Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats



cKo_±3353. IA30 


Given By 






Vol. LI/, No. isse 

January 4, 1966 


B^ Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Communique 2 


Statement by President Johnson 5 

Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 15 


by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 7 

For index jif^O^<^^b<ick cover 

North Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Meeting at Paris 

The North Atlantic Council held its regular 
ministerial meeting at Paris December 15-17. 
Following are texts of a statement made iy 
Secretary Rush upon his arrival at Paris on 
December 13 and a communique issued on De- 
cember 17, together with a list of the members 
of the U.S. delegation. 


It's always a pleasure to be in Paris. 

The meeting of the NATO ministers, which 
will begin next Tuesday, is the 34th such meet- 
ing which has occurred since the beginning of 
NATO 15 years ago. We expect this to be, as 
usual, an important opportunity to talk about 
our common interests in the light of the chang- 
ing world situation. 

Some of you gentlemen in the press write 
from time to time about what is called the dis- 
array in NATO. But let me point out that the 
very success of NATO, in meeting its primary 
purpose, has apparently afforded us the luxury 

of being able to differ about secondary matters. 

As far as the United States is concerned, our 
recent election confirms that we shall continue 
on a steady bipartisan course which we have 
followed since World War II. And that means 
full commitment to the security of the NATO 
area and full insistence upon the rights and the 
obligations which become ours as the result of 
World War II. 

It's a very great pleasure to be here. 


Press release 523 dated December 18, revised 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Min- 
isterial Session in Paris on December 15, 16 and 
17, 1964. 

2. The Ministers surveyed the whole field of 
East- West relations. The basic causes of ten- 
sion still persist, and will persist as long as it 
remains the aim of the Communist countries to 
extend their system to the whole world. The 
Ministers noted that recent developments in 
China and the Soviet Union have increased the 
uncertainties with which the world is faced. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Issued by the OfBce 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
foreign relations and on the worli of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International afTairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbicb : 52 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 


They reiterated their conviction that it re- 
mained essential for the Alliance to maintain 
and strenprtlien its unity. 

3. The Ministers also reviewed the situation 
in various areas in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer- 
ica. They reaffirmed their interest in the sta- 
bility of these areas and in the economic and 
social welfare of the peoples concerned. 

4. In their discussions on the st-at© and future 
progress of the Alliance, the Ministers em- 
phasized the importance of strengthening and 
deepening their political consultation. Eecog- 
nizing the challenges that may face the orga- 
nization in the years ahead, they directed the 
Council in permanent session to study the state 
of the Alliance and the purposes and objectives 
commonly accepted by all members, and to keep 
the Ministers informed. 

0. The Ministers reaffirmed their determina- 
tion to continue their efforts to find a peaceful 
solution to the questions at icsue between East 
and "West. In particular, they continue to at- 
tach great importance to making progress to- 
wards meeting the legitimate aspirations of the 
German people to reunification on the basis of 
their right to self-determination. In regard to 
Berlin, the ilinisters confirmed the terms of 
their declaration of 16th December 1958.^ 

6. The Ministers expressed their conviction 
that the unity and military preparedness of the 
Alliance had safeguarded peace and preserved 
the freedom of the "West in the past. So long as 
general and complete disarmament under effec- 
tive international control has not been achieved, 
any weakening of the Allied defensive posture 
would expose the Alliance to increased pres- 
sures. The Ministers therefore stressed the im- 
portance of maintaining the cohesion of the 
member states in the strategic as well as the 
political field. Only a military structure de- 
monstrably capable of swift and vigorous reac- 
tion to any aggression can meet the threat. To 
maintain such a structure, involving as it does 
a continuous adaptation to changing require- 
ments, necessitates a persistent effort to improve 
the readiness, state of training, and equipment 
of the forces of the Alliance. It further re- 
quires a sound economic basis for the defense 

effort and the most rational use of available 

7. The Ministers also confirmed their deter- 
mination to continue their efforts to arrive at 
agreements in the field of disarmament. In this 
connection, they stressed the importance of 
avoiding the dissemination of nuclear weapons. 

8. The Ministers examined the problems con- 
fronting the Alliance in the field of conven- 
tional and nuclear weapons. A thorough ex- 
change of views on these problems took place 
and will be continued. 

9. The Ministers took note of developments 
in the studies of the inter-related questions of 
strategy, force requirements and resources, ini- 
tiated in pursuance of the decisions taken at 
their meeting in Ottawa in May 1963.== They 
reaffirmed the significance they attached to these 
studies and instructed the Council in permanent 
session to continue them with the assistance of 
the NATO military authorities. 

10. The Ministers also considered the special 
military and economic problems of Greece and 
Turkey. They reaffirmed the need for acceler- 
ating the economic development of these two 
Allied countries, and for an effort to strengthen 
the defense of the Southeastern region of 
NATO. They instructed the Council in per- 
manent session to continue to examine these 
questions urgently. 

11. In the spirit of previous resolutions on 
defense aid to Greece in 1968 and 1964, the 
Ministers established a procedure aimed at con- 
tributing to the solution of the special defense 
problems of Greece and Turkey in 1965. 

12. With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, 
the Ministers heard a report by the Secretary 
General on the "watching brief" conferred on 
his predecessor at The Hague in May 1964.^ In 
an effort to improve these relations and in the 
interests of the solidarity of the Alliance, they 
agreed that this "watching brief" should con- 
tinue. They reaffirmed their determination to 
lose no opportunity of contributing to a reduc- 
tion in tension and a peaceful, agreed and equi- 
table solution of the problem of Cyprus, con- 
firming also their support for the efforts of the 
United Nations and the mediator. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4. 

■ Ibid., June 10. 1963. p. 895. 
• Ibid., June 1, 19C4, p. 852. 

JANUARY 4, 1065 

13. The Ministers considered a report on civil 
emergency planning. They reaffirmed the im- 
portance of such planning within the context of 
overall defense, noting the progress which had 
been achieved and the work which remained to 
be done. 

14. The next meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council at the Ministerial level will be held on 
the invitation of the United Kingdom Govern- 
ment in London in May 1965. 


The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 11 (press release 519) that the following 
would be the members of the U.S. delegation to 
the 34th ministerial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council at Paris December 15-17: 

United States Representatives 
Dean Rusk, chairman, Secretary of State 
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury 
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense 

United States Representative on the North Atlantic 


Thomas K. Finletter 


John W. Auchincloss, Deputy Director, Office of Politi- 
cal Affairs, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and European Regional Organizations, 

Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France 

Robert Carswell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
the Treasury 

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant to the Secretary of the 

Blbridge Durbrow, Deputy U.S. Representative on the 
North Atlantic Council 

Philip J. Farley, Director, Office of Political Affairs, 
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion and European Regional Organizations, Paris 

Brig. Gen. Jaroslav T. Folda, USA, Director, European 
Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs 

Robbins P. Gilman, Special Assistant to the Director, 
Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, De- 
partment of State 

James L. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs 

John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Repre- 
sentative, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and European Regional Organizations, 

Robert H. Kranich, Office of Atlantic Political and 
Military Affairs, Department of State 

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of State 

Edward S. Little, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

David H. McKillop, Director, Office of Western Euro- 
pean Affairs, Department of State 

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs 

David H. Popper, deputy coordinator. Director, Office 
of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State 

Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of De- 
fense for International Security Affairs 

J. Robert Schaetzel, coordinator. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs 

Gen. Dean C. Strother, USAF, U.S. Representative to 
the NATO Military Committee and Standing Group 

Charles A. Sullivan, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of the Treasury 

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs 

Prank D. Taylor, Office of German Affairs, Department 
of State 

Llewellyn B. Thompson, Ambassador at Large, Depart- 
ment of State 

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs 

George S. Vest, Office of Atlantic Political and Military 
Affairs, Department of State 

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Cblefs 
of Staff 

Secretary of Delegation 

John C. Fuess, Deputy Director, Office of International 
Conferences, Department of State 

Letters of Credence 

The following newly appointed ambassadors 
presented their credentials to President John- 
son on December 15 : 

Ricardo Arias Espinosa of Panama, 
Moussa Leo Keita of the Republic of Mali, 
Hyun Chul Kim of Korea, 
Gustavo Larrea Cordova of Ecuador, 
Othman Shariff of the United Republic of 


Hosea J. Soko of the Republic of Zambia, 


Tran Thien Khiem of Viet-Nam. 


U.S. Plans New Sea-Level Canal and New Treaty on Existing Canal 

Statement hy President Johnson ' 

This Government has completed an intensive 
review of policy toward the present and the 
future of the Panama Canal. On the basis of 
this review I have reached two decisions. 

First, I have decided that the United States 
should press forward with Panama and other 
interested governments in plans and prepara- 
tions for a sea-level canal in this area. 

Second, I have decided to propose to the Gov- 
ernment of Panama the negotiation of an en- 
tirely new treaty on the existing Panama Canal. 

These decisions reflect the unanimous judg- 
ment of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are 
based on the recommendations of Ambassador 
Robert Anderson, Secretary [of the Army] 
Stephen Ailes, Secretary Tliomas Mann [As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs], and our Ambassador in Panama, Am- 
bassador Jack Vaughn. They have the full sup- 
port of Mr. Truman and General Eisenhower. 
They have been reported to, and in most in- 
stances sympathetically received by, the leader- 
ship of the Congress. 

These two steps, I think, are needed now- 
needed for the protection and the promotion of 
peaceful trade — for the welfare of the hemi- 
sphere — in the true interests of the United 
States — and in fairness and justice to all. 

For 50 years the Panama Canal has carried 
ships of all nations in peaceful trade between 
the two great oceans — on terms of entire equality 
and at no profit to this country. The canal has 
also served the cause of peace and freedom in 

'Made on Dec. 18 (White Hoase press release; 
as-delivered text). 

two world wars. It has brought great economic 
contributions to Panama. For the rest of its 
life the canal will continue to serve trade, and 
peace, and the people of Panama. 

But that life is now limited. The canal is 
growing old, and so are the treaties for its man- 
agement, which go back to 1903. 

The Panama Canal, with its limiting locks 
and channels, will soon be inadequate to the 
needs of our world commerce. Already more 
than 300 ships built or building are too big to 
go through with full loads. Many of them — like 
our own modem aircraft carriers — cannot even 
go through at all. 

So I think it is time to plan in earnest for a 
sea-level canal. Such a canal will be more 
modern, more economical, and will be far easier 
to defend. It will be free of complex, costly, 
vulnerable locks and seaways. It will serve the 
future as the Panama Canal we know has served 
the past and the present. 

The Congress has already authorized $17 mil- 
lion for studies of possible sites and of the other 
practical problems of a sea-level canal. There 
seem to be four possible route? — two in 
Panama, one in Colombia, and one which goes 
through Nicaragua and possibly Costa Rica as 

I have asked the Secretary of State to begin 
discussions immediately with all the govern- 
ments concerned with these possible new routes. 
In these discussions we will be prepared to work 
on the terms and the conditions of building and 
operating a new canal, and if preliminary ar- 
rangements can be reached, we will be ready to 
go ahead with selected site surveys. 

Last January there was violence in Pana- 


ma.^ As I said then, ". . . violence is never 
justified and is never a basis for talks." * 

But while the people of the United States 
have never made concessions to force, they have 
always supported fair play and full respect for 
the rights of others. So from the very first day, 
as your President, I made it clear that we were 
ready to sit down and to seek answers, to reason 
together, and to try to find the answers that 
would be just, fair, and right, without precon- 
dition or without precommitment on either side. 

On that basis, relations between our two 
coimtries — negotiations — were resumed in 
April,* and on that basis I chose Mr. Robert 
Anderson, the distinguished former Secretary 
of the Treasury under President Eisenhower, to 
be my special ambassador on this problem. 
Since then Ambassador Anderson has been 
working with the American Ambassador, Mr. 
Vauglin, with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. 
Ailes, and with Secretary Mann of the State De- 
partment. They have recommended that we 
should propose a new treaty for the existing 
canal. After careful review with my senior 
advisers, I have accepted this recommendation. 

Today we have informed the Government of 
Panama that we are ready to negotiate a new 
treaty. In such a treaty we must retain the 
rights which are necessary for tlie effective op- 
eration and the protection of the canal and the 
administration of the areas that are necessary 
for these purposes. Such a treaty would re- 
place the treaty of 1903 and its amendments. It 
should recognize the sovereignty of Panama. 
It should provide for its own termination when 
a sea-level canal comes into operation. It should 
provide for effective discharge of our common 
responsibilities for hemispheric defense. Until 
a new agreement is reached, of course, the pres- 
ent treaties will remain in effect. 

In these new proposals we will take every 
possible step to deal fairly and helpfully with 
the citizens of both Panama and the United 
States who have served so faithfully through 
the years in operating and maintaining the 

These changes are necessary not because of 
failure but because of success; not because of 
baclrwardness but because of progress. The age 
before us is an age of larger, faster ships. It is 
an age of friendly partnership among the na- 
tions concerned with the traffic between the 
oceans. This new age requires new arrange- 

The strength of our American system is that 
we have always tried to understand and meet 
the needs of the future. We have been at our 
best when we have been both bold and prudent 
in moving forward. The planning of a new 
canal and the negotiation of a new treaty are 
just such bold and prudent steps. So let us to- 
day in friendship take them together. 

U.S.-Cambodian Talks End 
Without Agreement 

Department Statement ^ 

The United States-Cambodian talks which 
began in New Delhi on December 8 ^ ended today 
without agreement on major differences. Am- 
bassador Philip W. Bonsai, leader of the U.S. 
delegation, issued the following statement in 
New Delhi earlier today : 

"In view of the deterioration in Cambodian- 
United States relations, the United States pro- 
posed these talks with the primary object of 
leaving no stone unturned to ensure that the 
Royal Cambodian Government understood the 
position of the United States. This much has 
been accomplished. It was also our hope to find 
means to bring about an improvement in rela- 
tions between us. The Cambodian Government 
has put forward a number of proposals which 
will require considerable study by my Govern- 
ment. Accordingly, the U.S. delegation is re- 
turning to Washington to report." 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1964, p. 152. 
' Hid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 195. 
• lUd., Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655. 

' Read to news correspondents on Dec. 17 by Marshall 
Wright, Deputy Director of the Office of News. 

• For background, see Btilletin of Dee. 14, 1964, p. 


The Evolution of Rising Responsibility 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs ^ 

Somewhere in his "nritings Ralph Waldo 
Emerson advised young people to be very care- 
ful about what they really wanted for them- 
selves, as the}^ are more than likely to achieve it. 

As the U.N. stands on the threshold of a 20th 
birthday called International Cooperation 
Year, every member of the United Nations will 
do well to think hard about what kmd of U.N. 
we want, for that is what we are likely to 

The Year of International Cooperation opens 
at a moment of political drama and constitu- 
tional crisis. I do not propose to detain you 
with yet another description of the tangled and 
fascinating issue that has grown up around 
article 19 of the U.N. Charter.^ The issue is 
essentially whether the Assembly will hang on 
to its power to tax the membership for the costs 
of maintaining a peace which is in every mem- 
ber's interest. One way or another, I hope and 
believe this parliament of the world's peoples 
will defend the powers it has — as every parlia- 
mentary institution in the long history of free 
institutions has had to do from time to time to 
stay in business at all. 

But for the purposes of our discussion this 
afternoon, I would like to assume that the 
U.N.'s broad membership will work out a 
way to clear up its debts and start afresh. The 

' Address made before the United Nations Association 
of the United States of America at New York, N.Y., on 
Dec. 13 (U.S./U.N. press release 4480 dated Dec. 12). 

• For background on the question of U.N. financing, 
see Bulletin- of Nov. 9, 1964, p. 681; Dec. 7, 1964, 
p. S26 ; and Dec. 21, 1964, p. 891. 

19th General Assembly, now in a state of sus- 
pended animation and animated suspense, has 
much important work to do. The U.N. system 
as a whole has opportunities to serve mankind 
which are limited only by the capacity of its 
members to work together and keep on working 

Revolution of Rising Expectations 

We can see the danger to our working to- 
gether in many walls and barriers — walls of 
brick and steel, and walls of paper which limit 
the flow of people and goods for the benefit of 

And we can see danger most clearly these 
days in the loosening of civilized restraints on 
international behavior. 

The ugly book burnings in Europe a genera- 
tion ago are matched now by the burning of 
books as a political instrument.^ When respon- 
sible governments organize or permit mobs in 
their own streets to attack foreign embassies, 
we are witnessing not just the breakdown of 
diplomatic niceties but an uglier process in 
which racial and national passions break 
through the fragile crust of civilization itself. 

Almost 15 years ago, when I was working for 
Paul Hoffman in the Marshall Plan, I had to 
substitute for him in making a speech at Col- 
gate University. Remembering Edmund 
Burke's famous commentary on the turbulence 
of his time, I called this speech "Reflections on 

" For a statement of Dec. 9 by Secretary Rusk, see 
ibid., Dec. 28, 1964, p. 905. 

JANUARY 4, 1965 

the Kevolution of Rising Expectations." The 
phrase has since been attributed to nearly every 
literate American of our time, but I think this 
was the first time that phrase saw the light of 

In the decade and a half since then, the revo- 
lution of rising expectations has swept across 
the colonial world and doubled the count of 
national sovereignties. Men and women who 
15 years ago were students or revolutionaries, 
or both, are today in charge of their countries' 
governments — or have already given way to 
younger students and more effective revolu- 

The aspirations that have risen so fast were 
well described in the Charter of the United 
Nations as "better standards of life in larger 
freedom." How the passions of our time have 
been aroused by passionate versions of that 
sober and balanced phrase ! 

It is surely time, as Pope Paul said this week, 
to "raise a dike" against the passions of men, 
for they threaten to swallow up in passionate 
indignities the natural dignity of individual 
men and women on the perverted theory that 
individuals belong to the state, rather than vice 

Nationhood is heady stuff. Every nation, and 
every national leader, can be expected to over- 
indulge once in a while. But continued over- 
indulgence in nationalist emotion can lead to 
much senseless killing and to the death of com- 
mon sense itself. 

The question about our world, and the ques- 
tion about the U.N. in this International Co- 
operation Year, is this: Can we all graduate 
fast enough from the "revolution of rising ex- 
pectations" to the "evolution of rising respon- 

The need for a rising standard of responsibil- 
ity is most evident in the U.N., because the U.N. 
is a magnified mirror of the tensions and 
dilemmas of the world at large. I cannot even 
mention here all the divisions in our divided 
world. East and West, North and South, politi- 
cal and economic and philosophical too. But as 
we look ahead to the U.N.'s next 20 years, four 
kinds of issues stand out as most likely to 
threaten the peace — because they threaten to 
unstick the glue that holds the world commu- 
nity together. 

One of these issues is the proliferation of nu- 
clear weapons. Anotlier is the growing practice 
of unsolicited intervention by nations in each 
other's internal affairs. A third problem is how 
the international community does something ef- 
fective about internal human rights. And there 
is, finally, a constitutional question about the 
organization of the U.N. itself. 

Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

First, then, on the problem of nuclear 
weapons : 

The world is face to face now with a disturb- 
ing trauma. Advanced science has made the in- 
struments of murder and destruction so efficient 
that there is no alternative to peace. The nu- 
clear powers have learned, or are learning, that 
their inconceivable power could only be used in 
the presence of almost inconceivable prov- 

And now the prospect is that within the next 
few years half a dozen countries, or perhaps 
as many as 10 or 12, could readily develop their 
own nuclear weapons. They have the scientists, 
the industry, the imagination, and the will to 
do the job. 

Nobody thinks this would make any sense. 
But it could happen. And the reason that it 
could happen is that there is no agreed machin- 
ery for making it unnecessary. 

Ever since we offered to give our atomic 
weapons to the U.N. under the Baruch plan, 
the United States has been looking for an agreed 
way to prevent the spread of these weapons 
around the world. There has been a little 
progress — a ban on tests in the atmosphere, a 
U.N. resolution against putting bombs in orbit, 
a "hot line" to reduce the danger of war by ac- 
cident or miscalculation. We will keep on 
working at disarmament, which is always more 
important than it is discouraging. But mean- 
while something can surely be done to prevent 
a rapid decline in the prospects for any general 
disarmament at all. 

That something is to get agreement that no 
furtlier nations will develop their nuclear 
weapons capabilities. For in a world already 
oversupplied with destructive capacity, both the 
ease and the madness of further proliferation 
are evident to every person that studies the mat- 


ter with tliouglitful attention. 

That the Chinese Communists poured re- 
sources and talent into building a bomb is sad 
and, in the long run, is very dangerous. But the 
worst thine about the Chinese action is that it is 
contagious. Peiping's neighbors, and Peiping's 
adversaries in world politics, can hardly be ex- 
pected to watch another nuclear power develop 
nearby without thinking hard about what this 
means for their own security. The world com- 
munity must either stop the further growth of 
nuclear weaponry altogether — wliich is what we 
have been trying to do in the Geneva disarma- 
ment talks — or it must somehow give assur- 
ances to the nonnuclear countries against 
domination by those nations that can make and 
deliver wholesale destruction. 

The debate on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons will doubtless be used by many nations 
this year for their own purposes. But beyond 
the soimds of Assembly debate, there are the 
silent prayers of men and women who don't un- 
derstand very much about nuclear energy but 
know only that they do not want their homes 
destroyed, their children burned alive, and their 
hopes snuffed out by the miscalculated rivalries 
of their political leaders. Here, in truth, is a 
problem for all the world — and all the world 
had better start treating it with the urgency it 

The Ethics of Intervention 

For the moment, we are all precariously pro- 
tected from the largest war by the nuclear con- 
frontation called mutual deterrence. But the 
alternative to world war is unhappily not neces- 
sarily world peace. It can be a world full of 
small wars and near wars. 

Here we have made some real progi-ess in 
limiting the kinds of warfare that killed so 
many people and occupied so many citizens in 
times gone by. Nearly all nations have come 
to believe now that it is unfashionable to raise 
a flag, roll the drums, and march across an in- 
ternational frontier onto the territory of another 
nation. Looking back on the story of man from 
the beginning of things, the outlawing of 
formal, advertised aggression is no mean ac- 
complislmient. There are plenty of boundary 
disputes left in the world — i9 of them, if the 

State Department's researches are up to date. 
But there is a presumption against overt mili- 
tary operations in somebody else's country, and 
that is one up for the progress of civilization. 

But the very fact that formal invasions are 
imfashionable has led to a new practice: the 
more or less hidden intervention by nations in 
the internal politics of their neighbors. Most 
of the fighting and killing that goes on in Asia, 
ia Africa, and in Latin America can be traced 
to outside interventions designed to overthrow 
governments by violent means. 

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America nearly 
every country wants and needs the help of out- 
siders in acliieving those "better standards of 
life in larger freedom" which are the goal of 
their rising expectations and the promise of 
their political independence. So outsiders are 
bound to be involved to some extent in their 
international affairs. The question therefore 
is: Under what restraints will the outsiders 
operate on the inside ? 

Over the years, more through the practice of 
nations than teachings of scholars, we have de- 
veloped a rough-and-ready ethic to guide this 
widespread practice of mutual involvement. 

Where the legitimate government, the con- 
stituted authorities of a nation, asked for out- 
side help as a sovereign act, an expression of 
their own independence, then the involvement 
of outsiders is all right. But where outsiders 
come in, without the permission of the national 
government, to help dissident insiders in an 
internal struggle for power, that is not all right ; 
it is all wrong. 

It is not an easy line to draw. Tlie principle 
that outsiders should be invited, not crash the 
party, is far from an infallible guide to good 
conduct. Invitations can be forged, and the 
government officials who issue them can be 
bribed or seduced. But still, the principle of 
permission is the best ethic mankind has yet 
developed to prevent a reversion to imperialism 
and foreign domination. 

Tliis is, in a nutshell, the issue in the current 
Congo affairs. The hostages were removed by 
permission of the Congo's legitimate govern- 
ment. The Stanleyville rebels are being aided 
without any such permission. 

Yet it is, surely, in the interest of the inde- 

JANUART 4, 1965 


pendent and developing Africa to have some 
rules that prevent intervention. 

If the principle is established that the out- 
siders, not the insiders, decide when interven- 
tion is right, the fragile fabric of nationhood 
will come apart at the seams in dozens of na- 
tions in Africa and elsewhere. Every nation 
has its dissidents, its internal struggle for 
power, its internal arguments about who should 
be in charge and how the country should be 
run. But if every internal rivalry is to become 
a Spanish Civil War, with each faction draw- 
ing in other Africans and great powers from 
other continents, the history of independent 
Africa in this century will be bloody and shame- 
ful and the aspirations of Africa's wonderful 
peoples will be cruelly postponed into the 21st 
century. This is why we supported the U.N. 
Operation in the Congo and were sorry that it 
had to be withdrawn, its mission incomplete, 
because of the U.N.'s financial difficulties. And 
that is why we oppose, and must continue to 
oppose, foreign intervention in the Congo. 

Promoting Individual Human Rights 

The moment will come, I hope and believe, 
when the third great issue of the U.N.'s next 
20 years is how — and indeed whether — to bring 
to life the human rights provision of the charter. 

It is not yet clear that the national leaders 
in the world, either in the large countries or in 
the small ones, really mean to promote (as they 
have agreed in article 55 of the charter to pro- 
mote) the "universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan- 
guage, or religion." Nor is it clear that the gov- 
ernments of the members of the U.N. intend 
to take (as article 56 enjoins us to take) "joint 
and separate action in cooperation with Jie Or- 
ganization for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55." 

The words I have just quoted from the U.N. 
Charter are not vei-y familiar grouiid to most 
Americans — or to the citizens of other countries, 
either. Tlie reason is simple : They are the un- 
derdeveloped area of the charter. 

Part of the trouble, I suppose, is a confusion 
between nationhood and freedom. Self-deter- 
mination, that noble goal which brought a bil- 

lion people out from imder foreign rule, was 
sometimes a racial as well as a national battle- 
cry. Too often in the modem nationalist revo- 
lution — let us say it with all honesty — the prom- 
ise of freedom was a promise of "separate but 
equal" status in the world. 

Thus the leaders of most nations were per- 
fectly clear that they wanted a U.N. to protect 
the achievement of nationhood by pressing for 
the self-determination of groups and peoples. 
But there is a good deal of uncertainty as to 
how far we— and our fellow members— want 
the U.N. to go in criticizing and correcting the 
ethical delinquencies of peoples once they have 
declared their national independence. 

It is this uncertainty, this confusion between 
nationhood and freedom, tliis feeling that na- 
tional and racial and ethnic groups, not indi- 
vidual men, women, and children, should be the 
beneficiaries of the continuing struggle for free- 
dom, which in the longer run may prove to be 
the most divisive and troublesome threat to a 
viable world organization. Yet if the central 
question about freedom is man's humanity to 
man, the U.N.'s relevance to our future will 
partly rest on what it does, or neglects to do, 
about individual himian rights. 

The International "Apportionment" Issue 

Wliile the General Assembly is sorting out 
the ethics of nuclear weapons, nonnuclear in- 
tervention, and international attention to hu- 
man rights, a great constitutional issue will be 
increasingly discussed in the corridors of the 
U.N. and the chancelleries of the world. We 
might call it the international apportionment 
issue, because this word "apportionment" has 
come to mean something to Americans through 
the actions of our own Supreme Court and our 
own State legislatures in recent months. 

And indeed, the constitutional issues that now 
face the U.N. are not so different from those 
which almost tore our own Constitutional Con- 
vention apart, in Philadelphia, nearly two cen- 
turies ago. Tliere the problem was how to rec- 
oncile the sovereign equality of States in an 
infant nation with the fact that some of the 
States were very small and others were very 

Here in the United Nations, today, there are 



two clearly discernible facts which nobody dis- 
putes but which are not easy to combine into 
one political system : on the one hand, the sov- 
ereign equality of nations, an immutable princi- 
ple of the charter ; on the other hand, the imeven 
distribution of real power and real resources 
in the real world. Somehow the small number 
of large and powerful countries must come to 
terms with the sovereign equality of nations. 
And somehow the small-country majority in 
the United Nations must come to terms with the 
minority of nations that make the U-N". not a 
debating society but an action agency for peace. 

The issue comes up in all sorts of ways. One 
day it's an argument about how the new U-N. 
trade institutions will be set up — whether there 
will be voting by an automatic majority, or a 
conciliation procedure by which the developing 
countries and the industrialized countries try 
to persuade each other to change their own 
economic and commercial policies. 

On another day it may be a budget argument; 
recently, in one specialized agency, a budget 
was voted by a large majority of votes which, 
however, represented less than 30 percent of the 
funds that had to be raised to make the budget 
a reality. 

But the most striking example of this con- 
stitutional issue is the Soviet claim that all 
peacekeeping matters should be handled solely 
in the Security Council. I think it's fair to 
say that no non-Conmiunist country in the 
world agrees with this extreme position. 
Peacekeeping is the U.N.'s most important func- 
tion, and it is clear that the membership at large 
intends to have something to do with the 

But on the other hand, the command and 
control of U.N. peacekeeping operations must 
provide an adequate voice for those nations 
which pro\'ide the troops and the airlift and 
the money to carry out U.N. decisions. 

So we're going to have to work out a com- 
promise somewhere in the mainstream between 
the view that wants to give the peacekeeping 
monopoly to the Security Council and the view 
that wants the General Assembly to be the main 
reliance of a turbulent world. I think that 
we will sooner or later find a middle way. Be- 
cause there is no alternative to peace there is 
also no alternative to workable peacekeeping 

machinery in this fi'agile and dangerous world. 
There are many ways in which the Security 
Council and the General Assembly can share 
the responsibility for keeping the peace. The 
search for the best way — that is to say, the way 
that can work in practice, however messy it may 
look in theory — may be the most important sin- 
gle thing going on in the U.N. during Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year 1965. 

A World of Diversity 

These four great issues — the spread of nuclear 
weapons, the ethics of intervention, the dilemma 
of human rights, and the reconciliation of re- 
sources with representation in the U.N.'s sys- 
tem — these are, it seems to me, major issues 
visibly ahead of us in U.N. affairs. As we grow 
beyond the revolution of rising expectations 
toward the evolution of rising responsibility, 
you and I, as Americans, have to face these 
complex and difficult issues squarely. For on 
their outcome depends the success or failure 
of the primary aim of American foreign pol- 
icy^ — to help create a world safe for diversity. 

This vision of a world of cultural pluralism, 
of independent nations following their own his- 
torical bent, diverse in social systems, economic 
orders, and political creeds— participating 
nonetheless in mutual enterprise based on con- 
sent, constructing by stages a new system of 
world order based on common interest, defend- 
ing the human rights of individual men and 
women and children — this vision is anything 
but visionary. 

What is visionary — because it cannot come to 
pass — is the Communist conception of a mono- 
lithic one-world suffocated by a universal 
dogma, impossibly boring in its bureaucratic 
uniformity and its predetermined history, im- 
placably stifling to gay and colorful variety 
and the natural dignity of individual human 
beings, implausibly operating under a pluto- 
cratic elite that calls itself, of all things, the 
party of the masses. 

The vision of a world safe for diversity is the 
sounder conception, the more practical goal, the 
more realistic prospect, as the record of recent 
years makes wholly clear. 

That is -why those nations which do not yet 
have free institutions — in which men and 

JANXTART 4, 1965 


women are not yet accorded the right of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness — can look 
forward to a mighty turbulent time until they 
do. And that is why, on the other side of an 
increasingly porous Iron Curtain, the once 
monolithic Communist bloc is in political dis- 
array — and philosophical ferment as well. 

Indeed, the old fixation that there is some- 
thing somehow immutable and irreversible 
about communism has gone the way of other 
delusions, a casualty of that simple, irresistible 
idea that all men are equal by reason of their 
natural dignity. 

There is nothing inevitable about our future. 
The real world has little room, and less pa- 
tience, for the Communists' claim they are 
bound to succeed, or for tired and discouraged 
voices who say we are bound to fail. We who 
believe in human dignity have hold of a hard 
reality. We can see the realism of saying a 
cheerful yes to a world of diversity — and the 
plain necessity to make common cause with 
others in the United Nations to save that world 
from poverty, conformity, and war. 

This task, which is the task of peace, the 
President recently called "the assignment of the 
century." * To show they want to get on vdth 
this task, the American people have just voted 
him the mandate of the century. 

President Congratulates Italian 
People on Launching of Satellite 

Statement 'by President Johnson 

White House press release dated December 16 

A significant milestone in cooperative inter- 
national space efforts was achieved yesterday 
[December 15] with the successful launching of 
the Italian San Marco satellite. 

This marks the first time a launch crew of any 
nation other than the United States or the So- 
viet Union has put its own scientific payload into 

My congratulations to the Italian people for 

their initiative and perseverance in the San 
Marco Project. It is a source of particular 
satisfaction to me that I participated in the sign- 
ing of the Italian- American agreement ' for this 
project in Eome in 1962. 

I look forward to continued success in the 
next phase of the San Mai-co Project, when the 
Italian Space Commission will attempt the diffi- 
cult operation of launching a similar satellite 
from an ocean platform near the Equator. 

industrial Research Leaders 
Return From Soviet Union 


White House press release dated December 16 

The President met on December 15 with his 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 
Donald F. Hornig, and a delegation of indus- 
trial research leaders who had accompanied Dr. 
Hornig to the Soviet Union [November 5-19]. 
In addition to Dr. Hornig the group included 
E. R. Piore, vice president for research and en- 
gineering, International Business Machines 
Corp.; James B. Fisk, president, Bell Tele- 
phone Laboratories; Robert L. Hershey, vice 
president, E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.; J. 
Herbert Hollomon, Assistant Secretary of Com- 
merce for Science and Technology; and Irwin 
M. Tobin, a Foreign Service officer presently 
with the Office of Science and Technology, 

Dr. Hornig and members of his party re- 
ported to the President on their discussions with 
K. N. Rudnev, Soviet Vice Premier ; M. V. Kel- 
dysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sci- 
ences ; and other Soviet leaders. They described 
to him their visits to factories, engineering de- 
sign institutes, and laboratories in the chemical 
and electronics industries in Moscow, Lenin- 
grad, Novosibirsk (the leading industrial and 
scientific center of Siberia), and other cities. 

The President discussed with the group their 
observations relating to the extension of indus- 

*/6»(i., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5172. 



trial contacts with the Soviet Union, the broad- 
ening of technical exchanges, and the possible 
relaxation of trade restrictions. The President 
thanked the group, especially those from in- 
dustry who had given so much of their time and 
effort to make this trip as a public service. 


Wbite HoDBc press release dated December 16 

Dr. Hornig, gentlemen : I am very happy to 
have heard your impressions of Soviet science 
and teclinology, based on your 2-week visit to 
Soviet Russia. I am especially grateful to you 
men from industry who gave so much of your 
time to make this trip and to prepare for it and 
present your conclusions. Tliis is another fine 
example of the willingness of American busi- 
nessmen and scientists to give of themselves for 
the public good. 

I am especially glad that you got to meet so 
many people in Russia and had such lengthy 
conversations with them. It is important for 
us to know the people and to understand as 
much as we can about their economic develop- 
ment. It is good to hear that the people you 
met in the research laboratories, factories, and 
schools throughout the coimtry showed such a 
lively interest in America and wanted to enter 
into contact with Americans by visits and corre- 
spondence. I was especially interested to hear 
that this was as true of people out in the middle 
of Siberia as it was in Moscow and Leningrad. 

Visits like yours help us to get to know the 
Russian people better, to know their country 
and see their accomplishments and problems at 
first, hand. We are hoping to cooperate with 
them in water desalting ^ and perhaps other spe- 
cific fields of technology that benefit mankind. 
I hope there will be more trips like yours, in 
both directions, and I am asking all agencies of 
the Government on our side to make sure that 
we're going as far as we can to extend this hand 
of peaceful contact to the Soviet people, with- 
out in any way endangering our security. 

' For background and test of agreement, see Bul- 
letin of Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828. 

Fifteen Nations To Exchange 
Shipping Information 

Following is the text of a joint Department 
of State-Federal Maritime ComTnission state- 
ment released on December 15 {Department of 
State press release 522) . 

Fourteen members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and Finland, representing the Gov- 
ernments of the principal maritime countries, 
have completed discussions in Paris resulting 
in arrangements for an exchange of information 
sought by the United States Federal Maritime 
Commission in connection with maritime 
freight rates relating to the inbound and out- 
bound trade of the United States. 

The Governments of the European and Jap- 
anese maritime countries will use their good 
offices with their shipowners concerned to fa- 
cilitate the production of shipping information, 
including statistics and documents, for the year 
1963. This information will be transmitted to 
the OECD, which will circulate copies to all 15 

These arrangements are designed to enable the 
United States Government to obtain the infor- 
mation it desires through an international 
cooperative process instead of the application 
by the United States of directives to conferences 
and lines to produce such information pursuant 
to section 21 of the U.S. Shipping Act of 1916. 

It is understood that these arrangements are 
without prejudice to the views of the European 
and Japanese maritime countries regarding the 
shipping legislation and policies of the United 

The information and documents will not be 
published or communicated to private persons 
in a form that would prejudice individual car- 
riers or reveal commercial secrets. 

The information and documents to be ex- 
changed are not to be used for the purpose of 
criminal prosecutions or assessing fines or pen- 
alties against shipowners or conferences. 

The United States informed the other coun- 
tries concerned that, before using the informa- 
tion or documents in formal proceedings before 

JANTJART 4. 1965 


the Federal Maritime Commission, it would 
consult through the OECD. Such consultation 
could include, if so requested, a discussion of 
alternative measures for solving the problem 

The Governments which have engaged in 
these discussions express their satisfaction that 
it has been possible, through multilateral dis- 
cussions in the OECD, to resolve the immediate 
problems involved in the exchange of informa- 
tion on shipjDing. 

The participating Governments other than 
the United States are : Belgium, Denmark, Fin- 
land, France, the Federal Kepublic of Ger- 
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement 
on Fishing Operations Off Alasl<a 

Press release 521 dated December 14 

The United States and the Soviet Union on 
December 14 concluded an agreement relating to 
fishing operations in the Northeast Pacific 
Ocean. The agreement is designed to minimize 
damage to the fishing gear of American king 
crab fishermen in the Kodiak Island area of 
Alaska by Soviet trawlers operating in the same 
general area. Under Secretary W. Averell Har- 
riman signed for the United States and Ambas- 
sador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin for the Soviet 

The agreement was recommended to the two 
Governments by delegations of the two coun- 
tries following discussions in June 1964 at 
Juneau, Alaska. It provides for the establish- 
ment of a number of areas in the vicmity of 
Kodiak Island in which mobile gear (trawls) 
will not operate during the period July-Octo- 
ber, inclusive, and establishes procedures for 
amending, by mutual agreement between the 
chief of the Soviet fishing fleet and local United 
States fishery officials, the boundaries of these 

areas or the periods during which they are re- 
served for fixed gear. It also provides for 
establishing new such areas by mutual agree- 

The agreement establishes in addition a sys- 
tem of direct radio communication between the 
Soviet fleet and fishery officials in Alaska. This 
system can be used for reporting to the Soviet 
fleet the positions of the United States king crab 
vessels outside of the areas mentioned above in 
order that special precautionary measures can 
be taken to avoid damage to them. 

Under the provisions of the agreement the 
United States will undertake special research in 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to 
develop more effective means of marking and 
detecting fixed gear of various types. 

The agreement will not prejudice existing 
rights of either Government. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Immigration. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of 
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 7700 
and 55 identical bills to amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Part II, July 2-August 3, 1964, 218 
pp. ; Part III, August 4-September 17, 1964. 417 pp. 

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Transportation 
Study. Hearings before a special subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce. Part 3. July 
14 and 15, 1964. 135 pp. 

Review of Dual-Rate Legislation, 1961-64. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of 
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish- 
eries on the activities of the Federal Maritime Com- 
mission and its administration of the Shipping Act 
of 1916 and other laws under its jurisdiction. July 
21-September 2, 1964. 761 pp. 

Foreign Trade and the Antitrust Laws. Hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 1, 
General Considerations. July 22-29, 1964. 598 pp. 

Use of Nuclear Power for the Production of Fresh 
Water From Salt Water. Hearing before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy. August 18, 1964. 
155 pp. 

International Labor Organization, 1964. Hearings be- 
fore the Ad Hoe Subcommittee on the International 
Labor Organization of the House Committee on Edu- 
cation and Labor on U.S. participation in the orga- 
nization. August 19-21, 1964. 66 pp. 




U.S. Cites Illegal Interference in Support of Congo Rebellion 

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

V.S. Representative in the Security Council'^ 

Before I comment on the agenda there is 
something I must say about some of the speeches 
I listened to here last week. I am glad that 
a whole weekend has intervened, and I hope 
this pause in our proceedings has somewhat 
restored my perspective. 

In the last few days the United States has 
been variously accused, and I quote, of "wanton 
aggression'"; of "premeditated aggression"; of 
plotting a hiunanitarian mission as a "pretext" 
for military intervention; of a "nefarious ac- 
tion" designed "to exterminate the black 
inhabitants"; of "inhumanitarianism" ; of a 
"wanton and deliberate massacre of Congolese 
people" ; of a "murderous operation" ; of a "pre- 
meditated and coldblooded act"; of "not being 
truly concerned with the lives of the hostages" ; 
of a "crude subterfuge" ; of "massive cannibal- 
ism"; of having killed Lumumba "with cyni- 
cism and premeditation"; of genocide against 
an entire people ; of being caught "redhanded" ; 
of using the United Nations as a "Trojan 
horse"; of a racist attack to kill thousands of 
"blacks," an operation which, in the words of 
one of the speakers, proved to him that ', "white, 
if his name is Carlson, or if he is an ^Vmerican, a 
Belgian, or an Englishman, is worth thousands 
upon thousands of blacks." 

'Made In the Council on Dec. 14 (U.S./U.N. press 
release 4479). For background on the U.S.-Belgian 
rescue mission at Stanleyville and Paulis on Nov. 24 
and 26, see Bulletin of Dec. 14, 1964, p. 838. 

And that's not all ! We have heard words in 
this chamber either charging or implying that 
the United States Government was an accom- 
plice to the death of Dag Hammarskjold — and 
even the assassination of President Kennedy ! 

I have served in the United Nations from its 
inception off and on for 7 years. But never 
before have I heard such irrational, irrespon- 
sible, insulting, and repugnant language in 
these chambers — and used to contemptuously 
impugn and slander a gallant and successful 
effort to save human lives of many nationalities 
and colors. 

But even such a torrent of abuse of my coun- 
try is of no consequence compared to the specter 
of racial antagonism and conflict raised in this 
chamber. I need no credentials as a spokesman 
for racial equality and social justice in this 
country, and the Government of this country 
needs none in the world. Yet at a time when 
all responsible men and governments are trying 
to erase every vestige of racial antagonism, 
when racism has become an ugly word in aU 
nations, we hear its ominous undertones — in the 
United Nations. 

Racial hatred, racial strife, has cursed the 
world for too long. I make no defense of the 
sins of the white race in this respect. But the 
antidote for white racism is not black racism. 
Racism in any form by anybody is an offense 
to the conscience of mankind and to the Charter 
of the United Nations, which enjoins us to pro- 
mote and encourage "respect for hiuuan rights 

JANTJART 4, 1965 


and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or 

Mr. President, the verbal violence, the mis- 
trust, the hatred, the malign accusations we have 
heard from a few representatives of African na- 
tions is not, I fear, just an echo of the language 
and tactics of the cold war, which for so long 
corrupted international discourse. And I heard 
with relief the statements last Friday by the 
distinguished representatives of the Ivory Coast 
and Morocco deploring the introduction into 
our debates of racial strife and hatred. 

We share profoundly their concern. We had 
hoped that the era of racial discrimination 
whicli has poisoned the atmosphere of Africa 
was coming to an end. It is precisely because 
the policy of apartheid in South Africa is incon- 
sistent with the concept of racial equality and 
harmony that it has been condemned by all 
of us. 

Yet the Foreign Minister of Congo ( Brazza- 
ville) seems to attribute the difficulties that have 
so long beset his country's neighbor, the Congo, 
to a mythical struggle between blacks and 

The Government of Congo (Brazzaville) has 
for well over a year encouraged and supported 
rebellion against the legitimate government of 
Congo (Leopoldville) under President Kasa- 
vubu. Prime Minister Adoula, and Prime Min- 
ister Tshombe. It is precisely the rebellion, 
the civil war, supported by Congo (Brazzaville) 
and other states which has been responsible for 
the massacre, often in atrocious circumstances, 
of thousands of Congolese civilians, for the most 
part local leaders and intellectuals formerly as- 
sociated with the Adoula government. And yet 
the Foreign Minister of Brazzaville has without 
foundation accused the United States and Bel- 
gium of killing "thousands and thousands of 
Congolese" in the recent rescue operation. 

Facts About U.S.-Belgian Rescue Mission 

The Council has heard the sober, factual ac- 
count of that operation by the Foreign Minister 
of Belgium. In fact, only a very small number 
of rebels were killed as a consequence of that 
operation and these only in self-defense or be- 

cause they were at the moment resisting the at- 
tempts to rescue the hostages. 

The grim story of thousands of innocent 
civilians — many of them foreign — illegally 
seized, brutalized, and threatened, and many 
murdered by rebels against the Congo Govern- 
ment, has already been related to this Council. 
Every means — legal, moral, and humane, includ- 
ing the United Nations — was exhausted to pro- 
tect their lives and secure their release, all with- 
out avail. When it became apparent that there 
was no hope, the Belgian and American Govern- 
ments, with the cooperation of the Government 
of the United Kingdom and with the express 
authorization of the sovereign Government of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, under- 
took an emergency rescue mission to save the 
lives of those innocent people. 

The operation was carried out with restraint, 
courage, discipline, and dispatch. In 4 days 
2,000 peoplfr— Europeans, Americans, Africans, 
and Asians — were rescued and evacuated to safe 
territoiy. These included Americans, Britons, 
and Belgians; Pakistanis, Indians, Congolese, 
Greeks, French, Dutch, Germans, Canadians, 
Spaniards, Portuguese, Swiss, and Italians; as 
well as citizens of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
and the United Arab Republic. 

The mission lasted 4 days from first to last and 
left the Stanleyville area the day its task ended ; 
it returned immediately to Belgium ; the episode 
is finished. 

Yet the memorandum ^ from certain African 
states supporting the request for this meeting 
charges that the United States and Belgium, in 
defiance of article 52 of the charter and as a de- 
liberate affront to the Organization of African 
Unity, launched military operations in Stanley- 
ville and other parts of the Congo with the con- 
currence of the United Kingdom and that these 
actions constituted intervention in African af- 
fairs, a flagrant violation of the charter, and a 
threat to the peace and security of the African 

It makes no mention whatever of the repeated 
and repulsive threats made by those controlling 
Stanleyville, of the solely merciful objectives of 
the rescue mission, of its authorization by the 
Government of the Congo, of the fact that the 

' D.N. doc. S/6076. 



mission withdrew as soon as it had evacuated 
the foreign hostages and other civilians who 
wished to escape, nor of the fact that some of 
the signatories of the letter are themselves in- 
tervening in the Congo against its Government, 
or of other relevant facts known to the members 
of this Council — and to the world at large. 

The United States emphatically denies the 
charges made in this memorandum and in the 
debate. We have no apologies to make to any 
state appearing before this Council. We are 
proud of our part in saving human lives im- 
periled by the civil war in the Congo. 

The United States took part in no operation 
with military purposes in the Congo. 

We violated no provision of the United Na- 
tions Charter. 

Our action was no threat to peace and secu- 
rity ; it was not an affront — deliberate or other- 
wise — to the OAU; and it constituted no inter- 
vention in Congolese or African affairs. 

This mission was exactly what we said it was 
when we notified this CouncU at the beginning — 
nothing more and nothing less than a mission to 
save the lives of innocent people of diverse na- 
tionalities, many of whom were teachers, doc- 
tors, and missionaries who have devoted their 
careers to selfless service to the Congolese peo- 
ple. To anyone willing to consider the facts — 
in good faith — that must be clear. To anyone 
who will face the facts, imobstructed by hatred 
for Tshombe or the Congo or Belgium or the 
United States and Great Britain, that must be 

While our primary obligation was to protect 
the lives of American citizens, we are proud that 
the mission rescued so many innocent people of 
18 other nationalities from their dreadful pre- 
dicament. We mourn the thousands of others — 
Congolese and foreign — already sacrificed in 
the preceding months of their horrible civil 
strife in tliis tortured country. And we urge 
all nations to appeal for the safety of those who 
remain in danger. 

No amoimt of detail — and certainly no extra- 
neous issues — can obscure the stark outlines of 
that story. Yet questions have been raised — 
harsh statements have been made — about the 
motivations involved in launching the rescue 
mission. Let me therefore speak to that point. 

Why the Mission Was Launched 

For months before the rescue mission was 
undertaken, diplomatic efforts hud been pursued 
through every conceivable channel to persuade 
the rebels to release the hostages. 

Conscious of the legal and humanitarian is- 
sues at stake, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, the Ad Hoc Commission of the 
Organization of African Unity, the Govern- 
ment of the Congo, and various other govern- 
ments, including African governments, made re- 
peated efforts to secure th^ rights and release of 
the hostages for three long, anxious, and frus- 
trating months. 

Every available avenue was tried ; every ap- 
proach was ignored or in effect rejected by the 
rebels; and in the process the Red Cross, the 
World Health Organization, and the United 
Nations were vilified by the military leaders of 
the rebels "as espionage organizations in the 
service of the neo-colonialists." These are the 
exact words used by the so-called General 
Olenga in a message on September 3, 1964. 
This accusation was also repeatedly broadcast 
by Stanleyville. 

For some days before November 23 it was 
difficult to be sure who was in charge in Stanley- 
ville — or indeed whether anyone was in control. 
It was impossible to know whether any agree- 
ment that might be made with any alleged rep- 
resentative of the rebels could in fact be carried 

Nonetheless, when the possibility arose, 
through the good offices of the chairman of the 
Ad Hoe Commission of the Organization of 
African Unity, of a meeting with a representa- 
tive pf the rebels in Nairobi on November 21, 
my Government immediately named its Ambas- 
sador to Kenya, Mr. William Attwood, to rep- 
resent it for the purpose of discussing the safety 
of the hostages. 

Mr. Thomas Kanza, who was said to repre- 
sent the rebels, did not appear. Instead, on 
that day, November 21, the Stanleyville Radio, 
mouthpiece of the rebel forces, suggested that 
the hostages be burned alive or massacred with 
machetes and "devoured." 

On the following day, November 22, the rebel 

JANUARY 4, 1965 


representative belatedly did appear ia Xairobi, 
and a meeting was subsequently held -with Am- 
bassador Attwood on Xovember 23. The rebel 
spokesman, however, refused to address the 
problem of the release of the hostages on its hu- 
manitarian merits ; he persisted in callous efforts 
to barter their lives for political and military 
concessions from the Government of the Con- 

It must be obvious that my Government 
could neither legally nor morally accept this as 
a satisfactory basis for discussion. Legally, we 
could not concede what lies within the com- 
petence of another sovereign government. 
Morally, we could not agree that our citizens 
could be illegally held for ransom. 

Mr. Kanza categorically refused the request 
of Ambassador Attwood to make a public com- 
mitment with respect to the safety of the hos- 
tages. When Anabassador Attwood reported 
this refusal and we continued to receive threats 
of imminent execution of the hostages, it was 
clear to my Government that all hope had run 
out and the time was short. 

At that very moment, five members of the 
American consular staff in Stanleyville, who had 
been held in illegal captivity for 3 months, dur- 
ing which time they were repeatedly beaten, 
were under threat of public execution. Similar- 
ly held was Dr. Paul Carlson, charged with 
being a spy in spite of all the evidence that he 
was a dedicated medical missionary working 
solely to relieve human suffering among the 
Congolese, including the rebels. Day by day his 
imminent execution was annoimced to the world. 

The fate that awaited these men and the hun- 
dreds of other hostages — men, women, and chil- 
dren — was clearly foreshadowed by the atro- 
cious execution of Congolese oiEcials, described 
to us by the representative of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and by the public state- 
ment of the rebel leader, Christophe Gbenye, 
read to us by the Foreign ^linister of Belgium, 
that "we will make our fetishes with the hearts 
of the Americans and Belgians, and we will 
dress ourselves with the skins of the Americans 
and Belgians." 

I have heard in this Council, nevertheless, the 
astonishing thesis that nothing needed to be 
done, that the threats were not real. I heard it 

asked whether it was "not a sad fact that the 
hostages were killed only after the paratroopers 
landed" and then heard it asserted that it was 
"well known that no Europeans had been 

Mr. President, the threats were very real in- 
deed ; they had been carried out ia the past, and 
we had every reason to expect that they would 
contiaue to be carried out in the future. From 
mid-August onward, after the rebel forces had 
taken Stanleyville, seizing and holding foreign- 
ers as hostages became a deliberate act of rebel 
policy. In the following months this medieval 
practice was widely applied. Many of these 
hostages were deliberately killed. 

By the time the Belgian paratroopers arrived 
in Stanleyville, and before the outlaws even 
knew of their impending arrival, the total of 
those thus already cruelly tortured and 
slaughtered amounted to 35 foreigners, includ- 
ing 19 Belgians, 2 Americans, 2 Indians, 2 
Greeks, 1 Italian, 2 Portuguese, 2 Togolese, and 
■i Dutch, and 1 English, many of them mission- 
aries who had spent their lives to help the Con- 
golese people. That, at least, is the verified 
number. God alone knows how many others, 
long missing and out of touch with the outside 
world, had met a similar fate. 

During tliis period of many months before the 
rescue mission arrived in Stanleyville, the rebels 
not only murdered these foreigners but system- 
atically slaughtered local Congolese officials, 
police, teachers, intellectuals, members of op- 
posing political groups, labor leaders, and rank- 
and-file members of labor unions who were con- 
sidered tinreliable or even tindesirable by their 
captors. The exact nimiber of Congolese so 
liquidated may never be known, but it had 
reached thousands long before November 24. 

In case there is still any doubt in your minds 
that the rescue of the hostages was a matter of 
life and death, members of the Coimcil might 
find of interest this photostat of a telegram from 
General Olenga to Major Tshenda in Kindu, 
dated September 30, 1964. It says: "Major 
Tshenda Oscar, Kindu : Reference your unnum- 
bered telegram, Americans Belgians must be 
held in a secure place stop In case of bombing 
region, exterminate all without requesting fur- 
ther orders, signed General Olenga." 



Again, if there is any doubt about what was 
happening before the rescue mission arrived, I 
call your attention — and I do so with reluc- 
tance — to what happened at Isangi, not far from 
Stanleyville, on November 19, 5 days before the 
paradrop. The entire Isangi religious commu- 
nity of 17 priests and 13 nuns were stripped of 
their clothes, beaten, and the nuns raped. Of 
these, an American nun. Sister Marie Antoi- 
nette, and a Dutch priest were murdered and 
thrown in the river. A Belgian Sister, Ann 
Francioise, was beaten to death. 

Mr. President, throughout this debate I have 
waited in vain to hear one word, spoken by 
those who have brought tliis complaint, in con- 
denmation of the taking of hostages and the 
deliberate liquidation of an intelligentsia. 
"Whatever their fancied complaints about the 
Belgian and American rescue mission, I would 
have thought that the complainants would at 
least have shown an awareness of and a respect 
for accepted standards of humanitarian con- 
duct, particularly as they are expressed in article 
3 of the Geneva convention for the protection of 
war victims of 1949, which prohibits the taking 
of hostages in time of internal conflict and guar- 
antees humane treatment to noncombatants lo- 
cated in areas of ci\al strife. 

I find tliis absence of condemnation of such 
inhumane practices all the more surprising, not 
only because they are illegal but because they 
are at such fundamental variance with the an- 
cient and proud traditions of the peoples of 
Africa themselves. Anyone who has visited 
and traveled in Africa, as I have, knows the 
kindness, consideration, and protection which 
the African tradition of hospitality and toler- 
ance extends to strangers. We will do notliing 
here to strain that tradition; for it is clear to 
us that the barbarism of the rebels in the Congo 
cannot be considered as that of African na- 
tionalists and liberators. 

U.S. Opposed to Foreign Intervention in Congo 

So much for the complaint of certain coun- 
tries that the rescue operation was a cynical pre- 
text for armed intervention in the Congo and 
that the hostages would have been secure had 
there been no attempt to rescue them. 

Let me now put the position of the United 

States into context. It has been consistent since 
independence day in the Congo, on June 30, 

From the beginning the United States has 
been opposed to any breakup of the Congo by 
secessionist movements — secessions based in 
Elisabeth ville, in Kasai, in Stanleyville, or any- 
where else. 

From the beginning the United States has 
favored responsible efforts for political recon- 
ciliation of dissident groups in the Congo 
through compromise and consensus. 

And from ihe beginning we have been op- 
posed — and remain opposed — to foreign inter- 
vention in the internal affairs of the sovereign 
and independent state of the Congo. 

In July 1960 the Government of the Congo — 
faced with a mutiny in its security forces and 
with a collapse of order and essential services — 
formally requested the United States to lend 
military assistance in restoring order. The re- 
quest was declined by the United States Govern- 
ment in favor of a United Nations effort. The 
United States Government supported in princi- 
ple and in practice — including very large finan- 
cial and material contributions — United Nations 
aid to the Congo precisely for the reason that 
any other course might have brought interna- 
tional conflict to the heart of Africa, with dan- 
gerous consequences not only for the Congo it- 
self but for the whole continent. 

The accomplishments of the United Nations 
are a matter of history. Law and order were 
maintained, secession was crushed, some ad- 
vance toward political stability was made, mas- 
sive economic and technical aid was supplied 
from all over the world. 

But unfortunately the United Nations — 
largely because some members of the U.N. re- 
fused to pay their assessments for the Congo 
operation — was unable to remain long enough 
to finish the task it had undertaken. It had 
to withdraw despite sober warnings that with- 
drawal was premature. 

Well before the United Nations left, new in- 
.surrections broke out, encouraged from neigh- 
boring coimtries where enemies of the Congo 
Government foimd comfort and aid through 
the embassies of a non-African power. Ever 
since that time both the Adoula government 

JANUARY 4, 1965 


and the present government have been afSicted 
by insurgents aided and supported from out- 
side. Prime Minister Adoula repeatedly sought 
help from Africa, but, with one or two notable 
exceptions, his plea for help was unheeded. 
In those circumstances he sought military aid 
from the United States and Belgium. 

Aid Given at Request of Congolese Government 

It has been charged in this Council that, quite 
apart from the rescue mission, the United States 
has intervened militarily in the Congo. 

I reject this charge. These are the facts : 

As I have stated, Prime Minister Adoula 
earlier this year requested — and the United 
States provided — some military materiel and 
training assistance to the Congo. This is 
exactly what all other African states have done 
or are doing. There is not one of them that 
does not obtain military equipment or training 
or both from outside Africa in the exercise of 
its own sovereign right. 

Wlien, in accordance with the constitution of 
the Congo, President Kasavubu selected Prime 
Minister Tshombe to succeeed Prime Minister 
Adoula, who had resigned, the United States 
continued this program. It did so upon specific 
affirmation by Prime Minister Tshombe that the 
Government of the Congo desired that the pro- 
gram be continued. As the need arose, the 
United States, at the request of the Government 
of the Congo, provided additional equipment 
and transport. It was not requested to, and did 
not, undertake military operations in the Congo. 

Mr. President, statements have been made 
here which seem to add up to the astounding 
proposition that the United States has no right 
to provide assistance to the Congolese Govern- 
ment and that that Government has no right to 
accept it because the aid comes from outside 
Africa. I repeat that there is hardly an African 
state which has not requested and received mili- 
tary aid, in the fonn of arms or training or botli, 
from outside Africa. Certainly Algeria, for ex- 
ample, has received and is receiving massive for- 
eign military aid in both these categories. 

Is this sovereign right to be exercised by some 
and denied to others? Would otlier states in 
Africa who receive arms and military assist- 
ance from outside the continent relinquish this 

equipment or assistance, or ask for its with- 
drawal, in the unhappy event that rebellion 
broke out within their boundaries ? I very much 
doubt that they would or that anyone here really 
believes they should. 

It is perhaps necessary to repeat that the 
United States furnished military assistance to 
the Congo in the fonn of transport and com- 
munications equipment, in the first instance to 
the government of Mr. Adoula, when it became 
quite apparent that the United Nations would 
be unable to undertake the necessary reorgani- 
zation of the Congolese army. Our assistance 
was continued when it became clear that the 
U.N. operation was about to be terminated for 
lack of funds, after a rebellion fomented from 
abroad had broken out in the Congo and after 
Mr. Adoula had appealed to other African 
states for aid to maintain peace and security in 
his country. 

Would any African country which has spoken 
at this table deny that, under similar circum- 
stances, it would have urgently appealed for 
and gratefully accepted military aid from out- 
side Africa? And, I must add, if these coun- 
tries sincerely wish the Government of the 
Congo not to seek such aid, let them scrupu- 
lously refrain from stirring up rebellion and 
aiding the insurgents. If they demand that the 
Government cease to defend itself with the only 
means at its disposal, while at the same time 
themselves refusing aid to the Government and 
granting it to the rebels, what confidence in 
their good faith can anyone have? On what 
grounds and for what purpose do they appeal 
to a Council the duty of which is to maintain 
international peace and security? If the prac- 
tice of supporting rebellion against a govern- 
ment which is disliked by other governments 
becomes prevalent in Africa, what security will 
any African government have? 

Let us not be hypocritical. Either each gov- 
ernment recognizes the right of other govern- 
ments to exist and refrains from attempting to 
overthrow them, or we revert to a primitive 
state of anarchy in which each conspires against 
its neighbor. The golden rule is do unto others 
as you would have them do imto you. 

The world has made some progress, and mili- 
tary invasions of one another's territory are 



diminishing, thanks in large measure to the 
United Nations. But a new practice has devel- 
oped, or rather an old practice has developed 
new momentum — the more or less hidden inter- 
vention b}' nations in the internal affairs of their 
neighbors. Most of the fighting and killing that 
still goes on can be traced to outside interven- 
tions designed to undermine or overthrow 

In Africa nearly every country wants and 
needs the help of outsiders in achieving those 
"better standards of life in larger freedom" 
which are the goal of their rising expectations 
and the promise of their political independence. 
So outsiders are boimd to be involved to some 
extent in their internal affairs. The question 
therefore is : Under what rules will the outsiders 
operate on the inside? Over the years, more 
through the practice of nations than the teach- 
ings of scholars, have we not developed some 
general principles to guide this widespread 
practice of mutual involvement? "Where the 
government, recognized diplomatically by other 
states as the responsible government, exercises 
its sovereign right to ask for outside help, then 
it would seem that the response and the involve- 
ment of outsiders is all right. 

But I concede that it is not an easy line to 
draw. The principle that outsiders should be 
invited and not crash the party is far from an 
infallible guide to good conduct. But still, the 
principle of permission is certainly the best one 
yet developed to prevent a reversion to imperial- 
ism and foreign domination. For if the out- 
siders, not the insiders, decide when interven- 
tion is right, the fragile fabric of nationhood 
will come apart at the seams in a score of new 
African nations. 

Everj' nation has its dissidents, its internal 
struggle for power, its internal arguments 
about who should be in charge and how the 
country should be nm. But if every internal 
rivalry is to become a Spanish Cival "War, with 
each faction drawing in other Africans and 
great powers from other continents, the history 
of independent Africa in this century will be 
bloody and shameful and the aspirations of 
Africa's wonderful peoples will be cruelly post- 

That is why we supported the United Nations 

Operation in the Congo and were sorry that it 
had to be withdrawn, its mission incomplete, be- 
cause of the United Nations' financial difficul- 
ties. And that is why we oppose unsolicited 
foreign intervention in the Congo. 

Illegal Intervention 

Contrast the aid that has been supplied to 
successive governments of the Congo upon re- 
quest with the current intervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of the Congo — in support of 
rebellion against the legitimate government. 
These outside elements have included foreign 
coimtries as far away as Peiping and Moscow, 
as near as Burundi and the neighboring Congo. 
They have included admissions as flagrant as 
the public statement by the President of 
Algeria : 

It is not enough to demonstrata What we are now 
doing is sending arms, rifles, and volunteers. We say 
that we are sending and we will continue Indefinitely 
to send arms and men. 

Last week Algerian military aircraft flew 
into Juba in the Sudan near the border of the 
Congo. They transferred cargo to trucks which 
then departed toward the Congolese frontier. 
"We received reports of Algerian personnel in 
transit at the airport at Khartoum; of 
Ghanaian aircraft transferring cargoes of rifles 
to Egyptian aircraft at Khartoiun for shipment 
to Juba; of rebel leaders being received in 
Khartoum and Cairo; of mortars, machineguns, 
and ammunition from Communist China used 
by the rebels; of Soviet encouragement and 
offers to replace arms given to the rebels by the 
United Arab Republic and Algeria. 

The representative of Algeria has so far not 
commented on these charges, although very 
liberal in his criticisms of my country's long 
effort to assist the Congo to preserve its inde- 
pendence, integrity, and unity. At the same 
time the Government of Ghana states only that 
it does "not know the veracity of this allega- 
tion" that it has supplied arms to the enemies of 
the Government of the Congo. 

I note with interest in this regard that the 
distinguished Foreign Minister of the Sudan 
appeared to deny Sudan's role in this traffic the 
other day in these words : 

JAKITART 4, 1965 


It is not true that we have been partial to either 
party in the Congo. It is not true that our airiwrts 
have been used for this or that purpose .... TTe have 
allowed medical equipment to go through to those who 
have asked for it ... . The press reports . . . that 
"apparently" our airports have been used for shipment 
of arms to the Congolese in Stanleyville .... Nothing 
of the sort has taken place. 

The statement of the distinguished Foreign 
Minister of Sudan is encouraging in that it gives 
hope that the Sudan intends to prevent traffic in 
arms and men to the Congo from the Sudan. 

But the Prime Minister of Algeria has spe- 
cifically stated that he is sendmg men and mili- 
tary supplies into the Congo. And it is known 
to the United States that Algerian and United 
Arab Eepublic military planes have landed in 
the Sudan, both in Khartoum and Juba, in the 
last few days and unloaded cargoes which were 
subsequently trucked to the Congolese border. 

It would accordingly be helpful if the Foreign 
Minister of the Sudan could further amplify 
his remarks and assure us that his Government 
is not shipping or pennitting the shipment 
through the Sudan of any arms or military sup- 
plies or persons, volunteer or otherwise, destined 
for the Congo without the permission of the 
Congo Government, and that it is taking all pos- 
sible steps to prevent any such illegal traffic to 
cross its borders into the Congo. I recall that 
on past occasions during secession and rebellion 
in the Congo the Sudanese Government did 
adopt this policy. 

If there should be any question about illegal 
interference in the Congo, let me point out that 
earlier this week Gbenye himself stated that the 
rebels were receiving foreign military assist- 
ance. He declared that an unspecified number 
of Congolese who have been trained in Com- 
munist China are en route to Join the rebels and 
that Russian and Chinese weapons, food, and 
medicines had already been received. He de- 
clared that Presidents Nkrumah, Nasser, and 
Ben Bella had promised to send arms and vol- 
unteers and that African states would provide 

The rebel leader further stated that the opera- 
tional plan is being held up pending Security 
Council action. He added that the center for 
the buildup of rebel strength would be Brazza- 
ville and that the object is to assemble outside 

assistance, including volunteers and supplies, 
from which a drive would then be launched to 
take Leopoldville. 

Let us understand what is happening. What 
is happening is that outside governments are 
claiming that they — not the Government of the 
Congo— shall decide whether that Government 
can be assisted or whether its enemies shall be 
assisted to overthrow it. 

Obligation of the Security Council 

I submit, Mr. President, that tliis is the prop- 
er and urgent business of this Council — not the 
complaint against a 4-day effort to save inno- 
cent lives wliich has long since ended. This 
is intervention in gross violation of the United 
Nations Charter and of repeated resolutions of 
this Coimcil concerning the Congo. 

On July 22, 1960, by unanimous vote the Se- 
curity Council passed a resolution ^ which re- 
quested "all States to refram from any action 
which might tend to impede the restoration of 
law and order and the exercise by the Govern- 
ment of the Congo of its authority and also 
to refrain from any action which might under- 
mine the territorial integrity and the political 
independence of the Republic of the Congo." 

On November 24, 1961, this Council voted 
another resolution * which urged "all Member 
States to lend their support, according to their 
national procedures, to the Central Govern- 
ment of the Republic of the Congo, in conform- 
ity with the Charter and the decisions of the 
United Nations." 

These resolutions are in full force today. In 
his last report on the Congo to the Security 
Comicil dated June 29, 1964,^ the Secretary- 
General explicity states: ". . . the resolutions 
of the Security Council concerning the Congo 
continue to be applicable, since they have no 
terminal date." 

Obviously all states are not refraining from 
actions which "impede the restoration of law 
and order and the exercise by the Government 
of the Congo of its authority." Obviously all 
states are not refraining from actions which 
"undermine the territorial integrity and the po- 

'For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 223. 
' For text, see ihid.. Dee. 25, 1961, p. 1068. 
" U.N. doc. S/5784. 



litical independence of the Republic of the Con- 
go."' And obviously all states are not lending 
their support to the Government of the Congo 
"in conformity with the Charter and the de- 
cisions of the United Nations." 

It is now up to the Council to see to it that 
these prior decisions are enforced — that the 
flagrant violations of the 1960 and 1961 resolu- 
tions are stopped. 

Tlie danger of foreign intervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of the Congo is no less today — to 
the Congo, to Africa, and to all the world — than 
it was in 1960. It is no less a danger when cer- 
tain of those who intervene are themselves Afri- 
cans. And the responsibility of the United 
Nations is no less clear than it was then. 

My delegation therefore urges the Council to 
reaffirm its support of the imity and territorial 
integrity of the Congo and call on all states to 
refrain from any action which would impede 
the restoration of law and order and the exer- 
cise by the Government of the Congo of its au- 
thority, and to consider, as an urgent matter, 
the establishment of an inspection and investi- 
gation group to proceed to the Congo and to 
report to this Council so that outside interven- 
tion in the affairs of the Government of the Con- 
go can be brought to an end at the earliest pos- 
sible moment. 

But, Mr. President, it is not enough that we 
should merel}- call upon members of this organi- 
zation to refrain from hostile and illegal acts 
against the Government of the Congo. The Se- 
curity Council has a solemn obligation to pro- 
pose constructive and positive solutions to the 
problems which the Congo faces and to do so 
rationally and responsibly, without malice or 
emotion, or political or ideological self-interest. 
Our obligation is to protect and assure the in- 
tegrity and independence of the Congo; it is 
to enable the people of the Congo to select their 
own government and create their own institu- 

Basis for Solution of Congo Problem 

The principles required for a viable solution 
to the Congo are not difficult to identify ; they 
have been inherent in the problem from the be- 
ginning and have formed the basis of repeated 
Security Council resolutions on the Congo prob- 

lem. What are these principles ? 

First, that the unity, territorial integrity, and 
political independence of the Congo should be 
respected and strengthened by all states; 

Second, that all states should refrain from any 
action which might impede the restoration of 
law and order and the exercise by the Govern- 
ment of the Congo of its authority ; 

Tliird, tliat secession, civil war, tribal rival- 
ries, and acts of defiance of the authority of the 
Central Government of the Congo should be 
deplored, as they consistently have been de- 
plored by the Security Coimcil since 1960 ; 

Fourtli, that a heavy responsibility lies in the 
hands of the Government of the Congo to bring 
about a speedy resolution of internal conflicts 
within the country and to hasten the process of 
national reconciliation of responsible elements 
within the nation, in order that the Congo may 
realize its great potential as a strong and free 
nation of Africa and member of the interna- 
tional commimity. 

In this connection, I would like to remind the 
Council that the present Government of the 
Congo was appointed by President Kasavubu 
imder the transitional provisions of the new 
constitution, which charges it with the responsi- 
bility of preparing for national elections to be 
held early next year. I am sure that all member 
states will agi-ee that it is in the interests of the 
Congo, of Africa, and of the world community 
that this government should be given every op- 
portimity — and every encouragement— to create 
the conditions for full and free elections which 
will permit the Congolese people to make their 
own free choice of their own leaders. 

These principles, Mr. President, provide a 
basis on which to build constructively and re- 
sponsibly. But they are, after all, principles 
and have value only as they are translated into 
action. This in turn imposes a heavy obliga- 
tion on all states wlio are in a position to help 
the Government of the Congo— and whose as- 
sistance that Government desires— to redouble 
their efforts to bring about a viable solution to 
the stubborn and debilitating problems that 
plague that country. 

Let me say a few words about those who are 
in a position to help. No country is more aware 

JAXUART 4, 1965 


than my ovm that the Congo is an African coun- 
try. In the interrelated world of today, it 
should be clear that the Congo problem must be 
solved in an African context. It is for this rea- 
son that my Government viewed both with sym- 
pathy and hope the constructive initiative which 
the Council of Ministers of the Organization of 
African Unity took at Addis Ababa in Septem- 
ber in its efforts to contribute to a solution of 
the Congo problems.® The fact that its efforts 
to achieve the objectives set forth in the resolu- 
tion which it passed at that time have not yet 
yielded the desired results should not be cause 
for despair ; it is, instead, a reason for reaffirma- 
tion of the sound principles which were ex- 
pressed in that resolution, and to try to find new 
ways of applying them so as to assist the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo in achieving a 
rapid, peaceful solution of its problems. 

Given the special responsibility of the mem- 
bers of the Organization of African Unity to as- 
sist the Govermnent of the Congo, the United 
Nations also bears a continuing heavy respon- 
sibility to help. This obligation arises not only 
out of the history of its past efforts to assist that 
country but also out of its continuing mandate 
to promote world peace and stability. Al- 
though, for reasons we are all aware of, the 
United Nations has steadily reduced its role in 
the Congo, it nevertheless continues to play a 
most important and constructive part in the re- 
habilitation of the country's economic and social 

Again, my delegation is strongly of the opin- 
ion that it is timely now for the United Nations 
to reexamine both what it is doing and what 
more it could do to assist the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the 
solution of its problems. In saying this, I am 
not suggesting vast new programs or dramatic 
new forms of international assistance to the 
Congo. What I am suggesting is that the 
United Nations, the Organization of African 
Unity, and perhaps such other organs as the 
Economic Commission for Africa, could sev- 
erally or jointly reexamine with the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
the problems which the latter faces and thereby 

bring their combined wisdom and their com- 
bined efforts to bear on the solution of the 
Congo's urgent difficulties. 

At our last meeting, Mr. [Paul-Henri] 
Spaak, the distinguished Foreign Minister of 
Belgium, expressed the strong conviction that 
the problems of the Congo cannot be solved by 
military means alone. My Government whole- 
heartedly concurs in this judgment. We hope 
to see an early end to the rebellion in a manner 
which will assure that all of the Congo's respon- 
sible political, economic, and social resources 
are effectively and peacefully mobilized in tack- 
ling the great tasks of national rehabilitation 
and national building. Toward this end, Mr. 
President, I wish to pledge the wholehearted 
support of my Government to cooperate with 
any and all responsible efforts by this organiza- 
tion, by the OAU, and by other appropriate in- 
ternational organizations. 

With good will, with imagination, and with 
a disinterested sense of our international respon- 
sibilities, the continuing difficulties in the Con- 
go, as with so many of the other stubborn prob- 
lems which this organization has had to fac« 
throughout its history, will yield to the com- 
bined wisdom and urgent efforts of those who 
are dedicated to responsible and constructive 

U.S. Replies to Cuban Charges 
in U.N. Generai Assembly 

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly^ 

It is with regret that I, too, have asked to 
exercise my right of reply, a right which my 
delegation has traditionally exercised very 
sparingly. This morning, however, not only 
the motives of my country but the basic facts 
called into evidence have been so distorted and 
misrepresented that I cannot permit them to 
pass without comment. 

The representative of Cuba [Ernesto "Che" 
Guevara], a man with a long Commimist revolu- 

* For background, 
p. 553. 

see Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, 

'Made In plenary session on Dec. 11 (U.S. delega- 
tion press release 4478). 



tionary record in Latin America, only the lat- 
ter portion of which has been devoted to Cuba, 
made a number of traditional charges against 
tlie United States. He charged that Cuba is 
the victim of attacks launched from this coun- 
try. We do not support or condone hit-and- 
run attacks against ships in the Cuban trade or 
other targets in Cuba. We are taking, as I have 
often repeated in these halls, all precautions to 
insure that raids are not launched, manned, or 
equipped from United States territory. Such 
steps respond to our intention to see to it that 
our laws are respected and not violated with 
impunity. But insistence upon respect of our 
laws should in no way be interpreted as any 
lack of sympathy by the United States Govern- 
ment and people with those Cubans inside and 
outside of that troubled island who long to see 
their country freed from tyranny. We fully 
share their longings and their aspirations. 

We also share the concern of the Organiza- 
tion of American States about Cuba's subversive 
activities, which has been referred to by the 
speakers who have preceded me here this after- 
noon — subversive activities in this hemisphere 
which have compelled the Organization of 
American States to take defensive action to 
bring this aggression to an end. 

It was only 2 years ago, as members of this 
Assembly will recall, when Cuba imported nu- 
clear missiles into this hemisphere under cover 
of deliberate deception of my country and of 
the world.^ 

The overflights of which Mr. Guevara com- 
plained are a substitute for the on-site inspeo 
tion agreed to by the United States and the So- 
viet Union in October 1962,' which Mr. Castro 
refused to permit. It was because of this 
method of assurance against reintroduction of 
missiles that the crisis could be terminated. 
The surveillance flights are authorized by the 
resolution approved by the Organization of 
American States under the Rio Treaty on Octo- 
ber 23, 1962.* As has been made unmistakably 
clear on repeated occasions, this hemisphere will 

' For background, see BuiiXTm of Nov. 12, 1962. 
p. 715. 

• Ibid., p. 741. 

* For text, see ibid., p. 722. 

take measures of self-protection against any 
repetition of the deception practiced in 1962, 
when Cuba collaborated in the installation of 
Soviet nuclear missiles threatening the security 
of all of the Americas. 

The representative of Cuba has also, and not 
surprisingly, demanded the liquidation of the 
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. This base, 
established, as Ambassador [Aquilino] Boyd of 
Panama pointed out, many years ago, was never 
an issue in Cuban and American affairs imtil 
the advent of the present government. On the 
contrary, it has always maintained most excel- 
lent working relations with Cuban officials and 
with the people and contributed substantially to 
the economic welfare of the area where it is 
located. The United States is not prepared to 
submit to unilateral cancellation of its treaty 

The representative of Cuba has also attacked 
the people of Puerto Rico and their association 
with my country. It seems ironic that the rep- 
resentative of a totalitarian dictatorship should 
attack the free democracy of Puerto Rico. The 
people of Puerto Rico recently held elections for 
a new Governor and a legislature. The results 
of the election speak for themselves. Propo- 
nents of association with the United States won 
a clear majority. Proponents of separation 
from the United States won less than 3 percent 
of the vote. 

The Cuban delegate mentioned self-determi- 
nation. It would be pertinent to ask why the 
Cuban people have not been given the same 
right of free self-determination exercised by the 
people of Puerto Rico. 

Tlie spokesman for Cuba has also sought to 
excuse its own economic disappointments by 
blaming measures of economic self-defense 
taken by other nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere. But Cuba's economic difficulties are of 
her own making. Soon after seizing power, the 
Cuban leaders, betraying their promises of free- 
dom and justice, began their attempts to destroy 
the existing social and economic structure. 
They found, however, that it is infinitely easier 
to destroy than to build. Mismanagement and 
doctrinaire excesses have brought a steady de- 
cline in productivity. 

The collective and individual actions of the 

JANUARY 4, 196.5 


governments of this hemisphere to restrict trade 
with Cuba are defensive measures taken in re- 
sponse to Cuba's continued promotion of 
subversion and violence elsewhere in the hemi- 
sphere. A principal purpose of this interfer- 
ence and this violence is to thwart the 
cooperative efforts of the member nations of the 
OAS, embodied in the Alliance for Progress, 
which is designed to bring about a far-reaching 
economic and social transformation in Latin 
America. To safeguard this movement toward 
democratic reform — which the Communist re- 
gime in Havana cannot tolerate — the nations of 
the hemisphere have been obliged to take meas- 
ures, including economic measures, to blunt and 
nuEify Cuban intervention and aggression. 

The representative of Cuba even stated that 
my Government is prohibiting the export of 
medicines to Cuba. This allegation, like his 
other charges, is completely without founda- 
tion. We are strictly following the decision of 
the OAS of July 26, 1964,= which excepted 
foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies pro- 
vided for humanitarian purposes from the 
economic measures applied to the Castro regime. 

Mr. President, the truth is that the Cuban 
government's quarrel is not with the United 
States alone but with all the governments of 
this hemisphere, five of whom have already 
spoken here this afternoon. All American gov- 
ernments — not just the United States — decided 
that the Marxist system imposed on Cuba by 
Castro was incompatible with the principles and 
purposes of the inter-American system. All 
American governments — not just the United 
States — authorized the taking of necessary steps 
to make sure that Soviet-furnished missiles and 
other weapons which seriously threatened the 
peace and security of the hemisphere were with- 
drawn from Cuba. More than two-thirds of the 
American governments — not just the United 
States — condemned the Cuban government for 
aggression and intervention against Venezuela 
last July. 

The decisions reached within the framework 
of the inter-American system illustrate the ne- 
cessity of fimdamental changes in the policies 
and actions of the Cuban government before any 

real importance can be attached to vague Cu- 
ban references to "negotiating differences." 

President Johnson stated last July," when 
asked about such offers : 

I am much more Interested In the deeds than the 
words [of the Castro regime], and I shall carefully 
watch for any actions . . . that I think would be 
in the best Interest of the people of Cuba and the peo- 
ple of the world. 

I think, sir, all the hemisphere awaits the 
deeds. The words have lost their meaning. 

Security Council Extends Mandate 
of Cyprus Peace Force 

Following is a statement made in the Security 
Council hy Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Rep- 
resentative, on Deceniber 18, together with the 
text of a resolution adopted unanimously hy the 
Council on that day. 


U.S. /D.N. press release 4482 

My delegation is especially gratified at the 
action just taken by the Council today 'm. ex- 
tending the mandate of UNFICYP [United 
Nations Force in Cyprus] . This decision made 
in response to the desire of the Government of 
Cyprus and the recommendation of the Secre- 
tai-y-General is clearly in the interest of the 
search for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus 

Fortunately, we have once again had the 
benefit of an outstanding report ^ to the Coun- 
cil prepared and submitted by the Secretary- 
General, wliich summarizes the actions taken by 
the Special Representative of the Secretary- 
General on Cyprus, the Commander of the 
Force, and the commimities on the island to 
move toward resumption of normal activities. 
It also clearly outlines the attitudes of the par- 
ties on the island and notes the limitations with- 
in which all must work. 

° For background, see ihid., Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174. 

'At a news conference at Washington on July 10. 
' U.N. doc. S/6102 and Corr. 1. 



The past 3-month period has been marked by 
more real progress than the previous periods 
combined. Sly delegation notes that, although 
he recognizes the political limitations on his 
task, Ambassador [Carlos Alfredo] Bernardes 
has indicated that furtlier progress can be made 
in the effort to establish an improved climate 
within which the distinguished mediator, Mr. 
Galo Plaza, can carry out the very difficult task 
which this Council has given to him. Certainly 
the report gives rise to the hope that with the 
continued presence of UNFICYP, there will be 
no further serious incidents on the island which 
could threaten international peace and secu- 
rity. My Government pays tribute to the con- 
tribution toward peace of all those serving in 
UNFICYP, past and present, as well as to the 
governments who have provided troops, police, 
logistic and financial support to the United Na- 
tions Force. 

I wish to empliasize, however, that the United 
States hopes for substantially more progress in 
the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem 
during the next 3 months than during the past 
3 months. Tlirough the exercise of restraint 
and generositj', a peaceful solution can and 
must be found. Our earnest good wishes go to 
all those in whose hands this solution rests. 


C.N. doc. S/6121 

The Security Council, 

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General 
(S/6102) recommends the maintenance In Cyprus of 
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the 
Security Council resolution of 4 March 19G4 (S/5575)* 
for an additional i>eriod of three months, 

Notin/j that the Government of Cyprus has indicated 
its desire that the stationing of the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 De- 
cember 1964, 

Noting with satisfaction that the report of the Secre- 
tary-General (S/6102) indicates that the situation in 
Cyprus has improved and that significant progress has 
been made, 

Reneicing the expression of its deep appreciation to 
the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementa- 
tion of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 
1964, 13 March 1964,' 20 June 1964 * and 25 September 

Reneicing the expression of Its deep appreciation to 
the States that have contribnted troops, police, sxip- 

plies and financial support for the implementation of 
the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 Jlarch 1964, 13 
March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 ' and 25 Sep- 
tember 1964, and the consensus expressed by the Presi- 
dent at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 ; 

2. Calls upon all Member States to comply with the 
above-mentioned resolutions ; 

3. Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral (S/6102) ; 

4. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the 
Security Council resolution of 4 Jlarch 1964 for an ad- 
ditional period of three months, ending 26 March 1965. 

United States Urges Restraint 
on Israel and Syria 

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

UjS. Representative in the Security CouTicil^ 

I was pleased to hear so many expressions 
here today of regard for the late Arkady A. 
Sobolev. May I also add mine, for I had the 
privilege of knowing him from the first days of 
his service in the United Nations almost 20 
years ago and fully shared the respect and the 
admiration which he earned and which he en- 
joyed among all of those who knew him. 

Mr. President, the presence here at our table 
today of a distinguished international figure, 
Ambassador da Cunha, Minister of Foreign 
Relations of Brazil, is an honor to this Council 
and also, I believe, a meaningfid testimony to 
the importance which his great country at- 
taches to the United Nations. Therefore I take 
advantage of this opportunity to thank him for 
his participation in our deliberations and also 
for the significant speech that he delivered in 
the General Assembly this morning. 

Mr. President, the recent incident on the 
Israel -Syrian frontier presents once more the 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466. 
' U.N. doc. S/5G03 ; not printed here. 

• For text, see Bulletin of July 13, 1964, p. 67. 

• U.N. doc. S/5986 ; not printed here. For texts of 
U.S. statements, see Hid., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 561. 

• For text, see ihid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 3ia 

' Made In the Security Council on Dec. 3 (U.S./U.N. 
press release 4474) . 

JANUARY 4, 1965 


tragic spectacle of two countries which have 
been unable to live as friendly or even as peace- 
ful neighbors. For 7 years the boundary land 
between Syria and Israel has known little 
peace. There the people have lived and have 
worked under the continual shadow of mutual 
distrust, of bitter hostility and repeated inci- 
dents of violence which have so often reached 
this Council chamber. 

The United Nations and this Council have 
attempted to end this conflict now for many 
years, to mitigate its effects and to offer alterna- 
tives to violence. Our success can be measured 
in fractions, in things partially achieved and in 
the avoidance of more serious conflict through 
timely United Nations action. 

Now once again the Truce Supervision Or- 
ganization, acting under the most difficult con- 
ditions, has served the organization with cour- 
age and with distinction. Within 2 hours after 
the shooting began, United Nations officers ar- 
ranged a cease-fire. Subsequently the Chief 
of Staff presented the Council with a compre- 
hensive report '' on the facts. We are grateful 
to him and to his staff for the light that they 
have cast on this most recent unfortunate inci- 
dent and for their careful analysis of its causes. 

It is now the duty of the Council to use this 
information, to use these interviews, these dia- 
grams and statistics, in order to put into per- 
spective the claims of both parties and particu- 
larly to make recommendations for the future. 
We have listened to statements by the distin- 
guished representatives of the parties with care- 
ful attention. 

I confess my profound disappointment that 
on November 13 Syria and Israel once again 
saw fit to resort to arms. We are disappointed 
that they were instantly prepared to do so with 
armaments that have no place in defensive areas, 
but the first shot fired from a rifle quickly esca- 
lated into fire on the spot and elsewhere by 
tanks, by artillery, and finally by jet aircraft. 
We are saddened, as previous speakers have said 
here, by the loss of life on both sides. We find 
it difficult to excuse the readiness with which 
the whole military action was undertaken. 

The general significance of the events is clear : 

' U.N. doc. S/6061, Corr. 1 and 2, and Add. 1. 

In a time of tension and the buildup of military 
forces, controversial activity along the armistice 
line was met with abrupt firing across it. In- 
stead of resorting in the first instance to United 
Nations machinery, each side struck immedi- 
ately at the other. And according to recent re- 
ports this pattern of activity has even been 

Within the context of what has been done in 
the past, the Council should, we believe, now 
recommend ways to make such incidents less 
likely to occur in the future. The United Na- 
tions Truce Supervision Organization Chief of 
Staff offers us some specific steps. 

In paragraph 24 of his report, as has been 
noted, he asks: "Is the reconstructed Israeli 
track entirely, as asserted by Israel, on the Israel 
side of the Armistice Demarcation Line or does 
it at some places encroach upon Syrian terri- 
tory, as asserted by Syria?" A clear answer to 
that question should prevent the possibility of 
further encroachment or even the suspicion of it. 

Such an answer could be provided by an inde- 
pendent survey of the line, the results of which 
we would hope could be accepted by both par- 
ties. Syria and Israel have implied their will- 
ingness to cooperate in that undertaking. The 
representative of Israel said a few days ago 
that Israel was prepared to agree to the contin- 
uation of the survey to establish the position of 
the track in relation to the border. And the 
representative of Syria has also cited in a recent 
statement before the Council paragraph 24, 
which sets forth the advantages of an inde- 
pendent frontier survey, and has declared his 
Government's belief that the question of the 
relocation of the Israel track in relation to the 
armistice line should, and I believe I quote him 
correctly, "not be left in abeyance." Mr. Presi- 
dent, upon the success of limited surveys de- 
pends the possibility of more general ones. The 
former is at present a necessity. The latter is 
desirable in the future. 

We would urge both sides to avoid any fur- 
ther provocative acts and to take seriously the 
counsels of self-restraint contained in para- 
graph 25 of the report, that is, to submit com- 
plaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission, 
rather than to commence shooting, and to sus- 
pend activities about which a party has com- 




plained if the chairman of the Commission 
deems it necessary during an investigation or 
after its results :iro known. These are not triv- 
ial or temporary exhortations. They embody 
the elements of cooperation without which the 
General iVrmistice Agreements would be dis- 
honored and ineffective. 

In paragraph 26 of the report the Chief of 
Staff points out the crippling effect which a 
semioperated Mixed Armistice Commission has 
upon UNTSO's effort to effect an orderly truce. 
Full participation in the activities of the Mixed 
Armistice Commission more than any other sin- 
gle act would increase the chances for a more 
effective observance of the truce by both sides. 
Full participation by both parties would add 
greatly to the authority of the Commission and 
reduce the suspicion and the uncertainties which 
give birth to these repeated acts of violence. 

All of us here know that peace is more than 
the absence of war. A Council table in New 
York cannot legislate peace to the people who 
live in the settlements in the towns near Tel El 
Qadi, nor can the Council dictate to the Govern- 
ments of Israel and of Syria that they must live 
at peace with each other. We can only recom- 
mend, urge, plead with all of our energy that the 
mechanisms for peaceful settlement and not 
guns be used. If they were, it is not beyond 
hope that we should never again discuss this 
subject which has come so often to this Council 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or proccmed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. D.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting comments 
received from governments and international organi- 
zations and institutions concerning technical as- 
sistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemina- 
tion, and wider appreciation of international law. 
A/5744. October 22. 1964. 68 pp. 

Letter dated October 28 from the Repre.sentative of the 
United Arab Republic transmitting the text of the 

declaration entitled "Programme for Peace and Inter- 
national Co-Operation," adopted by the second con- 
ference of heads of state or government of nonalined 
countries, held at Cairo October 5-10. A/5763. 
October 29. 1964. 38 pp. 

Note verbale dated October 28 from the Representative 
of Iran transmitting the text of a message sent by 
the Shah to heads of states concerning the world 
campaign for universal literacy. A/5704. October 
30, 1964. 3 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on observance of the 
15th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. A/INF.106. Novem- 
ber 2, 1964. 35 pp. 

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the cor- 
respondence relating to the decision to postpone the 
opening date of the 19th regular session of the As- 
sembly to December 1. A/5773. November 5, 1964. 

Note by the Secretary-General on activities in the field 
of industrial development. A/5775. November 6, 
1964. 3 pp. 

Note by the Secretary-General on the world campaign 
for universal literacy. A/5776. November 6, 1964. 
2 pp. 

Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
Letter dated October 29 from the U.S. Representative 
on the Committee transmitting texts of principal 
statements made by U.S. representatives in Sub- 
committees II and III on each of the American ter- 
ritories considered by those subcommittees. A/AC. 
109/104. November 6, 1964. 34 pp. 

Supplementary list of items proposed for inclusion in 
the agenda of the 19th regular session of the General 
Assembly. A/5760/Rev. 1. November 9, 1964. 2 pp. 

Letter dated November 7 from the Representative of 
the U.S.S.R. concerning the U.N. financial crisis. 
A/5777. November 9, 1964. 8 pp. 

Note by the Secretary-General on the United Nationa 
Training and Research Institute. A/5778. Novem- 
ber 9, 1964. 1 p. 

Letter dated November 6 from the Representatives of 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. transmitting 
documents relating to the second memorandum of 
understanding to implement the bilateral space agree- 
ment of June 8, 1962. A/5779. November 9, 1964. 
6 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the question of 
South-West Africa. A/5781, November 10, 1964. 6 

Report of the Secretary-General on special educational 
and training programs for South-West Africa. A/ 
5782. November 10, 19f>4. 18 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the special training 
program for territories under Portuguese administra- 
tion. A/5783. November 11, 1964. 15 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on offers by member 
states of study and training facilities for inhabitants 
of non-self-governing territories. A/5784. Novem- 
ber 11, 1964. 13 pp. 

Note by the Secretary-General on population growth 
and economic development. A/5786. November 16. 
1964. 2 pp. 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 

Letters dated October 9, 12, and 27 and November 27 
from the Representative of the United States giving 
information on U.S. space vehicles in orbit or beyond. 
A/AC.105/INF.80, October 16, 1964; A/AC.105/ 
INF.81, October 16. 1964; A/AC.10.5/INF.S2, Novem- 
ber 4, 1964; A/AC.105/INF.S4, December 3, 1964. 
2 pp. each. 

JANTTART 4, 1965 



Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Iran of 
March 5, 1957 (TIAS 4207), for cooperation con- 
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at 
Vienna December 4, 1964. Enters into force on the 
date on which the agency accepts the initial inven- 

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Iran, United States. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, December 2, 1964. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Information 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. 
Done at Paris June 18, 1964." 

Notification received that it is willing to he bound 
by terms of the agreement: Netherlands, Decem- 
ber 11, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS .5433. 

Ratifications deposited: Dahomey, December 15, 
1964 ; Spain, December 17, 1964. 

Postal Services 

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, 
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding 
air mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa Octo- 
ber 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 
Ratification deposited: Iran, October 9, 1964. 

Safety of Life at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Enters into 
force May 26, 1965. 
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, December 1, 1964. 


Congo (Leopoldville) 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 

1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at L^opold- 
ville December 9, 1964. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 9, 1964. 
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreements of February 23, 1963, as amended (TIAS 
5461, 5484, 5653), and April 28, 1964, as amended 
(TIAS 5565, 5662). Effected by exchange of notes 
at L^opoldville December 9, 1964. Entered into force 
December 9, 1964. 


Agreement relating to a joint cost-sharing program for 
the production of equipment and the providing of 
technical assistance for the base air defense ground 
environment (BADGE) system. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tokyo December 4, 1964. Entered 
into force December 4, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1731- 
1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Nairobi 
December 7, 1964. Entered into force December 7, 


Agreement supplementing the agreements of Novem- 
ber 15, 1951, and January 15, 1957 (TIAS 2500, 3761), 
so as to provide for additional investment guaranties 
authorized by new United States legislation. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Ankara November 27, 
1964. Entered into force November 27, 1964. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement relating to fishing operations in the North- 
eastern Pacific Ocean. Signed at Washington De- 
cember 14, 1964. Entered into force December 14, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of January 9, 1964, as amended (TIAS 
5514, 5563, 5627). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon November 30, 1964. Entered into force No- 
vember 30, 1964. 

' Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, "Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to December 14 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Btjlletin is No. 519 of 
December 11. 





Date Subject 

12/14 U.S. participation in International 

12/14 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on North- 
east Pacific fishing operations. 

12/14 Arrangement on exchange of 
shipping information. 

523 12/18 NATO communique (revised). 

♦Not printed. 



INDEX Vol LII, No. lSSi2 January 4, 1965 

Cambodia. U.S.-Caml>odian Talks End Without 
Agreement 6 

Colombia. I'.S. Plans New Sea-Level Canal and 
Now Treaty on Existing Canal (Johnson) . . 5 

Congo (Leopoldville). U.S. Cites Illegal In- 
terference in Support of Congo Rebellion 
(Stevenson) 15 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreign Policy 14 

Costa Rica. U.S. Plans New Sea-Level Canal 
and New Treaty on Existing Canal (John- 
son) 5 

Cuba. U.S. Replies to Cuban Charges in U.N. 
General Assembly (Stevenson) 24 

Cyprus. Security Council Extends Mandate of 
Cyprus Peace Force (Yost, text of resolu- 
tion) 26 

Economic Affairs 

Fifteen Nations To Exchange Shipping Informa- 
tion 13 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Fishing 
Operations OfC Alaska 14 

Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Larrea Cor- 
dova) 4 

Israel. United States Urges Restraint on Israel 
and Syria (Stevenson) 27 

Italy. President Congratulates Italian People 
on Launching of Satellite (statement) ... 12 

Korea. Letters of Credence (Kim) 4 

Mali. Letters of Credence (Kelta) 4 

Nicaragua. U.S. Plans New Sea-Level Canal 
and New Treaty on Existing Canal (John- 
son) 5 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North 
Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Meeting at 
Paris (Rusk, communique) 2 


Letters of Credence (Arias Espinosa) .... 4 

U.S. Plans New Soa-Level Canal and New Treaty 
on Existing Canal (Johnson) 5 

Presidential Documents 

Industrial Research Leaders Return From Soviet 

Union 12 

President Congratulates Italian People on 

Launching of Satellite 12 

U.S. Plans New Sea-Level Canal and New Treaty 
on Existing Canal 6 


Industrial Research Leaders Return I"rom Soviet 
Union (White House announcement, remarks 
by President) X2 

President Congratulates Italian People on 
Launching of Satellite (statement) .... 12 

Syria. United States Urges Restraint on Israel 
and Syria (Stevenson) 27 

Tanzania. Letters of Credence (Shariff) . . 4 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 30 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Fishing 
Operations Off Alaska 14 


Industrial Research Leaders Return From Soviet 
Union (White House announcement, remarks 
by President) 12 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Fishing 
Operations Off Alaska 14 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 29 

The Evolution of Rising Responsibility (Cleve- 
land) 7 

Security Council Extends Mandate of" Cyprus 
Peace Force (Yost, text of resolution) ... 26 

U.S. Cites Illegal Interference in Support of 
Congo Rebellion (Stevenson) 15 

U.S. Replies to Cuban Charges in U.N. General 

Assembly (Stevenson) 24 

United States Urges Restraint on Israel and 
Syria (Stevenson) 27 

Viet-Nam. Letters of Credence (Tran Thien 

Khiem) 4 

Zambia. Letters of Credence (Soko) .... 4 

Name Index 

Arias Espinosa, Rlcardo 4 

Cleveland, Harlan 7 

Johnson, President 5, 12 

Keita, Moussa Leo 4 

Kim, Hyun Chul 4 

Larrea Cordova, Gustavo 4 

Rusk, Secretary 2 

Shariff, Othman 4 

Soko, Hosea J 4 

Stevenson, Adlal E 15, 24, 27 

Tran Thien Khiem 4 

Yost, Charles W 26 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 

WASHINGTON., D.C., 20402 






1965: International Cooperation Year 

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International 
Cooperation Year." This Foreign Affairs Outline discusses this theme by pointing out that "interna- 
tional cooperation is a fact of life; indeed . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 
20th century." 

Included in this pamphlet is a statement by President Johnson in which he proposes to dedicate 
1965 "to finding new techniques for making man's knowledge serve man's welfare. . . . Let it be a 
turning point in the struggle — not of man against man, but of man against nature. In the midst of 
tension let us begin to chart a course toward the possibilities of conquest which bypass the politics of 
the cold war." 






Please send me copies of Foreign Affairs Outline — 1965: International 

Cooperation Year. 




Dnclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
ible to Supt. of Documents) 









Vol LI I, No. ISSS 

January 11, 1965 



Statements hy Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 1(3 


Statement hy Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Act of Washington Jfi 


Statement hy Stardey Nehnrier Jfi 

Far index see iriside hack cover 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 23 

Press release 528 dated December 23 

Secretary Rush: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. I would like to extend to this dis- 
tinguished press corps my warm personal sea- 
son's greetings. I hope that we and others can 
manage our affairs in such a way that you will 
have a chance to spend at least some time with 
your families during this holiday season. I can't 
guarantee it, but we will do our best. 

As we come toward the end of the year, you 
may be interested in a few thoughts about how 
the end of the year looks. I shall not make ex- 
tensive remarks because I want to get to your 
questions, but you may be interested in noting 
that the process of change continues through- 
out the world. We have relations with 115 
countries. During this calendar year there vsdll 
have been elections or changes of government in 
more than 45 of them, so that your lives and 
my life never become boring. 

As far as our allies are concerned, our more 
than 40 allies are secure and gi'owing in as- 
surance, developing economically to greater 
levels of prosperity. I think if there is any 
particular question among our allies that gives 

us the gravest concern at the moment it will 
be, of course, the miresolved issue of Cyprus, 
which has deeply divided oui* two friends, 
Greece and Turkey. 

Reasons for Encouragement in Hemisphere 

Here in tliis hemisphere there have been many 
retisons for encouragement this year. Events 
in Venezuela and Brazil and Chile and else- 
where seem to indicate that Castroism is not 
accepted as an answer to the problems of this 
hemisphere. It is true that Cuba continues to 
pursue a jiolicy of interference, but that inter- 
ference has been reduced considerably by the 
sharp reaction of the hemisphere to the Cuban 
effort. The meeting of the foreign ministers 
in July ^ made the attitude of the countries of 
the Western Hemisphere entirely clear on this 
pomt. We thought the hemisphere made a 
notable step forward in working out simple pro- 
cedures for the admission of new members in 

^ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on July 22 
and text of the Final Act, see Bulletin of Aug. 10, 
1964, p. 174. 


Tb* Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Usaed by the Office 
of Media Serrlcea, Bnreao of Public Af- 
fairs, provldeB tie public and Interested 
acendea of the QoTemment with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
foreign relatione and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Herrtce. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on rarl- 
ons phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Interna- 
tional Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are Hated currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Peici : 52 Issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 10, 

KOTB : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is Indexed In the Eeaders' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



its latest meeting,'- and we look forward to the 
entry into the hemisphere family of Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 

"We were encouraged to leani from the Isust 
PLconomic and Social Comicil meeting in Peru ^ 
that the hemisphere expects to exceed the 
growth-rate target set under the Alliance for 
Progress — the growth-rate target of 2.5 percent. 
Although there is some unevemiess here and 
there, the general progress has been most en- 
couraging. The primary products have come 
up to good prices, and trade is improving among 
our Latin American friends. 

Western Europe and NATO 

In Western Europe our NATO meeting* 
clearly reflected the fact that these coimtries 
feel more prosperous and more secure than at 
any time, I think, since the war. The problems 
within the alliance have to do with how Europe 
is to be formed in the long run, what Europe 
is to be, and that is a great historical question 
which will take some time and on which I think 
we need not be too impatient. 

There is still the unresolved question of the 
management of the nuclear problems of the 
alliance, and those^will be up for considerable 
discussion in the weeks and months ahead. As 
far as we are concerned, we have taken the 
view that there are two ways to come into the 
so-called nuclear club : One is to possess nuclear 
weapons ; the other is to be a target for nuclear 
weapons. This problem was transformed back 
in the fifties when the Soviet Union developed 
large numbers of missiles aimed at our NATO 
allies, in addition to the intercontinental mis- 
siles aimed at us. And so those countries who 
are the targets of nuclear weapons have an un- 
derstandable interest in the problem, a desire 
to know about it, to participate in the answers to 
the problem, and to be sure that their interests 
are fully taken into account in all discussions 
of nuclear matters. And that is why the Euro- 
pean initiative in the summer of 1960 led to Mr. 

• See p. 46. 

• For a statement made by Assistant Secretary Mann 
before the Inter-American Economic and Social Coun- 
cil at Lima on Dec. 8, see Buixetin of Dec. 28, 1964, 
p. 898. 

' For background, see ibid., Jan. 4, 1965, p. 2. 

Herter's proposal in December 1960 ° and which 
has been the subject of discussion in the alli- 
ance since that time. Those discussions will 
continue in the weeks ahead. 

There has been some considerable improve- 
ment, I think, in the relations between the West 
and the countries of Eastern Europe. This, I 
think, is a positive development in world af- 
fairs and one which we should watch with inter- 
est and to which we should take a positive 

Problems in South Viet-Nam and the Congo 

There are in other parts of the world some 
extremely dangerous issues. The most imme- 
diate one — the most immediate two are in South- 
east Asia and in the Congo. In South Viet-Nam 
the problem is a combination of unity within the 
country and pressures and infiltration from the 
outside. We believe very strongly that both 
these elements need an answer, that both are im- 
portant to the security and the independence 
of South Viet-Nam, and that unity is a primary 
requirement for a solution to that problem; and 
undoubtedly we will have a chance to come 
back to that in a few moments. 

In the Congo the situation there has become 
threatening at the end of the year because of 
outside intervention." As far as we are con- 
cerned, we have for 5 years provided assistance 
to the Government of the Congo and to the 
United Nations in an agreed policy of sustain- 
ing the unity and the independence of that 
great country in the heart of Africa. We do not 
consider that, our assistance to the Congo Gov- 
ernment is intervention, as some have said. 
There is almost not a countiy in Africa which 
is not receiving assistance at the request of its 
government from someone outside the continent, 
and indeed there are continuing United Nations 
resolutions which encourage members to give 
assistance to the Congo and to the Government. 
It is quite another thing in the sort of interven- 
tion that is reflected in furnishing arms il- 
le"-allv to rebel elements. This is not a matter 

' For baeksround, see ihid., .Tan. 9, 1961, p. 39. 

"For a statement made by Ambassador Adlai B. 
Stevenson before the Security Council on Dec. 14, see 
ihid., Jan. 4, 19C.5, p. 15. 

JANXTART 11, 1965 


that turns just on personalities, as is sometimes 
said. This type of intervention began under 
Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula. 

So Africa is faced with the possibility of the 
cold war intruding itself into the heart of 
Africa and the possibility that the Congo be- 
comes a deeply divisive issue among the 
African states themselves. We hope very much 
that the Security Council and the OAU [Or- 
ganization of African Unity] can keep in close 
touch with each other and find a peaceful and a 
prompt answer to the problems that exist there. 

Need for Settlement of German Question 

Looking around the world historically I 
would say that one of the most urgent needs is 
to find a permanent, peaceful, and satisfactory 
settlement for the German question. I know of 
no other issue which, if satisfactorily resolved 
on the basis of the self-determination of the peo- 
ple directly concerned, could have more far- 
reaching consequences in the long run for the 
security and the stability of all of Europe, West 
and East, and which could more effectively open 
the door to far-reaching measures in disarma- 
ment and thereby relieve so much of the burden 
of resources which are now placed upon the peo- 
ples of both Eastern and Western Europe and 
upon the United States. The settlement which 
could relieve those resources would free them 
for the unfinislied business of our peoples, and 
so we would hope that in 1965, 20 years after 
the war is over, we could make some serious 
progress toward a permanent settlement of that 
difficult problem. 

Rights of Legation 

I might also call your attention to a statement 
that I made recently with respect to rights of 
legation.'' At year-end we find ourselves con- 
cerned about the erosion in these historical 
rights of intergovernmental representation 
which are the very heart of the structure of in- 
ternational i-elations. It has taken several cen- 
turies to get^ these rights of legation on a stable 
basis. It is not necessary that governments al- 
ways agree with each other, but it is necessary 
that, if they are to have communication with 

' For test, see ibid., Dec. 28, 1964, p. 905. 

each other and to have some chance to establish 
their relationships on a reciprocal basis, these 
elementai-y rights of legation be fully respected. 
And we have been concerned in this past year by 
the negligence on the part of some governments 
in protecting official installations and accord- 
ing our official representatives abroad the tradi- 
tional rights which diplomacy insists upon. 

These are matters which cannot help but 
affect adversely bilateral relations between us 
and others, and I would just like to point out to 
you that we shall be sensitive on these matters, 
because they are important and they do affect 
the structure of international society. 

Well, these are some of the things that are 
on my mind. As you can see, as usual it is a 
mixed situation, a clianging situation. There 
are elements for encouragement — assurance, 
gratitude — in many parts of the world. There 
are elements of danger — South Viet-Nam, the 
Congo — which need and will get our continu- 
ing attention, and there is always much un- 
finished business still ahead of us. 

Now I will take your questions. 

The Vietnamese Situation 

Q. Mr. Secret ary, could you go Into more 
detail in your assessm-ent of the Vietnamese sit- 
uation and what can he done about it? 

A. Well, at the present time the most imme- 
diate question has to do with unity among the 
leadership in South Viet-Nam. 

Let me say at the veiy beginning that Ambas- 
sador [Maxwell D.] Taylor is there as the 
spokesman for the United States, for the Presi- 
dent. He is there carrying out American policy, 
a policy which is primarily that of assisting the 
South Vietnamese to gain and maintain their 
own security. He speaks for the Government 
of this country, and we shall back him in every 
possible way. 

Now, the immediate problem, which has been 
under discussion, is that of unity within the 
leadership and relations between the civilian 
authorities and the militai-y authorities. It is 
not for lis to insist uijon a particular detailed 
pattern. There are many ways in which gov- 
ernments can organize themselves. But, never- 
theless, on the initiative of the military authori- 



ties themsolvcs, there was brought into being a 
civilian government to undertake the normal 
civilian responsibilities of government. And 
the military authorities indicated that it was 
their desire to restrict themselves to their mili- 
tary duties and get on with the war against the 
Viet Cong. 

Now, what is important is not detail. "What 
is important is not even personality. What is 
important is unity, the setting aside of personal 
rivalries or lesser issues in the interest of main- 
taining the strength and the unity of the 

"\\'e believe that all those who have positions 
of leadership or responsibility might well put 
their personal considerations aside, just as the 
vast number of ordinary- South Vietnamese put 
personal considerations aside, and just as our 
Americans, who are out there in the field assist- 
ing them in their great struggle, put personal 
considerations aside. 

And so we hope very much that in this period 
of discussion that is now going on, and to wliich 
I cannot from here go into detail at this moment 
without perhaps getting in the way of discus- 
sions going on in Saigon — we hope vei-y much 
that this overriding need for common effort and 
unified action will impress itself upon all ele- 
ments there, because unity would be worth 
many, many divisions and unity would open the 
way for a more prompt and manageable solu- 
tion to the severe problems that exist in that 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your oferdng remarks 
you expressed the hope that the German ques- 
tion may he settled, that ''65 will be tlie begin- 
ning of the settlement of the German question. 
What are your plans, can you tell us, to realize 
this hope? 

A. Well, I cannot myself tell you that there 
are indications, say, from the Soviet Union that 
it's going to be easy to achieve a permanent set- 
tlement of the German question during this next 
year. But we shall be in touch with our col- 
leagues in France and Great Britain and the 
Federal Republic. 

We have had discussions in Paris recently, as 
you know, on this subject. We shall be con- 

tinuing those discussions in the weeks ahead. 
We do hope that some means can be found to 
advance this question beyond the point where 
it exists at the present time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what happens if, in Viet- 
Nam, the Vietnamese military leaders decline to 
set up a goverrmient which is civilian in char- 

A. Well, I gather that — my present under- 
standing, Mr. Scali [Jolm Scali, American 
Broadcasting Company], is that this is not the 
issue which they opposed. The latest reports 
I have indicate that they support the present 
government there. But the question has to 
do with complete unity of action and loyal sup- 
port to the arrangements which have been 
agreed upon. I can't go into detail on that 
because, as I say, we are in the midst of discus- 
sions in Saigon at the present tune. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, General [Nguyen'] Khanh 
made som,e comments yesterday that have been 
interpreted as anti- American. I wonder, sir, if 
you could assess for us hotv tcidespread is any 
feelvng of anti-Americanism in South Viet- 
Nam, and how seriously do you taJce it? 

A. Well, I noted those remarks, and I don't 
want to get into a personal discussion with the 
General on these matters. Some of them, I 
suspect, might have been made in the heat of 
the moment. But we do not find, in our rela- 
tions with a large number of Vietnamese, 
through our own representatives in Saigon and 
in the field, that there is any anti-American 
sentiment around the country. 

American Interest in Vietnamese Independence 

Q. Mr. Secretary, It is sometimes staled that 
one of the reasons for American assistance to 
Viet-Nam is the fact that vital Western inter- 
ests are involved in the situation there. Now 
tlmt we are once again confronted with what 
apparently is a critical situation, could you de- 
fine for tos the precise nature and the extent of 
those vital Western interests, as you see tliem? 

A. Well, our interest in Southeast Asia has 
been developed and expressed throughout this 
postwar period. Before SEATO [Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization] came into existence, 

JANUARY 11. 1965 


■we and Britain and France were in very close 
touch with that situation. SEATO under- 
lined the importance we attached to the security 
of the countries of that area. 

But, actually, the American interest can be 
expressed in very simple terms. "VVliere there 
is a country which is independent and secure 
and in a position to work out its own policy 
and be left alone by its neighbors, there is a 
country whose position is consistent with our 
understanding of our interests in the world. 
It's just as simple as that. 

If we have military persomiel in Southeast 
Asia, it is because we feel that they are needed 
to assist South Viet-Nam at the present time 
to maintain its security and independence. If 
South Viet-Nam's neighbors would leave it 
alone, those military people could come home. 
We have no desire for any bases or perma- 
nent military presence in that area. We are 
interested in the independence of states. That 
is why we have more than 40 allies. That is 
why we are interested in the independence and 
security of the nonalined countries. Because, 
to us, the general system of states represented 
in the United Nations Charter is our view of a 
world that is consistent with American inter- 
ests. So our own interest there is very simple. 
But it is very important, because we feel that 
we have learned in the last many decades that 
a persistent course of aggression left to go un- 
checked can only lead to a general war and 
therefore that the independence of particular 
countries is a matter of importance to the gen- 
eral peace. 

Peiping's Militant Doctrine 

Q. Mr. Secretary., could I put that question 
slightly diflerently? In the last decade or so, 
over three or four administrations, this Gov- 
ernment has taken the position that the Indo- 
china peninsula had an importance to this coun- 
try leyond the actualities of the countries 
involved; that is, that it had a relationship to 
the American problem with China, and out of 
this developed, over a long period of time, the 
so-called falling -domino theory. Could you tell 
us whether you subscribe to that theory and 
whether you look upon our interest in Viet-Nam 

and Laos— or how you look upon our interest 
in Viet-Nam and Laos in relation to China? 

A. Well, I would not myself go to the trou- 
ble of trying to outline a "domino" theory. The 
theory of the problem rests in Peiping. It rests 
m a militant approach to the spread of the 
world revolution as seen from the Communist 
point of view. And we know, given their fre- 
quently and publicly proclaimed ambitions in 
this respect and what they say not only about 
their neighbors in Asia but such continents as 
Africa— Africa is ripe for revolution, meaning 
to them ripe for an attempt on their part to 
extend their domination into that continent- 
there is a primitive, militant doctrine of world 
revolution that would attempt to destroy the 
structure of international life as written into 
the United Nations Charter. 

Now, these are appetites and ambitions that 
grow upon feeding. In 1954 Viet-Nam was di- 
vided.* North Viet-Nam became Communist. 
The next result was pressures against Laos, 
contrai-y to those agreements; pressures against 
South Viet-Nam, contrary to those agreements. 
In other words, mitil there is a determination 
in Peiping to leave their neighbors alone and 
not to press militantly their notions of world 
revolution, then we are gomg to have tliis 

And it's the same problem we have had in 
another part of the world in an earlier period 
in this postwar period in such things as the 
Berlin blockade, the pressures against Greece. 
Those things had to be stopped. They were 
stopped in the main. 

Now the problem is out in the Pacific. And 
we have a large interest in the way these prob- 
lems evolve in the Pacific, because we have 
allies and we have interests out there. South- 
east Asia is at the present time the point at 
which this issue of militant aggression agamst 
one's neighbors for ideological reasons is posed. 

Q. Well, how difficult do you consider it 
would be to sustain the defense against what 
you have described, how much more difficult. 

' For background, see American Foreign Policy, 1950- 
1955: Basic Documents, vol. I (Department of State 
publication 6446), p. 750. 



shaitM South Viet-Nam he lost to the Com- 

A. I should think they would simply move 
the problem to the next country and the next 
and the next. And, as I say, this is not dom- 
inoes. This is Marxism. This is the kind of 
Marxism which comes out of Peiping. I mean 
it's all there to see. They make no secret of it. 

Q. Mr. Secretaiy, in yow statement last night 
you said that the basis of American support was 
a duly constituted, unified government in Viet- 
Nam-. Is there a suggestion here that if it is 
impossible to achieve such a unified goveim- 
m^nt the United States will curtail or withdraw 
its aid? 

A. Well, I don't want to get into details of 
what might happen on such a question of that 
sort. Obviously, if thei-e are problems of unity, 
there are certain kinds of assistance that are 
simply not feasible. In other words, develop- 
ments in the civilian field that could be very 
promising, from the point of view of the South 
Vietnamese economy and the South Vietnamese 
people, can be impaired if there is not an effec- 
tive administration having the full support of 
all elements in the country to put it into opera- 
tion. But I wouldn't want to get into detail on 

Relations With United Arab Republic 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes. 

Q. There have been recent reports from Cairo 
that the United Arab Republic would like $35 
million more annually from the P.L. 480 sales in 
addition to tohat they are already getting on 
the 3-year agreement. This comes at a time 
when Nasser is facilitating the movement of 
weapons into the Congo to tlie rebels. Is there 
any tJwught being given to cutting off P.L. 1^80 

A. Well, there are no discussions of these 
questions going on at the present time with the 
Egyptian Government. But it is true that re- 
lationships are reciprocal and that, if relations 
are to be good, both sides must make important 
investments in those relationships. 

U.S. Declares Viet-Nam Unity 
Basis for Support 

statement hy Ro'bert J. McCloskey 
Director, Offlce of News ^ 

I and others in tlie Department have had some 
inquiries throughout the afternoon growing out 
of allegations criticizing our Ambassador in 
Saigon [Maxwell D. Taylor] as well as the 
United States Government. 

In that connection, I would like to say Ambas- 
sador Taylor has been acting throughout with 
the full support of the United States Government. 
As we have repeatedly made clear, a duly consti- 
tuted government exercising full power on the 
basis of national unity and without improper 
interference from any group is the essential con- 
dition for the successful prosecution of the effort 
to defeat the Viet Cong and is the basis of United 
States support for that effort. This is the posi- 
tion Ambassador Taylor has been expressing to 
Vietnamese leaders. 

^ Made to news correspondents on Dec. 22. 

We were very much concerned about the burn- 
ing of our USIS library. 

I must say that we do not understand why 
fighter planes loiocked down, in some fashion, an 
American civilian plane flying ordinary civil air 
corridor routes across Egypt. Tliat is under 
full investigation. Under the ICAO [Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization] convention, 
we have the privilege of participating in that in- 
vestigation and are making an investigation. 
But where it could have been easily ascertained 
that this was an ordinary commercial type 
plane, flying in ordinary commercial patterns, 
and that a more satisfactory answer could have 
been foimd than to bring it down, through some 
confusion in clearances (if that's what it was) 
or some uncertainty about just what its pur- 
poses were. 

Q. Does the P.L. IfSO agreement expire this 

A. I believe one does expire this year. 

Q. Are there any thoughts for renegotiating 


A. I beg your pardon? 

JANUARY 11, 1965 
758-989—65 2 


Q. Will it ie renegotiated? 

A. I wouldn't want to say at the moment. 

Situation in the Congo 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you described the Congo 
situation as extremely dangerotis. What spe- 
cific steps can this country take to prevent the 
Congo from becoming another Viet-Nam? You 
vaguely referred to the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity, or the United Nations, or others. 
Yet, do you have some specific suggestions to 
forestall this danger? 

A. The Security Council is meeting this 
afternoon, I believe, on that question.'' And 
they will have some resolutions in front of them. 
The OAU is still working on it through its Com- 
mission. We are in consultation with a good 
many governments about that matter. I think 
it is important that the neighbors of the Congo 
not permit or participate in interference in that 
country. We think that it would be extremely 
unfortunate if this vast country be caught up in 
new secessions; become a field of violence in- 
volving not only powers outside of the continent 
but also African countries pitted against each 
other in that situation. 

I would not want to specify any particular 
steps at this time, but we are very active dip- 
lomatically in this matter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us the U.S. 
reaction to the British initiative in setting up 
these new summit talks with the Soviet Union? 

A. It's all right with us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you look upon 
joint action by Laos and South Viet-Nam with 
U.S. support toioard curtailing the flow of 
Communist supplies over the ^'•Ho Chi Minh 

A. I wouldn't want to get into that very 
much. As you know, the Viet Minh have been 
in Laos for some time and the Government has 
been acting against them in various parts of the 
coimtry. I don't attach imdue significance to 

some of the reports I have seen here in the last 
few days on that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, for clarification — 

U.N. Financial Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us something 
about our future relations with the United Na- 
tions and our continued use of the United Na- 
tions in a peacekeeping operation — operations — 
as %oe have done in the past, particularly in view 
of the problem of the artixile 19? ^^ 

A. We do believe that in connection with the 
article 19 problem there should be a thorough 
discussion of the future of peacekeeping opera- 
tions in the (J.N. We believe that tlie Security 
Comicil should have what the charter calls "pri- 
mary responsibility" in this field. We do not 
agree with those who think that the Security 
Council ought to have sole responsibility in this 
field. But we hope that procedures can be 
worked out whereby the Security Council will be 
given every possible opportunity to carry out its 
primary responsibility. 

The General Assembly also has responsibility 
in this as in other matters. But we feel that 
the General Assembly ought to defer, at least 
for a time, to the Security Council in order that 
the Security Council's jirimary responsibility 
can be made effective. 

We also think that those who make substan- 
tial economic contributions, financial contribu- 
tions, to the U.N. ought to be listened to with 
considerable respect by the general membership. 
It is true that 5 percent of the contributions to 
the U.N. control two-thirds of the vote in the 
General Assembly. Now we have not seen, 
thus far, irresponsible action taken by the Gen- 
eral Assembly in the financial field. But we 
think that the General Assembly should con- 
sult very carefully the wishes of those who do 
in fact make up the largest financial support for 
the U.N. to see whether, on the financial side, 
the plans tliat are being proposed are feasible 
or acceptable to those who provide the re- 

These are matters which have been raised for 

' For statements made by Ambassador Adlai E. 
Stevenson In the Security Council on Dec. 22 and 24, 
see p. 43. 

" For baelfground on the U.N. financial crisis, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 9, 1964, p. 681 ; Dec. 7, 1964, p. 826 ; 
and Dec. 21, 1964, p. 891. 



discussion. I made a speech in New York on 
this subject, or, rather, Mr. Harlan Cleveland 
iviul a speech for me when I couldn't go.^' They 
havo been discussed among delegations at the 
r.X. We hope that out of this discussion that 
has started over the article 19 there can come 
some improved procedures in this regard. 

Q. Thank you, sir. 

Q. M)'. Secretary, is any thought being given 
to suggestions that profits from the World Bank 
loans be used to finance the United Nations? 

A. That has been suggested from time to 
time, but I don't believe that's an answer for 
the present problem. It's not an answer for 
the present problem. 

Q. Thank you. 

"The Hopefulness of These Times" 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

Once again we come to keep an old and cher- 
ished tradition — the lighting, here in Washing- 
ton, of the Nation's Christmas tree. 

For all of us — of all ages — the lights of 
Christmas symbolize each year the happiness of 
tliis wonderful season. But this year I believe 
that the lights of Christmas symbolize more 
than the happiness of the moment. Their 
brightness expresses the hopefulness of these 

These are the most hopeful times in all the 
years since Christ was born in Bethlehem. Our 
world is still troubled. Man is still afflicted by 
many worries and many woes. Yet today — as 
never before — man has in his possession the 
capacities to end war and preserve peace, to 
eradicate poverty and share abundance, to 
overcome the diseases that have afflicted the 
human race and permit all mankind to enjoy 
their promise in life on this earth. 

At this Christmas season of 1964 we can think 
of broader and brighter horizons than any who 

" For text, see i6id., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112. 
' Made at the lighting of the national Christmas tree 
on Dec. 18 (White House press release). 

ha\'e lived before these times. For there is ris- 
ing in the sky of the age a new star — the star of 

By his inventions, man has made war un- 
thinkable, now and forevermore. Man must, 
therefore, apply the same initiative, the same in- 
ventiveness, the same determined effort to make 
peace on earth eternal and meaningful for all 

For nearly 200 years of our existence as a na- 
tion, America has stood for peace in the world. 
At this Christmas season — when the world com- 
memorates the birth of the Prince of Peace — I 
want all men, evei-ywhere, to know that the peo- 
ple of this great nation have but one hope, one 
ambition toward other peoples: that is to live 
at peace with them and for them to live at peace 
with one another. 

Since the first Christmas, man has moved 
slowly but steadily forward toward realizing the 
promise of peace on earth among men of good- 
will. That movement has been possible because 
there has been brought into the affairs of man 
a more generous spirit toward his fellow man. 

Let us pray at this season that, in all we do 
as individuals and as a nation, we may be 
motivated by that spirit of generosity and com- 
passion which Christ taught us so long ago. 

Now it is my privilege to do— as Presidents 
have done for 40 years — to press this button and 
light the Christmas tree for all the Nation. As 
I do so, may I take this opportunity to express 
to each home and family in the nation the wishes 
of our family — Mrs. Jolmson, Lynda, Luci, and 
myself — for a happy holiday season and years 
of peace and success to come. 

U.S. Grants Aid to Chinese 
Refugees in Kong Kong 

Press release 525 dated December 21 

The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 21 that an agreement has been reached 
between the World Rehabilitation Fund, Inc., 
and the Government of Hong Kong to construct 
and maintain two physical rehabilitation cen- 
ters in Hong Kong. One of the centers will 
benefit handicapped Chinese refugees, and the 

JANU-VRT 11, 1965 


other will assist Chinese refugee spastic 

U.S. assistance to Chinese refugees is au- 
thorized by Presidential determination under 
authority contained in the Migration and Kef- 
ugee Assistance Act ( P.L. 87-510 ) . With funds 
appropriated by the Congress, a grant of $1,- 
200,000 was made to the World Rehabilitation 
Fund, Inc., by the Department of State to im- 
plement the agreement's principal objectives. 
They are: to construct and operate an mstitu- 
tion capable of assisting Chinese refugee spastic 
children, inclusive of medical, educational, and 
recreational facilities ; and to construct and op- 
erate a multipurpose day center with a training 
and vocational rehabilitation program designed 
to help disabled Chinese refugees to become self- 

Sites for both institutions will be provided by 
the Hong Kong Government. 

The World Eehabilitation Fund, Lie, is an 
American nonprofit voluntary agency head- 
quartered in New York under the presidency of 
Dr. Howard Rusk. President Harry Truman 
serves as the Fund's honorary chairman. 

Congressional! Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

A Report on the Strategic Importance of Western Eu- 
rope. Letter from the Acting Chairman, U.S. Ad- 
visory Commission on International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, transmitting a report made by 
Walter Adams, member of the Commission and pro- 
fessor of economics, Michigan State University. H. 
Doc. 367. September 24, 1964. 18 pp. 

U.S.-Luxembourg Income-Tax 
Convention Enters Into Force 

Press release 526 dated December 23 

On December 22, 1964, the convention be- 
tween the United States and Luxembourg for 
the avoidance of double taxation of income, pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion, and promotion of trade 
and investment, which was signed at Washing- 
ton on December 18, 1962, was brought into 
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifi- 
cation at Luxembourg. 

The provisions of the convention follow, in 
general, the j)attern of income-tax conventions 
in force between the United States and numer- 
ous other countries. The convention is designed 
to remove an undesirable impediment to inter- 
national trade and economic development by 
eliminating as far as possible double taxation 
on the same uicome. 

So far as the United States is concerned, the 
convention applies only with respect to United 
States (that is. Federal) taxes. It does not 
apply to the imposition or collection of taxes 
by the several States, or the District of Colum- 
bia, except that article XX (3) contains the na- 
tional-treatment provision to the effect that 
citizens of one of the countries sliall not, while 
residents of the otlier country, be subject to 
other or more bm'densome taxes (national, 
State, communal, or municipal) than are the 
citizens of such other country who are residents 
of its territory. 

Pursuant to its terms, the convention is ef- 
fective for taxable years beginnmg on or after 
January 1, 1964. 




U.S. Calls for Constructive Approach to Congo Problem 

Statements hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative in the Security Council 


U.S./U.N. pres3 release 44S5 

I had not expected to take occasion at this 
time to speak again on the subject of the Congo,^ 
althougli I may find it necessary to do so before 
the debate concludes. But I must intervene long 
enough to say to the gentleman who has just 
spoken, the representative of Algeria, that 
M-hereas yesterday we heard in the Coimcil some 
very reassuring statements from the Foreign 
Ministers of Sudan and of Ghana denying that 
they were in any way aiding the rebels, I regret 
that I have heard no similar denial from the 
representative of Algeria, but only, indeed, an- 
other polemical attack on the Government of the 
Congo and on the only countries that have tried 
to help both this government and its predeces- 
sors to preserve the independence, the integrity, 
and the unity of the Congo. 

Perhaps it would be just as well to disregard 
the verbal violence to which we have just been 
subjected by the representative of Algeria. 
However, I must say in response to his question 
that the administration of President Johnson 
was not inaugurated by a massive reprisal 
against Africa, if I quote his language cor- 
rectly. But if you choose to use the phrase "in- 
augurated," Mr. ^Vmba,ssador, let me inform 
you, sir, that it was maugurated by a participa- 
tion by the Government of the United States in 

a rescue mission to save the lives of 2,000 for- 
eign civilians of 18 nationalities. 

And let it not be said again in this chamber, 
I trust, that no one was killed before the Bel- 
gian soldiers arrived to rescue the hostages il- 
legally held in Stanleyville. I have before me 
a list of 58 persons who were killed, their names, 
the dates, and I should be happy to make it 
available to tlie delegate of Algeria or to any- 
one else who chooses to examine it. I only 
regret that the list gi'ows day by day. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4486 

Just about everyone has spoken twice, so I 
will take the liberty of doing so too. I shall 
not detain the Council long, however, as about 
everything that can be said and should be said 
about this case has been said, including part of 
it that should not have been said. 

When I spoke here a week ago - about the role 
of the United States in the Congo and in the 
mission to rescue the civilian hostages of many 
nations held bj^ the rebels in Stanleyville, I had 
high hopes that this participation by the United 
States would be correctly imderstood, if not, 
indeed, applauded by the nations who had 
signed the complaint against my country. I had 
high hopes because the rescue mission was in- 

' For background on the U.S.-Belgian rescue missions 
in the Congo on Nov. 24 and 26, see BuiiETiN of Dec. 
14, 19<>4, p. 838. 

' For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson in 
the Security Council on Dec. 14, see ihid., Jan. 4, 1965, 
p. 15. 

JAXCARY 11, 1965 


spired by principles which I thought unassail- 
able and by motives whicli I fancied were shared 
by all men of good will and of humane instmcts 

In the intervening days of this discussion, I 
have been torn between disbelief at the incessant 
parrot-like repetition of absurd charges and 
sorrow that several African nations are disdain- 
ful, even resentful, of my country's long and 
consistent efforts to help achieve the unity, the 
integrity, and the peaceful development of the 
Congo by assistance in many forms, first by the 
United Nations and subsequently by the Central 

Yet these same countries proclaim again and 
again that an independent, stable Congo is what 
they want. I believed them at first, and now I 
wonder what their real objectives are. 

I heard no such complaints about United 
States aid during the years of the struggle to 
end secession in Katanga and preserve the unity 
of the Congo, when the troops of many members 
of the United Nations were transported to the 
Congo in United States vessels and aircraft, 
used American equipment, and were supported 
by American voluntary contributions and 
matching bond purchases when other means of 
financing failed. We did our part as did many 
other nations, and in view of the accusations 
by a small group of African states I am proud 
to recall the part that we played at that time 
in the Council today. 

But, for the most part, I have heard only a 
repetition of charges that my Government was 
insincere in its efforts to extricate the hostages 
and that together with Belgium we planned ag- 
gression in the Congo, using the rescue mission 
as a pretext, and that we alone are responsible 
for frustrating peace and order in this troubled 

Perhaps the most outrageous, the most de- 
spicable, charge that we have heard in the Coun- 
cil during these proceedings was the one made 
yesterday that the United States and Belgium 
intentionally kept their nationals in the regions 
occupied by the Congolese rebels in order to 
have a pretext for intervention by military 
means. In effect, the Foreign Minister of the 
Congo (Brazzaville) accused my country of 
deliberately baiting a trap with unsuspecting 
and imiocent human beings, of deceitfully 

leaving them to the tender mercies of out- 
laws and terrorists in order to have a pretext 
for intervening against those outlaws. I shall 
say no more about this repulsive assault. Like 
the racialism that has emerged in this discussion, 
I deeply regret it — because it has, I fear, been 
noted well and widely by all responsible men. 

As none can deny, my Government sought to 
persuade all Americans, except the staff of our 
consulate in Stanleyville, to leave the region 
prior to the occupation of Stanleyville by the 
rebels on August 5. Our consular officials re- 
mained because it was their duty to stay until 
all others were out. These consular officials 
were, however, imprisoned and held as hostages 
until released by the rescue mission. Some 
Americans left, but others, particularly mis- 
sionaries, refused to leave their posts at the side 
of the Congolese people to whom they had de- 
voted their lives. Some, in the bush, could not 
be notified in time. Some, who sought to leave, 
failed to reach the airport before it was seized 
by the rebels. Some, who had left the region, 
returned against our advice, to tend to their 

And I have heard some strange doctrines as- 
serted here — provoked, I hope, more by emotion 
than by reflection — for example, that African 
states can intervene against a neighbor African 
state, while denying the right of other states to 
answer the Congo's call for help. 

I have heard a rebellion equated with a legiti- 
mate government — which must be the first at- 
tempt to use the United Nations to validate an 
armed attack against a member state. 

And I have heard that the United States 
Government is indifferent to the death of Ne- 
groes in Mississippi and of Africans in the 
Congo, and that my country habitually seeks to 
overthrow unsympathetic governments. 

I heard, too, from a non-African source, the 
charge that my country sought to establish in 
the Congo a beachhead for colonialism in Cen- 
tral Africa for the purpose of monopolistic ex- 
ploitation of the Congo's natural wealth. But 
this is nothing new. The same Communist 
countries have for years misdescribed United 
States public or private efforts to assist under- 
developed nations, efforts which they cannot 
otherwise assail. The technique is old and fa- 



miliiir. 'WHiat is new is the small chorus of Afri- 
can voices that now echo the same refrain. 

On another point the Czechoslovak delegate 
claimed that NATO, which exists for the de- 
fense of "Western Europe, had intervened in 
the Congo. He was quite mistaken. Two mem- 
bers of NATO have taken steps at the request 
of tiie Government of the Congo. 

On the other hand, the Communist states 
have never attempted to deny that they inter- 
vene, often through military assistance, in what 
they call "wars of liberation." On some occa- 
sions they have assisted genuine nationalist 
movements fighting for the liberation and in- 
dependence of their countries. In many cases, 
however, they intervene in countries already in- 
dependent and members of the United Nations, 
on behalf of subversive movements or open re- 
bellions against indigenous national govern- 

This is the sort of intervention, by the estab- 
lished government of one independent country 
against the established government of another 
independent country, which, if continued, will 
tear aj)art the fabric of international coopera- 
tion and world peace. Yet this is precisely the 
sort of intervention in which the Communist 
countries normally, regularly, and as a matter 
of doctrine engage. We hardly think this quali- 
fies them to denounce others who furnish aid to 
recognized sovereign governments resisting 
armed rebellion inspired from abroad. 

Tlie bulk of the charges against my country 
appear to fall in the category of motivation 
rather than of facts, although in some cases the 
latter are also disputed. Allegations have been 
made which call into question the good faith of 
my Government and of the statements which I 
made here last week. This I can only regret, 
since motives — and other men's speculations 
concerning them — are unfortunately not prov- 
able. I have, as I said, explained my country's 
motives and purposes at length in my earlier 
remarks. I can only hope, in the light of what 
is known of my country's long record of assist- 
ance to other nations in their efforts to improve 
the lot of their peoples, that the leaders of the 
governments rei)resented here among the com- 
plainants will examine in the privacy of their 
consciences what I have said in this Council. If 
they do, I believe they will find that they do 

not themselves really believe their intemperate 
charges. And if we question motives, I too 
could question theirs. 

Socrates in his Dialogues of Plato said this: 
"The partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, 
cares nothing about the rights of the question, 
but is anxious only to convince his hearers of 
his own assertions." 

And I recall, too, a Danish proverb, which 
has its equivalent in all countries, I daresay, 
that "empty wagons make the most noise." 

It is said that no foreign civilian was killed 
by the rebels before the Belgian paratroops 
landed in Stanleyville. This, too, is demon- 
strably false. I reported earlier that 35 foreign 
civilians were murdered by the rebels in the 
several months immediately preceding the No- 
vember 24 rescue operation. I have here a par- 
tial list of foreign civilians killed by the rebels 
this year prior to November 24. It now amounts 
to 65 persons — and the end of this grisly story 
is not yet. 

I will spare you the names, the dates, and 
the place of their deaths. The list will be avail- 
able for anyone who chooses to examine it. 

I think histoiy will record the long efforts 
of the Congolese Government to obtain help in 
training, equipping, and disciplining its army 
in order to preserve law and order against the 
day when the United Nations would have to 
leave — and that the United States and Belgium 
were among those who answered the call. It 
will record the fact that the rebellion was 
against the government of Prime Minister 
[Cyrillc] Adoula at the beginning, a fact which 
the complaining nations seem to overlook. It 
will record Mr. Adoula's appeals to African na- 
tions to help him fill the void created by the final 
departure of United Nations troops. It will 
record their failure to respond — and now their 
denunciation of those who did. 

And it will also record the unashamed, in- 
deed exultant, admissions by the Chiefs of State 
of Algeria and the United Arab Republic, Pres- 
ident Ben Bella and President Nasser, that they 
are sending arms to the rebels to help overthrow 
the Government of the Congo and will continue 
to do so. I have been challenged to prove the 
complaint of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo that members of the Or- 
ganization of African Unity were assisting the 

JAXTJARY 11, 1965 


rebels. A few days ago we heard speakers say 
that the complamt of the Government of the 
Congo should be dismissed as without substance. 
But the charge is admitted; and we have an 
alarming preview of the kind of legality and in- 
ternational conduct that they intend to practice 
regardless of what they preach about African 
brotherhood and unity. 

Mr. President, contrary to the bold assertions 
of the Foreign Minister of Kenya that the 
United States is frustrating peace in the Congo, 
I remind you that the promise of the United 
States to cooperate with the Organization of 
African Unity has already been reaffirmed in 
this Council. And I repeat again that the 
United States, in spite of everything — the dis- 
appointments and contradictions — stands i-eady 
to cooperate with the OAU, with the Security 

Council, and with the Government of the Congo 
in finding a solution, a bona fide solution, to the 
problems, political or economic, which beset the 

And I now wish to appeal once more for an 
end to the ugly, abusive, and dangerous polemic 
which has demeaned tliis hall of justice, peace, 
and iiiternational fraternity. A calm and con- 
structive approach to the perpetual problems 
posed by the Congo's long, hard struggle to 
preserve its independence, its territorial integ- 
rity and unity, may get results. Bitterness, 
hatred, and falsehood will get results too — re- 
sults that no one in his right mind cares to con- 
template at any time — let alone on the eve of 
Christmas, the birthday of the Prince of Peace. 

The hand is extended. If others will grasp 
it, we may still be able to act before it is too late. 

First Special 8 titer- American Conference Provides for Admission 
of New Members to Organization of American States 

The First Special Inter- American Conference 
was held at Washington, D.C., Decemher 16-18 
to consider the question of the admission of 
new members to the Organisation of American 
States. Following is a statement made hy Am- 
bassador Ellsworth Bunker, Alternate U.S. 
Representative to the conference, on December 
17 upon the occasion of the installation of the 
General Com^nittee, together with the text of 
the Act of Washington, which was a portion of 
the Final Act of the conference. 


Mr. Chairman : I should like to make a few 
remarks in support of the masterful statement 
made by the distinguished Foreign Minister 
from Brazil [Vasco Leitao da Cunha]. In 
fact, Mr. Chairman, in the course of the con- 
sideration of this matter in the Comicil of the 
OAS, the jjosition of my Government has been 
so frequently made known that it needs no ex- 

tensive restatement at this time. In summary, 
it is as follows. 

The Charter of the OAS,' as clearly intended 
by its framers, provides for the admission of 
new members — both additional American states 
existing at the time the charter was adopted and 
those which have smce emerged. It seems clear 
to us that when article 2 says, "All American 
States that ratify the present Charter are 
Members," it means just what it says. 

If there were any doubt as to the intention 
that this article should apply to new states aris- 
ing since 1948, that doubt is surely dispelled by 
the understanding unanimously agreed upon by 
the representatives of all governments attend- 
izig the conference in 1948 that drew up the 
charter, to the effect that, "in accordance with 
these articles, any new state established in the 
Hemisphere may become part of the Organiza- 

The explicit requirements, then, for member- 

' For text, see Bulletin of May 23, 1948, p. 666. 



sliip, are simple : that the ap|)licant be "Ameri- 
can" (i.e., that it be situated geographically 
within the "Western ITemispliere), and that it be 
a "state."' AVe understand t hat this word "state" 
is used in the ordinary sense which it has in 
international law — that is, an independent, sov- 
ereign entity, thus able to carry out all its 
obligations under the charter. 

With the charter clear, the requirements ex- 
plicit and simple, the task of this conference, 
then, is correspondingly simple — that of agree- 
ing upon a procedure which will implement 
tiiese provisions. No amendment of the charter 
is therefore involved, in our view. Indeed, the 
argument has been made that procedures are 
not even necessary, that membership is auto- 
matic and is within the control of the would-be 
member. This view, however, does not com- 
mend itself to us. With respect to any appli- 
cant, some determination must be made as to 
whether it is an independent "American state" — 
a determination that is presumably one for the 
existing membei-ship to make. And for this, 
some procedure must be established. 

Tlie procedure proposed in the draft resolu- 
tion presented to this conference by the delega- 
tions of Argentina,. Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Eica, 
Paraguaj-, and the United States seems to us 
admirably suited. With respect to the form, 
however, it seems to us that the distinguished 
Foreign Minister of Ecuador [Gonzalo Escu- 
dero], with his usual intelligence and vision, 
has made a notable contribution to this confer- 
ence by suggesting that the document be in the 
form of an acta — the "Act of Washington." 
Making use of the Secretary General as the 
administrative head of the Organization and 
custodian of the charter, and of the Council 
as the major body in permanent session on which 
all participating members are represented, 
seems to us both practical and expeditious. 

The proposal that the action of the Coimcil 
require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
present members avoids both the potential 
tyranny of the bare majority and the potential 
despotism of the veto — which concept we have 
happily been able to avoid introducing into the 
inter-American system. Moreover, while such 
matters are not in reality decided by counting 
noses, it does not seem consistent with the nec- 
essary harmony and solidarity to provide even 

theoretically that a political entity sliould be- 
come a member if one-half minus one of the 
present members feel tliat it fails to qualify as a 

Two other points require mention: 
We are aware that there are three territories 
in this hemisphere which are the object of con- 
troversy between adjacent or neighboring 
American Republics and an extracontinental 
power. Wliile this conference is not called 
upon — and indeed it would be most in- 
appropriate — to pass upon or prejudge in any 
way the substance of these problems, their exist- 
ence has, in the view of many, a potential rele- 
vance to the establishment of procedures for 
admission to membership. Indeed, so long as 
such disputes should continue, they would nat- 
urally be a cloud upon the very existence and in- 
dependence of any political entity that might 
emerge from tlie territories so far as its suit- 
ability is concerned for admission to the OAS 
as an independent state. In attention, then, to 
sucli a situation, and to the strength of feeling 
on this matter by certain of our sister Republics 
directly affected, it seems fitting that we ex- 
I^ressly exempt any entity arising from such ter- 
ritories from decision by the Council until such 
time as an end has been put to the controversy 
by some method of peaceful settlement. 

Secondly, in the discussions in the Council of 
the problem of membership, considerable at- 
tention has been given to the question of 
whether, in addition to the charter, the would-be 
member must sign and ratify the Rio Treaty. 
This treaty is, of course, the basis of our hemi- 
spheric security system; contains solemn com- 
mitments on which our protection and security 
rest; and in its operation makes use of such in- 
.strumentalities as the Council and the MFM 
[Meeting of Foreign Ministers], investing them 
with autliority as Organ of Consultation. 
From a practical point of view, then, it would 
be difficult to envisage an American state being 
an effective member of the organization with- 
out Ijecoming a party to the Rio Treaty. More- 
over, article 25 of the charter provides that, in 
the event any situation arises endangering the 
peace of America, "the American States . . . 
shall apply the measures and procedures estab- 
lished in the special treaties on the subject." 
Thus, in our view, while it cannot be juridically 

JANUART 11, 19C5 


asserted that adherence to the Eio Treaty is a 
prior condition to hecoming a member, the 
charter is clear that the members shall apply the 
measures and procedures of such a treaty and 
there is the further obligation of all members to 
put themselves m a position to carry out fully 
all the provisions of the charter. 

These, then, Mr. Chairman, are the views of 
my Government on the single question before 
this meeting. Prompt and, we would hope, 
unanimous adoption of a resolution embodying 
such reasonable procedures as those in the draft 
before us will be an act of justice toward the 
new independent states in this hemisphere. It 
will be in accord with our historic tradition of 
seeking an end to dependent relationships in the 
international community. It will demonstrate 
that the OAS is— as its framers intended— an 
organization that can evolve and adapt to meet 
the challenges of a rapidly changing world. 


Wheeeas : 

The common purposes pursued by the Organization 
of American States are to consolidate the ties of soli- 
darity among the peoples of this hemisphere, to bring 
about closer cooperation among them, to obtain an 
order of peace and justice, and to defend their sover- 
eignty, their territorial integrity, and their inde- 
pendence ; 

In establishing their mutual relations on bases of 
concord and friendship the member states have sought 
to eliminate from the Americas : in the political sphere, 
the doctrines and systems that, by impairing the per- 
sonality of the individual, are a danger to peace ; and 
in the economic sphere, the preferential systems that 
are prejudicial to cooperation and their develo;5ment ; 

It is the will of the member states of the Organiza- 
tion of American States to permit the independent 
American states that so desire and that are willing to 
comply with the obligations of the Charter to partici- 
pate in the benefits of their organization; 

^ The Final Act, adopted at the closing session of the 
conference on Dee. 18, included a preamble and three 
resolutions : I, Act of Washington ; II, Vote of Appreci- 
ation ; and III, Vote of Thanks. The Guatemalan del- 
egation abstained with a statement which said, among 
other things, that it "persists in its original view and 
reiterates that the proper form of resolving the matter 
of admitting new members is through the signature 
of an additional protocol enumerating the requirements 
and limits governing the admission of new mem- 
bers. . . ." 

The inter-American system, as established in nu- 
merous resolutions of Inter-American Conferences and 
in provisions of the Charter itself, is founded upon re- 
spect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, the in- 
dependence of the states, and their equality before the 

Resolution XCVI.3 and Resolution XCVII.2 of the 
Tenth Inter-American Conference ' clearly establish a 
special situation with respect to the occupied territories 
that are the subject of litigation or claim between extra- 
continental countries and some American states ; 

Articles 2 and ins of the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States indicate that any state that 
wishes to be a member of the Organization must meet 
the following requirements : 

a. That it be an independent state, 

b. That it be located within the Western Hemisphere, 

e. That it sign and ratify the Charter of the Organi- 
zation of American States ; 

Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter establish obliga- 
tions for all the American states with respect to col- 
lective security of the hemisphere ; 

In accordance with those articles, the American 
states shall apply the measures and procedures estab- 
lished in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As- 
sistance, for the purpose of fulfilling all the obligations 
arising from their condition as members of the Orga- 
nization ; 

Article .33 of the Charter stipulates that the Inter- 
American Conference is the supreme organ of the Or- 
ganization and that it decides the general action and 
policy of the Organization and determines the struc- 
ture and functions of its Organs and has authority to 
consider any matter relating to friendly relations 
among the American states ; 

Article .50 authorizes the Council of the Organization 
to take cognizance, within the limits of the Charter 
and of inter-American treaties and agreements, of any 
matter referred to it by the Inter-American Confer- 
ence or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs; 

Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, the Council 
shall be responsible for the proper discharge by the 
Pan American Union of the duties assigned to it ; and 

It is necessary to establish a procedure for the ad- 
mission of new members. 

The First Special Inter-American Conference 

Resolves : 

1. That any independent American state that desires 
to become a member of the Organization should so in- 
dicate by means of a note addressed to the Secretary 
General, in which it declares that it is willing to sign 
and ratify the Charter of the Organization of American 
States and to accept all the obligations inherent in the 

' For a report on the Tenth Inter-American Confer- 
ence by William G. Bowdler, see Buixetin of Apr. 26, 
1954, p. 634. 



condition of membership in the Organization, espe- 
cially those relating to collective security expressly set 
forth in articles 24 and 25 of the Charter of the 

2. That, once it is informed of the matter by the 
Secretary General, the Council of the Organization, in 
accordance with articles 108, 50, and 51 of the Charter, 
shall determine by the vote of two thirds of the mem- 
ber states whether it is appropriate that the Secretary 
General be authorized to permit the applicant state to 
sign the Charter of the Organization and to accept the 

deposit of the corresponding instrument of ratification. 

3. That the Council of the Organization shall not 
take any decision with respect to a request for admis- 
sion on the part of a political entity whose territory, in 
whole or in part, is subject, prior to the date of this 
resolution, to litigation or claim between an extra- 
continental country and one or more member states 
of the Organization of American States, until the dis- 
pute has been ended by some peaceful procedure. 

4. That this instrument shall be known as the "Act 
of Washington." 

Record of U.S. Participation During Second Year 
of Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement 

Statement by Stanley Nehmer '■ 

The past year has brought many new prob- 
lems, challenges, and opportunities for the 28 
participating goveniments in the Long-Term 
Cotton Textile Arrangement.- We from the 
United States look forvrard to continuing with 
our colleagues from other countries the discus- 
sion begun last year concerning our respective 
experiences with this international cooperative 

"We believe the record of the first 2 years of 
this agreement shows that the Long-Term Ar- 

' Made before the Cotton Textiles Committee of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on 
Dec. 1. Mr. Xehmer is Director of the Office of Inter- 
national Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs ; he 
was U.S. representative at the meeting of the Com- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 19G2, p. 431. The 
governments participating in the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Repub- 
lic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, 
.Jamaica, .Japan, Luxembourg. Mexico, Netherlands, 
Xorway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
United Arab Republic, United Kingdom (including 
Hong Kong), and United States. 

' For a statement made before the Committee by Mr. 
Xehmer on Dec. 3, 1963, see Bulletin of Jan. 20, 1964. 
p. 96. 

rangement, despite difficulties from time to time, 
is of benefit to all countries concerned with in- 
ternational trade in cotton textiles. We be- 
lieve that this record has confirmed the wisdom 
of a collective efTort to establish an international 
arrangement that would permit the solution of 
problems of common concern to both importing 
and exporting countries in the field of cotton 
textiles. We believe that it has also confirmed 
the judgment that multilateral action in this 
field is to be preferred to unilateral action, both 
from the standpomt of the importing and the 
exporting countries. 

At this point, as the Long-Term Arrangement 
enters its third year, I should like to restate what 
we consider as the principal goals and objectives 
of the Long-Term Arrangement. 

— The Long-Term Arrangement means to the 
United States a practical way whereby develop- 
ing countries have the opportunity to expand 
their exports, particularly to the industrialized 

— The Long-Term Arrangement means to the 
United States an opportunity for industrialized 
countries to open their doors to trade from the 
developing countries, with the assurance that 

JANUARY 11, 1965 


such action will not result in economic and 
social dislocation in their domestic economies. 

— The Long-Term Arrangement means to the 
United States a unique multilateral venture 
capable of meeting a difficult problem without 
resort to national unilateral actions. 

Despite occasional difficulties and setbacks, 
we believe this agreement has been successful 
in the achievement of these objectives. 

The United States continues to be the world's 
largest market for cotton textiles. Over 70 
countries export cotton textiles to the United 
States. The United States is a market open 
and free from unilateral import quotas. It is 
a market supplied by a domestic industry which 
is intensely competitive and widely diversified. 
It is a market also supplied by an extremely 
active and financially strong group of traders 
promoting imports from an ever-growing list 
of countries. 

I should like to report on the record, the ex- 
periences, and the problems of the United 
States in implementing the goals of the arrange- 
ment over the past year. 

Implementation of Last Year's Conclusions 

At its meeting last year this Committee 
adopted a series of conclusions in order to im- 
prove the implementation of the Long-Term 
Arrangement for both the exporting and the 
importing countries. The LTnited States has 
been successful over the past year in following 
these suggestions. At this point I should like 
to summarize our record in this field. 

First, we have added more information to our 
statements on our domestic market situation, 
including, whenever possible, production data 
and price statistics. Other members of this 
Committee undoubtedly are aware of the diffi- 
culties in this area. For example, comprehen- 
sive data on apparel production by fiber content 
have not heretofore been available in the LTnited 
States. An entirely new statistical program has 
been instituted to obtain more comprehensive 
and reliable data on cotton textile production. 
In time, we expect to have available production 
statistics exactly corresponding to the cotton 
textile categories now used in classifying cotton 
textile imports. 

More comprehensive price data are also a par- 

ticularly difficult area since importers are gen- 
erally reluctant to provide sucli data. 
Additional data have been obtained, however, 
and the increased information continues to con- 
firm the existence generally of substantial price 
differentials between domestically produced 
and imi^oi'ted textiles. Work is continuing on 
the analysis of pricing techniques and pricing 
bases for imported and domestically produced 
cotton textiles. 

Second, the United States, over the past year, 
reviewed all article 3 restraints outstanding 
against participating and nonparticipating 
countries. Several restraints were drojjped, 
and others have been proposed to exporting 
countries for elimination. Thirteen other re- 
straints were eliminated as a result of bilateral 
agreements. Others were liberalized. 

Third, over the past year the United States 
has held bilateral consultations with five par- 
ticipating countries and three nonparticipating 
comatries concerning prospective levels of trade. 
Consultations are planned with five exporting 
countries, including three participants. The 
United States also consulted with several coim- 
tries concerning extensive revisions of existing 

Fourth, the United States cooperated with a 
number of suppliers on problems related to the 
classification of cotton textiles. Such coopera- 
tion took the form of exchanges on classification 
procedures. In certain cases, the United States, 
in an effort to limit its restraint requests, pro- 
vided detailed technical specifications of the 
goods covered under the restraint. The United 
States has agreed in response to some requests 
to provide greater flexibility for related cate- 

These are the main points of our efforts dur- 
ing the past year to unplement last year's con- 
clusions of this Committee. These efforts will 
be continued in the months and years ahead. 

Implementation During Second Year 

The United States initiated few new restraint 
actions during the past year. Existing article 
3 restraints were in many cases liberalized as 
part of article 4 bilateral agreements. In sev- 
eral important cases the United States discon- 
tinued article 3 restraints. 



At the present time the United States main- 
tains article 3 restraints on exports from only 
three countries that were participants in the 
Long-Term Arrangement as of tlie end of tlie 
second Long-Term Arrangement year. A total 
of only 10 separate restraints involving 7 sep- 
arate products are in etl'ect. Three of these re- 
straints were initiated during the second Long- 
Term Arrangement year, and the others were 
renewals from the fii-st Long-Term Arrange- 
ment year. 

Tliree restraint actions were also initiated, 
imder the equity provisions of article 6, with ex- 
porting countries that do not participate in the 
arrangement. Several of the restraints are 
interim measures, and consultations are contin- 
uing with a view to reaching a mutually accept- 
able solution. 

These actions were not taken lightly. I will 
speak in a moment of the increasing concentra- 
tion of U.S. imports in fewer products and the 
substantial rise of U.S. imports in some 25 cate- 
gories. As I have just indicated, the United 
States, over the past year, has made substantial 
eflforts to make its market data more complete, 
including production and price statistics. A 
statement on the market situation was submitted 
to the secretariat for each new restraint, and 
these statements were circulated to all coimtries 
participating in this Committee. 

Over the past year the United States has also 
endeavored, in the case of many supplier coun- 
tries, to negotiate bilateral arrangements under 
article 4 in lieu of existing article 3 restraints in 
• order to liberalize such restraints. Ten major 
article 4 arrangements are now in effect with 
participating countries and three with countries 
I that are not participants of the Long-Term Ar- 
j rangement. Six of these agreements have been 
1 concluded since last year's meeting of this Com- 
mittee, including agreements with Portugal,* 
the Philippines,^ India,^ Greece,^ Turkey,' and 
Yugoslavia." Agreements are under discussion 
with several other important suppliers. 

* Not printed. 

• For text, see Bulueti:? of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 383. 

* For text, see ihid., June 8, 1964. p. 914. 
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 291. 
' For text, see ibid., p. 292. 

• For text, see ibid., Oct. 26, 1964, p. 602. 

I may cite here a few figures from 12 bilateral 
arrangements now in effect, or agreed, with de- 
veloping coimtries. (I do not include our ar- 
rangements with Japan or Hong Kong.) 

At the time agreements with these 12 sup- 
pliers were negotiated, restraint actions in effect 
with tliese countries totaled 268 million square 
yards equivalent, covering many of the products 
in which these countries had experienced their 
most rapid growth. Under the bilateral agree- 
ments, these 12 suppliers are entitled to ship, 
during the third year of the Long-Term Ar- 
rangement, a total of 340 million square yards— 
an increase of over 25 percent — in these same 
categories previously restrained. In addition, 
the United States agreed to eliminate 13 specific 

With respect to overall levels of trade, it might 
be noted that for the agreement periods begin- 
ning during the third year of the Long-Term 
Arrangement, these 12 countries may sliip a 
total of 400 million square yards in the cate- 
gories covered by the agreements. This is al- 
most twice the volume the United States im- 
ported from these countries, in the same cate- 
gories, during U.S. fiscal year 1961, a total of 
only 220 million square yards. 

As part of all of these agreements the United 
States has agreed to waive its rights to invoke 
article 3. The agreements generally have a 
term of 3 or 4 years and provide annually for 
5 percent growth. All the agreements also pro- 
vide for considerable flexibility of exports. The 
United States Government believes that through 
these agreements it has made a very substantial 
effort to provide expanded export opportunities 
for developing countries consistent with the ob- 
jectives of the Long-Term Arrangement. 

In addition to the negotiation of new arrange- 
ments imder article 4 the United States has al- 
ways been prepared to consult with bilateral 
partners on adjustment of existing article 4 ar- 
rangements. A series of such consultations 
were held in "Wasliington and in other capitals 
over the past j-ear. In the case of Spain, the 
United States this fall negotiated an entirely 
new agreement,'" which involved the elimina- 
tion of some 20 specific category ceilings and 

" For text, see ibid., Nov. 30, 1964, p. 795. 

JANUARY 11, 1965 


substantial increases in 20 others. In the case 
of India, the United States agreed to a change 
in marketing periods in order to forestall loss 
by India of part of the agreed export levels due 
to unusual circumstances." In the cases of the 
Kepublic of China " and of Jamaica," the 
United States agreed to revisions in several ex- 
port ceilings. 

United States Imports of Cotton Textiles 

This faithful implementation of last year's 
conclusions and a sparing use of restraints dur- 
ing the second year of the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment would have permitted an increase in im- 
ports and did, in fact, result in increases in a 
large number of categories. However, there was 
an important offsetting factor which substan- 
tially affected the volume of imports in some 
categories — to such an extent, in fact, that over- 
all imports were slightly lower. 

This new development was the enactment of 
one-price cotton legislation, which affected in 
a major way both the condition of U.S. cotton 
textile markets and the pattern of U.S. cotton 
textile imports during the greater part of the 
past year. One-price cotton was one of the ob- 
jectives of President Kennedy's seven-point pro- 
gram of assistance to the U.S. textile industry 
amiounced on May 2, 1961," and more recently 
reaffirmed by President Jolinson. Legislation 
establishing one-prie« cotton became efi'ective on 
April 11, 1964. As a result of the measure, do- 
mestic mills are no longer required to pay a 
higher price for raw cotton than foreign users 
of U.S. cotton. The measure, unless renewed, 
will expire in mid-1966. The administration 
will seek legislation to continue one-price cotton 
and hopes to obtain early legislative action. 

An important temporary effect of the new 
legislation, botli before and after its passage by 
Congress, was the hesitation and uncertainty 
that it created in U.S. cotton textile markets. 
Domestic production and imports were both ad- 
versely affected. Manufacturers, wholesalers, 
and importers ti'immed inventories in anticipa- 

" For text of agreement, .see Hid., June 8, 1964, p. 91.5. 
" For text of agreement, .see ibid., Nov. 18, 1063, p. 790. 
" For text of agreement, see iMd., Oct. 21, 1963, p. 645. 
" Ibid., May 29, 1961, p. 825. 

tion of price reductions reflecting the reduced 
cost of cotton. This reluctance to make forward 
commitments affected particularly many lower 
value, coarser, and heavier cotton textile items, 
such as yam and sheeting, for which cotton con- 
stitutes the major part of total cost. 

The market uncertainties caused during the 
passage of legislation on one-iDrice cotton af- 
fected the domestic market to such an extent 
during the early months of the second year of 
the Long-Term Arrangement that imports de- 
clined noticeably in the yam and fabric groups. 
There were, however, continuing increases in 
the household and apparel groups, and there 
are indications of a recovery in yarn and fabric 

Imports in tlie household and apparel groups 
during the second Long-Term Arrangement 
year increased to 456 million square yards equiv- 
alent compared to 436 million in the first Long- 
Term Arrangement year and 340 million in fis- 
cal 1961. Imports in the yarn, fabric, and mis- 
cellaneous groups in the second Long-Term Ar- 
rangement year were 576 million square yards 
equivalent. This was less than the 687 million 
imported during the first Long-Term Arrange- 
ment year but more than 100 millions in excess 
of imports during fiscal 1961. 

At last year's meeting the United States noted 
the substantial rise in imports from developing 
countries that has accounted for most of the in- 
crease in total cotton textile imports into the 
United States over the last 31/0 years. During 
the past year these countries as a group main- 
tained their high share of the U.S. import mar- 
ket. Developing countries continued to ac- 
count for nearly two-thirds of total U.S. im- 
ports as compared with 55 percent S^/o years ago. 
Developing countries also largely accoimted for 
the substantial rise in imports in some 25 prod- 
uct categories. 

Over the past year the drive of supplying 
countries to diversify into products of a higher 
value gained new momentum. The unit value 
of all cotton textile imports reached a new high 
and was 7 percent higher than a year earlier. 

The aggregate level of U.S. imports during 
the second year of the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment reflects these varying influences. In quan- 
titative terms, imports amounted to 1,031 mil- 



lion square yards coinpai-od with 1,1-^ million 
square yards during the lirst year of the Long- 
Term Arrangement and 812 million square 
yards during liscal year 1961. Imports totaled 
$295 million during the second year of the Long- 
Term Arrangement, within 2 percent of the pre- 
vious year but $70 million more than in fiscal 
year 19G1. This modest decline in imports, as 
measured in terms of quantity, is attributable 
in large degree to the uncertainty in segments 
of the U.S. cotton textile market created by the 
introduction of one-price cotton. There is every 
reason to believe that it will be temporary. In 
fact, all the available data suggest that the de- 
cline has halted and the trend has already re- 

To illustrate this point, imports in three low- 
er value products, which traditionally account 
for roughly one-third of total U.S. imports — 
yarns, sheeting, and miscellaneous fabrics oth- 
er than duck — fell by 65 million square yards. 
It was in these products that market imcer- 
tainty was most severe during the first 9 months 
of the second year of the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment. In passing it should be noted that it was 
in these products in the yarn and fabric groups 
that disruption had been most severe previously. 
Conversely, imports rose in 25 other product 
categories by an aggregate of 58 million square 
yards or an average of 22 percent. Half of 
these categories had increases in excess of 20 
percent, and some of these were in excess of 100 
percent. Most of these were products relative- 
ly advanced in manufacture for which reduc- 
tions in raw material costs resulting from one- 
price cotton were insignificant compared to the 
wide differences between domestic and import 
prices of these products. Market uncertainty 
in these products, therefore, was negligible. 

We expect excellent markets in the United 
States this year for imported cotton textiles in 
all groups. Even imported yam, which we 
anticipated would be seriously challenged by 
domestic spinners when one-price cotton became 
available to them, should enjoy a good market 
in the United States. The domestic producers 
of sales yam have lowered their prices to re- 
flect savings in cotton costs, even though labor 
and other prwluction costs have increased since 
enactment of this legislation. The temporary 

falloff in yam imports clearly seems to be pri- 
marily the result of earlier uncertainty in the 
U.S. yarn markets when the legislation was 
pending and the result of the short-term re- 
(luirement of yarn users for near deliveries in 
order to meet their own delivery demand and 
replenish inventories. Imported yarn, as re- 
cently as the past 2 weeks, is still being of- 
fered at 4 to 5 cents — and in at least one case, 
as much as 7 cents — under domestic prices in 
yarn constmctions which sell in the 40- to 60- 
cent price range. These differentials are in a 
market where 1 or 2 cents is more than sufficient 
to determine the supplier. 

The continuing rise and increasing concen- 
tration of imports in the more advanced stages 
of manufacture have created a serious problem 
for the United States with regard to the imple- 
mentation of the Long-Term Arrangement. Al- 
ready in 1962, imports amounted to more than 
25 percent of total U.S. production in eight 
categories. In 1963 these import ratios further 
increased. Most of the categories involved 
represent advanced stages of manufacture, par- 
ticulariy in the apparel field. Wliile it is an 
objective of U.S. policy to provide opportuni- 
ties for the orderiy growth of trade, the United 
States cannot afford to ignore the problems 
faced by domestic producers in many of these 
segments of the U.S. cotton textile market when 
there is already a heavy concentration of 

Condition of the U.S. Cotton Textile IVIari<et 

An upswing is now underway in the U.S. 
cotton textile industry, as price adjustments and 
rising consumer spending have erased the un- 
certainties prevailing earlier this year. How- 
ever, compared to most other manufacturing 
industries in the United States, the recovery in 
the U.S. cotton textile industry remains mod- 
est. Sales of cotton textiles, starting from 
fairly low levels, have only recently regained 
the operating levels of 1962. Let me summarize 
the highlights of these recent developments. 

First, mill employment has continued its 
long-tei-m decline and in the first half of 1964 
was 12 percent below the levels of the late 1950's. 
Unemployment in the industry lias remained 
substantially above the national level. Wages 



in the industi-y, which were increased twice 
during the past year and five times since 1959, 
remain substantially below tlie average for all 
manufacturing industries. 

Second, profits remain low and business fail- 
ures high as compared to other U.S. manufac- 
turing industries. For the first half of 1964 
net profits were 2I/2 percent of sales, unchanged 
from 1962 and down from the 3-percent rate 
attained in 1959. There were 21 business fail- 
ures, involving firms with current liabilities of 
$5.5 million, as compared with failures involv- 
ing liabilities of $4.2 million in all of 1962. 

Third, the current upswing is partly fed by 
temporary factors, such as the rebuilding of 
inventories depleted earlier this year. 

Nevertheless, the current upswing does con- 
tain many hopeful signs pointing to a brighter 
future for both domestically produced and im- 
ported cotton textiles in the United States. 

First, there have been adjustments in prices, 
particularly in yams, which will strengthen the 
competitive position of cotton relative to other 
fibers. Although one-price cotton is only re- 
cent, its effects have been felt throughout the 
industiy. By September, mill consumption of 
cotton had increased by 6 percent over the level 
of a year ago. 

Se^'ond, the domestic textile industi-y has con- 
tinued to step up its rate of spending on re- 
search, product development, and new equip- 
ment. For 1964, total investment spending of 
the textile sector is expected to reach approxi- 
mately $800 million as compared with $500 
million only 4 years ago. This year's invest- 
ment will represent the largest percentage m- 
crease of any manufacturing industry. 

Third, active spindleage in the United States 
has been declining for many years and is now 
some 4 million imits less than in 1956. As a 
result of these scrapping and modernization 
programs, a better balance exists today between 
plant capacity and market demand in the United 
States, permitting better and more economic 
utilization of existuig equipment. 

Fourth, consumer demand for textiles in the 
United States is strong. Per capita consump- 
tion of fiber is expected to advance markedly 
this year, and cotton will be a major beneficiary. 

Present projections for market trends indicate 
that this expansion will continue into 1965. 

One effect of the present strength of con- 
sumer demand has been a new surge of orders 
to overseas suppliers. This rise in orders wUl 
undoubtedly contmue. Imports are expected 
to rise in the months ahead. 

Thus, a strong and healthy cotton textile in- 
dustry in the United States is not only im- 
portant for the industry itself, its employees, 
and the U.S. economy, but also m the long run 
it is the best guarantee of expanding export 
markets for cotton textile producers abroad. 
Through a vigorous program of market re- 
search, product development, advertising, and 
sales promotion, U.S. manufacturers have pio- 
neered many of the products, markets, and uses 
in which overseas suppliers now do profitable 
business in the United States. If U.S. cotton 
textile producers are vmable to share in the 
growing U.S. market and lose the contest of 
interfiber competition, overseas suppliers of 
cotton textiles will milikely be able to maintain 
their share of U.S. textile markets. For all 
these reasons, we are greatly encouraged by the 
recent evidence that the U.S. cotton textile in- 
dustry has begim to share in the general expan- 
sion of business which has been underway in 
the United States for almost 4 years. 

Problems in Implementing Arrangement 

At this point, while I am speaking of U.S. 
policy during the second year of the Long-Term 
Arrangement, it may be useful to comment 
briefly on the position of exjjorting comitries in 
their relations with the United States. As the 
United States noted at last year's meeting, the 
Long-Term Arrangement is not a one-way 
street. The arrangement imposes reciprocal 
obligations on both the importing and the ex- 
porting countries to cooperate in maintaining 
orderly markets. 

In this connection, I regi-et to say that my 
Government has not always had the full co- 
operation of exporting comitries. The United 
States tried to avoid formal restraint action by 
consulting with exporting countries about our 
concern over rising imports in particular cate- 
gories. In only three cases did the country 



concerned take steps to insure an orderly de- 
velopment of trade in the product by limiting 
the rate of exports. 

Ovei"shipnients of restraint levels continued 
to be a serious problem for certain products, al- 
though cooperation of exporting countries gen- 
erally was much improved during the second 
year of the Long-Term Arrangement. In some 
cases these overshipments resulted from mis- 
underetandings of the products covered by the 
restraint i-equests under U.S. classification pro- 
cedures. Also, conflicting demands have been 
made on the United States with regard to this 
point by exporting coimtries. On the one hand, 
exporting countries wish to see a restraint ac- 
tion as narrowly circumscribed as possible; on 
the otlier, they quite properly point to the need 
for simple definition of the products to be cov- 
ered so that the restraint can be easily admin- 
istered by their export control authorities. 

A growing problem over the past year has 
been the circumvention and negation of export 
restraints by transshipments and tliird-country 
transactions. The United States has agreed in 
principle to the institution of a comprehensive 
certification system with two suppliers who pro- 
posed such systems in order to prevent further 
circumvention of their export arrangement 
through third-country transactions. A certifi- 
cation procedure has also been instituted with 
two other suppliers to prevent large-scale trans- 
shipments of velveteen. 

The United States has also foimd that some 
exporting countries have been reluctant to agree 
to the elimination of export restraints no longer 
needed. Under the flexibility provisions of 
paragraph 4 of article 3, shortfalls in exports of 
products subject to restraint can be transferred 
to other restraints, effectively increasing per- 
missible levels of trade in each of these other 
products by 5 percent. In certain cases this 
provision has acted as an incentive to exporters 
to resist elimination of restraints. 

The United States has also encountered a 
problem with regard to the implementation of 
the equity provisions of the Long-Term Ar- 
rangement relating to nonpartici pants. Since 
the inception of the Long-Term Arrangement, 
the United States has consistently followed a 

policy of implementing the Long-Term Ar- 
rangement impartially between countries par- 
ticipating and those not participating in the 
arrangement. Since restrained trade is fre- 
quently diverted to new suppliers, no other pol- 
icy is equitable. Certain nonparticipating ex- 
porting countries, on the other hand, have 
refused to accept requests for restraint on the 
grounds that they should not be subjected to the 
provisions of the Long-Term Arrangement. 
Some exporting countries have been reluctant 
to recognize that disruption in the markets of 
the importing country is often created by the 
cumulative effects of imports from all sources 
of supply. The United States, for its part, has 
taken the position that it cannot permit non- 
participants to benefit from the restraints im- 
posed on participating countries. We have 
fomid that restrained participating countries 
share this view with us. 

Finally, I would like to mention here a prob- 
lem which, while not directly related to the 
United States, is of considerable concern to this 
Committee. In preparing for this meeting we 
have once again been struck by the fact that 
certain countries continue to control imports of 
cotton textiles by licensing systems and other 
means outside the arrangement; furthermore, in 
certain cases formal and informal restrictions 
by private interests on the marketing of im- 
ported goods may be important and effective im- 
pediments to international trade in cotton tex- 

I feel it is particularly important this year 
that the Committee examine all the facts, not 
only about the way in which all importing coun- 
tries have implemented the provisions of the 
Long-Term Arrangement since last year's meet- 
ing but also the ways in which cotton textile 
trade may be restricted outside of the provisions 
of the arrangement. 

A Look Toward the Future 

This is the record of the United States with 
regard to the implementation of the Long-Term 
Arrangement during its second year. We will 
bo interested to hear the reports of our col- 
leagues from other coimtries with regard to 
their experiences and the opportunities, prob- 

JANUjVEY 11, 196 5 


lems, and challenges which they faced in im- 
plementing the arrangement. 

As the Long-Tenn Arrangement enters its 
third year, it also may be appropriate for the 
Committee to give increased attention to the 
broad trends in world production and trade 
in cotton textiles as tliey have been developing 
since the inception of the Short-Term Arrange- 
ment in 1961.^^ The secretariat has been cir- 
culating considerable statistical information 
since last year's meeting which would be useful 
in the Committee's deliberations on this matter. 
We believe that the general trends, indicated 
by these and other statistics, are encouraging. 
Many new countries have joined the ranks of 
exporting nations during the last 3 years and 
now contribute a significant share of total world 
trade in cotton textiles. New and established 
supplier nations have done well and exports 
from developing coimtries have reached new 
highs. The center of gravity of export trade 
in cotton textiles has shifted increasingly, dur- 
ing these years, from the industrialized to the 
developing parts of the world. At the same 
time, while this has been happening, the pro- 
ductive capacity and the levels of operation of 
cotton textile industries in the developing coun- 
tries have continued to expand. 

I believe all of us will be very much inter- 
ested to heaj- from our colleagues in developing 
countries about the performance of the cotton 
textile industries in their respective countries, 
particularly the overall rates of growth in ex- 
ports and production. 

We also hope that this discussion could lead 
this Committee to take a forward look at pro- 
spective developments in world trade in the 
years ahead. Considerable work is also being 
done in this area by other international bodies, 
such as the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] Textiles Com- 
mittee and the International Federation of Cot- 
ton and Allied Textile Industries. Further- 
more, the resources of the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee, which is concerned with 
trade in cotton and collects data related to cot- 
ton consumption, could be tapped for this pur- 

" For text, see ibid., Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337. 

pose. The secretariat has already been keeping 
in close touch with the work of these bodies. 
I believe my colleagues will agree that this co- 
operation should be continued. 

Likewise, the statistics collected by tlie secre- 
tariat on imports and production are vital to an 
understanding by each of our countries of de- 
velopments in the field of cotton textiles. We 
need to continue our cooperative efforts in this 
area and to correct deficiencies in our statistical 

We all recognize that the Long-Term Ar- 
rangement is subject to the imperfections in- 
herent in an arrangement of this sort. How- 
ever, seen in a broader perspective, the arrange- 
ment has been highly successful in harmonizing 
the interests of exporting and importing coun- 
tries. The Long-Term Arrangement has 
proven itself a good instrument to resolve diffi- 
culties of developing and developed countries 
alike in a rapidly changing situation. It pro- 
vides a framework within which developing 
coimtries have been able to increase their ex- 
ports considerably without running the risk of 
miilateral quota restriction. It is also an in- 
strument which enables the industries of the 
developed countries to make necessary adjust- 
ments in the face of rising competition from 
imports. The record of the U.S. cotton textile 
industry in this regard is highly encouraging, 
and I hope tliat other importing countries will 
be able to report this week similar progress in 
their own countries. 

Once again, the United States believes that it 
can point to its contribution to the expansion of 
trade in cotton textiles from developing coun- 
tries. We believe the record of the last 2 years 
shows that problems between develojjing and 
developed countries in this area of trade can al- 
ways be resolved when there is a mutual desire 
of accommodation within the framework of the 
Long-Term Arrangement. United States ]do1- 
icy will continue to provide trade opportuni- 
ties for developing countries in the U.S. market. 
As the Long-Term Arrangement enters its 
tliird year, it looks better and better as a living 
instrument for resolving in a spirit of mutual 
accommodation important problems in one of 
the major commodities in world trade. 




Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. C'.-V. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Tiationji. United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 


Current Actions 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 

Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of the 
second part of its third session, October 5-23. A/ 
AC.105/21. October 23. 1964. S7 pp. 

Letter dated October 27 from the Representative of 
the United States transmitting a progress report on 
international cooperation envisaged in the field of 
satellite communications. A/AC.105/22. October 
27. 1S)«4. 9 pp. 

Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space on international cooperation In the peaceful 
uses of outer space. A/57S5. November 13, 1964. 
45 pp. 

Letter dated November 12 from the Representative of 
the U.S.S.R. giving information of Soviet space 
launchings from September 13 to October 28. A/ 
AC.10.VINF.83. November 19, 1964. 2 pp. 

CoiL<;i<leration of principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and cooperation among 
states in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. Report of the Special Committee. A/5746. 
November 16, 1964. 186 pp. 

Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, 
dissemination, and wider appreciation of interna- 
tional law. A/5791. November 20, 1964. 4 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963, Volume 3 : 
The International Market and Balance of Payments. 
K/CN.12/696/Add.2. July 1, 1964. I)s7 pp. 

Cooperation With the Latin American Demographic 
Centre. Note by the secretariat. E/CN.12/687. 
August 24. 1904. 54 pp. 

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel- 
opment. Analysis of the results and prospects for 
Latin America. E/CN.12/C.1/21. October 8, 1964. 
117 pp. 

Commission on Human Right.s. Note by the Secretary- 
General transmitting a study on freedom of infor- 
mation in the Republic of Mali from 1960 to 1963. 
E/CN.4/862/Add.3. September 3, 1964. 12 pp. 

Technical Assistance Activities of the United Nations. 
Rep<jrt of the Secretary-General on the 1965 Regu- 
lar Programme of Technical Assistance. E/3990. 
October 2. 1964. 70 pp. 

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. 
ReiKjrt of the Secretary-General on Conversion to 
Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Dis- 
armament. E/3898/Rev. 1. October 7. VM'A. 40 pp. 

Statistical Commission. Report by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral on Construction Statistics. E/CN.3/305. Octo- 
ber 21, 1964. 136 pp. 

Supplementary report by the Secretary-General on 
Legislation and Practice Relating to the Status of 
Women in Family Law and Property Rights. E/ 
CN.6/425. October 23. 1904. 38 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on Information Con- 
cerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories. 
E/CN.6/427. November 3, 1964. 27 pp. 


North Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Information 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic informa- 
tion. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.' 
Notification received that it is icilling to be bound by 

terms of the agreement : Luxembourg, December 

21, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 

Accession deposited: Central African Republic, De- 
cember 22, 1964. 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of June 13, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5668, 
5701). Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton December 21, 1964. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 21, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709 ) , with exchange of notes. Signed at Washing- 
ton December 22, 1964. Entered into force December 
22, 1904. 


Convention with respect to taxes on income and prop- 
erty. Signed at AVashington December 18. 1902. 
Ratifications exchanged: December 22, 1964. 
Entered into force: December 22, 1964; effective for 
taxal)le years beginning on or after January 1, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of October 14, 1901, as amended (TIAS 
48.52. 5228, 5415, 5524). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Karachi November 28, 1964. Entered into 
force November 28, 1964. 


Arrangement relating to a program of visits and ex- 
changes in cultural, educational, scientific and other 
fields during the calendar years 1965 and 1966. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington De- 
cember 23, 1964. Entered into force December 23, 

' Not in force. 

JANUARY 11, 1965 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Docnments, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico, ex- 
tending agreement of August 15. 1960, as extended. 
Exctiange of notes — Signed at Mexico August 14, 1964. 
Entered into force August 14, 1964. TIAS 5648. 3 pp. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Costa Rica. Exchange of notes — Signed at San Jos6 
August 17 and 24, 1964. Entered into force August 24. 
1964. TIAS 5649. 4 pp. 50. 

Spectrometric Research. Agreement with Australia. 
Exchange of notes — Dated at Washington August 14 
and 17. 1964. Entered into force August 17, 1964. 
TIAS 5650. 3 pp. 5(J. 

Maritime Matters — Public Liability for Damage 
Caused by N.S. Savannah, Agreement with Ireland. 

Exchange of notes — Signed at Dublin June 18, 1964. 
Entered into force June 18, 1964. TIAS 5651. 6 pp. 

Agricultural Commodities — Use in the Republic of the 
Congo of Congo Francs Accruing Under Certain 
United States-Congo Agreements. Agreement with 
United Nations amending the understanding of Feb- 
ruary 13, 1962. Exchange of letters — Signed at New 
York August 25 and 26, 1964. Entered into force Au- 
gust 26, 1964. TIAS .5652. 3 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Republic 

of the Congo, amending agreements of November IS, 
1961, and February 23, 1963. as amended. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at L^opoldville August 28 and Sep- 
tember 4, 1964. Entered into force September 4, 1964. 
TIAS ,56.5.3. 4 pp. .50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Para- 
guay — Signed at Asuncion September 5, 1964. Entered 
into force September 5, 1964. With exchange of notes. 
TIAS .56.54. 14 pp. 100. 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Administrative Expendi- 
tures. Agreement with Norway, amending Annex C 
to agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — 

Dated at Oslo August 25 and September 2, 1964. En- 
tered into force September 2, 1964. TIAS 5655. 3 pp. 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Supplementary 
convention with Sweden, modifying and supplementing 
the convention and protocol of March 23, 1939 — Signed 
at Stockholm October 22, 1963. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 11, 1964. TIAS 5656. 11 pp. 100. 

Establishment of Long Range Aid to Navigation 
(Loran-C) Station in Newfoundland. Agreement with 
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa Sep- 
tember 16, 1964. TIAS 5657. 6 pp. 50. 

Parcel Post. Agreement and detailed regulations with 
Kuwait — Signed at Kuwait October 9, 1963, and at 
Washington October 21, 1963. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 16, 1964. TIAS 5658. 23 pp. 150. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Argentina, amending agreement of June 22, 
1962— Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Entered 
into force September 29, 1964. TIAS 5660. 4 pp. 50. 

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Nigeria, amending 
and extending agreement of October 19, 1960. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Lagos April 28 and May 
21, 1964. Entered into force May 21, 1964. Operative 
July 1,1963. TIAS 5661. 4 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Republic 
of the Congo, amending agreement of April 28, 1964. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at L^opoldville August 25, 
1964. Entered into force August 25, 1964. TIAS 5662. 
3 pp. 50. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 


U.S. participation in international 

World Rehabilitation Fund. Inc., 
agreement with Hong Kong. 

Income-tax convention with Lux- 

Educational and cultural exchange 
agreement with Rumania. 

Rusk : news conference. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 















INDEX January 11,1965 Vol.LII,No. 1SS3 

American Kepublics 

First Special Intcr-Aiiieriean Conference Pro- 
vides for Admission of New Members to Orga- 
nization of iVmerican States (Bunker, Act of 
Washington) 46 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 

U.S. Grants Aid to Chinese Refugees in Hong 
Koiis 41 

Congo (Leopoldville) 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 

U.S. Calls for Constructive Approach to Congo 
Problem (Stevenson) 43 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreijni Policy 42 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 

Rusk'.s News Conference of December 23 . . 34 

Economic .•Vffairs 

Record of U.S. Participation During Second 
Year of Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange- 
ment (Nehmer) 49 

U.S.-Luxembourg Income-Tax Convention En- 
ters Into Force 42 

Europe. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
December 23 34 

Foreign Aid 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 

U.S. Grants Aid to Chinese Refugees in Hong 
Kong 41 

Germany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
December 23 34 

Hong Kong. U.S. Grants Aid to Chinese Refu- 
gees in Ilont; Kong 41 

International Organizations and Conferences 

First Spoci.'il Inter-American Conference Pro- 
vides for Admission of New Members to Orga- 

nization of American States (Uunker, Act of 

Washington) 4(5 

Record of U.S. Participation During Second 
Year of Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange- 
ment (Nehmer) 49 

Luxembourg. U.S.-Luxenibourg Income-Tax 

Convention Enters Into Force 42 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary 

Rusk's News Conference of December 23 . . 34 
Presidential Documents. "The Hopefulness of 

These Times" 41 

Publications. Recent Releases 58 

Refugees. U.S. Grants Aid to Chinese Refugees 

in Hong Kong 41 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 57 

U.S.-Luxembourg Income-Tax Convention En- 
ters Into Force 42 

United Arab Republic. Secretary Rusk's News 

Conference of December 23 34 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 57 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 

U.S. Calls for Constructive Approach to Congo 
Problem (Stevenson) 43 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 23 34 

U.S. Declares Viet-Nam Unity Basis for Sup- 
port (McCloskey) 39 

Name Index 

Bunker, Ellsworth 46 

Johnson, President 41 

McCloskey, Robert J 39 

Nehmer, Stanley 49 

Rusk, Secretary 34 

Stevenson, Adlai E 43 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 




Responsibilities of a Global Power 


This 20-page pamplilet seeks to answer two questions central to any discussion of foreign policy 
Why is the United States involved and committed in the far corners of the world and carrying wha 
seems an inordinate share of the free world's burden ? And why do foreign policy problems defy clea 
solutions when the United States commands such vast power? 

A discussion in some depth of the changes in the postwar world, the implications of an int 
dependent world, and our tasks as a global power results. 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt of Docuinents) 

PUBLICATION 7777 15 cents 

Please send me copies of Respo)isi1)iUUea of a Global Power. 











Vol LII, No. 1S34. 

rF3 5 - '- 


January 18, 1965 

Transcript of NBC Interview 62 


Statement by Frank M. Coffin and Text of Colombo Plan Communique 77 


Text of U.S. Note 87 

For index see inside hack cover 

A Conversation With Dean Rusli 

Following is the transcript of an intervieio 
with Secretary/ Busk on the National Broad- 
casting Company''s television program "J. Con- 
versation With Dean Rusk'''' on January 3. Par- 
ticipating in the program xoere Elie Ahel, NBC 
diplomatic correspondent, and Robert GoralsM, 
NBC State Department correspondent. 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, you are about to 
close out your first 4 years in office as Secretary 
of State. Looking back on those rather tur- 
bulent years since 1961, what progress do you 
feel we have made toward a safer, saner world ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, these past 4 years, 
Mr. Abel, have been packed with events. A 
sheer chronology of what has happened on a 
month-by-month basis would take the rest of 
our time. 

I think there has been steady progress toward 
a surer peace, more caution about the use of 
war and settling political disputes. I think 
there has been some increase in the hope that 
points of agreement can be found to close the 
gaps between the two great systems of the world, 
but there remains much unfinished business. 

You see, it is hard for us to comprehend what 
it means to have 115 nations in the world, in 
the midst of so much change. Among these 
115 nations, for example, in the calendar year 
1964, tliere were elections or changes of govern- 
ment in more than 45 of them. Half these na- 
tions are newly mdependent nations who are 
going through the growing pains of infant 
countries, much like the growuig pains that we 
had in our first 20 years. But I think it is 
important also to bear in mind that the conunon 
sense and the commitments of the American 
people and the rather simple directions of 
American foreign policy that have been worked 
out in this postwar period on a bipartisan basis 
are a great stabilizing element in this world 

We can talk about the great story of freedom 
which is working itself out, not only in the free 
world but in the Conrmiunist world and in the 
so-called nonalined world. We have had dis- 
appointments in these 4 years, but we have had 
cause for quiet and deep satisfaction. 

If I may speak personally for a moment, I 
am indelibly marked by the privilege of serving 


The Department of State BnUetln, a 
weekly publication lesned by the Office 
of Media Services, Bnrean of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International aflCalrs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the Dnited States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Interna- 
tional Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for Bale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, D.S. Qovem- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbicb: 62 Issues, domestle $10, 
foreign $18 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 

NOTB : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is Indexed In the Beaderg' Qulde to 
Periodical Literature. 



thase two most extraordinai'y men, John F. 
KcniKHly and Lyndon B. Johnson. Anyone 
who served John F. Kennedy will never be 
quite the same again. And we were all deeply 
shocked by the tragedy of November 19G3. 
But then we saw Lyndon Johnson, who as Vice 
PresideTit served with great, dedication and tact 
in a diilicult job, take a step forward with tower- 
ing strength to bring us through that shattering 
tragedy and to make it clear that, although we 
had had a gre^t loss, the Nation lived and that 
the United States would take care of its respon- 
sibilities both at home and abroad. And so I 
think that we can face the new year with con- 
fidence, with satisfaction, and with hope, pro- 
vided we realize that there is a great deal of un- 
finished business and that we cannot yet lay 
our burdens down. 

The Major Trouble Spots Today 

Mr. GoraJxki : "Wliat are the major trouble 
spots today ? "\Aliich do you consider particu- 
larly serious? 

Secretary Riixk: "Well, I would think in terms 
of peace that the two most dangerous centers 
of infection at the present time are to be found 
in South Viet-Nam and in the Congo. South- 
east Asia is the scene of a crucial historical 
question. That is, whether a course of aggres- 
sion is going to be allowed to move ahead and 
whether appetites will be allowed to grow upon 

When we think about a question like Soutli 
Viet-Nam, we tend to forget a great deal that 
has gone before. We came out of World War I 
without joining in the international attempt to 
organize the peace. We didn't join the League 
of Nations. We tend to forget, now, that only 

10 years elapsed between the seizure of Man- 
I'liuria in 1931 and Pearl Harbor. We tend to 
forget that only half that time elapsed between 
such aggressions as Ethiopia, the move into 
tlie Ehineland, and the outbreak of World War 

11 in Western Europe. 

But during World War IT the American peo- 
ple came to a national decision not to be negli- 
gent about the organization of peace again. 
We did so on a national, bipartisan basis. We 
came out of it with a determination to make the 

TTnited Nations system work. I think we came 
out of it feeling that we had learned a lesson 
about what happens when a course of aggression 
goes unchecked. So that when Joseph Stalin 
picked up after World War II his idea of a 
militant world revolution and set out to apply 
l^ressures on Western Europe, with large armed 
forces, in the most menacing kind of approacli, 
we pitched in with our Western European 
friends to organize the defenses of the West and 
we brought that course of aggression to a stop. 
We have had dangerous problems, we have had 
crises, but Western Europe, the Western World, 
the Atlantic world, has never been more secure. 

Now, we have the similar problem in the 
Pacific, and, as you know, the Pacific is just as 
important to us as the Atlantic. 

Now, there you have a regime in Pciping 
which has publicly proclaimed its determina- 
tion to pursue the Morld revolution on a mili- 
tant basis. It has proclaimed it with such 
violence that it has created great problems and 
divisions within the Communist world itself. 
Now, here is Southeast Asia, made up of a num- 
ber of independent countries who have a right 
to be free and independent. We are not in- 
terested in having them as allies. We luive 
more than 40 allies. But we are interested in 
two things: one, that they have a chance to be 
secure and free and determine for themselves 
what their attitudes toward the rest of the world 
will be; and secondly, that they not become one 
of those victims of aggression, like Manchuria, 
like Ethiopia, like Austria, Czechoslovakia, be- 
fore World War II, whose fate encourages the 
aggressor to continue on a course that could 
only lead to a larger war. And so we look 
upon the Southeast Asia problem not just as 
a problem in a small neighborhood but as a 
major problem in the possibility of organizing 
a pejice right around the globe. 

Now, there is another center of infection that 
we have been troubled about in recent weeks, 
and tliat is the Congo. I say "in recent weeks" 
because that issue has become more complex 
as it has become clear that outside elements have 
been furnishing arms illegally to rebel elements 
in the Congo and that disorder has set African 
nation against African nation and threatens to 
draw the heart of Africa into the cold war. 

JANUARY 18, 1965 


As you know, we have had this before the 
United Nations in recent days, and some vei-y 
sharp things have been said about it.^ We hope 
that the Security Council and the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity will find a way to stop 
interventions in the Congo — the sort of inter- 
vention that will lead to violence and make this 
vast country simply a battleground for con- 
tending elements, at least in Africa, and possi- 
bly from all over the world. 

U.S. Policy in South Viet-Nam 

Mr. GoralsM: Some Senators, notably Sen- 
ator [Mike] Mansfield and Senator [Frank] 
Church, have suggested neutralization of South 
Viet-Nam. Columnist Walter Lippmann has 
suggested withdrawal. Do you feel a change 
in policy is in the wmd ? 

Secretary Rusk: Let's look for a moment at 
some of these alternatives and some of the words 
that pick up contradictoi-y meanings. We have 
no problem with a Southeast Asia which is 
made up of independent and secure nations who 
may elect to be nonalined. We are not look- 
ing for allies. We do believe those nations have 
the right to make those choices for themselves, 
without outside military pressure coming in on 
them from the north and certainly without at- 
tempts to take them over from the north through 
various forms of military intervention. 

Now, we don't believe that we can say to the 
billion and a half people of Asia, "Move over. 
Get out of the way, and the United States will 
find your answers for you." There are three- 
quarters of a billion Communists in Asia, or 
rather Asians under Communist rule. There 
are three-quarters of a billion in the so-called 
free world, or the nonalined world. Now, we 
can't solve their problems for them simply by 
Americans trying to do the job and pat every- 
thing into order. What we can do, however, is 
to help those jieoples and nations of Asia who 
are determined to be free to maintain their free- 
dom and their security, and that was the basis 
of President Eisenhower's decision 10 years 
ago — 11 years ago — to give assistance to South 
Viet-Nam. And it is on that basis that we 
have been helping them ever since. 

Now, we could withdraw. We could with- 
draw. That is one alternative. But again, 
withdrawal will simply, it seems to us, open 
up that terrible prospect that those who are 
committing this aggi-ession will feel that in suc- 
cess they have a confirmation of the wisdom 
and the possibility of their policy. 

You see, there was a settlement in South Viet- 
Nam — in Viet-Nam — in 1954.^ Tlie country 
was divided. North Viet-Nam became Com- 

Now, when North Viet-Nam was organized as 
a Communist country, almost immediately its 
neighbor, Laos, and its neighbor, South Viet- 
Nam, came under direct pressure from North 
Viet-Nam. Now, this is the nature of the appe- 
tite proclaimed from Peiping. One doesn't re- 
quire a "domino" theory to get at this. Peiping 
has announced the doctrine. It is there in the 
primitive notion of a militant world revolu- 
tion which has been promoted by these veterans 
of the long march who now control mainland 
China. So we believe that you simply postpone 
temporarily an even greater crisis if you allow 
an announced course of aggression to succeed 
a step at a time on the road to a major 

Now, another possibility would be to, im- 
mediately, expand tlie war, to multiply the cas- 
ualties by the thousands, to subject the ordinary 
people of that part of the world to the most 
devastating horrors of destruction. We can't 
tell what the future is going to bring all by 
ourselves, because Hanoi and Peiping are writ- 
ing this scenario too. Tliey are making deci- 
sions themselves. But we have not felt that 
we would find a solution easy, quick, prompt, 
satisfactory, simply by mounting an even larger 
operation and starting down a trail, the end of 
which no one in any country could possibly see 
with assurance. 

These 14 million people of South Viet-Nam 
have the caj^ability basically of meeting the 
problem of the guerrilla action in their country 
if they can obtain the unity and the assistance 
that is needed for that purpose. 

The second part of their problem, the infiltra- 

^ For back^ound, see Bttlletin of Jan. 4, 196.5, p. 15, 
and Jan. 11, 1965, p. 43. 

■ For text of the Geneva agreement on the cessation 
of hostilities in Viet-Nam, see American Foreign Policy, 
1950-1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, p. 750. 



tion from Hanoi, has got to stop, and steps will 
have to be taken in order to see that that does 
stop. But the basic problem is in the effort of 
the South Vietnamese themselves, with our large 

The Question of a Political Settlement 

Now, there have been those who talk about a 
possible political settlement. Let me say that 
this is not something tliat we object to in prin- 
ciple, but I would point out that there have 
been two political settlements already in South- 
east Asia : the conference which led to the agree- 
ments in 1954 ; the conference which led to the 
Laotian agreement in 1962.^ There was an ef- 
fort to find a permanent settlement of those two 
situations by political means. 

Xow, the ink wasn't dry on the agreement of 
1962 before it was clear that North Viet-Nam 
was not withdrawing its military personnel, as 
required by the agreement; that they were not 
withholding the use of the corridor of Laos for 
infiltration of South Viet-Nam, as was called 
for by the agreement; in other words, that that 
political settlement has not been effective be- 
i':iuse Hanoi and Peiping have not yet decided 
to leave these neighbors alone. 

Now, these two capitals know perfectly well 
without any peradventure of doubt that, if they 
do leave their neighbors alone, the American 
military forces will come home, that our pres- 
ence there is a direct response to the pressures 
that they have brought upon their neighbors in 
.'southeast Asia. So that if they reach the point 
where they are prepared to leave their neighbors 
alone, then there are all sorts of political possi- 
bilities that open up to register that fact and to 
bring that situation to a peaceful conclusion. 
But if they are determined to continue to press 
into Southeast Asia, then I don't see how a 
political settlement can be reached which would 
guarantee the freedom and security and safety 
of these peoples of that great peninsula. 

So no one is afraid of a political effort. As 
a matter of fact, when the Gulf of Tonkin ques- 
tion was before the United Nations Security 
Council,* the Soviet representative said in his 

speech that he thought Hanoi ought to be in- 
vited to the Security Council. The President 
of the Security Council sent a message to Hanoi, 
inviting them to come where these things could 
be talked out. Hanoi and Peiping rejected that 

Last year the Polish Government proposed 
with respect to Laos that the two cochairmen, 
that is, Britain and the Soviet Union, and the 
three members of the International Control 
Commission — India, Canada, Poland — and the 
Government of Laos, sit down among them- 
selves as a preliminary — in a preliminary dis- 
cussion — to try to clear the way for a new 14- 
nation conference on Laos. We agreed to that.^ 
Hanoi and Peiping rejected it. So that the 
possibilities of a political settlement turn upon 
what is in the minds of the people in Hanoi and 
Peiping about their neighbors to the south. If 
they are ready to settle on the basis of the secu- 
rity and the independence of their neighbors, no 
problem; but if they are determined to press 
into Southeast Asia, well, then there are very 
grave problems ahead. 

Problems of Halting Aggression in Southeast Asia 

Mr. Abel: I suppose it comes down to this, 
Mr. Secretary: In Europe we did successfully 
deter acgrression from the East. We knew how 
to do it, by creating NATO, by interposing six 
American divisions on the mainland of Europe. 
Those methods don't seem to work in Southeast 
Asia. It seems to be a different kind of chal- 

Is part of the problem that we have tried to, 
in effect, transpose our European experience to 
Southeast Asia where — 

Secretary Rusk: I don't think it is just a ques- 
tion of transposing the European experience be- 
cause, after all, you did have in Europe highly 
sophisticated nations who, although deeply in- 
jured by the war, had great capacities of their 
own and could take a full load of the responsi- 
bilities for organizing the common defense. 

In Asia, let me point out that this pressure, 
this course of aggression, has been halted with 
respect to Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philip- 

* For tests of the Declaration on the Neutrality of 
Laos and Protocol, see Bulletin of Ang. 13, 1902, p. 259. 

* For background, see ibid., Aug. 24, 19C4, p. 272. 

' For text of a U.S. statement of July 30, 19G4, see 
ihid., Aug. 17, 1964, p. 218. 

JAXTTAKY 18. 1965 


pines. In other words, this is not a general 
problem throughout Asia. But in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in South Viet-Nam, the lead- 
ers of that country who are, many of them, 35 
to 45 years of age, have never known anything 
but violence and dissension in their own comi- 
try. They have never known a period of peace 
in which they could begin to feel like a nation, 
accept their fellow citizens as brothers, organize 
a unified country as we have become accustomed 
to ourselves. 

You see, you had the period of the Japanese 
occupation. Then there was the struggle with 
the French, then the struggle with North Viet- 
Nam — 20-25 years of violence. During that 
period, things happened which separated Viet- 
namese from Vietnamese. During the Diem re- 
gime, for example, some of their officials 
pointed out that if they were resting on a fairly 
narrow political base it was because they felt 
they could not bring into the government those 
who had collaborated with the French or those 
who had collaborated with Ho Chi Minh. Now, 
you add to those groups those who collaborated 
with Diem. So that the problem of finding a 
base on wliich the unity of the leadership of 
that coimtry can rest has been a difficult one, 
but yet it is a critically important one, because 
unity in the country would make the problem 
of guerrillas and infiltration far easier to 

Let me say that we find relatively few among 
our fellow citizens who are pressing us either 
to get out or to make it a big war. We do feel 
that there are many Americans, quite under- 
standably, who do feel a sense of frustration 
that things aren't somehow moving more rap- 
idly toward a conclusion. I, myself, share that 
view. Of course, we would like to move as 
quickly as we can, but in looking at the alter- 
natives ahead of us, we must expect, I think, 
difficulty. It is going to require persistence ; it 
is going to require a good deal of effort by the 
South Vietnamese, as well as ourselves, and a 
certain coolness in dealing with this problem in 
a way that is in the genuine interests of the free 
world, rather than takmg reckless action which 
would move us off thoughtlessly in either the 
direction of defeat or in the direction of a very 
great catastrophe. 

You see, any one of us can make our own pre- 
dictions about what this or the other line of 
action might produce, but the President of the 
United States has to live with the results, what- 
ever they are. He can't pick up a phone and 
say to somebody, "Sorry, I was wrong," because 
he is responsible to the Nation for whatever 

Now, there are some in other countries, for 
example, who seem to be relatively indifferent 
to problems of this sort in Southeast Asia, and 
yet they are the first ones to say that if we were 
to abandon Southeast Asia, this would cause 
them to wonder what our commitments under 
such arrangements as NATO would mean. Do 
you see? 

In other words, the issue here is the capability 
of halting a course of aggression at the begin- 
ning, rather than waiting for it to produce a 
great conflagration. 

Mr. Abel: But isn't Viet-Nam, Mr. Secre- 
tary, almost a copybook example of a situation 
in which we have perhaps reached the outside 
limits of American power to provide what is 
lacking? By that I mean a political founda- 
tion or footing. Surely it is not for lack of mil- 
itary hardware that the war has been going so 

Secretary Rush : Well, I think there is — as a 
matter of fact, on the military side, one would 
not say that the war has been going badly in 
the usual sense. The political problem is not 
primarily a problem for the countryside where 
most of the people live. The people in the 
countryside, for the most part, are villagers who 
have paid little attention to political questions 
for the last 100 years at least. They are inter- 
ested, as all villagers are — as I was when I was 
a very young, small boy — in the crops and get- 
ting a livelihood out of the soil and getting some 
education if possible, and health, and things of 
that sort. The political problem is primarily 
in the cities and especially in Saigon, where 
there are those who have developed political 
ideas, who have tried to find their place in the 
political life of the country. 

We can't, ourselves, write prescriptions for 
these leaders. We can't tell them in detail how 
they should organize themselves. That would 
be something that would have very fragile roots 



in the. country. Rut ■we have tried to make it 
very clear to tliein that unity among themselves 
is a precondition for success in their effort. 

One thing that is encouraging about the situa- 
tion is that, although they have, upon occasion, 
quarreled rather badly among themselves, we 
ai"e unable to find any significant group in South 
Viet-Nnm, outside of the Viet Cong, who seem to 
be looking to Hanoi for an answer. In other 
words, these 14 million people seem to be com- 
mitted to the notion that South Viet-Nam ought 
to be free and secure and be left alone to work 
out its own affairs. 

Mr. Abel: As far back as Jolin Hay, Mr. Sec- 
retary, the argvmient was made that the Secre- 
tary of State ought to stay out of politics, leave 
that to the President. Yet you and Secretary 
[of Defense Robert S.] McNamara both testi- 
fied before the Democratic Convention's Plat- 
form Committee and on several occasions be- 
'■:ime involved in fairly sharp exchanges with 
>iiiator Goldwater. How do j'ou justify that? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, in the first place, the 
Democratic Platform Committee did, for a 
change, meet here in "Washington. Ijet me point 
out that previous Secretaries of State have 
worked very closelj' with their Democratic lead- 
pi> — Democratic or Republican leaders — in de- 
^ >ing their party platforms insofar as foreign 
all'airs are concerned. In other words, they have 
never taken a hands-otf attitude toward party 
platforms. That was, I think, the only partisan 
event that I attended, although I did do speak- 
. ing during tlie campaign before nonpartisan 
irioups here and there about the coimtry. 

No, I took the view that, when foreign policy 
is under discussion, the Secretary of State 
should not be the only person in the country to 
remain silent. And this was particularly true 
■when the very roots of a postwar, bipartisan 
policy seemed to be under challenge from those 
who would change it in important respects, or 
■who seemed to want to change it in important 
respects. So I think that we came through that 
period without upsetting too much the tradi- 
tional view. Let me say the traditional view 
was never quite as 100 percent pure as perhaps 
you suggested, and I think we will move now to 
take into account the views of the responsible 
leaders of both parties to see where we are with 

respect to this great bipartisan effort of the post- 
war period. 

Interpretation of President's Mandate 

Mr. Abel: There has been a great deal of dis- 
cussion since the election about whether or not 
the President has a mandate to follow a par- 
ticular course based on his enormous popular 
majority. How would you interpret that in 
your own area ? Do you feel that the election re- 
turns confirmed and supported the basic and 
continuing foreign policy that you are dedi- 
cated to? 

Secretary Ettsk: I think it would be more for 
the President than for me to try to speak in de- 
tail about how one interprets a mandate of that 
sort. I would myself, however, believe that, to 
use the President's expression, "Our guard is 
up, but our hand is out," constitutes one element 
in the attitudes that seem to have the general 
approval of the American people. 

You see, we have moved into a period of his- 
tory in the last 10 years that man has never been 
in before, a period in which mass destruction on 
an almost unimaginable scale is literally pos- 
sible, where a full nuclear exchange is an opera- 
tional fact with which governments have to 
grapple. And that means that man has got to be 
a little careful about pursuing policies on the 
basis of glandular reactions. He has got to be 
prepared to use persistence and patience and to 
try to see where his interests really, in fact, lie, 
and not to suppose too quickly that all you have 
got to do is to say to the other side, "Do this, or 
bang," because the answers don't lie there any 

Mr. Abel: On that verj' point, Mr. Secretary, 
a number of the newer countries, those who are 
trying to get into the nuclear club, seem to imag- 
ine that possession of these weapons is going 
to give them a great deal more power and influ- 
ence in the world. I wonder whether we liaven't 
found, with our very long experience in nuclear 
weaponry, that possession of these weapons in 
fact tends to limit our choices? 

Secretary Rusk: I think that is a very per- 
ceptive comment. I think there are those who 
think that the possession of nuclear weapons 
somehow makes you a master of your own fate. 
In fact, I suppose there is nothing that more 

JANUARY 18, 1963 


readily limits your freedom of action than the 
possession of such enormous destructive power. 
This very power carries with it a responsibility, 
and I would say that the United States never in 
its history has been more limited by its world- 
wide responsibilities than it is today, and among 
those responsibilities is this awesome one for the 
nuclear arsenal which is in our hands. 

Attitude of New Soviet Leaders 

Mr. Gorahkl: It has been more than 2 months 
now since the Kremlin reshufBe, with [Aleksai 
N.] Kosygin and [Leonid] Brezlmev being the 
two top Soviet officials. Have you seen any in- 
dications of where the new Soviet leaders will 
go, what direction they will take? 

Secretary Rusk: They have indicated in a 
variety of ways that they maintain tlie general 
posture of peaceful coexistence, that they would 
like to find additional points at which some 
agreement might be possible, that they would be 
prepared to search for points of further agree- 
ment. We have been, on the other hand, dis- 
turbed by the strong attitudes that they have 
taken with respect to South Viet-Nam and to 
the Congo. If these are examples of wars of 
liberation which are in accordance with their 
doctrine they seem still committed to support, 
then we have some very tough times ahead. We 
have some serious issues with them that we will 
have to work at. But in general I would thmk 
that there is, there continues to be, a certain cau- 
tion in their approach, that their attitude is 
marked by a certain respect for the United 
States, just as our attitude is marked by a cer- 
tain respect for the vital interests of the Soviet 
Union in terms of their own situation. But 
again, I don't see dramatic movement in either 
direction, either negatively or positively, at the 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, a related question, 
if I may : Wlio is at the other end of the "hot 
line" today, if we were to use it ? 

/Secretary Rusk: Perhaps this is a little indis- 
creet. We asked that question, and the answer 
was, "The Government of the Soviet Union." 

Mr. Abel: The head of that Government be- 
ing Mr. Kosygin, I assmne ? 

Secretary Rusk: He is the Prime Minister. 

Mr. Abel: We will continue our conversation 
with Secretary Rusk in just one moment. (An- 
nouncement.) Mr. Secretaiy, you mentioned 
disappointments. What was your chief disap- 
pointment of the past 4 years ? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think, Mr. Abel, im- 
doubtedly the tragic failure of the Bay of Pigs, 
for which President Kennedy and I have taken 
our full share of responsibility. 

Developments in the Western Hemisphere 

Mr. Goralskl: Speaking of Cuba, sir, in the 
beginning of the program you mentioned the 
two major centers of infection, the Congo and 
Southeast Asia. You did not mention Cuba. 
Do you think Castroism has waned and ebbed 
sufficiently that it is no longer a major concern 
to us? 

Secretary Rusk: I tliink in the last 2 or 3 
years it has become very clear that Castroism 
as a threat to the Western Hemisphere has been 
very, very severely reduced. One could illus- 
trate that in a great many ways: The Organiza- 
tion of American States has effectively isolated 
Castro in the hemisphere, politically and eco- 
nomically, with a high degree of solidarity 
among the members of the hemisphei'e. There 
are not the Cuban embassies around the hemi- 
sphere that themselves were centers for agents 
and subversion and intimidation, as was the 
case, say, 2 or 3 years ago. 

I think we also have seen in the events in 
Venezuela and Brazil, in Chile, of the past 12 to 
14 months, a striking demonstration that the 
people of the hemisphere are not prepared to go 
down the slippery slope with the sort of thmg 
that Castro has in mind. 

We have seen in recent months a very sharp 
reduction in Castro activity in the hemisphere, 
partly because countries have reacted and are 
taking steps to prevent it. They are making it 
more difficult for his type of propaganda and 
action to have any success. 

But then it is also true that the Alliance for 
Progress is now beginning to take hold, as a 
practical matter. That is, we had a year or two 
of planning, preparation. Now, fimds in very 




large amounts are beginning actually to be 
spent, and you are beginning to see some tangi- 
ble movement forward in the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. I remember, in 1961 President Kennedy, 
on the outskirts of Bogota, dedicated the first 
unit of a housing project in an open field.' To- 
day, I think there are 11,000 units at that proj- 
ect, and housing something like 60 to 70 thou- 
sand people. Dozens upon dozens of fresh-water 
installations are now available in cities where 
they were not before. Schools by the tens of 
thousands have been built, and these things now 
are beginning to make a deep imprint. And 
the hemisphere can now see that there is a way 
to bring about the necessary economic and so- 
cial changes in the hemisphere without resort- 
ing either to repression from the extreme right 
or to dictatorship from the extreme left. 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, I wonder, though, 
if there isn't a coincident development — I won't 
call it a related one — and that is that we seem 
to have become less moralistic about military 
dictatorships or dictatorships influenced largely 
by the military coming to power in some of these 
Latin countries. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that if you 
look, as I have had occasion to do, at the curve 
of coups d'etat or goJpes. in Latin America, you 
can see that the frequency of such coups d'etat 
is dropping off. 

Something else to bear in mind is that, in 
coimtry after country, the military establish- 
ment is committing itself more deeply to the 
maintenance of a constitutional and democratic 
system. Now, it is true that in some situations 
the military have upset a duly elected govern- 
ment. "We have felt that, although we don't 
enjoy or like such developments, we have felt 
that the course of wisdom is not simply to draw 
back and break relations and pretend that we 
can ignore the results but to work with these 
countries to help them get back on the consti- 
tutional and democratic path as speedily as pos- 
sible. I think this has shown some results. I 
don't think we ourselves ought to take a com- 
pletely arbitrary or doctrinaire approach. Our 

support is for constitutional and free systems, 
and we work at it all the time in trying to assist 
those that are constitutional and free to demon- 
strate that they can be successful and to assist 
those that are not to move in that direction. 

The Burden of the Arms Race 

Mr. Abel: I have been a little — I have won- 
dered some about the growing pains of some of 
these less developed countries. The Latin 
American coimtries are a case in point, but there 
are a good many others. Wliy is it that so many 
of them seem to wish to burden themselves with 
very heavy loads of armament at a time when 
the resources available for advancing the public 
good are so limited ? 

Secretary Busk: Well, we have been con- 
cerned about that problem. I said earlier that 
the United States and the Soviet Union were the 
two principal countries that had a serious in- 
terest in disarmament as it might apply to them- 
selves. I recall that at the United Nations and 
the General Assembly, at a time when they were 
voting unanimously for disarmament, 70 mem- 
bers were at that moment asking us for military 

Now, we think it would be a great misfortune 
if all of these newly independent nations should 
be caught up in, shall we say, minor-league arms 
races among themselves. Because, compared to 
their resources, these could be very burdensome 
and stand in the way of their own economic and 
social development. A supersonic fighter squad- 
ron, for example, can build and maintain a uni- 
versity. This is one of the reasons why we pro- 
posed at Geneva that we — and the Soviet 
Union — organize a bonfire of certain weapons 
that in due course will be coming out of our 
military defense establishment.' In one sense it 
is true to say that they are becoming obsolescent 
or obsolete and therefore the bonfire is not very 
significant. But it would be important that 
those weapons, however obsolete they might be 
for us, not be distributed all over the rest of the 
world to bring about new levels of sophistication 
and expense for nations who may be tempted to 

• IJ>id., Jan. 15, 1962. p. 91. 

' For a statement made at Geneva on Mar. 19, 1964, 
by Adrian S. Fisher, see ibid., Apr. 20, 1964. p. 64.3. 

JANTj/VRT 18, 1965 


get into an arms race in tlieir own neighbor- 

The United Nations 

Mr. Goralski: With the proliferation of na- 
tion-states you have liad a proliferation in U.N. 
membership — 115 members now. Do you feel 
because of its size the U.N. is no longer as ef- 
fective as it was immediately after World 
War II? 

Secretary Rusk: I think the size creates some 
complications in procedure. For example, if 
everyone wants to speak on every issue, j'ou have 
a problem of simply time. And it is true, too, 
that theoretically the majority of the General 
Assembly can now be voted in a way that raay 
appear to be irresponsible to the rest of the 
world. For example, 5 percent of the contribu- 
tions to the General Assembly can cast two- 
thirds of the vote of the General Assembly, and 
I thinlf 10 percent of the population of the world 
can cast two-thirds of the vote in the General 

We studied this with considerable care in 
terms of weighted voting. We have tried about 
15 different weighted voting formulas and com- 
pared them against the 275 or so key issues that 
have been before the General Assembly in the 
last few years. Quite frankly, thus far we have 
not found a weighted voting formula that would 
have improved the relative influence or position 
of the United States in dealing with these issues. 
This is because in the main — now, there have 
been some exceptions, but in the main — we find 
ourselves working ordinarily with the large ma- 
jority of the U.N. Assembly in trying to 
strengthen the U.N. system. And so I would 
say that, with one or two painful exceptions, 
this issue has not been too difficult for us as yet. 

Mr. Abel: Doesn't this, though, bring about 
a further mutuality of interest between our- 
selves and the Soviet Union? You mentioned 
the matter of nuclear war. You mentioned also 
the matter of a common interest, perhaps, in 
cutting down arms expenditures. Isn't there a 
third one : that we and they as two of the great 
powers which provide, in theory, a large part 
of the budget, in fact ought not to leave our- 
selves at the mercy of a two-thirds vote in the 

General Assembly to commit us to all kinds of 
harebrained and irresponsible schemes? 

Secretary Rush : I think within limits that is 
so. For example, we have had some discussion 
with the Soviet Union and certain other delega- 
tions in New York about the possibility of 
underlining in some fashion the fact that the 
Security Council has primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity. The Soviet Union is inclined to take 
the view that the Security Council ought to have 
the sole responsibility, where it would be gov- 
erned in any event by a veto. We believe that 
the General Assembly ought not to be blocked 
out of its latent or its eventual responsibility in 
this field if the Security Comicil is unable to 

Similarly on financial questions, we believe 
that those who make the largest contributions- 
say the 20 or 25 principal contributors to the 
United Nations — might well be given a special 
consultative status to the General Assembly on 
financial questions so that the large majority of 
the General Assembly will have before them the 
views of those who in fact come forward with 
the largest contributions. 

Now, these are things that we are prepared 
to talk out, and so long as we can do it without 
trying to strip the ordinary members of the 
U.N. of the charter privileges that they have, 
I think we could make some headway on it. 
But we do have certain common interests with 
the Soviets on this matter. 

Question of U.N. Membership for Peiping 

Mr. Goralshi : Many people believe it is only 
a matter of time, a very short period of time, 
before Communist China is admitted to the 
United Nations. If you are still Secretary of 
State when that happens, what does this coimtry 

Secretary Rusk: Well, let's wait and see 
whether that situation develops while I am Sec- 
retary of State. 

Let me say that the impression that we are an 
ostrich vnth its head in the sand with respect to 
mainland China, I think, rather misses the 
point. We know very much that they are there, 
and I suppose it is fair to say that we have 



talked with Peiping on serious mattere more 
than any other government in the world except, 
perliups, the Soviet Union. We have been talk- 
mg witli them for at least 8 years, and we have 
raised with them very far-reacliing questions. 
Those talks have not produced very much be- 
ciiuse they usually begin with an insistence by 
Peiping that we immediately abandon these 11 
million people of the Republic of China on For- 
mosa, and that we can't do, and so what follows 
after that gets to be a little stilted and a little 
formal in character. But we know they are 
there. '\^niat does concern us is what Peiping 
would think about its admission to the United 
Xations under present circumstances. You see, 
we believe that they are embarked upon a course 
of pressure and of aggression, a militant expan- 
sion of their system against their neighbors. 
They attacked India. They are pushing in on 
Soutlieast Asia. We have had problems of that 
sort with them before. 

Xow, if the leaders of their Politburo sit down 
to ask themselves, "How are we doiiig in the 
world?" the more they say to themselves, "We 
are doing fine, therefore let's continue to our 
path," the greater the dangers for the future, 
and we think that anything in terms of expan- 
sion of trade or recognition or admission to the 
U.N. that tends to encourage them to believe 
that their policy is paying dividends is not in 
the interests of getting a peace established in the 
Pacific area. 

Mr. Abel: Wliat about American correspond- 
ents going into Cliina? I can recall that we did 
have American correspondents in Russia long 
before we had diplomatic relations with Mos- 
cow. Wliy aren't there American correspond- 
ents in China today ? 

Secretary Rusk: We have tried from time to 
time to work out exchanges for American cor- 
respondents to go to mainland China. Tliat 
has not yet been accepted by Peiping. I will 
tell you, Mr. Abel, if you can get a visa to go 
to China, we will give you a passport. 

Mr. Abel: Thank you very much indeed. I 
am afraid I have no such prospect. 

Mr. Gorahki: Wliat about the prospects in 
Europe? Has President de Gaulle told you 
that France is going to withdraw from NATO 
in 1969? 

JANTJARY 18, 1965 

France and NATO 

Secretary Rusk : No. He, as you know, draws 
a sharp distinction between what he calls the 
alliance, which is the North Atlantic Treaty, 
and the NATO organization, which is the struc- 
ture which has been worked out since 1950 for 
the organization of the forces of NATO. This 
is largely because he does not himself wish to 
integrate French forces into NATO forces as 
such. He feels that he wants to strike their 
roots deep into France and to build his armed 
forces on a national basis rather than on an in- 
tegrated basis. There are special circumstances 
in the recent history of France which perhaps 
have led him to that conclusion. 

So I don't believe that he anticipates with- 
drawing from the alliance. He does have mis- 
givings about the organization of NATO. We 
hope that at some stage France will come for- 
ward with specific suggestions about how they 
see the organization of the alliance — thus far, 
they haven't done so — so the rest of us can take 
a look at it to see what they have in mind. But 
I suppose that between now and 1969 these 
matters will be up for review. The alliance con- 
tinues after 1969. The only significance of 1969 
is that at that time any member has a privilege 
of withdrawing if they wish to do so. But the 
general assumption among the members of the 
alliance is that it will continue. 

Mr. Abel: We have been maintaining a quar- 
ter of a million American troops in Western 
Europe all these years. Does that have to go on 
indefinitely ? Woulcbi't three divisions there be 
just as sure a guarantee of our intervention as 

Secretary Rush: Well, our general view has 
been that these forces should be there for as long 
as necessary and that we have felt that they at 
least thus far have been necessary. 

You will remember, in 1961 we had a rather 
sharp crisis over Berlin. At that time we even 
augmented our forces there somewhat. Now, 
if some of these political questions such as Ger- 
many and Berlin either can be settled or it can 
be made clear that they are not going to be made 
the subject of a crisis, and there can be some 
easing off of the military confrontation of the 
two power groups, then perhaps this matter can 
be re\'iewed. 


Mr. Goralski: Sir, one of the problems in the 
months ahead for you will certainly be the mat- 
ter of foreign aid again. That is an annual 
thing, now, a fight before Congi-ess for a certain 
amount of money — $3.5 billion dollars last year. 
Do you foresee an end to foreign aid or a sub- 
stantial reduction in the years ahead ? 

Foreign Aid 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there can be 
reductions of foreign aid to successive countries 
as they work themselves out of the need for aid. 
Most of the NATO countries are now off the aid 
list. There are others who — some dozen or 15 — 
who are in the process of coming off of the aid 
list. Actually our foreign aid is much more 
highly concentrated than most people suppose. 
In other words, the — three-quarters of our for- 
eign aid will be found going to some dozen coun- 
tries or so, in a very rough sense — this isn't ex- 
actly accurate. 

The fact that you find a great many coimtries 
on the list, I think, is a direct outcome of the 
technical assistance aspect of our policy, in line 
with President Truman's Point 4 operation. 
We have a great many things in this country to 
offer to countries who are in a development proc- 
ess. Some of them are not very costly: tech- 
niques, experience, advice. We feel we ought to 
make those available. Just one point, for ex- 
ample: 100 years ago we invented a imiversity 
for the purpose of development. That is the 
land-grant college, these great agricultural and 
engineering colleges that ai-e in every State. 
Now, this was a unique American development. 
This is highly relevant to the development prob- 
lems of countries all over the world, and they are 
showing great interest in drawing out of that 
experience of ours something that is relevant 
to themselves. 

Now, it would be, I think, churlish of us to 
withhold anything that we can contribute in 
this direction. So I think that for a long time 
to come we will be in the aid field in a variety of 
ways, I would hope strongly through interna- 
tional organizations, I would hope strongly 
through the teclinical assistance side of things. 
In such things as grants, I think we can see some 
reduction in that. In terms of lending. I think 

we can see a strengthening of the borrowing ca- 
pacity of developing countries so that conces- 
sional lending is not so heavily required. Now, 
if we can establish peace on a more solid basis, of 
course military assistance can drop off, but until 
it is established, all these things are part of our 
own defenses. 

I tend to illustrate it, Mr. Goralski. in my own 
mind, this way : We have almost a million Amer- 
icans in uniform outside the continental United 
States in this great struggle for freedom. We 
support them with a $50-billion defense budget. 
It seems to me that 3 or 4 cents of our Federal 
tax dollar to be used for foreign aid, to get this 
job done without committing those young men 
to combat, is a good use of 3 or 4 cents of our 
Federal tax dollar. 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, how do you propose 
to deal with the fact that the leaders of your 
own party in the House and the Senate seem to 
want different kinds of foreign aid bills? Sen- 
ator [J. W.] Fulbright has said that he is not 
interested in "carrying the ball," so to speak, for 
a bill that lumps everything together. On the 
other hand, Congressman [Thomas E.] Morgan, 
the head of the House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee, says just the opposite. He will not carry 
the ball for a bill that breaks it down into sepa- 
rate categories. Wliat do you do about this? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Abel, since both 
of these views have been made public, I think 
my proper answer at this point is that I shall try 
to use some quiet diplomacy on the problem 
when these gentlemen get back to town. 

Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy 

Mr. Abel: There is one point I would like to 
get — it is a little philosophical, but I know it 
interests you, and looking at Mr. Acheson [for- 
mer Secretary of State Dean Acheson] over 
there on the wall reminds me of it. Do you or 
do you not see a connection between the moral 
tone of our life here in this country and the 
effectiveness of our foreign policy overseas ? 

Secretary Riisk : I personally think that there 
is a very close and very powerful comiection. 
I don't believe that sanctimony helps us in our 
relations with the rest of the world, and I don't 
think that it is in our interests to preach to other 




people without ourselves being willing to act 
and help in resolving problems that we want to 
preach to them about. But 1 have no doubt that 
the basic moral commitments, if you like, of the 
American people are a very important part of 
our relations with the rest of the world. In- 
deed, there have been times when I would think 
tliat other peoples- views of what kind of society 
we are trying to build here at home may be the 
most important element in their thinking about 
daeir relations with us. Think of F.D.R., for 
example. lie was in some respects something 
of a — he was President during a period of rela- 
tive American isolation, but he made a tremen- 
dous impact on ordinary people right around 
the world because of the kind of society he was 
li trying to develop here at home. These things 
are important. 

Xothing has been more important to me, as I 
see it, in our relations with the rest of the world 
in the last year or so than the dedicated, con- 
certed effort by the President, the Congress, and 
the Supreme Court, and most Americans, to get 
on with real progress in the civil rights issue, 
for example. So I think these elementary no- 
tions which people have about what is worth 
living for and the springs of conduct have a 
great deal to do with what other people think 
about us and the extent to which we can work 
closely with them. 

Decline in International "Good Manners" 

Mr. Goralski: Many people have raised the 
question, sir, of who is worth helping. Around 
the world USIS libraries are being burned, par- 
ticularly in Indonesia and Egj-pt, and yet we are 

I assisting them. We will — we are now in the 
process of negotiating a wheat agreement with 

! President Nasser of Egypt. TVliy do we con- 
tinue helping these coimtries who obviously are 
not very happy with our policies? They don't 
like what we do, and yet we are helping them 
and they do little, in turn, for us. 

Serrefnry Rusk: Well, we have been very 
much concerned about what might be called the 
decline in good manners in international society 
in the last few years, particularly in the last 
year or two.* Let's bear in mind that for the 

' For a statement of Dec. 9 by Secretary Rusk, see 
jfl ibid., Dec. 28, 1964, p. 90.5. 

most part these demonstrations that we run into 
abroad are organized, and usually organized by 
the Communists or by those who work with 
them. Indeed, this is so much the case that we 
can almost predict, now, given a particular 
development or circumstance, how many win- 
dows we shall lose in how many embassies at any 
given moment, because the Communists do or- 
ganize this. And one of the reasons they attack 
our information libraries is that there is some- 
thing which makes a difference to them. This 
is where the story of the free world is getting 
out effectively to people in other countries. 

Once in a while we will get demonstrations be- 
cause we try to help settle a dispute, and aU 
parties get mad at us because we can't agree 
with them 100 percent. We have had demon- 
strating in Athens and in Ankara and in Nico- 
sia in the same year over the Cyprus affair. 
Well, those things are part of being a great 

Now, we do expect, however, that govern- 
ments accept the responsibility of giving pro- 
tection to the official representation of the 
United States in their countries. This is ut- 
terly fundamental to the fabric of international 
society, and we will be pressing that point in 
every possible way. 

Now, when some of these things happen, it 
is very easy for one event to lead to another and 
the situations start to slide and, if each side 
kicks it further downward, then it just slides 
right down into the pit. It is not in our interest 
to have these things go to a final break. On the 
other hand, we do have to find ways and we do 
find ways to express our displeasure and our 
insistence that such things as good manners are 

We as a great power, I think, are called upon 
to show a certain amount of patience in dealing 
with such issues, but even there, if patience 
goes to the point of encouraging them to do it 
again — encouraguig them to ignore the rights 
of a legation and the conduct that has been 
worked out over several centuries for mainte- 
nance of official relations among nations — then 
patience becomes unrewarding. And so I think 
you will find that in 1965 we shall make it quite 

JANTTART 18, 1965 


clear that we are sensitive about this question of 
giving rights and protections to official repre- 
sentatives abroad, as an elementaiy condition 
for the maintenance of relations among nations. 

The Strong Tradition of Freedom 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, all Americans, I 
suppose, must believe in the eventual triumph 
of freedom over tyramiy. Surely that is the un- 
derlying justification for all of these rather 
costly efforts we have been talking about. 
Granting that we cannot forever control or sway 
the destinies of other countries, what grounds 
do you see for believing that freedom will pre- 

Secretary Rtisk: Well, I have vei-y deep con- 
victions on that matter, Mr. Abel. The United 
States is a country which has military power 
that is almost beyond the capacity of the mind 
of man to comprehend. But it remains true that 
our greatest power as a people lies in those sim- 
ple commitments to freedom that are a part of 
our entire national existence. The notion that 
governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed remains the most pow- 
erful and explosive political idea in the world 
today. Now, you can see this working out in a 
variety of ways. It is not just that this is a part 
of a process of 2,000 years of history and that 
you put your faith in that inevitable process of 
history. You can see it in such things as the at- 
titude of the rest of the world, including the 
nonalined world, when great crises develop in 
which freedom seems to be the issue. For ex- 
ample, during the Cuban missile ci'isis, it was 
not just that NATO was unanimous and the 
hemisphere was unanimous. We had powerful 
support, much of it private, behind the scenes, 
from the nonalined countries, who wished us 
well in coming through that in a way that was 
satisfactory to the free world. 

This is a contagious idea behind tlie Iron Cur- 
tain, this notion of freedom. Little by little the 
use of terror has been lifted. Wlien there was a 
recent change in the government of the Soviet 
Union, many Communists immediately sought 
the answer to the question : "Does this mean a 
restoration of terror, because we are concerned 
about that?" You hear talk, now, about initia- 

tive, individual responsibility, decentralization, 
profits in the Commvmist world. 

No, I think these notions of freedom are deep 
in human nature, and they help to establish al- 
most instinctive allies among ordinary common 
people throughout the world. From this point 
of view, I think the American people are a part 
of a strong tradition that does, in fact, represent 
the course of histoiy. 

Mr. Abel: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

President Sends New Year's 
Message to Soviet Leaders 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Johnson to Anastas Mikoyan., Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., and Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers. 

White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated December 30 

December 30, 1964: 
Dear Mr. Chairmen : Personally, and on be- 
half of the American people, I extend to you and 
the Soviet people greetings and best wishes for 
the New Year. 

The year just ending has produced significant 
accomplishment in some areas of endeavor. But 
major international problems are unresolved 
and the most urgent business for all of us re- 
mains strengthening the foundation of world 
peace. In this task, our two Governments bear 
great responsibilities and it is my earnest wish 
that in the coming year we can make substantial 

Arms control remains especially urgent ; noth- 
ing can contribute more to the hopes of mankind 
for the future. During the months ahead I hope 
we can work for practical agreements to this 
end. We can and should move to limit the 
spread of nuclear weapons ; to achieve a verified 
worldwide comprehensive test ban; to make a 
cutoff of fissionable material production for 
weapons coupled with measures to safeguard 
the peaceful uses of nuclear power ; and to agree 
on a verified freeze in existing offensive and de- 
fensive strategic nuclear delivery systems. 


depaetment of state bulletin 

By progress in this critical area, our Govern- 
ments can help to make this a happier and safer 
world for all peoples. You may be certain that 
the American people and their Government will 
never be second in this effort. 
Sincerely yours, 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

U.S. Officials Send Congratulations 
to President Saragat of Italy 

Following are the texts of congratulatory 
\ \ messages from President Johnson and Secretary 
Rusk to Gixiseppe Saragat, who was elected 
,. President of Italy on December 28. 


Message From President Johnson 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 28 

^ December 28, 1964: 

On behalf of the American people, I extend 
to you warm congratulations upon your election 
as President. I look forward to a continuation 
of the close friendship between our two coun- 
tries m these times which present not only great 
problems but also great opportunities. Mrs. 
Johnson joins me in sending our personal best 


Ltndon B. Johnson 

Message From Secretary Rusk 

Decejiber 28, 1964 
I wish to extend congratulations and warm 
personal best wishes on your election as Presi- 
dent of the Republic of Italy. Our association 
during your tenure as Foreign Minister has been 
particularly rewarding to me. We are heart- 
ened to know that in the years ahead Italy will 
have your capable leadership, and we are con- 
fident that our two nations will continue to 
cooperate closely in the search for peace and 

Dean Rusk 

U.S. Regrets Malaysia Unable 

To Accept Military Credit Proposal 

The Government of Malaysia announced on 
December 28 that it would be unable to accept 
that portion of a U.S. proposal dealing with the 
purchase of military equipment. Another por- 
tion of the proposal having to do with training 
of Malaysian personnel by the United States is 
still under consideration. Following is a De- 
partment statement read to news correspondents 
on December 29 by Robert J. McCloskey., Direc- 
tor of the Office of News, together with the text 
of a joint convmwnique issued on November 23 
by a U.S. defense tearn and officials of the Gov- 
ernment of Malaysia at the conclusion of dis- 
cussions held at Kuala Lumpur November 


We regret that the Government of Malaysia 
is unable to accept the U.S. offer of credit ar- 
rangements for the purchase of military equip- 
ment. Tlie terms offered were standard for the 
purchase of military equipment under arrange- 
ments whereby the U.S. Government guarantees 
loans extended by banks. The United States 
has exceiDtionally hea%'y commitments in Viet- 
Nam and elsewhere in Asia where we are ex- 
pending our resources to defend the independ- 
ence of free nations. These efforts represent a 
real contribution to the security of Malaysia. 
Malaysia is already receiving substantial mili- 
tary aid from Britain, Australia, and New Zea- 
land. The United States has offered grant aid 
for military training which flic Malaysian Gov- 
ernment has under consideration. 


The visiting United States defence team has 
held discussions w-ith the Government of Ma- 
laysia during the past two weeks regarding the 
sale of militarj' equipment and a programme of 
training for the Government of Malaysia's ex- 
panded defence programme. As a result the 
United States has offered to: 

JANXTART 18, 1965 


(1) Assist in arranging for the purchase in 
tlie United States of military equipment, prin- 
cipally aircraft on medium term credit arrange- 
ments, and 

(2) To provide training for a number of 
Army and Air Force personnel in various mili- 
tary specialties. 

Tlie ilinisters of Defence and Finance will 
now present the U.S. Government's offer to the 
Government of Malaysia for its consideration. 

President Sends Christmas Greetings 
to Americans in Viet-Nam 

Presidential Message 

White House press release dated December 23 

To my fellow- Americans in Vietnam, and to 
their wives, children and parents, I send warm- 
est Christmas greetings. 

Those of us who are at home, full of joy and 
thoughts of peace, are ever mindful of, and 
grateful to, those thousands of you who toil 
today where there is no peace. 

You are in Vietnam, far from the places and 
people you love, because the forces that have 
given our nation strength and wealth have also 
placed upon it the burden of defending free- 
dom — even in remote and distant villages. 

In every generation the burden of protecting 
liberty has fallen to a few stouthearted men. 
We Americans celebrate this holy season in 
liberty because our forebears had the courage, 
the determination, the will to sacrifice, that was 
equal to the challenges before them. Future 
generations in many lands will spend Christmas 
days in freedom because there are men every- 
where who are equal to this grim challenge in 
our time. 

You who carry Freedom's banner in Vietnam 
are engaged in a war that is imdeclared — yet 
tragically real. It is a war of terror where the 
aggressor moves in the secret shadows of the 
nights. Murder and kidnapping and deception 
are his tools. Subversion and conquest are liis 
goals. It is a war waged with political, social. 

economic and psychological weapons as well as 
guns and bombs. Thus every American in 
Vietnam, whether soldier. Embassy secretary or 
AID [Agency for International Development] 
official, whether in the jungle, in the mountains 
or in the cities, is on the front lines of this 

Those of you who are helping the Vietnamese 
people to defend themselves against this in- 
sidious warfare may serve in places with names 
that ring strange to American ears ; Long Khot, 
Kien Tuong, Binh Gia. But your sacrifices are 
known and honored in American towns and 
cities more familiar to you, for you are meeting 
your coimtry's conunitment to a world of justice. 

All Americans join me in sendmg thanks — 
and not at Cliristmas only, but around the clock, 
and around the year. 

U.S. Provides Emergency Food 
Supplies to Somalia 

Department Statement ^ 

In response to the appeal of the Somali Gov- 
ernment, the United States is taking iimnediate 
steps to provide 500 tons of emergency food 
supplies to famine-stricken regions of that 
country. Prime jNIinister Abdirazak [Hagi 
Hiissein] reported on Saturday [December 26] 
that 700,000 inhabitants of the Somali Eepublic 
are facing very severe famine conditions due to 
a crop failure and appealed to all diplomatic 
chiefs of mission in Mogadiscio for assistance. 

One hundred tons of grain will be flown in 
from Khartoum by a C-130 JIATS cargo plane. 
The first load is expected to arrive in Mogadiscio 
on Thursday [December 31]. Another 400 tons 
will be delivered by sea to Somalia within a 
matter of weeks, and additional shipments vdll 
be made as rapidly as transport can be provided. 

In addition to the initial shipment of 500 
tons, the United States wiU contribute 6,500 
tons of grain sorghum. 

^ Read to news correspondents on Dec. 29 by Robert 
J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News. 




Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia 

LONDON, NOVEMBER 17-20, 1964 

The Conmltative Committee of the Colombo 
Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in 
South and Southeast Asia held its 16th annual 
meeting at London November 17-20. Following 
are a statement made on November 19 by Frank 
M. Coffin, who headed the U.S. delegation,^ a 
communique released at the close of the meeting, 
and chapter II of the 13th annual report, which 
was one of the annexes to the communique. 


Two years ago I crossed the Pacific to attend 
my first meeting of the Colombo Plan Con- 
sultative Committee at Melbourne.- This year 
I had only to cross the Channel, from Paris 
to London. But my interest and enthusiasm 
have increased in proportion to my experience 
with Colombo colleagues — whether I fly 1 hour 
or 1 day. To come once more to this table is 
to sense the bedrock of community and continu- 
ity in a sea of change. So much has happened 
in the past 2 years that one cannot resist using 
this forum of perspective as an ideal sounding 
hoard for reflection on the past and inspiration 
for the future. 

' Mr. Coffin is the Permanent U.S. Representative to 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Orga- 
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 

'For an article by Matthew J. Marks dealing with 
proposals made at the Melbourne meeting, see Btjlle- 
TiN of June 24, 1963, p. 977. 

There are two sets of comments I would like 
to make as I reflect on these past 2 years. The 
first is the interpretation of our own experience 
in the United States in development assistance 
since I last shared your councils. The second, 
admittedly an area where we all must tread 
carefully, is the attempt to look ahead to the 
significance of this community of nations in the 
foreseeable future. 

When I last spoke to this Committee, the 
United States Agency for International De- 
velopment was 1 year and 1 week old. It is now 
celebrating its third birthday. Its new organi- 
zation and mission represented the lessons of 
nearly a decade and a half, during which the 
emphasis in assistance programs shifted more 
and more toward long-range development pro- 
grams, concepts of overall development plan- 
ing, systematic assessment of priority needs, and 
encouragement of effective domestic policies in 
the developing countries. We had learned the 
lesson that the various arms, hands, and feet of 
development assistance — the toolshop of aid 
which had expanded to include the furnishing 
of food and fiber, the supply of experts and the 
training of students and officials, the extension 
of credits both middle and long term, the guar- 
anteeing of investments and the making of feasi- 
bility studies — needed a central nervous system, 
a unified organization, to coordinate both 
strategy and tactics. 

During the past 2 years we have put flesh on 
the bones of these concepts. We have stressed 



the development of doctrine and analysis, which 
require from both the giver and receiver of as- 
sistance complementary decisions as to major 
objectives, priority needs, and policies best cal- 
culated to mobilize the national resources for 
development. This resulting strategy of de- 
velopment is the basis for both the vital domestic 
actions without which real development will not 
take place and for the type, amomit, and dura- 
tion of external assistance that can best stimu- 
late and complement these actions. 

This concept of joint enterprise and respon- 
sibility in development was articulated in chap- 
ter II of last year's Colombo Plan proceedings, 
as well as in the final actions of the United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Development.^ 
Our own studies and teclmiques, recognizing the 
individual differences among countries, the fact 
that what is a crucial bottleneck for one country 
is not such for another, have gone far enough 
to teach us much about the maximizing of de- 
velopment assistance if done in partnership with 
domestic policies aiming at development — a 
complex interrelationship often bearing the 
oversimplified label of self-help. In saying this 
I do not forget the remarks of my colleague 
from Thailand, who pointed out that assistance 
must sometimes be given countries to require 
them to be effective in mobilizing their own re- 

Much more needs to be done, for development 
is a many-faceted process. The field is vast 
and yearns for more cultivation. But the har- 
vest — supremely worth striving for — is a better 
use of resources, faster, more rewarding, and 
more productive development, and, as Mr. 
Moran [H. O. Moran of Canada] said yester- 
day, greater support of the development effort 
by both the industrialized and the developing 

Complementing our interest in refining the 
strategy of development is a steadily increas- 
ing emphasis which our Congress has given to 
research. Pragmatic and impatient for results 
as we Americans are reputed to be, I think it 
is highly significant that our Congress this past 

'For the preamble and rpcommenclations contained 
in the Final Act of the UNCTAD, which met at Geneva 
Mar. 23-Jiine 16, 1964, see ibid., Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150. 

year saw fit to double the appropriation for 
research on problems of development. 

Part of our analytical and research efforts 
are specially directed to the oldest of assistance 
fields — teclinical assistance. We are not satis- 
fied that we know all that we should know — in 
what fields, to what purposes, and with what 
interrelationships we should allocate limited 
teclmical assistance resources to achieve a maxi- 
mum development effect. We are well aware 
of the increasing quantity and quality of tech- 
nical assistance being extended by regional 
Colombo Plan members to each other, and we 
hope to share your insights concerning what 
might be called an evolving technical assistance 
doctrine. Particularly important is the or- 
ganic relationship between capital and teclmical 

Within the broad field of technical assistance, 
we share the interest of many members of the 
Colombo Plan in a much more rigorous analysis 
of the relation between population growth and 
development. The past 2 years have seen in 
our Government, as in others, a more forthcom- 
ing acknowledgment of the priority of the 
problem posed by rapidly accelerating popula- 
tion levels. We are gratified that the special 
topic for next year's meeting is to be the problem 
of population. We hope it will provide us with 
insights into impact of population growth on 
development and the ranges of appropriate and 
available action programs. 

Improving Performance in U.S. Programs 

All that I have said so far concerns some of 
our newer efforts in the fields of doctrine, 
analysis, research, and programing. "Wliat re- 
mains of the development assistance effort is the 
submerged part of the iceberg — implementa- 
tion, the finding of new and better ways to do 
the job. Here we are trying in many ways to 
improve our performance. Part of our ap- 
proach lies in an expanding, close, long-range 
collaboration with our universities and founda- 
tions. Our objective is to develop, over time, 
a cadre of top specialists who are equally at 
home in their institutions of learning, research, 
and teaching and in critically important over- 
seas work. And this, I take it, is in line with 



il one of the areas of exploration currently beinjj; 
undertaken by the new British Ministry of 
Overseas Development. 

ij In the administration of our Food for Peace 

' programs, we hare seen increasingly flexible 
uses for education, health, and social wel- 

II fare. A greater flexibility under the law now 
permits students in many countries to buy text- 
books, scientists to engage in biomedical or 
nutritional studies, and a wide variety of health- 
research projects within the recipient countries. 
Food for Peace is now a direct tool for niral 
development in a number of countries. In 
Korea 6,500 workers under a community self- 
help program received food wages to build 
small dams, dikes, and irrigation canals follow- 
ing on tlie reclamation of 12,000 acres of much- 
needed land. You may have noticed in our 
exhibit the Vietnamese farmer pouring corn for 
feed purposes. This corn is sold at a modest 
price to upgrade livestock. The proceeds pay 
for transportation, milling, and distribution 
costs, vaccines, and insecticides. Thus the ini- 
tial provision of surplus foodstuffs directly to 
meet acute needs is used in a way which hope- 
fully puts in motion a series of developmental 
activities of widening and continuing impact. 
Another element in our evolving efforts which 
has come to fruition in the last couple of years 
is the I'nited States Peace Corps. This excit- 
ing program for mobilizing the skills of young 
American volunteers, launched at the begin- 
ning of the Kennedy administration, has in 
. t raining or has sent overseas some 2,500 volun- 
teers to Colombo Plan member countries. At 
the invitation of governments. Peace Corps 
volunteers have been working in Afghanistan, 
Ceylon, Indonesia, India, Nepal, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. 
Many are teachers, many try to assist local com- 
munities in a variety of development eflforts. 
The response to the Peace Corps ide^i has been 
so universally favorable in the recipient coun- 
tries that the concept has now spread to other 
industrialized countries, and several in Europe 
are launching similar volunteer movements of 
their own. 

Finally, we have given increased emphasis 
to ways and means of stimulating private in- 

vestment in developing countries, which holds 
a great potential for development as a supple- 
ment to governmental resources. We have 
made available to potential investors in a dozen 
industrialized nations a catalog of over 1,200 
feasibility studies. We have now concluded 
investment guarantee agreements with 60 
countries. One of our most recent initiatives 
is the creation of a nongovernmental organiza- 
tion, the International Executive Service Corps, 
whose objective is to make senior management 
skills available at local rates to developing 

To summarize the recent history of the United 
States development effort, I would say that it 
has been characterized by consolidating the or- 
ganizational changes of 1961, breaking new 
ground in development assistance research, 
analysis, and doctrine, and striving to increase 
the flexibility and efficiency of operations. If 
I speak with a sense of pride, I do not want to 
be misunderstood. What I am proud about is 
that, behind all the debate and occasional mis- 
understandings, we are trying, constantly try- 
ing, to be more effective in building a better 

At this point I want to express my admira- 
tion for the new initiative taken by Canada in 
its own aid program, both as to amounts of 
assistance and as to the terms on which it is 
available. The present enthusiasm and new 
thinking going into the United Kingdom pro- 
gram, as evidenced by the remarks of the Prime 
Minister and Minister Castle, are also hearten- 
ing. This world is really a seamless web, and 
new and broader efforts such as those in Can- 
ada and the United Kingdom cannot fail to 
help reinforce our own will and commitment 
in the United States, and the will of other in- 
dustrialized countries as well. 

Bilateral and Multilateral Development Efforts 

If the recent past has been one of innovation 
in our own program, on the international scene 
it has been one of steady growth and experimen- 
tation in bilateral aid, coupled with truly 
dramatic developments in international institu- 

As for the bilateral programs, now aid 

JAXCARY 18, 1065 


agencies have been established in a number of 
countries, among them Colombo Plan members. 
The most recent step which has captured our at- 
tention is the creation of the Ministry of Over- 
seas Development in the United Kingdom under 
the dynamic leadership of the distinguished 
lady who so effectively and graciously chairs our 
proceedings [Barbara Castle]. In addition to 
such strengthening of the governmental ma- 
chinery to handle bilateral programs, there has 
been a wide variety of special laws, taxes, guar- 
antee systems, equity investment corporations, 
volunteer organizations, and hundreds of reli- 
gious, charitable, research, and education groups 
and foundations. 

One can point to a substantial, varied, and 
growing aid effort, with bilateral aid being 
dominant but with multilateral aid, now about 
12 percent of total aid, growing at a faster pace. 
Official aid has shown an increase for every 
year except one since 1956. Technical assistance 
has shown a sharper increase than capital aid. 
There has been a noticeable movement — though 
not a steady one — toward liberalizing interest 
rates and extending periods of repayment. 
This is a record of substantial response by the 
industrialized north to the underdeveloped 

On the multilateral front we can look liack 
on several years of almost uninterrupted in- 
novation. The creation of IDA [International 
Development Association] ; the new initiatives 
of its parent, the World Bank; the birth of the 
Inter- American Development Bank; the orga- 
nization of the Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress to assess and report 
on development plans and policies ; the Central 
American Common Market; the Latin Ameri- 
can Free Trade Area ; the new African Devel- 
opment Bank — these are only some of the new 
international institutions created or enlarged 
within the very recent past. 

But perhaps more dramatic than any of these 
institutional innovations was the United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Development, 
many of whose significant actions were fore- 
shadowed in chapter II of last year's report. 
This may be said to mark both an extension 
and a convergence of the revolutions about 
which we have been speaking — the revolution 

of rising demand on the part of the less devel- 
oped two-tliirds of the world, and — to use my 
phrase of 2 years ago — a corresponding counter- 
revolution of effective response. "With respect 
to the first, UNCTAD is an extension in that it 
reflects to an unprecedented degree the aspira- 
tions of the developing countries, and there 
developed during the UNCTAD a unity of pur- 
pose among this group of nations. It produced 
many recommendations which state these 
aspirations. Agreement was reached at 
UNCTAD for new United Nations machinery 
to review systematically, in depth, and on a con- 
tinuing basis virtually all the issues related to 
the trade and development of developing coun- 
tries. It is probably accurate to say that, above 
all else, this was what the developing countries 
most wanted. 

The UNCTAD also marked a significant step 
in the counterrevolution of response. Most of 
the developed countries entered into the pro- 
ceedings with serious intent, a great deal of 
study, and, in the words of the Final Act, a 
genuine desire to find "by means of interna- 
tional co-operation, appropriate solutions to the 
problems of world trade in the interest of all 
peoples and particularly to the urgent trade 
and development problems of the developing 
countries." To this end, in spite of disagree- 
ment on some key issues, tliere was, neverthe- 
less, a substantial area of agreement on certain 
policies to be pursued, studies to be made, in- 
stitutional arrangements to be established. It 
is no exaggeration to say that the Conference 
has had a profound impact on the participating 
countries and upon international programs con- 
cerned in one way or another with trade and 
development. More important, it went a long 
way in establishing a sense of common interest 
which is so necessary in order to arrive at a 
right and effective relationship between the de- 
veloped and developing, the rich and the poor, 
the north and the south. By "sense of common 
interest" I mean an appreciation on both sides 
of the world's house that the giving and receiv- 
ing of aid is realistic, necessary, dignified ; nei- 
ther an imposition on the rich nor an indignity 
to the poor. 

May I say a few words about trade. Perhaps 
in no field of mternational relations has there 



been greater attention given during the past 
montlis tlian to the field of trade. Trade has 
become in some ways almost synonymous with 
aid as a dii-ectional approach to meeting the 
economic development aspirations of the devel- 
oping nations. Several important steps are 
imder waj' in the GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade] responsive to the trade 
and development problems of such countries. 
Also it is our hope and intent that the Kennedy 
Round of trade negotiations will result in sub- 
stantial benefits to the trade of the developing 
countries. I take particular encouragement 
from the low percentage of items noted for ex- 
ception filed by, first, the United Kingdom, and 
also by the United States. 

Colombo Plan's Future Role 

This brings us to the question : Wliere, in this 
world of new institutions, does this — perhaps 
the oldest institutional arrangement for coop- 
eration in development — fit? How does UNC- 
TAD affect Colombo? Does it affect it at 
all ? If so, does it lessen or increase its impor- 
tance ? These are questions all of us are asking 
ourselves. It is well to face them openly. 

I for one am convinced that what the Colombo 
Plan organization and meetings offer the world 
is more important than ever before. It fills a 
gap that cannot be filled simply by institutional 
fiat. Geneva helped dramatize development. 
The continuing machinery and other organiza- 
tions such as the World Bank, IDA, the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund], my own or- 
ganization — the Development Assistance Com- 
mittee of OECD — regional organizations such 
as the Inter-American Committee for the 
Alliance for Progress, will do much to advance 
tlie analysis, the strategy, the coordination of 
development efforts. But if the relations be- 
tween the industrialized and the developing 
countries are to move beyond simple confronta- 
tion to constructive dialog, the example of the 
Colombo Plan meetings must continue. 

For it is here, among nations which have taken 
the time, year after year, to pore through coun- 
try chapters, distill meaningful summaries, to 

discuss special topics of common interest, to 
launch the first large efforts of intraregional as- 
sistance — it is here that under.standing tempers 
the demands which each group of countries 
makes on the othei-. 

We cannot allow the exchange between the 
rich and the poor to take on the character of 
trench warfare between fixed and unmovable 
positions — whether the subject be the size of the 
transfer of resources in the past, the magnitude 
of future needs, the legitimate objectives of as- 
sistance, or the conditions under which it should 
be made available. 

The development effort is an exercise in mu- 
tuality. It must spring from a motivation rec- 
ognizing a mutual self-interest in the progres- 
sive and orderly development of free societies. 
Development can take place only if both rich 
and poor recognize a mutuality of obligation. 
The industrialized countries have the obligation 
to give adequate aid on liberal terms and to as- 
sure reasonable access to their markets for ex- 
panding exports of the developing countries. 
The developing countries have the obligation 
to manage wisely their resources as a comple- 
ment to external assistance, even with their own 
sacrifices, and not merely to tolerate but to solicit 
and seriously consider objective evaluation of 
their own policies and programs. 

Both must listen and respond to the legiti- 
mate concerns of the other. And they must 
both understand that by so doing they are not 
doing the other a favor but that they are acting 
in their own self-interest — a self-interest, how- 
ever, (hat is held in common. Upon this recog- 
nition rest the prospects of the newest Age of 
Development. It is in the fulfillment of the 
concept of mutuality thus defined that the 
Colombo Plan faces its newest opportunity. 
Its forum has always been useful. Its vitality 
will be even more important in the years ahead. 
I am therefore pleased to express on behalf of 
my Government a very affirmative position on 
the proposed extension of the Colombo Plan for 
another 5 years. 

With these words I recommend that we 
approve the draft report which is before us. 

JANUARY 18, 1965 




The Sixteenth Meeting of the Consultative 
Committee of the Colombo Plan for Co-opera- 
tive Economic Development in South and 
South-East Asia took place in London from the 
17th to 20th November, 196i. The Rt. Hon. 
Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, delivered the Inaugural Address. 
The Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation, 
Mrs. Barbara Castle, was elected Chairman of 
the Meeting. 

2. Countries represented at the meeting were : 
Afghanistan, Australia, Bhutan, Burma, Can- 
ada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, the Maldive Islands, Nepal, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thai- 
land, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Vietnam. Cambodia was not represented. 

3. The meeting was attended by the Director 
and Staff from the Colombo Plan Bureau. Ob- 
servers were present from the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, the International Bank for Eeconstruc- 
tion and Development, the United Nations 
Technical Assistance Board and Special Fund 
and the Asian Productivity Organization. 

4. The Consultative Committee reviewed eco- 
nomic development in the Eegion during the 
past year and the jirogi-ess of the Colombo Plan. 
An assessment was made of the tasks ahead of 
the countries of the Region. The Committee 
adopted the Annual Report which was drafted 
by Officials at their Meeting, preceding the 
Meeting of the Consultative Committee. 

5. The Committee agreed that the Colombo 
Plan should be extended for a further period 
of five years from 1966 to 1971. 

6. The Committee recognised the importance 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, which has inaugurated a new 
phase in the international discussion of prob- 
lems of development. The Committee has it- 
self devoted much attention to many of the 
problems with which the Confei'ence concerned 
itself and the Committee expressed the hope 
that the Committee would continue to play a 
creative role in seeking solutions for these prob- 

lems with special reference to the needs of the 

7. The Committee noted that, as in earlier 
years, there were wide disparities over the past 
year in the rate of growth in real terms of gross 
national product among the developing coun- 
tries in the Colombo Plan Region. There were 
also gi-eat differences between the rates of in- 
crease in population. However, it can be said 
that the gain in real national income per head 
was, in general, only about half that in total 
national income. The Committee recognised 
the implications of rapid population growth for 
the possibilities of achieving an early substan- 
tial improvement in living standards. 

8. The mdications are that the total agi'icul- 
tural output in the Region continued to rise only 
modestly in 1963-64; there were occasional food 
shortages in some countries. Nevertheless, 
many coimtries secured significant increases in 
agricultural production for export and in ex- 
port earnings. Industrial production contin- 
ued to expand in the Region as a whole in 1963, 
though it is to be borne in mind that the econ- 
omy of the area is still dominated by agriculture 
and only some countries have as yet a significant 
industrial sector. 

9. There was a substantial increase in devel- 
opment expenditures in many countries in the 
Region during 1963; other expenditures also 
rose, particularly on defence. Despite the ef- 
forts made by some coimtries to mobilize do- 
mestic resources, there was some resort to 
deficit financing and, therefore, an increase in 
money supply and in the domestic price level 
in many coimtries. Individual countries of the 
Region experienced problems in maintaining 
internal financial stability which varied in 
acuteness, and they had varying degrees of 
success in combating them. Continued efforts 
will be necessary to pursue policies which will 
maintain financial stability while not inhibiting 
investment in essential development. 

10. Development in the Region depends 
heavily on export earnings and this, in turn, is 
strongly influenced by changes in the prices of 
the Region's main primary commodities, mainly 
rubber, tin, jute and tea. Experience was varied 
during the pei'iod; but because of increased pro- 
duction and more favourable prices for some 




products diirino: tlie year 1963-64, the value of 
exiwrts from the Kegioii rose considerably. By 
I' contrast, imports rose mucli less, partly because 
of restrictions imposed bj' member countries in 
1962-63 in order to halt the deterioration in 
their external trade position. There was, how- 
I'MT, some further rise in import prices. The 
net result was an improvement in the trade bal- 
ance and, consequentl}', in tlie balance on cur- 
rent accomit of the Region and in the reserves 
of member countries. 

11. The Committee noted that the achieve- 
ment of adequate growth depended, among 
otiier things, on an increase of the trade of de- 
veloping economies with the industrially ad- 
^ :inced countries and with each other. Stabili- 
zation of the prices of primary commodities at 
reasonable levels and access both for these and 
for manufactures in world markets will continue 
to call for attention in the coming years. 

12. The level of public expenditure in de- 
velopment per head over the area as a whole re- 
mains low, and measures are urgently necessary 
to accelerate the rate of investment and to 
moderate the rapid rate of population growth. 

13. There has been some increase in the 
amount of aid available to countries of the Re- 
gion though this has resulted from the more 
rapid disbursement of aid previously commit- 
ted rather than from an increase in new commit- 
ments. Aid on a large scale will continue to be 
necessary if the area as a whole is to be able 
to finance development programmes at the same 
time as financing its essential current imports. 

14. The total aid provided by Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Ignited Kingdom 
and U.S.A. to countries in the Region since the 
lieginning of the Plan rose to $14,864 million. 
The value of the aid contributed in 1963-64 was 
S2,165 million. In addition, an increasing 
amount of aid is being provided by Regional 
members to each other and there is substantial 
private investment in countries within the Re- 

j gion fi-om member countries outside. 

15. Some member countries have taken steps 
to make aid available on easier terms during 
the past year. The resources of the Interna- 
tional Development Association (which includes 
several members of the Colombo Plan among 
its major contributors and which has contrib- 

JANTJART 18, 1965 

uted largely to financing development in the 
Region on easy tenns) have been increased. 
Most aid continues to be tied to purchases from 
the donor countries though there has been an 
inci-ease in the proportion of aid not tied to 
specified projects. Further efforts will be 
needed to provide aid on liberal terms and con- 
ditions and thus assist in dealing with the prob- 
lem of the accumulation of external debt. 

16. The Consultative Committee recognised 
the importance of intra-regional training and 
emphasised that there was scope for consider- 
able expansion in this field. It welcomed the 
appointment of the Adviser on Intra-Regional 
Training and took note of the recommendations 
in the Report which he circulated to it. The 
Committee also welcomed the attention drawn 
to the importance of the co-ordination by Mem- 
ber Countries of their capital and technical as- 
sistance programmes and welcomed the action 
which certain countries were taking, or con- 
sidering taking, in order to expand their own 
capacities to recruit more qualified experts and 
provide training facilities in certain fields where 
demand exceeds supply. 

17. In accordance with the precedent set in 
1962, a selected topic of special mterest to Mem- 
ber Govenmients is discussed each year. Tlie 
topic selected for discussion this year was 
"Development Problems of the Rural Areas". 
In most of South and South East Asia, the rural 
sector accoimts for the greater part of gross na- 
tional product and occupies an overwhelming 
majority of the working population. Many 
countries' earnings of foreign exchange are 
heavily dependent on agricultural exports. In 
many countries there is widespread unemploy- 
ment and imder-employment in rural areas. 
The Committee noted with concern that while 
demand for food was increasing constantly, 
both because of population growth and because 
of higher incomes, current food production 
seems barely to be keeping ahead of popula- 
tion growth. It was felt that priority should 
be given to expanding agricultural output. At 
the same time, it was suggested, Governments 
should not think of rural development in isola- 
tion but should try to achieve a balanced growth 
between agricultural and industrial sectors. 

18. Factors on which successful development 


of the rural areas must depend, include adequate 
national planning and administration, applied 
research, advisory and extension services, im- 
proved seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation, 
mechanisation, transport and other infrastruc- 
ture, marketing and price arrangements, credit 
and incentives for farmers, systems of land 
tenure, social reforms and community develop- 

19. The special topic for discussion at next 
year's Meeting of the Consultative Committee 
will be "The Eelationship between Population 
and Economic Development in the Colombo 
Plan Area". 

20. Tlie Consultative Committee agreed that 
in 1966 the Information Committee should be a 
Committee of the whole; that each member 
government should endeavour to send to that 
meeting a specialist information officer; and 
that it should discuss the role of information 
and mass communications in economic and 
social development. 

21. The Tliirteenth Annual Report adopted 
by the Committee this year will be published 
in the capitals of Member Countries on or after 
15th January, 1965. Chapter I of the Report, 
"Review of Economic Progress'',* and Chapter 
II, "The Task Ahead", are annexed to this 

22. The Consultative Committee welcomed 
the invitation of the Government of Pakistan 
to hold the 1965 Meeting in Karachi. 

20th November, 1964. 


The Task Ahead 

1. The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meeta 
for the first time after the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development at Geneva. The Commit- 
tee has always been a meeting place where developed 
and developing countries could discuss the problems 
to be faced in reaching the stage of self-sustaining 
development, and the ways in which all could co- 
operate to overcome them. The United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development has covered a 
wider range of issues than those of development and 
aid within the Colombo Plan area, with which the 
Consultative Committee has traditionally concerned 
itself, though this is not to underrate the contribu- 

' Not printed here. 

tion which the Consultative Committee itself has made 
in the field of international economic co-operation. 

2. The dialogue between developed and developing 
countries is concerned, of course, not merely with de- 
velopment and aid, but also with trading relations 
between them, since these relations vitally affect fi- 
nancing of development. In this field, the UNCTAD 
emphasized especially the need for improved access by 
the less developed countries to the markets of the world, 
and for international arrangements covering primary 
commodities, especially those exported by developing 

3. In the field of development a number of objec- 
tives were summarized in the Recommendation on 
Guide Lines for International Financial Co-operation 
which was adopted without dissent at the UNCTAD ; 
they have been finding general acceptance. Among 
the more important are :- 

(a) Adequate plans and policies at national and 
multi-national levels; 

(b) the maximum use of national resources for the 
achievement of balanced growth ; 

(c) the promotion of regional development; 

(d) a greater measure of external aid, which should 
be sufficiently flexible to talie account of any decline 
in external income arising from causes beyond the 
control of developing countries ; 

(e) freedom, so far as is practicable, in the use of 
aid, which should take account of the possible need to 
finance local costs ; 

(f) the provision of aid on terms which take ac- 
count of the capacity of recipients to service the debt; 

(g) the limitation of short and medium-term com- 
mercial credit to the capacity of the less developed 
countries to repay it ; 

(h) attention to the problems which may be created 
for developing countries through the accumulation of 
external debt ; 

(1) an increase in the inflow of private capital ; 

(j) an Increase in the flow of technical assistance. 

These measures, to be taken by developing and de- ' 
veloped countries as appropriate, were recognised as 
necessary in order to achieve the higher rates of eco- 
nomic growth by developing countries. 

4. Previous reports of the Consultative Committee 
have shown an awareness of most of these questions. 
This is not surprising : the problems of economic de- 
velopment do not change quickly, nor are they easily 
solved. The preceding survey of developments in the 
past year (Chapter I) and the Country Chapters which 
follow show their importance in the Colombo Plan area. 

5. The picture is far from uniform. The countries 
of the area differ in size, in resources, and economic 
structure (though in all of them agriculture is the most 
important sector). They differ also in their systems 
of government, and therefore in the manner in which 
their economic life is organised. They differ widely, 
indeed, in the degree to which they find it possible to 
formulate and implement ambitious and comprehensive 



.lonomic plans. They differ, also, in the degree of 
tiimncial statiillty which they currpntly enjoy. Never- 
theless, certain general comments can be made. 

0. There has been a significant growth In national 
income in most countries of the region, but the growth 
of population (though unevenly distributed) has re- 
mained rapid, so that the rise in national income per 
head has been very much smaller. In recent years 
tluM-e has been relatively little increase in agricultural 
production, and the problem remains of achieving 
liigher yields in agriculture. The increase has, in 
general, been much larger in the nascent industrial 
sector. Reports from individual countries do not show, 
as yet. much evidence of plans for development on re- 
gional lines, with the development of one country 
complementing that of others. 

7. Countries in the region have taken steps to in- 
crease Government revenue, mobilise domestic savings 
more effectively, and reduce inflationary financing. 
The extent and success of these efforts has varied, 
liowever, between different countries. Some, esije- 
cially those with large development programmes, 
financial position may have been affected by natural 
disasters or deterioration in the terms of trade, have 
found it difficult to maintain essential consumption 
and the rate of public investment without resort to 
deficit financing and a consequent increase in money 
supply and prices. In view of the diversity of ex- 
perience in the region it must be recognized that, in 
spite of the efforts which have been made, there is no 
cause for complacency. The problem has been ag- 
gravated for a number of countries of the Colombo 
Plan area by heavy expenditure on defence. This not 
only diverts substantial amounts of scarce resources 
from economic and social development but it also tends 
to generate inflationary pressures which hamper de- 
velopment. Continued efforts will be necessary to pur- 
sue policies which will maintain financial stability 
while not inhibiting investment in essential develop- 

8. There has been some increase in the amount of 
_ aid available to countries of the area, both from fel- 
low members of the Colombo Plan and from elsewhere, 
though this has resulted more from rapid expenditure 
of aid previously committed than from an increase in 
commitments during the year. This, together with an 
Increase in export prices for some of the products of 
the region (coming after a downward trend lasting 
several years), and the consequent increase in export 
earnings, has led to an improvement in the balance 
of payments position of most countries of the region. 
It remains true, however, that aid on a large scale will 
continue to be necessary to enable the region as a whole 
to finance its development programmes as well as some 
of its current imports. Some countries in the region 
have adopted measures to encourage an inflow of for- 
eign private investment, and further efforts in this 
direction would be of help in supplementing resources 
available for development. 

9. The International Bank is now studying the feasi- 

bility of a scheme, to be administered by I.D.A., of 
supplementary financial measures to help countries 
whose development plans may be endangered by a 
falling-off in export earnings. If, as a result, a success- 
ful scheme could be implemented a welcome Increase 
in the flexibility of aid would be provided. 

10. In view of the continuing need for external as- 
sistance on a large scale and the continuing problem 
of external debt servicing, it is recognised that external 
assistance should be made available to area members on 
liberal terms by Governments and institutions. During 
the past year certain member countries — notably 
Canada and the United Kingdom — have taken steps to 
soften the terms of their lending. A large part of the 
initial contributions to the I.D.A. (which includes sev- 
eral members of the Colombo Plan among its major 
contributors) has been allocated to members of the 
Colombo Plan area for loans on very soft terms, and 
it is to be hoped that the recent replenishment of I.D.A. 
resources by $750 million over a 3-year period will sub- 
stantially benefit the countries of the region. While 
the greater part of aid continues to be tied to pur- 
chasers from the donor countries, during the past year 
there has been an increase in the proportion of aid not 
tied to specific projects, both by member countries and 
by multi-lateral institutions. Continued attention 
must, however, be paid to the questions of terms and 
conditions of aid and of debt, and further efforts must 
be sought through bilateral or multilateral programmes 
to provide aid on liberal terms and conditions. 

11. Technical Co-operation in the form of the provi- 
sion of experts' services, training facilities and training 
and research equipment, continues to play an important 
role in the development of the region. While exiiendi- 
ture on technical assistance during 1963-64 decreased 
from the previous year's record figure the number of 
new training places provided for 196.3-G4 is the highest 
on record for any single year. As the pace of develop- 
ment increases, the need for technical a.ssistance will 
grow further and it is hoped that this greater need will 
be met. A special feature is the attention which is 
now being given to intra-regional training programmes. 
Another development has been the increasing emphasis 
placed by member countries on co-ordinating their 
capital and technical assistance programmes. It is felt, 
however, that there may still be scope for the improved 
co-ordination in recipient countries of the technical 
assistance activities of the various donor countries and 
international agencies. 

12. The achievement of stable growth of developing 
economies is dependent, among other things, on an in- 
crease in their trade with one another and with the 
industrially advanced countries. In this connection, 
stabilisation of the prices of primary commodities at 
reasonable levels and increased access for these, as 
also for manufactures in the world markets, are among 
the measures to which attention will need to be given 
in the coming years. 

13. These, then, are the major problems which con- 
front the region. They will have to be dealt with 


JANUiVRY 18, 1965 


partly through continuing co-operation within the 
Colombo Plan, which has been a pioneer in the field, 
and partly through international co-oi)eration on a 
wider scale, including the new machinery which is to be 
set up within the United Nations framework for this 
purpose. While a number of steps have been taken to 
solve these problems, it remains true that progress in 
many directions is only in the early stages. 

U.S.S.R. Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution 
on Syrian-Israeli Complaint 

Following is a statement made in the Secu- 
rity Council on December 21 hij Charles W. 
Tost, Deputy U.S. Representative., together 
with the text of a U.S.-V.K. draft resolution 
which that day had been vetoed by the Soviet 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4484/Corr. 1 

It is a little late to reopen the debate on this 
subject wliich we have been considering for so 
many days,i and I do not projiose to say but a 
few words. The Coimcil is generally familiar 
with the extensive consultations and negotia- 
tions which were held over a period of weeks 
in which a nmnber of pei-manent members and 
a number of nonpermanent members and the 
parties made efforts to arrive at a consensus. 
They endeavored to deal in the first instance in 
an unbiased and generally acceptable way with 
the incident of November 13. That did not 
prove possible to do. I think some of the rea- 
sons why it was not possible have emerged in 
our discussions this afternoon. 

As the Council is well aware, there are in the 
long histoiy of unhappy incidents along the 
Syria-Israel demarcation line cases in which 
the majority of the Council feels that the blame 
should be attributed rather clearly to one side 
or the other side. This apparently was a case 
in which the majority of the Council did not 
feel so, and that is the reason why it was im- 
possible to reach a generally acceptable con- 

However, my delegation does very much re- 
gret that the Council because of the exercise of 
the veto has been unable to endorse at least the 
constructive recommendations of the United 
Nations Chief of Staff [Lt. Gen. Odd Bull] in 
regard to the continued maintenance of peace 
along the demarcation line. 

We believe that the draft presented by the 
United Kingdom and ourselves did reflect the 
Coimcil's best judgment as to how it might con- 
tinue its longstanding responsibility in the 
maintenance of peaceful conditions between 
Israel and Syria. Obviously, it was impossible 
to give perfect satisfaction to any of us, but 
these were constructive steps based squarely on 
the recommendations of the Chief of Staff which 
certainly would have seemed to us worthwhile 
to approve. 

We note that in its statement before the Coun- 
cil on December 3 the Soviet delegation did not 
make any constructive suggestions and limited 
itself to dealing in what seemed to us a partial 
manner with the immediate incident. Other 
delegations, however, in referring to the Chief 
of Staff's report - commented favorably and 
generally supported the proposals of the Chief 
of Staff which he offered in paragraphs 24 
through 27 of his report. May I say in this 
connection that the clause in the draft resolu- 
tion which we submitted in paragraph 2(b) 
whicli dealt with the survey and demarcation of 
the armistice line was based on the reports of 
General Bull of August 1963 ^ and November 
1964, and provided clearly while commencing 
in the area of Tel El Qadi for proceeding there- 
after to the completion of tlie full sui-vey. It 
is heartening to note that the majority of the 
Council are in favor of the continued strength- 
ening of the U.N. peacekeeping role in this cru- 
cial area and that the majority do endorse the 
Chief of Staff's efforts to improve the present 

Further and finally we should like to stress 
that lack of unanimity on the part of the per- 
manent members of the Council in tliis matter 
derogates in no way from the responsibility of 
the parties to carry out in cooperation with Gen- 
eral Bull the terms of the General Armistice 

" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 27. 

' U.N. doc. S/6061, Corr. 1 and 2, and Add. 1. 
' U.N. doc. S/5401 and Adds. 1-4. 



Agreement. We consider the vote whit-h has 
just taken place on this resohitiou to represent 
a strong consensus on the part of the Council, 
and we firmly believe that in carrying out the 
reconmieudations approved by the majority of 
the Council the parties would be setting their 
feet on the path that would lead to more peace- 
ful conditions in the area. We earnestly hope 
that they will do so. 

Letter dated November 21 from the Representative of 
the United States regardin;; the "situation of ex- 
treme danger to the lives of innocent civilians" pre- 
vailing in Stanleyville. S/G05G. November 22, 19G4. 
2 pp. 

Letter dated November 24 from the Representative of 
the United States regarding the emergency rescue 
operation and transmitting texts of a U.S. Govern- 
ment statement and a letter from the Prime Minister 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the U.S. 
Ambassador at L^opoldville. S/00G2. November 24, 
1964. 6 pp. 


The Security Council, 

JJavinff heard the statements of the representatives 
of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, 

Taking into consideration the report of the Secre- 
tary-General of 24 November 19(>4.° 

1. Deplores the renewal of military action on the 
Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line on 13 Novem- 
ber 19G4 and drcply regrets the hiss of life on both 
sides ; 

2. Takes note in the report of the Secretary-General 
of the observations of the Chief of Staff in paragraphs 
24 through 27, and in the light of these observations, 

(a) That Israel and Syria co-operate fully with the 
Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in his 
efforts to maintain iteace in the area ; 

(b) That the parties co-operate promptly in the 
continuation of the work begun in 19G3, of survey and 
demarcation as suggested in paragraph 45 of document 
S/5401, commencing in the area of Tel El Qadi, and 
proceeding thereafter to completion, in fulfilment of 
the recommendations of the Chief of Staff's reports 
of 24 August 1903 and 24 November 1964 ; 

(c) That Israel as well as Syria participate fully 
in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission ; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the 
' Council by 31 March of the progress that has been 

made toward implementing these suggestions. 

Current U.N. Documents 

^'hneographcd or processed documents (such as those 
ted below) may 6e consulted at depository libraries 
the United States. U.Jf. printed publications may be 

i,iini,'ised from the Sales Section of the United Na- 

tu,H!<. United Nations Plaza, N.T. 

Security Council 

Letter dated November 21 from the Representative 
of Belgium drawing attention to the gravity of the 
situation in the Stanleyville region and stating that 
"preliminary measures" had been taken "against the 
po.ssibility that it might prove neces-sary to evacuate 
the hostages." S/6055. November 22, 1964. 3 pp. 


U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural 
Exchange Agreement for 1965-66 

Press release 527 dated December 23 

William E. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, and Rumanian Am- 
bassador in Washington Petre Balaceanu on 
December 23 exchanged diplomatic notes in the 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., which 
provide a framework for arranging visits and 
exchanges between the two countries for the 
calendar years 1965 and 1966. On the occasion 
of the exchange of the documents, Assistant 
Secretary Tyler noted with satisfaction that 
these provide for an increase in the number of 
exchanges over those of the past 2 years and 
contain new provisions for expanded contacts 
between institutions of the two comitries. 

Initial arrangements for a United States- 
Rmnanian exchanges program for 1961 and 1962 
were made through an exchange of notes at 
Washington on December 9, 1980.^ Another 
exchange of notes on April 2, 1963,^ provided 

JANCART 18, 1965 

* U.N. doc. S/6113, as amended ; failed of adoption 
because of the negative vote of a permanent member 
of the Council. The vote on Dec. 21 was 8 to 3 
(Czechoslovakia, Morocco, U.S.S.R.). 

» U.N. doc. S/6061, Corr. 1 and 2, and Add. 1. 

' For texts, see Bulletin of Dee. 26, 1960, p. 969. 

' For texts, see ibid., Apr. 29, 1963, p. 601. 


for a continuation of the program in 1963 and 

The notes exchanged on December 23 provide 
for exchanges in the fields of education, science, 
teclinology and industry, performing and cre- 
ative arts, sports, and tourism. The notes also 
provide for cooperation in the fields of motion 
pictures, exhibits, books and publications, radio 
and television, and for the exchange of uni- 
versity professors, scientists, and cultural 


Department of State, 
Washington., December 23, 1964 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the 
recent discussions between representatives of 
the Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica and the Government of the Rumanian Peo- 
ple's Republic regarding the program of visits 
and exchanges in cultural, educational, scien- 
tific, and other fields during tJie calendar years 
1965 and 1966. 

In this connection, I wish to inform you that 
the Government of the United States approves 
the following provisions which record the un- 
derstandings reached in the discussions: 

1. Education Exchanges 

a. Both Parties agree to provide for the ex- 
change of graduate students, young instructors, 
and research scholars for purposes of advanced 
scholarly and scientific study between United 
States and Rumanian miiversities and other in- 
stitutions of higher learning, including scien- 
tific institutes. 

b. Both Parties agree to provide for ex- 
changes between United States and Rumanian 
universities of professors and instructors for 
lectures, language instruction and study, consul- 
tations, and seminars. 

2. Scientific, Technical, and Industrial Ex- 

a. Both Parties agi-ee to encourage the devel- 
opment of exchanges in the field of science, 

"The Rumanian note (not printed here) is identical 
but in the Rumanian language. 

including such exchanges as may be carried out 
between academies of sciences of both countries. 
To this end, each Party agrees to facilitate visits 
of scientists from the other country for the pur- 
pose of delivering lectures and addresses at 
scientific institutes and institutions of higher 

b. Both Parties favor the exchange of dele- 
gations composed of specialists and techni- 
cians who wish to study various aspects of tech- 
nical and industrial activity in the other 

c. Each Party, through diplomatic channels 
or appropriate authorized organizations, and on 
a mutual basis, shall continue to invite scien- 
tists and technicians to participate in national 
scientific meetings, congresses, and conferences 
as opportunities may arise. 

3. Exchanges in Performing and Creative Arts 

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to 
support exchanges in the field of performing 
arts, including artistic, musical, and theatrical 
groups, conductors, theatrical supervisory 
personnel, and individual artists. 

(1) Both Parties agree to facilitate the at- 
tendance of invitees to national musical com- 
petitions and other similar events with 
international participation which may be 
organized in each country. 

b. Both Parties agree to encourage and sup- 
port exchanges in the field of creative arts, in- 
cluding groups of writers, composers, artists, 
and others, as well as mdividuals in these cate- 

4. Exchanges in Sports 

a. Each Party agrees to encourage and facili- 
tate invitations from its athletic and sports or- 
ganizations in order that athletes from one 
country can participate in athletic and sports 
exhibitions and contests in the other country. 

5. Exchanges of Books and Publications and 
Cooperation in the Field of Publishing 

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to as- 
sist in the exchanges of books, pamphlets, pe- 
riodical literature, scholarly and scientific 
studies, microfilms, and other printed and dupli- 

depaetment of state bulletin 

cated materials devoted to educational, scien- 
ti!ic, technical, cultural, and other subjects 
lu'tween universit}-, public and specialized 
libraries and other appropriate institutions of 
both countries. 

(1) Educational materials and publica- 
tions may include university catalogues, text- 
books, study programs, curricula, syllabi, 
visual aids, and documentary materials in 
various field of study. 

b. Both Parties agree to use their good of- 
fices to encourage the sale through commercial 
channels of books and other publications in the 
Rumanian language in the United States and 
in the English language in the Rumanian Peo- 
ple's Republic. 

c. Both Parties agree to encourage, subject to 
the consent of the authors or other parties in 
interest, the translation and publication in one 
country of scientific and literary works, includ- 
ing anthologies, dictionaries, and other compila- 
tions, as well as scientific studies, reports and 
articles published in the other country. 

6. Radio and Television Exchanges 

a. Both Parties agree to assist in the exchange 
of radio and television programs between 
American and Rumanian radio and television 
companies and organizations. The details of 
these exchanges will be worked out between the 
representatives of American radio and televi- 
sion companies designated by the Department 
oi State and Rumanian radio and television or- 
ganizations designated by the legal authorities, 
or between the Parties. 

b. Each Party agrees to facilitate appear- 
ances, either recorded or in person, over radio 
and television by government oflicials, artists 
and public figures of the other coimtry. 

7. Exhibits 

a. Both Parties agree to provide for showings 
in several cities of exhibits from the other coim- 
try during each of the two years these arrange- 
ments are in effect. 

8. Cooperation in the Field of Motion Pictures 

a. Both Parties will encourage the conclusion 
of commercial contracts between American film 

companies approved by the Department of State 
and Rumanian film organizations approved by 
the legal authorities for the purchase and sale 
of mutually acceptable feature films. 

b. Both Parties will encourage the exchanges 
of approved documentary and scientific films 
between corresponding organizations and assist 
their distribution through appropriate distri- 
bution channels. 

c. Both Parties will seek to arrange annual 
special showings in their respective capitals and 
other cities of representative films to which film 
personalities from the other country may be 

d. Both Parties agree that all of the films ex- 
changed, purchased, or sold in accordance with 
this section will be released in dubbed or sub- 
titled versions. The contents of the films will 
be preserved and any changes must be agreed 
to by the supplying Party. Prior to its dis- 
tribution, the release version of each film must 
be agreed to by a representative designated by 
the supplying Party. 

e. The Parties favor and agree to encourage, 
under appropriate conditions, other means of 
cooperation in this field, such as the joint pro- 
duction of feature, documentary, and other 

9. Tourism 

a. Both Parties favor the development of 
tourism between the two coimtries and agree 
to take measures, on the basis of equality of 
opportunity, to satisfy better the requests of 
tourists to acquaint themselves with the way of 
life, work, and culture of the respective peoples. 

Specific details and programs of the above- 
mentioned visits and exchanges will be agreed 
upon through diplomatic channels or by ap- 
I^roved organizations. Except where other 
mutually satisfactory arrangements have been 
made, it is agreed that individual visitors and 
delegations will pay their own expenses to and 
in the receiving country. It is understood that 
the arrangements agreed upon do not exclude 
the possibility of additional visits and ex- 
changes which may be mutually acceptable to 
the two Parties or which may be undertaken by 
interested United States and Rumanian orga- 

JANTTART 18, 1965 


nizations or private citizens, it being understood 
that arrangements for additional exchanges, as 
appropriate, will be facilitated by prior agree- 
ment in diplomatic channels or between ap- 
proved organizations. It is also understood 
that the commitments provided for above shall 
be subject to the constitutional requirements and 
applicable laws and regulations of the two 

It is further understood that tliis arrange- 
ment may be renewed by an exchange of notes 
between the two Parties prior to the end of 1966. 

The Government of the United States of 
America takes note of the approval by the Gov- 
ernment of the Rumanian People's Republic of 
these understandings as confirmed in your note 
of today's date. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

For the Secretaiy of State : 

William R. Tyler 
Assistant Secretary of State 

His Excellency 
Petre Balaceanu, 
Ambassador of the 
Rumanian People's Republic. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Norway 
of February 25, 1957 (TIAS 383G), for cooperation 
concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at 
Vienna June 15 and Decemlser 18, 19C4. Enters into 
force on th3 date on which the Agency accepts the 
initial inventory. 

Signatvrcs: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Norway, United States. 

Caribbean Organization 

Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Or- 
ganization with statute annexed. Done at Wash- 
ington June 21, 1960. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 6, 1961. TIAS 4853. 

Notiflcatioiis of withdrawal: France, December 22, 
1964 ■ United Kingdom, December 31, 1964 ; United 
States, December 29, 1964, all effective Decem- 
ber 31. 1965. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 

Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 


Eatification deposited: Costa Rica, November 9, 1964. 
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 

relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 

disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered 

into force April 24, 1964.^ 

Accession deposited: Costa Rica, November 9, 1964. 

Safety of Life at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Enters into 
force May 26, 196.5. ,. ,no^ 

Acceptance deposited: Iceland, December 11, 1964. 


Second proc^s-verbal extending period of validity of 
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
November 18, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, .5266). 
Done at Geneva October 30, 19<"4. Entered into force 
for the United States December 18, 1964. 
Signatures: Argentina, November 17, 1964; Canada, 
November 25, 1964 ; Israel, December 1, 1964 ; Italy, 
November 27, 1964 : Rhodesia, November 26, 1964 ; 
United States, December 18, 1964. 
Second proc&s-verhal extending the declaration on pro- 
visional accession of Switzerland to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 
1958 as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at 
Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the 
United States December 18, 1964. 
Signatures: Canada, November 25, 1964; Israel, De- 
cember 1, 1964; Italy, November 27, 1964; Rho- 
desia, November 26. 1964 ; Switzerland, November 
6. 1964 ; United States, December 18, 1964. 
Proc^s-verbal extending declaration on provisional ac- 
cession of United Arab Republic to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 
(TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. 
Entered into force for the United States December 
18, 1964. 

Signatures: Canada, November 25, 1964; Italy, No- 
vember 27, 1964; Mauritania, November 25. 1964; 
Rhodesia, November 26, 1964 ; United Arab Repub- 
lic, November 19, 1964; United States, December 
IS, 1964. 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 29, 19.50. TIAS 2052. 
Accession dcpo«i<e(Z; Zambia, December 28, 1964. 



Agreement amending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 28.56, 4670, 4979, 5243, .5477). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Kabul October 31 and 
November 7, 1964. Entered into force November 7, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of November 16, 1964 (TIAS 5696). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Tehran December 15, 
1964. Entered into force December 15, 1964. 



INDEX January 18, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1334 

Asia, Economic Development in Soutli and 
Soiitlieast Asia (Coffin, Colombo Plan com- 
munique, chapter II of annual report) ... 77 

China. A Conversation With Dean Rusk (Tran- 
s.ript of NBC Interview) 62 

Cuba. A Conversation With Dean Ilusli (Tran- 
s.ript of XBC Interview) 62 

I>epartmcnt and Foreign Service. A Conversa- 
tion With Dean Rusk (Transcript of NBC 
Interview) 62 


A Conversation With Dean Rusk (Transcript of 

-NBC Interview) 62 

President Sends New Tear's Message to Soviet 

Leaders (message to Miko.van and Kosygin) . 74 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and Ru- 
mania Sign Cultural Exchange Agreement for 
1965-66 (text of U.S. note) 87 

Foreign Aid 

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (Transcript of 

NBC Interview) 62 

Economic Development in South and Southeast 
Asia (Coffin, Colombo Plan communique, 
chapter II of annual report) 77 

U.S. Provides Emergency Food Supplies to 

Somalia 76 

France. A Conversation With Dean Rusk 

(Transcript of NBC Interview) 62 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Economic Development in South and Southeast 
Asia (Coffin, Colombo Plan communique, 
chapter II of annual report) 77 

Israel. U.S.S.R. Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution on 
Syrian-Israeli Complaint (Tost, text of reso- 
lution) 86 

Italy. U.S. Officials Send Congratulations to 

President Saragat of Italy (.Johnson, Rusk) . 75 

Malaysia. U.S. Regrets Malaysia Unable To 
Accept Military Credit Proposal (Department 
statement, joint communique) 75 

Military Affairs. U.S. Regrets Malaysia Unable 
To Accept Military Credit Proposal (Depart- 
ment statement, joint communique) .... 75* 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A Con- 
versation With Dean Rusk (Transcript of 
NBC Interview) 62 

Presidential Documents 

President Sends Christmas Greetings to Ameri- 
cans in Viet-Nam 76 

President Sends New Tear's Message to Soviet 
Leaders 74 

T'.S. Officials Send Congratulations to President 
Saragat of Italy 75 

Rumania. U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural Ex- 
cli:in?p Agreement for 196.'>-66 (text of U.S. 
: i 87 

Somalia. U.S. Provides Emergency Food Sup- 
plies to Somalia 76 

Syria. U.S.S.R. Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution on 
Syrian-Israeli Complaint (Yost, text of reso- 
lution) 86 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 90 

U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural Exchange 

Agreement for 1965-66 (text of U.S. note) . . 87 


A Conversation W'ith Dean Rusk (Transcript of 

NBC Interview) 62 

President Sends New Year's Message to Soviet 
Leaders (message to Mikoyan and Kosygin) . 74 

United Nations 

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (Transcript of 

NBC Interview) 62 

Current U.N. Documents 87 

U.S.S.R. Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution on Syrian- 
Israeli Complaint (Tost, text of resolution) . 86 


A Conversation With Dean Rusk (Transcript of 

NBC Interview) 62 

President Sends Christmas Greetings to Ameri- 
cans in Viet-Nam (message) 76 

'Name Index 

Abel, Elie 62 

Coffin, Frank M 77 

Goralski, Robert 62 

.Johnson, President 74, 75, 76 

Rusk, Secretary 62, 75 

Yost, Charles W 86 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 28-January 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to December 28 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 527 of 
December 23. 


Brown sworn in as Ambassador to 
Liberia (biographic details). 

Program for visit of Prime Minis- 
ter of Japan. 

Advisory Committee on Arts re- 
ports on cultural presentations 
program (portions of the report 
will be printed in a later issue of 

the BULLETI.M). 

Board of Foreign Scholarships 
annual report (rewrite). 









t532 12/30 

*Xot printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Responsibilities of a Global Power 

This 20-page pamphlet seeks to answer two questions central to any discussion of foreign poliq 
Why is the United States involved and committed in the far corners of the world and carrying wl) 
seems an inordinate share of the free world's burden ? And why do foreign policy problems defy d^ 
solutions when the United States commands such vast power? 

A discussion in some depth of the changes in the postwar world, the implications of an infi 
dependent world, and our tasks as a global power results. 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, cheek, or money order jmy- 

iW« f« C-inf /vF T^n 

PUBLICATION 7777 15 cents 

Please send me copies of BesponsiHlities of a Global Power. 

Cmr, STATE) 







Vol. L/I, No. 1335 

January 25, 1965 


Address of the President to the Congress 94- 



Statement hy Glenn T. Seaborg 116 


hy Assistant Secretary Williams lOJf 


Article by William 11. Taft III 113 

For index see inside hack cover 

The State of the Union 


Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members or 
THE Congress, my fellow Americans : On this 
Hill, which was my home, I am stiiTed by old 
friendshiiJS. Though total agreement between 
the Executive and the Congress is impossible, 
total respect is important. I am proud to be 
among my colleagues of the Congress whose 
legacy to their trust is their loyalty to their na- 
tion. I am not unaware of the inner emotions 
of the new Members of this body tonight. 
Twenty-eight years ago I felt as you do now. 
You will soon learn that you are among men 
whose first love is their country, men who try 
each day to do as best they can what they believe 
is right. 

We are entering the third century of the pur- 
suit of American imion. 

' Delivered before a joint session of the House and 
Senate on Jan. 4 and simultaneously broadcast to the 
Nation by television and radio (White House press 
release; as-delivered text) ; the advance text is avail- 
able as H. Doc. 1, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 


Two hundred years ago, in 1765, nine assem- 
bled colonies first joined together to demand 
f i-eedom from arbitrary power. 

For the first century we struggled to hold 
together the first continental union of democ- 
racy in the history of man. One hundred years 
ago, in 1865, following a terrible test of blood 
and fire, the compact of union was finally 

For a second century we labored to establish 
a unity of purpose and interest among the many 
groups whicli make up the American commu- 

That struggle has often brought pain and 
violence. It is not yet over. But we have 
achieved a unity of interest among our people 
that is unmatched in the history of freedom. 

And so tonight, now, in 1965, we begin a new 
quest for union. We seek the unity of man with 
the world that he has built — with the knowl- 
edge that can save or destroy him— with the 
cities which can stimulate or stifle him — with 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments In the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
state and other otHcers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Interna- 
tional Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Peice : 52 Issues, domestic ?10, 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



the wealth and machines which can enrich or 
menace liis spirit. 

"We seek to establish a harmony between man 
and society which will allow each of us to en- 
largce the meaning of his life and all of us to 
elevate the quality of our civilization. 

This is the search that we begin tonight. 

The State of the World 

But the unity we seek cannot realize its full 
promise in isolation. For today the state of 
tlip Union depends, in large measure, upon the 
state of the world. 

Our concern and interest, compassion and 
vigilanc<^, extend to every corner of a dwindling 
I planet. 

I Yet, it is not merely our concern but the con- 

' cem of all free men. We will not, and we should 

not, assume that it is the task of Americans 

alone to settle all the conflicts of a torn and 

troubled world. 

r^et the foes of freedom take no comfort from 
this. For in concert with other nations, we shall 
help men defend their freedom. 

Our first aim remains the safety and the well- 
being of our own countrj'. 

We are prepared to live as good neighbors 
with all, but we cannot be indifferent to acts 
(Ik'signed to injure our interests, or our citizens, 
or our establishments abroad. The community 
of nations requires mutual respect. We shall 
extend it — and we shall expect it. 

In our relations with the world we shall fol- 
low the example of Andrew Jackson, who said : 
''I intend to ask for nothing that is not clearly 
right and to submit to nothing that is wrong." 
And he promised that "the honor of my coun- 
try shall never be stained bj- an apology from 
H' for the statement of truth or for the per- 
formance of duty." That was this nation's 
policy in the 1830"s and that is this nation's 

Our own freedom and growth have never been 
he final goal of the ^Vmerican dream. 

We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty 
ind abundance in a worldwide desert of dis- 
ippointed dreams. Our nation was created to 
lelp strike away the chains of ignorance and 
nisery and tyranny wherever they keep man 
ess than God means him to be. 

Wo are moving toward that destiny, never 
more rapidly than we have moved in the last 4 

In this period we have built a military power 
strong enough to meet any threat and destroy 
any adversary. And tliat superiority will con- 
tinue to grow so long as this office is mine — and 
you sit on Capitol Hill. 

In this period no new nation has become Com- 
munist, and the unity of the Commimist empire 
has begun to crumble. 

In this period we have resolved in friendship 
our disputes with our neighbors of the hemi- 
sphere, and joined in an Alliance for Progress 
toward economic growth and political democ- 

In this period we have taken more steps 
toward peace — including the test ban treaty — 
than at any time since the cold war began. 

In this period we have relentlessly pursued 
our advances toward the conquest of space. 

Most important of all, in this period the 
United States has reemerged into the fullness of 
its self-confidence and purpose. No longer are 
we called upon to get America moving. We are 
moving. No longer do we doubt our strength 
or resolution. We are strong and we have 
proven our resolve. 

No longer can anyone wonder whether we are 
in the grip of historical decay. We know that 
history is ours to make. And if there is great 
danger, there is now also the excitement of great 

America and the Communist Nations 

Yet we still live in a troubled and perilous 
world. There is no longer a single threat. 
There are many. They differ in intensity and 
in danger. They require different attitudes and 
different answers. 

With the Soviet Union we seek peaceful 
undei-standings that can lessen the danger to 

Last fall I asked the American people to 
choose that course. 

I will carry forward their command. 

If we are to live together in peace, we must 
come to know each other better. 

I am sure that the American people would 
welcome a chance to listen to the Soviet leaders 

ANtTARY 25, 1965 


on our television — as I would like the Soviet 
people to hear our leaders on theirs. 

I hope the new Soviet leaders can visit Amer- 
ica so they can learn about our country at first 

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly 
beginning to assert their identity. Your Gov- 
ernment, assisted by leaders in labor and busi- 
ness, is now exploring ways to increase peaceful 
trade with these countries and with the Soviet 
Union. I will report our conclusions to the 

In Asia, communism wears a more aggressive 

We see that in Viet-Nam. 

Why are we tliere? 

We are there, first, because a friendly nation 
has asked us for help against the Communist 
aggression. Ten years ago our President 
pledged our help. Three Presidents have sup- 
ported that pledge. We will not break it now. 

Second, our own security is tied to the peace 
of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had 
to fight against aggression in the Far East. To 
ignore aggression now would only increase the 
danger of a much larger war. 

Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That 
will come only when aggressors leave their 
neighbors in peace. 

What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and 
in that cause America will never be found 

The Non-Communist World 

But commimism is not the only source of 
trouble and unrest. There are older and deeper 
sources — in the misery of nations and in man's 
irrepressible ambition for liberty and a better 

With the free Kepublics of Latin America I 
have always felt — and our country has always 
felt — very special ties of interest and affection. 
It will be the purpose of my administration to 
strengthen these ties. Together we share and 
shape tlie destiny of the new world. In the 
coming year I hope to pay a visit to Latin 
America. And I will steadily enlarge our com- 
mitment to the Alliance for Progress as the in- 
strument of our war against poverty and injus- 
tice in the hemisphere. 

In the Atlantic commimity we continue to 
pursue our goal of 20 years — a Europe that is 
growing in strength, unity, and cooperation 
with America. A great unfinished task is the 
reunification of Germany through self-deter- 

This European policy is not based on any 
abstract design. It is based on the realities of 
common interests and conunon values, common 
dangers and common expectations. These reali- 
ties will continue to have their way — especially 
in our expanding trade and especially in our 
common defense. 

Free Americans have shaped the policies of 
the United States. And because we know these 
realities, those policies have been, and will be, 
in tlie interest of Europe. 

Free Europeans must shape the course of Eu- 
rope. And, for the same reasons, that course 
has been, and will be, in our interest and in 
the interest of freedom. 

I foimd this truth confirmed in my talks with 
European leaders in the last year. I hope to 
repay these visits to some of our friends ia 
Europe this year. 

In Africa and Asia we are witnessing the 
turbulent unfolding of new nations and con- 

We welcome them to the society of nations. 

We are committed to help those seeking to 
strengthen their own independence, and to work 
most closely with those governments dedicated 
to the welfare of all their people. 

We seek not fidelity to an iron faith but a 
diversity of belief as varied as man himself. 
We seek not to extend the power of America 
but the progress of humanity. We seek not to 
dominate others but to strengthen the freedom 
of all people. 

I will seek new ways to use our knowledge 
to help deal with the explosion in world popu- 
lation and the growing scarcity in world re- 

Finally, we renew our commitment to the 
continued growth and effectiveness of the 
United Nations. The frustrations of the 
United Nations are a product of the world that 
we live in and not of the institution which gives 
them voice. It is far better to throw these dif- 
ferences open to the assembly of nations than 
to permit them to fester in silent danger. 



I These are some of tlie goals of the American 
nation in the world in which we live. 

For ourselves we seek neither praise nor 
blame, neither gratitude nor obedience. 

TVe s(M>k peace. 

A\\' seek freedom. 

We seek to enrich the life of man. 

For that is the world in which we will flourish 
and that is the world that we mean for all men 
to ultimately have. 

Toward the Great Society 

World affairs will continue to call upon our 
energy and courage. 

But today we can turn increased attention to 

(the character of American life. 
We are in the midst of the greatest upward 
surge of economic well-being in the history of 
any nation. 

()ur flourishing progress has been marked by 
price stability that is unequaled in the world. 
Our balance-of-payments deficit has declined 
and the soundness of our dollar is unquestioned. 
I jiledgc to keep it that way, and I urge business 
and labor to cooperate to that end. 

We worked for two centuries to climb this 
peak of prosperity. But we are only at the be- 
ginning of the road to the Great Society. 
Aliead now is a summit where freedom from the 
wants of the body can help fulfill the needs of 
the spirit. 

We built this nation to serve its people. 

We want to grow and buUd and create, but 
we want progress to be the servant and not the 
master of man. 

We do not intend to live — in the midst of 
abundance — isolated from neighbors and na- 
ture, confined by blighted cities and bleak 
suburbs, stunted by a poverty of learning and an 
emptiness of leisure. 

The Great Society asks not only how much, 
but how good; not only how to create wealth, 
but how to use it ; not only how fast we are go- 
ing, but where we are headed. 

It proposes as the first test for a nation : the 
quality of its people. 

This kind of society will not flower sponta- 
neously from swelling riches and surging power. 
{I It will not be the gift of government or the 
creation of Presidents. 

It will require of every American, for many 
generations, both faitli in the destination and 
the fortitude to make the journey, and like free- 
dom itself, it will always be challenge and not 

Tonight we accept that challenge. 

A National Agenda 

I propose that we begin a program in educa- 
tion to insure every American child the fullest 
development of his mind and skills. 

I propose we begin a massive attack on crip- 
pling and killing diseases. 

I propose we laimch a national effort to make 
the American city a better and more stimulating 
place to live. 

I propose we increase the beauty of America 
and end the poisoning of our rivers and the air 
that we breathe. 

I propose we carry out a new program to 
develop regions of our country that are now 
suffering from distress and depression. 

I propose we make new efforts to control and 
prevent crime and delinquency. 

I propose we eliminate every remaining 
obstacle to the right and the opportimity to vote. 

I propose we honor and support the achieve- 
ments of thought and the creations of art. 

I propose that we make an all-out campaign 
against waste and inefficiency. 

Our basic task is threefold : first, to keep our 
economy growing; to open for all Americans 
the opportunity that is now enjoyed by most 
Americans; and to improve the quality of life 
for all. 

In the next 6 weeks I will submit special mes- 
sages with detailed proposals for national action 
in each of these areas. 

Tonight I would like briefly to explain some 
of my major recommendations in the three main 
areas of national need. 

A Growing Economy 

First, we must keep our nation prosperous. 
We seek full employment opportunity for every 
American citizen. I will present a budget de- 
signed to move the economy forward. More 
money will be left in the hands of the consumer 
by a substantial cut in excise taxes. We will 

JAXUARY 25, 1965 


continue along the path toward a balanced 
budget in a balanced economy. 

I confidently predict — what every economic 
si"Ti tells us tonight— the continued flourishing 
of the American economy. 

But we must remember that fear of a reces- 
sion can contribute to the fact of a recession. 
The knowledge that our Government will, and 
can, move swiftly will strengthen the confidence 
of investors and business. 

Congress can reinforce this confidence by in- 
suring that its procedures pennit rapid action 
on temporary income tax cuts. And special 
funds for job-creating public programs should 
be made available for iimnediate use if reces- 
sion threatens. 

Our continued prosperity demands continued 
price stability. Business, labor, and the con- 
sumer all have a high stake in keeping wages 
and prices within the framework of the guide- 
posts that have already served the Nation so 


Finding new markets abroad for our goods 
depends on the initiative of American business. 
But we stand ready— with credit and other 
helj, — to assist the flow of trade which will ben- 
efit the entire Nation. 

Our economy owes much to the efficiency of 
our farmers. We must continue to assure them 
the opportimity to earn a fair reward. I have 
instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to lead 
a major effort to find new approaches to reduce 
the heavy cost of our farm programs and to 
direct more of our effort to the small fanner 
who needs help most. 

We can help insure continued prosperity 
through a regional recovery program to assist 
the development of stricken areas left behind 
by our national progress; further efforts to 
provide our workers with the skills demanded 
by modern technology, for the laboring man 
is an indispensable force in the American sys- 
tem; the extension of the minimmn wage to 
more than 2 million unprotected workers; the 
improvement and modernization of the unem- 
ployment compensation system. And, as 
pledged in our 1960 and 1964 Democratic plat- 
forms, I will propose to Congress changes in 
the Taft-Hartley Act, mcluding section 14-B. 
I will do so hoping to reduce conflicts that for 

several years have divided Americans in various 
States of our Union. 

In a country that spans a continent modem 
transportation is vital to continued growth. 

I will recommend heavier reliance on com- 
petition in transportation and a new policy for 
our merchant marine. 

I will ask for funds to study high-speed rail 
transportation between urban centers. We will 
begin with test projects between Boston and 
Washington. On high-speed trains, passen- 
gers could travel this distance in less than 4 


Opportunity for All 

Second, we must open opportimity to all our 

Most Americans tonight enjoy a good life. 
But far too many are still trapped in poverty, 
idleness, and fear. 

Let a just nation open to them the city of 
promise: to the elderly, by providing hospital 
care under social security and by raising bene- 
fit payments to those struggling to maintain the : , 
dignity of their later years ; to the poor, through :' 
doubling the war against poverty this year; to i 
Negro Americans, through enforcement of the 
civil rights law and elimination of barriers to 
the right to vote; to those in other lands that 
are seeking the promise of America, through 
an immigration law based on the work a man 
can do and not where he was born or how he 
spells his name. 

To Enrich the Life of All 

Our third goal is to improve the quality of 
American life. 

We begin with learning. 

Every child must have the best education 
that this nation can provide. 

Thomas Jefferson said no nation can be both 
ignorant and free. Today no nation can be both 
ignorant and great. 

In addition to our existing programs, I will ; 
recommend a new program for schools and stu- 
dents with a first-year authorization of 

It will help at every stage along the road to 



For the preschool years we will help needy 
children become aware of the excitement of 


For the primary and secondary school years 
we will aid public schools serving low-income 
families and assist students in both public and 
private schools. 

For the college years we will provide scholar- 
ships to high school students of the greatest 
promise and greatest need and guaranteed low- 
interest loiins to students continuing their col- 
lege studies. 

Xew lalwratories and centers will help our 
schools lift their standards of excellence and 
explore new methods of teaching. These cen- 
ters will provide special training for those who 
need and those who deserve special treatment. 

Greatness requires not only an educated peo- 
ple but a healthy people. 

Our goal is to match the achievements of our 
medicine to the afflictions of our people. 

"We already carry on a large program for re- 
search and health. 

In addition, regional medical centers can pro- 
vide the most advanced diagnosis and treatment 
for heart disease, cancer, stroke, and other 
major diseases. 

New support for medical and dental educa- 
tion will provide the trained men to apply our 

Community centers can help the mentally ill 
and improve health care for school-age children 
from poor families, including services for the 
mentally retarded. 

An educated and healthy people require sur- 
roundings in harmony with their hopes. 

In our urban areas the central problem today 
is to protect and restore man's satisfaction in 
belonging to a community where he can find 
?fvurity and significance. 

The first, step is to break old patterns — to 
begin to think and work and plan for the 
development of eiitire metropolitan areas. We 
will take this step with new programs of help 
for basic community facilities and for neighbor- 
hood centers of health and recreation. 

Xew and existing programs will be open to 
those cities which work together to develop 
unified long-range policies for metropolitan 

JANUARY 25, 1965 

"We must also make important changes in our 
housing programs if we are to pursue these same 
basic goals. So a Department of Housing and 
Urban Development will be needed to spear- 
head this effort in our cities. 

Ever}^ citizen has the right to feel secure in 
his home and on the streets of his cormnunity. 

To help control crime we will recommend pro- 
grams to train local law enforcement officers ; to 
put the best techniques of modern science at 
their disposal; to discover the causes of crime 
and better ways to prevent it. 

I will soon assemble a panel of outstanding 
experts of this nation to search out answers to 
the national problem of crime and delinquency, 
and I welcome the recommendations and the 
constructive efforts of the Congress. 

For over three centuries the beauty of Amer- 
ica has sustained our spirit and enlarged our 
vision. "We must act now to protect this herit- 
age. In a fruitful new partnership with the 
States and cities the next decade should be a 
conservation milestone. "We must make a mas- 
sive effort to save the coimtryside and estab- 
lish — as a green legacy for tomorrow — more 
large and small parks, more seashores and open 
spaces than have been created during any period 
in our history. 

A new and substantial effort must be made to 
landscape highways and provide places of re- 
laxation and recreation wherever our roads run. 

"Within our cities imaginative programs are 
needed to landscape streets and transform open 
areas into places of beauty and recreation. 

"We will seek legal power to prevent pollution 
of our air and water before it happens. "We 
will step up our effort to control harmful wastes, 
giving first priority to the cleanup of our most 
contaminated rivers. "We will increase research 
to learn more about control of pollution. 

"We hope to make the Potomac a model of 
beauty here in the Capital, and preserve un- 
spoiled stretches of some of our waterways with 
a wild rivers bill. 

More ideas for a beautiful America will 
emerge from a "White House Conference on Nat- 
ural Beauty which I will soon call. 

"We must also recognize and encourage those 
who can be pathfinders for the Nation's imagi- 
nation and understanding. 


To help promote and honor creative achieve- 
ments, I will propose a National Fomidation on 
the Arts. 

To develop knowledge wliich will enrich our 
lives and insure our progress, I will recommend 
programs to encourage basic science, partic- 
ularly in the universities — and to bring closer 
the day when the oceans will supply our grow- 
ing need for fresh water. 

The Government 

For government to serve these goals it must 
be modem in structure, efficient in action, and 
ready for any emergency. 

I am busy currently reviewing the structure 
of the executive branch of this Government. I 
hope to reshape it and reorganize it to meet more 
effectively the tasks of the 20th century. 

Wherever waste is found, I will eliminate it. 

Last year we saved almost $3,500,000,000 by 
eliminating wast« in the Government. And I 
intend to do better tliis year. 

And very soon I will report to you on our 
progress and on new economies that your Gov- 
ernment plans to make. 

Even the best of government is subject to the 
worst of hazards. 

I will propose laws to insure the necessary 
continuity of leadership should the President 
become disabled or die. 

In addition, I will propose reforms in the elec- 
toral college — leaving undisturbed the vote by 
States, but making sure no elector can substitute 
his will for that of the people. 

Last year in a sad moment I came here and 
I spoke to you after 33 years of public service, 
practically all of them here on this Hill. 

This year I speak after 1 year as President 
of the United States. 

Many of you in this Chamber are among my 
oldest friends. We have shared many happy 
moments and many hours of work, and we have 
watched many Presidents together. Yet, only 
in the White House can you finally know the 
full weight of this Office. 

The greatest burden is not running the huge 
operations of government — or meeting daily 
troubles, large and small — or even working 
with the Congress. 

A President's hardest task is not to do what 
is right but to knoio what is right. 

Yet the Presidency brings no special gift of 
prophecy or foresight. You take an oath, step 
into an office, and you must then help guide a 
great democracy. 

The answer was waiting for me in the land 
where I was born. 

It was once barren land. The angular hills 
were covered with scrub cedar and a few large 
live oaks. Little would grow in the harsh cali- 
che soil of my country. And each spring the 
Pedernales River would flood our valley. 

But men came and they worked and they 
endured and they built. 

And tonight that coimtry is abundant — abun- 
dant with fruit and cattle and goats and sheep — 
and there are pleasant homes and lakes, and 
the floods are gone. 

Wliy did men come to that once forbidding 

They were restless, of course, and they had 
to be moving on. But there was more than 
that. There was a dream — a dream of a place 
where a free man could build for himself, and 
raise his children to a better life— a dream of 
a continent to be conquered, a world to be won, 
a nation to be made. 

Remembering this, I knew the answer. 

A President does not shape a new and per- 
sonal vision of America. He collects it from 
the scattered hopes of the American past. 

It existed when the first settlers saw the coast 
of a new world, and when the first pioneers , 
moved westward. 

It has guided us every step of the way. 

It sustains every President. But it is also 
your inheritance and it belongs equally to all the 
people that we all serve. 

It must be interpreted anew by each genera- 
tion for its own needs ; as I have tried, in part, 
to do tonight. 

It shall lead us as we enter this third cen- 
tury of the search for "a more perfect Union." 

This, then, is the state of the Union: free, 
restless, growing, and full of hope. m\ 

So it was m the beginning. 

So it shall always be, while God is willing 
and we are strong enough to keep the faith. 



Treasury Issues Statement on Gold 
and Foreign Exchange Markets 

The Treasury Department on January 8 
issued the foU^noing statement. 

A wave of speculative comment has distorted 
the significance of recent developments in the 
gold and foreign exchange markets. The under- 
lying factors influencing these markets have not 
changed in recent days. Comparatively wide 
price fluctuations have been set off, in these cus- 
tomarily small and narrow markets, by mis- 
taken interpretations of the coincidence of 
several unrelated official actions or statements 
by various governments. 

Tlie Treasury is able to give categorical as- 
surance that neither the announced purchases of 
gold by the French Treasury, nor the minor 
technical adjustment that has been executed in 
the market quotations for the pound sterling, 
nor newspaper stories concerning a possible re- 
■-'on in gold cover requirements in the United 
^; :ites, reflect or imply any fundamental change 
in the basic supply and demand situation that 
has prevailed in the gold and foreign exchange 
markets in recent months. 

With regard to the French gold purchase 
announced yesterday [January 7], this transac- 
tion adjusts the current French position. Fu- 
ture demand will be primarily tied to whatever 
developments there may be in the French bal- 
ance of payments over coming months. After 
this transaction, French dollar holdings will 
tf.ral about $1.2 billion, of which nearly $700 
million are held to cover the outstanding debt 
of the French Government to the United States 
and Canada while an adequate working balance 
would require about $400 million. 

With respect to market trading for currently 
available and forward purchases of the British 
pound sterling, price changes have reflected a 
technical adjustment to repeated but modest 
speculative pressures that accumulate from 
time to time. Such pressures could become dis- 
ruptive if it were not for the fact that market 
quotations can vary within a moderate range 
to increase the costs and risks of imwarranted 
speculation of this nature. 

There is an obvious problem with regard to 
the 25 percent gold reserve requirement. Action 
will be needed sooner or later to correct the 
situation. Some change will be appropriate in 
order both to assure the availability of credit 
in a growing domestic economy and to relieve 
any doubt that may remain anywhere that the 
U.S. gold supply stands firmly behind the dollar 
in international markets at the immutable price 
of $35. Wliile legislative action will im- 
doubtedly have to be requested of the Congress, 
the form or timing of the request has not been 
finally determined. 

Concerning the movement in the London gold 
price the need for operational flexibility in mar- 
ket dealings should be emphasized. Any specu- 
lation against the basic price of gold would in- 
evitably end on the losing side. The market is 
under firm control but has been allowed to fluc- 
tuate fi-om time to time as needed to make such 
speculation more costly. 

President Johnson Receives Report 
on Increasing Trade With U.S.S.R. 

A group of American businessman reported 
to President Johnson on January 7 on their 
participation in the Business International 
Executive Roundtahle held at Moscow Novem- 
ber 15-20. Following are remarks made at the 
White House meeting by President Johnson, 
Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges, and 
William BlacTcie, president of the Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., who was spokesman for the group. 

White House press release dated January 7 ; as-delivered textg 
Secretary Hodges 

This is a veiy distinguished group of U.S. 
businessmen who have been to Moscow and dis- 
cussed trade. Mr. Blackie, tlie president of 
Caterpillar Tractor, will speak for the group in 
telling you what they are bringing to the Gov- 
ernment and to you. 

Mr. Blackie 

Mr. President, I believe that I might best 
serve my purpose this morning by making a 

JAUTJAKT 25, 1965 


further conservation of summary of views 
struck out by this group somewhere between 
1 and 2 o'clock tliis morning. 

Our fii-st observation is that the Soviet Union 
desires greater trade with the United States and 
has indicated a willingness to discuss the settle- 
ment of whatever obstacles there may be to that 
trade, including the lend-lease obligation. As 
businessmen we naturally are interested in any 
opportunities there might be for advancing the 
growth and pi'osperity of our companies and 
through them our coimtry, but we are much 
more interested in the security and welfare of 
the United States and the rest of the fre« world. 
We would not have gone to Moscow without 
the approval of our Government, and we would 
not be willing to seek greater trade with Soviet 
Russia unless our Govenmient's policy would 
encourage us to do so. 

The basic problems between the United 
States and Soviet Russia are political, and trade 
can never be a complete substitute for continu- 
ous effort to solve these problems. But ui this 
context trade policy could be made an instru- 
ment of national policy, and it is in that light 
that we would prefer it be regarded. Mutual 
beneficial ti'ade is normally a desirable goal in 
and of itself, but in the case of trade with the 
Soviet Union mider today's conditions, it could 
have added meaning. It presents an oppor- 
timity to bridge a communications gap, to 
establish more contacts, and to develop greater 
understanding between the two coimtries. It 
seemed to us very possible more trade could 
improve the climate for political settlement, 
just as political settlement might pave the way 
for more trade. 

It also occurs to us that our objective should 
be to seize every reasonable opportmiity to in- 
fluence the evolution of Soviet society toward 
goals that are more acceptable to the West, and, 
if capitalism and free enterprise be as good as 
we think we are proving they are, they should 
also be better for the Soviet people than world 
commimism dominated by the Kremlin. This 
could be part of our continuing effort to per- 
suade Soviet leaders the goals of peace and 
higher standards of living for their people can 
be achieved more surely and more quickly by 
their accepting the permanence and the polit- 
ical-economic systems of the West, by seeking 

assurances of security at the conference table 
and advancing economic growth through mu- 
tually beneficial trade. 

The opportunity to influence tliis kind of 
evolution of Soviet attitude obviously depends 
on the number and quality of the contacts we 
were able to make, and as matters stand today, 
contacts between American business and the So- 
viet Union are limited almost entirely to Gov- 
ernment officials on both sides. On the other 
hand, if the United States does not see fit to 
modify some of its present policies, then we can 
expect that Soviet Russia will continue to obtain 
most of what it wants from other Western pow- 
ers and will continue to build plants to produce 
what it is unable to obtain either from them 
or from us. This might slow its economic 
growth somewhat, but in the long run might 
have the effect of putting the Russians in better 
position to compete with us in thii'd markets. 
That is where major competition is most likely 
to occur to deny economic benefits to the United 
States that arise from mutually beneficial trade, 
to further restrain relations between our coun- 
tries, to strain them, to f urtiier separate United 
States policy from cooperation with those of 
our allies, and to deny opportimities for con- 
tact and influence over the evolution of Soviet 
attitude, policy, and practice. If, within the 
limits of military security, we were now to open 
the channels of trade with the Soviet Union, 
contact with Soviet officials, with foreign trade 
organizations, and Soviet industrial managers, 
all would multiply. Mutually beneficial deals, 
licensing arrangements, and possibly even joint 
ventures might be developed. Through success- 
ful experience in cooperation, successful for 
both sides, it would be our hope that some pres- 
ent fears would fade and that confidence might 
grow. Thank you. 

Secretary Hodges 

Thank you, Mr. Blackie. And now, ladies 
and gentlemen, the President of the United 

President Johnson 

Secretary Hodges, Mr. Haynes [Eldridge 
Haynes, president. Business International, 
Inc.], Mr. Connor [Secretary of Commerce- 



desifniate John T. Connor], Mi\ Blackie, ladies 
and gentlemen: It is a pleasure for me to wel- 
come you to the "White House this morning and 
to thank j-ou for spending the day in "Washing- 
ton to tell us about your recent conversiitions in 
Moscow and about the prospects for trade be- 
t\vix>n ourselves and the Soviet I^nion. 

I have been very stimulated by the discussions 
that some of our exchanges have had with other 
countries in the world concerning our future 
H'lations with them and particularly our ex- 
clianging trade with them. 

The Science Adviser to the President [Don- 
ald F. Hornig] brought in a group the other 
day that had accompanied him to the Soviet 
T'liion, in the Bell Laboratories and IBM and 
other prominent industrialists, and I spent a 
very fniitful few minutes listening to their ex- 
jH riences and to their recommendations.^ 

As I have observed in my communications to 
my countrymen, I have suggested that the lead- 
iM-hip in government — and that would be Sec- 
ntarA- Hodges and the new Secretary, Mr. Con- 
iH'P. and the Secretary of Labor, and other 
Cabinet officers — pursue relentlessly with the 
It iders of business in this comitrj' and the le<ad- 
eis of labor some of their recommendations that 
lia\e come out of these exchanges and out of 
tlicse studies. The chairman of the Foreign 
Tolations Committee has recently sent a ques- 
tionnaire to leading business people throughout 
our country asking for their views and their 
rr ommendations. I look forward to recei^dng 
^Tports from these various groups that are ap- 
jilying themselves to this project, and I will 
idrefully review their findings and conclusions 
luid re^ich some of my o^^^l and at an appro- 
friate time submit my recommendations to the 
( ' iigress. 

I think all of you know your Government is 
committed to explore ways to increase peaceful 
trade with the Soviet Union and with the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe. Now the leaders of 
)oth business and labor have had some 
exchanges and have some good solid recom- 
mendations, some of which you made this mom- 

' For a White House announcement and remarks 
made by President Johnson on Dec. 1.5, 19C4, see Bitl- 
F.riN- of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 12. 

ing and we will want to pursue further. I 
am confident that the results of these meetings 
will — and these trips, these exchanges, will be 
to improve both our understanding and theirs 
of what must be done if we are to take advan- 
tage of the possibility of trade between us. 

As I okserved a night or so ago when I ad- 
dressed the Congi-ess,= if we are to live together 
in peace, we must Imow each other better. A 
long axiom in my political thinking has been 
that a man's judgment is no better than his 
information on any given subject, and you men 
who have gone there and made a study of 
these problems are bringing the American 
people information which is quite essential to 
their determining what is a wise policy for this 
nation. I think there is no better way to come 
to know each other than to engage in peaceful 
and profitable commerce together. I think it 
is extremely important that we constantly keep 
in view our own national interest, what is best 
for our own country, and these exchanges no 
doubt will help some of you to point up what is 
best for our national interest. 

I want to again thank you for your initiative 
and for yoiir enterprise and for the time that 
you have taken to make this study. Your assess- 
ment of what we might do to expand our trade 
with these countries in peaceful goods is most 
welcome, and I assure you that in the early 
days of the new administration the most com- 
petent talent available to us in government, in 
business, and in labor will be recruited and 
their recommendations considered to the end 
that we determine what would be a wise and 
proper policy for our Government. 

I thank you for coming here. I enjoy get- 
ting to know you. I don't want to put in any 
commercials for any particular companies, but 
to those men that have had to shoulder an extra 
load while you have been gone from your desks 
I hope you will carry them the President's ap- 
preciation. I started out my career as a yoimg- 
ster on a highway gang riding a 5-ton tractor, 
and last week I observed with a great deal of 
pride what a Caterpillar bulldozer can do; so 
I want to say to Mr. Blackie, if his recommen- 
dations are as solid as his equipment, they are 
going to receive very good consideration. 

' See p. 94. 

JAXTJART 25, 1965 


Agricultural Development in Africa 

hy G. Mermen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

It is a great pleasure to be here on the western 
slope of the Rockies and to have this oppor- 
timity to talk about one of my favorite sub- 
jects — Africa. Your interest in that part of 
the world is heartening, because there is a great 
need for all Americans to know more about 

In the two decades since the United Nations 
was formed in San Francisco, its membership 
rose from 46 to 115. Of the new members, 32 
are African nations which have come to inde- 
pendence in the past 13 years. And next month 
the small West African country of Gambia will 
join the ranks of free African states. With the 
exceptions of the Congo, which was disrupted 
by internal strife, and Algeria, which fought 
a bitter war of independence, most of 
Africa's transition from colonialism to inde- 
pendence took place in relatively harmonious 

Although there are many linguistic, physical, 
cultural, and other differences among the 265 
million Africans who inhabit a landmass more 
than three times the size of the United States, 
there are several important aspirations that are 
shared by Africans in all parts of the continent. 

First of all, there is the pressure for free- 
dom and independence that has drawn world 
attention to Africa. 

A second major aspiration — and in some ways 
the most important — is African insistence on 
personal and national dignity and equality of 
treatment with the rest of the world. 

A third major aspiration is the new nations' 

' Address made before the Western Colorado Horti- 
cultural Society at Grand Junction, Colo., on Jan. 7. 

detennination to improve their standards of 
living and reduce their burdens of illiteracy, 
poverty, illness, and malnutrition. 

A fourth important force at work in Africa 
is a desire for unity, which, while not precisely 
definable, can be seen in the 35-nation Organiza- 
tion of African Unity. 

And, lastly, there is the African aspiration 
of nonalinement. In the long run, we believe 
nonalinement will work to the advantage of 
the free world, as long as each coxmtry remains 
truly devoted to preserving its independence. 

In attempting to achieve these aspirations, 
Africa's new and emerging nations have two 
advantages over other underdeveloped areas of 
the world. Most African countries do not have 
the enormous population pressures that are en- 
countered in Asia, for example. Nor do they 
have landholding systems that tend to retard 
progi'ess, such as those existing in some Latin 
American areas. Although these two ad- 
vantages — together with Africa's extensive ■ 
mineral resources — are favorable factors in . 
Africa's struggle for economic development, the • 
continent nevertheless has formidable problems -i 
to overcome before standards of living can be j 
improved substantially. ,' 

Almost every African leader faces such prob- ; 
lems as : j 

1. Low annual per capita incomes — average | 
only about $120 per person for the continent ! 
as a whole. 

2. High illiteracy rates — about 85 percent 
throughout most of Africa. 

3. A shortage of doctors, nurses, hospitals. 
There are more than 17,000 people per doctor 
in Africa, or 25 times the ratio in this country. 



4. High infant mortality. One of every five 
African children dies before reaching his teens. 

5. A lack of trained teclinicians and 

G. Little private capital, few local business- 
men, and a sliortage of industry. 

7. Inadequate transportation and communi- 
cations facilities. 

S. Tribal frictions. 

9. A movement of young rural people to the 
cities and the inevitable urban problems that 
such drift causes. 

10. And, perhaps most important of all, low 
agricultural productivity in countries where 
about 75 percent of the people make their living 
from the land. Although Africa has more 
arable land (632.5 million acres) than either 
the Soviet Union (575 million acres) or the 
United States (462.5 million acres), the average 
^Vfrican farmer is only about 4 percent as pro- 
ductive as a North American farmer. Fur- 
tliermore, Africa accounts for only some 5 per- 
cent of the world's agricultural products, 
compared with our 16 percent. 

Despite those handicaps, however, there has 
been much quiet progress in Africa — the kind 
of progress that cannot be easily or quickly 
measured. There are new schools and imiver- 
sities and improved training in those institu- 
tions. Medical facilities, too, are expanding 
and improving. 

Tliere also has been measurable economic 
progress, although up-to-date figures are dif- 
ficult to come by. For example, gross national 
products in such countries as Liberia, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, and Nigeria have been increasing by 
an average of 4 to 5 percent annually for 
several years. 

The recent growth of Africa's international 
trade is another indication of progress. The 
continent's total exports rose from $5.7 billion 
in 1958 to $7.9 billion in 1062— an mcrease of 
some 40 percent. This increase has permitted 
Africa to purchase more needed goods from 
abroad to help speed its development. 

In Africa's most widespread economic activ- 
ity — agriculture — there have been many gains 
in recent years. Agricultural production for 
the entire continent in 1963 was 25 percent above 
the total for the average production in the 

years 1952-54, and African agricultural exports 
have been rising slowly but steadily in recent 

Cocoa production, for example, rose about 25 
percent in Ghana and Nigeria, and BSYs percent 
in Ivory Coast between 1959 and 1963. Pro- 
duction of another important crop — peanuts — 
doubled in Nigeria and increased 150 percent 
in Ghana in the same yeare. Vanilla produc- 
tion in Madagascar more than doubled between 
1959 and 1963, and Ivory Coast's coffee crop 
increased by one-third in the same period. 
Ethiopian cotton fabric production increased 
fourfold between 1959 and 1962. 

In terms of the continent as a whole, one 
important longnm development is the recogni- 
tion by African leaders that they must under- 
take regional economic programs if they want 
to avoid wasting scarce African plant and cap- 
ital. To promote African unity in the eco- 
nomic field, as well as to provide a cooperative 
means to help individual nations, African coun- 
tries are cooperating with the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Africa. Although young in 
years, the ECA has helped create an African 
Development Bank and an Institute for Eco- 
nomic Development and Planning, and is work- 
ing on regional industrial development schemes. 

U.S. Aid Program 

There can be little question, however, that 
foreign assistance is needed to bolster Africa's 
individual and cooi)erative efforts in the eco- 
nomic field. Our Agency for International 
Development progi'am in Africa, as is assistance 
from other friendly nations, is geared to meet 
Africa's most urgent needs. 

In recent years, our assistance has approxi- 
mated $500 million a year, about half of which 
is surplus farm products and Export-Import 
Bank development loans. In addition, some 
3,500 Peace Corps volunteers are hard at work 
in 19 African countries. 

Our overall aid program covers a broad range 
of activities, including education, health, trans- 
portation, commimity development, industrial 
development, and mining. Tonight, however, 
I want to cite a few examples of U.S. assistance 
in the fields of agriculture and livestock that 
may be of particular interest. 

JANTJART 25, 196(5 


Under Public Law 480, better known as the 
Food for Peace progi-am, the United States has 
made surplus U.S. foodstuffs available to 20 
African nations. Some of this has been in the 
form of emergency assistance in times of dis- 
aster. Another use of U.S. food is to provide 
better diets for African children. In this con- 
nection, I recall the eagerness with which 
schoolchildren in the middle of the Congo lined 
up to get their daily cup of milk during the 
recess period. Another vivid memoiy is that 
of refugee children from Angola at Sona Bata 
in the Congo, who ate milk in powdered form, 
so eager were they for food. 

Another interesting use of surplus food can 
be found in Algeria, Morocco, and Timisia, 
where "food for work" projects have been orga- 
nized. In Algeria, for example, some 110,000 
men who otherwise would be unemployed are 
engaged in reforestation, terracing, irrigation, 
dam building, and other rural rehabilitation 
programs. Pail of their pay is P.L. 480 food- 
stuffs, and the other part is in cash wages pro- 
vided by the Algerian Government. These 
programs give highly useful work both to 
unemployed workers in Africa and to unem- 
ployed foodstuffs from the United States. 

A number of American organizations and in- 
dividuals are helping to improve agricultural 
techniques and production in Africa. The Na- 
tional Farmers Union, for example, is engaged 
in providing training in cooperative techniques 
in both East and AVest Africa. Land-grant col- 
leges also are playing important roles in agri- 
cultural teaching. Oklahoma State in Ethiopia, 
Michigan State in Nigeria, and the University 
of Illinois in Sierra Leone provide three such 

One highly successful individual effort took 
place in eastern Nigeria, where a Negro Ameri- 
can poultry specialist from Mississippi made 
chicken and eggs important parts of the peo- 
ple's diets. Charles L. Davis, affectionately 
known as "Chicken Charlie," greatly increased 
the number of private local chicken farmers and 
helped lower the price of eggs from $1.25 a 
dozen for imported eggs to 75 cents for domestic 
fresh eggs. Mr. Davis' work in Nigeria was so 
successful that Zambia recently asked to have 
him survey opportunities for poultry produc- 

tion in that country, and he is there now on 
temporary duty. 

In Tunisia, Nassir Lateef , an American horti- 
cultural specialist of Arab ancestry, is directing 
a project that has raised the coimtry's horticul- 
tural production and is making a significant im- 
I^rovement in Tunisia's economy. By scientific 
farming methods and new tecliniques, Mr. 
Lateef's work has helped increase Tunisia's 
vegetable production fi*om 260,000 tons in 1958 
to more than 400,000 tons. This has helped 
lower Tunisia's need for imported horticultural 
products from $14.4 million annually in 1959 to 
about $1.4 million today. 

Importance of Livestock Farming 

Livestock, after agriculture, is Africa's sec- 
ond most important pursuit. The U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organization estimates that 
Africa has 28 percent of the world's goats, 14 
percent of its sheep (approximately 225 million 
sheep and goats), and 12 percent of its cattle 
(more than 110 million cattle) . Although hides, 
skins, and wool are important exports in some 
parts of Africa, the primary importance of live- 
stock lies in the continent's internal economy. 
In addition, livestock plays important social 
and religious roles in some parts of Africa. 

Livestock's importance as an economic factor, 
however, is sharply limited by animal diseases. 
Of these, the most serious is trypanosomiasis, 
which is spread by the deadly tsetse fly. The 
main areas of such infestation are found in a 
broad belt that runs just below the Sahara from 
southern Senegal to East Africa, and across 
central Africa from Angola to Mozambique. 

Because of the importance of livestock in 
Africa, a number of our AID projects are in 
the field of livestock farming. 

In Chad, for example, we are helping the 
Chadians erect 22 prefabricated slaughtering 
and drying sheds for beef processing and hide 

In Ethiopia we have developed a research sta- 
tion which includes a veterinary laboratory and 
instruction in rapid crossbreeding of cattle. 

In Kenya the United States is assisting in 
range and livestock development. 

In Morocco U.S.-recommended feeding 



methods are lielping sliccp f annere realize prices 
50 to 100 percent above those of fanners using 
traditional methods. 

In Nigeria AID has helped improve range 
management practices in an area of some one 
million acres, and the calf death rate has been 
rut by 50 percent. In that country, also, a pri- 
vate American firm is developing cold-storage 
plants in the northern, cattle-raising part of the 
( ountry, and recently made the first successful 
rail shipment of chilled beef to the southern 
c^ astal cities. 

Let me point out, too, that our agricultural 
and livestock assistance to Africa is not de- 
signed to make African products competitive 
with American products. In fact, Africa, 
which has the lowest per capita consimiption of 
proteins in the world, will require manj' years 
to produce sufficient livestock products to meet 
local consumption and help close its nutritional 
gap. Our agricultural imports are almost en- 
tirely tropical commodities that cannot be pro- 
duced in this country. 

What I have mentioned today are only a few 
of the ways in which Africa and the United 
States are cooperating to help build strong and 
free African nations. But I think they are il- 
lustrative of the broad range of challenging 
problems and opportunities that must be faced 
in Africa's development. 

At this point in time, there is no end to the 
challenges and opportunities in Africa. I am 
pleased to find your healthy interest in Africa 
and its development, and I hope many of you 
will continue to remain interested in the prog- 
ress of Africa and its relations with the United 

Board of Foreign Scholarships 
Reports on Exchange Program 

|{ The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 30 (press release 532) the release of the 
annual report of the Board of Foreign Scholar- 
ships for the year September 1963-64. Entitled 
T> acker and Scholar Abroad,^ the report con- 

tains a collection of excerpts from the first-per- 
son reports of former students, teachers, 
professoi-s, and scholars who have been abroad 
under the Department of State's educational ex- 
change program. The excerpts also cover ex- 
periences of foreign grantees in this country. It 
is the most detailed collection of such statements 
made public since govermnentally sponsored ed- 
ucational exchanges began under the Fulbright 
Act in the late 1940's. 

In a foreword John M. Stalnaker, chairman 
of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and 
president of the National Merit Scholarship 
Corporation, wrote : 

Each of the grantees, in preparing [his] accounts 
and comments . . . made a thoughtful effort to add up 
his experiences, his failure and success in fulfilling 
these aims [of the Mutual Educational and Cultural 
Exchange xict]. Their accounts amply testify, we 
feel, to the unique challenge and rewards of this 
world-wide program. 

Members of the Board of Foreign Scholar- 
ships, which administers the program of ex- 
changes with some 135 comitries and territories, 
are appointed by the President. Besides Dr. 
Stalnaker, they are: Oscar Handlin, Winthrop 
Professor of History, Harvard University, 
vice chairman; John N. Andrews, U.S. Vet- 
erans Administration; Robert B. Erode, pro- 
fessor of physics, University of California, 
Berkeley; G. Homer Durham, president, Ari- 
zona State University; Jolm Hope Franklin, 
professor of American history. University of 
Chicago; Mrs. Ella T. Grasso, secretary of 
state of Connecticut; Francis Keppel, U.S. 
Commissioner of Education, Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare; A. Wesley 
Roehm, Oak Park and River Forest High 
School, Oak Park, 111. ; George F. Taylor, direc- 
tor, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, Univer- 
sity of Washington ; Frederick E. Tennan, vice 
president and provost, Stanford University; 
and A. Curtis Wilgus, director of Caribbean 
conferences. Center of Latin American Studies, 
University of Florida. 

JAKUAKT 25, 19G5 

' Copies are available upon request from the Opera- 
tions Staff, Board of Foreign Scholarships, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 


Arts Committee Reports Progress 
on Cultural Presentations 

The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 29 {press release 531) the release of a 
report to Congress on the cultural presentations 
program hy the Advisory Committee on the 
Arts?- Following is the text of the transmittal 
letter from Roy E. Larsen, chairman of the Ad- 
visory Committee, to John W. McCormaxih, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives,'' to- 
gether tvith the section of the report containing 
the Committee's recommendations. 


Deae IVIk. Speaker : This report has been pre- 
pared for the members of the Congress by the 
Advisory Committee on the Arts, in accordance 
with Section 107 of Public Law 87-256. This 
report will also be widely distributed to the 
American public, and will thus serve as one of 
the means of fulfilling the Committee's func- 
tion, as reciuired by the Congress, to "make re- 
ports to the public in the United States and 
abroad to develop a better imderstanding of 
and support for the programs authorized by 

this Act." 

The material in this report is based on the 
first full year of operation of the Cultural Pres- 
entations Program, following a temporary dis- 
continuance of program operations in the latter 
months of 1962 and early months of 1963 and 
completion of an intensive study of the entire 
program. The study, which covered the poli- 
cies and management of the program, as well as 
its relationship to overall United States 
objectives in foreign affairs, set new goals and 
provided new guidelines for the Cultural 
Presentations Program. I\aiown as the Larsen- 
Wolfe report, it was approved by Assistant 
Secretary Lucius D. Battle, who later said : 

" Copies of the report, entitled Annual Report of the 
Cultural Presentations Program, Department of State, 
for the Year July 1, 1963 to June 30, 19G!,, will be avail- 
able upon request from the Office of Cultural Presenta- 
tions, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

' An Identical letter was sent to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate. 

The report marked a decisive turning point in the 
program. First, it recognized, and sanctioned, the 
gradual emergence of the program from its original 
competitive character : when it was launched as the 
"President's Special Program" in 1954, it was in effect 
a response to the Soviet cultural offensive. After 8 
years, it had matured enough to merit a higher and 
more difficult challenge. Messrs. Larsen and Wolfe 
suggested a new — and, I think, admirably expressed— | 
statement of purpose . . . "to reflect abroad the state i 
of the performing arts in America, both in terms of 
creative cultural vitality and the desire and capacity 
of a free people to support the development of a flour- 
ishing national culture." 

A copy of that study is attached to this re- 
port.^ In the latest fiscal year, a great many off 
its recommendations and suggestions have been 
implemented by the Department of State in" 
the conduct of the progTam. The major rec- 
ommendations that have been followed were 

1. The Department of State has assumed full 
responsibility for direct management of allj 
phases of the program by contrast with the(j 
former arrangement, whereby a major part of 
the management was handled outside the Gov- 
ernment imder contract. 

2. Expert artistic counsel is provided di-i 
rectly to the Department of State by a revital- 
ized and expanded Advisory Committee on thei 
Arts and by its panels, which nominate per- 
forming groups and individuals for the Pro- 
gram. { 

3. A formal policy of long-range planning 
has been put into effect and program plans are , 
now projected tloree years ahead. 

A great many other recommendations, most 
of them narrower in scope, have also been im- 
plemented. Some others are still in the process i 
of being put into effect, and the continuing ex- 
perience with the program has indicated still 
other changes that would appear to help effec- 
tuate the long-range goals of the program. 

Although some operational problems are al- 
most inevitable in a world-wide, many faceted 
program of this type, the Committee is gratified 
by the exceptional progress made diuing Fisca 

' Not printed here ; a limited number of copies of th( 
Report of Survey of Cultural Presentations Program 
are available upon request from the Office of Cultura 
Presentations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 



Year 1964. A stability and sense of direction 
were achieved to a degree that had not been 
previously reached and that should make Cul- 
tural Presentations an increasingly important 
arm of U.S. foreign policy. With improved 
management and a consistently high standard 
of excellence in choice of cultural attractions, 
the program is being more fully utilized by 
American embassies abroad than ever before in 
its ten-year history, and it is now an integral 
part of the embassies' total effort to communi- 
cate and to develop favorable relationships with 
people of host countries. 

Performers, both professional and amateur, 
who go abroad under the Cultural Presenta- 
tions Program render valuable services for our 
coimtry through their performances and their 
plaiuied offstage activities. The Committee 
gives its highest commendation to the many 
performers and, in particular, their conductors 
or directors, who serv^ed so successfully this past 
year as "cultural ambassadors of good will." 
It is the earnest hope of the Committee that 
ways wUl be found in the near future to give 
well-deserved recognition to the performing 
artists who make it possible to communicate 
between nations through the highest peaceful 
arts, and who in doing so may have to make 
career sacrifices and subject themselves to 
health hazards. 

The role of the Ambassadors is, of course, ex- 
ceedingly important, and most Ambassadors 
have given generously of their time in helping 
the performing arts groups and individuals to 
carry out their missions effectively. Special 
tribute is also due the Public Affairs OfBcers 
and Cultural Affairs Officers of the U.S. Infor- 
mation Agency stationed at American embas- 
j sies abroad. On them falls much of the burden 
of planning, scheduling and arranging the 
activities to take place as a consequence of the 
visits of performing groups and individuals. 
It is part of their job to fit these visits appro- 
priately into the total context of the embassies' 
social and cultural relationships within host 
'countries. It is also part of their job to pre- 
pare careful and objective assessments of the 
I performers. To do justice to these tasks calls 
for' creative thinking, long hours, determined 
I iTort, and diplomacy of a high order. Based 
on the experience of the past year, it has ap- 

peared to be almost axiomatic that the success 
of the performers as "cultural ambassadors" 
depends on the thought, time, and care that have 
gone into the plans and arrangements made by 
the Public Affairs Officer and the Cultural 
Affairs Officer at each post. 

The Committee has been gratified in observ- 
ing that its advice with regard to the Cultural 
Presentations Program has been consistently 
heeded and that, wherever possible, soimd ideas 
growing out of Committee discussion have been 
put into practice. The Committee is also 
pleased to note that the President, the Secretary 
of State and other leaders of the executive and 
legislative branches continue to give encourage- 
ment, through both word and deed, to the devel- 
opment of a flourishing national culture, which 
can serve as a powerful force to bring together 
the peoples of the many countries tliroughout 
the world. 

Respectfully submitted, 

EoT E. Larsen 


It has already been noted that progress of the 
Cultural Presentations Program during fiscal 
year 1964 was substantial, and heartening to 
those directly concerned. Nevertheless, there 
are still areas in which improvement would 
help the program to approach its optimum use- 
fulness. The Committee recommends contin- 
ued strengthening of the following aspects of 
the program : 

Public Understanding 

Tliere is a need to make clear that the pro- 
gram is primarily to encourage international 
communication and understanding, not to pro- 
vide entertainment, and that the performer is 
uniquely equipped to demonstrate American 
cultural achievements and to surmount polit- 
ical, geographic, and language barriers because 
of the universality of the arts among peoples 
of the world. The relation of our cultural 
exports to our country's domestic development 
of the arts must be emphasized, as sliould the 
point that the cultural standing of the United 
States is increasingly important in our relation- 

JAXTJARY 25, 1965 


ships with other countries interested in, and 
even insjjired by, our aspirations to develop 
"The Great Society." 

One of the major recommendations of the 
Larsen-Wolfe report was that the public recog- 
nition given to those who participate in the 
program be increased measurably. This prob- 
lem of recognition remains to be worked out, 
and deserves concerted thought and effort. 


The artistic judgment of panels of experts is 
an invaluable element in the total program. 
Excellence is the criterion against which all 
performing groups and individuals are assessed 
by panels in the fields of music, drama, and 
dance. Backgrounds and interests of panel 
members have a bearing, of course, on the em- 
phasis given to the many different forms of per- 
forming arts within the three broad fields. To 
assure that important forms of art are not over- 
looked, the composition of panels should be re- 
examined from time to time and rotation of 
panel membership instituted. 


Program balance by geogi-aphic areas and 
fields of art was accomplished to a large degree 
by reports from Foreign Service posts and anal- 
ysis by area representatives of the U.S. Infor- 
mation Agency and of the Bureau of Educa- 
tional and Cultural Affairs. However, the 
process of matching cultural attractions to the 
interests and potentialities of specific geo- 
graphic areas should be further develoi^ed so 
that the kinds of performing groups and indi- 
viduals selected will be well suited to the pur- 
poses for which they are being presented. In 
particular, this would mean deeper analysis of 
locations and audiences to be reached, and de- 
termination of (1) the appropriate form of art 
of interest at certain seasons, (2) whether the 
attraction should be a large or small group or 
an individual, (3) whether there is need for 
professional or amateur performers or sam- 
plings at different times of both types, and (4) 
whether the timing of appearances will fit in 
with local events of significance. To comple- 
ment this kind of planning, means should be 



explored to build up a greater reservoir of in- 
formation on highly competent performing 
groups and individuals traveling abroad under 
private or commercial sponsorship. The "ex- 
tension" of private or commercial tours is a 
technique that can be used to increased advan- 
tage in the future ; however, such tours are often 
concentrated in the European area and the per- 
fonners are not readily available for sponsor- 
ship under the program in the less developed 
areas of the world. 

Although repetition of excellent types of at- 
tractions is useful, and even necessary, in many 
areas, there should be a continuing search for 
new ideas and ways to demonstrate abroad the 
variety and depth of American achievements in 
the performing arts. 

Drama should again be represented in the 
program and, with due consideration of pro- 
gram balance and limitations of funds, some of 
the new, carefully studied proposals of the Ad 
Hoc Drama Panel should be put into effect, in- 
cluding the Drama Coaching Team, the hus- 
band-wife acting teams, theater in the round, 
and use of the Porto Theater concept after it has 
been developed through private research efforts. 
Use of outstanding academic theatrical produc- 
tions should again be considered after it has 
been possible to sponsor tours abroad of prof es- ■|| 
sional productions of the type recommended by ' 
the Drama Panel and planned for fiscal year > 
1965. The Playwright Project, developed by^ 
the panel, would lead to the commissioning of 
leading American playwrights to apply their 
creative talents to producing great works of • 
drama that would help tell the story of the 
American way of life and the American idea. 
There is a dearth of such works in existence; 
however, their development should arise out of 
the normal artistic channels with private finan- 
cial support. The Committee encourages this 
development but believes it is not, and should 
not, be the role of the Government to bring it 




Overscheduling of activities in which per- 
formei's are expected to take part, both in per--| 
formance and offstage, is a common problem. 
It reflects the interest of embassy officers in 





utilizing the performers to the fullest extent 
during tlio short time they are available in the 
particular area. This enthusiasm indicates a 
SI rong interest in the program, but at the same 
t iiuo ma}' not take into account the effects on the 
performers who try to keep up with a packed 
schedule in each country, who may have to 
travel at odd hours and under rugged condi- 
tions, and who because of frequent changes in 
]( loation encounter health problems. The sched- 
uliiig at each post should therefore be carefully 
and selectively developed to serve the priority 
in I crests of the post, but also with due considera- 
I III to the health, safety, and other touring 
jin iblems confronting performers. 

Commercial sponsors in a few areas may tend 
to exploit academic performing groups by bill- 
iiiLT or promoting them in such a way that au- 
• lu'uces attracted expect to witness professional 
pirformances. Most of the seven college groups 
wlio toured for the program during the past 
year performed so well that many people who 
saw and heard them could not believe that they 
were other than professional. However, any 
ki lul ( if misrepresentation is not in keeping with 
the program's standards or objectives. Em- 
bi-sy officers should guard against abuses of 
I lis type by choosing reliable sponsors who are 
i Merest ed in reachmg the kinds of audiences 
<li'>ired by the embassy and by assuring agree- 
iiu'ut on the specific terms and conditions under 
wliich performances can be given. 

Interagency Coordination 

Ixesponsibilities for the Cultural Presenta- 
tions Program are shared by the Department 
if .">tate and the U.S. Information Agency. The 
I )i'partment's Office of Cultural Presentations 
airies out the overall planning, policy, and 
iianagement aspects, with USIA personnel re- 
sponsible for promotional, operational, and re- 
■ lotting activities in each foreign country 
ited. Working relationships have been co- 
; ifative, and coordination has been good, de- 
pite the many administrative, logistical, and 
'! igram complications. There are still areas 
r r improvement. USIA could well devote a 
aiger portion of its resources to promotional 
ilans and materials and give a higher priority 
n some countries to preparations for visits of 

performing groups and individuivls. Wliere 
there are opportunities for regional area meet- 
ings of Cultural Affairs Officers and Public Af- 
fairs Officers, there should be frank, informal 
discussions of problems, experiences, and new 
ideas in carrying out the program. The De- 
partment should make greater use of advance 
men and escorts carefully chosen for the job 
to be done. 

Centennial of the Birth 
of Jean Sibelius 

Following are texts of a message to the Fin- 
nish people from President Johnson and a mes- 
sage to the American people from Finnish 
President Urho Kekkonen, both of which were 
released in the United States and in Finland 
on January 1 at the beginning of the SibeliitrS 
centennial year. 

Message From President Johnson 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated January 1 

We in America celebrate this year the cen- 
tennial of the birth of Jean Sibelius, the great 
Finnish composer. His achievement has be- 
come a part of the world's cultural heritage. 
Through his art, Sibelius has made an enduring 
contribution to the enrichment of the human 
spirit, and his music continues to bring enjoy- 
ment to people throughout the world. For us, 
as for the people of Finland, his Finlandia has 
become a symbol of man's indomitable will for 
freedom. We are therefore proud to join in 
doing homage to this son of Finland during 
Sibelius Year. 

IVIessage From President Kekkonen 

Finland will celebrate 19G5, the centennial 
of the birth of Jean Sibelius, as a Festival 
Year. In the long history of music, few com- 
posers have reflected the faith of a nation to 
the same extent as Sibelius' music reflects the 
faith of the Finnish people. Some of his 
works have come to sj'mbolize the desire of the 
Finnish people for freedom, and the greatest of 
them have given the world high examples of 
Finnish cultural achievement. But the art of 

TAXTJART 23, 1965 


Sibelius, springing from a national context, has 
grown until it can be said to belong to humanity 
as a whole. I am proud and happy that the 
American people, whose interest in the music 
of Jean Sibelius has always meant so much to 
us, are honoring with affection and appreciation 
the memory of our great composer. 

President Issues Executive Order 
on Communications Satellite Act 


Provxdinq for the Carbying Out of Certain Provi- 
sions OF THE Communications Satellite Act of 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 
301 of title 3 Of the United States Code, and as Presi- 
dent of the United States, it is hereby ordered aa fol- 

Section 1. Definitions. As used in this order : 

(a) The term "the Act" means the Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 419), and includes, ex- 
cept as may for any reason be inappropriate, that Act 
as amended from time to time. 

(b) The term "the Corporation" means the Com- 
mimications Satellite Corporation (incorporated on 
February 1, 1963, under title III of the Act and under 
the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act). 

(c) The term "the Director" means the Director of 
Telecommunications Management provided for in Ex- 
ecutive Order No. 10995 of February 16, 1962. 

(d) The term "the Secretary" means the Secretary 
of State or his designees. 

Sec. 2. Director of Telecommunications Management. 
(a) Subject to the provisions of this order, the Director 
shall generally advise and assist the President in con- 
nection with the functions conferred upon the Presi- 
dent by the provisions of Section 201(a) of the Act. 

(b) The Director shall : 

(1) Aid in the planning and development, and aid 
in fostering the execution, of a national program for 
the establishment and operation, as expeditiously as 
possible, of a commercial communications satellite 

(2) Conduct a continuous review of all phases of 
the development and operation of such a system, in- 
cluding the activities of the Corporation. 

(3) Coordinate the activities of goveramental 
agencies with responsibilities in the field of telecom- 
munication, so as to Insure that there is full and ef- 
fective compliance at all times with the policies set 
forth in the Act. 

(4) Make recommendations to the President and 
others as appropriate, with respect to all steps neces- 
sary to insure the availability and appropriate utiliza- 
tion of the commimications satellite system for general 
Government purposes in consonance with Section 
201(a)(6) of the Act. 

(5) Help attain coordinated and efficient use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum and the technical compatibil- 
ity of the communications satellite system with existing 
communications facilities both in the United States 
and abroad. 

(6) Prepare, for consideration by the President, 
such Presidential action documents as may be appro- 
priate under Section 201(a) of the Act, make necessary 
recommendations to the President in connection 
therewith, and keep the President currently informed 
with respect to the carrying out of the Act. 

(7) Serve as the chief point of liaison between the 
President and the Corporation. 

Sec 3. Secretary of State, (a) The Secretary shall 
exercise the supervision provided for in Section 201(a) 
(4) of the Act and, in consonance with Section 201 
(a) (5) of the Act, shall further timely arrange- 
ments for foreign participation in the establishment 
and use of a communications satellite system. 

(b) The Secretary shall have direction of the 
foreign relations of the United States with respect to 
the Act, including all negotiations by the United 
States with foreign governments or with international 
bodies in connection with the Act. 

Sec. 4. Annual reports. The Director shall timely 
submit to the President each year the report (includ- 
ing evaluations and recommendations) provided for in 
Section 401 (a) of the Act. 

Sec. 5. Assistance and Cooperation. The Director 
and the Secretary shall effect such mutual coordina- 
tion, and all other federal agencies concerned, and the 
Corporation, shall furnish the Director and the Secre- 
tary such assistance and documents, and shall other- 
wise extend to them such cooperation, as will enable 
the Director and the Secretary properly to carry out 
their responsibilities under this order and best pro- 
mote the implementation of the Act in an orderly and 
expeditious manner. In connection with his respon- 
sibilities under section 3 of this order, the Secretary 
shall consult with the Director and other federal 
officers concerned, and, as may be appropriate, with 
the Corporation. 

Sec 6. Functions reserved. The functions, or parts 
of functions, conferred upon the President by the Act 
that are not assigned herein are reserved to the 

" No. 11191 ; 30 Fed. Reg. 29. 

The White House, 
January 4, 1965. 



The United States Scientific Attache Program 

ly WUliam 11. Taft III 

Postwar science has added a new dimension 
to foreign policy. Its importance as a gage of 
a nation's international standing, in peace as 
well as war, is fully recognized. Advanced na- 
tions strive to strengthen existing science and 
technology, less developed ones to possess them 
as keys to economic progress. All imderstand 
the prestige that accrues to nations which con- 
tribute significantly to the advancement of 
knowledge and to the improvement of teclmical 
skills. Witness the worldwide impact of space 
exploration and other scientific discoveries only 
slightly less dramatic. 

The world applauds a Sputnik, a Ranger's 
pictures of the moon, installations of atomic 
power stations, international exchanges of scien- 
tists. On the politicoscientific level the tracking 
station on foreign tenutory, nuclear safeguard 
guarantees, exchange arrangements may bring 
many diplomatic complexities in their train. 

The Department of State's scientific attache 
)rogram complements these developments. The 
wsition of the United States as a very promi- 
nent scientific power demands both the so- 
jhisticated projection of our science elsewhere 
ind an intelligent response to foreign science. 
To answer these imperatives the Department 
appointed its first scientific attaches in the early 
I950's. Their counterpart within the Depart- 
ment is the Office of International Scientific Af- 
fairs. The program has gro\vn to include 23 
It t aches, who are posted at our more important 
imbassies. Six of the largest, London, Paris, 
Bonn, Stockholm, Rome, and Tokyo, have two 
ipiece. "WTiere an embassy's size does not war- 

int assignment of a scientific attache. Foreign 
Service officers are being especially designat€d 

to tend to scientific problems. Indeed the af- 
finity between science and diplomacy is now so 
close that the Department this year has also 
established a science curriculum within its train- 
ing program for officers in the Foreign Service. 
The new courses cannot turn the latter into 
scientists, but they will contribute to the officers' 
ability to observe, report, and advise on matters 
of a scientific nature. 

Excepting some of the assistant attaches, the 
Department has stressed from the inception of 
the new program the need for having U.S. sci- 
ence and scientific interests abroad represented 
by men of science. Their professional standing 
is of primary importance; it enables them the 
more easily to associate with the foreign scien- 
tific community on their own merits. In the 
past foreign scientists have been less likely than 
other groups to fall within the purview of em- 
bassy personnel. 

Our scientific attaches have all been trained 
in science and research, many of them being 
scientists of distinction and reputation. Among 
them are chemists, physicists, a geologist, and 
a physiologist. One, our attache in Canberra, 
is an Antarctic explorer and polar biologist. He 
exemplifies the Department's effort to make its 
scientist appointments as logical as possible; 
he is accredited to New Zealand and Australia, 
which are close collaborators with the United 
States in Antarctic research as well as in other 

• Mr. Taft is a Foreign Service officer, 
currently on the staff of the Office of Inter- 
national Scientific Affairs. 

TAXr.VKY 25, 1963 


scientific fields. He acts to link the United 
States with science developments in a far cor- 
ner of the world. Australia especially shares 
with us scientific interests beyond those of the 
Antarctic. Space projects and installations, 
atomic energy research, problems of Pacific 
flora and fauna are subjects of common con- 
cern. Like his counterparts in other embassies, 
he is his ambassador's scientific adviser in these 
and all scientific matters. 

The task of recruiting scientists of ability for 
a variety of scientific attache positions around 
the world is difficult in itself. To fit them ap- 
propriately to the position and to choose those 
whose flexibility will enable them to work 
smoothly in an alien environment on matters of 
foreigii relations as well as on science is doubly 
so. Their selection has demanded patience and 
perseverance. Like others, our scientific at- 
tache in Stockholm illustrates the care of 
selection. He is an internationally known 
meteorologist, who in 1961 became the chair- 
man of the department of geophysical sciences 
at the University of Chicago. He has also 
served as professor at Caltech and at M.I.T. 
His early life was spent in Norway, so that his 
knowledge of Scandinavian languages and his 
early associations assist him in his new position. 
Although posted to Stockholm, he is expected 
to concern himself with science in all of 

There is certainly a U.S. -Scandinavian mu- 
tuality of interest in weather matters, and the 
Stockholm attache's specialty is not inappro- 
priate. However, this has in no way deterred 
him from reporting in detail what in the recent 
emphasis of Swedish science is much more im- 
portant to the Department, namely : Sweden's 
planning to bring research and invention speed- 
ily from the laboratory to practical industrial 
use. No area of technological management is 
more in demand. 

Science in the Developing Countries 

All our earlier scientific attache posts were 
established in Europe, where scientific achieve- 
ment in parallel with that in the United States 
continues to attract primary interest in its re- 
lations to American research and to the man- 
agement problems of science. But posts have 

also been more recently opened at embassies in 
new countries, where science and technology are 
destined to play a significant role in rapidly 
changing societies. It is internationally fash- 
ionable as well as essential to the new comitries' 
development to encourage the organization and 
improvement of their science. 

Thus there is now a scientific attache posted 
in our Cairo embassy. He represents U.S. in- 
terests in the U.A.R.'s efforts to progress scien- 
tifically. Egyptians have been working hard 
to increase the numbers, skill, and performance 
of their scientific and technical personnel in 
order to assist the general living standards of 
an expanding population in a land oppressed 
by desert and disease. America has in Egypt 
as in other developing nations an important 
stake in the local growth of science. For sev- 
eral years, more than 1,000 Egyptian students 
have been training in the United States, the 
bulk of them studying in engineering and in 
the medical, physical, and biological sciences. 
The appropriateness of LT.S. training to Egyp- 
tian conditions and needs is a continuing con- 
cern. The scientific attache represents the U.S. 
scientific presence in Egj'pt, material illustra- 
tions of which are the U.S. Navy and National 
Institutes of Health programs thei-e. He helps 
to define the Department's approach. 

Other developing countries with U.S. scien- 
tific attaches are Pakistan, India, Brazil, and 
Argentina. Some consideration has been given 
to the possibility of creating new posts in capi- 
tals such as Lagos and Bogota. An important 
purpose is to recognize the new countries' in- 
terest in establishing science and their scientists 
on a firm local footing. Their governments feel 
that modern science and research and the ap- 
plication of technology arising therefrom are 
the best hope of speeding backward economies 
forward; but custom and the habits of local 
society unfortiuiately make it difficult to give 
the local scientist useful authority and status 
to do the job. This may be despite the less 
developed nations' firm determination to build 
a science structure, the upgrading of their 
scientific academies, and the like. A serious 
problem lies in guaranteeing the young scien- 
tist, more likely than not educated to his pro- 
fession in a developed modem society, a useful 



career in his liome country. Too many are lost 
to the areas which have provided tlieir educa- 
tion. Our scientific attaches seek to keep 
abreast of those problems, which tie in with 
U.S. concern for development. They can also 
be a bridge between good but isolated local 
scientists and our important, prestigious science 

In Israel the U.S. scientific attache follows 
a rapidly expanding local science and research, 
a considerable proportion of which has from 
time to time been supported by U.S. agencies. 
Israel is significant as a new nation energeti- 
cally exploring the problems of its arid areas. 
It has a particular interest in the desalination 
of sea water.' an efficient means to which will 
sohe myriad difHculties in developed and imder- 
developed nations. Also, it is acting as an ex- 
porter of science and technical assistance to 
many African nations. These activities paral- 
lel U.S. interests. The scientific attache at Tel 
Aviv by locality and training is a valuable 
professional observer. 

Tokyo and the European Capitals 

The U.S. .scientific attaches in Tokyo and in 
the larger European capitals, where tlie almost 
endless ramifications of science and technology 
make analysis of scientific developments ex- 
ceedingly complex, of necessity select certain 
aspects for emphasis. In Japan, for example, 
the U.S. Embassy and its scientific attaches 
have played a part in facilitating operations of 
the 3-year-old U.S. -Japan Committee on Sci- 
entific Cooperation.' It fosters the collabora- 
tion of the two countries' scientists, stimulates 
the exchange of students, and naturally stresses 
scientific research of special concern in the Pa- 
cific region. 

; Some recent preoccupations of our scientific 
attaches in European capitals, combining mat- 
ters of science and international politics, in- 
clude the following: in London, tlie drain of 
English scientists to the United States, which 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 16, 19G4, 
p. 724. 
'For background, see ibid., July IZ. IfMM. p. V,1. 

has mixed some traditional English antipathy 
agamst the United States with misunderstand- 
ing; in Rome, the problem of taxes and U.S.- 
supported research ; in Paris and Bonn, local 
advances in technology and fields of science 
such as microbiology, space, medicine, and 
atomic energy, all of which separately or jointly 
have a long-range effect upon national prestige 
and political effectiveness. In Paris, also, a 
second scientific attache is responsible for as- 
sisting the science committees of regional orga- 
nizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. The work of 
those organizations in science gives to them, in 
U.S. opinion, a more generally useful existence. 
Our attache seeks to collaborate in this aspect 
of their activity. 

It should be clear from this partial listing of 
the Department's scientific attaches and their 
assignments that their business is as varied as 
their posts. They act too in support of the sci- 
entific interests of other U.S. agencies. What 
gives them a common denominator of value for 
the Department of State and the embassies in 
which they serve is essentially their professional 
familiarity with science, together with their 
scientific point of view. Whatever their im- 
mediate work, they are in a wider sense con- 
cerned in their respective posts with the impact 
of science and teclinology upon foreign affairs 
and its bearing upon the U.S. position. Tliis 
is an increasingly large order, drawing into con- 
sideration of it all foreign affairs personnel, 
who in their turn can profit from the scientist's 

The universality of science has within it a 
potential for peace and international under- 
standing basic to all U.S. foreign policy. Ques- 
tions of international resources, of worldwide 
health, of social welfare and material standards 
of living, of population control, and others in- 
volving science both abroad and at home affect 
our well-being. In addition we have a sliared 
interest with other peoples in advancing knowl- 
edge for its own sake. The scientific attache is 
related to any and all such things and lends to 
them a scientist's authority. 

JANTiVRY 25, 19G5 


The Plowshare Program — Developing Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Explosives 

Statement hy Glenn T. Seaborg 

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ^ 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity 
to appear before the Joint Committee to dis- 
cuss our program, called Plowshare, for the 
development of peaceful uses of nuclear explo- 
sives. I will give you some general informa- 
tion on the recent progress and future plans 
for the program. I have with me Mr. Jolin S. 
Kelly, the Director of our Division of Peace- 
ful Nuclear Explosives, who will provide you 
with more detailed information. 

Generally, the potential peaceful applications 
of nuclear explosives can be divided into three 
classes or types of applications. One we call 
the scientific application. The nuclear explo- 
sive has several unique characteristics which can 
make possible some lands of research investiga- 
tions not possible by other means. The second 
type of application is in an area that might 
be called imdergromid engineering. Here, nu- 
clear explosives can be detonated deep under- 
ground to shatter rock to facilitate mining of 
ores and recovery of oil, stimulate flow of gas, 
or produce imderground permeable zones for 
storage or waste disposal. The third type of 
application is the potential use of nuclear ex- 
plosives in excavation for large engineering 

We have made substantial progress in each of 
these areas during 1964. Specifically, we con- 
ducted seven major Plowshare experiments in 
1964, mcluding at least one in each type of 

Most of our effort in this field is directed 
toward designing a nuclear explosive wliich will 
produce new isotopes of the very heavy ele- 
ments and possibly even new elements. There 
are 92 elements which exist in nature, ranging 
from the lightest, hydrogen with atomic num- 
ber 1, to the heaviest, uranium with atomic : 
niunber 92. In addition to these, man has pro- 
duced 11 "transuranium elements," that is, ele- 
ments which are heavier than uranium. These 
may be produced in a specially designed nuclear 
explosion where a target material such as ura- 
nium is bombarded with neutrons. ; 

Two of 11 transuranium elements, einstein- 
ium and fermium, in fact, were first produced 
and found in the debris from the Mike thenno- 
nuclear explosion in 1952. Since then, several 
experiments have been conducted imdergroimd , 
at the Nevada Test Site to develop an improved, 
lower yield device to produce these veiy heavy, 

The goal is to design a device in which a very '■ 
large number of neutrons from the nuclear ex- 
plosion bombard a target material such as 
uranium. Some of the atoms of the target ma- 
terial midergo multiple neutron capture and 
thus are built up to heavier elements. 

In October 1964 the Lawrence Radiation Lab- 
oratory, Livermore, California, conducted one 
of the latest experiments in this work. This 
experiment was called Par. The attached 
chart " siumnarizes these results. The Par ex- 
periment shows that with the approximately 

^ Made before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
on Jan. 5. 

' Not printed here. 



30-kiloton yield of the Par event, the neutron 
intensit}- of the lo-megaton Mike shot was ex- 
ceeded by about fourfold. It would require 
several tens of years of operation of the world's 
best reactor to equal the integi'ated neutron flux 
obtained from the Par explosion. 

In terms of producing isotopes of transura- 
nium elements, the results of Par are very ex- 
citing. The analyses, to date, of the Par debris 
have shown that isotopes as heavy as fermium 
2.")" were produced. More detailed analyses of 
larger samples of the debris are underway, and 
there is some evidence that isotopes of mass 
number 250 may be found. Isotopes of mass 
number 259 would be the heaviest yet produced 
by man by any means. 

In October 1964 the Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory conducted an experiment similar to 
Par in conjimction with the Barbel test in the 
weapons program. The results from the Bar- 
bel experiment neai-ly match those from Par. 

It now seems clear that nuclear explosives can 
be used to produce new isotopes and even new 
elements. A modest improvement in neutron 
flux, accompanied by the use of a heavier tar- 
get material, such as one of the transuranium 
elements, plutonium, curium, or californium, 
could lead to the creation of isotopes with mass 
numbers greater than 270 and atomic numbers 
greater than 103, which would mean the discov- 
ery of new elements. 

We expect to continue investigation of the 
scientific application at a modest but steady 
level. At least one such experiment will be con- 
•ducted in 1965. 

Underground Engineering 

Prior to 1964 we had experience with fully 
contained vmderground nuclear detonations in 
tuflf, alluvium, salt, and granite. The Handcar 
event of November 1964 provided important 
data on the efi'ects of such detonations in dolo- 
mite. The Handcar data are particularly val- 
uable since many imderground resources are 
associated with carbonate formations. 

We believe that we now have enough data on 
underground engineering to warrant undertak- 
ing a demonstration project in cooperation with 
.industry. We have had numerous discussions 

with several companies about possible joint 
projects. Our next step in this area will prob- 
ably be guided by these interests. 

Excavation Application 

There are two facets to the development of 
nuclear excavation teclinology. One, of course, 
is the development of the cratering technology ; 
tlie other is the development of clean devices 
and other techniques to reduce the amount of 
radioactive materials reaching the atmosphere 
from cratering detonations. 

During 1964 five experiments were conducted 
in the excavation program. One was a high- 
explosive row-charge cratering experiment in 
basalt. More recently, the Sulky experiment 
was executed. We conducted three events, 
Klickitat, Ace, and Dub, in the clean-device and 
debris-entrapment program. The results of 
these are very promising. The amoimt of ra- 
dioactive material reaching the atmosphere 
from a cratering detonation employing these 
techniques would be at least a factor of a hun- 
dred or more less than would have been possible 
prior to 1964. We have been concentrating on 
the development of clean nuclear explosives and 
on techniques for keeping debris underground. 

About six or seven additional device-develop- 
ment tests are required to refine the device 
technology pioneered by the 1964 tests. Four 
basic cratering experiments and an intermedi- 
ate-size demonstration project are required to 
refine the cratering technology sufficiently to 
permit undertaking large, useful projects. Two 
of the four basic tests would be row-charge ex- 
periments. For the demonstration project, we 
are investigating, in cooperation with the Atchi- 
son, Topeka and Santa Fo Railroad, the Bu- 
reau of Public Roads, and the California High- 
way Department, the feasibility of a project 
called Carryall. This is a 2-mile cut through 
the Bristol Mountains in California about 200 
miles east of Los Angeles. Carryall, if con- 
ducted, would provide a cut to be used by the 
railroad for relocation of its main line and for 
a segment of new Interstate 40 (Route 6G). 

Despite the progress in the development of 
clean cratering techniques, every nuclear crater- 
ing detonation will release some radioactive 

JANTJABT 25, 1965 


material to the atmosphere. Therefore, the 
present test ban treaty,^ which bans under- 
ground nuclear detonations tliat cause radio- 
active debris to be present beyond the territorial 
limits of the country conducting such an ex- 
plosion, imposes some restrictions on nuclear 
excavation. It appears, therefore, that large 
nuclear excavation projects, particularly those 
near territorial boundaries, such as a new sea- 
level, transisthmian canal, would require an 
agreement with other parties to the treaty. 

On the other hand, as I, and other members 
of the administration, testified before the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of 
the treaty, there are some cratering experiments 
necessary to develop excavation technology 
which can be conducted without violating the 

As the allowable experiments proceed, as 
present technical uncertainties are resolved, and 
as even cleaner explosives become available, we 
believe it will be possible to conduct, under the 
treaty, additional cratering experiments which 
will advance excavation technology. In addi- 
tion, through carrying out such experiments as 
can be done within the limitations of the treaty 
and allowing international observation of the 
principal ones, as we did with Project Gnome, 
we believe that other nations may be able to 
observe for themselves the practicability, safety, 
and feasibility of using nuclear explosives for 
large excavation projects. 

Our opinion that there is international in- 
terest in Plowshare was strengthened by the dis- 
cussions on Plowshare and international co- 
operation in Plowshare which occurred in 
Geneva during the Third International Confer- 
ence on Atoms for Peace.^ 

We probably should begin to give serious con- 
sideration to some form of international coop- 
eration in Plowshare. This could either be in 
connection with the IAEA [International 
Atomic Energy Agency] or other appropriate 
international groups. 


' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239 ; for 
a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on Aug. 12, 1963, see 
iUa., Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350. 

' For a statement made by Dr. Seaborg at Geneva on 
Aug. 20, 1964, see ibid., Sept. 21, 1964, p. 408. 

U.N. Asks All States To Refrain I 
From Intervention in Congo | 

Following are texts of statements made in the ij 
Security Council hy U.S. Representative Adlai] 
E. Stevenson on Deceinber 30 and a resolution d 
adopted hy the Council on that day. 


U.S. /D.N. press release 4487 j 

First let me also express the thanks of my I 
delegation to our colleagues, AmbassadoriJ 
[Arsene Assouan] Usher of tlie Ivory Coast andii 
Ambassador [Dey Ould] Sidi Baba of Morocco, i 
for their indefatigable, patient, and resource-| 
f ul work in bringing this long debate to a con- 
clusion by a resolution that I believe expresses 
in general the anxiety of all of the members 
of the Security Council to see law and order: 
restored to an independent and stable Congo. 

Mr. President, the United States believes that! 
the resolution which we have just adopted is a, 
positive and constructive step toward the estab- 
lisliment of a better climate m the Congo, which 
in turn will facilitate an eventual solution, and' 
that it is also a step toward improved relation's i 
between the Democratic Eepublic of the Conge! 
and its neighbors. The resolution is consistent! 
with past resolutions on the Congo in that it ex- 
plicitly reaffirms the sovereignty and the terri-. 
torial integrity of the Congo. It is also con- 
sistent with the OAU [Organization of Africai 
Unity] resolution of September 10, 1964.^ 

Perhaps the most important provision, as thi 
distinguished representative of France ha; 
pointed out, is operative paragraph 1, which re 
quests all states to refrain or desist from inter 
fering in the internal affairs of the Congo. It i 

' The operative sections of this resolution are eoi 
tained in U.N. doc. S/6076 dated Dee. 1. 



clear that the Congolese Government cannot 
successfully restore law and order and pursue 
a policy of national reconciliation in the face of 
such intervention. This resolution clearly obli- 
gates those states which are now providing as- 
sistance to factions that are openly in rebellion 
against the duly constituted Central Govern- 
ment to cease and desist from such intervention. 
Any other coui"se of action will make the imple- 
mentation of this resolution impossible. 

"With respect to operative paragraph 2, my 
Government subscribes to the view that fightmg 
must cease. ^Vnd I wish in this connection to 
recall that the OAU resolution of September 
10th, which provides the setting for this para- 
graph, remains in full effect and that one of the 
primary objectives of that resolution was to 
stop the fighting. I am sure, Mr. President, that 
•we all share the hope that bloodshed will end 
and peace be restored to this sorely troubled 
country. At the same time I think we all rec- 
ognize that it is not the intention of the resolu- 
tion that we have just voted to restrict the free- 
dom of the (lovernment of the Congo to govern 
or to exercise its responsibilities for maintaining 
the sovereignty and the imity of the Congo. 
This paragraph seeks only an end to the fighting 
which has so disrupted the Congo and which 
has made governing difficult and, at some times 
and places, impossible. 

I also draw attention to the fact that operative 
paragraph 3 calls for action with respect to mer- 
cenaries in accordance with the OAU resolution 
of September 10th. Like the members of the 
OAIT, we would prefer to see the mercenaries 
withdrawn. The Congolese Prime Minister has 
also expressed agreement with the OAU resolu- 
tion. Therefore, it is up to all of the states to 
help create the conditions which would enable 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo to take action in accordance with this 
provision. Compliance with all provisions of 
the resolution would help to create those 

Now, concerning operative paragraph 4, 
which encourages the OAU to continue its ef- 
fort to assist the efforts of the Congo in the 
conciliation process, we believe that the resolu- 
tion which we have adopted will provide a firm 
basis for effective OAU action in this direction. 

And we stand ready in any appropriate way 
to cooperate with the OAU as requested by 
operative pariigraph 5. 

Finally, I believe that the Council has acted 
wisely in asking the Secretary-General to follow 
the situation in the Congo and keep the Council 
informed as appropriate. In this connection, 
I would point out in particular that if there is 
to be any meaningful cease-fire of any duration 
it can be achieved only by a proper observation 
of a neutral and impartial body. I trust, there- 
fore, that as part of his mandate the Secretary- 
General will do whatever is possible and feasible 
to help assure compliance with this provision 
and keep us informed of the results. The same 
consideration, of course, also applies to the 
Council's appeal for nonintervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of the Congo. 

I believe there is one point that I should 
make. In his remarks on December 28, the 
representative of Guinea indicated that the 
members of the group for which he was speak- 
ing interpreted preambular paragraph 2 as re- 
ferring to the Belgian-American rescue mission 
in the Stanleyville area and as, therefore, de- 
ploring it. Mr. President, I think it is quite 
clear from the statements made during this de- 
bate that the overwhelming majority of the 
members of this Council do not so interpret 
this paragi-aph of this resolution. And the 
fact tliat my delegation has voted for the resolu- 
tion as amended makes it perfectly clear that 
we do not so interpret it. 

And, finally, Mr. President, let me say that 
I cannot agree wdth the representative of 
Guinea, if I understood him correctly, that the 
United Nations has failed in the Congo. Per- 
haps he spoke this morning more in temper 
than in reflection for, on the contrarj', the 
United Nations has a long history of construc- 
tive involvement in helping to develop a central 
government in the Congo, in helping to deal 
decisively with several secessions in several 
provinces of that country, and in helping to 
achieve unity, progress, and development in the 
Congo. But that there is rebellion, violence, 
and death there now is not the fault of the 
United Nations. Let us not deprecate what 
the United Nations has done in its greatest and 
most difficult peacekeeping operation, an opera- 

JANUART 25, 1965 


tion that was authorized by this Council. 
Kather let us now strive to fulfill the promises 
of that great collective effort in wliich so many 
members of the United Nations participated 
so gallantly. Let us strive in good faith to 
fuiish what was started in this chamber and do 
our loyal best to insure that all those who have 
died for the preservation of the independence 
and the integrity of the Congo shaU not have 
died in vain. 

[In a further intervention, after the statement of 
the Soviet representative, Ambassador Stevenson 

Mr. President, I had not assiuned that we 
were going to reargue this case after a month 
here this afternoon, but in view of what the 
representative of the Soviet Union has said, I 
shall have to add a further word. 

He said that the interventionists had been 
unmasked here in the Security Coimcil. The 
interventionists were not unmasked. They ad- 
mitted their intervention with pride, indeed, 
with exultation. They were not the United 
States and Belgium. 

Moreover, he said that he had expected that 
there would be some recognition of the crime 
perpetrated by the United States and Belgium. 
The crime was helping, in the case of my coun- 
try, to save the lives of 2,000 innocent hostages 
held illegally. 

I have nothiug more to say. 


The Security Council, 

Noting with concern the aggravation of the situation 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Deploring the recent events in the Democratic Repub- 
lic of the Congo, 

Convinced that the solution of the Congolese prob- 
lem depends on national reconciliation and the restora- 
tion of public order. 

Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, 

Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Taking into consideration the resolution of the Orga- 
nization of African Unity dated 10 September, in par- 

"U.N. doc. S/6129 (as reissued); adopted by the 
Security Council on Dec. 30 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 
1 abstention (France). On a separate vote France 
voted for operative paragraph 1. 

ticular paragraph 1 relating to the mercenaries, 

Convinced that the Organization of African Unity 
should be able, in the context of Article 52 of the 
Charter, to help find a peaceful solution to all the 
problems and disputes affecting peace and security 
in the continent of Africa, j i 

Having in mind the efforts of the Organization of \ 
African Unity to help the Government of the Dem- [ 
ocratic Republic of the Congo and the other political | ^ 
factions in the Congo to find a peaceful solution to ] 
their dispute, 

1. Requests all States to refrain or desist from inter- 
vening in the domestic affairs of the Congo ; 

2. Appeals for a cease-flre in the Congo in accord- 
ance with the Organization of African Unity's resolu- 
tion dated 10 September 1964 ; 

3. Considers, in accordance with the Organization 
of African Unity's resolution dated 10 September 1964, 
that the mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be 
withdrawn from the Congo; 

4. Encourages the Organization of African Unity to 
pursue its efforts to help the Government of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo to achieve national recon- 
ciliation in accordance with resolution CM/Resolution 
5 (III) dated 10 September 1964 of the Organization 
of African Unity ; 

5. Requests all States to assist the Organization of 
African Unity in the attainment of these objectives ; 

6. Requests the Organization of African Unity, in 
accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, to keep the 
Security Council fully informed of any action it may 
take under this resolution ; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions to follow the situation in the Congo, and to re- 
port to the Security Council at the appropriate time. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
Usted below) may be consulted at depository lihrarxes 
in the United states. U.N. printed puMicatioiis maybe 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated November 23 from the Representative of 
Italy regarding the danger threatening a number 
of foreign civilians in Stanleyville, including about 
100 Italian citizens. S/6058. November 23, 1964. 

Letter dated November 23 from the Representative of 
the United Kingdom regarding the granting of facil- 
ities in Ascension Island in connection with the 
proposed rescue operation. S/6059. November 24, 
1964. 1 p. ,,..*, 

Letter dated November 24 from the Prime Minister 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding 
the authorization by his Government for the evacua- 
tion of hostages by Belgium and the United States. 
S/6060. November 24, 1964. 1 p. 



Letter dated November 24 from the Representntive of 
Helgium regarding the rescue operation aud trans- 
mitting texts of a statement by the Belgian Foreign 
Minister aud a letter from the I'rime Minister of 

1 he Democratic Republic of the Cougo to the Belgian 
Ambassador at lAk)iK>ldville. S/(50C3. November 24, 
I'.KH. t; pp. 

I.itter of November 25 from the Representative of the 
I'.S.S.R. regarding tlie action taken by Belgium, 
the Uuiteil Kinsxlom, and the United States. S/6066. 
November 2.". 19l'>4. 2 pp. 

I I ;rcr dated November 20 from the Representative of 
I'.elgium regarding the rescue mission in Stanley- 
ville and Paulis and the withdrawal of the paracom- 
mando battalion. S/6067. November 2G, 1964. 

2 pp. 

I.ctter dated November 26 from the Representative of 
the United States regarding the rescue of the hos- 
tages and the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. 
S /C068. November 26, 1964. 1 p. 
I,. Iter dated November 26 from the Representative of 
the United Kingdom transmitting a statement issued 
by the Foreign Office with reference to the Soviet 
statement of November 25. S/60G9. November 27, 
\W4. 1 p. 
I.rtter dated December 1 from the Representative of 
Helgium regarding the ending of the rescue operation 
:ind the withdrawal of all Belgian paracommandos. 
S /6074. December 1, 1964. 1 p. 
Letter dated December 1 from the Representative of the 
United States regarding the departure of the rescue 
mission from the Congo. S/6075. December 1, 1964. 
I.itter dated December 1 from the Representatives of 
14 African countries, the United Arab Republic, and 
Yugoslavia requesting a meeting of the Security 
Council to consider the situation in the Congo and 
transmitting a memorandum stating why their gov- 
irnment-s consider the situation is likely to "endanger 
till- inniiitcnance of peace and security in Africa." 
s 1,1,71; December 1, 1964. 3 pp. 
Lcit.r ilatLii December 4 from the Representative of 
Czi' iiii.--lovakia transmitting the text of a statement 
by bis Government concerning the "armed interven- 
tion in the Congo." S/6082. December 4, 1964. 2 pp. 
Letter dated December 9 from the Repre.sentative of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo transmitting a 
message from Prime Minister Tshombe requesting 
a meeting of the Security Council. S/6096. Decem- 
ber 9. 1964. 3 pp. 
Letter dated December 4 from the Representative of 
. Turkey regarding the situation in Cyprus. S/6083. 

December 4. 1964. 4 pp. 
Letter dated December 7 from the Representative of 
Turkey regarding reports carried in Greek-language 
newspapers published in Cyprus. S/6088. December 
7. 19tH. 2 pp. 
Letter dated December 7 from the Representative of 
Turkey transmitting the text of a telegram from 
the Vice President of Cyprus regarding Greek press 
reports. S/60S9. December 7, 1;k;4. 2 pp. 
Letter dated December 9 from the Representative of 
Turkey regarding an article in an Athens newspaper. 
S/6103. December 10, 1964. 2 pp. 
Letter dated December 11 from the Representative of 
Turkey transmitting the text of a Turkish note ver- 
bale regarding "The Municipality Law, 1964." 
S/6104. December 11, 1964. 1 p. 
Letter dated November 19 from the Representative of 
Malaysia regarding Indonesian incursions into 
Malaysia. S/6O.-4. November 19. 1964. 2 pp. 
Letter dated December 4 from the Representative of 
Malaysia regarding a further series of Indonesian 
incursions into Malaysia. S/6084. December 4, 1964. 
2 pp. 


Current Actions 



Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 
4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Malta, January 5, 1965. 


International convention to facilitate the importation 
of commercial samples and advertising material. 
Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into 
force November 20, 1955 ; for the United States Oc- 
tober 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 

Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Rwanda, December 1, 1964. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at 
United Nations Headquarters, New York, Decem- 
ber 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9, 1964.' 
Accessions deposited: Niger, December 1, 1964 ; Up- 
per Volta, December 8, 1964. 


Declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confed- 
eration to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. En- 
tered into force for the United States April 29, 1960. 
TIAS 4461. 
Signature: Cuba, August 20, 1964. 

Declaration on relations between contracting parties 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
the Government of the Polish People's Republic. 
Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into 
force November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, July 6, 1964. 

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Tokyo November 12, 19,59. Entered into force for 
the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498. 
Signature: United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, July 6, 1964. 

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered Into force 
October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184. 
Signature: Nigeria, August 4, 1064. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, July 6, 1964. 

Proces-verbal extending aud amending declaration of 
provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs aud Trade of Novem- 
ber 22, 19.58 (TIAS 4461). Done at Geneva Decem- 
ber 8, 1961. Entered into force for the United States 
January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957. 
Signature: Cuba, August 20, 1964. 

Procfes-verbal extending declaration on provisional 
accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on 

' Not In force for the United States. 

JANTTARY 25, 1965 


Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). 
Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into 
force for the United States January 9, 1902. TIAS 

Signature: Federal Republic of Germany, August 6, 
Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
April 6, 1962.' 

Signature: Nigeria, August 4, 1964. 
Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 
6, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1902. TIAS 

Signature: Nigeria, August 4, 1964. 
Long-term arrangements regarding international trade 
in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva Febi-uary 
9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 

Accession deposited: Korea, December 10. 1904. 
Proc&s-verbal extending period of validity of declara- 
tion on provisional accession of Argentina to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 
18, 1960 (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva November 7, 
1962. Entered into force January 1, 1903. TIAS 

Signatures: Nigeria, August 4, 1964; Uganda, 
October 26, 1904. 
Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab 
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. En- 
tered into force for the United States May 3. 1963. 
TIAS 5309. 

Signatures: Australia, November 25, 1964; Central 
African Republic, October 14. 1964; Finland. July 
28, 1904; Mauritania, November 25, 1904; Spain, 
.October 6, 1904 ; Uganda, October 26, 1904. 
Ratifications deposited: Italy, November 19, 1964; 
Yugoslavia, July 6, 1964. 
Declaration on provisional accession of the Federal 
People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Novem- 
ber 13, 1962. Entered into force for the United States 
November 21, 1964. TIAS 5678. 
Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany (subject 
to ratification), October 20, 1964; Nigeria, August 
4, 1964. 
Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
July 1, 1963. Entered into force August 29, 1903. 
Signature: Israel, June 24, 1904. 
Second proe&s-verbal extending declaration on pro- 
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 19.59 
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963. 
Signatures: Austria (subject to ratification), July 
24, 1964; Cuba. August 20. 1964; Netherlands, 
July 31, 1904 ; Nigeria, August 4, 1904 ; Rhodesia, 
September 4, 1964 ; Tunisia, November 24, 1904. 
Entered into force: November 24. 1904. 



Suriplementary convention to the extradition conven- 
tion of October 20, 1961. as supplemented (32 Stat. 
1S94: 49 Stat. 3276). Signed at Brussels November 
14, 1903. Entered into force December 25, 1964. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 30, 1904. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of I 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance I 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1731- 
1730), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei | 
December 31, 1904. Entered into force December I 
31, 1904. ! 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (08 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei 
December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 


" Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

For sale l>y the Superintendent of Documents, V.8. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.G., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, ivhich 
may be obtained from, the Office of Media Services. 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Viet-Nam : The Struggle for Freedom. 

Answers to 36 most frequently asked questions about 
Laos and Southeast Asia, as well as Viet-Nam. Also 
included is a background of recent events in this part 
of the world. Pub. 7724. Far Eastern series 127. 31 
pp. 250. 

Foreign Affairs Outline [No. 5] — 1965: International 
Cooperation Year (Revised). Article based on an ad- 
dress by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organization Affairs, before 
the Conference Group of U.S. National Organizations 
for the United Nations at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7763. 
International Organization and Conference series 56. 
7 pp. 5«i. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries in a 
leaflet series on foreign countries. They describe 
briefl.v the iJeojJle, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map and lists of principal officials and U.S. diplomatic 
and consular ofiicers. Some also include a .selected 
bibliography. Leaflets are now available on the coim- 
tries listed below at 50 each, unless otherwise indicated. 

Brazil. Pub. 7756. 4 pp. 
Colombia. Pub. 7767. 8 pp. 
Ecuador. Pub. 7771. 8 pp. 
Indonesia. Pub. 7786. 8 pp. 
Japan. Pub. 7770. 12 pp. 100 
Korea. Pub. 7782. 8 pp. 
Nicaragua. Pub. 7772. 4 pp. 
Yugoslavia. Pub. 7773. 8 pp. 

Responsibilities of a Global Power. Article by Under 
Secretary of State George W. Ball is based on an 
address he made before the Chicago Council on For-- 
eign Relations at Chicago, 111. Pub. 7777. General 
Foreign Policy series 197. 22 pp. 150. 




INDEX January 25, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1SS5 

Africa. Agriculturnl Development in Africa 
(Williams) 104 

\^iculture. Agricultural Development in Af- 
riai (Williams) 104 

\meriean Republics. The State of the Union 
(Johnson) 94 

Asia. The State of the Union (Johnson) ... 94 

\tomic Energy. The Plowshare Program — De- 
veloping Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives 
(Sealwrs) 116 

::ongo (Leopoldville). U.N. Asks All States To 
Refrain From Intervention in Congo (Steven- 
son, resolution) 118 

Congress. The Plowshare Program — Develop- 
ing I'eaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives 
(Seaborg) 116 

3epartmcnt and Foreign Service. The United 
States Scientific Attach^ Program (Taft) . . 113 

Economic .Affairs 

^resident Johnson Receives Report on Increas- 
ing Trade With U.S.S.R. (Blackie, Hodges, 
Johnson) 101 

Treasury Issues Statement on Gold and Foreign 
Exchange Markets 101 

Sducational and Cultural Affairs 

krts Committee Reports Progress on Cultural 
Presentations (letter of transmittal, Commit- 
tee recommendations) 108 

Board of Foreign Scholarships Reports on Ex- 
change Program 107 

3urope. The State of the Union (Johnson) . . 94 

■''inland. Centennial of the Birth of Jean Sibelius 
• Johnson, Kekkonen) Ill 

•'oreign .Aid. Agricultural Development In Af- 
rica (Williams) 104 

?rance. Treasury Issues Statement on Gold and 

Foreign Exchange Markets 101 

: health. Education, and Welfare. The State of 

the Uiiion (Johnson) 94 

Presidential Documents 

Centennial of the Birth of Jean Sibelius . . . Ill 

'resident Issues Executive Order on Communi- 
' ations Satellite Act 112 

'resident Johnson Receives Report on Increas- 
ing Trade With U.S.S.R 101 

rhe State of the Union 94 

Publications. Recent Releases 122 


President Issues Executive Order on Communi- 
cations Satellite Act (text of order) .... 112 

The United States Scientific Attache Program 

(Taft) 113 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 121 

President Johnson Receives Report on Increas- 
ing Trade With U.S.S.R. (Blackie, Hodges, 

Johnson) loi 

The State of the Union (Johnson) 94 

United Kingdom. Treasury Issues Statement on 

Gold and Foreign Exchange Markets .... 101 
United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 120 

U.N. Asks All States To Refrain From Inter- 
vention in Congo (Stevenson, resolution) . . 118 

Name Index 

Blackie, William 101 

Hodges, Luther H 101 

Johnson, President 94, 101, 111, 112 

Kekkonen, Urho Ill 

Larsen, Roy E 108 

Seaborg, Glenn T 116 

Stevenson, Adiai E 118 

Taft, W' illiam H., Ill 113 

Williams, G. Mennen 104 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 4-10 

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl3ce 
of News, Department of State. Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to January 4 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 532 
of December 30. 

No. Date Subject 

•1 1/4 U.S. participation in international con- 

•2 1/6 Program for visit of Prime Minister of 

* Not printed. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 





U.S.— Japanese Cooperation in Asia 

The postwar resurgence of Japan has important implications not only for the United States 
for freedom and progress throughout Asia. 

This pamphlet, based on an address made at Tokyo in September 1964 by Assistant SecretaryJ 
State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, projects Japan's role in Asia and its relations with ] 
United States against the background of the threat of Communist militancy in Southeast Asia. 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 


Please send me copies of Foreign Affairs Outline: U.S.-^apa 

Cooperation in Asia. 










Foreign Aid 126 

Extension of ACDA Authorization I44. 

Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act llfi 


hy Anibassador C. Burke Elbrick 137 

Excerpt From 17th Report to Congress 1^8 

For index see inside hack cover 

Foreign Aid 


To the Congress of the United States: 

We live in a turbulent world. But amid the 
conflict and confusion, the United States holds 
firm to its primary goal — a world of stability, 
freedom, and peace where independent nations 
can enjoy the benefits of modern knowledge. 
Here is our difference with the Communists — 
and our strength. They would use their skills 
to forge new chains of tyranny. We would use 
ours to free men from the bonds of the past. 

The Communists are hard at work to domi- 
nate the less- developed nations of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Their allies are the ancient 
enemies of mankind: Tyranny, poverty, igno- 
rance, and disease. If freedom is to prevail, we 
must do more than meet the immediate threat 
to free world security, whether in southeast Asia 
or elsewhere. We must look beyond — to the 

' H. Doe. 53, 89th Cong., 1st sess. ; transmitted on 
Jan. 14. 

long-range needs of the developing nations. ! 
Foreign assistance programs reach beyond ; 
today's crises, to offer — 

Strength to those who would be free ; j 

Hope for those who would otherwise despair;' 
Progress for those who would help them- 
selves. ' 

Through these programs we help build sta-)j 
ble nations in a stable world. i 


Acting on the experience of the past 4 years, 
I am presenting a program which — 

is selective and concentrated ; 

emphasizes self-help and the fastest possible 
termination of dependence on aid; 

provides an increasing role for private enter- 
prise ; 

improves multilateral coordination of devel- 
opment aid ; 

reflects continuing improvement in manage- 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous iihases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department, Dnited 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Offlce. Washington. DC, 
20402. Price : 52 issues, domestic .$10. 
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 1 
llcation approved by the Director of the) 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19. 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
is indexed in the Readers' Guide to j 
Periodical Literature. I 




Specifically, for fiscal year 1966 I recom- 
mend — 

no additional autliorizations for development 
lending or the Alliance for Progress; existing 
authorizations for tliose purposes are adequate; 

authorizations of $1,170 million for militarj' 
assistjince ; 

$300 million for supporting assistance; 

$l'10 million for teclmical cooperation ; 

$l.">r. million for contributions to international 

$50 million for the President's contingency 
fund; and 

$62 million for administrative and miscella- 
neous expenses. 

I am also requesting a special standby au- 
thorization for use if necessary in Vietnam only. 
l| My appropriation request for fiscal year 1966 
'under these authorizations is for $3,380 million : 
$1,170 million will be used for military assist- 
ance; $2,210 million is for the other categories 
of aid. 

This is a minimum request, the smallest in the 
listorv- of the foreign aid program. It is $136 
nillion less than requested last year, and will 
mpose the smallest assistance burden on the 
Vinerican people since the beginning of the 
Uai-shall plan in 1948. 

This minimum request reflects my determi- 
iition to present to the Congress the lowest aid 
)udget consistent with the national interest. It 
akes full account of the increasing eificiency of 
he assistance program, and the increasing 
lilability of assistance funds from intema- 
. lual agencies in which the costs are shared 
inong a number of countries. 
I believe that in carrj-ing out this program 
ho American people will get full value for their 
loney. Indeed, we cannot afford to do less. 
Russia and Red China have tripled their prom- 
's of aid in the past year. Tliey are doing 
'>re than they have ever done before; the com- 
ition between them has led to increased ef- 
'its by each to influence the course of events in 
10 developing nations. 

If, during the year, situations should arise 
liich require additional amounts of U.S. as- 
-tance to advance vital U.S. interests, I shall 
>t hesitate to inform the Congress and request 
Iditional funds. 


I am requesting $1,170 million for the military 
assistance program. This is an increase of $115 
million over the total appropriation for military 
assistance for the current fiscal year. In order 
to meet urgent requirements in southeast Asia 
during fiscal year 1965, we cut back programs 
in other countries which are under pressure. 
Some of the fiscal year 1966 appropriation will 
be needed to make up what we have left undone. 

Still, the program is highly concentrated. 
Nearly three-quarters of the money will go to 11 
countries around the great arc from Greece to 
Korea. Vietnam alone will absorb an im- 
portant share. 

Military assistance makes it possible for na- 
tions to survive. It provides a shield behind 
which economic and social development can 
take place. It is vital to our own security as 
well. It helps to maintain more than 3i^ mil- 
lion men under arms as a deterrent to aggression 
in countries bordering on the Sino-Soviet world. 
Without them, more American men would have 
to be stationed overseas, and we would have 
to spend far more for defense than we now do. 


As a supplement to military assistance, I am 
requesting $369 million for supporting as- 
sistance — economic aid which is directly related 
to the maintenance of stability and security. 
Eighty-eight percent of the money will be used 
in Vietnam, Laos, Korea, and Jordan. 


The world's trouble spots — the Vietnams and 
the Congos — dominate the headlines. This is 
no wonder, for they represent serious problems. 
Over $500 million of the current request for 
military and supporting assistance will be de- 
ployed to meet the frontal attack in Vietnam 
and Laos. 

Indeed, $500 million may not be enough. I 
am therefore requesting for fiscal year 1966 an 
additional standby authorization for military 
or supporting assistance which would be used 
only in Vietnam and only in case we should need 
more funds to protect our interests there. Any 
progi-am which would make use of this addi- 
tional authorization will be presented to the au- 


iBRCVRT 1, 19 6. I 


thorizing committees of the Congress concur- 
rently with the appropriation request. 
* * * 

Our past investment in the defense of the free 
world through the military assistance and sup- 
porting assistance programs has paid great divi- 
dends. Not only has it foiled aggressions, but it 
has brought stability to a number of countries. 
Since the beginning of this decade, the funds 
used each year for military aid and supporting 
assistance have been sharply reduced. Today, 
we are spending $1 billion less on these accomits 
than we did in 1960 and 1961. 


Military security in the developing world will 
not be sufficient to our purposes unless the ordi- 
nary people begin to feel some improvement in 
their lives and see ahead to a time when their 
children can live in decency. It follows that 
economic growth in these regions means as much 
to our security as their military strength. That 
is an important reason why the United States 
has taken the lead during the past few years in 
organizing, on an international basis, a program 
of development assistance. 

Of course, such assistance is and must be con- 
centrated where it will contribute to lasting 
progress. Experience has demonstrated that 
certain requirements need to be met by the de- 
veloping countries if such progress is to occur. 

They need to imdertake sound measures of 
self-help — to mobilize their own resources, 
eliminate waste, and do what they can to meet 
their own needs. And they need to avoid spend- 
ing their resources on unnecessary armaments 
and foreign adventures. Our aid can contribute 
to their economic and social progress only if it 
can be provided within a framework of con- 
structive and sensible policies and programs. 

Fortunately, most of the developing countries 
recognize the relationship between the wise use 
of their own resources and the effectiveness and 
availability of external aid. 

It is a cardinal principle of U.S. policy that 
development assistance will go to countries 
which have undertaken effective programs of 
self-help and are, therefore, able to make good 
use of aid. During fiscal year 1964, for ex- 
ample, 64 percent of our development assistance 

went to seven such countries: India, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Brazil, and Chile. 
In other countries as well, including a number of 
smaller countries, sound self-help efforts are 
making it possible for us to provide effective de- 
velopment aid. 

* * * 

With development assistance we seek to help 
countries reach, as rapidly as possible, the point 
at which further progress is possible without 
external aid. 

A striking example of how, through self- 
help, a developing country can reach the point 
where it can carry on without concessional aid is 
the Republic of China. Little more than 10 
years ago, free China faced enormous security 
and development problems. The prospects for 
economic growth looked dim. But in only 10 
years, as a result of determined self-help supple-: 
mented by effective U.S. aid — 

per capita gross national product has risen 45 
percent ; 

saving accounts for one-fifth of the national; 
income ; 

exports have tripled ; 

industrial output has tripled ; 

the private share of output has doubled, and ' 
now accounts for two-thirds of all industrial, 
production ; j 

agricultural production has increased by 50 1 

Free China has also joined other nations as' 
a good cash customer for U.S. exports, particu- 
larly agricultural commodities. i 

This remarkable cooperative effort has 
brought the Republic of China to the point 
where it no longer needs AID [Agency for In- 
ternational Development] assistance. Fiscal 
year 1965 marks the end of this successful pro- 

* * * 

I am requesting $580 million as our fiscal year ! 
1966 aid commitment to the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. This is an increase of $70 million over 
last year's appropriation . 

Impatient expectations of this great joint un- 
dertaking have sometimes in the past blinded 
us to its achievements — achievements which now 
touch the lives of nearly half of the 200 million 



people of Latin America. Increasingly, how- 
ever, the peoi)le of the United States have come 
to recognize what tlie Alliance means. 

To date, as a result of U.S. assistance in sup- 
port of the Alliance — 

over 75,000 teachers have been trained ; 

nearly 10 million schoolbooks have been put in 

over 12 million children are now participating 
in school lunch programs — an incretxso of over 
8 million in the past 2i/4 j'ears ; 

development banks and other credit institu- 
tions which support the private sector have been 
established in 15 countries; 

over 300,000 houses have been or are being 
built ; 

savings and loan associations, nonexistent a 
few years ago, have now accumulated and are 
investing local deposits of $75 million ; 

25 of our own States have joined the partners 
for the Alliance program — they bring to bear a 
vital people-to-people effort on our relationships 
with Latin America ; 

40 U.S. colleges and imiversities are working 
to modernize teaching and training in Latin 

The Inter-American Committee for the Al- 
liance for Progress (CIAP), established to pro- 
vide even closer ties for mutual economic effort, 
successfully completed its first review of country 
performance under the Alliance. The work of 
this Committee is further evidence that the gov- 
\ jemments and people of Latin America are ac- 
cepting increasing responsibility for their o^^•n 
.development. The failure of Castroism is be- 
coming clearer each day. More and more, Latin 
America is facing up to the fundamental prob- 
iems of poverty, a rapidly growing population, 
^nd financial disorder. Increasingly, more and 
• more of these countries are moving toward eco- 
nomic viability and self-sustaining growth. 

The Alliance is taking hold. The war on 
poverty in Latin America is imderway. We in 

he United States are proud of the way our good 
leighbors to the south are meeting the challenge 
Df development. We are proud, too, of the role 

he United States is playing in this great effort 
jind pledge our steadily enlarged support. 

The problem of food requires special mention. 

Growing population and rising standards of 
living increase the demand for food. Produc- 
tion in most developing countries is barely keep- 
ing pace. In some countries, it is actually fall- 
ing behind. 

In the years ahead, if the developing coun- 
tries are to continue to grow, they must rapidly 
enlarge their capacity to provide food for their 
people. Up to a point, they can and should 
improve their ability to buy some of their food 
from abroad. For the most part, however, they 
must expand and diversify their own produc- 
tion of food. This will require many things: 
Changes in traditional methods, abundant use 
of fertilizer, greater incentives for producers, 
and, frequently, changes in pricing practices and 
more effective organization of distribution. 

To meet their needs for food, the developing 
countries will need help. 

We, in the United States, are uniquely 
equipped to give it. 

We are rightly proud of our dynamic and 
progressive agriculture, with its record of suc- 
cess which contrasts so sharply with the agri- 
cultural failures of the Communist countries. 
We must use our agricultural abmidancc and 
our extensive technical skills to assist the less- 
developed countries to strengthen their ability 
both to produce and to buy agricultural com- 
modities and, more generally, to support rural 

We can and must mount a more comprehen- 
sive program of technical assistance in agricul- 
ture engaging the U.S. Department of Agricul- 
ture, our State universities and land-grant 
colleges, and the most creative of our people in 
agriculture, marketing, and industry. 

At the same time, we can help meet the food 
needs of the developing nations through our 
food-for-peace program under Public Law 480. 
Even under the most favorable conditions, it 
will be a number of years before the developing 
countries can produce and import on commercial 
terms all the food they need. In the interim, 
our own agricultural plenty can help provide 
for the hungry and speed the day when these 
countries can stand on their own feet and pay 
for their food imports on commercial terms — 
as happened in the case of Japan and Europe. 

"EBRUARY 1, 196 5 



We are placing inci-easing emphasis on the 
role of private institutions and private enter- 
prise in the development process, and we shall 
continue to do so. 

Foreign aid cannot succeed if we view it as a 
job for government alone. For government can 
only do a small part of the job. We must bring 
to bear on the problems of the developing world, 
the knowledge and skills and good judgment of 
people from all walks of American life. The 
Agency for International Development pro- 
vides the means for utilizing the resources of 
private business, of our universities and colleges, 
of farm groups, labor unions, banks, coopera- 
tives, savings and loan associations, and profes- 
sional groups. 

I am happy to report that most AID-financed 
capital projects and a large and growing part, of 
teclonical assistance are already administered by 
contract with private American firms and 

In this connection, the privately managed 
International Executive Service Corps has an 
important role to play. I welcome the interest 
of business executives in serving overseas. 

The Advisory Committee on Private Enter- 
prise in Foreign Aid established by the 88th 
Congress has been meeting for a number of 
months. It is working hard. We are looking 
forward to their report which we hope will 
suggest new ways of enlarging the role of the 
private sector in the aid program. 

To mobilize additional private capital, and 
the skills which go with it, I am asking the 
Congress to enact an investment tax credit. I 
am also asking for expanded authority in con- 
nection with the investment guarantee program 
of the Foreign Assistance Act. However, such 
measures to encourage the flow of capital to the 
developing world can do only a part of the job. 
The less-developed countries must pursue pol- 
icies that will create new opportunities for their 
own businessmen and a favorable climate for 
investors from abroad. 

We are making a special effort to encourage 
private enterprise in the developing countries, 
through — 

technical assistance for private enterprise ; 

productivity centers and schools of business 
administration for training in management and 
new techniques; 

commodity loans to provide materials and 
parts for private business ; 

loans to industrial development banks and 
agricultural credit banks ; 

loans to private business. 

All of these programs have one object — to get 
private enterprise more heavily engaged in the 
task of development. 


We will persist in our efforts to put more aid 
on a multilateral basis, to improve the coordi- 
nation of bilateral aid, and to increase the share 
of the burden borne by other free world nations. 

A growing proportion of economic assistance 
is directly administered by international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
IDA [International Development Association], 
and the Inter- American Bank. In the past 4 
years, such multinational institutions increased 
their capital assistance to the developing na- 
tions by 50 percent. We, in turn, are prepared 
to increase our contribution to those organiza- 
tions — as rapidly as other members do so. It is 
essential that these institutions maintain their 
international character. 

To strengthen multinational aid, and further 
to strengthen the Alliance for Progress, I urge 
the Congress promptly to approve the 3-year 
authorization of $750 million which constitutes 
the U.S. contribution to the Fund for Special 
Operations of the Inter-American Development 


* * * 

Besides channeling aid through multilateral 
institutions, we are increasingly relying on ia- 
ternational consortia and consultative groups to 
coordinate our bilateral aid with that of others. 
India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, and Timisia 
are among the countries where such arrange- 
ments have been established, in most cases under 
the auspices of the World Bank. The Inter- 
American Committee for the Alliance for Prog- 
ress (CIAP) is fast becoming a most useful 
forum for the coordination of assistance to Latin 
American countries. 



In addition to these arrangements in sup- 
port of individual countries and regions, the 
United States consuUs regularly with other 
major donor countries and international agen- 
cies in the Development Assistance Committee 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. 

All in all, in fiscal year 1966, 85 percent of 
U.S. development loans in Asia and Africa 
will be committed under international arrange- 
ments. All U.S. aid to Latin America is made 
available within the international framework 
of the Alliance for Progress. 
* * * 

We are continuing to urge other donors to 
^ive more aid on better terms. 

Since 1960, new commitments of bilateral 
economic assistance by other free world nations 
lave increased by 50 percent. In the past year, 
.he United Kingdom has organized a Ministry 
if Overseas Development. Canada has under- 
aken a program of lending on terms which are 
nore liberal than ours. 

We are particularly concerned about the 
erms of aid. The burden of debt borne by the 
leveloping countries is rising. Their accumu- 
ated public foreign debt now runs to about $30 
)illion. The volume of repayments comes to 
learly $5 billion per year and it is rising by 15 
percent each year. This is a hea\'y load for 
lations with small resources struggling to raise 
he capital they need for economic and social 

We will continue to emphasize in our discus- 
ions with other donors during tlie coming year 
he need to improve the terms on which aid is 


Tight, effective management is essential for 

tight, effective aid program. 

I am especially pleased to report to the Con- 
ross about the progress being made by the 
Ldministrator of the Agency for International 
)evelopment in improving the management and 
perat ions of the program. The result is greater 
fficiency for less money. 

In keeping with our Government-wide econ- 
my program, the Agency — 

cut direct hire employment during fiscal year 

1964 by 1,200; the downward trend has con- 
tinued during the past 6 months; 

cut superstructure and overhead ; during the 
past 18 months, separate AID organizations in 
13 countries and 27 positions at the mission di- 
rector and deputy level have been eliminated; 

streamlined management procedures. 

Since the Congress adopted the unified ap- 
proach to the organization of assistance which 
is reflected in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, 
our aid programs have been better coordinated, 
better planned, and have better served the re- 
quirements of U.S. foreign policy. 

We are giving continuing attention to the 
problem of improving the Agency's personnel 
structure and achieving the highest possible 
quality in our staff. We expect to do so in the 
context of a program which is designed to 
strengthen the personnel capabilities of all the 
foreign affairs agencies of the Goverrmient. 
* * * 

AID has made great progress in reducing the 
effect of economic assistance on our balance of 

The bulk of our assistance — well over 80 per- 
cent — now takes the form of U.S. goods and 
services, not dollars. Dollar payments abroad 
have sharply declined. In 1960, the dollar drain 
to other countries which resulted from the aid 
program measured over $1 billion. This year 
and next the drain is expected to be less than 
$500 million. Moreover, a significant part of 
this is offset by interest on and repayment of 
past U.S. loan assistance. 


In my message on the state of the Union,^ I 
spoke of the need to create a harmony between 
man and society — a harmony which will allow 
each of us to enlarge the meaning of his life and 
all of us to elevate the quality of our civilization. 
This summons is not — and cannot be — addressed 
to Americans alone. For our own security and 
well-being, and as responsible free men, we must 
seek to share our capacity for growth, and the 
promise of a better life, with our fellow men 
around the world. 

That is what foreign aid is all about. 

We have pledged our strength — economic and 

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

EBRUART 1, 1965 


military — in defense of those who would be free 
and in support of those who would join in work- 
ing toward a stable, prosperous world. 

I call upon the Congress to join with me in 
renewing this pledge and to provide the tools to 
do the job. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, January IJi., 1965. 

Foreign Aid, an Investment 
in Man's Future 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Wliite 
House. The National Committee for Interna- 
tional Development is an outstanding example 
of the constructive help which private citizens 
can give to their country by taking an active 
part in public affairs. It is good that you have 
come to Washington to inform yourselves at first 
hand of the work of our aid program. I have 
just completed my own careful review of this 
program as a part of the annual budgetmaking, 
and I want you to know that I am proud of the 
story that Dean Rusk and David Bell have to 

The foreign aid program is an investment in 
man's future. Some of its returns are already 
in. We have strong and vigorous neighboi-s 
today in Europe and Japan. With our help, tlie 
first of the developing countries are approaching 
self-support; thus economic aid to Free China 
ends this year because it has done its job. Our 
Latin American partners are moving forward 
in the Alliance for Progress. But we have a 
long pull ahead of us, and our continued sup- 
port for the progress of the developing countries 
is far too important to allow waste or scattering 
of effort. 

The Agency for International Development 
has done a good job of tightening management, 

' Made before the National Committee for Interna- 
tional Development at the White House on Jan. 11 
(White House press release). 

cutting costs, squeezing more aid from every taxi 
dollar. You can expect David Bell to carry I 
these reforms still further. i 

Under his leadership we have taken a harder] 
look at the kinds of things we are asked to sup-i 
port and at the performance of the countries j 
which ask for assistance. The saving effected! 
is a direct result of concentration on the most 
productive activities and on the countries that; 
make the best use of our help. ' 

To make our aid still more effective, we will] 
rely even more on private American leadership i 
and skill in the aid program. It was the greatij 
American land-grant colleges that sparked ouni 
own agricultural revolution. They are now be-?i 
ginning to play an increasingly effective role in:| 
the developing countries, and we will turn to] 
them more and more, through contracts for tech-i> 
nical assistance. 

Private enterprise made our industrial plant.^ 
the world's most productive; so we must use;] 
every tool we can, from technical assistance to 
insurance for private ventures abroad, to get- 
more Americans to share their know-how. i 

Under the aid program today, American en- 
gineering and construction firms are in the field 
designing and building more than $4 billion in 
wealth-producing capital projects in Asia, Af- 
rica, and Latin America: dams to generate 
power and irrigate new lands, roads to get goods 
to markets, factories to produce the fertilizer 
these countries need so badly. 

So we are glad that you have come to examine 
this program and to review our plans with us. 
This whole program is more and more a partner-, 
ship between Government and non-Government 
institutions of every kind. It is more and more 
an effort of the whole American community. 

I hope that your Committee will be able to 
help in the task of insuring the widest possible 
public understanding of this constantly chang- 
ing and improving program. For it is now be- 
coming a partnership of Government and pri- 
vate citizens to serve the objective I set forth last 
year — "strengthening the family of the free." ' 

^ For text of President Johnson's message on foreign 
aid of Mar. 19, 1064, see Bttlletin of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 51& 



President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato of Japan 
Exchange Views on Matters of Mutual Interest 

Eisaku Sato, Prim^ Minister of Japan, visited 
the United States January 9-16 at the invitation 
of President Johnson. He met with the Presi- 
dent and other U.S. officials at Washington 
January 12 and IS. Folloicing are an exchange 
of greetings between President Johnson and 
Prime Minister Sato at the White House on 
January 12 and the text of a joint connmunique 
released on January 13. 


White Houoe press release dated January 12 
'resident Johnson 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary of State, 

an bclialf of tlie American people it is a great 

personal pleasure for me to welcome you to our 

ountry and particularly to our Capital City. 

For our land and for yours and for all lands 

iverywhere this new year is a year of high hope 

-. and a year of rare opportunity. It is for that 

reason that we are especially glad to welcome 

; fou as our first visitor of this year. 

• ' In nearh' half of the nations of this earth, 

Mr. Prime Minister, new leaders, even as you 

ind I, are beginning a time of new service. In 

he last 14 months more than 50 governments 

lave had a change in leadership of their gov- 


This is a rare and hopeful moment for man- 
kind, and certainly its promise must not be lost. 
Together the world's leaders must serve the will 
)f the world's peoples by working for lasting 
leace and by working for meaningful progress 
n the development and the improvement of all 

Here in the United States as we look to the 

east and to the south we are reassured and sus- 
tained by our membei'ship in the Atlantic com- 
munity and the community of the Americas. 
Yet today, Mr. Prime Minister — I want to tell 
you and I want you to carry this message to your 
people — we look equally to the west, to the Pa- 
cific family of man and to the goal of Pacific 
partnership. Our investment in Pacific trade, 
in defense, in development is vast, and that in- 
vestment is growing each day. Our most popu- 
lous State happens to now be a Pacific State. 

Japan is a keystone of Pacific partnership. 
The people of Japan, whom you represent, have 
combined what we think is extraordinary eco- 
nomic successes with a fierce devotion to the 
democratic processes. In honoring you and 
honoring your people we pledge afresh our com- 
mitment to that partnership: first, partnership 
in the challenging tasks of nation building and 
international cooperation; second, partnership 
in the defense of free nations that seek our as- 
sistance; third, partnership in the unrelenting 
pursuit of peace for all mankind. Under con- 
ditions of conflict the full promise of the Pacific 
is denied to all its people. Under conditions of 
peace that promise is boundless. 

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to assure you this 
morning that the United States of America has 
no higher goal on its national agenda than the 
achievement of lasting peace with freedom for 
all the nations of the Pacific. We have much to 
discuss together in the next few days wliile you 
are here as our guest. For 20 years the United 
States and Japan have forged bonds of common 
purposes. Now this morning you come to 
America when historic forces of change are at 
work in the Pacific region. Those forces will of 
course affect the destiny of both of our nations, 

^ FEBRUARY 1, 1D05 


and that is why I think your visit is so well 
timed and that is why your visit is so deeply 

Our opportmiity is to build out of our com- 
mon past a new understanding between our re- 
spective peoples with which to approach our 
common future together. 

So in this spirit, with the hammers of the 
inauguration in the background and the snow 
in the frontground, all America welcomes you 
to this first house most warmly. 

Prime Minister Sato 

Thank you very much, Mr. President, Mr. 
Secretary of State, distinguished participants 
in this very warm welcome on a brisk winter's 
day, and thank you for the cordial reception 
you are extending to me and my party and for 
the privilege of this early opportunity to meet 
and discuss with you matters of mutual concern. 

The fact that I have come here at this time 
at the beginning of the new year, when the 
demands of public office are exerting their 
greatest pressures for you, Mr. President, as 
well as for me, is eloquent proof of the impor- 
tance and necessity of our present encoimter. 
We meet, Mr. President, as leaders of nations 
in search of new approaches to our common 
goals. During the past few months certain 
events of significance have occurred on the in- 
ternational scene. The force they exert on the 
course of world affairs compels us with fresh 
urgency to address ourselves not merely to the 
matters of our mutual relations but to issues of 
global import as well. 

On my present visit, Mr. President, we shall 
be exchanging views upon wide-ranging sub- 
jects of vital mutual concern. I shall hope to 
take up with you many of the problems in 
United States- Japan relations, and I shall hope 
to consider them with you not simply on a bi- 
lateral basis but also from the broader perspec- 
tive of the positions of our two countries in the 
Far East and in the total world context. 

I anticipate a very close, free, and forthright 
series of discussions. It is my belief that only 
through direct personal exchanges of this kind 
between friendly nations can we hope to deal 
adequately with the rapidly changing world in 
which we live. With this in mind I seek to 

present to you, Mr. President, my frank as-i 
sessment of the recent events affecting world 
stability and world peace. I feel confident, Mr. j 
President, that we shall emerge from our dis- 1 
cussions with a better undei-standing of what) 
is at stake and where the guidelines for our l 
future course may lie. Thank you very much. 


White House press release dated January 13 I 

1. President Johnson and Prime Minister' 
Sato met in Washington on January 12 and 13, :| 
1965, to exchange views on the current interna- ij 
tional situation and matters of mutual interest ?! 
to the United States and Japan. They were 
assisted by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Min- ., 
ister [Etsusaburo] Shiina and Secretary-;! 
General [Takeo] Miki of the Liberal Demo-) 
cratic Party. 

2. The President and the Prime Minister re- '. 
viewed the present international situation and 
reaffirmed the partnership of the two countries •] 
which grows out of common beliefs and thei] 
shared objective of a lasting peace based on 
justice, freedom and prosperity for all peoples. 
They expressed a firm determination that the 
two countries should cooperate more closely in 
seeking this common objective. They agreed 
that for this purpose the two countries should 
maintain the closest contact and consultation 
not only on problems lying between them but 
on problems affecting Asia and the world in 

3. The President and the Prime MinisteTj 
recognizing the valuable role of the United 
Nations in the maintenance of the peace and 
prosperity of the world, exchanged frank views 
on the difficult questions now confronting the 
United Nations, and agreed to continue coopera- 
tive efforts to strengthen the functions of the 
United Nations and to enhance its authority. 

4. The President and the Prime Minister rec- 
ognized the desirability of promoting arms con- 
trol and a reduction of the arms race as rapidly 
as possible, and strongly hoped that, following 
the partial test ban treaty, further steps can be 
made toward the realization of a total nuclear 
test ban. 

5. The President and the Prime Minister, rec- 



ogiiizing that the question of China is a prob- 
lem luiving a vital bearing: on tlie peace and sta- 
bility of Asia, exchanged frank views on the 
positions of their respective countries and 
agreed to maintam close consultation with each 
other on this matter. The President emphasized 
the United States policy of firm support for the 
Republic of Cliina and his grave concern that 
Communist China's militant policies and ex- 
pansionist pressures against its neighbors en- 
danger the peace of Asia. The Prime Minister 
stated that it is the fundamental policy of the 
Japanese Goverimient to maintain friendly ties 
based on the regular diplomatic relationship 
with the Government of the Republic of China 
and at the same time to continue to promote pri- 
vate contact which is being maintained with the 
Chinese mainland in such matters as trade on 
tlie basis of the principle of separation of po- 
litical mattei-s from economic matters. 

0. The President and the Prime Minister ex- 
pressed their deep concern over the unstable 
and troubled situation in Asia, particularly in 
Vietnam, and agreed that continued persever- 
ance would be necessary for freedom and in- 
dependence in South Vietnam. They reaffirmed 
I tlieir belief that peace and progress in Asia are 
prerequisites to peace in the whole world. 

7. The President and the Prime Minister rec- 
ognized that the elevation of living standards 
and the advancement of social welfare are es- 
sential for the political stability of developing 
nations throughout the world and agreed to 
strengthen their economic cooperation with such 
countries. They agreed to continue to consult on 
the forms of such assistance. The Prime Min- 
ister expre.s.sed a particular interest in expand- 
ing Japan's role in developmental and technical 
assistance for Asia. 

8. The President and the Prime Minister re- 
affirmed their belief that it is essential for the 
stability and peace of Asia that there be no 
uncertainty about Japan's security. From this 
viewpoint, the Prime Minister stated that 
Japan's basic policy is to maintain firmly the 
United States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and 
Security Treaty arrangements, and the Presi- 
dent reaffirmed the United States determination 
to abide by its commitment under the Treaty 
to defend Japan against any armed attack from 
the outside. 

9. The President and the Prime Minister af- 
firmed the importance of constantly seeking 
even closer relationships between the two coun- 
tries. In particular, they recognized the vital 
importance to both countries of the expansion 
of their economic relations sustamed by the 
growth of their respective economies, and agreed 
that the two countries should cooperate with 
each otlier in the worldwide efforts for the ex- 
pansion of world trade and for effective inter- 
national monetai-y cooperation. 

10. The President and the Prime Minister 
confirmed the desirability of maintaining and 
utilizing the Joint United States-Japan Com- 
mittee on Trade and Economic Affairs ^ where 
exchange of views takes place at the cabinet 
level, as well as the United States-Japan Com- 
mittee on Scientific Cooperation ^ and the Joint 
United States-Japan Conference on Cultural 
and Educational Interchange.^ They further 
agreed that the fourth meeting of the joint 
United States-Japan Committee on Trade and 
Economic Affairs would be held in July of this 

11. The President and the Prime Minister 
recognized the importance of United States mili- 
tary' installations on the Ryukyu and Bonin Is- 
lands for the security of the Far East. The 
Prime Minister expressed the desire that, as soon 
as feasible, the administrative control over these 
islands will be restored to Japan and also a deep 
interest in the expansion of the autonomy of the 
inhabitants of the Ryukyus and in further pro- 
moting their welfare. Appreciating the desire 
of the Government and people of Japan for the 
restoration of administration to Japan, the 
President stated that he looks forward to the day 
when the security interests of the free world in 
the Far East will permit the realization of this 
desire. They confirmed that the United States 
and Japan should continue substantial economic 
assistance to the Ryukyu Islands in order to ad- 
vance further the welfare and well-being of the 
inhabitants of these islands. They expressed 
their satisfaction with the smooth operation of 
the cooperative arrangements between the 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1964, 
p. 23."). 

'/6i(?., July 13, 1964, p. 01. 

'Ibid., Oct 14, 1963, p. 582, and Oct. 28, 1963, p. 659. 

FEBRUARY 1, 1965 


United States and Japan concerning assistance 
to the Kyukyu Islands. They agreed in princi- 
ple to broaden the finictions of the existing 
Japan-United States Consultative Committee * 
so as to enable the Committee to conduct consul- 
tations not only on economic assistance to the 
Kyukyu Islands but also on other matters on 
which the two countries can cooperate in con- 
tinuing to promote the well-being of the inhabi- 
tants of the islands. The President agreed to 
give favorable consideration to an ancestral 
graves visit by a representative group of former 
residents of the Bonin Islands. 

12. The President and the Prime Minister dis- 
cussed the United States-Japan Civil Air 
Transport Agi-eement, the North Pacific Fisher- 
ies Convention, private investment in Japan, the 
Interest Equalization Tax and other economic 
matters. They agreed on the importance of 
close consultation and cooperation between the 
two governments to attain mutually acceptable 
and equitable solutions to issues pending be- 
tween the United States and Japan. 

13. The President and the Prime Minister, 
mindful of the many areas of himian health 
which are of great concern to all the peoples of 
Asia, agreed to undertake a greatly expanded 
program of cooperation in medical science with 
respect to such diseases as malaria, cholera, 
schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, and stomach can- 
cer, in addition to cooperative efforts on prob- 
lems of air pollution and pesticides. As a first 
step to implement the agreement, they agreed to 
convene a conference of the foremost medical 
scientists from the United States and Japan to 
work out the details of the new program for dis- 
cussion with other governments concerned. 

14. The President and the Prime Minister 
expressed their satisfaction with the meeting 
just held and their desire to continue to main- 
tain close personal contact. 

' JMd., May 11, 1964, p. 755. 

U.S. Expresses Regret on Death 
off Prime IVlinister off Burundi 

Department Statement ^ 

The United States Government has learned 
with deep regret that the newly named Prime 
Minister of Burundi, Pierre Ngendandumwe, 
was assassinated last night [January 15] in 

Mr. Ngendandumwe had been Prime Minister 
in a previous government, and we had looked 
forward to again having friendly relations with 
his newly named government. 

Affrican Newsmen Tour U.S. 

The Department of State announced on Jan- 
uary 15 (pressreleases) that 25 leading African 
newsmen had accepted the joint invitation of the 
Wliite House, the Departments of State and 
Defense, and the U.S. Information Agency to 
participate in an inaugural-time tour of the 
United States. The press and radio newsmen, 
who arrived at Washington on January 18, are 
from 19 countries, ranging from Algeria to 
Zambia and from Guinea to Somalia. They 
represent newspapers printed in English, 
French, Amharic, and Arabic, as well as radio 
networks operating in several additional Afri- 
can tongues. 

The visitors are spending 30 days in the 
United States observing various aspects of 
American life, such as national and local gov- 
ermnent, education, industry, research, housing, 
and defense. Their tour started at Washing- 
ton with the inauguration and proceeds to Fort 
Bragg, Cape Kennedy, Nashville, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Omaha, New York, and 
Washington again. 

' Read to news correspondents on Jan. 16 by a De- 
partment press officer. 



The United States and Eastern Europe 

by C. Burke Elbrick 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia '• 

I should like to talk to you this morning about 
Eastern Europe, an area of the world which is 
looming increasingly larger on the international 
horizon and is assuming ever greater importance 
from the standpoint of American foreign policy. 
While I can make no special claim to being an 
expert on the countries of Eastern Europe, I 
have at various times in the recent past been 
associated with the conduct of our relations 
with the area — both in Washington and in the 
field — and my present assignment to Yugoslavia 
involves me directly in our relations with one 
of the most interesting of these countries. 

Today we are witnessing important political, 
economic, sociological, and cultural develop- 
ments in the various countries which make up 
Eastern Europe. These developments, coupled 
with other significant changes on the interna- 
, tional scene, impel us, I believe, to consider care- 
fully the nature of our own relations with the 
Eastern European countries and our future 
dealings with them. 

Before World War II, Eastern Europe seldom 
assumed great importance in the consideration 
of United States policy and interests. Even 
in moments of history when the United States 
played an important role in giving shape to 
Eastern European political developments, the 
Eastern European area was not in itself a matter 
of vital strategic or political interest to the 
security of the United States. 

' Address made at the University of Louisville, Louis- 
ville. Ky.. on Jan. 5. 

Our interest in establishing diplomatic or 
other relations with Eastern European states 
dates back generally to the latter part of the 19th 
century, when some of them were emerging from 
under the rule of the Ottoman Empire into 
independent national entities. During this 
period we established relations with Rumania 
and Serbia. Later, in the beginning of this 
century, we accredited diplomats to Bulgaria 
and to the then independent state of Montene- 
gro. After the bitter struggle of World War 
I — for which the Sarajevo incident served as 
the fuse — new states were born and old ones dis- 
solved. Out of the ruins of empires there 
emerged Albania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
Poland and the Baltic States, and a Yugoslavia 
to unite the South Slavs of Serbia and Mon- 
tenegro, as well as the Croats and Slovenes 
formerly under Austria-Hungary. 

Looking back on it now, we realize that 
United States political interest in Eastern 
Europe between the two World Wars was rather 
limited, even though we had an important in- 
terest in the creation or reconstitution of some 
of the Eastern European states in the course of 
the World War I peace settlement. 

As a victorious power in World War II, we 
had a considerable voice in postwar territorial 
and political settlements. Nevertheless, the 
military presence of Soviet troops in all Eastern 
European countries at the end of 1945, except 
Albania, reinforced Soviet strategic, political, 
and economic aims while frustrating the West's 
attempts to obtain democratic and just political 

FEBRr.XRY 1, 196 5 


agreements. Gradually the West's position in 
this ai-ea was eroded away until only small and 
harassed diplomatic stafl's remained to represent 
once signilicant interests. Stalinism was in 

Challenges to Soviet Domination 

During this difficult period, however, one im- 
portant event constituted a marked rebuff to 
Stalin's aims and policies in Eastern Europe. 
This was the historic break between Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union in 1948, when Yugoslavia 
was expelled from the Connnunist bloc. It had 
refused to tolerate Soviet interference in its in- 
ternal affairs and has continued on an inde- 
pendent course ever since. 

With Stalin's death in 1953, the system of cen- 
tralized control and domination over every facet 
of Eastern European life slowly came to a halt. 
Khrushchev's policy, in contrast, seemed aimed 
at maintaining Soviet domination in the field of 
international Communist affairs and ideology 
and Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc in 
dealing with the rest of the world, while tolerat- 
ing a certain degree of autonomy by Eastern 
European governments and Commmiist parties 
in the day-to-day management of their internal 
economic, political, and social problems. 

Khrushchev's espousal of destalinization and 
the slowly emerging Sino-Soviet conflict had 
unsettling effects on Eastern Europe. Com- 
munist leaders had difficulty in judging how far 
destalinization could or should be carried out in 
their parties and governments. The use of So- 
viet troops to put down the Hungarian national 
uprising in 1956 showed that So-\-iet leaders 
were not prepared to permit the legitimate proc- 
ess of destalinization to be used to overthrow the 
Commtmist system itself and lead to withdrawal 
from the Warsaw Pact grouping. Eeactions 
elsewhere have been varied. 

In 1061 Albania broke off diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and became ideologically 
alined with Commtmist China. 

In the last 3 years Eumania has shown new 
concern about promoting Eumanian economic 
national interests and has explored trade oppor- 
tunities with the West. 

Poland, since 1956, has followed its own mod- 
erate internal policies. 

Even Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser degree, 
Bulgaria give signs of change. 

At the present time national interests and 
change are the watchwords in Eastern Europe. 
Within certain limits each Eastern European 
country has evolved with some diversity in form 
and institutions according to its own prevailing 
conditions. Most of them in varying degrees 
have abandoned the ruthless practices of police 
rule that prevailed in Stalin's day. Most of 
them have realized the value of material in- 
centives to stimulate economic production. Most 
of them have given up jamming the U.S. Gov- v 
ernment's Voice of America broadcasts. All 
of them are interested in developing trade and i 
cultural exchanges with Western Europe and i 
the United States. 

The departure of Khrushchev from his Soviet 
Government and Party position does not seem 
to have affected the Eastern European states 
insofar as their acquired autonomy in internal 
affairs is concerned. In fact, some Eastern 
European leaders show signs of using the change 
of leadership in the Soviet Union to reinforce 
their own positions of authority and to diminish 
the area in which they are beholden to Moscow. 

These changes in Eastern Europe and the im- 
plicit challenges to unquestioned Soviet domina- 
tion of the area have come about for several 

First, Stalin's successors concluded that his 
methods and system of maintaining power could 
no longer be continued, and they were abandoned 
in favor of more discreet methods. 

Second, continuing economic difficulties and , 
the need to raise the people's standard of living 
at the expense, if necessary, of the usually para- 
mount needs of the state exerted increasing and 
irresistible pressure for change on the Com- 

munist regimes. 

Third, the winds of nationalism which have 
been sweeping countries on other continents 
were also felt in Eastern Europe, where political 
and intellectual leaders have come to place more 
emphasis on national identity and national 

Fourth, the Sino-Soviet split in the world 
Communist movement, in which Soviet and 
Chinese competed for the allegiance of individ- 
ual Communist parties and leaders, gave East- 



•m Europeans some leverage for advancing 
lieir own interests. 

Fifth, Western Europe and the United States 
ire a constant magnet to Eastern Europe be- 
■ause of their military strength, their economic 
ind technological superiority, and their rela- 
ively affluent standards of living. The poli- 
ces of Western countries have also served to 
jupport Eastern European countries in asser- 
,ion of independent and national interests. 

Finally, the fact that Yugoslavia was able to 
levelop as a Communist state without being 
jolitically dependent on either Moscow or the 
►Vest, free to run its political, economic, and 
•ommercial affairs in its own way, could not be 

iome Notable Changes 

The specific changes which have occurred in 
":istem Europe over the past few years are 
00 numerous to list in detail, but here are a few 
vortli noting. 

Poland in 1956 abandoned forcible collectivi- 
aition of farmland and, along with Yugoslavia, 
s the only coimtry in the Conmiunist area where 
Drivate farmers control the bulk of agricultural 
and. The Polish state has also developed 
trnng economic ties with the West, has estab- 
led a certain accord with the Roman Catho- 
ic Church, permits, relatively speaking, 
•onsiderable freedom of cultural and artistic ex- 
pression, and follows moderate internal 

In Hungary- the regime which emerged un- 

ler Kadar in 1956 first crushed its opponents 

hen, in 1958, launched a program of reconcilia- 

ion between the authorities and large seg- 

nents of the non-Communist population. This 

econciliation was emphasized in Kadar's 

logan : "Who is not against us, is with us." In 

0fi4, 1 million Hungarians, out of a total popu- 

on of 10 million, were able to travel abroad. 

vadar has asserted Hungarian autonomy in 

ntemal matters, has eliminated Stalinist ele- 

nents and police methods, and has emphasized 

mprovement in the standard of living. The 

lungarian Government granted an amnesty to 

irtually all who fled Hungary after the upris- 

:: and to others imprisoned for political of- 
enses. It has also reached an agreement with 

the Vatican on the appointment of bishops to 
Hungarian dioceses of the Roman Catholic 

Like Hungary, Rumania has recently re- 
leased virtually all its political prisoners. 
Rumanian leaders are also emphasizing the Ru- 
manian national identity and Rumanian culture, 
rather than Soviet achievements. Rumania 
has turned to the West for needed industrial 
equipment to meet its economic requirements 
and is opposed to proposals, supported by the 
Soviet Union, that all Eastern European na- 
tional economic plans should be subordinated 
to and integrated into an overall regional eco- 
nomic plan. All this suggests that, despite only 
gradual measures of internal liberalization, 
Rumania is increasingly concerned to promote 
its national economic interests and its ties with 
the West. 

In Czechoslovakia there have also been some 
changes. The Czechoslovak Government has 
eased its travel restrictions. The climate for dis- 
cussion and debate of economic and cultural 
matters has markedly improved. Certain eco- 
nomic reforms in the direction of a market-type 
system are being planned. In 1964, for the first 
time since the Communist takeover in 1948, no 
American citizens were being held in Czecho- 
slovak prisons. Czechoslovakia, like the other 
Eastern European countries, is trying to im- 
prove its relations with the West. 

In Bulgaria we find a certain ambivalence in 
regard to policy toward the West. A spy trial 
was staged a year ago apparently to warn the 
population against contact with Americans. A 
demonstration by African and Bulgarian stu- 
dents protesting our role in the rescue opera- 
tion of the hostages in Stanlevville broke a few 
windows in the United States I^egation. But 
the Bulgarian Government has also settled the 
claims of the United States for the property of 
American citizens which it nationalized. The 
United States, among other countries, exhibited 
in 1962 and in 1964 at the biennial Plovdiv In- 
ternational Trade Fair. During the past year 
Bulgaria signed an agreement with Greece 
which settled a number of bilateral issues, in- 
cluding border problems and war claims. In 
internal economic policy Bulgarian authorities 
also show some signs of flexibility. 

.rEBRUART 1, 1965 


U.S. Approach Toward Soviet Bloc States 

The changes which I have mentioned are well 
known to our friends in Western Europe. As 
Secretary Eusk recently said, relations between 
the West and the countries of Eastern Europe 
have shown considerable improvement.^ He 
added that this was a positive development in 
world affairs and one which we should watch 
with interest and to which we should take a posi- 
tive approach. 

In formulating our own approach toward 
Eastern Europe we must first of all bear in mind 
that both Moscow and its ideological allies and 
Peiping and its adherents share the same ulti- 
mate aim — that of world domination by the 
Communist movement. "Wliile Moscow and 
Peiping differ on the means of achieving this 
objective, we must always guard against any 
wishful thinking that the objective has been 
abandoned. We especially deplore Peiping's 
militant and dangerous course in pursuit of 
its foreign affairs. To the extent that Moscow 
intends to promote its aims without resort to 
war but within the framework of peaceful re- 
lations, we welcome the competition between our 
economic and political system and that of 
communism. For we have no fear of the clash 
of ideas ; we have no doubt that our cause will 
eventually triumph. 

The first objective of our policy toward So- 
viet bloc states, therefore, is to prevent them 
from extending their influence— military, po- 
litical, or ideological — and to make it clear to 
them that it would be dangerous and futile for 
them to try to do so. This requires that we 
maintain the power of our nuclear deterrent 
and our conventional armed forces to deal flex- 
ibly with any emergencies which may arise 
around the world. This also requires that we 
assist the developing countries to make the 
kind of economic and social progress which will 
meet the needs of their peoples and thereby 
blunt Communist aspirations in those coun- 

Secondly, we believe that the Soviet bloc 
states recognize the dangers of a devastating nu- 
clear war and therefore have a common interest 

' For a transcript of Secretary Rusk's news confer- 
ence of Dec. 23, see Buixetin of Jan. 11, 1965, p. 34. 

with the West in preventing such a catastrophe. 
We believe that the search for further agree- 
ments to prevent war and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is a worthy and essential end 
in itself. 

Third, we wish to stimulate Eastern European 
states to assert their national identity and in- 
terests and to meet the needs of their peoples at 
home. We must, therefore, take into account 
the differences among Communist states in order 
to act effectively in promoting our objectives. 
Wliere Conamunist states are evolving to an in- 
creasingly sensitive appreciation of their na- 
tional and domestic interests, we want to en- 
courage such evolution. Where they turn to 
the West for trade, we want to be able to respond 
by trading with them in peaceful goods. Where 
they are interested in cultural and educational 
exchanges, we want to do our part to foster 

Promoting Mutually Benencial Relations 

It is to our advantage to expand our ties with 
Eastern Europe in a way which will promote 
mutually beneficial relations and advance the 
prospects for peace and freedom. There are 
some who believe that our best approach would 
be to exert appropriate pressure on the Soviet 
bloc states in order to obtain political and other 
concessions from them. No self-respecting gov- 
ernment and no Conmiunist regime would sub- 
mit to such an approach. After all, we should 
not lose sight of the security interests of the 
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe or of the politi- 
cal and ideological ties which bind the regimes 
in those countries to Moscow. In the process of 
trying to develop better relations with the So- 
viet bloc states, we cannot realistically expect 
that Eastern European Communist leaders will 
be prepared to endanger their ties with Moscow, 
and perhaps their own positions, to satisfy our 
demands. We can, however, pursue our objec- 
tives by carefully elaborated policies toward 
each Eastern European country which take 
fully into account the basic realities existing in 
each country and the many possibilities open to 
the United States (and, of course, to Western 
Europe) within the framework of those 



This is a long-range problem, not one which 
ran be resolved in several months or even several 
years. In following this approach the United 
States has in no way abandoned its fundamental 
view that ultimately the peoples of Eastern 
Europe must have the opportunity freely to elect 
governments of their own choosing and to enjoy 
all the rights as well as responsibilities of free 

U.S. Relations With Yugoslavia 

As I mentioned earlier, Yugoslavia has not 
been a member of the Soviet bloc since 1948. 
"VMiile I do not want to suggest that our rela- 
tions with Yugoslavia are perfect, nevertheless 
1 they can serve as some indication of the kind 
' of relations which we would hope to develop 
in time with other Eastern European Commu- 
nist states. 

With Yugoslavia we have very active diplo- 
matic relations in every field. We have excel- 
lent access to their Government officials, to their 
economic institutions and industrial enterprises, 
to their universities, to their information media 
and publishing organizations, to the arts, to 
local government, to armed forces leaders, to 
; as wide a cross section of the people as we wish 
I to reach. We have a fair amount of trade based 
on nondiscriminatory tariff rates. Members of 
the recent U.S. trade mission to Yugoslavia 
found that there was much scope for increased 
trade in both directions. 

We have an active information program in 
Yugoslavia which aids us in keeping Yugoslav 
r>fficials infonned of significant American pol- 
ies. A busy cultural program helps to pro- 
: 1 mote an exchange of professors, teachers, musi- 
cians, scientists, and leaders in many other 
fields. Two months ago we signed an educa- 
tional and cultural exchange agreement ' under 
the Fulbright-Hays Act. Every year the 
United States participates in the Zagreb Fall 
Fair. Many works of American authors and 
playwrights are translated into the languages 
of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav television uses Amer- 
ican TV productions. Many Yugoslavs now 
look to the United States rather than to Western 

• Ibid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 831. 

Europe or to Eastern Europe for leadership 
in medicine and science. 

Yugoslavia participates in international or- 
ganizations such as the World Bank and the In- 
ternational Monetary Fimd and gives strong 
support to the U.N. and its specialized agencies. 
A Yugoslav detachment has for many years 
been a part of the U.N. force along the armistice 
line between the United Arab Republic and 

Yugoslavia maintains very good relations 
with Italy and Greece, its NATO neighboi-s, 
and with Austria, which is a neutral country; 
and it also has cordial relations with Hungary, 
Rumania, and Bulgaria, which are in the Soviet 
bloc. Despite Yugoslavia's very poor relations 
with Albania, it nevertheless maintains a diplo- 
matic mission in the Albanian capital, and Al- 
bania likewise has a diplomatic mission in Bel- 

We therefore regard Yugoslavia as a force for 
stability and peace in the Balkan area. It es- 
pouses no territorial ambitions against any of 
its neighbors, and it strongly supports the prin- 
ciple that outstanding disputes should be re- 
solved by peaceful means rather than by the 
use of force. Its foreign policy has three ele- 
ments: close ties with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe; maintaining good relations 
with the West, including the United States; 
and expanding and further developing its ties 
with the group of nonalined states in its role 
as a nonalined country. "\\Tiile we may not agree 
with some Yugoslav positions in international 
affairs, nevertheless we have excellent commu- 
nication with their officials and we can and do 
make our position known. 

In its internal affairs the Yugoslav Govern- 
ment has made it clear that it is concerned to 
meet the needs of its people and that it desires 
their participation in Yugoslav political, eco- 
nomic, cultural, and social life. The develop- 
ment of its market-oriented economy, the use 
of economic incentives and industrial and com- 
mercial competition, the lack of Government 
doctrine affecting the arts, the consistent at- 
tempts by the state to put its relations with the 
churches in Yugoslavia on a firm and satisfac- 
tory footing, the undogmatic approach of Yugo- 
slav leaders to the problems of the country — 

FEBRUARY 1, 1965 

760-858— «5 3 


these and other aspects of the Yugoslav scene 
today are those which interest us and which ap- 
parently are also regarded with some interest by 
the other countries of Eastern Europe. 

We must, as I have said before, tailor our 
approach to each Eastern European country in 
accord with the state of our relations with that 
country. With some we must clear away the 
debris of accumulated problems before we can 
build a new and satisfactory relationsliip. With 
others it is clear that both sides are ready 
to proceed immediately to discuss how to lay 
the basis for a mutually more beneficial 

We want to make it possible for the tradi- 
tional ties which existed between Eastern Eu- 
rope and the West before World War II to be 
reestablished and reaffirmed. For, after all, 
Eastern Europe is a part of Europe. But this 
is not a matter in which only Western Europe 
is involved. We have our own interests to de- 
fend and promote. As President Jolmson re- 
cently said,* 

We wish to build new bridges to Eastern Europe — 
bridges of ideas, education, culture, trade, technical 
cooi>eration, and mutual understanding for world peace 
and prosperity. 

These bridges will help to cement those un- 
broken bonds of friendship which have long ex- 
isted between the peoples of Eastern Europe and 
the people of the United States. 

The term "iron curtain" used to reflect ac- 
curately the frontier area between Eastern 
Europe and the rest of the Continent and the 
lack of contact and communication between 
Eastern Europe and the West. Now that ways 
and means are opening to us to establish or re- 
establish contact and communication with East- 
ern Europe, the United States should not put 
itself in the position of discouraging or reject- 
ing such an opportunity by maintaining an "iron 
curtain" between itself and Eastern Europe. 
The bridges which we hope to build will assist in 
repairing the postwar divisions in Europe. 
They can also have the purpose of fostering 
greater and more lasting understanding be- 
tween the United States and Eastern Europe. 

* Ihid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876. 

U.S. To Continue Helping Germany j 
in Search for Nazi Criminals 


FoUoxoing is an exchange of correspondence \ 
between the Department of State and the Em- \ 
iassy of the Federal Republic of Germany on \ 
the subject of the collection of evidence concern- | 
ing murders perpetrated during the Hitler \ 


Press release 3 dated January 11 

The Department of State acknowledges the 
receipt of the note from the Embassy of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany dated December 22, 
1964, requesting, as part of a worldwide appeal, ,: 
the assistance of the Government of the United ll 
States in collecting evidence concerning Nazi 
murders not yet known in the Federal Eepublic 
of Germany. 

The two principal repositories of Gennan 
documents which might be of value to the Fed- 
eral Eepublic are the Berlin Document Center 
and the National Archives and Records Service 
of Alexandria, Virginia. The archives of the 
Library of Congress also contain some German 

The Federal Republic has of course for a 
number of years frequently consulted the Berlin 
Document Center, and the Center continues to 
give all possible assistance to appropriate Ger- 
man authorities. German investigators have 
also in the past searched the documents at the 
Library of Congress and may, if they wish,, 
again investigate these files. 

The Government of the United States has re- ' 
turned to the Government of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany over SO percent of the Ger- 
man documents originally stored in the National i 
Archives at Alexandria. In 1960, officials des- 
ignated by the German Federal Government 
searched these Archives for material which 
could be of use in the prosecution of Nazi war ^ 
criminals. In order to be certain, however, that 
no useful document which might still be in the 
Archives has been overlooked, the Government 
of the United States invites the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Germany again to 



icant obstacles were placed in the way of U.S. 
traders wishing to do business with tlie Soviet 
Union. American engineers and private cor- 
porations participated substantially in the 
building of industrial plants and installations in 
the Soviet. The dollar volume of U.S. exports 
to the Soviet Union reached more than $100 
million in IPSO and in 1931. 

Following World War II, it was the hope of 
the United States and other free-world coun- 
tries that the traditional trade relations between 
Eastern and "Western Europe would soon be re- 
stored. Under normal conditions Eastern 
Europe had exported to the West grain, coal, 
timber, and other raw materials in exchange for 
equally necessary machinery, equipment, and 
consumer goods. The decline which took place 
in this trade after the war was due primarily to 
Communist policies and actions and only 
secondarily to free-world restrictions on trade. 

As the result of Soviet policies, particularly 
the Soviet determination to reduce to a mini- 
mum both economic and political contacts be- 
tween the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
West, the commerce of Eastern European coun- 
tries was reoriented to intrabloc exchanges, al- 
most a complete reversal of the prewar pattern 
in which a major share of their total trade had 
been with the West. 

There are increasing signs that this may not 
remain the permanent pattern of Eastern Eu- 
ropean trade. As outlined in the first chapter, 
U.S. controls over trade with the Communist 
countries have developed in response to major 
movements in East -West relationships, but they 
. have also been geared to the changing circum- 
stances in individual countries. The major 
question for United States policy at this time 
on trade with Communist countries is whether 
developments within the individual coimtries 
warrant further modifications in policy on non- 
strategic trade with the Eastern European coun- 
tries and the Soviet Union. 

This major question is receiving serious and 
deservedly thorough study, not only within the 
responsible executive departments but also by 
the Congress, by a variety of nongovernmental 
organizations, and by businessmen. "Wliile it 
is not certain what may be the consensus of this 
widespread review in matters of detail, it is 
clear at least that the general policy of differ- 

entiation in the treatment of trade with Commu- 
nist countries should be continued as the funda- 
mental pattern in East-West trade policy. 

Policy Toward Individual Eastern European 

President Jolmson said recently,^ 

History is again on the march in Eastern Europe 
and on the march toward increased freedom. These 
people — and some of their rulers — long for deeper, 
steadier, and more natural relations with the West. We 
understand this longing, and we intend to respond 
to it in every way open to us. 

We will welcome evidence of genuine willingness 
on the part of East European governments to cooperate 
with the United States Government in joint endeavors. 
We will reject no such overtures out of hand. We 
will judge them in terms of the true interests of our 
own people and the people of these countries. We wish 
to build new bridges to Eastern Europe — bridges of 
ideas, education, culture, trade, technical cooperation, 
and mutual understanding for world peace and 

Bridges of improved relations and of trade 
have been built with Yugoslavia and with Po- 
land. Eumania is expanding its trade and is 
taking steps to improve its relations with the 
United States. 

One of the objectives of the Battle Act is "to 
assist the people of the nations under the domi- 
nation of foreign aggressors to reestablish their 
freedom." The system of trade controls which 
the United States uses has the advantage of per- 
mitting differentiation among the different 
Communist countries of Eastern Europe. This 
system is based on individual examination of 
particular export license applications. No U.S. 
trade is permitted with Communist China, 
North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Cuba, al- 
though with respect to Cuba there is the possi- 
bility of sales of food and medical supplies. 
Exports of a limited list of obviously nonstra- 
tegic consmner-convenience items to the Soviet 
Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Al- 
bania, and East Germany are permitted on a 
free general license basis. A much larger group 
of commodities may be exported freely on this 
general license basis to Poland and Kumania. 
All other items for all of these coimtries require 

'For text of remarks made by President Johnson 
at a luncheon at the White House on Dec. 2 for officials 
of Radio Free Europe, see Buu.etin of Dec. 21, 1064, 
p. 876. 

FEBRUARY 1, 1965 


individual licenses. There is automatic denial 
of the clearly strategic items on the Battle Act 
list at one end of the spectrum, relatively regular 
approval of nonstrategic items at the other end 
of the spectrum, and varying treatment of the 
items between. This process of differentiation 
among the different Communist countries has 
been a key element of American East -West trade 
control policy virtually since its inception. 

Since Yugoslavia's rejection of Kremlin 
domination in 1948, the United States has treat- 
ed it in trade matters as any non-Communist 
coimtry. The United States and other free- 
•world countries opened "Western markets and 
sources of supply, enabling Yugosla^na to de- 
velop normal trade ties with the free world. 
As a result, about 70 percent of Yugoslav trade 
is now with the free world. U.S. exports to 
Yugoslavia exceed the value of total U.S. ex- 
ports to the entire bloc. The United States 
extends most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff 
treatment to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia is as- 
sociated with the major free-world economic or- 
ganizations, including the International Bank 
for Eeconstruction and Development, the In- 
ternational Monetary Fimd, the OECD. and 
GATT. It is not a member of the Soviet bloc's 
Warsaw Pact nor of the Coimcil for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CEMA) , although it does 
have a limited association with the latter. 

As a result of the events of 1956 in Poland, 
which represented an attempt to reduce Soviet 
domination, Poland sought improved relations 
with the countries of the West, including the 
United States. The United States has respond- 
ed with substantial sales of surplus agricultural 
commodities, with MFX treatment for imports 
and with reduced export controls. As a result 
Poland has a larger commercial trade with the 
United States than any other of the Soviet bloc 
countries. It has moved toward closer contacts 
with the United States and has continued to 
emphasize its own national identity and in- 
terests. Following the modification of United 
St<ates controls for the purpose of facilitating 
exports of goods reasonable and necessary for 
the Polish civilian economy, the United States 
was instrumental in obtaining similar treatment 
for Poland in COCOM. 

More recently, Rumania has actively asserted 
its own national interests, particularly in the 

economic field. Rumanian interest in trade and 
other contacts with the West has increased, and | 
the United States recognized these developments : 
in bilateral discussions with the Rumanians dur- 
ing the past year.' In these discussions, agree- ] 
ment was reached on improved conditions for 
trade between the United States and Rumania, i 
on certain equipment that Rumania could pur- 
chase in the United States, and on other matters 
making for improved relationships. 

There are evidences in most of the other Eas<> 
em European countries of efforts to reduce their 
economic dependence on the Soviet Union and i 
to increase their trade and contacts with West- - 
em Europe and the United States. The United 1 
States has been hopeful that all of these peoples, 
while living at peace with their neighbors, could i 
develop their own policies in accordance with . 
their own national aspirations and talents. 
Our trade policy toward individual countries of 1 
Eastern Europe can be a means of bringing ; 
about mutually beneficial contacts by Americans ■ 
with the peoples of Eastern Europe and can en- 
able the United States to influence somewhat de- 
velopments during this period of accelerating 

Policy Toward U.S.S.R. 

With respect to the Soviet Union the situation 
is quite different from that prevailing in the 
smaller countries of Eastern Europe. The 
U.S.S.R. is a higlily self-sufficient economy with 
a broad industrial base and a well-developed 
teclinology. Its major deficiencies are largely 
in agriculture and in the consumer goods fields. 
These deficiencies are a direct reflection of his- 
toric Soviet preoccupation with the develop- 
ment of heavy industry to provide a powerful 
military-industrial base. Soviet self-sufficiency 
is particularly evident with respect to advanced 
weapons teclmology and military production 

In overall size So^•iet industry is second only 
to that of the United States, and the Soviet 
econony is even closer to self-sufficiency than our 
own. Its imports from all free-world indus- 
trial countries run at a rate of only one-half of 

^ For test of a joint communique, see ibid., June 15, 
1964, p. 924. 



one percent of the Soviet jiross national product. 
The Soviet Union has little dependence on the 
products of the free world. 

During; the years of the Berlin blockade, the 
Korean conflict, and the tensions of the Stalin 
and early post-Stalin years the Battle Act em- 
barj:;o profxnim served to provide some restraint 
on Soviet aggressive capability. Tlie multi- 
lateral control system continues to be effective in 
preventing the shipment of strategic goods to 
the bloc. In time of crisis, controls could be 
expanded and strengthened quickly within the 
framework of this sj'stem. As a matter of long- 
term policy, however, the nations of the free 
world are reluctant to impose total economic 
denial on a country with which they are not at 
war. In view of Soviet self-sufficiency, such a 
policy would make little strategic sense. It 
would have only a negligible effect on the Soviet 
Union, while denying the benefits of trade to 
many non-Communist countries. 

In accordance with the provisions of the 
Battle Act, a system of selective controls appli- 
cable to strategic trade has been developed. 
iTJnder this system the United States and other 
COCOM countries deny to the U.S.S.R. com- 
modities of military significance. We and our 
COCOM partners are also agreed that no free 
country should become overly dependent on the 
Soviet bloc for critical commodities, such as oil. 
In addition, the United States also prohibits ex- 
ports to the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc 
and Cuba of equipment and technical data 
whicli might make a significant contribution to 
the military or economic potential of those coun- 
tries which would prove detrimental to the na- 
tional security and welfare of the United States. 

The strategic and other official restrictions on 
:rade with the Soviet Union restrict only a small 
fraction of potential trade. The United States 
permits trade with the Soviet bloc in consuraer 
Toods and in most types of equipment for the 
production of those goods. We have carried on 
.ome trade in agricultural products. The re- 
ent decision to sell wheat to the Soviets was aJi 
'Xtension of this practice. 

•ale of Wheat 

On October 9, 1963, President Kennedy an- 
lounced that the U.S. Government was pre- 

pared to approve sales of surplus American 
wheat, wheat flour, feed grains, and other agri- 
cultural commodities to the U.S.S.R. and East- 
ern European countries.'' He stated that sales 
should be for American dollars or gold, either 
cash on delivery or normal commercial terms. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation was au- 
thorized to sell private traders the amount neces- 
sary to replace the grain used to fulfill these 
requirements, and the Department of Commerce 
was authorized to grant export licenses for their 
sale with the commitment that the commodities 
were for delivery to and use in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe only. Provision was 
made that the wheat sold to the Soviet Union 
would be carried in available American ships, 
supplemented by ships of other countries as 
required; and that no single American dealer 
was to receive an excessive share of these sales. 

The President's announcement stated, "Ba- 
sically, the Soviet Union will be treated like any 
other cash customer in the world market who 
is willing and able to strike a bargain with pri- 
vate American merchants. A^Hiile this wheat, 
like all wheat sold abroad, will be sold at the 
world price, which is the only way it can be 
sold, there is in such transactions no subsidy to 
the foreign purchaser; only a savings to the 
American taxpayer on wheat the Government 
has already purchased and stored at the higher 
domestic price which is maintained to assist our 
farmers. . . . 

"This transaction advertises to the world as 
nothing else could the success of free American 
agriculture. It demonstrates our willingiiess 
to relieve food shortages, to reduce tensions, and 
to improve relations with all countries, and it 
shows that peaceful agreements with the United 
States which serve the interests of both sides 
are a far more worthwhile course than a course 
of isolation and hostility." 

The President called attention to the fact that 
wheat is our number one farm surplus and that 
such sales would improve our balance of pay- 
ments position and benefit domestic producers. 
He emphasized that the United States had never 
had a policy against selling consumer goods, in- 
cluding agricultural commodities, to the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Since we had been 

* Ibid., Oct. 28, 1963, p. 660. 

EBRUAKT 1, 196 5 


selling nonsubsidized farm products to them for 
years, it would make little sense to refuse to sell 
those products on which we must otherwise pay 
the cost of storage. He stated that the decision 
with respect to the sales to the Soviet Union did 
not represent a new Soviet- American trade pol- 
icy but was, rather, one more hopeful sign that 
a more peaceful world is both possible and ben- 
eficial to us all. 

The sales of wheat to the Soviet Union were 
paid for in cash, with payment in full on a c.i.f . 
basis totaling $140.2 million for 65.6 million 
bushels of wheat. In addition, the U.S.S.R. 
purchased $9.6 million worth of rice from the 
United States, for which it also paid cash. 

A letter from the Attorney General ' concern- 
ing legal questions raised by the proposed wheat 
sales stated that the Battle Act presents no legal 
obstacle to sales of agricultural commodities to 
Eastern European bloc countries. The Attor- 
ney General noted that the Battle Act was de- 
signed to supplement the Export Control Act 
and did not purport to regulate private U.S. 
shipments to Soviet bloc countries, which were 
already subject to regulation under the Export 
Control Act. 

The Attorney General said in part : 

The Battle Act relates, rather, to trade with the 
Soviet bloc by countries receiving aid or assistance 
from the United States. Moreover, the transactions to 
which this opinion relates would be purely commercial 
in nature from the standpoint of the purchasing coun- 
tries, and would therefore not involve "economic or 
financial assistance" within the meaning of the Battle 
Act. The Commodity Credit Corporation assists ex- 
ports of agricultural products through the payment 
to United States exporters of subsidies designed to 
eliminate the impact on such exporters of the domestic 
price support program and thereby enable them to com- 
pete on an equal basis with foreign exporters. 
However . . . the only "assistance" involved in the pay- 
ment of such subsidies redounds to the benefit exclu- 
sively of United States producers and exporters. 

United States policy on trade with Commu- 
nist countries may be summarized in the follow- 
ing three points : 

° For text, see ibid., p. 661. 

1. Trade can be a useful instrument in the 
contest with communism and in affecting Com- 
munist policies, provided it is adapted to the 
particular situations presented by different 
Communist countries. 

2. Trading policies suited to one period in our 
relations with a particular Communist country 
may not be equally appropriate at another 

3. Our national purpose can be served either 
by the denial of trade or the encouragement of 
trade, depending on circmnstances. Further- 
more, the denial of trade may be either total or 
selective. It is important that the steps taken 
in East- West trade policy be flexibly adapted 
to particular Communist countries at particular 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

88th Congress, 2d Session 

Ocean Transportation of Grain to Russia. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the 
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 
January 28-30, 1964. 270 pp. 

Antarctica Report — 1964. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
on Deep Freeze 1963-64 operations. May 28 and 
August 10, 1964. 106 pp. 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Forty-seventh Session of the International Labor Con- 
ference. Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State for Congressional Relations transmitting the 
texts of the 47tli session of the International Labor 
Conference at Geneva in June 1963, with its recom- 
mendations. H. Doc. 35. January 4, 1965. 16 pp. 

Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance 
of Payments. Report of the Joint Economic Com- 
mittee. S. Rept. 1. January 6, 1965. 45 pp. 

Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mes- 
sage from the President relative to changes in our 
immigration laws with accompanying papers. H. 
Doc. 52. January 13, 1965. 12 pp. 

Foreign Aid. Message from the President relative to 
foreign aid. H. Doc. 53. January 14, 1965. 8 pp. 

State of Our Defenses. Message from the President 
relative to the state of our defenses. H. Doc. 54 
January 18, 1965. 11 pp. 




U.S. Commends Development 
Activities of U.N. Special Fund 

Statement by Franklin n. WUliums ^ 

In behalf of my delefration and personally I 
wisli to welcome you, Mr. Chairman [D. Cosio 
IVilleg:\s of Mexico], and to express our pleasure 
that you are again directinfr the deliberations of 
this Governing Council of the Special Fund. 
We all deeply appreciate the special effort you 
made to be here with us. Your presence, your 
wisdom, your efficient, courteous, and quiet 
leadership will insure that the business of this — 
perhaps the last session of this Governing Coun- 
cil — will be completed with dispatch and the 
igenda considered and debated in an atmosphere 
Df mutual respect, good will, and understanding. 

Mr. Chairman, I consider myself most fa- 
Vored that my first exposure to sessions of this 
Council was marked by a presentation as in- 
formative, clear, and brilliant as that given by 
Dur distinguished Managing Director and hi.^ 
^ble staff yesterday morning. This Council is 
Jideed fortunate that Mr. Paul Hoffman's vigor 
md determination brought him a rapid recovery 
From injuries that would have prevented a lesser 
paan from being with us at these meetings. 
I Anyone reading the documents provided us 
prior to this session certainly must have real- 
zed that the Special Fund, this great intema- 
ional voluntary effort, was truly a going con- 
•em. But it was particularly enlightening to 
isten to those who direct its affairs — Mr. Hoff- 
nan, Mr. [Roberto] Heurtematte, Mr. [Myer] 
'Uohen, and Mr. [Paul M.] Henry — as they de- 
ailed the problems and described some of the 
lew approaches which have been part of the 
fund's activities in recent months. It is an 

' Made in the GoveminR Council of the U.N. Special 
'"nnd on Jim. 12 (U.S./C.X. press release 4488). Mr. 
Villianis was U.S. Representative to the 1.3th .session 
■f the Governing Council ; he is also U.S. Representa- 
ive on the D.N. Economic and Social Council. 

impressive fact that, with approval of the 
Managing Director's current program submis- 
sion, the total value of projects approved by 
the Council passes the $1 billion mark — includ- 
ing well over $400 million in Special Fund ear- 
markings. This is an eminently auspicious level 
at which to initiate the United Nations Devel- 
opment Program. 

My delegation is confident that under the 
continued direction of our Managing Director 
and his colleagues this program, regardless of 
its institutional structure, will continue to build 
upon the record of the past and expand its 
impact throughout the world during this Inter- 
national Cooperation Year. In proclaiming 
International Cooperation Year throughout the 
United States this past October, President 
Lyndon Johnson stated : ^ 

. . . cooperation with other nations and other peo- 
ples is always uppermost in our minds and is the first 
aim of our policies, the central instrument of our 
foreign policy. . . . 

We believe that with the creation of the 
United Nations Development Program the op- 
portunity for even more effective cooperation 
among nations and peoples will be provided. 

It was particularly interesting yesterday to 
listen to Paul Hoffman's description of some of 
the types of Special Fund activities which are 
contributing so substantially to the development 
of what he referred to as "low-income coun- 
tries." The Managing Director has always had 
the unequaled ability to breathe life and give 
color to dry statistics and to draw the listener's 
attention to the human beings behind statistics. 
He obviously has not lost this knack. 

Mr. Chairman, my delegation looks forward 
with interest to future reports of constantly 
increasing numbers of completed projects. We 
hope that they will provide even more details 
about the projects. We were interested yester- 
day in the suggestion of the distinguished dele- 

' BTn-urriN of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 

"EBRUART 1, 1965 


gate of Italy that the Managing Director and 
his staff might provide information on the ex- 
tent to which use of preparatory assistance has 
contributed to speedier and more effective ini- 
tiation of actual project operations. We would 
also like to know whether the projects are being 
completed on schedule, how their costs compare 
with tlie original cost estimates, et cetera. 

My delegation was particularly impressed by 
the Managing Director's report that expen- 
diture of $17 million on the part of the Special 
Fund and the benefiting countries in feasibility 
surveys has led to investment of some $785 
million. We recognize that this startling ratio 
of return to cost cannot be expected to continue, 
but we are confident that future reports will 
show more and more instances of both private 
and public investments resulting from Special 
Fund surveys. In the future we hope that we 
will receive information of surveys which rec- 
ommend against investment. Such negative re- 
sults have value and can prevent use of scarce 
capital resources in unwise or improductive 

At some future time when more projects have 
been completed, it would be enlightening, we 
believe, to know more of the work being done 
by those who have received training in institu- 
tions supported by the Special Fund. Mr. 
Henry told us yesterday of the Fund's expe- 
rience in the field of applied research and the 
problems of planning adequately for research 
institutions. We hope that future reports will 
expand upon this experience and tell us more of 
what is happening to research and training in- 
stitutions and research activities initiated as 
Special Fund projects. 

Mr. Chairman, my delegation is especially 
pleased to note that the implementation of ap- 
proved programs continues to show a steady 
improvement. We are encouraged by Mr. 
Cohen's report of the recent meetings held with 
the various executing agencies and by his state- 
ment that the agencies find Special Fund work 
stimulating and worth while, however frus- 
trating they find recruitment delays, the prob- 
lems of phasing of equipment deliveries in rela- 
tion to technicians' arrivals, and the difficulties 
in securing counterpart personnel. 
We note with interest that the time between 

project approval and signature of plans of oper I 
ations now averages 10 months. This average j 
like any average, includes not only a substantial i 
number of cases in which the time is much] 
shorter but also a number of unfortunate cases ' 
in which the delay is much longer. There are a 1 
few projects approved by this Council 2 years I 
or longer ago for which plans of operations have 
not been signed. Nor does signing of the planJ 
of operations necessarily mean the start of oper-l 
ations, for we note with regret a few instances Ieij 
which plans of operations were signed in 19621J 
but field operations have not yet started. We'i 
share the concern of the Special Fund manage-*! 
ment at these delays, and, while we recognize^ 
the problems, we commend the continuing ef-^l 
forts of all to reduce these delays. 

Iilr. Hoffman and his associates are not only'i 
improving the implementation of the projects 
approved by this Council, but their methods oij 
reporting to us with regard to their activitiesij 
also continue to improve. I found the graphs 
which were used to illustrate yesterday's state- 
ments particularly valuable, and we are de- 
lighted that the distinguished delegate of Sene- 
gal has taken steps to insure that these charts 
are reproduced for our further study and 

My delegation wishes to join many others who 
have already spoken in congratulating the man- 
agement of the Special Fund on the inclusion 
in Document L/112 of the table on "Assistance 
From Other Sources to Activities of the Special 
Fund." We recognize that the present report 
contains only partial information, and we hop? 
not only that it will be continued but also that 
it will be made more and more complete. For 
our part we will cooperate with the staff of the 
Special Fund to this end. 

]\Ir. Heurtematte has told us of the financial 
advisory services which the Fund has provided' 
in two recent cases. We are encouraged by this' 
pioneer effort and by the fact that financial ad- 
visers are included in four of the projects in 
the program recommended to this session for 
approval. My Government has always favored 
close ties between the Fund and the various re- 
gional and international banking institutions, 
and we welcome Mr. Heurtematte's description 
both of these cooperative arrangements and of 



the specific financial advisory missions which 
have been UTulertuken. 

Mr. Chairman, the Managing Director has 
recommended 68 projects for approval at this 
session of the Governing Council. Thirty- 
three of these relate to the broad field of indus- 
try and infrastructure, and eight of these relate 
directly to iruinufacturing. My delegation ap- 
proves of this. Tiie projects recommended for 
the United Eepublic of Tanzania provide an 
interesting example of the variety and complex- 
ity of Special Fund activities related to indus- 
trial development : strengthening of the Indus- 
trial Studies and Development Center in 
Dar-es-Salaam; establishment of an institute to 
provide advisory information and training serv- 
ices for industry and business in the field of 
management development and labor produc- 
tivity ; assistance in an experiment to determine 
the feasibility of sheep raising as the basis for 
a wool industry; and training for science teach- 
ers who will be instrumental in providing future 
scientists and technicians essential for industrial 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, my delegation is par- 
ticularly interested in the six regional projects 
which are recommended for approval at this 
Governing Council session. Neither insects, 
fish, nor wildlife know national boundaries, and 
the rivers and lakes which often form these 
boundaries cannot be developed by any one 
country alone. The Special Fund's ability to 
respond quickly and effectively to the combined 
interests of several governments is indicative of 
the value of this kind of program and is being 
increasingly put to use. In addition to the 
technical merits of regional projects, they by 
their very nature contribute to increased co- 
operation among neighboring countries. In 
these days of international tension and un-, at a time when the world's atten- 
tion is held by the disagreements among neigh- 
boring states, it is refreshing to find that the 
Special Fund is providing opportunities for in- 
creased cooperation among countries in attack- 
ing man's historic common enemies. At the 
White House ceremony on October 2, 1964, pro- 
claiming 1965 as International Cooperation 
Year in the United States, President Jolmson 

"In this day and in this age man has too many 
common interests to waste his energies, his tal- 
ents, and his substance in primitive arrogance 
or destructive conflict. ... So this year and 
next year and in the years to come, international 
cooperation must be an enduring way of life in 
the community of man." 

Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Notification received that it considers itself hound: 

Uwanda, December 1, 1964. 
Customs convention on temporary importation of pri- 
vate road vehicles. Done at Xew York June 4, 1954. 
Entered into force December 1.5, 1957. TIAS 3943. 
Notification received that it considers itself bound: 

Rwanda, December 1, 1964. 


Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the 
convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 
1591) by providing that .sessions of the Assembly of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization shall 
be held not less than once in 3 years instead of an- 
nually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered 
into force, December 12, 195G. TIAS 37.56. 
Ratification deposited: Malawi, November 30, 19(54; 

Protocol amending article .50(a) of the convention on 
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase 
membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at 
Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 
1962. TIAS 5170. 

Ratifications deposited: Malawi, November 30, 1964; 
Morocco, December 8, 1904. 


International coffee agreement, 1902, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accessions deposited: Sierra I^one, November 27, 
1904 ; Switzerland, December 17, 1964. 


Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 6, 19.52. Entered into force September 16, 
19.55. TIAS 3324. 
Application to: Mauritius, October 6, 1964. 

Culturai Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, 
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake 

?EBRrART 1, 196S 


Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 

21, 1952.' 

Notification received that it considers itself iound: 

Rwanda, December 1, 1964. 
Constitution of tlie United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at 
London November 16, 1945. Entered into force for 
the United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 
Signatures and acceptances: Malawi, October 27, 

1964 ; Zambia, November 9, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered Into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 
Notification received that it considers itself bomid: 

Malta, November 25, 1964. 
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Western Samoa, 
January 15, 1965. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 
4900 ) . Done at London April 11, 1962.= 
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, December 14, 1904. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 
global commercial communications satellite system. 
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 
force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 
Notification of approval: Portugal, January 14, 196.5. 


Protocol for the prolongation of the international sugar 
agreement of December 1, 1958 (TIAS 4389). Done 
at London August 1, 1963. Entered into force for 
the United States February 27, 1964. TIAS 5744. 
Accessiofi deposited: Malagasy Republic, October 22, 

Ratifications deposited: Brazil, October 29, 1964; 

Peru, November 14, 1964 ; Philippines, November 5, 



Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 
1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. 
TIAS 5687. 

Signatures: Cuba, August 20, 1964 ; Federal Republic 
of Germany (subject to ratification), October 20, 
1964 ; India, September 15, 1964 ; Israel, June 24, 
1964; Netherlands, July 31, 1964; South Africa, 
August 18, 1964 ; United Kingdom, July 21, 1964. 


International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signa- 
ture at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. 
Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts 
III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Greece, January 14, 1965. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
^ Not in force. 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of September 30, 1964 (TIAS 5669). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at New Delhi December > 
31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. I 

Israel i 

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as I 
amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, .5079), for coopera- i 
tion concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed ' 
at Washington August 19, 1964. I 

Entered into force: October 1, 1964. 

Korea I 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the;! 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act n 
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-11 
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul il 
December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31. : I 
1964. I 


Luxembourg I 

Convention with respect to taxes on income and prop- ■}■ 
erty. Signed at Washington December 18, 1962. ; 
Entered into force December 22, 1964. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 30, 1964. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of q 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance ' 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- ij 
1709), with related notes. Effected by exchange of :l 
notes at Rabat December 29, 1964. Entered into ' 
force December 29, 1964. 



The Senate on January 15 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Ben H. Brown, Jr., to be Ambassador to Liberia. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 529 dated December 28.) 

William A. Crawford to be Ambassador to Rumania. 

Ralph A. Dungan to be Ambassador to Chile. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State presa 
release 502 dated November 25.) 

William H. Sullivan to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of Laos. (For biographic details, see Department 
of State press release 511 dated December 3. ) 



search the German documents still remaining 
in the National Archives at Alexandria. Upon 
notitication by the German Government of its 
desire to send competent and qualified author- 
ities to visit the Archives, the Department of 
State will be pleased to make appropriate ar- 
ranjrements with the National Archives. 

The Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany is aware that the Government of the 
United States of America has long had a deep 
interest in the efforts of the Federal Kepublic 
to find, prosecute, and convict Nazi criminals 
not yet brought to justice. The Federal Re- 
public is also undoubtedly aware of the concern 
of many American citizens that the scheduled 
expiration in May 1965 of the 20-year period 
under the German statute of limitations for 
murder might permit presently unknown Nazi 
■ criminals to escape prosecution. In light of 
these considerations, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany is assured that 
, the Government of the United States of Amer- 
I ica will continue to assist the Federal Republic 
in every appropriate way in its search for evi- 
dence of Nazi crimes and criminals. 
Department of State, 


Tbe Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Issued on November 22 [20J, 1964, an appeal to all 
Governments, organizations and individual persons, 
both In Germany and abroad, to make available with- 
out delay all material in their possession on Nazi crimes 
■still unknown in the Federal Republic, either original 
documents, photostat or uiicrofllm copies to the "Zen- 
tralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Auf- 
Itlarung nationalsozlalistischer Gewalttaten" (CJentral 
Office of the Land Judicial Administrations for the In- 
vestigation of National Socialist Crimes) Ludwigs- 
burg/Germany, Schomdorfer Str. 28. 

The Federal Parliament (Bundestag) on December 9, 
1964, has strongly supported the appeal of the Federal 
GoTernment of November 20, 1964, and has asked the 

Federal Government to take all necessary steps to en- 
able the German prosecution authorities to collect all 
evidence relating to murder in the Nazi period and 
to check it systematically until March 1, 1965. 

The Federal Government would appreciate any as- 
sistance given by the Government of the United States 
in collecting evidence concerning Nazi murders, not yet 
known in the Federal Republic. 

The Embassy will forward without delay all material, 
which will be made available, to the Central Agency 
in Ludwigsburg/Germany. 

Washington, D.C, December 22, 196i 

Letters of Credence 

The following newly appointed ambassadors 
presented their credentials to President Johnson 
on January 14 : 

Michel Gallin-Douathe of the Central African 

Hugo B. Margain of Mexico, 
Jonas Mouanza of the Republic of the Congo 

(Brazzaville), and 
Ary Tanunoune of the Republic of Niger. 

Tax Convention With Honduras 
Continues in Force 

Department Statement 

Press release 4 dated January 14 

As a result of a notice given on December 17, 
1964, by the Government of Honduras of its 
desire that the convention of June 25, 1956, be- 
tween the United States and Honduras ' for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income 
be continued in force through the year 1965, it 
is considered that the convention remains in 
full force and effect. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3766. 

FEBRUARY 1, 1965 



President Johnson Asks Four- Year Extension 
of ACDA Authorization 

The White House on January 15 made pub- 
lic the following letter ^ fro7n President Johnson 
to Carl Hayden, President pro tempore of the 
Senate^ enclosing a letter to President Johnson 
from 'William C. Foster, Director of the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agen- 
cy, with proposed legislation to amend the 
Arms Control and Disarm,ament Act. The 
President sent an identical letter to John W. 
McCormack, Speaker of the House of Repre- 

White House press release dated January 15 


January 15, 1965 
Dear Mr. President: I liave the honor to 
forward today to the Congress — with my 
strongest urging that it be enacted promptly- — 
a draft of a bill to assiire the continuing leader- 
ship of the United States in the purposeful pur- 
suit of peace. 

Four years ago, the United States became the 
first nation in the world to establish an Agency 
for Arms Control and Disarmament. The rec- 
ord of achievement since has refuted the doubts 
of those who questioned whether there was 
effective work for such an agency to perform. 
"\^niile the journey toward peace remains long, 
we have begun to take the first steps — and 
we have found others of the family of nations 
willing to walk with us. 

' H. Doc. 55, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 

In the last year and a half, we have con- 
cluded the nuclear test ban treaty now joined 
by over 100 other nations. We have estab- 
lished a direct communications link between 
Washington and ]\foscow, joined in a United 
Nations resolution against weapons in space, 
and initiated cutbacks in the planned produc- 
tion of fissionable material — a step which the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have 
announced that they intend to take also. 

We have, in addition, placed before the 18- 
nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva a 
number of important, concrete proposals for the 
control and reduction of armaments on which 
agreement has not yet been achieved. 

In our times, as always, vigilance remains 
the price of liberty and we stand today as a 
strong, ready and vigilant nation, prepared and 
determined to defend our freedom and the free- 
dom of those who stand with us. But as a na- 
tion vigilant to danger, we must also be vigilant 
for opportunities for improving the hopes for 
peace. The Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency helps us keep this most vital vigil. 

Since existing authorization expires on June 
30, 1965, I am asking the Congress to extend 
that authority for four years. I do so because 
it is my purpose to intensify our efforts in this 
critical area. I am determined to work in 
every way that I can for safeguarded agree- 
ments that will halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons, lessen the risk of war and reduce the 
dangers and costly burdens of armaments. 
This effort — as much as our continuing pre- 


department of state bulletin 


paredness efforts militarily — is essential to our 
security for a continued iiicrease and sj^read of 
modern weapons can actually decrease our 

The first legislation creating the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency is a proud and 
honored memorial to the initiative and vision of 
President Jolm F. Kennedy. It is also a living 
tribute to the responsibility of the Members of 
Congress, and, in particular, to the dedicated 
leadership offered through the years by the Vice 
President-elect. Such legislation so clearly re- 
flects the spirit and the will of the American 
people that I hope the Congress will act with 
all dispatch to give approval to this extension 
of the Agency's valuable role. 

The background and justification for my 
recommendation are amplified in the accom- 
panying letter to me from the Director of the 
Agency, 'William C. Foster. I share Mr. Fos- 
ter's conclusions fully and confidently trust that 
the action of the Congress will impressively re- 
affirm to the world the dedication of this gener- 
ation of Americans to the untiring quest for 
peace for ourselves and all mankind. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 


January 13, 19G5 
Dear Mr. PRZsmENT: I submit herewith, for 
your approval and transmittal to the Congress, 
proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act in order to extend the 
authorization for appropriations for this 
Agency. This proposed amendment has one 
purpose: to authorize appropriations of $55 
million for the four-year period of fiscal years 
1960 through 19G!). Since the current authori- 
zation is inadequate to permit operations much 
beyond June 30, 1965, this legislation will be 
required to keep the Agency operating. Early 
enactment is necessary to permit timely con- 
gressional consideration of the Agency's fiscal 
1966 budget estimates. 

As you have repeatedly pointed out, en- 
hancing our national security through the veri- 
fied control and reduction of world-wide arma- 

ments and through other measures to lessen the 
risk of war is a United States foreign policy 
goal of the greatest importance. The United 
States has already achieved three significant 
measures toward this end: the nuclear test ban 
treaty, the communications link between Wash- 
ington and Moscow, and the United Nations 
resolution against weapons in space. In addi- 
tion, we are cutting back our planned produc- 
tion of nuclear materials, and the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union have announced 
that they intend to make cutbacks in theirs. 
The Agency has played a key role in the devel- 
opment of the cun-ent United States proposals 
before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Con- 
ference; namely, to freeze the production of 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, to halt pro- 
duction of fissionable materials for weapons use, 
to create observation posts to reduce the danger 
of war by miscalculation and surprise attack, 
and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
into the national control of countries currently 
not possessing them. 

Attempts directed toward arms control and 
other measures to lessen the threat of war are no 
longer Utopian dreams. The work of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency has become 
an integral part of our over-all national secu- 
rity policy. Indeed, the need for arms-control 
measures is becoming even more acute as more 
nations develop a nuclear capability and as the 
arms race remains with us. Armaments alone 
can no longer increase security; the imcheckcd 
increase of these weapons of mass destruction 
can only diminish our safety and the hope for 

Research in arms control and disarmament is 
imperative if realistic international agreements 
are to be reached. The complexity of arms-con- 
trol negotiations requires systematic and com- 
prehensive study in the development of policy 
proposals. The chief value of this endeavor is 
to allow the United States to make concrete 
proposals for arms-control measures which will 
not jeopardize our security interests vis a vis the 
relative balance of power in the world, and 
which will assure that such agreements permit 
proper inspection and verification to prevent 
possible subterfuges by other nations. It also 
has an ancillary value in demonstrating to our 

FEBRUARY 1, 1986 


allies, adversaries, as well as neutrals, the im- 
portance we attach to arms control. 

To fulfill the Agency's responsibility as a 
repositoi-y of knowledge on the teclmical, eco- 
nomic, militaiy, and political aspects of arms 
control, made especially difficult by the rapidly 
changing world scene, to back up proposals 
currently before the Eighteen-Nation Disarma- 
ment Conference, and to prepare new proposals 
in support of your continuing quest for peace, 
the Agency must have authorization to carry 
on its efforts during the years ahead. Specifi- 
cally, the Agency must have resources to pursue 
vital studies aimed at preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons, conti'oUing and reducing arms, 
and developing other measures to reduce the risk 
of war. Although the United States has already 
achieved significant progress in making the 
world safer from the ever present nuclear threat, 
the quest must continue and even intensify dur- 
ing the coming years. 

Tlie road to peace and arms control is slow 
and arduous, but it is one which we must travel. 
Therefore, I believe our authorization for ap- 
propriations should be for a period adequate to 
allow for long-range research planning and to 
emphasize our determination in making this 
effort.. I believe a four-year authorization for 
fiscal yeai-s 1966 through 1969 would accomplisli 
these purjDOses. 

Faithfully yours, 

William C. Foster 

Enclosure : 

Proposed Legislation to 
Amend Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act. 



To amend the Arm.s Control and Disarmament Act, as 
amended, in order to increase the authorization for 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and Bouse of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled. That the second sentence of section 49(a) 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, 
(22 U.S.C. 2.589(a)), is amended by inserting imme- 
diately after "$20,000,(X)0", the following : "and for the 
four fiscal years 1966 through 1969, the sum of 

Amending the Immigration 
and Nationality Act 

Following is a message from the President 
transmitted to Congress on January 13.^ 

To the Congress of the United States : 

A change is needed in our laws dealing with 
immigration. Four Presidents have called at- 
tention to serious defects in this legislation. 
Action is long overdue. 

I am therefore submitting, at the outset of 
this Congi-ess, a bill designed to correct the de- 
ficiencies. I urge that it be accorded priority 

The principal reform called for is the elimina- 
tion of the national-origins quota system. That 
system is incompatible with our basic American 

Over the years the ancestors of all of us — some 
42 million human beings — have migrated to 
these shores. Tlie fundamental, longtime 
American attitude has been to ask not where a 
person comes from but what are his personal 
qualities. On this basis men and women mi- 
grated from every quarter of tlie globe. By 
their hard work and their enomiously varied 
talents they hewed a great nation out of a wil- 
derness. By their dedication to liberty and 
equality, they created a society reflecting man's 
most cherished ideals. 

Long ago the poet Walt "Wliitman spoke our 
pride: "These States are the amplest poem." 
We are not merely a nation but a "nation of 

Violation of this tradition by the national- 
origins quota system does incalculable harm. 
The procedures imply that men and women 
from some coimtries are, just because of where 
they come from, more desirable citizens than 
others. We have no right to disparage the an- 
cestors of millions of our fellow Americans in 
this way. Relationships with a nmnber of 
countries, and hence the success of our foreign 
policy, is needlessly impeded by tliis proposition. 

The quota system has other grave defects. 

^ White House press release ; also available in H. 
Doc. 52. S9th Cong., 1st sess., which includes, in addition 
to the President's letter, the test of the proposed legis- 
lation and a section-by-section analysis. 



Too often it arbitrarily denies us immigrants 
who luvve outstandini: and sorely needed talents 
and fikills. 1 do not believe this is either good 
government or good sense. 

Thousands of our citizens are needlessly sepa- 
rated from their [larents or other close relatives. 
I To replace the quota system, the proposed bill 
relies on a technique of preferential admissions 
based upon the advantage to our nation of the 
skills of the immigrant, and the existence of a 
close family relationship between the immi- 
grant and people who are already citizens or 
permanent residents of the United States. 
Within this system of preferences, and within 
the numerical and other limitations prescribed 
by law, tlie issuance of visas to prospective im- 
migrants would be based on the order of their 

First preference under the bill would be given 
to those with the kind of skills or attainments 
which make the admission especially advan- 
tageous to our society. Other preferences would 
favor close relatives of citizens and permanent 
residents, and thus serve to promote the reunit- 
ing of families — long a primary goal of Ameri- 
can immigration policy. Parents of U.S. citi- 
zens could obtain admission without waiting 
for a quota number. 

Transition to the new system would be grad- 
ual, over a 5-year period. Tlius the possibility 
of abrupt changes in the pattern of immigra- 
tion from any nation is eliminated. In addi- 
tion, the bill would provide that as a general 
rule no countrj' could be allocated more than 10 
percent of the quota numbers available in any 
one year. 

In order to insure that the new system would 
not impose undue hardship on any of our close 
allies by suddenly curtailing their emigration, 
the bill authorizes the President, after consulta- 
tion with an Immigration Board established by 
the legislation, to utilize up to .30 percent of the 
quota numbers available in any year for the pur- 
pose of restoring cuts made by the new system in 
the quotas established by existing law. 

Similar authority, permitting the reservation 
of up to 10 percent of the numbers available in 
any year, would enable us to meet the needs of 
refugees fleeing from catastrophe or oppression. 

In addition, the bill would — 

(1) permit numbers not used by any country 

to be made available to countries where they 
are neoiled ; 

(2) eliminate the discriminatory "Asia- 
Pacific triangle" provisions of the existing law; 

(3) eliminate discrimination against newly 
independent countries of the Western Hemi- 
sphere by providing nonquota status for natives 
of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago ; 

(4) afford nonquota status to parents of citi- 
zens, and fourth preference to parents of resi- 
dent aliens; 

(5) eliminate the i-equirement that skilled 
first-preference immigrants needed in our econ- 
omy must actually find an employer here before 
they can come to the United States ; 

(6) afford a preference to workers with lesser 
skills who can fill specific needs in short supply; 

(7) eliminate technical restrictions that have 
hampered the effective use of the existing fair- 
share refugee law; and 

(8) authorize the Secretary of State to re- 
quire reregistration of quota-immigrant visa 
applicants and to regulate the time of payment 
of visa fees. 

This bill would not alter in any way the many 
limitations in existing law which prevent an 
influx of undesirables and safeguard our people 
against excessive or unregulated immigi-ation. 
Nothing in the legislation relieves any immi- 
grant of the necessity of satisfying all of the 
security requirements we now have, or the re- 
quirements designed to exclude persons likely to 
become public charges. No immigrants ad- 
mitted imder this bill could contribute to unem- 
ployment in the United States. 

The total number of immigrants would not be 
substantially changed. Under this bill, author- 
ized quota immigration, which now amounts to 
158,361 per year, would be inci-eased by less 
than 7,000. 

I urge the Congress to return the United 
States to an immigration policy which both 
serves the national interest and continues our 
traditional ideals. No move could more effec- 
tively reaffirm our fundamental belief that a 
man is to be judged — and judged exclusively — 
on his worth as a human being. 

Lyxdox B. Johnson, 
TitE WnrrE House, January J3, 1965. 

FEBRUARY 1, 196 5 


The Battle Act Report, 1964 



Purpose of the Battle Act 

In enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Control (Battle) Act the Congress recognized 
that the United States can best preserve and 
maintain peace by developing maximum na- 
tional strength and by utilizing its resources in 
cooperation with other free nations. The pur- 
pose of the Act is to prevent to the extent that 
we are able the shipment to the Sino-Soviet bloc 
of strategic items which would contribute sig- 
nificantly to the military-industrial potential of 
tlie bloc. 

The Battle Act became law in 1951, but the 
United States had controlled exports of military 
material for more than a decade prior to that 
and had applied controls over the shipment of 
atomic energy materials to all destinations since 

Need for Multilateral Strategic Trade Controls 

In the face of the aggressive expansion of the 
Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe 
following "World War II, it was obvious that 
steps would have to be taken to assure that stra- 
tegic commodities did not reach the Soviet 
Union. Accordingly, an extensive strategic ex- 
port control system was established by the 
United States in 1948. 

It was clear from the outset that unilateral 
action by one nation to retard the military 
buildup of the Soviet bloc by denying it selected 
strategic goods would not be effective unless the 
other major industrialized countries of the free 

world adopted similar measures. A number of 
countries already had controls over exports of 
certain war materials and several were under- 
taking the control of shipments of strategic 

During 1948-49, through a series of bilateral i^ 
negotiations between the United States and ij 
Western European countries, agreement was 
reached to impose an embargo on shipments to 
the Soviet bloc of arms, ammunition, imple- 
ments of war, and atomic energy items, where 
this prohibition was not already being applied 
by individual countries. There were also de- 
tailed technical discussions on the industrial ma- 
terials and equipment which should be placed 
under embargo. The United Kingdom and 
France formulated an Anglo-French list of 
strategic items, similar to but less comprehen- 
sive than the U.S. lists, which they endeavored 
to persuade other Western European countries 
to apply. Countries which had already begun- 
controlling shipments of strategic goods to the 
bloc realized very quickly that the maintenance 
and extension of individual country controls 

' The report, transmitted to the Congress on Jan. 13, 
is available as Department of State publication 7736, 
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402; 
price 35 cents. In addition to the two chapters 
printed here, the report includes Chapter III, Value 
and Composition of East-West Trade ; Chapter IV, 
Trade With Cuba; Chapter V, United States Restric- 
tions on Trade and Financial Transactions With Com- 
munist Countries ; and Appendixes A, Text of Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 ; B, The Battle 
Act Lists; C, Trade Controls of Free-World Countries; 
D, Presidential Determinations Made July 1963-June 
1964; and E, Statistical Tables. 



:ould be frustrated unless cooperative measures 
;ould be nj^reed upon. It became clear that 
xwrdiiiatod and simultaneous action was 

In the atmosphere of the Berlin blockade, 
igreemcnt was shortly reached on a multilateral 
)rganization. The bilateral list negotiations 
;vere transferred to a multilateral fonuu and the 
ists were expanded. An informal Consultative 
jroup (CG) was formed in Paris by the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Bel- 
rium, Luxembourg, and the United States. 
VIembership was soon expanded to include Nor- 
way, Denmark, Canada, and the Federal Re- 
lublic of Germany. These 11 countries were 
ater joined by Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and 
Tapan, bringing the total membership in this 
nformal, voluntary organization to 15. In 
iddition to tlie embargo lists, measures were 
igreed upon for the coordinated regulation of 
'xports, and the foundation was laid for supple- 
nentary controls such as the Import Certificate- 
Delivery Verification system and Transit Au- 
horization Certificates. 

The Coordinating Committee (COCOM) is 
he permanent working committee of the Con- 
ultative Group. This organization of the Con- 
ultative Group-Coordinating Committee has 
)perated effectively since January 1950 and 
low includes 14 NATO countries (all except 
celand) and Japan. COCOM considers and 
•ecommends specific control measures and their 
ipplication and enforcement to the govem- 
nents of the participating countries. The Con- 
«ltative Group's function is to review the rec- 
•mmendations and activities of COCOM, to 
lispose of unresolved matters referred to it 
•y COCOM, and to set the general frame of 
eference for future COCOM activities. 

The Consultative Group-COCOM organiza- 
ion has no formal treaty or charter governing 
ts operation and is not a part of any other 
ntemational organization. It provides a 
orum in which decisions on trade control ques- 
ions can be reached that will apply uniformly 
all the countries participating in the multi- 
ateral strategic control system. 

With the eruption of the Korean conflict in 
050, the agreed multilateral controls were ex- 
ended to the point of virtual embargo on in- 
iustrial equipment and major raw materials 

to the Communist bloc with especially strin- 
gent controls, including restrictions on sliipping 
and bunkering, for Conmmnist China and 
North Korea. The United States imposed a 
complete embargo on trade, shipping, and 
financial transactions with Communist China, 
North Korea and subsequently North Viet- 

With the truce in Korea, the death of Stalin, 
and the changes in climate following these 
events, pressures for a reappraisal and revision 
of East- West trade controls became widespread. 
Marked progress had been made in the restora- 
tion of productivity in Western Europe. This 
stimulated a drive to seek additional outlets 
for exports, including more trade with the 
Soviet bloc as a whole but particularly some 
measure of resumption of normal trade patterns 
with the countries of Eastern Europe, exclud- 
ing the U.S.S.R. Some of the tension in East- 
West relations had eased. Technical advances 
had been made which affected the strategic 
value of items under control. 

A major revision in the COCOM embargo 
lists took place in 1954. Realizing that it was 
becoming increasingly ineffectual to attempt to 
retain on the commodity lists those items whose 
strategic evaluation had diminished, the United 
States concentrated its efforts on preserving 
and tightening controls on items of greatest 
strategic significance. This position ai)plied 
only to controls on shipments to the Soviet- 
oriented countries of Eastern Europe; the 
United States remained firmly opposed to any 
relaxation in controls over trade with Com- 
munist China and North Korea. After ex- 
tended negotiation the international embargo 
lists were reduced. The changes applied only 
to the European Soviet bloc, however, not to 
Communist China and North Korea. The list 
of arms, ammunition, and implements of war 
remained unchanged; atomic energy items also 
were kept under firm embargo control and a 
special atomic energy embargo list was estab- 

There have been periodic list reviews since 
1954. The China differential was abolished in 
1957, and since then the COCOM countries have 
used the same strategic lists for the Soviet- 
oriented countries of Eastern Europe, Com- 
munist China, North Korea, and North Viet- 

ZBRT7ART 1, 1S65 


Nam. The United States did not take such 
action, however, and continues to maintain a 
virtually complete embargo on trade and finan- 
cial transactions with Communist countries of 

While there may be differences of opinion 
at any given time among the countries partici- 
pating in COCOM as to the details of what 
should be regarded as strategic, these differences 
have been resolved in recent years through fre- 
quent teclmical reviews that have preserved the 
basic scope of the international strategic lists. 
These reviews have resulted in the addition of 
new items of technological importance and the 
deletion of items which are considered to be no 
longer of strategic significance from the stand- 
point of Sino-Soviet capabilities. 

Revision of Battle Act Lists 

United States preparation for and participa- 
tion in the COCOM list reviews is in conformity 
with the requirements of section 103(a) of the 
Battle Act. This section provides that deter- 
minations as to which items are strategic, for the 
purpose of the Act, shall be continuously ad- 
justed to current conditions on the basis of in- 
vestigation and consultation. The most recent 
COCOM i-eview took place during the period 
November 1963 through April 1964. Eevisions 
in the lists of items embai-goed by the COCOM 
countries and corresponding revisions in the 
Battle Act lists became effective June 15, 1964. 

The Battle Act Title I Category A list of 
arms, ammunition, implements of war, and 
atomic energy materials was expanded by trans- 
ferring to it four propellants (hydrazine, hydro- 
gen peroxide, nitroguanidine, and guanidine ni- 
trate) and by adding specially designed power 
generating and propulsion equipment to the 
definition of nuclear reactors. 

The Battle Act Title I Category B list of 
petroleum, transportation materials of strategic 
value, and items of primary strategic signifi- 
cance used in the production of arms, ammuni- 
tion, and implements of war was expanded by 
the addition of 8 new items and 13 new subitems. 
It was relaxed by the deletion of 4 items and 7 
subitems and by changing the specifications for 
embargo cutoff of 20 items and changing the 
specifications for allowable small shipments of 


8 items. In addition, the definitions of 6 items 
were clarified. Most of the items (87) remained 
unchanged, of these 69 were not considered for 
revision and proposals to change 18 were not 

The 8 new items were synthetic film machin- 
ery, cold cathode tubes, neutron generator tubes, 
instrumentation for controlling the processing 
of irradiated materials, high density artificial 
graphite, polymeric substances, winding fila- 
ment, and devices for measuring the speed of 
sound in water. The 4 items deleted were plants 
for the production of titanium and zirconium, 
large mobile generating imits, ice breakers, and 

The revised list reflects the continuing em- 
phasis on embargo of electronic items. The 
number of electronic items increased from 51 
to 54, so that this category now accounts for 37 
percent of the entire list of 146 items. 

The Battle Act Title II list of items not sub- 
ject to embargo imder Title I but which should 
be controlled was reduced from 38 to 21, by 
deleting 25 items and adding 8. In addition, 
2 existing items were expanded. 


Objectives \ 

United States policy toward international 
commmiism has three objectives : 

1. To prevent the Communists from extend- 
ing their domain, and to make it increasingly- 
costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try 
to do so; 

2. To achieve agreements or understandings 
which lead to peace and help reduce the risk of 
a devastating war ; 

3. To encourage evolution within the Com- 
munist world toward national independence, 
peaceful cooperation, and open societies. 

United States policy toward trade with Com- 
munist countries has developed within this 
framework and, over the years, has reflected the 
prevailing realities of political and economic 
relations with the individual Communist 

During the latter 1920's and 1930's no signif- 



INDEX February 7, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1336 

Africa. ^Vfricaii Newsmen Tour U.S 136 

Bulgaria. Tbe I'uited States and Eastern Eu- 

roi)i> (Elbrick) 137 

Burundi. I'.S. Expresses Regret on Death of 

Prime Minister of Burumii 136 

Central .\frican Republic. Letters of Credence 

(Gallin-Douathe) 143 

Chile. Duugan eoufirmed as Ambassador . . . 158 
Communism. The United States and Eastern 
Europe (Elbricli) 137 

Congo (Brazzaville). Letters of Credence 

(Mouanza) 143 


Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(messiige of the President to the Congress) . 146 

rhe Battle Act of Report, 1964 (excerpts from 
17th report to Congress) 148 

Confirmations (Brown, Crawford, Dimgan, Sul- 
Uvan) 158 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 154 

foreign Aid (message of the President to the 
Congress) 126 

President Johnson Asks Foot- Year Extension of 
ACDA Authorization (letters of President and 
ACDA Director, test of proposed legislation ) . 144 

[Czechoslovakia. The United States and Eastern 
Europe lElbrick) 137 

3epartment and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Brown, Crawford, Dungan, Sullivan) . 158 

)isarmament. President Johnson Asks Four- 
Year Extension of ACDA Authorization (let- 
ters of President and ACDA Director, test of 
proposed legislation) 144 

Dconomic .\ffairs 

"he Battle Act Report, 1964 (excerpt from 17th 
report to Congress) 148 

'ax Convention With Honduras Continues in 
Force 143 

"he United States and Eastern Europe (El- 
brick) 137 

Educational and Cultural AGTairs. The United 
States and Eastern Europe (Elbrick) . . . 137 


■he Battle Act Report, 1964 (escerpt from 17th 
report to Congress) 148 

the United States and Eastern Europe (El- 
brick i 137 

'oreign Aid 

'oreign Aid (message of the President to the 
Congress) 126 

"oreign Aid, an Investment in Man's Future 
(Johnson) 132 

Jermany. U.S. to Continue Helping Germany In 
Searih for Nazi Criminals (U.S. note, German 
memorandum) 142 

(onduras. Tax Convention With Honduras 
Continues in Force 143 

lungary. The United States and Eastern Eu- 
rope I Elbrick) 137 

mmigration and Naturalization. Amending the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (message of 
the I'resident to the Congress) 146 

apan. President Johnson and Prime Minister 

I Sato of Japan Exchange Views on Jfatters of 

; Mutual Interest (exchange of greetings, com- 
munique) 133 

aos. Sullivan confirmed as Ambassador . . 158 

iberia. Brown confirmed as Ambassador . . 158 

Mexico. Letters of Credence (Margain) . . . 143 

Niger. Letters of Credence (Tanimoune) . . 143 
Poland. The United States and Eastern Europe 

(Elbrick) 137 

Presidential Documents 

Amending the Immigration and Nationality 

Act 146 

Foreign Aid 126 

Foreign Aid, an Investment in Man's Future . 132 
President Johnson Asks Four- Year Extension of 

ACDA Authorization 144 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato of 

Japan Eschange Views on Matters of Mutual 

Interest 133 

Public Affairs. African Newsmen Tour U.S. . 136 

Crawford confirmed as Ambassador .... 158 
The United States and Eastern Europe (El- 
brick) 137 

Ryukyu Islands. President Johnson and Prime 
Minister Sato of Japan Exchange Views on 
Matters of Mutual Interest (exchange of 
greetings, communique) 133 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 157 

Tax Convention With Honduras Continues in 

Force 143 


The Battle Act Report, 1964 (excerpt from 17th 
report to Congress) 148 

The United States and Eastern Europe (El- 
brick) 137 

United Nations. U.S. Commends Development 
Activities of U.N. Special Ftind (Franklin 
H. Williams) 155 

Yugoslavia. The United States and Eastern 

Europe (Elbrick) 137 

Name Index 

Brown, Ben H., Jr 158 

Crawford. William A 158 

Dungan, Ralph A 158 

Elbrick, C. Burke 137 

Foster. WiUiam C 144 

Gallin-Douathe, Michel 143 

Johnson, President 126, 132, 133, 144, 146 

Margain, Hugo B 143 

Mouanza, Jonas 143 

Sato, Eisaku 133 

Sullivan, William H 158 

Tanimoune, Ary 143 

Williams, Franklin H 155 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: January 11-17 


releases may be obtained from the Ofl3ce 

of News 

Department of State, Washi 

igton, D.C., 


No. Date 


3 1/11 

Note to German Embassy 


collection of evidence 

on Nazi 


4 1/14 

Income-tax convention with Honduras | 

continues in force. 

5 1/15 

African newsmen tour U.S. 


Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 




U.S.-"Japanese Cooperation in Asia 

The postwar resurgence of Japan has important implications not only for the United Stao 
for freedom and progress throughout Asia. 

This pamphlet, based on an address made at Tokyo in September 1964 by Assistant Secret " 
State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, projects Japan's role in Asia and its relations wiiS 
United States against the background of the threat of Communist militancy in Southeast Asia. 





EJnclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Dociuuenta) 


Please send me copies of Foreign Affairs Outline: U.S.-Japanese Coop 

in Asia. 










Vol. LII, No. 1337 

Fehruary 8, 1965 


Address by Secretary Rusk 165 

hy Assistant Secretary Bundy 168 

hy Gen. Uarold K. Johnson 176 




hy David H. Popper 180 
For index see inside hack cover 

The Inaugural Address of President Johnson 

My fellow countrymen : On this occasion, the 
oath I have taken before you and before God 
is not mine alone, but ours together. We are 
one nation and one people. Our fate as a 
nation and our future as a people rest not upon 
one citizen but upon all citizens. 

That is the majesty and the meaning of this 

For every generation, there is a destiny. For 
some, history decides. For this generation, the 
choice must be our own. 

Even now, a rocket moves toward Mars. It 
reminds us that the world will not be the same 
for our children, or even for ourselves, in a short 
span of years. The next man to stand here 
will look out on a scene that is different from 
our own, because ours is a time of change — 
rapid and fantastic change — baring the secrets 
of nature, multiplying the nations, placing in 
uncertain hands new weapons for mastery and 
destruction, shaking old values and uprooting 
old ways. 

Our destiny in the midst of change will rest 

'Delivered on Jan. 20 (White House press release; 
as-delivered text). 

on the unchanged character of our people and) 
on their faith. ! 

They came here — the exile and the stranger;! 
brave but frightened — to find a place where a I 
man could be liis own man. They made a cove-ij 
nant with this land. Conceived in justice, writn 
ten in liberty, bound in union, it was meant onn 
day to inspire the hopes of all mankind, and i; 
binds us still. If we keep its terms, we shal'i 

First, justice was the promise that all wh^ 
made the journey would share in the fruits oJ, 
the land. , 

In a land of great wealth, families must no' j 
live in hopeless poverty. 

In a land rich in harvest, children just mi 
not go hungry. 

In a land of healing miracles, neighbors muss 
not suffer and die untended. 

In a great land of learning and scholars: 
young people must be taught to read and write 

For the more than 30 years that I have servec 
this nation, I have believed that this injustice 
to our people, this waste of our resources, wa ; 
our real enemy. For 30 years or more, with tb ] 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the OfBee 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional Interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C I 
20402. PRICE : 52 issues, domestic $1( 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pul ; 
lication approved by the Director of tt 
Bureau of the Budget (January 1! 

NOTE : Contents of this publication ai | 
not copyrighted and items contalne 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of tl 
Department of State Bulletin as tl 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletl 
is Indexed in the Readers' Guide ( 
Periodical Literature. 



resources I have had, I have vigilantly fought 
iigjiinst it, I have learned, and I laiow, tJiat it 
will not surrender easily. 

But change has given us new weapons. Be- 
fore this generation of Americans is finished, 
this enemy will not only retreat — it will be con- 

Justice requires us to remember: "UHien any 
citizen denies his fellow, saying, "His color is 
not mine," or "His beliefs are strange and dif- 
ferent.'' in that moment he betrays America, 
thougli his forebears created this nation. 

Liberty was the second article of our cove- 
nant. It was self-government, it was our Bill 
of Rights. But it was more. America would 
be a place where each man could be proud to be 
himself: stretching his talents, rejoicing in his 
work, important in tlie life of his neighbors 
4nd his nation. 

This has become more difficult in a world 
where change and growth seem to tower beyond 
:he control, and even the judgment, of men. 
We must work to provide the knowledge and 
he surroundings which can enlarge the possi- 
jilities of every citizen. 

The American covenant called on us to help 
ihow the way for the liberation of man, and 
hat is our goal. Thus, if as a nation there is 
nuch outside our control, as a people no 
■tranger is outside our hope. 

Change has brought new meaning to that old 
oission. We can never again stand aside, pride- 
ul in isolation. Terrific dangers and troubles 
hat we once called "foreign" now constantly 
ive among us. If American lives must end and 
V.merican treasure be spilled, in countries that 
.'6 barely know, then that is the price that 
hange has demanded of conviction and of our 
nduring covenant. 

Think of our world as it looks from that 
ocket that is heading toward Mars. It is like 

child's globe, hanging in space, the continents 
fuck to its side like colored maps. We are all 
ellow passengers on a dot of earth. And each 
f us, in the span of time, has really only a 
loment among our companions. 

How incredible it is that in this fragile exist- 
ice we should hate and destroy one another, 
"here are possibilities enough for all who will 
oandon masterj' over others to pursue mastery 

over nature. There is world enough for all to 
seek their happiness in their own way. 

Our nation's course is abundantly clear. We 
aspire to nothing that belongs to others. We 
se«k no dominion over our fellow man, but man's 
dominion over tyranny and misery. 

But more is required. Men want to be part 
of a common enterprise — a cause greater than 
themselves. And each of us must find a way 
to advance the purpose of the Nation, thus find- 
ing new purpose for ourselves. Without this, 
we will simply become a nation of strangers. 

The third article is union. To those who 
were small and few against the wilderness, the 
success of liberty demanded the strength of the 
Union. Two centuries of change have made this 
true again. 

No longer need capitalist and worker, farmer 
and clerk, city and countryside, struggle to 
divide our bounty. By working shoulder to 
shoulder together we can increase the bounty 
of all. 

We have discovered that every child who 
learns, and every man who finds work, and every 
sick body that is made whole — like a candle 
added to an altar — brightens the hope of all 
tlie faithful. 

So let us reject any among us who seek to 
reopen old wounds and rekindle old hatreds. 
They stand in the way of a seeking nation. 

Let us now join reason to faith and action to 
experience, to transform our unity of interest 
into a unity of purpose. For the hour and the 
day and the time are here to achieve progress 
without strife, to achieve change without 
hatred; not without difference of opinion but 
without the deep and abiding divisions which 
scar the union for generations. 

Under this covenant of justice, liberty, and 
union, we have become a nation — prosperous, 
great, and mighty. And we have kept our 

But we have no promise from God that our 
greatness will endure. 

We have been allowed by Him to seek great- 
ness with the sweat of our hands and the 
strength of our spirit. 

I do not believe that the Great Society is the 
ordered, changeless, and sterile battalion of 
the ants. 

tBRUAKY 8, 1965 


It is the excitement of becoming — always 
becoming, trying, probing, falling, resting, and 
trying again — but always trying and always 

In each generation — with toil and tears — we 
have had to earn our heritage again. 

If we fail now, then we will have forgotten 
in abundance what we leanied in hardship : that 
democracy rests on faith, that freedom asks 
more than it gives, and the judgment of God is 
harshest on those who are most favored. 

If we succeed, it will not be because of what 
we have, but it will be because of what we are ; 
not because of what we own, but rather because 
of what we believe. 

For we are a nation of believers. Underneath 
the clamor of building and the rush of our day's 
pursuits, we are believers in justice and liberty 
and union. And in our own Union we believe 
that every man must some day be free. And 
we believe in ourselves. 

That is the mistake that our enemies have 
always made. In my lifetime — in depression 
and in war — they have awaited our defeat. 
Each time, from the secret places of the Ameri- 
can heart, came forth the faith that they could 
not see or that they could not even imagine, 
and it brought us victory. And it will again. 
For this is what America is all about. It is 
the uncrossed desert and the unclimbed ridge. 
It is the star that is not reached and the harvest 
that is sleeping in the unplowed ground. 

Is our world gone? We say farewell. Is a 
new world coming? We welcome it— and we 
will bend it to the hopes of man. 

To these trusted public servants and to my 
family, and those close friends of mine who have 
followed me down a long, winding road, and to 
all the people of this Union and the world, 
I will repeat today what I said on that sorrow- 
ful day in November last year : I will lead and 
I will do the best I can. 

But you — you must look within your own 
hearts to the old promises and to the old dreams. 
They will lead you best of all. 

For myself, I ask only in the words of an 
ancient leader: "Give me now wisdom and 
knowledge, that I may go out and come in be- 
fore this people: for who can judge this thy 
people, that is so great ?" 

Mr. Ailes and Mr. Mann Hold 
Opening Talks on Sea-Level Canal i 

Department Announcement ^ 

In order to begin discussions on a sea-levelJ 
canal, as proposed by President Jolinson in his! 
statement of December 18,= Secretary of the] 
Army Stephen Ailes and Assistant Secretaryj 
of State for Inter- American Affairs Thomas C.j 
Mann will visit Nicaragua, Costa Eica, Panama, , 
and Colombia next week. j 

The purpose of this visit will be to explore,! 
in a preliminary way, the views of the govern-; 
ments concerned with possible new routes, with 
regard to the proposed sea-level canal and on- 
site surveys and to explain the U.S. Govern-, 
ment's preliminary ideas concerning the require- 
ments and problems relating to the new canal., 

The visit will be exploratory only and de- 
signed to facilitate better understanding of the 
general points of view of all the governments 
concerned. i 

Secretary Ailes, Secretary Mann, and their 
party will be traveling in a IMATS aircraft; 
schedided to depart Wednesday, January.] 
27. They plan to return to Washington on,. 
February 3. ^ \ 

^Released to the press by the Office of News on 
Jan. 21. 
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 5. 



The United States Navy, Watchdog of Peace 

Address by Secretary Eusk ^ 

Governor [of Virginia Albertis S.] Harrison, 

le^retary [of the Navy Paul H.] Nitze, Ad- 

liral [David L.] McDonald, officers and men 

f the U.S.S. Amo'ica, ladies and gentlemen : 

You have conferred upon me a unique honor 

1 permitting me to commission our newest air- 

nift carrier. Aircraft carriers, combining sea 

nj air power, have made major contributions 

3 the security of the United States and of the 

ree world. In the Second "World "War they 

'ere the cutting edge of victory in the Pacific 

nd protected the passage of massive forces 

loving across the Atlantic. Since then they 

continued their vital mission of shielding 

United States and the free world, in both 

■ ar and peace. This magnificent ship now 

5ins a gallant company of carriers which have 

^rved their country and the cause of free<lom 

I nobly and so well. 

Those who conduct our foreign policy have 
vcr)- direct interest in and reliance upon the 
jilitary power this nation commands. Until 
eace is strongly organized and assured among 
ations, we shall need a powerful and flexible 
' lilitarj- Establislunent — forces which, with our 
Hies, can surely deter or defeat aggression at 
ay level. It used to be said that the diplo- 
lats tried to preser\-e the peace and that when 
ley failed the militan,' took over. That no- 
on was never sound. We suffered heavy pen- 
Ities for neglecting our military defenses in 
ime of peace and were guilty of the crime of 
impting thieves. The Departments of Defense 
id State have a vital common objective. It 
, in the familiar words of the preamble to 

' Made on the occasion of the commissioning of the 
.S.S. America at Portsmouth, Va., on Jan. 23 (press 
elease 11 ) . 

our Constitution, "to secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." 

I am glad to be able to report that the Depart- 
ments of State and Defense have never worked 
in closer hannony in support of the President 
than they do today. This common effort is re- 
flected not only at the Cabinet level — Secretary 
[of Defense Eobert S.] McNamara and my- 
self — but through all ranks on both sides of the 
Potomac. The distinguished Secretary of the 
Navy, Paul H. Nitze, embodies this fusion of 
purpose in his own personal background and 
experience and in leading the Navy — a service 
which has had the widest range of experience in 
all parts of the world since its own creation at 
the beginning of our Republic. 

The U.S. and the World Community 

To understand our relations with the rest of 
the world, we must remind ourselves of the rev- 
olutionary changes that have occurred through- 
out the world in the past 20 years. "We have 
witnessed an "explosion" of states — the dissolu- 
tion of great colonial empires and the creation 
of many new nations. There has been clear re- 
alization among peoples everywhere that they 
need not live in poverty and misery. And we 
have the unresolved and underlying crisis of our 
times: the struggle between two diametrically 
opposed ideas of the way in which the world 
should be organized — between those who be- 
lieve in and promote the communization of the 
world and those who believe in the kind of 
world projected in the Charter of the United 
Nations. These and other tumultuous events 
have taken place against the backdrop of rev- 
olutions in military technology. 

EBRUART 8, 1905 


In this kind of world the United States can- 
not find security by defending North America, 
or the Western Hemisphere, or one ocean, or 
Western Europe. We have to be concernetl 
with the whole world. We can be secure only 
to the extent that this planet is safe for freedom. 
In recent years there has been a growing 
tendency among some leaders in the free world 
to speak and act as if the danger of a major 
war had receded. This tendency perhaps has 
been aggravated by the dispute between Moscow 
and Peiping and the movement toward more 
autonomy in Eastern Europe. 

To the extent that the danger of major out- 
right aggression has receded, it is because of 
the strength of the free world, above all, the 
formidable military power of the United States. 
To relax would be to invite aggression. 

In Ms recent state of the Union address, 
President Jolmson said : ^ 

... we have built a military power strong enough 
to meet any threat and destroy any adversary. And 
that superiority will continue to grow so long as this 
oflSce is mine — and you sit on Capitol Hill. 

We must maintain our vigilance and our ef- 
forts until the ideas and institutions of freedom 
are secure and the coercive systems of the Com- 
munist world revolution are turned back by the 
community of nations. We must try to win 
this ultimate victory without the terrible devas- 
tation of a great war if possible. The first ob- 
jective, therefore, of our military forces is to 
deter the use of force by the enemies of freedom. 

It is essential that we remain prepared to meet 
any attack or threat against ourselves or our 
allies, with either nuclear or conventional 
weapons. We must improve our capacity, and 
that of our allies, to deal with lesser forms of 
aggression, such as the infiltration of arms and 
men across national frontiers. By doctrine and 
training, the Communists have turned to these 
more subtle forms of aggression. It is just as 
essential that guerrilla aggression be defeated 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America today as it 
was that it be defeated in Greece in 1947. 

We must try to examine and grasp more fully 
the meaning of military power in those situa- 
tions which do not call for the total destruction 
of an enemy or even for classic military opera- 

tions. We must give more thought to the kind j 

of military-political instrmnents needed in these \ 

situations, including the role of ships, such as - 
this carrier America. 

Role of the Navy i 

History abounds with the use of naval forces | 
to convey our commitments and determination, j 
For nearly two decades the 6th Fleet has been | 
a strong and stabilizing influence in the Mediter- j 
ranean. In a few weeks the U.S.S. Claude V. ' 
Richetts will deploy to the 6th Fleet to demon- | 
strate seapower in a special context: the ability ' 
of sailors from many NATO navies to live 
and work together in manning a highly so- 
phisticated ship.^ 

For many years the 7th Fleet has been a ; 
major stabilizing force in the Western Pacific. ■; 
Today it continues its patrols from the Sea of ^ 
Japan to the South China Sea, ever ready to ' 
protect the interest of t\\Q United States and the | 
security of our friends— a watchdog of peace 
in an area continuously threatened by an im- 
perialist Peiping and its partners in aggression, i' 
Recently the massive capabilities of the U.S.S. ■' 
Daniel Boone, the first Polaris submarine de- < 
ployed to the Pacific, have been added to those 
of the 7th Fleet. ; 

Nearer home are our naval forces in American ; 
waters— North, Central, and South American. 
In the missile crisis of October 1962 they played 
a vital role in a victory that was achieved with- 
out war. Today they stand guard against ag- 
gression by Castro's Cuba against our friends 
and neighbors to the south. As we look ahead, 
we look forward to a closer partnership with 
Latin American forces in this task, buildmg on 
the highly successful combined naval training 
exercises known as Operation Unitas. I hope 
our friends in this hemisphere will regard the 
naming of this great ship— AmeWca— as appro- 
priate and fitting. For she now joins our other 
naval forces whose mission is the security not 
only of the United States and North America 
but of all of the Americas and, indeed, of all 


= BtTLLETlN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

"For remarks made by Secretary Rusk, Secretary 
Nitze, and Admiral McDonald when the U.S.S. CJauie 
r. Ricketts visited at Washington, D.C., see ibid., 
Nov. 9, 1964, p. 660. 



nations which are determined to defend their 

As Secretary of State, I have special feelings 
about the Navy. First, there is the fact that 
the State Department shares ■with the Navy an 
intore.-^t in the Marine Corps, and not only for 
the important role it plays as a member of our 
fighting forces. Marine Security Guards serve 
in our embassies all over the world. They are 
fine representatives of the United States and 
symbols of security not only to our official rep- 
sentatives but to all Americans who visit our 
smbassies overseas. Our Memorial Court in the 
State Department Building is dedicated to the 
United States Marine Guards, along with our 
Foreign Service officers and others who gave 
'heir lives "for the cause of peace and friendship 
iniong nations." 

Flexibility of Seapower 

^[ore broadly, seapower has certain inherent 
•li:iracteristic3 for which a Secretary of State 
nnrt; be grateful. It can move everywhere 
hrough international waters and bring an 
American presence into any area promptly and 

"^i>apower is flexible. It can pack a big 
'.ach, or a small one, or readily perform the 
>oaceful missions of mercy or of good will. 
Thus, from the point of view of a Secretai-y of 
^tate, seapower has important special advan- 
ai:(>s and an aircraft carrier is a unique instru- 
nent of the American commitment both to peace 
nd to freedom. 

Despite our tremendous power, our military 
■iirces are limited in relation to our global 
oimnitments. Seapower might well close 
xisting gaps in our strategic deployments, with 
he greatest range of possible responses. It 
ould lielp to give us a maximum of options in 
risis situations. And, as does our Concord 
Hjuadron in the Indian Ocean, it could convey 
uiet but powerful assurance from the United 
>tates of America. 

In closing I would like to salute the officers 
nd men of this great ship. Your ship and tlie 
ircraft she will carry are among our most 
lodem, sophisticated, and complex weapons 
\ -tems. But they cannot operate themselves. 
)nly the highly skilled, carefully trained, and 

dedicated officers and men who man the America 
can make it possible for her to perform her 
mission. You number nearly 5,000. You iiave 
an exacting task. Your hours will be long and 
the work often hazardous. Separations from 
your families are inevitable. But you can have 
the deep pride and satisfaction of serving your 
counti-y and the cause of freedom to which our 
nation has been committed since its birth. 

And the American people will be proud of 
you. You have volunteered to do a job, and 
you will do it well. And not just today, but in 
the months and years to come, as you carry 
United States power and presence throughout 
the oceans of the world, we will remember how 
greatly we are in your debt. Those who love 
liberty will be grateful to you. And you can 
proudly claim that you have served on the 
U.S.S. America. 

I wish you the best of luck, fair winds, 
and smooth sailing. 

United States Reaffirms Support 
of Geneva Agreements on Laos 

Following is a statement made on January 18 
by Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office 
of News, in response to a number of questions 
about Laos and the Geneva agreements. 

We continue to support the Geneva agree- 
ments and the independence and neutrality of 
Laos which they are intended to achieve. Our 
actions are designed to preserve the Geneva 
settlement. We have for some time been assist- 
ing the Royal Lao Government, at its request, to 
help defend the independence, territorial integ- 
rity, and neutrality of Laos. Tins assistance 
has been made necessary by the repeated and 
blatant violations of the Geneva agreements by 
the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces 
since the agreements were signed on July 23, 
1962.^ In view of the serious Communist vio- 
lations of the Geneva agreements, we believe 
that this assistance to help Laos defend itself 
is entirely justified. 

> For text, see Buuletin of Ang. 13. 1962, p. 259. 

FRRUARY 8, 1965 


American Policy in South Viet-Nam and Soutiieast Asia 

hy William P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

When my old friend Senator [Stuart] Sym- 
ington relayed your invitation to come here, I 
was delighted to accept. I shall make only one 
partisan statement tonight and that is to say 
how fortunate you in Missouri are in your dis- 
tinguished senior Senator. For the rest, I 
would like to speak on the topic you have 
chosen — "American Policy in South Viet-Nam 
and Southeast Asia" — totally without regard to 
partisanship. That topic and the issues it 
raises concern all of us, as Americans. 

I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets of 

1. Kow did we come to be in South Viet- 
Nam? How does what we are doing there re- 
late to our wider purposes in the world, to our 
specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word, to our 
national interests? 

2. Wliat has been the course of events in 
Viet-Nam that has brought us to the present 
situation ? 

3. What are the key problems, and what can 
we do to help in solving them and in achieving 
our objectives? 

A Look at History 

The first question requires a look at history. 

Even when the Far East was much more dis- 
tant than it is today, we Americans had deep 
concern for developments there. Americans 
pioneered in trade and missionary effort with 
China and in opening up Japan to Western 
influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colo- 

' Address made before the Washington Chamber of 
Commerce, Washington, Mo., on Jan. 23 (press release 

nial power m the Philippines but began almostij 
at once to prepare the way for independence andu 
self-government there — an independence prom- j 
ised by Act of Congi-ess in 1936 and achieved oni! 
schedule in 1946. By the 1930's, we had widei; 
interests of many types in the Far East, though;! 
only few direct contacts in Southeast Asia apartil 
from the individual Americans who had served'j 
over decades as political advisers to the inde-ij 
pendent Kingdom of Thailand. i 

Events then took a more ominous turn. Wei; 
became aware that the ambitions of Japanese; 
military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a 
threat not only to the specific interests of our- . 
selves and other Western nations but to the 
peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. ; 
China, in which we had taken a lead in dis- 
mantling the 19th-century system of foreign , 
special privileges, was progressively threatened ' 
and large parts overrun. We ourselves were; 
finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the' 
Philippines. We responded to aggi-ession by 
conducting with our allies a major Pacific war: 
that cost the United States alone 272,700 casual-' ■ 
ties and over a hundred billion dollars. 

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated 1 
and the way apparently cleared for an Asia of i 
free and independent national states that would | 
be progressively freed of colonialism, that need 
threaten neither each other nor neighboring 
states, and that could tackle in their own way I 
the etei-nal problems of building political and 
economic structures that would satisfy the 
aspiration of their peoples. 

That kind of Far East was a pretty good: 
definition of our national interests then. It i£| 
equally valid today. We cared about the FaJ; 



East, and we care today, because we know that 
what happens there — amonjr peoples number- 
ing 33 percent of the world's population, with 
great talent, past historic greatness, and capac- 
ity — is bound to make a crucial difference 
whether there will be the kind of world in 
whicli the common ideals of freedom can spread, 
aations live and work together without strife, 
uid, most basic of all, we ourselves, in the long 
run, survive as the kind of nation we are deter- 
nined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East 
s our stake in a peaceful and secure world, as 
iistinct from a violent and chaotic one. But 
hero were three great flaws in the 1945 picture 
ifter the defeat of Japan. 

Three Flaws in the 1945 Picture 

1. In China a civil war had been raging since 
Jie 1920's between the Government, led by 
3hiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist 
novement. After a brief and edgy truce during 
he war against Japan, that civil war was re- 
turned in circumstances where the Government 
lad been gravely weakened. We assisted tliat 
jovemment in every way possible. Mistakes 
nay have been made, but in the last analy- 
is mainland China could not have been saved 
Tom conmiimism without the commitment of 
najor United States ground and air forces 
o a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced 
vith a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia 
.gainst Europe and the Near East, we did not 
oake — and perhaps could not then have made 
-that commitment. And there came to power 
kn the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Com- 
nunist. regime filled with hatred of the West, 
rith the vision of a potential dominant role 
or China, but imbued above all with a primi- 
ive Communist ideology in its most virulent 
nd expansionist form. 

2. In Korea a divided country stood uneasily, 
alf free and half Communist. With our mili- 
\ry might sharply reduced after the war, as 
•art of what may have been an inevitable slack- 
ning of effort, we withdrew our forces and 
educed our economic aid before there was in 
xistence a strong South Korean defensive 
apacity. With Soviet backing. North Korea 
ttacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. 
jVith the Soviets then absent from the U.N. 

Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn 
the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to 
assist South Korea. The United States played 
by far the greatest outside role in a conflict tJiat 
brought 157,530 United States casualties, cost 
us at least $18 billion in direct expenses, and in 
the end — after Communist China had also in- 
tervened — restored an independent South 
Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea 
to be worked out in the future. 

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected 
three elements : 

— a recognition that aggression of any sort 
must be met early and head-on or it will have 
to be met later and in tougher circumstances. 
We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's — 
Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czecho- 

— a recognition that a defense line in Asia, 
stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not 
adequately define our vital interests, that those 
vital interests could be affected by action on 
the mainland of Asia. 

— an understanding that, for the future, a 
power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, 
that there must be local political, economic, and 
milit;\i7 strength in being to make aggression 
unprofitable, but also that there must be a 
demonstrated willingness of major external 
power both to assist and to intervene if re- 

3. In Smttheast Asia, finally, there was a 
third major flaw: the difficulty of liquidating 
colonial regimes and replacing them by new 
and stable independent governments. The 
Philippines became mdependent and with our 
help overcame the ravages of war and the Com- 
munist Huk rebellion. The British, who had 
likewise prepared India and Burma and made 
them independent, were in the process of doing 
the same in Malaya, even as tliey joined with 
the Malayans in beating back a 12-year Com- 
munist subversive effort. Indonesia was less 
well prepared; it gained its independence too, 
with our support, but with scars that have con- 
tinued to affect the otherwise natural and 
healthy development of Indonesian nationalism. 

French Indochina was the toughest case. 
The French had thought in terms of a slow evo- 

EBRU.UIT 8, 1965 


lution to an eventual status within some French 
union of states — a concept too leisurely to fit the 
postwar mood of Asia. And militant Viet- 
namese nationalism had fallen to the leadership 
of dedicated Commvmists. 

We all know the result. Even with sulistan- 
tial help from vis, France was imable to defeat 
the Commimist-led nationalist movement. De- 
spite last-minute promises of independence, the 
struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to 
preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could 
only have been won, again, by a major United 
States military commitment — and perhaps not 
even then. The result was the settlement at 
Geneva.^ The accords reached there were al- 
most certainly the best achievable, but they left 
a situation with many seeds of future trouble. 
Briefly : 

1. North Viet-Nam was militantly Commu- 
nist and had developed during the war against 
the French an army well equipped and highly 
skilled in both conventional and subversive 
warfare. From the start, North Viet-Nam 
planned and expected to take over the south 
and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking 
that this would probably happen by sheer decay 
under pressure but prepared to resort to other 
means if needed. 

2. South Viet-Nam had no effective or popu- 
lar leadership to start with, was demoralized 
and imprepared for self-government, and had 
only the remnants of the Vietnamese military 
forces who had fought with the French. 
Under the accords, external military help was 
limited to a few hundred advisers. Apart from 
its natural self-sufEciency in food. South Viet- 
Nam had few assets that appeared to match 
those of the north in the struggle that was sure 
to come. 

3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some re- 
spects, more remote from North Viet-Nam, with 
a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong historical 
tradition, and the freedom to accept external 
assistance as she saw fit. From the start Siha- 
nouk insisted, with our full and continuing 
support, on a status of neutrality. 

" For the texts of Geneva agreements on the cessation 
of hostilities in Indochina, see American Foreign Pol- 
icy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, vol. I ( Department of 
State publication 6446), pp. 750-785. 

4. Laos, however, was less unified and was 
left under the accords with a built-in and legal- 
ized Communist presence, a disrupted and weak 
economy, and no military forces of significance. 

Such was the situation President Eisenhower 
and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two 
things were clear : that in the absence of exter- 
nal help communism was virtually certain to 
take over the successor states of Indochina and 
to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps 
beyond, and that with France no longer ready 
to act, at least in South Viet-Nam, no power 
other than the United States could move in to 
help fill the vacuiun. Their decision, expressed 
in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was 
to move in to help these countries. Besides 
South Viet-Nam and more modest efforts in 
Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was 
begun to Thailand. 

The appropriations for these actions wer& > 
voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 i 
the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast Asia i 
Treaty,' to which Thailand and the Philippines 
adhered along with the United States, Britain^ 
France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. 
Although not signers of the treaty, South Viet- , 
Nam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the 
SEATO members for help against aggression. 

So a commitment was made, with the sup- 
port of both political parties, that has guided ' 
our policy in Southeast Asia for a decade now. 
It was not a commitment that envisaged a 
United States position of power in Southeast 
Asia or LTnited States military bases there. We ; 
threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment 
that substituted United States responsibility 
for the basic responsibility of the nations them- ' 
selves for their own defense, political stability, 
and economic progress. It tvas a commitment 
to do what we could to help these nations attain > 
and maintain the independence and security to 
which they were entitled- — both for their own; 
sake and because we recognized that, like South 
Korea, Southeast Asia was a key area of the 
mainland of Asia. If it fell to Conununist con- 
trol, this would enormously add to the momen- 
tum and power of the expansionist Communist 
regimes in Communist China and North Viet- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1954. p. 393. 



Nam and thus to the threat to the whole free- 
world position in tiie Pacitic. 

U.S. Policy in the Far East 

I have come at a statement of our policy in 
the Far East by tlie route of liistory, for policy 
is the fruit of history and experience, seldom of 
some abstract design from a drawing board. 
In essence, our policy derives from (1) the fact 
of the Connnunist nations of Asia and their 
policies; (2) the lessons of the thirties and of 
Korea; (3) the logical extension of that fact 
and these lessons to what has happened in 
Southeast Asia. 

It is possible to define our total policy in 
Asia, as it has existed at least since 1954, in 
quite simple terms. 

1. Our objectives are those of the free na- 
tions of the area — that they should develop as 
they see fit, in peace and without outside inter- 
ference. We would hope that this development 
will be in the direction of increasingly demo- 
cratic institutions and that there will be con- 
tinued and expanded ties of partnership and 
contact with ourselves and with the other na- 
tions of the free world. Yet we know that 
Asia will develop as the leaders and peoples of 
Asia wish it to develop, and we would not have 
it otherwise. 

2. Asia confronts two central problems: tlie 
threat of Communist nations whose objective 
is domination and enslavement, and enormous 
economic and political problems that would 
fexist in any case. If these two problems cannot 
be solved over time, the Asia of the future will 
be the breeding ground of ever more direct 
threats to our national interest and could be the 
source of a third world war. 

I 3. To deal with these central problems, the 
free nations of the area need the help of the 
United States and of our major allies. Out- 
numbered in population and in military forces 
iy the Communist nations as they are — by 
learly two to one if you leave out India — the 
free nations of Asia cannot do the job alone. 
We cannot do it for them, but we have the re- 
sources and the military power to play a crucial 

4. The peace and security of East and South- 
east Asia are indivisible. If the Communist 

powers succeed in aggression, they will be 
encouraged, free nations discouraged, and the 
inevitable process of evolution toward modera- 
tion within the Communist countries them- 
selves postponed or perhaps prevented alto- 
gether. We have seen the dynamics of Hitlerite 
Germany and militarist Japan checked and 
defeated and the West Germany and Japan of 
today emerge as respected major nations of the 
world. Thanks to NATO, our handling of 
the Cuban crisis, and other actions, something 
like the same process may be underway with 
Soviet Russia today. Such a process of mod- 
eration will come eventually for tlie Commu- 
nist nations of Asia if they are checked. It 
cannot come if they are not, and any loss of 
free nations makes the future task that much, 
and perhaps immensely, more difficult. 

So much, then, for how we came to become 
involved in South Viet-Nam and how that in- 
volvement relates to our wider policies and 
purposes. In simple terms, a victory for the 
Communists in South Viet-Nam would inevi- 
tably make the neighboring states more suscep- 
tible to Communist pressure and more vulner- 
able to intensified subversion supported by 
military pressures. Aggression by "wars of 
national liberation" would gain enhanced pres- 
tige and power of intimidation throughout the 
world, and many threatened nations might well 
become less hopeful, less resilient, and their will 
to resist undermined. These are big stakes 

Course of Events In Viet-Nam 

Let us now wind the reel back to South Viet- 
Nam in 10.54 and trace the course of events to 
the present. 

From 1954 to 1959 great progress was made. 
In Ngo Dinh Diem a stanchly nationalist and 
anti-Communist leader was found. Against all 
odds, including the opposition in 1954-55 of 
old-line military leaders and religious groups, 
he took hold. Under his rule tlie nationalist 
feeling of the newly formed coimtry — which 
does differ to a significant degree from the 
north — was aroused, and it soon became and has 
remained clear that, whatever the extent of their 
attachment to particular governments in their 
own country, the great mass of the people of 

T^RRUART 8, 1965 


South Viet-Nam do not wish to be ruled by com- 
munism or from Hanoi. 

On the economic and social front education 
was vastly expanded, major land reforms were 
carried out, and the economy grew at a rapid 
rate, far outstripping what was happening un- 
der the Communist yoke in tlie north. Instead 
of decaying and dropping by default into 
communism. South Viet-Nam was in a fair way 
toward becoming really able to stand on its own 

In all this the United States played a major 
helping role. On the military side we helped 
to create a fairly decent army almost from 
scratch, with a normal Military Assistance Ad- 
visory Group of a few hundred men. That 
army was never big enough to threaten the 
north, nor was it meant to be ; it may well have 
been too much oriented to conventional warfare 
and not to the handling of a sophisticated guer- 
rilla aggression. 

Then, beginning roughly in 1959, two trends 
got underway that are still today at the heart 
of the problem. 

First, the Diem government, instead of stead- 
ily broadening its base and training key groups 
for responsibility, began to narrow it. More 
and more the regime became personal in char- 
acter. Opposition parties, which had previ- 
ously been active in relatively free elections, 
were driven underground, and there began a 
process of repression which, while never drastic 
by the standards we shoidd apply to govern- 
ments in new nations, much less by those of 
Communist countries, nevertheless alienated in- 
creasing numbers of the all-too-small pool of 
trained men capable of helping to govern 

Second, Hanoi went on the march. Seeing 
itself thwarted in both South Viet-Nam and 
Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas into 
the south and increasing cadres to assist the 
Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos. In 
South Viet-Nam there had been from the start 
thousands of agents and many pockets of Com- 
munist influence left behind in the division of 
Viet-Nam, and as early as 19.57 a campaign of 
assassination of local officials had begun tliat 
tallies on the map almost exactly with the areas 
under strongest Communist control today. In 
1959 such activity was stepped up, guerrilla 

imits formed, and the real campaign got 

That campaign is sometimes referred to as a 
civil war. But let us not delude ourselves. 
Discontent there may have been — and local re- 
cruiting by the Viet Cong, largely through in- 
timidation. But the whole campaign would 
never have been possible without the direction, 
personnel, key materiel, and total support com- 
ing from Hanoi and without, too, the strong ; 
moral support, and key materiel when needed, 
provided by Peiping and, up to 19G2 at least, by „ 
the Soviet Union. Thousands of highly trained i 
men coming from the north, along with thei 
crucial items of equipment and munitions — these i 
have been from the start the mainspring of the ( 
Viet Cong insurgency. Tliis has been all along i 
a Commmiist subversive aggression, in total vie- 1 
lation of the Geneva accords as well as general, 
principles of international behavior. j 

Indeed the true nature of the struggle has 4 
been publicly stated many times by Hanoi itself,i| 
beginning with a 1960 Communist Party con-i| 
ference in North Viet-Nam which declared the, 
policy of, as they put it, "liberating" the south. I 

By early 1961, South Viet-Nam was clearly' 
in difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice^ 
President, visited the country in the spring, and j 
we stepped up our military supplies and tried | 
to turn our training emphasis increasingly toj 
the guerrilla front. Then, in the fall of 1961, 
a series of key assassinations and raids on Gov-, 
emment centers brought South Vietnamese! 
morale to a critical point. Something more wasi 
needed. President Kennedy considered and ret- 1 
jected the sending of United States combat units' 
to fight the Viet Cong. Instead, he respondec| 
to the request of the South Vietnamese Govern ' 
ment for American military advisers with Viet-; 
namese units and for Americans to furnish heli-j 
copter and air transport lift, combat ah 
training, communications, and, in short, ever- 
possible form of assistance short of combat units 

But the military effort was and is only ontj 
aspect of the stniggle. The economic front wa: 
equally important, and a smaller but extraordi 
narily dedicated group of civilian American i 
went into the dangerous countryside, unarmec 
and often unescorted, to help in the creation o 
the fortified hamlets that soon became, and re; 



main, a key feature of strategj', and to bring to 
tlio villages tlie schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, 
and other improvements that meant so much 
and would sei-ve to show the Government's con- 
cern for its people. 

The basic strategj- adopte<l in early 1902 was 
sound and was, indeed, in key respects the same 
as the strategy that prevailed against com- 
munism in Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines. 
It is a strategy,' that takes patience and local 
leadership and that takes learning and experi- 
ence as well. The Vietnamese and we are still 
l&irning and changing today and will go on 
doing so. 

Under the advisory concept, the American 
strength in South Viet-Xam rose to 12,000 by 
I inid-1062 (eventually to the present 23,000), and 
with our help the South Vietnamase began to 
reverse the slow tide of growing Communist 
gains. By the spring of 1963, things seemed 
to be on the upswing, not only in the judgment 
of senior Americans but in that of experienced 
obsen-ers from third countries. 

Yet the unhappy tendencies of the Diem gov- 
ernment had persisted, despite all the quiet ad- 
vice we could give in favor of reforms. The 
stubbornness and inflexibility wliich had been 
his great assets in the early days after 1954 had 
now become serious drawbacks. The Buddhist 
uprisings of the spring of 1963 brought the po- 
litical situation to the forefront again. Now, 
Buddhism as a religion is not nearly as dom- 
inant in South Viet-Nam as it is elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia— Thailand, Laos, and Cam- 
. bodia. The adherents of Buddhism may not be 
even a majority of South Vietnamese, and there 
are significant Catholic and other groups as 
well as large numbers of adlierents to older 
religious beliefs. Nonetheless, Buddhists are 
the most numerous faith, they are entitled to 
fair treatment, and they had some case against 
the Diem government for personal discrimina- 
tion, though little, according to the findings of 
a United Nations Commission, for true religious 
persecution. But these grievances might have 
been met without serious trouble if they had not 
been fanned by a small group of leaders who 
were and are, in fact, politically motivated. 

Unfortimately the Diem government refused 
to compromise or to redress the areas of legit- 

imate grievance and in August sent the army 
into the pagodas of Saigon and other cities, fol- 
lowing up with a drastic campaign of suppres- 
sion against students and a wide circle of politi- 
cal opponents. As a result, by late September — 
when I personally accompanied Secretary [of 
Defense Robert S.] McNamara to Saigon — it 
was clear that Diem and his brother Nhu had 
aroused wide popular opposition and, perhaps 
most crucial, had alienated almost to the break- 
ing point the key trained elements within the 
Government structure itself, both civilian and 

Although Ambasador [Henry Cabot] Lodge 
continued to urge reforms that might still have 
saved the goverimient. Diem did not respond, 
and on November 1, 1963, he was overthrown, 
he and Nhu — most unfortunately — killed, and 
a new military govermnent installed by force. 

No one could then tell whether the new gov- 
ernment would be better. Clearly, it had to be 
military in the first instance, and the first mili- 
tary group, under General [Duong Van] Minh, 
had considerable popular backing. Yet it was 
ineffective and tended to throw out the baby 
with the bath, replacing so many military and 
provincial officials that the way was opened for 
major Viet Cong gains. Then, in January, Gen- 
eral [Nguyen] Khanh took control in a blood- 
less coup. He showed ability on the military 
and economic front, but he, in turn, decided to 
turn over the government to civilian leadere to 
be selected by consultation among representa- 
tives of the key groups — the Buddliists, the 
Catholics, the military, lalwr, the religious sects, 
the various areas including the considerable 
body of refugees from the north, past political 
groupings, and so on. 

The Political Situation Today 

The revsult was tiie present government under 
Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong, a man of 
determination and character, dedicated to fair- 
ness to all groups. He is wrestling today es- 
sentially with the same kind of problems that 
Diem faced and overcame in 1954, but in the far 
more difficult internal security crisis brought on 
by the Viet Cong aggression, which has been 
slowly extending the areas of Commimist con- 
trol in the countryside and the pace of guerrilla 



and terrorist activity, even to Saigon itself. 

So the political situation today is critical, and 
its resolution is central to turning the war 
around and restoring an independent and secure 
South Viet-Nam. That task must essentially be 
done by the Vietnamese people, mider Vietnam 
ese civilian and military leaders, all under a 
government that unites the divergent political- 
interest groups and that gives orders that can 
be carried out. 

I have dwelt at such length on the political 
history because it is this aspect that is today in 
the headlines, as it is the greatest concern of 
our representatives in Saigon and of the Viet- 
namese leaders themselves, who must find the 

And may I pause here, apropos of the head- 
lines, to say that I tliink the American people 
are getting the facts. We in Government follow 
closely what is said in the newspapers and maga- 
zines and on TV; part of our job is to see that 
these media are properly informed and given 
access to everything except for those few details 
that are necessarily matters of security in what 
is, after all, a war situation. I think we are 
doing our job and that the media are doing 
theirs. The picture that you, as thoughtful 
citizens, get is in fact the picture that we have 
on all essential points. If that picture is com- 
plex or not entirely clear, believe me our pic- 
ture is the same, for that is the nature of the 

The real point of the political history in 
South Viet-Nam is that it should cause us no 
amazement and no despair. Was it not 7 years 
between the end of the American Revolution 
and the making of a lasting Constitution, even 
for a new nation which had united to fight a war 
and had centuries of British evolution toward 
democratic self-government behind it? And 
how many new nations in the world today have 
found lasting stability in a decade, especially 
where there had been little preparation under 
colonialism, where the national historic tradi- 
tion was remote, and, above all, where a violent 
aggressor was striking constantly at the very 
fabric of government? Take, if you will, one 
fact alone — ^that in the first 8 months of 1964 
the Viet Cong assassinated more than 400 local 
officials and kidnaped another 700— and try in 

your mind to project what an equivalent amount 
of gangsterism would do to government per- 
formance in this country and then to project 
that effect, in turn, onto the situation in a coun- 
try such as South Viet-Nam. 

So this is a tough war, and tlie Vietnamese 
are a tough people to have stood up under it 
and to be holding their heads above water after 
20 years of violence and uncertainty. 

A Course for the Future 

How should we now, then, approach this ■ 
situation, as Americans? 

Above all, we must stand firm and be patient. 
We never thought in 1961, or in 1954, that the 
task would be easy. North Viet-Nam had cer- 
tain advantages: 

—Experience and sophistication in every as- 
pect of subversion and political warfare. 

—Dedicated and fanatic agents who for the 
most part came from the south to fight the 
French and then returned to areas they knewiij 

— An open corridor through Laos to keep up 
the supply of guerrillas and supplies. In the 
past year, such infiltration has markedly in- 
creased and has included for the first time sig- 
nificant numbers of indigenous North Viet- 
namese trained in North Viet-Nam in regular 1 
military luiits. 

— A numerical ratio of guerrilla forces to 
Government forces that is well below the ratios 
of 10 to 1 that have been found necessaiy for 
success in past guerrilla wars. There are today^ 
in South Viet-Nam perhaps 35,000 hard-core 
Viet Cong fighters and another 60,000 to 80,000 
local Viet Cong forces, against roughly 400,000 
militai7 and paramilitary forces for the Gov- 
ernment, or a ratio of about 4 to 1. 

—The internal political divisions and, above 
all, the inexperience in government of the SoutI 


Yet the balance sheet is by no means all on^ 

— Our advisory effort, on all fronts, has done' 
great things and, in the wide personal relation- 
ships involved, must stand almost miique in the 
history of relations between an Asian nation 
under fire and an outside Western nation. Al- 



tliough there are from time to time signs of 
anti-American feeling, working relationships at 
all levels remain close and friendly. 

— With our help, the Government has been 
al>le to maintain economic stability and to move 
lu help areas secured from the Viet Cong. 

— Our inilitai-y ell'ort and our equipment, sup- 
plied to tlie Vietnamese, have largely offset the 
unfavorable numerical ratio favoring the Viet 

— The Vietnamese military forces continue to 
fight well. Our own military men consider 
most of them as tough and brave as any in tlie 
world. Though there have been military re- 
verses, there have also been significant vic- 
tories — which sometimes do not make headlines. 
On the military front, the Viet Cong is not 
capable of anything like a Dien Bien Phu. 

— Above all, the Vietnamese people are not 
voting with their feet or their hearts for com- 

As to our basic policy, the alternatives to our 
present course might be, on the one hand, to 
"withdraw or to negotiate on some basis such 
as what is called ''neutralization," or, on the 
other hand, for the Vietnamese and ourselves 
to enlarge the war, bringing pressure to per- 
suade Hanoi, by force, that the game they are 
playing is not worth it. 

It is also suggested that the United Nations 
might bo of help. There may emerge possibili- 
ties for a U.N. role, but it is not clear that the 
U.N., which has been xmable to carry through 
commitments such as the Congo, would be able 
to act effectively to deal with this far more dif- 
ficult situation in its present form. And this 
has been the public judgment of the U.N. Secre- 
tary-General, Mr. U Thant. 

As to the basic alternatives, so long as South 
Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight, with- 
drawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that pro- 
duced a return to the essentials of the 1954 
accords and thus an independent and secure 

South Viet-Nam would of course be an answer, 
indeed tJie answer. But negotiation would 
hardly be promising that admitted communism 
to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, 
or that exposed South Viet-Nam and perhaps 
other countries of the area to renewed Com- 
munist aggression at will, with only nebulous 
or remote guarantees. 

As for enlarging our own actions, we cannot 
speak surely about the future, for the aggres- 
sors themselves share the responsibility for such 
eventualities. We have shown in the Gulf of 
Tonkin that we can act, and North Viet-Nam 
knows it and knows its own weaknesses. But we 
seek no wider war, and we must not suppose tliat 
there are quick or easy answers in this direction. 

The root of the problem, to repeat, is in South 
Viet-Nam. We must persist in our efforts there, 
with patience rather than petulance, coolness 
rather than recklessness, and with a continuing 
ability to separate the real from the merely 

As a great power, we are now and will con- 
tinue to find ourselves in situations where we 
simply do not have easy choices, where there 
simply are not immediate or ideal solutions 
available. We caimot then allow ourselves to 
yield to frustration but must stick to the job, 
doing all we can and doing it better. 

The national interests that have brought 
us into the Viet-Nam struggle are valid, and 
they do not become less so just because the going 
gets rough and the end is not yet in sight. Pres- 
ident Johnson said in his state of the Union 
message : * 

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That 
will come only when aggressors leave their 
neighbors in peace. 

"VVliat is at stake is the cause of freedom, and 
in that cause America will never be found want- 

* Ihid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

FEBRUART 8, 1965 


The Defense of Freedom In Viet-Nam 

by Gen. Harold K. Johnson 

Chief of Staff, United States Army ' 

I believe I may best serve our many mutual 
interests by speaking tonight on the subject of 
Viet-Nam. Five weeks ago tomorrow night I 
departed Saigou en route to Bangkok after 
spending 4 days looking around South Viet- 
Nam. I spent a week in the country in March 
and earh' April. Thus, I had a chance to make 
some comparisons. Very clearly, Viet-Xam is 
a test case for United States power in our deal- 
ings with the Commimist world. Accordingly, 
I want to ti-y to explain some parts of our ef- 
fort there by covering three broad points in my 
remarks tonight. 

First, what is Viet-Nam? second, what are 
the key problems there for the United States? 
and third, how are we progressing in solving 
the problems ? 

History of Viet-Nam 

With resj>ect to my first point, what is Viet- 
Nam I it is most important to an understanding 
of all that is going on there to have an idea, 
at least, of just what constitutes the Republic 
of Viet-Xam. 

We normally think of Viet-Nam as one of 
the very new countries born in the aftermath 
of World War II. Yet the people of Viet- 
Nam are an old people with a long and proud 
tradition of civilization. Until 1946 the Viet- 
namese were commonly known as Annamites, 
and the borders of present-day Viet-Xam are 
essentially those which the ancient Empire of 
iVnnam reached about 1S02, more than 160 yeai-s 

' Address made before the National Security Indus- 
trial Association at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 14. 

The most significant feature of Annam's very 
long history is her stubborn struggle for inde-: 
pendence from China. Few nations can boast 
a similar record of tenacity in defending theii 
national freedom. 

The Kingdom of Annam, wliich was old when 
the Cliristian era began, suffered a first con-i 
quest by China m the early second century. 
For the next 900 years Annam was consideredi 
a province of China. But around the year 
1000, a nationwide rebellion drove the Chinese 
out, and the reestablished kingdom stayed in-i 
dependent for the next four centuries. Then 
Annam was conquered by China once more, but 
after 20 years of occupation the foreign con^ 
querors were driven out again by the freedom- 
loving Annamites. From the time of this self- 
liberation, in 1428, the Kingdom of Annam, 
later called an empire, managed to maintain a 
status of independence from China. It was 
only in 1863 that French colonizers moved into 
this area and assumed control of that section 
of the country south of Saigon. The remainder 
of the country, including what is now North 
Viet-Xam, became a protectorate of France in 
1884. In this protectorate an Emperor of An-; 
nam was the nommal ruler tmtil the end oi 
World War II. 

From mid-1940 to mid-1945, all of Indochina 
(Annam, Laos, and Cambodia) was occupied bj 
the Japanese. During these 5 occupation years 
the French civil administration was permitted 
to continue under Japanese coittrol, but theK 
developed a strong opposition, largely Com- 
munist directed, against both the Japanese and 
the French. Within days after Japan's sur- 
render in August 1945, these opposition ele-ii 



ments formed a revolutionary regime, headed by 
Conununist leader Ho Chi Miiih, wliich pro- 
claimed a Kepublic of Viet-Nam. The new 
Eepublic was to comprise the very area which, 
until the beginning of tiie colonial period in 
1863, had been the Empire of Annam. 

Viet-Nam Today 

The French were never able to regain full 
control in Indochina. In 1954 an international 
conference at Geneva cut Viet-Xam m two at 
the ITtJi parallel: the so-called "Democratic 
Kepublic of Viet-Xam'" (DEV) in the north im- 
der Conmiunist rule, and the Republic of Viet- 
Nam (RVX") in the south, a part of the free 
world. Of Viet-Xam's total 127,000 square 
miles, South Viet-Xam has slightly more than 
66,000. Of all Viet-X'am's present-day popula- 
tion, estimated at roughly 32 million. South 
Viet-Xam has about 15 million. In size, there- 
fore, South Viet-X'am is slightly smaller than 
the State of "Washington; in population, it 
equals California. 

The country is itself a land of curious mix- 
tures. It has three distinct types of terrain: 
rain forest in some parts accompanied by dense 
undergrowth, upland plateaus that remind a 
person of the eastern approaches to our own 
Eocky Mountains, and coastal areas and the 
delta that are completely under water during 
certain periods of the year. In the roughly one- 
third of the country south of Saigon there are 
very few roads because virtually all travel and 
all conmierce are conducted on inland water- 

j There are a great many ethnic groups in 
Viet-Xam. While the majority of the popula- 
tion are Vietnamese, there are enough dissident 
groups to create problems for a central govern- 
ment. At best, these groups are passively hos- 
tile: at worst, they defy the efforts of the Gov- 
ernment to exercise control over the areas in 
which they live. Many of the small businessmen 
of the country are Chinese, most of whom were 
not citizens until after 1954, when the Govem- 
nient authorized those Chinese bom in Viet- 
Xam to take out citizenship papers. Despite 
citizenship, there is still a basic question as to 
whether or not these Chinese are loyal to the 
land of their birth. 

Approximately 80 percent of the population 
live on farms — not farms as we know them, but 
small parcels of land designed to maintain a 
family, with just a little bit left over. Until 
just this past year. South Viet-Xam has contin- 
ued to be an exporter of rice, one of its basic 

To a far higher degree than most of the de- 
veloping countries, South Viet-Nam possesses 
the material and human resources of a dynamic 
society and the prerequisites for a normal, even 
prosperous life. But South Viet-Xam has not 
been permitted to live a normal existence for 
over two decades. It is a sign of amazing basic- 
root strength and resilience that South Viet- 
Xam, though battered, is still in there fight- 
ing — despite the turmoil and sufferings caused, 
first by 5 years of Japanese occupation, then by 
8 veal's of the Indochina war, and now by 10 
years of Communist insurgency against the 
Saigon Government. 

U.S. Commitment in South Viet-Nam 

I shall not now describe once more what you 
have heard and read over and over again, 
namely the nature and the frustrations of the 
war against the Communist guerrillas, who fight 
by ambush and ruse at a front that is every- 
where and yet is nowhere. All this you know 
without my having to repeat it for you. 

But why are we so deeply committed to help- 
ing the Eepublic of Viet-Xam? Let me quote 
you a brief passage from President Johnson's 
state of the Union address of January 4th, just 
past: ^ 

Why are we there? 

We are there, first, because a friendly nation has 
asked us for help against the Communist aggression. 
Ten years ago our President pledged our help. Three 
Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not 
break it now. 

Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. 
Twice in one generation we have had to fight against 
aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression 
now would only increase the danger of a much larger 

Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come 
only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace. 

What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and in that 
cause America will never be found wanting. 

' BtniETis of Jan. 2.j, 1965, p. 94. 

FEBRrART 8, 1965 

761-596—65 3 


As Secretary of State Dean Eusk said on a 
nationwide television interview, also this 
month : ^ 

It is going to require persistence . . . and a certain 
coolness in dealing with this problem . . . rather than 
taking reckless action which would move us off thought- 
lessly in either the direction of defeat or in the direc- 
tion of a very great catastrophe. 

Another question that is frequently asked, and 
that is certainly on the minds of at least some 
of you, is this: Since we Americans have such 
a great responsibility in South Viet-Nam, and 
since we provide such large amounts of aid to 
the country, why do we only "advise" the Viet- 
namese military instead of taking actual com- 
mand of operations ? 

This very question was posed to General 
[Maxwell D.] Taylor, now our Ambassador to 
Viet-N"am, by Life magazine a few weeks ago. 
He pointed out what such takeover would mean 
in practice. It would actually imply, he said, 
that "American minds and American wills" 
would have to be inserted at the points of deci- 
sion in 10 ministries and in each of the 45 prov- 
inces — and that "we Americans would have the 
wisdom, the foresight, the judgment to do better 
than the indigenous officials themselves are 
now doing." 

General Taylor added : 

I know of almost no example in history of the suc- 
cessful direct command of troops by foreign offi- 
cers. . . . We never took over direct command of Korean 
troops. We retained an advisory role, as here. We 
got excellent results in the long run, when leadership 
and training of the Koreans themselves reached the 
necessary level. 

I am convinced that the concept of Americans taking 
over command would be a failure. It would really 
defeat the purpose that we are here for — namely, to 
create a free nation that can stand on its own feet. 

I have had personal experience in World 
War II and in Korea with directing the activi- 
ties of non-U.S. troops, and I can endorse fully 
General Taylor's reasoning and conclusion. 

Political and Economic Problems 

So far I have mentioned problems of mili- 
tary policy. This is my province as a soldier. 
But we all know that in combating Communist 

" n)id., Jan. 18, 1965, p. 62. 

insurgency the military effort must be most 
closely interrelated with political, economic, so- 
cial, and propaganda measures designed to 
presei-ve, or regain, the sympathies of the popu- 
lation. We are all most acutely aware of the 
fact that without a dynamic, imaginative, well- 
coordinated politico-economic-psychological ef- 
fort, military operations as such cannot possibly 
solve the insurgency problem. 

But Vietnamese Government attempts to re- 
gain the confidence of a single hamlet are shat- 
tered when a terrorist sneaks through the de- 
fenses to kill the head man. To the peasants 
this is a demonstration of where the power lies. 
Can the hamlet or village chief be protected 
from an assassin or a kidnaper ? My only reply 
is that he must be so protected. 

Can the economic and social conditions of the 
family in the small hamlet be improved ? Pro- 
tection and improvement go hand in hand. 

One of the plus signs that I observed on my ' 
recent trip was the effect of advisers recently, 
introduced at the subsector or district level in 
Viet-Nam. The district is a political subdivi- 
sion of a province, something on the order of the 
relationship between a county and the State. 
The subsector is the military name for this po- 
litical subdivision. With the arrival of the sub- 
sector advisers, an essential bridge has beem 
created between the pacification efforts of the 
regular military establishment and the protec- 
tion efforts of the paramilitary forces who reside 
full time in their communities. One of the dif- 
ficulties that continues to exist is the variety 
of performance by the local defense units. With' } 
the increased supervisory effort, there has been j 
an improvement in this performance. In addi- ■ 
tion, there is a bonus effect resulting from I 
actions initiated in the economic and sociologi- j 
cal fields by American advisers who grow morej 
intimately familiar with conditions in their dis- 1 
tricts with each passing week. | 

One fact is often overlooked, and that is that ! 
guerrilla casualties consistently have been much \ 
higher than those of tlie Government forces. '< 
The Communist insurgents have been able so 
far to replenish their ranks by a form of forced 
recruiting, but they, too, have now been fighting, 
and mostly under hardship conditions, for many [ 
years without being able to gain ultimate vic- 



tory. The hard-core Communist cadres will 
fight to tlie end, but the bulk of their men — 
peasant voutli pressed or lured into service — 
are by no means fanatical supermen. There is 
some growing evidence that the guerrillas are 
not invincible and that the Commimist ''war of 
liberation'' strategy is not a jsalatable recipe for 
conquest by stealth. We must not lose courage 
or patience. 

Two major problems continue to plague us in 
Viot-Nam today. Tlie first of these is the dis- 
■ sident element that I have already mentioned. 
As an example, the area of Ca Mau on the south- 
ern tip of Viet-Nam has resisted a central gov- 
. emment since at least 1929. Another example 
is the Province of Quang Ngai in the upper 
part of the country, where members of 16,000 
. families elected to move to North Viet-Nam in 
. 1954 wlien the country was divided, although 
, their families remained beliind. It is reason- 
able to assume that most of these dissidents have 
returned to or near their homes. 

The second major problem has been the in- 
ability to establish a cohesive governmental 
structure that can gain and maintain the sup- 
port of the majority of the populace. This has 
been a persistent, puizzling, and particularly 
difficult problem. With such a diverse popula- 
-. tion, it is not strange tliat a disparity of view- 
f point would exist, exasperating as it is to the 
«■ people of the United States. 
;; It is most important that we maintain a clear 
t- perspective about South Viet-Nam. No cam- 
paign has ever been conducted without some 
. failures to go along with successes. It is diffi- 
*: ;ult to judge fairly and objectively the respec- 
i: tive weights of the successes and failures in 
^'>uth Viet-Nam. It is important to remember 
it some parts of South Viet-Nam have never 
. ■ jeen under the control of a central government, 
rhe Communists are notorious for their success 
n penetrating and assuming the direction of the 
. jfforts of dissident groups. Some parts of Viet- 
N'am demonstrate no change in this pattern. 

Let me now address my third point: What 

ire we doing to solve the problems, and what 

P <dnd of progress are we making? Here, of 

. x>urse, I wLU confine my remarks primarily to 

he military field, since this is my concern as a 


What the U.S. Is Doing 

In broad terms, this is what we are doing. 

Today, we continue to maintain our assistance 
and advisory effort at the current level of about 
23,000 Americans from all three services, of 
which about 15,000 are Army personnel. I as- 
sure you that we are sending our very best peo- 
ple to Viet-Nam, and, as a sidelight on this 
point, let me add that we have more volunteers 
for Viet-Nam than we can deploy. 

iVIoreover, I believe that there are many more 
favorable and constructive events than there 
ai'e unfavorable. 

The military force is growing stronger and 
more capable with each passing month. 

The paramilitary forces, that is, the local 
hamlet and village defense units, are giving a 
good account of themselves in many more cases 
than they used to. 

There is a clearer vmderstanding of the neces- 
sity for improving the lot of the man in the 
hamlet and the village, together with that of liis 

Military leadership has improved over that 
which I observed in April. There seemed to be 
a more cohesive and continuous effort out in the 
country than there was 8 months earlier. 

The Viet Cong have suffered heavily, and, 
while you read figures of Government casual- 
ties, it is estimated conservatively that the Viet 
Cong are suffering at least three to one for 
each Vietnamese soldier that is killed. 

I have talked to a great many of our young 
officers and men. They quickly become at- 
tached to the Vietnamese with whom they are 
working. Every one that I talked to imder- 
stood why he was there, the value of what he 
is doing, and the rightness of the cause that he 
was supporting. There is an occasional mal- 
content, of course. 

There is a clear need for imderstanding that 
the shot that our forebears fired at Lexington 
in 1775 still reverberates in the far corners of 
this earth and that the oppressed and people 
under attack look to us to uphold the principle 
imderlying that shot at Lexington. That prin- 
ciple is a very simple one : that men who wish 
to be free, and who are willing to fight and die 
for the privilege of freedom, are entitled to the 
support of other free men. Free men are en- 

rEBRITART 8, 1965 


titled to pursue freedom without interference 
from those who seek to oppress and to enslave 
them. Our yoimg officers and men believe in 
this principle. Each of them has raised liis 
hand and sworn to defend freedom. I would 
ask that you do no less. 
It is imperative that as a people we demon- 

strate the maturity that has long been ours and 
that this demonstration be supported by an 
exhibition of patience, persistence, and deter- 
mination. No greater honor can come to any 
man than that he stand and defend the cause of 
freedom. This is why the United States is in 
Viet-Nam — to defend freedom. 

The United States, France, and NATO: A Comparison 
of Two Approaclies 

hy David E. Popper 

Director^ Ofice of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs ^ 

I welcome the opportunity to participate in 
your discussion on this subject. I am not here 
to suggest simple solutions to hard problems, 
nor to engage in polemics on controversial 
matters. No purpose would be sei'ved by ap- 
proaching the differences between the United 
States and France in a spirit of passion. It was 
Talleyrand who once advised his juniors always 
to remember the maxim : 'Wayez pas de zele"; 
loosely, "Above all, not too much zeal." 

In the past. United States relations with the 
French have sometimes been cahn and some- 
times delicate, but they have almost never been 
dull. France was our first ally. Over almost 
200 years we have had numerous altercations, 
some quite serious; and we have had our com- 
mon ventures, in war and in peace. It has been 
a long, if occasionally troubled, friendship. 

Today — let us admit it — there are elements 
in the international scene which, if not carefully 
watched, could jeopardize our good relations. 
We are deteimined not to have this happen. 
We intend to work our way through our difficul- 
ties by careful analysis and thorough discussion 
of our common problems, always with due re- 

' Address made at the University of Utah, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on Jan. 21. 

gard for the interests of other states. These 
interests are important, and they are closely 
affected by our actions vis-a-vis the French. 

France and the United States seldom stand 
alone on opposite sides of an issue. Clustered 
in their respective neighborhoods — perhaps 
more often in ours than in theirs, for the range 
of problems on our agenda today — are our 
NATO partners and other states. 

The United States and France, that is to say, 
ai-e not ranged against each other in a great, 
bipolar confrontation. Tlius the issues we shall 
discuss are not in the same class as those which , 
divide us from the Russians or the Chinese Com- 
munists. We are not talking about absolutist, 
ideological extremes. France is and will re- 
mam a part of the free world. As long as 
French governmental institutions are stable — 
and no one alive can remember when they have 
been more stable than they are today — the 
French will not embrace Communist doctrine. 
No one is more stanch than President de Gaulle 
in liis opposition to Conmiimist world domina- 
tion. In the last great test of Soviet adventur- 
ism — the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 — 
the French stood as firmly at the side of the 
United States as any coimtry. 



France, a Key Factor in Europe 

You lire in the midst of an admirable and ex- 
tensive study of P'rance, and you will therefore 
be quite familiar with the factors which have 
molded the current French posture in interna- 
tional relations. I shall pause for only a mo- 
ment to recall some of the most pertinent. 

Like other Europeans, the French have been 
deeply scarred by the ravages of 20th-century 
conflict in Europe. In 1918 they were among 
the victors, but their manhood and their sub- 
stance were bled white. In 19-40 they suffered a 
cataclysmic defeat. Recovering sturdily from 
that setback, they were plunged into frustrating 
colonial wars in Southeast Asia and in Algeria. 
During all this period their actions were ham- 
pered by the governmental structure of the 
Third and Fourth Republics. This saddled the 
French with a system of weak and short-lived 
executives — a system tolerated in the interest of 
preserving a more secure democracy. In the 
end, the system proved inadequate to meet the 
harsh tests of the times. 

It is not surprising, then — it is only natural — 
that this able, proud, energetic, and logical 
French populace should rally round the great 
historical figure who led their resistance in war 
and restored their status in peace. And he has 
not disappointed them. He liquidated the 
French colonial problem; restored the morale, 
the effectiveness, the loyalty, and the respecta- 
bility of the French armed forces; presided over 
a great national economic and financial revival ; 
brought to fruition a Franco-German recon- 
ciliation which should cement the peace in 
Western Europe; and gave France a vigorous 
and important role in the leadership of the 
West. It is a supremely impressive catalog of 
accomplishment, one which secures President de 
Graulle's place in the firmament of French 

France's friends in NATO — not least, the 
Qnitcd States — can only rejoice in this modern 
French renaissance. We never forget that 
France is a key factor in Europe. Its size, its 
luman and material strength, its resources, its 
geographical position make it a virtually indis- 
aensable element of any Western European or 
\tlantic area association. It would be very dif- 

ficult even to think of NATO or an integrated 
Europe without it. Stability and strength in 
France are a matter of primary importance 
to us. 

NATO at a Crossroads 

We are examining the French and American 
attitudes toward a North Atlantic world which 
stands at a crossroads. NATO, the institutional 
embodiment of that world, is thought by some 
to be in dire straits ; by others, more realistically 
we believe, to be in a phase of significant change. 

NATO was organized in 1949 not only for the 
common defense against an imminent danger 
of Communist aggression, but also, as the North 
Atlantic Treaty states, to preserve the freedom 
and civilization of its members and to promote 
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 
area. The problem of defense it has tackled 
directly, and with remarkable success. NATO 
nuclear deterrence, almost completely provided 
by the United States, has held in check any 
Communist aggressive tendencies ; and NATO's 
powerful general-purpose forces, including 
large American contingents, have curbed any 
desires there might have been for military ad- 
ventures along NATO frontiers. No NATO 
territory has been lost. The NATO countries 
feel more secure today than ever before. The 
very credibility of a large-scale war in Europe 
has dwindled. 

Behind this shield, free Europe, originally 
assisted by Marshall Plan aid, has provided a 
dazzling display of the recuperative powers, the 
energy, and the skill of its people. From an 
exhausted and depleted subcontinent with 
highly uncertain political and economic pros- 
pects, it has been transformed into a stable, 
dynamic, and highly prosperous area. And as 
the Soviet bloc loses its monolithic unity and is 
subjected to the mellowing influences of a more 
sophisticated and stable society, the sense of 
imminent military and social peril that existed 
in 194:9 has all but vanished. 

But people are prone to forget that only the 
maintenance of NATO strength can insure its 
members against a recurrence of cold-war 
threats. NATO is not immune from the time- 
honored phenomenon which afflicts all al- 

T.BRUART 8, 1005 


liances— (hat, while Ihoy hang togethei- in times 
of crisis, they tend to fall apart in fair weather. 
In this sense, NATO could become a victim of 
its own success. 

Not that NATO is on (ho point of disintegra- 
tion. Responsible leaders in NATO countries 
are quite aware that the basic cin-unistance 
which brought it into being— the Conununist 
threat (o ti\o free world— continues to exist. 
Conununist methods have changed but not Com- 
nuuiist, object ivcs. There was a Berlin crisis in 
1961 and a Cuban crisis in 1962. There couhl 
be another crisis in 1965 or in subsequent years. 
Every NATO government recognizes that its 
securi(y still i-ests on the Athvntic alliance. Tliis 
applies not only (o Europe, including the 
French, but equally to (he United S(a(es. Our 
postwar policy has been predicated on the recog- 
nition that a strong and free Europe is essen- 
tial to our own safety. That is why we 
maintain close to 400,000 men in and around 
Europe and why we are in fuel the strongest 
military power in Europe today. 

Nevertheless, changing circumstances in both 
the North Atlantic and the Conununist worlds 
do have an impact on NATO itself. The 15 
NATO nations can if they wish exploit the 
growth potential which lies in the alliance and 
can adapt it to the requirements of the Atlantic 
partnei-ship of the future. Or they can, though 
we would hope they would not, take a static 
view toward NATO. In this case its utility 
and its relevance to changing conditions would 
gradually decline and its future might lie one 
of diminishing importance. 

We are approaching the time when some 
great decisions will need to be made in this 
area. The North Atlantic Treaty has no ter- 
minal date; it continues in efl'ect indefinitely. 
But in 1969, 20 yeai-s after the treaty was signed, 
anv member may denounce it and Avithdraw 
from NATO 1 year therea Iter. The remaining 
membei-s would of coui-se continue to be bound 
by the treaty unless they followed suit. 

One might conclude from French official 
statements that they might conceivably with- 
draw, or that (hey would at least call for a 
thorough review of the NATO system, as they 
are quite entitled to do under the tei-ms of the 

treaty. Whether they would actually do so is 
in the realm of conjecture. Unfortunately, 
while the French have made clear their dis- 
satisfaction with cer(ain aspec(s ot (he system, 
they have not yet furnished a bill of particulars 
indicating the specific changes (hey might de- 
sire to make. 

The French decision in (his ma((er will be 
linked wi(h (he developuuMit of French iKilicy 
(oward (he organization of Europe. For a pri- 
mary question for any emerging European as- 
sociation of nations must be its relationship to 
the United States. 

I I 



France's Stress on Nationalism |r 

To survey tiie French approach toward At- jE 
lantic area problems in relation (o our own, let ^1 
me make a few points as to the attitudes of 
the two countries and discuss them in some 

The fii-st point is that, in comparison with its 
principal allies, France has tended in recent 
years to lay increasing stress on nat ioualism and' 
less on interdependence. We are talking here,: li 
of coui-se, in relative terms. All countries are 
to some degree interdependent in the close-lniit t 
world of today ; none w-ould willingly submerge: 
its national identity or fundamental purposes. 
Yet France under De Gaulle makes no secret 
of its strongly nationalist orientation. Whether 
in NATO or in the area of European union, the 
French are cool to proposals involving new steps 
toward integration or suggestions of broader 
supranational authority. 

As wo shall note, they seem to want to reverse; 
the progress so far made in NATO toward mill-; 
tary integration. It is also true that they have 
recognized that their interests are advanced by 
fulfillment of the provisions of the 1957 Treaty' 
of Rome, through the mechanism of the Euro 
pean Economic Conununity — provisions which' 
will produce an economically integrated Europ 
of the Six when they have been fully applied 
These were negotiated before President dt 
Gaulle returned to power. But as regard) 
political integration, other Europeans complaii 
of French unwillingness to move forward. ^ 
French veto in 1963 cut short etforts to brinj 
Britain into the EEC. And French indif' 




fi'ience seems to Ixjcloiul tlio prospects for 
steps toward furtlier integration wliicli, in vuvy- 
injr ways, are advocaleil by tlio (lornians, 
Italians, Beljjians, and Dutch. 

I mention tliese matters witli some dilTidence, 
fur it is not. for Americans, even by implication, 
fo seek to tell Europeans of any nationality how 
ii> mami;;e their own affairs. We do not, liow- 
r\rr, conceal our conviction that the influence 
"i free Europe in a world dominated by ag- 
gregations of great power will dej)end on closer 
integration in Europe, rather than on the 
jealous safeguard of every exclusive national 
prerogative on the part of any state. And 
we have a direct stake in the decisions which 
I".uropeans may make in this regard. For an 
Atlantic partnership is certain to be more 
-iiimdly based if it rests on a footing of deal- 
ings between an American and a luiropean unit 
i>{ comparable importance, than if — as is the 
'■;i-e today — there is no effective voice to speak 
for Europe. 

The President put the case most succinctly in 
' > atldress at Georgetown University on De- 

taber 3 — an address which charts America's 
' "urse in the Atlantic community during the 
years ahead : ' 

The United States [he declared] has no policy for 
the people of Europe, but we do have a policy toward 
the people of V.UTO\>e. . . . 

First, we must all seek to assist in increasing the 

unity of Kuroi>G as a key to Western strength and a 

barrier to resurgent and erosive nationalism. 

I Second, we must all work to multiply in number and 

Intimacy the ties between North America and Europe. 

r we shape an Atlantic civilization with an Atlantic 

Eecent French official statements would lead 
one to doubt that the French Government would 
address the problem from a similar standpoint. 
"WTien P'rench oflicials refer to unity in Europe, 
they stress the independence of Europe, in mili- 
tary and in other matters, ratlicr than the inter- 
dependence of Atlantic welfare and defense. 
From this standpoint what seems to us to be 
realistic cooperation can be represented as dom- 
ination from outside and as somehow denatur- 
ing the European ideal. Other NATO govern- 
ments have not embraced this thesis. 

• For text, see Buixetin of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866. 

Question of Military Integration 

1 turn now to my second point with respect 
to French views. It can be stated as follows: 
There are clear indications that the French, far 
more tlian any other NATO member, wish to 
modify the existing NATO system so as to move 
it in tiie direction of the classical-type alliance 
of an earlier period. 

A bit of background is perhaps necessary to 
understand wluit is involved here. Very prop- 
erly, the French make a sharp distinction be- 
tween the Western alliance and the organiza- 
tional structure of NATO. The North Atlantic 
Treaty, as negotiated in 1949, is a general agree- 
ment for the collective defense of its signatories 
within a prescribed area, in accordance with 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. It 
mentions a permanent council, but apart from 
that it is silent as to the way in which the parties 
should organize themselves to carry out the 
defensive purposes of the treaty. 

The NATO political and military structure 
we have today was created step by step by the 
members of the organization, including the 
French. While the treaty itself is an expression 
of the underlying unity of its members, its ef- 
fective organizational structure is what sets the 
alliance apart from the generality of defense 

The essence of that structure is a carefully 
limited, but nonetheless significant, degree of 
military integration which welds the NATO 
armed forces into a coordinated, powerful fight- 
ing unit for use in the event of attack on NATO 
territory. For this purpose an international 
command system has been created. SHAPE 
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Eu- 
rope], near Paris, and SACLANT [Supreme 
Allied Command Atlantic] headquarters, in 
Norfolk, both under commanders of American 
nationality, consist of integrated international 

The officers assigned to these commands are 
there as NATO officers, not as national officers. 
They make war plans on behalf of the alliance 
and set standards on behalf of the alliance. 
Through the system of commitment of national 
forces to NATO, they can within broad limits 
count on the use of known forces to repel at- 



tack. The force goals projected by NATO are 
models influencing the composition and develop- 
ment of the forces of the NATO nations. 

The complex of NATO forces is supported 
by an internationally financed and controlled 
system of infrastructure facilities, such as air- 
fields, depots, pipelines, and military communi- 
cations, constructed and maintained through on- 
going NATO programs. NATO encourages the 
standardization of equipment in the forces of 
the alliance, as well as the joint production of 
many military items, and forces committed to 
NATO engage periodically in NATO maneu- 
vers. To sum up, the militaiy success of NATO 
is in no small part due to the assurance that 
common action by known forces under inte- 
grated command will be forthcoming in the 
event of attack on NATO territory. 

The French still play an active and important 
part in this system. Indeed, given their central 
location in the geogi'aphic structure of NATO, 
and given the conditions of modem war, their 
own defense is intimately connected with the 
operations of NATO air and ground commands 
in the central European area. 

But since the establislunent of the Fifth Ke- 
public, tlie French have markedly reduced the 
size of their forces committed to NATO. Two 
of the four French ground divisions once so 
committed had been withdrawn for national use 
in the French-Algerian hostilities. Contrary to 
common assumption at the time, the divisions 
were not recommitted when peace was restored. 
In 1959 the French Mediterranean Fleet was re- 
moved from NATO commitment and returned 
to full national command; more recently, the 
same was done for virtually all France's At- 
lantic naval forces. And the French refuse to 
permit any nuclear weapons under NATO con- 
trol to be stationed in France. 

Some of these actions have been explained as 
the result of considerations extraneous to the 
alliance itself. Nevertheless, current French 
doctrine seems to envisage only loose arrange- 
ments for cooperation in the event of war, 
within the NATO framework or bilaterally, and 
without subordination to international author- 
ity. Such arrangements might come to resemble 
those worked out by European general staffs 
under the ententes and alliances of the 19th and 

early 20th centuries. The difficulty these pre- 
sented was that one could never be certain that 
when the crisis came the nations concerned 
would be prepared to commit the forces in- 
volved or to place them imder integrated rathec 
than separate commands. | I 

I should stress that what the French have ' 
done in withdrawing their forces from commit- i 
ment is perfectly proper in terms of NATO ; 
procedures. But if other allies were to act in j 
the same way and on the same scale, the military j 
machine NATO has forged in Europe would' 
rapidly lose its strength and its deterrent power^ ' 
No other ally has done so. 

The Nuclear Problem 

The issue of military integration is posed n 
most sharply in the nuclear area. And here I ; 
come to my third point of contrast in French i, 
and American views. It is as follows: The] 
French regard a national nuclear force as a re- J 
quirement for great- power status; they have 
every intention of building it into a significant:, 
national force; and they are in principle un-; 
sympathetic to proposals for integrated nuclear; 
forces in NATO. For our part, we recognize; 
that the French have attained a military nucleari 
capability; we continue to hope that it may be 
possible to head off the creation of additional 
national nuclear forces; and we sense and sym- 
pathize with the desire of many of our NATO 
allies for a greater share in the alliance organi-, 
zation for nuclear defense. 

It is worth noting that the decision to build 
a French nuclear force goes back to the Fourth: 
Kepublic, prior to President de Gaulle's return, 
to the French political scene. Thus, successive, 
French administrations have accepted the heavy 
costs of developing a national nuclear establish- 
ment — costs in money and resources — which; 
might otherwise be devoted to other military oi 
social purposes. As the French plans move 
ahead in the years to come, the French envisage 
the creation of a force de frappe which, thougli| 
small by American standards, will nonetheless 
have considerable striking power. 

Our concern with the creation of new national 
nuclear forces lies in the fact that their verj 
existence tends to encourage other nations tc 
acquire their own nuclear weapons, for powei 



luid sliitus purposes. One hesitates to con- 
teinplato tlie kind of tensions that would exist 
if ill! the nations capable of nianufacturing such 
weapons were to do so. Quite apart from the 
costs involved, the dauirer of triggerinfj oil" a 
destructive nuclear conllict through miscalcu- 
lation, accident, or irrefponsible decision would 
inci-ease in geometric proportion as the number 
of separate forces mounted. And the danger 
that such a conflict would almost immediately 
draw in others, raising the destruction to un- 
imaginable proportions, would grow as well. 
These are the reasons for our desire to avoid 
the proliferation of such weapons. They ex- 
plain our efforts, at the United Nations and 
elsewhere, to obtain satisfactory assurances 
against putting nuclear weapons under the 
national control of still other countries. 

The progress of these effoi'ts in the world out- 
side Europe is not within the scope of our dis- 
cussion today. In XATO, however, we have a 
special sort of nuclear problem. The NATO 
countries could continue to rely on American 
strategic nuclear retaliatory' forces for protec- 
tion against the hundreds of Soviet missiles 
targeted against their territorj-. Some will 
doubtless continue to do so. Others, however, 
desire to share in a more significant and etTec- 
tive way in responsibility for their own nuclear 
defense. They will not l>e indefinitely satisfied 
with a second-class status, particularly if other 
countries of roughly similar size and impor- 
tance liave tiieir own nuclear forces. 

The only solution to the problem has seemed 
jObe to provide to those NATO nations desiring 
o participate responsibly in NATO nuclear de- 
fense a means of doing so on a collective basis — 
^thout giving any of them individual access 
xt or control of nuclear weaponrj'. The prin- 
';iple is clear, its implementation most complex 
ind difficult. 

In 1060 the United States made one suggcs- 
ion for meeting the requirement;' after 
'engthy study with other allie.s, this eventually 
onerged in the form of the concept of a multi- 
ateral force. And when the British Labor gov- 
irnment came into power last October, it was 
luick to propose a more comprehensive scheme 
"or integrating within NATO various existing 

' For background, see ibid.. Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39. 

or programed national nuclear contingents, to- 
gether with whate\pr mixed-nuumed elements 
might be created under a multilateral force 

Tlie French Government had previously re- 
mained aloof from the prolonged diplomatic 
discussion on these matters, since its energies 
were concentrated on the creation of its own 
nuclear force. At this stage, liowever, it made 
clear its objections to this line of approach. The 
question was raised whether German participa- 
tion would be consistent with the Franco-Ger- 
man treaty; indeed, whether arrangements of 
the kind under discussion would not split the 
NATO alliance. 

As matters now stand, the discussion is con- 
tinuing through diplomatic cliannels. What> 
ever the result, we are anxious that it represent 
the desires of our European allies, with no pos- 
sible ground for contending that pressure from 
this ([uarter lias influenced the outcome. 

It has always been understood that any meas- 
ures adopted would be open to any interested 
member of the alliance. At no point has there 
been any desire to divide the alliance or to iso- 
late any member of it. Our attitude was suc- 
cinctly summarized by the President in a few 
sentences of his Georgetown speech, which I 
would like to quote at this point: 

For 20 years the atomic might of the United States 
has been the decisive guard of freedom. Ours remains 
the largest strength and ours a most awesome obliga- 
tion. But we recognize the reasonable interest and 
concerns of other allies, those who have nuclear weap- 
ons of their own and those who do not. We seek ways 
to bind the alliance even more strongly together by 
.sharing the tasks of defense through collective action 
and meeting the honorable concerns of all. 

This is the meaning of the proposals that we have 
made. This is the meaning of the discussions that we 
expect, and that we welcome, with all interested allies. 
We come to reason, not to dominate. We do not seek 
to have our way but to find a common way. And any 
new plans for the handling of weapons so powerful 
we think deserve most careful discussion and delibera- 
tion. No solution will be perfect in the eyes of every- 
one. But we all know that the problem is there. It 
must be solved. And we will continue to work for Its 

To round out the picture, it must be said that 
we regret the failure of the French to become a 
party to the limited nuclear test ban treaty, un- 
derstandable as that may be in terms of the 

■EBRTTART 8, 1965 


French nuclear testing program. And we also 
regret the refusal of the French to occupy their 
seat at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com- 
mittee in Geneva — the major forum for the 
East- West consideration of disarmament prob- 

Other Divergencies 

I have attempted to outline some of the 
divergencies between the American and the 
French approaches to the problems of the At- 
lantic world. Naturally enough, our policies 
are also, to some extent, divergent in other 

For example, while there are strong tenden- 
cies in the "West toward bridge building with 
Eastern Europe, it is the French who are most 
optimistic as to an eventual association of all 
of Europe — still unspecific in form — extending 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. Wliile we too 
are aware of difficulties standing in the way of 
German reunification, it was France which first 
stressed the need to reach agreement on Gennan 
frontiers. Wliile some NATO nations estab- 
lished diplomatic relations with Communist 
China at an early stage, France is the only 
one to have moved to recognition in recent 
years. The French favor a conference now to 
end the war in South Viet-Nam and to settle 
its future. And, like the Communist bloc in 
the United Nations, the French have refused 
to pay their share of peacekeeping costs in the 
Congo and thus risk the loss of tlieir vote in the 
United Nations General Assembly. 

I am not tonight arguing the merits of these 
positions. The point I would make is that they 
all have some bearing on the vigor of the At- 
lantic relationship. For that relationship is 
political as well as military. No one would 
argue for strict uniformity in the foreign poli- 
cies of the NATO allies. Tlie responsibilities 
of each of them vary so widely that that would 
be impracticable. 

What I would suggest is the utility of the 
fullest possible discussion of policy problems 
involving East-West relations, in the NATO 
agencies which are already at hand for that 
purpose. Over the last few j^ears there has been 
a steady increase in the number of matters of 
this kind raised in the unpublicized forum of 

the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate | 
bodies, not only to keep the allies informed of I 
f ortlicoming developments but also to facilitate / 
the harmonization of policies. Our United I 
States representatives have been active in this ■ 
respect, but we and others can make our con- | 
sultation in NATO still more effective. We can I 
put more matters before the Council, and w© j 
can send more of our senior officials to Paris to ! 
discuss these matters with their opposite num- j 
bers from other NATO capitals. And thus, as j 
the military danger to NATO recedes, we might l| 
hope to use tlie NATO forum to realize theij 

broader purposes of an Atlantic partnership. } 



Bilateral Relations 

There remains the problem of bilateral rela- | 
tions between the United States and France. '- 
Clearly, in the present atmosphere, there arei 
potential sources of Franco- American friction i! 
which will require careful handling if goodi! 
relations between the two Governments are to' 
be preserved. ' 

A case in point is the recent anxiety in France ; 
over large-scale investment by great American ; 
corporations in some important sectors of the 
French economy. This is a sensitive topic, with 
serious political and economic overtones. It iS; 
not, of course, a problem entirely limited to 
France: American business has been quick to- 
recognize the opportunities provided by produc- 
tion inside the other Common ^Market countries, 
as well as elsewhere in Europe. It is anytliing 
but a simple problem. Before reaching con-' 
elusions about it, one would need to answer A 
number of important questions. For example,; 
how much of an impact has American invest-, 
ment made on the local economy, and what is' 
the nature of that impact ? Has American busi- 
ness observed satisfactory standards of conduct' 
in the local environment? Is American invest-, 
ment a consequence of stringency in European; 
capital markets, and are there alternative 
sources of needed capital? Wliat is the bear- 
ing of American investment on cartel and 
monopoly policies within the EEC? on the 
balance of payments problem? Does Ameri- 
can entry bring with it advanced technology oi 
stimulate research and development? 

Obviously, questions such as these can b< 



answered only on tJie basis of expert study. 
The issues involved need dispassionate con- 
sideration if tiiey are to be settled in the mutual 
interest of tlie parties. Wliatever the methods 
used, they must be designed to produce liplit 
ratlier thiui heat, agreement rather than irri- 

Indeed, tliis is the spirit in which we would 
hope to cope with all of our problems witli the 
French Government. We want no controversy 
with our oldest ally. AVe have made it clear 
that we will support no enterprise directed 
against France; that we will conclude no agree- 
ment in the XATO context that is not open to 
French adherence; and that there will be a fidl 
exchange of views with the French before any 
such agreements are concluded. 

We are convinced that in this friendly spirit 
solutions can he found for our current perplexi- 
ties in the Atlantic area. We think the historic 
forces and the concrete interests impelling 
Europe toward greater internal cohesion and 
toward closer transatlantic relations will not in 
the long run be denied. And we shall continue 
to bend our efforts toward these ends. 

United States Takes Note 
of Soviet Nuclear Test 

Following are a statement released hy the 
UjS. Atomic Energy Commission on January 
19 and a statement read to news correspondents 
iy a Department of State spokesman on Jan- 
^ry 25. 

AEC Statement of January 19 

As previously reported, the United States 
detected through seismic signals a Soviet under- 
ground nuclear test in the Semipalatinsk area 
on 15 January with a yield in the intermediate 
range. The United States detection system has 
now detected a certain amount of venting con- 
nected with the test. The amounts of radio- 
activity date will not produce meas- 
urable exposures to pei-soiis. In view of the 
treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water,' 

' For text, see Bulleti:? of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239. 

the Department of State has asked the Govern- 
ment of the Soviet Union for information on 
this event. 

Department Statement of January 25 

In an oral i-oply to our inquiry, the Soviet 
Government has stated that a nuclear explosion 
was carried out deep underground on January 
15 and that some radioactive debris leaked into 
the atmosphere. However, the oral reply states 
that the amount is so insignificant that the 
Soviet Government excludes the possibility of 
a violation of the limited test ban treaty. The 
United States is continuing its own evaluation 
of the facts involved. 

President Meets With Committee 
on Nuclear Proliferation 


White House press release dated January 21 

The President met today for an hour with 
his Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, headed 
by Roswell Gilpatric, and discussed its work. 
Present at the meeting held in the Cabinet room 
shortly after 1:00 p.m. were the 10 members 
of the advisory committee and the President's 
principal advisers in the national security area. 

The Committee was established by Pre^sident 
Jolmson in November to study the problems for 
world peace and security posed by the increase 
in the number of nations capable of building 
nuclear weapons. At that time the Committee 
was asked to present its findings during the 
month of January. 

Mr. Gilpatric was formerly Deputy Secretary 
of Defense under Presidents Johnson and Ken- 
nedy and is now a New York attorney. Other 
members of the Committee are : 
Arthur H. Dean, formerly chairman, U.S. delegation 

to the Geneva disarmament conference j 
Allen W. Dulles, formerly Director of Central 

Intelligence ; 
Gen. Alfred M. Grnenther, formerly Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe ; 

FEBRU.VRY 8, 1965 


Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, formerly Scientific Ad- 
viser to President Eisenhower ; 

John J McCloy, formerly High Commissioner for Ger- 
many and coordinator of U.S. disarmament activi- 

Dr James A. Perkins, president of Cornell University ; 

Arthur K. Watson, chairman of the board, IBM World 
Trade Corporation ; 

William S. Webster, president. New England Electric 

System ; 
Dr. Herbert F. Tork, formerly Director, Research and 
Engineering, Department of Defense. 


White House press release dated January 21 

Yesterday the Nation reaffirmed its dedica- 
tion to the pursuit of peace. Today we find 
that problem, once again, first on our national 

Tomorrow and in the years ahead, our future 
and the future of the world will be shaped in 
no small measure by what we now do in the face 
of the complex and difficult problems posed by 
the spread of nuclear weapons. 

I am grateful, therefore, that such distm- 
guished and experienced men have today given 
me and my advisers the benefit of their patient 
and searching counsel. 

Agreed Minute Provides for Exchange 
of Shipping Information 

Press release 7 dated January 18 

On December IS, 196i, the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
{OECD) and the United States announced the 
conclusion of discussions in Paris resulting in 
arrangements for an exchange of information 
sought by the Federal Maritime Gommhsion in 
connection with maritime freight rates relating 
to the inbound arid outbound trade of the 
United States} FoVmoing is the text of an 
Agreed Minute providing for the exchange of 
shipping information which was made public 
on January 18. 

1. As a result of discussions between repre- 
sentatives of the Govermnents of Belgium, Den- 
mark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of 

Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the ] 

United Kingdom (referred to collectively as , 

"the 14 Governments") and the United States of j 

America, it is understood that the following is ; 

the procedure to be followed in an exchange of i 

information between these Governments in con- I 

nection with Foreign Trade Studies envisaged | 

by the Federal Maritime Commission of the ; 

United States. . j 

2. The 14 Governments are willing to use their i| 

good offices to facilitate the production of the \ 

following statistical information by their slup- i 

owners who are members of the conferences., 

listed in Appendix A. I 

(1) Tlie total revenue tons of cargo carried; 
during 1963 on the trade routes specified ini 
Appendix B ; 

(2) The total gross freight revenue earned (, 
on such cargo carried ; , j 

(3) The number of revenue tons of certain i| 
commodities to be agreed upon with an indica-. 
tion of the basis of revenue tons used ; and 

(4) The gross freight revenue earned from ; 
the carriage of such commodities as are agreed 
upon under subparagraph (3) above. 

Tliese statistics will be presented as aggre- 
o-ated total for each conference of shipowners 
concerned; the method of aggregation will be 
decided by each conference for itself. ^Vlien 
all the information has been assembled and ag- 
<rre<rated by each conference it will be made 
available to the Government of the country ui 
which the conference has its Headquarters. 
That Government will in turn forward it to the 
O.E.C.D. which will then circulate copies to all 
15 Governments. The information will be 
treated as confidential. 

3. This exchange of information between 
Governments will also include in the case of the 
conferences specified in Appendix C, which are 
based on the United States and concerned witti 
trade outwardbound from the United States (tc 
be referred to as "outbound conferences") . 

(1) copies of any letters, memoranda, circu- 
lars or dociunents exchanged between the out 

• For text of a joint Department of Stat^Federa 
Maritime Commission statement of Dec. 15, see Bm 
LETiN of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 13. 



bound conferences and any of their common 
carrier member lines and/or any of their agents 
durinfr the calendar j-ear 1963 relating to rates, 
from the United States ports served by the re- 
spective tnxde to the foreign ports served, on a 
list of commodities to bo agreed, other than 
documents which merely list or state such rates 
without discussions; and 

(2) copies of any reports, studies, analyses 
or documents compiled by or for or received by 
the outlK)und conferences in the calendar year 
1903 with respect to all rates in the subject trade 
charged by the outbound conferences. 

The copies referred to in subparagraphs (1) 
and (2) of this paragraph are solely those di- 
rectly available at the offices in the United States 
of the outbound conferences. 

4. The 14 Governments are willing to use their 
good offices to facilitate the provision of infor- 
mation in this instance to resolve an immediate 
'and specified difficulty, and this willingness to 
do so in this particular instance is wholly with- 
out prejudice to their known jurisdictional and 
other objections to a number of features of 
United States shipping legislation and to the 
procedure and activities of the Federal Mari- 
time Commission. 

I 5. In recognition of the readiness of the 14 
Governments to use their good offices to secure 
the information specified in paragraphs 2 and 
3 above, the United States Government imder- 
takes, if such efforts are successful, not to pro- 
ceed with the enforcement of any of the Section 
21 [of the U.S. Shipping Act of 1916] Orders 
obtaining, including those applicable to the out- 
bound conferences. Any proceedings now 
pending under these Orders, whether before the 
Federal Maritime Commission or in any Courts 
in the United States shall be terminated upon 
receipt of the information and documents. It 
ig noted that pending the working out of the 
present arrangements these proceedings have in 
fact for the time being been suspended. 

6. The statistical information referred to in 
paragraph 2 above shall not be published or 
»mmunicated to private persons in a form 
hat would prejudice individual carriers or re- 
real commercial secrets. Before any Govem- 
inent publishes the information in any form, 
hat Government will consult with the Govern- 

ment or Governments which received the infor- 
mation from the conferences. 

7. The 14 Governments for their part have 
no objection to information derived from the 
letters, memoranda, circulars, reports, studies, 
analyses or documents referred to in paragraph 
3 above being used in the preparation of public 
reports by the United States Government, pro- 
vided that these do not identify either the con- 
ference or the carrier concerned. 

8. The information and documents to be ex- 
changed under this agreement shall not be used 
for the purpose of criminal prosecutions or 
assessing fines or penalties against shipowners 
or conferences. 

9. The United States Government agrees to 
consult with the 14 Governments before using 
information or documents in formal proceed- 
ings before the Federal Maritime Commission. 
Such consultations may include at the request 
of either side a discussion of alternative methods 
of solving the problem involved. The 14 Gov- 
ernments participating in such consultations 
are not thereby departing from their previously 
expressed views (reference is made to para- 
graph 4 of these minutes) that they object to 
governmental interference in international 
shipping and to governmental rate fixing. 

10. The Governments undertake to make 
their best efforts to produce promptly the infor- 
mation and documents specified in paragraphs 2 
and 3. 

Paris, December 15, 1964- 

Appendix A. Conferences Providing Statistical Infor- 

1. North Atlantic/Continental Freight Conference. 

2. Continental North Atlantic Westbound Freight 

3. North Atlantic United Kingdom Freight Confer- 

4. North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association. 

5. North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Confer- 

6. West Coast of Italy, Sicilian and Adriatic Porta/ 
North Atlantic Range Conference (W.I.N.A.C.). 

7. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Confer- 

8. French North Atlantic Westbound Freight Con- 

9. North Atlantic Baltic Freight Conference. 

10. Scandinavian Baltic/United States North Atlan- 
tic Westbound Freight Conference. 

11. Pacific Westbound Conference. 

'EBRUART 8, 1965 


12. Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan. 

13. Far East Conference. 

14. Japan- Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference. 

15. Pacific Coast European Conference. 

16. Outward Continental North Pacific Conference. 


Appendix B. List of Trade Routes 

1. From United States North Atlantic Ports to Bel- 
gium, Holland and Germany. 

2. From Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands to 
United States North Atlantic Ports. 

3. From United States North Atlantic Ports to the 
United Kingdom and Eire. 

4. From the United Kingdom and Eire to United 
States Atlantic Coast Port.s. 

5. From United States North Atlantic Ports to Ports 
on the Mediterranean Sea. 

6. From Ports in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and on the 
Adriatic Sea to United States North Atlnntic Ports. 

7. From United States North Atlantic Ports to 
French Atlantic Ports. 

8. From French North Atlantic Ports to United 
States North Atlantic Ports. 

9. From United States North Atlantic Ports to 
Swedish Ports. 

10. From Sweden to United States North Atlantic 

11. From United States Pacific Coast Ports to Ports 
in Japan. 

12. From Japan to United States Pacific Coast Ports. 

13. From United States Atlantic and Gulf Ports to 
Ports in Japan. 

14. From Japan to United States Atlantic and Gulf 

15. From United States West Coast Ports to Ports in 
Scandinavia and Continental Europe. 

16. From Scandinavia and Continental Europe to 
United States West Coast Ports. 

Outbound Conferences Providing Docu- 

Appendix C. 


1. North Atlantic/Continental Freight Conference. 

2. North Atlantic United Kingdom Freight Confer- 

3. North Atlantic Mediterranean Frei{,'ht Conference. 

4. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Confer- 

5. North Atlantic Baltic Freight Conference. 

6. Pacific Westbound Conference. 

7. Far East Conference. 

8. Pacific Coast European Conference. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.G., 20520. 

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 9 — U.S.-Japanese Co- 
operation in Asia. Article based on a speech made by 
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs, before the Research Institute of 
Japan at Tokyo. Pub. 7776. Far Eastern series 128. 
4 pp. 5<t. 

Amendments to the Constitution of the United Na- 
tions Food and Agriculture Organization, as Amended. 

Adopted at the Twelfth Session of the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization, Rome, November 16-December 
5, 1963. TIAS 5506. 6 pp. 50. 

Columbia River Basin — Cooperative Development of 
Water Resources. Treaty, with Annexes, with Can- 
ada — Signed at Washington January 17, 1961. En- 
tered into force September 16, 1964. With related 
agreements. Exchanges of notes — Signed at Washing- 
ton January 22, 1964 and at Ottawa September 16, 
1964. TIAS 5638. 51 pp. 300. 

Establishment of Television System in Saudi Arabia. 

Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Jidda December 9, 1963, and January 6, 1964. 
Entered into force January 6, 1964. TIAS 5659. 12 
pp. 100. 

Mapping — Cooperative Program. Agreement with Do- 
minican Republic. Signed at Santo Domingo August 
28, 1964. Entered into force August 28, 1964. TIAS 
5663. 8 pp. 100. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India, 
amending agreement of April 15, 1964. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Washington September 15, 1964. En- 
tered into force September 15, 1964. TIAS 5664. 5 
pp. 5(*. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Kenya. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Nairobi August 26, 1964. Entered into, 
force August 26, 1964. TIAS 5666. 7 pp. 100. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Yugoslavia. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington October 5, 
1964. Date of entry into force January 1, 1965. With 
exchanges of letters. TIAS 5667. 13 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea — 
Signed at Conakry June 13, ltK34. Entered into force 
June 13. 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5668. 
15 pp. 150. 




U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement 
on Trade in Automotive Products 

Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada 
met with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch, 
January 15-16. Following is an exchange of 
remarks between the President and the Prime 
Minister on January 16 prior to their signing of 
a UJS.-Canadian agreement on trade in auto- 
motive products, together with the text of the 


White House press release (Austlo, Tex.) dated January 16 
President Johnson 

The Prime Minister and I, with Secretary 
Martin [Paul Martin, Canadian Secretary of 
State for External AfTairs] and Secretary Rusk, 
are about to sign a historic agreement, an 
agreement for free trade on automotive products 
between Canada and the United States. 

Two years ago it appeared that our two 
countries might have grave differences in this 
great field of trade. We faced a choice between 
the road of stroke and counterstroke and the 
road of understanding and cooperation. "We 
have taken the road of understanding. 
. This agreement is the result of hard work 
on both sides all along that road. I am sure 
that the Prime Minister joins me in expressing 
our hearty thanks to the negotiators on both 
sides and to their chiefs, Mi-. Rusk and Mr. 

Mr. Prime Minister, would you like to say a 
word before we sign ? 

Prime Minister Pearson 

Mr. President, I share completely your satis- 
faction as we are able today to sign this auto- 
motive agreement, and our expression of thanks 
to those, including the Secretary of State and 
the Secretarj- of State for External Affairs, who 
conducted the negotiations. 

This is one of the most important accords ever 
signed between our two coimtries in the trade 
field. As you say, we faced a very difficult situa- 
tion in this particular area of industry, and 
through hard work and patient negotiation we 
have concluded an agreement which is of benefit 
to both coimtries. In effect, we have agreed to 
rationalize the production of our respective in- 
dustries and to expand our production and trade 
through a dismantling of tariff and other bar- 
riers in the automotive field. This wasn't ac- 
complished easily, and it could not have been ac- 
complished at all if there had not been that 
mutual miderstanding, good will, and confidence 
which has grown up between our two countries 
over the years. 

A measure of the significance of this agree- 
ment is basically this : Canada and the United 
States trade more with each other than any 
other two countries. Indeed, about one-fifth of 
your exports go to Canada, and automobiles and 
parts constitute the largest single category in 
that trade. I am confident that this agreement 
will result in an even greater flow of two-way 
trade, and eventually the consumers on both 
sides of the border will share in its benefits. 

Mr. President, I have said to you many times 
and you have said to me many times that there 
are no problems between our two countries which 
can't be solved if we work at them hard enough 
and in the right spirit. This is what we have 
done in this agreement which we are about to 


Press release 6 dated January 18 

Agreement Concerning Automotive Products 
Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of Canada 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Canada, 

Determined to strengthen the economic relations 
Ijetween their two conntries ; 

FEBRr.^RT 8, 1903 


Recognizing that this can best be achieved through 
the stimulation of economic growth and through the 
expansion of markets available to producers in both 
countries within the frameworli of the established 
policy of both countries of promoting multilateral 
trade ; 

Recognizing that an expansion of trade can best be 
achieved through the reduction or elimination of tariff 
and all other barriers to trade operating to impede 
or distort the full and eflScient development of each 
country's trade and industrial potential ; 

Recognizing the important place that the automotive 
industry occupies in the industrial economy of the two 
countries and the interests of industry, labor and con- 
sumers in sustaining high levels of efficient production 
and continued growth in the automotive industry; 

Agree as follows : 

Abticle I 
The Governments of the United States and Canada, 
pursuant to the above principles, shall seek the early 
achievement of the following objectives : 

(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive 
products within which the full benefits of specialization 
and large-scale production can be achieved ; 

(b) The liberalization of United States and Cana- 
dian automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and 
other factors tending to impede it, with a view to 
enabling the industries of both countries to participate 
on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total 
market of the two countries : 

(c) The development of conditions in which market 
forces may operate effectively to attain the most eco- 
nomic pattern of investment, production and trade. 

It shall be the policy of each Government to avoid 
actions which would frustrate the achievement of 
these objectives. 

Article II 

(a) The Government of Canada, not later than the 
entry into force of the legislation contemplated in 
paragraph (b) of this Article, shall accord duty-free 
treatment to imports of the products of the United 
States described in Annex A. 

(b) The Government of the United States, during 
the session of the United States Congress commencing 
on January 4, 1965, shall seek enactment of legislation 
authorizing duty-free treatment of imports of the 
products of Canada described in Annex B. In seeking 
such legislation, the Government of the United States 
shall also seek authority permitting the implementation 
of such duty-free treatment retroactively to the earliest 
date administratively possible following the date upon 
which the Government of Canada has accorded duty- 
free treatment. Promptly after the entry into force 
of such legislation, the Government of the United 
States shall accord duty-free treatment to the prod- 
ucts of Canada described in Annex B. 

Article III I 

The commitments made by the two Governments ir 

this Agreement shall not preclude action by eithei| 

Government consistent with its obligations under Par(| 

II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. j 

Article IV i 

(a) At any time, at the request of either Govern 
ment, the two Governments shall consult with respec 
to any matter relating to this Agreement. 

(b) Without limiting the foregoing, the two Gov; 
ernments shall, at the request of either Government 
consult with respect to any problems which may aris 
concerning automotive producei's in the United State 
which do not at present have facilities in Canada fo 
the manufacture of motor vehicles, and with respect tj 
the implications for the operation of this Agreemen 
of new automotive producers becoming established i 

(c) No later than January 1, 1968, the two Goverr' 
ments shall jointly undertake a comprehensive revie'J 
of the progress made towards achieving the objectivf 
set forth in Article I. During this review the Go'l 
ernments shall consider such further steps as may l( 
necessary or desirable for the full achievement of thes 

Article V 
Access to the United States and Canadian markel 
provided for under this Agreement may by agreemei 
be accorded on similar terms to other couutrie.s. I 

Article VI ; 

This Agreement shall enter into force provisionalij 
on the date of signature and definitively on the da, 
upon which notes are exchanged between the two Go; 
ernments giving notice that appropriate action in the' 
respective legislatures has been completed. j 

Article VII j 

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duratio.' 
Each Government shall however have the right ! 
terminate this Agreement twelve months from the da! 
on which that Government gives written notice to tj 
other Government of its intention to terminate t; 
Agreement. | 

In witness whereof the representatives of the tV 
Governments have signed this Agreement. 

Done in duplicate at Johnson City, Texas, this 16; 
day of January 1965, in English and French, the t'f 
texts being equally authentic. 


Lyndon B. Johnson ,| 

Dean Rusk 


Lester B. Pearson 1 

Paul Martin 



Annex A 

1. (1) Automobiles, when Imported by a manufac- 
turer of automobiles. 

(2) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, ex- 
cept tires and tubes, wlien imported for use as orig- 
inal equipment in automobiles to be produced In Can- 
ada by a manufacturer of automobiles. 

(3) Buses, when imported by a manufacturer of 

(4) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, 
except tires and tubes, when imported for use as orig- 
inal equipment in buses to be produced in Canada 
by a manufacturer of buses. 

(5) Specified commercial vehicles, when imported 
by a manufacturer of specified commercial vehicles. 

(6) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, 
except tires, tubes and any machines or other articles 
required under Canadian tariff item 438a to be valued 
eeparately under the tariff items regularly applicable 
thereto, when imported for use as original equipment 
In specified commercial vehicles to be produced in Can- 
ada by a manufacturer of specified commercial ve- 

2. (1) "Automobile" means a four-wheeled pas- 
senger automobile having a seating capacity for not 
more than ten persons ; 

(2) "Base year" means the period of twelve months 
commencing on the 1st day of August, 1963 and ending 
on the 31st day of July, 1964 ; 

(3) "Bus" means a passenger motor vehicle having 
a seating capacity for more than 10 persons, or a 
chassis therefor, but does not include any following 
vehicle or chassis therefor, namely an electric track- 
less trolley bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or half- 
tracked vehicle or motor vehicle designed primarily 
for off-highway use ; 

(4) "Canadian value added" has the meaning as- 
■igned by regulations made under section 273 of the 
Canadian Customs Act; 

(5) "Manufacture" of vehicles of any following 
class, namely automobiles, buses or specified commer- 

* clal vehicles, means, in relation to any importation 
I of goods In respect of which the description is relevant, 
a manufacturer that 

(i) produced vehicles of that class in Canada in each 
of the four consecutive three months' periods in the 
base year, and 

(II) produced vehicles of that class in Canada in the 
period of twelve months ending on the 31st day of 
Jaly In which the Importation is made, 

(A) the ratio of the net sales value of which to 
the net .sales value of all vehicles of that class sold 
for consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in 
that period is equal to or higher than the ratio of 
the net sales value of all vehicles of that class pro- 
duced in Canada by the manufacturer in the base year 

to the net sales value of all voliides of that class sold 
for consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in the 
base year, and is not in any case lower than seventy- 
five to one hundred ; and 

(B) the Canadian value added of which is equal to 
or greater than the Canadian value added of all ve- 
hicles of that class produced in Canada by the manu- 
facturer in the base year ; 

(6) "Net sales value" has the meaning assigned by 
regulations made under section 273 of the Canadian 
Customs Act ; and 

(7) "Specified commercial vehicle" means a motor 
truck, motor truck chassis, ambulance or chassis there- 
for, or hearse or chassis therefor, but does not include : 

(a) any following vehicle or a chassis designed pri- 
marily therefor, namely a bus, electric trackless trolley 
bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or half-tracked vehicle, 
golf or invalid cart, straddle carrier, motor vehicle de- 
signed primarily for off-highway use, or motor vehicle 
specially constructed and equipped to perform special 
services or functions, such as, but not limited to, a fire 
engine, mobile crane, wrecker, concrete mixer or mobile 
clinic ; or 

(b) any machine or other article required under 
Canadian tariff item 438a to be valued separately under 
the tariff item regularly applicable thereto. 

3. The Government of Canada may designate a manu- 
facturer not falling within the categories set out above 
as being entitled to the benefit of duty-free treatment 
in respect of the goods described in this Annex. 

Annex B 

(1) Motor vehicles for the transport of persons or 
articles as provided for in items 692.05 and 692.10 of 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States and chassis 
therefor, but not including electric trolley buse.s, three- 
wheeled vehicles, or trailers accompanying truck trac- 
tors, or chassis therefor. 

(2) Fabricated components, not including trailers, 
tire.'9, or tubes for tires, for use as original equipment in 
the manufacture of motor vehicles of the kinds de- 
scribed in paragraph (1) above. 

(3) Articles of the kinds described in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above include such articles whether fin- 
ished or unfinished but do not include any article 
produced with the use of materials imported into 
Canada which are products of any foreign country (ex- 
cept materials produced within the customs territory 
of the United States), if the aggregate value of such 
imported materials when landed at the Canadian port 
of entry, exclusive of any landing cost and Canadian 
duty, was — 

(a) with regard to articles of the kinds described 
in paragraph (1), not including chassis, more than 60 
percent until January 1, 1968, and thereafter more 

FEBRCVRY 8, 1005 


than 50 percent, of the appraised customs value of the 
article imported into the customs territory of the United 
States; and 

(b) with regard to chassis of the kinds described in 
paragraph (1), and articles of the kinds described in 
paragraph (2), more than 50 percent of the appraised 
customs value of the article imported into the customs 
territory of the United States. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Vientiane December 29, 1964. | 
Entered into force December 29, 1964. 

Somali Republic j 

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program ] 
agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as I 
extended (TIAS 5332, 5508). Effected by exchange! 
of notes at Mogadiscio December 29 and 30, 1964.. | 
Entered into force December 30, 1964. 

Current Actions 


Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 
global commercial communications satellite system. 
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 
force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 
Notification of approval: France, January 18, 1965. 




Lloyd Nelson Hand as Chief of Protocol, effective; 
January 21. (For biographic details, see Department! 
of State press release 8 dated January 21.) i 


Agreement concerning automotive products. Signed at 
Johnson City, Tex., January 16, 1965. Entered into 
force provisionally on date of signature, and will 
enter into force definitively on date notes are ex- 
changed between the two governments stating that 
appropriate legislative action has been completed by 

Central African Republic 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bangui December 31, 1964. 
Entered into force December 31, 1964. 


Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in 
cotton textiles of October 19, 1963, as amended 
(TIAS 5482, 5.549), by revising export ceiling for 
category 57. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington January 13, 1965. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 13, 1965. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701- 
1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Reykjavik 
December 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1731- 
1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Reykjavik 
December 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 


Leonard Unger as Deputy Assistant Secretary iorti 
Far Eastern Affairs, effective January 9. 

Checi< List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl3ce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

No. Date Subject 

6 1/18 Automotive agreement with Canada. 

7 1/18 Agreed minute on shipping infor- 

*8 1/21 Hand sworn in as Chief of Protocol 

( biographic details ) . 
t9 1/21 Schwartz : statement on African 


10 1/23 Bundy : "American Policy in South 

Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia." 

11 1/23 Rusk : commissioning of U.S.S. 

America, Portsmouth, Va. 
tl2 1/24 Rusk : death of Churchill. 
tl3 1/24 Harriman: death of Churchill. 

♦Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



INDEX Fehnuiry 8, 1965 Vol. Lll, No. 13S7 

American Principles. The United States Navy, 

WntfhiloK of Peace (Rusk) 1C5 


American Policy iu South Viet-Nam and South- 
cast Asia (Bundy) 168 

Cni?er desijniated Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Far Eastern Affairs 194 

Atomic Energy 

Presiclent Meets With Committee on Nuclear 
Proliferation (White House announcement, 
statement by President) 187 

United States Takes Note of Soviet Nuclear 
Test 187 

Canada. U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on 
Trade in Automotive Products (Johnson, Pear- 
son, text of agreement) 191 

China. American Policy in South Viet-Nam and 
Southeast Asia (Bundy) 168 

Colombia. Mr. Ailes and Mr. Mann Hold Open- 
ing Talks on Sea-Level Canal 164 

Communism. American Policy in South Viet- 
Nam and Southeast Asia (Bundy) .... 168 

Costa Rica. Mr. Alles and Mr. Mann Hold Open- 
ing Talks on Sea-Level Canal 1G4 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Hand) 194 

Designation.s (Unger) 194 

Disarmament. President Meets With Commit- 
tee on Nuclear Proliferation (White House 
announcement, statement by President) . . 187 

Economic Affairs 

igreed Minute Provides for Exchange of Ship- 
ping Information (text) 188 

r.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Trade In 
Automotive Products (Johnson, Pearson, text 
of agreement) 191 

Europe. The United States, France, and NATO : 
■ A Comparison of Two Approaches (Popper) . 180 
"ranee. The United States, France, and NATO : 
AComparisonof Two Approaches (Popper) . ISO 
ntemational Organizations and Conferences. 
Agre«>d Minute I'rovides for Exchange of Shii>- 
plng Information (text) 188 

Corea. American Policy In South Viet-Nam 
and Southeast Asia (Bundy) 168 

Laos. United States Reaffirms Support of Ge- 
neva Agreements on Laos (McCloskey) . . 167 

Military Affairs 

Tlie Defense of Freedom in Viet-Nam (Gen. 

Harold K. Johnson) 176 

The United States, France, and NATO : A Com- 
parison of Two Approaches (Popper) . . . 180 

The United States Navy, Watchdog of Peace 

(Rusk) 165 

Nicaragua. Mr. Ailes and Mr. Mann Hold Open- 
ing Talks on Sea-Level Canal 164 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United 
States, France, and NATO : A Comparison of 
Two Approaches (Popper) 180 

Panama. Mr. Ailes and Mr. Mann Hold Open- 
ing Talks on Sea-Level Canal 164 

Presidential Documents 

The Inaugural Address of President Johnson . 162 

President Meets With Committee on Nuclear 

Proliferation 187 

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Trade in 
Automotive Products 191 

Protocol. Appointments (Hand) 194 

Publications. Recent Releases 190 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 194 

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Trade In 
Automotive Products (Johnson, Pearson, text 

of agreement) 191 

U.S.S.R. United States Takes Note of Soviet 
Nuclear Test 187 


American Policy in South Viet-Nam and South- 
east Asia (Bundy) 168 

The Defense of Freedom in Viet-Nam (Gen. 
Harold K. Johnson) 176 

Name Index 

Bundy, William P 168 

Hand, Lloyd Nelson 194 

Johnson, Gen. Harold K 176 

Johnson, President 162, 187, 191 

McCloskey, Robert J 167 

Pearson, Lester B 191 

Popper, David H 180 

Rusk, Secretary 165 

Unger, Leonard 194 

U.S. coviamiclil raixTixs oPFictiills 

Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 




Policy, Persistence, and Patience 

An Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusk 

This 32-page pamphlet is the transcript of an interview with Secretaiy Eusk ou the Nation I 
Broadcasting Company's television program, "A Conversation With Dean Eusk," broadcast on Jaj 
uary 3, 1965. Secretary Eusk discusses with NBC correspondents Elie Abel and Robert Goralf j 
the issues and problems facing the United States in South Viet-Nam, Southeast Asia, the Congo, ; 
the Western Hemisphere and explains what they mean for the American people. I 




Please send me copies of Policy, Persistence, and PaUenc0— 

Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 



WASHINGTON, D.C., 20402 

Enclosed find $ _ 


(cash, check, oi- money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 









Vol LII, No. 1338 

February 15, 1965 


The Budget {Excerpts) 207 
State of Our Defenses 211 

Statement hy Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 198 

Statements hy G. Mennen Williams and Abba P. Schwartz 819 

Article by Gladys A. Tillett 229 

For index see inside back caver 

The United States Reviews tlie U.N. Constitutional Crisis 

Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly '■ 

This is my first opportunity to express pub- 
licly, on behalf of tlie delegation of the United 
States, our congratulations to you on your elec- 
tion as President of this Assembly,- and our 
admiration — I shall now add — for tlie manner 
in -which you liave conducted that office in most 
difficult circumstances. 

I have asked to speak at this late date so that 
I can share with all delegations, in a spirit of 
openness, with candor and with simplicity, my 
Government's views on the state of affairs at this 
United Nations as our annual general debate 
comes to its conclusion. Certain things wliich 
I shall say here today have to do with law, with 
procedures, with teclinical and administrative 
matters. So I want to emphasize in advance 
that these are but manifestations of much deeper 
concerns about peace and world order, about the 

' Made in plenary session on Jan. 26 (U.S. delegation 
press 4492) . 

' Alex Quaison-Sackey, of Ghana, was elected Presi- 
dent of the General Assembly on Dec. 1, 1964. 

welfare of human society and the prospects of ! 
our jjeoples for rewarding 1 ives. J 

Tliere can be little doubt that we have reached \ 
one of those watersheds in human affairs. It is i 
not the first, of course, and surely not the last. « 
But this is clearly a critical point in the long,.' 
wearisome, erratic, quarrelsome but relentless j 
journey toward that lighter and brighter com- j 
munity wliich is the central thread of the human ' 
story. I 

Twenty years ago we took a giant stride oni 
that historic journey. We negotiated and 
signed and ratified the Charter of the United' 
Nations. The first pui-pose of tlie United Na- 
tions was to create a new system of world order. 
Those who drafted the charter were acutely con- - 
scious of earlier efforts to find collective security 
against war and were determined to do betterj 
this time. 

I speak to you as one who participated in the 
formulation of the charter of this organization, 
both in the Preparatory Commission in London 


The Department of State BuUetln, a 
weekl.v publication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with Infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the Dnlted States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general Interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale hy the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, Ti.C- 
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic $10- 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. ] 

Use of funds for printing of this pnl 
llcatlon approved hy the Director of th 
Bureau of the Budget (January li 

NOTE : Contents of this publication ar 
not copyrighted and Items contalne 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of tb 
Department of State Bulletin as th 
source will be appreciated. The BuUetl 
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide t 
Periodical Literature. 



and in tlie charter conference in San Fran- 
cisco. under ciroiunstances so eloquently rec;vlle.d 
by Dr. [Alberto] Lleras Camargo in liis mem- 
orable address in this hall last evening. I too 
recall vividly the fears and liopes of those days 
as the World War ended in the twilight of an 
old era and the fresh dawn of a new one — feare 
and hopes which brought us togetlier deter- 
mined to insure that such a world catastrophe 
would never again occur. At those conferences 
we laboretl long and diligently ; we tried to take 
into account the interests of all states; we at- 
tempted to subordinate narrow national in- 
terests to the broad common good. 

This time we would create something better 
than static conference macliincry, something 
solid enough to withstand the winds of contro- 
versy blowing outside and inside its halls. This 
time we would create workable machiner}- for 
keeping the peace and for settling disputes by 
nonviolent means, and we would endow it with 
a capacity to act. This time we would create 
working organizations to stimulate economic 
^owth and social welfare and human rights — 
md put resources back of tliem. And this time 
we would create a constitutional framework 
lexible enough to adapt to an inevitably chang- 
ng environment and to allow for vigorous 
growth through invention, experiment, and im- 
provisation within that framework. 

Twenty j-ears ago nobo<ly could see, of course, 
vhat the postwar years would bring. But there 
vas a widespread feeling, in those bright, cool 
lays on the rim of the Pacific, that the United 
Nations was our last chance for a peaceful and 
ecure system of world order, that we could 
ot afford another failure. For the character 
f war had evolved from a clash of armies 
or strategic ground to the po.ssibility of the 
estruction of populations and the indiscrim- 
nate destruction of wealth and culture; the 
■eapons of war had evolved from field artillery 

> blockbusting Iwmbs, and then to a single 
■arhead that could wipe out a city ; and recourse 

> war had evolved from what was cruel to 
hat could be suicidal insanity. 

Twenty years ago tliere was a widespre^ad 
^ling, too, that it already was late in the day 
p begin loosening the strait jackets of unbridled 
>vereignty and unyielding secrecy, to begin 
'stematically to build the institutions of a 

peaceful, prosperous international community 
in the vulnerable, fragile, interdependent 
neighborhood of our planet. For science and 
technology- were making the nations interde- 
pendent will3--iiilly and interconnected whether 
they liked it or not. Science and technology 
were making international cooperation and or- 
ganization a modem imperative in spite of ide- 
ology and politics and were paving the way for 
a practical assault on world poverty, if the world 
was uj) to the challenge. 

Contemporary World Realities 

It may well be that 20 years ago people ex- 
pected too much too soon from this organiza- 
tion. In the workaday world we quickly dis- 
cover that social and scientific and institutional 
inventions — even important and dramatic 
ones — do not swing wide the doors to utopia 
but only add new tools to work with in the 
solution of man's problems and tJie abatement 
of man's ills. In the workaday world we also 
discover, over and over again, that man him- 
self is a stubborn animal, and in no way more 
stubborn than in his reluctance to abandon the 
iron luggage of the past that encumbers his 
journey toward human community. In the 
workaday world we discover, too, that to be 
effective an international organization must be 
relevant to contemporary world realities and 
that there may be conflicting views as to just 
what those realities are. 

So we have learned how real are the limita- 
tions upon a single enterprise so bold and so 
comprehensive in its goals as the United Na- 
tions. We have learned how heavy are the 
chains of inherited tradition that inhibit man's 
journey toward wider community. We have 
learned that the United Nations will be no less — 
and can be no better — than its membership 
makes it in the context of its times. 

And yet we have seen that the charter of 
this organization has made it possible to main- 
tain a hopeful rate of dynamic growth ; to adapt 
to changing realities in world affairs; to begin 
to create workable international peacekeeping 
machinery; to begin to grapple with the com- 
plex problems of disarmament; to stimulate 
effective international cooperation; and so to 
move, however erratically, down the road to- 

3RUART 15, 1905 


ward that international community which is 
both the goal of the charter and the lesson of 
history. I am proud to say that not only has 
the United States given of its heart and mind 
to this endeavor but that over the years we 
have contributed more than $2 billion to the 
support of the United Nations and its activities. 
The progress which this institution has fos- 
tered has been accomplished despite the unprece- 
dented character of the organization, despite 
the intractable nature of many of the problems 
with which we have dealt, despite the so-called 
cold war which intruded too often in our delib- 
erations, and despite a series of debilitating 
external and internal crises from which the 
organization has, in fact, emerged each time 
more mature and better able to face the next 


Accomplishments of the United Nations 

In the short space of two decades the United 
Nations has responded time after time to 
breaches of the peace and to threats to the peace. 
A dozen times it has repaired or helped repair 
the rent fabric of peace. And who can say that 
this has not made the difference between a living 
earth and an uninliabitable wasteland on this 
planet ? 

During that time, the United Nations has 
sponsored or endorsed all the efforts to halt the 
armaments race and to press on toward general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. 
Its efforts were not fruitless. Agreement was 
reached on a direct communications link be- 
tween Washington and Moscow, a step lessening 
the risk of war through accident or miscalcula- 
tion. A treaty was signed — long urged by the 
General Assembly — banning nuclear weapon 
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
under water. The two states presently capable 
of stationing nuclear weapons in outer space 
expressed in the United Nations their intent to 
refrain from doing so, and we adopted a resolu- 
tion here calling on all other states to do like- 
wise. In short, the efforts of the last 20 years 
have at last begun to arrest the vicious spiral of 
uncontrolled nuclear armament. 

In the short span of 20 years the United Na- 
tions also has created a versatile range of inter- 
national agencies which are surveying resources, 

distributing food, improving agriculture, puri- 
fymg water, caring for children, controlling dis- 
ease, training technicians — researcliing, plan- 
ning, programing, investing, teaching, adminis- 
tering thousands of projects in hundreds of 
places, so that, to quote the charter, "we the 
peoples of the United Nations" may enjoy "so- 
cial progress and better sta,ndards of life in 
larger freedom." These activities are now be- 
ing fuianced at the impressive level of some $350 
million a year. 

In its brief life the United Nations also has 
taken major strides toward creating an open 
community of science — for the peaceful use of 
atomic energy, for the application of technology 
to industry and agriculture and transport and 
conununications and health, for a worldwide 
weather reporting system, for shared research 
in many fields, and for cooperative regulation 
of the growing list of tasks, like frequency allo- 
cation and aerial navigation, which cannot even 
be discussed except on the assmnption of inter- 1 
national cooperation and organization. 

We have proved in practice that these things ', 
can be done within the Charter of the United ; 
Nations whenever enough of the members want ■ 
them done and are willing to i^rovide the means 
to get them done. ' 

In the process we have left well behind us the 
outdated question of whether there should be a! 
community of international institutions to serve; 
our common interests. The question now is 
how extensive and effective these organizations 
should become — how versatile, how dynamic,i 
how efficient — and on what assumptions about, 
the sharing of support and responsibility. 

A Fork in the Road Ahead 

And yet, in spite of this history, we have 
reached a fork in the road ahead of this organi-^ 
zation — and thus in our search for world ordeii 
and our journey toward a wider community. ' 

Is this to overdraw the picture — to overdram 
atize the situation in wliich we find ourselves Ij 
Not, I tliink, if we recollect the historic char 
acter of warfare. 

I assume that we are all convinced that th 
revolutionary advance in destructive capabil: 
ity — and the danger that little wars anywher' 
can lead to bigger wars everywhere — has mad: 



war uu obsolete means for the settlement of dis- 
putes among nations. Yet World War II, I 
reniiiul you, ooourrtv,! after it already was cle<ir 
to intelligent men that war had be<:ome an ir- 
rational instnmaent of national policy, that 
another way must bo found to settle interna- 
tional accounts and to effect needed change. 

The reason is not hard to find : Tlie level of 
destruction does not oblitei'ate tlio inherently 
double cliaracter of warfare. In our minds we 
tend to iissociate war, and correctly so, with the 
ancient lust for conquest and dominion ; we tend, 
rightly, to identify war as the instrument of 
conquerors and tyrants. Yet in every war there 
is a defender wlio, liowcvcr rehictantly, takes up 
arms in self-defense and calls upon others for 
aid. And this is the other face of war : War has 
been the instrument by which lawlessness and 
/ebellion have been suppressed, by wliich nations 
have preser^•ed their independence, by whicli 
freedom has been defended. War is an instru- 
ment of aggression — and also the means by 
which the aggressors have been turned back and 
the would-be masters have been struck down. 

As long ago as 490 B.C., Miltiades and his 

heroic spearmen saved Greek civilization on the 

Plain of Marathon. Nearly 2,500 years later, 

he gallant flyers of the Royal Air Force fought 

n the skies over Britain until the invading air 

irmadas were turned back, wliile the indomi- 

able legions of the Soviet Army fought on and 

m at Stalingrad until at last they broke the 

>ack of the Nazi threat to the Russian homeland. 

All through the years we have been taught 

igain and again that most men value some 

hings more than life itself. And no one has 

eminded us more eloquently and resolutely that 

t is better to die on your feet than to live on 

our knees than the noble spirit that left us the 

ther day in London — Sir Winston Churchill. 

I As long as there are patriots, aggression will 

e met with resistance — whatever the cost. 

Jid the cost rises ever higher with the revolu- 

,on in weaponrj". At Marathon 200 Athenians 

)st their lives. At Stalmgrad 300,000 invaders 

>st their lives. 

There, precisely, is the difficulty we are in. 
low, in our day, the end result of aggression 
lid defense is Armageddon — for man has stolen 
f Promethean fire. Yet resistance to aggres- 

sion is no less inevitable in the second half of 
the 20th century than it was 2,500 years ago. 

Tlie jiowcrs of the atom unleashed by science 
are too startling, too intoxicating, and at the 
same time too useful as human tools for any of 
us to wish to abandon the astonishing new tech- 
nology. But, if we will not abandon it, we must 
master it. Unless the United Nations or some 
other organization develops reliable machinery 
for dealing with conflicts and violence by peace- 
ful means, Armageddon will continue to haunt 
the human race; for the nations will, as they 
must, rely on national armaments until they 
can confidently rely on international institu- 
tions to keep the peace. 

Preserving the U.N.'s Capacity To Act 

This, it seems to me, makes the present junc- 
ture in our affairs historic and critical. This, 
it seems to me, is why the Assembly should be 
able to perform its proper functions in the event 
of an emergency, and why this issue before us 
must be resolved. 

What then is the issue before us? It is, in 
essence, whether or not we intend to preserve 
the effective capacity of this organization to 
keep tlie peace. It is whether to continue the 
difFicult but practical and hopeful process of 
realizing in action the potential of the charter 
for growth through collective responsibility, or 
to turn toward a weaker concept and a differ- 
ent system. 

This choice has not burst upon us without 
warning. Some 3i/^ years ago, the last Secre- 
tary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, in what 
turned out to be his last rejiort to the General 
Assembly, foreshadowed this choice quite clear- 
ly. Tliere were, he said : 

. . . different concepts of the T'nited Nations, the 
character of the Orsanization, its authority and its 

On the one side, it has in various ways become clear 
that certain Members conceive of the Organization as 
a static conference machinery for resolving conflicts 
of interests and ideologies with a view to peaceful co- 
existence, within the Charter, to be served by a Secre- 
tariat which is to be regarde<l not as fully interna- 
tionalized but as representing within its ranks those 
very interests and ideologies. 

Other Members have made it clear that they conceive 
of the Organization primarily as a dynamic instru- 
ment of Governments through which they, jointly and 

RUARY 15. 1965 


for the same purpose, should seek such recoueiliation 
but through which they should also try to develop forms 
of executive action, undertaken on behalf of all Mem- 
bers, and aiming at forestalling conflicts and re- 
solving them, once they have arisen, by appropriate 
diplomatic or political means, in a spirit of objectivity 
and in implementation of the principles and purposes 
of the Charter. 

If that language of Mr. Hammarskj old's 
seems mild and diplomatic, the warning was 
nevertheless clear. If it was relevant then, it is 
no less relevant now. If we needed an orga- 
nization with capacity for executive action then, 
how much more do we need it now. 

Challenge to Assembly's Power of Assessment 

There have been many challenges to the 
United Nations' ability to act, from the abuse 
of the right of the veto to the effort to impose 
a troika to replace the Secretary-General. Now 
we are faced with a challenge to the Assembly's 
right even to engage in peacekeeping functions 
or to determine how they are to be financed and 
to adopt assessments to suppoit them.^ 

The decision to invest this Assembly with 
the power over the United Nations finances — 
its power of assessment — was made in 1045 
when the charter was adopted. Ever since then, 
an overwhelming proportion of the members 
have been paying their assessments on the as- 
sumption and understanding that this was, in 
fact, the law — and that the law would be ap- 
plied impartially to one and all. 

Almost from the outset these assessments 
have included peacekeeping activities. Start- 
ing in 1947, the United Nations Truce Super- 
vision Organization in the Middle East, the 
United Nations military observer in Kashmir, 
the United Nations observation mission in Leb- 
anon, and other similar missions were financed 
by mandatory assessments under article 17. 
For 10 years no member of the United Nations 
thought to refuse, as some are now doing, to 
pay these assessments or to condemn them as 
illegal, as they now do. 

When the assessments for the United Na- 
tions Emergency Force in the Middle East and 
the Congo operation were passed year after 

' For background on the U.N. financial crisis, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 9, 1964, p. 681 ; Dec. 7, 1964, p. 826 ; 
and Dec. 21, 1964, p. 891. 

year by large majorities in this Assembly, thej 
members clearly understood them also as man- ! 
datory obligations. | 

This was the understanding of states when] 
they made voluntary contributions above and| 
beyond their regular scale of assessments to re- i 
duce the burden on members less able to pay. ! 

This was the understanding on which thej 
members approved the United Nations bond is-j 
sue, and it was the understanding on whichi 
the Secretary-General sold — and over 60 mem-j 
ber states bought — some $170 million of thesej 
bonds. I 

As the Secretary-General so aptly put it last. 
Monday [Janiiary 18], the question is whether; 
the United Nations will, in the days ahead.I 
be in a position "to keep faith with those whcj 
have kept faith with it." 

When the argument was pressed, in spite oi 
the United Nations' unfailing practice, thai! 
peacekeeping assessments were not mandator]! 
because peacekeeping costs could not be exj 
penses of the organization within the meaning 
of article 17, that question was taken to the In) 
ternational Court of Justice for an opinion; 
We all know that the Court confirmed the prin; 
ciple which the Assembly had always followed 
Peacekeeping costs when assessed by the Asj 
sembly — and specifically those for the Cong( 
and the United Nations Emergency Force — ar, 
expenses of the organization within the meaninj, 
of article 17. We also know that the Genera' 
Assembly by resolution at the last session ac 
cepted that opinion by an overwhelming vaU 
thus confirming that the law was also the polic, 
of this Assembly as well. ' i 

The Assembly's most important prerogative 
may well be its power of assessment. It is tli 
heart of collective financial responsibility an( 
as the Secretary-General also said last week 

... a policy of improvisation, of ad hoc solution 
of reliance on the generosity of a few rather than tl, 
collective responsibility of all . . . cannot much long' 
endure if the United Nations itself is to endure as 
dynamic and effective instrument of internatlon 

It is your power of assessment which 
being challenged. It is the power of each mer 
ber of this Assembly — and particularly tho 
smaller nations whose primary reliance f 
peace and security and welfare must be tli 



United Nations. ^Vnd — make no mistake about 
it — it is your power to keep or to abandon. 

We can live witli certain dilemmas and jiara- 
doxes; we can paper over certain ambiguities 
and anomalies; we can ignore certain oontradic- 
tions of policy and principle in the interests of 
pui-suing the common interest of majorities in 
this Assembly. And we can, of course, change 
our procedures and devise new procedures, 
within the framework of the basic law, for 
handling our affairs in the future. Or we can 
indeed change the law. Rut we cannot have a 
double standard for applying the present law 
under which we hare been operating in good 
faith for the past two decades. 

We cannot have two rules for paying assess- 
ments for the expenses of the organization : one 
rule for most of the members and another rule 
for a few. If this Assembly should ignore the 
charter with respect to some of its members, it 
will \ie in no position to enforce the charter im- 
partially as to others, with all the consequences 
which will follow with respect to the mandatory 
or voluntary character of assessments. 

Adapting Procedures to Political Realities 

This is not to say that the procedures under 
which the Assembly exercises its authority 
should not conform to changed conditions and 

political realities. Indeed, it is all-important 
hat they do. 

That is why my Government has suggested 
■hat a special finance committee, perhaps with 

1 membership similar to the Committee of 21, 
Reestablished by the Assembly to recommend to 
he General Assembly in the future the ways 
ind means imder which it should finance any 
najor i>eacekeeping operations — and that this 
onimittee should consider a number of alter- 
lative and flexible financing schemes whenever 
t is called upon for such recommendations.' 

We are not dogmatic alx)ut this proposal, and 
re are prepared to examine patiently variations 
nd alternatives with other members — we have 
een for months and months. Certainly it 
hould not be beyond the ingenuity of such a 
ommittee, on a case-by-case basis, to devise 

' For text of a U.S. working paper on the financing 
t U.X. peacekeeping operations, see ibid., Oct. 5. 1964, 

ways of assiu'ing financing arrangements for 
the future which are generally acceptable, 
particularly to the permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

But in favoring procedural changes, we do not 
challenge the basic law of the charter: We seek 
improved working procedures; we do not seek 
to undo the past but to smooth the future. 

We support the primacy of the Security Coim- 
cil in the maintenance of peace and security and 
would support an increase in its role; but we 
seek to maintain the residual right of this As- 
sembly to deal with such questions in the event 
the Security Coimcil fails to do so. 

We support the right, under the charter, of 
this Assembly to assess the membership for the 
expenses of this organization so long as it en- 
forces this power equitably and impartially ; we 
will also support steps to assure that the views 
of all are taken fully into accoimt. 

We believe, as I have said, that the Assembly 
should continue, within the scope of its powers, 
to be able to deal, free of a veto, with problems 
of peace and security should the need arise. We 
are prepared to seek ways of accommodating 
the princij)le of sovereign equality and the fact 
of an unequal distribution of responsibility. 

The question here is whether the United Na- 
tions will demonstrate again, as it has in the 
])ast, a capacity for flexibility and adaptation 
which has permitted it to grow and to prosper 
in the past and whether we continue to adhere 
to the prevailing principle of collective financial 
responsibility for world peace. 

It will, of course, be up to the member gov- 
ernments to decide whether this organization is 
going to continue to work under the charter as it 
has been accepted by most of us, interpreted by 
the Court, and endorsed by this Assembly. 

U.S. Clear About Its Own Choice 

My Government is quite clear about its own 
choice, lest that be a secret to any of you. We 
want to continue to do our full share in design- 
ing and supporting — morally, politically, and 
materially — any sound expansion of the peace- 
keeping machinery of this organization. We 
feel that there are possibilities for a more di- 
versified family of weapons of peace in the 
United Nations arsenal — from conciliation pro- 

EBRUART 15, 1965 


cedures, to small teams available for investiga- 
tion of complaints and for border inspection, 
to logistical plans for peacekeeping missions. 

My Government also intends to continue the 
search for meaningful and verifiable steps to 
limit and, hopefully — hopefully, I repeat — to 
halt the arms race. For a peaceful world de- 
livered of the burden of armament, we will pur- 
sue with the urgency it merits the objective of 
stopping the spread of lethal weapons and of 
halting the multiplication of nuclear arms. 
This most urgent objective is in the common in- 
terest of all mankind. For if we fail to achieve 
it soon, all the progress attained thus far would 
be brought to naught and the goal of general 
and complete disarmament would become more 
distant than ever. 

My Government is prepared to support a fur- 
ther enlargement of the capacity of the interna- 
tional agencies to wage the war against poverty. 
We would, for example, like to see the combined 
Special Fund and Expanded Progi-am of Tech- 
nical Assistance raise its budgetary goal well 
beyond the present $150 million, once the two 
programs have been merged satisfactorily. We 
would like to see a further expansion of capital 
for the International Development Association. 
We would like to see a further expansion in the 
use of food for development. We would like to 
see some major experiments in bringing to focus 
the whole family of United Nations agencies. 

We would like to see, among other things, 
the Center for Industrial Development inten- 
sify its work and become an effective laboratory 
for spreading the technology of the industrial 
revolution to the far corners of the planet. We 
feel that there are good opportimities for build- 
ing up the institutions and programs dealing 
with the transfer and adaptation of science and 
technology, and for developing the wise use of 
the world's most precious resources. 

And, too, we wish to see the final chapter 
written in the drama of decolonization, and 
written peacefully. We, too, wish to explore 
the desirability of creating some new United 
Nations machinery in that most neglected area 
of the charter called human rights. We, too, 
want to press on in such fields as weatlier fore- 
casting, nuclear energy, resources conservation, 
and the conversion of sea water. 

My Government is as anxious as any delega- 
tion represented in this Assembly to get on with 
these priority tasks, to press ahead toward the 
peaceful solution of disputes, toward coopera-l 
tive development, toward building the law and' 
institutions of a world community in which man 
can some day turn his full talents to the quality ' 
of society and the dignity of the individual. j 

This is what we have believed in and worked; 
for at the United Nations for two decades now.; 
This is what most of the members have believed, 
in and worked for as long as they have been' 

members. i 


Danger of Diminishing U.N.'s Authority 


What, then, is the alternative ? Wliat if the; 
Assembly should falter in the exercise of its owri 
authority? What if the Assembly should re-, 
pudiate its own history, reject the opinion of; 
the International Court, reverse its own deci-j 
sion with respect to that opinion, and shut its' 
eyes to the plain meaning of the charter, and, 
thereby the treaty which gives it being ? ' 

I have no prophetic vision to bring to the; 
answer to this question — for this would be a 
step in the dark, down an unfamiliar path. ] 
can only say with certainty that the United Na- 
tions would be a different institution than mosl 
of the members joined and a lesser institutior 
than it would otherwise be. 

I do not have to draw a picture of the un^ 
certainties, the delays, the frustrations, and nc 
doubt the failures that would ensue were mem j 
bers able to decide with impunity which activi 
ties they, unilaterally, considered to be legal cfll 
illegal and which, unilaterally, they chose t(,' 
support or not to support from year to year, 
And so our world would become not a safer bu 
a more dangerous place for us all, and the hope; 
for a strengthened and expanded and more use 
f ul United Nations would have been dimmed. 

I must say in all earnestness that my delega; 
tion would be dismayed if at this stage in histor 
the members of this Assembly should elect t^ 
diminish the authority of this organization aw 
thereby subtract from the prospects for worli 
order and world peace. If the General Assem 
bly should now detour on the long journe;; 
toward an enforcible world order, I fear w^ 
will set back the gx-owth of collective responsi; 



bility for the maintenance of peace. 

A\'ise men drew a lesson from World War I 
and established the I-<eague of Nations. Pi'esi- 
dent Woodrow Wilson took the lead in that 
I great experiment, and my countrymen, in hind- 
sight, deeply regret that the United States did 
not take up its share of the burden in that his- 
toric enterprise. But the lesson of World War 
II was not wasted on this country, as our active 
I. iilership in establishing tlie United Nations 
ami its charter attests. 

VTiio can say whether we shall have another 
cliance to draw a lesson from another global 
conflict and start again ? But this we know full 
well : AVe, the human race, are fellow travelers 
on a tiny spaceship spinning through infinite 
space. We can wreck our sliip. We can blow 
'the human experiment into nothingness. And 
by every analogy of practical life, a quarrelsome 
ship's company and many liands on the steering 
gear is a good recipe for disaster. 

Why the U.S. Is Committed to the U.N. 

In such a world there can be only one over- 
riding aim: tlio creation of a decent human 
order on which we can build a reasonable 
peace — not simply the precarious peace of bal- 
ances and alliances, not simply the horrifying 
peace of mutual terror, but the peace that 
springs from agreed forms of authority, from 
accepted sj-stems of justice and arbitration, 
from an impartial police force. 

That is why our commitment to an effective, 
working, tenacious United Nations is so deep 
jind why, in the most literal sense, the United 
Nations carries with it so much of the hope and 
future of mankind. 

I This is our position not because we, among 
the members, are uniquely dependent upon the 
United Nations for the security and safety of 
our citizens. 

This is our position not because we, among 
:he members, especially look to the United Na- 
ions for guidance and help for our economic 

I This is our position not because we found it 
|idvantageous to our narrow national interests 
fo treat assessments as mandatory ; we found it 
^ price worth paying in recognition that others 
filso shared the principle that all members bear 

some measure of responsibility for maintaining 
the peace. 

This is our position, rather, because we be- 
lieve that in the nuclear age the only true 
national security for all members lies in a reli- 
able and workable system of dealing with inter- 
national disputes by nonviolent means — because 
we believe that w-e shall continue to face crises 
and problems which, by definition, can only 
be dealt with internationally — because we be- 
lieve that workable, effective international 
institutions are a plain necessity of our day 
and age — because we believe that in every 
secure commimity shared privileges demand 
shared responsibility — and because we believe 
it unwise and unsafe and unnecessary to take a 
side road at this stage of the journey on which 
we set out together two decades ago. 

Beneath all the complexities of the issue that 
now threatens the future capacity of this or- 
ganization, there are some very simple, very 
basic, very plain points to remember. 

]My nation, most nations represented here, 
have paid their assessments and have kept their 
accounts in good standing. 

My Government, most governments repre- 
sented here, have accepted the principle of col- 
lective financial responsibility and have striven 
to uphold the prerogatives of this Assembly. 

My Govei-nment, most of the governments rep- 
resented here, want to resolve this crisis without 
violence to the charter and to get on with our 
international business. 

That is why we have all stood available to 
discuss this issue at all times. 

'^"Nliat we have sought is not defeat for any 
member of this organization. "WHiat we have 
sought is the success of the United Nations as a 
living, growing, effective international organi- 

But the Assembly is now nearing a fork of 
the road, and I have attempted to put the issue 
frankly because the Assembly may soon again 
have to decide which branch of the road it will 
take. And the very least that we can do is to be 
absolutely clear just what we are doing when 
we exercise that option. 

Finally, I, for one, cannot escape the deep 
sense that the peoples of the world are looking 
over our shoulder — waiting to see whether we 

FEBECAKV 15. 19G5 


can overcome our present problem and take up 
with fresh vigor and with renewed resolution 
the great unfinished business of peace, which 
President Jolmson has called "the assignment of 
the century." ° 

U.S. Leaders Express Sorrow 
at Death of Winston Churchill 

Folloioing is the text of a statement iiuide hy 
President Johnson after the death of Sir 
Winston Churchill at London on January 23, 
together with an Executi've order, a message 
from Secretat^ Rusk to Michael Stewart, Brit- 
ish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and 
statements hy Under Secretary W. AvereJlFIar- 
riman and U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations Adlai E. Stevenson. 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release (U.S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, 
Md.) dated January 24 

Wlien there was darkness in the world, and 
hope was low in the hearts of men, a generous 
Providence gave us Winston Churchill. 

As long as men tell of that time of terrible 
danger and of the men who won the victory, 
the name of Churchill will live. 

Let us give thanks that we knew him. With 
our grief let there be gratitude for a life so fully 
lived, for services so .splendid, and for the joy 
he gave by the joy he took in all he did. 

The people of the United States — liis cousins 
and his fellow citizens — will pray with liis 
British countrymen for God's eternal blessing 
on this man, and for comfort to his family. 

He is Histoi-y"s child, and what he said and 
what he did will never die. 

States shall be flown at half-staff on all buildings, 
grounds and naval vessels of the Federal Government! 
in the District of Columbia and throughout the United 
States and its Territories and possessions. I further 
direct tliat the flag shall be flown at half-staff for the| 
same length of time at all United States embas,sies,' 
legations, consular offices, and other facilities abroad,! 
including all military facilities and naval vessels and I 
stations. ' 

The White House, 
January 24, 1965. 

Message of Secretary Rusk 

Press release 12 dated January 24 , 

My colleagues and I extend to you our deepest 
sympathy in the death of Sir Winston. We' 
shai-e your sorrow and feel greatly the loss ofl 
the man who has been such an inspiration to all 
free peoples of the world. He characterized to| 
all Americans the closeness of the ties betweeoj 
our two countries. 

Statement by Under Secretary Harriman 

Press release 13 dated January 24 

People the world over are mourning the loss' 
of the indomitable leader of our times, Winstoiij 
Churchill, who became to all the symbol of cour-; 
age and determination to preserve and strength-^ 
en the cause of freedom. 

Those of us who had the privilege of know- 
ing him and of working with him will nevei 
forget the example he set of devotion to liberty 
and fierce opposition to the forces of tyranny 
and injustice. 

His wise counsel and invincible spirit will 
ever guide and inspire us as we face the new 
and critical problems ahead. 


Executive Order 11193 > 

Winston Spencer Churchill 

As a symbol of respect for the memory of Sir Winston 
Spencer Churchill, an Honorary Citizen of the United 
States, it is hereby ordered, pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 4 of Proclamation 3044 of March 1. 1954, 
that through the day of interment the flag of the United 

^ma., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 
' 30 Fed. Reg. 821. 

Statement by Ambassador Stevenson 

U.S. /U.N. press release 4491 dated January 24 

He, with Franklin Koosevelt, gave us oui 
finest hour. He was not afraid of blood or sweat 
or tears — or anything else, for that matter 
Now, all we will have of him is the inspiratior 
of his indomitable spirit, but that is the greates 
bequest he could leave us. 




The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1966 (Excerpts) ' 


To the Congress of the United States: 

International affairs and finance. — We 

3iiiuiot achieve lasting world peace with arma- 
(uents alone. Nor can greater worldwide pros- 
perity be bought with money alone. These goals 
will be achieved only through the hard work, 
patience, understanding, and strength of men 
}f good will everywhere. 

Yet it is essential that we continue to put 
jur best energies and some of our vast economic 
■esources to work in solving the problems the 
vorld faces today. Prudent and careful ex- 
penditures for our international programs can 
lelp to keep men free, to promote understand- 
ng, and to substitute cooperation and nego- 
iation for force in world affairs. 
• The inCf) budget calls for only a very modest 
ncrease in foreign economic assistance expend i- 
tires. With these funds, we will continue to 
oncentrate our aid efforts in those less (level- 
led coimtries that are demonstrating the will 
nd determination required to achieve political 
tability and economic growth. 

We shall maintain our firm commitment to 
he Alliance for Progress — the focus of our ef- 

' n. Doc. 1."). Part 1, 80th Cong., Ist gem. ; tran.smitted 
n Jan. 2.5. Reprinted here are the sections on inter- 
ational affairs and finance from parts 1 and 4 of the 
12-poge volume entitled The Budget of the United 
\tatet Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 
0, J966, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
'.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 
5402 ($1.7.-^). 

forts to achieve miity and understanding in this 
hemisphere. As an important part of this com- 
mitment, I recommend prompt action to permit 
our participation in the expansion of the Inter- 
American Development Bank. 
This budget also enables us to : 

• Continue our participation in and support 
for the United Nations. 

• Maintain an adequate and alert network 
of diplomatic posts around the world. 

• Improve our overseas information activi- 
ties, so that others may know us not just as a 
rich nation, but as a free and responsible nation 
as well. 

• Expand the Peace Corps, by now a proven 
experiment in international cooperation. 

In an important steji to strengthen the free 
world's financial system, the members of the 
International Monetary Fund are considering 
an increase in quotas. Upon completion of these 
discussions, expected shortly, I shall recom- 
mend that the Congress authorize promptly the 
fimds needed to provide the U.S. share of this 

PART 4. 


International Affairs and Finance 

Through its international activities, the Fed- 
eral Government remains alert and responsive 
to developments in a rapidly changing world. 
In pursuit of the objectives of world peace, sta- 
bility, and prosperity, the United States par- 

EBnUARY 15, 1966 


ticipates in international organizations such 
as the United Nations and the Organization 
of American States. It increases mutual under- 
standing through worldwide information and 
exchange activities. It pursues negotiations 
affecting a wide spectrmn of problems— from 
the reduction of armaments to the liberalization 
of world trade and commerce. It builds for the 
future by encouraging economic and social 
progress in the developing nations, and it helps 
to avert immediate dangers to peace by provid- 
ing economic as well as military assistance to 
threatened countries. 

New obligational authority of $5.1 billion is 
requested for international affairs and finance 
activities for 1966, a decrease of about $1.6 
billion from 1965. Administrative budget ex- 
penditures for these activities are estimated to 
be $4.0 billion in 1966, $59 million less than in 

Conduct of foreign affairs. — The Depart- 
ment of State has primary responsibility for a 
wide array of activities required to conduct 
the Nation's foreign affairs. To fulfill its re- 
sponsibilities, it must maintain diplomatic and 
consular posts in 113 countries — 31 more than 
were required 5 years ago. A small niunber of 
additional diplomatic and consular posts will be 
opened in 1966, reflecting the forthcoming inde- 
pendence of new nations and the implementa- 
tion of a new consular convention with the 

Workloads will continue to increase in other 
areas as well. For example, more Americans 
will be traveling abroad in 1966, resulting in 
an estimated 1,320,000 applications for pass- 
ports — a 10% increase over 1965. Travel of 
foreigners to the United States will also con- 
tinue to grow. The budget anticipates that 
1,365,000 nonimmigrant visas will be issued— 
14% over 1965. Additional commercial staff 
will be required to deal with increased work- 
loads, including the promotion of U.S. exports. 
Improved communications to support the For- 
eign Service and enhanced security measures at 
posts abroad are also provided for. 

In addition, the budget includes funds for the 
expenses of U.S. membership in the United 
Nations and other international organizations. 
Our participation in and support of these bodies 

are important to our quest for international j 
peace, security, and cooperation. I 

All these activities of the Department of State i 
will require expenditures of $306 million in j 
1966, $10 million more than in 1965. > 

The United States Arms Control and Disar- 1 
mament Agency will expand its staff and con- 1 
tract research efforts in 1966 to formulate new 
U.S. approaches toward controlling and reduc- j 
ing arms and lessening the risk of war, and to I 
support U.S. iDarticipation in international dis- j 
armament meetings. j 

Agency for International Development. — ] 
The Agency for International Development ad-lj 
ministers and coordmates economic assistance 
programs in less developed countries where po-J 
litical stability, resistance to aggression, or eco-i 
nomic and social progress are important to thpi; 
foreign policy objectives of the United States.' 
In those countries which are working to achievej 
economic growth and stability through concen-j 
trated self-help and self-discipline, the Unitedj 
States is supplementing local resources with| 
long-term loans and teclinical and supporting! 
assistance. In 1966, expenditures for all AID 
activities are estimated to total $2.1 billion, an 
increase of $50 million over 1965. 

New obligational authority of $2.2 billion if| 
being requested for 1966, about the same as th( 
1965 amount. This request covers only the mosi; 
urgent requirements. It reflects a continuing 
effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiencj, 
of our assistance programs. 

An increasing proportion — now over 80%—. 
of U.S. commitments for economic assistanci, 
programs is directly tied to the purchase o 
goods and services in the United States. In thij 
way, any adverse effect of our assistance pro' 
gram on the U.S. balance of international pay 
ments is minimized. In addition, the long-tern 
growth of U.S. exports is stimulated througl | 
the development of new trade patterns am I 

Development Joans and technical coopej 
ation. — Most expenditures for development a.'i 
sistance are in the form of long-term loans, re 
payable in dollars. Expenditures for the.' 
loans are estimated to total $870 million in 196< 
slightly more than in 1965. This total excludfj 
loans imder the Alliance for Progress, which ' 
discussed separately. 



This assistance is concentrated in relatively 
few developinj; countries to finance the dollar 
costs of capital projects and/or critical imports 
upon whicli economic growtli depends. India, 
Pakistan, and Turkey are tlie major recipients. 

In these and other major covmtries, U.S. fi- 
nancial liclp is part of a systemat ic program of 
modernization can-ied out in accordance with a 
development plan. This help usually repre- 
sents an agreed-upon U.S. share of the total 
amount of assistance provided by most of the 
major industrial countries of the free world. 
Where comprehensive development plans have 
not yet been formulated and approved, lending 
is normally undertaken only for specific proj- 
ects, each of which is carefully reviewed in 
terms of its teclinical soundness and its relative 
contribution to overall growth. 

In most countries, dollar loans — to be effec- 
tive — must be complemented by teclmical coop- 
eration. The United States meets this need 
through grants for part of the costs of furnish- 
ing U.S. advisers who can bring American ex- 
perience and technical skills to bear on the vari- 
ous complex problems of economic development. 
Expenditures for such grants are expected to 
imount to $205 million in 1966, $15 million more 
■-han in 1965. 

AUinnce for Progress. — Through the Alli- 
ince for Progi-ess, the United States is working 
svith the Latin American nations in a special 
'ffort to achieve the economic and social reforms 
■equired to accelerate economic growth. U.S. 
larticipation in these efforts involves primarily 
development loans and technical assistance. 
' This budget includes new obligational au- 
'hority of $580 million for 1066 for the Alliance 
"or Progress activities of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development ; expenditures in 1966 are 
■stimated at $398 million, an increase of $33 
nillion over 1965. Other important Alliance 
Activities will be carried out through the Inter- 
Vmerican Development Bank, the Export-Im- 
)ort Bank, the Food for Peace Program, and 
he Peace Corps. 

I Other AID programs. — In some cases, the 
iJnited .States provides supporting assistance 
p-ants and loans to counter immediate threats 
jo political and economic stability which, in 
urn, pose danger to free world security. The 

[Fiscal years. In millions] 

Payments to the public 



Program or agency 

new obll- 











ity for 

Administrative Budget Funds: 

Conduct of foreign affairs: 

Department of State 





U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency 





Tariff Commission 





Foreign Claims Settlement 






Economic and financial pro- 

grams : 

Agency for International 


Development loans 





Technical cooperation... 





Alliance for Progress 





Supporting .assistance... 





Contingencies and other. 





Subtotal, Agency for 

International Devel- 




2, 100 


International financial in- 


Present programs 





Proposed legislation 




Peace Corps 





Export-Import Bank 









Food for Peace ' 


Foreign information and ex- 

change activities: 

United States Information 






Department of State 





Subtotal, administrative 





'5, 136 

Trust Funds 




' 115 

Intragovernmental transac- 

tions and adjustment for 

net cash issuances or with- 

drawals by international 

financial institutions (de- 








4, 153 

' See General Notes, page 4, Item 4. INot printed here.) 
' Compares with new oblJRatlonal authority for 1964 and 1965, as fol- 
lows: Administrative budget funds: 1964, $4,457 million; 1966, $6,769 
million. Trust funds: 1964, $57 million; 1965, $32 million. 

number of coimtries in which such financing is 
necessaiy has declined sharply in recent years, 
but there continue to be urgent requirements in 
the Far East — primarily in Vietnam. Expend- 
itures for supporting assistance are estimated 
to rise to $390 million in 1966 from $370 million 
in 1965. 

lEBRUART 15, 1965 


The United States makes substantial contri- 
butions to programs of international organiza- 
tions which complement our bilateral aid efforts. 
These programs range from general develop- 
ment assistance operations, such as those of the 
United Nations Special Fund, to specific activi- 
ties, such as the Indus Basin Development pro- 
gram administered by the World Bank. 

AID programs for guaranteeing private in- 
vestment abroad are encouraging increased par- 
ticipation by the American business community 
in the developing comitries. To accelerate this 
trend, legislation is recommended to increase 
substantially the authority to extend these guar- 
antees. The value of guarantees outstanding 
is expected to rise in 1966 to a total of $4 billion, 
about $1 billion more than in 1965. 

Other economic and financial programs. — 
New obligational authority of $456 million is 
requested for 1906 to strengthen the Alliance 
for Progi-ess tln-ough expansion of the resources 
and activities of the Inter- American Develop- 
ment Bank. This total includes a request for 
$206 million in new obligational authority to 
provide the second and final installment of a 
$412 million increase in the U.S. subscription 
of callable capital held in reserve in the U.S. 
Treasui-y against Bank borrowing in private 
capital markets. No expenditure of these funds 
is contemplated. Under jjroposed legislation to 
expand the Bank's long-term lending financed 
by member governments, new obligational au- 
thority of $250 million is being requested in 
both 1965 and 1966; a similar amount will be 
requested for 1967. 

New obligational authority of $104 million is 
requested for 1966 to finance the first install- 
ment of the 3-year, $312 million increase in 
the U.S. subscription to the International De- 
velopment Association approved during the last 
session of Congress. This Association is an af- 
filiate of the World Bank, established to make 
loans on easier terms than regular Bank loans. 

The member nations of the International 
Monetaiy Fvmd are considering strengthening 
this institution through an increase in the quotas 
of all members. Completion of the discussions 
involved is expected shortly, and legislation will 
be promptly recommended to authorize the U.S. 
share of this increase. The budget includes new 

obligational authority of $1 billion for 1965 for 
this purpose. 

The Export-Import Bank is continuing its 
efforts to expand U.S. exports. The Bank's 
successful insurance and guarantee programs — 
undertaken in cooperation with insurance com- 
panies and commercial banks — will protect more 
than $1.5 billion of U.S. exports against both 
political and commercial risks by the end of 
1966. Direct loans to foreign borrowers are 
also expected to increase, thereby developing 
markets for U.S. products and providing U.S. 
capital equipment for projects around the world, i 
Sales to private buyei-s of certificates of par- ' 
ticipation in the Bank's portfolio will contribute ; 
to an estimated net excess of Bank receipts over \ 
expenditures of $480 million in 1966. j 

The continuing success of the Peace Corps is ; 
expected to result in increased demand from' 
foreign nations for the services of volunteers,! 
as well as increased interest from qualified' 
Americans. Peace Corps programs are antic- i 
ipated in 46 countries in 1966, and the numberi 
of volunteers and trainees is expected to rise! 
from 15,000 in 1965 to 17,000 by the end of 1966. : 
This will require an estimated increase of $25' 
million in expenditures. 

Food for Peace. — The Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Pub- 
lic Law 480) is the foundation of the Food for: 
Peace program, through which U.S. agricul-; 
tural surpluses are made available to help feed 
liungry people and contribute to economic de- 
velopment abroad. 

About two-thirds of the Food for Peace pro- 
gram consists of sales of commodities to foreigr 
nations for their own currencies. To the extent 
possible, these currencies are then used in th( 
recipient countries to pay U.S. obligations, t( 
finance loans to U.S. private enterprise, and t(, 
supportr local development jirojects. Almost al 
of these currencies are inconvertible, and con 
siderable balances have developed in a numbei 
of countries. In an effort to improve our abil 
ity to make more effective use of these currencies 
a special foreign currency authorization is pro 
posed permitting the President to use up to 5^ 
of such currencies in each of those countries ii 
which U.S. balances are in excess of regula 
U.S. needs. These fimds will be used for addi 



tioiial worthwhile purposes serving U.S. 
national interests, and annual reports will be 
maile to the Congress on these uses. 

Other aspects of the Food for Peace program 
provide grants of food abroad and long-term 
credit sjiles for dollars. 

Expenditures for Food for Pe^ice are esti- 
mated at $1,GG1 million in 1966, the same as in 
1065. The total volume of commodities shipped 
I is e.xpected to remain appro.ximately at 1965 
levels. The decline in expenditures for the for- 
eign currency sales program reflects in part 
lower ocean transportation payments. Under 
legislation passed last year, these payments will 
cover only additional costs resulting from the 
use of U.S. vessels. 

Disposal of commodities abroad through pri- 
vate welfare agencies, as authorized by section 
,416 of tlie Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, 
is sometimes treated as a part of the Food for 
iPeace etfort. Expenditures for this program, 
.which are classified under agriculture and agri- 
, cultural resources, are estimated at $179 million 
ill 1066. 

Foreign information and exchange activi- 
ties. — The Department of State and the United 
States Information Agency work together to 
develop improved mutual understanding with 
other peoples. 

Expenditures for educational and cultural ex- 
change activities of the Department of State 
will increase as a result of measures to improve 
:he quality and effectiveness of tliese activities. 
Most of the increase in new obligalional author- 
ity is requested to substitute for a decline in 
U.S. -owned foreign currencies available for the 
program. Tlie increase will also provide for 
: ravel of dependents of certain American teach- 
ers and professors sent abroad and for special 
«rvices for non-T'.S. Government-sponsored 
"'oreign students in this country-. 

The United States Information Agency will 
reallocate its resources in order to improve the 
luality of its information activities while reduc- 
ng costs. This will permit reductions in both 
expenditures and employment in 1966. Under 
his reallocation, decreases in trade fair exhibi- 
ions and the Western European program will 
'ermit greater worldwide motion picture and 
elevision efforts as well as further buildup in 

the African program. The 1966 estimate for 
new obligational authority includes $13 million 
to complete an important Voice of America 
radio transmitting facility in the Far East. 

State of Our Defenses 

Message of the President to the Congress ' 

To THE Congress of the Unfted States : 

One hundred seventy-five years ago, in his 
first annual message. President Wasliington told 
t he Congress : 

Among the many interesting objects which will 
engage your attention tliat of providing for the com- 
mon defense will merit particular regard. To be pre- 
pared for war is one of the most effectual means of 
preserving iwace. 

For the 89th Congress — as for the 1st Con- 
gress — those words of the first President remain 
a timely charge. 

In the 20th year since the end of mankind's 
most tragic war yon and I are beginning new 
terms of .service. The danger of war remains 
ever with us. But if the hope of peace is 
sturdier than at any other time in these two 
decades, it is because we — and free men every- 
where — have proved preparedness to be "the 
most effectual means of preserving peace." 

Arms alone cannot assure the security of any 
society or the preservation of any peace. The 
health and education of our people, the vitality 
of our economy, the equality of our justice, the 
vision and fulfillment of our aspirations are all 
factors in America's strength and well-ljcing. 

Today we can walk the road of peace because 
we have the strength we need. We have built 
that strength with courage. We have employed 
it with care. We have maintained it with con- 
viction that the reward of our resolution will 
be peace and freedom. 

We covet no territory ; we seek no dominion ; 
we fear no nation; we despise no people. With 
our arms we seek to shelter the peace of man- 

' Wliito House press release dated Jan. 18 (H. Doc. 
'A, H!»th Cong., 1st sess.). 

iXBRr-VRT 15. 1965 


In this spirit, then, I wish to consider with 
you the state of our defenses, the policies we 
pursue, and— as Commander in Chief— to offer 
recommendations on our course for the future. 

The State of Otjr Defenses 
I am able to report to you that the United 
States today is stronger militarily than at any 
other time in our peacetune history. 

Under our free and open society, the Ameri- 
can people have succeeded in building a strength 
of arms greater than that ever assembled by 
any other nation and greater now than that of 
any combination of adversaries. 

This strength is not the handiwork of any 
one administration. Our force in being and in 
place reflects the continuity and constancy of 
America's purpose under four administrations 
and eight Congresses— and this responsible con- 
duct of our system is, of itself, a source of mean- 
mgf ul strength. 

For the past 4 years, the focus of our national 
effort has been upon assuring an indisputable 
margin of superiority for our defenses. I can 
report today that effort has succeeded. 

Our strategic nuclear power on alert has in- 
creased tlireefold in 4 years. 

Our tactical nuclear power has been greatly 

Our forces have been made as versatile as the 
threats to peace are various. 

Our Special Forces, trained for the unde- 
clared, twilight wars of today, have been ex- 
panded eightfold. 

Our combat-ready Army divisions have been 
increased by 45 percent. 

Our Marine Corps has been increased by 
15,000 men. 

Our airlift capacity to move these troops 

rapidly anywhere in the world has been doubled. 

Our tactical Air Force firepower to support 

these divisions in the field has increased 100 


This strength has been developed to support 
our basic military strategy— a strategy of 
strength and readiness, capable of countering 
aggression with appropriate force from bal- 
listic missiles to guerrilla bands. 

Our forces are balanced and ready, mobile 
and diverse. Our allies trust our strength and 
our adversaries respect it. But the challenge | j 
is imceasing. The forms of conflict become ] 
more subtle and more complex every day. We [ 
must— and we shall— adapt our forces and our i 
tactics to fulfill our purposes. , 

If our military strength is to be fully usable ; 
in tunes requiring adaptation and response to ; 
changing challenges, that strength must be so j 
organized and so managed that it may be em- 
ployed with planned precision as well as j 
promptness. { 

The state of our defense is enhanced today ; 
because we have established an orderly system l 
for informed decisionmaking and planning. \ 
Our planning and budgeting programs are ] 
now conducted on a continuing 5 -year basis and 
cover our total military requirements. ■ 

Our national strategy, military force struc- , 
ture, contingency plans, and defense budget are i 
all now related in an integrated plan. ' 

Our orderly decisionmaking now combines i 
our best military judgment with the most ad- , 
vanced scientific and analytical techniques. , 
Our military policy under the Secretary of , 
Defense is now more closely tied than ever to ; 
the conduct of foreign policy under the Secre- , 
tary of State. 

Thus, we now have the ability to provide 
and maintain a balanced, flexible military force, 
capable of meeting the changing requirements 
of a constantly changing challenge. 

II ,i 


Basic Defense Policies ; 

1. Four years ago, President John F. Ken-- 
nedy stated to the Congress and the world: '^The 
primary purpose of our arms is peace, noti 
wary That is still their purpose. We a/re\ 
armed, not for conquest, but to insivre our own- 
security and to encourage the settlement of\ 
international differences by peaceful processes. 

We are not a militaristic people, and we havej 
long denounced the use of force in pursuit of 

= For President Kennedy's special message of Mar. 28, 
1961, on the defense budget, see Public Papers of tie 
Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy;^ 
19C,1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,! 
1902. ' 




national ambition. Wc seek to avoid a nuclear 
iiolocaust in wliich tliere can bo neither victory 
nor victors. But we shall never again return 
to a world where peaceloving men must stand 
helpless in the path of those who, heedless of 
destruction and human sutfering, take up war 
and oppression in pursuit of their own ambi- 

2. The strength of our strategic retaliatory 
forces must deter nuclear attack on the United 
States or our Allies. 

, The forces we now have give that capability. 
I The United States has— 

More than 850 land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. 

More than 300 nuclear-armed missiles in 
Polaris submarines. 

More than 000 strategic boinbci-s, half of them 
i-eady at all times to be airborne within 15 miii- 

I These strategic forces on alert are superior, 
in number and in quality, to those of any other 

To maintain our superiority, the immediate 

"mure will see further increases in our missile 

strength, as well as concentration on further 

ethnological improvements and continuing 

igorous research and development. 

We are — 

Kequesting more than $300 million to con- 
■inue our program for extending the life and 
mproving the capabilities of our B-52 strategic 
>ombers, wliile eliminatingtwo squadrons of B- 
•2B's, the earliest — and least effective — model 
■f this plane. 

Continuing development of engines and other 
ystems for advanced aircraft to retain our 

ption for a new manned bomber, should the 

eed arise. 

Continuing deployment of the SR-71, the 
v'orld's fastest airplane, which will enter the 

LCtive Forces this year. 
Continuing installation of the new over-the- 

orizon radars, giving us almost instantaneous 

nowledge of ballistic missiles launched for 


i Continuing procurement and deployment of 

ur latest strategic missiles, Minuteman II and 

'olaris A-3, greatly extending the range, ac- 

curacy, and striking power of the strategic 

Replacing older, more costly, and vulnerable 
elements of our strategic forces. The outdated 
Atlas and Titan I missiles will be retired this 
year and the remainder of the B-47 forces will 
bo phased out during fiscal year 19G6. 

All this is part of a continuing process. 
There will always be changes, replacing the old 
with the new. 

Major new developments in strategic weapons 
systems we propose to begin this year are — 

A new missile system, the Poseidon, to in- 
crease the striking power of our missile carrying 
nuclear submarines. The Poseidon missile will 
have double the pay load of the highly successful 
Polaris A-3. The increased accuracy and flexi- 
bility of the Poseidon will permit its use effec- 
tively against a broader range of possible tar- 
gets and give added insurance of penetration 
of enemy defenses. 

A series of remarkable new payloads for stra- 
tegic missiles. These include penetration aids, 
to assure that the missile reaches its target 
through any defense; guidance and reentry 
vehicle design, to increase manyfold the effec- 
tiveness of our missiles against various kinds of 
targets; and methods of reporting the arrival 
of our missiles on target, up to and even in- 
cluding the time of explosion. 

A new short-range attack missile (Sram) 
that can, if needed, be deployed operationally 
with the B-52 or other bombers. This aerody- 
namic missile — a vast improvement over exist- 
ing systems — would permit the bomber to at- 
tack a far larger number of targets and to do 
so from beyond the range of their local defenses. 

3. Tlie strength, deployment, and mohility of 
our forces must be su^h that, co7nbined with 
those of our allies, they can prevent the erosion 
of the free woi'ld by limited, nonnuclear aggres- 

Our nonnuclear forces must be strong enough 
to insure that we are never limited to nuclear 
weapons alone as our sole option in the face of 
aggression. These forces must contribute to 
our strategy of responding flexibly and appro- 
priately to varied threats to peace. 

I have already cited the increases achieved 
during recent years in the strength and mobility 

EBRUART 15, 19G5 
762-186—65 3 


of our Army, Navy, Marines, and of our air 
transport which gets tliem to the scene of battle 
and the tactical aircraft which support them 
there. These forces, furthermore, are now 
better balanced, better integi-ated, and under 
more effective command and control than ever 
before. We shall maintain our present high 
degree of readiness. 

We must further improve our ability to con- 
centrate our power rapidly in a threatened area, 
so as to halt aggression early and swiftly. We 
plan expansion of our airlift, improvement of 
our sealift, and more prepositioned equipment 
to enable us to move our troops overseas in a 
matter of days, rather than weeks. 

To this end, we will — 

Start development of the C-5A cargo trans- 
port. This extraordinary aircraft capable of 
carrying 750 passengers will bring a new era 
of air transportation. It will represent a dra- 
matic step forward in the worldwide mobility 
of our forces and in American leadership in the 
field of aviation. 

Build fast deployment cargo ships, capable 
of delivering militai-y equipment quickly to any 
theater. This represents a new concept in the 
rapid deployment of military forces. These 
ships will have a gas turbine engine propulsion 
system, a major advance in marine engineering 
for ships of this size. Such vessels will be de- 
ployed around the globe, able to begin deliveries 
of heavy combat-ready equipment into battle 
zone within days or even hours. 

Increase our forward floating depot ships sta- 
tioned close to areas of potential crisis. 

Begin large-scale procurement of the revolu- 
tionary sweptwing F-111 and the new A-7 
Navy attack aircraft. 

We will also begin construction of 4 new nu- 
clear-powered attack submarines, and 10 new 
destroyer escorts. And we will continue to de- 
velop a much smaller, more efficient, nuclear 
powerplant for possible use in our future air- 
craft carriers. 

4. While confident that our present strength 
will continiie to deter a thermonuclear tvar, we 
must always ie alert to the 'possibilities for 
limiting destruction which might he inflicted 
upon our people, cities, and industry — should 
such a roar he forced upon us. 

Many proposals have been advanced for! 
means of limiting damage and destruction to 
the United States in the event of a thenno-| 
nuclear war. Shifting strategy and advancingi 
technology make the program of building ade-| 
quate defenses against nuclear attack extremely! 

Decisions with respect to further limitation| 
of damage require complex calculations con-i 
ceming the effectiveness of many interrelated! 
elements. Any comprehensive program would! 
involve the expenditure of tens of millions ofj 
dollars. We must not shrink from any ex-| 
pense that is justified by its effectiveness, but wel 
must not hastily expend vast sums on massive; 
programs that do not meet this test. I 

It is already clear that witliout fallout shelter! 
protection for our citizens, all defense weapons' 
lose much of their effectiveness in saving lives.; 
This also appears to be the least expensive way. 
of saving millions of lives, and the one whicii 
has clear value even without other systems. Wel 
will continue our existing programs and start' 
a program to increase the total inventory of 
shelters through a survey of private homes and 
other small structures. j 

We shall continue the research and develop- 
ment which retains the options to deploy ar 
anti-ballistic-missile system, and manned inter-j 
ceptors and surface-to-air missiles against 
bombers. ■ 

5. Our military forces must he so organised 
and directed that they can he ii-'ied in a meas- 
ured, controlled, and deliberate ivay as a versa-\ 
tile instnimient to support our foreign policy. J 

Military and civilian leaders alike are unani 
imous in their conviction that our armed might 
is and always must be so controlled as to per- 
mit measured response in whatever crises maji 
confront us. 

We have made dramatic improvements in ouij 
ability to commimicate with and command ou; 
forces, both at the national level and at the leve 
of the theater commanders. We have estab 
lished a national military command system, witl 
the most advanced electronic and communica' 
tions equipment, to gather and present the mili 
tary information necessary for top level man 
agement of crises and to assure the continuit; 
of control through all levels of command. It- 
survival under attack is insured by a systen 



of airborne, shipborne, and otlier command 
postii, and a variety of altemativo protected 

We have developed and procured the post- 
attack command control system of the Strategic 
Air Command, to assure continued control of 
our strategic forces following a nuclear attack. 

We have installed new safety procedures and 
systems designed to guarantee that our nuclear 
weapons are not used except at the direction 
of the higliest national authority. 

This year we are requesting funds to extend 
similar improvements in the survivability and 
effectiveness of our coimnand and control to 
otlier commands in our oversea theaters. 

6. America will continue to be first in the use 
of science and technology to insure the security 
of its people. 

We are currently investing more than $6 bil- 
lion per year for military research and develop- 
ment. Among other major developments, our 
investment has recently produced antisatellite 
systems that cjin intercept and destroy armed 
satellites that might be launched, and such rev- 
olutionary new aircraft as the F-111 fighter- 
bomber and the SR-71 supersonic reconnais- 
sance aircraft. Our investment has effected an 
enormous improvement in the design of anti- 
ballistic-missile systems. We will pursue our 
program for the development of the Nike X 
antimissile system, to permit deployment of this 
antiballistic missile should the national security 
require. Research will continue on even more 
advanced antimissile components and concepts. 

About $2 billion a year of this program is in- 
Vested in innovations in teclinology and in ex- 
perimental programs. Thus, we provide full 
play for the ingenuity and inventiveness of the 
beet scientific and technical talent in our Nation 
and the free world. 

American science, industry, and technology 
are foremost in the world. Their resources rep- 
resent a prime asset to our national security. 

7. Our soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and 
TMrines, from whom we ask so much, are the 
'omergtone of our military might. 

The success of all our policies depends upon 
>ur ability to attract, develop fully, utilize, and 
"etain the talents of outstanding men and 
•vomen in the military services. We have 

souglit to improve housing conditions for mili- 
tary families and educational opportunities for 
military personnel. 

Since 1961, we have proposed — and the Con- 
gress has authorized — the largest military pay 
increases in our history, totaling more than $2 

To insure that the pay of military personnel, 
and indeed of all Government employees, re- 
tains an appropriate relation to the compen- 
sation of other elements of our society, we will 
review their pay annually. The procedures for 
this review will be discussed in my budget 

It is imperative that our men in imiform have 
the necessary background and training to keep 
up with tlie complexities of the ever-changing 
military, political, and teclmical problems they 
face each day. To insure this, the Secretary 
of Defense is imdertaking a study of military 
education to make certain that the education 
available to our service men and women at their 
academies, at their war colleges, and at the com- 
mand and staff colleges, is excellent in its 

In recent years large numbers of volimteers 
have been rejected by the military services be- 
cause of their failure to meet certain mental 
or physical standards, even though many of 
their deficiencies could have been corrected. 
To broaden the opportunity for service and 
increase the supply of potentially qualified vol- 
unteers, the Army is planning to initiate an 
experimental program of military training, 
education, and physical rehabilitation for men 
who faU at first to meet minimum requirements 
for service. This pilot program, which will 
involve about 10,000 men in 1965, will establish 
how many of these young volunteers can be 
upgraded so as to qualify for service. 

8. Our citizen-soldiers must be the best orga- 
nised, best equipped reserve forces in the world. 
We must make certain that this force, which 
has served our country so well from the time of 
the Revolution to the Berlin and Cuban crises 
of recent years, keeps pace with the changing 
demands of our national security. 

To this end, we are taking steps to realine our 
Army Reserves and National Guard to improve 
significantly their combat readiness and effec- 

raBEDAET 15, 1965 


tiveness in times of emergency. This realine- 
ment will bring our Army Reserve structure 
into balance with our contingency war plans 
and will place all remaining units of the Army 
Reserve forces in the National Guard. At the 
same time, by eliminating units for which there 
is no military requirement, we will realize each 
year savings approximating $150 million. 
Under our plan, all units will be fully equipped 
with combat-ready equipment and will be given 
training in the form of montlily weekend drills 
that will greatly increase their readiness. 
Under the revised organization, both the old 
and the new units of the National Guard, as 
well as individual trainees who remain in tlie 
Reserves, will make a much greater and continu- 
ing contribution to our national security. 

We shall continue to study our reserve forces 
and take whatever action is necessary to increase 
their combat effectiveness. 

9. The Commander in Chief and the Secre- 
tary of Defense m,ust continue to receive the 
best professional military advice available to 
the leaders of any government in the world. 

The importance of a strong line of command 
running from the Commander in Chief to the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the unified and specified commanders 
in the field has been repeatedly demonstrated 
during recent years. 

The Secretary of Defense will present to you 
certain recommendations to strengthen the 
Joint Staff. 

10. T7e xo'ill strengthen our military alliances, 
assist freedom-loving peoples, and continue our 
military assistance program. 

It is essential to continue to strengthen our 
alliances loith other free and independent na- 
tions. We reaffirm our unwavering determina- 
tion that efforts to divide and conquer free men 
shall not be successful in our time. We shall 
contmue to assist those wlio struggle to preserve 
their own independence. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
a strong shield against aggression. We reaffirm 
our belief in the necessity of unified planning 
and execution of strategy. We invite our 
NATO allies to work with us in developing bet- 
ter methods for mutual consultation and joint 
strategic study. We shall continue to seek ways 

to bind the alliance even more strongly together 
by sharing the tasks of defense through collec- 
tive action. 

We shall continue our program of military 
and economic assistance to allies elsewhere in\ 
the world and to those nations strugglingl 
against covert aggression in the form of ex-\ 
ternally directed, undeclared guerrilla warfare.\ 
In southeast Asia, our progi'am remains un-! 
changed. Fi'om 1950, the United States hasi 
demonstrated its coimnitment to the freedom,! 
independence, and neutrality of Laos byl 
strengthening the economic and military secu-l 
rity of that nation. The problem of Laos is thei 
refusal of the Conununist forces to honor thei 
Geneva accords into which they entered in 1962.| 
We shall continue to support the legitimate! 
government of that coimtry. The Geneva ac-! 
cords established the right of Laos to be leftj 
alone in peace. i 

Similarly, the problem of Vietnam is the re-| 
fusal of Conunmiist forces to honor their agreej 
ment in 1954. The North Vietnam regime' 
supported by the Chinese Commimists, haf| 
openly and repeatedly avowed its intention t(I 
destroy the independence of the Republic o:l 
Vietnam through massive, ruthless, and inces-i 
sant gueiTilla terrorism against Governmemi 
and peojile alike. ; 

Our purpose, under three American Presij 
dents, has been to assist the Vietnamese to livi- 
in peace, fi-ee to choose both their own way oi 
life and their own foreign policy. We shall con 
tinue to honor our commitments in Vietnam 

Principles of Defense SIanagement 

1. To carry out our strategy and enforce ou 
policies requires a large budget for defense. ; 

The world's most affluent society can sure! 
afford to spend whatever must be spent for it 
freedom and security. We shall continue ti 
maintain the military forces necessary for ou 
security without regard to arbitrary or pre 
determined budget ceilings. But we shall coe 
tinue to insist that those forces be procured a 
the lowest possible cost and operated with th' 
greatest possible economy and efficiency. 

To acquire and maintain our unprecedente 
military power, we have been obliged to inves 
more than one-half of every dollar paid in taxi 
to the Federal Government. The defens 



budget lias grown from $43 billion in fiscal year 
1S)()0 to more than $51 billion in fiscal year 1964. 
I now estimate the Defense expenditnres for fis- 
cal year 1965 to be about $49.3 billion, or ap- 
proximately $2 billion less than in fiscal j^ear 
1964. I further estimate that Defense expendi- 
tures for fiscal year 1966 -will be reduced still 

, another $300 million. 

I There are two main reasons for this leveling 
off in Defense expenditures : 

I First, we have achieved many of the needed 

I changes and increases in our military force 

Second, we are now realizing the benefits of 
the rigorous cost reduction program introduced 
into the Defense Establisliment during the past 

J 4 years. 

\ As I have stated — and as our enemies well 
know — this country now possesses a range of 
credible, usable military power enabling us to 
deal with every form of militarj' cliallenge from 
guerrilla terrorism to tliermonuclear war. 
Barring a significant shift in the international 

. situation, we are not likely to require further 
increments on so large a scale during the next 

. several years. Expenditures for defense will 
thus constitute a declining portion of our ex- 

1 panding annual gross national product, which is 
now gi'owing at the rate of 5 percent each year. 
If, over the next several years, we continue to 
spend approximately the same amount of dol- 
lars annually for our national defense that we 
are spending today, an ever-larger share of our 

. expanding national wealth will be free to meet 
other vital needs, both public and private. 

Let me be clear, however, to friend and foe 
alike. So long as I am President, we shall spend 
whatever is necessary for the security of our 

2. Defense expenditures in the years ahead 
must continue to be guided by the relentless pur- 
suit of efficiency and intelligent economy. 

There is no necessary conflict between the 
need for a strong defense and the principles of 
economy and soimd management. If we are to 
remain strong — 

outmoded weapons must be replaced by new 

ones ; 

obsolete equipment and installations must be 
i eliminated ; 

costly duplication of effort must be elimi- 

We are following this policy now, and, so long 
as I am President, I intend to continue to fol- 
low this policy. 

"We have x'ecently announced the consolida- 
tion, reduction, or discontinuance of defense ac- 
tivities in some 95 locations. When added to 
those previously completed, these actions will 
produce annual savings of more than $1 billion 
each year, every year, in the operations of the 
Defense Department, and release about 1,400,- 
000 acres of land for civilian purposes. These 
economies — which represent more prudent and 
effective allocation of our resources — have not 
diminished the strength and efficiency of our 
defense forces, but rather have enhanced them. 

We are the wealthiest nation in the world and 
the keystone of the largest alliance of free na- 
tions in history. We can, and will, spend what- 
ever is necessary to preserve our freedom. But 
we cannot afford to spend 1 cent more than is 
necessary, for there is too much waiting to be 
done, too many other pressing needs waiting to 
be met. I urge the Congress to support our 
efforts to assure the American people a dollar's 
worth of defense for every dollar spent. 

3. While our primary goal is to maintain the 
most powerful military force in the world at the 
lowest possible cost, we unll never be unmind- 
ful of those communities and individuals who 
are temporarily affected by changes in the pat- 
tern of defense spending. 

Men and women, who have devoted their lives 
and their resources to the needs of their country, 
are entitled to help and consideration in makmg 
the transition to other pursuits. 

We will continue to help local communities by 
mobilizing and coordinating all the resources 
of the Federal Government to overcome tempo- 
rary difficulties created by the curtailment of 
any Defense activity. We will phase out un- 
necessary Defense operations in such a way as 
to lessen the impact on any community, and we 
will work with local communities to develop 
energetic programs of self-help, calling on the 
resources of State and local governments — and 
of private industry — as well as those of the 
Federal Govenunent. 

FEBRUAET 15, 1961 


There is ample evidence that such measures 
can succeed. Former military bases are now in 
use throughout the country in communities 
which have not only adjusted to necessary 
change, but have created greater prosperity for 
themselves as a result. Their accomplishments 
are a tribute to the ingenuity of thousands of 
our citizens, and a testimony to the strength 
and resiliency of our economy and our system of 

4. We must continue to make whatever 
changes are necessary in our Defense Establish- 
ment to increase its efficiency and to insure that 
it keeps pace with the demands of an ever- 
changing world; we must continue to improve 
the decisionmakim.g process by those in com- 

The experience of several years has shown 
that certam activities of the Defense Establish- 
ment can be conducted not only with greater 
economy, but far more effectively when carried 
out on a department-wide basis, either by a 
military department as executive agent or by a 
Defense agency. The Defense Communications 
Agency, established in 1959, and the Defense 
Supply Agency and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, established in 1961, have all eliminated 
duplication of effort, improved management, 
and achieved better fulfillment of their mis- 
sions. In addition, we have recently an- 
nounced — 

consolidation of the field contract adminis- 
tration offices of the military department under 
the Defense Supply Agency ; 

formation of the Department of Defense Con- 
tract Audit Agency, to increase the efficiency 
and lower the cost of Government auditing of 
Defense contracts ; 

formation of the Traffic Management and 
Terminal Command, under the single manage- 
ment of the Department of the Army, to regu- 
late surface transportation of military cargo 
and personnel within the continental United 

Each of these actions will lead to better per- 
formance, surer control, and less cost. Most 
important, these actions are informing and ex- 
pediting the decisionmaking process. We will 

continue to seek out opportunities to further in- 
crease the effectiveness and efficiency of our 
Defense Establishment. 


The Secretary of Defense will soon come be- 
fore you with our detailed proposals for the 
coming year. He will have recommendations i 
for further strengthening of our strategic forces | 
and our conventional forces. He will have ad- j 
ditional suggestions for achieving greater effi- j 
ciency, and therefore greater economy. I 

As you consider the state of our defenses and ! 
form your judgments as to our future course, j 
I know that you will do so in the knowledge i 
that today we Americans are responsible not : 
only for our own security but, in concert with 1 
our allies, for the security of the free world. ( 
Upon our strength and our wisdom rests the | 
future not only of our American way of life, but j 
that of the whole society of free men. I 

This is an awesome responsibility. So far, ! 
we have borne it well. As our strength rose— j 
and largely as a consequence of that strength— i 
we have been able to take encouraging steps , 
toward peace. We have established an Arms , 
Control and Disarmament Agency. We have 
signed a limited nuclear test ban agreement I 
with the Soviet Union. We have, at the same 
time, met the challenge of force, unflinchingly, ': 
from Berlin to Cuba. In each case, the threat ^ 
has receded and international tensions have j 
diminished. ! 

In a world of 120 nations, there are still great i 
dangers to be faced. As old threats are turned'; 
back, change and turmoil will present new ones. ; 
The vigilance and courage we have shown in, 
the last 20 years must be sustained as far ahead 
as we can see. The defense of freedom remains : 
our duty— 24 hours a day and every day of the I 
year. \ 

We cannot know the future and what it holds. ! 
But all our experience of two centuries reminds 
us that — 

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual, 
means of preserving peace. 

Ltndon B. Johnson. 
The White House, January 18, 1965. 



U.S. Objectives and Refugee Relief Programs in Africa 

FoIIoicing are statements mad^ on January 
21 by G. Mennen WiUiams, Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs, and Abba P. Schwartz, 
Administrator of the Bureau of Security amd 
Consider Affairs, before the Subcommittee on 
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary 


Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the 
foreign policy interests and objectives of the 
United States in Africa and the current situa- 
tion of African refugees. These are matters 
of great importance to the United States. 

Africa, as you icnow, for all its difficulties, 
has experienced an unprecedented spurt toward 
freedom and development. Next month the 
West African country of Gambia will become 
the continent's 37th independent nation — the 
33d new African state since 1951. Never be- 
fore have so many countries come to independ- 
ence in so short a time. The African revolu- 
tion of freedom bears dramatic witness to a 
, transition from colonialism to national inde- 
pendence that has not yet run its course. 

The United States welcomes Africa's new 
nations and wants to see them prosper in peace. 
Their independence holds new promise for a 
secure world community, and we wish to see 
them make increasingly effective contributions 
to the world community. 

We have supported the growth of independ- 
ence and self-determination in Africa because 
it is both realistic and right. The welfare, 
peace, and security of the United States are 
closely linked with those of the rising nations 
of Africa. "We want to see a strong, \-igorous, 
and free Africa develop in prosperity and sta- 

bility, because such a development will be of 
benefit both to the African nations and to the 
United States. 

In Africa we seek the same flourishing of 
human dignity, freedom, and self-determina- 
tion that our Founding Fathers called for in 
this country. Because of the mutuality of our 
goals and our interests, it is clear that Africa 
is important to the United States and to the 
free world. 

■We cannot, therefore, be complacent about the 
Communist threat to Africa. It is tliere, it is 
real, it is dangerous. And we must meet it 
witliin a framework of policy and financial con- 
siderations suitable to a democratic nation. 

To this end, the United States will continue 
to assist African nations to help themselves. 
This goal is completely in harmony with our 
American heritage. 

For the same reason, we support the principle 
of government by consent of the governed for 
the people still in dependent status. We op- 
pose any abridgement of human rights any- 
where. And we encourage the protection of 
the just rights of minorities everywhere. 

W^e believe that our pursuit of these princi- 
ples in our relations with Africa will help us 
build coimtries with a similar interest in peace, 
in security, and in prosperity in the years ahead. 

Africa's Basic Problems 

Although independence has come rapidly to 
much of Africa, many African leaders recog- 
nize and have stated that independence, by it- 
self, does not solve the continent's basic prob- 
lems. Africa's problems of poverty, illiteracy, 
and disease are deep-rooted and difficult to solve. 

W^e and other friends of Africa are trying to 
help African nations overcome their handicaps 

rEBRCART 10, 1068 


We also believe that lasting solutions to many 
of Africa's problems can best be accomplished 
primarily by Africans themselves. Indeed, 
both singly and through such groupings as the 
Organization of African Unity and the Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa, the African na- 
tions already have taken important steps in 
search of solutions to their problems. 

Yet, in this interdependent world, the chal- 
lenges and opportunities which African states 
face are challenges and opportunities for us as 
well. The fight against poverty and the strug- 
gle for full and equal human rights which con- 
cern us in our own society must also concern 
us in Africa. 

This does not mean that we intend to tell 
Africa what to do. It does mean, however, that 
we remain ready and willing t« assist in every 
way we can— through the Peace Corps, through 
economic assistance, through education— when 
our help is sought by African nations. 

We have already done a great deal in this 
regard, and we hope to make our future contri- 
butions even more effective. But the United 
States is not alone in its desire to aid Africa. 
We are working closely with other friendly 
nations to speed the day when African nations 
can move ahead witliout external assistance. 

Because of our interest and assistance— and 
despite present difficulties in the Congo — most 
Africans basically view U.S. efforts with re- 
spect. Although recent events have created 
some suspicions, most people in Afi-ica know 
our objective there is to help maintain their true 
independence and not to dominate their new 

By contrast, the Commimists do seek to domi- 
nate Africa. They are actively attempting to 
destroy independence on that continent. De- 
spite their repeated efforts, however, the Com- 
munists have had far less success than they 
expected — in the Congo, in Guinea, and else- 
where. There is no Communist satellite in 
Africa. Africans have worked hard for their 
independence, and they will not abandon it to 
an alien ideology of any kind. 

Despite the efforts of Africans and their 
friends, the continent is faced with many in- 
herent problems that cannot be solved quickly. 

Refugees in Africa 

One of the most difficult problems faced by { 
the African states is that of the movement and | 
treatment of refugees. A flow of refugees is j 
caused in some instances by hostilities arising j 
from tribal or etlinic rivalries. In others, it is j 
the result of a confrontation between black | 
nationalism and European rule. | 

Wliatever its cause, the flight of refugees has j 
an impact on the refugees' homelands, provides j 
new problems for the countries to which refu- j 
gees flee, and raises the danger of Communist \ 
exploitation of refugees. This combination of | 
factors presents a challenge to the United States, 1 
to African nations, to the United Nations, and j 
to the various international, national, and pri- j 
vate relief agencies. Not only is there a need to 
provide immediate relief for the refugees but] 
also a need to resolve the underlying political, ] 
economic, and social problems. Clearly, the] 
best efforts of all are required. I 

The major African refugee problems today! 
are : 

1. As a result of a change in regime several] 
years ago in Rwanda — stemming from both! 
political and ethnic antagonisms — some 160,000 
refugees (for the most part Tutsis) have fled 
into neighboring countries. There are now 
about 35,000 in Burundi, 50,000 in Uganda,' 
15,000 in Tanzania, and 60,000 in the Congo. ; 

2. Some 40,000 refugees from southern Sudan' 
are located in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad, 
the Central African Eepublic, and the Congo.! 

3. There are about 250,000 refugees from" 
Angola in the Congo as a consequence of the' 
struggle between the Portuguese authorities! 
and the Angolan nationalist movement. j 

4. Between 8,000 and 10,000 Mozambican; 
refugees have crossed the border from Mozam-, 
bique into Tanzania for similar reasons. i 

5. Some 30,000 refugees from Portuguese] 
Guinea have similarly moved into Senegal. j 

6. Many young refugees, mainly in theiri 
twenties, have left South Africa, South-West 
Africa, Ehodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.! 
Some leave their homeland to escape arrest for' 
political activity. Others want to help their 
nationalist political organizations carry on work 
in exile. Many leave seeking educational op- 



portunities denied to them at home. The 
principal gathering points for these young 
refugees liave been Loopoldville and Dar-es- 
Salaani. More recently, newly independent 
Zambia's capital, Lusaka, also has become a 
center for them. Once they reacli independent 
capitals, they seek to make education and train- 
ing arrangements abroad. Usually they suc- 
ceed in finding such ari-angements in the West- 
em World, in other African coimtries, or in the 
Communist nations. 

7. As a consequence of the rebellion in the 
Congo, thousands of Congolese and non- 
Congolese have fled into neighboring countries. 

The Congo Situation 

Because of the great interest in the Congo 
situation, I would like to interject here remarks 
about the nature of the rebel regime and the 
rescue of Americans, Europeans, Asians, and 
Africans from rebel-held areas. 

Despite their alfinity for leftist jargon and 
aflUiations, most Congolese rebel leaders are 
motivated by a desire for political power rather 
than by ideological considerations. Tliey will- 
ingly accept financial and military aid from 
the Russian and Cliinese Communists or from 
so-called "radical" African states. Until the 
end of October, however, they professed a re- 
spect for Belgian interests and a willingness to 
work with Belgium. 

The leadei-s of the rebellion gained popular 

support by exploiting tribal differences, real or 

imagined grievances against local or Central 

• Government authorities, and genuine economic 

and social misery. 

Such success as the rebel army has had up 
to now springs from discipline based upon tribal 
beliefs. Initiation ceremonies convince rebel 
soldiers tluit their witch doctors have made 
them invincible to bullets. Protected by this 
belief, and bolstered frequently by drugs, they 
often can unnerve poorly disciplined and in- 
adequately led Central Government forces by 
relentless attacks. 

The rebels exterminated people who had 
worked closely with the Central Government 
or who were not members of the ilXC- 
Lumumba — a political party founded by the 

late Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. In 
some areas, notably Kindu and Paulis, the rebels 
also apparently were driven by a desire to re- 
turn to the primitive state in which they lived 
before Belgian colonizers arrived. In those 
areas hundreds of "intellectuals" — which means 
anyone who was literate — were summarily 

Since the rebellion began last May, thousands 
of Congolese also have fled the eastern Congo, 
but no accurate count of their number is avail- 
able. Members of a given tribe fleeing the 
rebels simply have been absorbed by their tribal 
brothers outside the path of the I'ebel advance. 
Those who fled to coimtries surrounding the 
Congo (Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, and the 
Central African Republic) may number as 
many as 10,000. These, too, usually have been 
assisted by related tribes in those countries. 

A new group of Congolese refugees, for which 
no accurate count is available, was created by 
the recapture of large areas of the eastern Congo 
by Central Government forces. This group, 
which fled before the advance of the Congolese 
Army, could prove a target for the Communists 
and "radical" African states. They may well 
be susceptible to recruitment as guerrillas 
against Central Government forces. 

In addition to the uncoimted thousands of 
Congolese refugees, some 4,000 non-Congolese 
also fled or were evacuated from the eastern 
Congo. Approximately 500 of them left prior 
to the closing of the borders betM-een the Congo 
and Sudan, Uganda, and the Central African 
Republic in August. The rest have been evacu- 
ated since the recapture of Stanleyville on 
November 24. Of the 4,000 evacuees, 2,500 
properly can be described as refugees. Tliese 
are Belgians, Greelcs, Indians, Pakistanis, and 
Dutch who have spent years in the Congo as 
small businessmen or planters. They have no 
home other than the Congo and now are living 
in relatively stable areas of the Congo and sur- 
rounding countries or have gone to Europe. 
The other 1,500 evacuees are missionaries (in- 
cluding 500 Americans), employees of large 
companies, and teclmicians working for the 
Congolese Government. Tlie permanent resi- 
dences of the latter group are in other countries, 

FEBRUAKY 15, 19C5 


and many have homes and jobs to which they 

can return. 
The non-Congolese evacuees fall into three 

categories : 

1. those whose evacuation was recommended 
before the rebels arrived and who left when 
warned ; 

2. those who received a timely warnmg to 
evacuate but decided to stay ; 

3. those who did not receive advance warn- 
ing of the rebels. 

About 500 evacuees, including at least 300 
American missionaries, fell into the first cate- 
gory. The second group was composed largely 
of European and Indian/Pakistani business- 
men and planters. They decided to stay— of ten 
because little happened to them m similar situ- 
ations in 1961— to protect their property or to 
protect the interests of the large companies for 
which they were working. This category also 
included Protestant and Catholic mission- 
aries—among them Dr. Paul Carlson— who did 
not wish to quit their flocks. The third group 
either lived deep in the hinterlands or m Stan- 
leyville, which fell to the rebels suddenly. Two 
American missionary casualties, Mr. William 
Scholten and Miss Mary Baker, were m this 


After August 1964, the rebels rarely gave 
permission for a non-Congolese to leave rebel- 
controlled territory. The members of the 
American consulate in Stanleyville were held 
as hostages under daily threats to their lives 
from mid- August on. Beginning October 28, 
all Americans and Belgians were treated as hos- 

The Belgian-American rescue operation ^ was 
undertaken against a background of increas- 
ingly ominous threats against the lives of Amer- 
ican and Belgian hostages. Making the situa- 
tion even more desperate were reports that what 
little rebel authority existed in Stanleyville was 
breaking down in the face of a rapidly deterio- 
rating rebel military situation. At least 47 non- 
Congolese— including 4 Americans— were killed 
by rebels prior to the Stanleyville operation. 
The rescue operation was undertaken on No- 

1 For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 14, 1964, p. 


vember 24. As a result, more than 1,300 non-j 
Congolese and over 1,000 black Africans were! 
rescued from Stanleyville. In subsequent air| 
and ground rescues, another 1,600 non-Congo- 1 
lese were saved. Fifty-nine American hostages, 
were rescued, and four were killed by rebelsj 
since November 24. There are no known! 
Americans unaccounted for in areas still held! 
by the rebels. So much for the Congo. 1 

Communist Exploitation of Refugees j 

Because of the instability created by thesej 
various groups of refugees in different sections] 
of Africa, the Commmiist nations are exploit-| 
ing the African refugee situation in several] 

ways. j 

In the case of the Rwandan refugees, for ex-j 
ample, there is reasonably reliable evidence thatj 
Communist powers, particularly Commmiist| 
China, have involved themselves to the detri-| 
ment of a peaceful solution. This involvement, 
has included encouragement of extremist agi-| 
tators, who stir up the refugees to pursue a| 
militant policy toward Rwanda, extending to, 
terrorist raids across Rwanda's borders. Com-j 
niunist assistance to refugee extremists re-j 
portedly has encompassed financial supiwrt to, 
the exiled ex-King of Rwanda and his close ad-l 
herents, advice on organizing terrorist raids, 
some arms aid, and the training of guerrilla in- 
structors in mainland China. It is believed tha^ 
this assistance in recent months probably hai 
been coordinated by the Chinese Communis^ 
embassy in Bujumbura, Burundi, with its sum- 
lar assistance given to the rebels in the Congo 
In Dar-es-Salaam and other refugee centers 
the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist 
countries actively seek to influence and gam 
footholds in refugee groups. Their efforts take 
several forms, which include offering scholar^ 
ships to refugee students, flooding offices oi 
exile nationalist groups and student camps witll 
propaganda literature, providing arms and 
other material assistance to nationalist refugee 
organizations, and offering the leaders short- 
term visits to Communist countries. It is esti- 
mated that more than 700 refugees have gonei 
to Communist countries for study and tramingj 
Significant numbers also have gone to certair. 
North African countries and to Ghana for raih-: 


tan' training. Today, for every tliree refugees 
that go to the Coninmnist bloc, one goes to the 
West — a sharp rise from tlie ratio of one for 
every six tliat prevailed a year ago. 

Tiie main thrust of Communist propaganda 
appears to he to create an image of tiu-msehcs 
as friends of the oppressed Africans against 
colonialist tj-ranny, at the same time branding 
the United States iis a "neocolonialism" power 
which opposes freedom and self-determination 
in Africa. 

For iiumanitarian reasons, the United States 
Government supports programs of assistance 
for African refugees. We actively support the 
African refugee programs of tlie T'nited Na- 
tions High Commissioner for Refugees. In 
addition, through the UXHCR, the World Food 
Program, and private organizations, the 
United States Government provides significant 
quantities of foodstuffs for the various refugee 
groups under the P'ood for Peace (P.L. 480) 
program. These programs for aiding African 
refugees will l)e discussed by my colleague, Mr. 
Abba Schwartz, Administrator of the Bureau of 
Security and Consular Affairs. His bureau has 
responsibility for refugee and migration affairs 
in the Department of State. 

We also have an educational program for 
young African refugee students. Since 1961, 
the Department of State has had a scholai-ship 
program to provide educational opportunities 
for southern African students. Under this pro- 
gram, a small number of southern African stu- 
dents, temporarily in residence in independent 
African countries, are brought to the United 
States for university study. Initially they are 
placed either at Lincoln University in Pennsyl- 
vania or at Rochester University in New York. 
There they receive orientation and, if nec&ssarj', 
language training prior to entry into a progi-am 
leading to a degree. At present, 200 students 
from a numljer of southern African countries 
are studying in the United States under this 

This program provides an attractive alter- 
native to study in Communist countries. The 
education the students receive here will help pre- 
pare them to make a responsible, constructive 
contribution to the development of Africa and 
to provide intelligent and democratic leader- 
ship to their people. 

Clearly there are many obstacles to an early 
solution of the many African refugee problems. 
W^here refugee problems have developed as a 
result of the conflict between African national- 
ism and European iiile, solution of the prob- 
lems will depend on resolution of the political 
conflict. In the case of the Rwandan refu- 
gees, where the problem is one of tribal or 
ethnic rivalries, the breakdown of security in 
the Congo has made solution more difficult. 
For example, in the past year there has been co- 
operation between the Congo rebels and the ex- 
tremists among the refugees from Rwanda who 
share the goal of ovei-throwing tlie Government 
of Rwanda. The finding of a solution also has 
been made more difficult by the support given 
to extremist agitators by certain Communist 

Looking to the future, it can be predicted 
that these refugee problems in Africa will con- 
tinue for some time to come. Until political so- 
lutions can be worked out between the Africans 
and Europeans in southern Africa, the refugee 
movements arising from this political conflict 
seem likely to continue or even increase. Sim- 
ilarly, the Rwandan refugee problem will not 
disappear quickly. Solution can only come 
when the refugees from Rwanda accept the po- 
litical and social changes which have come about 
in Rwanda and decide to settle down wliere they 
are now or return home peacefully. 

To sum up, the movements of refugees are 
manifestations of the political, economic, and 
social problems in Africa, which botji Africans 
and friends of Africa are working to resolva 
The problems themselves are principally Afri- 
can in nature and must be worked out in a 
manner satisfactory to Africans. Non-African 
countries cannot and should not attempt to im- 
pose external remedies for African ills. Al- 
though African refugee problems may exist 
for some time, such problems are not unique to 
Africa, nor are they unexpected, as Africans 
new to authority and responsibility gain ex- 
perience in running tlieir own affairs and deal- 
ing with their many problems. Certainly the 
United States throughout its history has been 
the world's greatest haven for refugees from all 
parts of the world, and we can view with sym- 
pathy and understanding Africa's present refu- 
gee difficulties. 

FEBRCART 15, 19G5 

In the light of this situation, then, U.S. refu- 
gee relief programs in Africa are a vitally im- 
portant tool in our efforts to accelerate lasting 
solutions to the problems. We respectfully re- 
quest, therefore, your continued interest and 
your continued support for U.S. refugee work 
in Africa. 


Press release 9 dated January 21 

I am pleased to appear before the committee 
in connection with its review of refugee prob- 
lems in Africa. 

There are over 490,000 refugees in Africa to- 
day who have left their homelands because of 
changing conditions in Africa and have crossed 
international frontiers into other African coun- 
tries offering asylimi. These refugees, compris- 
ing six separate and conspicuous refugee prob- 
lems, are grouped according to the following 
countries from which they have fled: Angola, 
Ewanda, the southern Sudan, South Africa, 
Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique. 

Under present conditions, few of these 
refugees will be able and willing to return to 
their homelands. The potential for resettlmg 
them in other countries is very limited. As a 
practical matter, for the foreseeable future most 
will remain in the countries which have granted 
them asylum. A relatively small number will 
continue to accept educational opportunities in 
other countries. Efforts to solve these refugee 
problems, on the part of the asylum govern- 
ments concerned and through international re- 
sources, are directed toward effecting the ref- 
ugees' soonest possible local integration on a 
basis of self-dependency. 

In addition to these six problems there are 
at least 10,000 Congolese refugees who have 
fled before rebel activities in the eastern part 
of the Congo into nearby asylum coimtries. 
The future status of these refugees will depend 
upon subsequent political and military develop- 
ments in the Congo. Meanwhile, they are be- 
ing cared for principally by their tribal broth- 
ers in the asylum countries or through relief 
assistance provided by the governments of these 

Apart from our educational program in be- 
half of refugee students, which Governor Wil- 
liams has already discussed, United States as- 
sistance to the African countries which have 
granted asylum to these groups of refugees has 
lieen given in two principal ways : tlirough our | 
contribution to the program of the United Na- | 
tions High Commissioner for Refugees I 
(UNHCR) and our strong support in this con- 
nection of projects for African refugees, and 
through the provision of P.L. 480 food com- 
modities. This food is provided on a govern- 
ment-to-govemment basis, through American 
and international voluntary agencies or through 
United Nations channels. 

As a member of the 30-nation Executive Com- 
mittee of the UNHCR progi-am, which care- 
fully reviews and approves all UNHCR 
policies, programs, projects, and funds, the 
United States Government has been able to ex- 
ercise a continuing influence upon the UNHCR 
effort in Africa. The UNHCR Executive 
Committee numbers five African nations on its 
membership — Timisia, Algeria, Tanzania, Ni- 
geria, and Madagascar — a circumstance which 
has enlarged the opportunities for U.S.-Afri- 
can cooperation. Our P.L. 480 assistance for 
African i-ef ugees is usually given as an element 
within an overall program coordinated by the 
UNHCR. As in many other areas, in the field 
of refugee assistance P.L. 480 contributions 
have often proved indispensable to avert star- 
vation and have served as a conspicuous sym- 
bol of American good will toward African 
peoples and nations. 

A third and considerable form of United 
States assistance has been the contributions in 
cash and kind of American Protestant and Cath- 
olic voluntary agencies and the provision of their 
expert services in carrying out operations (in- 
cluding their distribution of P.L. 480 foods) . 

The Six Refugee Problems 

Let me speak briefly about each of the six refu- 
gee problems which I mentioned earlier. 

1. Angolan refugees in the Congo — 250fi00 {es- 
Approximately 161,000 refugees from Angola 
entered the Congo in 1961, and there has been 

; ' 



a contimiinj; interniittpnt influx in subsequent 
yeare down to the present. Although some 
estimates place the number far higher, it is the 
DopartnieJifs best estimate that there are now 
about 250,000 ^Vngolan refugees in the Congo. 
I A large number of them were resettled locally, 
in 1961 and early in 1962, on land made avail- 
able by the Congolese Government under a pro- 
gram conducted by the UNHCE in conjunction 
with the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (UNOC), the League of Eed Cross 
Societies (LICROSS), and Catholic and Prot- 
estant volimtaiT agencies. Most of the refu- 
gees who have arrived during the last several 
years have not received such resettlement 

2. Refugees from Rwanda — IQOfiOO 

There are approximately 160,000 refugees 
from Rwanda in neigliboring asylum countries 
who have fled from Rwanda in several waves 
sine© 1959. These include 50,000 in Uganda, 
35,000 in Burundi, 15,000 in Tanzania, and 60,- 
000 in the Kivu Province of the Congo. Tliese 
refugees fled Rwanda as a result of violence asso- 
ciated with political change in that country, 
exacerbated by age-old antagonisms between the 
Tutsi and Hutu etlinic groups in Rwanda. 
About 90 percent of the refugees are members of 
the minority Tutsi etluiic group (of which there 
are 300,000 members still within Rwanda) . The 
governments of the asylum countries concerned, 
witli the assistance of the UNHCR, have been 
seeking to bring about the local settlement of 
these refugees. LTCROSS and the voluntary 
agencies have been active participants in these 
programs, which have been impeded in the 
Kivu by disorder and civil strife. 

3. Refugees from southern Sudan — IfipOO (esti- 


During the last several years, an estimated 
40,000 refugees from the southern part of Sudan 
have entered Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Con- 
go (I^opoldville), the Central African Repub- 
lic, and Cliad. These refugees from predomi- 
nantly Moslem Sudan, like virtually the entire 
population of the southern one-third of that 
country, are black Africans. About 15 percent 
are Christians, the rest pagans. IMore than one- 
fourth of these refugees entered Uganda, where 

they have been receiving UNHCR relief and 
local resettlement assistance since May of 1904: 
at the request of the Ugandan Government. The 
UNHCR, at the request of the Government of 
the Central African Republic, is also commenc- 
ing a similar program for Sudanese refugees in 
that country. Those in the other asylum coun- 
tries are not yet receiving any major organized 
assistance but have been given some relief help 
by voluntary agencies and members of the local 
populations. Most of them are living at a bare 
subsistence level. 

4. South African and South-West African refu- 

gees — undetermined numbers 

Since March of 1960 a relatively small but 
steadily increasing number of refugees from 
South Africa, opposed to the apartheid policies 
of the South African Government, have been en- 
tering and receiving initial asylum in the U.K. 
High Commission territories of Swaziland, Ba- 
sutoland, and Bechuanaland. There has also 
been a small, intermittent influx into Bechuana- 
land of refugees from South-West Africa. Most 
of these refugees have proceeded to other Afri- 
can countries — especially Tanzania — and thence 
have gone on to other countries to accept educa- 
tional opportunities. Wliile the exact total 
number who have come out so far is not known, 
the number in the indicated asylimi countries at 
any given time is from 500 to 1,000. These refu- 
gees have not as yet received organized interna- 
tional assistance but have been helped consider- 
ably by certain voluntary agencies and by 
African political organizations. 

5. Refugees from Portuguese Guinea in Sene- 


Some 30,000 refugees from Portuguese Guinea 
have entered Senegal since March of 1964, 
the largest influx by far taking plac« in June 
and July. Their flight is a byproduct of the 
turmoil and violence associated with the orga- 
nized efl^ort of Portuguese Guinea Tiationalist 
groups to secure self-determination for the peo- 
ple in that coimti-y. The problem of emergency 
feeding of these refugees was met througli P.L. 
480 resources distributed by the Catholic Relief 
Sei-vice, at the request of the President of Sene- 
gal. At its 12th session in Octol^er 1964 the 
UNHCR Executive Committee authorized the 

FEBRUARY 15, 1965 


UNHCR to carry out a program to assist the 
Government of Senegal in resettling these refu- 
gees within Senegal, chiefly on an agricultural 

6. Refugees from Mozambique 

During the past few years a small number 
of refugees from Mozambique (estimated at not 
over 1,000) entered Tanzania, wliere they have 
been given relief but no rehabilitation assistance 
by tlie Government of Tanzania and by inter- 
ested African political organizations. Last fall 
an additional 10,000 refugees fled from Mozam- 
bique into Tanzania. Tliey are presently being 
given emergency relief by the Govermnent of 
Tanzania, Catholic Relief Service, and through 
the World Food Program. The UNHCR has 
not yet received a formal request from the Gov- 
ernment of Tanzania to assist in coping with 
this problem. 

P.L. 480 Assistance 

Tlie value of United States P.L. 480 food 
contributions for sub-Sahara African refugees 
has averaged about $1.7 million per year over 
the last 3 years. These food contributions have 
often been particularly effective in meeting the 
first emergency needs of the refugees. Such 
assistance has then been continued as required 
initil the refugees — chiefly througli UNHCR- 
sponsored resettlement programs — have be- 
come self-supporting through agricultural pur- 
suits on land made available by the local govern- 
ments. Many of the refugees have been able to 
become self-supporting within a period of 
months following their arrival in the asylum 

I should like to cite the P.L. 480 program for 
refugees in Senegal as a recent and typical ex- 
ample of the importance of tliis resource in 
helping African asylum countries meet urgent 
refugee problems. When the 30,000 refugees 
from Portuguese Guinea fled into Casamance 
Province in Senegal in the spring and summer 
of 1964, they were initially housed and fed by 
local Casamance farmers. In July, when the 
food supplies of these farmers were virtually 
exhausted, the President of Senegal requested 
Catholic Relief Service to initiate a title III, 
P.L. 480 program large enough to meet the 

basic food requirements of both the 30,000 
refugees and an equivalent number of Sene- 
galese farmers until the amiual harvest in late 
October. This program was established on an 
emergency basis and averted famine in Casa- | 
mance. Food distribution to the farmers was I 
terminated by the end of October but will be i 
continued for the refugees until they have be- ; 
come self-supporting under the UNHCR local ' 
resettlement program approved by the UNHCR { 
Executive Committee in October. 

Regardless of the chamiels used to provide 
P.L. 480 foods for refugees— whether on a gov- 
ernment-to-government basis or through private 
or intergovernmental agencies — the food pack- 
ages are marked in the English and local lan- 
guages to indicate that they are a gift of the 
people of the United States. 

UNHCR Programs 

During the past 3 years the UNHCR has 
become increasingly involved in African i-efu- 
gee problems. This is because the African 
asylum countries prefer that external assistance 
for helping them meet refugee problems come 
through United Nations rather than bilateral 
means. The overall worldwide budget of the 
UNHCR has been at the level of approximately 
$3 million for each of the last 2 yeai-s, of which 
about one-half has been devoted to refugee 
problems in Africa. In addition to this sub- 
stantial but limited assistance, the UNHCR 
plays a significant role in stimulating a further 
and continuing flow of assistance through vol- 
untary contributions from many governments, ^ 
private groups, and individuals. Finally, the 
UNHCR is able to draw upon his emergency 
fund to meet the firet urgent needs in new refu- 
gee situations, pending approval by his Execu- 
tive Committee of a regular program toward 
resolving the problem. UNHCR programs are 
always conceived to effect the permanent re- 
settlement of the refugees as soon as possible, 
thus keeping the period of direct welfare relief 
to a minimum. 

The UNHCR acts toward making his as- 
sistance available only after he has been re- 
quested to do so by the asylum country con- 
cerned. Upon receiving a request for such 
assistance, the UNHCR sends a factfinding 



mission to appraise the problem on the spot. If 
the problem warrants UNIICR assistance, a 
proposetl program is drawn up in coordination 
with the uroveniment of the asylum countiy. 
This projrram is presented, as soon as feasible, 
to the UNIICR Executive Committee for ap- 
proval. The submission to the Executive Com- 
mittee includes detailed project justification 
and fundinfj data. If approved by the Execu- 
tive Committee, the projjram is implemented by 
the UNIICR under contractual arranfjements 
with voluntary agencies, including LICROSS. 
These arrangements often include financial con- 
tributions and other participation by tlie private 
agencies. UXHCR assistance is always de- 
signed to l)e supplementaiy to that which the 
responsible ;vsylum government is able to pro- 
vide from its own resources. In the largely 
underdeveloped African asylum countries the 
refugee problems are often a severe burden on 
their limited resources. The UNHCR acts as 
overall coordinator of the resettlement pro- 
grams and of the effort to develop additional 
resources through international contributions. 
The prototype for UNHCR-asylum country 
joint programs for the local resettlement of 
refugees was the operation in Togo concluded 
in IDBo. During 1061 some 6,000 refugees from 
Ghana entered Togo, where for a number of 
montlis they existed on a minimum subsistence 
level, largely through help from their tribal 
brothers in Togo. As these resources steadily 
diminished, the Togolese Government requested 
the assistance of the UNHCR. The UNHCR, 
after developing emergency relief contributions, 
formulated with the Togolese Government the 
local resettlement program under which the 
refugees have become .self-supporting and 
which has thus resulted in the elimination of 
this particular refugee problem. The Togolese 
Government provided land for the refugees to 
enable them to become small farmers able to 
produce enough food for their own use and to 
sell suflicient in the local market to moot their 
other needs and to improve their opportunity 
in life. At the same time, at the request of 
the UXHCR. the United States furnished suffi- 
cient quantities of P.L. 480 foods (under a 
title II program with LICROSS) to meet 
emergency and continuing feeding requirements 
until the refugees could harvest crops of their 

own. The UNIICR provided building ma- 
terials for low-cost dwellings, emergency medi- 
cal assistance, clothing, the seeds and agricul- 
tural implements necessary for farming 
purposes, and cooking utensils. Those refugees 
who were not able for whatever reason to enter 
agriculture were aided through special projects, 
including vocational training, to reestablish 
themselves as artisans or in business. The 
UNHCR has followed substantially the same 
pattern in dealing with the problems of the 
Rwandan, Angolan, Sudanese, and Portuguese 
Guinean refugees. 

The UNHCR local resettlement programs in 
Africa are substantially different from the type 
of problem faced with refugees in Europe. In 
the case of the latter, the major solution lay in 
overseas resettlement. Local integration proj- 
ects for those who could not emigrate were 
difficult and costly to work out for a variety of 
reasons and had to be carried out on an indi- 
vidual case basis. In Africa, generally speak- 
ing, the refugee problems are not susceptible 
to solution through external resettlement. 
However, the local resettlement of the refugees 
can be accomplished on a mass basis, in view 
of the ready availability of sufficient land, the 
favorable conditions for agriculture, and the 
fact that in many instances the refugees have 
a close tribal affinity with the local residents of 
the asylum countries and are received hospit- 
ably by the latter. 

The most complex and costly problem faced 
by the UNHCR in Africa is the Rwandan refu- 
gee problem. The UNHCR has entered into a 
great variety of projects in dealing with this 
problem in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and 
tlie Kivu Province of the Congo. 

In addition to the provision of food, clothing, 
medical iissistance, building materials, cook- 
ing utensils, and seeds and agricultural imple- 
ments, as was done in Togo, UNIICR projects 
for the Rwandan refugees liave included special 
tsetse-fly control measures in order to make the 
land provided habitable, projects to improve 
irrigation and to guarantee sufficient supply of 
water for daily use, community development, 
educational assistance, and special vocational 
and handicraft training projects. Because of 
developments in the eastern Congo and nearby 

FEBRUARY 15. 1965 


areas, it has been necessary for the UNHCR to 
postpone the implementation of some approved 
projects, to abandon others, and to transfer ref- 
ugees from one country to another — a costly, 
complex operation which will entail the estab- 
lishment of a new planned community in Tan- 
zania for up to 10,000 refugees to be moved 
from the Kivu Provmce of the Congo. The re- 
location of 10,000 refugees within Burimdi is 
also planned. 

At the same time the UNHCR hopes that 
conditions will permit the carrying out of two 
programs approved by the Executive Commit- 
tee which call for a comprehensive effort, in co- 
operation with other concerned United Nations 
agencies, to create the facilities and the social 
environment in Burmidi and the Kivu which 
will ultimately make j^ossible the permanent 
integration of many of the refugees in local 
economic life and which will raise the level of 
living conditions generally in the resettlement 
areas selected for these programs. Toward 
these ends special projects are planned, for 
example, for the conversion of marshes into 
arable land through drainage (this project is 
already underway in Burundi) ; public-health 
programs ; reforestation ; the creation and oper- 
ation of educational facilities; the production 
and processing of tea (as a cash crop) ; the 
modernization of techniques in agricultural 
production and animal husbandly; and the 
establishment of vocational training facilities 
and handicraft workshops. These zonal pro- 
grams would insure that the refugees and the 
local residents enjoy equally the benefits of a 
rising standard of economic life and would 
avoid the antagonisms which would be inevi- 
table if the refugees — through United Nations 
assistance — were given more favorable oppor- 
tunities and living conditions than low-income 
indigenous groups. 

Voluntary Agency Assistance 

The role of the American and the interna- 
tional voluntary agencies in assistance pro- 
grams for African refugees is a vital one. 
Together with LICROSS, these agencies are the 
chief operational instruments in the refugee 
assistance programs in Africa carried out with 
international fimds. The religious agencies. 

through their traditional missionary work, ■ 
have a detailed knowledge of the areas and ; 
peoples concerned and a long experience in the I 
provision of assistance in Africa which are in- I 
dispensable to the success of current programs. I 
LICROSS, experienced in meeting emergency j 
and disaster situations in underdeveloped coun- ■ 
tries, has also (as in Togo, for example) used | 
its assistance programs as a vehicle for initiat- ! 
ing and training local Red Cross societies. j 

Assistance From Asylum Countries ! 

The governments of the African asylum j 
countries have faced their responsibilities in this • 
field with courage and generosity. Without 1 
exception, they have granted asylum to those i 
fleeing from other coimtries. The citizenry of j 
the asyliun coimtries have shared their slender ' 
resources with the refugees, and the govern- i 
ments — many of which face acute national eco- 1 
noraic problems — have met the costs of refugee i 
assistance from their own budgets insofar as | 
possible. Only when the burden has become, 
untenable have they turned to the UNHCR. I 
Uganda, for example, has expended over $1.5 
million on the Sudanese and Rwandan refugees ' 
during the past 2 years and will spend about $1 ' 
million in 1965 alone. Tanzania, while receiving , 
UNHCR assistance for Rwandan refugees, has 
dealt largely unaided with the flow of refugees i 
from Mozambique and South Africa into Tan- 
zania and has agreed to accept the transfer of 
additional thousands of Rwandan refugees 
from the Kivu Province into Tanzania for per- : 
manent settlement. 

There is little doubt that there will be refugee! 
problems in Africa for some years to come. 
The essential mechanism for dealing with these' 
will probably continue to be sijnilar to that 
which I have described in general terms today 
and which has been reasonably effective so far. 
It is gratifying to know that the conunittee is 
making a careful review of this field since it 
touches directly upon matters of impoilance to 
the United States: our traditional concern fori 
the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees 
and our ardent desire that Africa, its nations 
and its peoples, attain political and economic 
stability within the framework of genuine free- 
dom and democracy. i 




Family Law and the Women of Africa 

LOME, TOGO, AUGUST 18-31, 1964 

by Gladys A. TilUtt 

The U.N. Seminar on the Status of Women in 
Family Law held at Lome, Togo, August 18-31, 
1964, was not just a routine meetmg of women 
on family problems. Like the earlier seminar 
on women in public life held in Addis Ababa in 
1960, it dealt with the potential of women for 
economic and social progress. The discussion 
at Lome was interwoven with the future of 
Africa. It recognized tlie part women must 
play in meeting tlie aspirations of newly emerg- 
ing nations and in raising standards of living 
for the African people. 

This was the fourth and final regional semi- 
nar in the current series on the status of women 
in family law conducted by the United Nations 
under its program of advisory services in the 
field of human rights.' With each seminar it 
has become increasingly clear that, even though 
the legislation of a country may guarantee po- 
litical rights for its women citizens as well as its 
men, sucli legislation cannot be fully effective, 
nor can women make their full contribution to 
the well-being of the commimity, if they do not 
stand equal under all aspects of the law. 

Each meeting brought to light striking illus- 
trations of outworn customs which deprive 

' For a. report by Mrs. Tillett on the seminar held at 
Bogota, Colombia. Dec. 3-17, 1963, see Bulletin of 
July 27, 1904, p. 128. Mrs. Tillett also attended the at Tokyo, .Tapan, in 1962 as U.S. observer. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1956, 
p. 561. 

many countries of the energies, initiative, and 
potentials for progress represented by women. 
In many areas, marriage has the immediate ef- 
fect of depriving the wife of personal and prop- 
erty rights basic to equality and dignity. For 
example, consider practices condemned by the 
U.N. Conference on Slavery in 1956,^ such as 
child betrothal and marriage too young for the 
girl to complete her education ; or the inherit- 
ance of a widow as a piece of property by her 
husband's heirs. Or consider the case of a social 
worker who has studied abroad, or the head- 
mistress of a school, both the possessors of nu- 
merous degrees; or a doctor or a lawyer or a 
personnel director in a large corporation — in 
many countries, upon entering marriage, these, 
like all other married women, would be legally 
incompetent to serve as guardians of their own 
children. Or consider an able wife and mother 
denied parental rights even though these are 
recognized without question for an unwed 

• Mrs. Tillett is the U.S. Representative 
on the United Nations Commission on the 
Status of Women and has been a member 
of the U.S. delegation to tlie last four ses- 
sions of tlie General Assembly. She was 
the U.S. participant in the Lome seminar; 
her alternate was Elsie Austin, assistant 
cultural affairs officer at Lagos, Nigeria. 

FEBRUART 15, 1965 


mother ; or a woman supporting her family, in- 
cluding a husband who may be ill or blind, yet 
unable by law and custom to manage the family 
property. It was in the liglit of such situations 
that the Commission on the Status of Women 
recommended special attention to family law. 


The participants in the Lome seminar came 
from 21 countries, and nearly half were men. 
They were designated as experts and were not 
government-instructed. They came from Al- 
geria, Cameroon, Central African Kepublic, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, the Mala- 
gasy Republic, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierre Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
and Upper Volta. France, Israel, and the 
United States sent official observers. 

The delegation of the host country, Togo, was 
headed by the wife of the Vice President of the 
Republic, who had herself a background of dis- 
tinguished achievement. Other members of the 
Togo delegation held high posts in the Govern- 

Ghana's participant was a Judge of the Gha- 
naian High Court, one of the few women in the 
world to hold such a post. Her alternate was 
from the Ministry of Education. 

Mali sent the President of its Supreme Court 
and as alternate a member of the Social Com- 
mission of Women in Mali. This was a husband 
and wife team. 

Sudan sent the Deputy Chief Justice of its 
Supreme Court ; Morocco, its Attorney General ; 
Cameroon, the Vice President of its Court of 
Appeals; Congo (Brazzaville), the Director of 
the Cabinet of its Ministry of Justice ; Guinea, 
the Deputy President of its National Assembly 
Social Committee; Central African Republic, 
the Chief of Women's Advancement Service in 
its Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; tlie 
Malagasy Republic, a Magistrate from its Pal- 
ace of Justice ; Nigeria, the State Counsel of its 
Federal Ministry of Justice; Senegal, a Com- 
missioner of its Supreme Court; Tunisia, the 
Vice President of the First Tribunal of Tunis; 
Upper Volta, a Deputy of its National Assem- 
bly ; and Kenya, its Superintendent of Women's 

Two countries, Sierra Leone and the Ivoryl 
Coast, sent distinguished educators. Threei 
countries, Uganda, Tanzania, and Dahomey,] 
sent leaders of women's organizations. I 

Some 19 nongovernmental organizations in! 
consultative status with the Economic and So-i 
cial Council of the U.N. sent observers who par- 
ticipated in the discussions. They included the' 
International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions; the World Federation of United Na-| 
tions Associations; the Afro-Asian Organiza-! 
tion for Economic Cooperation; the Interna-l 
tional Commission of Jurists; the International! 
Committee of the Red Cross; the International! 
Council of Women; the International Federa-J 
tion of Business and Professional Women; the: 
International Federation of Women Lawyers;' 
the All African Women's Conference; thej 
Friends World Committee for Consultation ; the, 
International Movement for Fraternal Union j 
Among Races and Peoples; the Commission of i 
the Churches on International Affairs; the 
Catholic International Union for Social Serv-j 
ice ; the AVorld Assembly of Youth ; the World ' 
Confederation of Organizations of the Teach- 1 
ing Profession ; the World Federation of Cath- : 
olic Yoimg Women and Girls ; the World Move- 
ment of Mothers; the World Union of Catholic j 
Women's Organizations ; and St. Joan's Inter- 
national Alliance. 

Arrangements and Documentation 

The Government of Togo provided facilities i 
for the seminar and made the preparatoi-y ar-_ 
rangements. The United Nations provided' 
conference services, including simultaneous: 

As in the Status of Women Commission and | 
other United Nations bodies, documentation ' 
was supplied in advance. The United Nations 
provided a summary of U.N. action thus far. 
Other papers had been prei^ared at the request 
of the United Nations : one, on the customary 
laws on marriage, divorce, and inheritance and i 
the effects of marriage on the status of women 
and children, by Judge Annie Jiagge of Ghana; 
another, on the status of women in customary 
family law and the evolution of the status of 
women in family law, by Guy Adjete Kuasse- 
gan, Advocate, and Marie Sivomey, chief of the 



Office of Social Affairs, both from Togo. A 
paper on family law in African countries in- 
fluenced l)y Islam had been written by Profes- 
sor i^iiinai Kaslunl of the Faculty of Law of the 

; University of Cairo. 

The inaucriiral meeting of the seminar was 
openetl with addresses by Xicolas (hunit/.ky, 
President of the Republic of Togo, and Paiui 
Ombri. Minister of Labor, Social Affairs, and 
Civil Service. 

i Mrs. Josephine Meatchi of Togo was elected 
chairman of the seminar. Vice chairmen came 

. from the Central African Republic, Ghana, 

( Morocco, and Tanzania. The rapporteur was 
from Nigeria. Other participants were discus- 
sion leaders on the agenda topics: Mr. Sail of 

' Mali on legal conditions for marriage and ques- 
tions of dowry, etc.; Mi-s. Hyde-Forster of 

• Sierra Leone on the effect of marriage on per- 

I sonal status and property rights; Mr. Yoyo of 
Congo (Brazzaville) on legal conditions and 
effects of dissolution of marriage ; Mr. Pouka of 
Cameroon on parental rights and duties; and 

/ Judge Jiagge on the legal status of unmarried 
women, inheritance rights, and social factors 
affecting the status of women in the family. 

Promotion of Stable Marriage 

J>;uly in tlie discussion attention was drawn 
to the role of Africa in winning support for the 
U.X. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Min- 
imum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages. Two African countries, Guinea 
and Togo, had taken the lead in urging General 
As.sembly approval of this convention when it 
was forwarded from the Commission on the 
Status of Women and adopted and opened for 
signature in 1962. In December 1964, follow- 
ing the Lome seminar, Upper Volta became the 
10th country to ratify the marriage convention, 
thus fulfilling the retiuirement for ratification 
by 10 countries in order to bring it into effect. 

Participants generally agreed that the age of 
marriage established in each countrv should be 
high enough to j^ermit girls to complete their 
education prior to marriage. It was thought 
this would lead to more stable marriages and 
might decrease the demand for divorce. 

Since as an obsen-er I had the privilege of 
sharing in the discussion, I pointed out that 

experience in the United States supported this 
view. I quoted from a recent study showing 
that persons in the upper levels of professional 
and managerial groups had the lowest divorce 
rates in the United States. I added that "while 
the United States faces a high divorce rate, 
nevertheless statistical data show 85 percent of 
the population marry only once. The remain- 
ing 15 percent account for a divorce rate out of 
proportion to their numbers, since this per- 
cent remarry — and often redivorce." 

A number of the participants expressed sur- 
prise and satisfaction at this explanation, since 
the impression had been that a large proportion 
of LTnited States women were involved in di- 
vorce. I therefore continued with an account 
of other methods which promote stability of 
marriage, including the unified family courts 
established in many of our States, which provide 
counseling and guidance with a view to protect- 
ing the children as well as the marriage 

African Problems 

It was generally agreed that the cooperation 
and encouragement of men are essential if prog- 
ress is to be made in improving the status of 
women in Africa. It was therefore significant 
that the seminar sessions, with both men and 
women participating, were conducted in an 
atmosphere that was frank, friendly, and sym- 
pathetic. For example, in the discussion of 
property rights it was pointed out that, while 
laws in Africa generally recognize joint owner- 
ship in business, it would be just to apply this 
principle also to ownership of the home, espe- 
cially where husband and wife both work and 
pool their earnings. 

Social and economic factors were considered 
in their relation to safeguarding the dignity 
of women. Polygamy was discussed in this 
context. It was pointed out that in most coun- 
tries polygamy exists along with monogamy, 
and some thought complete abolition of polyg- 
amy might be premature. Participants also 
expressed the view that African countries might 
aim at the progressive abolition of polygamy, 
not only through legislation but also by removal 
of underlying conditions which tend to per- 
petuate it; when equal opportunities for educa- 

FEBRr.\RT 15, 1965 


tion and employment were open to women, 
polygamy might disappear of its own accord. 
It was rei^orted that in one country polygamy 
had been abolished, and in others the incidence 
was less — in one case as low as 2 percent. While 
dowry was recognized as not in itself objection- 
able, it was evident that abuse of dowry, like 
bride price, favors polygamy by the rich and 
deprives young men with little money of the 
right to marry. One country i-eported laws 
allowing a reasonable dowi-y which is not com- 
pulsory and imposing high penalties on those 
setting high prices. 

All felt that education of women and girls 
is basic to the solution of cultural and sociologi- 
cal problems in certain parts of Africa, espe- 
cially practices which are harmful to the health 
and contrary to the human dignity of young 

There was concern and also agreement that 
all countries in the region should be called ozi 
to prevent tlie cruel customs which inflict great 
suffering on widows upon the death of the 
husband. Education was seen as the means 
not only to eliminate discrimination against 
women but to improve the well-being of the 
family as a whole. 

Under this broad interpretation, the partici- 
pants urged expansion of technical, vocational, 
and professional training to equip women for 
their new roles and responsibilities in develop- 
ing societies. They envisioned added stability 
for the home through the benefits of adult edu- 
cation, particularly for rural women, in nutri- 
tion, child care, and home management. 
Educated women will have the capacity as well 
as the responsibility for leadership in making 
all groups aware that the political equality al- 
ready granted women gives them new leverage 
to lift their status. Voluntai-y organizations 
were cited as a channel through whicli women 
can work in joint nonpartisan efforts to stimu- 
late progress. One participant noted that in 
her country volunteer organizations are already 
providing women with a means to focus public 
opinion and have often influenced government. 

I intervened to say that in the United States 
women's organizations, both civic and profes- 
sional, are regarded as effective bodies which 
can be counted on for courage in promoting 

sound social change. They are often consulted; 
by high government officials because of theirl 
knowledge, competence, and influence. I cited 
the unprecedented number of women appointed! 
by Pi-esident Jolinson to high policymaking! 
posts as a milestone in the progress of women.i 
I also emphasized the great service of the Wo-i 
men's Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor| 
in studying problems and bringing about im-j 
provement for women m the United States,: 
and noted that such women's bureaus have been 
established m many other countries. And I de- 
scribed the work of our national Commission i 
on the Status of Women, patterned on the U.N.I 
Commission, which has made a 2-year study of] 
the situation at the local as well as national levelj 
and has developed a series of recoimnendationsj 
for further action. j 

Value of U.N. Seminars | 

The Lome semmar gave added impact to the| 
series of U.N. seminars on women in family law.^ 
As in previous meetings, the seminar had the 
advantage of distinguished leadership with a 
background of knowledge and experience for 
its task. It examined problems in depth with 
special attention to needs and situations in Af-. 
rica. It stirred thought on the grassroots', 
level, stimulated hope for practical action! 
for the progress of women, and emphasized the! 
political, social, and economic potential of worn- ] 
en in the U.N. Decade of Development. The I 
impact of the seminar was perhaps best demon- \ 
strated by tlie imanimous recommendation of the,, 
partici23ants that another U.N. seminar be held • 
in Africa in the near future on matters of con-i 
cern to women. 

Women in all parts of the world have long 
been aware of the problems which confront them i 
in achieving equal i-ecognition of dignity and 
rights in family law. It was Mme. Marie- 1 
Helene Lef aucheux, for 6 years Chairman of the I 
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, | 
whose experience gave her wide knowledge i 
of women in developing countries, who said, I 

A great deal has been heard during the winding up 
of colonial administrations about "dignity," which is ! 
justifiably sought after; it is about time that the same 1 
concern was felt, at all times and everywhere, for the ' 
dignity of women. 



Above all else, the seminar at Lome gave tlie 
participants an opportimity to consider to- 
getlier the special situation of women on the 
African Continent and to point the way to ful- 
fillment for all the women of Africa of the gre^it 
principles of dignity and equality embodied in 
the constitutions of each of their countries. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

ilimeoffrapltcd or processed documents (such as those 
luitcd below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.X. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
liotiJt, I'nited Xations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated November 16 from the Representative of 
South Africa regarding the resolution (S/5773) 
adopted on June IS. S/6053. November 19, 1964. 

2 pp. 

■ Report by the Secretary-General concerning the in- 
cident involving fighting between Israel and Syria 
on 1.3 November 1964 in the northern area of the 
Armistice I>emarcation Line established by the Is- 
rael-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. S/6061, 
November 24. 3!>C4, 41 pp.; S/60G1/Add.l, December 
1, 19C4. t>3 pp. and photographs. 

Note verbale dated November 26 from the Representa- 
tive of Czecho.slovakia regarding the problems of 
U.N. peacekeeping oi)erations. S/6070. November 
' 27, 1964. 6 pp. 

Letter dated November 30 from the Representative of 

Jordan transmitting the text of a memorandum is- 

I sued by his Government regarding the complaint of 

the Syrian Arab Republic against Israel. S/6077. 

December 2. 1964. 2 pp. 

Report of the Special Committee on the Tolieies of 
Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa. S/6073, December 7. 1964, 227 pp.; 
S/6073/Add.l, December 10, 1964. 129 pp. 

Letter dated December 8 from the Representative of 
the I'nited Kingdom regarding a series of attacks 
made on the territory of the Federation of South 
Arabia about which the British Government is ad- 
dressing a prote.'it to the Yemeni Republican author- 
ities. S/6094. December 9, 1964. 2 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na- 
tions Operation in Cvprus for the period September 
10 to December 12, 1964. S/6102. December 12, 
1964. 121 pp. 

Letter dated December 11 from the Representative of 
Yemen regarding military acts of aggression com- 
mitted by the British Armed Forces against the 
Yemen Arab Republic. S/6105. December 14, 1964. 

3 pp. 

Letter dated December 11 from the Representative of 
Greece regarding Turkish charges of Greek propa- 
ganda activities relative to Cyprus. S/6108. De- 
i cember 14. 1964. 2 pp. 

1 Letter dated December 12 from the Representative of 

' Greece regarding a violation of Greek airspace by 

Turkish aircraft. S/6109. December 14, 1904. 1 p. 


Department Releases 1965 Edition 
of "Treaties In Force" 

Press release 10 duted January 28 

The Department of State on January 28 re- 
leased for publication Treaties in Force: A List 
of Treaties and Other International Agree77ients 
of the United States in Force on Januaiy 1, 

This is a collection showing the bilateral rela- 
tions of the United States with 136 states or 
entities and the multilateral rights and obliga- 
tions of the contracting parties to more than 
360 treaties and agreements on 74 subjects. The 
1965 edition lists some 300 new treaties and 
agreements, including the consular convention 
and king crab fisliery agreement with Japan, the 
Colmnbia River treaty with Canada, the 
Chamizal convention with Mexico, the desalina- 
tion agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the cul- 
tural exchanges agreements with that country 
and Rumania, the commercial communications 
satellite agreement, and two law-of-the-sea con- 
ventions (continental shelf and territorial sea). 
Also included in this edition are NS Savannah 
agreements with Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Nor- 
way, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the United 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements 
are arranged by country or other political en- 
tity, and the multilateral treaties and other 
agreements are arranged by subject ^^^th names 
of countries which have become parties. Date 
of signature, date of entry into force for the 
United States, and citations to texts are fur- 
nished for each agreement. 

The publication provides information con- 
cerning treaty relations with numerous newly 
independent states, indicating wherever pos- 
sible the provisions of their constitutions and 
Independence arrangements regarding assump- 
tion of treaty obligations. 

Information on current treaty actions, sup- 
plementing the information contained in 

FEBRCART 15. 1965 

Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the 
Department of State Bulletin. 

The 1965 edition of Treaties in Force (318 
pp.; Department of State publication 7817) is 
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 20402, for $1.50. 

Current Actions 



Convention for unification of certain rules relating to 
the precautionary attachment of aircraft. Done at 
Rome May 29, 1933. Entered Into force January 12, 
Accession deposited: Niger, October 9, 1964. 

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on inter- 
national civil aviation ( to increase number of parties 
which may request holding an extraordinary meeting 
of the Assembly). Adopted at Rome September 1.5, 
Ratification deposited: Malawi, November 30, 1964. 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitte<l on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, November 25, 1964. 


Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of 
the International Labor Organization. Dated at 
Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 
20, 1948. TIAS 1868. 
Admission to membership: Malta, January 4, 1965. 

Law of tlie Sea 

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 

29 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. 

TIAS 5200. 

Accessions deposited: Albania (with reservation and 
declaration), December 7, 1964; Italy, December 
17, 1964. 
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva 

April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. 

TIAS 5578. 

Accession deposited: Albania, December 7, 1964. 

Load Line 

International load line convention. Done at London 
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 
47 Stat. 2228. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, November 2, 1964. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at Mos- 
cow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 
1963. TIAS 5433. 

Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Western Samoa. 
January 15, 1965. 


Convention concerning the international exchange ol 

publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.! 

Entered into force November 23, 1961." i 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 10, 1964.1 
Convention concerning the exchange of official publica-1 

tions and government documents between states.; 

Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered intoi 

force May 30, 1961.' 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 10, 1964.1 

Satellite Communications System j 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a| 
global commercial communications satellite system.l 
Done at Washington August 20, li)64. Entered into! 
force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. | 

Notification of approval: Sweden, January 18, 1965. I 

Women — Political Rigiits 

Convention on the politic-al rights of women. Done atj 

New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force Julyi 

7, 1954.' I 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Niger, De-j 

cember 7, 1964. 




China | 

Agreement relating to the status of U.S. forces partici-l 
pating iu joint exercises in 1965 and providing for thej 
mutual waiver of damage claims to government prop-i 
erty. Effected by exchange of letters at Taipei De-j 
cember 10 and 19, 1964. Entered into force Deeem-; 
her 19, 1964. ', 

Korea ^ 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with ex-! 

changes of letters. Effected by exchange of notes atj 

Washington January 26, 1965. Entered into force: 

January 26, 1965. ■ 

Yugoslavia \ 

Agreement regarding claims of U.S. nationals, with] 
exchange of notes and interpretative minute. Signed] 
at Belgrade November 5. 1964. j 

Entered, into force: January 20, 1965. i 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Release issued prior to January 25 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 9 of 
January 21. 

No. Date 





16 1/28 


Cotton textile agreement with Korea. 
Ball : statement on legislation to im- 
plement coffee agreement. 
Treaties in Force . . . 1965 released. 

Held for a later issue of the Bxjlletin. 



INDEX February 15, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1338 


Family I-j»\v aud the Women of Africa (Tillett) . 229 

U.S. Objectives and Refugee Relief Trograms in 
Africa (Schwartz, Williams) 219 

ConRo (Leopoldville). t'.S. Objectives and Refu- 
RiH' Kolicf rrograms in Africa (Schwartz, 
Williams) 219 


The Budget of the United States Government for 
the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1966 (Ex- 
cerpts) 207 

State of Our Defenses (message of the Presi- 
dent to the Congress) 211 

U.S. Objectives and Refugee Relief Programs In 
Africa (Schwartz, Williams) 219 

Economic Affairs. The Budget of the United 
States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending 
June .SO, 19C0 (Excerpts) 207 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Tlje Budget 
of the United States Government for the Fis- 
cal Year Ending June 30, 1966 (Excerpts) . . 207 

Foreign .Aid 

The Budget of the United States Government 
for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1966 (Ex- 
cerpts) 207 

U.S. Objectives and Refugee Relief Programs in 
Africa (Schwartz, Williams) 219 

Human Rights. Family Law and the Women of 
Africa (Tillett) . . 229 

International Information. The Budget of the 
United States Government for the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1966 (Excerpts) 207 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Family Law and the Women of Africa (Til- 
lett) 229 

Military Affairs. State of Our Defenses (mes- 
sage of the President to the Congress) . . . 211 
Presidential Documents 

The Budget of the United States Government for 
the Fiscal Tear Ending June 30, 1966 (Ex- 
cerpts) 207 

State of Our Defenses 211 

U.S. Leaders Express Sorrow at Death of Win- 
ston Churchill 206 

Publications. Department Releases 1965 Edition 

(if "Treaties in Force" 233 

Refugees. U.S. Objectives and Refugee Relief 
Programs in Africa (Schwartz, Williams) . . 219 

Science. State of Our Defenses (message of the 

President to the Congress) 211 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 234 

Department Releases 1965 Edition of "Treaties 

in Force" 233 

United Kingdom. U.S. Leaders Express Sorrow 
at Death of Winston Churchill (Harriman, 
Johnson,, Stevenson) 206 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 233 

The United States Reviews the U.N. Constitu- 
tional Crisis (Stevenson) 198 

Name Index 

Uarriman, W. Averell 206 

Johnson, President 206,207,211 

Rusk, Secretary 206 

Schwartz, Abba P 219 

Stevenson, Adlai E 198, 206 

Tillett, Gladys A 229 

Williams, G. Mennen 219 

o.i. coviMiciiT rmiiTiaa orriciiiiii 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 







Policy, Persistence, and Patience 

An Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusic 

This 32-page pampMet is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on the Nat 
Broadcasting Company's television program, "A Conversation With Dean Rusk," broadcast on, 
uary 3, 1965. Secretary Rusk discusses with NBC correspondents Elie Abel and Robert Goi 
the issues and problems facing the United States in South Viet-Nam, Southeast Asia, the Congo 
the Western Hemisphere and explains what they mean for the American people. 





EJnclosed And $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Snpt. of Docaments) 


Please send me copies of Policy, Persistence, and Patience— A; 

Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 










Vol LII, iYo. 1639 

Februai-y 22, 1965 



Address by President Johnson 21^ 

hy Under Secretary Harriman 2^6 

Report of U.S. Delegation to lOth Session of Hague Conference 265 

For index see inside hack cover 

United States and South Vietnamese Forces Launcli 
Retaliatory Attacks Against Nortli Viet-Nam 


White House press release dated February 7 

On February 7, U.S. and South Vietnamese 
air elements were directed to lamich retaliatory 
attacks against barracks and staging areas in the 
southern area of North Viet-Nam which intelli- 
gence has shown to be actively used by Hanoi 
for training and infiltration of Viet Cong per- 
sonnel into South Viet-Nam. 

Eesults of the attack and further operational 
details will be announced as soon as they are 
reported from the field. 

Today's action by the U.S. and South Viet- 
namese Governments was in response to provo- 
cations ordered and directed by the Hanoi 

Commencing at 2 a.m. on February 7th, Sai- 
gon time (1 p.m. yesterday, eastern standard 
time, two South Vietnamese airfields, two U.S. 
barracks areas, several villages, and one town 
in South Viet-Nam were subjected to delib- 
erate surprise attacks. Substantial casualties 

Our intelligence has indicated, and this action 

confirms, that Hanoi has ordered a more aggres- 
sive course of action against both South Viet- 
namese and American installations. 

Moreover, these attacks were only made pos- 
sible by the continuing infiltration of personnel 
and equipment from North Viet-Nam. This in- 
filtration markedly increased during 1964 and i 
continues to increase. ^ 

To meet these attacks the Government of | 
South Viet-Nam and the U.S. Government 
agreed to appropriate reprisal action against 
North Vietnamese targets. The President's 
approval of this action was given after the 
action was discussed with and recommended by 
the National Security Council last night 
[February 6]. 

Today's joint response was carefully limited | 
to military areas which are supplying men and 1 
arms for attacks in South Viet-Nam. As in the 
case of the North Vietnamese attacks m the 
Gulf of Tonkin last August,^ the response is 
appropriate and fitting. 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 



The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly puhlication issued by the Office 
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation Is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department. United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the lield of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office. Washington. D.C., 
20402. Price : 52 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget {January 19, 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State BuUetin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
is Indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



As tlie U.S. Governiiu'iit has f renuont 1 y stated, 
we seek no wider war. AVhether or not this 
course can lie maintained lies with the North 
j Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situa- 
I tion remains the cessation of infiltration from 
! North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the 
I Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease ag- 
[ gression against its neighbors. 


White Uouse press release dated February 7 

Following meetings with the National Se- 
' curity Council, I have dii-ected the orderly with- 
drawal of American dependents from South 

It has become clear that Hanoi has under- 
I taken a more aggi'essive course of action against 
I both South Vietnamese and American installa- 
tions, and against Americans who are in South 
Viet-Nam assisting the people of that country 
to defend their freedom. "We have no choice 
now but to clear the decks and make absolutely 
clear our continued determination to back South 
Viet-Nam in its fight -to maintain its independ- 

In addition to this action, I have ordered the 
deployment to South Viet-Nam of a Hawk air 
'1'fense battalion. Other reinforcements, in 
units and individuals, may follow. 


Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. In 
describing certain of the events which have 
taken place in South Viet-Nam and North Viet- 
Xam during the past 24 hours, I'll refer to this 
map which stands in front of us. On it we have 
sliown the relative positions of China, Laos, 
North Viet-X'am, South Viet-N'am, Cambodia, 
Tliailand, and the South China Sea. 

Approximately 24 hours ago, at 2 a.m. Sun- 
'liy morning, Februarv' 7, Saigon time, the Viet- 
•Nam Communist guerrillas carried out tliree 

' -Made at the opening of a news conference at the 

attacks, one against installations in the Pleiku 
area, which is in the central part of South Viet- 
Nam, a second at Tuy Iloa, with an airstrip 
adjacent to it, an area near the coast, and a 
third against Viet-Nam villages near Nha 

The first attack in the Pleiku area was car- 
ried out by a company of Viet Cong using 81- 
mm. mortars, the mortar fire was directed 
against the United States military compound 
at the Second Corps Headquarters of the South 
Vietnamese military forces, and simultaneously 
elements of the same company attacked the air- 
strip at Camp Holloway, at which were located 
United States helicopter forces on the outskirts 
of Pleiku. 

This latter attack on the airstrip was accom- 
panied by a ground probe during which small- 
arms fire was used, rifle grenades, demolition 
charges, and recoilless rifles. Following com- 
pletion of the attacks a Viet Cong four-tube, 
81-mm. mortar position was located outside the 
perimeter defense of the airstrip. Nearby were 
containers for 61 mortar rounds. The United 
States casualties in the Pleiku area were 7 
killed, 109 wounded, and, of the 109, 76 of the 
wounded required evacuation. 

In addition 5 United States helicopters were 
destroyed, 9 to 11 damaged, and 6 United States 
fixed- wing aircraft were damaged. 

The second attack at Tuy Hoa was directed 
against Vietnamese villages in tlie area and 
against the storage tanks for aviation gas for 
the Vietnamese Air Force stationed at tlio Chop 
Chi Airfield. Again, 81-mm. fire was used, the 
storage tanks of aviation gas were set on fire. 
There were no United States casualties in that 

The third attack, as I mentioned earlier, was 
against a village or series of villages about 15 
miles northeast of N^ha Trang. The reports of 
operations in this area are fragmentary, and I 
can't give you the results other than to'sav that 
we believe that there were no United States 
casualties there. Immediately following, the 
United States representatives in Saigon met 
with representatives of the South Vietnamese 
Government. They jointly agreed that joint 
retaliatory' action was required. The Presi- 
dent's approval of this action was given after 
the action was discussed with and recommended 

FEBRUART 22, 1965 


by the National Security Council at a meeting 
held between 7:45 p.m. and 9 p.m. last night. 

As a result of this action, elements of the U.S. 
and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed 
to launch joint retaliatory attacks against bar- 
racks and staging areas in the southern portion 
of North Viet-Nam. 

On this map yovi see Hanoi, the capital of 
North Viet-Nam, Saigon, the capital of South 
Viet-Nam, the line of demarcation between the 
two countries at the I7th parallel. Tlie targets 
agreed upon for the joint retaliatory attacks 
were barracks areas and staging areas in the 
southern portion of North Viet-Nam. As I say, 
elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air 
Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory 
attacks against those targets. These are the 
areas which Hanoi has used as bases for the in- 
filtration of men and equipment out of the 
southern portion of North Viet-Nam across the 
border into Laos, down the corridor through 
Laos, and into South Viet-Nam. The infiltra- 
tion routes are picturized on the map. One 
comes into the Pleiku area in the central part 
of Viet-Nam, and others come further south. 

U.S. aircraft took off from three U.S. carriers 
that were steaming in the South Cliina Sea. 
These carriers were steaming south of the I7th 
parallel, which is the line of demarcation be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam, about 100 
miles off the coast of South Viet-Nam. The 
three carriers were the U.S.S. Ranger^ U.S.S. 
Haneoch^ and U.S.S. Coral Sea. 

Of the aircraft which took off from the car- 
riers, 49 struck the Dong Hoi barracks and 
staging area in the southern part of North Viet- 
Nam. Certam other U.S. aircraft and certain 
South Vietnamese aircraft aborted because of 
adverse weather conditions and did not proceed 
to their target areas. Photo reconnaissance of 
the results of tlie strike is not yet available, but 
the combat crews upon their return to tlie car- 
riers reported seeing heavy fires, heavy smoke, 
and substantial damage to military targets in 
the target area. One U.S. aircraft, an A— 1 
from the carrier Coral Sea, was lost. The pilot 
was seen to eject into the sea. Air-sea rescue 
operations are underway. All other aircraft 
returned safely to their bases. 


Following is the text of a letter from U.S. 
Eepresentative Adlai E. Stevenson to Roger 
Seydoux, President of the Security Council. 

Dear Mk. President: I have the honor to 
inform you of the followmg acts which have 
further disturbed the peace in Viet-Nam. 

In the early morning of February 7th, Viet- 
namese time, Viet Cong forces carried out 
coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese air 
bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two barracks 
installations in the Pleiku area, and on a num- 
ber of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha 
Trang. Numerous casualties were mflicted, 
and at least one village was burned. 

These attacks by the Viet Cong, which op- 
erates under the military orders of North 
Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a con- 
certed and politically timed effort to sharpen 
and mtensify the aggression at a moment de- 
signed for broader effect in the field of inter- 
national jjolitics, and to test the will of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States to 
resist that aggression. 

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
and the Government of the United States im- 
mediately consulted and agreed that it was 
necessary to take prompt def ensiv^e action. Ac- 
cordingly, on the afternoon of February 7th, 
Vietnamese time. United States and South Viet- ' 
namese air elements were directed to take joint; 
action against certain military facilities in thej 
southern area of North Viet-Nam. An attack] 
was carried through agamst Dong Hoi, which is 
a military installation and one of the major; 
staging areas for the infiltration of armedj 
cadres of North Vietnamese troops into South 
Viet-Nam in violation of international law and 
of the Geneva Accords of 1954. '. 

The Viet Cong attacks of February 7th re-i 
lated directly to the central pi-oblem in Viet-: 
Nam. That central problem is not one of al 
struggle by one element of the population in 
South Viet-Nam against the Government. 
There is, rather, a pattern of military operations 
directed, staffed, and supplied in crucial re-; 
spects from outside the comitry. L'p to 34,000 



arinod and trained soldiers have infiltrated into 
South Viet-Xaui from the north since 1959. 
In addition, key items of equipment, such as 
mortars of the type employed in the attacks of 
February Ttli, have come from North Viet-Nam. 
1 During 1964, the infilti-ation of men and equip- 
ment has increased sharply, and virtually all 
of tliose now coming in are natives of North 
I Viet-Nam. 

Infiltration in such numbers can hardly be 
labeled "indirect aggression" — though that 
I fonn of aggression is illegal too. Wliat we are 
' witnessing in Viet-Xam today is a sustained 
; attack for more than six years across a frontier 
I' set by international agreement. 

Members of the Security Council will recall 
'that we discussed in the Council, in August 
' 1964,^ aggression by the Hanoi regime against 
naval units of the United States in the Gulf 
, of Tonkin. At that time we de.scribed these 
' attacks as part of a pattern which includes the 
infiltration of armed personnel to make war 
against the legitimate government of South 
> Viet-Nam, the arming of terrorist gangs in 
" South Viet-Xam, the assassination of local offi- 
cials as an instrument of policy, the continued 
fiirhtmg in Laos in violation of the Geneva 
;i irreements, — a pattern, in short, of deliberate 
>\-tematic and flagrant violations of interna- 
t i' >nal agreements by the i-egime in Hanoi which 
siirned them and which by all tenets of decency, 
law, and civilized practice, is bound by their 

Ill' Republic of Viet-Nam, and at its request 
I ■ Government of the United States and other 
J emments, are resisting this systematic and 
itinuing aggression. Since reinforcement of 
the Viet Cong by infiltrators from North Viet- 
Xam is essential to this continuing aggression, 
•■'iiinter-measures to arrest such reinforcement 
from the outside are a justified measure of self- 
I defense. 

' For text of a statement made by Ambassador Steven- 
son before the Security Conncll on Ang. 5, see Bulletin 
of Aug. 24, 1904, p. 272. 

Mr. President, my Government is reporting 
the measures which we have taken in accordance 
with our public commitment to assist the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam against aggression from 
the X'orth. 

We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in 
its statement of August 8, 1904, which was cir- 
culated in Security Council Document S/5888, 
explicitly denied the right of the Security 
Council to examine this problem. The disre- 
spect of the Hanoi regime for the United Na- 
tions adds to the concern which any United Na- 
tions member state must feel about Hanoi's vio- 
lation of the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 

Nevertheless I would remind you, and through 
you other members of the Security Council and 
of the United Nations, that our mission in 
Southeast Asia is peace and that our purpose is 
to ensure respect for the peace settlement to 
which all concerned are committed. 

We therefore reserve the right to bring this 
matter to the Security Council if the situation 
warrants it. 

In a statement issued this morning on behalf 
of President Johnson, the United States Gov- 
ernment once again emphasized that "we seek 
no wider war. Wliether or not this course can 
be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese 
aggressors. The key to the situation remains 
the cessation of infiltration from North Viet- 
Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi re- 
gime that it is prepared to cease aggression 
against its neighbors." 

Our objective is a peaceful settlement. This 
would require both the self-restraint of the re- 
gime to the north and the presence of effective 
international peacekeeping machinery to make 
sure that promises are kept. 

This is our purpose. But we will not permit 
the situation to be changed by terror and vio- 
lence and this is the meaning of our action this 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Adlai E. Stevenson 

FEBRUARY 22. 1965 


Unity, the Legacy of American Democracy 

Address hy President Johnson ^ 

Tonight I want to share with you some 
thouglits on what I conceive to be the meaning 
of this moment in our national life. 

In all of history, men liave never lived as we 
are privileged to live toniglit — at tliis rare and 
at this precious moment. 

Our arms are strong — our freedoms are many. 

Our homes ai'e secure — and our tables are 

Our knowledge is great — and our imderstand- 
ing is growing. 

We enjoy plenty — ^we live in peace. 

And tliis is much — but there is more. 

Out of the years of fire and faith in this 20th 
century, our diverse peoples have forged to- 
gether a consensus such as we have not knowai 
before — a consensus on our national purposes 
and our national policies, and the principles 
that guide tliem both. 

This consensus is new. We have come to it 
more suddenly than we foresaw — and more 
fully tlian we anticipated. Tonight questions 
are being asked about the meaning of tliat con- 
sensus — proper, jienetrating, and profound 

Tlioughtful men want to know — are we en- 
tering an era wlien consensus will become an 
end in itself? 

Will we substitute consensus for challenge? 

Will a devotion to agreement keep us from 
those tasks that are disagreeable? 

' Made before the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith at Washington. D.C., on Feb. 3 (White House 
press release; as-delivered text). The League gave 
President Johnson its annual America's Democratic 
Legacy award. 

Tonight, for myself, I want to turn back to 
the ancient Scriptures for the answer: 

He that observeth the wind shall not sow ; and he j 
that regardeth the clouds shall not reap. j 

If we were to try, tliis restless and stirring i 
and striving nation would never live as the cap- 1 
tive of a comfortable consensus. 

So we must know that the times ahead for| 
us — and for the world for that matter — are not I 
to be bland and placid. We shall know tests. '< 
We shall know trials — and we shall be ready. I 
For I believe more will be demanded of our, 
stewardship tlian of any generations which have ' 
ever lield the trust of America's legacy before! 

'''■. . i 

So let me be specific. I 

Using the Consensus To Strengthen Our Society | 

We are at the thresliold of a new America—; 
new in numbers, new in dimensions, new in its 
concepts, new in its challenges. If tlie society! 
that we have brought already to greatness is' 
to be called great in tlie times to come, we must 
respond to that tomorrow tonight. • 

The unity of our people — the consensus of 
tlieir will — must be the instrument that we put 
to use to strengtlien our society, undergird its' 
values, elevate its standards, assure its order, 
advance the quality of its justice, nourish itsi 
tolerance and reason, and enlarge the meaning 
of man's rights for everj^ citizen. 

For I believe with Justice Brandeis that : 

If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let 
our minds be bold. 

And this is what we are striving to do here 



in your Capital City and in your National Gov- 

Invested just a few weeks ago with the trust 
of America's consensus, we are grii,=;ping tlie net- 
tles of our society. We are not avoiding con- 
troversy to prolong the political consensus — 
rather, we are striving to use the consensus to 
resolve and remove the political controvei-sies 
that have already stood too long across the path 
of our people's progi'ess and their fulfillment. 
I took the oath as the President only 12 or 
13 days ago. Since my state of the Union mes- 
sage on January 4 before my inauguration, I 
have sent to the Congress by the end of this week 
16 messages — messages that are facing up to con- 
flicts, messages that involve controversy — and 
don't doubt it- — and messages that respond to 
the needs of this society. 

For what we have asked, we stand ready to- 
niglit to welcome all support and to confront 
all opposition. Believing that our requests are 
right, and that our cause is just, tliis adminis- 
tration is determined that the opportunity of 
this rare and most precious moment shall not 
be denied, defaulted, or destroyed. 

If some say our goals are idealistic, we wel- 
come that as a comijliment. For 188 years, the 

1 strongest fiber of America has been that thread 
of idealism whicli weaves through all our effort 
and all our aspiration. 

So let the world know — and let it be kno^vn 
tliroughout our own land — that this generation 
of Americans is not so cynical, and not so cool, 

■ . not so callous that idealism is out of style. 

In a national house that is filled to overflow- 

; ing, we are determined that the lives wo lead 

s shall not be vacant and shall not be empty. 

; Your Government is not concerned with sta- 
tistics but with the substance of your schools, 

i and your jobs, and v'our cities, and your family 
life, and your countryside, your health, your 
hopes, your protection, your preparedness — and 
your rights and opportunities. 
For as Emerson once said : 

The true test of civilization is not the census, nor 
the size of cities nor the crops, but the kind of man 
that the country turns out. 

i, So we are concerned tonight with the kind of 
: man that the countrj- turns out in these times 
and the times that are to come. 

In a changing environment, a changing so- 
ciety, a changing age, we are determined that 
our own beloved America shall turn out men 
who are enlightened and who are just, men who 
know beauty in their lives and compassion in 
their souls, men who are hardened by the 
strength of their faith rather than by the harsh- 
ness of their fears. 

And it is for this that we work and are ready 
to fight — and we ask you to work and, if need 
be, fight with us — in a consensus of common pur- 
pose and common idealism. 

"WTiile we look inward to search the soul of 
America, we do not turn inward — nor turn 
away from the opportunities and responsibili- 
ties of America tonight in this world. 

We proceed as we do, knowing that as we 
cannot isolate ourselves from the world, so we 
cannot isolate our role in the world from our 
responsibilities at home. 

We must meet the responsibilities here if we 
are to be equal to the opportunities there. But 
the success of all we undertake — the fulfillment 
of all that we aspire to achieve — rests finally on 
one condition : the condition of peace among all 

Mr. [Dore] Schary and Mr. [Abraham] Fine- 
berg, in your citation tonight, the words ex- 
pressed the essence of America in the thought 
that — "as a coimtry, we try." I believe that it is 
the highest legacy of our democracy that we are 
always trying — trying, probing, falling, rest- 
ing, and up trying again — but always trying 
and always gaining. 

And this is the pursuit and the approach that 
we must make to peace. Not in a day or a year 
or a decade in 120 nations or more — not, per- 
haps, in a lifetime — shall we finally grasp the 
goal of peace for which we reach tonight. But 
we shall alwaj's be reaching, always trying — 
and, hopefully, always gaining. 

Exchange of Visits With Soviet Leadership 

Toward that end, when I spoke last month to 
the Congress,^ I expressed the hope that the new 
leadership of the Soviet Union might come 
and visit our land — come to see us, to meet us, 

' For text of President Johnson's state of the Union 
message of Jan. 4. see Bulletin of Jan. 25, 196'), p. 94. 


to learn firsthand the determination here in our 
beloved America for peace and the equal deter- 
mination to support freedom. 

I am gratified that this expression is receiving 
the active, the constructive— and, I hope, the 
fruitful— attention and the interest of the 
Soviet Government. I have reason to believe 
that the Soviet leadership would welcome my 
visit to their country— as I would be very glad 
to do. I am hopeful that before the year is out 
this exchange of visits between us may occur. 
As I have said so often before, the longest jour- 
ney begins with a single step — and I believe that 
such visits would reassure an anxious world that 
our two nations are each striving toward the 
goal of peace. 

So let it be said and let it be known that 
wherever America has responsibility— wherever 
America has opportunity — we shall be f oimd al- 
ways trying. 

So I believe it is for the long effort ahead, not 
for the end of the passing moment, that our 
great national consensus has formed and will 
actually be preserved. 
In division, there is never strength. 
In differences, there is no sure seed of prog- 

In unity our strength lies, and on imity our 
hope for success rests. 

So let us never forget that unity is the legacy 
of our American democracy. Through the 
veins of America flows the blood of all man- 
]j;inc1 — from every continent, every culture, 
every creed. If we built no more arms, or no 
more cities, or no more industry, or no more 
farms, we would be remembered through the 
ages for the vmderstanding that we have built 
in human hearts. 

It is in the heart that America lives and has 
its being — and it is there that we must work, all 
together and each of us alone. We must work 
for the miderstanding, and the tolerance, and 
the spirit of benevolence and brotherly love that 
will assure every man fulfillment and dignity 
and honor, whatever his origins, however he 

spells his name, whatever his beliefs, whatever 
his color, whatever his endowments. 

If this be our purpose, and if this be our 
accomplishment, then our society will be great. 

U.S. Recalls Ambassador 
From Tanzania 

Defartment Statemenf^ j 

On January 15 the Government of the United 
Eepublic of Tanzania declared two United 
States diplomatic officers personae non gratae on 
the ground that they had engaged in subversive 
activities and asked them to leave Tanzania 
within 24 hours. 

The United States Government, which de- 
sires continuing friendly relations with the 
Government of the United Eepublic of Tanza- 
nia, instituted a thorough inquiry into the facts 
and fomid no basis whatever for the allegation. 
The United States Government presented the 
Government of the United Republic of Tanza- 
nia with the results of its investigation, includ- 
ing relevant documentation. The United States 
Government advised the Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania that, on the basis 
of all the information available to it, the allega- 
tion concerning the two diplomatic officers was 
entirely unsubstantiated. The United States 
Government asked the Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania to provide any 
evidence to support the allegation made, and I 
also proposed that the two Govermnents join in 1 
an effort to ascertain all the facts. | 

The Government of the United Republic of \ 
Tanzania has declined to supply any evidence 
to substantiate the allegation and has also de- 
clined to join with the United States Govern- i 
ment in a thorough examination of the facts. 

In these circumstances the United States ; 
Government has recalled the Ambassador [Wil- 
liam Leonhart] for consultation. ^ 

^ Read to news correspondents on Jan. 30 by Robert 
J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News. 



The Economic Responsibilities of the United States 

hy Under Secretary Harriman ^ 

Tlie United States is the most important eco- 
nomic power in tlie free world. I propose to 
discuss tonight the inescapable responsibilities 
rliat go with that power and the opportmiities 
that it opens up. These include our foreign 
trade goals, our efforts to acliieve a strong inter- 
national monetaiy system, and our foreign aid 
objectives. These matters are closely related. 
How we handle them will do much to determine 
not only our national well-being but our na- 
tional security. 

Tlie first essential is a sound, strong domestic 
economy, with an adequate rale of growth. We 
need tliis, first of all, for the welfare of our 
people. We need it also to sustain our security 
requirements, whether military-, political, or 

A high growth rate lessens our burdens. Our 
defense budget, huge — and necessarj' — as it is, 
is in fact no more than the increase in our gross 
national product during the last 18 months. 
Foreign aid is now less than one-tenth of our 
annual increase in national output. The Presi- 
dent's foreign aid request for the next fiscal year 
is one-half of 1 percent of our GXP. 

We need stable prices also. Maintenance of 
a high gro\\-th rate and stable prices will im- 
prove our competitive position abroad and at 
the same time make the United States more 
attractive for capital investment. Both factors 
would improve our balance of payments, thus 
enhance our ability to finance our own foreign 
investments and commitments. 

Full employment and a growing economy 

pro\dde a favorable climate for measures to re- 
duce obstacles to trade and to encourage the 
mobility of resources within the domestic econ- 
omy. They facilitate adjustment to competi- 
tion, whether foreign or domestic. 

Our war on poverty here at home is aimed at 
raising the quality of American life. But that 
is not its only goal, for, as President Jolinson 
said in his state of the Union message : " 

We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty and 
abundance in a worldwide desert of disappointed 
dreams. Our nation was created to help strike away 
the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wher- 
ever they keep man less than God meant hun to be. 

Our high living standards and sustained 
growth are, of course, extremely important in 
the world struggle between freedom and coer- 
cion. We used to hear much about rapid eco- 
nomic growth in the Communist world. We 
have heard a good deal less about it in the last 
few years. And the GNP for Western Europe, 
Canada, Japan, and the United States is fast 
approaching $li/4 trillion — about 21^ times that 
of the entire Communist world. 

In economic competition with the West, the 
Communists are not gaining ground as they 
once were. Tlieir agricultural policies have been 
disastrous. Nor have they been able to keep 
the promises they have made to their own people 
to provide more consumer goods. These are 
facts of which the more discerning leaders of 
developing nations have become aware. And 
even leaders of some Communist comitries seem 
to be aware of them — hence their moves toward 
increased economic incentives. 

' Address made before the American Business Press, 
Inc., at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 4 (press release 19). 

• For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 



There is a further connection between our 
prosperity and growth and the economic health 
of the free world. Our economy "feeds" the 
economies of so many other nations — they can- 
not be prosperous and strong if we are not. 
It used to be said that if the United States had 
the sniffles, the rest of the free world caught 
cold. Fortunately, Western Europe and Japan 
are much hardier than that now. In fact, some 
years ago they continued to forge ahead while 
we suffered a mild recession. But the rest of 
the free world would surely suffer if we were to 
have a serious setback. Just as certainly, the 
expansion of our economy is a stimulant to the 
rest of the free world. We have had almost 
4 years of sustained economic advance. In that 
period our annual imports have increased by 
$31/2 billion to $18,500,000,000. That is $?A/o 
billion of income for other countries that they 
would not have had if our economy had stood 
still. Of this, the larger part — more than $2 
billion — represented tropical agricultural prod- 
ucts, metals, and other primary commodities, 
bought mostly from the developing countries. 
This substantial increase in our purchases has 
helped their prospects for development. 

We, in turn, benefited through an increase 
of approximately $41^ billion in our exports in 
4 years — an increase of about 22 percent. Thus 
our growth was stimulated by full employment 
and higher incomes in Western Europe and 
Japan and by the rising pace of development in 
various other countries of the free world. 

Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than 
the fact that in the past decade of remarkable 
economic growth in Western Europe our trade 
with that area has more than doul^led and with 
Japan more than tripled. These figures show 
clearly the value to us of our investment in the 
Marshall Plan and in Japanese reconstruction. 

Interdependence of Free World 

This brings me to a major point, the inescap- 
able reality that our economic policies are 
closely linked with the policies of other free- 
world countries. This interdependence makes 
our lives somewhat more complicated but our 
efforts greatly more productive. The fact is 
that economic nationalism is as much of an 

anachronism for the United States today as it 
was at the end of World War II. 

This was understood 20 years ago when we 
looked out on a world come to wholesale grief 
and chaos from war. We were almost alone in 
emerging from that war with a powerful econ- 
omy; and we held the preponderance of the 
world's financial reserves. However, we right- 
ly believed that our position was vulnerable, 
since so much of the free world was weak, in 
serious disorder, and under external pressure. 

We acted accordingly. As one essential, we 
undertook a series of military commitments to 
insure the common defense. But it was through 
our economic policies — in aid, in trade, and in 
monetai-y arrangements — that we set in motion 
a new, dynamic impetus for economic recovery 
and an era of unprecedented prosperity in the 

Our world is immeasurably better, stronger, 
and safer for these developments. Other in- 
dustrial countries are no longer unduly depend- 
ent on our capital or critically sensitive to fluc- 
tuations in our markets. Nevertheless, we are 
more, rather than less, heavily involved in the 
world economy. 

Our economic dimensions alone make this 
involvement a necessity. But it is also a mat- 
ter of today's realities in an open international 
economic system. It is a system we have worked 
hard throughout the postwar period to enlarge 
and to strengthen. We have done so in the 
Iniowledge that it can accelerate the economic 
growth, and hence the security, of the free world 
by enabling the efforts of each nation to sup- 
port, rather than detract from, the efforts of 
other nations. 

Such a system provides maximum opportuni- 
ties for international economic specialization; 
it stimulates the growth and spread of technol- 
ogy ; it encourages capital to flow in directions 
where it can be most productively employed; 
it enhances the I'ole of competition as a pro- 
ductive and modernizing economic force; and 
it gives to consumers everywhere a wider range 
of choice. 

We can gain these great advantages only by 
constantly working for them. The system as a 
whole can succeed only if national economic 
policies are based on mutual cooperation and an 



agreed code of responsible beluivior. And, as 
the largest single element in the world economy, 
the United States has a unique obligation to 
lead the way. 

The United States has souglit diligently to 
fullill that obligjition. More than three dec- 
ades ago, we began a long and tenacious effort 
to i-educe restrictions on the movement of goods 
and capital and to develop sensible ground rules 
for national behavior in the field of foreign 
economic policy. 

We took the lead through the reciprocal trade 
negotiations in the thirties; through the series 
of postwar multilateral trade reductions under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
through our financial and aid policies which 
greatly hastened the day when Western Eu- 
rope and Japan could remove quotas and ex- 
change controls and once more make their 
currencies convertible; and most recently 
through the Trade E.xpansion Act of 1962. 

This persistent exercise in international co- 
operation led to an unprecedented boom in 
world trade. Since 1948 the volume of world 
trade has tripled. For the first time in this 
century, trade increased faster than income. 
Thereby it accelerated economic growth and 
raised productivity in all countries. 

The striking contrast between these achieve- 
ments and the situation in the thirties is not a 
matter of trade volume alone. In that unhappy 
; era competitive exchange depreciation and trade 
retaliation measures were standard weapons in 
. a nation's economic arsenal. Yet the net effect 
i of these methods was self-defeating. All na- 
tions suffered through lower income and in- 
' leased unemployment. 

Xow we have broken free from the web of 
trade and payment restrictions that were the 
Ipffacy of the thirties and of the Second World 
^Var. We have built an impressive system of 
international organizations through which we 
■n consult and work together with other na- 

•ns to make all of us riclier and more secure. 
This is the purpose of such organizations as the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development], the GATT [General 
Airreement on Tariffs and Trade], the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund], the World 

Bank, and the specialized economic agencies 
and regional organizations of the United 

We and our free-world partners have come 
a long way in building this system of interna- 
tional cooperation, but we may now be at an 
important crossroad. Progress now — whether 
in trade, in financial affairs, or in aid pro- 
grams — will depend increasingly on effective 
cooperation among all the major industrial 

The Kennedy Round 

The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, 
now underway, is a key test of our collective 
resolution. In concept and in scope these nego- 
tiations represent the most ambitious opportu- 
nity thus far to enlarge the benefits of trade for 
all nations of the free world. 

There will be hard bargaining. We, as well 
as our partners in Europe and Japan, bring to 
these negotiations special and highly charged 
domestic interests. No country will be able to 
get all that it would like. But the success of the 
negotiations will not lie in specific trade advan- 
tages we may gain or disadvantages we may 
avoid. Rather, it will depend on the progress 
made toward a better world trading environ- 
ment. A successful Kennedy Round will en- 
courage the continued expansion of world trade. 
As such it will be to the common advantage of 
all participants, industrial and developing 
countries alike. 

Ijooking beyond a successful Kennedy Round, 
there will be other tests of our resolution in the 
trade field. They can arise in subsequent trade 
negotiations as well as in other commercial 
policy issues. At every stage we will face the 
question of how much competition we are pre- 
pared to accept from abroad. On the basis of 
the record — of the benefits in employment and 
productivity we have gained from trade expan- 
sion — I believe we should move in the direction 
of accepting more, rather than less, of such com- 
petition. Neither we nor other industrial coun- 
tries can afford restrictive policies whose ulti- 
mate effect is to curb economic change and thus 
to discourage modernization and expansion. 

■|',T!T*APV '••1 


The International Monetary System 

Similar considerations apply to our role and 
objectives in the international financial field. 
The international monetary system, after all, is 
not an end in itself. It is an instrument that 
can either encourage or hinder desirable actions 
ha trade and in domestic economic policy. 

The United States of necessity has had a dom- 
inant role in the postwar evolution and expan- 
sion of this payments system. Tliere were two 
reasons for this. As the dollar was the only 
major currency that was fully convertible 
throughout the period, it had to serve as an 
international reserve for the I'est of the world. 
Without it, the supply of international means 
of payment would not have been sufficient to 
finance the rapidly growing volume of inter- 
national trade. Second, through military and 
economic aid and through long-term loans to 
foreign governments, as well as through private 
investment, the United States transferred a 
huge amount of capital and international re- 
serves to the rest of the world. 

Our reserves and capital were put to good 
use — not only to help secure vital political in- 
terests but in economic terms as well. These 
actions restored the international monetaiy 
system and brought us to our present world of 
booming trade and convertible currencies. 

Almost throughout this period, we incurred 
balance-of-payments deficits. These deficits 
were the necessary counterpart of the rebuild- 
ing of reserve positions in other countries, nota- 
bly in Western Europe. In the late 1950's, 
when these deficits grew, we took measures to 
regain equilibrium. 

Our objective has been, and continues to be, 
to bring our accounts in balance without sacri- 
ficing important military, political, and eco- 
nomic responsibilities abroad, or a high level 
of employment at home. Our deficit is becom- 
ing smaller, and our fundamental financial posi- 
tion grows stronger. Nevertheless we are con- 
cerned that our very large net receipts from 
goods and services are not yet enough to make 
up for our net military expenditures abroad, the 
small portion of our aid that is still untied, 
net foreign travel, and our presently large net 
outflow of private capital. 

There is every reason for confidence that we 

will be able to deal effectively with the problem 
of our deficits and our gold outflow. The facts 
of our underlying financial strength help keep 
this problem in perspective. 

A key element in that financial strength is 
assets owned abroad by the U.S. Government 
and by American citizens totaling $86 billion. 
This does not include more than $12 billion of 
Government loans to developing comitries on 
longer terms. Against these assets are claims 
on the United States by foreign governments 
and citizens totaling $56 billion. Thus, we have 
a net assets position abroad of $30 billion. And 
these net assets have increased steadily since the 
war. The increase was over and above our 
huge capital grants in the form of military and 
economic aid. 

In addition, we have $15 billion in gold and 
a commercial export surplus that totaled more 
than $5 billion last year. There should be no 
question, therefore, of tlie international finan- 
cial strength of the United States or the sound- 
ness of the dollar. 

We should recognize that our balance-of-pay- 
ments deficits have been an imiDortant source for 
creating the additional liquidity the world has 
needed to finance the vast expansion in world 
trade. As we eliminate the deficit in our bal- 
ance of payments, it will be necessary to develop 
alternate sources of liquidity to finance con- 
tinued expansion in world trade. One major 
source in this liquidity will be through the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. This is already 
being planned and should have our full support. 

Further, we believe that other industrial coun- 
tries should share with us the burdens of main- 
taining a reserve currency. As of now, the 
dollar holdings of other comatries form an 
indispensable part of the world's international 
reserves and comprise a key element in the 
operations of the world economy. 

The need to encourage the continued and en- 
larged movement of private capital around the 
world is an important case in point. These cap- 
ital flows have been a major veliicle for the in- 
terchange of teclinology among industrial coun- 
tries. Tliey finance trade. They contribute to 
the effective employment of world resources. 

One difficulty we face is the fact that our 
highly developed capital market has no effec- 
tive coimterparts in other industrial countries. 



As a result, foreifji^ borrowers sometimes enter 
our capital market simply l)ecause it is large, 
eflicient, and convenient, thus putting added 
pressure on our balance of payments. We have 
taken temporarj' measures to reduce this use of 
our capital. Over the long term, of course, this 
is not a satisfactory answer. Our common 
purposevS require an increased, not a diminislied, 
flow of capital in the free world. For this rea- 
son we look to the opening and strengthening 
of capital markets in Western Europe. 

More generally, we have come to learn that 
payments pressures of one sort or another can 
recur in an open international system. The 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy, as well as 
the United States, have at various times in the 
past few years been confronted with such 

A strong tradition of international coopera- 
tion has developed in the monetary field to deal 
with such crises. But all would agree that we 
don't know all the answers and that much re- 
mains to be done. Financial crises can sub- 
ject the world economy to large and unnecessary 
losses. Tliese must be avoided. But our sights 
should go beyond this. In the last analysis, the 
merit of any international monetary system 
must be measured by its ability to promote trade, 
the productive movement of capital, economic 
growth, and stability, and to help in achieving 
and maintaining international equilibrium. 
Our problem is to meet the increasing liquidity 
requirements of an expanding world economy, 
not to force a harsh reduction in the existing 
level of world liquidity. We must never for- 
get the lesson of the thirties and the self- 
defeating scramble for gold that preceded it. 
It is in these terms that we must constantly re- 
examine and reassess our policies and instru- 

U.S. Responsibilities in the Developing Countries 

Finally, I would like to comment on our eco- 
nomic responsibilities in the developing coun- 

This, fortimately, is no longer a task for us 
alone. But we must continue to provide leader- 
ship. In many respects it is the biggest piece 
of unfinished business that we