited by the 
last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2. This last 
sentence says that when 'action' is necessary the Gen- 
eral Assembly shall refer the question to the Security 
Council. The word 'action' must mean such action as 
is solely within the province of the Security Council. 
It cannot refer to recommendations which the Security 
Council might make, as for instance under Article 38, 
because the General Assembly under Article 11 has a 
comparable power. The 'action' which is solely within 
the province of the Security Council is that which is 
indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, 
namely 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. If the 
word 'action' in Article 11, paragraph 2, were inter- 
preted to mean that the General Assembly could make 
recommendations only of a general character affecting 
peace and security in the abstract, and not in rela- 
tion to specific cases, the paragraph would not have 
provided that the General Assembly may make recom- 
mendations on questions brought before it by States 
or by the Security Council. Accordingly, the last sen- 
tence of Article 11, paragraph 2, has no application 
where the necessary action is not enforcement action." 

The Security Council does have the sole authority, 
under Chapter VII, to make binding decisions, obliga- 
tory and compulsory on all Members, for coercive or 
enforcement action, but that does not mean that the 
General Assembly cannot make recommendations (as 
opposed to binding decisions) as to the preservation of 
the peace. 

UNEF, as shown by the Secretary General's report 
and on the face of the Resolutions which authorized it 
(see . . . above), involved no enforcement action, and 
was clearly within the recommendatory power of the 
General Assembly as regards a situation turned over 
to it by the Security Council by a Resolution voted for 
by the Soviet Union. 

ONUC lias authorized by the Security Council, and 
reauthorized by the Security Council, and no valid ob- 
jection can be raised to that authorization. 

Few Members of the United Nations would ever agree 
that, if the Security Council proves itself unable to 
act in the face of an international emergency, the 
General Assembly can only stand by, motionless and 
powerless to take any step for the preservation of the 

Certainly the record of recent years shows that the 
General Assembly can take and has taken appropriate 
measures in the interest of international peace, and 
that it has done so with the support of the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the Members, who believe that such 
measures are fully within the letter and the spirit of 
the Charter. 

2. The Claimed "Exclusive" Fights of the Security 
Council as to Peacekeeping Expenses 

The Soviet Union also contends that the Security 
Council has sole authority to determine the expenses of 
a peacekeeping operation, and to assess them on the 
membership, and that the General Assembly has no 
such right. 

We think it unlikely that many Members would ever 
agree that the 11 Members of the Security Council 
should be able to assess the other 101 Members with- 
out any consent or action on their part — surely taxa- 
tion without representation. 

There is not the slightest justification in the Charter 
for any such contention. The only reference in the 
Charter to the Organization's expenses is In Article 
17, paragraph 2, which provides that "the expenses 
of the Organization shall be borne by the Members 
as apportioned by the General Assembly." The Se- 
curity Council is never mentioned in the Charter in 
connection with any UN expenses. 

3. The Claimed "Non-Includability" of Peacekeeping 
Expenses under Article 17 

Article 17 of the Charter reads : 

"1. The General Assembly shall consider and ap- 
prove the budget of the Organization. 

"2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne 
by the Members as apportioned by the General Assem- 
bly." (emphasis supplied) 



It is clear that if the expenses of UNEF and ONUC, 
as apportioned by the General Assembly, are "expenses 
of the Organization", they are obligatoi-y on the Mem- 
bers and must be paid. 

This is precisely the question which was decided in 
the atlirmative by the International Court of Justice in 
its Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, accepted by the 
General Assembly. 

Before the Court the Soviet Union contended, as it 
does on page 7 of its memorandum of September 11, 
1SK>4, that paragraph 2 of Article 17 refers only to 
the budgetary expenses of the Organization. The 
Court points out, at page 161, that "on its face, 
the term 'expenses of the Organization' means all the 
expenses and not just certain types of expenses which 
might be referred to as 'regular expenses'." 

The Soviet memorandum of September 11, 1964, 
refers, at page 7, to a proposal made at San Francisco 
as to costs of enforcement action. In point of fact, 
the proposal was made by South Africa, which sug- 
gested an amendment to what is now Article 50 of 
the Charter. 

Article 50 deals with the right of a State (whether 
a UN Member or not) to consult the Security Council 
for a solution of any special economic problems aris- 
ing from preventive or enforcement measures taken 
by the Council ; the Article obviously relates to the 
situation where, for example, a Secui'ity Council em- 
bargo or boycott against an aggressor has the side 
effect of seriously harming the economy of an innocent 
third country. 

The South Africa amendment was to the effect that 
a guilty country against which UN enforcement ac- 
tion is taken should be required to pay the costs of 
the enforcement action and to make reparation for 
losses and damages sustained by the economies of 
innocent third countries as a result. Countries jmr- 
ticipating in the enforcement action were to submit 
their claims for costs and reparation to the Security 
Council for approval and for action required to en- 
sure recovery. The amendment had nothing whatever 
to do with the payment of peacekeeping costs incurred 
by the United Nations itself. Furthermore, the amend- 
ment was rejected, by Committee III/3 by a vote of 
19-2. The two votes in favor of the amendment were 
presumably those of South Africa, the proposer, and 
Iran, the seconder, which indicates that both the Soviet 
Union and the United States voted for rejection. See 
Documents on UN Conference on International Orga- 
nization, Vol. 3, p. 478, and Vol. 12, pp. 393, 435, 493, 

The full text of Committee III/3's report on the 
matter (partially quoted in the Soviet memorandum 
at p. 7) was as follows (p. 513) : 

"Economio Problems of Enforcement Action. In 
conclusion, having heard various explanations on the 
subject of mutual assistance between states in the 
application of the measures determined by the Security 
Council and having noted the legitimate concern ex- 

pressed by South Africa that the expenses of enforce- 
ment action carried out against a guilty state should 
fall upon that state, the Committee declared itself 
satisfied with the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11. 
[Note: The present Charter Articles 49 and 50, which 
contain no provisions as to the treatment of peace- 
keeping expenses.] 

"A desire moreover was expressed that the Orga- 
nization should, in the future, seek to promote a 
system aiming at the fairest possible distribution of 
expenses incurred as a result of enforcement action. 

"Having duly noted the explanations and sugges- 
tions given, the Committee unanimously adopted para- 
graphs 10 and 11 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
without change." (underscoring in the original) (p. 

The Committee's rejection of the South African pro- 
posal that aggressors pay, and the Committee's omis- 
sion from Articles 49 and 50 of any reference to ex- 
penses, left Article 17 as the only Article in the Charter 
dealing with expenses. That rejection and omission, 
and the Committee's emphasis on the fairest possible 
distribution of enforcement expenses, buttress the con- 
clusion that such expenses are to be included in Arti- 
cle 17, paragraph 2, and apportioned by the General 
Assembly, and are to be borne by the Members. 

The Soviet memorandum of September 11, 1964, p. 9, 
refers to a statement by Goodrich and Hambro in 
"Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Doc- 
uments", Boston, 1949, that the expenses referred to in 
Article 17, paragraph 2, do not include the cost of 
enforcement action. In point of fact the statement 
is foimd in a footnote, footnote 90 on p. 184. The 
footnote refers to Article 49 (which provides that 
Members are obligated to join in affording mutual 
assistance in carrying out Chapter VII measures de- 
cided upon by the Security Council) and to the dis- 
cussion of that Article on p. 295 of the same book. 
Both references, and the discussion, make it clear 
that the authors have in mind enforcement costs that 
are to be borne by Members themselves in carrying 
out measures decided upon by the Security Council 
under Articles 48 and 49, and not the type of non- 
enforcement peacekeeping expenses involved in UNEF 
and ONUC, where, by agreement, primary expenses 
were to be borne by the States furnishing the forces, 
but their extra and additional expenses were to be 
reimbursed by the UN. 

The Soviet memorandum contends (pp. 9, 10) that 
the fact that the General Assembly set up separate 
accounts for UNEF and ONUC expenses, apart from 
the regular budget, and, in certain cases, apportioned 
and assessed those expenses in a manner different 
from that used in the case of regular budget expenses, 
took UNEF and ONUC expenses out of the category 
of "expenses of the Organization" as found in Article 
17, paragraph 2. 

The International Court of Justice in its Advisory 
Opinion of July 20, 1962 decisively rejected this con- 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


tentiou. saying with respect to UNEF expenses, after 
a full review (pp. 172-175) of the General Assembly 
UNEF assessment resolutions from 1956 to date : 

"The Court concludes that, from year to year, the 
expenses of UXEF have been treated by the General 
Assembly as expenses of the Organization within the 
meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter." 
(p. 175) 

As to ONUC expenses, the Court said at pp. 178, 

"The conclusion to be drawn from these paragraphs 
is that the General Assembly has twice decided that 
even though certain expenses are 'extraordinary' and 
'essentially different' from those under the 'regular 
budget', they are none the less 'expenses of the Orga- 
nization' to be apportioned in accordance with the 
power granted to the General Assembly by Article 17, 
paragraph 2. This conclusion is strengthened by the 
concluding clause of paragraph 4 of the two resolutions 
just cited which states that the decision therein to use 
the scale of assessment already adopted for the regular 
budget is made 'pending the establishment of a dif- 
ferent scale of assessment to defray the extraordinary 
expenses'. The only alternative — and that means the 
'different procedure' — contemplated was another scale 
of assessment and not some method other than assess- 
ment. 'Apportionment' and 'assessment' are terms 
which relate only to the General Assembly's authority 
under Article 17." (emphasis in the original). 

The clear conclusion is that the UNEF and ONUC 
expenses are "expenses of the Organization" as re- 
ferred to in Article 17, paragraph 2, and, as duly 
apportioned by the General Assembly, "shall be borne 
by the Members" as obligatory obligations. 

4. The Claimed "Non-Applicaiility" of Article 19 

The first sentence of Article 19 of the Charter reads 
as follows : 

"A member of the United Nations which is in arrears 
In the payment of its financial contributions to the 
Organization shall have no vote in the General As- 
sembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of the contributions due from it for the 
preceding two full years." 

The Soviet Memorandum of September 11, 1964, 
states (p. 11) that the arrears to which Article 19 
refers are arrears in the payment of expenses under 
Article 17. This is of course true. 

But the Memorandum contends (pp. 10, 11) that 
since, according to the Soviet claim, UNEF and ONUC 
expenses are solely within the competence of the Secu- 
rity Council and are not "expenses of the Organiza- 
tion" under Article 17, they cannot be included in the 
calculation of arrears under Article 19. 

But, as the International Court of Justice has held 
and as the General Assembly confirmed (see heading 
D ."J above), UNEF and ONUC expenses ore "expenses 
of the Organization" under Article 17 and were prop- 
erly apportioned under that Article by the General 

Assembly. Therefore they are to be included in any 
calculation of arrears under Article 19. 

The Memorandum refers on p. 11 to an amendment 
to the present Article 19 proposed at the San Francisco 
Conference by Australia. The amendment in question 
would have added to Article 19 a provision that a 
Member shall have no vote If it has not carried out its 
obligations under what is now Article 43. In other 
words, for example, if a Member has agreed with the 
Security Council under Article 43 to furnish certain 
troops on the Council's call, and later refuses to do so, 
it should lose its vote. The proposed amendment would 
thus have added to Article 19, which already provided 
for loss of vote by a member failing to pay its assess- 
ments for UN expenses, a provision for loss of vote by 
a member failing to comply with its Article 43 obliga- 
tions. Expenses were not involved in the proposed 
amendment at all. 

In point of fact the proposed amendment was with- 
drawn by Australia and was never voted on. The 
proposed amendment and its withdrawal have nothing 
to do with the fact that Article 19 does deprive a mem- 
ber of its vote for falling to pay its assessments for 
UN expenses, and the fact that those expenses include, 
as the International Court of Justice has held, the 
UNEF and ONUC peacekeeping expenses incurred by 
the UN itself and duly assessed on all Members by the 
General Assembly. Those interested in the proposed 
amendment will find the accurate story in the docu- 
ments of the UN Conference on International Orga- 
nization, Vol. 8, pp. 470 and 476. 

So the conclusion is clear that, in the calculation 
of arrears under Article 19, UNEF and ONUC assess- 
ments are to be included. 

E. The Attitude of the UN Membership 

From the foregoing it is clear that UNEF and ONUC 
arrears are legal and binding obligations of Members. 
Furthermore, it is the overwhelming conviction of the 
U.N. Membership that they should be paid, and that 
all Members have a collective responsibility for the 
financing of such operations. 

General Assembly Resolution 1854 (XVII), of De- 
cember 19, 1962, accepting the International Court of 
Justice Advisory Opinion that UNEF and ONUC ex- 
penses are "expenses of the Organization" within the 
meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, has already been 
cited, together with the vote of 76-17-S in its favor. 

By Resolution 1874 (S/IV), adopted on June 27. 1963 
by the vote of 92-11-3, the General Assembly aflirmed, 
among other principles, the principle that the financing 
of peacekeeping operations is the collective responsibil- 
ity of all Member States of the United Nations. 

On June 27, 1963, by the vote of 79-12-17, the Gen- 
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 1877 (S/IV), read- 
ing in part as follows : 

"Noti>i(i with concern the present financial situation 
of the Organization resulting from the non-payment 
of a substantial portion of past assessments for the 
United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and 



the ad hoc Account for the United Nations Operation 
in the Congo, 

'■Believing that it is essential that all assessments 
for these AceouHts be paid as soon as possible, 

"1. Appeals to Member States which continue to be 
in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions 
for pa.vnient to the United Nations Emergency Force 
Special Account and the ad hoc Account for the United 
Nations Operation in the Congo to pay their arrears, 
disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective 
constitutional and financial arrangements can be proc- 
essed, and, pending such arrangements, to make an 
announcement of their intention to do so : 

"2. Expresses its conviction that Member States 
which are in arrears and object on political and juridi- 
cal grounds to paying their assessments on these ac- 
counts nevertheless will, without prejudice to their 
respective positions, make a special effort towards 
solving the financial difficulties of the United Nations 
by making these payments;" 

Despite the overwhelming support for the legal con- 
clusion of the International Court of Justice that UNEF 
and ONUC expenses are legally binding obligations, 
and for the political conclusion that these expenses 
should be paid, regardless of legal dissent, to keep the 
UN solvent, the United Nations is still faced with re- 
fusals by certain States to pay their shares of these 

F. Article 19 

November 10 is the opening of the General Assembly, 
and November 10 presents the inevitable and inescap- 
able issue of Article 19 unless requisite payments are 
made before that opening. Article 19 reads as follows : 

"A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears 
in the payment of its financial contributions to the 
Organization shall have no vote in tlie General Assem- 
bly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the 
amount of the contributions due from it for the preced- 
ing two full years. The General Assembly may, 
nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is 
satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions 
beyond the control of the Member." 

The first sentence of Article 19 says in simple and 
clear terms that a Member subject to its provisions 
shall have no vote in the General Assembly. It does 
not say that the General Assembly has any discretion 
with respect to such a Member ; it does not say that the 
General Assembly shall vote as to whether the delin- 
quent shall have no vote ; it simply says that the delin- 
quent shall have no vote. The first sentence of Article 
19 in the French text is even more emphatic : it says 
the delinquent Member cannot vote — "ne peut partici- 
per au vote". 

The second sentence of Article 19 does provide for 
a vote ; a delinquent Member whose failure to pay is 
due to conditions beyond its control map be permitted 
by the General Assembly to vote. But there is no dis- 
cretion as to a delinquent Member whose failure to pay 

is not due to conditions beyond its control, no discre- 
tion as to a Member which refuses to pay. 

The United States hopes that those Members about 
to be confronted by Article 19 will take the action nec- 
essary to avoid the confrontation. 

The way to avoid the confrontation is for those sub- 
ject to the terms of Article 19 to make the necessary 

The United States does not seek the confrontation^ 
but if on November 10 the plain and explicit terms of 
Article 19 do become applicable, there is no alternative 
to its application. 

It is not only that Article 19 means what it says — 
that the Member shall have no vote — it is that failure 
to apply the Article would be a violation of the Charter 
which would have far-reaching consequences. 

Failure to apply the Article would break faith with 
the overwhelming majority of Members who are paying 
their peacekeeping assessments — often at great sacri- 
fice — as obligations binding under the Charter. 

Failure to apply the Article would be a repudiation 
of the International Court of Justice and of that rule 
of international law whose continued growth is vital 
for progress toward peace and disarmament. 

Failure to apply the Article would mean the discard- 
ing of the only sanction which the United Nations has 
in support of its capacity to collect what its Members 
owe it. 

Failure to apply the Article would undermine the 
only mandatory power the General Assembly has — the 
power under Article 17 to assess the expenses of the 
Organization on the Members. 

Failure to apply the Article would tempt Members 
to pick and choose, with impunity, from among their 
obligations to the United Nations, refusing to pay for 
items they dislike even though those items were 
authorized by the overwhelming vote of the Members. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union has already said that it will 
not pay for certain items in the regular budgets. How 
could any organization function on such a fiscal 

Failure to apply the Article to a great power simply 
because it is a great power would undermine the 
constitutional integrity of the United Nations, and 
could .sharply affect the attitude toward the Organiza- 
tion of those who have always been its strongest 

Failure to apply the Article could seriou.sly jeop- 
ardize the support of United Nations operations and 
programs, not only for the keeping of the peace but for 
economic and social development. 

The consequences of not applying Article 19 would 
thus be far worse than any conjectured consequences 
of applying it. 

We believe that it is the desire of most Members of 
the United Nations that the situation not arise which 
makes Article 19 applicable, and therefore we believe 
that it is up to the Membership to see to it that the 
confrontation is avoided through the means available 
under the Charter for avoiding it — the making of the 
necessary payments. 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


G. The Fundamental Issue 

The United Nations' financial crisis is not an ad- 
versary issue between individual Members ; it is an 
issue between those who refuse to pay and the Orga- 
nization itself, the Organization as a whole. It is an 
issue which involves the future capacity of the United 
Nations as an effective institution. If the United 
Nations cannot collect what is due from its Members, 
it cannot pay what it owes; if it cannot collect what 
is due from its Members, it will have no means of 
effectively carrying on its peacekeeping functions and 
its economic and social programs will be jeopardized. 

The issue is one which vitally affects all Members 
of the United Nations. 

The United Nations is of particular importance to 
its developing Members. It is not only a free and 
open forum where all can defend what they think 
and urge what they want, it is an institution which, 
in response to the interests of all — both large and 
small — can act. But it cannot act unless it has the 
funds to support its acts. And if it cannot get from 
its Members the funds to support its acts, all would 
be the losers. So it is to all countries that the United 
Nations must look for a solution. 

It has sometimes been said that somehow the 
United States should work out with the Soviet Union 
a compromise on some of the fundamental issues. 

Could the United States — or should it — agree that 
Member States which are not members of the Security 
Council should have nothing at all to say about peace- 
keeping, even in cases in which the Security Council 
cannot act? And nothing to say about peacekeeping 
expenses or their assessment? 

Could the United States — or should it — agree that 
Article 19, despite its plain terms, should not be ap- 
plied against a great power in support of General 
Assembly assessments, simply because it is a great 

The United States does not see how, without violat- 
ing the Charter, anyone could or should agree to any 
of these propositions. 

H. United States Efforts to Find Solutions 

The sincere and earnest desire of the United States 
to find a way out of the United Nations' financial 
crisis, and to avoid confrontation under Article 19, 
is evidenced by the repeated attempts it has made to 
reach common ground. 

On March G of this year the United States proposed 
to the Soviet Delegation certain Ideas as to the 
Initiation, conduct and financing of future peacekeep- 
ing operations which it was hoped — without sacrificing 
the rights of the General Assembly — would emphasize 
the primary role of the Security Council in peace- 
keeping and the desirability of according full weight 
to the views and positions of the Termanent Members 
of the Security Council and other major contributors 
to peacekeeping expenses. The United States hope 
was that agreement as to future peacekeeping opera- 

tions would facilitate the solution of the present 

However, despite frequent Inquiries as to when a 
reply to the United States suggestions could be ex- 
pected, four months went by without any answer. 
Then in early July, the Soviet Union circulated a 
memorandum, dated July 10, 1964 (Doc. S/5811), 
which merely repeated the familiar Soviet thesis that 
only the Security Council has any rights under the 
Charter with respect to peacekeeping operations, and 
that the General Assembly and the Secretary General 
have none. There was no mention of the arrears 
problem or of any of the ideas the United States had 
suggested for discussion. 

On receipt of that memorandum, and later, the 
United States Delegation again endeavored to enter 
into a discussion with the Soviet Delegation as to the 
United States suggestions. Unfortunately the unvary- 
ing answer was that the uncompromising Soviet memo- 
randum of July 10 was the only reply to be expected. 

This sincere effort to enter into a dialogue with the 
Soviet Delegation was in the hope that adjustments as 
to the arrangements for the initiation and financing of 
future peacekeeping operations could make it easier 
to reach some solution as to the present and the past. 
Unfortunately, there has been no Soviet willingness to 
enter into that dialogue. 

It is common knowledge that representatives of other 
Member States also have sought to initiate discussions 
with the Soviet Union on this subject and also have 
been met with a reiteration of past Soviet contentions. 

Nonetheless, the United States has not given up hope, 
and it intends to continue its attempts to work out 
new arrangements in the hope that solutions for the 
future may make it easier for those in arrears on 
UNEP and ONUC assessments to clear up in some 
manner these past arrears. The United States Intends 
to continue its efforts in the Working Group of 21, 
now meeting under the chairmanship of Chief Adebo 
of Nigeria, and the United States hopes that all other 
Members of the Group will join in this attempt. 

Accordingly, the United States has tabled in the 
Working Group, as a basis for discussion, a Working 
Paper ' which sets forth examples of the kinds of new 
arrangements it has in mind as to peacekeeping opera- 
tions involving the use of military forces. The follow- 
ing elements were mentioned : 

"1. All proposals to initiate such peacekeeping op- 
erations would be considered first in the Security Coun- 
cil. The General Assembly would not authorize or 
assume control of such peacekeeping operations unless 
the Council had demonstrated that it was unable to 
take action. [Tliis would be a self-denying ordinance 
on the part of the General Assembly, emphasizing the 
primary role of the Security Council.] 

"2. The General Assembly would establish a stand- 
ing special finance committee. The composition of this 

* U.N. doc. A/AC.113/30 ; for text, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 5, 19G4, p. 4S8. 



committee should be similar to that of the present 
Working Group of Twenty-One .... [The Commit- 
tee membership would include the Permanent Members 
of the Security Council, who would thus have a posi- 
tion more commensurate with their responsibilities 
than in the General Assembly.] 

"3. In apportioning expenses for such peacekeeping 
operations, the General Assembly would act only on a 
recommendation from the committee passed by a two- 
thirds majority of the committee's membership. [The 
Permanent Members of the Security Council would 
have an influence greater than in the Assembly, but no 
single Member could frustrate, by a veto, action de- 
sired by the overwhelming majority.] 

"4. In making recommendations, the committee 
would consider various alternative methods of financ- 
ing, including direct financing by countries involved in 
a dispute, voluntary contributions, and assessed con- 
tributions. In the event that the Assembly did not 
accept a particular recommendation, the committee 
would resume consideration of the matter with a view 
to recommending an acceptable alternative. 

"5. One of the available methods of assessment for 
peacekeeping operations involving the use of military 
forces would be a special scale of assessments in which, 
over a specified amount. States having greater ability 
to pay would be allocated higher percentages, and 
States having less ability to pay would be allocated 
smaller percentages than in the regular scale of as- 
sessments." (Doc. A/AC.113/30, 14 September 1964). 

The United States hopes that such ideas may lead to 
a measure of agreement among Members of the United 
Nations as to how these operations are to be started 
and paid for in the future. Arrangements of this kind 
should go a long way toward giving the Soviet Union 
and others in a similar position such assurances for 
the future as .should make it easier for them to make 
their payments relating to the past. 

I. What Other States Have Done 

It is recognized that the Soviet Union and certain 
other States in arrears for UNEF and ONUC have 
strongly-held views against paying these arrears. 
However, the example of what other States have done 
when in a similar position indicates that loyalty to the 
Organization, respect for the International Court of 
Justice and the rule of law, and consideration for the 
overwhelming views of Members, should be overriding. 

On this point, the following was said by Ambassador 
Piero Vinci, the Permanent Representative of Italy to 
the United Nations, in the Working Group of 21 on 
September 23. 1964 : 

"But we feel that the correct line is the one that the 
Latin American countries have chosen to follow, al- 
though they did not consider the International Court's 
ruling consistent with the views they had been up- 
holding. The working paper submitted by the Delega- 
tions of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and circulated 
as document A/AC.113/3 reads as follows: '. . . 

also because they wish to maintain the prestige of the 
Court, whose objectivity in considering the matters 
submitted to it is one of the most solid guarantees of 
the maintenance of international peace and .security, 
the Latin American countries accepted the advisory 
opinion'. In keeping with this well inspired and wise 
policy, the distinguished Representative of Mexico in- 
formed us, on Thursday, September 17th, that his Gov- 
ernment had decided of its own free will — if I under- 
stood correctly — by a sovereign act which does not 
affect its position of principle, to pay its arrears. We 
have here an example and an implicit suggestion that, 
I believe, should be carefully weighed and even more 
usefully followed by whomever might still have reser- 
vations on the subject." 

In 1954 the United States itself faced a somewhat 
similar predicament in connection with an issue on 
which it had very strong convictions. This was a 
matter involving awards made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal to certain former oflScials of 
the United Nations Secretariat. The United States and 
a number of other countries objected strongly on legal 
grounds to the payment of such awards by the Gen- 
eral Assembly. To settle the matter, the General As- 
sembly decided to seek an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice. The United States 
vigorously argued its position before the Court. Never- 
theless, the Court handed down an advisory opinion 
contrary to that sought by the United States. 

Despite its strongly -held views on the issue, the 
United States voted with the majority to act in accord- 
ance with the opinion of the International Court of 
Justice. It was not easy for the United States to 
accept the majority view as to the issue, but it saw no 
real alternative if the rule of law and the Charter, 
as interpreted by the Court, were to be maintained. 

The case illustrates the fact that all Members, large 
or small, can be called upon and can be expected to 
comply with an authoritative legal opinion and the 
clearly demonstrated will of the General Assembly that 
they should make payments as to which they may 
have the strongest legal and political reservations. 

In insisting that Member States, including great 
powers, follow the examples cited and find some way 
to make the necessary payments, all must be prepared 
to be flexible with regard to the modalities of pay- 
ment. The only vitally essential ingredient in any 
solution is that the funds be made available to the 
United Nations. Most Member States are undoubtedly 
prepared to be flexible in approach to such a solution, 
are inclined to be considerate of the interests and 
prestige of States which have thus far found difficulty 
in payment, and are ready to negotiate on any reason- 
able basis consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the United Nations Charter and Financial Regulations. 

J. Conclusion 

The United Nations is faced with a financial and 
constitutional crisis which must be solved if the Or- 

NOVEMBER 9, 1964 


ganization is to continue as an effective instrument. 
Tlie Charter cannot be ignored. Faith cannot be 
brol^en. Commitments must be met. Bills must be 

The problem is one which is of crucial importance to 
all Members, and a solution can be found only if all 
Members work together in a search for common 

The issue is one between (a) the countries that 
have brought on the crisis by their refusals to pay and 
(b) the other Members of the Organization. It is now 
the task of all those other Members to get the help of 
those who have thus far refused to pay in solving the 
crisis that faces the entire Organization. 

This memorandum has dealt, among other things, 
with Article 19 and its applicability. The consequence 
of not applying it, if it becomes applicable, would be to 
undermine the very integrity and capacity of the UN. 
Let all Members cooperate in finding that common 
ground which would make possible the receipt by the 
United Nations of the funds which would make Article 
19 inapplicable and which would enable the Organiza- 
tion, thus strengthened, to look forward to continued 
effective usefulness and Man's best hope for a peaceful 


Current Actions 



Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49(e), and 61 of the 
convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1.591 ) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization shall 
be held not less than once in 3 years instead of an- 
nually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered 
into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756. 
Ratifications deposited: Chad, August 28, 1964; 
France, September 21, 1964 ; Kenya, May 31, 1964 ; 
Somalia, September 30, 1964. 

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on 
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase 
membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at 
Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 
1962. TIAS 5170. 

Ratifications deposited: Chad, August 28, 1964; 
Kenya, May 31, 1964 ; Somalia, September 30, 1964. 

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on inter- 
national civil aviation (to increase number of par- 

ties which may request holding an extraordinary 
meeting of the Assembly). Adopted at Rome Sep- 
tember 15, 1962.' 

Ratifications deposited: Au.stria, May 12, 1964 ; Chad, 
August 28, 1964 ; Cuba, June 15, 1964 ; Czechoslo- 
vakia, June 8, 1964 ; Federal Republic of Germany, 
July 27, 1964 ; Jamaica, September 28, 1964 ; Kenya, 
July 22, 1964 ; Netherlands, August 26, 1964 ; New 
Zealand, August 24, 1904 ; Somalia, September 30, 
1964 ; Syrian Arab Republic, May 14, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened 
for signature at the United Nations December 10, 

Ratification deposited: Denmark (with a reserva- 
tion), September 8, 1964. 
Accession deposited: Norway (with a reservation), 

September 10, 1964. 
Enters into force: December 9, 1964." 

Nortli Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Information 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. 
Done at Paris June 18, 1964.' 

Notification received that it is willing to be bound by 
terms of the agreement: Norway, October 20, 1964. 


Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
embodying results of 1960-61 tariff conference. Done 
at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the 
United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253. 
Signature: Nigeria, August 4, 1964. 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of April 5, 1963 (TIAS 5356). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Quito October 6, 1964. 
Entered into force October 6, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709) , with exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi 
September 30, 1964. Entered into force September 
30, 1964. 


Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 
6 and 12, 1960 (TIAS 4571), so as to provide for 
additional investment guaranties authorized by new 
U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Monrovia September 26 and 29, 1964. Entered into 
force September 29, 1964. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Nouakchott May 4 and July 
3. 1964. Entered into force July 3, 1964. 

' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 



INDEX November 9 ^1964. Vol.LI,No.i32i 


President Sends Food for Peace Report to Con- 
gress 67S 

President Signs Bill Extending Food for Peace 

Program 677 

Atomic Energy. Secretary Rusk Discusses World 

Developments on "Issues and Answers" . . . 654 

China. Secretary Rusk Discusses World Devel- 
opments on "Issues and Answers" .... 654 

Claims. President Signs Cuban Claims Bill ; 
Asks ."^tudy of Vesting Provision (Johnson) . 674 


President Reports on Operation of Foreign As- 
sistance Program (text of message) .... 675 

President Sends Food for Peace Report to Con- 
gress 678 

President Signs Bill Extending Food for Peace 

Program 677 

President Signs Cuban Claims Bill ; Asks Study 

of Vesting Provision (Johnson) 674 

Cuba. President Signs Cuban Claims Bill ; Asks 

Study of Vesting Provision (Johnson) . . . 674 

Department and Foreign Service 

FSI To Offer Course on "Science, Technology, 
and Foreign Affairs" 674 

USIA Foreign Service Officers To Become Part 
of FSO Corps (Johnson) 663 

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk Discusses World 

Developments on "Issues and Answers" . . 654 

Economic Affairs 

Money Flows and Balance-of-Payments Adjust- 
ment (Roosa) 669 

Some Lessons of Economic Development Since 
the War (Rostow) 664 

Toward the Brotherhood of Man (Rusk) . . . 650 

Foreign Aid 

President Reports on Operation of Foreign As- 
sistance Program (text of message) . . . 675 

President Sends Food for Peace Report to Con- 
gress 678 

President Signs Bill Extending Food for Peace 

Program 677 

Toward the Brotherhood of Man (Rusk) . . 650 

Malawi. Security Council Recommends Malawi 

for U.N. Membership (Yost) 680 

Military Affairs. Mixed-Manned Demonstration 
Ship Visits Washington (McDonald, Nitze, 
Rusk) 660 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Mixed-Manned Demonstration Ship Visits Wash- 
ington (McDonald, Nitze, Rusk) 660 

President Johnson Exchanges Letters With 

NATO Secretary General Brosio 673 

Presidential Documents 

President Johnson Exchanges Letters With 

NATO Secretary General Brosio 673 

President Meets With Cabinet; Reviews World 

Situation 653 

President Meets With Consultants on Foreign 

Affairs 663 

President Reports on Operation of Foreign As- 
sistance Program 675 

President Signs Bill Extending Food for Peace 

Program 677 

President Signs Cuban Claims Bill ; Asks Study 

of Vesting Provision 674 

USIA Foreign Service Officers To Become Part 

of FSO Corps 663 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 691 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk Discusses World De- 
velopments on "Issues and Answers" . . . 654 

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk Discusses 
World Developments on "Issues and An- 
swers" 654 

United Nations 

Secretary Rusk Discusses World Developments 

on "Issues and Answers" 654 

Security Council Recommends Malawi for U.N. 

Membership (Yost) 680 

United States Submits Memorandum on U.N. 

Financial Crisis 681 

Name Index 

Brosio, Manlio 673 

Johnson, President . . 653, 663, 673, 674, 675, 677 

Langton, Baden 654 

McDonald, David L 660 

Nitze, Paul H 660 

Roosa, Robert V 669 

Rostow, W. W 664 

Rusk, Secretary 650, 654, 660 

Scali, John 654 

Stevenson, Adlai E 681 

Yost, Charles W QSO 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: October 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce 

of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 


Release issued prior to October 19 which ap- 1 

pears in this 

issue of the Bulletin is No. 438 of 

October 7. 

No. Date 


457 10/19 

Rusk: "Toward the Brotherhood 

of Man." 

*4.58 10/19 

Blair House Fine Arts Committee 


♦459 10/19 

U.S. participation in international 


400 10/20 

Rusk: visit of U.S.S. Claude V. 


•461 10/20 

Rusk : death of Herbert Hoover. 

*462 10/21 

Morgan: "United We Stand — 

Training for Effective Action in 

the U.N.'s Third Decade" 


t463 10/21 

G. Griffith Johnson : "Progress and 

Prospects in International Eco- 

nomic Cooperation." 

*464 10/22 

Cultural exchange. 

t465 10/22 

Duke: Yale Club of Washington. 

*466 10/22 

Cleveland: "The Spirit We Are 

Talbot: "Some Reflections on the 

t467 10/23 

United States in the United 


t408 10/23 

Ball : "The United Nations Today." 

469 10/23 

FSI seminar on science, technol- 

ogy, and foreign affairs. 

*470 10/23 

Cultural exchange (Eastern Eu- 

rope, Near East). 


*Not print 

tHeld for 

a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, D.C.. 20402 




U.S. Participation in tlie UN 

Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963 

This is the 18th annual report, covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies for the year 1963. 

In his letter of transmittal, President Johnson reaflirms U.S. support of the United Nations as "the 
best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of niankind." 
Further, he calls the 18th General Assembly "a faithful mirror of political reality" as "it dealt in an 
intensely practical way with current human events." 

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation 
therein are fully described in this 433-page volume. The appendixes contain U.N. charts and other 
organizational information, as well as information on U.N. publications and documentation. 

PUBLICATION 7675 $1.25 


PUBLICATION 7675 $1.25 


WASHINGTON, D.a 20402 

Please send me copies of U.S. Participation in the UN — Report by the 

President of the Congress for the Tear 196S. 


Enclosed Und $. __ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 


able to Supt. of Documents) 

cm, STATE 







Vol. LI, No. 1325 


by Under Secretary Ball 691^. 


hy Assistant Secretary Talbot 700 


by Assistant Secretary Johnson 708 

by Ambassador George G. McGhee 716 

For index see inside back cover 

The United Nations Today 

by Under Secretary Ball ^ 

It is sometimes regarded as fashionable — or 
at least good politics— to deplore the United 
Nations as it operates today and to advocate a 
return to the purposes for which it was orig- 
inally conceived. Those who yearn in this nos- 
talgic manner for an earlier time betray, it 
seems to me, an ignorance of history. For they 
overlook the one relevant fact — that the United 
Nations was never able to function as its found- 
ers had originally intended. 

The Charter of the United Nations, like other 
great organic documents, was the product of a 
time of troubles. It was drafted toward the 
end of the greatest war in histoi-y. It was 
intended as an instrument for preserving the 
peace and preventing another war. It con- 
templated an arrangement by which the great 
powers, allied in World War II, could live 
in harmony and, in common agreement, police 
the postwar world. 

' Address made at an annual United Nations dinner 
sponsored by the Mayor's Committee of Greater Kansas 
City, at Kansas City, Mo., on Oct. 24 (press release 
468 dated Oct. 23). 

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion 
"one world" with one treaty hardly lasted 
through the first General Assembly in 1946. 
For it soon became apparent that the Soviet 
Union had joined the United Nations in name 
only. It had no intention of making common 
cause with the West in the interests of a better 
world. Instead, it slammed down an Iron Cur- 
tain to form a cage around one-third of the 
world's people — the whole population of a great 
landmass that stretches from Stettin to the Yel- 
low Sea. 

The United Nations was thus frustrated in 
its original objective of serving as a forum 
for reconciling differences among the great 
powers and for enforcing their agreements on 
the rest of the world. It was frustrated for 
one reason only — that the ambitions of one 
great power denied the basic tenets of the 

This has not, however, destroyed the U.N.'s 
usefiilness — indeed, its indispensability. For, 
fortunately, the United Nations Charter — like 
our own Constitution — proved capable of serv^- 


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ing the changing requirements of an evolving 
world. Deflected from its original purpose, it 
still made possible quite different, yet enor- 
mously effective, endeavors, and it is these en- 
deavors that I shall try to describe in the few 
minutes that we have together tliis evening. 

The Story of the Past 19 Years 

The storj' of the past 19 years — that brief 
moment of time since the United Nations Char- 
ter was signed — is highly concentrated history. 
It is the storj' of vast shifts and realinements 
in power arrangements throughout the world. 
If in this period one-third of the world's popu- 
lation has been encircled by the Iron Curtain, 
in this same short jDeriod another one-third has 
made the eventful passage from colonial status 
to some form of national independence. Today 
the 50th new nation [Zambia] became inde- 
pendent; others are actively in the making. 

Such a revolutionary movement on a world- 
wide scale has no precedent. The great changes 
of the past have taken place only over cen- 
turies; the postwar anticolonial revolution has 
been compressed in two short decades. The 
United Nations has in effect been the overseer 
of the process — and the task has not been an easy 

The breakup of the European empires meant 
the collapse of a longstanding system of world 
order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties, 
the sudden emergence of new states, the sudden 
liberation of a billion people from colonial de- 
pendence. The world has never known a com- 
parable political convulsion — so abruptly be- 
gun, so quickly concluded. 

Even under the best of circumstances one 
could well have expected this to be a period of 
violent conflict, chaos, and vast bloodletting. 
But the collapse of the European empires did 
not take place in the best of circumstances — 
quite the contrary. It took place in a world 
polarized between the great powers of East and 
West — where the Sino-Soviet bloc sought to 
promote its interests by the vigorous promotion 
of chaos. 

The Communists tried hard to exploit the tur- 
moil implicit in rapid change. They sought fo 
capture and divert nationalist revolutions into 
Communist revolutions. They did their best to 

turn political instability into political collapse, 
to rub salt into the wounds of racial antago- 
nisms, to fan jealousies between the poor and the 
rich, to exploit the inexperience of the new gov- 
ernments, to capitalize on economic misery, and 
to heighten tensions between new states and 
their neighbors wherever they existed. 

But they failed. Fifty nations have been 
born since the Second World War, and not one 
of them has chosen communism as a way of life 
or a system of government. The Eussians tried 
to subvert most of these nations, and they failed. 

The Chinese Communists are now busy in a 
couple of dozen of them, and they will fail too. 
Leaders of the anticolonial revolutions are 
sometimes frightened by Communist power ; but 
in the long run most of them have proved 
resistant to Communist teclmiques and resentful 
of efforts to make them once again dependencies 
of a powerful metropolitan nation. 

Membership in the United Nations has power- 
fully aided the new countries to resist domina- 
tion from whatever outside source. It has pro- 
vided them with both a sanctuary and a means 
of expression. Within the framework of the 
charter small comitries can band together for 
mutual encouragement and protection — and 
they have a ready forum for public complaint if 
they are picked on by powerful neighbors. A 
good deal of loud talk results, and not all of it is 
in polished language or even in good taste. But 
rash talk inside the United Nations is better 
than rash action outside the United Nations. 
And I am reminded at this political season that 
our domestic politics are not so free of invective 
that we should be unduly sanctimonious about 
harsh polemics at the international level. We 
should not, in other words, be put off by the fact 
that representatives of the new nations are 
sometimes given to irrelevant talk. Neither we 
nor they should permit it to obscure the relevant 
business that every new state has to tackle as it 
enters the age of engineering and economics. 

In fact, instead of being irked by the occa- 
sional exuberance of some of the representatives 
of new nations in the General Assembly, we 
should be eternally grateful to the U.N. that the 
complex business of transforming half a hun- 
dred new states from dependence to sovereignty 
has, for the most part, been accompanied by 
speeches rather than by shooting. This is, I 

NOVEMBER 16, 1964 


think, one of the strikmg achievements of our 

U.N. a School of Political Responsibility 

In trying to understand the actions of the new 
nations we should realize that in their eyes the 
U.N. has a very special meaning. The immedi- 
ate and natural ambition of every new nation is 
to establish its national identity. Membership 
in the United Nations has served this purpose; 
it has become the badge of independence, the 
credentials of sovereignty, the symbol of nation- 
hood, and the passport to the 20th century. 
Wlien the delegation of a new nation takes its 
place in the grand hall of the General Assembly, 
that nation has arrived ; it can look the world in 
the eye and speak its piece. And even if that 
piece may be discordant to our ears, the fact that 
it can be spoken has helped to stabilize the post- 
war world. 

Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting 
oif steam ; it is also a school of political responsi- 
bility. While some of its members may repre- 
sent closed societies, it is itself an open society. 
The General Assembly is staged for all the 
world to see, and performing upon that stage 
sometimes — though not perhaps often enough — 
helps turn demagogs into statesmen. 

The growing sense of responsibility in the 
new nations is only partly the result of fuiding 
themselves on stage before a critical world. It 
stems also from the growing conviction that the 
business of economic and social development in 
their own countries is tough and demanding. 
They find the problems of food and health, edu- 
cation and tecluiology, enterprise and adminis- 
tration, will not yield to repetitive slogans car- 
ried over from the fight for independence. And 
they discover, too, the need to develop a new 
relationship with the Europeans and with the 
North Americans. 

The framework of the United Nations pro- 
vides a basis for such a new relationship — a po- 
litical system in which the less developed nations 
can have a full sense of participation, a sys- 
tem that makes possible a family of technical 
organizations whose international staffs can 
help conceive and carry out the development 
plans every people now expects a government 
to pursue with vigor. 

Peacekeeping Capacity of the U.N. 

In the vast mutation that has almost dou- 
bled the number of nations in the world, the 
interests of the great powers have been at all 
times deeply involved. In every political 
change, in every part of the world, one ques- 
tion lurks nearby : ^^^lat big power will gain — 
or lose — what advantage ? In the global rivalry 
the United States and its closest allies have had 
an enormous edge on the Communists: We 
really want other countries to be independent 
and people to be free, while the world of Com- 
munist ideology leaves room only for satellites 
and adversaries. 

But because of this fundamental struggle be- 
tween global powers, the world has lived in 
constant danger that a jungle war in Southeast 
Asia, a tribal conflict in the heart of Africa, or 
an ancient gi-udge fight in the Middle East 
could lead to a global confrontation — and that 
what began as a brush fire could be fanned into 
nuclear war. Yet in 19 years the confrontation 
of the armed forces of the great powers has 
been everywhere averted, save only in Korea. 
And so another major role of the United 
Nations can be stated as a paradox: Unable 
to hold the great powers together, it has played 
a decisive role in keeping them apart. It has