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JV9 *935 


Given By 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



Aggression From the North 

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam 

President Johnson declared in an address on February 17 that the purpose of the United Si 
in Viet-Nam "is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are u: 
attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country," Aggression From the N 
is a 64-page report, illustrated with maps and photographs, which summarizes the massive evidem 
that attack and its source of support. 

The introduction to the Department's pamphlet closes with these words : "The Government oi 
United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. '. 
important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how, and why, Th 
the purpose of this report." 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt of Documents) 


Please send me copies of Aggression From the North: The Beoa 

North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam. 










Vol. LI I, No. 1346 

AprU 5, 1965 

Statement by Secretary Rusk 482 


Statement hy David E. Bell 4^8 


Statement by Assistant Secretary Johnson 608 

by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 4^2 

For index see inside back cover 

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1966 

Statement by Secretary Busk ^ 

Thank you for the privilege of appearing be- 
fore you in support of the President's foreign 
assistance program for fiscal year 1966. 

This request will enable the United States to 
carry forward a program which, as President 
Johnson said in his message to the Congress in 
January, offers "Strength to those who would 
be free; Hope for those who would otherwise 
despair; Progress for those who would help 
themselves." ^ 

Foreign aid continues to be an indispensable 
arm of our foreign policy in building a society 
of free nations in a stable world. The funda- 
mental reason why we conduct programs of eco- 
nomic and military assistance is to support our 
interests, in the broadest sense, around the 
world. Our security is inextricably bound up 

^ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on Mar. 9 (press release 38) . 
' Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126. 

with the evolution of a world of independer 
peace-seeking nations. It is in our most eleme* 
tary national self-interest to do what we ci 
to help in strengthening the prospects for peac 
ful progress in Asia, Africa, and Latin Americ 
Economic and military assistance can make 
crucial contribution to such progress, at vei 
reasonable cost relative to our great econom 
strength and our vital interest in a decent wor] 

"We should not let today's crisis or tomorrow 
headline obscure the very real advances we hai 
made in the years since World War II. Wlii 
progress in some countries has been slow an 
frustrating, in many it has been steady and i 
some truly outstanding. 

This great endeavor will not be complete 
quickly. It will take patience, foresight, an 
courage. It will continue to require the imde 
standing and calm judgment of the America 


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mation is Included concerning treaties 
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eople, if this progress is to continue. To have 
foreign policy that has continuity, relevance, 
id direction is a constant test of a free people's 
jility to govern themselves in the modem 
orld. It would be dangerous for our security 
id tragic for the future of the world if, out of 
•ustration or fatigue, the United States were 
1 turn back when we have come so far down 
16 road. 

Winston Churchill said, in his prophetic 
leech in Fulton, Missouri, 19 years ago this 
onth, "Our difficulties and dangers will not be 
moved by closing our eyes to them. They 
ill not be removed by mere waiting to see 
fiat happens. . . ." 

The United States has determined that it 
)uld not just wait "to see what happens." 
It is, of course, true that the interests of the 
:iited States are not always and everywhere 
e same, in each part of the world, in every 
untry. The first question always faced in 
nsidering whether the United States should 

icfflU fovide assistance to any country is: What 
erest do we have in this situation; what are 
r objectives here? 

It is also quite true that the provision of aid 
not everywhere or always a necessary or use- 
1 expression of United States interests. The 
■end question that is always asked in con- 
Blering whether assistance should be provided 
a count n,-: Can our aid be useful; what is 
" country prepared to do for itself; is the 
intry prepared to make sacrifices, exercise 
f-discipline, and commit its own resources 
i a framework within which American assist- 

— «ce can be effective? 

Finally, there are, of course, other advanced 

cuitries and a variety of international organi- 

' ions that can assist the developing countries. 

d consequently, in each case we ask: What 

ources are available to this particular coun- 

i;u» ii' from sources other than the United States; 

^ Kit necessary for us to be directly involved? 

s* flecognizing these qualifications, it is unmis- 

:ably plain that in a substantial number of 

:umstances assistance from the United 

ites has proved its great worth in the past 

' *:i is proving it at present 

Aid Tailored to Varying Situations 

The program the President has recommended 
is tailored to the varying situations in which we 
ought to help. It is highly concentrated in 
those cases where our assistance is most needed 
and will accomplish the largest results : 

— 76 percent of the funds requested for devel- 
opment loans are scheduled to go to seven coun- 
tries : India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, Tunisia, 
Brazil, and Chile; 

— 88 percent of the funds requested for sup- 
porting assistance are expected to go to four 
countries : Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Jordan. 

The total appropriation request for economic 
assistance m fiscal year 1966 is $2.21 billion. The 
military assistance program is $1.17 billion, for 
a total request for new appropriations of $3.38 

The new authorization for the economic por- 
tion of the foreign assistance program totals 
$848 million. As you know, Development Loan 
and the Alliance for Progress programs are op- 
erating under a continuing authorization. 

I urge the Congress to give its prompt ap- 
proval of the full amoimt requested. 

Tlie Aid Program by Geograpliic Areas 

For Latin America we are requesting an ap- 
propriation of $580 million for the coming fiscal 
year for the Alliance for Progress. The phys- 
ical accomplishments already registered under 
the alliance are encouraging. But perhaps 
more important is that the people of Latin 
America are begiiming to know that the alliance 
can succeed. Many of the Latin American na- 
tions have now turned to the hard tasks of re- 
form and growth. The Castro experiment in 
Cuba has shown itself to be a failure. The 
Cuban dictator is becoming more and more iso- 

Brazil provides a striking example of what 
has happened. Prior to the advent of the new 
government in Brazil in April 1964, Brazil was 
seriously threatened by a steady economic and 
political deterioration which brought recurrent 
crises and growing popular unrest. Since then, 
the situation has changed dramatically for the 
better. Political stability has been restored. 

■tlL 5, 1085 


The environment which helped Communists and 
other extremists to infiltrate and exert a dis- 
proportionate influence has given way to an 
environment which discourages violent or ex- 
treme action. 

The Brazilian Government has vigorously 
declared its common purpose with other demo- 
cratic nations; its foreign policy is typified by 
the important role that Brazil played in the 
OAS [Organization Ox American States] adop- 
tion last year of additional measures against 
Cuban subversion. It has launched a program 
for economic stability and growth; initiated 
major reforms ; and at the same time maintained 
democratic institutions and a free press. Much 
remains to be done, but the first, difficult steps 
have been taken. 

Recent developments in Chile have been sim- 
ilarly encouraging. The victory of the Chris- 
tian Democrats in last September's presidential 
election, and in last Sunday's congressional elec- 
tions, has expressed Chile's preference for peace- 
ful reform. Wliile the road ahead will be 
difficult, President [Eduardo] Frei has, since 
his inauguration in November, set the stage for 
an ambitious economic stabilization and devel- 
opment program, including measures to reduce 
price inflation, substantially increase internal 
financing of the development program, and 
stimulate the agriculture and export industries. 

Turning to Africa, the picture is highly di- 
verse. Real progress is being made in some 
countries such as Tunisia and Nigeria; slower 
improvement in others. Our assistance pro- 
grams are directed, as they should be, chiefly to 
training and to tlie building of institutions 
needed for planning and executing development 
activities. These programs are designed to de- 
velop human and social resources and to supply 
the ingredients of economic and social prog- 
ress — education, technical skills, public admin- 
istration, and managerial talents. Thus the 
proposed program for Africa in fiscal year 1966 
is $218 million, 42 percent of which is for techni- 
cal assistance. 

Social and economic improvement is slow, and 
there are troublesome difficulties. East and 
Central Africa are subject to active Communist 
machinations and blandisliments. The competi- 
iion in Africa between the Soviets and Cliinese 

has intensified, wliich adds to internal in 

The Congo, of course, presents a prime anc 
immediate problem in Africa. We continue t< 
support the legally constituted Central Govern 
ment in response to its request for assistance anc 
in conformity with U.N. resolutions. Thi 
Congo is an African problem, and we seek ai 
African solution; we look to other Africans 
especially through the Organization of Africa] 
Unity, to work together with the Congolese t( 
tliis end. We expect that, once a measure o: 
internal stability is established, progress can bi 
made toward a broadly based national govern 
ment. This has not yet happened, and somi 
fighting continues despite vigorous efforts o 
the Central Government to bring the rebellioi 
under control. Increased aid to the rebels f ron 
external sources has threatened to prolong th 
struggle and create new difficulty for the Conge 
for other African states, and for the Unite( 

The Government of the Congo is faced witl 
grave responsibilities in this trying period. I 
must better mobilize its own efforts and gair 
more support from its neighbors. We musi 
continue to help. Without a peaceful Congo 
there can be no stability in Africa. 

In the Near East and South Asia, India 
Pakistan, and Turkey are making substantia 
progress in their efforts to create modern econo 
mies. These three countries accoimt for ovei 
$685 million — more than 40 percent — of the de 
velopment assistance projjosed for fiscal yeai 
1966. Iran, too, has been making encouragin| 
headway and is moving ahead with program: 
of economic and social progress. 

We have extended aid to most Arab nation 
in the past, and currently we have programs ii 
several, including the U.A.R. Compared witl 
the size of our assistance to the major recipien 
countries in this critical area of the world- 
India, Pakistan, and Turkey — our economic as 
sistance program in the United Arab Republi( 
has been quite small. But the troubled stati 
of our relations with the U.A.R. makes evei 
that small program loom large. 

Recent events in the U.A.R. are naturally f 
matter of great concern to us. The U.A.R.'s 
support of the Congolese rebels and the con 



tinued presence of substantial Egyptian forces 
in Yemen have led to some deterioration 
in our relations witli Egj'pt. This strain 
was lieigiUenotl by the destruction of the 
USIS library in Cairo. 

"We Iiave sousrht, and we continue to seek, a 
basis for continuing a cooperative relationship 
with the U.A.R. External aid is vital to the 
r.A.R.'s development, and we believe that the 
. .onomic progress of the U.A.R. is a necessary 
element in a growing environment for peace 
and stability in the Middle East. However, 
while we desire to assist Eg}-pt in its enormous 
;:i>k of social and economic advancement, there 
is plainh" an inadequate basis of undei'standing 
at the present moment. We are, therefore, en- 
couraging the U.A.R. to examine with us the 
n<i5sibilities of reducing areas of difference. 

In the Western Pacific two countries neces- 

■ sarily have recently occupied the center of our 
attention: South Viet-Nam, where foreign as- 
sistance plays a major role, and Indonesia, 
where our assistance has been steadilj' reduced 
over the last 2 years. 

South Viet-Xam has a right, as do all the 
nations of Southeast Asia and, indeed, in the 

■ rest of the world, to live in peace, free from 
aggression from neighboring countries. More- 

' over, it has an understandable desire to be left 
in peace in order to use its resources on the 
economic and social development of its people, 
rather than for the harsh necessities of resisting 
I egress ion. 

Under the President's proposals for fiscal 
year 1966, we shall continue to provide sizable 

* economic and military assistance. Indeed, the 
foreign assistance program is the principal 

' vehicle for this support, not only of South 

'■ 'Viet-Xam, but for the protection and safety of 
the nations in Southeast Asia threatened by 

» 'Chinese Communist aggression. 

1" ' As you can see in the presentation book before 
you, the technical assistance program in In- 
donesia is currently under review. The United 
States and Indonesian Governments have been 
at odds on certain policies and courses of action 
pursued by the Indonesians. Over the past 2 
years there has been a significant change in our 
assistance program in Indonesia. X^o loans 
have been made during this period. No ship- 

ments under the Public Law 480 sales agree- 
ments for surplus food have been made to 
Indonesia for nearly a year, and the agreement 
itself has now expired. In the same period, the 
technical assistance program, largely for uni- 
versities, training, and malaria eradication, has 
dwindled. Under present circumstances it is 
questionable that a basis will exist for further 
technical assistance in fiscal year 1906. 

Elsewhere in the Western Pacific, Taiwan has 
made such marked gains in growth that it now 
stands on its own, and no longer requires AID 
assistance, even though programs under P.U. 
480 and military assistance are continuing. The 
accomplishments of Taiwan, as a result of 
United States assistance, and their own ability 
and persistence, are an excellent example of suc- 
cess. South Korea is making considerable prog- 
ress despite the necessity to maintain large mili- 
tary forces. Her expanding export earnings 
and economic growth are enabling us to shift 
increasingly from supporting to developmental 
aid within the overall program of assistance to 
Korea. In Thailand our assistance takes fully 
into account the threat of Communist subver- 
sion and infiltration in the northeast. Despite 
these threats, Thailand has maintained a grow- 
ing and stable economy over the last decade. 

Aid and the Balance of Payments 

I should like to turn now to two matters of 

First, the level of external public debt of the 
developing nations has been steadily increasing 
and, in some cases, alarmingly so. The accumu- 
lated burden is now about $30 billion. Even 
more significantly, the repayment volume on 
the debt is nearly $5 billion per year and is in- 
creasing 15 percent annually. 

This is a heavy load for countries with limited 
resources, inconvertible currencies, and low for- 
eign exchange earnings. The United States 
and other free- world nations must continue their 
joint efforts to ease this burden, particularly 
during the early years — the crucial first 
decade — of major development efforts. That is 
why it is imperative for the United States to 
maintain the current low interest rates and grace 
periods for development loans. That is why we 

APRIL 5, lOO.-) 


are continuing to urge other donor nations to 
soften further tlie terms on which their aid is 

If we raise rates on long-term development 
assistance, the ultimate loser will be not only the 
recipient country but the American taxpayer as 
well. For the higher the repayment burden, 
the longer development will take; and the day 
when nations will no longer need our aid will be 
further postponed. 

Second, for several years we have given 
close attention to the relation of foreign aid 
to our balance-of -payments position. 

Since 1961 foreign aid has had a steadily de- 
creasing impact on our balance of payments. 
The adverse impact is at the lowest level yet 
achieved. More than 85 percent of the funds 
requested for the economic assistance program 
in fiscal year 1966 will be spent directly in the 
United States for U.S. goods and services. 

The drain of dollars that still occurs through 
the aid program is due primarily to three fac- 
tors — our contributions to international organi- 
zations, dollar expenses of employees overseas, 
and a small amount of commodity procurement 
in the less developed countries themselves. It 
should be added that some of these dollars do 
return to the United States througli such chan- 
nels as procurement under United Nations 

The net drain of funds from the economic 
aid program, taking into account repayments 
from prior aid loans, was about $300 million in 
fiscal year 1964. In 1961 the comparable drain 
was almost $1 billion. 

The committee should also bear in mind that 
foreign aid often opens the way for United 
States trade. Obviously, that is not the reason 
we extend foreign assistance, but it is one of the 
helpful byproducts. Our aim is more trade, 
less aid. This is what has happened in Western 
Europe and Japan and is happening in Taiwan, 
Greece, Israel, and other countries. 

United States exports to Western Europe 
have doubled since 1950 ; exports to Japan have 
tripled in that time. 

There are substantial future markets in the 
developing nations. As development picks up 
momentum, the peoples of these nations will be 
able to buy more from us and from other coun- 
tries. The less developed countries are deter- 

mined to grow — to buy more and to sell more, 
The United States can reasonably expect to get 
its fair share of these expanding markets. In 
addition, as these economies grow, there will be 
an increase in returns on growing American 
private investment in the less developed areas, 
Thus foreign aid is a minor adverse factor in 
the current balance-of-payments problems; it 
is a strong positive factor over the long run. 

International Aid-Giving Agencies 

The question has been raised whether a largei 
proportion of our economic aid for developmenl 
purposes should be channeled through interna- 
tional organizations. It is a proper questior 
and an important one, and we welcome full dis 

The United States has strongly supported tht 
establishment of international organization; 
providing assistance to development. We hav( 
been a major supporter of the World Bank, anc 
we strongly backed Mr. [Eugene] Black wher 
in 1959 he proposed the establishment of th( 
International Development Association. Th( 
United States energetically supported the estab 
lishment of the Inter-American Developmenl 
Bank. We have been strong supporters of th( 
United Nations Special Fund and the Ex 
panded Program of Technical Assistance, no^^ 
in process of merger into a single framework. 

In all these cases and others, we have beer 
working for the expansion of aid given on ar 
international basis as rapidly as other advancec 
countries have been willing to contribute a fail 
share to the common budget of these organiza 
tions. This remains our position. The Con 
gress only last week accepted the President's 
recommendation and authorized an expansior 
in funds for the soft-loan window of the Inter 
American Development Bank. We look for 
ward to negotiations later this year under th( 
leadership of the World Bank which we trust 
will result in enlargement of the funds avail 
able to the International Development Associa 

I believe, therefore, that the executive brand 
and the Congress are in agreement on the de- 
sirability of enlarging the resources availabk 
to international aid-giving agencies on the basis 
of cost-sharing among the advanced countries 

Furthermore, I believe we are in agreement 



on the importance of steudily improving the 
arrangements for multilateral coordination of 
bilateral aid programs. Tlie United States has 
taken a leading role in setting up international 
consortiums such as those for India, Pakistan, 
and Turkey, and international consultative 
groups such as those for Nigeria, Thailand, and 
Colombia. The World Bank is at present con- 
sidering the possibility of establishing several 
more consultative groups over the next year or 
two, and the United States has supported this 

In addition, the United States encouraged the 
creation of the Inter-American Committee on 
tlie Alliance for Progress (ordinarily referred 
to as CIAP) as a multilateral coordinating ar- 
rangement tailored to the special circumstances 
of Latin America. The CIAP has made a 
promising beginning, under strong leadership, 
and has our full support. 

The United States has supported the estab- 
lisliment and the operation of the Development 
Assistance Conmiittee of the OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] in Paris. The DAC has made some 
headway toward developing a common under- 
standing and common policy positions among 
the major aid-giving countries. 

Thus, both through our support for inter- 
national development agencies and through our 
support of multilateral coordination, we have 
made substantial progress toward achieving 
gna I or effectiveness with the aid made available 
.to developing countries and toward a more 
equitable sharing of the costs of aid among the 
advanced countries. 

It is an impressive fact, as noted in the Presi- 
dent's aid message, that "in fiscal year 1966, 
85 percent of U.S. development loans in Asia 
and Africa will be committed under interna- 
tional arrangements. All U.S. aid to Latin 
America is made available within the interna- 
tional framework of the Alliance for Progress." 

In Africa and in Asia, forces are now moving 
to strengthen multilateral arrangements on a 
regional basis. Properly organized, such ar- 
rangements could lead to more concerted meas- 
ures of self-help within regions; to the emer- 
gence of more and better projects and plans for 
external financing; and to the mobilization from 
iEurope, Japan, and elsewhere of additional de- 

%'elopment funds. Although the kind of ar- 
rangements created in Latin America, through 
the machinery of the Organization of American 
States, would not, of course, be exactly dupli- 
cated in other regions, we are prepared to play 
our part in encouraging further development of 
multilateral regional arnuigements which have 
the effects described above. 

To support international aid agencies and 
multilateral coordination, it is not necessary to 
derogate or eliminate our bilateral aid pro- 
grams; quite the contrary. In our judgment, 
the United States clearly requires sti-ong bilat- 
eral aid programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The international aid agencies, wliile 
growing steadily, cannot hope to replace more 
than a fraction of the bilateral aid of the United 
States and other advanced countries in the im- 
mediate future. It would be a serious mistake, 
in our judgment, to abandon the i)rinciple of 
shared funding for the international aid agen- 
cies, and this necessarily will limit the rate at 
which those agencies can be expanded. 

Moreover, I believe the executive branch and 
the Congress are in agreement on the very great 
importance of establishing proper standards for 
self-help performance on the part of countries 
which desire to receive assistance. Some — but 
not all — of the international aid agencies have 
done well in this respect. But it is no exaggera- 
tion to state that for the last several years the 
United States has taken the lead, both through 
its bilateral programs and through its par- 
ticipation in multilateral arrangements, in 
strengthening the insistence on sound self-help 
perfonnance by aid-receiving countries. 

Nor has this insistence, if executed with full 
respect for the independence and sovereignty of 
the countries receiving aid, created unusual 
diflicultias for our international relations. The 
relationship between donor and recipient is nec- 
essarily a delicate one, but it can be constructive 
and friendly if based on a shared commitment 
to the mutual objective of economic and social 
progress in the country in question. Our bi- 
lateral relationships are excellent in nearly all 
the cases where major assistance is involved. 
Tlie cases in the world where our bilateral rela- 
tionships are in difficulties do not revolve around 
aid but around far broader and deeper political 


\PRIL 5, 1965 


The United States intends to rely to the maxi- 
mum extent possible on international agencies 
and multilateral coordinating organizations to 
establish the self-help standards necessary to 
make development aid effective. But for the 
present, certainly it is necessary for us to con- 
tinue to work bilaterally as well as multi- 
la terally toward this objective. 

In summary, it is our conviction that United 
States interests require us to proceed with a 
strong bilateral aid program, as well as to con- 
tribute to the steady increase of aid funds 
available to international agencies and to use 
multilateral institutions or groups where it is 

We believe our present proposals for bilateral 
aid authorizations are a prudent and sensible 
commitment of our resources, allowing concen- 
tration on those countries and those programs 
where they will do the most good. The task of 
assisting peaceful development in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America is a lengthy, difficult, and 
complex matter which in our judgment requires 
the best talent we can seek and mobilize on a 
bilateral as well as a multilateral basis. Rely- 
ing solely on either form of aid to the exclusion 
of the other simply does not meet the conditions 
as they exist. 

"The Power To Save the Future" 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would recall 
that Winston Churchill, agam in his Fulton 
address, spoke of "the power to save the future." 

Neither Mr. Churchill, nor any leader of the 
free world since World War II, has ever main- 
tained that the United States or any nation has 
the power or the responsibility to control every 
event in every part of the world. But our ex- 
perience requires us to reject the idea that we 
must just wait to see what happens. Inaction 
in the face of challenge is the sure path to 

Since 1945 the United States has been con- 
cerned with the peace of the entire world. To- 
day we can be secure only to the extent that the 
commimity of nations is secure — on land, at sea, 
in the air and the adjoining areas of space. 

Our policy has been, and will continue to be, 
to work patiently but purposefully toward a 

world of stability in which aU nations are ablt 
to grow and prosper without fear of interference 
from outside. 

In pursuit of this goal we are pledged tc 
meet challenges — whether direct attack or sub 
version — which threaten our own security or th< 
security of those who want to be free. 

We employ a variety of tools in this effort 
Foreign aid is one of the most important. 

Without it, we would be at the mercy o: 
events. And tlie field would be left to oui 

We must not lose the future by default. 

President Reaffirms U.S. Goal 
of Peace in Soutlieast Asia 

Following is a statement made hy Presideni 
Johnson during a news conference at the LBJ 
Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on March £0. 

I want to amiounce this morning Ambassador 
Maxwell Taylor will shortly resume his pe- 
riodic visits to Washington for consultation or 
the Vietnamese situation. He will return tc 
Washington on March 28 and remain approxi- 
mately a week. There are no immediate issues 
which make the meeting urgent. It is a regu- 
lar — repeat — regular periodic visit, part of out 
continuous consultations to make sure that our 
effort in Viet-Nam is as effective and as efficieni 
as possible. 

I^t me say this additionally on Viet-Nam, 
One year ago this week, on March 17, 1964,^ ] 
made this statement, and I quote : 

For 10 years, under three Presidents, this nation 
has been determined to help a brave people to resist 
aggression and terror. It is and it will remain the 
policy of the United States to furnish assistance to 
support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to 
bring Communist aggression and terrorism undei 

Our policy in Viet-Nam is the same as it was 
1 year ago, and, to those of you who have in- 
quiries on the subject, it is the same as it was 

' For text of a White House statement of Mar. 17 
1964, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522. 



10 years ago. I have publicly stated it, I have 
reviewed it to the Congress in joint sessions, I 
have reviewed it in various messages to the Con- 
gress, and I have talked individually with more 
than 500 of them stating the policy and asking 
and answering questions on that subject in the 
last 60 days. In addition I have stated tliis pol- 
icy to tlie press and to the public in almost ev- 
ery State in the Union. Specifically, last night 
I read where I made the policy statement 47 
times. Well, I want to repeat it again this 
morning for your information and for em- 

Under this policy, changes in the situation 
may require from time to time changes in tac- 
tics, in strategy, in equipment, in personnel. 
.\s I said last month,'' the continuing actions we 
'ake will be those that are justified and made 
necessary by the continuing aggression of 
others. These aggressors serve no peaceful in- 
terest, not even tlieir own. No one threatens 

. their regime. There is no intent or desire to 
conquer them or to occupy their land. What 
is wanted is simply that they carry out their 
agreements, that they end their aggression 
against their neighbors. 

j' The real goal of all of us in Southeast Asia 

must be tlio peaceful progress of the people of 

that area. They have the right to live side by 

le in peace and independence. And if this 

: little country does not have that right, then the 
question is what will happen to the other him- 
dred little countries who want to preserve that 

' Wght. They have a right to build a new sense 
of community among themselves. They have 

' a right to join, with help from others, in the 
full development of their own resources for 
their own benefit. They have a right to live 

i^ together without fear or oppression or domina- 

^ tion from any quarter of this entire globe. 

So this is the peace for which the United 
States of America works today. This is the 
peace which aggression from the North today 
prevents. This is the peace which will remain 

- the steadfast goal of the United States of 

Secretary Regrets That Soviets 
Do Not Support Viet-Nam Accords 

Following is the text of a statement by Sec- 
retary Busk released by the Department of 
State on March 19 after reports of a public 
statement made at London that day by Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to the 
effect that the United States would have to 
deal directly with North Viet-Nam on the Viet- 
Nam. situation. 

I agree with Mr. Gromyko that Hanoi is the 
key to peace in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi stops 
molesting its neighbors, then peace can be re- 
stored promptly and U.S. forces can come home. 
I regret that the Soviet Union, which was a 
signatory of the 1954 and 1962 accords, appears 
disinclined to put its full weight behind those 

Thai Counter measures 
to Communist Threat 

by Marshall Green * 

We hear much these days about Communist 
aggression in Southeast Asia. For very obvious 
reasons the focus is on Viet-Nam and to some 
extent on Laos, but I would like to draw your 
attention to another area in Southeast Asia 
■where Communist China and other Asian Com- 
munists are involved in expansionism and sub- 
version. I refer to the northeast area of Thai- 
land, where there is an impressive and growing 
array of evidence that Thailand may become an 
important target for the Communists. How- 
ever, this is something that the Thai Govern- 
ment has long foreseen and, with our assistance, 
has taken effective measures to counteract. 
Here are some of the facts : 

Communist subversive activity within Thai- 
land has centered primarily on the northeast- 

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the 
close of an address before the National Industrial Con- 
ference Board on Feb. 17, see ihid.. Mar. 8, 1965, p. 332. 

' Excerpt from an address made before the Open 
Forum, Daytona Beach, Fla., on Mar. 14. Mr. Green, 
who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 
Affairs, also spoke extemporaneously on other Far 
eastern problems. 

APRIL 5, 1965 


em province of Nakhon Phanom, close to Com- 
munist-held areas of Laos. There have been 
acts of terror. There has been a step-up in at- 
tempted recruitment of Communist-type cadres 
among the villagers and a reported increase in 
the number of meetings called by Communists 
and Communist sympathizers, who parrot 
the Communist line and hand out propaganda 

There has also been a step-up in the radio 
propaganda effort. The voices of Radio Pei- 
ping and Radio Hanoi are strongly heard in 
northeast Thailand. They are supplemented 
by a clandestine radio, located in Communist- 
held areas of Laos (and at times in North Viet- 
Nam) , which calls itself the "Voice of the Thai 

Finally, there have been disturbing indica- 
tions of Chinese Communist intentions vis-a-vis 
Thailand. For example, when in January 1965 
the clandestine Communist radio announced the 
formation of a "Thai Patriotic Front," with the 
declared purpose of overthrowing Thailand's 
Government, both Radio Peiping and Radio 
Hanoi repeated the broadcast over their power- 
ful stations and indicated their support of this 
front group. Furtlier, the Chinese Communists 
recently purchased $1 million worth of Thai 
currency in Hong Kong, for purposes that can 
only be guessed at. There has been a very 
great increase recently in the numbers of peo- 
ple being given Thai language and area training 
in Communist China, the purpose of which 
seems completely clear. In light of these other 
indications, the Chinese Communist Foreign 
Minister's reported remark that insurgency may 
break out in Thailand in 1965 takes on an omi- 
nous ring. 

Wliat is Thailand doing about this situation ? 
Wliat are we doing about it ? 

Taking a lesson from what has happened in 
Viet-Nam and Laos, the Thai for some time 
have been making a determined and effective 
effort to remove the economic and social griev- 
ances which often make village people vulner- 
able to the blandishments of communism. They 
have on their own initiative put into the field 
in every northeast province bordering on Laos 
what are called Mobile Development Units. 
These MDU's are designed to make an immedi- 
ate impact upon the villages in the area, both 

psychological and material. Teams attached 
to the imits visit the villagers in remote areas, 
discuss their problems with them, and in many 
cases take steps to meet those problems. They 
construct village roads, repair or build bridges, 
build schools, and supply badly needed medical 

We are backing this Thai effort by supply- 
ing equipment for use by these MDU's. We 
are also engaged with the Thai in the Accel- 
erated Rural Development program, which 
will provide the vital followthrough behind 
the impact projects of the MDU's. The Ac- 
celerated Rural Development project will pro- 
vide public-works capability at the provincial 
level. It will also give provincial officials 
greater authority and capability in the field 
of public works, as well as in agriculture, 
health, education, et cetera. This decentrali- 
zation should make the program more effective 
as well as more responsive to village wants and 
needs. The leaders of the Thai Government 
are strongly committed to making this program 
a success. 

The security roads project, which will hi 
completed this year, will for the first time make 
two areas in north and northeast Thailand- 
near Communist-held territory in Laos — ac- 
cessible to Thai security forces throughout the 
year. These roads will also bring as an extrs 
dividend great economic benefits. 

In connection with internal security, we an 
engaged in retraining and reequipping 16,00( 
provincial police. A similar but more inten 
sive program has been carried out with th( 
6,300 men of the border police. 

We have supplied a portable radio trans 
mitter in the northeast to help counter th( 
powerful voices of Radio Peiping and Radi( 
Hanoi. This station, broadcasting mostly ii 
the northeast dialect, has become the mos 
popular in the northeast. 

On the military side, the Thai are increas 
ingly emphasizing the civic action and counter 
insurgency missions of their forces. The Tha 
armed forces are contributing importantly t( 
the success of the Mobile Development Units 
which are a joint civilian/military effort. Oui 
military assistance is aimed at encouraging tin 
Thai to continue in these directions and to mak< 
their armed forces more effective. 



To sum up, the Communist tlirejvt to the area 
is very real, but so are the countcrmeiisures 
being taken to meet that threat. As tlie inten- 
sity of the Communist effort increases, it will 
probably be necei;sary for the Tiiai Government 
to intensify its own etforts. However, the im- 
portant programs which they have developed 
over the last few years assure that they will not 
be caught napping by the Conununists. A solid 
basis has been laid for meeting, if necessary, 
a stronger Communist drive. 

After all the painful lessons of the past, it 
is heartening to see a government and people 
acting in time to protect the freedom and in- 
tegritv of their nation. 

Korean Foreign Minister Holds 
Talks With Secretary Rusk 

Joint Statement 

Press release 45 dated March 17 

Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee of the Ee- 
I public of Korea made a 3-day visit to AVash- 
ington, D.C., from March 15 to 17, 1965. Dur- 
ing the visit, the Foreign Minister called on 
President Johnson and Vice President Hum- 
phrey and held meetings with Secretary of 
'State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, 
and other high officials of the United States 
Government for an exchange of views on 
matters of mutual concern. 

During tlic course of wide-ranging discus- 
sions. Minister Lee and Secretary Rusk re- 
viewed the current international situation, in 
particular, recent developments in Southeast 
Asia. They recognized that the aggressive 
policy of Communist Cliina continues to menace 
the peace and security of Asia, and agreed that 
the free nations of the region sliould seek greater 
unity and coordination of effort as they pursue 
progress and prosperity under freedom. Sec- 
retary Rusk, in this connection, paid tribute to 
the people and the Government of the Republic 
of Korea for their contribution to the defense of 
South Viet-Xam against Communist subversion 
and aggression. 

Foreign Minister Lee and Secretary Rusk 
exchanged views on the progress recently made 

in the negotiations for normalization of rela- 
tions between Korea and Japan. Secretary 
Rusk noted that tlie initialing of the Basic Re- 
lations Treaty between the two neighboring 
countries has established an important momen- 
tum for early conclusion of the long-pending 
talks. Secretary Rusk reaffirmed that normali- 
zation of the relations of the two countries 
would in no way affect the basic U.S. policy of 
extending military and economic aid to the Re- 
public of Korea for the maintenance of its 
security and development of its economy. 

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary also 
reviewed the progress of the current negotia- 
tions for the Status of Forces Agreement be- 
tween Korea and the United States. The 
Foreign Minister expressed the desire of his 
Government to conclude the long-pending agree- 
ment. Secretary Rusk assured him that the U.S. 
Government would give full consideration to 
the views of the Korean Government. It was 
agreed that both Governments would seek to 
expedite the negotiations so as to achieve final 
agreement as soon as possible. 

President of EEC Commission 
Meets With President Johnson 

Following is the text of a joint communique 
released at the close of a meeting at the White 
House on March 18 between President Johnson 
and Walter Flallstein, President of the Com- 
mission of the European Economic Community. 

White House press release dated March 18 

The President met today with Dr. Walter 
Hallstein, President of the Commission of 
the European Economic Community. During 
his visit in Washington Dr. Hallstein is also 
having talks with the Vice President ; the Secre- 
taries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and Com- 
merce; the President's Acting Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations; Senator Ful- 
bright and Representative Boggs. 

The President and Dr. Hallstein agreed on 
the high value of existing close relations be- 
tween the United States and the Common Mar- 
ket. They agreed that continued progress to- 

AFRIL 5, 1965 


ward European integration strengthens the 
free world as European partnership with the 
United States grows closer. 

President Johnson assured Dr. Hallstein of 
the continued strong support of the United 
States for the goal of European unity. The 
President extended his congratulations on the 
recent decision to merge the executive bodies 
of the three European Communities, which the 
President sees as another significant step in 
the process of European integration. 

The President emphasized the importance of 
the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. He 
noted their significance for less developed coun- 

tries as well as industrialized nations. He told 
Dr. Hallstein of the importance which the 
United States attaches to the liberalization of 
trade in both industry and agriculture. 

Dr. Hallstein emphasized his wish to see an 
increasingly united Europe assume an impor- 
tant role in the developing Atlantic partnership. 
He affirmed the intention of the European 
Commission to work for the successful comple- 
tion of the Keraiedy Round. 

The President and Dr. Hallstein agreed to 
maintain continued close contact on matters 
of joint concern to the United States and the 
European Economic Community. 

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics 

hy W. W. Rostov) 

Counselor of the DepartTnent and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^ 

Looking back over the last decade, and leav- 
ing Berlin aside, virtually evei-y major inter- 
national crisis has arisen out of the dynamic 
process going forward in emerging nations, 
interacting with Communist and Western pol- 
icy. The list of such crises is long : Indochina, 
in all its phases; Suez; Lebanon-Jordan; Al- 
geria ; Cuba ; the Congo ; West Irian ; Malaysia ; 
Tibet; and so on. 

What I should like to do today is, first, to 
characterize the dramatic process underway in 
the southern half of the world; second, to de- 
scribe Communist policy toward that process; 
and, third, to suggest what we in Washington 
hope to achieve in our relations with these na- 
tions and peoples, in concert with our Atlantic 
allies and other more developed nations. 

' Address made at the University of Freiburg, Frei- 
burg, Germany, on Mar. 15 (press release 44), under 
the joint sponsorship of the Arnold-Bergstraesser In- 
stitute, the University of Freiburg, and the Amerika 
Haus Freiburg. 

Wliat we can observe in Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Latin America are more than 
a billion human beings caught up in revolu- 
tionary movements designed to modernize their 

In fact, of course, the so-called developing 
nations represent a wide spectrum, with dif- 
ferent problems marking each stage along the 
road to self-sustained growth and industrial and 
political maturity. Some of these nations are 
well along that road; others are just beginning. 
And in the end, each nation, like each individ- 
ual, is, in an important sense, unique. Wliat is 
common throughout these regions is that men 
and women are determined to bring to bear what 
modern science and technology can afford in 
order to elevate the standards of life of their 
peoples and to provide a firm basis for positions 
of national dignity and independence on the 
world scene. 

Behind these revolutions is what might be 
called a reactive nationalism; that is, a wide- 



spread desire of nations that, in one way or 
another, have felt the power and weiirht of 
those who were technologically and industrially 
more mature, to free themselves from this kind 
of technical inferiority and, in so doing, to find 
new positions of international status. 

Although other impulses enter into the mo- 
tivation for economic growth in the developing 
nations — for example, a desire that the children 
live longer and have wider opportunities for the 
development of their personalities — the desire 
for increased national status and dignity on the 
world scene appears a predominant motivation. 

For an historian this is no surprise. Wlien, 
for example, JelTerson and Hamilton argued in 
the United States, in the late 18th century, 
whether industrialization should be undertaken, 
Hamilton's critical argument was that without 
industrialization the United States would be 
helpless in dealing with Great Britain and other 
more advanced European powers. 

Similarly, the impulse to industrialization in 
France, Germany, Japan, and Russia in the 
period from, say, 1815 to 1885 arose primarily 
from this kind of reactive nationalism — from a 
desire to overcome a sense of relative inferior- 
ity. As you will recall, Hamilton's argument 
was directly translated into German thought in 
the early 19th century. 

In the contemporary world, of course, the 
reaction has been more explicitly against colo- 
nialism and its memories; but similar impulses 
are evident in less developed nations which long 
since escaped colonial rule but do feel weighed 
down by the burdens of relative underdevelop- 

All this yields a sense of impatience and 
frustration within developing nations. They 
are anxious to attain quickly a position of dig- 
nity and power on the world scene; but they 
confront the arithmetic of power in a world 
of modem technology and modem weapons. 
Tliey desire urgently to see a rapid increase 
of national income and human welfare; but 
they confront the inherent human and institu- 
tional difficulties of the modernization process 
which limit the pace at which development can 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising 
that we see in both the domestic politics of the 
developing nations and their international re- 

lations reflections of this double frustration 
wliich sometimes takes the form of bitter 
struggles within their regions to alter bound- 
aries or settlements laid down, in what is now 
regarded as an arbitrary or im satisfactory way, 
as part of the colonial heritage. 

Some of our greatest difficulties flow from 
leaders in the developing nations who have 
built on such sentiments ambitious policies of 
regional expansion or hegemony — policies dis- 
ruptive in themselves and sedulously exploited 
by the Communists both to heighten conflict 
within the free world and to acquire presence, 
influence, and leverage. 

Communist Policy in Transition Period 

The Communists study carefully the frus- 
trations within the developing nations. Con- 
scious of the complexities and crosscurrents 
inherent in the transition to modernization, it 
is Communist policy to heighten them. They 
aim first to expand their influence and to 
weaken the "West by exploiting these situations 
and, if possible, to produce a failure of the poli- 
tical process and, amidst attendant confusion, 
to take over power. 

Specifically, Communist policy aims to 
heighten the typical surge of nationalist feel- 
ing that is likely to mark the early stages of 
modernization. They encourage an exagger- 
ated nationalism in order to achieve one or more 
of these results which serve Communist inter- 
ests: the heightening of regional conflicts 
which Communists can exploit; the diversion 
of scarce energies, resources, and talents away 
from the constructive tasks of modernization; 
and the damaging of relations between develop- 
ing nations and the more advanced democratic 
nations which must be an important source of 
external assistance. 

In terms of welfare policy within a develop- 
ing nation, Communists (while adapting their 
stance to a particular circumstance with increas- 
ing flexibility) generally project the view that 
no important movement toward economic and 
social development can occur until after there 
has been a successful Communist revolution. 
They seek to divert, thereby, the energies of the 
people away from concrete tasks of develop- 
ment into disruptive revolutionary activity, 

APRIL 5, 1965 


while heightening a sense of disappointment 
with the pace and the unevenness of economic 
progress, and forestalling the emergence of an 
effective national consensus. 

Finally, in areas where they think the tactic 
may prove fruitful, they seek to disrupt the 
efforts to move forward in the direction of ef- 
fective political democracy, hoping to profit by 
the breakdown of public order. This, for ex- 
ample, was their objective in Venezuela last 

These tactics are rooted in a judgment that, 
unless communism manages to seize power dur- 
ing the complex and difficult transition to mod- 
ernization, a Communist takeover will prove 
impossible. Communists sense that once non- 
Communist methods have demonstrated tliat 
regular grov?th, social equity, and stable demo- 
cratic political practice are attainable and mu- 
tually consistent goals, an historic opportunity 
will have passed them irreversibly by. 

The Communists are, then, the scavengers of 
the modernization process. They prey on every 
division, weakness, and uncertainty that is likely 
to beset a society in the process of its trans- 
formation to a modem mold. 

U.S. Relations With Developing Nations 

What we see, then, sitting in Washington, is 
a situation where the interplay of the revolu- 
tions of modernization and nationalism, with 
Communist efforts to exploit their inherent 
frustrations, poses a set of major problems. 

What is our policy ? 

Our first task, of course, is to assist those 
nations threatened by Communist aggression, 
direct or indirect, to maintain their independ- 
ence. For those nations located along the bor- 
dei'S of the Communist bloc, this has drawn 
the United States into a series of direct alli- 
ances designed to make clear that overt aggres- 
sion by Communists against these nations would 
bring into play the full military power of the 
United States. Partly because of the success 
of the free world's effort in Korea, Commu- 
nists have put their major reliance since that 
time on techniques of ideological attraction, 
subversion, and guerrilla warfare. In South- 
east Asia, in the Caribbean, and in Africa we 
are now undergoing a critical test of whether 

we can make those tecliniques as sterile as we 
rendered the earlier techniques of Communist 
aggression applied against Western Europe and 
Korea and the attempt to install missiles in 

Our second task is to assist the developing 
regions to the south to establish the longer run 
basis for their independence through programs 
of economic and technical assistance and trade. 
The balance between defense and construction 
we created in our initial response to Stalin's 
postwar offensive, in the form of the Truman 
Doctrine, on the one hand, and the Marshall 
Plan, on the other, remains relevant down to 
the present time in other regions; although 
there is, of course, a difference between the tasks 
of development and those of postwar Euro- 
pean reconstruction. We must face, for ex- 
ample, the hard fact of Communist aggression 
in Southeast Asia; but we must also conduct 
programs of assistance, which are at least as 
important, and use our influence to encourage 
the governments in that region to get on with 
the tasks of modernization. 

In Latin America, working with well-estab- 
lished international machinery of considerable 
sophistication, we work together in the Organi- 
zation of American States, both to render sterile 
Castro's offensive of subversion and guerrilla 
warfare against the hemisphere and to make the 
great adventure of the Alliance for Progress 
come to life in this decade. 

Third, we seek to be of such assistance as we 
can in achieving peaceful settlements of the 
regional conflicts which have threatened dis- 
integration in parts of Southeast Asia, the 
Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and im- 
portant parts of Africa. 

In trying to perform these functions — in try- 
ing to assist in the maintenance of the inde- 
pendence of nations, in their modernization, 
and in keeping peace in the regions — the United 
States finds itself often in a rather complicated 
position. Our friends in the developing coun- 
tries are, in one part of their minds, pleased to 
receive our help and support; but, in another 
part of their minds, one of the major purposes 
of revolutions of nationalism and moderniza- 
tion is to achieve a higher degree of independ- 
ence of the more advanced powers of the world 



and, in particular, a higher degree of independ- 
ence of tlie United States. 

This ambivalence toward the United States 
we undei-stand very well indeed. As I sug- 
gested earlier, we are, after all, the first of the 
nations to have broken away from colonialism. 
We were forced to make our way on the world 
scene amidst more advanced powers, toward 
whose struggles against one another we prac- 
ticed a policy of isolation and reserve. 

But in the modern world the intimacy of 
communications and the character of weapons, 
combined with the Communist assault on the 
foundations of "Western life, require of us all 
a common objective; namely, that we all do 
what we can, not merely to pursue conventional 
national interests but to contribute actively to 
the building of an orderly world community. 
Even thougli the modernizing nations in the 
south are understandably concentrated on their 
absorbing domestic tasks, we hope to see them 
assume enlarged responsibilities for mutual 
support in defending their independence, for 
mutual support in their tasks of development, 
for mutual support in the settlement of their 
intraregional conflicts. We welcome the im- 
pulse in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for 
the governments and peoples to take a more 
active role in their regions and on the world 
scene; for the interest of the United States is 
not to build an empire — it is to play our part in 
building an orderly world community. 

The Hard Facts of Interdependence 

This is a theme, I believe, which deserves some 
further exploration. 

Although these nations and peoples stand at 
quite different levels of modernization than 
Western Europe and Japan, and although they 
command much lower levels of wealth and in- 
come, they share with the more advanced coun- 
tries of the free world a major impulse and 
objective; namely, they wish to play an en- 
larged role in determining their own destinies. 

In fashioning that role on a rational basis 
they, like the rest of us, confront certain hard 
facts of our interdependence. In security mat- 
ters, for example, none of us — rich or poor — 
is in a position to guarantee his own security 
outside the framework of collective arrange- 

ments. This is as true of security against Com- 
munist techniques of indirect aggression as it 
is of security against aggression by conven- 
tional forces as in Korea, by nuclear blackmail 
as in Berlin and Cuba in 1961-62, or in the 
deterrence of nuclear aggression itself. In 
Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and in Africa 
it will require concerted efforts by those in the 
region, aided by their friends outside, to deter 
or to deal with guerrilla war conducted across 

The first and most fundamental limitation on 
us all in the modern world, in seeking to shape 
our own national destinies, is the imperatives of 
interdependence in the field of security. 

Second, we are bound even more closely and 
inextricably together through interdependence 
in the field of trade, in monetary affairs, and in 
movements of capital and technology. With 
respect to the developing countries, in partic- 
ular, external assistance is of critical impor- 
tance for many of them in the process of 

How then are developing nations to find ways 
to diminisli their dependence and to increase 
the dignity of their position, while accepting 
the international ties required for their secu- 
rity and their development? The answer may 
lie in following something like the pattern pio- 
neered in postwar Europe and in European re- 
lations with the United States. 

It is worth recalling that what bound Europe 
and the United States together from the Tru- 
man Doctrine and the Marshall Plan forward 
was more than a commitment to defend the 
whole area against Stalin's murderous intent. 
It was a common desire to revive Europe, to 
unite it to the maximimi possible, and to create 
in Europe a dignified and effective jxartner of 
the United States on a global basis. 

In my work in Latin America I find many of 
the same thoughts and feelings astir that I knew 
as well in Europe in the immediate postwar 
years. There, too, men are emerging who are 
determined to put their nations on their feet, to 
set them firmly on the path of self -sustained 
growth. There, too, are men who are anxious 
to establish a larger and more dignified role for 
themselves and their countries in dealing with 
the United States and the whole world com- 
munity; and, as part of this effort, one can 

APRIL 5, 1965 


observe, as in postwar Europe, strong impulses 
to regional integration. 

The predominant mood in Latin America, as 
in Europe, is not, as nearly as I can perceive it, to 
break away from the United States. It is to 
find means of settling a certain range of Latin 
American problems on a Latin American basis 
and to deal with the United States, Europe, and 
the rest of the world from a foundation of in- 
creased dignity and effectiveness in areas of in- 
escapable interdependence. 

Although institutions capable of supporting 
such enterprises are less advanced in Asia, the 
Middle East, and Africa than in Latin America, 
it may well be that we shall see in the years 
ahead the emergence of similar regional ar- 
rangements — arrangements which are not de- 
signed to close off contact from the rest of the 
world, which respect the irreducible interde- 
pendencies of the modern world, but which also 
give to the developing nations of a region a 
foundation more firm for their relations with 
one another and with those outside than can be 
found on a simple national basis. For example, 
the Organization of African Unity exists. De- 
spite the inevitable vicissitudes of a young insti- 
tution, it handled skillfully the disputes between 
Ethiopia and Somalia and between Algeria and 
Morocco ; in the field of economic development, 
for example, an African Development Bank has 
been born. 

Meanwhile in the Far East efforts go forward 
to create an Asian Development Bank, and, with 
respect to security arrangements, an elaborate 
set of bilateral and multilateral ties exist be- 
tween Asian and non- Asian powers. These have 
been formed ad hoc to meet a sequence of secu- 
rity problems as they arose in the postwar years. 
We may see in the years ahead the emergence 
of new groupings, notably in the face of the 
Chinese Communist nuclear capability. 

What I am suggesting is this : Although the 
process can now only be dimly perceived — and 
it will certainly be long and arduous — there 
may be a kind of repetition in the other regions 
of the world of the pattern that we achieved in 
a generation of postwar work in Europe and 
across the Atlantic — an effort that is still incom- 
plete and must still be carried forward in many 

Common Mission Among the Atlantic Nations 

I evoke this possibility here in Germany be- 
cause it may be our common mission among the 
Atlantic nations to help encourage the forma- 
tion of such groupings and to work with them 
systematically on an Atlantic basis as they take 

With respect to Latin America, it is the ex- 
plicit hope of all of us in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, for example, that Europe join the 
United States and others in working systemati- 
cally through the machinery we have created in 
the Inter- American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress (CIAP). We are pleased that m 
the country reviews within CIAP a representa- 
tive of the Development Assistance Committee 
of OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] will take part this 
year and at least one European country will be 
represented on a national basis as well. 

We may, for example, all wish to explore to- 
gether the implications and the possibilities 
opened up by the suggestion of Mr. Robert 
Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Africa, that economic aid to 
Africa be organized on a more systematic mid- 
tilateral basis; and surely the Atlantic nations 
as a whole share with the United States a vital 
interest in both the security of free Asia and its 
economic development — never more than now, 
when the emergence of a Chinese Communist 
nuclear capability raises the question of a pos- 
sible nuclear confrontation in Asia as well as in 
Europe. We all should be alert to the possi- 
bilities of working in concert with such new in- 
stitutions as may emerge; for example, the 
Asian Development Bank. 

We in the Atlantic came together in the post- 
war years to master the threat of aggression and 
to revive the economic, social, and political life 
of Western Europe. We have extended that 
agenda to critical fields of trade and monetary 
affairs. And we are all further committed tc 
work together for the unity of Germany and foi 
a settlement m Central Europe based on the 
principles of self-determination and security 
for all. 

In the developing nations each European na- 
tion has played a role rooted in its historic 
national interests or in its current national po- 


litical or economic interests. And these policies 
aave contributed and are contributing greatly 
1 1 o stability and progress ; for example, the Brit- 
ish in Malaysia, the Frencli in the African 
:iimunautt\ But, in fact, the underlying in- 
i rests of all of us in Asia, the Middle East, 
\frica, and Latin America are common inter- 
-ts. The outcome in Southeast Asia, for 
xample, is a vital interest of free men 
■\ory\vhere, as is the success or failure of the 
iiiomic development efforts of India and 
'akistan or the nations of Latin America. 
Our policies in the Atlantic must increas- 
iigly reflect that underlying common interest, 
riie more sj-stematic organization of the devel- 
.'ping regions may not only give them a chance 

I > concert more effectively than in the past but 
Iso provide us the occasion for a higher degree 

>f concert. 


'artnership for Order and Progress 

I^t me return now to the title of my talk: 
The Role of Emerging Nations in World Poli- 
ics.'* I believe their role should be like that of 

II the rest of us: to work together to form in 
heir regions areas of peace and order, of sanity 
ind regular progress; to work with self-respect 
nd dignity with others in their inescapable 
reas of interdependence; and to make the max- 
iium contribution they can to converting this 

rigcrous and disorderly planet into a world 
'Uimunity living and operating in the spirit 
nd by the rules of the United Nations Charter. 
. As one who has been privileged to share in the 
vperience of European and Atlantic develop- 
lont since 19-lo, but has also had the privilege 
f working with governments and peoples at 
luch earlier stages of development, I am drawn 
>ward this conclusion : Ultimately these differ- 
ices in stages of modernization are perhaps not 
~ important as certain common underlying 

It is true, of course, that peoples in the 
it^rging nations suffer from poverty, hunger, 
id illiteracy on a scale we in the Atlantic 

world no longer know. In some cases they are 
new to national political life and to the inter- 
national arena. Both economically and polit- 
ically we must be conscious of these differences 
in stages of development and historical experi- 
ence. And we should be as helpful as we can be 
and are permitted to be in moving them 

But beyond these differences are the deeper 
imivei-sal desires of men and nations to shape 
their own destiny where they can; to conduct 
their relations of dependence and interdepend- 
ence with dignity where they cannot; and to 
try, in ways harmonious with their own tradi- 
tions and their own ambitions, to make an 
environment for their children which is safer, 
which provides more welfare and a greater 
range of expression for independent talent and 
personality than contemporary life affords. 

It is, I believe, our interest and our duty in 
the Atlantic world to work together across bar- 
riers of relative development, of differing cul- 
tures, and of painful memories from the past, 
to bring them forward into that partnership 
in maintaining order and progress on this small 
planet which our conamon humanity demands. 



The Senate on March 17 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Walter M. Kotschnig to be the representative of the 
United States to the 21st session of the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations. 

Armin 11. Meyer to be Ambassador to Iran. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
February 11. ) 

Dwight J. Porter to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Lebanon. (For Ijiotrraphic details, see Department 
of State press release 03 dated March 29.) 

■niL .->. 1965 



Foreign Aid and the Balance of Payments 

Statement hy David E. Bell 

Administrator, Agency for International Development ^ 

Thank you for the privilege of appearing be- 
fore this committee. As Administrator of the 
Agency for International Development, I am 
particularly pleased that these hearings are be- 
ing held, for they present an excellent ojiijor- 
tunity to give the facts to the Congress and to 
attempt to clear up some of the misconceptions 
surrounding the relation of aid to our balance 
of payments. 

Foi-eign aid is by its very nature closely in- 
volved with the flow of payments. Thus each 
action and step taken by AID is and must be 
evaluated from the point of view of our balance- 
of-payments situation. 

The foreign aid program provides goods and 
services to other countries which they cannot 
obtain through normal means — through their 
export earnings and through obtaining capital 
on commercial terms and by private investment. 
A successful aid program is one which enables 
the recipient country to strengthen its economy 
to the point where it can obtam goods and serv- 
ices it needs for steady expansion and growth 
by normal trade and normal capital move- 
ments — and without further need for aid grants 
and soft loans. This is what was achieved in 
Western Europe imder the Marshall Plan and 
has smce been achieved in Japan, Spain, Greece, 
Taiwan, and other countries. 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur- 
rency on Mar. 9. 

It is plainly important to seek to carry ou 
this important national program, like any other 
at minimum cost to the United States. 

In the first years of the U.S. foreign aid pro 
gram after World War II, during the Marshal 
Plan and most of the 1950's, our aid appropria 
tions were, in general, spent wherever in th^ 
world prices were lowest. During the Marshal 
Plan period, of course, the United States wa 
the only major source in the world for most o 
the goods those countries needed. Therefor 
most of the aid dollars, although not tied ti 
U.S. procurement, were spent in this coimtrj 
Later in the 1950's the revived European econ 
omies became increasingly effective competi 
tors for U.S. aid purchases. 

Beginning in 1959, in response to the changec 
situation of the U.S. balance of payments, ou 
policies respecting aid purchases were changed 
Today, with small exceptions, aid appropria 
tions can only be spent in the United States fo 
goods and services produced in this country 
This has undoubtedly raised the cost to th 
Federal budget of providing a given amount o 
goods and services under the aid program 
since some items are being purchased with aii 
appropriations in the United States which coul( 
be bought more cheaply in other countries 
But our present policies are intended to mini 
mize the adverse effect of the aid program o) 
the balance of payments, even if that results i 
some mcreased cost to the budget. 



The "Accounting" Approach to Flow of Dollars 

Tliere are two approaches to measuring the 
impact of AID's exi)enditures on tlie balance 
of payments. The first, whicli might be called 
the "accounting" approach, measures the di- 
rect result of the AID spending : Are the dollars 
appropriated by the Congress spent directly in 
this coimtr}', or are they spent abroad or trans- 
ferred to another country or to an international 

Under this method of measurement, which is 
similar to the Department of Commerce figures 
on tlie balance of paj'ments, during fiscal year 
196-i — the latest data available — the gross ad- 
verse effect on the U.S. balance of payments of 
aid's economic assistance programs was about 
$513 million. 

We have now received preliminary estimates 
for the calendar year 1964 which show sub- 
stantial further improvement. The payments 
abroad dropped to about $400 million. This is 
offset by repayments of past assistance extended 
by AID and predecessor agencies of over $150 
million, making a net effect of about $250 

Tlie current expenditure rate under our eco- 
nomic assistance program is almost exactly $2 
billion per year. Thus in 1964, for every dollar 
of economic aid extended, 20 cents showed as a 
current adverse impact in our balance of pay- 
ments — not considering current or future 

Put the other way around, 80 percent of 
aid's expenditures last year represented not 
dollars going abroad but steel, machinery, fer- 
tilizer, and other goods and services purchased 
in the United States. 

Under these circumstances, of course, a cut 
in AID appropriations would primarily reduce 
U.S. exports and would have only a very small 
effect on the balance of payments. Moreover, 
the proportion of appropriations spent in the 
United States is rising. Eighty-five percent 
of new obligations are being committed for 
direct expenditure in the United States. 

The $400 million of AID offshore payments 
in calendar 1964 is made up of the following 
major elements : 

— $120 million representing payments of 

U.S. voluntary contributions to international 
organizations, such as U.N. agencies, the Indus 
Eiver Project administered by the IBRD, and 
the Social Progi-ess Trust Fund. 

— $78 million for commodity purchases in 
other less developed countries — cases where, for 
example, required goods are unavailable in the 
United States or shipping costs are too high. 

— $19 million for commodity purchases in 
other developed countries. These are either 
tag-end expenditures of major projects ap- 
proved before aid was tied in 1959 or items un- 
available from any other source, approved on 
a case-by-case waiver basis. 

— $66 million in cash transfers — transfers of 
funds made in a very few cases where normal 
procedures for providing assistance are not 
feasible or made in small amoimts to cover local 
costs of teclmical assistance projects. The 
amount of such transfers has been reduced 
sharply in recent years and is expected to be 
only $40 million in calendar 1965. 

— $30 million for local expenses of AID 
direct-hire personnel stationed abroad. This 
represents the local expenses which could not 
be met by use of Treasury-owned local cur- 

— $87 million for other expenditures outside 
the United States. Tliis includes payments by 
U.S. contractors for such necessary items as 
wages. It also includes payments to schools and 
hospitals abroad, disaster relief expenditures, 
offshore expenses of participants, and other 
project costs. 

As indicated above, this $400 million was off- 
set by about $150 million in repayments of prin- 
cipal and interest on loans extended by AID 
and its predecessor agencies. 

Indirect Economic Effects 

This then is the "accounting" measure of the 
direct flow of dollars abroad resulting from our 
economic aid program. 

The true net economic effect of foreign assist- 
ance on our balance of pajTnents cannot be 
measured so simply. This is because there are 
indirect effects not revealed by the direct 
accounts. A substantial portion of the dollars 
that go out under our aid program, to the 

APRIL 5. 1965 


United Nations, for example, comes back 
through regular commercial channels for 
purchases of U.S. goods. 

Dollars which go out and enter the economy 
of a less developed country may be used later 
by that country to buy needed goods in the U.S. 
market or may go through trade channels to a 
third country, wliich will use the dollars for 
purchase of goods in the U.S. market. 

These are examples of the so-called "feed- 
back" effect, wliich means that the effect of aid 
outflows on the U.S. balance of payments is 
overstated, because dollar outflows to a con- 
siderable extent are unmediately reflected in in- 
creased U.S. export sales for dollars. 

But there is another mdirect effect in the op- 
posite direction. Wlien an aid recipient is able 
to buy U.S. imports under a tied loan — that is, 
has a letter of credit opened in a U.S. bank 
which can only be spent m the United States — 
then that country may use the tied dollars to 
buy goods that it would have otherwise bought 
with dollars it already owns. These other dol- 
lars — free exchange — are thus available for 
other purchases either in the United States or 
elsewhere. This is the so-called "substitution" 
effect, meaning that to some extent aid-financed 
imports are "substituted" for imports that would 
have been bought with "free" dollars, and to 
this extent the effect of tied aid on the U.S. bal- 
ance of payments is understated. 

There are no good estimates of the size of the 
feedback and substitution effects. Only indi- 
rect evidence is available. With respect to the 
question of how much substitution occurs, for 
example, it is clear that most of the less de- 
veloped countries have severe shortages of 
dollars and need more goods from the United 
States than they can afford, even with the addi- 
tion of aid. Furthermore, statistics do not indi- 
cate that a dropoff in commercial trade occurs 
when there is an increase in aid. Quite the 
opposite. The most frequently cited example is 
Latin America. "WHiile expenditures under the 
Alliance for Progress have been increasing over 
the past 3 years, so have Latin American pur- 
chases from the United States through regular 
commercial channels. In fact, according to pre- 
liminary estimates, commercial U.S. exports 
to Latin America increased by $500 million 
in 1964 alone. Thus it is the best guess of the 

economists who have studied these matters that i 
the amount of substitution is relatively small. 

Overall, it is our conclusion that the indirect i 
economic effects of aid on our balance of pay- i 
ments roughly balance each other, and even | 
allowing for some variation from time to time, 
the true effect of aid on our balance of pay- 
ments would not differ very much in either di- 
rection from the figures shown by the accounting 
estimates referred to earlier. 

To siun up, our balance-of-payments figures 
show, by the "accounting" measure, the share of 
our expenditures made directly for U.S. goods 
and services is 80 percent and rising and the 
share paid to foreigners and international orga- 
nizations is 20 percent and falling. These fig- 
ures do not take into account indirect effects, 
but it is our best guess that they would be 
little different if they did. AID dollars spent 
abroad which return quickly in payment for 
commercial exports roughly offset the amount 
of AID financing for goods that would have 
been exported anyway. As nearly as we can 
tell, these two imperfections roughly cancel 
each other out and 15-20 percent is a valid 
indication of the real advei-se impact of aid 
on the U.S. balance of payments. 

Relationship of Aid and U.S. Gold Holdings 

I should like to say a word about the rela- 
tionship of U.S. aid and holdings of U.S. gold. 

Some aid recipients have bought gold from 
the United States in the past few years, mostly 
to finance their gold subscription to the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. In the main, how- 
ever, gold transactions between the United 
States and aid recipients result in a net gain 
in U.S. holdings. During 1964, for example, 
less developed countries purchased $28 million 
worth of gold from the United States (of which 
all but $3 million was subscribed to the IMF) 
but they sold $89 million worth of gold to us 
for dollars in the same period. 

There is thus no direct relation between aid 
and an outflow of gold to aid recipients. In 
fact, the reverse is true. The U.S. gold prob- 
lem lies with the industrial countries of Europe, 
not in our relations with the aid recipient 

I have been speaking thus far of AID expend- 



iturcs. There are other U.S. prog^rams which 
can properly be referred to as foreign aid in a 
broad sense. I should like to mention these 
briefly, with a word about their balance-of- 
payments impact. 

Military assistance consists principally of the 
provision of U.S. -produced military equipment. 
Takinsr into account the costs of U.S. personnel 
overseas to administer the program, some over- 
seas training costs, and other overseas expendi- 
tures, the estimates are that over 85 percent of 
military assistance expenditures are made 
directly in the United States and the remainder 
are made offshore. 

The Public Law 480 program provides U.S. 
surplus agricultural commodities by sale and 
donation to other countries. In view of the 
nature of the program, virtually all of the ex- 
penditures under it are made directly in the 
United States, with only minor and unavoid- 
able olTshore costs in foreign ports. The same 
is true of expenditures under the Export- 
Import Bank loans. 

The Peace Corps expenditures are almost 
entirely for the living expenses of the volun- 
teers abroad and for their training and super- 
vision in the United States. It is estimated 
that about 7.5 percent of Peace Corps expendi- 
tures are made in the United States and about 
25 percent offshore. 

Finally, U.S. contributions to international 
agencies such as the International Development 
Association are paid in dollars and are shown 
• in the Department of Commerce statistics as 
100-percent outflows. In fact, however, a sub- 
stantial share of the total expenditures of these 
international organizations is made in the 
United States. Consequentl}', the accounting 
estimate of balance-of-payments impact in this 
case overstates the true effect. 

I should also like to stress that we are seeking 
in every way we can devices to use local cur- 
rencies, owned by the United States as a result 
of Food for Peace sales or other U.S. assistance, 
to meet the local costs of our aid missions. The 
net effect of this policy is to enable us in many 
countries to substitute U.S.-produced com- 
modities for what would otherwise be dollars 
used to purchase local currencies to cover the 
local costs of U.S. Government activities. 

Offshore Expenditures Kept at Minimum 

President Johnson's message of February 10 ' 

Until we master our balance-of-payments problem, 
AID officials will send no aid dollar abroad that can 
be sent instead in the form of U.S. goods and services. 

We are doing just that. I have asked that 
every project and every commodity order be 
closely examined. Waiver of tied procurement 
regulations will be allowed only when it is 
clearly justified in the U.S. interest. Local 
costs will be paid for out of U.S. local currency 
holdings wherever possible. 

We expect, as I have indicated, to see some 
further increase in tied purchases and expendi- 
tures in the United States, but we are close to 
the limit. Some minimum offshore expendi- 
tures will remain — principally the local ex- 
penditures of our employees and those of our 
contractors who are stationed overseas, the con- 
tributions of the United States to international 
organizations, and a few special cases where 
tying to U.S. procurement is imfeasible or 

The President, advised by his Cabinet Com- 
mittee on the Balance of Payments, has con- 
cluded that this small remaining element of 
offshore expenditures under the aid program is 
a cost to our coimtry which is far outweighed 
by the benefits to our own interests that will ac- 
crue from the achievement of economic and 
social progress in the less developed countries. 

A similar judgment underlay the distinction 
drawn by the President in his recent balance-of- 
payments message between U.S. private invest- 
ment abroad in advanced countries — which for 
the time being is to be discouraged — and U.S. 
private investment abroad in less developed 
countries, which the U.S. Government is con- 
tinuing strongly to encourage. 

Looking beyond the immediate present, the 
foreign aid program has a number of effects 
which are positively beneficial to our balance of 

First, our aid today is overwhelmingly in the 
form of dollar repayable loans — unlike the sit- 
uation under the Marshall Plan, when 90 per- 
cent of our aid was in the form of grants. 

■ For text, see BtnxEnrr of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

APRIL 5, 1985 


Future repayments of interest and principal on 
today's loans will be a positive factor in our 
balance of payments. 

Secondly, the evidence is plain that countries 
which with our aid achieve steady economic 
growth become increasingly better markets for 
U.S. exports and more attractive places for U.S. 
investment abroad. Over the last 15 years our 
exports to Europe have doubled and our ex- 
ports to Japan have tripled. As other coun- 
tries — Spain, Greece, Taiwan, and so on — gain 
economic momentum and our aid comes to an 
end, the same kind of result is evident. 

Moreover, the aid program in case after case 
has directly led to the introduction of American 
products and services in other countries and to 
follow-on markets unrelated to the aid program. 
Aid has in fact been one of our best export pro- 

motion mechanisms. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to 
report that since 1961 we have steadily reduced 
the effect of foreign aid on our balance of pay- 
ments. We are continuing the efforts to mini- 
mize the effect as part of the action program 
announced by President Johnson last month. 

We will do more. But the upper limit may 
soon be reached, as the adverse impact lias al- 
ready been reduced to $400 million, not includ- 
ing repayments. 

In addition, it is important to recognize that 
a continuation of the present program will have 
a long-range positive impact on our balance oi 
payments as a result of a dollar repayment flow, 
expandmg markets for our exports, and im- 
proving opportunities for our private invest- 
ment abroad. 

Trade and the Balance of Payments 

Statement by G. Griffith Johnson 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Ajfairs ^ 

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear 
before this committee to discuss the pi'oblems 
of expanding exports as a contribution to the 
elimination of our balance-of -payments deficit. 
The continuation of large deficits in our balance 
of payments could create major difficulties for 
the achievement of our economic objectives of 
sound and steady growth at home and abroad. 
It is therefore urgent to reduce the deficit 
sharply and quickly — but without major dam- 
age to the international economy. The Presi- 
dent's 10-point program meets that need.^ 

^ Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency on Mar. 16 (press release 43). 

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con- 
gress on Feb. 10 (H. Doc. 83), see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 
1965, p. 282. 

In a number of major respects the interna- 
tional financial situation of the United States 
currently presents a paradox. In 1964 we had 
an unprecedented surplus in trade and serv- 
ices — $5.9 billion on commercial account. We 
had an unprecedented trade surplus — $3.7 bil- 
lion in commercial trade— more than 21^ times 
as large as that of West Germany, whose trade 
suri:)lus was the second largest in the world. 

Since 1960 we have improved our commercial 
surplus by $2.2 billion and reduced the net def- 
lion in commercial trade — more than 21/2 times 
by $1.2 billion. This total improvement of 
$3.4 billion almost matches the $3.9 billion def- 
icit in 1960. Yet in 1964 we still had a deficit 
of $3 billion. 

What happened, as you know, is that over 
this period there has been a large increase in 



the outflow of private capital, which increased 
by over $2V4 billion between 1960 and 1964. Al- 
most $2 billion of the increase came in 1964 
alone, when the gross outflow exceeded $6^^ 
billion. It was therefore quite appropriate 
that the President's program — while calling for 
action in all areas of international accounts, in- 
tluding exports — focused attention on the capi- 
tal outflow to the developed countries. This is 
the area responsible for the persistence of the 
deficit and where major improvement must be 
sought at this time. 

My main theme here, however, is trade. 
There is one point I would like to make about 
the measure of our commercial trade surplus. 
The figure of $3.7 billion is exclusive of our 
Government-financed exports, such as sales im- 
der P.L. 480 and our aid programs. If we were 
to include these exports of goods and services, 
our trade surplus would be almost $6.6 billion 
and our total current account surplus would be 
$9.4 billion. We do not include them in an 
analysis of our current trade position because 
their contribution to our balance of payments 
will be spread over a very long period. For 
example, in 1964 we received dollar repayments 
of some $150 million on previous aid loans and 
used almost $300 million worth of foreign cur- 
rencies generated under these programs to sub- 
stitute for dollar expenditures. 

World Competitive Position of U.S. 

Tlie performance of our exports recently is 
reassuring about our world competitive position. 
In the late fifties and early sixties our exporting 
industries have had to adjust to the emergence 
of Western Europe and Japan as major ex- 
porters to the world as the process of rehabil- 
itating their domestic economies was virtually 

It was in that period that extreme concern 
was expressed about the loss of the U.S. com- 
petitive position in the world. Our share of 
world exports was declining from the abnor- 
mally high levels achieved after World War II, 
when we were the major supplier to the world. 
This decline appears to have bottomed out in 
1963, and in 1964 we actually increased our 
share of world exports substantially. 

We have been aided in this recovery by a 

number of factors: (1) the remarkable sta- 
bility in our wholesale price level since 1958 
while prices for our principal competitors have 
been rising; (2) our leadership in industrial 
technology; (3) substantial growth in the 
economies of Europe, Japan, and Canada; and 
(4) increased accessibility to major markets 
abroad as a result of negotiated reductions in 
tariffs and the elimination of other trade re- 

Part of the past decline in U.S. exports as a 
percentage of world exports can be attributed to 
the abnormally rapid growth of trade among 
the countries of the EEC [European Economic 
Community] and, to a lesser extent, of the 
EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. 
Because of tariff reductions within these 
groups, their internal trade has naturally ex- 
panded faster than it otherwise would have, and 
faster than their trade with the entire world. 
To get a more objective assessment of the U.S. 
share of world exports, it is appropriate to ex- 
clude intra-EEC trade from the calculation. 
Using this approach, the U.S. share has declined 
only marginally — from 17.4 percent in 1960 
to 17 percent in 1964 — and was higher in 1964 
than in any year since 1960. 

While our export position today refutes the 
pessimists of some years ago, competitiveness 
is a dynamic factor and the loss of it is always 
a potential threat. Furthermore, while we be- 
lieve there is cause for optimism over the longer 
pull, it must be kept in mind that there is no 
assurance that the trade surplus will develop 
favorably in any given year. 

There is another aspect of competitiveness 
that should be noticed. In assessing competi- 
tiveness, one generally focuses on what is hap- 
pening to our share of world exports. But the 
size of imports obviously plays an equal role in 
determining the size of the trade surplus. In 
this connection it is relevant to point out two 
things : 

1. As our share of world exports was de- 
clining, our share of world imports was also de- 
clining. If we start with 1960, for example, 
we find that our share of world imports declined 
somewhat faster than our share of commercial 
world exports. Since the flow of imports re- 
flects in large part the competitiveness of a 

APRIL 5, 19G5 


country's industries against foreign producers, 
it would appear that internally the competitive 
position of the United States has improved vis- 
a-vis foreign suppliers. 

2. Between 1960 and 1964 we increased our 
exports by $4.8 billion. Since our imports also 
increased by less than $4 billion, our commercial 
trade surplus increased by $900 million. Based 
on this 4-year experience, I think we must rec- 
ognize that further substantial increases in our 
trade surplus will at best require a substantial 
period of time. 

Geographical Distribution of U.S. Trade Surplus 

Another important aspect of our trade sur- 
plus is its geographical distribution. One point 
stands out clearly. Our commercial trade sur- 
plus is predominantly with our competitors. 

Dividing the world into two groups — Western 
Europe, Japan, and Canada on the one hand, 
and the rest of the world on the other — we find 
that in 1964 we ran a commercial surplus of be- 
tween $3.9 and $4 billion with the advanced 
countries and a commercial deficit of between 
$200 and $300 million with the rest of the world. 
(We export far more to the rest of the world 
than wo import, but when we deduct the aid- 
financed exports the result is a small commer- 
cial deficit.) More than 75 percent of the com- 
mercial surplus came from Western Europe and 
the balance from Japan and Canada. More- 
over — and this is important — about 40 percent 
of our trade surplus was with the Common 
Market. Our increase in exports to the Com- 
mon Market since 1960 has been almost double 
the increase in our imports from there — about 
$1 billion of exports as against something under 
$500 million of increased imports. 

The record clearly shows that we have been 
able to improve our commercial trade surplus 
with both Western Europe and the Common 
Market since 1960 in spite of some decline in our 
share of world exports. 

In this analysis I have concentrated on the 
trade surplus. This, however, is only part, 
although by far the largest part, of our trans- 
actions in goods and services with these coun- 
tries. If we took into account tourism, income 
from investments, shipping expenditures, and 

the like, as well as trade, the qualitative pic- 
ture would probably still be about the same 
However, the distribution of our surplus oii 
services would be quite different — returns oil 
direct investment, for example, come mainlj 
from the less advanced countries while our tour- 
ist expenditures would be heavily in the ad- 
vanced countries. To go into this aspect 
although a vital one in any overall assessment 
would lead me too far afield from my mail 

What I have tried to indicate is that the trad( 
account has been a main bulwark of our tota 
balance-of-payments picture in recent years anc 
in any longrun solution of our balance-of-pay 
ments problem must play a significant role 
Our trade performance has, on the whole, beei 
an encouraging demonstration of the funda 
mental competitiveness of American industry 
and agriculture. 

Barriers Which Impede U.S. Exports 

We think, however, that our trade perform 
ance could be even better in a world with fewe 
impediments to the flow of goods among coim 
tries. The committee, I am sure, shares thi 
view and has expressed interest in a more de 
tailed analysis of the barriers which impede ou: 
exports. These barriers are both of a tariff am 
a nontariff nature. Even though I shall trea 
these two types separately for purposes of dis 
cussion, they obviously are part of an insepara 
ble whole since, if any country wants to keep ou 
foreign goods, a tariff barrier, a nontariff bar 
rier, or a combination of both can serve the sami 
end. However, of the two types, it has generall; 
been felt that the nontariff barrier is the greate 
obstruction to trade. A complete prohibitioi 
against imports, for example, of the type tha 
the United Kingdom imposes against America! 
coal, cannot be overcome; a tariff, if its level i 
not excessively high, does permit trade, as wit 
ness the flow of American goods to all countrie 
of the world over tariff barriers. The Genera 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT| 
recognizes this distinction and is designed ti 
bring about both the elimination of nontarif 
barriers and the reciprocal lowering of tarif 



Following the Second World War, during the 
' oeriod wIilmi everyone thought in terms of a 
dollar shortage, the countries of Western Eu- 
"ope adopted a series of measures to limit their 
lollar expenditures for nonessential goods and 
;ervices. Nontarill barriers, and, in particular, 
luantitative import restrictions, were the major 
levices used for this purpose. At that point in 
:ime, these restrictions did not cut seriously in- 
:oU.S. exports, since European countries were 
in any event spending all the dollars they earned 
or were given by us under the Marshall Plan. 
As Europe recovered and European dollar 

■ shortages turned into substantial European 
holdings of dollars, their import restrictions be- 
gan to become meaningful and the United States 

■ 'Government was extremely vigorous in seeking 
- their elimination. 

In the industrial field this objective has been 
largely achieved. The industrial items of ex- 
port interest to the United States which still re- 
main subject to overt quantitative restrictions in 
. Western I^urope are now only a handful. The 
. Danes restrict the import of washing machines; 
the Austrians have some 12 industrial items un- 
der restriction ; Spain's restrictions are consider- 
ably more extensive, but even here the situa- 
tion has considerably improved as compared 
with that of a few years ago. On the other 
side of the world, Japan has been undergoing a 
rapid process of removing quantitative restric- 
tions, but its restrictions still are more exten- 
sive than those in Western Europe. 

I shall not take your time with excessive de- 
tail. However, I would like to call your atten- 
tion to a compilation the Department of State 
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, 
which appears in annex A of a Joint Committee 
print of 1963 on The United States Balance of 
Payments — Perspectives and Policies, on the 
quantitative restrictions then maintained by 
certain foreign countries. In addition, I v.-ould 
like to call your attention to State Department 
documents released early in 1964 ' and again in 
196i * on the recent progress achieved in elimi- 
nating or reducing foreign barriers to U.S. 

' Ibid.. Feb. 10. lOOi. p. 214. 
' Not printed here. 

Nontariff Barriers in Agricultural Field 

I have been careful to stress the word "indus- 
trial" when talking of the post- World War II 
progress in reducing quantitative restrictions 
against our exports in Western Europe and 
Japan. Agi-icultural trade, including many 
processed foodstuffs, still remains encumbered 
by a myriad of trade restrictions whose complex- 
ity almost defies complete analysis. These bar- 
riers are also changing in character. For 
example, as the European Common Market 
moves to its common agricultural policy, it has 
eliminated quantitative restrictions on many 
products and then replaced these by a system 
of variable levies, which in principle provide 
just as effective — perhaps even more etTective — 
protection for their farm products. The Joint 
Economic Committee report which I cited will 
show that the bulk of the restrictions facing our 
exports in Europe are in the agricultural field. 

Ilowever, even here, the picture is not all 
bleak. We have had some success in reducing 
and eliminating barriers in this field. The 
documents I cited will show this. In 19G4, for 
example, we obtained some liberalization by 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and 
Japan, among others, on agricultural products 
significant to American farmers. The trade 
figures bear this out. Our commercial agri- 
cultural exports in 1962 were $3.5 billion and 
rose to about $4.6 billion in 1964. In addi- 
tion, P.L. 480 and other aid-financed exports 
ran about $1.7 billion in 1904. Even to the 
countries of the Common Market, 1964 was a 
good year for agricultural exports; our agri- 
cultural exports to these six countries increased 
from $1.2 billion to $1.4 billion from 1963 to 
196-1 — all of them commercial. 

In addition to agriculture, European restric- 
tions against the import of U.S. coal remain 
onerous. As I indicated earlier, the United 
Kingdom has a complete import embargo 
against U.S. coal for all practical purposes; 
Germany has a limited tariff quota; other coun- 
tries have comparable devices to restrict their 
coal imports from us. These restrictions pre- 
vent the export of a substantial volume of U.S. 
coal. Since the United States is an efficient 
producer of coal, we are particularly concerned 




about these restrictions and will continue to 
press vigorously for their reduction and re- 

There are types of nontariff barriers other 
than quantitative restrictions. For example, 
we are concerned about road taxes in Western 
Europe which we believe hit unfairly against 
American cars as compared with European cars. 
These taxes may have helped induce automobile 
investment in Europe by our producers to manu- 
facture European-type cars there. In this case 
the nontariff tax barrier is augmented by rela- 
tively high tariffs, and the combination prob- 
ably has been significant. 

I have spoken at some length about European 
nontariff barriers. In order to bring this into 
balance, I should note that the United States 
also has its nontariff barriers. The Europeans, 
for example, complain of our import restric- 
tions in agriculture, particularly for dairy 
products. They are particularly upset about 
our American selling-price rule for levying im- 
port duties on various products, mainly chemi- 
cals. Other policies complained about on both 
sides are "buy domestic" practices and anti- 
dumping procedures. I mention these to indi- 
cate that the discussion of nontariff barriers 
has nearly all countries as both the accusers 
and the accused. 

Significance of tlie Kennedy Round 

I would like to say a few words about tariffs. 
We have made remarkable progress in reducing 
tariffs among developed countries since the re- 
ciprocal trade agreements program was insti- 
tuted in the early 1930's, and particularly 
through the negotiations held under the GATT 
since shortly after World War II. We are 
now engaged in what could be the most ambi- 
tious trade negotiating exercise ever, in the 
Kennedy Round, under the authority provided 
in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 

In terms of American investment abroad, as 
well as trade, the Kennedy Round can be of 
great significance. Since the formation of the 
European Common Market and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) , tariffs among 
the member countries have been reduced by 70 
percent. In a few years member countries of 

these groupings will pay no tariffs at all on 
their exports to each other. By contrast, our 
exporters will face tariffs, the so-called common 
external tariff in the case of the Common Mar- 
ket and the individual country tariffs in the 
case of EFTA. In short, in contrast to their 
member country competitors, our exporters will 
face serious tariff barriers. 

Much of the investment moving from the 
United States to Europe has been motivated by 
the desire to get inside these barriers. I think 
it is fair to say that the higher the level of tariffs 
of tlie EEC and the EFTA, the more reason our 
producers will have to operate inside the tariff 
barriers in order to avoid having to overcome 
them. We therefore believe that a successful 
Kennedy Round can be a crucial factor in mod- 
erating the flow of U.S. investment into the 
EEC and EFTA countries. The lower their 
tariffs, the lower the incentive to get inside the 
tariff walls. 

Over and above the investment impact, of 
course, we have a large trade stake in the Ken- 
nedy Round. This stake is worldwide in 
scope — nearly two-thirds of our commercial ex- 
ports go to countries outside Europe — but the 
issue is perhaps focused most sharply in rela- 
tion to the new regional groupings in Europe. 
x\s the EEC and the EFTA move forward in 
dismantling their internal trade barriers, the 
degree of discrimination grows against outsid- 
ers. As the EEC moves toward a common agri- 
cultural policy, with a heavily protected market 
for its producers, the world's agricultural ex- 
porters face increasing difficulties. 

In these great regional markets, as indeed in 
others as well, the vital element is not only the 
competitiveness of our industry but also the 
opportunity to display this competitiveness 
through reduced trade barriers. This obvi- 
ously works both ways. The lower our tariffs, 
the more competitive our industries must alsc 
be in the face of foreign competition. Oui 
postwar trade record — and our trade perform- 
ance last year — has made clear that, overall 
our industry and agriculture are able to com- 
pete. It is the opportunity to compete which 
we believe a successful Kennedy Round will 
help to maintain and enhance. 



Jeed To Improve Monetary System 

The question may be raised whether much 
(uicker progress in our exports could be made 
f those countries which are comphiining about 
•excess dollars'' created by our deficits would 
ipend tliem on imports from the United States. 
rhis question makes the basic point that the 
•esponsibility for solving major bahince-of-pay- 
nents problems — for facilitating the adjust- 
ment process under modern-day conditions — 
should fall both on the surplus and the deficit 
countries. "We support this position fully. 

However, some perspective is needed on the 
role of the additional dollars created by U.S. 
deficits. Of the almost $26 billion held by 
foreigners, about $15 billion is held by official 
.nonetary authorities. Two points should be 
made about these official holdings. Historical- 
ly, the accumulation of dollars was desired to 
build up reserves to needed levels. By building 
up these reserves, the shift to convertibility and 
the reduction of restrictions on trade were made 
possible. The whole world has been a benefici- 
arj' of these developments. At the same time it 
is clear that the addition of dollars to official re- 
serves cannot continue indefinitely as in recent 
years. Ideally, countries which find themselves 
faced with too large an inflow of dollars could, 
while legitimately urging an end to U.S. deficits, 
also take measures to assist the adjustment 
process. One cannot say in advance what 
should be the proper mix of policy instruments 
.for any one country, but the possibilities are 

In the ca-se of the almost $11 billion held by 
the private sector it should be noted that all 
these dollars are held voluntarily. Indeed, in 
1964 most of the deficit was financed by the 
dollar accumulations of the private sector. 
These privately held dollars are used, among 
other things, for the purpose of financing world 
trade, to the benefit of all concerned. 

These issues go to the heart of the effectiveness 
of our international monetary' system. 'While 
its postwar performance in expanding trade and 
output has been remarkable, it has depended 
in major measure for additional liquidity on 
U.S. deficits. These deficits cannot be allowed 
to continue, and therefore, as previous witnesses 

before this committee have testified, the need 
is for improving the international monetary 
system to provide necessary financing facilities 
for world trade and investment without such 
heavy dependence on the United States. 

President Recommends Increase 
of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund 

The White House on March 17 made public 
the folloioing letter from President Johnson 
to Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Sen- 
ate. The President sent an identical letter to 
John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of 

White House press release dated March 17 

March 17, 1965 

Dear Mr. Prestoent: The International 
Monetary Fund has played a key role in the 
flourishing economic growth experienced by the 
Free "World in the last two decades. An ex- 
pansion of the Fund's resources is now needed 
if it is to continue to contribute effectively to 
Free "World growth in the future. The United 
States has given its firm support to the Fund 
since its creation in the Bretton "Woods Agree- 
ments of 1945. This support must continue. 

I recommend to the Congress that the quota 
of the United States in the International Mone- 
tary Fund be increased by twenty-five percent 
along with the similar or greater increases pro- 
posed for other members. The increases pro- 
posed for all members will raise Fund quotas by 
about $5 billion and bring total quotas to $21 
billi(m. This expansion is vital to the United 
States. It will : 

— promote the orderly and stable growth of 
Free "World trade and payments in which we so 
importantly participate; 

— maintain the strength and central position 
of the Fund in the evolution of the international 
monetary system ; 

— help finance the temporary swings in bal- 
ance of payments associated with the growing 
volume of international transactions; 

APRIL 5, 1965 


— support the expansion of bilateral credit 
facilities which have contributed to the develop- 
ment of the international monetary system; and 

— provide to the Fund other major currencies 
to meet drawings that have mainly been fi- 
nanced by dollars in the past, and thus 
strengthen the present payments system. 

Demands on the Fund's resources have stead- 
ily risen as the volume of world trade and 
financial transactions has grown. In the past 
five years drawings on the Fund have averaged 
over $1 billion per year; during the period 1955- 
1959, the annual average was $440 million. This 
increased use of the Fimd reflects both the 
great expansion of current international trans- 
actions since 1959 and the increasingly large in- 
ternational movement of capital since the re- 
turn to convertibility of the major European 
currencies. Increased use of the Fund has been 
especially marked among the large industrial 
countries. Since 1962 Canada, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States have 
either drawn on Fund resources or entered into 
standby arrangements or both. 

A significant change in the holdings of the 
Fund has also occurred. For many years the 
U.S. dollar was the only currency extensively 
drawn by other member nations. But because 
of our balance of payments deficits, the Fimd 
has increasingly provided other currencies to 
drawing members. As a result its holdings of 
major currencies other than dollars and sterling 
have declined by over $1 billion since 1959. The 
proposed quota increase will substantially en- 
large the Fund's holdings of these currencies. 

Moreover, the Fund's credit facilities have 
been directly useful to the United States. Prior 
to 1958, the United States attained a large 
creditor position because of the extensive lend- 
ing of dollars by the Fund. From 1958 to 1963 
reversal of our earlier Fund creditor position 
financed over $1 billion of our payments deficit; 
and since 1963, we have made net drawings of 
$260 million of the Fund's resources for this 
same purpose. 

I am transmitting legislation which would 
authorize the United States Governor of the 

Fund to agree to an increase of $1,035 million 
in the United States quota, bringing our total 
quota to $5,160 million. Three-fourths of the 
increase, or $776 million, will be obligated in 
dollars but will be expended only as needed by 
the Fund. The remaining $259 million will be 
payable in gold. In return for this gold pay- 
ment, the United States will receive a substan- 
tially equivalent reserve asset in the form of a 
virtually automatic drawing right on the Fund. 
Arrangements have been made both to mini- 
mize the amount of gold sales by the United 
States to other Fund members for their gold 
subscription payments, and to mitigate the im- 
pact of any purchases that may occur. 

The National Advisory Council on Interna- 
tional Monetary and Financial Problems has 
prepared a report which is being sent separately 
to the Congi'ess.^ The report will provide back- 
gi-ound information for the use of the Congress, 
and strongly endorses the proposed quota in- 

The increased Fund quotas will contribute 
importantly to the economic health of the Free 
World. The increase is clearly in the interest 
of the United States. I urge that Congress give 
jjrompt and favorable consideration to this 


Ltndon B. Johnson 



To amend the Bretton Woods Agreementa Act to 
authorize an increase in the International Monetary . 
Fund quota of the United States 

Be it enacted iy the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled. That the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 
as amended (22 U.S.C. 286-2Sr)k-l ) , is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following new section: 

"Sec. 20(a) The United States Governor of the Fund 
is authorized to consent to an increase of $1,03.^,000,000 
in the quota of the United States in the Fund. 

"(1>) In order to pay the increase in the United 
States subscription to the Fund provided for in this 
section, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated 
$1,03,5,000,000, to remain available until expended." 

' Special Report to the President and to the Congress 
on Proposed Increases on Quotas of the International 
Monetary Fund, March 1965. 




Calendar of International Conferences^ 

In Recess as of April 1, 1965 

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

■ Sept. 17, 1964). 

jTJ.N. General AssembI}': 19th Session (recessed Feb. 18 until Sep- New York Dec. 1, 1964- 


Scheduled April Through June 1965 

OECD Enerpy Committee: Ad Hoc Drafting Group Paris Apr. 1-2 

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Air Traffic Control Liability .... Montreal Apr. 1-15 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Regional Meeting . . Paris Apr. 5-6 

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Locust Control Rome Apr. 5-9 

ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Group on Transport of Geneva Apr. 5-9 

Dans;erous Goods. 

U.N. Committee on Appropriateness of Studying the Definition of New York Apr. 5-9 


WMU Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session Paris Apr. 5-24 

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel Paris Apr. 6-8 

Inter-American Children's Institute: 46th Session of Directing Montevideo Apr. 6-9 


UNCTAD Trade and Development Board New York Apr. 6-23 

U.N. Committee of 24 New York Apr. 6- 

CENTO Ministerial Council: 13th Session Tehran Apr. 7-8 

ITU Administrative Council Geneva Apr. 12-MayJ18 

U.X. ECOSOC Statistical Commission New York Apr. 13-May^3 

PAHO Executive Committee: 51st Meeting Washington Apr. 19-26 

International Whaling Commission: Special Session London Apr. 20-23 

lA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: Meeting Lima Apr. 20- May 1 

of Experts. 

UNESCO Executive Board: 70th Session Paris Apr. 20-May 20 

FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: Rome Apr. 21-28 

9th Session. 

ILO .\sian Maritime Conference Tokyo Apr. 21-30 

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 20th Plenary Session . . Geneva Apr. 21-May 7 

ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 6th Meeting Montreal Apr. 21-May 7 

"FAO Program Committee: 9th Session Rome Apr. 21-May 7 

FAO Finance Committee Rome Apr. 21-May 7 

FAO Joint Finance and Program Committee Rome Apr. 26-28 

ECE Joint Study Group on Simplification and Standardization of Geneva Apr. 26-30 

Export Documents. 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris Apr. 26-30 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 19, 1965, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-June 1965. 
The list docs not inchide numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in those are 
referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, V^'ashington, 15. C, 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial 
and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comitd consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central 
Treaty Organization- ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far Eist; ECE, Economic Commission for 
Europ'e; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International 
Civil .Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International 
Labor Organization; I.MCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental 
Occanographic Commission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union: NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation- 0.-(S, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 
OIE, Office of International Epizootics; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

APRIL 5, 1965 609 

Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1965 — Continued 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission : Meeting 
on Seismic Seawave Warning System. 

Inter-American Development Bank: 6th Meeting of Board of Gov- 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping 

International Sugar Council: 19th Session 

FAO/ECAFE Technical Meeting on Planning the Use of Land for 
Agricultural and Economic Development in Asia and the Far East. 

U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission (and its Ad Hoc Committee): 
17th Session. 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

ICEM Executive Committee: 25th Meeting 

SEATO MUitary Advisers: 22d Meeting 

North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Subcommittee on Oceanog- 

GATT Groups on Cereals, Meats, and Dairy Products 

SEATO Council of Ministers: 10th Meeting 

ICEM Council: 23d Session 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 10th Session 

Economic Commission for Latin America: 11th Session 

World Health Organization: 18th Assembly 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . . 

OECD Committee for Scientific Research: Consultative Group . . 

UNHCR Executive Committee: 13th Session 

UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences 

NATO Ministerial Council: 3tth Meeting 

OECD Committee for Scientific Research: 13th Session 

ICAO All- Weather Operations Panel 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 5th Session. 

International Conference on Petroleum and the Sea 

18th International Film Festival 

ECAFE Working Party on Housmg and Building Materials: 8th 

UPU Executive Council: Regular Session 

ECE Electric Power Committee: Meeting on Requirements for 
Electric Power. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 24th Plenary Meeting . 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review of U.S. 

International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee . . 

OAS Special Inter-American Conference 

ILO Governing Bodv: 162d Session 

WMO Executive Board: 36th Session 

U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, B\iilding and Planning: Working 
Party on Population and Housing Censuses. 

IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage 
Stability of Passenger and Cargo Sliips. 

FAO/WHO Committee of Government Experts on the Code of 
Principles Concerning Milk and Milk Products: 8th Session. 

International Seed Testing Association: 14th Congress 

WMO Executive Committee: 17th Session 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 
9th Session. 

FAO/OIE International Meeting on Hog Cholera and African Swine 

U.N. Committee on Scientific Effects of Atomic Radiation: 14th 

CENTO Co\incil for Scientific Education and Research 

U.N. Legal Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . 

OECD Economic Forecasters 

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions 

UNCTAD Interim Coordinating Committee for International Com- 
modity Arrangements. 

BIRPI Meeting for Revision of Bern Copyright Convention . . . 

NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee 

Central American Ministers of Government/Interior (Security) . . 

U.N. ECOSOC Special Committee on Coordination 

U.N. ECOSOC Special Fund: 14th Session of Governing CouncU . 

Honolulu Apr. 26-30 

Asunci6n Apr. 26-30 

London Apr. 26-30 

London Apr. 26-May 3 

Bangkok Apr. 26-May 5 

New York Apr. 26-May 1 

Paris Apr. 27-29 

Geneva Apr. 27-30 

London Apr. 28-30 

Vancouver, B.C .... April 

Geneva April 

London May 3-5 

Geneva May 3-7 

London May 3-7 

Santo Domingo .... May 4-8 

Geneva May 4-21 

Paris May 5-7 

Paris May 10 (1 day 

Geneva May 10-19 

New York May 10-28 

London May 11-13 

Paris May 11-13 

Montreal Mav 11-24 

New York Ma'y 11-31 

Monaco May 12-20 

Cannes May 12-27 

Bangkok May 13-21 

Bern May 14-22 

Istanbul May 17-22 

Washington May 17-30 

Paris May 18-19 

Washington May 18-22 

Rio de Janeiro .... May 20-June J 

Geneva May 21-29 

Geneva May 24-25 

Geneva May 24-27 

London May 24r-28 

Rome May 24-29 

Munich May 24- June 1 

Geneva May 27- June 1 

London May 31- June 4 

Rome May 31-June 5 

Geneva May 

London May 

New York or Geneva . May 

Paris May 

Geneva May 

London May 

Geneva May 

Paris May 

Panamd May 

New York June 1-7 

New York June 1-8 



Intemntioiuil Labor Conference: 49th Session 

UNICKF Committee on Administrativo Budget 

UNESCO/IOC Interaationnl Indian Ocean Expedition Coordina- 

UNICEF Program Committee 

IMCO Council: 14th Session 

ITU CCIR Study Groups I, II, III, V, VI 

OECD Committee for Agriculture at Ministerial Level 

UNESCO/IOC Bureau and Consultative Committee: 5th Session . 

Inter-American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly 

UNICEF Executive Board 

U.N. ECOSOC Technical .\ssistance Committee 

UNCT.\D Expert Group on Monetary and Financial Questions. . 

OECD Special Committee for Oil 

OECD Energy Committee 

FAO Council: 44th Session 

OECD Interim Science Committee 

ICAO .\ssembly: 15th Session 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 32d Session 

OECD Committee for Trade 

U.N. "iOth Anniversary Session 

ILO Governing Body : 162d Session 

Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 8th General 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 39th Session 

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel 

International Whahng Commission: 7th .\nnual Meeting 

I FAO .African Forestry Commission: 2d Session 

NATO Industrial Planning Committee 

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport . . 

NATO Science Committee 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 
15th .\nnual Meeting and Scientific Committee Meeting. 

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee 

GATT Trade and Development Committee 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Slinisterial Meeting . 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV 

OECD Tourism Committee 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 38th Session 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful L^ses of Outer Space 

Geneva June 2-24 

New York June 3-4 

Paris June 7-9 

New York June 

London June 

Geneva June 

Paris June 

Rome June 

Santiago June 

New York June 

Geneva June 

New York June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Rome June 

Paris June 

Montreal June 

New York June 

Paris June 

San Francisco June 

Geneva June 

Guatemala June 



9-July 9 






14- July 9 





22- July 19 




25 (1 day) 

25-July 10 

Geneva June 29-Aug. 6 

Paris June 

London June 

East Africa June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Halifax, N.S June 

Paris June 

Geneva June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Paris June 

Rome June 

New York June 

Security Council Recommends 
the Gambia for U.N. Membership 

'Statement by Charles W. Yost ^ 

Before making my statement on the .subject 
of our agenda, I sliould like to join in welcom- 
ing to the Council table the four new members: 
Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Uru- 
guay. Each one of these nations has already 
proved in and out of the United Nations that 
it is devoted to the causes of the charter and 
of world peace. We are certain that they will 
continue to give to this Council the benefit of 
fheir unique experience and keen devotion to 

'Made in the Security Council on Mar. 15 (U.S./ 
t'.X. press release 4514). Mr. Yost is Deputy U.S. 
Ilepresentative in the Security Cotincll. 

the difficult tasks which lie before us. 

We are happy, too, Mr. President [Arsons 
Assouan Usher] to welcome you as this month's 
Council President, and we trust that your ten- 
ure in this office will be as fruitful and as auspi- 
cious as on those previous occasions when you 
luid so effectively presided over our meetings. 

The United States is pleased to vote for the 
resolution now before the Council recommend- 
ing the admission of the Gambia to the United 

The Gambia's long historj', culminating with 
the achievement of independence on February 
18 of this year, has been one of an industrious 
people, enriched through its contact with sev- 
eral foreign cultures. The determination and 
sense of responsibility, the practice in democ- 
racy, with which the Gambian people have 

VPRIl, 5, 1965 


advanced toward independence will now serve 
her well in her efforts to achieve, despite the 
inherent difficulties which the distinguished 
representative of the United Kingdom has 
outlined, the full measure of her economic and 
political potential. We are happy to hear that 
just as the United Kingdom has assisted the 
Gambia to independence so it will pi-ovide eco- 
nomic aid to help the new state toward a stable 

The United States has long enjoyed cordial 
relations with the Gambia. It was, indeed, a 
special honor for us to be host to Prime Min- 
ister and Mrs. [D. K.] Jawara last year when 
they visited the United States for a month. 
This visit established a basis of friendship and 
understanding which we are confident will con- 
tinue to strengthen relations between our two 
countries. It reciprocated, in fact, a visit to 
the Gambia during "World War II of President 
Franklin Delano Koosevelt, who thus became 
the first American President to visit the Conti- 
nent of Africa. President Roosevelt's fii-st 
stop on that trip was Bathurst, and he stayed 
there both en route to and from the Casablanca 
conference in January 1943. 

In the ensuing years, exchanges of visits be- 
tween the Gambia and the United States have 
continued. Some 20 Gambians are studying 
here now. If I may be permitted to inject a 
personal note, Mr. President, my son is rooming 
at the university with -one of the Gambian stu- 
dents here. We hope that many more will come 
to the United States in the future. 

In the realm of world ati'airs, Prime Minister 
Jawara has left no doubt of the Gambia's will 
to contribute to the building of world peace. 
The United States welcomes the Gambia, there- 
fore, as a future member of the United Nations 
with the conviction tliat the Gambia's role in 
this body will be a positive and constructive 
one. In the important work which stands be- 
fore all of us, we wish her all success and 

"Tlie Ck)uncil on Mar. 15 unanimously recommended 
that the Gambia be admitted to membership in the 
United Nations. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such a 
those listed below) may 6e consulted at depository I 
braries in the United States. V.N. printed publicc 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of th 
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Report of the United National Conference on Trad 
and Development. Report of the Advisory Commi 
tee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions o 
the administrative and financial implications of th 
recommendations in the Final Act relating to inst 
tutional machinery. A/5837. December 18, 100- 
11 pp. 

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade an 
Development. Note by the Secretary-General sul 
mitting the text of a letter dated November 25 froi 
the Director General of the International Labor 0: 
fice. A/5838. December 18, IQM. 3 pp. 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Le 
ters dated September 30, December 22, and Decen 
ber 23 from the Representative of the United Stat« 
concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond b 
the United States. A/AC.105/INF.79, October ' 

1964, 2 pp. ; A/AC.105/INP.85, December 30, 1964, 
pp.; A/AC.105/INF.86, December 30, 1964, 2 pp. 
A/AC.105/INF. 87, December 30, 1964, 2 pp. 

Election of non-permanent members of the Securlt 
Council. Letter dated December 30 from the Repri 
sentative of Indonesia regarding the new compositio 
of the Security Council of which Malaysia has bi 
come a non-permanent member. A/5844. January ' 

1965. 1 p. 

Assistance in cases of natural disaster. Report of tb 
Secretary-General. A/5845. January 5, 1965. 14 pj 

Security Council 

Letter dated January 4 from the Representative of Ttu 
key regarding the continued circulation of "entirel 
fabricated rumors" about Turki-sh Cypriot activitie 
by the Greek and Greek Cypriot press. S/613' 
January 4, lOO.j. 3 pp. 

Letter dated January 5 from the Rejiresentative of th 
Democratic Republic of the Coii'^vi informing th 
Council of the seizure by Congolese military author: 
ties of "two lorries of Soviet manufacture carryin 
machine-guns of Chinese origin destined for th 
Congolese rebellion." S/6138. January 5, 196! 
1 p. 

Letter dated January 5 from the Acting Representativ 
of Thailand refuting Cambodian charges (S/6132 
of a violation of Cambodian territorial waters by . 
Thai police boat. S/6139. January 6, 1965. 1 i 

Letter dated January 7 from the Representative o 
Malaysia regarding the of the threat o 
more intensive attacks against Malaysij 
in 1965. S/6140. January 7, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated .January 7 from the Acting Representativ 
of Thailand prote.'^ting the seizure of a Thai flshin; 
boat and the killing of four of its crew members b: 
an armed group of Cambodian soldiers who entere( 
Thai territorial waters on a previou.sly capture( 
Thai fishing boat. S/6141. January 7, 1965. 1 p 




/Urrent Actions 


lorth Atlantic Treaty — Atomic Information 

igreemeut between the parties to the North Atlantic 
I Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic informa- 
) don. Done at Paris June IS, 1964. 
Voliflcation received that it is willing to he hound 
by terms of the agreement: Federal Republic of 
Germany, March 12, 1965. 
Entered into forec: March 12, 196o. 
kgreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooi)eration regarding atomic informa- 
tion. Done at Paris June 22, 19.55. Entered into 
force March 29. 1956. TIAS 3521. 
Terminated: March 12. 19G5 (superseded by agree- 
ment of June 18, 19G4, supra). 


;onvention of Union of Paris of March 20, 18S3, for 
the protection of industrial property, revised at Brus- 
sels December 14. 1900, at Wa.shington June 2, 1911, 
at The Hague November 6, 1025, and at London June 
2, 19;}4. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered 
into force August 1, 1938. TS 941. 
Notification that they consider themselves hound: 
Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, March 6, 1965. 

.'onTention of Union of Paris for the protection of in- 
du.strial property of March 30, IS.SS, revised at Brus- 
sels December 14, 19<^K), at Washington June 2, 1911, 
at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 
1934. and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lis- 
bon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 
1962. TIAS 4931. 

Notification that they consider themselves hound: 
Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, March 6, 1965. 


.nternational telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United 
States October 23. 1!K>1. TIAS 4892. 
Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, January 19, 


declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva November 18, 1900. Entered into force 
October 14, 1962. TIAS 51.S4. 
Signature: Spain, December 31, 1964. 

Declaration on provisional accession of the United 
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1902. En- 
tered into force for the United States May 3, 1963. 
TIAS .5300. 

Signature: Iceland, January 28, 1965. 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, 
December IS, 1904. 

Second proci^s-verbal extending period of validity of 
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to 

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of No- 
vember 18, 1900, as extended (TIAS 5184, .'5266). 
Done at Geneva October 30, 1!H>4. Entered into 
force for the United States December 18, 1964. 
TIAS 5733. 

Acceptances deposited: Australia, January 6, 1965; 
Austria,' January 4, 1965; Belgium, December 21, 
19C>4; Brazil, January 22, 1965; Chile, January 6, 
1965 ; Denmark, December 23, 1964 ; Finland, De- 
cember 30, 19G4 ; France, December 14, 1964 ; 
Japan, December 28, 1904 ; Pakistan, January 18, 
1905 ; South Africa, December 30, 1964 ; Spain, De- 
cember 31, 1904 ; Sweden, December 1.5, 1964 ; 
Turkey, December 30, 19(54 ; United Kingdom, 
December 21, 1964. 
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional 
accession of United Arab Republic to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 
1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 
19<>4. Entered into force for the United States De- 
cember 18, 1964. TIAS 5732. 

Acceptances deposited: France, December 14, 1964; 
Sweden, December 15, 1964 ; Belgium, United King- 
dom, December 21, 19(54 ; Denmark, December 23, 
1904 ; Japan, December 28, 1964 ; Finland, Spain, 
Turkey, December 30, 1904 ; Australia, Chile, Jan- 
uary 6, 1965; Pakistan, January 18, 1965; Brazil, 
January 22, 1965 ; Iceland, January 28, 1965. 
Second proc&s-verbal extending the declaration on pro- 
visional accession of Switzerland to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 
1958, as extended (TIAS 4401, 4957). Done at 
Geneva October 30, 1904. Entered into force for 
the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734. 
Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many," Sweden, December 10, 19(54 ; France, Decem- 
ber 14, 19(54 ; Norway, December 17, 1964 ; Belgium, 
United Kingdom, December 21, 1964 ; Denmark, 
December 23, 1964 ; Japan, December 28, 1964 ; Fin- 
land, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, December 30, 
19(54 : Cuba, December 31, 1904 ; Austria,' January 
4. 1905 : Chile, January 6, 1965 : Peru, January 8, 
1965; Pakistan, January 18, 1965; Brazil, Janu- 
ary 22, 19(i5. 
Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force for the 
United States November 20, 1904. TIAS .5687. 
Signatures: Chile,' January 6, 1965; Greece, Febru- 
ary 15. 1965 ; Italy, February 2, 1965 ; Luxembourg, 
February 9. 1905; Peru, January 8, 1905; Spain, 
January 7, 1905; Turkey, February 1, 1965; Yugo- 
slavia, December 15, 1964. 



Agreement extending the loan of certain naval vessels 
to Argentina under the agreement of March 4 and 
April 1, 1960, as amended (TIAS 445.5, 4(i,'53). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires Febru- 
ary 1 and 17, 1965. Entered into force February 17, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of December 7, 1904 (TIAS 5727). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Nairobi February 15, 
1965. Entered into force February 15, 1905. 

' Subject to ratification. 

iPRIL 5, 1965 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington, D.G., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Se^-vices, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government oflicials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular otficers, and, in some cases, a 
selected bibliography. Those listed below are avail- 
able at 5<t each. 

Afghanistan. Pub. 7795. 8 pp. 

Communist China. Pub. 7751. 6 pp. 

Congo (Leopoldville). Pub. 7793. 8 pp. 

El Salvador. Pub. 7794. 4 pp. 

Ethiopia. Pub. 7785. 6 pp. 

Guatemala. Pub. 7798. 4 pp. 

Peru. Pub. 7799. 5 pp. 

Spain. Pub. 7800. 4 pp. 

Venezuela. Pub. 7749. 8 pp. 

The Battle Act Report 1964. Seventeenth report to 
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense As- 
sistance Control Act of 1951. Pub. 7736. General 
Foreign Policy series 196. 89 pp. 35^. 

Policy, Persistence, and Patience— An Interview With 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, with mi- 
nor editorial changes, of a National Broadcasting Co. 
television program which was broadcast on January 3, 
1965. Pub. 7809. General Foreign Policy series 199* 
32 pp. 20(f . 

Military Missions to Chile. Agreement with Chile, 
uniting and replacing the Air Force and Naval Mis- 
sions Agreements of February 15, 1951, as extended 
and amended, and the Army Mi.ssion Agreement of 
November 15, 1956. Exchange of notes— Dated at 
Santiago October 27, 1964. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 27, 1964. TIAS 5683. 14 pp. 10(f. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Yugoslavia— Signed at Belgrade 
October 28, 19C4. Entered into force October 28, 19&1 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 50^. 7 pp. 10<». 
Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Yugoslavia— Signe<l at Belgrade 
October 29, 1964. Entered into force October 29, 1964 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5685. 6 pp. 5<f. 
Guaranty of Private Investments. Agreement with 
Liberia, supplementing the agreement of September 6 
and 12, 1960. Exchange of notes— Signed at Monrovia 
September 26 and 29, 19ftl. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 29, 1964. TIAS 5686. 3 pp. 5(J. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declara- 
tion on Provisional Accession of Iceland to agreement 
of October 30, 1947— Done at Geneva March 5. 19&1 
Entered into force with respect to the United States 
and Iceland November 21, 1964. TIAS 5687. 9 pp 

Fisheries— King Crab. Agreement with Japan. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Washington November 25, 
1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964. TIAS 
5688. 5 pp. 5^. 

Education— Commission for Educational Exchange and 
Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with 
Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade November 9, 1904. 
Entered into force November 9, 1964. TIAS 5689. 
5 pp. 5?. 

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Informa- 
tion for Defense Purposes— Filing Classified Patent 
Applications. Agreement with Sweden. Exchange of 
notes— Signed at Washington October 20 and Novem- 
ber 17, 1964. Entered into force November 17. 1964 
TIAS 5690. 6 pp. 5(}. 

Extradition. Treaty and Additional Protocol with 

Brazil — Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 13, 1961, 

and June 18, 1962, respectively. Entered into force 
December 17, 1964. TIAS 5691. 22 pp. 150. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement, with Annex, with 
Uruguay — Signed at Montevideo December 14, 1946. 
Entered into force provisionally December 14, 1946 
TIAS. 5692. 13 pp. 10(f. 

Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with United Kingdom— Signed at Washington 
June 29, 1964. Entered into force December 4, 1964 
TIAS 5693. 2 pp. 5<f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece, 
amending the agreement of October 30, 1963, as 
amended. Exchange of notes— Signed at Athens No- 
vember 16, 1064. Entered into force November 16, 
1064. TIAS 5604. 2 pp. 54. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Greece — Signed at Athens November 
17. 1904. Entered into force November 17, 1964. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 5695. 8 pp. 10«t. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Iran— Signed at Tehran November 16, 
1964. Entered into force November 16, 1964. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 5696. 6 pp. 5(f. 
Desalination. Agreement with U.S.S.R.— Signed at 
Moscow November 18, 1964. Entered into force No- 
vember 18, 1964. TIAS 5697. 4 pp. 5tf. 

Exchange of OfiBcial Publications. Agreement with 
Ethiopia. Exchange of notes— Signed at Addis Ababa 
November 25. 1964. Entered into force November 25. 
1964. TIAS 5698. 4 pp. 54. 

Maritime Matters— Use of Italian Ports and Terri- 
torial Waters by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with 
Italy— Signed at Rome November 23, 1964. Entered 
into force November 23, 1964. TIAS 5699. 14 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, 
amending the agreement of May 22, loas, as amended. 
Exchange of notes— Signed at Conakry July 1 and 11. 
1964. Entered into force July 11, 1964. TIAS 5700. 
3 pp. 54. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Chile, amending the agreement of 
August 7, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes- 
Signed at Santiago November 17. 1964. Entered into 
force November 17, 1964. TIAS 5702. 3 pp. 54. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Turkey, sup- 
plementing the agreements of November 15. 10.51, and 
January 15, 1957. Exchange of notes— Signed at 
Ankara November 27, 1964. Entered into force No- 
vember 27, 1964. TIAS 5704. 3 pp. 54. 



<DEX April. 5, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 134S 

nerican Principles. The Role of Emerging 
Nations in World Politics (Rostow) .... 492 


•le Role of Emerging Nations In World Politics 

(Rostow) 492 

lal Countermeasures to Communist Threat 
(Green) 489 


onflrmations (Kotschnig, Meyer, Porter) . . 497 

ireign Aid and the Balance of Payments 

(Bell) 498 

)reign Assistance Program for 1966 (Rusk) . 482 
■esident Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota 

In Monetary Fund 507 

•ade and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith 
Johnson) 502 

epartment and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions 1 Kotschnig, Meyer, Porter) 497 

.•onomic Affairs 
reign Aid and the Balance of Payments 

Hell) 498 

•esident of EEC Commission Meets With Presi- 
dent Johnson (joint communique) 491 

•esident Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota 

in Monetary Fund 507 

'le Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics 
(Rostow) 492 

'•ade and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith 
Johnson) 502 

' jrope 

■•■"ident of EEC Commission Meets With Presi- 

nt Johnson (joint communique) 491 

Hole of Emerging Nations in World Politics 
l; i I .u) 492 

uilf and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith 
I Johnson) 502 

>reign Aid 

)reign Aid and the Balance of Payments 

(Bell) 498 

ireign .Assistance Program for 1966 (Rusk) . . 482 
^e Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics 
(Rostow) 492 

imbia. Security Council Recommends the 
GamMa for U.N. Membership (Yost) . . . . 511 

itemational Organizations and Conferences 
Uendar of International Conferences .... 509 
•esident Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in 
Monetary Fund 507 

an. Meyer confirmed as Ambassador .... 497 

area. Korean Foreign Minister Holds Talks 
With Se<retary Rusk (joint statement) . . . 491 

;banon. Porter confirmed as Ambassador . . 497 
residential Documents 

resident of EEC Commission Meets With Presi- 
dent Johnson 491 

resident Reaffirms U.S. Goal of Peace In South- 
east Asia 488 

resident Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota 

In Monetary Fund 507 

ubiications. Recent Releases 514 

hailand. TTial Countermeasures to Commu- 
nist Threat (Green) 489 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 513 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Regrets That Soviets Do Not 

Support Viet-Nam Accords (statement) . . . 489 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 512 

Kotschnig confirmed as U.S. representative to 

21st session of ECAFE 497 

Security Council Recommends the Gambia for 

U.N. Membership (Yost) 511 


President Reaffirms U.S. Goal of Peace in South- 
east Asia 488 

Secretary Regrets That Soviets Do Not Support 

Viet-Nam Accords (statement) 489 

Name Index 

Bell, David E 498 

Green, Marshall 489 

Hallstein, Walter 491 

Johnson, G. Griffith 502 

Johnson, President 488,491,507 

Kotschnig, Walter M 497 

Lee, Tong Won 491 

Meyer, Armin H 497 

Porter, Dwight J 497 

Rostow, W. W 492 

Rusk, Secretary 482,489,491 

Yost, Charles W 511 

Check List of Department off State 
Press Releases: March 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, WashiuKton, 
D.C.. 20.-)20. 

Release issued prior to March 15 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulx£TIN is No. 38 of March U. 

No. Date Subject 

t42 3/16 Ball : "The Danger of Nostalgia" 
(with minor editorial revisions). 

43 3/16 G. Griffith Johnson : statement before 

Senate Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Finance. 

44 3/15 Rostow : "The Role of Emerging Na- 

tions in World Politics." 

45 3/17 Joint statement by Rusk and Korean 

Foreign Minister. 

•46 3/18 Lewis sworn in as Ambassador to 
Mauritania (biographic details). 

•47 3/18 Moore sworn in as Ambassador to 
Mall (biographic details). 

t48 3/18 Williams: "U.S. Policy in Africa." 

•49 3/18 Mann sworn in as Under Secretary 
for Economic Affairs (biographic 

•50 3/18 Harrlman sworn in as Ambassador 
at Large (biographic details). 

t51 3/19 Rostow; "United States Policy To- 
ward Europe." 

•52 3/19 MacArtbur sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Congressional Rela- 
tions (biographic details). 

•Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Buli-etiw. 

I.I. «oyiiili>ciiT f«i»Ti«s opriciiiiM 



o:.b-oEc G 


BOX 286 



Foreign Relations of the United States 
1943, Volume V, The American Republics 

Tho Department of State recently released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume 
2'he American Republics. This volume contains documentation on the regional wartime diploma 
of the American states and on the relations of the United States with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, a: 

Of particular interest in volume V are the compilations dealing with the efforts of the Unit 
States to assure the defense of the hemisphere, to discourage commercial and financial transactions wi 
the Axis Powers, and to induce tho American Republics to declare war on the Axis Powers or, at lea 
to sever dii)lomatic relations with them. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^3, Volwme V, The American Republics (pii 
lication 7813) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfB 
Washinglon, D.C., 20402, for $3.25 each. 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, oliooU, or money order pay- 
able to Supt of Documents) 

PUBLICATION 7813 $3.25 

Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United Statei, 

I'JliS, Volume 7, The American Rcpuhlies. 



Clir, STATE 

\ ^ 







MAY 2 4 IBbb 


11'- hy Under Secretary Ball 532 


by Assistant Secretary Williams 639 

Special Article by David H. Popper 518 

For index see inside back cover 

April ^ marked the 16th anniversary of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. This special article, written for the 
Bulletin by the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and 
Military Affairs, describes how the NATO nations have moved 
beyond a military alliance and applied the techniques of coop- 
eration to translate their common interest into com/mon action. 

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment 

by David E. Popper 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
not the oldest of our collective defense arrange- 
ments, but in many ways it is the most impor- 
tant. Its 15 member states, for all their differ- 
ences, constitute a loose-knit Atlantic commu- 
nity encompassing the bulk of the wealth and 
strength of the free world. Its partisans hold 
it, with much justice, to be far more than a sim- 
ple defense pact. In this sense the term "the 
alliance," by which it goes in Western diplo- 
matic circles, is something of a misnomer — a 
word which, to be sure, describes its fundamental 
purpose but is far from being all-inclusive. 

As it reaches its 16th anniversary, NATO is 
clearly approaching a time of testing. The post- 
World War II era in which it was created seems 
irretrievably past. That era has been succeeded 
by an age with new dimensions, many of which 
have in large part been shaped by the existence 
of NATO itself. Because the alliance meets a 
vital security need for its participants, it will 
continue; but we cannot be sure precisely how 
it will be adapted to the circumstances of the 

Stark necessity provided the impetus for con- 
clusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. 


The Department of State BuUetln, a 
weekly ptibltcatlun Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and Interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is Included concerning treaties 
and International agreements to which 
the United States Is or may become a 
party and treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial In the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 
20402. Price : 52 Issues, domestic JIO, 
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds tor printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 

NOTB : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and Items contained 
herein may be reprinted. Citation of th« 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin 
Is Indexed In the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Victory in war had not been succeeded by a tran- 
luil peace. Instead, weak, war-ravaged West- 
'ni European states found themselves threat- 
•ned by the Soviet absorption of Eastern Europe 
ind the rising temper of the cold war. Tlie 
ilarm signals of a menacing communism went 
)ut from Berlin to Greece and Turkey. The 
Qnited States, which for the second time in a 
^neration had just attested with its blood the 
•elationship of the freedom of Western Europe 
o its own security, again faced a challenge to its 
safety across the Atlantic. 

Tiie situation cried out for common action in 
he common interest, and for leadership to give 
hat interest concrete form. As a beginning, the 
iVestern European states organized themselves 
meet immediate military problems. Apply- 
ng its great residual strength, the United States 
)roclaimed its intention to resist aggression. It 
provided a new economic underpinning for Eu- 
■ope through the Marshall Plan. And it joined 
vith Canada and its European partners to set 
he capstone on a North Atlantic association of 
ree nations dedicated to the preservation of 
heir collective welfare and security. 

The Treaty signed by 12 North Atlantic na- 
ions at Washington on April 4, 1949, was thus 
n large part a defensive response to external 
■ressure. It was and has remained an instru- 
iient for collective defense, created pursuant to 
he license provided by article 51 of the United 
s'ations Charter, which recognizes such defense 
IS an inherent right. 

The purposes of the Treaty have never been 
iggressive or expansionist. The area it em- 
)races has been extended through the adherence 
if Greece and Turkey and of the Federal Re- 
)ublic of Germany. It has been diminished 
hrough the separation of Algeria from metro- 

Utan France. It forms today an Atlantic 
irhborhood of relative stability in a turbulent 


NATO has been a cornerstone of the security 

licies of its members since its inception. And 

has proved its utility. There have been no 

'inmunist territorial gains in the NATO area. 

he military strength of the participants has 
•een pooled, for defensive purposes and such 
(urposes alone. Our own defense frontier has 
n effect been moved to the Iron Curtain line. 

Western nuclear power has been brought to bear 
in Europe, in a carefully controlled and co- 
ordinated manner. 

More broadly, NATO military arrangements 
have made it possible for the energies of free 
Germany to be linked in constructive coopera- 
tion with those of its ex-enemies in the West, in 
a vigorous and democratic Western Europe. 
NATO strength has provided a shelter within 
which European economic recovery has taken 
place, and a solid base for Europe's dynamic and 
increasingly integrated economy. It has sus- 
tained the Western-oriented societies of Greece 
and Turkey. Perhaps most important, NATO 
has epitomized and bolstered the Atlantic part- 
nership in the protection and advancement of 
common free-world interests. 

NATO and Its Problems 

Like any significant political organism, the 
alliance is constantly faced with difficult prob- 
lems and hard choices. Some of these are the 
result of its own success. NATO has never been 
stronger than it is today. The NATO nations 
have never been so prosperous, and within the 
NATO area they have never felt more secure. 
Historically, alliances have flourished under the 
pressures produced by a common external 
threat; they have fallen apart when these pres- 
sures were — or seemed to have been — removed. 
NATO is not automatically immune to such dis- 
integrating tendencies. Its members may find 
it difficult to recall that, thougli common action 
for common purposes is seldom easy, it is in the 
long run the only feasible method of coping with 
the problems of an increasingly interdependent 

NATO leaders know that continued unity and 
vigilance are required if the gains they have 
made are not to be jeopardized. They know 
that it is the strength of the North Atlantic 
nations that has reduced the probability of ag- 
gression against their territories. They under- 
stand that despite improved political and 
economic relations with the Soviet bloc coun- 
tries — a desirable objective in itself — it has not 
been possible to negotiate arms control or Euro- 
pean security arrangements which would reduce 
the need for a strong and integrated defense. 

.PRTL 12, 1965 


The ultimate objectives of the Communist world 
have not changed. Thus, in a minimal sense, 
NATO represents the kind of insurance a pru- 
dent man maintains even when he believes him- 
self to be in the best of health. 

The Treaty and the Organization 

To understand NATO and its problems, one 
must start with the realization that the Western 
alliance exists, as it were, on two levels. There 
is, first, the North Atlantic Treaty: a legally 
binding document which commits each of the 
signatory states to regard an attack upon one 
of them in the Nortli Atlantic area as an attack 
against them all, and to respond by taking nec- 
essary action, including the use of anned force, 
to restore and maintain security. 

The Treaty has other, more general provisions 
directed toward achievement of broader objec- 
tives. These have to do with the peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes; the strengthening of the 
free institutions of the parties; their stability 
and well-being; economic collaboration; and 
other, similarly important matters. 

But the heart of the Treaty is the collective 
defense obligation. The Treaty is not limited 
in time. Since 1959, however — 10 years after its 
signature — it has been open to review. In 1969 — 
after 20 years — any i^arty may denounce it and 
withdraw on 1 year's notice. The Treaty would 
then continue in effect among the remaining 
parties. Contrary to some popular impressions, 
it would not expire. 

One article of the Treaty jirovides for the es- 
tablishment of a Comicil, able to meet promptly 
at any time, to consider matters concerning the 
implementation of the Treaty. (It can, in fact, 
meet on an hour's notice.) The Council is di- 
rected to set up such subordinate bodies as may 
be necessary, in particular a Defense Committee. 
Beyond this, the Treaty is silent on organiza- 

What was agreed in 1949, therefore, was a 
not unusual type of postwar alliance, within the 
framework of the United Nations, for collective 
defense. In this sense NATO did not differ 
radically from other alliances we had formed 
or have subsequently organized. The North At- 
lantic Treaty does not call for any special meas- 
ures of integration, and certainly not for vest- 

ing supranational functions in Internationa 

Without breaching this limitation, the mem 
bers of the alliance have responded to their se 
curity needs by building up an organizationa 
structure which sustains military arrangements 
of unusual power. This represents, as it were 
a second level of de facto international agree 
ment. It is a structure which could not hav( 
been organized without a limited degree of mil 
itary integration. The structure was built witl 
the assent of all NATO members, and it func 
tions because the members tacitly recognize thai 
its existence is a prime condition for the mainte 
nance of adequate defensive strength. 

NATO machinery operates on the basis o1 
consensus : In practice no NATO nation is obli 
gated to take any specific action or step in whicl 
it does not acquiesce. It is a tribute to the sensf 
of cooperation and mutual restraint which has 
existed in the Atlantic area that, over 16 years 
the word "veto" has not been current in NATC 
terminology. Differences have been resolvec 
by consultation, because all parties have beei 
motivated by a common aim. 

The life of the alliance resides as much ii 
the way its agencies function as in the legal skel 
eton of the Treaty itself. The tone is set b; 
its principal deliberative body, the North At 
lantic Council — a body which sits at the NATC 
Headquarters in Paris. High-level ambassa 
dors represent each of the parties on the Coun 
cil in its permanent sessions. Top policymaking 
officials from the governments of the NATC 
nations journey frequently to Paris for discus 
sion of particular issues of interest. And at thi 
NATO summit, so to speak, there are regulai 
semiannual meetings of NATO foreign min 
isters, in many of which NATO defense and fi 
nance ministers also participate. 

The Council and its subordinate committees- 
committees which deal with political, economic 
military, and related matters — are supported bj 
an expert international staff'. Heading the stat 
is the NATO Secretary General (now Ambassa 
dor Manlio Brosio of Italy), who presides ovei 
the Council and who speaks for the NATO or 
ganization in a unique way. 

Since its representatives speak for govern 
ments, the Council is at the apex of the NATC 




.April 1949 -April 1965 

Treaty Powers 

iiKiiiie. It lias a professional military coun- 
•rpart in tlie NATO Militarj- Committee, which 

i> in Washington (where it maintains close 

tact with U.S. military authorities). All 

VTO members except Iceland, which has no 

ined forces, are represented permanently on 
,ie Military Committee, by very high-ranking 
lilitary oflicers. The military Chiefs of Staff 
f the Xx\.TO nations meet periodically in the 

"Himittee. The executive agent of the Mili- 
iry Committee is the Standing Group, com- 
osed of United States, United Kingdom, and 
"rench representatives. higher military 
iithorities supervise and direct in a general 

ay the entire XATO military operation. 

he Military Strength of NATO 

NATO's military strength resides not .so 
lucji in tlie cumulative totals of its members' 
ailitarj- manpower and weapons, tremendous 
lough these are, as in the way in which these 

-ources are organized to act effectively in case 
t need. In pre-atomic wars, even under Blitz- 
ntg conditions, nations could buy time by sur- 

rendering space. Geography and tlie limits of 
offensive power gave them the opportunity to 
work out ways in wliich they could cooperate, 
as allies, in the drive to victory. Combined 
commands could be set up after wai-s began, 
sometimes — in fortunate circumstances — on the 
basis of professional military staff conversa- 
tions which had taken place in time of peace. 

In the missile age, this approach to warfare 
is utterly anachronistic. The societj^ of any 
nation could be destroyed in a matter of min- 
utes. Victory in a thermonuclear exchange is 
likely to be a worthless reward. Survival de- 
pends on a level of strength sufficient to deter 
attack — on a capacity for military response 
sufficient to prevent small outbreaks of violence 
from escalating to catastrophic proportions. 
Time is of the essence. Both deterrence and de- 
fense depend critically on the existence of fixed 
advance plans and on a firm assurance that 
specific military elements can be counted upon 
to fulfill their missions as soon as that becomes 

In these circumstances an exclusively individ- 

I'RIL 12, 1965 


ual national approach to defense problems is 
bound to be risky. In the cramped and 
crowded area of Western Europe it is quite ir- 
rational. Accordingly, the NATO nations have 
devised a system for a coordinated military re- 
sponse to meet aggression. It is a system which 
will produce the desired results without dilut- 
ing the national character of the military units 

The outstanding features of the NATO de- 
fense structure are the voluntary commitment 
of national forces to the defense of NATO, the 
organization in time of peace of integrated 
higher commands, and the development of siz- 
able commonly funded and operated facilities 
to support the NATO forces. 

The committed forces represent the first 
echelons of NATO defense. Their total 
strength is very considerable. Some of these 
forces are assigned to NATO. These include 
land and air forces on the continent of Europe, 
including tactical air forces. American and 
Canadian forces are strongly represented in this 
category, as well as units of other NATO na- 
tions. Their training in peacetime and their 
military operations in war are a NATO respon- 
sibility, but the forces remain under national 
control for administration and discipline; and 
they receive their logistic support from national 

A second category of forces is earmarked, 
rather than assigned. Member countries have 
agreed that these forces would be placed at the 
disposal of NATO commanders in the event 
of mobilization or war. Naval forces in the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean fall within this 
category. Still other forces of the NATO na- 
tions remain under full national command, for 
the defense of the NATO area. Forces may, of 
course, be withdrawn from cominitment for 
emergency or other national purposes. The 
practice is not uncommon, but most of the with- 
drawals are relatively small and are temporary 
in nature. 

To round out their arsenal, NATO-committed 
forces include certain nuclear delivery sys- 
tems, mostly of shorter range, in the hands of 
a number of the allies. Under the NATO 
stockpile arrangement, nuclear warheads are 
provided for these systems by the United States 

but are retained in American custody, as re- 
quired by United States law, until their release 
is authorized. The United States Strategic Air 
Command is not committed to NATO, but plans 
for the use of NATO-committed nuclear forces 
and the missiles and planes of SAC are very 
closely coordinated. 

Control of the NATO-committed military 
panoply rests in a group of integrated NATO 
commands which represent the physical author- 
ity of NATO in a tangible way. These com- 
mands are truly international. Within them 
the staff officers of 14 nations prepare military 
plans and work in other ways to enhance the 
effectiveness of the imits they lead. Thi-ough 
periodic maneuvers and exercises, both com- 
mands and miits acquire the habit of coopera- 
tion for alliance purposes. A small but impor- 
tant new Allied Mobile Force of ground and 
air units contributed by a number of allies is 
prepared for quick movement by air to the 
northern (Scandinavian) or southeastern 
(Greek-Turkish) flank for NATO military ac- 
tion in case of need. 

The best known of the commands is the Allied 
Command Europe, whose headquarters 
(SHAPE) is located just outside Paris. Its 
Supreme Commander (SACEUR) has always 
been an American of the most distinguished 
character. The present commander, Gen. Ly- 
man L. Lemnitzer, is a worthy successor to his 
great American predecessors: Generals Eisen- 
hower, Gruenther, and Norstad. Similarly 
distinguished American admirals have com- 
manded the Allied Command Atlantic, with 
its headquarters at Norfolk, Va. Equally 
worthy British admirals have headed the Allied 
Conunand Channel at London. 

All of these commands operate through sub- 
ordinate international commands situated at 
strategic points within the NATO area. Cana- 
dian-United States regional defense plans are 
made by a bilateral Regional Planning Group. 

The NATO forces are supported by a sys- 
tem of commonly built and owned facilities — 
graced by the name of "infrastructure" — wliich 
enables military units to operate effectively in 
time of war. Infrastructure includes airfields, 
depots, pipelines, port facilities, and communi- 
cations networks ; and the investment in infi'a- 



stnicture now totals billions of dollars. A re- 
lated NATO undertaking is a new NATO air de- 
fense ground control system, which will enable 
hostile aircraft to be located and intercepted 
by NATO planes and missiles with the neces- 
sary supersonic speeds and accuracy; this alone 
will involve a $300 million expenditure, largely 
for sophisticated electronic equipment to be 
^supplied by a number of NATO countries. 
Progress has also been made in standardizing 
the equipment of NATO-committed forces. 
NATO nations tend to construct or to purchase 
only a limited number of specific types of costly 
equipment, such as planes, armored vehicles, 
and missile systems. Some of these are manu- 
factured by NATO consortia; that is, by co- 
operative arrangements in whicli the production 
facilities of a number of NATO countries are 
joined. The same principle applies on the 
technological military frontier. .Joint research 
and development projects involving two or 
more NATO nations are common. 

Some NATO Military Problems 

This recital of NATO military strength 
should not obscure the existence of serious mili- 
tary problems. Even after 16 years, the NATO 
nations are not yet fully adjusted to the con- 
straints of close cooperation, in which conflict- 
ing interests must be reconciled for the common 

There are, for example, problems of strategic 
<loctrine. Some European countries maintain 
iliat the only way to deter Communist aggres- 
sion against NATO Europe is to make it plain 
to the adversary that any substantial attack 
on his part will be met with a crushing strategic 
nuclear response — in effect, with full-scale re- 
taliation by strategic nuclear forces. This has 
long been a prevailing view in NATO circles. 
The logical corollary of this doctrine is that 
there is little point in spending large sums on 
massive, conventional aj-med forces to fight a 
lengthy or widespread nonnuclear war. 

In recent years American strategists have 
moved away from this type of approach. It is, 
of course, acknowledged that if NATO is sub- 
jected to all-out aggression, it must and will be 
defended by whatever means may be nece.ssary, 
including the fuU use of our nuclear strength. 

At the same time, we believe that sizable non- 
nuclear forces must be maintained in readiness, 
to deal with less extensive hostilities which 
might begin in unforeseen and unpremeditated 
ways. If wo could not check such outbreaks 
with ready forces equipped with conventional 
weapons, we might immediately be compelled to 
choose between surrender and the incineration 
of the Northern Hemisphere in an apocalyptic 
nuclear exchange. 

Debate on this and similar problems con fronts 
NATO military and political leaders with some 
very hard and fundamental realities. Few 
issues provoke greater recalcitrance or are more 
resistant to compromise. And yet, while the 
professional discussion continues through the 
years, the actual NATO force posture, what- 
ever its insufficiencies, continues to represent a 
massive deterrent to any military adventure 
anywhere in the NATO area. On the Central 
European front alone, the Germans are ap- 
proaching a strength of 12 divisions assigned to 
NATO ; the United States maintains the equiv- 
alent of 6 divisions ; the United Kingdom, 3 ; the 
French, 2 ; and other allies, smaller forces. The 
NATO strength in aircraft and in naval units 
is at least a match for any likely opposition. 

Thus, while NATO experts wrestle with the 
problem of adjusting NATO forces to an agi-eed 
and realistic strategic concept, NATO forces re- 
main an effective shield for the alliance. 

There is also the question of the organization 
of the alliance's nuclear strength. Originally 
NATO relied almost completely on the Ameri- 
can Strategic Air Command ; and for strategic 
protection — that is, possible retaliatory attack 
on targets in the heartland of an aggressor — 
American strategic forces still afford the bulk 
of NATO's protection. 

Some members of the alliance are quite con- 
tent to see this situation persist. Others, how- 
ever, believe that they have reached a stage 
at which they should have a greater share in 
meeting the alliance's nuclear responsibilities. 
They are, after all, within range of hundreds 
of Soviet missiles aimed against them. Yet it 
is difficult to spread the burden of nuclear de- 
fense without creating dangerous, expensive, 
and wasteful separate national nuclear forces. 
Anything we did to encourage such forces could 

APRIL 12, 1965 


not fail greatly to increase the risk of nuclear 


This is a thorny problem. We have moved to 
meet the desire for shared responsibility in a 
number of ways. As indicated above, we have 
provided some of our allies with shorter range 
nuclear delivery systems, retaining the nuclear 
warheads themselves under our custody in time 
of peace. We have worked out agreed general 
guidelines on the conditions under which nu- 
clear weapons might have to be used for the 
defense of NATO. We have imparted to our 
allies a great deal of information on nuclear 
warfare. We have worked with SACEUR's 
representatives, at Omaha, to coordinate plans 
for the use of NATO and United States nuclear 
delivery systems in the event of hostilities. 

Most recently, we have explored the pos- 
sibility of meeting European desires for gi'eater 
nuclear responsibility through the creation of 
some form of collective nuclear force in which 
European manpower and resources could phiy 
a part within the alliance — without creating the 
dangerous new independent centers of nuclear 
decisionmaking we should like to avoid. Sucli 
an integrated force is still under discussion. Its 
political and military complexities have not yet 
been unraveled. But it could provide a solu- 
tion to what is perhaps NATO's critical military 
problem, in a way Avhich would meet the honor- 
able concerns of all. 

Finally, as in any common enterprise, there is 
the problem of distributing the burden of de- 
fense equitably. There is no perfect solution for 
this problem and no simple unit of measure- 
ment. Defense is incredibly and increasingly 
expensive. Precisely how heavily a given in- 
crement weighs upon a nation's economy can be 
a subject for interminable argument. Clearly, 
however, gross disproportions in effort and out- 
lays relative to national economic capability are 
a source of dissatisfaction, which allies must 
seek to minimize. 

At a time when the apparent danger of ag- 
gression is small, a high degree of sophistication 
is required to avoid ill-advised savings by a 
ruinous rundown of defensive capabilities. By 
and large, the NATO nations have resisted this 
temptation. Thus, the overall pictui'e of 
NATO's military organization is one of con- 

tinued strength and effectiveness, unimpaired 
by time and the relaxation of international ten- 
sions. Problems aplenty confront alliance mili- 
tary authorities, but they are problems incident 
to change and growth as well as problems of 

NATO and Allied Political Cohesion 

It would be a mistake to consider NATO 
solely as a military organization. As we have 
noted, its founders gave it a political and an 
economic purpose as well. They had a vision of 
broad cooperation among the states of the North 
Atlantic area, based on the freedom, common 
heritage, and civilization of its peoples. The 
vision persists, sometimes in the form of the 
Atlantic partnership described by Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, sometimes in other evo- 
cations of an Atlantic community. 

The North Atlantic Council represents the 
principal agency for Atlantic political coopera- 
tion. Because its meetings are devoted chiefly 
to matters affecting national security, little pub- 
licity can be given to its work. Yet week in 
and week out, it follows closely the develop- 
ment of East-West relations around the globe 
and focuses its attention on problems of partic- 
ular concern to one or more of the allies. 

The Council's political activities ai-e under- 
taken in formal and informal sessions, in special 
groups of interested parties, and in subsidiary 
committees. The Council is thus a flexible and 
versatile instrument. The scope of its political 
work can best be grasped by a few examples: 

(a) Since its Permanent Eepresentatives can 
meet on short notice, it is an eminently suitable 
forum for informing and exchanging views with 
governments in an emergency. During the 
Cuba missile crisis in October 1962, the allies 
provided througli the Council an extraordinary 
manifestation of solidarity and support for the 
United States. Crisis consultation is a princi- 
pal Council concern. 

(b) The Council keeps under continuous re- 
view new developments and new policies 
throughout the Communist bloc. The NATO 
international staff works with expert connnit- 
tees drawn from the NATO nations to analyze 
and interpret events and trends; and national 
representatives in the Council exchange views 



Key Statistics on NATO Countries 

Population COS) 

Country (in milliona) 

Belgium 9. 29 

Canada 18. 9 

Denmark 4. 7 

France.. 47. 8 

Germany 55. 4 

Greece 8. 5 

Iceland . 186 

Italy 50. 5 

Luxembourg . 325 

Netherlands 11. 96 

Norway 3. 7 

Portugal 9. 

Turkey 30. 3 

I'nitcd Kingdom 53. S 

United States 189. 3 

Total NATO 493. 7 

QNP ('(53) (in 

Dtftnse tzpeiuti- 

Area {in 

miltioru of 

tuus ('63) (in 

square miles) 



of dollars) 

















































Sources: OECD Observer and NATO Information Service. 

as to their significance and the allied responses, 
if any, wliich should be made. Thus, the Coun- 
<"il might discuss the consequences of a Chinese 
Communist nuclear explosion; an upsurge of 
Communist influence in an underdeveloped 
coimtry: the results of a cliange in tlie .Soviet 
political hierarchy; new signs of independence 
in a Soviet bloc country ; or any one of a host 
of similar developments. 

(c) To solicit understanding and support, 
allies explain in the Council important actions 
of international import wliich they may take. 
Thus, we have explained our steps to apply 
economic pressures against Cuba, and our ob- 

. jectives in Viet-Xam. Various national policies 
with respect to Africa and the Middle East have 
been under discussion. 

(d) Allies explore in the Council the extent 
to which they can coordinate their policies or 
actions in other international fonim.s — for ex- 
ample, as regards certain problems in the 
United Xations. Similarly, they often consult 
to coordinate their replies to notes they receive 
from the U.S.S.R., and their positions on mat- 
ters of arms control and European security as 
these are debated in the 18-Nation Disarma- 
ment Committee in Geneva or in other forums. 

(e) The Council is used to coordinate trade 
and credit policies vis-a-vis the Communist bloc, 
to the extent that this is possible. 

(f) An individual ally may seek guidance 
from the Council as to how it should react to a 
particular development or problem. 

(g) The Council may help to moderate the 
harmful consequences of a controversy between 
two allies, as in the case of Greek-Turkish ten- 
sion arising from the situation in Cyprus, or 
the fisheries dispute between the United King- 
dom and Iceland. 

In addition to all this, the Council is the ulti- 
mate organ of political decision regarding al- 
liance military policies. Wlien its activities in 
permanent session are subjected to review at the 
semiannual ministerial meetings, the ministers 
will normally engage in a frank and useful re- 
view of tlie international situation; a discussion 
of outstanding alliance militaiy problems; a 
survey of the sit iiat ion of the alliance in general ; 
and a consideration of specilic matters of partic- 
ular interest to one or more members. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the result 
of all this deliberation is by no means iman- 
imous or automatic agreement. The NATO 
nations are free countries, nurtured in diver- 
sity; they will submerge their individual 
national interests under the spur of necessity, 
but they are neither required nor accustomed 
to relinquish their own policies or views as a 
result of X-VTO discu.ssion. Yet the process of 
political consultation in NATO affords a major 
hope for increased cohesion in the alliance. A 
presentation in the Council, followed by critical 
questioning from Permanent Representatives, 
inevitably produces a better understanding of 
differing points of view. It can and not infre- 

APRIL 12, 10 0.5 


Mr. Popper's article on NATO is the first of a 
series being written especially for the Bulletin 
by officers of the Department and the Foreign 
Service. Officers who may be interested in sub- 
mitting original bylined articles are invited to 
call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline 
Palton, extension 5806, room 5536. 

quently does lead to the creation of a consensus, 
or to the harmonization of policies by mutual 
adjustment of positions. And it is sometimes 
followed by common action which, though it 
may be taken individually by each ally, is none- 
theless an effective manifestation of the will of 
the group as a whole. 

Prospects for the Future 

This brief review of NATO activities demon- 
strates that, if NATO was organized as a classi- 
cal military alliance, it has long since moved 
beyond that status and into new ground. 
Building on a recognition of common interest 
among the NATO nations, the statesmen and 
officials who have worked in and for NATO 
have brought to fruition many of the hopes of 
its organizers. Without impinging on the 
sovereign rights of any state, the NATO na- 
tions have applied techniques of integration and 
cooperation so as to translate their common in- 
terest into common action. The limits of this 
process are yet far from having been reached. 
There is much which can still be done, provided 
the member states so desire, in the military 
field, in the nuclear area, and in the harmoniza- 
tion of the political and economic policies of the 
countries that make up the North Atlantic 

Not all of this, to be sure, need or can be done 
within the specific framework of NATO itself. 
Other agencies with broader membership and 
different, if complementary, objectives can 
make equally important contributions to the co- 
hesion of the West. The Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development, for 
example, is engaged in a broad range of activi- 
ties keyed to economic policy collaboration, the 

coordination of foreign aid policies, the expan- 
sion of nondiscriminatory trade, and inter- 
national monetary measures designed to ease 
balance-of-payments stresses. It has no or- 
ganizational tie with NATO, except for a pre- 
ponderantly identical membership. Yet the 
success of each organization reinforces the work 
of the other. In a broad sense, viewed together, 
the two agencies are unifying elements in the 
world of the developed nations — agencies which 
can be helpful in the management of their re- 
lations with states and groups of states in both 
the Commimist and the underdeveloped areas. 
The great questions for NATO's future have 
less to do with its existence than with its adap- 
tation to new circumstances. Some of these 
questions have been mentioned : They relate to 
the degree of military integration in the alli- 
ance; the need for a collective nuclear capa- 
bility; the nature of NATO defense strategy; 
the limits of political consultation; economic 
policy toward Communist countries ; and simi- 
lar matters. But underlying all these is a more 
fundamental problem — the extent to which the 
member states can attain a meeting of minds 
on the community of their interests in the 
broadest areas of cooperation. There could 
develop in the NATO community a kind of 
insularity which would obviously affect tlie 
scope of common action. 

One can conceive of at least three forms of 
such insularity. One or more countries might, 
first of all, decide no longer to participate in 
NATO defense arrangements, but instead to 
rely on their ovm resources and the general 
obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty foi 
collective defense against attack. If tliis 
should happen, the other allies would have tc 
decide how to organize their own forces to pre- 
serve as far as possible the benefits of existing 
and projected joint measures for NATC 

A second form of insularity could emerge i: 
a group of NATO nations, in EurojDe, shoulc 
decide that the kind of Atlantic association witl 
the North American members of NATO whicl 
now exists should be subordinated to a pureb 
European organization with particularistic, in 



vard-Iooking characteristics. This is an un- 
ikely continirency, and it must be distin<ruished 
from the present European economic com- 
nunities and from projected orj^anizations 
vhicli envisage an Atlantic partnership between 
S'ortii American countries and a politically in- 
egrated Europe. As the latter type of Euro- 
pean community developed, the United States 
•ould anticipate an even more fruitful consul- 
ativo relationship tjian now exists, for the di- 
orpencies which inevitably arise because of the 
litference in size and strength among the At- 
antic partners would be gi-eatly diminished. 
\Ve have welcomed the increasingly important 
•ole NATO's European members have assumed 
n the alliance as they have grown in strength 
ind confidence. We would welcome all the 
nore a collective European voice speaking for 
Rurope's interest in the common cause. 

Tliere is a third variety of insularity which 
ivill have a bearing on NATO's future. It is a 
natt«r of outlook. As Secretary Rusk stated on 
E \f arch 6 : ^ 

. . . Europe and the North Atlantic community can- 

- lot preserve their security merely by holding a line 

- ' Across Europe. Their common security is involved also 

n what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin 

\merica, South Asia, and the Western Paciflc. They 

have a vital common interest in the defeat of active 

iggression in Southeast Asia. They have a common 

Interest with the free peoples of the developing world 

■ In putting an end to aggression by the infiltration of 

arms and trained fighting men national 


"Uliat this statement suggests is that the 
NATO nations, over and above what they have 
already done, should lift their eyes to new 
liorizons outside the NATO area itself. It is a 
reminder that no nation and no continent can 
'xist in a sealed compartment. It highlights 
the interdependence which links the free peoples 
of Europe and America with those of the rest 
of the world. 

These, then, are some of the forces at work in 
all the NATO nations — including the United 
'• States — as they enter the ITth year of their asso- 
ciation. They have it within their power to re- 

' Bulletin of JIar. 22, 1965. p. 427. 

spond to the new challenges which assail them 
by modernizing the alliance to cope with new 
threats and new problems. Or, alternatively, 
they can, through indifference or timidity, con- 
demn the alliance to a diminishing role in the 
balance of this decade. It is hard to believe 
that the 15 NATO members would consciously 
make the latter choice. 

• Reprints of the above article will soon he 
available upon request from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, 
B.C. ,20520. 

President Reiterates U.S. Policy 
on Viet-Nam 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated March 25 

1. It is important for us all to keep a cool and 
clear view of the situation in Viet-Nam. 

2. The central cause of the danger there is 
aggression by Communists against a brave and 
independent people. There are other difficulties 
in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression 
is stopped, the people and Government of South 
Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, 
and the need for supporting American military 
action there will end. 

3. Tlie people who are suffering from this 
Communist aggression are Vietnamese. This 
is no struggle of white men against Asians. It 
is aggression by Communist total itarians 
against their independent neighbors. The main 
burden of resistance has fallen on the people and 
soldiers of South Viet-Nam. We Americans 
have lost hundreds of our own men there, and 
we mourn them. But the free Vietnamese have 
lost tens of thousands, and the aggressors and 
their dupes have lost still more. These are the 
cruel costs of the conspiracy directed from the 
North. Tliis is what has to be stopped. 

4. The United States still seeks no wider war. 
We threaten no regime and covet no territory. 
We have worked and will continue to work for a 

.VPRIL 12, 1905 


reduction of tensions on the great stage of the 
world. But the aggression from the North must 
be stopped. That is the road to peace in South- 
east Asia. 

5. The United States looks forward to the 
day when the people and governments of all 
Southeast Asia may be free from terror, sub- 
version, and assassination — when they will need 
not military support and assistance against 
aggression but only economic and social cooper- 
ation for progress in peace. Even now, in Viet- 
Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs 
of development which have the cooperation and 
support, of the United States. Wider and 
bolder programs can be expected in the future 
from Asian leaders and Asian councils — and in 
such programs we would want to help. This is 
the proper business of our future cooperation. 

6. The United States will never be second in 
seeking a settlement in Viet-Nam that is based 
on an end of Communist aggression. As I have 
said in every part of the Union, I am ready to 
go anywhere at any time and meet with anyone 
whenever there is promise of progress toward an 
honorable peace. We have said many times — to 
all who are interested in our principles for hon- 
orable negotiation — that we seek no more than a 
return to the essentials of the agreements of 
1954 — a reliable arrangement to guarantee the 
independence and security of all in Southeast 
Asia. At present the Communist aggressors 
have given no sign of any willingness to move in 
this direction, but as they recognize the costs of 
their present course, and their own true interest 
in peace, there may come a change — if we all 
remain united. 

Meanwhile, as I said last year and again last 
week,^ "It is and it will remain the policy of 
the United States to furnish assistance to sup- 
port South Viet-Nam for as long as is required 
to bring Communist aggression and terrorism 
under control." The military actions of the 
United States will be such, and only such, as 
serve that purpose — at the lowest possible cost 
in human life to our allies, to our own men, and 
to our adversaries too. 

^ Bulletin of Apr. 5, 1965, p. 488. 

Secretary Rusk Discusses Use | 

of Tear Gas in Viet-Nam I 

Following is a statement made hy Secretary\ 
Rush at a hrle-fing for news correspondents owj 
March 21^^ together with the transcript of thei^ 
question-and-anstoer period. { 

Press release 59 dated March 24 I 


Some of you have asked me for some comment^ 

as to the policy aspects of the use in Viet-Naro] 
of gases of the tear-gas family, back in Decern- j 
ber and January. And I am very glad to re- 
spond to those questions. 

The shadow of gas warfare has been raised| 
in connection with these incidents. That is not 
involved. We are not embarking upon gas war-, 
fare in Viet-Nam. There has been no policy 
decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Namj 
We are not talking about agents or weapons that; 
are associated with gas warfare in the militarv 
arsenals of many countries. We are not talking 
about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva con-j 
vention of 1925 or any other understandingSj! 
about the use of gas. | 

Now, we can underetand the concern around 
the world and in this country about the specter 
of gas warfare. These memories go back to. 
World War I, when tens of thousands were) 
killed or maimed by what might be called "mili^j 
tary gases." j 

This is not involved here. We are talking! 
about a gas which has been commonly adopted, 
by the police forces of the world as riot-control; 
agents — gases that are available commerciallji 
and have been used on many occasions, some iii; 
this country, and on many occasions in otheij 
count I'ies. j 

Now, why is tear gas a part of the equipmentj 
of police forces? It is because police forces] 
would like to be able to use the minimum force! 
that is required for the maintenance of law and 
order. It is a minimum instrument. And mj 
information is that certain situations arose in 
South Viet-Nam where this problem presented! 



Oil one occasion, for example, the Viet Cong 
liiil seized a \-illa<re, was lioldinj; the vinagers 
II iiostage, and was tiring through these vil- 
agers at mixed crowds outside tlie village. The 
lecision was made to employ tear gas to try to 
leal with that situation as a riot-control type of 
iroblein in order to avoid the problem of 
vhetlier to use artillery or aerial bombs tliat 
vould inflict great damage upon imaocent 

There is no question here about gas -warfare 
nd gas in contravention of established conven- 

Now, it may be that there was a failure in full 

xplanation, in brieling or in re[X)rting, from 

■aigonon this matter. The initial reports 

iided to stimulate problems which were not 

: I'scnt ; for example, the use of the word "ex- 

' rimentation" suggested that something new 

nd esoteric and weird might be involved here. 

"his is not the case. 

What has been involved has been well-known, 

raditional agents, in the hands of police forces 

II many pai'ts of the world. And under the 

ircumstances in which this gas was used in 

'iet-Xam, the desire was to use the minimum 

orce required to deal with the situation to avoid 

eath or injury to innocent people. 

Now, that is at the heart of the policy ques- 

'>n. We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is 

irainst our policy to do so, as it is against the 

lolicies of most other governments that I know 


But we are reminded, when something of tliis 
nrt comes up, of the nature of the war in 
^outh Viet-Nam. It isn't a comfortable and 
isv war. It isn't a war that is going to be 
rcided by troops on parade with blank car- 
ridges. It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out 
■ itliout regard to ordinary norms of conduct 
y the Viet Cong. 
j^l Those who are concerned about tear gas I 
i'ould hope would be concerned about the fact 
hat (luring 19f)-t over 400 civilian officials were 
illed and over a thousand were kidnaped in 
•outh Viet-Nam — village chiefs, schoolteach- 
rs, public-health officers. Among other civil- 
ins, 1,.300 were killed, over 8,000 were kid- 
aped, and entire villages have been burned to 

the gi-ound, and families of those who were in 
the armed forces were kidnaped and held as 

There is nothing more urgent, from the 
point of view of the United States, than that 
peace be restored to that country as quickly as 
possible. And peace can be restored if Hanoi 
would stop infiltrating militarily trained per- 
sonnel into South Viet-Nam, stop the sending of 
arms into South Viet-Nam, and stop directing 
these operations aimed at taking over South 
Viet-Nam against the wishes of the people of 
that country. 

Now, these are the essential policy aspects of 
the problem. We do not expect that gas will 
be used in ordinary military operations. Police- 
type weapons were used in riot control in South 
Viet-Nam — as in many other countries over the 
past 20 years — and in situations analogous to 
riot control, where the Viet Cong, for example, 
was using civilians as screens for their own 

But this does not represent a new departure 
of policy, the introduction of new weapons, the 
introduction of any new approach to the very 
difficult problems in that country. 

I would be glad to take a question. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, to clear up one point, in 
vieio of the propaganda furor that has ieen 
mixed over the use of gas, is aroy consideration 
now being given to the thought of not using gas 
any longer? 

A. Well, this is again a problem of general 
practice among nations. In situations of riot 
control or situations analogous to riot control, 
these police instruments undoubtedly will be 
used. They have been used in many countries 
and will again be used. 

But I think that a good deal of the interna- 
tional reaction has been based upon the first im- 
pressions that somehow we were moving into gas 
warfare, that somehow weapons were being used 
contrary to the Geneva convention. This is not 
the case. And I would hope that second 
thoughts, of which we have already had some 

PRIL 12. 10G5 


evidence — that second thoughts would realize 
that the issue that was involved here was the 
minimum force that was required under the cir- 
cumstances where otherwise innocent people 
could be very severely punished in a circum- 
stance over which they themselves had no 

Q. Is it correct^ sir, that gas war, that the use 
of the tear gas was used initially in order to 
release some Americans who were being held by 

A. No. There was one situation, I under- 
stand, where there was a suspicion that prison- 
ers might be held — Viet Cong elements holding 
hostages, perhaps both Vietnamese and Ameri- 
cans — but that was not confirmed because 
when the area was entered it was found that no 
prisoners were discovered. So we don't know. 

This was not an attempt to direct this particu- 
lar weapon specifically toward the needs of 
Americans. This was a general problem in 
which the South Vietnamese themselves were 
the primary participants in a situation that 
seemed to require riot-control methods rather 
than artillery, 500-pound bombs, and the rest 
of it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is true, sir, that you re- 
ferred to tear gas, whereas many of the stories, 
of course, refer to nausea gas. Could you clarify 
the point on that? 

A. The tear-gas family, which is available 
through commercial firms to police forces in 
this and other countries, includes some gas that 
produces nausea. I understand tliat on one in- 
cident — in one incident out there that there was 
some admixture of these two types of gases. 
But that again does not mean that there has 
been any new departure in policy or in practice 
from the riot-control family of weapons in this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what you\e trying to say 
is that our action in South Viet-Nam was com- 
parable to, say, the British troops and U.N. 
troops in Cyprus who used tear gas to separate 
the Greeks and the Turks? 

A. Well, these gases have been used on a num- 
ber of occasions. For example, we ourselves 
used these gases in comiection with the famous 

prison riot in Korea, where some of the pris-l 
oners were engaging in violence but most of the! 
prisoners were peaceable and wanted nothing 1 
to do with it. And the problem there arose as I 
to the minimimi force that would achieve the] 
requirements of law and order. And so we used 
tliese types of gases in that prison revolt. And 
these have been used in many situations in dif- 
ferent parts of the world. Mr. Harkness? 

Q. Sir, this is somewhat of a corollary ques- \ 
tion. But you referred to the inadequate or in- 
complete reporting from Saigon. Do you think < 
that our policy and the South Viet-Nam policy] 
of restricting reporters hinders full, accurate] 
reporting? ' 

A. Oh, I think that the information that isi 
available in South Viet-Nam is more extensive,i] 
more detailed, more intense than any situation 
that I know about. I must say that I have somei! 
questions about newspapermen picking up a I 
telephone in Da Nang and calling outside — ; 
some of them transoceanic calls — saying 20 air- 
craft departed from Da Nang a few minutes 
ago headed north, or headed west, or headed 

In other words, this is a tough fight out there. 
And the problem of making information avail- 
able is related to the lives of the people who are 
directly involved m that situation. So that we 
have been considering that problem very seri- 
ously, and we think that we can woi'k out a basis 
on which there can be full and complete infor-' 
mation to the public, and at the same time pro- 
tect the essential military requirements of the 
local situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to make it abundantly 
clear, to me at least, you referred to one occasion 
in which an admixture loas used, but you''re not 
attempting to separate these tvhen you say riot- 
control gases which h/we been used? 

A. No, no. Tliey are all in the riot-control, 
commonly called tear-gas, family. In other 
words, police forces can go to commercial houses 
and buy these gases. I know of no gas that has 
been used which is not so available and which 
is not in the hands of police forces in many 
parts of the world. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, can you 



clarify, sir, as to whether there was a policy de- 
r'lsian in the United States over the vse of these 
■/■t-H's/ And could you also say tvhether the 
forces in the field have authority to use these 
at any time of their choosing? 

A. "We have known, of course, that gases of 
tliis type are avaihible to the South Vietnamese 
Government. We have ourselves provided 
some of tliose jjases to the South Vietnamese 
Government. Tliey had other simihir weapons 
left over from French days out there, I gather. 
So that we knew those weapons were there. 
"We know that they have been used in riot- 
control situations. We were not specifically 
asked in Washington on the day before any one 
of these incidents whetlier we approved the use 
of this particular weapon. They were faced 
with a situation that was analogous to riot con- 
trol, where the Viet Cong were intermingled 
with civilians and, as you gentlemen know 
from other reporting from out there, this has 
been a problem — is a problem with guerrillas 
where there is such intermingling, and we have 
had some problems in attacking the Viet Cong 
where they are intermingled, because innocent 

, people get hurt. 

I Now, here was a situation where they tried to 
meet the problem with a minimum of violence 
that would deal with the situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you clarify the sec- 
ond portion of that, sir, as to wJiether from now 
on also the forces in the field will have author- 
ity to use the gases without referral — 

A. Oh, I think that there are more of the 
governments of the world that reserve the right 
to use these weapons in riot-control situations 
or situations analogous to riot control. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what distinction do you 
draw between the tear gases and other non- 
lethal gases that are incapacitating, which can 
range in this whole family way up to the mus- 
tard gases of World War I fame? 

A. I think there is a very sharp difference 
between the military gases that are a part of the 
inventory of the military forces in a number 
of countries and the gases which have no lethal 
effect, which have a minimum disabling char- 

acter, which are normal to police forces all over 
the world. I think there is no great difficulty 
in distinguishing between those two. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in which category — 

A. And I think from the point of view of 
the Geneva convention there is no problem in 
distinguishing between those two. 

Q. In which category of gases would you 
place what are called the psychochemical gases, 
which destroy your will to resist? 

A. I think those would be military in char- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned at the start 
the use of this in December and January, I be- 
lieve. Were you saying by this it has not been 
used since January? 

A. It has not been used, as with gases of any 
type, police or military. There are operational 
limitations upon their use. I mean — as a mat- 
ter of fact, in the three incidents which have 
been reported, it wasn't very effective; when the 
wind blew it away, it was dissipated, it didn't 
achieve the purpose. But the purpose was to 
deal with the problem with a minimum of vio- 
lence. So I would suppose that this is not going 
to be a very important part of the effort out 
there, because in any event, except in the most 
inunediate circumstance of a mob in a city 
square, there are limitations on the ability of 
police-type gases to accomplish the job. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of the great pub- 
lic interest and excitement oiier this issue during 
the last 2 days, have any new directives or policy 
decisions been insued to the authorities, the 
American authorities, in Viet-Nam, for dealing 
with this problem? 

A. No new directives have been issued. The 
anticipation is, of course, that these weapons 
be used only in those situations involving riot 
control or situations analogous to riot control. 
There are many reasons for that. But I mean 
that is the nature of the weapon. It's a riot- 
control type of weapon, and where that is not 
involved it would not be an appropriate weapon. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Foreign Secre- 
tary [Michael] Stewart said that he had 

APRIL 12, 19G5 


Tyrought uj) the matter with you and expressed a 
grave concei'n of the British people. Can you 
tell us what you told Mm yesterday ? 

A. Well, I think that that was based upon 
the original reports that indicated that we might 
be somehow embarking upon something new and 
difTerent — embarking upon gas warfare as it 

is generally considered around the world. This 
is not involved here. And I think when the 
character of this weapon becomes known, the 
limited number of incidents, the special circum- 
stances of incidents become generally under- 
stood, I think second thoughts will take over. 

Q. Thank youvery much, sir. 


The Dangers of Nostalgia 

hy Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Two generations ago a candidate for the 
Presidency blandly announced that what 
America needed was "not nostrums but nor- 
malcy . . . not submergence in internationality 
but sustainment in triumphant nationality." 
One contemporary observer remarked that 
these solecisms left "the impression of an army 
of pompous phrases moving over the landscape 
in search of an idea." But in point of fact 
"a return to normalcy" became more than a 
loudly trumpeted campaign slogan — it set the 
pattern of American foreign policy for almost 
20 years. 

The nostalgia for a return to an earlier era — • 
a period remembered rightly or wrongly as less 
demanding and more rewarding — is an under- 
standable human impulse. After almost every 
war, after almost every great period in human 
endeavor, there comes a time when people begin 
to look backward with a warm glow and to feel 
that heroic exertions are no longer required. 

In the 1920's and thirties this nostalgia 
served to heighten and reinforce an authentic 
and indigenous form of American isolation- 

' Address made before the National Foreign Policy 
Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations at 
Washington, D.C., on Mar. 16 (press release 42, with 
minor editorial revisions) . 

ism — a heritage from the early days of a new 
nation composed of strong-willed men who had 
turned their backs on the Old World to con- 
centrate their energies and resources on creating 
the New. 

But the serious and responsible men who are 
today urging that America reduce her world 
commitments are not isolationists. Nor should 
the policy they are advancing be called — as 
some have suggested — "neoisolationism." To- 
day's nostalgia for "normalcy" is not solely, or 
even principally, a homegrown phenomenon. 
It is the companion of — and, to a considerable 
extent, the response to — a similar nostalgia in 

On both sides of the Atlantic the argument 
begins with the assertion that the conditions no 
longer exist which, in the years after the Sec- 
ond World War, required the extension of 
American power and responsibility to all cor- 
ners of the globe. This assertion is grounded 
on a fact and an assumption. 

The fact, which no one challenges, is that 
the nations of Western Europe have long since 
recovered from the devastation of the war and 
are industrially stronger and economically more 
healthy than ever before. 

The assumption — unproven and unprova- 





ble — is tlmt a nuclear war between the free 
world and tlie Conununist bloc is no longer a 
serious possibility. 

Granted this fact and this assumption, the 
argument proceeds that it sliould be possible to 
return to a more nearly "normal" world regime 
of power and responsibility in which the role 
of the United States would be greatly dimin- 
ished. America can, and should, it is con- 
tended, midertake a gradual withdrawal from 
the farflung activities forced on it by the ab- 
normal conditions of the postwar world. 

Proponents of Resurgent Nationalism 

I'roponents of a resurgent nationalism — in- 
creasinglj- ^•ocal in certain European circles — 
have found this argimient particularly attrac- 
tive. If their own nations are to regain their 
prewar power and position in world affairs, 
their first tactical move must be to reduce U.S. 
power and influence. This means, among other 
things, weakening or dismantling the institu- 
tions and arrangements through which America 
and Europe cooperate. 

As this step is taken, they see the old Europe 
falling back into shape again, the individual 
states resuming their historic pattern of rela- 
tions, albeit with much moi'e effective economic 
cooperation. xVs Atlantic ties are reduced in 
importance, they look forward to something ap- 
proaching the restoration of the traditional 
European system. Finally, they feel that, over 
the long pull, a Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals may be more than a figure of speech — 
provided, of course, that Europeans are left 
alone to work it out. 

A Beguiling Doctrine 

This line of argiunent is not confined to Eu- 
rope ; it has adherents on this side of the ocean 
as well. American proponents of this view 
have, in recent months, contended with increas- 
ing vigor that the United States should cease 
its intense preoccupation with world affairs and 
concentrate on its domestic business — as though 
the one excluded the other. They have argued 
further that the United States should reduce 
its concern with Europe and with Atlantic 
problems. Times have changed, they say, and 

American policy should refiect those changes. 
The emphasis placed on the organization of 
power through Atlantic institutions and At- 
lantic arrangements is, they assert, both unnec- 
essary and unseemly. 

Moreover, they contend, the United States 
should progressively disengage from most of 
its responsibilities in Asia, Africa, and the other 
far reaches of the world. It is all right to main- 
tain some air and sea power, but we should with- 
draw our forces guarding the outposts of free- 
dom. We should reduce our commitments to 
far-off peoples, cut back our efforts to provide 
economic assistance, and vastly reduce our mili- 
tary expenditures. We should cultivate our own 
garden and not try to deal with the burgeoning 
weeds in other peoples' vacant lots. 

This is unquestionably a beguiling doctrine, 
ilodern Ajnericans have no taste for imperial- 
ism, and few would challenge the desirability 
of reducing our commitments if we could be 
assured that this would not jeopardize the vital 
interests of ourselves and our friends. Cer- 
tainly no American in a position of responsi- 
bility today wishes to extend United States 
commitments farther than is essential for the 
safety of the free world. But is any substan- 
tial curtailment of responsibilities possible 
without undermining the structure of world 
security we have worked so hard to construct? 

President Johnson has stated on more than 
one occasion that the. state of the Union depends, 
in large measure, upon the state of the world. 
In recognition of this fact wo have during the 
postwar period undertaken three major respon- 
sibilities : 

First, to provide a major share of the defense 
of free-world interests against Communist ag- 

Second, to contribute technology and re- 
sources to the economic and political develop- 
ment of the free nations that have arisen from 
the ashes of old colonial systems. 

Third, to use our prestige and moral leader- 
ship to prevent internecine quarrels between 
other free- world states and to bring about their 
settlement if they cannot be prevented. 

The argument that we should retreat from 
these responsibilities — that the United States 

APRIL 12, I960 
76S-297— 65- 


should withdraw its power and attention from 
many parts of the world — goes to the heart of 
our proven policies. Those policies have served 
us well in the postwar years, and they should 
not be lightly discarded. For if we do disen- 
gage from our responsibilities, who is there to 
assume them? And if they are not assumed, 
can we be certain that America itself will be 
secure ? 

New Postwar System Needed 

In my view we would make a dangerous mis- 
take to accept the arguments of those who call 
for a return to the pattern of the prewar era. 

In the first place, no matter how it may ap- 
pear from the vantage point of today, tliat i^at- 
tem was something less than perfect — and we 
should not encourage its exhumation. No one 
aware of "Western history over the last 50 years 
can seriously contend that the so-called Euro- 
pean system was an effective arrangement 
either to maintain the peace or to advance the 
welfare of the world's peoples. 

The Europe of the first four decades of this 
century — marked as it was by the rivalries of 
nation states — did not bring peace but devastat- 
ing conflict. Two world cataclysms have made 
it clear beyond question that a fragmented 
Europe is a danger to the world. 

Civilization survived with difficulty the rav- 
ages of the First World "War. It was set back 
many years by the second. Given the vast de- 
structive power of nuclear arms, it is question- 
able whether civilization as we know it could 
survive a third. 

"What is necessary, therefore, is not the re- 
turn to a prewar system of national rivalries 
but a new system that takes full account of the 
realities of this complex and perilous age. The 
realization of this need has been one of the great 
constructive forces of the last 20 years. It has 
inspired the movement toward economic in- 
tegration in Europe. But it has yet to bring 
about the kind of political unity that can assure 
the end of the rivalries and antagonisms that 
have caused so much havoc in the past. 

Even had the European system of the pre- 
war era proved a stable and effective means of 
organizing relations among states and peo- 

ples, it would be impossible to reconstruct it as 
a system of world power in the world of the 
1960's. For the whole structure of the prewar 
world has been altered irrevocably by the events 
of the last quarter century. 

One major change — as we are all constantly 
aware — was the drawing of an Iron Curtain 
around one-third of the world's people. 

A second major change was the narrowing 
of the ocean — the tightening of relations among 
the nations that border on the littoral of the 
North Atlantic — Western Europe and North 
America. To talk today of the two continents 
as though they existed wholly apart from one 
another is unreal and misleading. And it is 
about the relative responsibilities of the United 
States and Europe that I would like to concen- 
trate my remaining comments. 

As both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
have pointed out, the Atlantic world of today 
is economically interdependent in a mamier un- 
known before the war. The nations included 
in that world constitute a great industrial com- 
plex which includes 90 percent of free- world in- 
dustrial capacity. Those nations have scram- 
bled their economic eggs irrevocably. We have 
all learned the hard lesson that what happens 
on one side of the northern ocean can have 
the most profound effects on the other. 

If economic interdependence is a hard fact 
with which we must live, then military interde- 
pendence is equally demonstrable. Today — . 
and for the foreseeable future — the ultimate de- 
fense of Western Europe is the vast destructive 
power of the American nuclear deterrent. Over 
time, we can foresee a greater participation by 
Europe in the nuclear defense of the West. 
That is an object of our policy, but what form 
it will take is a major unanswered question. It 
may come about through a collective effort such 
as the United States itself has proposed. Or it 
may — unhappily for us all — come about through 
the development of additional independent na- 
tional nuclear systems. 

Many look forward to the ultimate creation of 
a truly European deterrent. But that will en- 
tail the achievement by Europe of a degree of 
political imity far exceeding that foreseen in 
the near future by even the most optimistic 



proponents of European federalism. And it 
will mean also the abandonment of the concep- 
tion fhiit the possession of a national deterrent 
system is a mark of status. 

Atlantic Defense Is Indivisible 

Still, whatever arrangements are worked out 
to enable the peoples of Europe to participate 
in their own nuclear defense, the nuclear de- 
fense of the Atlantic world is. and by its nature 
must be, indivisible — and this adds a totally 
new requirement to the organization of Western 
power. Tlie effect ive integration of effort be- 
tween the nations of the Atlantic world is an 
implacable condition to the defense of the com- 
mon interests of Europe and North America. 
As President Johnson said in his state of the 
Union message,- Europe and the United States 
have "common interests and common values, 
common dangers and common expectations. 
These realities will continue to have their way — 
especially in our expanding trade and especially 
in our common defense." 

Wliile over the years, therefore, there will al- 
most certainly be some rearrangements of force 
within the Atlantic world, I see no possibility 
that either a prosperous economic life or an ef- 
fective defense can be sustained without At- 
lantic cooperation and Atlantic institutions. 
y"l Never again can it safely rest on a Europe frag- 
mented in the prewar pattern or on an Atlantic 
• world divided by the northern ocean as a moat 
between America and Europe. 

America, therefore, can never cease to be pre- 
occupied with Europe, any more than Europe 
can cease to be preoccupied with ^Vmerica. For 
in this highly complex age our destinies are 
bound together in a very special way by our 
conunon interests, our common dangers, and our 
devotion to a common set of principles and as- 

U.S. Position Unique in World History 

Xor (.an America withdraw, as some have sug- 
g<'~ted, from a high measure of responsibility 
for the maintenance of order and stability 
throughout the free world. We can never again 

' For text, see Bctlletin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

return to a day wlicn tlic. world was policed by 
the British Fleet and order was kept over large 
portions of the earth by diligent proconsuls of 
colonial powers. 

For, in addition to the drawing of the Iron 
Curtain and the narrowing of the Atlantic, a 
third great change has occurred in the past 20 
years which has altered the structure of world 
power almost beyond recognition. Prior to 
1940, at least 1 billion people were controlled 
by a handful of nations, mostly in Western 
Europe, that held dominion over vast colo- 
nial systems. The sun never set on the British 
Empire — and only intermittently on the empire 
of the French. Holland held vast possessions 
in the East Indies, Belgium a great territory 
in Africa. 

But today almost all of this is gone. In place 
of a world system of colonial dependencies, there 
are 50 new nations — a few perhaps born pre- 
maturely, almost all bom weak. The great in- 
dustrial nations of Europe and North America 
have accepted the fact that never again will 
they exercise power through the control of sub- 
ject peoples. 

One cannot dismantle a vast and highly de- 
veloped power structure such as prewar colo- 
nialism in the brief period of a quarter century 
without creating power vacuums and power 
dislocations of major dimensions. Out of neces- 
sity, out of idealism, out of a mature sense of 
reality, the United States has acted in many of 
these situations to safeguard the liberty of free 
people from Communist aggression. We have 
assumed responsibility — not because we ab- 
horred vacuums but because we abhorred 

Today, as a consequence, we find ourselves in a 
position unique in world history. Over the 
centuries a number of nations have exercised 
world power, and many have accepted at least 
some of the responsibilities that go with power. 
But never before in human history has a nation 
undertaken to play a role of world responsi- 
bility except in defense and support of a world 
empire. Our actions have not been motivated 
by pure altruism: rather we have recognized 
that world responsibility and American secu- 
rity are inseparably related. But, nevertheless, 

APRIL 12, 19G5 


what America has done is an achievement of 
which the American people can be justly proud. 

Concept of World Involvement 

Those who advocate a progressive with- 
drawal of American power have, it seems to me, 
never made clear where or how a withdrawal, 
once begun, could end without great damage 
to freedom. They have never acknowledged 
the fact that in today's interdependent world 
no action by a global power can ever be taken 
in isolation. They do not seem to understand 
that what we do in South Viet-Nam will have 
a profound meaning for people in the other 
outposts of freedom. 

Our power cannot and should not be exer- 
cised in the same fashion and to the same degree 
in every trouble spot throughout the world. 
We must measure and weigh the nature and 
extent of each involvement. But it is hardly 
useful to call for the wholesale withdrawal of 
American commitments without a careful ex- 
amination of the consequences in each case. 

In view of the ever-present threat of Com- 
munist aggression, no one can responsibly urge 
the removal of United States strength unless 
convinced that the military, economic, and 
political needs of the peoples of the area will 
be met from other free-world sources. In prac- 
tical terms this can come about only through 
the resumption of world responsibilities by our 
Western allies. 

The United States has long sought to en- 
courage the Western European nations to play 
a greater role in world affairs. But, based on 
the experience of recent years, only a few have 
been prepared to apply the full strength de- 
rived from their economic prosperity to the 
effective sharing of farflung responsibilities. 
There are several reasons for this. 

The first is that most Western European na- 
tions have had little experience in the exercise 
of responsibility divorced from the defense of 
territories or the advancement of quite narrow 
and specific national interests. To undertake — 
alongside the United States — to play a role of 
responsibility in a world where colonial em- 
pires have largely disappeared would require 
them to develop a whole new set of attitudes to- 
ward world affairs. 

Admittedly the assumption of world respon- 
sibilities is difficult, even for a global power. 
But to carry their fair share of world responsi- 
bilities is still possible, even for smaller nations. 
What is required is not unlimited resources but 
the will to use such resources as are available. 
Yet this is a concept that nations not organized 
on a continental scale find difficult to accept. 
To some extent the problem is psychological. 
Lacking the resources for a world role, they lack j 
a sense of world involvement. And with the 
disappearance of their colonial possessions 
(which defuied a specific national interest), 
they are reluctant to commit what resources 
they do have to a more generalized common 
effort. i 


Concerting Broad Lines of Policy 

World involvement, of course, means more 
than the free expression of views. To play a 
useful and effective role on the world stage it 
is not enough for a nation simply to offer advice 
on all aspects of world aft'airs. It should be 
prepared to back that advice with resources. 
If unwilling to do so, it does not contribute to 
the interests of the free world by seeking to im- 
pose its views on the nations that are carrying 
the common burden. In fact, when national 
positions are vigorously promoted without re- 
gard to their effect on the responsible common 
efforts of other states, free- world interests may 
well be injured. 

The problem, therefore, is not how we can 
encourage the Western European nations to re- 
sume their traditional prewar role in world 
affairs — for that role disappeared with the 
passage of empires. The problem is rather how 
we can encourage them to share with us a role 
that is something new and unique in history, 
a role of world responsibility divorced from 
territorial or narrow national interests. 

Hopefully we can move toward this objective ' 
by continuing to improve the scope and mecha- 
nisms of consultation within the Western alli- 
ance. We have made progress along this line, 
and we shall make more. For we recognize that 
a greater sharing of responsibilities will mean 
a greater sharing of decisions; it will mean the 
concerting of broad lines of policy all over the 
world. Tliis will not be easy. But it must 



be done. As President Johnson said last 

. . . we iiuist all work to multiply in nuniber and 
Intimacy the ties between North America and Euroi)e. 
For we shai>e an Atlantic civilization with an Atlantic 

Urgency of European Unity 

Xonetlicless the key problem will still re- 
main — and it cannot be disregarded. Most of 
the Atlantic nations, as now organized, are too 
small to participate with an efTectiveness com- 
mensurate with their talents and resources in 
the great matters that shape the destiny of all 
peoples. The lesson of the last few years is 
clear. A satisfactory allocation of world re- 
sponsibilities will be possible only when other 
free-world nations organize their political and 
economic affairs on a scale adequate to the re- 
quirements of the modem age. 

This point is well understood by those who 
have led the drive toward European imity. 
Much of the momentum behind that drive has 
stemmed from a deep anxiety that the Euro- 
pean peoples would be unable to make their 
proper contribution to world affairs so long as 
they were organized as national states small in 
mid-20th-century terms. 

Until 1963 Europe made great strides toward 
unity. Over the past 2 years, however, we have 
witnessed a revival of nationalism. Yet the 
inescapable logic of unity remains a strong 
' latent force. Hopefully, the lost momentum 
will be recaptured in the months ahead. For 
the achievement of this objective is unfinished 
business of the first order of urgency. 

The U.S. and World Responsibilities 

Until this business is in fact finished, the 
United States must continue to carry a large 
part of the responsibilities of the free world 
for one compelling reason. If we do not, many 
of those responsibilities will not be met at all. 
And if they are not met, we shall have gravely 
jeopardized both our values and our safety. 

And so, while it would l)e comforting to think 
that our postwar tasks around the world were 
largelv over — that we could now withdraw our 

' Ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866. 

attention from the far corners of the globe with 
the satisfying feeling of a job well done — that 
our niassi\e responsibilities could all be shifted 
to other shoulders — this is simply not the case. 
For, like it or not, we live in a world that will 
almost certainly remain for a long time to 
come turbulent, difficult, frustrating, and com- 

What we dare not do is to turn our backs 
on the world as it is — and wish it were 
sometliing different. 

The late T. S. Eliot once wrote that "Human 
kind cannot bear very much reality." But 
Americans are a people who take pride in being 
realistic. Now, if ever, we must demonstrate 
that quality. 

Congress Approves Appropriations 
for Inter-American Banlt 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated March 25 

I have signed the bill, H.R. 45, under which 
the Congress has authorized appropriations over 
the next 3 years of $750 million as the United 
States share in an increase in the resources of 
the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter- 
American Development Bank. 

This bill is another important milestone in 
continuing United States support for the Alli- 
ance for Progress. Since it began operation 
in 19G0, the Inter- American Development Bank 
has made an ever-increasing contribution to 
this common effort. In 1904 it made loans total- 
ing $286.4 million, which represent a significant 
percentage of all the loans made by public fi- 
nancial institutions participating in the alli- 
ance. The Bank's role as the bank of the 
alliance will be strengthened by this further 
addition to its resources, and its multilateral 
character will be enhanced because all members 
will contribute to the increase. 

Along with other member governments, the 
United States has agreed to make this contribu- 
tion to the Bank's Fund for Special Operations 
in three equal installments in 1965, 1966, and 
1967. I am asking the Congress to act prompt- 
ly on a 1965 supplemental request to pay our 

APIUL 12, 1965 


first installment; provision for the second has 
been made in my 1966 budget. 

In taking this further step, we are reminded 
that the Alliance for Progi-ess is more effective 
every day. For Latin America the alliance 
offers hope instead of despair, growth and ad- 
vancement rather than deterioration and de- 
struction. It unites rather than divides and 
seeks to conquer, not people and nations, but 
those ancient enemies of mankind — poverty, ig- 
norance, htmger, and disease. In short, it rep- 
resents the means by which free men of all 
the Americas have joined together in a peace- 
ful effort to win a better life for themselves 
and their children. 

Looking to the future, we expect the hearten- 
ing acomplisliments of the Alliance for Prog- 
ress in 1964 to be continued and even surpassed. 
Dedication and hard work throughout this hem- 
isphere have been the key to the success of our 
efforts. But the struggle has not been an easy 
one, and many difficult obstacles remain to be 
surmounted before our goal is within reach. 
This year and the years ahead summon us all to 
even greater effort in our quest for a better life 
in freedom and dignity. 

President Calls for Full Use 

of Resources in Overseas Programs 

Stateinent hy President Johnson ^ 

All departments — and virtually all agencies — 
have personnel and programs abroad. From 
time to time, I have expressed to you individu- 
ally my views in regard to this. I do not believe 
it is necessary — or desirable — for the executive 
branch to duplicate globally the pattern of do- 
mestic resijonsibilities and operations at home. 

I have recently been giving much thought to 
such matters. And today I want to share some 
observations — and make a recommendation — in 
this regard. 

Our programs around the world are all un- 

' Made to the Cabinet on Mar. 25 ( White House press 

portant to the accomplislmient of our foreign 
policy objectives. But our resources and money 
are always scarce. They are never plentiful 
enough to cover every need and to fulfill every i 

It is important that all of us — as managers — i 
make certain that our people abroad and the 
money we spend abroad are used to achieve the 
maximum support of the accomplishment of our I 
foreign policy objectives. We must insure that i| 
every person is being utilized to the fullest and ' 
that evei-y dollar spent is a dollar needed to ac- 
complish our purposes. 

While I could speak at length on this, I believe 
action is more needed than words. For that 
reason, I am today asking the following: that i 
the Secretary of State, who is responsible for i' 
reconmiending our foreign policy objectives, \ 
and the Director of the Budget [Kermit Gor- \ 
don], who is responsible for reconun ending dis- ' 
tribution of resources to accomplish those 
objectives, meet with all of you who have over- < 
seas programs to look at our operations in 10 
or 15 coinitries. 

This would be done on an experimental basis — 
before our next budget enters preparation. 

The review should be on a country basis — 
with all U.S. agencies, all U.S. programs, and all i 
U.S. policies related to people and programs 
being reviewed coimtry by country. The ob- 
ject should be to detennine that we are doing 
the things that are most essential for us to do, 
that thei'e are no unnecessary people and no- 
imnecessary programs — and that all our money 
is being well spent. 

In countries where such reviews are con- 
ducted, I shall expect each agency to respect the 
levels established for each of our programs by 
Secretary Kusk and Mr. Gordon in the alloca- 
tion of funds and resources for the ensuing 
year — and in the projection of our plans. 

I believe that this kind of comitry-by-country 
review — looking at all of our programs as they 
relate to our objectives in each country — can 
insure for us better management in the fuller 
utilization of all our resources. I also believe 
that this approach can and will materially 
strengthen the conduct and execution of the for- 
eign policy of the United States. 



United States Policy in Africa 

hy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

Not too many years ago, a distinguished 
Congresswoman asked State Department help 
in jilanning a trip to Africa. The almost 
incredulous reply was : "Surely, Madam, you're 
not interested in hunting lions or elephants." 

More recently, as Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Atfairs, I took a night off to try to 
see elephants at Kenya's world-famous Treetops 
Hotel. I quickly learned, however, that my 
African friends expected me to visit Africa for 
better reasons than to see Africa's treasury of 
wildlife — and, of course, we do have many more 
important concerns in Africa, important as 
wildlife conservation is. 

The most significant reason Africa is of con- 
cern to the United States is, properly, that 
neither we nor our children can live in peace, 
freedom, and prosperity in the long run unless 
the peoples of Africa can develop in peace and 
freedom and fulfill their fundamental aspiration 
for a better life. Without such development, 
the continent's troubles will be a continuing 
threat to world peace and security. 

That conclusion is hardheaded, honest, patri- 
otic pragmatism. That is why we are interested 
now in helping to build stable and independent 
countries in Africa and in maintaining cordial 
and lasting relations with them. And that is 
why we support African self-determination. 

Happily, in favoring this course, our tradi- 
tional beliefs and our national self-interest 
coincide completely. 

There are many other reasons for our interest 
in Africa. 

" Address made at Williams College, WiUlamstown, 
Mass., on Mar. 18 (press release 48) . 

For more than a century and a half, Ameri- 
can missionaries have been active in many parts 
of the continent. 

Long before our missionaries, however, Af- 
rica and America were linked together by the 
.slave trade. Although long dormant, that link 
has in recent years led Negro Americans to 
become increasingly proud of, and interested in, 
Africa — an interest that goes hand in linnd with 
their interest in civil rights. 

The United States has long had commercial 
interests in Africa, going back to the days of 
clipper ships. Although the volume of our 
commerce and investment in Africa is still rela- 
tively modest in comparison with our volume 
in other continents, it is not inconsiderable and 
is of increasing importance. 

Some of Africa's mineral resources are of 
critical importance to American science and 
teclinology. For example, our machine-tool 
industry relies heavily upon Africa's industrial 
diamonds, and certain comparatively rare Af- 
rican metals are essential to our industrial and 
scientific community for use at extremes of heat 
and cold. 

In addition, we have important space-age 
ties with Africa. Our first manned space flight 
was reported on by two African tracking sta- 
tions, and African tracking and control sta- 
tions are essential to our current space experi- 
ments and operations. 

The United States also relies on various fa- 
cilities in Africa to maintain our essential 
worldwide communications net. This rightly 
suggests that Africa's physical location has im- 
portant strategic implications. This was dem- 

APKIL 12, 1965 


onstrated not only in the past by the use of 
North Africa as a jumpoff point for the Allied 
return to Europe in World War II but more 
recently when Soviet aircraft could not use 
West African landing facilities during the 
Cuban missile crisis. 

Africa also figures in our concern with Com- 
munist subversion, which has turned in the 
direction of the statement attributed to Stalin : 
"The backs of the British will be broken not 
on the River Thames, but on the Yangtze, the 
Ganges, and the Nile." Communist Party Con- 
gresses as early as 1957 resolved to penetrate 
Africa. Since then, the Communist nations 
have stepped up their iiivestment of men, 
money, and subversion in Africa. The entry 
of Red China into the African Continent, and 
its competition with Moscow, have increased 
and made more complex, rather than dimin- 
ished, the total impact of Communist impe- 
rialism in Africa. "Wlaile it is true that no 
African country has become a Communist satel- 
lite, that danger to African freedom must be of 
continuing concern to us and to them. 

The United States also has an interest in the 
peoples of Africa because of their tremendous 
dynamism and their increasingly significant 
role in world affairs. In the United Nations, 
where they comprise almost one-third of the 
voting strength, their vigor and leadership 
contribute much to the growing importance of 
the underdeveloped areas of the world. 

Furthermore, while American and European 
interests in Africa are similar to a considerable 
extent, tlie United States does have interests 
and concerns different and apart from those of 
the European countries that once ruled in that 
area — such as, for example, Chinese Commu- 
nist recognition in the U.N. 

In brief, then, our interests in Africa must 
be considered increasingly in the development 
of our worldwide foreign policy of peace, free- 
dom, and prosperity. 

Economic and Social Realities in Africa 

Because of our significant interests in Africa, 
therefore, it is necessary for us to have a clear 
understanding of that continent's present stage 
of development and of the realities of African 

Africa is an enormous continent — more than 
three times the size of the 50 United States — 
and, although potentially very rich, for the 
most part is presently burdened with severe 
poverty, disease, and illiteracy. Unlike Asia, 
Africa's 265 million people do not present a 
problem of overpopulation. 

These people speak nearly 1,000 different 
languages. Although culturally fragmented, 
the peoples of Africa have many basic similar- 
ities in the everyday realities of African life. 

For one thing, most of the people of Africa 
are poor in terms of developed material wealth. 
The average per capita income for the continent 
as a whole is about $120 a year and as low as 
$40 a year in some parts of the continent. This 
is the lowest per capita income of any geo- 
graphic region in the world — almost twice as 
low as the next lowest region — and there is little 
local capital for economic development. For- 
timately there is a pattern of economic growth 
in most parts of Africa. 

Although Africa is primarily an agricultural 
continent and 75 percent of the people make 
their living from the land, the average African 
farmer is only about 4 percent as productive 
as his counterpart in North America. 

Education presents much the same picture. 
While there is a cultural and sophisticated elite, 
about 85 percent of Africa's people are illiter- 
ate. There is a crucial lack of trained people 
to perform the many vital middle-level func- 
tions so necessary to African development. I 
might point out, however, that educational fa- 
cilities and opportunities are expanding. To- 
day some 40 percent of Africa's children are in 
primary school — a vast increase over a decade 
ago. In addition, secondary school enrollment 
has risen from 800,000 to 1.8 million in the last 
4 years, and the number of universities has gone 
up from 24 to 35. 

Communications and transportation are ex- 
tremely poor throughout much of Africa. In 
many parts of the continent a telephone call 
from a French-speaking country to an English- 
speaking nation must be routed through Paris 
and London. Total improved highway mile- 
age in the whole continent of Africa is only 
551,530 miles, compared to 2.7 million miles of 
improved roads in the United States alone. 



Health is another major problem. Every 
known tropical disease exists in the continent, 
taking the lives of one of every five African 
chiUlren. There is a severe shortage of doctors, 
nui-ses, and other health personnel. "WHiere we 
have one doctor for every 740 people, the ratio 
for Africa (excluding South Africa) is one for 
ever}' 22,500 people. 

Another important reality of African life is 
the mstability created when traditional African 
tribal values meet the modern political, eco- 
non\ic, and social concepts of new national gov- 
ernments. In much of Africa — but by no 
means all — the function of decisionmaking is 
moving from traditional chiefs and elders in 
the villages into the hands of younger people 
in the cities. 

Political Realities 

Alongside Africa's economic and social reali- 
ties is an imposing list of political realities we 
must include in our foreign policy formulation. 

The first, and most important, of these reali- 
ties is Africa's drive for freedom and inde- 
pendence. In less than a decade and a half, 
33 new nations have come to independence in 
Africa, and others are on the way. Although 
we sometimes lose sight of the fact, these new 
nations made the transition to national sover- 
eignty in cooperation with the former metro- 
poles in peace and good order — except for Al- 
geria and the Congo. 

The major territories without self-govern- 
ment lie in southern Africa, where white minor- 
ity governments control large black majorities 
and significant numbers of Asians and coloreds, 
who are people of mixed blood. In most of 
these areas little, if any, progress is being made 
toward self-determination in acceptable terms 
for the people, and because of this, the future 
for peace in southern Africa is not promising. 
The lack of progress there is a major concern 
to independent Africa and an issue which pas- 
sionately unites and motivates Africans 
throughout the continent. Until this problem 
is solved, there will be trouble in Africa, with 
worldwide impact. 

The desire of Africa's new and developing 
nations to obtain recognition of their dignity as 
equal, sovereign states in the world community 

is another African reality. For this reason 
they place great faith in the U.N. as a forum 
where African countries have voices equal to 
those of other areas of the world. 

Later I'll say a word about the African de- 
sire for nonalinement and the compulsion to- 
ward African unity. These are real and 
intensely felt African aspirations. 

A final African political reality — and one of 
considerable importance to the United States — 
is the growing size of Communist activities in 
Africa. Communist overtures to Africa cover 
a broad range of activities, from diplomatic on 
down. To date, the Soviets have 24 diplomatic 
missions and the Commimist Chinese have 16 
in Africa. Together, they have extended more 
than $1 billion in credits and loans to African 
nations, although much of that amount has not 
been drawn upon by Africans. Approximately 
7,000 African students go to Communist uni- 
versities in Europe and Asia on scholarships 
each year. That is about 1,000 more than the 
number of African students who come to the 
United States annually, but far fewer than the 
30,000-40,000 in the United Kingdom, France, 
and other parts of Western Europe. In addi- 
tion to scholarships, the Communists also have 
increased their use of publications, radio broad- 
casting, films, and cultural exchanges as propa- 
ganda weapons in Africa. Finally, of course, 
the Communists widely employ undercover 
forms of subversion. 

Although the growing size of the Communist 
presence in Africa contributes to the recogni- 
tion of Africa's importance and dignity and 
promotes an increasing, although overall small, 
number of African militants, it is also leading 
to an increasing African awareness of the true 
objectives of communism. African leaders 
have seen or heard about Communist interfer- 
ence in the internal affairs of African gov- 
ernments, efforts to win African support for 
Communist cold-war objectives, and the treat- 
ment of African students in Communist univer- 
sities. As a result, many Africans are seriously 
concerned with the way Communist deeds and 
actions conflict with African national interests 
and their desires to develop themselves in a 
peaceful climate in which they are truly inde- 

APRIL, 12, 106.5 


Five Pillars of U.S. Policy 

In the light of these realities in modern Af- 
rica, what, then, should be a realistic American 
policy toward Africa ? 

The primary purpose of all U.S. foreign pol- 
icy is, of course, the security of the United 
States, and this concern is reflected in our Af- 
rican policy. This does not mean, however, that 
the protection of America's interests in Africa 
is inimical to the best interests of the African 
people. Indeed, the situation is quite the con- 
trary. The objectives we seek in protecting 
Anierican interests in Africa are objectives 
which also promote the real interests of the 
African people. 

As we have no territorial or other special 
ambitions anywhere, American policy is direct- 
ed toward the building of a world of peace and 
freedom. In today's interdependent world, that 
is the only way we can guarantee our own peace 
and freedom in the long run. In seeking peace 
and freedom for ourselves, therefore, we do it 
best by seeking it for others. For that reason 
our basic policy toward Africa is designed to 
advance African interests as much as our own. 

American foreign policy toward Africa is 
based upon fundamental American principles 
that are an integral part of our national life 
and express our national ethos. At the same 
time, however, our policy is as practical in the 
protection of our national interests and secu- 
rity as the motto "honesty is the best policy" is 
essential to the successful conduct of a profitable 

In any event, our tough-minded Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk, has emphasized more than 
once that a scarlet thread of American policy is 
an insistence that "governments derive their 
just powers from the consent of the governed." 
In foreign affairs, the counterpart of this is 
called self-determination and is a leitmotif of 
our whole policy. 

Moroccans still have a warm memory of 
Franklin Delano Eoosevelt because of their be- 
lief that he advanced the cause of independence 
for that country. Likewise, President John F. 
Kennedy is remembered by Algerians for his 
1957 speech in the Senate in which he pointed 
out that there was only one solution — independ- 
ence — to the vexing Algerian problem. As 

Pi-esident, his friendship for Africa has made 
his name indelible on that continent. Senegal- 
ese, too, remember the warm rapjaort established 
by President Lyndon B. Joluison during his 
visit to that country's first independence cele- 
bration in 1961. 

Throughout Africa the United States is 
either praised or darmied — depending upon the 
point of view— because of our support for inde- 
pendence. It is interesting, too, that at the first 
Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955 the 
meeting's heroes were not Marx, Lenin, and 
Mao Tse-tung, as the Communist Chinese hoped, 
but the fathers of the American Revolution and 
their Declaration of Independence. Funda- 
mentally, therefore, I believe I can say realisti- 
cally that Africans have a basic friendship for 

Of the five pillars of U.S. policy toward Af- 
rica, self-determination, then, with the several 
corollaries that flow from it — such as our ac- 
ceptance of the African desire for nonaline- 
ment — is the first and most important. 

The second main pillar of that policy is en- 
couragement of the solution of African prob- 
lems by Africans themselves and support of 
their institutions through which solutions can 
be reached, such as the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity and the Economic Commission for 

The third is support of improved standards 
of living through trade and aid. 

The fourth is the discouragement of arms 
buildups beyond the needs of internal security 
or legitimate self-defense. 

The fifth is encouragement of other countries 
of the world, particularly the former Euro- 
pean metropoles, to recognize their continuing 
responsibilities toward Africa. 

In this statement of our African policy fun- 
damentals, I have not mentioned opposition to, 
or containment of, communism. However, there 
is no question that the support of freedom over 
communism is basic to and a product of, the 
aforementioned tenets that guide United States 
policy in Africa. From time to time special 
measures may be needed to meet crisis situa- 
tions — and they will be taken vigorously when 
necessary — but conditions in Africa are such 
that the support of true African independence 



!Uid development is, in the long run, the surest 
iruiirantei> tliat Africa will remain in the world 
of free choice and keep communism at arm's 

Support of SelNDetermination 

Tuminj; to the first pillar, U.S. support of 
self-determination includes several facets: 

Fii-st, our supjxjrt of the right of African 
countries to choose whether or not the}' wish 
to be indei)endcnt; 

Second, the right of Africans to govern 

Third, the right of Africans to choose the 
kind of institutions under which they want 
to live; 

Fourth, the right of African countries to a 
foreign policy of alliance or nonalinement ; and, 

Fifth, our willingness to support a movement 
of African unity if that is what the Africans 
themselves want. 

On the first facet — independence — the Amer- 
ican policy of self-determination has insisted 
that the African people be given the right to 
choose independence if that is what they want. 
This policy is a practical one, showing prefer- 
ence for a peaceful transition and a recognition 
that the long-term interests of all concerned 
may best be served by a progressive approach, 
over a reasonable period of time, within a 
.framework of agreement by all parties. 

For example, the United States is satisfied 
that the several steps toward self-government 
and ultimate independence worked out between 
the people of the British High Commission 
Territori' of Bcchuanaland and Great Britain 
fulfill our definition of self-detei-mination. 
Those .~teps recognize the necessity for consent 
of the governed and the choice of independence 
within an agreeable length of time. On the 
other hand, the United States agrees with Great 
Britain that a unilateral declaration of inde- 
pendence by Southern Rhodesia, in its present 
state of limited franchise and representation, 
does not satisfy self-determination. It seems 
quite evident that a large proportion of that 
country's people are dissatisfied with the present 
amount of self-government. Under present ar- 
rangements, they see little hope of acquiring 

satisfactory internal self-government in a 
reasonable period of time. 

Special mention must be made of the lack of 
self-determination in the Portuguese territories 
in Africa. Our policy there is to use every 
persuasive force we have to get the Portuguese 
Government into a dialog with the Africans 
concerned. We would like to see such a dialog, 
looking toward a mutually agreed program of 
development for self-government with the ulti- 
mate right to opt for outright independence, 
some form of community with Portugal, or even 
union with Portugal. A resolution reafEiTning 
the rights of the people of the territories to 
self-determination was approved in the United 
Nations in December 1963, with the support of 
the United States, after a series of talks between 
the Portuguese Foreign Minister and a niunber 
of African diplomats at the United Nations. It 
will be noted that our policy does not demand 
"one man, one vote" tomorrow, but it does 
contemplate an immediate recognition of the 
people's timely right to choose independence or 
other form of association or disassociation. In 
addition, it recognizes the right to government 
by the consent of the governed, with steps being 
taken to prepare the people for such self- 
government as rapidly as possible. 

On the second facet — self-government — in- 
dependence and government by the consent of 
the governed are not necessarily the same thing, 
I should point out. The Republic of South 
Africa has independence from foreign domi- 
nation, but it does not have government by the 
consent of all the governed nor does its system 
of apartheid portend that there will be a govern- 
ment with the consent of the governed. Amer- 
ican policy in this situation has been made 
abundantly clear in word and action at the 
United Nations and elsewhere. The United 
States is in complete and unalterable opposition 
to apartheid. We have imilaterally, and with 
the United Nations, declared an embargo on 
American arms for the Republic of South 
Africa. We have sought by every diplomatic 
means to convince the South African Govern- 
ment that apartheid contains the seeds for de- 
struction for South Africa, as well as trouble for 
the rest of Africa and the world. As in the 
case of the Portuguese territories, we seek to 

.VPRIL 12, 196.5 


impose no special formula upon South Africa. 
Rather, we seek to induce a dialog between the 
Government and its citizens with no present 
voice in that Government, looking toward a 
mutually agreeable and peaceful transition to 
government by consent of all the governed. 

On the tliird facet — free choice of institu- 
tions — our policy of self-determination also 
contemplates our acceptance of free choice by 
African governments of their own form of gov- 
ermnent and society, so long as they provide 
government by the consent of the governed and 
do not injure others. Our policy does not antic- 
ipate that every African government will be 
a faithful copy of the Governments of the 
United States, Britam, France, or any free- 
world country, even though we believe m their 

In this connection, wliile we ourselves prefer 
a two-pai-ty system, we can, nevertheless, imder- 
stand the reasons why many Africans want a 
one-party system at this time. This is a concept 
that our policy can live with, especially if it 
provides a reasonable right to govermnent 
representative of and responsive to the needs of 
the people. But this is not to say that we feel 
the one-party system is an ultunately desirable 

In judging Afi-ican one-party systems, how- 
ever, Americans must be mindful that it wasn't 
until after a decade of government under our 
own Constitution that we had national parties 
ourselves. (The majority of African govern- 
ments are only 5 years old.) Until recently in 
some of our States, one-j^arty systems continued 
to exist. However, within these State one- 
party systems, there were opposing factions and 
the people had a choice between them. This 
also is true in Africa, where the one-party 
systems have a degree of internal dialog and 
discussion that distinguishes them from the 
monolithic one-party systems of Europe, with 
which we are more familiar. 

The question of African "socialism" also falls 
within the framework of self-determination. 
Here we must recognize that, in the African 
context, teclm.ical terms do not necessarily have 
the same meaning as in ours. African socialism 
is at least as alien to Karl Marx's socialism as 
today's American capitalism is different from 

that described by Adam Smith. There is no 
African state that does not welcome foreign 
private mvestment and capitalist enterprise. 
Indigenous private enterprise flourishes to some 
extent in every country, although large-scale 
private enterprise is not in evidence in many 
states because their economies are not yet rich 
enough to pennit the accumulation of sufficient 
private capital. 

On the fourth facet — nonalinement — U.S. 
acceptance of the African desire for a policy of i 
nonalinement is a logical extension of our i 
philosophy of self-determination. There was 
a time when the United States fretted about 
"true neutralism." But for 4 years our Gov- 
ernment has felt it unnecessary for any country 
whicli seeks its own independence to have to 
be alined with us to be seeking the same kind of 
the world we seek. Any country that seeks 
independence ipso facto denies the subservience 
that communism demands. As President Ken- 
nedy said in his state of the Union message in 
January 1962 : - 

. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful 
world community of free and Independent states, free 
to choose their own future and their own system so 
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others. 

Some may choose forms and ways that we would 
not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they 
are choosing. We can welcome diversity — the Com- 
munists cannot. . . . And the way of the past shows 
clearly that freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the 

On the fifth facet — African miity — the' 
United States recognizes the right of Africans 
to create any form of association among them- 
selves they choose, so long as the purposes of 
such association are not destructive to the wel- 
fare of others. As a practical matter, the 
United States understands the African desire — 
I might almost say compulsion — for unity, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, that unity is so 
obviously in the best interests of developing 
economic and political viability for the frag- 
mented and underdeveloped African states. 
While the United States approves the move for 
African unity in principle, it is our policy not 
to take specific action toward this goal unless 
requested to do so. Thus we have supported 

'■ For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 



he idea of (lie alino?t-contiiient-wide Orfjani- 
W| »tion of African Unity and tlie Economic 
ipq Uomniission for Africa, as well as a number of 
)sg noro limited regional groups. 

Self-determination inevitably raises practical 
[uestions in its application. For example, just 
nrho has the privilejje of decision ? Can a single 
sit}', for instance, determine it wishes to be 
ndependent from the countryside with which 
t has been traditionally associated ? Specifi- 
lly, should Katanga, or Orientale, or Kasai 
ovinces in the Congo have the riglit to opt 
'or independence? 

Tlie T'nited States has felt that, like the ques- 
ion of wliat constitutes a bargaining unit in 
abor relations, the right for self-determination 
as to be based on a practical historical unit in 
irder to permit fast and sensible results. In 
le Congo, for example, the whole country was 
defined by a century's experience. Tn any 
ent, the Africans themselves expressed their 
pect for the recognition of historical fron- 
tiers in the first meeting of the OAIJ in 19(5.3. 
and we feel this is a useful and important base 
ind adjunct for our policy of self-determina- 

African Solution of African Problems 

The second major pillar of U.S. policy to- 
ward Africa is our support for African solu- 
tions of African problems. This is a natural 
derivative of the philosophy of sovereign self- 
determination and the American belief that a 
sf)!ution by neiglibors will be more effective than 
one developed from the outside — not unlike our 
own idea that tlie Federal Government should 
not do those things that local government can 
do as well or better. 

Perhaps two examples will suffice to illustrate 
liow this policy operates. In lOfi.3, after the 
-sassination of President fSylvanusl Olj'mpio 
of Togo when the new government took over, 
although there was some embarrassment be- 
i^ause of the long delay, the United States indi- 
' ated it would not act on the question of recog- 
nition imtil a significant number of African 
I'ountries had acted. This precedent has been 
followed in similar, sub.sequent cases. The 
United States has welcomed and encouraged the 
Organization of African Unitv in its efforts to 

solve the border disputes between ilorocco and 
Algeria and Ethiopia and Somalia. In the 
present Congo problem, the United States has 
welcomed OAU cooperation witli the Govern- 
ment of the Congo in solving tlie internal re- 
bellion and outside interference. The United 
States has consistently and with some success 
urged Congolese President [Joseph] Kasavubu 
and Prime Minister EMoisel Tsiiombe to work 
with that organization, consistent with the sov- 
ereignty of the Congo. 

Aid and Trade 

The third main pillar of our African policy 
is our support of African economic develop- 
ment and independence through aid and trade. 
Aid to Africa is still a relatively new concept, 
and is only one-tenth of our global aid program. 
But, in the short time of its existence, our assist- 
ance program is beginning to show positive 
results. For example, as a result of a chicken- 
hatcliing program in Nigeria, much-needed pro- 
tein was provided for the people and the cost of 
eggs was reduced from $1.25 to 75 cents a dozen. 
Likewise, in Tunisia, the abililj' to produce vege- 
tables for home consumption rose to the point 
that horticultural imports were cut from $14.4 
million annually in 1!)59 to about $1.2 million 

U.S. aid to Africa is a realistic resj^onse to our 
support of American interest in that continent. 
There are many reasons why the United States 
finds it desirable to have an aid program in 
Africa. One is that the majority of Americans 
who believe in aid do so because they want to 
help others less fortunate than themselves. 
This may sound strange in a day when it is sup- 
posed to be more fashionable to be hard-boiled 
tlian warmhearted, but it is a fact, nonetheless. 
And perhaps it is one of the reasons why we 
have become the great people that we are. 

In addition, there are both long-range and 
.short -t«rm practical reasons for our assistance. 
The most important long-range basis for aid is 
that it helps build a world in which we and our 
children can live in security and peace. As 
President Kennedy said in his inaugural ad- 
dres.s,' "If a free society cannot help the many 

• For text, see ihid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 

APRIL 12, 1965 


who are poor, it cannot save the few who are 
rich." Thus, unless the rest of the world lives 
satisfied, it will be constantly in turmoil. Under 
any circumstance such turmoil would breed 
trouble. But in this age of cold war there is no 
doubt there would be serious trouble resulting 
from Communist activity in areas of continued 

In addition to that long-range consideration, 
the United States also has a number of specific 
short-term reasons for desiring to maintain 
good relations with its African friends through 
an aid program. It can be argued, with good 
reason, that aid does not buy friends. One can 
agree with that. But there are realities we 
must accept in this world. As an affluent major 
power, we could turn friends against us if we 
did not give them a helping hand when it 
is needed. And aid is an important, even 
essentia], element in creating the mutual under- 
standing and cooperation among African coun- 
tries that help our friends comprehend the many 
world problems we all face — the threat of 
Cliinese communism, for example, or the need 
for international scientific cooperation. 

Obviously, in a continent where many of the 
preconditions for rapid economic development 
are lacking, the tasks of nation building are 
difficult. Much of our help, therefore, is di- 
rected toward encouraging the African nations 
to do all they can to spur their progress and to 
help them develop the tools necessary to do the 
job. We are putting our assistance into proj- 
ects that not only reach large numbers of people 
and improve their lives but those which help 
countries develop their own resources and in- 
crease their ability to help themselves. 

Aid is also a necessary ingredient of the eco- 
nomic development needed to build political 
stability. In every African country — certainly 
in all tliose I myself have visited — the people 
are hungry for economic and social improve- 
ment. Any government — however progressive 
and constructive, however cloaked with the 
glory of winning independence — that fails to 
reckon with this hunger will find itself in jeop- 
ardy and the order and stability of its people 
gravely disturbed. This not only adversely af- 
fects the country involved but, because of its 

international repercussions, the United States 
as well. 

African governments are not yet of them- 
selves able to generate the full thrust required 
for the economic and social improvement needed 
to satisfy their people. They must seek aid or 
risk deepening troubles. The key question is 
from whom aid will be sought, and when it can 
be delivered and put to work. It is worth not- 
ing that in almost every instance the newly inde- 
pendent nations of Africa turned first to the 
West for aid and looked elsewhere only if they 
were disappointed by the Western response. 

Our overall aid program for Africa embraces ' 
a variety of tools — development grants, support- , 
ing assistance, development loans, development 
research, support for international organiza- 
tions. Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps. We ii 
do not conceive the development of Africa as a I 
challenge to the United States alone but a chal- j 
lenge to the whole free world. And tliis devel- | 
opment is a challenge not only to governments , 
but to private enterprise. 

As a consequence, the State Department, 
other departments and agencies of the United 
States Government, and other organizations — 
public and private — are initiating and support- 
ing (1) programs to promote aid and assistance 
to African countries by nations of the free 
world and (2) all programs to encourage and 
help private investment and enterprise in 

Africa is magnificently endowed by nature,- 
and with the effective combination of invest- 
ment, trade, and local initiative, its potential 
can be realized. For example, the intelligent 
development of its many important minerals 
provides scope for private financial and com- 
mercial enterprise, as well as an ever-increasing 
source of livelihood for the African people. 

It is no surprise, therefore, that American 
private companies have shown increasing par- 
ticipation in Africa's development. The need 
for investment in Africa is great, and the 
potential of resource development holds much 
promise for all concerned— Africa, Europe, the 
United States, and the rest of the free world. 

Between World War II and 1957, it is 
estimated that total investment in Africa 



amounted to some $10 billion, of which the bulk 
came from Europe. U.S. investment in Africa 
reached the $1 billion mark only in I'JGl. 
Europe's trade with Africa is about five times 
that of the United States, which in 196-2 totaled 
approximately $1.7 billion. We have no desire 
to disrupt or supplant existing commercial ties 
between Africa and Europe, but we believe 
there are many commercial opportunities that 
have not yet been investigated and we have 
an increasing interest in exploring those 

American investment in Africa has increased 
considerably in recent years, rising from $218 
million in 1950 to nearly $1.5 billion in 1963. Of 
that amount, about 40 percent is in South Africa 
and 60 percent in other African countries. We 
, like to believe that this growth is due to the co- 
^ P operation between hospitable African coimtries 
and the initiative of American enterprise, plus 
po.ssib]y the stress put on the importance of pri- 
vate investment in Africa by U.S. Government 
agencies. We look forward to further increases 
as a result of the investment climate and condi- 
tions engendered by investment-minded African 
governments with American government co- 

Internal Security and Arms Limitation 

The fourth pillar of our policy toward Africa 
is our desire to discourage arms buildups be- 
yond the needs of internal security or legitimate 

Our policy is designed to encourage arms 
limitation in Africa. Generally the military 
requirements of most African countries have 
been worked out with the former metropoles, 
and there has been little need for supplementary 
arms assistance from the United States. In 
some cases, however, there is a strong desire 
to rely on more than one source in this field, and, 
on request, we have provided limited military 

We feel that the prospects for peaceful settle- 
ments of disputes are bettered by avoiding arms 
races. And, given the very limited economic 
resources of the newly independent countries, it 
is imperative for them to devote their resources 

to economic and social development rather than 

Obviously the Communists would benefit from 
an arms race in Africa, while the free world 
would not. For that reason our military assist- 
ance is designed primarily to meet the minimum 
legitimate internal security or self-defense re- 
quirements of the recipients, and to contribute 
to economic and social development wherever 

This program, which is small compared with 
those in other regions of the world — only some 
2V^ percent of our worldwide military assist- 
ance — is principally confined to providing mili- 
tary and telecommunications equipment and 
technical assistance. Such assistance, we be- 
lieve, can help African nations develop the con- 
ditions of law and order which are necessary 
for steady progress. We do not anticipate sig- 
nificant growth in the military assistance pro- 
gram for Africa, and most of all we do not wish 
to help generate any form of arms race. Even 
in countries where we are providing major 
items, we feel that our sincere efforts to be help- 
ful in assisting in legitimate self-defense and 
the responsible limitations under which we pro- 
vide such assistance dissuade those countries 
from turning to others who might be less con- 
cerned with the total arms race in Africa. We 
would prefer a race in overcoming the economic 
and social problems that now beset the conti- 

While we attempt to stress internal security 
and civic action programs when called upon for 
legitimate military assistance, wherever possible 
we seek to build police programs to limit the 
need for military programs. 

Encouragement of European Concern 

The fifth, and final, pillar of our African 
policy that I would like to discuss is our desire 
to encourage other countries, particularly the 
former European metropoles, to recognize their 
responsibilities toward Africa. 

To a large extent this already is being done. 
We recognize Europe's vital and longstanding 
interests in Africa, and we have cooperated with 
them to encourage continuing and expanding 

APRIL 12, 1965 


mutually beneficial African-European rela- 
tions. Such relations are well established in 
many parts of the continent, for which much 
credit is due both to the former metropolitan 
powers and to the African countries involved. 

With few exceptions colonial ties are being 
laid aside for new types of cooperative arrange- 
ments between Africa and Europe. And, where 
African aspirations for independence and dig- 
nity have been satisfied, it has been the African 
nations themselves who have sought fruitful and 
continuing relations with the former metropoles. 
We consider this sound policy, and we are 
pleased that the new cultural, economic, and 
political relationships between the former met- 
ropoles and the newly independent African 
countries are, in most instances, both close and 
cordial, and politically and economically bene- 
ficial. There is no reason why they should not 

At the same time the young nations of Africa 
not only want to be independent but they feel 
compelled to manifest this independence. For 
that reason they wish to emphasize their indi- 
vidual personalities and characteristics and 
minimize their dependence upon others in polit- 
ical, economic, or cultural fields. Generally, 
then, they feel they must avoid exclusive rela- 
tions with the former metropoles in order not 
to compromise their feeling or image of 

It is our feeling that the United States can 
give African countries a second "great power" 
association which will increase their sense of 
independence. At the same time their connec- 
tions with the United States will give the Afri- 
can countries a greater political capacity to 
maintain associations with the former metro- 
poles. We believe that the availability of such 
an American presence meets the genuine needs 
of African states without their having to turn 
to the Communist nations. We believe the 
United States in this way can enhance the con- 
tributions of the free-world community to 
Africa and contribute to the preservation of the 
traditional cultural and other friendly relation- 
ships. In brief, then, our desire is to supple- 
ment and strengthen existing relationships in 
Africa, not to supplant them, but always recog- 
nizing that we have important interests of our 

own in Africa. In this way we believe the 
United States can best serve world peace and 
African and our own best interests. 

In brief conclusion, then, U.S. policy toward 
Africa is based on our support for the African 
people to chart their own future, to work out 
their own problems by themselves if they can, 
to improve their living standards, to maintain 
intei-nal security without encouraging an Afri- 
can arms race, and to benefit from continued 
good relations with other free-world nations, 
particularly the former European metropoles, 
without jeopardizing their independence. 

In December 1963 President Johnson said : * 

We in the United States are dedicated to the same 
goals as the peoples of Africa — justice, freedom, and 
peace. Under our late President, John F. Kennedy, 
the United States made sigrnificant advances toward 
the attainment of those goals. We will continue to 
work toward those same objectives under my adminis- 
tration. We want to help build a world in which all 
men have a better opportunity to improve their lives, 
both spiritually and materially. Thus, we will con- 
tinue to press for equal rights for all — both in my 
country and abroad — and we will continue to assist the 
world's new and emerging nations in their efforts to 
strengthen their foundations of freedom and inde- 

In carrying out that policy, the United States 
hopes : 

1. To assist African nations to develoji effec- 
tive governments to assure peaceful progress 
for their people and to contribute to world peace 
and stability essential to the security of the 
United States. 

2. To help these nations build solid economic 
conditions to become self-sustaining members 
of the world community and not susceptible to 
Comnnmist overtures. 

3. To encourage peaceful application of self- 
determination to still-dependent Africa. 

4. To develop a true community of interests 
between Africa and the United States. 

If we can accomplish those goals in the face 
of Africa's rapidly changing situation, the 
United States believes Africa will — in African 
terms — contribute importantly to world peace, 
prosperity, and stability in years ahead. 

' For te.xt, see ibid., Jan. 6, 19C4, p. 17. 



U.S. and 11 OECD Nations Discuss 
International Shipping Problems 

Kepresentatives of the United States and 11 
maritime countries of the free ^Torld met March 
23-25 at the lioadquarters of tlie U.S. Mission 
to tl»e United Xations in New York to di.scuss 
problems of international sliipping. The 11 
countries (Bel<rium, Denmark, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Japan, the Xetiicrlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom) were represented b}' a 
group of shipping officials. 

U.S. representatives included G. Griffith 
Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, and Adm. Jolm Harllee, 
USN (retired). Chairman of the Federal Mari- 
time Commission. 

The principal subjects discussed related to the 
regulation of international shij^ping. The 
meeting was similar to othere among OECD 
countries on this general subject. 

In previous meetings the maritime nations 
had considered the need of the Federal Mari- 
time Commission for tonnage and revenue in- 
formation in the U.S. trades to study any dis- 
parities between freight rates on U.S. exports 
and imports. An agreement was reached on 
December 15, 19G4, in the Organization for 
E('onomic Cooperation and Development re- 
garding the exchange of this information. Tlie 
text of this Agreed Minute ^ was simultaneously 
released in tlio countries which were party to 
it. Tiio operation of this agreement was re- 
viewed in the New York meeting, and the gen- 
eral subject of exchange of information 

The dual-rate contract problem was also dis- 
cussed. The Bonner Act (P.L. 87-346) pro- 
vides that shipping conferences in the U.S. 
international trade offering lower rates to 
shippers who agree to give a portion of their 
business to conference lines must use a contract 
containing certain protective features. 

The meeting reviewed the complexity of these 
problems and the possibility that they might be 
adjustwl through international cooperation. 

The talks were informal and exploratory in 
character, and no decisions were reached. The 
promotional policies of the United States in the 
sliipping Held and the position of the U.S. mer- 
chant marine were not considered. 

World Trade Week, 1965 


Whereas the vigorous growth of our reciprocal 
trade with nations around the world advances the 
attainment of a more abundant life for every Ameri- 
can ; and 

Whereas the continued expansion of the interna- 
tional exchange of the products of i)eople's labors is 
mutually profitable to all trading nations and builds 
greater good will among them ; and 

Whereas we are working together with other na- 
tions to enlarge the opportunities for global marketing, 
by both developed and developing countries, through 
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers in the Kennedy 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations; and 

WnEitKAS more and more American businessmen 
are engaging in trade with overseas businessmen ; and 

Whereas American export progress, serving as an 
inspiring illustration of the strength of our private 
enterprise, encourages businessmen throughout the 
United States to seek new opportunities in the world's 
growing markets ; and 

Whereas American products, by their quality and 
variety, offer witness to the vigor and creativity of our 
economy in all parts of the world ; and 

Whereas it is essential that we continue to expand 
our export trade, so that we may further improve 
our international balance of payments, accelerate the 
progress of our advancing American industry, and 
increase the employment of American workers : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Lyni>on B. Johnson, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
the week beginning May 16, 1965, as World Trade 
Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, 
and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that 

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, 
professional, and civic groups, as well as the people 
of the United States generally, to observe World Trade 
Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, cere- 
monies, and other api>ropriate activities designed to 
promote continuing awareness of the imixirtance of 
world trade to our economy and our relations with 
other nations. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be affixed. 

' BiTiiETiN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 188. 

' No. 3647 ; 30 Fed. Reg. 4047. 

APRIL 12. 1965 


Done at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth 
day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen 

[seal] hundred and sixty-five, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the one 

hundred and eighty-ninth. 

luyvJUJ4A*tA^ — 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

Department To Hold Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 

The Department of State announced on 
March 24 (press release 58) that it will hold a 
national foreign policy conference for editors 
and broadcasters on April 13 and 14 at Wash- 
ington. Invitations have been extended by Sec- 
retary Rusk to representatives of the daily and 
periodical press and broadcasting stations and 
groups in all 50 States. 

Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara will address the confer- 
ence. Among other high officials expected to 
participate are: David Bell, Administrator, 
Agency for International Development ; George 
W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Carl T. 
Rowan, Director, U.S. Information Agency; 
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs; and Harlan Cleveland, 
Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs. 

Participants in the conference will have an 
opportunity to meet with other high-level of- 
ficials in concurrent roundtables covering 
Africa, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Latin 
America, the Near East, the Sino-Soviet con- 
frontation, the United Nations, the Western 
alliance, and disarmament. 

The conference will be held on the "back- 
ground only" ground rule. The sessions will be 
in the Department of State. 

This will be the ninth in this series. The 
purpose of tliese conferences is to assist the 
information media in making available to the 
American public the maximum possible infor- 
mation in depth on current international rela- 
tions issues. 

New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking 
Station Opens in Australia 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson to Prime Minister Rohert 
Menzies of Australia on the occasion of the 
dedication on March 19 of a new U.S. lunar 
and planetary spacecraft tracking station in \ 
the TidhinbUla Valley near Canberra, Australia, 

Makoh 19, 1964. 

It is a great pleasure for me to congratulate 
you on the outstanding and continuing con- 
tribution Australia is making to progress in the 
space age. The standard of performance at the 
tracking and data acquisition facilities already 
existing in Australia is excellent. I am con- 
fident that at the new space tracking facility 
at TidbinbiUa we vsdll see the same high level 
of performance. The station, which is oper- 
ated entirely by Australians, is now tracking 
the Mariner satellite on its photographic mis- 
sion to Mars. 

Today, in dedicating this facility, we take 
another step forward in the close cooperation 
between our two countries and in the effort 
of all those around the world who seek to labor 
together, to share their talents, to assure greater 
mutual understanding. 

This will be the true measure of our success 
in the exploration of outer space. And it is 
for this special reason, Mr. Prime Minister, 
that I extend my deep appreciation and best' 
wishes for the operation of this new station. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Baclfground Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions. January 14, 1965. 138 pp. [Committee 

Background Documents on East-West Trade. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. February 1965. 
299 pp. [Committee print.] 

Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Problems for 
the period January 1-June 30, 1964. H. Doc. 70. 
February 2, 1965. 96 pp. 

Automotive Products Agreement Between the United 
States and Canada. Hearing before a subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
February 10, 1965. 30 pp. 



>ecurity Council Renews Mandate 
)f Cyprus Peacekeeping Force 

Following is a statement made in the UJV. 
^rniritij Cmincil on March 19 by U.S. Repre- 
ntative Adlai E. Stevenson, together with the 
xt of a resolution adopted unanimously by the 
ouncil on that day. 


■.S./U.N. press release 4515 

On behalf of my Government, may I also con- 
rrutulate the Soviet delegation and the Govern- 
nent of the Soviet Union for the most recent 
ichievement of its cosmonauts and of its great 
••cientilic community, which makes possible such 
emarkable achievements in outer space. I have 
ilways fancied that to be in a state of weight- 
essness must be very pleasant. But, alas, I fear 
t is a state I shall never experience. 

But I am sure we all devoutly hope that a 
tate of weightlessness is not the destiny of the 
"nited Nations. 

■ Mr. President, as this Council considers the 
•xtension of the mandate of the United Nations 
leacekeeping force in Cyprus, we are once again 
he beneficiaries of an excellent report prepared 
>y tlie Secretary-General.' In clear, precise, 
• et judicious language he has set out for us the 
■ssential elements of the current situation in 
Jyprus. His report makes easier our task of 
Forming balanced judgments on what needs to 
le done to move closer to the objectives of tlie 
■Security Council resolution of March 4 [1964].^ 

I am happy to note, therefore, that all of the 
speakers who have preceded me have supported 
he Secretary-General's recommendation that 
he United Nations peacekeeping force in 
'yprus be extended for a further 3-month 

' C.N. (Iw. S/G22R and Corr. 1 and Add. 1. 
• U.N. doc. S/557.5. 

period. Jfy delegation believes that the United 
Nations force has discharged its delicate task 
with admirable propriety, efficiency, and energy. 
And we believe that the continued presence of 
UNFICYP on Cyprus is still essential to the 
creation of the conditions necessary to the work- 
ing out of an agreed solution. 

The Secretary-General's report documents 
the dangers, the provocations, the crises, and the 
frustrations with which these soldiers of peace 
must cope from day to day — and in the middle 
of the night, as well. Yet they have managed 
to be in the right places at the right time to pre- 
vent many ugly incidents from leading to local 
strife and to keep local strife from spreading 
throughout this land so long poisoned by com- 
munal bitterness. 

The service to peace rendered by the men 
and their leaders who are wearing the insignia 
of the United Nations on the island of Cyprus 
has, we believe, earned universal gratitude and 
admiration. So I wish to join the other speak- 
ers and express the thanks of the TTnited Nations 
for a job well done to General [K. S.] Thimay- 
ya and to the officers and men from Canada, Ire- 
land, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden who stand the peace watch for all 
of us on Cyprus. We owe our thanks, too, to 
the contingents of civilian police from Aus- 
tralia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and 
Sweden who serve in the U.N. Force. And we 
are grateful as well to the enlightened states- 
men of these nations which have made the forces 
available — in the service of peace and in keep- 
ing faith with the first responsibility of this 

"We welcome, Mr. President, the draft resolu- 
tion submitted by the delegations of Bolivia, 
the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Nether- 
lands, and Uruguay ^ and shall vote for it. We 
believe that its sponsors have acted wisely not 
only in proposing the extension of UNFICYP 

• U.N. doe. S/6247. 

\PRIL 12, 1965 


for another 3 months but also in noting the con- 
tinued uneasiness -which prevails at several 
points, in reaffirming the Council's previous 
resolutions, and in calling on the parties con- 
cerned to act with the utmost restraint and to 
cooperate fully with the U.N. Force. 

The mere presence of the U.N. Force on 
Cyprus, important as it is, is not enough, Mr. 
President. To be effective, it must be permitted 
to carry out the mandate assigned to it by this 
Council in its resolution of March 4, 19G4. My 
delegation has read with concern in the Secre- 
tary-General's report of instances of failure to 
cooperate with UNFICYP and of instances in 
wliicli the freedom of movement of UNFICYP 
was denied or seriously abridged. I think that 
this Council is entitled to expect that, so long 
as it keeps a force on the island, the parties will 
respect the rights of that force and cooperate 
fully with it — a point that is covered in the 
draft resolution before us. It was reassuring, 
therefore, to hear the Foreign Minister of 
Cyprus [Spyros Kyprianou] state on Wednes- 
day [March 17] that his Government will 
"strengthen" its cooperation with UNFICYP. 
Mr. Pi-esident, the Secretary-General has 
called attention to differences of interpretation 
about UNFICYP's mandate. My delegation 
is in wholehearted agreement with his interpre- 
tation tliat the force should act neither as an 
instrument of the Government of Cyprus in ex- 
tending its authority over the Turkisli Cypriot 
community, nor should it assume responsibili- 
ties for restoring the constitutional situation 
which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1963. 

We expect that the mandate of the force as it 
has been exercised will be respected and that an 
early manifestation of this will be compliance 
with the force commander's recommendations 
regarding the situation which recently devel- 
oped in the Lefka-Ambelikou area, as described 
in the supplement to the Secretary-General's 
report. On numerous previous occasions 
UNFICYP has helped to "defuse" other poten- 
tially dangerous situations. 

Both General Thimayya and the Secretary- 
General's special representative. Ambassador 
[C. A.] Bernardes, have won the respect of all 

the parties to this dispute by their ability, diplo- 1 
macy, and impartiality. They represent an { 
important resource which both parties should j 
continue to utilize. | 

Inasmuch as the U.N. Force is on the island ! 
to help create conditions which will facilitate a ] 
solution, we are naturally disturbed by any in- j 
crease in tension which obstructs a solution — i 
an anxiety that has been expressed by other'! 
members. The Secretary-General has frankly 
expressed his grave concern over the impact of i 
the increased input of heavy arms into Cyprus, i] 
Since his report was issued, there have been I 
further disturbing indications about the arrival i| 
of heavy and sopliisticated weapons. We share 
the Secretary-General's concern — indeed the 
universal concern. Clearly, if the mandate of 
the United Nations Force, and I quote, is ". . . 
in the interest of preserving international peace ^^ 
and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a j 
recurrence of fighting," increasing heavy arraa- ! 
ment supplied to one of the commmiities is not f 
helpful. In fact, a previous report of the Sec- 1 
retary-General raised the question as to whether -; 
the importation of any arms was consistent with ' 
the letter and spirit of the March 4 resolution, 
which admonished member states to take no 
action which might worsen the situation and: 
urged the "utmost restraint" on the leaders of 
1 >oth communities. 

The Council cannot fail to be concerned, 
therefore, in light of the previous history of 
this problem, that the supply of heavy arms by 
any member state, coupled with any lack of" 
restraint in their use, could dangerously ag- 
gravate the situation. I must note that this^ 
danger has increased since our December meet- 
ing on the Cyprus problem.'' At that time we, 
had before us a report which noted a decrease 
in the rate of arms importation. 

Mr. President, is it not high time that the 
parties to the dangerous and difficult situation 
they have laid before us place greater confidence 
in the demonstrated abilities of the U.N. Force 
and its capable commander to protect the secu- > 
rity interests of the people of Cyprus? Is it 
not higli time they turned their attention to a 




nil til 








' Bulletin of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 26. 



otum to normal conditions and to communal 
I'conciliation? Judging by tiie full attention 
iven it in the Secretarv-General's report, this 
.-vpect of the United Nations work on Cyprus 
i:is not been neglectetl by the U.N. stafT in 
\vprus. After a year of heroic efforts by the 
nternational community to restore peace to 

yprus, we believe it demands and deserves the 
r<rent attention of the parties concerned. 

In paragraph '27'2 of his I'eport, the Secretary- 
leneral states that he is aware that it 
vill become increasingly difficult to maintain 
'XFICYP because of the si)ecial burden on 
liose providing contingents and also because of 
!ie growing difficulty of financing the force by 
oluutary contributions. M_y delegation knows 
nly too well that the military and financial 
urden has been borne by a small number of 
iates. We arc confident that as long as there 
- a peacekeeping job to do in Cyprus, they will 

<pond to the need. We hope that their ex- 
iiiple will inspire other states to come forward 
nd a.ssume a share of the financial burden. In 
Ills conne<^tion, I am authorized to state that, 
f the Council extends UNFICYP's mandate, 
ly Government stands ready to contribute up 

> an additional $2 million toward defraying 
he expenses. 

Our objective is not just peacekeeping but 

•acemaking, and this Council and those who 
re fumi.shing the forces to keep the peace on 
■'ypnis have a right to expect something more 
■I the way of cooperation and compromise from 

•th sides to make peace in Cyprus. So have 

lose of us who have been contributing the 
imds and logistical support for the force. And 

I has everyone who values peace. 

We would hope, at last, Mr. President, that 

spite the bitter history of this dispute, both 
ides will soon find the will and the means for 

more forthcoming attitude toward the United 
<'ations and toward each other. 

This mission has now been in force for a year; 
nd a year is time enough to lay out the 
)pposing positions and to clarify the issues. 

lie United Nations mediator, Senor Galo 
Maza, has consulted with all the parties on a 

imber of occasions. It is not too soon to ex- 
x'Ct that liis labors might at last be rewarded 

by a substantial change in the attitude and be- 
havior of the parties to this dispute. 

What is needed now is not a stale repetition 
of charges and countei-charges or a grim ad- 
herence to evei-y detail of traditional positions 
but, on the contrary, a really serious spirit of 
accommodation and compromise which could 
revive cooperation and ultimately friendship 
among the nations and communities concerned, 
and which at the same time could relieve the 
United Nations and the world from the burdens 
and the dangers which this strife has too long 
imposed upon them. 

I'm sorry I have no Shakespearean quotation 
to enlighten or enliven our discussion, but I 
do recall that "all is well that ends well." But 
to end well this situation should end soon. 


U.N. doc. S/6247 

The Seciiritii Council, 

Xotitiff that the report by the Secretary-General 
(S/C228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) recommend.s the 
maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace- 
Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolu- 
tion of 4 March 19G4 (S/.557.5) for an additional period 
of three months, 

Xotiiig that the Government of Cyprus has indicated 
its desire that the stationing of the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 March 

Noting from the Report of the Secretary-General 
that while the military situation has on the whole 
remained (juiet during the period under review and 
while the presence of the United Nations Force has 
contributed significantly to this effect, nevertheless the 
I>osition remains one of uneasiness in .several poinl.s, 
with the conse<iuent danger of a renewal of fighting 
with all of its disastrous consequences, 

Reneieing the expression of its deep appreciation 
to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the im- 
plementation of the Security Council resolutions of 
4 March l!)fr4, 13 March 1964 (S/.560.?), 20 .Tune 1964 
(S/.577S). 2.T September 1964 (S/5987) and 18 Decem- 
l)er 1964 (S/G121), 

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to 
the States that have contributed troops, police, sup- 
plies and financial support for the implementation of 
the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 
March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 (S/5868), 
2.5 September 1964 and 18 December 1964, and the 
consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd 
meeting on 11 August 1964 ; 

.PRIL 12, 1965 


2. Calls upon all Member States to comply with the 
above-mentioned resolutions ; 

3. Calls upon the parties concerned to act with the 
utmost restraint and to co-operate fully with the 
United Nations Force ; 

4. Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General 
(S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) ; 

5. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the 
Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an 
additional period of three months, ending 26 June 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may 
be purchas-ed from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated January 5 from the Representative of 
Greece regarding a violation of Greek airspace by 
three Turkish military jet aircraft. S/6143. Janu- 
ary 7, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter dated January 8 from the Acting Representa- 
tive of Thailand regarding investigations by Thai 
authorities which have established that no Thai 
police launch violated Cambodian waters and that 
no Cambodian fi.shermen were abducted by Thai 
police as alleged by Cambodia (S/6136). "s/6144. 
January 8, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter dated January 1 from the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Cambodia regarding the Republic of Viet- 
Nam'a "version" of an incident at Aniong Kres 
(S/6041) and calling the Vietnamese proposal for 
U.N. mediation "another hypocritical manoevre." 
S/6147. January 13, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of 
Cambodia reiterating charges of the violation of 
Cambodian territorial waters bv Thai police. 
S/6149. January 15, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of 
Cambodia rejecting charges by Thailand {S/6141) 
of the violation of Thai territorial waters by Cam- 
bodian soldiers. S/6150. January 15, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of 
Caml)odia protesting an act of aggression by "a band 
of Thai armed elements" at Thkeam " Romeas. 
S/6151. January 15, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter from the Representative of Cyprus transmitting 
the text of a letter from Dr. Ihsan Ali. S/6152 
January 15, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 18 from the Representative of 
Greece concerning a violation of Greeli airspace by 
a Turkish jet aircraft. S/6154. January 20, 1965. 
1 p. 

Letter dated January 20 from the Acting Representa- 
tive of Thailand rejecting Cambodian charges 
(S/6151). S/6155. January 21, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter dated January 20 from the First Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Indonesia informing the Secretary-General of his 

Government's decision to withdraw from the United| 
Nations because of the seating of Malayisia on thei 
Security Council. S/6157. January 21, 1965. 4 pp.| 

Letter dated January 20 from the Representative oil 
Turkey regarding the letter of Dr. Ihsan Alll 
(S/0152). S/6158. January 22, 1965. 2 pp. i 

Letter dated January 22 from the Representative of| 
Turkey enclosing the text of a telegram from the; 
Vice President of Cyprus regarding a recent change] 
in the date of a bank holiday in Cyprus. S/6159. 
January 22, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 23 from the Representative of' 
Turkey regarding Greek and Greek Cypriot prepare-' 
tlons for a renewal of hostilities. S/6161. Jann-J 
ary 25, 1965. 1 p. j 

Letter dated January 25 from the Representative of] 
Greece regarding discriminatory actions by the Turk-' Government against Greek nationals residing! 
in Istanbul. S/6162. January 25, 1965. 3 pp. i 

Letter dated January 26 from the Representative of 
Jordan regarding provocative acts by Israeli au- 
thorities in the Mount Scopus area in Jerusalemj 
S/6163. January 26, 1965. 1 p. 

Letter dated January 27 from the Representative of] 
Cuba transmitting the text of a note from the Cubani 
Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding "further in-i 
cidents directed asainst the independence and secu-'l ' 
rity" of Cuba. S/6164. January 28, 1965. 5 pp. | , 

Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of! ' 
Cambodia regarding a violation of Cambodian terri-i ' 
tory by "armed units of the Thai police." S/6165J | 
January 28, 1965. 1 p. j 

Letter dated January 22 from the Representative of; 
Malaysia replying to the letter of January 20 (S/, i 
6157) from tlie First Deputy Prime Minister and' 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. S/6166.' ' 
January 29, 196.5. 4 pp. I 

Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of! 
Turkey providing further information on Greek and 
Greek Cypriot preparations for a renewal of hostili- 
ties in Cyprus. S/6168. February 1, 1965. 1 p. 

General Assembly 

Collection of Contributions as at 17 .January 196.5. 
Report of the Secretary-General. A/5847. January 
IS. 1965. 5 pp. 

Collection of Contributions as at 1 February 1065. 
Report of the Secretary-General. A/5S71. Febru- 
ary .3, 1965. 2 pp. 1 

Reports of the Special Committee on the Situation] 
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declara-' 
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples : General introductory chap- 
ter covering the work of the Committee in 1964, 
A/5800, December 31, 1964. 90 pp. ; Implications of 
the activities of the mining industry and of the other 
international companies having interests in South- 
West Africa, A/5S40, January 5, 1965, 204 pp. 

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. Report of the Secretary-General 
on the administrative and financial implications of 
the recommendations for convening a committee to 
prepare a new draft convention relating to the tran- 
sit trade of landlocked countries. A/5S49. January 
21, 1965. 3 pp. 

Question of Oman. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on Oman. A/5846. January 22. 1965. 281 pp. 

The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa. Report of the Secretary- 
General. A/5850. January 22. 1965. 4 pp. 

Accelerated Flow of Capital and Technical Assistance 
to the Developing Countries. Report of the Secre- 
tary-General on the measurement of the flow of 
long-term capital and oflBcial donations to develop- 
ing countries. A/5732. February 1, 1965. 70 pp. 




U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve 
Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem 

Following is a statement made hy President 
Johnson on March 22 regarding an agreement 
between the United States and Mexico on the 
lower Colorado River salinity problem, to- 
gether with a joint State-interior Department 
announcement containing the text of tlie 


White House press release dated March 22 

Tlie United States and Mexico have today ap- 
proved an agreement between the Cominis- 
aioners on the International Boundary and 
Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 
on measures to be undertaken to achieve a solu- 
,- ition to the saluiity problem on the lower Colo- 
c jrado River. This agreement is in accordance 
,. fwith the objective to reach a permanent and ef- 
I' ifective solution, first announced by Presidents 
Kennedy and Lopez Mateos in their joint com- 
munique of June 30, 1962,' and reaffirmed with 
President Lopez Mateos in the joint communi- 
que of Fchniary 22, 1064.^ 

The solution agreed upon involv'es the con- 
struction of an extension to the present drainage 
'liannel of tlie Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and 
Drainage District in Arizona which would per- 
mit the discharge of that district's drainage 
al)ove or below Morelos Dam, Mexico's main di- 
vei-sion stnicture on the Colorado River. 
T.^nder this arrangement Mexico will be able to 
decide when waters from the Wellton-Mohawk 
District will be diverted to its irrigation system. 
Tlip agreement has been considered by the 

' For text, see Buixetin of July 23, 19C2, p. 13.5. 
' For text, see ibid., Mar. 16, 19&4, p. 396. 

Governors of the Colorado River Basin States 
and by the chairmen of the appropriate congres- 
sional committees, and they have all agreed to 
it. I have, therefore, instructed the Secretaries 
of Stat« and of the Interior to take the necessary 
steps to carry out the agreement. Wliatever 
appropriations are necessary will be requested 
promptly from the Congress. 

I am pleased that we have been able to resolve 
this problem with Mexico through friendly ne- 
gotiations. Like the Chamizal treaty with 
Mexico ' and the Columbia River treaty with 
our northern neighbor, Canada,^ both of which 
we are now implementing, this agreement dem- 
onstrates once again that among men of good 
will any problem will yield to sincere and con- 
certed efforts to resolve it. 


Department of State press release 54 dated March 22 
Joint State-Interior Press Release 

The Presidents of the United States and Mex- 
ico on March 22 announced approval of an 
agreement on the lower Colorado River salinity 
problem. The agreement takes the form of a 
"Minute" of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission, United States and Mexico. 
Attached are a copy of the Minute (i.e., record 
of a Commission decision) and an explanatory 

' For text, see ihid., Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480. 

* For background and text of treaty, see ibid., Feb. 13, 
1961, p. 234; Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199; and Oct 12, 1904, 
p. 504. 

APRIL 12, 19G.) 


map of the directly affected areas.^ 

Under the arrangements agreed upon for a 
5-3'ear period, the United States through tlie In- 
terior Department's Bureau of Reclamation 
will, subject to the availability of appropria- 
tions, undertake to construct by October of this 
year an extension of the drainage cliannel of 
the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage 
District in Arizona. Tlie extension ^YiIl permit 
discharge of Wellton-Mohawk drainage into tl\e 
Colorado River either above or below Mexico's 
Morelos Dam, as Mexico may request. Tlie dis- 
charges above Morelos Dam would be diverted 
for irrigation of Mexican lands, while dis- 
charges below the dam would flow to the Gulf of 

All Wellton-Mohawk drainage will be ac- 
counted for as a part of the water delivered to 
Mexico under the treaty of 1944.^ Tlie United 
States will control the flows in the river reach- 
ing Morelos Dam during the winter months so 
that, excluding this drainage, those flows will 
meet Mexico's minimum scheduled deliveries 
imder the treaty. The discharge of Wellton- 
Mohawk drainage above Morelos Dam is to be 
coordinated, insofar as practicable, with Mex- 
ico's scheduled deliveries in order to minimize 
the salinity of its irrigation water. 

The International Commission will keep the 
operation continually imder review. Both Gov- 
ernments reserve all legal rights. 

Essentially, the proposed works would be 
operated so as to discharge the most highly 
saline drainage water from the Wellton- 
Mohawk District below Mexico's principal 
diversion point during tlie winter months when 
irrigation requirements in the Mexicali Valley 
are at tlieir lowest. During this period, this 
would be accomplished by pumping the most 
saline drainage water into the extension channel 
for discharge below Morelos Dam. 

At other times, when Mexico schedules in- 
creased deliveries of irrigation water, drainage 
water would be pumped from the less saline 
wells in the Wellton-Mohawk District so that 
most or all of it may be discharged from the 
extension channel into the Colorado above 
Morelos Dam. There it would mingle with 

other Colorado River flows and be diverted by 

which the Mf 
;viate tem- '«i 

Mexico for irrigation. 

Text of IVIInute | 


Recommendations on the Colorado River 
Salinity Problem 

The Commission met in the office of the Mexican 
Section in Cindad Juarez, Chihuahua, at 12:00 m on 
March 22, 1965, to comply with in.structlons it has 
received from the two Governments, to consider meas- 
ures "to reach a permanent and effective solution" of 
the problem of the salinity of the waters of the Colo- 
rado River which reach Mexico, as contemplated in the 
Presidential Communiques of March 16 ' and June 30, 
1962 and February 22. 1964. 

The Commission reviewed the measures whic 
two Governments have taken to date to allevi 
porarily the problem of salinity of waters of the 
lower Colorado River, and noted the reduction which 
has occurred in the salinity of drainage waters from 
the "Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District 
and that continuefl improvement is anticipated. 

The Commission, with the scientific and engineering 
studies made by both Governments as a basis, there- 
upon adopted the following Resolution, subject to the 
approval of the two Governments, embodying the fol- 
lowing Recommendations: 

1. That the United States construct at Its expense 

an extension to the present Wellton-Mohawk District's 

drainage conveyance channel, w'ith capacity of 353 

cubic feet (10 cubic meters) per second, along the left 

bank of the Colorado River to a point below Morelos 

Dam, and a control structure in that extension of the ; 

channel in the reach between Morelos Dam and the ^ 

mouth of the Araz Drain, which structure would per- 
mit the discharge of the Wellton-Mohawk District's 
drainage waters to the bed of the river at a point either ■ 
above or below Morelos Dam. 

2. That the Commission permit execution of the 
works which may be required for tlie extension channel 
to pass through Morelos Dam. 

3. That the extension channel and control struc- 
ture proposed in Recftmmendation 1 be operated and 
maintained by the United States at its expense to dis- 
charge all of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage 
waters below Morelos Dam, except those which are 
discharged above the Dam on the days and at such 
rates as Mexico may request in writing. ' 

4. That during the life of the present Minute and 
subject to the reservations of Recommendation 11, the 
Commission account for Wellton-Mohawk District's 
drainage waters as a part of those described in the 
provisions of Article 10 of the Water Treaty of Feb- 

° Not printed here. 
• 59 Stat. 1219. 

'For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 
.042, and Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650. 





uary 3, 1944, with tlie understanding: a) that on 
he days for which MoxifO requests water at the mini- 
um winter rale of deliveries of 900 culiic feet (25.5 
abie meters) per second, the United States control 
aters reaching the limitrophe section of the Colorado 
liver so that without including Wellton-Mohawk L>is- 
k'fs drainage waters, their Hows be not less than 
00 cubic feet (22.7 cubic meters) per second, their 
verage flow be not less than 900 cubic feet (25.5 
obic meters) per second for the total of such days 
nring each winter period for which the minimum 
ate is requested, and that the computation of that 
verage flow not take into account flows in excess of 
000 cubic feet I2S.3 cubic meters) per second; and 
) that the winter periods in reference extend from 
(ctober 1 of each year through February of the next 
oUowing year. 

5. That throughout the life of this Minute, Mexico 
■hedule water at the minimum rate of deliveries of 

00 cubic feet (2."i.5 cubic meters) per second, for the 
laximum practical number of days during each winter 
leriod, and for not less than !K) days. 

6. That the pumping of Wellton-Mohawk District's 
t'i-^ laluage waters which are to be delivered to Mexico 

bove Morelos Dam be coordinated, insofar as practica- 
le, with Mexico's scheduled deliveries of water at tlie 
lortherly boundary in order to minimize the salinity of 
hese deliveries ; with the understanding that during the 
■'■^ ^riod October 1 to February 10 the United States pump 
t the maximimi rate but not to exceed '.i'>S cubic feet 
ler second and, insofar as practicable, from the more 
aline wells in the District, and during other i)e- 
lods when the total quantity of the Wellton-Mohawk 
Mstriet's drainage waters Is discharged below Morelos 

That the United States endeavor to conclude ar- 
angements to permit discontinuance of discharge of 
raters from the canal wasteways of the Yuma County 
Vater Users' Association to the bed of the Colorado 
tlver below Morelos Dam, and if neces.sary for this 
nipose, construct and operate, at the expense of the 
lited States, works needed so that such waters be de- 
Ivered near San Luis, Arizona, and San Luis, Sonora ; 
t Mexico iiay for the increased cost of pumping 
rhich may be required to discharge these waters to 
lexico at the delivery point near San Luis, Arizona, 
San Luis, Sonora. 

8. That this Minute be in effect during a i)eriod of 
lye years, beginning on the date on which the exten- 
ion to the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage con- 
rQyance channel is placed in operation ; and that 
taring this period the Commission review conditions 
rllich gave rise to the problem and In due time recom- 
nend whether, in keeping with the expressed 
ly both Governments of achieving a permanent and ef- 
fective solution, a new Minute should be adopted to 

>ccome effective upon termination of this period. 

9. The construction by the United States of works 
■ontemplated in this Minute be completed and the works 

^ placed in operation by October 1, 1960, subject to 

the appropriation of funds by the United States Con- 
gress to implement this Minute. 

10. That this Minute be speciflcally aiii)r()vcd by both 

11. That the provisions of this Minute not constitute 
any precedent, recognition, or acceptance affecting the 
rights of either country, with respect to the Water 
Treaty of February 3, 1944, and the general principles 
of law. 

The meeting then adjourned. 

D. Herbeba J. 
Commissioner of Mexico 

Fernando Rivas S. 
Secretary of the Mexican 

J. F. Friedkin 
Commissioner of the 

United States 
Louis F. Blanchabd 
Secretanj of the 

United States Section 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
amended. Done at New York October 20, 1!)5(;. En- 
tered into force July 29, 19.->7. TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, March 25, 19()5. 
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, March 22, 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention on roiid traffic with annexes. Done at 
Geneva September 19. 1949. Entered into force 
March 20, V.>'<2. TIAS 2487. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malawi, 
February 17, 11)65. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations; 

Optional protocol to the \'lenna convention on consular 

relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 


Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 

Ratification deposited: Gabon, February 23, 1965. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Dune at 
Mo.scow August 5, 1II63. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. TIAS .543:!. 

Ratification deposited: Malagasy Republic, March 15, 


Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of March 30, 1S83, revised at Brus- 
sels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, 
at The Hague November 6, 1925, at Lond<m June 2, 
1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lis- 
bon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 
4. 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notifications of accession: Mauritania, March 11, 

' Not in force. 

APRIL 12, 1965 


1965; South Africa, March 17, 1965; Yugoslavia, 
March 11, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Enters into 
force May 26, 1965. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 24, 1965. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United 
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, March 6, 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.' 
Signatures: Southern Rhodesia, March 23, 1965; 
United States, March 24, 1965. 



Agreement amending the agreement of May 28, 1962 
(TIAS 5060), for financing certain educational ex- 
change programs. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Copenhagen February 18 and 25, 1965. Entered into 
force February 25, 1965. 

Dominican Republic 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 19.J4, as amended (68 Stat. 454 ; 7 U.S.C. 1731- 
1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Santo 
Domingo March 18, 1965. Entered into force March 
18, 1965. 


Agreement regarding the serving of United States 
Armed Forces on Philippine military reservation at 
Mt. Cabuyao by establishment thereon of a United 
States communications facility. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Manila March 16, 1965. Entered 
into force March 16, 1965. 

United Arab Republic 

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Cairo 
May 5, 1964. Entered into force provisionally May 
5, 1964. TIAS 5706. 
Entered into force definitively: April 7, 1965. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 19.")4, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Bel- 
grade March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 
](>. 1965. 


Recent Releases ' 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Oovernment Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 20/iOZ. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, ij 

' Not in force. 

Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, 
amending the agreement of June 13, 1964. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Conakry October 7, 1964. Entered 
into force October 7, 1964. TIAS 5701. 4 pp. 50. 

Fishing Operations — Northeastern Pacific Ocean. 

Agreement with U.S.S.R. — Signed at Washington De- 
cember 14, 1964. Entered into force December 14, 
1964. TIAS 5703. 17 pp., map. 250. 

Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. 

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes— Signed 
at Ottawa November 27, 1964. Entered into force No- 
vember 27, 1964. TIAS 5705. 2 pp. 5<}. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the United 
Arab Republic — Signed at Cairo May 5, 1964. Entered 
into force provisionally May 5, 1964. TIAS 5706. 9 
pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan, 
amending the agreement of October 14, 1961, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi No- 
vember 28, 1964. Entered into force November 28, 
1964. TIAS 5707. 3 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of the Congo — Signed at Leopoldville Decem- 
ber 9, 1964. Entered into force December 9, 1964 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5708. 10 pp. lO^;. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, 
amending agreement of .Tanuary 9, 19(34, as amended. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon November 30;, 
1964. Entered into force November 30, 1964. TIAS 
5709. 4 pp. 5<i;. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-' 
public of the Congo, amending the agreements of Feb- 
ruary 23, 1963, and April 28, 1964. as amended.: 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Leopoldville December 9,' 
1964. Entered into force December 9, 1964. TIAS' 
5711. 3 pp. 5«!. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, 
amending the agreement of June 13, 19(34, as amended. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington Decem-j 
ber 21, 1964. Entered into force December 21, 1964.J 
TIAS 5712. 3 pp. 5(i(. 
Agricultural Commodities — .Sales Under Title TV. 
Agreement with Iceland — Signed at Reykjavik Decem^ 
ber 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 1964. 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5713. 8 pp. 100. 




IIDEX April J2, 1965 Vol. LII, No. ISJ^G 

/rica. United States Policy in Africa (Wll- 
lani-s) 539 

nerican Principles. The Dangers of Nostalgia 
(Bain 532 

ynerican Republics. Congress Approves Appro- 
priutious for luter-American Bank ( Johuson) . 537 

'istralia. New U.S. Spacecraft Tracl£ing Sta- 
tion Opens In Australia (Johnson) 550 


I nurcss Approves Appropriations for Inter- 

AiniTican Bank (Johnson) 537 

ncr.'ssional Documents Relating to Foreign 
l'..lR-.v 550 

T)rus. Securit.v Council Renews Mandate of 
Cyprus Peacekeeping Force ( Stevenson, text of 
resolution) 551 

apartment and Foreign Service. President 
Calls fur Full Use of Resources In Overseas 
I'rciiirams 538 

■onomic .\ffairs 

•ngress Approves Appropriations for Inter- 

.^merican Bank (Johnson) 537 

.>'. and 11 OECD Nations Discuss International 

Shipping Problems 549 

S. and Mexico .\gree on Measures To Solve 
Ix)wer Colorado River Salinity Problem (John- 
son, text of agreement) 555 

orld Trade Week, 19G5 (proclamation) . . . 549 

irope. The Dangers of Nostalgia (Ball) . . 532 

)reiKn Aid. Congress Approves Appropriations 

for Inter-American Bauif (Johnson) .... 537 

iternational Organizations and Conferences. 

I'.S. iiiui 11 OKCD Nations Interna- 
tional Shipping Problems 549 

exico. U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To 
Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem 
(Johnson, text of agreement) 555 

ilitary .MTairs 

.\Ti) .Vfter Sixteen Years: An Anniversary As- 

se.>isnient (Popper) 518 

'■cretary Rusk Discusses Use of Tear Gas in 
Vlet-Nam 528 

orth .Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 

.\fter Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assess- 
ment (Popper) 518 

residential Documents 

ongress Approves Appropriations for Inter- 

.Vmorican Bank r^Zl 

iw U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station Opens in 

.\ustralia 650 

resident Calls for Full Use of Resources In 

Overseas ProRraras 538 

resident Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam . 527 
.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve 
[Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem . . . 5,>5 
JotXA Trade Week, 19«w . . ,>J9 

nblic .Affairs. Department To Hold Conference 
I for Editors and Broadcasters 550 

Publications. Recent Releases 558 

Science. New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station 

Opens In Australia (Johnson) 550 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 657 

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve 
Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem (John- 
son, text of agreement) 555 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 554 

Security Council Renews Mandate of Cyprus 
Peacekeeping Force ( Stevenson, text of resolu- 
tion) 651 


President Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam . . 527 
Secretary Rusk Discusses Use of Tear Gas in 
Viet-Nam 528 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 532 

Johnson, President . . . . 527, 537, 538, 549, 550, S.IS 

Popper, David H 518 

Rusk, Secretary f,29, 

Stevenson, Adlai E 551 

Williams, G. Mennen 539 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to March 22 which appe.Tr 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 42 of ilarch 
16 and 48 of March 18. 

No. Date Subject 

t53 3/22 Ball : "The United States and Can- 
ada : Common Aims and Common 
54 3/22 Agreement with Mexico on lower 
Colorado River salinity problem. 

•55 3/22 Vaughn sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for Inter-American Affairs 
and Coordinator of Alliance for 
Progress (biographic details). 

t56 3/23 Cleveland: "The Building Blocks of 
World Order." 

*57 3/23 Guest sworn in as Ambassador to 

Ireland (biographic details). 
58 3/24 Foreign policy conference for editors 

and broadcasters (rewrite). 
.59 3/24 Rusk : news briefing on use of tear 

t60 3/25 U.S. -Canadian claims agreement. 

tei 3/25 Harriinnn: "The United States and 
International Cooperation." 

•02 3/26 Program for visit of President 
Yameogo of Upper Volta. 

*.\ot printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 





Foreign Relations of tiie United States 

1943, Volume V, The American Republics 

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19^3, Volume V, The American Republics. 










Vol. Lii, No. mi 

April 19,1965 

Remarks by Secretary Rusk 588 



hy TJnier Secretary Ball 572 


IntematioTial Cooperation: A Realistic Appraisal . . by McGeorge Bundy 562 
The Building Blocks of World Order . . by Harlan Cleveland 566 

For index see inside back cover 

International Cooperation: A Realistic Appraisal 

hy McGeorge Bundy 

Special Assistant to the President ' 

The meeting which you are engaged in to- 
day is one which marks another stage in the 
preparations of American citizens and of the 
American Government for a full eflfort in this 
International Cooperation Year. 

It is a pleasure for me to tell you that the 
President takes the deepest interest in this un- 
dertaking. He started it during the heat of a 
campaign last October. He has continued to 
follow its work in the months since then. The 
President means exactly what he has said — that 
the work of the Government in supporting your 
work in International Cooperation Year is of 
high importance. 

The President has asked me to bring you his 
personal welcome today and to express his apol- 
ogies for removing the principal speaker from 
this meeting. It did seem essential that the Vice 
President, who is the senior officer of the Gov- 

^ Address made before the National Conference on 
International Cooperation Year at the Department of 
State on Mar. 23. 

ernment in the field of space, should be at Cape 
Kennedy today. You are generous in your 
involuntary acquiescence in this decision, and 
the President knows as well as all the rest of 
us do that there is, in fact, no substitute for 
the Vice President. 

Preaching to a group of this kind about the 
purposes of international cooperation is really 
not a very fruitful undertaking. I see here men 
and women who have proven their interest in 
and understanding of this topic ; who, in the last 
quarter century, have helped make the record of 
which our nation has reason to be proud ; who 
have understood the connection between the na- 
tional interest and the common human interest; 
who have understood the distance between the 
idea and the execution; and who have shown by 
their actions the continuing and necessary rela- 
tionship between the initiative of the individual 
citizen and the responsibility of the citizen's' 

So I do not come with the thought of sur- 


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prising you or of enlightening you, but only 
with the hope that we on our side, having tem- 
porarily a share in the administrative responsi- 
bilities of j'our Government, may be able to 
reassure you of our continued commitment and 
our dedication to the kind of activities ■which 
you are undertaking and which we will hope to 
carry forward together. 

It is particularly important and satisfying to 
have a chance to make this act of reassurance at 
a time when there are hea\-y burdens upon this 
country and its Government in situations of in- 
ternational danger — most conspicuously, but by 
. no means imiquely, in Southeast Asia. You 
^ need no one to tell you that the President of the 
United States is spending long hours every day 
over these problems. It is clear that it is the 
President who has and is carrying out the final 

ponsibilities of the Commander in Chief and 
of the civil chief of government in making the 
udgnients week in and week out which are re- 

ired. in his language, "by the continuing ag- 

ssion of others'' in Southeast Asia. 
Nothing has been more encouraging to him 

facing these dangers. I think, than the sense 
if understanding, of support, of determination, 

d of care which has been conveyed to us in the 

lite House in our contacts with all kinds of 
leaders throughout the country. 

\ Dual Responsibility 

\t the same time nothing is more important, 
iven in a shadowed time like this, than that we 

ould none of us forget that the United States 
jrovernment must continuously meet a dual re- 
sponsibility — to construct programs of peaceful 
eooperat ion as well as to resist aggression. And 
iierefore, in an immediate and serious sense, to 
dt together and work on the problem of inter- 
lational cooperation for the prediction of the 
reather, to sit together on questions of hu- 

anity's health, to work together on new pro- 



jukI )0sals for managing mankind's problems of 
»««' ommunication — to do these things, and to do 
0H hem in the spirit of seriousness and commit- 
"•J lent whicii this meeting exemplifies, is in fact 

help keep the balance of American policy in 

1 time when necessarily we are also preoccupied 
nth active operations in defense of peoples 
rhose independence is gravely threatened. 

tPRIL 19. 1965 

In a wider sense, an activity like International 
Cooperation Year tends to lift the attention of 
i\jnoricans, and one may liope of others as well, 
to problems which do not automatically get all 
the attention they deserve. "\Mien there is con- 
flict, among men or among nations, those en- 
gaged can be counted on to give the necessary 
level of attention to the defense and advance- 
ment of the particular interests to which they 
are committed. Immediate interest is an ex- 
tremely strong force. There is, if one may turn 
to the analogies of physics, a kind of inertia 
about it ; it is quit© easy to let that contest con- 
tinue, to let it work itself out, to let its laws 
govern the course of events. 

And, therefore, even when there is conflict, 
there is a heavy responsibility upon those who 
are responsible for the acts of one side or an- 
other to watch with care, to think in terms of 
moderation and restraint, and to guide their 
action, as the President has so often said, by a 
clear and continuing sense of what is fitting, 
what is measured, what is adequate. In a larger 
sense, there is a responsibility also to drive and 
force one's attention to those things which do 
not necessarily and inevitably require attention. 
And that is the kind of thing which an exercise 
of this sort is designed to do. 

This is not simply a matter of working on 
other things than those which involve the use 
of force in international affairs; it is a matter 
also of turning to look at the other side of the 
coin in the areas of economics, of ideas, and of 
national interests. It is very easy in our eco- 
nomic affairs, as we all know from experience, 
to allow the immediate interest of one side as 
against another to govern a decision; and it is 
certainly proper that governments should be 
responsive to the legitimate interests of their 
citizens and of their private institutions. It is 
also clear to all of us that in the field of ideas 
it is very easy to allow a rigorous commitment 
to one's own beliefs and convictions to stand 
in the way of a responsible examination of the 
beliefs and convictions of others. And, finally, 
when one thinks in terms of the national in- 
terest, it is quite easy to allow that interest to be 
defined uniquely by what feels good, sounds 
good, is comforting to us, within our own nation. 

Yet in each of these tliree fields — of eco- 


nomics, of ideas, and of national interests — it 
is more often true than not that tlie immediate 
interest itself is not well served by such a nar- 
rowly limited concentration upon the problem. 
It is not by accident that the greed wluch is 
narrow economic interest, the prejudice which 
is a narrow set of ideas and of convictions, and 
that kind of national pride which is limited in 
its understanding of the responsibilities and of 
the real place of one's nation, are in the end self- 
defeating, even withui their own frame of refer- 
ence. The great advantage of an effort like 
ICY is that by definition it will help to lift our 
attention from these narrow constraints — these 
natural, easy, limited, and dangerous ways of 
construing our own responsibilities and our 
own purposes. 

The Realities of "Contest" and "Difference" 

On the other hand, in such undertakings we 
must not fall into the opposite error of assum- 
ing that, because it is cooperation and because 
it is international, it is automatically good, 
automatically right, or automatically deserving 
of the support of men and women of good will. 
It is well, I think, to bear in mind that there is 
real force in the concept of conflict of interest; 
that it is not easy to arrange for forms of co- 
operation in which there is genuine advantage 
to more than one party ; that it is quite easy to 
handle these matters so that the wimiing of one 
man must be the losing of another. We do not 
really serve the cause of international coopera- 
tion if we assume that it is a self-executing 
form of virtue. 

That is a lesson which I will not take time to 
spell out in a company as experienced as this 
one. It is worth remembering only because we 
have lived to regret it when we have attempted 
to place more weight upon a pattern of coopera- 
tion than that pattern was really able to carry. 

It has been a most important part of the 
achievement of the United Nations — so great, 
although so limited — that in its very charter 
it took account of the limitations built into the 
world situation, and that it did not in the main 
set out to achieve things which no international 
organization in 1945 could have achieved. Even 
in that case there were excessive hopes in some 

quarters, and it is our good fortune that in this 
country, at least, these excessive hopes did not 
precipitate a deep disillusiomnent. Instead, a 
serious commitment to tlie purposes and to the 
meaning of the United Nations remains a strong 
and steady part not only of the policy of the 
Govermnent but of the commitment of the 
people — which is in the end a more determining 

To take another example — if in our efforts 
to acliieve some slight progress toward a limi- 
tation of the arms race, we had found ourselves 
committed to a form of test ban treaty which 
did not meet the legitimate concerns of those 
in this country who are naturally deeply and 
i-esponsibly engaged in the defense of the na- 
tional security, if in fact that treaty had not 
been defensible in those terms and to that legiti- 
mate sector of American opinion, then either 
the treaty would not in fact have won the con- 
sent of the Senate to its ratification or the vic- 
tory thus won would have had a shaky and 
limited base within our own country. 

And so there is a continuing need, I suggest, 
for wariness and for a sense of real interest in 
our concern for the development of the instru- 
ments of cooperation. 

Having stated that limitation and having 
spoken of the relation of an effort toward new 
forms of cooperation to the continuing realities 
of contest and of difference, I would like to 
speak for a moment about the built-in, construc- 
tive, and fmctifying influences which mark the 
effort toward international cooperation when it 
is carried out with a proper respect for reality 
and with a proper awareness of its relation to 
other forms of necessary national action. 

This is the kind of thing which can remind 
a nation that its real interests require atten- 
tion to its higher interests, that its immediate 
sense of itself can be enlarged — must indeed in 
this small world be enlarged — and that the proc- 
ess of enlargement is a form of liberation.! 
Just as there is a requirement for the defense of 
our own immediate interests in money, in trade, 
in defense, and in assuring our survival as a 
nation in the nuclear centuries, so there is an 
upper edge of our policy which must recognize 
the problems and hopes of others in these same 




If it be true tliat any man's death diminishes 

Ime, it is also true that any man's life or acliieve- 

Iment or new hope is enlarging to us all. "When 

|all is said and done, it is this wider view of the 

liuman adventure wliich we should have before 

in work such as that which you are now 

irting. And it is riglit for the United States, 

fhile maintaining concern for and responsibil- 

toward its own interests, also to maintain 

strong sense of obligation not to be second 

long the nations wliich seek a wider standard 

id which are willing to be judged by that wider 


We are engaged at the moment in a national 
iventure in space which is heavily dependent 
upon the cooperative and friendly assistance of 
ly other nations — for observation and for 
itingencies. We are also engaged upon an 
Tort with other nations — but very largely an 
lerican effort — to assist the Government and 
>ple of South Viet-Xam in resistance against 
sion. "\Yliile we engage in these efforts, 
re can and should and will keep our purpose 
en and our hope alive to wider patterns of 
operation both in space and in Southeast 
ia. We have repeatedly proposed increased 
forts in space cooperation; such cooperation 
f^iow goes forward with a number of nations 
in many of the important and new, if less spec- 
acular, fields of action. We have proposed — 
md we shall propose again — that the nations 
if Southeast Asia continue to keep before them- 
«lves, not simply and only their requirement 
ind interest in independence and freedom from 
oppression, but also the hope of cooperation in 
he peaceful development of what should be- 
;ome a rich, important, flourishing, and tranquil 
action of the globe. 

The Urgency of Arms Control 

Finally, it seems to me that, just as we keep 
)ur attention upon the development and the 

maintenance of our own effective overall de- 
fense forces, we must help to focus the attention 
of all the world upon the continuing and urgent 
requirement that humanity find a way to put 
still greater limits, still surer controls, upon 
the weapons which have made our age new in its 
ultimate possibilities of catastrophe. I put that 
at the head of the list, in part because it seems 
to me that whatever may be the immediate pros- 
pect of new and large agreements in this field — 
and until such agreements are actually reached 
the immediate prospect always seems doubtful — 
it must be the task of the United States, and it 
will be the purpose of this administration, to 
make clear that wherever there is a prospect of 
progress that serves the common interest of sur- 
vival in this field of arms control and disarma- 
ment, the United States will strive to be in the 


There is always danger of misunderstanding 
when a nation attempts to say for itself that it 
is serving an interest wider than its own. None 
of us, even as citizens, and still less as public 
officials, has a right to engage in such self-praise 
in smugly certain tones. But I think it is fair 
for us to say that we have a natural and proper 
obligation to serve a wider interest. The history 
of our nation, its traditions, and its great docu- 
ments, from the Declaration of Independence 
down to the President's speech on the right to 
vote, make this so. 

It is an obligation of Americans, precisely be- 
cause they are good Americans, to trj- also to be 
something more. And I take it that with the 
wisdom of experience and the wariness of un- 
derstanding as your badges of admission, you 
are here to do just that. I can only tell j'ou that 
those of us who for the time being are full-time 
practitioners are deeply grateful to you. We 
wish you every success ; we will try to give every 
support ; and we are proud to be a part of your 

VPRTL 19. 10G5 


The Building Blocks of World Order 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs'^ 

I am billed on the program for a report from 
the Cabinet Committee — not an agreed, formal 
report but a fill-in on where we are and how 
we got here. So I am not flying blind, but I 
am flying solo. 

I will start by quarreling with the old notion 
that U.S. foreign policy doesn't have any do- 
mestic constituency. The Department of Agri- 
culture has the farmers, so the argument runs ; 
Commerce has the business community ; Labor 
has the trade unions ; but the State Department 
only has the foreigners — and they don't vote. 

It is true that the foreigners we deal with 
from this building don't vote — not in American 
elections, anyway. But the Americans who 
want to cooperate with foreigners do. And on 
just about every subject under the sun there are 
vocal and active groups of Americans who want 
to cooperate across national frontiers — and who 
will have our heads if we don't make that co- 
operation possible. 

So the upshot is that a foreign policy based 
on cooperation by the United States has an 
American constituency as wide as the continent 
and as deep as men's instinct for survival. 

One of my jobs hereabouts is to keep our 
international conference program within rea- 
sonable bounds. You may well wonder whether 
I'm really working at it when we attended 540 
Government-level conferences with other na- 

' Address made before the National Conference on 
International Cooperation Year at the Department of 
State on Mar. 23 (press release 56). Mr. Cleveland is 
chairman of the Cabinet Committee on International 
Cooperation Year; for background, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 15, 1965, p. 382. 

tions last year. In the 19th century the United., i 
States went to an average of one conference I ; 
a year ; now it's more than one a day. 

Five hundred and forty is a lot of confer- 
ences. But if the American people had their 
way, unrestricted by Government bureaucracy j , 
and congressional appropriations, they would' 
organize and attend even more of them. Every 
few days we help eliminate or put off an inter- 
national conference — and we often hear about it 
from irate or disappointed Americans who feebj 
that we should cooperate more, not less, withipii 
other nations on their especially important sub- 
ject, with their particular friends abroad. 

It may be that our constitutents do not under- 
stand everything their Government is doing. 

It may be that they want money spent for 
their o^v7i kind of cooperation but want to econ- 
omize on other kinds of cooi^eration from which 
they don't directly benefit. 

It may be that people interested in coffee 
prices or tuna fishing rights or malaria eradi- 
cation or refugee relief or investment guaran- 
tees sometimes don't see the comiection between 
their specialized interest and the healthy growth 
of a U.N. peacekeeping system. 

But every American has some direct stake 
in some form of international cooperation — 
and most of them know it. 

Certainly every American knows that modern 
science and technology can kill us or cure us, 
can starve us or feed us, can make life on this 
earth wonderful — or make it impossible. 

And most Americans perceive, more or less 
vaguely, that they have a stake in building the 




institutions that contain and control and chan- 
nel into peaceful uses the potential dangers 
and ambivalent wonders science makes possible. 
This is a major goal and preoccupation of 
U.S. foreign policy — and why it enjoys such 
wide support from so many people. 

Planning for International Cooperation 

AVe who live in this attractive but complicated 
city of Washington are supposed to be figuring 
out what kind of international institutions to 
build, what to do next in every field of inter- 
national cooperation. Every form of interna- 
tional cooperation crucially depends on what we 
-Vinericans think, what initiatives we take, how 
we react to the initiatives of others. Every de- 
partment and agency of the Federal Govern- 
ment, and every committee of the Congress, has 
an international program and administers a 
piece of American foreign policy. The time is 
long past when the complexities of American 
foreign policy could all be stuffed into the De- 
partment of State. 

But let's face it, we don't think ahead hard 
enough about the next steps in every field of in- 
ternational cooperation. On the crisis sub- 
jects — on Viet-Nam or Berlin or Cuba or the 
Congo — there is of course a great deal of plan- 
ning ahead ; the angles are figured and refigured 
nearh' every day — and always on Sundays. 

But do we know just what institutions we 
want to build next in the field of international 
•health? Do we have a plan for achieving the 
freedom from hunger we freely endorse? Do 
we have a clear concept of "next steps" in inter- 
nat ional education ? Have we thought through 
all tlie implications, for education and for inter- 
national politics, of space satellites that can 
relay a national cultural attraction instantane- 
ously to any part of the globe? Have we con- 
sidered wiiat the requirement for international 
peacekeeping may do to the mix of our weapon 
systems, nr to our national budget? 

Xo, not enough. That's t lie answer to all these 
questions and to similar questions in most of the 
fiehls represented in this distinguished gather- 
ing this morning. We in Government have, of 
course, a tendency to do more planning on mat- 
ters in an acute state of crisis than on other sub- 

jects wliere the crisis is chronic, less dramatic, 
and less easy to get excited about. 

Government is not unique in this: Wliat 
univei-sity or foundation has thought through 
the revolutionary role of American education in 
world afi'airs ? What corporation has correctly 
assessed the direction and volume of its own 
international opportunities? We all tend to 
react mostly to clear and present stimuli, deal- 
ing with opportunity as it knocks and trouble 
as it tribulates. 

But it's not good enough. The multiple ex- 
plosions, the accelerating pace of change, sym- 
bolized in our time by "bombs, babies, and bull- 
dozers," can lead either to tragedy or triumph 
for civilized man — and whether it's to be 
triumph or tragedy depends, most of all, on 
what we Americans do. And what we do may 
depend, in all these fields where the crises are 
chronic, on what we are launching here in this 
room todaj'. 

For what the President has assigned us is no 
less than to propose to him a line of policy, a 
sense of direction, a specific plan of attack, in 
every major field of international cooperation. 

Nor has the President given us the rest of the 
century to think about these complex and pro- 
fessionally fascinating matters. Pie has called 
a White House Conference on International Co- 
operation for 3 days this fall, from November 29 
to December 1, to receive and consider our 

Like most important things, ICY got started 
almost by accident. Prime Minister Nehru 
floated the idea in his 1961 address to the U.N. 
General Assembly, and everybody agreed. The 
next year the General Assembly voted, unani- 
mously but without much clarification, to call 
1965 International Cooperation Year. 

Then an interim committee of the U.N. — on 
which the United States did not even sit— la- 
bored for a year and produced a sensible if 
still somewhat generalized report. ICY, it said, 
should be used to publicize tlie progress the na- 
tions had already made in cooperating with each 
other. Each nation should do what it thought 
best along this line. Apart from some ICY lec- 
tures in the U.N. building, few international 
ICY projects are planned. The committee also 

APRIL 19, 1965 


suggested that controversial subjects should be 
avoided — which would have eliminated a good 
many interesting topics. 

U.S. Approach to ICY 

Here in tlie United States we took a some- 
what different tack. Nobody thought the Amer- 
ican people needed to be sold on international 
cooperation as a general proposition. The 
building of international agencies for coopera- 
tion is the chosen instrument of our postwar 
foreign policy, the preferred way of getting 
from here to the kind of world we want to live 
in, the very heart of a bipartisan consensus that 
had endured war and crisis for two decades. 

So we decided to do something more. Once 
the President had established our Cabinet Com- 
mittee, we took an interdepartmental look down 
the road, and this is what we saw : 

First, there isn't any such thing as interna- 
tional cooperation in general. There are only 
very concrete programs and relationsliips in 
dozens of special fields of endeavor — in business 
and labor and agriculture and trade and invest- 
ment and education and health and housing and 
communications and every other subject you can 
think of. 

Second, it would obviously be a good thing to 
review and give special publicity this year to 
what has already been accomplished, interna- 
tionally, in each of these fields. It is important 
to know that international cooperation is not an 
abstraction, that its virtues are measurable in 
hard results. It is important to wring the sen- 
timentality out of the term and to know that in 
practice international cooperation is hard work 
at functional tasks which are usually unglamor- 
ous and sometimes grubby. But this review 
should not just be the collection of blurbs; it 
should be a critical, analytical stocktaking, a 
basis for looking ahead. 

Third, we should create a market for ideas 
about the next steps in international coopera- 
tion. In each field we should ask, ""\\1iat do you 
think we should be ti-ymg to accomplish, over 
the next few years, in the buildmg and improve- 
ment of international institutions?" 

Fourth, we should invite into this idea market 
both the Government agencies active in each 

field and also the best nongovernmental think- 
ers and doers in the same fields. 

Tliis conviction that many of the best ideas 
about what the Government ought to be doing 
start outside the Government, and the enormous 
importance of private agencies in our interna- 
tional relations, led the President to invite a 
distinguished group of citizens from all over the 
country to the White House last October to wit- 
ness the signing of his ICY proclamation.^ 

It led the Secretary of State to ask the United j 
Nations Association to take the lead in organiz- j 
ing a National Citizens Commission, more than 
half of whose members are here this morning. 

It led, fuially, to the President's call for a 
Wliite House Conference, to which citizen 
groups and Government agencies alike could 
bring a distillation of their best ideas for Presi- 
dential consideration. 

Drawing Practical Plans To Build Peace 

As we in Government have talked through the 
plans for International Cooperation Year, some 
notions, attitudes, and expectations have natu- 
rally become a little clearer to all of us. I can- 
not represent these as a formal consensus of the 
Cabinet Conunittee, but I doubt if my colleagues 
in the executive branch of the Government 
would disagree very much with what I am about 
to say. 

First, it is important for us not to be bothered 
by the apparent irony of pushing international 
cooperation in a year while we can hear the din • 
of daily clashes in Viet-Nara and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations is still in the 
drydock. Indeed there would be little excuse 
for asking such busy people as you to take off 
your coats and work with us if all the organs 
of international cooperation were healthy, ro- 
bust, and growing in a serene fashion into re- 
sponsible, efficient, untroubled maturity. 

Second, we do not begin by taking it for 
granted that the most desirable next step in 
every field and every institution of international 
cooperation is necessarily an expansive one — or 
an expensive one either. There is nothing 

\ « 



■i i 

° For background and text of proclamation, see ibid., 
Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 



ibout international life that insures people and 
organizations from Parkinson's Law, from over- 
tunbition and overexertion, much less from im- 
precise goals or indiscriminate action. In some 
ireas we may need to pull up our socks before 
taking the next step. 

I Third, we are looking forward to some lively 
^counters between the Government experts and 
their opposite number's in the private or semi- 
private sector. The international record of the 
United States Government is not without blem- 
ish, and the wisdom of public officials is not al- 
ways infallible. AYe assume that everyone ap- 
proaches this exercise in a constructive frame 
bf mind, but we also hope that the critical facul- 
ties brought into play will be razor sharp and 
the moo<l intentionally provocative. Personal- 
ly, I can't think of anytliing I would rather 
fight about than how to cooperate better. 

FinaUy, I hope that all of you share with us 
the sense of satisfaction that comes from en- 
gaging in this fascinating process of capturing 
and defining an idea, of relating it to a goal, 
of investing it with substance, of molding it into 
operational activity, and of thus leaving our 
mark upon the record of human affairs. 

AVe C4in share, too, a sense of tempered excite- 
ment. Tempered, be-cause we know that what 
we do in the months ahead will not save the 
world — though it maj' well help. But excite- 
ment too, because we are dealing here, in our 28 
subdivisions of cooperation, with all of the main 
building blocks of world order. 

Presumably you are here because you think 
the thing to do about world order is not merely 
to profess a pious peace, nor yet to cry a despair- 
ing havoc. We are all here because we think 
the way to build peace is to draw practical plans 
and get on with the hard labor of selecting the 
next block, deciding where it fits, smearing it 
with mortar, and lifting it into place. 

A little dreaming helps, but we are not mov- 
ing in a dream. "We are here to write down our 
dreams, negotiate their acceptance, figure their 
cost, and organize to bring them to pass. Our 
dreams are worth the efforts, for they are noth- 
ing short of a world community where diversity 
can flourish, ideas can clash, and talented men 
can compete with each other — without killing 
each other in the process. 

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam 
Situation on BBC 

Following is the transcript of an interview of 
Secretary Rusk by Jatnes Mosstnan, British 
Broadcasting Corporation correspondent and 
producer, which was broadcast over BBC at 
London on April 2. 

Press release 67 dated April 2 

Mr. Mossman: Is your extension of bombing 
of the North an attempt to bludgeon them into 
negotiating, or is it a military attempt to twm 
the war into one that you can cope with better? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the total object is 
political. That is, the safety and the security 
of these countries of Southeast Asia. There is 
a military aspect to it, because the North is send- 
ing military men and arms into the South. But 
I wouldn't try to draw too thin a line as to the 
precise object of it. Someone is shooting at you ; 
you have to do something about it. You shoot 
back. But you're prepared to settle the ques- 
tion immediately, if they're prepared to leave 
their neighbors alone. 

Q. I noticed that Mr. Walter Lippmann the 
other day talked about it as being a carrot and 
stick policy with all stick and no carrot. And 
that if you, in other words, ^oanted to nego- 
tiate, you're not giving them too much of an 

A. Well, I think they've had plenty of oppor- 
tunity to hold their hand. I don't myself be- 
lieve that, when someone is shooting at you, 
you ask them for unconditional surrender when 
you ask them to stop shooting. That's not the 
issue here. 

G. You''re not asking for unconditional sur- 
render, in fact? 

A. We're asking for them to stop shooting. 
Now, if there are those who call that uncondi- 
tional surrender, then I can't agree with them. 
I think that's an abuse of language. 

Q. I noticed that same French observers, at 
least French observers told me, in fact, who had 
come from Hanoi to Saigon — their impression 
was that the Communists would ratlier see the 

APRIL 19. 1965 


whole of their heavy industry destroyed than 
step T^Ojck from, the threshold of victory in the 
South. Now, if they were to he as adamant as 
that, would that, as it were, call your hluff in the 
homiing tactic? 

A. There's no bluff here. 

Q. Well, Pm putting it haMy. Would that 
undermine your tactic and leave you with an- 
other decision to make? 

A. I wouldn't want to speculate about the fu- 
ture. I don't know that is Hanoi's view. But if 
they continue to push, then we will continue to 

Q. Any kind of negotiations would not in- 
volve any sort of refection of Laotian settlement 
there? That is out? 

A. Well, we had a negotiation of the Laotian 
settlement. We would be delighted to go back 
to that and see everyone comply with it. That 
would be a major step toward peace in South- 
east Asia. But the other side has consistently 
refused to consider that in any way, shape, or 
form. Now again, the point here is : Wliat is 
there to be negotiated ? Who is going to nego- 
tiate, and to what end ? Now, most of the suc- 
cessful negotiations of the postwar period have 
been preceded by some private contact that in- 
dicates that a satisfactory basis of settlement 
can be found — the Berlin blockade of '48, the 
Korean war, and so forth. That is missing 
here ; that is missing. 

Q. You've had silence, completely? 

A. No indication that — despite a nmnber of 
contacts of various sorts — no mdication that 
Hanoi is prepared to leave Laos and South Viet- 
Nam alone. So that the issue is posed in the 
sharpest form today. 

Q. There was a great fuss in the European 
press about the use of this nonlethal gas, and 
then there was a suggestion in the press that 
pilots are now being told to go out and find their 
own targets, on their own initiative. Is that 

A. Oh, it wouldn't surprise me if pilots go 
out and look for targets. That's what they're 

there for — the mission is clear, and the mission 
is authorized. 

The gas was, unfortunately, based upon a 
fundamental misunderstanding of what was in- 
volved. That was a police-type gas and has 
nothing to do with gas warfare. It has been 
used many times, by many governments all over 
the world. 

Q. One hears of a ^^hard" school of thought in 

Washington, Mr. Secretary, lohich would like to 
use this occasion to settle with the Chinese, in 
particular to destroy their nuclear capacity be- 
fore it gets any larger. Would it be true to say 
(a) that that school existed and (b) that it had 
increased its effectiveness? 

A. I have not heard any discussion of that 
sort among the I'esponsible levels of the Govern- 
ment. You know, the President has said many, 
many times that we have no desire to enlarge 
this war. Wliat we want is the safety and se- 
curity of South Viet-Nam and of Laos. And if 
the other side would leave its neighbors alone — 
and we've said this luitil it's boring, appar- 
ently — then we, our own forces, could come( 
home immediately. 

Q. How far do you depend on Russia stand- 
ing aside, in order to pursue this tactic? 

A. Wlien we made our commitment to South 
Viet-Nam, we did not make it on the basis of 
what others would "not do." We've been 
through this before — you and we, in differ- 
ent parts of the world. We've faced the prob-'i 
lem of aggression since the seizure of Manchuria i 
in 1931. The United States has taken 160,0001 
casualties since World War II in meeting this 
problem of aggression in all parts of the world. 
Now that means that we're serious about this 
kind of pi'oblem. There's no possibility of or- 
ganizing a peace in the world if anyone bent on 
aggression discovers that he can be successful 
at it, because this is an appetite that grows with > 
eating. There's no end to it. And if we haven't 
learned that in the last three decades, then we 
must have been very stupid indeed during this 

Q. How can you contain China, though? 
This sou/nds a naive q^iestion, but — admittedly — 
assuming that everything you say is absolutely 






to be supported, as it is m the West, I dan't see 
how America can compete yrith China in tlie 
end — in influencing Southeast Asia, which is 
virtually a Chinese backyard — in the end. 

A. We have no desire, ourselves, to influence 
Southeast Asia. We're not looking for politi- 
cal pastures there. We're not looking for a 
military position, or for bases, or any special 
privileges. But we consider that it is utterly 
fundamental that small countries have a right 
to live safely and independently in the neighbor- 
hood of great powers — Canada, Mexico. AATiy 
not? These countries in Southeast Asia have 
the same right to live out their own lives, with- 
out being overrun by a force from the outside. 
Now that is an issue in which more than a hun- 
dred smaller countries all over the world have 
the most fundamental stake. Their national 
existence depends upon it. If we were to 
abandon that idea, then the great powers would, 
what? Revert to the jungle? Enter a race 
among themselves to gobble up those portions 
that are within their reach, until they come into 
massive conflict with each other? That's the 
sure road to catastrophe. 

Q. Do you think the American public could 
[face the prospect of another Korea, over that 
\ issue? 

t A. I think that you can assume, without any 

question, that the American public, the Ameri- 

'ean Congress, and the American Government 

are committed to South Viet-Xam, for the 


Q. Whatever happens? 

A. That is the point. 

U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; 
Funds for New Building Requested 

Following is a statement made by President 
Johnson on March 30 regarding the bombing of 
the VjS. Embassy at Saigon on that day, to- 
gether with the text of a letter of April 1 from, 
the President to Hubert H. Humphrey, Presi- 
dent of the Senate, transmitting a bill to au- 

thorize construction of a new building to replace 
the damaged chancery. An identical letter icas 
sent to John W. McCoivnack, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives. 


White House press release dated March 30 

The terrorist outrage aimed at the American 
Embassy in Saigon shows us once again what 
the struggle in Viet-Nam is about. This 
wanton act of ruthlessness has brought death 
and serious injury to innocent Vietnamese citi- 
zens in the street as well as to American and 
Vietnamese personnel on duty. I extend my 
deepest sympathy to the families of all who lost 
their lives. 

Outrages like this will only reinforce the de- 
termination of the American people and Gov- 
ernment to continue and to strengthen their as- 
sistance and support for the people and Govern- 
ment of Viet-Nam. The Embassy is already 
back in business, and I shall at once request the 
Congress for authority and funds for the im- 
mediate construction of a new chancery for the 
American Embassy in Saigon. This will be one 
more symbol of our solidarity with the people 
of Viet-Nam. It is they who are the real tar- 
gets of the Communist aggressors. 

Led by Ambassador [U. Alexis] Johnson, the 
Americans in Viet-Nam have once again shown 
outstanding qualities of courage and coolness. 
They have the admiration of their countrymen. 


White House press release dated April 1 

April 1, 1965 
Dear Mr. President : I am transmitting here- 
with a bill to authorize the construction of a 
new building to replace our damaged chancery 
in Saigon, Viet-Nam. In this bill I am re- 
questing authorization of $1 million which will 
permit us to build a new chancery promptly. 
This new building may be either complete in 
itself or the first stage of a larger chancery, as 
experience dictates. In either case, it will be a 

APRIL 19. 19G5 



dignified, efficient, economical, secure, and per- 
manent place of business for the United States 
in Saigon. 

This new building will be one more symbol 
of our solidarity with the people of Viet-Nam. 
It will show them that the United States has 
no intention of abandoning them in the face of 
Communist terrorism and aggression. It wUl 
show them that we intend to live up to our com- 

This new building will also show the Com- 
munists in Hanoi and their tools in the Viet 
Cong that wanton murder of civilians and de- 
struction of civilian property cannot deflect us 
from our stated purposes in Viet-Nam. 

To emphasize this determination and resolve, 

I request the Congress to act promptly on this 


LxNDOisr B. Johnson 


To amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 
1926, as amended. 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and Bouse of Representa- 
tives of the United States of America in Congress as- 
sembled, That section 4 of the Foreign Service Build- 
ings Act of 1926, as amended (22 U.S.C. 295), is fur- 
ther amended by adding the following new sub-section : 

"(e). For the purpose of carrying into effect the 
provisions of this Act in South Viet-Nam, there is 
hereby authorized to be appropriated, in addition to 
amounts previously authorized prior to the enactment 
of this amendment, one million dollars to remain 
available until expended." 

The United States and Canada: Common Aims 
and Common Responsibilities 

Jy Under Secretary Ball ^ 

There is an honorable ritual that requires any 
representative of the United States Government 
visiting Canada or any Canadian Minister visit- 
ing the United States to try to provide a fresh 
and scintillating assessment of the state of re- 
lations between our two countries at the precise 
moment of his visit. This is not an under- 
taking without hazards. I still bear the scars 
of my own effort last year. Nor should it be 
approached cavalierly. For the relations be- 
tween your country and mine are too intimate to 
be easily analyzed and too complex to be taken 
for granted. They cannot be summed up in a 
few platitudes and certitudes — and anyone who 
tries will surely miss the mark. 

Our relations, after all, have deep roots. 

' Address made before the Canadian and Empire 
Clubs at Toronto, Canada, on Mar. 22 (press release 

They are not an affair of the moment. They 
are compounded of history as well as the events- 
of the day. They are the resultant of many 
national attitudes and national experiences. 

Nor can they be expressed in simple equations. 
They are composed of complex variables. They 
are not all of a piece ; they exist in a number of 
different forms and on a number of different 

First, there are the bilateral relations between 
the Canadian and American peoples and be- 
tween the Canadian and United States Gov- 
ernments. Thousands of our citizens cross com- 
mon borders each day in opposite directions. 
Our economic eggs have been scrambled irrev- 
ocably. Our Governments are in constant 
communication on a wide spectrum of prob- 
lems — defense, foreign policy, civil aviation, 
fisheries, conservation, emergency planning. 



highway improvement, power production, and 

Second, tiiero are relations that flow from go- 
ograi)hy. Your country ajul mine have common 
problems and common responsibilities because 
we are, at the same time, nations of North Amer- 
i ica and nations of the Western Hemisphere. 
And our borders on the two oceans give us 
common interests — and subject us to common 
dangers — in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas. 

Third, we have special relations as fellow 
menilH.n-s of the Western alliance dedicated to 
the defense of the NATO area from Communist 

Fourth, as industrialized nations in a highly 
interdependent world economy, we have respon- 
sibilities to manage our affairs with due regard 
for other nations. We have special responsibil- 
ities, in addition, for what has been called the 
north-south relationship — responsibilities to as- 
sist in improving the peoples of the less devel- 
oped countries. 

FiriaUy, apart from the duties and obligations 
that derive from geography or wealth, our com- 
mon membership in the United Nations requires 
us to see to it that both the spirit and the letter 
A of the charter are applied in resolving the prob- 
lems and conflicts of mankind. 

Relations on Many Levels 

The fact that our relations exist on many 
levels complicates the solution of the problems 
between us. Within the intricate and elaborate 
structure of world relationships we are each 
important countries. Whatever either of us does 
'*" has an impact around the world. 

For that reason we are required always to 
keep in mind that no problem between us exists 
in isolation, ^^niatever we do on one level of 
- relationship has its echoes on others. 

But if the existence of relations on many lev- 
els complicates tlie solution of problems between 
us, it can also simplify them. 

Some of our difficulties in the past have, I 
think, come alx)ut because we focused on issues 
too narrowly. From time to time we have both 
been too self-centered. We have failed to take 
into account the larger context of our interests 
'' ? and relationships. 

We are doing better these days. The year 

19G4 produced a good harvest of Canadian- 
American relations. This year promises to be a 
vintage j'ear. 

A Recent Achievement 

Let mo ment ion one recent achievement. That 
is the solution of the problem of our automotive 
trade. A few months ago a healthy solution of 
this problem was hard to foresee. Your Gov- 
ernment was concerned with the disparity be- 
tween domestic automotive production and 
consumption. It had designed an import duty 
rebate scheme that was causing considerable 
anguish to some American producers. Those 
producers were initiating procedural steps that 
would have led to the imposition of countervail- 
ing duties. 

Our Governments were starting down a haz- 
ardous path of action and response, retaliation 
and counterretaliation that would before long 
have wasted our resources and embittered our 

By agreeing to eliminate tariff and other 
barriers to automotive trade we avoided eco- 
nomic warfare.^ We have found a solution 
that should, over the years ahead, greatly bene- 
fit producers and consumers on both sides of the 
border — a solution that should lead to a ration- 
alized and integrated North American industry 
with lower costs and lower prices. 

This agreement demonstrates how, by imagi- 
nation and good will, we can resolve our dif- 
ferences. It provides, I would suggest, three 
lessons that should prove useful guides in the 
future : 

First, we were able to reach a healthy and 
mutually beneficial result because we did not 
act unilaterally but by common agreement and 
by a decent awareness of one another's prob- 
lems and interests. 

Second, we followed our liberal economic 
instincts and did not distort the operation of 
market forces by piling restriction on re- 

Third, we did not let ourselves get bogged 
down in political theory but acted in the tradi- 
tion of pragmatism that is the heritage of both 

'For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 

APRIL 19, 1965 


our countries. We knew good business when 
we saw it and were not deflected by doctrinal 
speculation as to the far-out implications of 
what we were doing. 

How Two Nations Can Live Togetiier 

The handling of the automotive problem is 
a good example of liow two nations can live 
togetiier rationally on a single continent. In 
its simplest terms the central problem that we 
face together — and I think we are as concerned 
about it as you — is how we can preserve the 
distinctive values of two separate national 
identities while still employing the resources of 
this vast continent in the most efficient manner. 

This is not, I submit to you, a problem that 
should outrim the imagination of highly in- 
genious peoples. 

After all, in the life of any nation there are 
many areas where the strict application of 
economic laws is traditionally tempered to pre- 
serve social values. This is almost the universal 
experience of nations with regard to agriculture 
and natural resources. 

In essence that is what a good part of Cana- 
dian-United States relations is all about. Un- 
der one heading or another our Governments 
are constantly consulting as to how to find a 
balance between common economic logic on the 
one hand and each nation's social and political 
objectives on the other. 

But since we are nations of realists, I think 
we should recognize that the area of available 
maneuver and of national flexibility is being 
progressively reduced. Competition in interna- 
tional markets is growing constantly more rig- 
orous as other great trading nations — through 
one device or another, such as the European 
Common Market — exploit the benefits of the 
economies of scale. 

How we work these problems out between us 
over the next few years will, therefore, be a 
test of the wisdom and resilience of both na- 
tions. I offer only one strong admonition to- 
day : that we do resolve doubts in favor of eco- 
nomic liberalism rather than resort to artificial 
measures that can in the long run only restrain 
the growth of productivity at the expense of 
both our peoples. 

"We Can Never Fully Understand Each Other" 

We can, as I have suggested, solve most of 
our problems by a healthy dose of pragmatism 
and a lively appreciation of one another's in- 
terests. But this does not mean that either of 
our nations will ever fully comprehend the 
problems of the other with full sensitivity to all 
the nuances of national anxiety, pride, and 
history that may be involved. 

The beginning of wisdom in achieving effec- 
tive relations between our countries and our 
peoples is, I think, the recognition that we can 
never fully understand each other. No matter 
how much we read one another's books and 
magazines, watch one another's movies and tele- 
vision, listen to one another's radios, or even 
talk together in a calm and rational fasliion, 
neither of us will ever achieve a total compre- 
hension of the other's national interests and 

For every great nation possesses a kind of 
interior life, a private family life, in which no 
outsider can ever fully participate and from 
which every outsider is to some extent excluded. 
If we are to avoid disappointment and frustra- 
tion and serious misunderstanding, we must 
frankly recognize that fact. 

In my own observation, actions that have 
tended to embarrass the relations between our 
countries have sometimes been taken, not be- 
cause one nation ignored the attitudes and in- 
terests of the other, but because it thought it 
imderstood them when it didn't. I think it 
may be a wise principle that when a line of 
policy involves the intimate domestic concerns 
of either of our countries, the other would be 
well advised to indulge a sympathetic presump- 
tion as to its neighbor's motives and not insist 
on making a wholly independent judgment. 

This observation has special relevance today 
because we are each preoccupied with an absorb- 
ing national problem. In Canada you are seek- 
ing to resolve the special difficulties and pre- 
serve the special values of a bilingual society. 
In the United States we are coming to grips 
with the changes required to achieve a fully 
effective biracial society. 

It would be neither appropriate nor useful 
for anyone from south of the border to express 



a view on your domestic affairs, but it is entirely 
appropriate for me to offer a few comments as 
to liow we Americans are seekin<r to resolve our 
own most pressing domestic concei-n. 

My country, as we are the first to admit, is 
engtiired today in rectifying a grave social in- 
justice. This undertaking is long overdue. 
Our task is, therefore, more difficult than it 
might have been had we tackled the problem 
with comparable determination at an earlier 

In the past hundred years we have managed, 
through great fortune and hard work, to de- 
velop an American economy that is enormously 
rich and jiroductive. "We have found the means 
for assuring tlie majority of our people an ade- 
jquate^andard of living. 

But even on the economic plane, we still have 
(far to go. There are still blighted areas in the 
United States, pockets of unemployment and 
[poverty. Under President Johnson's leader- 
Iship, the I'nited States has launched a vast pro- 
Igram to eliminate these conditions. 

Our Negro citizens, in particular, have not 
(shared fully in our rich economic life. More 
i fundamental than that, however, they have been 
denied social and political equality. Racial in- 
justice is more serious in some parts of the 
country than in others. But it is a national 

Today, at long last, the United States is un- 
Idertaking to remove a great blight of social in- 
lequity, to establish the full equality not merely 
of Negroes but of all other citizens, to abolish 
Isegregation and discrimination in every form, 
land to assure to all Americans the same priv- 
[ileges and opportimities. 

This requires a profound change in our so- 
[ciety — a change that we are seeking to bring 
I about within a remarkably short period. I am 
I certain that we will succeed. The momentum 
I achieved within the past few years will continue 
land accelerate until we have wiped out every 
jlast vestige of social, political, and economic 

Meanwhile we are quite aware that events in 

'this peaceful revolution can take ugly forms. 

No American can be anything but saddened by 

the incidents in Selma and Montgomery, Ala- 

bama, and in McComb, Mississippi. And we 
know all too well that pictures of police dogs 
and firehoses are not good advertisements for 
the United States around the world. 

But at the same time we cannot help but be 
proud of the real meaning of the incidents these 
pictures portray. I do not refer merely to evi- 
dences of individual bravery and forbearance on 
the part of many people, both Negro and wliite, 
but also to the fact that these events are a part 
of the price we are paying for progress — the by- 
products of a determined national effort, fully 
supported by the overwhelming opinion of 
Americans, to bring about a shining transfor- 
mation in our national life. 

As President Johnson said last week : ' 

There Is no cause for self-satisfaction in the long 
denial of equal rights of millions of Americans. 

But there is cause for hope and for faith in our 
democracy and what is happening here. . . . 

Our mission is at once the oldest and most basic of 
this country : to do right, to do justice, to serve man. 

. . . And should we defeat every enemy, and should 
we double our wealth and conquer the stars and still 
be unequal to this issue [of equal rights for American 
Negroes], then we will have failed as a people and as 
a nation. 

And so I ask your understanding — as good 
neighbors — while we move forward with our 
domestic revolution. It may, as I have said, 
often be difficult, or even impossible, for you 
fully to comprehend all of the history and emo- 
tion, the clashes of interests and feeling that are 
involved. But we give you our word as your 
closest neighbor that we are working with speed 
and effectiveness to remove inequality and 
prejudice from our land. 

Common World Obligations 

What we do on the national plane cannot, as 
I have suggested earlier, be separated from the 
world obligations that we share in common. 
Today our two countries are deeply involved in 


APRIL 19, 1965 

■■' For an address made by President Johnson before 
a joint session of Congress on Mar. 15, see White House 
press release dated Mar. 15. 


the fight for freedom around the world. Your 
young men are keeping the peace in Cyprus, as 
you kept it before in the Congo. American 
soldiers are helping the people of South Viet- 
Nam to protect their beleaguered land from 
Communist aggression, which, though it has not 
taken the form of an army in columns crossing 
a frontier, is as much an invasion as an earlier 
Communist movement against South Korea. 

Our efforts in the far comers of the world in 
aid of common principles form part of the ce- 
ment that binds our two countries. For both 

think in terms of the world responsibilities that 
events have imposed upon us. 

I have no doubt that we shall both do what 
history requires of us. For Canadians and 
Americans alike are proud peoples, fiercely 
dedicated to liberty and equally selfless in the 
defense of our common principles. 

And as Prime Minister [Lester B.] Pearson 
said in New York last week, "When the chips 
are down and there is a real threat to basic 
values and principles that we cherish, we have 
stood and will stand together." 

United States Policy Toward Europe 

hy W. W. Rostow 

Gownselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ' 

I am grateful for this opportunity to share 
with you here in Germany some thoughts about 
United States policy toward Europe. My last 
opportunity to speak in Germany was at a quite 
different moment. I spoke m Berlin on October 
18, 1962, on the present state of the cold war.^ I 
spoke then of the unity which the West had 
maintained since the war in the face of Com- 
munist aggression. And I added : ". . . it will 
be tested again — perhaps gravely tested — before 
Klirushchev realizes that his contmued Berlin 
crisis is countei-productive." The next day I 
returned to the United States and was plunged, 
like all of us, into the midst of the Cuba missile 
crisis which had, in fact, quietly begun some 
days before with the aerial photography of tlie 
missiles — a crisis wliich remains one of the 
major watersheds of modern history. 

Before surveying some of the changes in our 

' Address made before the German Society for For- 
eign Affairs at Bonn, Germany, on Mar. 19 (press re- 
lease 51 ) . 

" For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 675. 

environment and our problems since 1962, it 
may be helpful to look back at the fundamentals 
of United States policy toward Europe and the 
Soviet Union; because, as President Jolmson 
emphasized in his speech at Georgetown Uni- 
versity on December 3, 1964,^ there remains a 
complete continuity in the fundamentals of that 
policy. In fact, my theme today comes from 
that speech. President Johnson said: 

For almost the first time, the interdependence of na- 
tions is not a remote goal or a ringing slogan. It is a 
fact which we neglect at our own peril. Communica- 
tion satellites, atomic rockets, jet transports have made 
distant capitals into close neighbors. One challenge is 
to transform this reality into an instrument for the 
freedom of man. Today the cost of failure to commu- 
nicate is not silence or serenity but destruction and 

My theme, then, is interdependence and some 
of its implications for the policy of the United 
States toward Europe and the whole world 

' For text, see iUd., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866. 







Four Commitments 

The polic}' of the United States, which ciys- 
tallized in 1947 and 1948, can be summarized 

First, we committed ourselves, through the 
Truman Doctrine, to resist Communist aggres- 
sion. In Europe that meant not merely de- 
fending Greece and Turl<ey from Comnnmist 
guerrilla warfare and pressure but also com- 
mitting ourselves to the defense of Berlin and 
the central front as a whole. In the years that 
followed, that commitment was expanded and 
translated into the elaborate NATO machinery 
we all now maintain. 

Second, we committed ourselves, through the 
Marshall Plan and its organization, not merely 
to the revival of Western Europe but to its 
revival in a framework of European unity. 
Tliis was a conscious choice. We decided that 
we wished to see emerge the most powerful 
partner that our own resources and European 
energj' and leadership could generate. We did 
not believe that the interests of each of us in 
the Atlantic community were identical. We did 
not believe tliat common policies between Eu- 
rope and the United States would be achieved 
without debate and negotiation. But we 
coimted then — as we count today — on the deep, 
abiding, common interests of Europe and the 
United States to produce out of European unity 
a partner in defending and advancing the values 
and interests of Western civilization that we of 
the Atlantic world all share. 

Third, we committed ourselves to seek by 
peaceful means the unity of Germany. This 
meant that we would not accept as legitimate or 
as historically viable Stalin's regime in East 
Germany nor would we accept as a fact of his- 
tory, to which we had passively to accommodate, 
an Eastern Europe cut from ties to its own past, 
cut from the natural lines of connection and 
commimication which have long been shared be- 
tween Eastern and Western Europe. Even in 
the darkest days of Stalin's rule we counted on 
the gradual assertion within Eastern Europe of 
the forces of nationalism and humanism; and 
we looked to a gradual transformation not 
merely of Eastern Europe but also a knitting 
up of the old ties between Eastern Europe and 
the Western World as a whole. If you will 

forgive a personal reference, it was that kind of 
faith which led some of us in 1947 to help set 
up tlie Economic Commission for Europe in 
Geneva, as an institution which might phiy in 
the long run a useful role in linking Western 
and Eastern Europe, as Stalin's unnatural im- 
prisonment of the East gave way gradually to 
more natural relations. Neither then nor now 
did we envisage tliat the West would seek to 
project its military power or its military orga- 
nizations into Eastern Europe. What was 
sought then — and now — was an arrangement 
which would reconcile the legitimate security 
interests of all nations, including those of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the 
principles of national independence and polit- 
ical self-detennination as well iis with the 
natural lines of interdependence which should 
link Eastern Europe to Western Euroj^e and the 
world community. 

Finally, in a nuclear age we have steadily 
sought to hold out to the Soviet Union and to the 
world community proposals that would bring 
the nuclear arms race under control by measures 
of arms control which embraced effective and 
reliable means of international inspection — in 
Europe and on a world basis. 

Steps Toward Success 

Wliat has been the fate of this policy ? 

It has succeeded over a period of almost a 
generation as few policies have succeeded in 
modern history. 

Our common commitments to the defense of 
Berlin were severely tested in 1948-1949 and 
then again against Khrushchev's technique of 
nuclear blackmail in 1958-1962. Western Eu- 
rope revived in every dimension of its life — eco- 
nomic, social, and political. It has established 
powerful instalments of economic unity on the 
Continent. We have developed and maintained 
important institutions of Atlantic partnersliip 
not only in NATO but also in matters of mone- 
tary collaboration and over a still wider eco- 
nomic front. Our faith in the abiding character 
of Eastern Europe's commitments to its history 
and to an independent, humane role on the world 
scene is being gi-adually vindicated. 

Nevertheless, in terms of the considerations 
which set in motion our policy in 1947, the great 

APRIL 19, 1965 


objectives are still to be attained. We are in 

Developing Habits of Interdependence 

Berlin, for the moment, is safe; but the wall 
and all it stands for is still there. And Berlin 
will only remain safe if the West continues to 
maintain the highest degree of military and po- 
litical unity. There is not the slightest evidence 
that Coimnmiist ambitions are constrained by 
any factor otiier than the costs and dangers of 
seeking to expand their power ; and those costs 
and dangers depend mainly on the strength and 
unity of the West. 

The alliance is in the midst of efforts to bring 
the nuclear and nonnuclear powers of the At- 
lantic into new partnership arrangements. How 
this matter is resolved will help shape the alli- 
ance for many years to come. Moreover, we 
have an opportunity to strengthen on a world 
basis the commitment to collective, rather than 
narrowly national, systems of defense. 

President Jolmson has made it crystal clear 
that, so far as the United States is concerned, 
we are ready to go forward to make a truly inte- 
grated Atlantic force, in which nuclear and non- 
nuclear nations would participate on a basis of 
equality, leaving the door open for coordina- 
tion within NATO for those members which 
may not wish to join such a force at this time, 
leaving the door open also to adjustments we 
might wish to make as Europe moves toward 
effective political imity. We remain convinced 
that it is in this direction the right answer lies 
in the critical matter of nuclear collaboration. 
If there is one area above others where we must 
maintain a deep understanding and a common 
front, it is in nuclear affairs: deterrence and 
arms control negotiations alike. 

We have built in recent years a remarkable 
system of monetary collaboration. It has per- 
mitted a more equal distribution within the At- 
lantic world of gold reserves. It has permitted 
the United States to support heavy dollar ex- 
penditures in meeting its NATO commitments 
on a massive scale. It has permitted capital 
flows within Europe and across the Atlantic, 
which have helped produce in the whole Atlan- 
tic community a phase of growth unexampled in 
the last hundred years. If our monetary author- 

ities had worked together as closely in 1929 as 
they have in recent years, much of the Great 
Depression could have been avoided. But evi- 
dently our monetary arrangements are incom- 
plete. An expansion in trade more rapid than 
increases in gold production requires of us an 
enlarged use of the IMF [International Mone- 
tary Fund] ; while our common commitments 
to rapid growth without inflation require not 
merely policies of self-discipline at home but 
intensified collaboration abroad. The question 
before us is this : Shall we go forward to refine 
the monetary system we have created, as a con- 
tinuing support for our economic, political, 
and military interdependence; or shall we lapse 
back toward national approaches to monetary 
questions whose consequences can be read in 
the common experience of the period 1929-1933 ? 
And so it is also with the problems of trade 
and of assistance to the developing nations. 
There, too, we are at a midpoint in developing 
the institutions and habits of interdependence, 
in learning to define common interests, common 
responsibilities, and then acting in concert upon 
them. There, too, we face the choice between 
going forward into arrangements of greater 
concert or risking the fragmentation of what we 
have achieved in a generation's labor. 

The Problems of German Unity 

Nowhere is this choice more vivid than in the 
problems that center about German unity. 

The achievement of German imity by peace- . 
ful means is not in any narrow sense a German 
question. It involves the whole future of our 
common relations with Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. The outcome will depend upon 
the miity, the strength, and the policy of the 
West, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
it will depend on changes in the situation and in 
men's minds to the East. 

We are more hopeful than we were a few 
years ago. There is light at the end of the 
tunnel. There are forces at work to the East 
which might, in time, lead peacefully to German 
unity and to a resolution of this dangerous ten- 
sion in the heart of Europe. But if we have the 
right to hope and the duty to work to imdo the 
unnatural division of Europe, it is mainly be- 
cause the whole Atlantic world has been united 



and strong— united in times of crisis and test 
and steadily "jatiierini:: that strength and con- 
fidence from eacli other which has made the 
West once more a natural pole of attraction to 
those in the East. 

Thus, in terms of the most basic and familiar 
issues of the Atlantic world itself — in terms of 
the commitments wo undertook to each other in 
the darkest days of the late 1940's — we must not 
merely stand still but move forward together, if 
our common interests are to be protected and 
advanced. Xothing has happened to make a 
fragmentation of the alliance safe for any of 
us — in any field. 

Resisting Communist Aggression 

But tiiere is more to it than that. 

Tlie fate of the Atlantic community is bound 
up not merely with the defense of Europe, with 
nuclear partnership, with vital housekeeping 
arrangements in the Atlantic, and witli progress 
toward a German and European settlement. 
The Atlantic community will also be shaped by 
events and by our policies in that larger and 
more populous part of the world community 
whirh embraces Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
and Latin ^Vmerica. 

Although the Commimist world is badly split, 
it should not be lost upon us that it is in these 
regions that Communists of every variety are 
expending their energy and resources in order 
to advance their interests and to damage the 
interests of the West. They are mounting pro- 
grams of aid and trade, of diplomacy and 
ideological attraction, subversion and guerrilla 
warfare with a renewed intensity. 

In 10G4 Communist commitments for new 
economic aid totaled nearly $1.4 billion, aside 
from massive aid to Cuba. This compares with 
a figure of about $3f.O million in 10G.3 and is 
well beyond the previous high figure of $1.1 
billion in 1001. The military aid figure for 
IfKvt was about $300 million, liringing the total 
of such aid extended to some $3.7 billion. WTiat 
these figures suggest is the seriousness with 
which the Communist regimes — all of whom are 
feeling the limitation of their resources — are 
p'lrsuingtheir policies of penetration. 

^ylle^eas the central front in Europe has been 
quiet since the Cuba missile crisis, men have 

been fighting and dying — in small engagements 
and largo — in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
and Latin America in conflicts initiated or pur- 
posefully enflamcd by Communist policy. 
Each is capable of causing a further spread of 
infection and a dangerous expansion of violence. 
This is not a period that justifies complacency. 

Moreover, with the Chinese Communist nu- 
clear explosion we face foreseeably the possi- 
bility of nuclear confrontation not merely with 
the Soviet Union but with Communist China 
itself. And we face the problem of strengthen- 
ing and giving confidence and support to free 
Asian nations which border on an overtly ambi- 
tious and aggressive Communist China which 
commands this new threat. 

These are matters which must be of vital con- 
cern to the Atlantic community as a whole. 
The possibility of nuclear engagement cannot be 
a question of merely regional concern on this 
small planet. 

Communist hopes and enterprises are based, 
of course, on the fact that the nations of these 
regions, which contain over a billion human 
beings, are undergoing an historic transforma- 
tion. They are altering their economic, social, 
and political institutions in ways that would 
permit them to absorb modern science and tech- 
nology. They are seeking a new status of 
dignity and authority both within their regions 
and on the world scene. These fundamental 
transformations leave them open to Communist 
penetration and influence. 

For the Atlantic nations — and for Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand as well — they pose 
these questions: IIow shall their independence 
be protected in the midst of these critical transi- 
tions? IIow can we help them establish the 
foundations for that kind of economic, social, 
and political progress which will bring them, 
in time, into the world community as modern, 
responsible, and democratic states? 

As of this moment we face in Southeast Asia 
a quite particular test. In its essence it is little 
different from the problem which pulled the 
United States out of its postwar impulse toward 
withdrawal and brought us back to confront 
Stalin in Europe. The basic issue in South 
Viet-Nam and Laos is much like the issue in 
Greece in 1947. Communist forces are seeking. 

AriSIL 19, 1965 


in a thoroughly professional way, to seize power 
in those countries, with illegal assistance from 
outside the country. They are seeking to ex- 
ploit the terrible arithmetic of guerrilla warfare 
that decrees a burden of some 15 government 
soldiers to control one active guerrilla. 

In one sense, the issue in Southeast Asia is 
even more fundamental than was the case in 
postwar Greece, for the guerrilla war in South 
Viet-Nam is substantially manned, supplied, 
and directed from outside the country in a man- 
ner which was not the case even in the worst 
days of the struggle in Greece. At stake is not 
merely Southeast Asia and the flank of the 
Indian subcontinent. The question which must 
be answered is a question much debated in Com- 
munist circles. It is whether in subversion and 
guerrilla war of this kind the Communists have 
found a method for bypassing the nuclear and 
conventional militaiy capabilities of mature 
industrial powers. In Laos and South Viet- 
Nam we are not facing merely a difficult local 
situation. We face a test of a strategy with 
global implications. Preliminary Communist 
efforts to establish the foundations for this kind 
of warfare are going forward in northeast 
Thailand, in parts of Africa, and in the Carib- 

The fundamental question at issue is just as 
real in Southeast Asia as it was in Greece in 
1947, in the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, in 
Korea in 1950-1951, and in the nuclear black- 
mail crises laimched by Khrushchev in Berlin 
in 1958 and Cuba in 1962. The fundamental 
question is whether we shall let Communist ag- 
gression in any form succeed. To render this 
form of aggi'ession ineffective is in the interest 
not merely of the United States but of the whole 
Atlantic world and in the interest of free men 

Indeed, it is a matter of universal concem, 
for it is difficult to envisage serious movement 
toward arms control and disarmament if Com- 
mvmist regimes feel free to ship arms and men 
illegally across international frontiers. 

The Developing Nations 

The vital interests of the Atlantic are also 
engaged in the great tasks of construction and 
pacification which we face in Asia, the Middle 

East, Africa, and Latin America. 

With respect to Latin America, for example, 
we are living through a decade which will cast 
a long shadow. In the Charter of Punta del 
Este the governments of Latin America com- 
mitted themselves to their peoples to 10 years 
of maximum effort toward achieving sustained 
economic growth, increased social justice, and a 
refinement of their democratic institutions. 
Observed some 3 years later, there is no ques- 
tion but that Latin America is now seized deeply 
of these commitments. In every nation these 
fundamental economic and social matters are 
the center of debate and of energetic action. 

In 1964, aided by a rise in export prices, 
preliminary figures indicate that Latin America 
exceeded the Pimta del Este target of an in- 
crease in gross national product of 21/^ percent. 
The figure may be something like 3 percent per 
capita in real terms. Even more important 
than these average statistics is the increasing 
dedication of governments to these large goals, 
backed by a younger generation whose com- 
petence and determination often remind me of 
the men in each European country who, during 
the days of the Marshall Plan, looked forward 
to the future rather than backward to Europe's 
tragic experience since 1914 and led the way in 
European reconstruction. 

The Alliance for Progress is a vast human 
adventure in which the vital interests of Eu- 
rope and the whole Atlantic are fully engaged. 
The old ties of culture, religion, and trade 
across the South Atlantic — as well as the ex- 
perience, technology, and capital now available 
here — offer Europe an opportunity to play a 
large role in this critical decade. We in the 
United States hope that Europe will seize this 
opportunity with both hands. For, in the long 
run, this emerging modem Latin America 
should move toward partnership in Atlantic af- 
fairs, rooted as it is in the same basic Western 
traditions and values as Europe and North 

Beyond the commitment to modernization, 
another interesting theme is emerging in the 
developing nations. The leaders in these re- 
gions, like European leaders in the last decade 
or so, are seeking ways to take a larger hand in 
their own fate. This is not a simple reaction 



against colonialism or other forms of extreme 
dependence out of the past. It reflects the be- 
ginninjxs of a miiture desire to play an effective 
role on the world scene. These leaders are com- 
ing to understand that, in a world as profoundly 
interdependent as our own, a simple assertion of 
nationalism and nationalist policies is not 
enough. Strong currents of regionalism are 
coming to the surface. 

Thus, following the earlier example of Eu- 
rope, there is the movement in Latin America 
toward the Central American Common Market 
and the Latin American Free Trade Area. 
Thus, following somewhat the precedent of the 
Marshall Plan arrangements, the 20 Republics 
together have created, to help direct the Alliance 
for Progress, the Inter- American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress, with a Latin Ameri- 
can chairman and six out of seven Latin Ameri- 
can members. Thus, in Africa, under more 
difficult circumstances, we can nevertheless see 
the beginnings of an effort by Africans to man- 
age their regional affairs through the OAU [Or- 
ganization of African Unity] ; and the executive 
secretary' of the Economic Commission for Af- 
rica, Mr. Robert Gardiner, has called for a min- 
isterial meeting to consider ways of handling 
African economic development and external as- 
sistance on a more effective multilateral basis. 
Tlius, in Asia the idea of a regional development 
bank is being canvassed, while Asian leaders 
search for new means of consultation and 
mutual support. 

Tliese initiatives may not yield soon in other 
regions as fully formed and stable institutions 
as those which exist or are being created in Latin 
America. But it is logical and right that the 
nations of these regions, recognizing the inade- 
quacy of simple national policies in the modem 
world, should increasingly concert both to take 
a larger hand in their own affairs and to manage 
with greater dignity and effectiveness their rela- 
tions with the more advanced nations of the 
Atlantic and the Pacific. 

For us of the Atlantic, such developments 
could permit the building of new and more sys- 
tematic postcolonial relations with these regions 
in economic matters and, where common inter- 
ests and commitments require, in security affairs 
as well. 

But if we are to play an effective role in re- 
lating ourselves constructively to these emerg- 
ing regions, we ourselves must greatly improve 
and render more systematic the consultations 
among ourselves. 

The Atlantic Agenda 

Viewed in this way, the agenda before us in 
the Atlantic world is long and challenging : to 
maintain and refine our defensive arrange- 
ments; to solve the nuclear question, as Presi- 
dent Jolmson put it, in ways which "bind the 
alliance even more strongly together by sharing 
the tasks of defense through collective action 
and meeting the honorable concerns of all"; * tX) 
mount together policies which would move us 
toward German unity and a European settle- 
ment based on self-determination and security 
for all ; to concert our policies looking toward 
arms control and disarmament; to move for- 
ward in monetary affairs and in trade in ways 
which draw us closer together and strengthen 
the economic foundations of the alliance, and 
which strengthen also the possibilities of trade 
and development for others; to face together 
tlie subtle, diffuse, but still dangerous aggres- 
sion of Communists in the developing world; to 
consult on nuclear problems beyond the At- 
lantic; to develop more systematic programs of 
assistance to the developing nations and regions. 

These are the tasks on which we are prepared 
to move forward with our Atlantic partners "in 
a world of great opportunity, in a tune of great 
need." * None of them is easy; but all must be 
dealt with if we are not to permit the fast-mov- 
ing currents of a highly interdependent world to 
risk a generation's collective achievement. 

Each of us cannot pick the items from the 
common agenda which conform to its narrow 
national interests and leave the rest to others. 
That way lies the erosion of alliances. 

As President Johnson said: "At every turn- 
ing point for 20 years we have risen above na- 
tional concerns to the more spacious vision of 
European unity and Atlantic partnership." 
No lesser vision will permit us to master this 

' Ibid. 

APRIL 19, 1965 


agenda. But if we remain loyal to that vision — 
and to the values of the common civilization 
which underlie it — we can surely move forward. 
Governed by such a commitment, no issue among 

us is beyond our gifts for mutual understand- 
ing and accommodation. 

It is in this spirit that we in Washington 
intend to persist. 

An Atlantic Partnership and European Unity 

iy George G. McGhee 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Oermany ^ 

I am glad to have this opportunity to meet 
with the International Club and the Europa- 
Union, an organization dedicated to the achieve- 
ment of a united Euro^Je. My country lias 
consistently encouraged movement by Euro- 
peans toward this goal. Americans believe 
that they too will gain if Europe unites. To- 
night I should like to discuss with you some of 
the reasons for this identity of interest. First 
I will outline the political pliilosophy wliich 
underlies American policy toward Europe. 
Then I will ask you to consider witli me how 
that philosophy applies to certain questions of 
the moment. 

Throughout the postwar period every Ameri- 
can President, whatever his party, has sup- 
ported efforts toward European unity. Let me 
quote to you the words in which President 
Johnson has reaffirmed tlie course that the 
United States will follow in the years ahead : - 

We will continue to work toward European unity 
and Atlantic partnership, knowing that progress will 
require initiative and sacrifice from us as well as 
from Europe, that success will come from years of 
patient effort and not a single dramatic move, that 
the steps ahead may be more difficult than the ones 

' Address made on Mar. 9 at Bad Godesberg, Ger- 
many, at the joint invitation of the Presidium of the 
Europa-Union of Germany and the International Club. 

- For the as-delivered text of remarks made by Tresi- 
dent .Johnson at the Alfred E. Smith memorial dinner 
at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 14, 1964, see White 
press release dated Oct. 14. 

Ours is not a policy shaped by transient 
features of the international scene. It take."* 
a long view of the U.S. national interest — in- 
terpreted in its largest sense. We have visual- 
ized the possibility of a Europe — economically 
integrated, politically united, encompassing all 
the major powers of the elder realm of 
Western civilization. Tliere are many rea- 
sons — historical, pragmatic, even, if you like, 
sentimental — for the unbroken continuity of 
our postwar policy toward Europe. 

Americans, for example, recognized that a 
major reason for the limited economic develop- 
ment m Europe in the interwar period had been 
the autai'kic conception of national economic 
activity. This same factor had inhibited the 
development of the individual American States 
in the decade following the Kevolution. The 
need for an unrestricted flow of goods, services, 
and people throughout the whole of the United 
States had an influence in shaping the closely 
federal form that our Union chose when its 
founders drew up our Constitution. 

Thus Americans draw from their own history 
their conviction that it is advantageous to merge 
the interests of smaller economic units in a 
single large economy. It worked for us. It 
seemed to us that it should work for Europe. 
The beneficial effects for Europe of internal 
trade liberalization, first under tlie OEEC [Or- 
ganization for European Economic Coopera- 
tion] and now increasingly under the EEC 



[European Economic Community], appear to 
have borne out tliis assumption. 



U Mutuality of Interests 

American interest, in the state of affairs in 
Europe has several mutually reinfoi'cing 
orifjins. The perspective of distance perlmps 
once led many Americans to contrast the peace- 
ful blending of European peoples and cultures 
in tiie United States with the fratricidal lack 
of iiarmony in Europe. We sought to stay out 
of Europe's quarrels. Nevertheless they en- 
gulfed us twice in this century in world wars. 
As most of us are of transplanted European 
stock, we take a natural interest in the home- 
lands of our forebeare. As people who have 
built a new countrj', we have realized that in 
new circumstances old rivalries can wither 
KiKia away. As realists, we drew the conclusion that 
our own countiy could not be safe while Europe 
remained at odds with itself. It is, therefore, 
not merely with distant benevolence that Ameri- 
cans liave welcomed steps by Europeans to put 
an end to struggles for dominion by one or an- 
other Euroj)ean power — a kind of struggle 
•whicii has had tragic consequences not only for 
Europeans but for oureelves. 

Americans also are conscious of sharing with 
Europeans the custody of a cultural heritage. 
Together, Western Europe and Xortli America 
represent the essential values of Judeo-Christian 
and Greco- Roman civilization. Thej' also 
virtually comprise the world's advanced indus- 
trial society. Few Americans would question 
that what we have in common far outweighs the 
differences between Americans and Europeans. 
These similarities seem to us a natural founda- 
tion for a cooperative relationship. It has 
seemed to us that steps toward European unifi- 
cation represent a final triimiph of human rea- 
son over the instinct of the past for national 
prestige and domination. 

Finally, there is a clear recognition in Amer- 
ica that a strong, free Europe is vital to the 
security of the United States. This fact was 
the basis for the vast outpouring of American 
money to assist Europe's reconstruction through 
the Marshall Plan. This fact is tiie basis for 
our NATO commitment — backed up by the con- 
tinuing presence in Germany of the equivalent 



jn (i 






of si.K American divisions — a stationing of 
forces abroad which is unprecedented in U.S. 
peacetime history. We will under no circum- 
stances allow the resources of Europe to be 
denied to the free world, to which we mutually 

Because the United States as a global power 
also has responsibilities elsewhere, there is a 
tendency to bring the American commitment to 
Europe into question whenever events in an- 
other part of the world make bigger headlines 
than what is happening here. This is ironic, 
for it is precisely the magnitude of the Ameri- 
can commitment here whicli has spared Europe 
the kind of destructive instability which makes 
headlines. We have some 25,000 men in South 
Viet-Nam — however, we have 250,000 in Ger- 
many. Let there be no mistake about it. We 
will under all circumstances fulfill our commit- 
ment to Europe. 

Moreover, at the same time, as Secretary Rusk 
said last week,' "Europe and the North Atlantic 
conununity cannot preserve their security 
merely by holding a line across Europe." Their 
common security is involved also in what hap- 
pens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, 
South Asia, and the Western Pacific. They 
have a vital common interest in the defeat of 
active aggression in Southeast Asia. They have 
a common interest with the free peoples of the 
developing world in putting an end to aggres- 
sion by the infiltration of arms and trained 
figliting men across national frontiers. 

The North Atlantic nations should recognize 
those vital common interests and join in sup- 
porting them. Above all, they should do noth- 
ing to encourage aggressors to believe that 
aggression will be allowed to succeed on the 
gromid or to reap a reward at tlie conference 

Adjusting Policy To Meet Current Tasks 

As in any long-term endeavor, the means by 
which the United States carries out its policy 
toward Europe must be adjusted to the particu- 
lar tasks at hand. Such adjustments are no 
indication of change in our purpose — nor of a 
decrease in our determination. To use an 

■ Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1965, p. 427. 

APRIL. 19. 19C.5 


analogy, a skilled climber will use a variety of 
techniques on his way to a mountaintop, suit- 
ing his pace as well as his methods to the diffi- 
culty of the pitch which immediately confronts 
him. We still keep our forces here because the 
military threat to Europe persists. We do not 
have to relive the days of the Marshall Plan, 
which represents a task accomplished. 

In the 20 years the United States has been 
striving for a new kind of relationship with 
Europe, I doubt that it has occurred even fleet- 
ingly to any responsible American that such a 
relationship could be anything other than one 
between sovereign equals. The idea of Europe 
being a satellite of America would be morally 
repugnant to all Americans. Such a relation- 
ship would constitute a denial of the very values 
which have linked Europe and America to- 
gether. It could never be strong and lasting. 

Historians, I think, will have no difficulty 
in documenting that America's postwar goal 
has been the creation of a strong and increas- 
ingly unified Western Europe. The first major 
step in this direction, the formation of the 
OEEC, was the outgrowth of an American 
suggestion that the European countries con- 
cerned organize themselves to draw up a Euro- 
pean plan for cooperation in the use of United 
States aid. We have continued to encourage 
European cooperation wherever this seemed 
possible. In short, the United States has held 
consistently to a course diametrically opposite 
to the one we should have followed had we 
wanted the states of Europe to become depend- 
encies of America. Had that been the case we 
should have sought to perpetuate Europe's di- 
vision and weakness. 

Practical experience in such forums as NATO 
and the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] has reinforced 
our conviction that we chose rightly in urging 
Europe to unite in its own interest. The eco- 
nomic and military power of Western Europe is 
very great but unfortunately is divided among 
many countries of unequal size. This makes the 
mobilization of Western strength for a common 
purpose a complicated aifair — sometimes an 
impossible one. Wliere unanimity is the rule, 
any one country, however small, can create an 
obstacle — even when an overwhelming majority 

favors action. We Americans would welcome 
a Europe able to speak with one voice — 
transcending national boundaries. 

This is not simply a theoretical wish. Tlie 
Kennedy Round of worldwide tariff negotia- 
tions at Geneva is, among other things, a prac- 
tical test of dealings between the United States 
and a group of European nations which has 
chosen to speak with one voice. In the field of 
trade and commercial policy the Commission 
of the European Economic Community is the 
single negotiator for the six member countries 
of the EEC. The Commission, in order to per- 
form this role, must first define the interest of 
the six comitries in a manner acceptable to all 
of them. Tliis is a difficult process. On occa- 
sion it has also been a painful one for the six 
countries involved. Wliat has emerged from 
the process, however, has generally turned out 
to be a conmiunity interest which is something 
more tlian the sum of the interests of the six. 

The rapid development of the EEC is con- 
fronting the United States with the emergence 
of a second free-world economic unit of a size 
commensurate with our own. In many ways 
this has created economic hardships for us — 
as internal EEC customs have gone down more 
rapidly than its common external barrier. Var- 
iable levies imposed by the EEC have resulted 
in sharp reductions in certain U.S. exports to 

It is obvious that as the growth of the EEC 
continues, we Americans will have to adapt to it 
in various ways — not all pleasant ones. 

Bases of Partnership 

I was asked the other day whether, in view of 
the hard bargaining which is taking place be- 
tween the United States and the EEC in the 
Kennedy Round, we were changing our minds 
about the EEC. What the questioner failed to 
grasp is that we welcome the challenge of nego- 
tiating with a responsible equal. Even though 
such negotiations can be difficult, the agree- 
ments reached in this way are likely to be more 
durable than those reached easily. We did not 
encourage the formation of the EEC in order 
to make tlungs easy for ourselves. We did so 
in order to have m Europe an entity capable 
of joining with us in assuring greater free- 



world procuress. Tl\e relationship of equality 
between the United States luid the EP2C most 
nearly approximates what we have long sought 
with Europe as a whole. It is the kind of rela- 
tionship we would like to see expaJided into 
other fields, thus laying the foundation for a 
broader Atlantic partnei-ship. 

"We are clear in our minds that such a part- 
nership need not be based on advance agreement 
to follow identical policies. Europe, with a 
perspective different from ours, will see many 
problems differently from us. Latin America 
is, for example, closer to us — just as Africa is 
closer to Europe. Even if the United States 
and Europe do not always define their interests 
in identical terms, however, their respective in- 
terests are bound to run closely parallel. We 
are, therefore^ not alarmed at the prospect of 
Europe devoting its energies to the promotion of 
its own genuine interests. A Europe which 
does, we believe, will find it in its self-interest to 
work with the United States. We would most 
assuredly be prepared to negotiate with such a 
Europe— as an equal — to minimize whatever 
differences might emerge. 

We do not believe that a divergence of its 
interests from those of the United States is 
necessary to give Europe an identity of its own — 
either now or in the future. The idea that 
Europe, as an emerging political unit, can prove 
itself only by the clash of its policies with those 
of others is uncomfortably close to the thesis 
■which prevailed among nations up to the end 
of the Second World War. The consequences of 
this narrow conception of self-interest are 
known to all of us. It would be deplorable if 
artificial differences were created merely for the 
sake of demonstrating Europe's independence 
" of America. Tlie only result would be the frus- 
tration of the accomplishment of our real com- 
mon interests. 

We in the United States are anxious that the 
mistakes of the pa.<5t not be repeated. The liberal 
spirit of cooperation which has characterized 
the Atlantic area over the past 17 years has 
brought not only internal tranquillity but un- 
precedented well-being to the area. We think 
I it imlikely that Europe will wish to turn its 
back on that achievement — in which the United 
States has been Europe's partner. Our policy 


rests on the conviction that Europe will want, in 
its own interests, to continue on the course on 
which we set out together a generation ago. 

Among those who are critical of our Euro- 
pean policy two contradictoiy complaints are 
heard. One is that the United States is trying 
to establish a blueprint for European develop- 
ment which intrudes into Europe's own affairs 
— in extreme form, that the United States is 
trying to "dominate" Europe. The other is that 
the United States does not speak out with suf- 
ficient clarity on European issues in which it 
has a stake — as some put it, that we are not pro- 
viding adequate "leadership." Neither criticism 
is justified. In President Jolinson's words: * 

The United States has no policy ior the people of 
Europe, but we do have a policy toward the people of 
Europe. And we do have common hopes and common 
objectives shared with most of the people of Euroi)e. 
Answers to our common problems must emerge from 
the consent of free countries, and that consent, in turn, 
will be based on discussion and debate and respect for 
the ideas and the proposals of all. But there must be 

Our Current Business With Europe 

In the meantime, the United States has much 
current business with Europe. This must be 
transacted, not with some hypothetical Europe 
of the future, but with the Europe of today. 
That Europe consists, on the one hand, of cer- 
tain community institutions with limited mem- 
bership and some supranational powers. It in- 
cludes, on the other hand, national states joined 
in various ways by treaties — both among them- 
selves and with the United States and others. 
These interrelationships are complex. Some 
have suggested their .simplification by a clear 
choice between a wholly European Europe and 
one within an Atlantic community. 

For our part, we do not feel that Europe must 
make such a choice. We are not dismayed by 
the complexity. The various relationships 
which have already been established, both with- 
in Europe and with America, are not neces- 
sarily contradictory. Many complement each 
other. For example, Franco-German reconcilia- 
tion was a necessary' precondition for any prog- 
ress toward European unity. It was necessary 

* Ihid., Dec. 21, 1904, p. 866. 

APRIL 19, 1965 


that these two great nations — neighbors in the 
very heart of Europe — take steps to assure that 
there should never under any circumstances be 
a revival of their traditional rivalry. They 
could not, however, make their relationship an 
exclusive one without stunting the development 
of Europe. The Franco-German relationship, 
together with all of the other permutations and 
combinations of bilateral ties among the various 
European countries, constitutes the warp and 
woof of European unity. "Wlien these strands 
have been closely enough knit they will become 
as one — the whole cloth of a united Europe. 

We regard the growth of a close-knit Europe 
as necessary for the establishment of a truly 
equal Atlantic partnership. Indeed, in dealing 
with current issues we have carried this convic- 
tion one step further to assure that new arrange- 
ments of an Atlantic-wide nature not prejudge 
later steps toward European unity. Proposals 
presently under discussion for a sharing of nu- 
clear responsibility within the Atlantic alliance 
provide a case in jjoint. From the beginning 
of such talks, whatever the form they have 
taken, we have made clear our willingness to 
accept a "European clause," which would per- 
mit a reconsideration of the terms of the ar- 
rangement should conditions change. We have 
recognized that the extension of European unity 
to include nuclear defense policy is unlikely to 
occur overnight. We have no wish to preempt 
the right of Europeans to determine what foiTn 
such unity might take. Indeed, it would be 
rash for anyone — European or American — to 
predict the future in this respect. Conse- 
quently we have always made it clear that none 
of the proposals presently under discussion 
should be considered a definitive solution to the 
problems of nuclear sharing witliin the alliance. 

We have stated our readiness to review what- 
ever arrangements are made in the event of the 
organization of Europe, or such other major 
changes in the status qiM as German reunifica- 
tion or general and complete disarmament. In 
sum, we have refused to make more difficult for 
Europeans any of the several possible paths 
toward the evolution of a united Europe. 

"UHiile we shall continue to give every support 
and encouragement to progress toward unity 
in Europe, the ways and means of achieving 


that objective are, and must be, peculiarly a 
matter for Europeans to decide. We are fol- 
lowing with great interest the initiatives that 
the nations of the Commimity are now consider- 
ing. We welcome this further stirring of 
Eui'opean effort in the direction of European 
unification. The increasing unity of Europe 
adds greatly to Western strength while, at the 
same time, it helps prevent the resurgence of 
destructive nationalism. Every step taken to- 
ward Europe's unification will, in our view, also 
lead us closer to Atlantic partnership. 

Drawing Artificial Distinctions 

The concepts of European unity and Atlantic 
partnership are both derived from deeply 
shared values and interests. You and we have 
no choice as to whether to be involved with one 
another. Together we can only choose whether 
our involvement will i-esult in friction between 
us or a greater community of purpose. People 
talk about the possibility of Europe cutting 
loose from the United States, or of the United 
States returning to isolationism, but seldom 
of both together. The fact is that, should either 
occur, it will find its mirror image in the other. 

Indeed, in a great many aspects of our affairs 
it is entirely artificial to draw a distinction be- 
tween what is European or American and what 
is "Atlantic." For example, as investment 
capital flows both ways across the ocean, carry- 
ing with it a flow of advanced technology, it 
benefits the region in which the investment is' 
made as well as its country of origin. At the 
same time it creates sinews of strength and unity 
binding together the Atlantic area as a whole. 
We in America, for our part, would welcome a 
greater flow of European investment in our 

Europe and America are, moreover, not only 
important to each other in terms of the inter- 
change of goods and capital. The interchange 
of persons within the Atlantic area, and the in- 
terchange of ideas among intellectuals and pro- 
fessional persons, enrich our lives and enlarge 
our horizons. Doctors, lawj'ers, university pro- 
fessors, and private citizens, as well as business- 
men, on both sides of the Atlantic have profited 
from this personal and professional intennin- 
gling. Through this shared experience they 



contribute siiiuiltaneoiisl}' to the creation not 
only of a European and American but also of 
an Atlantic outlook. 

There is, of course, both in Europe and in the 
United States a human tendency to talk most 
about those problems which lie closest to home. 
I submit, however, that for both Europeans and 
Americans these close-to-home problems include 
more than enough common ones to guarantee 
the durability of our relationship. In truth, 
the complexities of a technological civilization 
make it impossible for either continent to find 
solutions to its most basic problems in isolation 
from the other. It would be easier for the 
United States than for any other nation to 
follow an independent security policy. We 
jhave, however, looked our security problem 
uarely in the face and have discovered that 
we cannot afford independence. We must rely 
ion you — as you rely on us — for the security 
if the Atlantic area, which includes both our 

In fact, NATO itself provides perhaps the 
t illustration of the detennination on both 
[sides of the Atlantic to get on with a common 
: — the task of strengthening our common 
lefense — while the construction of Europe pro- 
s. It would have been dangerous indeed to 
pone the urgent security affairs of the alli- 
ce until its European members were fully 
irganized to make binding political and mili- 
,ry decisions as a group. NATO is, more- 
based on the undeniable fact that the 
lefense of the Atlantic area is, in the last 
alysis, indivisible. It must indeed be based 
pen Atlantic partnership. 
Let me supply another illustration of inter- 
ependence from the field of international 
onetary policy. Here the same realities ap- 
y. The deficit in the balance of payments of 
e United States is not the result of a lack of 
lealth in the American economy. Our economy 
is thriving and all predictions are that it will 
pontinue to expand. Theoretically, the United 
States could bring its balance of payments into 
substantial surplus overnight by unilateral ac- 
ion. We have, however, elected to use means 
which are slower though no less sure. We have 
faken this course because we recognize the cost 
lat other measures would entail, in terms of 


UPRU, 19, 1965 

reduced free-world security, decreased foreign 
aid, and interruption in the flow of capital to 
regions in need of development. 

In todaj''s world the assertion of a so-called 
"independent" monetary policy by any major 
nation would produce rude shocks in every cor- 
ner of the earth. Furthermore, such "inde- 
pendence" would beget more "independence" of 
the same kind, as other countries, finding them- 
selves in difficulties, took unilateral action to 
restrict imports of goods and expoits of capital. 
A downward spiral would commence, taking the 
initiator of "independence" with it. 

It is not really a question of choosing between 
mdependence and interdependence. It is a 
question of taking a sensible view of what each 
country can do for itself and what it cannot do 
without joining with other countries. That 
pressing domestic problems await solution both 
in Europe and the United States makes inter- 
continental cooperation not less but more essen- 
tial. Only by agreeing to work with others for 
the acliievement of common benefits can a nation 
today make efficient use of its own resources for 
its own good. 

Working Together for Common Good 

Working together for the common good is the 
true meaning of Atlantic partnership. It is 
only within an environment of shared respon- 
sibility that both Europe and i^jnerica can best 
discharge the great tasks that confront us. 

Our common defense in NATO provides for 
each of us a degree of security which no single 
nation can achieve for itself at a cost compatible 
with the social imperatives of a free society. 

The further reduction of obstacles to trade 
through the Kermedy Round negotiations in 
Geneva will facilitate the freer flow of goods 
and services between Europe and North 
America, thus stimulating the most efficient use 
of resources on both sides of the Atlantic. It 
will also result in the sharing of these benefits 
with the rest of the world. 

Our cooperation in the development of other 
regions of the world will assure that these 
nations will seek their future within the frame- 
work of the free world. 

A strong Atlantic community will further 


enhance the attraction that Western Europe it- 
self already visibly exerts upon the Eastern 
European countries, niakmg Western Europe 
one source of a unifying flow of magnetic force 
for which the national aspiiations of the 
Eastern countries supply the responding pole. 
These are some of the purposes that we thmk 
a partnership between Europe and the United 

States can serve. We do not conceive of an 
Atlantic partnership as an end in itself — a way 
of chaming Europe to America, or America to 
Europe. We regard it as an evolutionary re- 
lationship which has already begun and which 
demands development, because Europe and 
America face challenges which only both to- 
gether can meet. 

International Visitors and the American Society 

h I 

Bemaj'ks by Secretary Busk ^ 

It is a very great pleasure indeed for me to 
welcome you here to the Benjamin Franklin 
Room of the Department of State. I think there 
is some connection. Benjamin Franklin was our 
first professional diplomat, but he was also our 
greatest citizen diplomat. 

You may be interested in noting, as you leave, 
that bust of Franklin in the comer over there. 
That is one of the four original Houdon busts of 
Franklin, struck, I think, in 1783. We're very 
proud to have that bust here. 

Benjamin Franklin was consumed with an 
interest in all that he saw, in all those whom 
he met, both at home and abroad, and the notion 
of relations among peoples, with a distinction 
and at a level which is very hard for the rest of 
us to achieve. 

As I move about the country I often get the 
question, what can I do as a single citizen to con- 
tribute to the building of peace around the 
world? I think the answer has to be, in each 
case: "Start from where you are. Wliat are 
the opportunities in front of you, in your com- 
munity, in your organizations, in your schools, 
through your money, through your time, 
through your votes ? " There are dozens of ways 

'■ Made at the first national conference of the National 
Council for Community Services to International Visi- 
tors (COSERV) at the Department of State on Mar. 19. 

in which each private citizen can make an im- 
portant contribution. A contribution which is 
multiplied 190 million times moves us a long 
way down the road to peace. 

And so Mrs. Rusk and I would like to tell you 
how grateful we are to all of you who are lend- 
ing your hand in assisting us in our relations 
with the peoples of the rest of the world. I hope 
that you take away from such meetings as this 
a deep realization that it is important and it does 
make a difference. 

You've been talking about a changing world.; 
We now have relations with about 115 countries. 
I believe during the last calendar year there 
were about 50 elections or changes of govern- 
ment in those 115 countries. And in 1965 we arfl 
right on schedule. It is a changing worldS 
There are many problems. But one thing Ij 
tliink which you should deeply understand i^ 
that the rather simple policies, the rather simple ' 
objectives, of the American people in this post- 
war scene have been a great stabilizing and or- 
ganizing force in this tumidt of world affairs. 
And as you receive foreign guests into your 
community, as you spend time with them, one 
of the things which I hope they will discover is 
that these utterly simple purposes of the Ameri- 
can people are really at the core of American 




Tlicre are some things that you can't say 
without being presumptuous, but which they 
themselves migiit discover. It's a mutter of the 
greatest historical importance, to nie, that the 
unimaginable power of the United States in 
this postwar jieriod has been committed in sup- 
port of these decent purposes of the American 
people. Power, Lord Acton said, tends to cor- 
rupt. But power has not corrupted the Ameri- 
can people. You can find our objectives spelled 
out in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the 
United Nations Charter: independent states co- 
operating across national frontiers, settling 
their disputes by peaceful means, acting to- 
gether to deal with aggression, building a more 
decent world in economic and social terms, and 
strengthening human rights. It's all there in 
jthe opening sections of the United Nations 

And that has been the direction of American 
effort and power in this postwar period. No 
appetites for territory, no ambition for domi- 
nation. We've been called aggressors at certain 
times when we've had to stand across the path 
of the aggressor; we have had that name thrown 
upon us. But your representation of what your 
communities are all about to those who come 
to visit with you is the basic stuff of which 
policy is made and represents the genuine and 
central purpose of America in dealing with the 
rest of the world. 

Developing a Decent World Order 

"VVe give effect to these purposes in a great 
many different ways. Now, for example, we 
attend some 600 intergovernmental meetings 
in the course of each calendar year — 15 to 20 a 
week. I thought you just might be interested 
to know that, in 1964, 69 of these were in the 
field of agriculture, 14 on communications, 54 
on economic development and resources, 15 on 
fisheries, 20 on fuel and power, 8 on labor, 9 on 
patents and royalties, 50 in scientific fields, 28 
on shipping and ports, 20 on human rights and 
social welfare, 58 on trade, 9 on transport, et 
cetera, et cetera. 

At least 80 percent of the work of the De- 
partment of State is concerned with what we 
might call the hidden part of world affairs, the 
quiet and steady and behind-the-scenes and be- 

low-the-surface effort to make sense out of this 
turbulent world. 

So foreign policy is not a distant thing. It's 
not a game. Its central concern is with the 
security and the well-being of the people of 
this country and with the development and the 
stability of a decent world order about us. 

I said that that policy comes out of the pur- 
poses of the American people. It also needs 
their support. We have almost a million men 
in uniform outside the continental United 
States today. They are drawn from every 
community in the countiy. We're called upon to 
support some of the harsh necessities of life in a 
troubled world by that intimate and personal 
claim upon the people themselves. And we 
need the funds for a strong defense budget ; we 
need the funds for foreign aid to assist other 
countries to build a decent structure for them- 

And when I mention those million men in 
uniform outside the United States, you know 
I'v^e never yet encountered anyone who has 
looked me in the eye and said to me that it is not 
worth three to four cents of our tax dollar for 
foreign aid to try to get the job done without 
committing those men to combat if possible. 
And this is a part of the foreign aid picture — 
to build that kind of world sketched out in the 
U.N. Charter, by the processes of peace, in co- 
operation with others, and not to cast ourselves 
all around the world in the role of some sort of 

We need funds for our educational exchange 
programs and of coui-se for our diplomacy. 

I must say the Department of State has been 
doing its l)cst to back the President in his econ- 
omy drive as far as Government departments 
are concerned. Three years ago I did not ask 
for any more people; last year the Congress 
wouldn't give me any more people ; and this year 
the President said I'd have to get along with 
fewer people. So it's not just dogs that get 
t heir ears pulled in Washington. 

Importance of Citizen Participation 

I would underline the importance of partici- 
pation by citizens in the relations among peo- 
ples. In 1962 the Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs Personnel imder the chairmanship of my 

APRIL 19, 1065 


distinguished predecessor, Mr. Christian Herter, 
issued a report on Personnel for the New Diplo- 
macy. It spoke of "the need to deal with 
peoples of other nations, as well as with their 
governments," and of "the representation of 
whole peoples before whole peoples of other 
societies." This relationship, it said, is "most 
conspicuous in connection with information 
programs, cultural programs, educational ex- 
changes, trade fairs, and like enterprises." 

And our Advisory Commission on Interna- 
tional Educational and Cultural Affairs, in its 
first annual report in 1963, spoke particularly 
about our program for the "exchange of per- 
sons — the extraordinary new dimension in the 
relationship of one country to another . . . 
conceived as a direct effort of the American 
people to bring about mutual imderstanding 
between themselves and the people of the 
world." It said : "There has been nothing quite 
like this — a peaceable, sizable exchange of per- 
sons, carried on by a goverimient on behalf of 
an entire people — in the whole history of hiunan 

Now, this could not be accomplished without 
the active and dedicated and lively participa- 
tion of our voluntary citizens groups, such as 
you here today represent. We are grateful for 
what you do at your diplomatic posts in your 
own communities and organizations, day in and 
day out. For, among other tilings, the Govern- 
ment itself simply cannot do what you are do- 
ing. We can't render that kind of personal 
and sensitive and imaginative and individual 
service which you yourselves can render in your 
own communities. This voluntary spirit is, of 
course, a keystone in the understanding which 
other peoples may have of us. It's an asset 
beyond price in this total world situation. 

We can have a Voice of America, and we 
can have an information program, and our am- 
bassadors can make speeches. But the most 
eloquent voice we have is what we say to people 
who visit our conununities, what they think we 
think of ourselves, what they think we think of 
each other. I have said before that, of all the 
actions taken by the last Congress, the most 
import-ant single action it took in terms of our 
relations with the rest of the world was the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act. I'm sure you 

know that President Johnson's statement a few 
nights ago ^ has gone around the world with the 
speed of light and has stimulated the most ex- 
traordinary and exliilaratrng reaction among 
people in distant places who never thought \ 
much about the United States, and who never : 
expect to come here on a visit, but who are stim- 
ulated by what we seem to be trying to do in our 
own situation here at home. 

Now, we understand that most of you have 
been working primarily with our short-term 
visitors, the several thousands who come here 
under the auspices of the Department of State 
and the Agency for International Develop- 
ment, and a considerable number of military 
visitors who come here under the auspices of 
the Department of Defense. There are many 
others who come imder private auspices, as well i, 
as under the auspices of some of the other offi- 
cial agencies. I think we can be proud and Ij 
greatly heartened by what this partnership has 
done, without detailed blueprints, which leaves ; 
to you and your local communities the maxi- 
mum of choice and imagination, and which has ■ 
done so much to reflect our friendliness as a i 
people and our basic commitments to the ideals • 
of freedom and peace among the peoples of I 
the world. 

I think we may find in the process that we ) 
learn more about ourselves as we try to be artic- 
ulate about ourselves to other peoples. And I 
have no doubt that we enrich our own commu- ■ 
nities by drawing upon what our visitors can.i 
themselves offer, whether in group discussions i 
or exchange of views or whatever it might be. 
This is very much a two-way street. 

Enriching the Experience of the Foreign Student I 

I would like to comment vei-y briefly on the 
foreign student in America, his needs and his 
opportunities. Many of you see him as a short- 
term visitor when he drops into your commu- 
nity on a vacation or during other travels. 
But he is in tliis country on a somewhat longer 
term basis. And there are many who are not 
sponsored — most of them are not sponsored. 

' For text of the President's address to Congress on 
voting rights, see White House press release dated 
Mar. 15. 



That is, they have no one officially concerned 
about their experience here. I'm not myself 
distressed that this slioiild be so, because from 
time immemorial students have traveled — 
IM^ they've wandered about. They don't want to 
be smothered by undue attention. But never- 
theless they're among us — some 80,000-85,000 
of tliem. And we do have some problems from 
time to time among the nonsponsored students. 
Like all other students everywhere else, they are 
sometimes afflicted with precarious finances — 
I've never seen a student who had enough. 
They have problems with perhaps insufficient 
English, inadequate educational backgroimd, 
unsatisfactory institutional arrangements — 
wliere they might have hit upon the wrong insti- 
tution for their particular purpose. They 
might have overestimated the chances for 
scholarships and employment after they reached 
til is coimtry. 

AMiile most colleges and universities offer 
these students coimseling and guidance, and 
thousands upon thousands of Americans in 
hundreds of conmiunities make their services 
and their homes available, there still are short- 
comings in many a student's experience here 
that may make for misunderstanding and less 
than a happy memory. 

Are there too many of them ? I should think 
that the answer to that is no. The colleges 
and universities make their own decisions about 
whom they will admit; the Government exerts 
practically no influence on the numbers who 
might come for study. In any event, these for- 
eign students are less than 2 percent of our col- 
lege and xmiversity student body. In some 
Western European nations, the percentage 
ranges between 10 and 15. That 2 percent I 
mentioned is a national average. Howard Uni- 
versity has 15. At M.I.T. it is perhaps 12. In 
other words, we have a lot of foreign students, 
but we also have a lot of students and we have 
room for more. 

Wo should have confidence that as a rule our 
educational institutions can carry out the re- 
sponsibilities they are placing on themselves 
when they accept foreign students. It's been 
rather dramatic in the last 15 years — as I've 
had occasion from one vantage point or another 
to watch this process — to see how much finer is 
the job which our colleges and universities are 

doing with foreign students now than, say, 15 
years ago. 

Numbers are not the criterion in how good a 
job we're doing. Each individual student is an 
individual deserving the best opportunity and 
experience here which he can find. We're mov- 
ing toward improved screening and selection 
procedures overseas, so that there is not that 
traumatic disappointment when the student ar- 
rives at the gates of an institution in our coun- 
try to find that he's just in the wrong place. 

For a period there was too much of an ex- 
aggeration, I think, among our friends abroad 
about a very few liighly prestigious institutions, 
and too little knowledge about the line, strong, 
active, and energetic institutions that exist all 
over the country, in which they can have a re- 
warding experience. I remember when I was 
with the Kockefeller Foundation — we were giv- 
ing a considerable number of foreign fellow- 
ships each year — that in the first interview about 
85 percent of those that we were talking to 
wanted to go to Harvard. Well, they had heard 
of Harvard, as most people have. But, in 
fact, to spread them around the country into 
institutions closely identified with their main 
interests, with a great variety of accommoda- 
tions and circumstances, proved to be their most 
rewarding opjKjrtunity. 

President Kennedy once said that the foreign 
student is often lonely. Now, perhaps he wants 
to be lonely in some cases, in which case we 
should leave him alone. Let's don't force our- 
selves on him. But if he is responsive and re- 
ceptive and if he is looking for those things 
in American life that will mean a great deal 
to him in the future, then we ought to do all 
that we can to respond. Perhaps we need to 
think more about certain facilities, particularly 
at vacation time — hostel arrangements that 
would ease the travel and the cost of travel, 
more of the sorts of things that make it easier 
for the student to get about a vast and some- 
what expensive country, in order to enrich his 

You know there are some very special things 
that we can give a number of these students, 
particularly those from the developing coun- 
tries. A little more than a hundred years ago 
we invented the land-grant institutions in this 
countrj' for the purpose of contributing to de- 

APRIL 19. 1965 


velopment. Agricultural and mechanical col- 
leges — that was the original concept. There 
was the invention of an educational system to 
help a nation develop its human and material 
resources. You haven't found that in other 
places quite so much as here. And that notion 
is of gi-eat value in the underdeveloped coun- 
tries. It helped us, I think, a good deal over 
the past century to escape the view that a col- 
lege or university degree elevates you into an 
aristocracy which is not supposed to work. The 
notion that a degree holder can get out in the 
field and pollinate corn or get out his shovel and 
test a cement mix is of great value to countries 
whose educated elite may feel that the practical, 
ordinary, everyday chores are not for men car- 
rying degrees. 

With the help of the United States Advisory 
Commission on International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, we are now taking a new look 
at the foreign student problem as a whole in 
this country. We hope to get some very useful 
suggestions from them which we will be glad to 
pass along to all those who may be interested. 
I'm sure that we need to find ways to apply 
overseas some of the superior methods of 
testing and screening so that the students that 
are selected will be able to get maximum benefits 
from their experiences here. I think we have to 
find some ways also to reach farther into the 
underprivileged groups, if one wishes to use that 
term — the have-nots in other societies — to see 
whether we can open up the doors of opportunity 
for more of them and help to invigorate and 
expand and enlarge the educational elites of 
their own countries. 

I don't quite know from an educational ad- 
ministrative point of view how the educational 
offerings in this country can be more closely and 
clearly related to the needs of these students 
upon their return to their own countries. It's 
a frightful task of curriculum organization. 
But I'm sure it's one to which we all ought to be 
continually alive and alert in order to try to 
anticipate what we can best do for that person 
when he becomes again a resident of his own 

We can do a great deal to enrich and diversify 
a student's experience while here. It is not our 

purpose to send him home sentimental about the 
United States. Understanding is much more i 
than amiability. If the student goes back Imow- 1 
ing what it is he does like about us, and knowing , 
what it is he does not like about us, our relations | J 
for the future are on a much firmer base than I 
if he goes back thinking that he is obligated to 
think well of the United States. I say that \ 
because I think it's right in principle, but I say i 
that also because, as a practical matter, that's ^ 
the only way that these relationships can en- ■ 

Tlie American people can afford to be deeply 
understood. Wlien you look at the effort, the ! 
record, that has been made in this postwar t 
period as a part of the great humane tradition i 
of freedom, you realize you are in the middle of [ 
those processes which are our greatest sti'ength i 
in world affairs. It's true that we have enor- 
mous military strength — and I don't believe that ( 
the human mind can comprehend the effect of I 
the application of that military strength— but t 
even that is not the source of our greatest I 
strength. Our strength lies in the fact that I 
we are a nation peopled from all parts of the 
human race, that we have drunk deeply of its s 
longest and greatest traditions, that we do not I 
consider ourselves to be at the end of that story, 
but that we are in the process of doing our part t 
to have that great story of freedom still fur- 
ther fulfilled. The notion of freedom is still the 
strongest and most explosive force in the world 
today. The simple notion of human dignity, of 
concern for the family, of protection against the 
disasters of a sometimes hostile natural environ- 
ment, the notion that men just don't like to be 
pushed around too much — these are things 
which we share with people from all parts of the 
earth. And these are the things which give us 
confessed and unconfessed allies when the great 
issues of freedom come into sharpest contest. 

It is not your task as COSEEV members to 
distort or corrupt your work in terras of the day- 
to-day and week-to-week problems of our rela- 
tions with other countries. You are working 
on a human story that is more than 2,000 years 
old, and that is how you can give that strength 
of America its additional strength, and in the 
process enrich and strengthen your own per- 
sonal lives. 



An Assessment of the International Monetary System 

by Douglas DiUon 
Secretary of the Treas^iry ^ 

Tliis is the fourth year in which I liave had 
the special privilege of addressing this con- 
ference of distinguished leaders in the world of 
finance. These have been years of remarkable 
innovation in financial practices and policies — • 
public and private — both within the United 
States and abroad. Internationally, we have 
fashioned a framework for mutual consulta- 
tion and cooperation that — measured against 
our common objectives of steady growth and 
flourishing world trade, coupled with substan- 
tial price stability — has proved both durable 
and viable. 

Rut, despite much excellent progress, our in- 
teriuitional financial system still suffers from a 
disturbing disequilibrium — one I have discussed 
with you on previous occasions. Tliis is the 
seemingly chronic tendency for capital to flow 
between countries in directions and in amounts 
that impede the entire process of restoring 
balance in the payments of deficit and surplus 
countries alike. 

The Group of Ten, in their recent study of the 
international monetary system,^ concluded 
unanimously that ways must be found to im- 
prove the process of balance-of-payments ad- 
justment. The United States wholeheartedly 
joined in that conclusion and welcomes the 
systematic studies of this matter now under- 
way in Working Party III of the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

' Atldrpss made before the annual Monetary Con- 
ference of the American Bankers Association at 
Princeton, N.J., on Mar. 19. 

' For background, see Buixetin of Aug. 31, 1964, p. 

Development]. However, if these studies are 
to have truly useful results they must face up 
to the stubborn and extremely difficult problem 
posed by the deep structural imbalances in the 
world's capital markets that have enormously 
complicated the smooth functioning of the ad- 
justment mechanism. 

The nature of the problem is clearly illus- 
trated by developments in our balance of pay- 
ments last year. By 1964, the measures we had 
undertaken to improve our trade position and 
to reduce the balance-of-payments impact of our 
aid and defense programs had acliieved visible 
and gratifying results. Yet, as you know, our 
deficit last year was once again disappointingly 
large, primarily because capital had poured 
out of the United States in unprecedented 
amounts — in significant part to the strong sur- 
plus countries of Western Europe. The recent 
annual report of the Monetary Commission of 
the European Economic Community high- 
lighted this point, noting that an improvement 
of about $3 billion in United States transac- 
tions for goods and services and government 
accounts had been largely offset by a $2 billion 
increase in private capital outflows. 

Within the basic limitations set by the needs 
of an underemployed domestic economy, the 
United States throughout the last 4 years had 
been alert to the fact that excessively easy money 
at home could only aggravate the problem of 
capital outflows. By shifting much of the bur- 
den for promoting domestic expansion to fiscal 
policy and tax reduction, we have enabled our 
monetary authorities to move gradually, but 
steadily, to an essentially neutral monetary 

APRIL 19, 1965 


Our short-term market interest rates have 
climbed significantly since the 1960-1961 re- 
cession, responding largely to two half-point 
increases in the discount rate. With the dis- 
count rate now at 4 percent, Treasury bill yields 
are within 14 percent or so of their postwar 
high — a high reached only briefly during the 
period of very tight money in 1959. Loan/ 
deposit ratios of banks have gradually climbed 
to a postwar peak, and other traditional meas- 
ures of bank liquidity have confirmed a gradual 
tightening in their position. The Federal Re- 
serve has rather steadily reduced the free re- 
serves of the banking system, and, for the past 
month, the banks have actually operated with 
a small net borrowed reserve position. Wliile 
corporate cash flow has remained higli, liquid- 
ity ratios have reached the lowest levels in a 
quarter of a century. 

Clearly, credit has remained readily available 
in the United States throughout this period, 
and our bank lending and long-term interest 
rates are still low relative to most otlier coun- 
tries. But it is also a pali:)able fact that rising 
investment opportunities and credit demands 
at home, combined with increases in the Federal 
Reserve discount rate and greater restraint in 
tlie provision of bank reserves, have noticeably 
reduced the ease of our market. Yet, instead 
of declining in resjionse to these developments, 
the capital outflow has accelerated. 

Differences in Investment Profitability 

This fact alone casts into doubt the thesis of 
those who view the problem almost entirely in 
terms of "excessive" domestic liquidity, with 
tighter monetary policy the simple, effective, 
and unique remedy. Naturally, if one defines 
an excess of liquidity as synonymous with an 
excessive capital outflow, I suppose that position 
would be unassailable. But that kind of analy- 
sis bears no realistic relationship to the difficulty 
we face today. All it does is to define away the 
substance of a very real and tough problem. 

In my judgment, it is much more enlighten- 
ing — althougli still not the entire answer — to 
analyze the problem in terms of differences in 
investment profitability, rather than in terms of 
liquidity. Consider, for example, the outflow 
of funds for direct investment abroad, which 

has continued to rise, reaching $2.3 billion in' 
1964. At the present time, many American ' 
firms clearly believe that a portion of theii' 
available resources can be most profitably in-, 
vested in subsidiaries abroad. That calcula-j 
tion rests on a variety of familiar considera-i 
tions — the more rapid growth of certain foreign ' 
markets; a desire to operate inside a wall of ex- 
ternal tariffs; proximity to readily available- 
raw materials; and lower production costs— 
to name some of the most obvious factors. 

But perhaps most important of all is the fact 
that United States industrial development so 
far exceeds that of any other country. This has 
brouglit with it a degree of competition that is 
unknown anywhere else in tlie world. Add toi' 
this our enormous flow of savings, and it is not 
surprising to find a general acceptance of lowea 
rates of return on capital in tliis country tha^ 
prevail elsewhere — rates that only partially rei 
fleet differences in risks between investment 
here and abroad. At the same time, our busij 
nessmen and investors tend to place higher cap 
ital values on prospective earnings than is th| 
case elsewhere, and our corporations at time 
find it attractive to pay higher prices in the ad 
quisition of going concerns abroad than woul^ 
seem reasonable to local investors. 

Wliatever the specific reason that particular 
direct investments abroad appear to a given 
company to be a more profitable use for its 
funds, the fact is that we cannot effectively in- 
fluence this judgment by simply reducing li- 
quidity and tiglitening credit at home. So 
long as the basic difference in profitability re- 
mains, any gain in terms of reduced foreign in- , 
vestment will entail a substantially larger cost 
in terms of dampening domestic investment as 
well. There seems, therefore, little warrant 
either in theory or in practice for basing eco- 
nomic policy on a presumption that corporate 
managers will permit considerations of the rate 
and availability of bank credit to affect their 
decisions on foreign investment, while leaving 
the domestic economy untouclied. 

In the broadest sense, international differ- 
ences in the rate of return on investment — as 
these differences are reflected in interest rates 
and the intensity of demands for credit — also 
lie behind the accelerating outflow of bank loans 
and other credits abroad. This structural im- 



:iliince forced us to propose the Interest Equali- 
ation Tax during the summer of 1003.' It 
tfectively increased tlie cost of long-term port- 
olio credit to foreigners in developed countries. 
IS a result the outflow of long-term portfolio 
apital in 19G-i dropped back to the 1960 level. 
The plain fact is that foreign borrowers are 
illing and able to pay higher rates than 
omestic borrowers of similar credit standing 
rith free access to the vast resources of the 
American credit market, and foreign loans are 
hus in many instances more profitable to the 
>nding banks. The same is true for the place- 
lent of liquid fimds by our corporations. But 
he massive outflow of these types of credit is 
Iso related to other deep-seated structural 
haracteristics of American and foreign capital 

As you know, with rare exceptions, foreign fi- 
lancial markets, even in countries with the most 
lighly developed economies, lack a large and 
luid short-term money market. Long-term 
)ond markets are usually even more constricted. 
Vs a result, in most other countries there is 
imply no effective mechanism by which pri- 
vate borrowers and lenders — and to a very con- 
uderablo extent governments — can readily raise 
>r dispose of large sums in short periods of 
ime in the open market. Instead, the available 
fimds within each country are channeled al- 
iiost entirely througli a relatively few big in- 
*itutions dealing with individual customers on 
I personalized basis. These institutional mar- 
kets are fairly well insulated from the short- 
term money market and frequently respond 
•nly sluggishly if at all to the actions of the 
inonetarj' authorities. 

The fluidity and size of the market available 
to most private borrowers abroad is further im- 
paired by the fact that many foreign govern- 
ments preempt a very large fraction of the sav- 
ings available for investment, or direct it into 
officially sanctioned uses, frequently with a siza- 
ble subsidy for preferred borrowers added 
along the way. This is partly a natural result 
of basic social decisions to provide, through gov- 
ernment social insurance programs, the protec- 
tion for citizens that we in the United States 

• Ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250. 

furnish to a much larger extent through private 
insurance and private industry. But it is also 
a reflection, in many instances, of a conscious 
desire to provide special preferences to one 
major group of borrowers or another, and to 
maintain a high degree of government control 
of national economic development. In either 
case, the natural result is to leave those busi- 
nesses and other borrowers that must look to the 
remainder of the market more or less per- 
petually starved for funds and with an impel- 
Img desire to seek needed capital from abroad. 
All of these factors have contributed to a 
structure of long-term interest rates in Europe 
that, with only one or two exceptions, has re- 
mained throughout the postwar period at levels 
that, in the light of past history, are unusually 
high. Official discount rates, and the money 
market rates more immediately influenced by 
the official rates, often bear little relationship 
to the loan charges payable by local borrowers. 
And, faced with constricted internal markets, 
and thus denied a full range of fiscal and mone- 
tary tools, the authorities themselves often find 
it essential to pursue essentially domestic credit 
objectives — and in some instances even to fi- 
nance internal budgetary needs — through ad- 
justments in external flows of funds. Some- 
times this is done by borrowing directly from 
abroad and sometimes by seeking to influence 
the external borrowing or placement of funds 
by their commercial banks. 

Fluidity of U.S. Credit Markets 

The sheer size of the United States economy 
and the tremendous volume of funds raised in 
our credit markets — estimated last year at over 
$70 billion — help account for the much greater 
fluidity of our markets and their ability to ad- 
just to, and absorb, large domestic or foreign 
demands with relative ease. But it is not a ques- 
tion of size alone. The relative freedom of the 
market mechanism, and the intensity of compet- 
itive pressures among institutions with a wide 
variety of investment options, permit funds to 
flow promptly from one sector of our economy 
to another in response to changing demands. 
And a long history of confidence in our cur- 
rency, further fortified by the stability of our 
prices in recent years, has encouraged indi- 

APRIL 19. 1965 


vidiials and investment institutions to commit 
funds freely at long term. 

As a result of the pressure of the huge volume 
of private savings seeking investment in our 
market, our long-term interest rate structure has 
remained essentially stable during the past 4 
years, even though money market rates have 
risen by 1% percent or more to a range of 4 to 
41/2 percent. As a result, the differential be- 
tvpeen short- and long-term rates has almost dis- 
appeared. Nevertheless, the bond market has 
continued to absorb a record volume of long- 
term financing at stable rate levels. 

Another indication of the strength of our 
longer term markets is that, over the past 4 
years, they have not merely provided the vast 
amount of funds necessary to support high 
levels of homebuilding, a remarkable expansion 
in business investment, and the rapidly grow- 
ing needs of our states and localities. They have 
also provided funds to the Government equal to 
the entire $28.8 billion Federal deficit during the 
first 4 years of this administration. During that 
period more than that amount was placed in 
savings bonds and marketable debt maturing in 
over 5 years. This achievement is reflected in 
the increase of almost 1 year, or 20 percent, in 
the average length of the marketable debt to a 
level last seen in mid-1956. 

In this setting we could not expect moderately 
tighter monetary policies to bring the needed 
reduction in the outflow of long-term funds 
abroad. The disparities in the structure of the 
capital markets of our different countries are 
simply too great to permit us to rely heavily 
on that approach toward adjustment. Much 
more is needed to bring interest rates here and 
in other industrialized countries into the rough 
alinement that is surely necessary if we are to 
put a permanent end to the destabilizing capital 
flows that have characterized the past 2 years. 

It might, of course, be argued that extremely 
tight money would be able to do the job if con- 
tinued over a long enough period. Such a 
policy rests on the highly doubtful assumption 
that in spite of our huge volume of savings it 
would be technically feasible — perhaps by dras- 
tically reducing the money supply — to raise 
the general level of our bank and long-term in- 
terest rates by the li/o to 2 percent that would 

be needed to achieve interest rate parity with 

But even granting that assumption, such a 
policy would surely be self-defeating. Before 
it could achieve the interest-rate objective, the 
extreme restriction of credit would surely move 
us toward domestic recession, and at a time 
when our economy is already failing to use its 
resources to the full. A recession would, in turn, 
delay our fundamental aim of creating a more 
favorable climate for investment in the United 
States. At the same time, it would rapidly 
create forces for easy money that would be likely 
to prove irresistible. Thus the end result would 
not be an improvement but rather an aggrava- 
tion of our balance-of-payments problem. 

To cite these limitations and difficulties in the 
use of monetary policy is not, of course, to say 
that monetary policy does not have a useful and 
indeed essential role to play in helping the ad- 
justment process in the United States, as in other 
countries. It has played such a role, is playing 
such a role now, and will continue to do so in 
the future. In fact, as I suggested earlier, one 
of our chief reasons for relying primarily upon 
fiscal policy to stimulate the domestic economy 
was to give monetary policy additional free- 
dom in coping with our balance-of-payments 
problem. And I can assure you that monetary 
policy remains fully available for further use 
should the need arise. But I see no realistic 
prospect that the full burden for achieving a 
permanent international adjustment in capital 
flows can reasonably be thrust on American 
monetary policy alone, either now or in the fore- 
seeable future. 

Instead, as I have suggested before to this 
group, the only really satisfactory long-range 
solution to our present problem of excessive 
capital outflows lies in achieving a more attrac- 
tive environment for investment within the 
United States through tax reduction and sus- 
tained growth, together witli the development of 
far larger, far more efficient, and far more flexi- 
ble capital markets abroad. Wliile there has 
been some encouraging progress in both of these 
directions, much more remains to be done. 

There are, of course, longrun measures, and 
their influence on capital flows must be expected 
to emerge only slowly. For the time being, the 



existing disequilibrium — and the urgency of re- 
ducing our deficit — has required that we seek 
the cooperation of our banks and other financial 
institutions, as well as of our industrial firms, 
in voluntarily reducing the flow of capital 
abroad.^ The response of those asked to par- 
ticipate in this voluntary program has been most 
gratif^'ing. The effects are already clearly visi- 
ble both in the foreign exchange markets and in 
our preliminarj' payments statistics, which 
point to a sharp and favorable change since 
mid-February. But two swallows don't make a 
summer. We need a considerable period of bal- 
ance to offset the deficits of the past. "VVe know 
we can count on j'our cooperation in achieving 
this vitally needed result. 

:Basic Problem of Adjusting Capital Flows 

But the success of our present program does 
not, of course, meet the basic problem. The 
nations of the free world, working together, 
must develop better means for influencing capi- 
tal flows within a basic framework of free mar- 
kets and national objectives — and without plac- 
ing intolerable burdens either upon monetary 
policy or upon the resources of the international 
monetary system. 

We must be imder no illusion that a different 
or improved international monetary system 
could in any way eliminate the need for adjust- 
ing these flows. But these two questions are 
nonetheless related, for one of the basic func- 
tions of the international monetary system is to 
provide sufficient means for financing deficits 
and surpluses to permit the working out of an 
orderly process of adjustment. 

This linkage between the process of adjust- 
ment and the international monetary system 
seems to me to be at the source of much of the 
confusion and difficulty evident in recent inter- 
national efforts to develop a common approach 
ifoward the further evolution of the interna- 
Itional payments system. All the major coun- 
ftries are fully agreed, I believe, on the need 
for developing an assured method of generating 
lintemational liquidity in adequate, but not ex- 
cessive, amoimts as world trade and production 

* For test of remarks made by President Johnson 
jefore a group of business and banking leaders on 
iB^b. 18, see ibid.. Mar. 8, 1965, p. 333. 


RIL 19, 1965 

increases over the years ahead. This much 
clearly emerged from the studies of the Group 
of Ten and the International Monetary Fund 
last 3-ear. 

But in recent months there has been little 
progress toward more concrete agreement on 
methods and approaches. The pronounced di- 
vergences in view that have become evident can, 
I believe, be traced in good part to quite differ- 
ent assumptions about the relationship of in- 
ternational monetary reform to the current 
United States payments deficit. 

The overriding need, in one European view, 
is to develop a mechanism which would force 
a prompt end to our payments deficits. We 
fully agree with these European friends on the 
necessity for achieving early balance in our in- 
ternational accounts. And we intend to achieve 
this goal by our own actions, which now for the 
first time cover all aspects of our payments 

But in assessing the problems of the interna- 
tional monetary system, our concern and that 
of a number of other countries has been to look 
toward the future, when there will no longer be 
an American payments deficit pumping dollars 
into the reserves of other countries. So the 
thrust of our thinking has been to find the best 
way of developing supplementary means of pro- 
viding the liquidity that is likely to be needed. 
We feel that this can only bo done gradually 
and by building on what we now have. And 
we emphatically disagree with the thesis re- 
cently propounded in some quarters which 
would turn back the clock and embrace an out- 
moded and highly restrictive system — a system 
that would surely cripple the growth of inter- 
national trade and commerce as our deficit was 

Under the circumstances, with these broad 
differences of approach, any final resolution of 
the variety of issues that have been raised 
seems to me highly unlikely until the United 
States has brought its international payments 
into balance. As that is done it will become 
less and less easy to ignore the potential need 
for supplementary sources of reserve assets and 
international credit facilities. Meanwhile, dif- 
ficult and time-consuming technical studies are 
well underway under the auspices of the Group 


of Ten, helping to clarify the issues and to eval- 
uate alternative teclmiques. These studies will, 
I believe, pi'ovide the basis for timely agree- 
ments on ways and means for improving the 
present monetary system well in advance of any 
urgent need. 

In looking back on the past 4 years and on the 
postwar period as a whole, there can be no ques- 
tion that the present system — anchored on gold 
and the dollar, and effectively supplemented by 
the International Monetary Fimd — has served 
the world well. The extremes of inflation and 
deflation characteristic of other postwar peri- 
ods have been avoided. Barriers to trade have 
been lowered or removed. And m this environ- 
ment the vast productive capabilities of the free 
world have been released to the benefit of us all. 

The challenge for the future is to build fur- 
ther on this system, recognizing its potential 
weaknesses and shortcomings, but preserving 
the elements of strength and flexibility that 
have contributed so much to our progress. 

In tliis area, as in the area of adjusting capi- 
tal flows, I have no fixed blueprint to offer to 
those who will share the responsibility for 
developing solutions. I remain confident, how- 
ever, that solutions can and will be foimd, pro- 
vided only that the United States discharges its 
own unmediate responsibility to maintain the 
full strength of the dollar as the world's pri- 
mary reserve currency by achieving an early 
balance in its international accomits. And with 
the help of you gentlemen that is exactly what 
we are going to do. 















U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets; 
U.S. Refutes Cliarges on Viet-Nam 

Statement hy Francis T. P. Plimpton ^ 

The United States welcomes the beginning of 
the activities of this committee, the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, au- 
thorized by paragraph 2 of General Assembly 
resolution 2006 (XIX). We hope, Mr. Presi- 
dent [Alex Quaison-Sackey, of Ghana] , that un- 
der your able leadership and guidance at these 
meetings, as well as in the consultations pro- 
vided for under paragraph 1 of that resolution, 
a way will be fomid out of the present difficul- 
ties which face the United Nations. You may 
be sure, Mr. President, that the U.S. delegation 
will bend eveiy effort for the achievement of 
solutions of these difficulties. 

' Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeep- 
ing Operations on Mar. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 
4516). Mr. Plimpton is Alternate U.S. Representative 
in the committee. 

My delegation had hoped that at its first meet- 
ing this committee might be permitted to con- 
centrate solely on the business for wliich we 
have been convened, namely: to consider how 
this committee can most effectively undertake 
the vitally important task entmsted to it by the 
General Assembly in resolution 2006. I there- , 
fore regret that certain representatives have seen 
fit to inject a discordant, irrelevant, and cold- 
war propagandist note into this first meeting. 

I have no intention of replying in detail, or 
still less in kind, to the statements that I refer 
to ; most of them do not warrant the committee's 
serious attention. Nevertheless, out of respect 
for the truth and for the sake of the record, I 
feel obliged to take a few moments of the com- 
mittee's time to reiterate the basic essential 
facts — facts which liave been repeatedly set 
forth in official statements and publications by 
my Government during the past few weeks. 

Let me briefly review those facts : ' 

First, the fact is that the totalitarian commu- 
nistic regime in Hanoi is conducting a war of 




itj ':, 



aggression against its neighbor, the Republic 
of Viet-Nam — that the subjugation by foi'ce of 
the Rej)ublic of Viet-Xani is the formal, official, 
announced policy of the Hanoi regime. 
Si\ Miui, the fact is that this continuing ag- 
j gii " . u is conducted to a major degree through 
active assistance and leadership supplied by the 
North Vietnamese authorities to tlie Viet Cong. 
The key leadership of the Viet Cong — its offi- 
cers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, 
political organizers, and pi'opagandists — have 
been trained, equipped, and supplied in North 
Viet-Nam and then sent into the Republic of 
Viet-Nam under Hanoi's military' orders. 
Most of the wciipons and most of the ammuni- 
tion and other supplies used by the Viet Cong 
in their effort to destroy the Republic of Viet- 
Nam have been sent from North to South 

It hardly needs to be pointed out that this 
continuing pattern of activity by the regime in 
Hanoi is in violation of the general principles 
of international law, in \'iolation of the Charter 
of the United Nations, and in violation of the 
Geneva accords of 1954. 

North Vietnamese Aggression 

Mr. President, these are the facts, and they 
are facts that make it unmistakably clear that 
the character of the conflict in South Viet-Nam, 
stripped to its bare essentials, is an aggressive 
war of conquest waged by North Viet-Nam 
against its neighbor. If it is a type of aggres- 
sion relatively new to the international 
community — long-term aggression through in- 
filtration, rather than short-lived aggression 
through an all-out invasion — it still remains 

I would remind the committee that the defen- 
sive measures which the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam and my Government 
have been taking in recent weeks are designed 
solely to counter this aggression — to emphasize 
our joint determination not only to resist the 
aggression but also to hold Hanoi's aggressive 
regime fully accountable for that aggression. 
Although it lias been repeatedly stated by my 
Government, I will say it again now : Our mis- 
sion is peace ; we threaten no regime and covet 

APRIL 19, 1965 

no territory; we seek no wider conflict — only 
the termination of aggression — and peace. 
Whether or not we can be successful in this 
course depends upon the actions and attitude 
of the aggressors who are trj-ing to destroy the 
freedom, independence, and right of self- 
determination of the Republic of South 

The key question, in short, has been and still 
remains the intentions of Hanoi. Nothing 
stands in the way of a peaceful settlement in 
Viet-Nam except the determination of Hanoi 
to continue its efforts to destroy its neighbor by 
exporting violence and terror. "We continue to 
wait for the first indication from some source 
that Hanoi is willing to give up this aggressive 
determination and to return to the ways of 
peace and a peaceful resolution of this interna- 
tional conflict. 

The attempt has been made this afternoon 
to foster the totally false impression that the 
Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are 
embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. I 
know of no more effective response to falsehoods, 
however monstrous, than to state the truth. 

And the truth, simple and clear, was pointed 
out in Secretary of State Rusk's statement to 
the press on March 24 : ^ 

— No one is embarking upon gas warfare in 

— There has been no decision to engage in gas 
warfare in Viet-Nam. 

— The gas referred to is entirely nonlethal and 
no different from the antiriot substances used 
by many police forces of the world. 

I would like to express the same hope that 
Secretarj' Rusk expressed only 2 days ago, 
namely, that 

Those who are concerned about tear gas . . . 
[should] be concerned about the fact that during 1964 
over 400 civilian officials were killed and over a 
thousand were kidnaped in South Viet-Nam — village 
chiefs, schoolteachers, public-health officers. Among 
other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kid- 
naped, and entire villages Iiave been burned to the 
ground, and families of those who were In the armed 
forces were kidnaped and held as hostages. 

'For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 528. 


That, Mr. Chairman, is something to be really 
concerned about. 

Wliat proof or statistics, other than those 
proofs or statistics of death and murder, are 
needed to demonstrate the urgency of restoring 
peace to Viet-Nam? And peace can be re- 
stored quickly if only the Hanoi regime will 
make the simple decision to stop its aggression 
and leave the people and Government of South 
Viet-Nam free to settle their own future. 

I would like to quote, Mr. Chairman, from 
President Johnson's statement of March 25 : ^ 

The central cause of the danger there is aggression 
by Communists against a brave and independent peo- 
ple. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, 
but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Gov- 
ernment of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their 
own future, and the need for supporting American mil- 
itary action there will end. . . . 

The United States still seeks no wider war. We 
threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have 
worked and will continue to work for a reduction of 
tensions on the great stage of the world. But the ag- 
gression from the North must be stopped. That is the 
road to peace in Southeast Asia. . . . 

. . . "It is and it will remain the policy of the United 
States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam 
for as long as is required to bring Communist aggres- 
sion and terrorism under control." The military ac- 
tions of the United States will be such, and only such, 
as serve that purpose — at the lowest possible cost in 
human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our 
adversaries too. 

The representative of the Soviet Union re- 
peated this afternoon once again the argiunents 
with which liis Government has tried to justify 
its refusal to pay assessments levied by the Gen- 
eral Assembly. In particular, my delegation re- 
grets what we understood to be his reiteration of 
the Soviet position that only the Security Coun- 
cil can take any action for the maintenance of 
peace and that the General Assembly has no 
right whatsoever as to the keeping of the peace 
or its financing. 

This means, as I understood the distinguished 
representative of the Soviet Union, that lais 
Government still insists that there must be a 
perpetual veto by any permanent member of the 
Security Council on the authorization of any 

' For text, see ibid., p. 527. 

peacekeeping operations, a veto on the conduct 
of any peacekeeping operations, and a veto on 
tlie financing of any peacekeeping operations. 
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I misunderstood the 
distinguished representative of the Soviet Un- 
ion. Whether I did or not, the members of this 
committee and of the General Assembly will 
have to decide whether that is the position they 
really want to have prevail in this organization. 

Two Problems Before the Committee 

To come back to our committee, Mr. Chair- 
man, in broad terms we are faced with two 
major problems : first, assuring the solvency of 
the United Nations, and second, arriving at a 
workable understanding as to the respective 
roles of the Security Coimcil and the General 
Assembly in the maintenance of peace. 

My delegation is prepared to consider seri- 
ously and with an open mind all proposals de- 
signed to find solutions for these two problems. 
We agree with your own thought, Mr. Chair- 
man, that during the weeks ahead perhaps the 
primary emphasis should be on informal nego- 
tiations in order to lay the groundwork for the 
substantive meetings of this committee. We 
are prepared to begin those negotiations tomor- 
row or Monday morning and to continue them 
as intensiA^ely as others concerned are prepared 
to do. "While we recognize the dangers of undue 
haste, we nevertheless feel that the best use 
should be made of every day available to us. 

Some delegations, Mr. Chairman, have em- ' 
phasized the importance of negotiations among 
the so-called greater powers. We consider such 
negotiations important, but we believe that it is 
equally important that other members of this 
committee and indeed other members of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations should 
be involved in the informal consultations which 
lie ahead. 

Mr. Chairman, we have no illusions about the 
difficulty and complexity of the problems we all 
face. But face them we must — and solve them 
we must — if the United Nations is to fulfill its 
essential role, as envisaged in the charter, for 
the maintenance of the peace the world so 
ardently desires. 







ier sr- 







«, Wi 



U.S. Expresses Views on Convening 
of U.N. Disarmament Committee 

s iternent hy Adlai E. Stevenson 

VJS. Representative to the United Nations * 

The United States believes that disarmament 
is of such primary importance that it should 
have continuous attention. And that is why we 
have been pressing vigorously to reconvene the 
18-Xation Disannament Conunittee in Geneva, 
whicli in our judgment is the best forum in 

ti "which to reach agreement on concrete disarma- 
ment proposals. 

A\liile we would prefer a negotiating com- 
mittee to a debating committee, we have no ob- 
jection to convening the whole membership of 
the United Nations and atfording everyone an 
opportimity to express his views. So if a ma- 
jority approves such a meeting, the United 
States would participate constructively and 
hope that from the ensuing discussion will come 
useful and constructive ideas which might then 
be considered in detail by the 18-Nation Disar- 
mament Conmiittee. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

\ Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
IMed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 

\in the'Vnited States. U.\. printed publications may 
l>e purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 

I Uon*, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

\ Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of 
Malaysia regarding tlie continuing Indonesian mili- 
tary buildup on the Borneo border. S/6167. Janu- 
ary 29. 19G5. 4 pp. 

I Letter dated January ?,0 from the Representative of 
the Dominican Republic denying charges made by 
"the communist Government of Cuba in its note 
dated 27 January" (8/6104). S/G1C9. February 1, 
1965. 2 pp. 

[Letter dated February 3 from the Representative of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding 
aggression committed from the territory of the 
Brazzaville Government. S/6172. February 4, 
1965. 1 p. 

' Made to news correspondents on Mar. 31 (U.S./U.X. 
press release 4517) following an announcement by the 
Soviet Representative, Xilcolai Fedorenlio. that he had 
asked the U.N. Secretary-General to seek a reconvening 
of the r.X. Disannament Committee. 


U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions 
of Ryukyus Consultative Committee 

FoUoicing is an excliange of notes between 
U^. Ambassador Edwin 0. Reischauer and 
Japanese Foreign Minister Etsusdburo Shiina 
at Tokyo on April 2. 


I have the honor to refer to the discussions 
concerning the Eyukyu I-slands between Prime 
Minister Sato and President Jolmson in "Wash- 
ington on January 12, 19G5,^ and to confirm on 
behalf of my Government the understanding 
that the functions of the existing Japan-United 
States Consultative Committee, as set forth in 
paragraph 2 of the exchange of notes of April 
25, 1964,^ are broadened so that the Committee 
is enabled to conduct consultations not only on 
economic assistance to the Kyukyu Islands but 
also on other matters on which Japan and the 
United States can cooperate in continuing to 
promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the 

I would appreciate it if you would confirm on 
behalf of the Government of Japan that the 
foregoing is also the understanding of your 
Government, and that the present note and your 
note in reply concurring in the understanding 
constitute an agreement between our two Gov- 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

Edwin O. Reischauer 
Ambassador of the United States of America 

'For te.\t of a communique released on Jan. 13, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1905, p. 134. 

' Not printed here; for background, see ibid.. May 11, 
1964, p. 755. 

APRH, 19, 1965 



April 2, 1965 
I have the honour to refer to your Excellency's note 
of today's date, which reads in the Japanese transla- 
tion thereof as follows : 

[Text of U.S. note.] 

I have the honour to confirm on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of Japan that the foregoing is also the under- 
standing of my Government and that your Excellen- 
cy's note and the present note in reply constitute an 
agreement between our two Governments. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your 
Excellency, Monsieur I'Ambassadeur, the assurance of 
my highest consideration. 

Etsusaburo Shiina 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan 

Current Actions 


Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at Lon- 
don November 16, 1945. Entered into force for the 
United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 
Acceptance deposited: Malta, January 20, 1965. 
Signature: Malta, February 10, 1965. 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at 
United Nations Headquarters. New York, December 
10, 1962. Entered into force December 0, 1964." 
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 5. 19C5. 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 190.3. Entered into force October 
10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, March 29, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London 
June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19. 1952 
TIAS 2495. 

Notification of denunciation received: Netherlands 
(including Netherlands Antilles), December 3, 
1964 ; effective May 26, 1966. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United 
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, March 2, 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.= 
Signatures: Iceland, March 31, 1965; Switzerland, 
United Arab Republic, April 2, 1965. 



Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op- 
erators of either country to operate their stations in 
the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at 
La Paz March 16, 1965. Entered into force April 15, 


Agreement concerning the establishment of an inter- 
national arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States 
claims relating to Gut Dam. Signed at Ottawa 
March 25. 1965. Enters into force on the day of ex- 
change of the instruments of ratification. 


Agreement amending the agreement of July 9, 1951 
(TIAS 2291), for duty-free entry and defrayment of 
inland transportation on charges of relief supplies 
and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at New 
Delhi January 21, 1965. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 21, 1965. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
" Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 29-April 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to Alarch 29 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 51 of 
March 19 ; 53 of March 22 ; and .56 of March 23. 

No. Date Subject 

*63 3/29 Porter sworn in as Ambassador to 
Lebanon ( biographic details) . 

t64 3/31 U.S. observer delegation to CENTO 
meeting (rewrite). 

t65 3/31 Mann: "International Trade." 

t66 3/31 Cleveland : "Peace Comes in Parcels." 
67 4/2 Rusk : transcript of BBC interview. 

t68 4/2 U.S. protests Soviet harassment of 
U.S. Navy vessels. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



NDEX April 19, 1965 Vol. LII. No. 13J^7 

American Republics. United States Policy To- 
ward Europe (Rostow) 576 

Zanada. The United States and Canada : Com- 
mon Aims and Common Responsibilities 
(Bain 572 

Communism. United States Policy Toward Eu- 
rope (Rostow) 576 

Congress. U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged ; 
Funds for Xew Building Requested (John- 
son) 571 

Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Embassy 
at Saigon Damaged ; Funds for New Building 
Retiuested (Johnson) 571 

Jisarmament. U.S. Expresses Views on On- 
vening of U.N. Disarmament Committee 
(Stevenson) 601 

Economic Affairs 

Vn Assessment of the International Monetary 
System (Dillon) 593 

rhe United States and Canada : Common Aims 
and Common Responsibilities (Ball) .... 572 

educational and Cultural Affairs. Interna- 
tional Visitors and the American Society 
li (Rusk) 588 


Vn .Vtlantic Partnership and European Unity 

(McGhee) 582 

[Jnited States PoUcy Toward Europe (Rostow) . 576 
foreign Aid. U.S. and Japan Broaden Func- 
tions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee 

(Reischauer, Shiina) 601 


^ Atlantic Partnership and European Unity 
(McGhee) 582 

United States Policy Toward Europe (Rostow) . 570 

lapan. U.S. and Japan Broaden Fimctions of 
Ryukyus Consultative Committee (Reischauer, 
Shiina) 601 

Presidential Documents. U.S. Embassy at Sai- 
gon Damaged ; Funds for New Building Re- 
quested 571 

Ryukyu Islands. U.S. and Japan Broaden Func- 
tions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee 
(Reischauer, Shiina) 601 

Treaty Information 

Current Actious (J02 

U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus 
Consultative Committee (Reischauer, Shiina) . (501 

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk Discusses 
Viet-Xam Situation on BBC (transcript of 
interview) 569 

United Nations 

The Building Blocks of "World Order (Cleve- 
land) 566 

Current U.N. Documents 601 

International Cooperation : A Realistic Ap- 
praisal (McGeorge Bundy) 562 

U.S. Expresses Views on Convening of U.N. Dis- 
armament Committee (Stevenson) .... 601 

U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets ; U.S. Re- 
futes Charges on Viet-Nam (Plimpton) . . . 598 


Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam Situation 

on BBC (transcript of interview) 569 

U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets; U.S. Re- 
futes Charges on Viet-Nam (Plimpton) . . . 598 

U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged ; Fimds for 

New Building Requested (Johnson) .... 571 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 572 

Bundy, McGeorge 562 

Cleveland, Harlan 566 

Dillon, Douglas 593 

Johnson, President 571 

McGhee, George C 582 

Mossman, James 569 

Plimpton, Francis T. P 598 

Reischauer, Edwin O 601 

Rostow, W. W 570 

Rusk, Secretary 569,588 

Shiina, Etsusaburo 601 

Stevenson, Adiai E 601 

us. co»tRiiiii«i niBtmc ornciimi 




BOX 286 


Superintendent of Documents 
ujB government printing office 




The Dangers of Nostalgia 

The "nostalgia" to which this title refers is the longing for "a return to an earlier era — a peri<j 
remembered rightly or wrongly as less demanding and more rewarding. . . ." This pamphlet, ba 
upon an address by Under Secretary Ball, discusses some of the complexities of today's woi'ld — resurge 
nationalism, the movement toward European integration, the interdependence of the Atlantic nation 
and the world responsibilities of the United States. It concludes with the thought that ". . . while : 
would be comforting to thmk that our postwar tasks around the world were largely over . . . that o« 
massive responsibilities could all be shifted to other shoulders — this is simply not the case. For, 
it or not, we live in a world that will almost certamly remain for a long time to come turbule 
difficult, frustrating, and comjilex." 





Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order pay- 
able to Supt. of Documents) 


Please send me copies of The Dangers of Nogialgia. 









il)lic Libr 
njultiiJiut of '~ 


u^ Address hy President Johnson 606 


hy Assistant Secretary Cleveland 613 


hy Ambassador W. Averell Harriman 621 

hy W. Michael Blumenthal 628 

For index see inside hack cover 

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia 

Address hy President Johnson ^ 

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some 
two dozen countries having an mterest m South- 
east Asia.^ We are joining those 17 countries 
and stating our American policy tonight, which 
we believe will contribute toward peace in tliis 
area of the world. 

I have come here to review once again with 
my own people the views of the American 

Tonight Ajnericans and Asians are dying for 
a world where each people may choose its own 
path to change. This is the principle for wliich 
our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsyl- 
vania. It is a principle for which our sons fight 
tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam. 

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet cam- 
pus. We have no territory there, nor do we 
seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and diffi- 

' Made at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 
on Apr. 7 (White House press release, as-delivered 
text) . 

' See p. 610. 


cult. And some 400 young men, bom into an 
America that is bursting with opportunity and 
promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's 
steaming soil. 

Why must we take tliis painful road? Why 
must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, 
and its power for the sake of a people so far 

We fight because we must fight if we are to 
live in a world where every country can shape 
its own destiny, and only in such a world will 
our own freedom be fuially secure. 

This kind of world will never be built by 
bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man 
are such that force must often precede reason 
and the waste of war, the works of peace. We 
wish that tliis were not so. But we must deal 
with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as 
we wish. 

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or 
peaceful place. 

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has 






I Itn 

^ ietii ci 
\ !Ksi( 
i M tl 



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attacked the independent nation of South Viet- 
Xam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, 
some of tlie people of South Viet-Nam are par- 
ticipating in attack on their own government. 
But trained men and supplies, orders and anns, 
flow in a constant stream from North to South. 

This support is the heartbeat of the war. 

Aiid it is a war of unparalleled brutality. 
Simple farmers are the targets of assassination 
and kidnaping. Women and children are 
strangled in the night because their men are 
loyal to their government. Ajid helpless vil- 
lages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale 
raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes 
in the heart of cities. 

The- confused nature of this conflict cannot 
mask the fact that it is the new face of an old 
J- memy. 

Over this war — and all Asia — is another real- 
.ty : the deepening shadow of Communist China, 
rhe rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. 
rhis is a regime which has destroyed freedom 
in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has 
)een condemned by the United Nations for ag- 
a^ression in Korea. It is a nation which is help- 
ing the forces of \'iolence in almost every 
jontinent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of 

wider pattern of aggi-essive purposes. 

'Why Are We in South Viet-Nam? 

"Wliy are tliese realities our concern? Wliy 
ire we in South Viet-Nam ? 

We are there because we have a promise to 
ceep. Since 1954 every American President has 
tffered support to the people of South Viet- 
nam. We have helped to build, and we have 
lelped to defend. Thus, over many years, we 
lave made a national pledge to help South Viet- 
"J^am defend its independence. 

And I intend to keep that promise. 

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small 
nd brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror 
hat must follow, would be an unforgivable 

We are also there to strengthen world order. 
Vround the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are 
'eople whose well-being rests in part on the be- 
ief that they can count on us if they are at- 
acked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would 
hake the confidence of aU these people in the 

value of an American commitment and in the 
value of America's word. The result would be 
increased unrest and instability, and even wider 

We are also there because there are srreat 
stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a mo- 
ment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring 
an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed 
in one country and then another. The central 
lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggres- 
sion is never satisfied. To withdraw from one 
battlefield means only to prepare for the next. 
We must say in Southeast Asia — as we did in 
Europe — in the words of the Bible : "Hitherto 
shalt thou come, but no further." 

There are those who say that all our effort 
there will be futile — that China's power is such 
that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. 
But there is no end to that argument until all of 
the nations of Asia are swallowed up. 

There are those who wonder why we have a 
responsibility there. Well, we have it there for 
the same reason that we have a responsibility for 
the defense of Europe. World War II was 
fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it 
ended we found ourselves with continued re- 
sponsibility for the defense of freedom. 

Our objective is the independence of South 
Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We 
want nothing for ourselves — only that the peo- 
ple of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their 
own country in their own way. We will do 
everything necessary to reach that objective, and 
we will do only what is absolutely necessary. 

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam 
were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for 
us to increase our response and to make attacks 
by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is 
a change in what we believe that purpose re- 

We do this in order to slow down aggression. 

We do this to increase the confidence of the 
bravo people of South Viet-Nam who have 
bravely borne this brutal battle for so many 
years with so many casualties. 

And we do this to convince the leaders of 
North Viet-Nam — and all who seek to share 
their conquest — of a simple fact : 

We will not be defeated. 

We will not grow tired. 

We will not withdraw, either openly or under 

-PRIL 26, 1965 


the cloak of a meaningless agreement. 

We laiow that air attacks alone will not ac- 
complish all of these purposes. But it is our 
best and prayerful judgment that they are a 
necessary part of the surest road to peace. 

The Path of Peaceful Settlement 

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But 
that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. 
And we must be prepared for a long continued 
conflict. It will require patience as well as 
bravery — the will to endure as well as the will 
to resist. 

I wish it were possible to convince others with 
words of what we now find it necessary to say 
with guns and planes : armed hostility is futile — 
our i-esources are equal to any challenge — be- 
cause we fight for values and we fight for prin- 
ciple, rather than territory or colonies, our 
patience and our determination are unending. 

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear 
that the only path for reasonable men is the 
path of peaceful settlement. Such peace de- 
mands an independent South Viet-Nam — se- 
curely guaranteed and able to shape its own 
relationships to all others — free from outside 
interference — tied to no alliance — a military 
base for no other country. 

These are the essentials of any final settle- 

We will never be second in the search for such 
a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. 

There may be many ways to this kind of 
peace: in discussion or negotiation with the 
governments concerned; in large gi'oups or in 
small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agi-ee- 
ments or their strengthening with new ones. 

We have stated this position over and over 
again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. 
And we remain ready with this purpose for 
unconditional discussions. 

And until that bright and necessary day of 
peace we will try to keep conflict from spread- 
ing. We have no desire to see thousands die in 
battle — Asians or Americans. We have no de- 
sire to devastate that which the people of North 
Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We 
will use our power with restraint and with all 
the wisdom that we can command. 

But we will use it. 

A Cooperative Effort for Development 

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible 
irony. For what do the people of North Viet- 
Nam want? They want what their neighbors 
also desire — food for their hunger, health for 
their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their 
country, and an end to the bondage of material 
misery. And they would find all these things 
far more readily in peaceful association with 
others than in the endless course of battle. 

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes 
for millions of impoverished people. Each day 
these people rise at dawn and struggle through 
until the night to wrest existence from the soil. 
They are often wracked by diseases, plagued 
by hunger, and death comes at the early age 
of 40. 

Stability and peace do not come easily in such 
a land. Neither independence nor human dig- 
nity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. 
It also requires the works of peace. The Ameri- 
can people have helped generously in times past 
in these works, and now there must be a much 
more massive effort to improve the life of man 
m that conflict-torn corner of our world. 

The first step is for the countries of Southeast 
Asia to associate themselves in a gi'eatly ex- 
panded cooperative effort for development. We 
would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its 
place in the common effort just as soon as peace- 
ful cooperation is possible. 

The United Nations is already actively en- 
gaged in develoi^ment in this area, and as far 
back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities 
in Viet-Nam in connection with their work ; 
there. And I would hope tonight that the [ 
Secretary-General of the United Nations could ! 
use the prestige of his great office and his deep ! 
knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as pos- ! 
sible, with the countries of that area, a plan for ' 
cooperation in increased development. 

For our part I will ask the Congress to join 
in a billion-dollar American investment in this 
effort as soon as it is underway. And I would 
hope that all other industrialized countries, in- 
cluding the Soviet Union, will join in this effort 
to replace despair with hope and terror with 

The task is nothing less than to enrich the 
hopes and existence of more than a hundred 




million people. And there is much to be done. 

The vast Mekong Eiver can provide food and 
water and power on a scale to dwarf even our 
own T^'A. The wonders of modern medicine 
can be spread through villages where thousands 
die even- year from lack of care. Schools can 
lui established to train people in the skills needed 
I') manage the process of development. And 
these objectives, and more, are within the reach 
of a cooperative and determined cH'ort. 

I also intend to expand and speed up a pro- 
gram to make available our farm surpluses to 
as-:ist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. 
T\"o should not allow people to go hungry and 
wear rags while our own warehouses overflow 
with an abundance of wheat and com and rice 
and cotton. 

So I will very shortly name a special 
team of outstanding, patriotic, and distin- 
guished Americans to inaugiirate our participa- 
tinii in these programs. This team will be 
headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able 
former President of the World Bank. 

The Dream of Our Generation 

This will be a disorderly planet for a long 
time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the 
' modem world are shaking old ways and uproot- 
ing ancient civilizations. There will be turbu- 
lence and -Struggle and even violence. Great 
• social change — as we see in our own coimtrj- — 
does not always come without conflict. 

We must also expect that nations will on oc- 
casion be in dispute with us. It may be because 
; we are rich, or powerful, or because we have 
made some mistakes, or because they honestly 
fear our intentions. However, no nation need 
ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose 
our will, or to dictate their institutions. 

But we will always oppose the effort of one 
nation to conquer another nation. 

We will do this because our own security is 
at stake. 

But there is more to it than that. For our 
generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. 
But we have the power, and now we have the 
: opportunity to make that dream come true. 

For centuries nations have struggled among 
each other. But we dream of a world where 

disputes are settled by law and reason. And we 
will try to make it so. 

For most of histoiy men have hated and killed 
one another in battle. But we dream of an 
end to war. And we will try to make it so. 

For all existence most men have lived in 
poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream 
of a world where all are fed and charged with 
hope. And we will help to make it so. 

The ordinary men and women of North Viet- 
nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, 
of Russia and America, are brave people. They 
are filled with the same proportions of hate and 
fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the 
same things for themselves and their families. 
Most of them do not want their sons to ever die 
in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of 
others, destroyed. 

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now 
has the knowledge — always before denied — to 
make this planet serve the real needs of the 
people who live on it. 

I know this will not be easy. I know how 
difScult it is for reason to guide passion, and 
love to master hate. The complexities of this 
world do not bow easily to pure and consistent 

But the simple truths are there just the same. 
We must all try to follow them as best we can. 

Power, Witness to Human Folly 

We often say how impressive power is. But 
I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and 
the bombs, the rockets and the warsliips, are all 
symbols of human failure. They are necessary 
symbols. They protect what we cherish. But 
they are witness to human folly. 

A dam built across a great river is impressive. 

In the countryside where I was bom, and 
where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, 
and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, 
where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless 
cold held sway. And all this happened be- 
cause electricity came to our area along the 
humming wires of the REA. Electrification 
of the countryside— yes, that, too, is impressive. 

A rich harA-est in a hungry land is impressive. 

Tlie sight of healthy children in a classroom 
is impressive. 

APRIL 26, 19G5 


These — not mighty arms — are the achieve- 
ments which tlie American nation believes to be 
impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time 
may come when all other nations will also find 
it so. 

Every night before I turn out the lights to 
sleep I ask myself this question : Have I done 
everything that I can do to unite this country ? 
Have I done evei-ything I can to help unite the 
world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the 
peoples of the world? Have I done enough? 

Ask yourselves that question in your homes — 
and m this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, 
all done all we can do ? Have we done enough ? 

We may well be living in the time foretold 
many yeai-s ago when it was said : "I call heaven 
and earth to record this day against you, that I 
have set before you life and death, blessing and 
cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou 
and thy seed may live." 

This generation of the world must choose: 
destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand. 
We can do all these things on a scale that has 
never been dreamed of before. 

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we 
will prevail over the enemies within man, and 
over the natural enemies of all mankind. 

U.S. Replies to 17-Nation Appeal 
on Viet-Nam 

On April 8 Acting Secretary George TF. Ball 
handed to an amhassadorial delegation the U.S. 
reply to an appeal on Viet-Nam adopted on 
March 15 at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Ijy a confer- 
ence of representatives of 17 nonalined nations 
and delivered to Secretary Rusk for President 
Johnson on April 1. FoUoxoing are the texts 
of the U.S. reply and the 17-nation appeal. 


We welcome the concern and interest of the 
governments participating in the Declaration 
of Marcli 15; just as we welcome any initiative 
aimed at bringing peace to any part of the 
world. The Declaration is a constructive con- 
tribution to the effort for peace. 

We fully agree with the general principles 
expressed m that Declaration. The fulfilhnent 
of those principles, which are an essential part 
of American policy everywhere, is the purpose 
of our presence in Vietnam. 

The Declaration reaffirms the right of all peo- 
ple to self-determination. And so do we. We 
seek self-determination for the people of South 

The Declaration reaffirms the belief that re- 
course to force is contrary to the rights of the 
people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and in- 
dependence. And so do we. We seek to bring 
peace and help restore those rights. 

The signatory nations point out that they are 
"deeply concerned" at the aggravation of the 
situation in Vietnam. And so are we. We 
should end the war by ensuring the independ- 
ence of South Vietnam. 

The Cause of Conflict 

The basic cause of the conflict in Vietnam is 
the attack by North Vietnam on the independent 
nation of South Vietnam. The object of that 
attack is total conquest. 

The regime in North Vietnam has sent trained 
military personnel and weapons of war on an 
increasing scale into South Vietnam. It has 
directed and sujjported a mounting campaign 
of terror, assassination, and military action 
against the Government and people of the Ke-^ 
public of South Vietnam. 

The Government of South Vietnam has re- 
quested the help of the United States in its de- 
fense against attack. In fulfillment of our long- 
standing conunitments we have given such help. ■ 
We will continue as long as we are needed, and 
until the aggression is halted. In these actions 
we seek only the security and peace of South 
Vietnam, and we threaten no regime. 

The war against South Vietnam is a war of 
great brutality. Simple farmers are the target 
of assassination and kidnapping. Women and 
children are strangled in the night because their 

' Handed by Mr. Ball to a delegation composed of 
Ambassador Berhanou Diuke of Ethiopia, Ajiibassador 
Abdul Majid of Afghanistan, Ajubassador Veljko Micu- 
novic of Yugoslavia, and Yaw B. Turkson, Counselor, 
Embassy of Ghana, on Apr. 8 (White House press 
release dated Apr. 8 ) . 



men are loyal to the government. Small and 
helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. 
Large scale raids are conducted on towns; and 
terror strikes in the heart of cities. 
"We hope that the anger of people in every 
nintry vrill extend to those who commit these 
daily acts of violence in the South. "We hope 
tliat the sj-mpathy and compassion of every land 
will be held out to these victims of unprovoked 
attack. These are men and women, and even 
children, who die because they are attacked — 
not because they are attackers. 

The "Way to Peace 

Peace in Southeast Asia demands an inde- 
I pendent South "\"ietnam — securely guaranteed 
'and able to shape its own relationships to all 
others — free from outside interference — tied to 
no alliance — a military base for no other coun- 
Tliese are the essentials of an final settlement. 
"We will never be second in the search for such 
la peaceful settlement in Vietnam. 

There may be many ways to this kind of 
I peace: in discussion or negotiation with the 
i governments concerned, in large groups or in 
small ones, in the reafErmation of old agree- 
ments or their strengthening with new ones. 

"We have stated this position over and over 
again, to friend and foe alike. And we remain 
ready — with this purpose — for unconditional 
• discussions. 

'We believe that peace can be achieved in 
Southeast Asia the moment that aggression 
from North Vietnam is eliminated. That ag- 
gression has many elements. It has meant the 
training and infiltration of agents and armed 
forces — the procurement and supply of muni- 
■ tions — the bombing of compounds by night and 
' Embassies by day — murdering secretaries and 
soldiers alike — in short, a whole campaign of 
terror and military action that is externally sup- 
ported and directed. "When these things stop 
and the obstacles to security and stability are 
I removed, the need for American supporting 
military action will also come to an end. 

And when conditions have been created in 
which the people of South Vietnam can deter- 
' mine their own future free from external inter- 
ference, the United States will be ready and 
eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet- 

nam. At the same time, it should become pos- 
sible to work out the future relationships be- 
tween North and South Vietnam on the basis of 
mutual respect and a determination to resolve 
their problems by peaceful means. 

Because the aggressor has made great efforts 
to hide his actions, it will also be important to 
have new ways and means of assurance that ag- 
gression has in fact been stopped. The problems 
of such control and assurance are not easy. But 
these difSculties are not at the center of the 
problem. The center of the problem is in the 
realities of behavior. Those realities are known 
and felt in South Vietnam. They are known 
and understood by those who are responsible 
for them. It is by their ending in fact that the 
actions of the United States Government wiU 
be governed. 

Economic Development 

"We also hope that the nations of the world 
can join in helping the countries of Southeast 
Asia in their own efforts to improve the life of 
their people. 

We have offered our help for a large-scale 
program of economic development embracing 
all of Southeast Asia. We hope that other in- 
dustrialized nations will join. 

We are glad of this Declaration. We believe 
that the nations which signed it are motivated 
by a deep and sincere purpose of peace. Tliat 
is our purpose too. We hope it is shared by all 
others who are affected by this Declaration. 


The Appeal of the Heads of State and Government 
OF Seventeen Non-Augned Countries Concerning 
Crisis in Vietnam 
Pursuant to the final Declaration of the Conference 

of Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned 

Countries held in Cairo in October 1964, 

' Handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson 
on Apr. 1 by a delegation composed of Ambassadors 
Dinke, Majid, and Micunovic and Ambassador Miguel 
A. Ribeiro of Ghana. The appeal was also deUvered 
on Apr. 1 to the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions and the Governments of Canada, Communist 
China, France, Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United King- 
dom, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and North Viet-Nam, 
as well as to the "NaHonal Front for the Liberation of 
South Viet-Nam." 

APRIL 26. 1965 


we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, 
have noted with great concern the aggravation of 
existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and 
in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America, arising from oppression and foreign inter- 
vention, and regret the present deadlock in the United 
Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its re- 
sponsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace ; 

we solemnly reaflirm the right of peoples to self- 
determination and the ijrinciple that all states shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force ; 

we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the 
Inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states ; 

we express our conviction that recourse to force and 
pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of 
the jteople of Vietnam to peace, freedom, and independ- 
ence and can only lead to the aggravation of the con- 
flict in that area and to its transformation into a 
more generalized war with catastrophic consequences ; 

we are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the 
situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the 
consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, 
including military intervention, which impedes the im- 
plementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam ; 

we are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible 
differences in appraising various elements in the exist- 
ing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the 
termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peace- 
ful solution through negotiations. We therefore make 
an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such 
negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any 
preconditions, so that a political solution to the prob- 
lem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the 
legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in 
the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and 
of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned 
Countries held in Cairo. 

We invite the governments of all countries interested 
in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, 
as soon as possible, with this apijeal. 

March 1.5, 1965 
Mohammad Yousuf, Prime Minister of the Royal Gov- 
ernment of Afghanistan 
Ahmed Ben Bella, President of tlie Democratic Peo- 
ple's Republic of Algeria 

Akchbishop Makaeios, President of the Republic of 

Dudley Senanatake, Prime Minister of Ceylon 

Halle Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia 

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of 

Sekotj Touee, President of the Republic of Guinea 

Lal Bahadur Shastei, Prime Minister of India 

Marshal Abdul Salam Mohamed Aref, President of 
the Republic of Iraq 

Jomo Kentatta, President of the Republic of Kenya 

Mahendra Bir Bikram, Shah Deva, King of Nepal 

General Mohamad Amin El-Hafez, President of the 
Syrian Arab Republic 

Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia 

Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab 

JosLP Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Re- 
public of Yugoslavia 

Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia 

Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda 

U.S.-Japan Economic Committee 
To IVIeet at Washington in July 

Tlie Department of State announced on 
April 6 (press release 70 dated April 5) that 
the fourth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan 
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will 
be held at Washington July 12-14, 1965. 

Tliis Cabinet-level Committee was established 
by the two Governments in 1961.^ The first 
meeting was held at Hakone, Japan, in No-' 
vember 1961,- the second at "Washington in De- 
cember 1962,=* and the third at Tokyo m Janu- 
ary 1964.* 

^ Bulletin of July 10, 1901, p. 57. 
^Ibid., Nov. 27, 1961, p. 890. 
' Ibid., Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959. 
' Ibid., Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235. 



Peace Comes in Parcels 

hij Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

For nearly two decades now, Americans have 
had a kind of love affair with the United Na- 
tions. The pollsters regularly turn up nearly 
90 percent of the American people who will sign 
on to practically any pro-U.N. question put to 
them. Every U.S. President since 1945 and 
overwhelming majorities on both sides of the 
aisle of the Congress have backed propositions 
to strengthen the United Nations. 

We have grown accustomed to its face. But 
now, with the sudden surprise of the uncritical 
admirer, we are discovering that the face of the 
United Nations shows the marks of its birth and 
the strain of its 20 turbulent years. 

"We too much resemble the newly wed husband 
"who took his bride and said, "Now that we're 
married, dear, I hope you won't mind it if I 
point out a few little defects that I've noticed 
about you." "Not at all," the bride replied 
with deceptive sweetness. "It was those little 
defects that kept me from getting a better 

So it should really come as no surprise that, 
on the eve of its 20th birthday, the U.N. should 
reveal blemishes serious enough to put it in the 
constitutional clinic for a few months. The 
U.N. is, after all, a mirror of the outside world — 
blemishes and all. And there's a very nasty 
war going on in Viet-Nam and quite a lot of 
assorted conflicts elsewhere on this troubled 
planet of ours. 

' Address made before the National Council of Jewish 
Women at New York City on Mar. 31 (press release 06). 

So let me take up this evening two questions 
which, in one form or another, people have been 
firing at us in the Department of State recently. 

Firsts if the United Nations cannot put an end 
to the war in Viet-Nam, how can we ever de- 
pend upon it to preserve the peace of the world? 

Second, with all the trouble it is having now, 
why should the U.N. pick this year to celebrate 
the achievements of international cooperation — 
by naming 1965 International Cooperation 
Year? Isn't there something ironic, maybe 
even ludicrous, about that ? 

A Hard Look at World Peace 

"Wo ciui approach Ijoth questions by taking a 
hard look at that state of affairs we call by the 
name of world peace. 

Down through history all but a handful of 
men and women have prayed and dreamed and 
longed for peace. But longing for peace got 
our ancestors nowhere and will do no better for 
us. How then are we going to achieve a system 
of order in which sovereign nations can exist 
and ideas can clash and talented men can com- 
pete without killing each other in the process? 
How do we work realistically to secure the peace 
of the world? 

Highly intelligent and rational men and 
women have been attracted— and still are at- 
tracted—to the search for a single answer to 
the challenge posed by that one word "war." 
Universal disarmament is the only answer, some 
people say. The world rule of law, others say. 

APRIL 26, 1963 


Nothing will do short of world government, it 
is said by others. 

Or perhaps these answers are drawn together 
into a single sweeping proposal for a world 
constitution to establish a system of universal 
law under a world government with legislative 
authority and with a world police force to take 
the place of all national aimed forces. 

In an abstract sense the case for a central 
world authority with the wherewithal to guar- 
antee world peace seems entirely logical. 

We do live in a world in which the impera- 
tives of modem teclmology increasingly require 
us to merge national interests in international 
jurisdictions — for such purposes as aerial navi- 
gation and weather forecasting and the use of 
radio frequencies and a hundred other 

Yet, for better or for worse, we also live in a 
world of fervent nationalism and well-marked 
national frontiers. 

Common interest and common sense have 
drawn the nations in recent years into an im- 
pressive start toward building an international 
community of common institutions working 
away at scores of practical and urgent tasks — 
and some exhilarating tasks, too, such as stamp- 
ing out malaria and providing hot lunches for 
undernourished schoolchildren. 

Yet nationalism has, if anything, been a ris- 
ing fever in recent years — and not only in the 
newest of the nations. 

Three-quarters of our planet is covered by 
water free from claims by nations. In outer 
space where the satellites fly there is no place 
at all for national sovereignty. Celestial bodies 
have been declared off limits to nationalism, by 
unanimous resolution of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations. 

Yet that same Assembly has been reluctant 
to tell the nations of which it is composed that 
they must pay what the Assembly says they owe 
the U.N. for helping keep the peace. 

And no one questions the right of a few major 
nations to a veto in the Security Council — that 
sturdy symbol of the principle of national sov- 
ereignty in the very heart of international 

The Concept of Sovereignty 

So nations are here to stay, after all. And it 
takes two of them to tango, and usually quite a 
few more to execute the modem dance of inter- 
national cooperation in the era of complex tech- 
nology and accelerating change. To cooperate 
means that two or more nations must be equally 
prepared to forgo claims of exclusive national 
sovereignty over some field of activity — or to 
admit that the march of science has already re- 
moved their claim from the realm of reason. 

Nothing illustrates this better than the failure 
of the so-called Baruch Plan in the very first 
years of the Unit«d Nations. Under this pro- 
posal, which seems even more sensational in 
retrospect than it seemed at the time, the United 
States was prepared to transfer to an inter- 
national agency exclusive sovereignty over those 
processes in nuclear science which could lead to 
the production of nuclear weapons. For 2 long 
years of windy debate, the Soviet Union did 
not budge from its initial position that this pro- 
posal was an unwarranted, impossible, and in- 
sidious effort to infringe the sovereignty of the 
Soviet Union. 

And to this day, the Soviet Union has been 
unable to bring itself to admit inspection teams 
to verify that underground disturbances are 
earthquakes and not tests of nuclear bombs. 
Only a few visits a year would be needed'l 
for this purpose. They could be very brief. 
The inspected areas would be very limited. The 
inspection teams would be under Russian sur- 
veillance on Soviet soil. They could even be 
blindfolded on the way in and out. And still 
the answer is no. 

This is why the test ban agreement does not 
cover underground tests. Such is the grip of 
the concept of sovereignty and the related sys- 
tem of secrecy on that nation with which we 
must primarily seek agreements bearing on 
world peace and world order. 

And such is the reluctance — shared in some 
degree by all nations — which stands in the way 
of establishing a world organization to guar- 
antee the peace. 

How are we going to build a peace system that 
covers the world ? Let's start by thinking about 



the nature of the natural world we humans 

A Plurality of Peacekeeping Systems 

Xuturo is not characterized by sameness but 
by diversity. Xo flower, no tree, no cloud, no 
horse or river or landscape is just like any other. 

Every crisis in human atfaire, too, is somehow 
different from all the others — and there are 
many different sources of frustration and ten- 
sion and hostility which can lead to conflict. 

So, given all this endless diversity, it may well 
be that world peace is too overwhelming an as- 
signment for any one system or institution to 
manage anyhow. The whole job of keeping the 
peace of the world — which means making the 
necessary changes without violence — is prob- 
ably beyond the capacity of any conceivable 
group of human beings who might be given the 
job, or arrogate it to themselves. 

Certainly the idea that any one nation, how- 
ever big or rich or talented, could run the whole 
planet is already widel}' recognized as a mon- 
strous illusion. 

But the idea that some single central au- 
thority could devise and administer and secure 
world peace may be equally illusory. 

So it seems to me that we must put aside 
the simplistic temptation to think of the prob- 
lem of world peace as one problem and think 
of it, rather, as a large group of problems to be 
dealt with by a plurality of peacekeeping sys- 
tems. Tliis may seem to increase the complexity 
of the undertaking. But, more important, it 
decreases the complexity of each of its parts. 

I think wo must learn, too, to stop asking for 
total ''solutions'' of these conflicts and start fig- 
uring out how to contain them and live with 
them — how to keep them sufficiently under con- 
trol so they are merely bothersome and not 
lethal. Tliis is, after all, what we do about 
tensions in our personal lives and in our local 
and national communities. 

Once we start thinking of the problem of 
peace as a large collection of diverse problems 
in a pluralistic world, then we can think more 
clearly about how to break the job into more 
manageable assignments — limited tasks that 

may be doable by limited, fallible mortals work- 
ing through the imperfect institutions that we 
humans are accustomed to build and operate. 

And we can even begin to use a somewhat 
different vocabulary than the abstractions 
called "peace" and "order" and "law." Maybe 
we sliould stress the verbs rather than the 
nouns — and talk more about containing conflict, 
and TTianaging change, and administering the 
institutions of peace. 

Orderly Relations Between Neighbors 

And in this light we can begin to see a crude 
hierarchy of peacekeeping systems at different 
levels of political organization. 

We can begin to see that each nation has the 
task and the responsibility of settling its own 
problems with its own neighbors. Treaties of 
peace and friendship — agreements for joint use 
and development of resources — settlements of 
disputes through negotiation, mediation, arbi- 
tration, or judicial recourse — joint instruments, 
joint ventures, joint control boards — add up to 
one level of international order. 

And indeed most nations do in fact main- 
tain a tolerable system of orderly relations with 
their neighboring states. Because a relatively 
few do not, we need additional machinery to 
keep the peace. 

Regional Security Organizations 

So we turn to the next level of order where 
wider institutions are needed to work at the job. 
This is the level of the geographic region, where 
increasingly elaborate mechanisms have come 
into being during the postwar years. The most 
obvious is the inter-American system, which 
has successfidly contained quite a few incipient 

This is no place for a comprehensive review 
of regional peacekeeping. But just remember 
in passing that the Organization of African 
Unity was still in swaddling clothes— and far 
from united on most important things— when 
it faced up to nasty conflicts between Morocco 
and Algeria and between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
The underlying problems have not been made to 
disappear, but the lid was put back on two pro- 

APRIL 26, 1965 


spective wars — for the time being, anyway. 

But, again, peacekeeping at the regional level 
does not give us a whole answer. In practice it 
often appears that the courage to engage in 
peacemaking varies directly witli distance from 
the dispute. Nations in a region are often 
quicker to suggest ready solutions for other peo- 
ple's conflicts than for their own. But the cour- 
age and machinery to keep the peace will hope- 
fully grow as regional security organizations 
grow in skill and learn by experience to deal 
with their own problems. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery 

At the next level — as close to the global as we 
can get — is the United Nations peacekeeping 
system. The United Nations was never in- 
tended to be the only piece of peacekeeping ma- 
chinery lying around in case of crisis. The 
U.N. was not built to rush to resolve every con- 
flict that arises anywhere. 

On the contrary. The charter explicitly calls 
upon parties to conflicts to seek to solve them by 
direct negotiation or by recourse to the various 
techniques of conciliation. The charter also 
explicitly endorses regional organizations and 
their role as intermediary peacekeeping systems. 

The United Nations, indeed, was conceived by 
its founders much more as a court of last resort 
than as the first port of call — more as a reser\^e 
system to be available in the event of failure of 
other systems than as a central organizer of 
world order. 

If we look back over the history of U.N. peace- 
keeping, we see that the actions have ranged 
from militaiy defense of a victim of aggres- 
sion — to the appointment of an investigating 
committee — to the work of a single civilian 

We see that the instiiimcnts employed here 
have ranged from the United States Marines to 
a 21-nation international force. 

We see that some peacekeeping operations 
have been authorized by the Security Council 
and some by the General Assembly — that some 
have been paid for by the nations directly con- 
cerned, some by a consortium of countries on a 
voluntary basis, and some by the assessment of 
dues on all members. 


We see that at times the U.N. has served as a 
forum for the airing of a complaint — at times as 
a channel of mediation — at times as an orga- 
nizer of field forces, inspectors, and observers — 
and at times in two or more of these three roles 
in the same crisis. 

Finally, we have seen that in some cases the 
U.N. has succeeded, sometimes brilliantly, in the 
role of peacekeeper and peacemaker and in some 
cases has been unable to act. 

This is to say that the record of the U.N. is a 
record of what its members were or were not 
willing to do and support under specific circum- 
stances at specific times and in the face of spe- 
cific problems which never will arise again in 
just the same form. Such experience defies the 
most careful efforts to draw clear lessons, make 
accurate predictions, or derive neat formulas for 
use in the iinknown peace equations of the 

The charter, of course, remains a noble con- 
stant in a troubled time. Its principles, its defi- | 
nitions of the goals of organized man, I'emain 
valid from generation to generation as tlie ma- 
chinery to advance them changes from month to 

Thus the U.N., viewed as a practical peace- 
keeper, is an organization in which particular 
arrangements can be made to do particular jobs 
at particular times under particular circum- _ 

Resources at the ready for dealing with emer- 
gencies can be enlarged — and should be. 

Peacekeeping procedures can be improved — 
and should be. 

Experience can be drawn upon for planning 
and training — and should be. 

There is no good reason why the capability 
and the reliability of the U.N.'s peacekeeping 
machinery should not be steadily improved. 
But the ad hoc character of U.N. operations in 
the peacekeeping field probably will be their 
trademark for some time to come. I 

Because unprecedented crises were met with" 
ad hoc peacekeeping machinery, because there 
are men weai-ing the U.N. insignia on duty in 
Cyprus and the Middle East, in Kashmir and 
Korea, we can all sleep more securely tonight. 
In these and other cases the United Nations has 



taken on specific assignments that turned out to 
lie manajxeable. It has not solved the imder- 
lying problems that gave rise to the conflicts, 
I'Ut it has contained the ligliting so people can 
iSn about their business instead of killing each 
I t iier — and search for more permanent solutions 
without blood on their hands. 

U.S. Support for International Techniques 

So there are agreements and techniques and 
institutions to help keep the peace at the nation- 
to-nation level, at the regional level, and at the 
near-imiversal level. Disputes have, in fact, 
been settled — more often contained — at all three 
levels more frequently than most people seem to 

In fact, there have been at least 20 occasions 
since the last war when more or less formal 
hostilities have started — and then been stopped 
through recourse to some form of peacemaking 
or through the intei*vention of one or another 
kind of peacekeeping machinerj' — disputes 
which, in another day, traditionally would have 
led to declarations of war and to fighting that 
might well have spread and escalated in wider 
international violence with more modem 

Yet we also have seen that some conflicts have 
not yielded to treatment by direct dealings 
among the parties, nor to regional treatment, 
nor to treatment by the United Nations system. 
Berlin is an obvious example and so — so far — 
is Viet-Nam. In neither case could the United 
Nations take over the job of enforcing peace; in 
neither case has it seemed useful to freeze posi- 
tions through public debate as long as no basis 
existed for a negotiated settlement among the 
powers mainly engaged. But in both cases the 
good offices of the Secretary-General remain 
available in the event the protagonists have any- 
thing to say to each other; and in both cases the 
United Nations might well have a role in super- 
vising an agreement if one can be reached. 

Meanwhile, in our multiplicity of machinery 
for containing conflict and building up systems 
for world order, the residual capacity for deal- 
ing with conflict and containing violence must 
reside with our own Armed Forces. 

Other peacekeeping elements are clearly pref- 

erable to the direct use of American force. 
This is, of course, why using the techniques of 
direct settlement is in our national interest — 
why our support for regional peacekeeping in- 
stitutions is in our national interest — and why 
our support for the United Nations in the search 
for answers is in our national interest too. In 
every peace-and-security crisis, whenever we 
can, we bring these international techniques 
into play to avoid being drawn each time mto 
the more dangerous and more costly way of 
dealing with violence, which is to employ our 
own power in our own name. 

Celebrating the Constructive Work of the U.N. 

All of this is merely the machinery for deal- 
ing with conflicts which have reached an ad- 
vanced stage in the process of combustion. But 
this machinery is to world order only what the 
police and fire departments are to civic order. 

Wliat of the Departments of Health and 
Sanitation and Education and Public Works — 
to name a few — which make civic order worth 
preserving? Wliat about the constructive side 
of world politics — which, like the iceberg's bulk, 
is mostly hidden from view in our crisis-con- 
scious channels of daily news? 

It is to celebrate this constructive work of 
the U.N., and to advance it, that we observe 
International Cooperation Year when there is 
armed conflict in Viet-Nam and the General 
Assembly is in the drydock. 

For the World Health Organization and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization and 
UNESCO [United Nations Scientific, Educa- 
tional and Scientific Organization] and the 
International Labor Organization are not in a 
state of paralysis. Nor is the Special Fund 
or the U.N. Technical Assistance Program or 
the Children's Fimd — nor any other of that 
large and lusty international family of agen- 
cies affiliated with the United Nations. 

They are all busily engaged — not always effi- 
ciently, but always usefully engaged— in scores 
of separate tasks that build order by doing 
things in an orderly way— tasks that contribute 
to peace by demonstrating in practice tliat there 
is more mileage for everybody in cooperation 
than in violence. 

APRIL 26, 1965 


Some of these agencies and commissions are 
based at the U.N. level and some at a regional 
level, but all work mostly on very down-to-earth 
jobs in very down-to-earth localities. All are 
engaged in manageable assignments in our 
charming, confusing, and pluralistic system for 
maintaining and strengthening the peace. 

And some of them are working in the most 
surprising places. Twelve different U.N. agen- 
cies, for example, have been at work for several 
years in Southeast Asia preparing plans for a 
multipurpose development project for the 
Lower Mekong Delta. This despite the war- 
fare, despite broken diplomatic relations, de- 
spite the rivalries and hatreds which have been 
endemic in that area. 

A Working System of World Order 

It is in this almost endless vista of human 
activity — this infinitude of tasks which are do- 
able by fallible men and women working 
through imperfect institutions — that we can 
glimpse the variety and diversity of elements 
that must constitute a working system of world 

Such a system has a central objective: world 
peace and orderly change. But it is adminis- 
tered through a largely decentralized network 
of international and regional and national and 
area-wide and local institutions, mutually rein- 
forcing but not necessarily interdependent. 

This is how a so-called system of world order 
is most likely to be built. And if world peace 
is to be maintained, if world conflict is to be 
kept within bounds we can live with, if world 
tensions are to be channeled in to life rather 
than death — this, I strongly suspect, is how it 
will come about. 

In the end, the peace may be a far cry from 
the tranquillity that most people associate with 
the five-letter word. The order may be hard to 
see in the midst of diversity, ^jlurality, color, 
and contest. The politics of peace may be 
enormously complicated. 

But it will be a peace system that reflects the 
heady pluralism of man and the hearty diver- 
sity of his cultures. And if we live with it a 
while, we'll grow accustomed to its face. 


President Yameogo of Upper Volta 
Visits the United States 

President Maurice Yameogo of the Republic 
of Upper Volta, accotnpanied hy Mrs. Yameogo, 
made a state visit to the United States March 
28-April 7 at the invitation of President John- 
son. During his 2-day visit at Washington 
March 29-30, President Yameogo met with 
President Johnson, Secretary Eiosk, and other 
Government officials. 

Following are an exchange of greetings be- 
tween President Johnson and President Yame- 
ogo on the south lawn of the White House on 
March 29 and the text of a joint covfimunique 
released on March 30. 

President Joiinson 

White House press release dated March 29 

Mr. President: For myself and Mrs. John- 
son — and for the people of the United States — ■ 
I am proud to extend to you and your wife our 
warmest and most cordial welcome to this coim- 
try and this capital. 

We are particularly pleased that you come 
today as the first state visitor to Washington 
since our inauguration earlier this year. 

The United States has — and is proud to 
have — strong and friendly ties with many peo- 
ples and many nations on every continent. But 
we are especially gratified by the growth of such 
relations with your continent — and with your 

In these last two decades independence has 
come for more than 1 billion people in 54 coun- 
tries. Nowhere has this revolution of national 
independence had greater impact than in Africa. 
We are mindful, Mr. President, that less than 
200 years ago our own forebears in America 
chose the course you, and your generation, have 
chosen in these times. 

Mr. President, here in America we understand 
what is in your heart, and the hearts of your 
countrymen, when you say, as you did recently : 

If we wish to get along with and haye relations 



with all nations, respecting their Ideologies, we In- 
tend also and above all to evolve without interference. 

History and fortune have smiled upon the 
United States. We are privileged to have great 
strength. But we believe that our strength 
means little unless we use it toward the end of 
assuring peoples who choose freedom the right 
to live without interference from neighbors or 
adversaries. This has been always a commit- 
ment of our people. 

As a great President, whom I know you ad- 
mire, Abraham Lincoln, once said of our Dec- 
laration of Independence, 

It . . . gave promise that in due time the weights 
wonld be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that 
all should have an equal chance. 

In America today, this generation of Ameri- 
cans is determined to fulfill that ideal — by all 
that we do in the world and by all that we do 
here at home. 

For all the long history of man, there have 
been injustices, there has been oppression, there 
has been evil. Today — in these times — we in- 
tend that these forces shall find not only their 
match but their master in the strength of our 
American nation and the moral resolve of our 
American people. 

Mr. President, we invite and welcome the 
attention of all nations, young and old, to the 
agenda of the C!ongress of the United States. 
Our concerns are many, and our responsibilities 
are great. But this week and this session, the 
American Congress is devoting itself to taking 
up the challenge of those ancient enemies of all 
mankind — ignorance, poverty, disease, and 

And, Mr. President, I want you to know we 
are determined as a people to prevail against 
: these foes. 

lI You, Mr. President, are conmiitted deeply to 
economic progress to improve the lives of your 
people. You seek with neighboring states real- 
istic means of cooperation to promote mutual 
welfare. You have steadfastly and wisely de- 
nied comfort to those who would subvert the 
hard-won freedom of your continent. These 
are aims which the American people support, 

We of this land covet no empire and seek no 

dominion anywhere in this world. We seek, as 
you seek, an Africa of strong and prosperous 
nations living at peace with their neighbors, 
free to choose their own paths of progress. 

To you, Mr. President, to your people, to all 
the peoples of Africa, the United Stiites re- 
affinns its good will, its friendly support, and 
its resolute determination to stand with you in 
your struggle for human progress. 

President Yameogo > 

White House press release dated March 29 

Mr. President, it was in Dakar tliat I had 
for the first time the honor of meeting you, and 
we remember the time when you also met 
Africa — the impression which you produced on 
all the chiefs of state assembled there ; and the 
strong impression you gave them has been con- 
firmed and justified today by the responsibilities 
you have taken. 

This being said, Mr. President, I would like 
to express the very great happiness, the very 
great honor, which I would like to direct to 
both the people of the United States and your- 
self for being here as your guest for a few days, 
and I am also very happy to express to the First 
Lady of the United States our admiration for 
her dynamic and sincere personality — the ad- 
miration expressed by my wife in the name of all 
the women in Upper Volta. 

Better than any official contact, it is a direct 
contact which testifies to the trutli because it 
allows friendship to really blossom in direct 

It might seem strange and even somewhat un- 
real that this gigantic country, one of the best 
equipped in the world, without the slightest 
doubt might have anything in common with 
Upper Volta, so small in comparison. How- 
ever, aU men who think, Mr. President, know 
and understand that the United States and 
Upper Volta do have an interest in common, do 
have something in common, and that is a desire 
and love for freedom, a desire to see men raised 
toward light, a desire to see a world free from 

' President Yameogo spoke extemporaneously In 

APRIL 26, 1965 


hatred. Tliat type of community is the most 
important thing. 

Mr. President, this is a struggle, this is a 
fight which we have to wage again and again 
every day, but all those who have always op- 
posed hope to despair, hope to injustice, know, 
Mr. President, that you are in the struggle, the 
strongest man, the best leader, a man of the 
size which is needed for someone who presides 
over the destinies of the United States and re- 
sponsibilities of the United States. And that 
is why, Mr. President, I am so honored to be 
the fii'st Chief of State of Africa to be received 
here by you. And it is also, Mr. President, be- 
cause I would like to express the hope that 
Upper Volta and all of the comitries of the 
third world can use the experience — an experi- 
ence often difficult — to institute with you a 
dialog whicli will be full of interest and also 
full of construction, because no one ignores, 
Mr. President, th& part played by the United 
States in building in the world a balance and 
equilibrium, and no one ignores, either, the fact 
that things may appear differently from various 
points of view. 

And my presence here, Mr. President, I be- 
lieve proves that the people of the United 
States — the United States intends to face its 
responsibilities to the fullest measure. 

Mr. President, in coming here I feel we laiow 
you already. We know you, and we have vm- 
derstood you particularly well since your recent 
speech before a joint session of Congress, which 
we have distributed very widely m our African 
press. This, together with everything else, has 
made us understand how strongly you fight for 
mankind, for justice, and it is in the name of 
all of the chiefs of state of Africa — all those 
among them who love freedom, justice — that I 
would like to express my admiration because we 
have a conimon fatherland, an Africa of free- 
dom and of justice. 

Mr. President, I must now speak to you about 
my country. Upper Volta. Our country is per- 
haps in the very center, at the very crossroads 
of western Africa. It has borders — it borders 
on six different countries, and therefore it may 
have to face various types of evolutions. It 
must be always able to face them. Precisely 
because of being a small nation of only 5 million 

inhabitants, it is also a nation which has made 
a choice which defines it. 

This choice, Mr. President, was made at the 
time when we acceded to independence on Au- 
gust 5, 1960, and the choice is that of fighting 
always for freedom, of standing always for the 
dignity of man, of standing, in other words, 
for the things for which you stand in this coun- 
try, Mr- President. And if we have to follow 
this road, a road which is often difficult, a road 
also which makes those who follow it feel proud 
of themselves. 

As we follow this road, we have found the 
friendship of the United States. It is a friend- 
ship which makes us proud. It makes us proud 
because not only we trust it but because we 
trust the future; we trust ourselves. That is 
why I would like to express to you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, my conviction that our two countries will 
strengthen their ties of cooperation, the ties of 
their friendship. Long live the United States 
of America. 


White House press release dated March 30 

President Joluison has been extremely pleased , 
to have as his first state visitor since the Inaugu- 
ration, President Maurice Yameogo of Upper 
Volta. Their exchanges were both close and , 
cordial and President Joluison was pleased by 
the identity of principles and purposes which 
motivate the two governments. 

This is President Yameogo's first trip to the 
United States. The talks in Wasliington af- 
forded the two Presidents the opportunity to 
renew and develop a personal acquaintance 
made at Dakar, Senegal, in 1961, and to discuss 
in detail matters of common concern. Presi- 
dent Yameogo also had conversations with Sec- 
retary of State Dean Rusk. 

President Yameogo described economic and 
political matters of importance to Africa, par- 
ticularly to his country, as well as the efforts of 
his Government to promote the advancement of 
the Voltan people. He expressed appreciation 
for the understanding and cooperative spirit 
which the United States has shown in assisting 
the economic development of Upper Volta. 



Pi-esident Johnson recalled the friendship 
that exists between Upper Volta and the United 
States and the many bonds that increasingly 
unite the Governments and peoples of the two 

The two Presidents discussed broad inter- 
national issues, including problems of under- 
development, African efTorts to encourage con- 
tinental unity, the Congo, and world peace. 

President Johnson expressed his admiration 
for President Yameogo's vigorous elTorts to im- 
prove the economic and social well being of the 
Voltan people and to secure cooperation and 
peace in Africa. In particular, he praised 
President Yameogo's leading role in the Coun- 
cil of the Entente, the Common Organization of 
African and Malagasy States and the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity. 

President Yameogo expressed his apprecia- 
tion of the measures taken by the U.S. Federal 
Ciovernment to secure equal rights and opjwr- 
tunities for all American people and lauded 
President Johnson's leadership of this ell'ort, 
the effects of which are felt throughout the 

The two Presidents took great satisfaction in 
the excellent relations existing between Upper 
Volta and the United States. They agreed that 
the visit had further strengthened the^ie rela- 
tions and pledged faithfully to preserve their 
cooperation and friendship. 

President Yameogo invited President Jolm- 
son, as soon as it would be practicable, to visit 
the Kepublic of Upper Volta and permit them 
to repay the gracious hospitality President 
Yameogo and his party have received. 

The United States and International Cooperation 

hy W. Averell Harrhnan 
Ambassador at Large ' 

Speaking to you today on the subject of the 
United States and international cooperation 
^ brings back vivid memories of the Marshall 
^l Plan and of my intimate relations at that time 
with Belgium and other European countries. 
Tills cooperative venture succeeded beyond any- 
one's optimistic expectations. Ai\(\. from it we 
learned much of the value of cooperation 
among similar-minded nations, the need for eco- 
nomic integration in Europe, and above all the 
ntial importance of economic growth in a 
modem society. At that time the United States 
brought to Europe not only much-needed eco- 
nomic assistance but also two basically impor- 
tant concepts: the value of a continent of free 

' Address made before the American Chamber of 
Commerce In Belgium at Brussels, Belgium, on Mar. 20 
(press release 61 dated Mar. 25) . 

trade and the essential role of increased pro- 
ductivity. Both of these concepts have in the 
intervening years been incorporated into 
European economic life and have contributed 
to the extraordinary dynamic vitality of 
Europe today. 

The role of American business and American 
investments in Europe is very much in the pub- 
lic eye these days. For this reason, I place par- 
ticular value on the opportunity to speak to 
the American Chamber of Commerce in Brus- 
sels, which stands for American business at 
its be„st — responsible, well informed, and 

American industry has enjoyed a warm wel- 
come in Belgium. Close and mutuallj' advan- 
tageous ties have developed between American 
and Belgian businessmen. Evidence for this 
may be found in the fine mood and spirit of 

APRIL 26, 1965 
7G9-991 — 65- 


this gathering tonight. It is clear that an 
organization like the American Chamber is es- 
sential to strengthen good relations within the 
American-Belgian business community in Brus- 
sels and to keep American businessmen abroad 
in close touch with the thinking and policies of 
both their own and tlaeir host governments. 

I would like to talk about the importance 
of open economic systems in today's world. 

It may, at the outset, be worth while to recall 
the fact that this relatively smaller country of 
Europe has had the foresight to adopt a con- 
scious policy of welcoming capital from abroad. 
As a result, more than 500 American concerns, 
many of them represented here tonight, have 
established outlets or manufacturing subsidi- 
ai-ies in Belgium or entered into partnerships 
with Belgian enterprises with a direct invest- 
ment estimated at over $500 million. 

This import of capital and technology has 
contributed to the pros|>erity of Belgium today. 
It has helped keep Belgian industry modern 
and strongly competitive in the Common Mar- 
ket It has helped Belgium reduce unemploy- 
ment to an enviably low level. And this capital 
has been absorbed without subjecting the Bel- 
gian economy in any way to foreign domina- 
tion, without affecting Belgium's social stinic- 
ture and its own way of life. In fact, although 
U.S. direct investment has been large, it I'epre- 
sented, I understand, only 3 percent of gross 
capital formation in Belgium in 1963, a typical 

Economic expansion is fundamental to to- 
day's world. We cannot turn back to systems 
which allowed unemployment, depression, stag- 
nation in the industrialized countries. We must 
have a system which assists the developing coun- 
tries to maintain themselves and to grow. We 
must have a dynamic system which insures that 
the economic growth and hence the security of 
one country of the free world strengthens the 
efforts of other nations. 

Such a system provides maximum opportuni- 
ties for international economic specialization; 
it stimulates the growth and spread of tech- 
nology; it encourages capital to flow in direc- 
tions where it can be most productively em- 
ployed; it sharpens the role of competition as 
a productive and modernizing economic force; 

and it gives to consumers everywhere a wider 
range of choice. We can gain these great ad- 
\'antages only by constantly working for them. 
The system as a whole can succeed only if each 
nation's economic policies are based on mutual 
cooperation and an agreed code of responsible 

With 90 percent of free-world industrial ca- 
pacity included in the complex of nations in 
the Atlantic world, an economic interdepend- 
ence now exists among these nations in a mamier 
unknown before the war. Both Presidents 
Kennedy and Joluison have recognized this eco- 
nomic interdependence and have directed our 
policies accordingly. In his state of the Union 
message,- President Johnson said that Europe 
and the United States have "common interests 
and common values, common dangers and com- 
mon expectations. These realities will continue 
to have their way — especially in our expanding 
trade and especially in our conmion defense." 

Collective Responsibilities of the Free World 

There are voices, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
however, which contend that America should 
undertake a gradual withdrawal from the far- 
flung activities forced on it by the abnormal 
conditions of the postwar world. In a speech 
on March 16 in Washington, Under Secretary 
of State George W. Ball said : ^ 

Proponents of a resurgent nationalism — increasingly 
vocal in certain European circles — have found this 
argument particularly attractive. If their ovs-n nations 
are to regain their prewar power and position in world 
affairs, their first tactical move must be to reduce U.S. 
power and inlluence. This means, among other things, 
weakening or dismantling the institutions and arrange- 
ments through which America and Europe cooper- 
ate. . . . they feel that, over the long pull, a Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Urals may be moi-e than a fig- 
ure of speech — provided, of course, that Europeans are 
left alone to work it out. 

In referring to global responsibilities, Mr. 
Ball continued: 

Those who advocate a progressive withdrawal of 
American power have, it seems to me, never made clear 
where or how a withdrawal, once begun, could end 
without great damage to freedom. They have never 
acknowledged the fact that in today's interdependent 









. it 


' For text, see Bitij,etin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 
' For text, see ihiil., Apr. 12. 1965, p. 532. 



world no action by a global power can ever be taken in 
isolation. Tliey do not seem to understand that what 
we do In South Viet-Xam will have a profound mean- 
ing for people in the other outposts of freedom. 

In Viet-Nam the free world faces the outward 
thrust of Communist China, spearheaded by 
North Vietnamese aggression. Tlie escahitioii 
of military activities going back over a period 
of years has been from the North in the form of 
North Vietnamese aggression. And this has 
been well documented over the years. Tlie Gov- 
ernment in Saigon and the Government of the 
United States botli lioped the danger could bo 
met within South Viet-Nam itself. Hanoi 
chose to escalate the conflict with greater vio- 
lence; they apparently interpreted restraint as 
indicating lack of will. The combined U.S.- 
South Vietnamese response, duly cautious in 
starting, is designed to make Hanoi realize that 
it has embarked on an objective it will not be 
allowed to achieve. The question is up to 
Hanoi — whether or not to cease and desist in its 
aggression against South Viet-Nam. The se- 
curity of South Viet-Nam is no more negotiable 
now than was the security of Western Europe 
negotiable when the outward thrust of Stalin's 
communism tlireatened it in the late forties. 

As Ambassador in Moscow in 1945, 1 reported 
that Stalin's intentions were to take over AVest- 
ern Europe. He thouglit that in the economic 
chaos that would result from the devastation 
and dislocations of the war, communism would 
find a fertile field. His ambitions were frus- 
trated by American and "Western European co- 
operation in tlie Marshall Plan and NATO. 
Today we find "Western Europe more prosperous 
and dynamic than ever. 

At the same time, however, we find the Com- 
munist probings and thrusts in the less de- 
veloped areas directed from either Moscow or 
Peiping. The Chinese and Soviet Communists 
are using everj' available technique in tlieir ef- 
fort to enlarge tlieir influence — economic and 
military assistance, propaganda, subversion, 
and, where it seems to have possibility of suc- 
cess, so-called "wars of liberation." In short, 
wherever political or economic weakness exists, 
there will be heavier pressure from Communist 
activity on independent nations. 

The free world must face up to this problem 
of Communist subversion squarely wherever 

and whenever it threatens. The sooner preven- 
tive and repressive steps are taken to stamp 
out such activity, the less danger there is to the 
free world of open aggression under the guise 
of liberation fronts. "Wliile maintaining a 
strong deterrent against the threat of nuclear 
war, we must be equally vigilant that our collec- 
tive security is not undermined by unchecked 
Communist subversion and infiltration. 

The deepening conflict between Moscow and 
Peiping has significance in the long run in 
shattering the monolithic structure of the Com- 
munist international movement. But in the 
immediate future it is, I believe, adding to the 
dangei's of Communist pressures. For the con- 
flict between the two big Communist powers has 
stimulated both of them to increase their activi- 
ties. Each is trying to prove that its methods 
promise the surest road to Communist takeover. 
Each is trying to expand its influence not only 
in Commimist parties around the world but 
with non-Communist parties and peoples as 

As long as Communist subversion and, par- 
ticularly, open thrusts of aggression continue 
to threaten free-world interests and security, 
all free nations have a collective responsibility, 
regardless of their size and resources, to give a 
helping hand to those who are the target of this 
subversion. We have long looked for tlie AVest- 
ern European nations to play a greater role in 
world affairs, and now that their domestic econ- 
omies have grown so strong, we are counting on 
their taking increased responsibilities. 

Increased Economic Cooperation 

The role which Belgium has played in the 
postwar period in world affairs reflects the high 
sense of purpose and responsibility of its lead- 
ers, supported fully by the Belgian people, who 
live realist ically in the present and who look also 
to the future. 

In economic matters both Belgium and the 
United States have been leaders in pressing for- 
ward to greater cooperation. Our commitment 
to an open system of international trade goes 
back to 1934 and Secretary of State Hull's re- 
ciprocal trade agreements program. After the 
war, in 1947, we initiated the multilateral tariff 
bargaining technique wliich became codified in 


the GATT, or the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. Under the GATT, deep tariff cuts 
were made in 1947, and further cuts were made 
in 1949, 1951, 1956, and 1960-61. 

In addition to reducing tariffs substantially 
during those two decades the major trading na- 
tions contracted in the GATT and in the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund to dismantle as rapidly 
as possible the other chief forms of trade restric- 
tionism- — quotas and exchange controls. This 
process was begun during the Marshall Plan 
years and stimulated by the Eurojiean Pay- 
ments Union. These have been largely elimi- 
nated in the industrial sector. 

This persistent exercise in international co- 
operation led to an unprecedented boom in 
world trade. The volume of world trade has 
tripled since 1948. For the first time in this 
century, trade increased faster than income. 
Thereby, it accelerated economic growth and 
raised productivity in all countries. 

We have broken free from the web of trade 
and payment restrictions that were the legacy of 
the thirties and of the Second World War. We 
have built an impressive system of international 
organizations through which we can consult and 
work together with other nations to make all of 
us more prosperous and more secure. That is 
the purpose of organizations such as the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) , the GATT, the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the specialized agencies and regional 
organizations of the United Nations. 

But now we may be at an important cross- 
road. Progi-ess now — whether in trade, in fi- 
nancial affairs, or in aid programs — will de- 
pend increasingly on effective cooperation 
among all major industrial nations. 

The Kennedy Round 

The Kennedy Eound of trade negotiations, 
now underway, is a key test of our collective 
resolution. In concept and in scope, these ne- 
gotiations represent the most ambitious oppor- 
timity thus far to enlarge the benefits of trade 
for all nations of the free world. A successful 
Kennedy Eound will encourage the continued 
expansion of world trade. As such, it will be 
to the common advantage of all participants, 
industrial and developing nations alike. 

Negotiations on industrial products are mov- 
ing forward. Much hard bargaining lies 
ahead. All major participating countries 
bring to these negotiations special and highly 
charged domestic interests. No country will be 
able to get all that it would like. But the suc- 
cess of these negotiations will not lie in specific 
trade advantages any country may gain or dis- 
advantages it may avoid. Rather, it will de- 
pend on the progress made toward a better 
world-trading environment. 

In the agricultural area, progi-ess unfortu- 
nately has been slow. We look forward hope- 
fully now to the initial negotiations on an im- 
portant category of agricultural products — 
grains — in May. We hope they will augur well 
for the tabling of offers in September and sub- 
sequent negotiations on the remainder of agri- 
cultural products. 

Meeting the Needs of the Developing Nations 

Wliile the industrial coimtries have been 
highly successful in modernizing and expand- 
ing their economies in the postwar period, prog- 
ress of the billion people of the developing 
nations has been much slower. Development, 
as we know, is not an easy task. Fortunately, it 
is no longer a task for the United States alone to 
aid the developing nations. In many respects 
it is the biggest piece of mifinished business that 
we and other free-world industrial countries • 
face. We and our fellow members of the OECD 
have enormous industrial and commercial power 
to put behind a common endeavor. As a group, 
the United States, Canada, Western Europe, 
and Japan account for approximately two- 
thirds of the world's industrial output. We 
command at least that much of the world's in- 
dustrial capacity, and we have a major share 
of its agricultural surplus. Our foreign trade 
is about two-thirds of total world trade. We 
must get these assets more heavily engaged in 
the job of development. 

We must succeed in two general tasks : 

First, in putting growing amounts of the 
capital, technology, and organizational skills of 
the industrial countries to effective use in the 
developing countries, with emphasis on the con- 
tribution of private investment ; and 

Second, in giving these countries reasonable 



access to our markets, at fair and stable prices, 
enabling them to expand their export earnings 
and pay more of their own way toward moderni- 

In addition to these basic needs — more capital, 
skills, and trade — there must be a better coordi- 
nation of effort by the aid donors. The Develop- 
ment Assistance Committee of the OECD is 
the primary forum for this purpose. There 
must also be increased coordination by special- 
ists in the recipient country. This will avoid 
wasted efforts and inefficient use of limited aid 
resources. It will help to dispel suspicion that 
one country is carrying a disproportionate share 
of the load. If conducted with full respect for 
the sovereignty of developing countries being 
aided, it is very much in their interest. 

Major responsibilities fall on the aided coun- 
try as well. It should set up a single strong of- 
fice within its own government to coordinate ex- 
ternal aid and avoid, for example, dissipating 
export credits on prestige projects without due 
regard for the overall requirements and re- 
sources of the country. There must be deter- 
mination on the part of the country being aided 
to do all it can to help itself attain economic 

There are already some good examples in 
Africa of coordination among U.S. and 
European contributors, such as the IBRD [In- 
, ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- 
opment] consultative committees for such coim- 
tries as Nigeria, Tunisia, and Sudan. Another 
example is the joint financing of the Trans- 
Cameroonian Railroad by the United States, 
France, and the European Economic Commu- 
nity. In the countries formerly under Belgian 
administration, numerous projects have been 
based on the matching of material financed by 
the United States with Belgian technical as- 
sistance. The expansion of I^ovanium Univer- 
sity, the National School of Law and Adminis- 
tration in Leopoldville, and several other 
Congol&se institutions provide outstanding 

It is of paramount importance to the free 
world that the African countries be helped to 
maintain their independence and attain eco- 
nomic growth. To its credit, Belgiiim has ac- 
knowledged responsibility in Africa. We 

earnestly hope that Belgium's interest will not 
tlag, that it will expand its cooperation, and 
continue to send material aid and technical per- 
sonnel, particularly to the countries of Africa 
formerly under its acbninistration. 

U.S. Balance-of-Payments Deficit 

Finally, I would speak of the American role 
and objectives in the international finan- 
cial field and our balance-of-payments situation. 
The international monetary system, of course, 
is not an end in itself. It is an instrument that 
can either encourage or hinder desirable actions 
in trade and in domestic economic policy. We 
have seen the issues sharpened during the past 
year by the studies and discussions within the 
International Monetary Fund and the Group 
of Ten. 

The essential problem is to develop a mecha- 
nism for providing adequate world liquidity^ 
but not too much — and at the same time to 
facilitate the process of orderly adjustment in 
countries which are in imbalance. We are con- 
sidering with other interestetl nations how the 
international monetary system can be made the 
vehicle for sustained expansion of world trade. 

Tliis has special urgency now that we are 
making concerted efforts to eliminate our own 
balance-of-payments deficit. Throughout the 
postwar period that deficit has been the major 
source of financing for the growth of trade and 
investment. As the dollar was the only major 
currency that was fully convertible throughout 
the period, it had to sen-e as an international 
reserve for the rest of the world. Tlie United 
States also transferred a huge amount of capi- 
tal and international reserves to the rest of the 
world through military and economic aid and 
through long-term loans to foreign govern- 
ments, as well as through private mvestment. 

Our reserves and capital were put to good use, 
not only to help secure vital political interests 
but in economic terms as well. These actions 
restored the international monetary system and 
brought us to our present world of booming 
trade and convertible currencies. 

A broader European capital market would be 
highly useful now in reducing the dependence 
of Europe upon American sources of capital. 
We wish to support the cooperative intema- 

APRIL 26. 1965 


tional program which the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development is cur- 
rently undertaking to imjDrove capital markets. 
Improved capital markets in Europe could 
contribute substantially to the further eco- 
nomic growth of OECD member countries, to 
greater trade opportimities for less developed 
countries, and to capital flows to help correct 
international payments imbalances. Capital 
markets are needed which are sufficiently large 
and efficient to raise with facility the sizable 
amoimts of capital required by today's large- 
scale industries. This means markets which 
are increasingly international in scope. 

Except during the Suez crisis, the United 
States has had a balance-of-payments deficit 
every year beginning with 1950. Our interna- 
tional deficit did not constitute a problem for 
us or other nations during most of the 1950's. 
Other nations actually welcomed our deficits as 
the mechanism whereby we supplied gold and 
dollars to build reserves depleted during the 
war and reconstruction era. 

By 1960, however, most European currencies 
were again freely convertible and exchange re- 
serves had reached comfortable levels. The 
problem now was that our trading partners had 
not too few but too many dollars. And, as 
President Jolmson stated last month in his 
balance-of-payments message,^ 

... we cannot — and do not — assume that the world's 
willingness to hold dollars is unlimited. 

Tliere is every reason for confidence that we 
will be able to deal effectively with the problem 
of our balance-of-payments deficits and our 
gold outflow. The facts of our basic financial 
strength help keep this problem in perspective. 

A key element in that financial strength is 
the $88 billion of assets owned abroad by the 
U.S. Government and by American citizens. 
Deducting foreign claims against our Govern- 
ment and citizens would leave us with net assets 
of $30 billion. This does not take into con- 
sideration the more than $12 billion of Govern- 
ment loans to developing countries on longer 
terms. In addition, we have nearly $15 billion 
in gold and a commercial export surplus last 
year of $3.7 billion, as well as income received 

* For text, see ihid., Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

from private foreign mvestment over $4.3 

As President Johnson noted in liis balance- 
of-payments message, 

A country which exports far more than it imports 
and whose net asset position abroad is great and grow- 
ing is not "living beyond its means." 

Our Government has made serious efforts the 
past 4 years to reduce our persistent large def- 
icits in our balance of payments, and with some 
success. But the 1964 deficit, with more than 
half of it occurring in the final quarter, was too 
large. The President, as you Icnow, has for- 
mulated a 10-point program with the firm in- 
tention of eliminating our international deficit. 
The program is designed to cut the deficit with- 
out halting the growth of the U.S. economy and 
without major damage to the international 

The major focus of our balance-of-payments 
program is on private capital outflow. In 1964 
private capital outflow soared to well over $6 
billion. The increase that year over 1963 was 
almost $2 billion. 

As representatives of U.S. firms doing busi- 
ness here in Belgium and elsewhere abroad, I 
am sure you are especially interested in the 
situation with respect to direct investment 
abroad by American companies. Last year such 
direct investment, with most of it in Europe and 
Canada, rose to $2.2 billion. This was $500 mil- 
lion higher than the rate for 1960 and more than 
$300 million above the 1963 rate. 

It is reported that during the past 4 years 
there have been 2,500 new ventures in Europe 
by U.S. firms. These firms have spent increas- 
ingly large sums as they bought into existing 
European enterprises. 

Now, I wish to make it clear that as a basic 
principle we regard U.S. investment in Eu- 
rofje — and elsewhere in the world — as highly 
desirable. We know that it brings benefits to 
the countries where it is made and that ulti- 
mately it produces earnings which flow back to 
the United States. For example, the return 
flow of income last year from direct investment 
was $31,4 billion — the same year when the capi- 
tal outflow for direct investment was $2.2 bil- 
lion. But when we are faced with a continuing 
large deficit in our international accounts over 











' roll 

: DCS 

of a 








a periotl of yesii-s, we must raise a question as to 
how rapid a pace of new foreign investment we 
can atford. 

Speaking of U.S. direct investment in Eu- 
rope, it is appropriate to recall the historic debt 
we Americans owe to European investment in 
tlie United States during and after our eco- 
nomic infancy. Even today there is consider- 
able European investment in the United States. 
There does not seem to be general awareness 
that, according to the latest available figures, 
European direct investment in the United 
States totaled almost $5.5 billion. The com- 
parable figure for U.S. direct investment in 
Europe as of December 31, 1963, is almost $10.4 
billion. We heartily welcome and appreciate 
the stimulus that Europe has given to our econ- 
omy with its direct investments. 

Role of American Business Community 

But, to revert to our balance-of-payments 
deficit, we believe we must bring our accounts 
into balance on an urgent basis. All areas of 
our payments must make their contribution. As 
part of the program, our outflows of private 
capital must now be held to levels consistent 
with the early achievement of efjuilibrium. 
Those levels clearly must be lower than the 
levels of last year. 

Primary responsibility for the program of 
voluntary cooperation with the American busi- 
ness community to improve our balance of pay- 
ments lies with Secretary of Commerce [John 
T.] Connor. He has asked the chief executives 
of about 600 companies doing the bulk of U.S. 
international business to determine, on the basis 
of their o^vn particular circumstances, how 
each of them can best improve his firm's indi- 
vidual balance on international transactions. 
He has suggested a number of means to accom- 
plish this, starting with an expansion of exports 
and development of new export markets. It 
also is suggested that these firms avoid or post- 
pone direct investment in marginal projects and 
exercise restraint in financing new direct invest- 
ments in developed countries with United States 
funds. Let me underline that we are not at- 
tempting to check private investment in the less 
developed countries. 

Other suggestions to the business community : 

— Greater use of funds raised in developed 
countries to finance direct investments in those 
countries ; 

— "\Miere appropriate to the company and the 
country, sales of equities in foreign subsidiaries 
to residents of host countries ; and 

— Minimizing the outflow of sliort-tei'm finan- 
cial funds and repatriation of such funds pre- 
viouslj' invested abroad. 

Seci'etary Connor has expressed great confi- 
dence in the ability and determination of the 
business community to meet this challenge — a 
confidence which I personally share. For, as 
Mr. Connor has pointed out, the American 
business communitj^, of which you are important 
representatives, realizes how important it is to 
our country and to our business enterprises 
that we achieve equilibrium in our l)alance of 
payments. Having the great stake they do in 
America and in an expanding international 
economy, they surely will do what is necessary 
to strengthen both. 

Developing Alternate Sources of Liquidity 

We should recognize that our balance-of-pay- 
ments deficits have been an important source for 
creating the additional liquidity the world has 
needed to finance the vast expansion in world 
trade. As we eliminate the deficit in our balance 
of payments, it will be necessary to develop 
alternate sources of liquidity to finance con- 
tinued expansion in world trade. One major 
source in this liquidity will be through the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. Steps now being 
taken to expand the Fund's resources have our 
full support. 

We agree with our European friends that the 
present international monetary system needs 
improvement. It is needed, however, not pri- 
marily because of the U.S. deficit but because, 
with the disappearance of the deficit, further 
growth of world reserves would be roughly lim- 
ited by the rate of gold production. And gold 
will not provide the growth of reserves that will 
be needed for continued rapid expansion of 
world trade, the needs of the developing coun- 
tries, and the extension of international capital 
markets. We will have to continue to use con- 
vertible currencies as reserve assets — along with 
gold — and possibly some form of new reserve 

APRIL 26, 1965 


asset, too. We are not advocating a particular 
solution at this time, but we are ready to con- 
tinue to explore different possibilities construc- 
tively within the Group of Ten. 

Our problem is to meet the increasing liquid- 
ity requirements of an expanding world econ- 
omy, not to force a harsh reduction in the ex- 
isting level of world liquidity. We must never 
forget the lessons of the thirties and the self- 
defeating scramble for gold that preceded it. 
It is in these terms that we must constantly 
reexamine and reassess our policies and instru- 

I have summarized what I consider to be the 

inescapable economic responsibilities of the 
United States and the i^olicies we are pursuing 
in order to fulfill these responsibilities. Above 
all, I have tried to convey the imperative of co- 
operation of other free nations, ^particularly the 
industrial nations. None of us can find security, 
none of us can share fully in the benefits of mod- 
ern society, inider policies of economic inde- 
pendence. We liave immense stakes in working 
togetlier. It must be our common goal to en- 
large the area of our cooiieration if the free 
world is to keep on growing in strength, if we 
are to achieve eventually a decent world order 
and a stable peace. 

The Kennedy Round 

hy TF. Michael Blumenthal 

Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations '■ 

The main trading nations of the world have 
been engaged in the Kennedy Round trade 
negotiations for more than 18 months. 
Throughout this period, the newspapers have 
abounded with reports on all aspects of these 
talks. A gi-eat many articles have been written 
and speeches delivered on the subject. Partici- 
pants and commentators alike have presented 
the public with an ample fare of political and 
economic analyses about the meaning, the im- 
I)lications, the progress — and the lack of it — of 
this Kennedy Round. 

The extent of worldwide public interest in the 
negotiations is not surprising and reflects a gen- 
eral recognition of the high stakes involved. 
Tariff negotiations are not traditionally a very 
exciting subject for the average person; and 
previous tariff talks did not, in fact, rate similar 
public discussion. But the Kennedy Round is 
not just another round of routine tariff bargain- 

' Address made before the Economic Forum at Kassel, 
Germany, on Mar. 8. 

ing. These negotiations are much broader in 
scope than any previous ones and vastly more 
important than anythmg tried in Geneva in the 

Tliere are a number of reasons for this. I 
would like to stress here just one or two which, 
I suggest, are of particular significance. 

In the first place, the negotiations take place 
in a very special political context. From the 
point of view of the United States, they repre- 
sent an important effort at Atlantic cooperation, 
a major test for ourselves and our friends in 
Europe of our ability to work together on a 
common endeavor of great importance to all our 
peoples and to many nations tliroughout the 
world. We see these negotiations as an example 
of the type of partnership — of the sharing of 
responsibility among equals — which President 
Kennedy and President Jolmson have stressed 
repeatedly as, in their view, the sum and sub- 
stance of a strong and vital Atlantic alliance. 

For the European Economic Community, 



these negfotiations are the first major oppor- 
tunity to demonstrate the policies to be followed 
in its economic relations with nonmember coun- 
tries in Europe and elsewhere. They provide a 
means to shape these policies, taking into ac- 
count the vital interests of member states — and 
of third-country trading partners as well. 

The Kennedy Round is a test, with the world 
watching, of how this new entity of six Euro- 
pean nations, growing and prospering rapidly 
and implementing with gratifying determina- 
tion the great dream of European imity, will 
respond to the exciting call for major trade 
liberalization in world commerce. The Ken- 
ne<ly Round, in other words, provides the Com- 
mon Market with the opportunity to give prac- 
tical meaning to those provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome which envisage an outward-looking 
and liberal external commercial policy. 

Relations With the Developing Nations 

Tlie context of the negotiations cannot, of 
course, l)e defined exclusively in terms of the 
bilateral U.S.-EEC setting nor merely with 
reference to the wider multilateral relationships 
of the Atlantic nations. An equally important 
element of the political setting, which distin- 
guishes the negotiations from previous tariff 
bargaining, concerns the relations with the 
developing world. 

It is of great significance that the Kennedy 
Round is taking place at a time when the emerg- 
ing nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
are making strenuous efforts to speed their eco- 
nomic development ; a time when they are call- 
ing attention to the importance of increased 
trading opportunities as a vital goal in their 
quest toward a higher standard of living for 
their people. 

The success of the Kennedy Roimd in a low- 
ering of trade barriers for all nations, in par- 
ticular the developing ones, and in serving the 
interests of people everywhere constitutes one 
of the principal challenges confronting us. It 
is another reason for the great worldwide inter- 
est in our work. 

There are, of course, many other factors 
which explain the importance attached to the 
Kennedy Round. Xot the least of these is that 
the United States is negotiating with powers 

provided by Congi-ess to the President in the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which far ex- 
ceed those available to an American President at 
any previous time. To cite only one example: 
During the last tariff negotiation, the so-called 
Dillon Round of 1960-61, the United States 
eventually reduced tariffs covering about 20 
percent of its imports with an average overall 
reduction amounting to about 8 percent. Other 
countries made correspondingly modest conunit- 
ments. One reason for this no doubt was the 
limited negotiating authority available to the 
United States. In the Kennedy Round, on the 
other hand, we have been in a position to join 
in a negotiation wliich is based on offers to 
reduce virtually all industrial tariffs by as much 
as 50 percent. 

Trade Policy and the Atlantic Partnership 

The United States attaches great importance 
to the Kennedy Round. As Secretarj' of State 
Dean Rusk has recently pointed out : ^ 

The Kennedy Round embodies two longstanding and 
basic lines of American foreign policy. One is the 
drive for freer trade and an increasing flow of com- 
merce throughout the world. The other is our support 
for a strong and united Western Europe, capable of 
acting in partnership with the United States in the 
great enterprises that lie before us. 

We know that an effective Atlantic partner- 
ship requires a strong and unified Europe and 
that our partnership is best achieved between 
a prosperous Europe, a prosperous America, 
and a prosperous free world. A cooperative 
effort between us and other nations to remove 
trade barriers will, in our view, help all of our 
peoples to reach higher standards of living and 
will greatly strengthen the bonds that bind 
nations of the free world together. 

The American policy of encouraging freer 
international trade through the progressive dis- 
mantling of world trade barriers is not new. 
"We found many years ago, through the eco- 
nomic hardships of the period between wars, 
that no nation can hope to achieve prosperity 
by erecting trade barriers around its borders 
and attempting to export its problems rather 
than its products. We learned from the experi- 
ence of those bitter years that national consid- 

= Bulletin of Nov. 30, 19C4. p. 766. 

APRIL 26. 19G5 



erations must always be balanced by an aware- 
ness of tlieir effect on other countries and that 
an open system of international trade which 
encourages the expansion of efficient produc- 
tion is best designed to contribute to the prosper- 
ity of all. 

In 1930 the United States, like many other 
countries, was a high-tariff country. Tlie aver- 
age of our tariffs, I believe, was more than 50 
percent. Between 1934, when the first Kecip- 
rocal Trade Act was passed, and 1962 we were 
able, through progressive trade negotiations, to 
reduce our average tariff level to about 12 per- 
cent. Durmg this period our imports rose from 
$1.7 billion in 1934 to $17 billion in 1963 and 
our exports increased correspondingly — amjile 
proof that a liberal trade policy makes sense! 

Tariff Negotiations and tlie EEC 

Your own experiences with the Common Mar- 
ket have, I think, proven two points : First, the 
Corrununity has benefited from the increasing 
competition within its internal market. Sec- 
ond, the process of the EEC's development has 
shown how patient and persevering negotia- 
tions can lead to agreement on industrial and 
agricultural trade of benefit to all parties to 
the negotiations. There is ample evidence to 
indicate that as between the EEC, the United 
Kingdom, other EFTA [European Free Trade 
Association] countries, Japan, and the United 
States patient negotiating can also produce very 
favorable results. 

One of the most encouraging facts is that all 
participants in the Kennedy Roimd fully ap- 
preciate that increasing trade is indispensable 
to sustained economic growth and are prepared 
to devote their energies to reducing obstacles 
to trade expansion. Even though the negotia- 
tions sometimes appear to assume the character 
of an adversary relationship, they are, in fact, 
characterized by a great community of interest. 

If we look back on the progress of the negoti- 
ations to date, we must acknowledge, first, that 
it has been neither rapid nor easy and that some 
of the problems that had to be overcome re- 
quired considerable effort and good will among 
all the negotiating partners. We should be 
neither surprised nor dismayed by this discov- 
ery. The tecluiical complexities and the eco- 

nomic and political importance of the Kennedy 
Round are such that it must necessarily take 
considerable time. Tlie decisions which gov- 
ernments have to make affect all sectors of their 
economy and will have a great impact for many 
years to come. 

We must also recognize tliat one of the major 
negotiating partners, the European Economic 
Community, is involved in these talks at a time 
when its own internal system is not yet com- 
plete. Under these circumstances, even fairly 
limited agreements along the road toward a 
Kennedy Round settlement create problems for 
the Common Market, since they generally re- 
quire prior agreement by the six member states. 
The time needed to achieve this internal com- 
mon view is often considerable. 

I am divulging no secret if I tell you that 
it sometimes puts some strain on your other ne- 
gotiating partners who are watching the Brus- 
sels deliberations, but it is equally clear from 
following the press that our journalistic friends 
occasionally fail to understand this situation. 
On a number of occasions, reports of deadlock 
and stalemate in Geneva have merely signified 
that time was being used to work out a partic- 
ularly difficult problem — in Geneva or in Brus- 
sels — and not that there was any lack of good 
will or determination by all the nations in- 
volved to find a mutually acceptable solution. 

Industrial Exceptions Lists 

In the industrial phase of the negotiations 
we have in fact made good progress. After 
much debate, analysis, and deliberation, the ma- 
jor trading nations of the world tabled their 
industrial exceptions lists on the 16th of Novem- 
ber of last year. Technically, these exceptions 
lists consist of those industrial items which each 
of the major participants in the Kennedy Round 
is witliliolding from its offer to cut tariffs by 
50 percent. As a practical matter, the tabling 
of these lists amounted to a positive offer to cut 
tariffs in half on the great majority of indus- 
trial goods entering world trade. Taken in the 
aggregate, the offers tabled November 16th rep- 
resent an unprecedented opening bid for trade 
liberalization. This is a major achievement. 

There are, of course, some differences in the 
quality of the offers made. For example, a 




number of the EFTA luitions have offered a 50- 
peirent out in (ill their industrial tariffs witiiout 
exceptions, subject only to the achievement of 
reciprocity. Otlier nations have found it neces- 
sary to except some items. 

AVe have recently completed a careful multi- 
lateral examination of these lists in Geneva. 
This procedure, known as the "confrontation 
and justification" of exceptions lists, involved 
each nation which tabled an exceptions list be- 
ing questioned- — or confronted — by other linear 
participants. The nations participating in the 
Kennedy Kound had previously agreed that 
only a ''bare minimum"' of items should be ex- 
cepted from the 50-percent Imear cut and that 
this should only be in cases dictated by "over- 
I riding national interest." The responses — or 
i justifications — of exceptions were to be based 
on these agreed criteria. 

The confrontation and justification procedure 
has brought out the fact that some exceptions 
lists are larger and more important than others. 
I The significance of an exceptions list cannot, of 
course, be judged in strictly quantitative or me- 
chanical terms. It is not the number of items 
or even the current trade volumes represented on 
these lists as much as the more qualitative im- 
pact on key sectors of world trade which must 
be taken into accomit in the negotiations. 

Tliei-e are items at present included on some 
exceptions lists which we expect to be taken off 
and included in the package of full 50-percent 
reductions. There are other currently excepted 
items on which important partial offers — that 
is, offers of 20, 30, or 40 percent — can be made. 
During the coming year, we will have to ne- 
gotiate diligently to reduce the exceptions lists 
which are on the high side so that at the end 
of the negotiations we can achieve an across-the- 
board cut in virtually all industrial tariffs by 50 

Again, I am probably di\'Tilging no secret if 
I tell you that some negotiating partners in Ge- 
neva, including the United States, consider the 
exceptions list of the European Economic Com- 
munity to be a quite large and significant one, 
particularly in relation to those submitted by 
the other principal countries. Of course, we 
fully recognize the great effort made by the 
Commission and the member states in working 

out the complex internal agreements necessary 
to produce this list. At the same time, we hope 
that the unprecedented offers which have been 
tabled by the other countries, including my own, 
and which, if realized, would bring major trade 
benefits to the Common Market will provide the 
necessaiy inducement to j^oii to reduce your list 
in the course of the negotiations. 

Obviously, the extent of the offers made by 
the big trading imits — such as the Common 
Market, the United States, the United King- 
dom, and Japan — will, in the final analysis, de- 
termine the overall results achieved. If any 
one of us falls short in our contributions, the 
total result of the talks will be reduced, to the 
detriment of everj'one. All of us would be the 
loser's, including very specially you in the Fed- 
eral Republic, who rely so heavily on a growing 
market for your industrial exports and who 
would benefit so considerably from the realiza- 
tion of the sweeping offers for tariff cuts which 
were tabled on November 16th. 

Our most stubborn immediate Kemiedy 
Round problems, however, are not in the indus- 
trial area. The fact is that, while we have 
moved quite far in this phase of our talks, we 
have not yet been able to register comparable 
progress in another vital sphere. I am, of 
course, referring to the agricultural negotia- 

Importance of Agriculture In World Trade 

The importance of agriculture in world trade 
is self-evident. In fact, it is almost a truism 
that no really far-reaching liberalization in in- 
dustrial trade can be accomplished without a 
corresponding effort on the agi-icultural side. 

There are many reasons for this. Industry 
and agriculture are inextricably interwoven in 
all economies. Reasonably priced farm prod- 
ucts are the basis for economic stability and 
higher living standards in all countries. Work- 
ers, businessmen, housewives, J'oung and old 
alike, all depend on foodstuffs, while the farm 
population depends on farm earnings for their 
ability to buy industrial products. 

Modest food prices mean faster economic 
growth and rising standards of living. And 
under full employment, access to high-quality, 
inexpensive food eases the pressures of infla- 

APRIL 26, 1965 


tion — a problem with which we are all familiar 
and which is not unknown in Europe at the pres- 
ent time. 

Efficient agricultural production and access 
to low-priced food imports can help to ease the 
industrial labor shortage in countries like the 
Federal Eepublic, where high levels of indus- 
trial output and exports are the keys to increas- 
ing prosperity. 

These are some of the reasons why the 
mmisters of the GATT, in launching the Ken- 
nedy Round, determined that the negotiations 
should encompass all elements of world trade 
including, specifically, agriculture. For in ad- 
dition to the importance of a free flow of agri- 
cultural goods in international trade for the 
economies of countries such as your own and 
mine, the ministers recognized that some Ken- 
nedy Round negotiating partners would not be 
able to participate at all if agricultural trade 
were not covered. 

Trade in Temperate Zone farm products 
is a life-and-death matter to several nations. 
Ninety-five percent of the exports of New Zea- 
land, for example, are farm products. To Aus- 
tralia farm products are almost as important. 
Canada, Argentina, and Denmark are other 
countries with such vital interests in Temperate 
Zone agricultural exports that a negotiation of 
the scope contemplated in the Kennedy Round 
witliout an inclusion of the farm sector would 
be meaningless for them. 

As far as my own covmtry is concerned, you 
all know what a great part farm exports play 
in our total trade. In 1963, 27 percent, or about 
$51/2 billion of our total exports were m agri- 
cultural goods. Our sales of farm goods to the 
European Economic Community alone were $1.2 
billion. Our exports of such goods to our other 
most important trading partners, notably the 
United Kingdom and Japan, are similarly so 
great that a trade negotiation with them would 
make little sense if the farm sector were not 
to be part and parcel of it. 

Agricultural Phase of Kennedy Round 

Tlie difficulties which we have encoimtered so 
far are not pure coincidence. Agriculture has 
always been a thorny problem in international 
trading relationships, and the Kennedy Round 

is proving no exception. The reasons are not 
difficult to imderstand : Agriculture, first in the 
United States and now also throughout West- 
ern Europe, is midergoing rapid and unprece- 
dented change. A technological revolution is 
taking place. In the United States yields for 
many farm crops have doubled or tripled within 
the last two decades. 

Less than 100 years ago some 65 percent of 
the American people were farmers. Today 
only 8 percent of our people gain their liveli- 
hood from farming. In 1949 the yield per acre 
for corn in the United States was 38 bushels; 
in 1961 corn belt farmers averaged 67 bushels 
per acre. 

Economic farm miits employing modern ag- 
ricultural technology are able to grow increas- 
ing quantities of food at greatly reduced cost. 
In both Europe and the United States the revo- 
lution in agricultural production techniques is 
pressing the small traditional farmer to choose 
either to increase the size of his holdings and 
employ modem methods or to move to better 
paying nonf arm occupations. This vast change 
on the countryside is, of course, a major social 
and political problem as well as an economic 
one. And it is a situation not unique to Ger- 
many, or to Europe, but a conunon problem of 
all industrialized nations, including the United 

It is not surprising, then, that agreement in 
the Kemiedy Round on how to lower agricul- 
tural trade barriei-s is giving us quite a bit of 
difficulty. But it would be unfortunate if we 
failed to find suitable solutions in this area. 
And it would be tragic indeed if the Kennedy 
Round, in agriculture and industry alike, 
should fail as a result of it. 

Where do we stand today in the agricultural 
phase of the Kennedy Round ? Let me sketch 
briefly the history of these negotiations to date. 

Wlien the Kennedy Round began in 1963, as 
I mentioned a moment ago, the ministers wisely 
decided that the negotiations should embrace 
all classes of products, including agriculture. 
They recognized even then that our negotiating 
techniques for agriculture might have to be dif- 
ferent than for the industrial sector, that a 
linear approach, for example, might well not 
be appropriate. They laid down the objectives 



of the agricultural negotiations to be,* 

. . . the creation of acceptable conditions of access 
to world markets for agricultural products in further- 
ance of a sigTilflcant development and expansion of 
world trade in such products. 

We have sought for many months to imple- 
ment this objective by developing a set of rules 
for the negotiations. Let us say it plainly: 
"We have failed in these efforts. Rules sug- 
gested by some of the exporting countries, in- 
cluding the United States, were not acceptable 
to certain importing countries and particularly 
the EEC. A rule proposed by the EEC, the so- 
called mcntant de souflen approach, was unac- 
ceptable to the other nations. 

Reasons for Failure To Agree on Rules 

Tlie reasons for our failure to agree on agri- 
cultural rules can be, at least in part, illustrated 
by a few basic facts about agricultural produc- 
tion and trade. 

First, for the same commodities, very dif- 
ferent domestic price levels prevail in some of 
the key countries. For example, under the 
recent price decisions in Brussels, EEC farmers 
are guaranteed DiI425 per metric ton of soft 
wheat, starting in 1967. In my country, for 
producers not restricting acreage the corre- 
sponding market price is roughly DM185 per 
metric ton, while those who agree to such re- 
strictions receive about DM250. 

Second, the scope of national price-support 
programs varies substantially between coun- 
tries. For example, the United States has price- 
support programs in effect for only about 45 
percent of its agricultural production. The 
Common ilarket, on the other hand, has, or is in 
the process of adopting, support regulations for 
well over 80 percent of its agricultural output. 

Third, the nature of price supports is often 
totally dilFerent. For example, in important 
instances our support programs are coupled 
with obligations by our fanners to restrict 
acreage to certain limits. Thus, in the case of 
soft wheat, wliich I just cited, a farmer can 
get the higher price only if he restricts his pro- 
duction. Xo such obligation exists in the EEC 

* For text of a resolution on trade negotiations 
adopted on May 21, 1963, see ihid., June 24, 1963, p. 99.j. 

and m certain other countries. Furthermore, 
whereiis the U.S. acreage-restriction program is 
voluntary for wheat and feed grains, partici- 
pation by our fanners in such programs is man- 
datory for certain other commodities, such as 
peanuts, rice, cotton, and tobacco. 

Fourth, the type of frontier protection em- 
ployed by various Kennedy Round negotiating 
partners differs substantially. We in the United 
States, for example, normally use only fixed 
tariffs to protect our agricultural producers. 
Only in the case of five commodities — wheat, 
cotton, sugar, peanuts, dairy products — do we 
additionally employ certain nontariff barriers 
at our border. These products accoimt for 
about a quarter of our farm production. You 
will note that, except for dairy products, these 
are precisely the commodities in which we have 
support and production-control programs, thus 
making our nontariff barriers a necessity. You 
in the EEC, on the other hand, use nontariff 
barriers, and in particular variable levies, on a 
much more extensive scale. This makes com- 
parison and negotiation quite diflicult. 

Fifth, the practices of nations with regard to 
export payments for agricultural commodities 
differ widely. The United States uses export 
payments only for a few commodities where 
special difficulties exist, namely, for wheat, rice, 
cotton, and dairj' products. The Common ^lar- 
ket, on the other hand, has regulations for all 
grains, livestock, and dairy products, which pro- 
vide for so-called "refunds"' — in other words, 
schemes for export payments equal to or higher 
than the sum total of your import charges. 

Given the differences in domestic price levels 
which I mentioned a moment ago, the differ- 
ences in export payments between the United 
States and the Conunon Market are quite sub- 
stantial. For example, average French export 
subsidies for wheat during the second half of 
1964 were about $40 per metric ton ; this com- 
pares with a U.S. subsidy which was in the $4 
to $12 range during the same period. 

The bilateral comparison of protection and 
support measures in the United States and the 
Common Market shows how great the differ- 
ences are and why a common set of rules for ne- 
gotiations in agriculture lias been so diflScult to 
find. The problem is, of course, even more com- 

APRIL 26, 1965 


plicated than this brief comparison suggests. 
After all, agricultural trade is not a bilateral 
problem, and when the differences in the policies 
of certain other countries — such as the United 
Kingdom and Japan, Canada and Australia — • 
are taken into accoimt, the issues become even 
more complex. 

Looking merely at the U.S. and EEC price- 
support, protective, and export-subsidy data, 
however, it is perhaps not too difficult to under- 
stand why certain nations in Geneva, including 
the EEC, found it impossible to accept the rule 
that reduction in agricultural protection by 
some specified percentage might be the basis for 
the negotiations. At the same time, other coun- 
tries would not accept the EEC's suggestion for 
a so-called montant de soutien binding as a gen- 
eral rule, for obvious reasons. The system does 
not lend itself to the different situations exist- 
ing in various countries, including the United 
States. Moreover, you will recognize tliat it 
would be a little difficult to convince an Ameri- 
can farmer, who receives a return little more 
than half as great as that of his European 
counterpart and who has to accept acreage and 
other restrictions not imposed on your farmers, 
that a mutual commitment to continue the two 
systems as at the present is hardly a very equal 
deal. Obviously, it would be even more difficult 
to convince that farmer that such a commitment 
improves trade in agriculture, as stipulated by 
the GATT mmisters. 

I will not dwell here on other reasons why 
the montant de soutien approach was not ac- 
cepted in Geneva, including the view of most 
of the negotiating partners that the form of 
binding proposed — namely, a binding in rela- 
tion to a hypothetical price rather than in ab- 
solute terms — is not really a binding at all, 
creates more problems than it solves, and does 
not constitute a valid check on agricultural 
protectionism, let alone leading to some degree 
of liberalization of trade. 

Last this analysis lead you to too pessimistic 
a view of the prospect for agreement on agri- 
culture in the Kennedy Round, let me add that 
the picture is not all black. There are cei-tain 
fundamental elements upon which substantial 
agreement does exist and which may provide a 
hopeful basis for important agreements on agri- 

culture in the Kennedy Round. The very fact 
that our long and arduous discussions in the 
past have enabled us to luiderstand the partic- 
ular methods and objectives of each government 
has also made it possible to establish some 
important areas of agreement. 

Important Areas of Agreement on Agriculture 

First, we have already identified certain 
products, namelj', grains, meat, and dairy prod- 
ucts, on which we will try to achieve improve- 
ments in the world trade situation through 
agreement on certain multilateral arrangements 
between exporting and importing coimtries. 
We have already gone some distance in agree^ 
ing on the elements to be covered in the context 
of this approach. 

Second, we are agreed that the negotiations 
in the Kennedy Round should not cover merely 
the protection at the border but must also deal 
with the implications of the domestic policies, 
wherever these have a real effect on international 
trade. This is one fundamental objective which 
the m,ontant de soutien approach also attempts 
to achieve; and on this question the United 
States, the EEC, and the other countries are in 
full accord. 

Third, we now seem to be in fundamental 
agreement that, given the diversity of the vari- 
ous systems of agricultural support and pro- 
tection in effect in the different countries, no 
single negotiating formula is likely to be ade- 
quate. We have recognized, it would seem, that 
each country must be free to undertake obliga- 
tions that conform with its own particular do- 
mestic system as long as these commitments are 
directed toward the implementation of the 
guiding objective laid down by the GATT min- 
isters, namely, a significant expansion in the 
trade of agricultural products. 

Fourth, we have confirmed and clarified the 
obvious but important principle that the present 
conunitments which all of us have in the GATT 
with regard to agricultural trade must be the 
starting point for the development of wider and 
further commitments. This means that we are 
agreed that the Kennedy Round cannot and 
should not be used as a means for negating pre- 
vious commitments but, rather, to expand and 
improve on them. 




We are at a crucial stage in our agricultural 
negotiations. Given the difficulties, and in the 
light of the areas of agreement whicli we have 
achieved, the Executive Secretary of GATT 
[Eric Wyndham White], vrho is also the chair- 
man of the Trade Negotiations Committee in 
the Kennedy Round, has suggested a procedure 
for countries to exchange concrete offers on 
April 1. designed to achieve ministerial objec- 
tives. We in the United States and many other 
countries in Geneva believe that liis proposal is 
the best one to move the negotiations forward. 
We have been awaiting the Common Market's 
reaction to this proposal, which, we understand, 
has been discussed in Brussels in recent days. 
We are hopeful there will be a positive re- 

In facing the agricultural problem, let us 
approach it with an open mind and recognize 
that prudent self-interest, yours and ours, dic- 
tates mutual compromises leading to agreements 
which can benefit all of our people. Some of the 
decisions that will have to be made will require 
courage and political will. Some decisions will 
not be easy in the short run. But only through 
compromise and the will to succeed will we 
achieve our objective at all. And if we fail in 
the agricultural field, the effect on the rest of the 
negotiations will be serious. It is difficult indeed 
to see how there can be a successful Kennedy 
Round without the agricultural component. 

Optimism for Future of Kennedy Round 

ii In conclusion, despite the hard work which 
lies ahead, particularly in the agricultural 
'sphere, I think we have reason to be optimistic 
for the future of the Kennedy Round. 

We are now fully engaged in the negotiations, 
and I expect most participants are now more 
acutely conscious of the difficulties involved in 
this effort to achieve an unprecedented reduc- 
tion in the barriers to world trade than thov 

'The Trade Negotiations Committee on Mar. 18 
adopted procedures for negotiations on agricultural 
products in the Kennedy Round. Governments which 
are members of the group agreed to table their pro- 
posals on grains by Apr. 26, and negotiations on these 
proposals will begin in the GATT Cereals Group on 
May 17. Proposals and offers on other agricultural 
products will be tabled not later than Sept. 16. 

may have been 2 years ago. But this is a neces- 
sary phase of the negotiations. We are coming 
to grips with intricate economic and political 

It is only through an understanding in depth 
of the components of these problems, and the 
objectives and requirements of the various 
countries concerned, that we can hope to devise 
solutions which improve the situation of all. 
For these are not negotiations in which there 
must be winners and losers. We are not bar- 
gaining in a static situation in which we are 
seeking to divide among ourselves some fixed 
value. We are, in fact, seeking to create the 
conditions in which we can multiply the benefits 
of expanding trade for all to share. And as I 
have already said, while these benefits are im- 
portant in the economic sphere, they are also 
significant in the political area. This applies 
particularly to our effort to create a solid frame- 
work based on mutual interest for our Atlantic 

Memorandum Signed on Study 
of Desalting Plant for Israel 

Following is the text of an announcement 
released concurrently on April 9 hy the Depart- 
ment of State, the U.S. Atomic Energy Com- 
mission, the Department of the Interior, and 
the Government of Israel. 

Press release 71 dated April 9 

A memorandum concerning arrangements for 
a feasibility study of a proposed dual-purpose 
power desalting plant for Israel was signed on 
April 9 by representatives of the United States 
and Israel. The signing took place at the De- 
partment of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary for Wa- 
ter and Power Development, Department of the 
Interior, and James T. Ramey, Commissioner, 
Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the 
United States, and Ambassador Avraham Har- 
man for the Government of Israel. The memo- 
randum contains administrative and super- 
visory arrangements for the jointly financed 
study to be imdertaken by Kaiser Industries, 

APRIL 26, 1695 


Inc., Oakland, Calif., with Catalytic Construc- 
tion Co., Philadelphia, Pa., as subcontractor. 

The contract with Kaiser Industries, Inc., for 
the feasibility study was also signed by officials 
of tlie firm and tlie Department of the Interior. 
The estimated cost of the contract, $340,000, will 
be shared equally by the Governments of the 
United States and Israel. The study is ex- 
pected to be completed in October 1965. 

The study is being undertaken in connection 
with the joint United States-Israel water de- 

salting program agi-eed upon by President 
Johnson and Prime Minister [Levi] Eslikol 
during June 1964.^ The study was recom- 
mended by a joint team of United States and 
Israeli experts who reviewed Israel's water and 
power needs during the summer and fall of 

' For text of a joint communique of June 2, see |!j "' 
Bulletin of June 22, 1964, p. 959. !l 

' For bacliground, see ibid., June 29, 1964, p. 100 ; Aug. 
IT, 1964, p. 230 ; and Nov. 16, 1964, p. 724. 


Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause 
In Transportation Act Urged 

Statement hy Under Secretary Mann ^ 

Mr. Chainnan, I appreciate the opportunity 
to testify on section 1007 of the Housing and Ur- 
ban Development Bill of 1965, which you have 
before you. This section would repeal section 
9(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 
which requires that contractors "sliall use only 
such manufactured articles as have been manu- 
factured in the United States" in performing 
work for which loans or grants are made under 
the act. 

The administration believes that section 9 (c) 
should be repealed. Let me set forth the main 
reasons for tliis. 

First, we have a steadily expanding interest 
m foreign trade. During the last 4 years our 
commercial exports rose from $17.5 billion to 
$22.3 billion, an increase of more than 27 per- 
cent. Our conunercial trade balance in 1964 — 
the svirplus of our commercial exports over com- 
mercial imports — was $3.7 billion. Our total 

^ Made before the subcommittee on housing of the 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee on Mar. 30. 

surplus of exports over imports, includmg Gov- 
ernment-financed shipments but excluding mili- 
tary supplies, was $6.5 billion. 

Our expanding exports, and the growing sur- 
plus of these over our imports, not only contrib- 
ute to our domestic prosperity but also are vital 
to our balance-of-payments situation. They 
carry the load for balance-of-payments sectors 
in which we have continuing deficits. 

Section 9(c) threatens to cut down on that 
commercial surplus — because we cannot expect 
foreign countries to follow relatively liberal 
policies in trade with us if we refuse to buy their 
goods. We know from the complaints received 
from other governments that this action has ex- 
cited some of their industries to demand that 
purcliases of U.S. goods be hampered. Trade is 
not a one-way proposition. It is and has to be 
two-way. If we limit our imports, others will 
limit our exports. 

Second, there is no need for such a provision. 
Our industry competes very well on the open 
market with foreign industry. We coukhi't 
have got that $3.7 billion export surplus if our 
products were inferior or overpriced. Take the 
two commodity groups primarily affected by 
section 9(c)— metals and manufactures, and 
machinery and vehicles. In those we had a sur- 



plus of exports over imports amount ing^ to about 
$5 billion in 1963, the most recent full year for 
wliifh the statistics are available. It is true that 
on certain products it is more economical to 
buy foreign — there would be no world trade if 
tills were not sometimes the case. But we are 
confident that, overall, our goods can compete. 
"We don't need to give our industry absolute jn-o- 
tection over and above existing tariffs. 

Third, because we have a vital interest in for- 
eign trade and Icnow that we can compete, we 
have entered into international negotiations to 
reduce barriers to trade. That is what we are 
doing right now in the Kennedy Round. Sec- 
tion S)(c) of tlie Transportation Act is incon- 
sistent with the international trading rules we 
have accepted as part of the bipartisan-sup- 
ported trade agi'eements program we liave pur- 
sued since the thirties. Because we have put up 
a new trade barrier just when we are trying to 
get others to lower theirs through the Kennedy 
Round, we have weakened our influence in 

Fourth, section 9(c) goes beyond the "Buy 
American" Act. In the first place, the "Buy 
American" Act applies (a) to U.S. Government 
procurement and (b) for U.S. Government use. 
The goods and services to be purchased under 
the Mass Transportation Act are for the pur- 
pose of providing transportation .services which 
will not be used by any government but rather 
will be sold to the general public in terms of 
fares and tickets. It is precisely this differ- 
ence whicli gives us our problems in keeping 
within the bounds of our international obliga- 
tions, specifically the principle of national treat- 
ment. Second, the "Buy American" Act, as it 
is applied today, makes it necessary for foreign 
firms to underbid American firms by certain 
percentage points. Section 9(c), on the other 
hand, makes it impossible to buy foreign goods 
for this program no matter what the price dif- 
ference is. Third, not only does section 9(c) 
give an absolute preference to our products, but 
it also enforces tliis preference on goods bought 
witli State and local moneys which are com- 
mingled with Federal fimds. Wliile there are 
a number of governments which discriminate 
against foreign suppliers along the broad lines 
of our "Buy American" legislation, we know 

of no discrimination which extends to com- 
mingled national and local funds for projects 
similar to the ones contemplated in the Mass 
Transportation Act. 

"When the President signed the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act, he did it in the knowledge 
that section 9(c) was a bad provision that could 
do us harm. He then pledged that ho would 
seek its repeal. 

For the reasons stated, I ask you to approve 
enactment of section 1007 of the bill you have 
before you. 

Funds Requested for Salinity 
Control on Lower Colorado River 

White House press release dated April 1 

The President transmitted to Congress on 
April 1 an amendment to the 1966 budget 
amounting to $5.2 million for the Bureau of Rec- 
lamation for salinity control measures on the 
lower Colorado River and initiation of a pro- 
gram of water salvage and drainage for the 
Yuma "\^alley. 

The amount requested will not increase the 
totals proposed in tlie 1966 budget. 

The sum of $2.2 million is proposed to com- 
plete construction of the temporary extension to 
the drainage channel of the Wellton-Mohawk 
In-igation and Drainage District of Arizona. 
"Work will be initiated on the extension in 1965 
with available funds. The extension will per- 
mit discharge of drainage either above or below 
Morelos Dam, Mexico's main diversion point on 
the Colorado River, pursuant to an agreement 
on salinity control measures on the lower Colo- 
rado River, signed March 22, 1965, by the Com- 
missioners of the International Boundaiy and 
"Water Commission, United States and ilexico.^ 
In accordance with the agreement, completion 
of the drainage channel is scheduled for October 


Another $3 million is requested to initiate 
work on a system of wells and drainage facili- 
ties in the Yuma Valley. Tliis program will 

' For background and text of agreement, see Bul- 
letin of Apr. 5, 19C5, p. 555. 

APRIL 26, 1965 


augment Colorado Kiver water supplies, pro- 
vide additional capacity to assist in regulating 
delivery of water to Mexico, and provide drain- 
age benefits to irrigated lands in the Yuma area. 
The pending budget request of $183,450,000 
for construction and rehabilitation. Bureau of 
Reclamation, is revised to $188,650,000. 

President Asks Authority To Remove 
Duties on Canadian Auto Products 

The White Eoxise on March SI made -public 
the following letter from President Johnson 
to Hubert H. Humphrey^ President of the Sen- 
ate. The President sent an identical letter to 
John W. McCorrnack, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives. 

White House press release dated March 31 


Dear Mk. President : On January 16, Prime 
Minister Pearson of Canada and I signed an 
important agreement looking toward freer 
trade in automotive products between our two 
North American countries.^ This Agreement 
resolves the serious difference wliich existed be- 
tween Canada and the United States over our 
automotive trade. More significantly, it marks 
a long step forward in United States commer- 
cial relations with her greatest trading partner. 
It testifies to the goodwill and confidence be- 
tween us. 

The automotive producers of the United 
States and Canada make up a single great North 
American industry. The same kind of cars, 
using the same parts, are produced on both 
sides of the border, in many cases in factories 
only a few miles apart. Over 90% of the auto- 
mobiles sold in Canada are assembled by finns 
owned in part or in whole by United States com- 
panies. The men and women who work in the 
plants on both sides of the border are members 
of the same international union. 

Tariffs and other restrictions involving Cana- 
dian-United States trade in automotive prod- 

^For background and text of agreement, see Bul- 
letin of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191. 

ucts have been the cause of significant ineffi- 
ciency in this great industry. Canadian plants 
produce a great variety of cars, essentially 
identical with those made in far larger num- 
bers in the United States. Because the Cana- 
dian market is relatively small, production runs 
have been short, and costs and prices have been 
high. High costs and prices, in turn— sup- 
ported by the tariff and other restrictions- 
have contributed to keeping the market small. 
Historically, Canada's share in North Ameri- 
can automotive production has lagged far be- 
hind her share in automotive purchases. In 
1963, in an attempt to increase its share of the 
North American market, the Canadian Govern- 
ment put into effect a plan, involving the remis- 
sion of tariffs, which was designed to stimulate 
automotive exports. A number of United 
States manufacturers, believing they would be 
injured by the plan, called upon this Govern- 
ment to impose covmtervailing duties. In all 
probability, such action would have invited 
retaliation. We were faced by the prospect 
of a wasteful contest of stroke and counter- 
stroke, harmful to both Canada and the United 
States, and helpful to neither. Our broader 
good relations with our Canadian friends 
would have suffered serious strain. 

To avoid such a dismal outcome, our two gov- 
ernments bent every effort to find a rational 
solution to the problems of a divided industry. 
The Automotive Products Agi-eement that the 
Prime Minister and I signed in January is the 
result of our joint labors. 

The agreement will benefit both countries. 
We will have avoided a serious commercial con- 
flict. Canada will have achieved her objective 
of increasmg her automotive production. 
United States manufacturers will be able to 
plan their production to make most efficient use 
of their plants, whether in Canada or the United 
States. They will save the price of the tariff, 
and, over the longer run, we will benefit from 
the faster growth in the Canadian market which 
lower prices will make possible. 

The Agreement has already brought results. 
The Canadian Government revoked its con- 
troversial plan and, on January 18, reduced all 
relevant duties to zero. I am informed that the 
Canadian Parliament will be asked to give its 
approval in the near future. 





"We recognize, of course, that full integration 
of the North American automobile industry 
cannot be brought about all at once. To allow 
time for adjustment, the Canadian sector of the 
industry^less than 1/20 the size of ours — will 
operate initially under special arrangements. 
The Agreement itself will be subject to compre- 
hensive review no later than January 1, 1968. 
"We should then be in a position to judge what 
further steps are necessary. 

In signing the Agreement, I pledged myself 
to ask the Congress to authorize the President to 
remove all United States duties on Canadian 
automobiles and parts for original equipment. 
I am today sending to the Congress draft legis- 
lation which would give the President that au- 
thority. The proposed legislation would also 
authorize the President to make similar auto- 
motive agreements with other countries, and 
to make agreements leading to mutually bene- 
ficial reduction of duties on replacement parts. 

I repeat : In my judgment, the Agreement will 
benefit both Canada and the United States, and 
the automotive industry and automotive work- 
ers in both countries. However, we recognize 
that adjustments in an industry of such size 
could result in temporary dislocation for par- 
ticular firms and their workers. 

To provide appropriate relief, the Bill I pro- 
pose will make applicable the adjustment as- 
sistance of Title III of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962. The tariff change contemplated in 
the automotive agreement, is, however, a special 
case. Tariffs will be cut to zero, all at one time. 
Furthermore, dislocation, if it should occur, 
may well be due as much to the decrease in ex- 
ports of certain products as to an increase in 
imports. Therefore, this Bill calls for special 
procedures for obtaining adjustment assistance. 
These special procedures will be limited in ap- 
plication to this Agreement and to a transition 
period of three years. If a similar agreement is 
made with another country, or if we should 
make agreements affecting replacement parts, 
appropriate adjustment assistance legislation 
will be recommended to the Congress. 
* * * * 

The Agreement and this Bill are designed to 
lead to a more efficient organization of the North 
American automotive industry. It is based on 

APRIL 26, 1963 

mutual trust and will result in mutual benefit — 
benefit to producers, to labor, and to consumers 
on both sides of the border. 

Canada has acted. It is our turn. In order 
that we may act, I ask the Congress to approve 
promptly this legislation. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Hear- 
ing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on S.693. February 16, 1965. 73 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II. Feb- 
ruary 17-24, 1965. 172 pp. 

To Amend the Arms Control and DLsarmament Act 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on S. 672 and H.R. 2998. February 22-23, 
1965. 132 pp. 

January 1965 Economic Report of the President. Hear- 
ings before the Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. 
February 24, 1965. 33 pp. 

Report on Audit of the Export-Import Bank of Wash- 
ington, Fiscal Tear 1964, Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 841. 
H. Doc. 105. March 8, 19<>.">. 28 pp. 

Communication from the President transmitting a re- 
port indicating the necessity for a supplemental 
estimate of appropriation for the Inter-American 
Development Bank for fiscal year 1965. H. Doc. 112. 
March 15, 1965. 2 pp. 

Communication from the President transmitting a 
draft of proposed legislation entitled "A Bill To 
Amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act To Au- 
thorize an Increase in the International Monetary 
Fund Quota of the United States." H. Doc. 121. 
March 17, 196.'>. 3 pp. 

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parlia- 
mentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 
89. S.Rept. 125. Jlarch 18, 19C5. 2 pp. 

Special Report of the National Advi-sory Council on 
Proposed Increases in Quotas of the International 
Monetary Fund. H. Doc. 122. March 18, 1965. 
22 pp. 

U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies. Eleventh Report by 
the Committee on Government Oi>erations. H. Rept. 
199. March 22, 1965. 45 pp. 

Amending the Request for Appropriations for the Inter- 
American Development Bank. H. Doc. 127. March 
.SO, 1965. 2 pp. 

Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between 
the United States and Canada. Communication 
from the President transmitting a draft of proposed 
legislation. II. Doc. 1.32. March 31, 19G.5. 10 pp. 

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Report 
to accompany S. 693. S. Rept. 143. April 1, 1965. 

31 pp. ^ . « 

Increasing the International Monetary Fund Quota or 

the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 6497. 

H. Rept. 222. April 1, 1965. 27 pp. 
Saigon Chancery. Report to accompany H.R. i0(>4. 

H. Rept. 225. April 3, 1965. 4 pp. 



Third Annual Meeting of Inter- American Economic and Social Council 

hy F. Bradford Morse ^ 

Mr. Speaker, between November 30 and De- 
cember 11, of last year, the Inter- American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (lA-ECOSOC) held 
its third annual meeting, to review develop- 
ments under the Alliance for Progress, in Lima, 
Peru. lA-ECOSOC is one of the three de- 
pendent organs of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States (OAS) and has provided since 1961 
inter-American multilateral direction for the 
Alliance for Progress. 

It was my good fortune to serve with my 
colleague. Congressman Armistead Seldon, as 
a member of the U.S. delegation to the con- 
ference last December. Congressman Seldon 
is chairman of the House of Eepresentatives' 
Subcommittee on Inter- American Affairs. His 
profound knowledge of Latin American affairs 
was an invaluable contribution to the delegation. 
The conference opened with a preparatory 
1-week meeting at the expert level preceding the 
meeting at the ministerial level. The United 
States delegation at the ministerial meeting was 
headed by the very able Assistant Secretary of 
State and United States Coordinator of the Al- 
liance for Progress, Thomas C. Mann, recently 
nominated by the President for Under Secre- 
tary of State for Economic Affairs.^ Deputy 
U.S. Coordinator William D. Sogers headed the 
U.S. delegation at the meeting of experts. The 
quality of the work of both of these men de- 
served high commendation. Certainly, the 
effectiveness of the United States delegation 


was due in large part to their experienced and 
effective leadership. 

Accomplishments of the Meeting 

The climate of the conference was both posi- 
tive and optimistic. The meeting saw the 
launching of a new special development assist- 
ance fund, to be operated and supported on a 
multilateral basis. The statutes of the fund 
and its first amuial budget were approved. A 
number of participating nations pledged spe- 
cific contributions, while others stated their 
intention to pledge specific contributions in the 
near future. The fund, with a budget of about 
$9 million, will support a number of multilateral 
alliance activities including technical assistance 
for planning, technical training programs, pub- 
lic information, and technical assistance for in- 
stitutional development. 

The lA-ECOSOC also considered and ap- 
proved a nmnber of resolutions in addition to 
the statutes and budget of the special develop- 
ment assistance fimd. 

Among these were re- 

• A report made in the House of Representatives on 
Mar. 24. Congressman Morse was a member of the 
U.S. delegation to the ministerial meeting of the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council held at Lima, 
Peru, Dec. 5-11, 1964. 

= For a statement made by Mr. Mann at Lima on Dec. 
8, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1964, p. 898. Mr. Mann's 
nomination as Under Secretary was confirmed by the 
Senate on Mar. 9. 




quests for the Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) to give spe- 
cial attention to certain problems such as ex- 
ternal trade, maritime transport charges in re- 
lation to the balance of payments, regional 
integration and capital ilight, and the relation- 
ship between population growth and social and 
economic development. 

One of the most hopeful reports made at the 
conference was the Ministers' estimation that 
in 1964. for the first time, the average per capita 
gi'owth rate for all of I^itin America would 
equal or possibly exceed the target rate (21/2 
perceiit per capita per year) urged in the Char- 
ter of Punta del Este. They also noted the 
substantial increase (at least 8 percent) in ex- 
port earnings which will probably materialize 
in 1964, when all the statistics become available. 

In the estimation of the Latin American dele- 
gates, however, foreign trade continues to be a 
major problem, particularly with respect to 
maintaining recent price increases for basic 

On a more pessimistic note, concerning agri- 
culture, the review stated : 

. . . that DO great progress has been made, except 
in isolated cases, in the technical improvement of agri- 
culture, in increasing agricultural productivity, or in 
carrying out programs of agrarian reform. 

The Ministers stressed the need to promote 
more active participation in the programs for 
development by all the people, including rural 
and urban commimities, labor unions, business 
groups, as well as government instrumentali- 
ties. This is a very healthy development, in my 
opinion, and demonstrates a growing under- 
standing of the social aspects of economic devel- 

In the housing field, lA-ECOSOC recognized 
the important efforts which many countries have 
already made. However, the gap between re- 
quirements and new housing construction con- 
tinues to grow. There is no question in my 
mind that greater efforts will therefore be nec- 
essary in this field. 

The Latin American delegations were partic- 
ularly concerned with the relatively slow pace 
of regional economic integration through the 
Latin American Free Trade Association, and 
made a call for early action to accelerate inte- 


APRIL 26, 1965 

gration through existing institutions. By con- 
trast, the Central American countries were con- 
gratulated on the progress they have made in the 
completion of the Central American Common 

The general satisfaction expressed by all dele- 
gations with respect to the work of the Inter- 
American Committee on the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, which had been created by lA-ECOSOC 
the year before, was a highlight of tlie discus- 
sion at Lima. CIAP was set up as a sort of year- 
round multilateral executive committee of the 
lA-ECOSOC. Among other things, it con- 
ducted for the first time a review of each coun- 
try's performance under the Alliance for Prog- 

This country review process is the heart of the 
economic and social development programs em- 
bodied in the alliance. The concept is premised 
on the thesis that aid is useless imless the recip- 
ient country has developed a comprehensive 
plan which coordinates development problems 
such as land and institutional reform with 
monetary and fiscal problems. This was not 
done a few years ago with regard to Brazil, for 
example. The result ? The United States was 
supporting the Brazilian currency during a 
period when the Brazilian Government was tak- 
ing no steps to control an extremely high and 
rapidly growing rate of inflation. 

External Trade Conditions and Prospects 

I was greatly impressed by the preoccupation 
of Latin American member countries with ex- 
ternal trade conditions and prospects. Of 
course, 1964 was a year that witnessed consid- 
erable international attention focused on the 
trade problems of the developing nations. This 
attention centered around the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) held in Geneva, March 23 through 
June 16, 1964. Prior to this conference, the 
Latin American nations held two meetings, the 
first at Brasilia and the second at Alta Gracia in 
Argentina. At Brasilia, the government ex- 
perts considered a document prepared by the 
secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA). The conclusions 
adopted at this meeting were subsequently re- 


\aewed at Alta Gracia by the representatives 
of 19 Latin American countries under the aus- 
pices of the Organization of American States. 
These meetings were intended to produce a 
consensus as to the goals of the UNCTAD. 

In Lima, most spokesmen were critical of 
what they feared to be a protectionist tendency 
of the industrial countries. Substantial im- 
provements by the developing countries, both 
in export earnings and in terms of trade in 1964, 
did not prevent considerable concern about the 
future trade prospects of the region. 

Underlying these criticisms is a concern 
which has been explicit in inter- American rela- 
tions for the last three decades: The Latin 
American nations, their economies oriented to- 
ward primary products, believe that the trend 
of the tenns of trade is moving against them 
in favor of the industrial nations. They be- 
lieve that the basic trend of the ratio of prices 
of their imports as compared with the earnings 
of their exports is mcreasrngly imfavorable. 
Furthermore, they are faced with the prospect 
of greater balance-of -payment deficits as their 
imports increase due to development needs, im- 
ports made up for the most part of vitally 
needed machinery and machine products. 

An obvious answer to these problems is a 
diversified economy. Even partial industriali- 
zation, however, is a lengthy process, especially 
in the face of severe social and consequent polit- 
ical strains. The one mimediate answer that 
the Latin Americans see to this problem is ex- 
panded exports in stable world markets at 
higher prices. Under the umbrella of favorable 
world markets, the developing nations believe 
they can diversify and expand their economies. 

Two things are certain : Most Latin American 
countries don't earn the import credit that they 
feel they need to achieve a satisfactory rate of 
economic growth; and, second, they believe that 
the answer to their problems lies in some form 
of regulation of the world markets for primaiy 
goods which are controlled in one way or 
another by the industrial nations. Tliey believe 
primary products are sold in a buyer's market 
whereas industrial goods are sold in a seller's 

It is obviously very frustrating to believe that 
the solution to one's problems is dependent on 

the good will of other nations. In the case of 
the Latin American nations, the expression to 
their frustration was found in UNCTAD and 
the meetings which preceded it. 

A North-South Duolog 

These meetings are important because they 
portend a new alinement in world relations. 
We no longer have an inter-American dialog 
but a world duolog with industrial nations more 
or less alined on one side of the conversation 
and the developing nations alined on the other. 

The effects of tliis alinement were certainly 
felt at UNCTAD, where the developing nations 
clearly dominated the proceedings. If it main- 
tains coherence, it will certainly be heard again 
in international organizations in general and in 
inter- American relations in particular. 

The United States has clearly supported ef- 
forts of economic organization in the hem- 
isphere, such as the Latin American Free Trade 
Association and the Central American Common 
Market. These groups are directed toward self- 
help by increasmg intraregional trade. How- 
ever, they also represent a possible base for a 
future duolog between the north and the south. 

I believe that several important observations 
can be made about this conference : 

First. The Latin American governments re- 
main keenly sensitive to the possibility that 
wide price fluctuations of their principal export 
commodities may cause a recurrence of serious 
balance-of-i>ayments deficits, thus wiping out 
their own efforts and the potential development 
progress supported by external assistance. 

Second. The annual review of the Alliance 
for Progress is becoming more effective with 
each meeting. This year the conference spent 
much less time talking about external assistance 
and more trying to advance reform and develop- 

Third. The Lima meetings gave the clear im- 
pression that the peoples and governments of 
Latin America are becoming firmly committed 
to the principles and objectives of the Charter 
of Punta del Este. 

Fourth. The work of CIAP in its first year 
of operation basically satisfied the expectations 
of tlie delegations. The general feeling was that 
the Committee had given the alliance better 



cohesion and a decided multilateral direction. 
The report of CIAP to lA-ECOSOC was the 
basis of much of the debate at tlie meetings. 

Fifth. Finally, as crucial as the economic and 
trade problems of Latin America are, I believe 

I that more attention must be given social prob- 
lems, such as public education, during the lA- 
ECOSOC meetings. In the early stages of 
development, public expectations are going to 
exceed accomplishment, rubstantial though that 
accomplishment may be. Consequently, the 
pressure for stopgap solutions which may be 
more illusory than real will be great. 

It is my firm belief that such solutions can 
only be avoided by accompanying economic 
progress with sound social reform. lA- 
ECOSOC presents the nations of the hemi- 
sphere with an opportunity to examine the prac- 
tical problems involved in social reform. I 
hope more of the Council's time will be spent do- 
ing so in the future. Just as meaningful eco- 
nomic development depends in the ultimate on 
a stable political framework, stable democratic 
political institutions depend in the long nm on a 
sound foundation of social justice. 


U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement 
on Claims Relating to Gut Dam 

Press release 60 dated March 25 

An agreement for the final disposition of 
claims of nationals of the United States against 
Canada arising out of the construction and 
maintenance of Gut Dam across the inter- 
national boundary in the St. Lawrence Kiver 
•was signed on March 25 at Ottawa by United 
States Ambassador "W. "Walton Butterworth and 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Af- 
fairs Paul Martin. 

The agreement provides for the establishment 

APRIL 26, 1965 

of a three-member international arbitral tri- 
bunal known as the Lake Ontario Claims Tri- 
bunal United States and Canada. The tribunal 
will determine whether Gut Dam caused dam- 
age to American property holders by raising 
the water level of Lake Ontario and, if it did, 
the amount of damages sustained and who is 
liable for the damage. The Canadian Govern- 
ment agrees to pay for all damages for which 
it is fovmd liable. 

The agreement will be submitted to the Senate 
for advice and consent to ratification by the 
President. After ratification, individual prop- 
erty owners will at the appropriate time be in- 
formed about the procedures for filing claims. 

The Department of State considers this agi-ee- 
ment a further demonstration of the close and 
friendly ties which characterize the relationship 
between Canada and the United States. 



The Government of the United States of Amebica 
AND THE Government of Canada, 

Considering ttiat claims hare been made by nationals 
of the United States of America against the Govern- 
ment of Canada alleging that their property in the 
United States has suffered damage or detriment as 
a result of high water levels in Lake Ontario or the 
St. Lawrence River ; 

Considering that these claimants have alleged fur- 
ther that the damage or detriment was attributable 
in whole or in part to the construction and mainte- 
nance of a dam in the international section of the St. 
Lawrence River known as and hereinafter referred 
to as "Gut Dam" and have claimed compensation for 
such damage or detriment from the Government of 
Canada ; and 

Considering that in the special circumstances asso- 
ciated with these claims the need arises to establish 
an international arbitral tribunal to hear and dis- 
pose of these claims in a final fashion, 
Have agreed as follows : 

Article I 

1. An international arbitral tribunal, which shall be 
known as the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal United 
States and Canada, hereinafter referred to as "the 
Tribunal", is hereby established for the purpose of 
hearing and Anally disposing of claims of naUonals of 


the United States of America including juridical per- 
sons that are presented to the Tribunal in accordance 
with the terms of this Agreement. 

2. The Tribunal shall consist of the Chairman and 
two national members. One national member shall 
be appointed by the Government of the United States 
of America within two months after this Agreement 
enters into force ; the other national member shall be 
appointed by the Government of Canada within the 
same period ; a third member, who shall preside over 
the Tribunal as Chairman, shall be designated jointly 
by the two Governments within three months after this 
Agreement enters into force. If the third member has 
not been designated within three months after this 
Agreement enters into force, either Party to this Agree- 
ment may request the President of the International 
Court of Justice to designate such third member. In 
the event of the inability of any member of the Tri- 
bunal to serve, or in the event of a member failing to 
act as such, his successor shall be chosen in accordance 
with the same procedure and within the same time 
limits provided herein for the selection of his pred- 

3. Each member of the Tribunal shall have one vote. 
Every decision of the Tribunal shall be reached by a 
majority vote and shall constitute a full and final 
determination of the subject matter of the decision. 

4. Each member of the Tribunal shall be a judge 
or a lawyer competent to hold high judicial office in 
his national State. No member prior to his appoint- 
ment shall have been associated directly or indirectly 
with any matter relating to this Agreement. 

5. Each member of the Tribunal, before entering 
upon his duties, shall make and snb.scribe to a solemn 
declaration before the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal 
stating that he will carefully and impartially examine 
and decide according to his best judgment and in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of this Agreement all 
matters presented for his decision. A duiJlicate of 
every such declaration shall be filed with each of the 
Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal. 

Abticle II 
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and 
decide in a final fashion each claim presented to it 
in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Each 
decision of the Tribunal shall be based on its deter- 
mination of any one or more of the following questions 
on the basis of the legal principles set forth in this 
Article : 

(a) Was the construction and maintenance of Gut 
Dam the proximate cause of damage or detriment to 
the property that is the subject of such claim? 

(b) If the construction and maintenance of Gut 
Dam was the proximate cause of damage or detriment 
to such property, what was the nature and extent of 
damage caused? 

(c) Does there exist any legal liability to pay com- 
pensation for any damage or detriment caused by the 
construction and maintenance of Gut Dam to such 
property ? 

(d) If there exists a legal liability to pay compen- 
sation for any damage or detriment caused by the con- 
struction and maintenance of Gut Dam to such prop- 
erty, what is the nature and extent of such damage 
and what amount of compensation in terms of United 
States dollars should be paid therefor and by whom? 

2. The Tribunal shall determine any legal liability 
issue arising under paragraph 1 of this Article in 
accordance with the following provisions : 

(a) The Tribunal shall apply the substantive law in 
force in Canada and in the United States of America 
(exclusive, however, of any laws limiting the time 
within which any legal suit with respect to any claim 
is required to be instituted) to all the facts and cir- 
cumstances surrounding the construction and mainte- 
nance of Gut Dam including all the documents passing 
between Governments concerning the construction of 
tlie dam and other relevant documents. 

(b) In this Article the law in force in Canada and 
the United States of America respectively includes in- 
ternational law. 

(e) No claim shall be disallowed or rejected by the 
Tribunal through the application of the general prin- 
ciple of international law that legal remedies must 
be exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity 
or allowance of any claim. 

3. In the event that in the opinion of the Tribunal 
there exists such a divergence between the relevant 
substantive law in force in Canada and in the United 
States of America that it is not possible to make a 
final decision with regard to any particular claim as 
provided by this Article, the Tribunal shall apply 
such of the legal principles set forth in paragraph 2 
as it considers appropriate, having regard to the desire 
of the Parties hereto to reach a solution just to all 
interests concerned. 

4. The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction over 
any claim presented under this Agreement unless the 
claim is accompanied by an undertaking, signed by the 
claimant in a form that is valid and binding under 
United States and Canadian law on any such claiiiuint 
and his successors and assigns and indicating that he 

(a) accepts the decision of the Tribunal as final and 
binding with respect to the matters to which it relates, 

(b) waives any right he may have to proceed against 
the Government of Canada otherwise than in a manner 
consistent with the terms of this Agreement. 

5. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prevent 
the Tribunal from making any general finding or find- 
ings with resijeet to all claims submitted to it, or any 
particular category of claims submitted to it. ,,1 

Article III 

1. Any claim presented to the Tribunal under the 
terms of this Agreement shall be considered and dealt 
with exclusively in accordance with the procedures set 
out in this Agreement. 

2. The Government of the United States of America ^ 
shall take such action as may be necessary to ensurejjj 



that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the 
United States shall discontinue its investigation and 
determination of nil claims relating to Gut Dam. 

Article IV 

1. Each Government shall appoint a Secretary of the 
Tribunal. The persons so appointed shall act a.s Joint 
Secretaries of the Tribunal and shall be subject to its 

2. The Tribunal may appoint such other persons, in- 
cluding engineers, as are considered necessary to assist 
In the performance of its duties, on such terms and 
conditions as the Tribunal may see fit, subject only to 
the availability of funds provided by the two Govern- 
ments for the expenses of tlie Tribunal. 

Abticle V 
The Tribunal shall meet at such times and places 
as may be agreed upon by the members of the Tri- 
bunal, subject to instructions of the two Governments. 

Akticle VI 
The Tribunal shall, with the concurrence of the two 
Governments, adopt such rules for its proceedings as 
may be deemed expedient and necessary, but no such 
rule shall contravene any of the provisions of this 
Agreement. The rules shall be designed to expedite 
the determination of claims. 

Article VII 

1. Within 90 days after this Agreement enters into 
force, the Government of the United States of America 
shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal 
three copies of the claim of each national of the United 
States of America alleging damage or detriment caused 
by the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam that 
it is submitting for adjudication. It shall also within 
the same period transmit three copies of each such 

"claim to the Government of Canada. The claims shall 
be accompanied by all of the evidence on which the 
Government of the United States of America intends 
to rely. 

2. Within 120 days after the receipt of each claim 

il by the Government of Canada, in accordance with the 
I terms of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Government of 
) Canada shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the 
Tribunal three copies of the answer it is submitting 
with respect to such claim. It shall also within the 
same i)eriod transmit three copies of each such answer 
to the Government of the United States of America. 
The answer shall be accompanied by all of the evidence 
on which the Government of Canada intends to rely. 

3. Within such time as may be prescribed by the 
rules adopted by the Tribunal : 

(a) The Government of the United States of America 
shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal 
three copies of a brief with reference to the construc- 
tion and maintenance of Gut Dam and to any damage 
or detriment caused thereby and three copies of all 
briefs being submitted In support of the claims; 

(b) The Government of the United States of .\merica 
shall transmit three copies of each such brief to the 

Government of Canada ; and 

(c) The Government of Canada shall file with the 
Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal three copies of one 
or more briefs in reply to the briefs of the Government 
of the United States of America and transmit three 
copies of the brief or briefs of the Government of 
Canada as so filed to the Government of the United 
States of America. 

With the briefs each Government may submit evidence 
to rebut evidence submitted by the other Government. 

4. No other pleadings or other briefs may be sub- 
mitted by either Government except at the request of 
or with the approval of the Tribunal. 

Article VIII 

1. Each Government shall designate an Agent who 
shall present to the Tribunal all the pleadings, evi- 
dence, briefs and arguments of his Government with 
respect to any claim filed with the Tribunal in accord- 
ance with the provisions of this Agreement. To assist 
the Agent, each Government may employ or appoint 
such counsel, engineers, investigators and other persons 
as it may desire. 

2. All individual claims shall be presented to the 
Tribunal through the Agent of the Government of the 
United States of America. 

Article TX 

Whenever under the terms of this Agreement the 
approval or other form of instructions of Governments 
is required, such approval or other form of instructions 
shall be communicated by the Agent of such Govern- 
ment. All other communications required to be made 
to or by either Government under the terms of this 
Agreement shall be channeled through its Agent. 

Article X 

The Governments shall make all reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the members of the Tribunal, Agents, coun- 
sel and other appropriate persons shall be permitted 
at all reasonable times to enter and view and carry 
on investigations upon any of the property covered by 
any claim presented under the terms of this Agreement. 

Article XI 
The tribunal shall keep accurate permanent records 

of all its proceedings. 

Article XII 

1. The Tribunal shall in an expeditious manner 
render decisions on the matters referred to it and 
shall from time to time make such Interim reports as 
are requested by the two Governments or as the 
Tribunal deems advisable. 

2. The Tribunal .shall submit to the Agents a copy 
of each decision when rendered. Each such decision 
shall be supported by reasons in writing and shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the record of all the pro- 
ceedings maintained in relation to the hearing of the 
claim with which the decision is concerned. 

3. A minority member may report a dissenting opin- 

APRIL 26, 1965 


ion in writing, which shall accompany any decision of 
the Tribunal submitted under the provisions of para- 
graph 2 of this Article to the Agents. 

4. The decisions of the majority of the members of 
the Ti-ibunal shall be the decisions of the Tribunal and 
shall be accepted as final and binding by the two 

Aetiole XIII 
Awards of the Tribunal shall be entered in United 
States dollars. Every award made by the Tribunal 
shall be paid in United States dollars within one year 
from the date the Tribunal submits the decision to 
which the award relates to the two Governments in 
accordance with the provisions of Article XII. 
Article XIV 
The Tribunal shall determine and render decisions 
on all claims submitted to it within a period of two 
years from the date of the first meeting of the Tribunal, 
unless the two Governments agree to extend the period. 
Abticle XV 
Each Government shall defray the expenses incurred 
by it in the presentation of claims, pleadings, evidence 
and arguments to the Tribunal and shall pay the sal- 
ary of its national member. All other expenses of the 
Tribunal, including the honorarium of the Chairman of 
the Tribunal, which shall be fixed by agreement of 
the two Governments, shall be defrayed in equal por- 
tions by the two Governments. 

Abticle XVI 

1. This Agreement shall be ratified, and the instru- 
ments of ratification shall be exchanged at Washing- 
ton as soon as possible. 

2. This Agreement shall enter into force on the 
day of exchange of the instruments of ratification. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentia- 
ries have signed the present Agreement. 

Done in duplicate at Ottawa, this twenty-fifth day of 
March, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five. 

W. Walton Butteewoeth 

Patjl Mabtin 

Current Actions 


Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 11, 1965. 

Done at 


Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of 
industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at 
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 
1911 at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London 
June 2 1934. and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done 
at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 4, 1962. TI AS 4931. . ,. ^ -n 
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, March 17, 1965 ; effective July 1, 1965. 

Satellite Communications System 

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 


Signature: Department of Posts and Telegraphs for 

Sudan, April 5, 1965. 

International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961; for the United 
States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Malta, March 22, 196o. 


General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with annexes 
and schedules and protocol of provisional applica- 
tion. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 

1700. ,..,..,. ^ t. 

Admitted as contracting party (.with rights and ob- 
ligations dating from independence) : Burandi, 
February 26, 1965. 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington 
March 22 through April 23, 1965.' 
Signature: Ireland, April 9, 1965 ; Italy, April 7, 1965. 



Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected : 
by exchange of notes at Cotonou March 8 and Id,. 
1965. Entered into force March 13, 1965. 


Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio oper- 
ators of either country to operate their stations in i 
the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Quito March 26, 1965. Entered into force March 2t5, 


Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as 
amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, o723), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Washington April 2, 1965. Enters into 
force on the date on which each Government receives 
from the otJier written notification that it has com- 
plied with all statutory and constitutional require- 
ments for entry into force. 


Agreement relating to mutual waiver of government 
claims for damages to government property and for 
injury or death of members of armed services. M- ■ 
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon February »• 
1065. Entered into force February 9, 1965. 

' Not in force. 



INDEX April 26, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1348 

Agriculture. The Kennedy Round (Blunien- 

Uial) 628 

American Republics. Third Annual Meeting of 
luter-Aiuerican Economic and Social Council 
(Morse) 640 

Asia. Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia 

(Johnson) 606 

Atomic Energy. Memorandum Signed on Study 
of Desalting Plant for Israel G3o 

Belgium. The United States and International 
Cooperation (Harriman) 621 


President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on 

Canadian Auto Products 638 

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Re- 
laUng to Gut Dam (text) 643 

Claims and Property. U.S. and Canada Sign 
Agreement on Claims Relating to Gut Dam 
(text) 643 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 639 

Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower 

Colorado River 637 

President .\sks Authority To Remove Duties on 

Canadian Auto Products 638 

Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause in Trans- 
portation Act Urged (Mann) 636 

Economic Affairs 

Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower 
Colorado River 637 

Tlie Kennedy Round (Blumenthal) 628 

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on 
Canadian Auto Products 638 

Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause in Trans- 
portation Act Urged (Mann) (J.36 

Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (Morse) .... 640 

The United States and International Coopera- 
tion (Harriman) 621 

r.S.-Japan Economic Committee To Meet at 
Washington in July 612 

Foreign Aid. Third Annual Meeting of Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council 

( 040 

(nternational Organizations and Conferences 

The Kennedy Round (Blumenthal) 028 

Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (Morse) .... 640 
srael. Memorandum Signed on Study of De- 
salting Plant for Israel 635 

lapan. U.S.-Japan Economic Committee To 
Meet at Washington in July 612 

Mexico. Funds Requested for Salinity Control 

on Lower Colorado River 637 

Presidential Documents 

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia .... 606 

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on 

Canadian Auto Products 638 

President Yameogo of Upper Volta Visits the 

United States 618 

Science. Memorandum Signed on Study of De- 
salting Plant for Israel 635 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 646 

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Re- 
lating to Gut Dam (text) 643 

United Nations. Peace Comes in Parcels 

(Cleveland) 613 

Upper Volta. President Yameogo of Upper 
Volta Visits the United States (Johnson, 
Yameogo, joint communique) 618 


Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia (John- 
son) 606 

U.S. Replies to 17-Nation Appeal on Viet-Nam 

(texts) 610 

Wame Index 

Blumenthal. W. Michael 628 

Cleveland, Harlan 613 

Harriman, W. Averell 621 

Johnson, President 606, 618, 638 

Mann, Tliomas C 636 

Morse, F. Bradford 640 

Yameogo, Maurice 618 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 5-11 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to April 5 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 60 and Gl 
of March 25 and 06 of March 31. 

No. Date Subject 

t69 4/5 Soviet note of February 22 on ship 
interference rejected. 

70 4/5 Meeting of U.S.-Japan Committee on 

Trade and Economic Affairs (re- 

71 4/9 U.S.-Israel memorandum on desalting 


t72 4/0 Mann: "Disparities In Progress Be- 
tween Nations." 

t73 4/9 Harriman: Roosevelt memorial dedi- 

tHeld for a later Issue of the Bot-LEtin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 




The Dangers of Nostalgia 

The "nostalgia" to which this title refers is the longing for "a return to an earlier era — a 
remembered rightly or wrongly as less demanding and more rewarding. . . ." This pamphlet, 
upon an address by Under Secretary Ball, discusses some of the complexities of today's world — resurg 
nationalism, the movement toward European integration, the interdependence of the Atlantic natio 
and the world responsibilities of the United States. It concludes with the thought that ". . . wli 
would be comforting to think that our postwar tasks aronnd the world were largely over . . . that ( 
massive responsibilities could all be shifted to other shoulders — ^this is simply not the case. For, ! 
it or not, we live in a world that will almost certainly remain for a long time to come turbii 
difficult, frustrating, and complex." 




A.8HINGTON, D.C. 20402 

tcloeed find $ 

ash, check, or money order pay- 
le to Supt of Docoments) 


Please send me copies of The Dangers of 'Nostalgia. 








i-""^^! II I ■■ ■ I WkM 
MAY 1 3 1955 


Statement by President Johnson 650 



by William C. Foster 659 


For index see inside back cover 

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia 

statement by President Johnson ' 

This has been a week of tragedy, disap- 
pointment, and progress. 

Tragedy today came to hundreds of Viet- 
namese, and many Americans, struck down 
in the cruel course of battle. On this, of all 
weekends, we must feel a deep sadness that 
men must still die, and families still be left 
homeless, in the brutality of war. 

We mourn the death of Joseph Grainger 
[an area development officer], who worked 
to improve the life of villagers in Viet-Nam. 
And we mourn all the others, on both sides, 
who found this week to be their last. 

I regret the necessities of war have com- 
pelled us to bomb North Viet-Nam. We have 
carefully limited those raids. They have been 
directed at radar stations, bridges, and am- 
munition dumps, not at population centers. 
They have been directed at concrete and steel, 
and not human life. 

' Made to news correspondents at the LBJ Ranch, 
Johnson City, Tex., on Apr. 17 (White House press 
release (Johnson City, Tex.)). 

I understand the feelings of those who re- 
gret that we must undertake air attacks. I 
share those feelings. But the compassion of 
this country, and the world, must go out to 
the men and women and children who are 
killed and crippled by the Viet Cong every 
day in South Viet-Nam. The outrage of this 
country, and the world, must be visited on 
those who explode their bombs in cities and 
villages, ripping the bodies of the helpless. 
The indignation of this country, and the 
world, must extend to all who seek dominion 
over the others with violent and ruthless dis- 
regard for life, happiness, or security. And 
let us remember, the people of South Viet- 
Nam, and the Americans who share their 
struggle, suffer because they are attacked — 
not because they are attackers. 

Window to Peace Still Open 

It has been a week of disappointment be- » 
cause we tried to open a window to peace, 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
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and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
state and other officers of the Depart- 

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ous phases of international alTairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
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and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
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Use of funds for printing of this pub- |a 
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Note: Contents of this publication are: 
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may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
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only to be met with tired names and slogans 
and a refusal to talk. 

They want no talk with us, no talk with 
a distingniished Briton, no talk with the 
j United Nations. They want no talk at all so 
far. But our offer stands. We mean every 
word of it. 
I Peace is too important. The stakes are far 
too high to permit anyone to indulge in 
slander and invective. We will not reply in 
kind. The window to peace is still open. We 
are still ready for unconditional discussion. 
We will impose no conditions of any kind on 
any government willing to talk, nor will we 
accept any. On this basis we are ready to 
begin discussion next week, tomorrow, or to- 
night. Nor can the continuation of the war be 
used to doubt the sincerity of our peaceful 
. purpose. 
ill The infiltrations continue. The terror con- 
tinues. Death in the night continues. And 
we must also continue. 

To those governments who doubt our will- 
ingness to talk the answer is simple — agree 
to discussion, come to the meetingroom. We 
will be there. Our objective in Viet-Nam re- 
mains the same — an independent South Viet>- 
Nam, tied to no alliance, free to shape its 
relations and association with all other na- 
. tions. This is what the people of South Viet- 
Nam want, and we will finally settle for no 

Our policy also remains the same, to strive 
for peace but not to yield to aggression, to 
use what power we must but no more than 
we need, to stay until independence is secure 
but to leave when that independence is surely 

And let this also be clear: Until that inde- 
pendence is guaranteed there is no human 
power capable of forcing us from Viet-Nam. 
We will remain as long as is necessary, with 
the might that is required, whatever the risk 
being and whatever the cost. 

We are told by some that there can be no 
peace and no hope for a better life unless we 
first surrender and abandon South Viet-Nam. 
This we will not do, and I hope that a mount- 
ing crescendo of world opinion, that is weary 
of war, that is opposed to aggression, will 

Secretary Rules Out Suspension 
of US. Raids on North Viet-Nam 

Statement by Secretary Rusk ' 

We have thought long and soberly about 
suspending, for a period, the raids on North 
Viet-Nam. Some have suggested this could lead 
to an end of aggression from the North. But 
we have tried publicly and privately to find out 
if this would be the result, and there has been 
no response. Others say such a pause is needed 
to signal our sincerity, but no signal is needed. 
Our sincerity is plain. 

If we thought such action would advance the 
cause of an honorable peace, we would order it 
immediately, but now our best judgment tells 
us it would only encourage the aggressor and 
dishearten our friends who bear the brunt of 

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 17 by 
Robert J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News. 

finally find a way to reach the ears of those 
that are now deaf to calls for peace. 

strengthened Unity of American Purpose 

This has been a week of progress because 
it has brought a strengthened unity of 
American purpose. More than ever, in the 
Congress and in the press, among people in 
every section and every occupation, we are 
united on the need to resist aggression, to 
pursue peace, and to improve the lives of the 
people of Southeast Asia. 

There has also been progress around the 
world in understanding the peaceful aim 
which we share with the Government of 
South Viet-Nam. There has been renewed 
appreciation that by defending South Viet- 
Nam we also stand for the independence of 
all who have cause to fear their neighbors. 
And our unyielding determination has 
strengthened the hope of those men menaced 
by terror and discouraged those who expect 
conquest by default. 

As a result, news from the battlefront is 
improving. It is more clear than ever that 
the real hope for the South Vietnamese is not 
with the attackers but against them. I join 

MAY 3, 1965 


the Vietnamese Government in a warm wel- 
come to the increasing numbers who choose 
to leave that false cause and rejoin their 

Progress in Economic Aid Programs 

Progress has also come in the beginning 
of a massive new effort to improve the lives 
of the people of Southeast Asia. 

These countries are not pawns on a chess- 
board. They are not simply a battlefield for 
contending powers or abstract ideologies. 
Their fields and villages sustain millions of 
people whose first desire is the food, shelter, 
and hope for progress. 

Last week I suggested that the industrial- 
ized countries of the world join in helping 
them realize those desires.^ Since that time, 
the skills and energies of our own Govern- 
ment have been directed toward examining 
the most effective contributions that we 
might make. We have had discussions with 
leaders of the United Nations. The Secretary- 
General has taken the lead. Other industrial- 
ized nations, like Japan, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, have shown their willing- 
ness to take a share in this enterprise. 

Already ideas are being transformed into 
programs and intentions into action. 

Our purpose should not be misunderstood. 
We do not seek to buy peace. If the price of 
ending aggression is blood and men, we are 
ready to pay that price. We do this because it 
is necessary to the health and independence 
of Southeast Asia. We do it because it is right 
in this world that the strong and the wealthy 
should help the poor and the weak. 

Nor are we neglecting the special needs of 
battle-torn South Viet-Nam. In the last 10 
years we have spent more than $2 billion for 
economic progress in that area. Yesterday, 
only yesterday, I sent a team of rural 
electrification experts to Saigon to help ex- 
tend the healing miracles of electricity to the 
Vietnamese countryside. For in South Viet- 
Nam, as in all Asia, peace must not simply 
be an end to conflict. It must be the begin- 

ning of progress and hope and of the elimina- 
tion of material misery. 

It is not easy to engage in a struggle whose 
beginning is obscure, and whose end is not in 
sight. Peace, like war, requires patience and 
the courage to go on despite discouragement. 
Yet we must go on, for there is a world to 
lose, a world of peace, of order, and of ex- 
panding programs for all who live therein. 
That will be a world whose institutions are 
varied as humanity itself. It will be a 
world in which nations follow where reason 
and experience lead, never sacrificing man to 
the abstract arrogance of ideology. It will 
be a world where each nation is free to take 
its own path to change. 

This is the course of history. Domination 
and empire, conquest and aggression, are 
relics of a bloody past. But we must protect 
our future against that past. 

How fortunate we are to have been given 
the power and the courage to match this vis- 
ion in this enormous time in the life of man. 

The Works of Peace 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

• • • • 

Three decades ago — 30 years ago — the, 
course of history for the world was set upon : 
a tragic direction because other men in other il 
lands misread our American purpose, mis-' 
judged our American will, and — not least of 
all— miscalculated the spirit and the stamina 
of our American youth. 

There must not be any mistakes like that 
made today, because I am determined to use 
whatever talents are mine to make certain 
that America is not misunderstood in the' 
world today. 

In this setting, and under these circum- 
stances which mean so much to me, I would 
like for a moment today to speak from my, 
heart to the hearts of men and women every- 1 
where in all this world, to say a few things:: 

Beyond these shores, we of America have 

= Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 


' Made during an address at the dedication of th< 
Gary Job Corps Center, San Marcos, Tex., on Apr. K 
(White House press release, as-delivered text). 



only one purpose ; that purpose is peace in the 
world for all men — peace for ourselves and 
peace for all mankind of all countries. 

The only wars we seek are wars such as 
we are fighting here today on these peaceful 
grounds — as Dr. Singletary mentioned — 
wars against poverty, wars against diseases, 
wars against discrimination, wars against 
ignorance, and wars against war itself. 

I started out the early part of the week 
trying to evolve and enunciate a program 
that I hoped would be war against war it- 
self, in a tripod, three-pronged speech that I 
made in Baltimore on Wednesday evening - 
to the Nation and to the world, in which I 
made clear our firmness and our commitment, 
and our determination to carry out our com- 
mitment; our readiness and our willingness 
to engage in unconditional discussions; and 
our great Christian and humanitarian desire 
to participate in helping to develop other 
parts of the world. 

And to you young men who may be fol- 
lowing in our footsteps not many years from 
now, I want to observe this: I don't think 
that this country has ever had a more profit- 
able week in its political history. 
Wednesday we were evolving a program 
_„. jOf war against war in Baltimore. Thursday 
we were passing the most far-reaching, com- 
prehensive legislative health program ever 
jj, .enacted by any country at any time through 
jjj- ithe House of Representatives. Friday we 
^^ igot done what we have been trying to do in 
this country since 1870 — pass a comprehen- 
sive, legislative national education bill. 

I remember back many years ago — more 
ban 20 years ago — when I was one of two 
r three men from my section to vote for 
-n education bill, and I was so proud last 
night when they brought me word that only 
17 in the entire Senate voted against one 
\esterday out of the 100 Senators there. 

So, on health, on education, the war on 

liseases, the war on ignorance, the war 

against war, and, yes, the war against dis- 

rimination — this week, yesterday, we re- 

,8i; ported from the committees of the House 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

and of the Senate the most comprehensive, 
legislative voting rights bill to have been 
committed from the committees of the Con- 

So we would like to welcome to these 
works that we are doing, not just the people 
of our Congress, or our State, but all peoples 
of all nations. And we were so happy that 
we could have the distinguished Governor 
from our sister Republic here on the plat- 
form with us today, because it was just a 
few weeks ago when I talked to his dis- 
tinguished President here about the program 
of this administration's war against war, 
war against ancient enemies of ignorance, 
and diseases, and poverty, and illiteracy, and 
I am so happy that their President Dias 
Ordaz is undertaking a similar program in 
his country, and he will have our most en- 
thusiastic support and cooperation. 

We do not seek to live in a world where all 
men think alike, but we do seek to live in a 
world where all men are free to think 

Peace is our purpose, and the works of 
peace are the works that we want to do most. 
Let no man in any land, any time, mis- 
judge our purpose, or our cause, or our 

We love peace. We hate war. But our 
course is charted always by the compass of 

We know today, as Americans have always 
known, that liberty has only one price — and 
that is eternal vigilance. That price we are 
able and we are willing to pay. 

Where we have given our commitments to 
others, as I said Wednesday night in Balti- 
more, we shall keep them, for we have made 
a binding commitment to ourselves that 
peace shall not be lost and freedom shall not 
perish from this earth. 

I hope I speak softly but fimily when I 
say to all, let none misjudge. Let none doubt 
the will that supports this American purpose 
of peace and freedom. 

I would say also let none today miscalcu- 
late either the spirit or the stamina of our 
American youth. In times past America has 
asked her young to shoulder arms and to 

MAY 3, 1965 



fight for freedom on many fields and many 
forests throughout the world. And I would 
remind all the world that they have never 

These times now we ask our young and 
the youth of all the lands to give their hands 
and their hearts to these worthy wars 
against poverty and disease, illiteracy and 
discrimination, because we believe the young 
people of the world are ready to rally to such 
endeavors. We know this is true of the 
young people in America, and as I said the 
other night we would so much enjoy asking 
our men from the far corners of Southeast 
Asia to return from the bombs and the 
bullets of that area, and bring them home, 
and to help those who live there build a 
peaceful world that knows no illiteracy and 
no disease and no poverty. 

Today we are spending in Southeast Asia 
between $11/2 billion and $2 billion on bombs 
and bullets and helicopters, and war and 
disease and development. How much better 
it would be if we could bring half of the 
money we are spending there now back in 
those helicopters with those men to help 
develop our own young people here at home, 
and leave the other half out there to help 
develop their young people so we could work 
together in brotherly love. 

We are determined here in America to 
give all of our youth their chance. We 
would like to see that done for all youth 
everywhere. We in America are committing 
our resources to the education of our people 
as never before, to their health as never 
before, to their happiness and their hope as 
never before. We are determined that no 
child born in this land of the free shall ever 
be deprived by our neglect of realizing his 
share of America's promise. 

That promise of America was once de- 
scribed by Thomas Wolfe in these words : 

— To every man, his chance. 

— To every man, regardless of his birth, his shin- 
ing golden opportunity. 

— To every man the right to live, to work, to be 
himself, and to become whatever his manhood and 
his vision can combine to make him. 

— This, seeker, is the promise of America. 

All my life, since I left this beautiful little 

city of San Marcos, I have been devoted to 
the fulfillment of this promise, and that 
devotion was never more positive or more 
determined than it is today. 

But I want the youth of the world today 
to know, whether they live in the East or 
the West, in old countries or young coun- 
tries, that the American President and the 
American people want to fulfill this promise 
not just for our own but for them too. 

We believe that this is not a dark and 
dreary hour for mankind, but rather we are 
convinced this is a bright and precious time 
when the hope for peace is real, when the 
chance for progress is great, when the light 
of liberty can shine forth more brightly than 
it has ever shined in all of our history. We 
are determined, we are steadfastly resolved, 
that the precious opportunity shall not be 
lost for the youth of America or for the 
youth of the entire world. 

In these purposes we are a nation united, 
we are a people dedicated, we are a land 
determined as we have been for 189 years. 

Ambassador Bunker Concludes k re 

Meetings With Indonesian Leaders 

Joint Communique ^ 

'! iem. 
'n Pie 

I ifsia 

^i ffliiJ 

'j j«rtai 

'i ithf 


'1 KDts 

'I iel 

■I jroHf 


During his visit in Indonesia, Ambassador 
[Ellsworth] Bunker, representing President 
Johnson, has had several meetings with His 
Excellency President Sukarno, and has met 
with First Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Su- 
bandrio and other Ministers of the Govern- 
ment of Indonesia. These meetings have 
produced a full and frank exchange of views 
on the attitudes and desires of the two gov- 1 
ernments toward the question of the relation- , 
ship between them. 

Both governments have recognized that 
friendly relations between Indonesia and the ' 
United States are of the greatest importance 
to the people of both countries. Ambassador 
Bunker has assured President Sukarno that . 
the United States has the objectives of at-, 
taining the freedom, welfare and security of ■ 




' Released at Djakarta, Indonesia, on Apr. 15. 

if Br: 



all countries. While it is true that on a range 
of matters of foreign policy the views of 
Indonesia and those of the United States 
are divergent, they have agreed that these 
differences should not be allowed to affect 
unduly the general pattern of friendship 
which has existed for so many years between 

President Sukarno emphasized that Indo- 
nesia regards the issue between Indonesia 
and Malaysia as being of the greatest im- 
portance, and that he wishes to see it settled 
on the basis of the Manila and Tokyo agree- 
ments.- Ambassador Bunker reaffirmed that 
the United States deeply regrets that the 
problem exists, and hopes that a peaceful 
solution to it can be brought about by Asian 
powers through these or any other means 
acceptable to those concerned. 

At the same time His Excellency the Pres- 
ident and Ambassador Bunker recognized 
that these differences have produced certain 
tensions between Indonesia and the United 
States, and that as a result the programs of 
assistance to Indonesia which the United 
States has undertaken in recent years should 
be reviewed and revised on a continuing 
I basis to be sure that they conform to the 
desires of the two governments. In specific, 
"Ambassador Bunker informed His Excel- 
lency the President that the United States 
would be willing to continue its program of 
technical assistance to certain Indonesian 
universities, and the President assured Am- 
bassador Bunker that this program was wel- 
come to and had the full support of the Gov- 
ernment of Indonesia. 

On the other hand, His Excellency the 
President and Ambassador Bunker agreed 
that in light of the current situation the 
Peace Corps should cease operations in Indo- 
nesia. The Peace Corps Volunteers will, ac- 
ordingly, take the necessary steps to termi- 

' The Manila a^eement, in Augrust 1963, called 
"or U.N. ascertainment of whether the populace in 
;he British Borneo states favored joining Malaysia. 
Indonesia rejected the U.N. findings. The Tokyo 
igrreement, June 1964, envisaged the formation of a 
"our-power Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission to 
lelp bring about a peaceful settlement. 

nate their programs in an orderly fashion 
and will depart from Indonesia during the 
next few weeks. 

His Excellency the President and Ambas- 
sador Bunker concluded that personal com- 
munication between President Sukarno and 
President Johnson was of great importance 
to both countries, and undertook to see that 
it will be maintained. 

Letters of Credence 

The following newly appointed ambassa- 
dors presented their credentials to President 
Johnson on April 13 : 

Radomiro Tomic Romero of Chile, 
Torben Ronne of Denmark, and 
Sir Patrick Dean of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 

U.S. Protests Harassment of Ships 
by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges 


Press release 68 dated April 2 1 

Department Announcement 

The United States Government in a note 
of April 2, 1965, to the Soviet Government 
protested the dangerous harassment of U.S. 
Navy vessels by Soviet ships. The note, 
which was delivered to the Soviet Embassy 
in Washington, cited six occasions on which 
reckless harassing maneuvers by Soviet 
ships endangered U.S. Navy ships in the At- 
lantic and Pacific Oceans as well as in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Most of these incidents 
resulted from deliberate Soviet attempts to 
interfere with U.S. naval operations by ap- 
proaching ships on collision courses in viola- 
tion of the International Rules of the Road. 

The note reminded the Soviet Government 
that "it would bear full responsibility for the 
serious consequences that would result 
should a collision occur. . . ." 

MAY 3, 1965 


Text of U.S. Note 

April 2, 1965 

The United States Government requests the Em- 
bassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
draw to the attention of the So\'iet Government the 
grave concern of the United States Government to 
recent harassing tactics employed by Soviet ships. 
These incidents have violated the Rules of the Road, 
disregarded the practices of good seamanship, and 
ig:nored the principle of the Freedom of the Seas as 
codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 

The Government of the United States, on Febru- 
ary 24, called the attention of the Soviet Govern- 
ment to two recent examples of hazardous activities 
undertaken by Soviet ships by their persistent pres- 
ence and maneuvering within United States naval 
tactical formations in the Mediterranean Sea: the 
harassing actions taken by the Soviet ship "Kotelni- 
kov" on January 10, which interfered with replen- 
ishment at sea operations involving the USS "Sara- 
toga" and the USS "Neosho;" and the reckless navi- 
gation of the Soviet ships "Dzerzhiniskiy, MB 152," 
and "Magomet Glazkeyv" which interfered with the 
flight operations of the USS "Roosevelt" during a 
two day period, from September 25 through 27, 1964. 

Even more recent examples of continuing Soviet 
harassments are documented in the following situa- 

On January 7, 1965, at about 5:45 p.m., GMT, at 
approximately 56°44' N. Lat., 13°01' W. Long., in 
the Eastern Atlantic, the Soviet ship "Vertikal," 
with a lookout stationed on her bow using binocu- 
lars, approached from dead astern to within 75 feet 
of the USNS "Button" and crossed over a towed 
magnetometer cable. This maneuver was made in 
spite of appropriate warning flags and signals dis- 
played by the "Button" indicating a tow astern. Im- 
mediately upon retrieval of the cable, it was evident 
that the cable had been torn by the screws of "Verti- 
kal" and the magnetometer severed and missing. 
Buring the cable retrieving, the "Vertikal" played 
two arc lights on the "Button's" stern and continued 
to close in on her starboard side and stern despite 
repeated emergency signals on the "Button's" 
whistle. Again, while the "Button" was turning to 
port to stream a second magnetometer, the "Verti- 
kal" closed on the "Button's" stern despite additional 
emergency signals on the latter's whistle to alert the 
Soviet ship. In view of these actions, it must be con- 
cluded that "Vertikal" intended deliberately to inter- 
fere with and to harass the "Button" during the 
course of a legitimate survey operation on the high 
seas and did in fact damage the "Button's" tow 
cable and sever and cause the ship to lose her 

On February 16, 1965, the Soviet ship "Zond" 
harassed the operations of the United States Navy 
submarine "Lafayette" in the Eastern Atlantic, ap- 
proximately 35 miles west of Cadiz, Spain. The 

"Zond" changed courses and speeds in order to re- 
main close to the "Lafayette" during the morning 
hours, attempting to cross ahead of the "Lafayette" 
from port to starboard on six occasions. This caused 
serious risk of collision in flagrant violation of the 
Rules of the Road and in complete disregard of good 
seamanship practices. 

On February 24, 1965, in the vicinity of Lat. 
32°41' N., Long. 117°46.6' W. oflF the California 
coast, the Soviet ship "Arban" manuevered to inter- 
fere with underway fueling operations of the USS 
"Hornet" and the naval tanker USS "Ashtabula." 
The "Hornet" was required to break off her ap- 
proach on the tanker because of serious risk of colli- 
sion and the "Arban's" illegal change of course to 
port in violation of the Rules of the Road. The 
"Arban's" actions throughout this incident were in 
complete disregard of customary courtesy on the 
high seas and the practices of good seamanship. 

On March 2, 1965, in the waters of the Narragan- 
sett Bay, off the coast of Rhode Island, the Soviet 
trawler "Sverdlovsy" (number M-B MRT 242) for 
more than one-half hour deliberately harassed the 
naval exercises of the USS "Courtney," the USS 
"Hartley," the USS "Keywadin." The "Sverdlovsy" 
first crossed the "Courtney's" bow from starboard to 
port and then, immediately after crossing, reversed 
her course to take position ahead of and in the track 
of the "Courtney." The "Courtney" was required to 
turn hard right to avoid collision. Thereafter, the 
"Sverdlovsy" changed course to head directly for 
USS "Keywadin," hazarding the particular exercise 
then underway. 

In view of the continuing and dangerous actions 
of Soviet ships to enter and remain with United 
States naval task force formations and to harass' 
their operations in violation of international law and 
in disregard of the principle of the Freedom of the 
Seas, the United States Government again reminds 
the Soviet Government that it would bear full re- 
sponsibility for the serious consequences that would ' 
result should a collision occur under these circum- 


Press release 69 dated April 5 T 

Department Announcement 

The United States Government on April 5 ; 
rejected the charges in a Soviet note of i 
February 22, 1965,^ which alleged inter- 
ference with Soviet ships by U.S. Navy ships 
and aircraft. 

The U.S. reply, which was delivered to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mos- 



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cow, stated that upon investigation by compe- 
tent U.S. authorities the Soviet allegations 
were found to be incorrect or exaggerated 
and that in all cases cited U.S. Navy ships 
and U.S. aircraft acted in compliance with 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas, did not violate the International Rules 
of the Road, and did not harass, threaten, or 
interfere with any Soviet ship. 

Text of U.S. Note 

April 5, 1965 
The United States Government refers to the 
Soviet Government's note of February 22, 1965 and 
to its interim reply of February 26, 1965.^ The Gov- 
ernment of the United States has studied the Soviet 
note of February 22 and upon investigation has 
found the allegations therein to be incorrect or ex- 
aggerated. The facts established by the competent 
United States authorities in all of the alleged inci- 
dents show that no United States Navy ship maneu- 
vered in violation of the Rules of the Road; no 
threat of collision was created at any time; and 
United States aircraft flights were neither danger- 
ously close nor low. In all of these cases. United 
States Navy ships and United States aircraft acted 
in compliance with the principle of freedom of the 
high seas as provided in Article 2 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 

The verified details of each alleged incident fol- 

At 5:00 a.m. GMT January 24, 1965, the USS 
"Joseph Strauss" sighted a merchant ship at Lat. 
22°55' N., Long. 125°15' E. The USS "Strauss" ap- 
proached the ship on a parallel course and proceeded 
alongside at a distance of 1,000 yards for a period of 
only 12 minutes, from 5:25 a.m. until 5:37 a.m., and 
not for a period of 52 minutes as alleged, in order to 
identify the ship which proved to be the Soviet mer- 
chant ship "Poronaysk." At no time, either during 
the approach or while proceeding off the beam of the 
"Poronaysk," did the "Strauss" train its weapons 
upon the Soviet ship as alleged. Actually, no ord- 
nance or fire control equipment of the USS 
"Strauss" was manned at any time, all directors, 
mounts and launchers remaining centerlined. At 
5:37 a.m. the USS "Strauss" increased speed and 
turned away 60 degrees, at the same time signaling, 
"I wish you a pleasant voyage." In reply, "Poro- 
naysk" hoisted code flags saying, "Thank you." 

On January 31, 1965 the USS "Gurke," at about 
the time and position alleged, did approach the So- 
viet ship "Poronaysk" in order to identify the Soviet 
ship. At no time, however, did the USS "Gurke" 
interfere with the safe navigation of the "Poro- 
naysk," cause any risk of collision, nor train her 


'■ Not printed here. 

MAY 3, 1965 

ordnance on the Soviet ship as alleged. The USS 
"Gurke" made a careful approach from the stem 
and maneuvered at a safe distance off the port beam 
of the "Poronaysk" merely for the legitimate and 
legal purpose of identification. The "Poronaysk" 
was not required to take any avoiding action but, in 
fact, maintained course and speed throughout the 

On January 26, 1965, in position 16°27' N., 109°52' 
E., at approximately 12:24 p.m. local time, the USS 
"Ernest G. Small" sighted an unidentified merchant 
ship five miles to the southeast which was tracked 
on course 320° at a speed of 12 knots. When the 
merchant ship failed to respond to the "Small's" 
signal and refused to identify herself, the United 
States ship increased speed and approached no closer 
than one-half mile off the starboard quarter where 
the merchant ship was identified as the Soviet 
tanker "Gorky." The "Small" at no time violated 
any of the Rules of the Road, nor did she maneuver 
in dangerous proximity to or make any provocative 
move toward the "Gorky," but, on the contrary com- 
plied fully with practices of good seamanship and 
the principle of the Freedom of the Seas. 

With regard to the alleged specified overflights of 
Soviet ships by United States military aircraft, the 
record establishes that no overflights were made at 
dangerously low altitudes but that all were made in 
compliance with authorized procedures for identifica- 
tion and in no way threatened or hazarded the 
safety of the ships in question. During the period 
from January 4 through 25, the Soviet scientific re- 
search ship "Yu. M. Shokal'skiy" was approached by 
United States naval aircraft on some ten occasions 
but at no time was the ship harassed by dangerously 
close approaches or directly overflown, and specifi- 
cally, in no case was the "Shokal'skiy" overflown at 
a height of 25 to 30 meters, as charged. All ap- 
proaches were made in compliance with applicable 
regulations which establish minimum safe heights 
and lateral distances from the ship to protect ade- 
quately both the safety of the ship and the aircraft 
involved. On January 30, 1965, the Soviet tanker 
"Fedor Poletayev" was sighted at about 7:26 p.m. 
G.MT, in the position 22°45' N., 49-52' W. No direct 
overflight occurred and the closest horizontal dis- 
tance was 500 feet astern for the purpose of distin- 
guishing her name. No objects of any type were 
dropped by the United States aircraft. On January 
29, 1965, United States aircraft did sight and iden- 
tify the Soviet ship "Dalniy" during daylight hours 
at the approximate position indicated. One overflight 
was made at a safe height of 1,000 feet and six 
other overflights were made at a safe lateral dis- 
tance from the ship for positive identification. On 
February 12, 1965, the United States aircraft 151359 
did locate and identify the Soviet transport "Cher- 
nyakhovsk" at approximately the position indicated 
in the Soviet note but at no time did the aircraft 
overfly the ship but rather made four approaches at 


a safe distance off her side. In summary, United 
States aircraft involved in all of the alleged aircraft 
incidents complied with authorized identification pro- 
cedures which provide for the maintenance of safe 
altitudes and sufficient lateral distances from the 
ship, and which do not interfere with navigation, 
pose any threat, or harass the ship in any way. 

In as much as the facts do not correspond to the 
allegations of the Soviet Government, the United 
States Government is not able to accept the protest 
contained in the Soviet Government's note of Febru- 
ary 22. The United States Government continues to 
instruct captains of its ships and its aircraft com- 
manders to comply with the Rules of the Road, with 
flight restrictions and other regulations which will 
reflect correct behavior and maintain safety in oper- 
ations at sea and in the air. 

U.S. Protests Harassment 
on Access Routes to Berlin 

Following is the text of a note delivered 
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 
the American Embassy at Moscow on April 
7. Identical notes were delivered by France 
and the United Kingdom. The Western 
Allies were replying to a Soviet note of 
March 23. 

April 7, 1965 
The Government of the United States of 
America cannot accept the views of the 
Soviet Government concerning the plenary 
meeting of the German Bundestag and the 
meetings of committees and fraktions which 
will take place in Berlin this week. These 
meetings do not affect the special status of 
Berlin, as defined in the quadripartite agree- 
ments, nor do they place in question the 
responsibility of the Four Powers for Berlin 
and Germany as a whole. Moreover, such 
meetings have taken place repeatedly in the 
past without provoking any incident. 

On the other hand the Soviet and East 
German authorities have for several days 
been taking a series of measures against ac- 

cess to Berlin, the illegal character of which 
is evident. 

Since April 1 the East German authorities 
have repeatedly hindered movement on the 
ground routes to Berlin. Civil freight and 
passenger traffic between Berlin and West- 
ern Germany has been deliberately delayed 
or stopped by unreasonable searches and 
interrogations. Since April 5 the Helmstedt- 
Berlin autobahn has been closed to traffic on 
several occasions and for several hours at a 
time. The waterways to Berlin have been 
similarly closed for periods of hours or days. 
These measures have amounted to a serious 
violation of the freedom of access to Berlin. 
In addition the East German authorities . 
have again intensified interference with the i 
free movement of persons between the West- • 
em and Soviet sectors of Berlin. 

Simultaneously, on the pretext that Soviet ; 
and East German maneuvers were taking: 
place in the Berlin area, Allied personnel 
traveling between Berlin and Western Ger- 
many have been turned back by the Soviet 
authorities on entering the autobahn. 

The Soviet controller in the Berlin Air 
Safety Center has also refused to guarantee 
flight safety for Allied aircraft using certain 
flight levels in the air corridors during the 
whole period of these maneuvers. 

These measures taken by the Soviet and 
East German authorities are contrary to the 
quadripartite agreements which define the 
special status of Berlin and establish the 
conditions of access to the city. They can 
only provoke tension in Europe. 

The Government of the United States of 
America looks to the Soviet Government to 
put an immediate end to the harassment of 
ground communications with Berlin and to 
take whatever steps may be necessary to pre- 
vent a recurrence. It will also hold the 
Soviet Government responsible for the safety 
of Allied flights in the air corridors. These 
flights will continue in accordance with the 
quadripartite rules on this subject. 














Arms Control— Foundation Stone in the Ramparts We Watch 

by William C. Foster 

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^ 

at I 









The Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency which I direct was established by 
Public Law 87-297 enacted by Congress in 
September 1961. The act states that this 
Agency "must have such a position within 
the Government that it can provide the Presi- 
dent, the Secretary of State, other officials of 
the executive branch, and the Congi-ess with 
recommendations concerning United States 
arms control and disarmament policy, and 
can assess the effect of these recommenda- 
tions upon our foreign policies, our national 
security policies, and our economy." This 
same act includes also the statement : "Arms 
control and disarmament policy, being an im- 
portant aspect of foreign policy, must be con- 
sistent with national security policy as a 

Let us consider briefly the relationship of 
arms control efforts with our national secu- 
rity interest. Four American Presidents since 
World War II have been deeply concerned 
with arms control. Our leaders have under- 
stood that mounting stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons cannot alone insure our security. 
Four U.S. administrations have realized that 
military preparedness is not in itself suffi- 
cient to assure peace. 

The national interest since 1945 has dic- 
tated that negotiations be undertaken to seek 
agreements aimed at reducing the risks of 
war and at the eventual elimination of the 
causes of war. 

Only fools would deny that our national 

^ Address made before the Chemical Industry 
Council of Southern California at Los Angeles, 
Calif., on Mar. 31. 

MAY 3, 1965 

security requires the use of force to meet 
aggression. So we must be firm in the main- 
tenance of superior armed might for use 
against an aggressive despoiler of freedom. 
But when a single nuclear weapon can con- 
tain several times the explosive force of all 
the bombs dropped by both sides in World 
War II, then it becomes clear that our na- 
tional security requires a search for safe- 
guarded arms control and disarmament 
agreements to avoid catastrophe for all 

In brief, we should understand that our 
national security does not always increase as 
we increase our arms. An arms race moving 
at increasing speed toward nuclear annihila- 
tion inevitably diminishes the security of us 

In consequence the United States has been 
engaged since the end of World War II in a 
quest for balanced, verifiable agreements 
with other nations. Such agreements would 
control and limit armaments as a means of 
averting war and strengthening world peace. 

By 1960 it had become increasingly ap- 
parent that if we were to be better prepared 
for negotiations, there was a need for a cen- 
tral agency charged with responsibility for 
planning and coordinating policy for arms 
control and disarmament. Such an agency 
would have to be equipped with an experi- 
enced staff fully qualified in the various fields 
which are involved in planning and nego- 
tiating for arms limitation and control. 

Accordingly, the late President Kennedy 
transmitted in 1961 = draft legislation for 

2 BULLCTIN of July 17, 1961, p. 99. 


consideration by the Congress which was to 
result in the establishment of the first agency 
of its kind in history — an agency for peace. 

How the Disarmament Agency Operates 

I could dwell at great length on the func- 
tions of my Agency, but I have other impor- 
tant matters to bring before you and, regret- 
fully, I will pass up this opportunity to tell 
you how great my team really is. But there 
are individuals, probably inspired by extrem- 
ist literature, who seem to think that ACDA 
is manned by dreamy-eyed idealists who sit 
in isolation from the rest of the Government 
and cook up proposals which would in effect 
turn over a defenseless America to its 
enemies. Nothing could be further from the 
truth, and I shall devote a minute or so telling 
you why. 

Arms control and disarmament proposals 
generally do originate in the Agency. If they 
survive the working-group level of other 
agencies concerned with security, the pro- 
posals are put by me before the Committee of 
Principals. The membership of this unique 
institution consists of the highest ranking 
official of each interested Government agency 
— the Secretaries of State and Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
Special Assistants to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs and for Science and 
Technology, the Administrator of the Na- 
tional Aeronautics and Space Administra- 
tion, the Director of the U.S. Information 
Agency, and the Director of the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency. 

As a committee, these officials review, dis- 
cuss, and make recommendations to the 
President on all arms control and disarma- 
ment proposals. Before any measures are set 
forth in negotiations, the President must give 
his final approval. 

As Director of the Agency I benefit from 
the advice of two groups of distinguished 
advisers. One is the General Advisory Com- 
mittee, composed of experts and prominent 
citizens appointed by the President from 
business, labor, academic, military, and sci- 



I; anjlh 

I mnlll 


entific fields. It brings an informed non 
governmental view to bear on arms control 
problems. Of this group, Mr. Herman 
Phleger of Redwood City and Professor Her- 
bert York of San Diego are from California. 

The other group, the Social Science Ad- 
visory Board, is made up of eminent scholars 
from leading U.S. universities and represents 
a variety of social science disciplines. It 
keeps me apprised of professional research 
in the field pertinent to arms control and 
advises on relevant social science develop- 
ments. Again from California, Professor 
Gordon Craig of Stanford University and 
Mrs. Alice Hsieh from Santa Monica make a 
welcome contribution to this effort. 

Since ACDA was established, the United 
States Government can point to some accom- 
plishments in its efforts to place restraints 
on the increase and the spread of the arms 
race. The best known and perhaps the most 
significant is the limited nuclear test ban 
treaty negotiated with the United Kingdom 
and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963 
and which now is adhered to by more than 
100 nations. That treaty was based on a 
draft introduced by the United States at the 
18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Gene- 
va the year before. The Washington-Moscow 
communications link — the "hot line" — agree- | 
ment was signed in Geneva in June 1963.'.| 
In October 1963 the U.S.S.R. and the United ij 
States sponsored a United Nations General i 
Assembly resolution to refrain from station- ''^^jif^^ 
ing nuclear weapons in space. This proposal 
had been made by us to the Soviet Union 
the year before. And just a year ago this 
nation, the Soviet Union, and the United 
Kingdom announced planned cutbacks in the 
production of fissionable materials for weap- 
ons use. 

These accomplishments represent small 
steps down a very long and tortuous path 
and much remains to be done in placing 
further restraints on the arms race. 

The nature of the modern arms race is 
vividly shown by testimony given by Secre- 
tary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara in 
February of this year. He estimates that, 
against the nuclear forces we expect the 

sive fi 

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;:ate i 




Soviets to have during the next decade, we 
would find it virtually impossible to provide 
anything like complete protection for our 
population no matter how large our nuclear 
forces were. 

By spending up to 25 billion additional 
dollars for defense, we might, he says, re- 
duce our fatalities from around 150 million 
to perhaps 80 million (assuming 1970 popu- 
lation and force levels). But, by increasing 
their ofl^ensive missile forces, the Soviets 
could offset our increase in survivors and 
thus prevent us from achieving even this 
level of protection. And they could do it at 
far less extra expense to them for the offen- 
sive forces than the extra cost to us for the 

An arms race of this nature would be 
madness. Both sides have an interest in 
preventing it. One of the immediate tasks of 
my Agency is to seek an acceptable alterna- 
tive by means of arms control agreements. 

The Defense Department estimates call 
for a large percentage of our projected stra- 
tegic offensive forces in the 1970's to play a 
damage-limiting role. We know that at each 
successively higher level of U.S. expendi- 
tures, the ratio of our costs for limiting 
damage to the potential aggressor's cost for 
jrs|assured destruction becomes less and less 
favorable for us. It would appear that fur- 
ther investigation is in order as to whether 
a disarmament agreement providing for a 
verified destruction of both U.S. damage- 
limiting missiles and Soviet assured-destruc- 
tion missiles might not provide a more effec- 
tive and reliable means of limiting damage 
to ourselves and to our allies. 








Arms Control and National Defense 

At this point let me express some of my 
snilccnvictions as to the role of the arms con- 
trol measures in our national defense. Such 
ilad^measures can, first of all, help to make ade- 
uate national defense possible at present 
orce and armament levels, and ultimately at 
ower levels. No one will deny that there are 
laijwncertainties in maintaining the present 
jSiBrough balance of deterrence as arms con- 
j;tj|tinue to build up on both sides. The point 

to understand and remember here is that it 
is possible to maintain military balance at a 
fixed level — or on a downward plane — rather 
than on an upward spiral. 

Secondly, arms control measures offer a 
means of correcting a situation in which a 
disproportionate amount of our national re- 
sources goes into armaments. No sensible 
person would begrudge the spending of more 
money were such expenditures to afford a 
necessary increase in our national security. 
However, when billions more can buy us only 
the same, or less, security, the effort should 
be made to have both sides level off and, if 
at all possible, scale downward under con- 
trolled and verified conditions. 

Thus it is essential that we attempt to 
slow down the nuclear buildup — and inhibit 
the further spread of nuclear weapons — 
while we still presumably have some control 
of the situation. 

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation 

The most urgent problem before us today 
is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In 
1963 President Kennedy spoke to the Nation 
on this subject: ^ 

I ask you [he said] to stop and think for a moment 
what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so 
many hands, in the hands of countries large and 
small, stable and unstable, responsible and irrespon- 
sible, scattered throughout the world. There would 
be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real secu- 
rity, and no chance of effective disarmament. There 
would only be the increased chance of accidental war 
and an increased necessity for the great powers to 
involve themselves in what otherwise would be local 

Last October at a test site near a lake 
called Lop Nor the Chinese Communists ex- 
ploded a nuclear device. 

A second nuclear test appears to be immi- 

The Soviet Union today has full cause to 
regret the significant scientific and techno- 
logical help provided Communist China in 
the 1950's which made this accomplishment 
possible. The nuclear weapon is a dangerous 
toy to place in the hands of a nation devoted 

3 Ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234. 

lAY 8, 1965 


to aggression by whatever means, and which 
espouses violence to effect social and political 
change. While Communist China calls loudly 
for nuclear disarmament, it defiantly boasts 
that its intention is to become a full-fledged 
nuclear power. In open defiance of the U.N. 
Charter, Communist China is busily engaged 
in spreading its own brand of imperialism by 
subversion and aggression. 

Indeed Communist China has openly chal- 
lenged Soviet leadership in the Communist 
world and challenged it with some success. 

Communist China leaders will continue to 
exploit politically their successes in nuclear 
testing, particularly in Afro-Asian areas, as 
evidence of their technical, military, and eco- 
nomic development. And there is no reason 
to believe that given time the Communist 
China regime cannot produce both medium- 
and long-range missiles armed with nuclear 
warheads. This is a disturbing long-range 
prospect in view of the hostility which the 
Peiping regime has demonstrated. 

The U.S. administration has these facts 
fully in mind — as our continued presence in 
South Viet-Nam testifies. President Johnson 
has reaffirmed our defense commitments in 
Asia, and our defense plans take full account 
of Communist Chinese military development. 

The Communist Chinese nuclear detona- 
tion, however, has created a very real and 
immediate problem, a problem whose critical 
portions we can only guess at but whose im- 
mediate solution is imperative. 

President Johnson, addressing the Nation 
2 days after the Chinese Communist detona- 
tion, spoke of an added meaning to the ex- 
plosion at Lop Nor : " 

Communist China's expensive and demanding effort 
[he said] tempts other states to equal folly. Nuclear 
spread is dangerous to all mankind. What if there 
should come to be 10 nuclear powers, or maybe 20 
nuclear powers? What if we must learn to look every- 
where for the restraint which our own example now 
sets for a few? Will the human race be safe in such 
a day? 

There is the great danger that, should 
Communist China continue to test, a chain 
reaction will set in whereby one, then an- 


* Ibid., Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610. 

other, and then another nation might make 
that same fateful decision. 

In India today there is a great deal of soul 
searching on whether or not to go ahead with 
the nuclear weapons program. Despite the 
fact that India has already experienced Com- 
munist China aggression, that nation is to be 
commended that it has elected not to pursue 
nuclear research for military purposes. But 
that is a decision which could be overturned 
at any time under given circumstances. 

Although the Communist Chinese nuclear 
test may have dangerous repercussions, it is 
not this action alone which lends new urgency 
to the threat of nuclear proliferation. And 
here we see a paradox. It stems from the 
rapid worldwide development of the peaceful 
uses of the atom. Nuclear power plants are 
a potential source of plutonium. Unfortu- 
nately, present measures are far from ade- 
quate to insure that the resulting plutonium 
might not be used for the development of '" 
nuclear weapons. There is an urgent need 
now for agreement among all nations that all 
transfers of nuclear materials and equipment 
for peaceful purposes take place under effec- 
tive international safeguards. 

The Political Climate ' 

The threat of nuclear proliferation occurs 
today against a backdrop of escalating inter- 
national tensions. 

In recent months increased military ac- 
tivity has involved our Armed Forces in 
Southeast Asia. The United Nations crisis 
caused by the Soviet Union's refusal to pay 
its arrears in accordance with article 19 of 
the charter continues unresolved. It has pi'e- 
cluded the use of the General Assembly as a 
platform for the discussion and possible reso- 
lution of international issues. 

Why, then, you may ask, should we con- 
tinue the attempt to address ourselves seri- 
ously to arms control and disarmament nego- 
tiations? The answer should be self-evident. 
The dangers of military escalation which 
attend such tensions only point up the in- 
creased need to utilize the conference table, 
to seek the means whereby to restrain and >: 
control the arms race. i 
















it I 

In the recent past such times of crisis as 
the Berlin wall and the resumption of at- 
mospheric testing were accompanied by 
negotiations which resulted in the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Princi- 
ples'' and the formation of the 18-Nation 
Disarmament Committee. The "hot line" and 
the limited nuclear test ban treaty came into 
Bi4 being in the afteiTnath of the Cuban crisis. 
While the United States and the Soviet Union 
are not presently in direct military confron- 
tation in Southeast Asia or some other 
trouble spots, nevertheless, the political cli- 
mate is one which demands urgent attention 
All to the possibilities of arms control. 

Areas of Possible Agreement 
'"' What are these possibilities? What must 
'* be continued to be discussed and, hopefully, 
^ agreed upon at the 18-Nation Disarmament 
""' Conference in Geneva? 
'" Obviously, measures in the nonprolifera- 
"^ tion category are the most urgent. To curb 
''* nuclear spread we seek agreement on an ar- 
rangement — as simple in concept as the test 
ban treaty — to be entered into by nuclear 
and nonnuclear powers alike. It would pro- 
hibit the nuclear powers from giving nuclear 
weapons or the information necessary to 
;cii]^their manufacture into the national control 
of nations which do not have such weapons. 
It would provide for a corresponding prohi- 
bition of the manufacture or acquisition of 
control of such weapons by any nonnuclear 

As I noted earlier, we also seek agreement 
that all transfers of nuclear materials and 
equipment for peaceful purposes take place 
under effective international safeguards. 
Safeguards are an integral part of United 
States agreements for cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of the atom. Our Atoms for 
Peace programs are strictly supervised so as 
to avoid the dangers inherent in the spread 
of nuclear materials and equipment for 
fliiii peaceful purposes. 

Only with effective international safe- 








■0 guards on all nuclear materials and equip- 

5 For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 

MAY 3, 1965 

ment used in peaceful programs can the 
world have reasonable assurance that no 
country with a power reactor is storing 
away some of its plutonium against the day 
it might decide to make a bomb. 

As part of the nonproliferation package 
we will continue to seek agreement on a 
verified cutoff of all production of fissionable 
material for weapons use. Our proposal is 
coupled with another that the major nuclear 
powers transfer quantities of nuclear weap- 
ons grade fissionable materials to peaceful 

A cutoff and transfer agreement would 
enhance our security. It would reduce signifi- 
cantly the rising nuclear stockpiles on both 
sides. It would also be of considerable value 
in persuading nonnuclear nations to resist 
temptation to divert their peaceful atomic 
programs to weapons production. 

Another important measure to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons is our continuing 
effort to secure agreement for a comprehen- 
sive test ban. This would be a ban on nuclear 
tests under ground as well as above — a ban 
which we would, of course, have to be able 
to verify with acceptable assurance. In pre- 
vious negotiations we have been unable to 
reach agreement with the Soviet Union on 
the question of on-site verification. The 
Soviets have argued that verification of com- 
pliance could be carried out with the use of 
remote seismometers only. We dispute this 
point since the present state of the art is 
such that it is impossible to distinguish be- 
tween some underground nuclear explosions 
and some earthquakes on the basis of seismic 
evidence. And that evidence is our best long- 
distance check. 

In an effort to improve our capability to 
detect and identify underground nuclear ex- 
plosions the U.S. Government over the past 
5 years has spent about $300 million and is 
continuing at about the same rate. There are 
two developments under active investigation 
that appear to be particularly promising. 
These are the use of ocean-bottom seis- 
mometers and the use of very large arrays 
of land-based seismometers. We continue to 
feel, however, that there will still be a few 


natural seismic events every year that may 
provide us vi^ith ambiguous evidence and that 
we vi^ill need some on-site inspections in any 

Now, you may well ask what are the pros- 
pects for any of these agreements. Frankly, 
I do not know. But I am an optimist, or I 
would not be in this business. I cannot con- 
ceive of man, with his incredible achieve- 
ments since the dawn of civilization, accept- 
ing, without challenge, the inevitability of 
his own and the world's destruction. 

And we have several things working for 
us in this nuclear age. Certainly the possibil- 
ity of a halt in the spread of nuclear weapons 
is in the mutual interest of both the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The destructive 
capabilities of nuclear weapons cause peoples 
everywhere to urge new efforts toward con- 
trolling the arms race. Arms control and 
disarmament policies are a major element 
today in the foreign policy of every nation. 
Every single foreign minister who spoke at 
the United Nations this winter emphasized 
his nation's deep interest in the problem. 
With this consensus, steps such as those I 
have outlined can oifer restraints and pro- 
vide the time needed to approach the larger 
problem of general and complete disarma- 

Again you may ask: Why bother? In to- 
day's world "overwhelming superiority" de- 
ters an enemy but does not guarantee its 
possessor against possible annihilation at the 
hands of a weaker force. This is particularly 
true when a "superior force" does not include 
an effective defensive capability against a 
nuclear attack. Such a defensive capability 
does not now appear in prospect. 

Therefore, we must examine other means 
that give hope of protecting the national in- 
terest. Arms control measures may well 
become an increasingly important foundation 
stone in the ramparts we watch. 

We hope that our campaign to contain the 
nuclear threat will move forward in the 
months ahead. At this point permit me to 
quote again the words of our President : " 

. . . the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the 
great dangers to peace, and as long as I am President 
I shall continue to work as hard as I know how to 
work to seek agreements that will stop that spread. 

And I can assure you that, despite the 
present roadblocks, so will my colleagues and 
so will I. 

United States Expresses Views 
on Laurel- Langley Agreement 

Statement by William P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs"- 

As you know, this matter [parity ques- 
tion] was discussed between President 
Macapagal and President Johnson last Octo- 
ber, and this was noted in the communique.^ 
Since then there have been continuing con- 
sultations, and my Government has given the 
matter careful consideration. 1974 is a long 
way off, and it may be premature to be talk- 
ing about what kind of agreement should 
replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement.' 
That agreement is a very special contract be- 
tween our two sovereign countries, and I 
think it has served well both Philippine and 
U.S. interests in its first 10 years of opera- 

During the life of the present agreement, 
its provisions will naturally continue to be 
operative. We believe that both countries 
will want to have a framework for continu- 
ity of a trade and investment relationship 
which will be mutually beneficial when the 
present agreement ceases. As far as the 
parity article is concerned — article VI of the 
agreement — we are aware of Philippine in- 
terest in seeing that this provision expires in 
1974, and on our side I can say that we have 
no intention of seeking its extension. We 
assume, of course, that rights acquired prior 
to 1974 will be protected in accordance with 
the Philippine Constitution. 

6 At a news conference on Oct. 3, 1964. 

' Made upon Mr. Bundy's arrival at Manila on 
Mar. 8 en route to Baguio for an annual conference 
of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 632. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 



International Trade 

by Under Secretamj Mann^ 

From our earliest days, New Orleans has 
been the port serving one of the most vital 
international trading areas of our nation. 
Through this port serving the Mississippi 
Valley goods move to and from all comers of 
the earth. 

Those of you here already know that inter- 
national trade is good for your region and 
good for the Nation. For 20 years the Mis- 
sissippi Valley World Trade Council has pro- 
vided outstanding leadership in promoting 
the exports of our heartland. But I believe 
it is useful to recall some of the reasons why 
trade serves our national interest. 

Perhaps the most impoi-tant secret of our 
economic growth is the fact that at the very 
beginning of our independent national life, 
a decision was made that all the States of 
the Union should be free to compete and 
trade with each other. 

Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Fed- 
eralist papers in 1787, said: 

An unrestrained intercourse between the States 
themselves will advance the trade of each. . . . The 
veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, 
and will acquire additional motion and vigour from 
a free circulation of the commodities of every part. 

He went on to say that: 

A prosperous commerce is now perceived and 
acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the 
most useful, as well as the most productive, source 
of national wealth. . . . 

The United States became, in point of fact, 

the first true common market. The principle 

of the free movement of capital, goods, and 

. labor between each of the former colonies 

became firmly fixed in our Federal system. 

The fact that our system has permitted all 
of our States to compete and trade with one 
another without restriction of any kind is 
one of the major reasons why we have been 
able to attain a level of economic and social 
development unequaled in the world's history. 

Todav we are about to enter the 50th 

1 Address made before the Mississippi Valley 
Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Mar. 31 
(press release 65). 

iMAY 3, 1965 

month of the most recent cycle of a dynamic 
expansion of our economy. In these 4 years 
of continuing growth our gross national out- 
put has expanded by 26 percent. Corrected 
for price changes, this means it has grown 
more than 5 percent a year. Real income per 
person, after taxes, has increased 3 1/3 per- 
cent a year. Employment has risen by almost 
5 million jobs. Profits after taxes have in- 
creased by 60 percent. And unlike other ex- 
pansions of economies in the recent past, the 
growth in our product has not been marred 
by rapid increase in cost and narrowing 
margins of profit. The price level remains 
stable; in fact, the wholesale price index for 
January 1965 is at the same level as it was 
in January 1961. 

Without a high level of exports our own 
domestic economy would not be so prosper- 
ous. At the turn of this century our country 
was exporting at the rate of about $1 billion 
annually, while today our exports are around 
$25 billion a year. 

Speaking last year on this point. President 
Johnson said:- 

Our exports provide jobs for about 3.6 million 
American workers and outlets for the crops of one 
out of every four acres of our farms. 

It is clear that we need our markets abroad 
in order to keep our domestic plant going at 
high and efficient levels of production. 

Last year our commercial exports, includ- 
ing those financed by the Government, ex- 
ceeded $22 billion. This was an increase of 
16 percent over 1963 and 27 percent over the 
1960 level. Although imports rose substan- 
tially in response to rising levels of economic 
activity here at home — reaching $18.6 billion 
— our commercial trade surplus increased 
from $2.3 billion in 1963 to $3.7 billion in 

Another aspect of international trade 
which has been of benefit to our people is the 
stimulus of competition from abroad. This 
competition has helped to make our produc- 
tive facilities efficient. It has brought about 
the production of high-quality products at a 
low cost. 

2 For text, see Bullctin of Nov. 23, 1964, p. 752. 


Experience has taught us that industries 
which are protected from the spur of com- 
petition do not conduct research or modern- 
ize their plants and methods of production 
or improve the productivity of the w^orker. 
The consumer — and this means all of us — 
benefits from competition. The worker ben- 
efits because by improving the efficiency of 
production it is possible to raise real wages 
simply by sharing with the worker increases 
in individual productivity. 

President Johnson has said:^ 

Our imports . . . maintain a healthy pi-essure on 
our own producers and workers to step up their 
efficiency, offer our consumers a wider choice of 
goods at competitive prices, and counteract domestic 
pressures for price increases. 

The nation which shuts itself off from the 
opportunity of competition from the outside 
world by protective devices will be the nation 
which finds itself lagging behind while more 
progressive economies in other countries 
pass it by on the road to greater efficiency 
and affluence. 

There are, of course, cases where limited 
protection may be justified. When infant in- 
dustries have clear prospects of becoming 
efficient and competitive, some degree of pro- 
tection for limited periods may be necessary. 
Other factors must be taken into account. 
But we must be continually aware that it is 
the consumer who pays the price of excessive 
protection. Trade barriers, whether in the 
form of tariffs or other devices, can be, and 
often are, subsidies for a relatively few priv- 
ileged members of the economy. 

The final point I would like to make about 
why trade is good for us is that a high level 
of international trade is essential to the 
efforts of the developing nations to achieve 
stability and progress in freedom — to the 
achievement, in a word, of the kind of world 
which offers reasonable prospects of peace. 

The low-income countries of Latin Amer- 
ica, Asia, and Africa make up half of the 
free world's population. They have massive 
economic and social problems and a shortage 
of the means to meet their aspirations. With 

3 Ibid. 

population expanding at an unprecedented 
rate, especially in these areas, great strains 
are placed on the political, economic, and 
social fabric of their societies. It is clearly 
in our national interest to do what we can 
to help build viable expanding societies that 
can provide for the needs and defense of 
their peoples. 

Loans, investment, and technical assist- 
ance are ways of helping the low-income 
countries grow. But more important in the 
long run is trade. 

In the 1950's the developing countries of 
the free world derived about 12 percent of 
their foreign exchange receipts from public 
and private capital flows from abroad. In 
contrast, about 88 percent of their foreign 
exchange receipts came from exjwrts. 

These countries have been particularly 
vulnerable because their economies depend 
so heavily on raw material exports. These 
exports are subject to wide fluctuations in 
price, and we have seen in the past that 
grave problems can be created by sudden 
drops in the prices of key commodities. 

Many of the developing countries have be- 
come aware that to become viable they must 
move together to form free trade areas and 
common markets. In Latin America, which 
I know is an area of special interest to you, 
two such groupings have been formed: the 
Central American Common Market, embrac- 
ing the five Central American countries, and 
the Latin American Free Trade Area, em- 
bracing eight countries of the Southern 
Hemisphere and Mexico. The United States 
has encouraged these developments and will 
continue to do so. 

The record of the United States in pro- 
moting the trade of the developing nations 
is a good one. We have worked to reduce the 
vulnerability of their commodities to drastic 
price fluctuations. We are working to help 
reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to their 
trade. In the Kennedy Round of trade nego- 
tiations we hope to see significant reductions 
on a multilateral basis in the barriers to 
their present exports and to their potential 
exports of manufactured goods. 

To sum up, I would like to use a phrase 



vvliicli President John Adams gave us in 
1797: ". . . commerce has made this country 
what it is. . . ." 

This is as true today as it was then. And 
it is our intention to work diligently for the 
improvement of our international trade pat- 

I hope the IMississippi Valley World Trade 
Council, which has played an important role 
in our national and international efforts, will 
continue to work for the kind of trade that 
helps us as well as the rest of the free world. 

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt 
From Interest Equalization Tax 


Exclusion for Original or New Japanese Issues 
AS Required for International Monetary 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
4917(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as 
added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax 
Act, approved September 2, 1964 (Public Law 88- 
5C3, 78 Stat. 809), by section 301 of title 3 of the 
United States Code, and as President of the United 
States, it is hereby determined that the full applica- 
tion of the tax imposed by section 4911 of the In- 
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 
of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, will have such 
consequences for Japan as to imperil or threaten to 
imperil the stability of the international monetary 
system and it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. The tax imposed by section 4911 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall not apply to an 
acquisition by a United States person of a debt obli- 
gation repayable exclusively in United States cur- 
rency which is issued or guaranteed as to the pay- 
ment of principal and interest by the Government of 
Japan (other than an obligation which by its terms 
is convertible into stock of the obligor) provided 

(a) Such debt obligation is acquired as all or part 
of an original or new issue as to which there is filed 
such notice of acquisition as the Secretary of the 
Treasury or his delegate may prescribe by regula- 
tions ; 

(b) The Government of Japan determines and 
certifies to the acquiring United States person that 
his acquisition of such debt obligation complies with 
the criteria set forth in this section; and 

(c) Before or as a result of such acquisition, the 
aggregate amount of all acquisitions by United 
States persons excluded from interest equalization 
tax by reason of this order during the calendar year 
in which the acquisition is made (or, in the case of 
acquisitions made during the period beginning on the 
effective date of this order and ending December 
31, 19(i5, during such period) does not exceed $100,- 

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury or his dele- 
gate is authorized to prescribe from time to time 
regulations, rulings, directions, and instructions to 
carry out the purpose of this order. 

Sec 3. This order shall be effective upon its filing 
for publication in the Federal Register with respect 
to acquisitions made during the period beginning on 
the effective date of this order and ending on the 
date specified in section 4911(d) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954. 

iuyvJU*AH/U>.t.<j«-" ■ 

The White House, 
April 2, 1965. 

U.S. and Japan Begin Program 
of Cooperation in IViedical Science 

White House press release dated A;»ril 8 


No matter what other problems divide the 
nations of the world, the peoples of the globe 
are joined together in a common struggle 
against suffering and disease. Americans 
have always stood ready to play our part in 
that struggle and to join the forces of our 
science and our medicine with those of 
others to try to control and prevent disease 
not only in our own country but in all parts 
of the world. 

When Prime Minister [Eisaku] Sato of 
Japan was here in January, we agreed that 
we will cooperate and join our resources and 
talents in an effort to solve some of the most 
serious medical problems that afflict our two 
countries, as well as other countries of Asia.' 

' No. 11211; 30 Fed. Reg. 4385. 

' For text of a communique released on Jan. 13, 
see Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134. 

MAY 3, 1965 


Today it is my privilege to announce here — 
concurrently with announcement being made 
by the Prime Minister following a meeting 
of the Japanese Cabinet — that we are going 
ahead to implement that agreement. 

An American team, headed by one of our 
distinguished medical scientists, Dr. Colin 
MacLeod, Deputy Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology, and including some 
of our most able medical experts, will leave 
soon for Tokyo to begin discussions on April 
19 with their Japanese counterparts. The 
purpose will be to seek ways and means by 
which our two countries can work with each 
other and with the other nations of Asia to 
speed our progress in overcoming diseases 
which are of importance to our own two 
countries as well as many others in the 
Pacific area. 

They will map out modes of attack against 
diseases such as malaria, cholera, schistoso- 
miasis, tuberculosis, virus diseases, heart 
disease, and cancer, and will discuss further 
cooperative efforts on problems of air pollu- 
tion and pesticides. 

After this planning conference, we hope 
to discuss with the countries concerned ways 
in which the cooperation can be of benefit to 
other Asian nations. 

Our goal is a peaceful world and a better 
world. We seek a better, fuller, and healthier 
life not only for all Americans but for all 
mankind. We can reach that goal if the na- 
tions which have talents and resources join 
hands with each other and those in need of 
assistance to face common problems together. 

We can make progress by giving attention 

to those concerns which unite us, while at 
the same time trying earnestly and unceas- 
ingly to solve the questions which divide us. 
The health of mankind is a problem of the 
deepest common concern. The cooperation 
between Japan and the United States and 
other interested nations of Asia is a sig- 
nificant and hopeful step toward these goals. 
It is my hope that the works and results of 
this program may long commemorate the 
friendly meeting here in the United States 
with Prime Minister Sato. 


The first planning meeting of the U. S. 
advisory group with their Japanese coun- 
terparts will be held at Tokyo between April 
19 and 21. The American delegation will 
consist of; 

Dr. Colin M. MacLeod, chairman, Deputy Director, 
Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of 
the President; 

Dr. J. Ralph Audy, Director, Hooper Foundation, 
University of California Medical Center; 

Dr. H. Stanley Bennett, Dean, Division of Bio- 
logical Sciences, University of Chicago; 

Dr. Thomas Francis, Jr., Chairman, Department 
of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of 
Public Health; 

Dr. James A. Shannon, Director, National Instl-. 
tutes of Health; 

Dr. James Watt, Director, Office of International 
Health, Public Health Service; 

Dr. John M. Weir, Director of Medical and Na- 
tural Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation; and 

Dr. Theodore Woodvi'ard, Professor and Head, De- 
partment of Medicine, University of Maryland. 



The Organization of African Unity 

"The first tangible fruit of the dream of 
Pan-African unity" — that is how the Organ- 
ization of African Unity, founded at Addis 
Ababa in Jlay 1963, has been described. Its 
establishment united divergent groupings 
among the independent African states and 
provided an organizational framework for 
cooperative effort toward solution of the 
problems confronting its members. Although 
subject to the strains resulting from inevi- 
table differences among the sovereign states 
which form its membership, the organization 
in its first 2 years has shown significant po- 
tential for influencing the political and eco- 
nomic development of the African Continent. 

Background and Birth 

Tlie formal search for African unity began 
in 1900, when the first pan-African confer- 
ence was convened in London. From that 
date until World War II, however, pan- 
Africanism was essentially a cosmopolitan 
movement of Negro intellectuals, largely out- 
side Africa and primarily concerned with 
creating a sense of community among Afri- 
cans living throughout the world. Although 
a series of congresses held between 1919 and 
1927 called for African participation in the 
government of colonial and mandated terri- 
tories in Africa, the movement had little root 
in the continent, and these specific political 
objectives remained subordinate to the 
broader search for "African community." 

The Second World War radically altered 
the situation for Africa and, thus, for pan- 
Africanism. The war brought Africa more 
fully into the mainstream of world events 
and at the same time weakened the ability 
of the major colonial powers to resist the 
growing pressure of nascent nationalism. 
The new mood was reflected in the resolu- 

tions adopted in 1945 by the Fifth Pan-Afri- 
can Congress, which named self-government 
or independence as the initial goals of pan- 
African aspirations. 

For the next decade, the energies gener- 
ated by the pan-African ideal were therefore 
channeled into the drive for self-government 
and independence at the territorial level, and 
the search for broader African unity fell 
dormant. Nevertheless, the search for an 
African personality never ceased, and in both 
French- and English-speaking parts of the 
continent there were expressions of this 

In the late 1950's the pan-African spirit 
revived and two lines of approach were 
adopted. The first sought to bring together 
the peoples, rather than the governments, of 
Africa, and was pursued in both African and 
Afro-Asian forums; the second sought to 
promote unified action at an intergovern- 
mental level. The first Conference of Inde- 
pendent African States was held at Accra, 
Ghana, in 1958, while cooperation in more 
limited regional groupings was attempted in 
the Mali Federation (1959), the Entente 
(1959 — Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, 
and Dahomey), and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali 
"Union" (1960). 

During 1961 several broader groupings 
emerged on the African scene. These groups, 
in some cases with overlapping membership, 
were generally known by the names of cities 

• Prepared in the Office of Inter-Afri- 
can Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, 
Department of State. Reprints are 
available upon request from the Office 
of Media Services, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., 20520. 

MAY 3, 1965 


where they had met. Thus, by 1962 there 
was a "Brazzaville group" (formally organ- 
ized as the Union Africaine et Malgachc — 
UAM), a "Casablanca group," and a "Mon- 
rovia group." Each represented a portion of 
independent Africa. In the winter of 1962- 
63, however, a call was issued for a meeting 
of all African nations to be held at Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963, and members 
of all three of these groupings agreed to par- 

At the conference the foremost item on the 
agenda was the establishment of an organi- 
zation of African states capable of giving 
tangible expression to the long search for 
African unity. Three proposals for such a 
body were put before the preliminary meet- 
ing of foreign ministers, but when they 
failed to reach agreement it appeared that 
the goal might not be reached at Addis 
Ababa. However, the heads of state and gov- 
ernment, meeting immediately afterward, 
took inspiration from Ethiopian Emperor 
Haile Selassie's opening address and success- 
fully resolved conflicting proposals in order 
to bring the OAU into being. 

The representatives of 31 states signed the 
OAU Charter on May 2.5, 1963; Morocco, 
though absent from the conference, signed 
shortly afterward to bring the number of 
original members to 32. The subsequent in- 
dependence and adherence of Kenya, Malawi, 
Zambia, and The Gambia has brought cur- 
rent membership to 36. 

Principles of the OAU 

The purposes and principles of the OAU, 
as set forth in the charter, reflect the historic 
concerns of pan-Africanism which underlay 
the organization's founding. The preamble 
reaffirms the principles of the United Na- 
tions and of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and also stresses "achieve- 
ment of the legitimate aspirations of the 
African peoples" and their "total advance- 
ment" through political and economic devel- 
opment. Article II of the charter pledges the 
signatories to "co-ordinate and harmonize 
their general policies" in several fields in 

order to promote African progress and unity, 
to defend their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, to eradicate colonialism from 
Africa, and to promote international coopera- 
tion. In pursuit of these aims member states 
further affirm in article III their adherence 
to the principles of noninterference in each 
other's internal aff"airs ; respect for the sover- 
eignty and territorial integrity of each state; 
peaceful settlement of disputes; condemna- 
tion of political assassination or subversive 
activity against neighboring states; libera- 
tion of remaining dependent areas; and 
"non-alignment with regard to blocs." 

Organizational Structure 

The work of the OAU is carried on 
through four "principal institutions" and a 
number of specialized commissions estab- 
lished by the charter, and through four ad- 
ditional commissions created by special reso- 
lution. These organs are shown schematically 
in the chart on p. 675. 

The "Principal Institutions" 

The Assembly of Heads of State and Gov- 
ernment, composed of the heads of all mem- 
ber states or their governments (or their duly 
accredited representatives), is the "supreme 
organ" of the OAU. It meets at least once . 
a year in regular session, though extraor- 
dinary sessions may be held with the ap- 
proval of two-thirds of the member states. 
Decisions at Assembly sessions require a 
two-thirds majority of the membership (ex- 
cept for procedural questions, decided by 
simple majority), with each state having one 
vote. The Assembly is empowered to discuss 
"matters of common concern to Africa" with 
a view to overall coordination of OAU policy 
and may also review the acts of all other 
organs or agencies of the organization. 

Second in importance only to the Assembly 
is the Cotincil of Ministers. Made up of the 
Foreign Ministers (or other designated min- 
isters) of member states, the Council is re- 
quired to meet at least twice annually. Like 
the Assembly, it may meet in extraordinary 
session if two-thirds of OAU members ap- 





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prove such a meeting. The Council is respon- 
sible to the Assembly for any matters re- 
ferred to it and for execution of Assembly 
decisions. Resolutions before the Council are 
decided by simple majority of the total OAU 

Between sessions of the Assembly and 
Council the day-to-day running of the organ- 
ization is in the hands of the General Secre- 
tariat, headed by an Administrative Secre- 
tary General appointed by the Assembly. The 
Secretariat is responsible for executing de- 
cisions taken by the Council of Ministers and 
for such housekeeping functions as mainte- 
nance of archives, provision of administra- 
tive and technical services for other OAU 
organs, and preparation of the OAU budget 
(apportioned in accordance with the U.N. 
scale of assessments) and of annual and spe- 
cial reports. The Secretary General, Diallo 
Telli of Guinea, was named to his post in 
July 1964; he is currently aided by four 
Assistant Secretaries General. 

In order that member states may respect 
their pledge to settle disputes by peaceful 
means, the charter provides for a Commis- 
sion of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbit7-a- 
tion. The protocol establishing the Commis- 
sion, approved by the Assembly at its first 
regular meeting in July 1964, calls for crea- 
tion of a panel of 21 members, each from a 
different member state, to furnish mediation, 
arbitration, or conciliation services. A Presi- 
dent and two Vice Presidents will be ap- 
pointed by the Assembly from among the 
members of the Commission, and these three 
officials will constitute the Bureau of the 

Commission members, to be nominated by 
OAU governments and appointed by the As- 
sembly, are required to have "recognized pro- 
fessional qualifications." They will be em- 
powered to act in disputes between states 
referred to the Commission by one or more 
parties to the dispute or by the Assembly or 
Council. If any party to the dispute refuses 
to submit to Commission jurisdiction, the 
dispute will be referred to the Council of 
Ministers for consideration. Mediation ef- 


forts will be carried on by one or more 
mediators; conciliation by three members of 
the Commission plus one conciliator named 
by each party to the dispute; and arbitra- 
tion by a tribunal of three Commission mem- 
bers, one chosen by each disputant and the 
third by the first two arbitrators named. 
Failing such agreement between the first two 
arbitrators, the third will be named by the 
Bureau of the Commission. A few nomina- 
tions to the Commission had been made by 
early 1965. 

The Specialized Commissions 

Article XX of the charter authorizes the 
Assembly to create "such Specialized Com- 
missions as it may deem necessary" and 
names the first five such commissions to be 
established : 

1. Economic and Social Commission; 

2. Educational and Cultural Commission; 

3. Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Com- 

4. Defense Commission; and 

5. Scientific, Technical, and Research 

Two additional specialized commissions 
were subsequently added by the Assembly at 
its July 1964 meeting: the Transport and 
Communications Commission and the Com- 
mission of Jurists. 

Each of the specialized commissions is 
composed of the appropriate minister or 
other designated representative of each 
member state, and each commission adopts 
its own regulations subject to approval of the 
Council of Ministers. Thus far the five orig- 
inal specialized commissions have all met 
twice (except for the Health, Sanitation, and 
Nutrition Commission, which has met once) 
and have drawn up regulations providing for 
annual meetings and for permanent staffs 
to operate under the aegis of the General 
Secretariat. Of the two commissions estab- 
lished in 1964, the Transport and Communi- 
cations Commission has met once while the 
Commission of Jurists has not completed its 
organizational arrangements. All Commis- 
sions report to the Council of Ministers. 




The N on charter Organs 

In addition to the organs called for by the 
charter, the OAU has to date created four 
bodies by Assembly or Council of Ministers 

A nine-member African Liberation Com- 
mittee was set up by an Assembly resolution 
adopted at the OAU's founding meeting in 
Addis Ababa. From its headquarters in Dar- 
es-Salaam, Tanzania, the Liberation Commit- 
tee exercises responsibility for "harmonizing 
the assistance from African States" to "na- 
tional liberation movements" in dependent 
territories of Africa. The Liberation Com- 
mittee was also charged by the Assembly 
with managing a special fund for aid to 
"liberation movements" and with proposing 
to the Assembly suitable means of apportion- 
ing the sums required among OAU member 

Meeting in extraordinary session at Addis 
Ababa in November 1963, the Council of 
Ministers established a seven-member ad hoc 
Commission on the Moroccan-Algerian Dis- 
pute to ameliorate a border dispute between 
those two countries. Although the ad hoc 
commission was expressly recognized as an 
expedient required by the fact that the Com- 
mission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbi- 
tration had not yet been set up, further delay 
in organizing the latter body has resulted in 
the ad hoc commission remaining in being 
until the present time. 

Another organ created by resolution of the 
Council of Ministers is the Commission on 
the Problem of Refugees in Africa, which 
was formed following the Council meeting 
held at Lagos, Nigeria, in February 1964. 
This 10-member body was given responsi- 
bility for examining the overall problem of 
refugees on the continent and ways and 
means of maintaining these refugees in their 
countries of asylum and for making recom- 
mendations on possible solutions of the prob- 
lems involved. In July 1964 the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government assigned the 
Commission the fui'ther task of drawing up 
a convention on "all aspects of the problem 
of refugees in Africa." 

After its investigations in East Africa the 
Commission prepared a draft convention 
which has been circulated to all member 
states for their consideration and observa- 
tions before it is made final. The Secretary 
General lias been authorized to convene a 
meeting of legal experts from member states 
of the commission on refugees in order to 
submit a final draft of the convention to the 
Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for 
Accra in September 1965. 

In September 1964 an extraordinary ses- 
sion of the Council of Ministers established 
the youngest of the OAU's noncharter or- 
gans, the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo. 
This 10-member body, under the chairman- 
ship of Kenya President Jomo Kenyatta, was 
charged by the Council with seeking to re- 
store peace both within the Congo (Leopold- 
ville) and between the Congo and its neigh- 
bors, Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville). 

What the OAU Has Done 

The OAU has been an extremely busy 
organization in the 2 years since its incep- 
tion. The Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government has met once since the founding 
meeting at Addis Ababa, while the Council 
of Ministers has already held eight sessions, 
four regular and four extraordinary. In ad- 
dition, numerous meetings have been held by 
the specialized commissions and by the non- 
charter organs, while the Secretariat has 
been engaged in establishing its permanent 
headquarters and staff in Addis Ababa. 

During this period the various OAU or- 
gans have dealt with a wide range of ques- 
tions, from housekeeping arrangements to 
major disputes between member states. For 
convenience, the principal issues are dis- 
cussed below under two broad headings: (a) 
political issues, and (b) economic, social, and 
technical questions. 

Political issues 

The political concerns of OAU member 
states have been clearly reflected in the reso- 
lutions adopted at the regular Assembly and 
Council sessions. The topics of recurrent 

MAY 3, 1965 



interest have included colonialism, disarma- 
ment, the South African racial policy of 
apartheid, the future of the Portuguese ter- 
ritories in Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Afri- 
can representation at the United Nations, 
and the extent to which the OAU should 
evolve toward an all-African government. 

In their resolutions OAU member states 
have constantly reiterated their goal of in- 
dependence for those parts of Africa still 
under non- African rule. They have sought to 
hasten "decolonization" of the continent 
through support of national liberation move- 
ments (coordinated by the African Libera- 
tion Committee), pressure at the United Na- 
tions, appeals to the Western powers, and 
boycott action against Portugal and South 
Africa. A special bureau has been set up 
within the Secretariat to coordinate this boy- 
cott action against South Africa and Portu- 
gal. South Africa has also come under sharp 
attack for its apartheid policy, with resolu- 
tions on this subject often including a con- 
demnation of racial discrimination elsewhere 
in the world (specifically including the 
United States). Special appeals have been 
directed to the British Government to pro- 
vide for more effective African participation 
in the government of Southern Rhodesia. 

With regard to disarmament, OAU resolu- 
tions have called for the removal of foreign 
military bases from Africa and the declara- 
tion of Africa as a denuclearized zone. The 
resolutions have also urged progress toward 
"general and complete disarmament under 
strict and efi'ective international control" and 
have appealed to the major powers to take 
steps toward this goal. 

OAU member states have also been con- 
cerned with African representation at the 
United Nations, which they wish to see in- 
creased to reflect the growing number of 
African members of the world organization. 
To make present African representation 
more effective, African members of the 
United Nations have established a perma- 
nent secretariat in New York to coordinate 
their efforts in accordance with resolutions 
of the Assembly and Council. 

A further subject of continuing interest 

has been the future development of the OAU 
itself. Ghana has proposed that the OAU be 
transformed into a "union government" for 
Africa, to which member states would yield 
elements of their present sovereignty. This 
suggestion remains under study. 

In the area of mutual defense, however, a 
greater degree of cooperative effort was re- 
cently agreed upon at the February 1965 
meeting of the Defense Commission at Free- 
town, Sierra Leone. Here, a Ghanaian pro- 
posal for an African force under OAU com- 
mand led to a compromise proposal under 
which each member state would designate 
units for potential use in an OAU force and 
would undertake to standardize training for 
such units. The proposal has been referred 
by the Council to member states for further 

Relation to Regional Groupings 

A final problem relative to the future 
course of the OAU has turned on the organi- 
zation's relationship with African regional 
groupings. The question was formally raised 
at the Council of Ministers meeting at 
Dakar, Senegal, in August 1963 with regard 
to the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), 
which grouped 14 French-speaking states. 
The issue was resolved at that time with a 
resolution which implicitly reaffii'med the 
primacy of the OAU, set broad criteria for 
the establishment of regional groupings, and 
suggested that preexisting groupings "evolve 
with a view to their adaptation to the Char- 
ter of the OAU." In response, the UAM 
states dissolved much of their machinery for 
political consultation and limited their activi- 
ties to the economic sphere. However, they 
have recently reorganized with slightly dif- 
ferent membership as the Organisation Com- 
mune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). 

In addition to these general issues the 
OAU has frequently been seized with dis- 
turbances or disputes arising on the African 
Continent. This is most clearly reflected in 
the four extraordinary sessions of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers convened to consider specific 
problems affecting one or more member 
states. The first extraordinary session, held 







Membership: 21 members 
appointed by the 


Membership; the 

"ministers concerned" 

of al I OAU states 


Four Assistant 
Secretaries General 

Mohammed Sahnoun (Algeria) 
Gratien Pognon (Dahomev) 
Joseph lyalla (Nigeria) 
Josiah Buliro (Kenya) (Acting) 


9 Members: Algeria, Congo 
(L), Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Uganda, UAR 


10 Members; Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, 
Tunisia, UAR, Upper Volta 


10 Members: Burundi, 
Cameroon, Congo (L), Ghana, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 


7 Members; Ethiopia, Ivory 
Coast, Mai I , Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania 

MAY 3, 1965 


at Addis Ababa in November 1963, dealt en- 
tirely with the Moroccan-Algerian border 
dispute and ended with creation of the ad 
hoc commission and with injunctions to both 
parties to avoid actions likely to jeopardize 
the commission's success. At Dar-es-Salaam, 
in February 1964, the Council considered 
similar border disputes between Somalia on 
the one hand and Kenya and Ethiopia on the 
other, and again urged moderation and nego- 
tiations. The Dar-es-Salaam meeting was 
primarily concerned, however, with the 
aftermath of army mutinies in Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika,^ and recommended 
that African troops be made available to 
Tanganyika as it wished to replace the Brit- 
ish forces used to suppress the mutiny in 
that country. 

The third and fourth extraordinary ses- 
sions of the Council, held at Addis Ababa in 
September 1964 and at New York in Decem- 
ber, both dealt with the situation in the 
Congo. Resolutions of these meetings empha- 
sized the concern of OAU member states at 
the conflict in the Congo, urged an end of 
hostilities and a peaceful reconciliation of all 
contending parties, and asked that the mer- 
cenary troops employed by the Congo Gov- 
ernment be dismissed. The resolution of the 
Addis Ababa session also established the Ad 
Hoc Commission on the Congo, which has 
sent missions to the United States, the two 
Congos, and Burundi as part of its search 
for a Congo settlement, while the resolution 
adopted at New York in December focused 
on the situation which developed in the wake 
of the Belgian-American rescue mission at 
Stanleyville and Paulis. 

Economic, Social, and Technical Questions 

Both in the charter and in the resolutions 
of the founding meeting, the heads of state 
and government assembled at Addis Ababa 
in May 1963 made clear their deep concern 
for the economic and social betterment of 

' Tanganyika united with the People's Republic of 
Zanzibar on Apr. 27, 1964, to become the United Re- 
public of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. On Oct. 29, 1964, 
the name of United Republic of Tanzania was 

their peoples. Thus the preambular state- 
ment of "responsibility to harness the natu- 
ral and human resources of our continent" 
was reflected in the charter provisions creat- 
ing the specialized commissions, and the 
resolutions of the Assembly carried this one 
step further. These stressed the desire of 
OAU member states to collaborate in seeking 
harmonization of development plans, Afri- 
can free-trade and monetary zones and a 
payments and clearing union, a restructuring 
of international trade to improve the posi- 
tion of the less developed African countries, 
coordinated transportation, and wide areas 
of cooperation in such fields as education, 
labor, communications, and health. 

In the ensuing 2 years the principal forum 
for discussion of economic, social, and tech- 
nical questions has shifted to the specialized 
commissions as the latter have been orga- 
nized. The Economic and Social Commission, 
for example, drew up a set of priorities at 
its first meeting (at Niamey, Niger, in De- 
cember 1963) which incorporated the major 
goals outlined by the Assembly resolutions. 
It also laid the groundwork for close coopera- 
tion with the United Nations Economic Com- 
mission for Africa (UNECA). At its sec- 
ond session (at Cairo in January 1965) the 
Economic and Social Commission prepared 
a more detailed study program, reiterated ' 
earlier recommendations on the setting up of 
an African trade union under OAU auspices, 
and placed new emphasis on the importance 
of vocational training to African develop- 

The other specialized commissions have 
dealt in similar fashion with their fields of 
concern. The Educational and Cultural Com- 
mission decided at its first session (at Leo- 
poldville in January 1964) to give priority 
to a reorientation of secondary education, an 
increase in teacher training, and an expan- 
sion in the number of students at all levels. 
In addition, it discussed such matters as 
radio and television exchanges, the establish- 
ment of an African Press Agency, and the 
basis for OAU cooperation with the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). 



The Scientific, Technical, and Research 
Commission has stressed the promotion of 
research and training, exchanges of informa- 
tion and personnel, and the need for accu- 
rate surveys of African resources. It also 
has been occupied with the now completed 
assimilation of the Committee for Technical 
Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara 
(CCTA) to foi-m the nucleus of its technical 
staff. The administrative headquarters of 
the Scientific, Technical, and Research Com- 
mission will be at Lagos, Nigeria, making 
this commission the only one of the six so 
far functioning to be headquartered outside 
Addis Ababa. 

In like manner the Health, Sanitation, and 
Nutrition Commission has emphasized the 
raising of health standards, exchanges of 
doctors and other personnel, reciprocal train- 
ing efforts, and the relationship between the 
OAU and the World Health Organization, 
while the Transport and Communications 
Commission devoted its initial meeting (at 
Cairo in October and November 1964) to an 
examination of African communications 
problems. Neither this commission nor the 
Commission of Jurists (which has not met) 
has yet defined its overall terms of reference 
as have the five older commissions. 

Retrospect and Prospect 

Though still less than 2 years old, the OAU 
has already shown convincingly that it can 
make an effective contribution to solution of 
African problems by bringing its member 
states together in common endeavor. In the 
political field, for example, the organization 
has successfully applied the principle of 
peaceful settlement to several intra-African 
disputes, and in such broader forums as the 
United Nations it has given its members a 
greater degree of unity than had previously 
been possible. Similarly, the OAU has 
brought its members into closer collaboration 
in the economic, social, and technical fields, 
and the joint approaches fostered by its spe- 
cialized commissions promise significant 
benefits for African development. 

The OAU thus appears to be taking impor- 
tant steps toward realizing the historic goals 

of the pan-African ideal — defined by one 
African leader as "to share the blessings of 
a richly endowed continent among all its in- 
habitants; to make a reality of the brother- 
hood of the 'extended family' in a United 
States of Africa." 


Assembly of Heads of State and Government 

Founding meeting — Addis Ababa, May 22-25, 1963. 
First regular meeting — Cairo, July 17-21, 1964. 

Council of Ministers 

Founding meeting — Addis Ababa, May 15-21, 1963. 

Regular meetings: 

first— Dakar, August 2-11, 1963. 

second — Lagos, February 24-29, 1964. 

third— Cairo, July 13-17, 1964. 

fourth — Nairobi, February 26-March 9, 1965. 
Extraordinary sessions : 

first — Addis Ababa, November 15-18, 1963. 

second — Dar-es-Salaam, February 12-15, 1964. 

third — Addis Ababa, September 5-10, 1964. 

fourth— New York, December 16-21, 1964. 

Specialized Commissions 

Economic and Social Commission — Niamey, Decem- 
ber 9-13, 1963; Cairo, January 16-22, 1965. 

Educational and Cultural Commission — Leopoldville, 
January 3-8, 1964; Lagos, January 26-29, 1965. 

Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission — 
Cairo, January 10-15, 1964. 

Defense Commission — Accra, October 29 — November 
2, 1963; Freetown, February 2^, 1965. 

Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission — 
Algiers, February 1-7, 1964; Lagos, January 21- 
26, 1965. 

Transport and Communications Commission — Cairo, 
October 24-November 5, 1964. 

Commission of Jurists — has not yet met. 

Noncharter Organs 

African Liberation Committee — Dar-es-Salaam, June 
25-July 4, 1963; Dakar, August 1963; Dar-es- 
Salaam, December 2-10, 1963, June 2-10, 1964, 
October 17-22, 1964, November 24-25, 1964; 
Moshi, February 22-25, 1965. 

Ad Hoc Commission on the Moroccan-Algerian Dis- 
pute — eight sessions since founding; most recent 
meetings, Rabat and Algiers, October 20-28, 
1964; Addis Ababa, February 18-20, 1965. 

Commission on the Problem, of Refugees in Africa — 
Addis Ababa, June 1-5, 1964; field studies. East 
Africa, November-December 1964. 

Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo — Nairobi, Sep- 
tember 18-22, 1964, November 27-28. 1964, Jan- 
uary 29-30, 1965, February 13, 1965, February 
25-March 3, 1965. 

MAY 3, 1965 



Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge 
Security Council and ECOSOC 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson to the Senate transmit- 
ting, for advice and consent to ratification, 
two amendments to the U.N. Charter. 

White House press release dated April 6 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I request the advice and consent of the 
Senate to ratification of two amendments to 
the Charter of the United Nations which are 
transmitted herewith along with a report to 
me from the Secretary of State.^ They are 
the first amendments adopted by the General 
Assembly since the founding of the United 

These amendments will strengthen the 
ability of the United Nations to act as a force 
for peace and the progress of mankind. 

They enlarge the membership of both the 
Security Council and the Economic and Social 
Council to bring those bodies into balance 
with the enlarged membership of the United 
Nations itself. 

History of the Amendments 

Amendments to the Charter of the United 
Nations must first be adopted by a two-thirds 
vote of the General Assembly, and then rati- 
fied by two-thirds of the Member States, 
including all the Permanent Members, ac- 
cording to their constitutional procedure. 

In late 1963, the General Assembly con- 
sidered resolutions proposing the two amend- 
ments in question. These resolutions focussed 
on three points : 

First, that the text of the United Nations 
Charter be changed to increase the size of the 
Security Council from eleven to fifteen, to in- 
crease the voting majority of the Security 

1 S. Ex. A. 

Council from seven to nine, and to increase 
the size of the Economic and Social Council 
from eighteen to twenty-seven. In the Secu- 
rity Council, neither the seats nor the right 
of veto of the Permanent Members would be 

Second, the resolutions provided that Mem- 
bers of the two Councils be elected on the 
basis of geogi-aphic distribution. 

In the Security Council, the ten non-Per- 
manent Members would include five from 
Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, 
two from Latin America, and two from West- 
ern Europe and other areas ; the five Perma- 
nent Members would remain the same. The 
present non-Permanent Membership of the 
Security Council includes two Members from 
Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, 
one from Western Europe and one seat split 
between Asia and Eastern Europe. 

In the Economic and Social Council, there 
would be the United States, twelve African 
and Asian states, five Latin American states, 
three Eastern European states (including the 
Soviet Union) , and six states from Western 
Europe and other areas. The present com- 
position of the Economic and Social Council, 
in addition to the United States, is five Afri- 
can and Asian states, four Latin American 
states, three Eastern European states (in- 
cluding the Soviet Union), and five states 
from Western Europe and other areas. 

Third, the resolutions proposed that Mem- 
ber States ratify the amendments by Sep- 
tember 1, 1965. 

On December 17, 1963, the resolutions 
were adopted by the General Assembly. On 
the enlargement of the Security Council, the 
vote was ninety-seven to eleven, with four 
abstentions ; on the enlargement of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, it was ninety-six to 
eleven, with five abstentions. 

In those votes, the United States abstained. 



not because it doubted the principle of en- 
largement, but to maintain complete freedom 
of action while giving deliberate study to the 
effects of the specific proposals. The Soviet 
Union and France voted negatively. China 
voted for enlargement of the Security Coun- 
cil but abstained on enlargement of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council. The United King- 
dom abstained on both resolutions. 

Since that time, sixty-three nations out 
of the required seventy-six have ratified the 
amendments. Other governments are now 
considering them. Of the Permanent Mem- 
bers of the Security Council, the Soviet 
Union has been the first to approve the 

Reasons for Ratification 

The United States should now move to 
ratify the Charter amendments to enlarge 
the Security Council and the Economic and 
Social Council. 

First, the amendments are realistic. 

The membership of the United Nations 
has gi'own from fifty-one in 1945 to one 
hundred and fourteen in 1965. Almost all 
of the newer Members are nations which 
have gained their independence from the 
peaceful dismantling of empires — a process 
which brought nationhood to one-third of all 
the peoples of the world and which is here 
to stay. 

We welcome this growth. 

The peoples of the world are more directly 
represented in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations today than they were twenty 
years ago. 

We want to work together and cooperate 
with these new countries, within the United 

If there are differences among us, we want 
them to be aired and examined within the 
United Nations. 

This is the way to a peaceful and coopera- 
tive world. 

But just as we welcome the gro^^i;h of the 
United Nations, we must also recognize that 
the present Security Council and the present 
Economic and Social Council do not now 
realistically reflect it. 

An increase in the representation on both 
Councils is now clearly necessary to restore 
the balance which existed between the Coun- 
cils and the General Assembly when the 
Charter came into force. An expansion of 
fifty percent in the case of the Economic and 
Social Council and less in the Security Coun- 
cil is a reasonable way to adjust to a Mem- 
bership which has more than doubled. At the 
same time, the expansion is not such as to 
make the Councils unwieldy. 

Second, the amendments are equitable. 

When the Charter was signed in 1945, the 
Member States from Africa and Asia num- 
bered thirteen out of a total of fifty-one — 
less than a third. Today, the Member States 
from these great continents number sixty- 
one out of a total of one hundred and four- 
teen — more than a half. The General As- 
sembly resolutions, necessarily and rightly, 
take this new arithmetic into account. 

Moreover, the explicit allocation of the 
new seats to geographic areas, as provided 
by Assembly Resolution, is wise. It is de- 
signed to eliminate the contentious problem 
of sharing an inadequate number of seats — 
which has led to pressures against existing 
seats, to disputes over the definition of geo- 
graphic areas, and to split terms on the 
Security Council to meet competing claims 
for repi-esentation. 

Third, the amendments fully protect the 
l)asic interests of the Permanent Members. 
While we have seen that the work of the 
Security Council can be hampered seriously 
by the abuse of the veto provision, it never- 
theless remains a wise and realistic feature 
of the United Nations Charter. The veto 
provision is maintained. 

Fourth, because the amendments are at 
once realistic and equitable, they will 
strengthen the United Nations. 

They will increase the vitality of these 
Councils and of the United Nations itself by 
permitting more of the newer Members to 
take part in the consideration of major world 

The amendments, which will ensure that 
the Councils represent the whole Organiza- 
tion they are intended to serve, will thereby 

MAY 3, 1965 


also ensure that the Councils continue to 
earn the confidence and support of the Mem- 
bership at large. Without this confidence 
and support, the Councils cannot be fully 

The Organization as a whole will benefit 
from fuller participation in the work of the 
Councils by the new Members who have much 
to contribute — as they will benefit from the 
exercise of shared I'esponsibility. 

Fifth and finally, the amendments are a re- 
flection and a demonstration of both the sta- 
bility and the adaptability of the United 
Nations Charter. 

We Americans have always had a healthy 
respect for the stability of our institutions 
and a wariness of change for the sake of 
change. Our American Constitution, which 
has been amended only fourteen times since 
the Bill of Rights of 1791, has clearly met 
the test of stability. The fact that the United 
Nations Charter has remained as it was 
written twenty years ago is ample evidence 
of its stability. 

At the same time, we Americans have al- 
ways recognized the forces of change, and 
have always known instinctively that the 
ability of an institution to adapt to changed 
conditions is a reliable measure of its ca- 
pacity for survival and growth. Our Amer- 
ican Constitution, as evidenced by its amend- 
ments, has clearly met this test of adapt- 

Now, with its twentieth birthday ap- 
proaching, the United Nations is seeking the 
first two amendments to its basic Charter. 
And this is welcome evidence of the inherent 
flexibility of another great institution. 

The State of the United Nations 

As we consider these first amendments to 
the United Nations Charter, it is fitting to 
review briefly the state of the United Na- 
tions itself. 

The limitations of the United Nations are 
apparent. It has not been able to prevent 
aggression in Southeast Asia ; it has not been 
able to rid the world of poverty. 

Nor has the United Nations been able to 
solve all of its internal problems. At the 
present time a serious financial problem 
threatens the capacity of the General As- 
sembly to perform its share of peacekeeping. 

And if the limitations are clear, the basic 
reason is plain. The United Nations is not 
a world government; it is an organization of 
governments participating by consent. It can 
move only in the direction and at the pace 
that its Members want it to move. 

And yet the United Nations has served 
well the cause of world peace and progress — 
and, therefore, the national interest and the 
personal interest of every American. 

Keeping the Peace 

Through the United Nations, the Members 
have acted to avert wars on at least a dozen 
occasions — local wars which could have 

In Kashmir, the United Nations obtained 
and still polices a cease-fire line running 
through a bitterly contested area. 

In Suez, the United Nations deployed an 
Emergency Force which enabled the respec- 
tive national military forces to withdraw. 

In the Congo, the United Nations provided 
20,000 troops, assisted a new nation to sur- 
vive its birth, and forestalled an east-west 
confrontation in the heart of Africa. 

In Cyprus, the United Nations has sta- 
tioned a force of 6,000 to strengthen that 
nation's security. 

The Office of the Secretary-General has 
evolved into a sensitive listening post — an 
ever-ready channel of communication — a 
potential conciliation service open at all 
times to the international community of 

Economic Development 

At the same time, the day-to-day work of 
the United Nations is directed overwhelm- 
ingly toward building conditions which make 
the peace worth keeping. 

United Nations experts are now at work 
in one hundred and thirty countries or ter- 
ritories — bringing modern knowledge and 



technologj' to bear on the universal struggle 
to liberate man from the slavery of poverty. 

The United Nations is in partnei'ship with 
eighty-nine nations and territories in co- 
operative pre-investment projects — survey- 
ing resources or training men and women in 
modern skills. 

The development lending institutions affili- 
ated with the United Nations have been in- 
vesting some $1 billion annually in world 

All in all, the level of development assist- 
ance flowing through the United Nations 
system of agencies now has reached some 
?1.3 billion a year. 

Technological Cooperation 

Meanwhile, United Nations agencies are 
performing the vital task of establishing co- 
operative ground rules which are required in 
the age of rapid international transport and 
instant international communication. 

Agencies affiliated with the United Na- 
tions have developed standards for inter- 
national air traffic — and for the safety of life 
at sea. 

They have arranged for orderly use of the 
airwaves by allocating available radio fre- 
quencies among nations and users. 

They have promoted international weather 
forecasting and are pioneering in the devel- 
opment of a World Weather Watch of incal- 
culable benefit to peoples of all nations. 

They have developed and maintained uni- 
form international quarantine regulations 
against the spread of communicable diseases 
— and liberated 800 million people from the 
threat of the greatest killer of all time: 

In these and other ways — through peace- 
keeping, through nationbuilding, and through 
international technical services — the United 
Nations serves its Members. In doing so, the 
Organization serves the national interest of 
the United States. It helps us do things we 
could not do so well alone and encourages 
other nations to share the burdens. 


In one sense, the smallest Members are in 
greatest need of the United Nations. 

In another sense, the United Nations is of 
greatest service to the largest nations — for 
without the United Nations, the nations with 
the greatest resources would have to shoul- 
der most of these tasks alone. 

And in a combined sense, the United Na- 
tions serves simultaneously the large and the 
small, the rich and the poor — for the peace of 
one area is but part of world peace, and the 
prosperity of one country is but an element 
of the world's well-being. 

This is why consistent and effective sup- 
port for the United Nations has been near the 
heart of the United States foreign policy for 
two decades. 

This is why the Congress and the public, 
regardless of politics or party, have been 
ready to stick with the United Nations 
through thick and thin. 

The Organization has reached a point 
where the Security Council and the Economic 
and Social Council need to be enlarged to take 
account of the great growth of the Organiza- 
tion in recent years. 

The proposed amendments offer respon- 
sible and equitable plans for meeting this 

Because the United Nations will continue 
to be deeply needed by nations which seek 
peace — by all nations which seek to raise the 
levels of human welfare — by all nations 
which seek to cooperate in putting the 
achievements of modern technology to work 
for all mankind — it is in the national interest 
of the United States to ratify these steps to- 
ward making more effective the principal 
Councils of the Organization. 

I therefore request the consent of the Sen- 
ate to ratification by the United States of 
these amendments to the Charter of the 
United Nations. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 
The White House, 
April 6, 1965. 

MAY 3, 1965 


The Food for Peace Program 
and the Challenge of the Future 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson transmitting to the Con- 
gress a report^ on activities carried on under 
Public Law A80 during the calendar year 

White House press release dated March 31 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am sending to the Congress the annual 
report on activities carried on under Public 
Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended, out- 
lining operations under the Act during the 
calendar year 1964. The report outlines in 
some detail the significant role of the United 
States through the years in helping to battle 
hunger in the world. The record is an im- 
pressive one. 

The Food For Peace program is one of the 
most inspiring enterprises ever undertaken 
by any nation in all of history — and every 
American can be proud of it, without regard 
to partisanship or political persuasion. 

In cooperation with the developing coun- 
tries, Food For Peace is directly benefiting 
more people than ever before. And more im- 
portantly, the operating agencies are reach- 
ing these people with more meaningful pro- 
grams. Increasingly the emphasis is on using 
our agricultural commodities to support 
projects that help eliminate the need for 
continued food aid. Today about 40 percent 
of our government's economic development 
assistance overseas is in the form of agricul- 
tural commodities and local currencies re- 
ceived from their sale. To achieve this record, 
Food For Peace exports reached a new high 
in 1964 of 18 million tons of agricultural 
commodities with an estimated export market 
value of $1.7 billion. 

Importance of Nutrition 

The Food For Peace program has made a 
significant contribution to the world attack 
on hunger and malnutrition — still the most 
grave health problem of the world. We now 

1 H. Doc. 130, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 

recognize that food deficiencies are most seri- 
ous in infants, the pre-school age and, to a 
lesser degree school age children. Not only 
does malnutrition result in high death rates 
and widespread disabling diseases, but re- 
search has now established that it produces 
permanent retardation of mental as well as 
physical development. Studies suggest that 
in some developing countries as high as 70 
percent of pre-school children are under- 
nourished or malnourished. 

Thus, increasing attention is being given 
to nutrition in Food For Peace. Its impor- 
tance is underscored by the fact that, of the 
100 million recipients of our donated foods, 
70 million are children, including more than 
40 million in organized national school lunch 

The Agency for International Development 
recently authorized funds which will be used, 
in cooperation with the Department of Agri- 
culture, for vitamin enrichment of nonfat dry 
milk distributed overseas. Experiments will 
also be undertaken to help developing coun- 
tries find the techniques and skills needed to 
process and distribute grain-based high pro- 
tein foods for children. 

Meeting Human Needs 

While the effort goes on to increase the 
nutritional balance in our commodity use, 
Food For Peace continues to seek the human- 
itarian goal of using our food to meet human 
needs : 

— During 1964, more than 3 billion pounds 
of commodities were programed through U.S. 
and international overseas relief agencies 
under Title III of Public Law 480 for dona- 
tion to 67.3 million people. As part of the 
Alliance for Progress, "Operation Niiios" 
school lunch programs in Latin America are 
currently feeding 13 million children — com- 
pared to fewer than 4 million when this 
special emphasis was initiated only two and 
a half years ago. 

— Food-for-work community development 
projects are expanding to broaden and 
strengthen the base of country development. 
In 1964, 9 million people benefited from pro- 
grams providing a supplementary wage of 



food — thi-ough Food For Peace — as payment 
for participation in local self-help projects. 

— There were fewer large scale disasters 
in the world during 1964 than in previous 
years, which accounts for the fact that Food 
For Peace was called upon to assist only 4 
million victims under Title II emergency 
relief progi-ams — the smallest number since 
the inception of the progi-am. However, an 
additional 1 million refugees benefited from 
these Food For Peace-supported emergency 
relief programs. 

— U.S. commodities are being supplied to 
50 of the 72 projects sponsored on a multilat- 
eral basis through the World Food Progi-am. 
Seventy countries share in supporting these 
development projects now reaching 2.7 mil- 
lion recipients. U.S. support of multilateral 
progi*aming is also exemplified by Food For 
Peace commodities provided to UNICEF 
[United Nations Children's Fund] and 
UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

— Public Law 480-generated currencies 
are paying U.S. overseas expenses, conserv- 
ing dollars and strengthening our balance of 
payments position. Reimbursements to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation through 1964 
by U.S. Government agencies utilizing these 
currencies totaled almost $1.1 billion. Addi- 
tional reimbursements also resulted from 
barter programs as U.S. agencies financed 
overseas procurement of goods and services 
with P.L. 480 commodities. Such reimburse- 
ments from both programs totaled over a 
third of a billion dollars in 1964. 

— Our balance of payments position is also 
benefiting from increased activity under 
Title IV, long-term dollar credit sales. Al- 
most one million tons of agricultural com- 
modities at an export market value of $93 
million, were shipped overseas in 1964 
under Title IV, also a new record. Title IV 
dollar repayments on principal and interest 
from previous sales are being made in in- 
creasing volume. Repayments during 1964 
totaled $5.4 million, compared to $2.3 million 
in 1963. 

Developing; Commercial IViarkets 

As Food For Peace embarks on its second 
decade, there is growing indication of the 
program's substantial contribution to the de- 
velopment of commercial markets for our 
farm products as well as purely humanitari- 
an efforts. Commercial sales of U.S. agricul- 
tural commodities overseas reached a new 
high of $4.6 billion during this year, more 
than double the commercial agricultural ex- 
ports of 1954 when P.L. 480 was first en- 

The P.L. 480 sales programs are designed 
to strengthen the economies of the recipient 
countries and thus hasten the day when they 
can finance their import requirements on 
commercial terms. Following are highlights 
of these sales programs: 

— Food For Peace exports under Title I 
(sales for foreign currencies) reached a 
record high in 1964 of almost $1.2 billion. 
Shipments amounted to more than 14 million 
tons, surpassing the previous peak of 13.9 
million tons set in 1963. 

P.L. 480 Supports Economic Development 

Agi-icultural commodities continue to 
sei've as one of our principal assets in inter- 
national economic development, contributing 
substantially to the total U.S. overseas aid 

— Planned uses of local currencies pro- 
vided in Title I sales agreements concluded 
during 1964 totaled $580.5 million for eco- 
nomic development — $553.5 million in loans; 
$27 million in grants. In addition, agricul- 
tural commodities sold to foreign govern- 
ments on long-term dollar credit under Title 
IV provided financing for economic pur- 
poses. These currencies are being used to 
supplement capital investment funds and 
technical assistance support in a wide range 
of industrial, agricultural, and socio-econom- 
ic development projects. 

— $57 million in local currencies generated 
by Title I sales of Food For Peace commodi- 
ties were loaned in 1964 to U.S. and local 
private enterprise for business development 
and trade expansion in 11 countries. 

MAY 3, 1965 


Challenge of the Future 

These are only some of the accomplish- 
ments of Food For Peace during the past 
year. The program has come a long way 
since 1954 when it was so generally consid- 
ered only as a temporary means to dispose 
of "burdensome" agricultural surpluses. 
Food For Peace has proved its worth as an 
important means to meet human need, en- 
courage economic development and support 
U.S. foreign policy. It has helped demon- 
strate to the world that human hunger is no 
longer an inevitable fact of life. Its elimina- 
tion is within our grasp. 

Yet for all of the many efforts and accom- 
plishments by the United States and other 
richly endowed countries, millions still suffer 
from some form of hunger or malnutrition. 
We have long recognized that an insufficient 
food supply is one of the leading contribu- 
tors to human misery and political instabil- 
ity. More recently we have begun to recog- 
nize that it is also a major deterrent to 
economic and social development. The re- 
sulting loss, in both human and economic 
terms, is one of the great tragedies and 
shortcomings of the Twentieth Century. 

The long-range solution to the hunger 
problem rests in improving the productive 
capacity of the developing nations them- 
selves. In my Messages to the Congress this 

year on agriculture and foreign assistance,^ 
I pointed to the need for increased attention 
directed to the agricultural sectors of less 
developed countries — specifically, to help 
overcome obstacles such as the present defi- 
ciency of fertilizer, the lack of adequate gov- 
ernment policies in establishing sufficient 
incentives for the farmer, and the general 
insufficiency of education so vitally needed to 
improve farming methods and technology. 

Our efforts on these matters must continue. 
But we must also continue to utilize our own 
agricultural resources until the day these 
other countries become self-sufficient. That 
will be a number of years away — but Food 
For Peace can shorten this time. 

Food For Peace is an important tool for 
development. It is good international policy 
and sound domestic policy. Food For Peace 
is, above all, a program which expresses the 
great and generous heart of the American 
people — and is a worthy expression of the 
compassion always so much a part of Ameri- 
ca's character. It deserves the continued sup- 
port of the Congress and of all Americans. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
March 31, 1965. 

- For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126. 




Central Treaty Organization Meets at Tehran 

The 13th session of the Ministerial Coun- 
cil of the Central Treaty Organization ivas 
held at Tehran April 7 and 8. Following are 
texts of an opening statement made by Sec- 
retary Rusk on April 7 and a final communi- 
que issued at the close of the meeting. 


Jlr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary General, Mr. 
Prime Minister, esteemed colleagues, and dis- 
tinguished guests: For the fifth time I now 
have the pleasure of addressing the opening 
of a Ministerial Council of the Central 
Treaty Organization. And with today's ses- 
sion I have the special satisfaction of having 
attended such meetings in the capitals of all 
five of the participating countries. 

First I want to say how pleasant it is to 
visit again this beautiful and vigorous city 
and to express my deep appreciation for the 
warm welcome and thoughtful hospitality 
which His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah, 
his Government, and the Iranian people have 
extended to the visiting delegations. I should 
like to add the thanks of my delegation for 
the very gracious message of welcome from 
His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah, 
brought to us this morning by our old friend 
and former Washington neighbor, the distin- 
guished Minister of the Imperial Court, Dr. 
Ghodse Nakhai. The Shahanshah holds a 
special place in the history of CENTO. Even 
though still a young man in the prime of life, 
he has guided the affairs of his nation for 
more than two decades. During the latter 
decade— the CENTO decade— His Majesty 

has taken a close interest in the development 
of the organization itself and in our common 
efforts to insure the security and progress 
of the region as a whole. We have all drawn 
strength from the support and counsel that 
the Shahanshah and his Government have 
devoted to these objectives. 

When we met last year in Washington, • I 
remarked that our first 10 years in CENTO 
had been a constructive decade of learning 
and organizing and building. In this year's 
deliberations, which we are about to begin, 
we shall have many opportunities to consider 
our common desire to make our CENTO in- 
stitutions and facilities still more fruitful. 

I do not want to leave the perspective of 
this 10th anniversary year without sharing a 
few reflections on some of the things that 
have changed and some of the things that 
remain with us from a decade ago. 

In 1955, when this organization came into 
being, it was still fashionable in some cir- 
cles, for some strange reason, to refer to 
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey as being among 
the "new" nations, despite the great antiquity 
of their civilizations. If not altogether new, 
all three of these countries had new aspects. 
At the end of the Second World War the 
world community was freshly aware of the 
basic renewal of the Turkish national con- 
sciousness brought about under the leader- 
ship of Kemal AtatUrk. People in lands far 
distant from Iran came to know more fully 
the measure of the transformation achieved 
in Iran since the beginning of the reign of 

' For background, see Bulletin of May 18, 1964, 
p. 766. 

MAY 3, 1965 


Reza Shah. Ten years ago people in my 
country and elsewhere were watching with 
great appreciation the progress of Pakistan 
in organizing a nation and establishing its 
identity in the few years that had elapsed 
since it won its independence under the lead- 
ership of the great Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 

Now, in 1965, it is not only incorrect but 
actually misleading to think of these coun- 
tries as "new" nations. Each has demon- 
strated time and again its stature among 
responsible nations in the forefront of the 
struggle for increased well-being, security, 
and cooperation among the peoples of the 

Iran and Pakistan have both provided dis- 
tinguished Presidents of the United Nations 
General Assembly, and both have served 
with distinction on the United Nations Secu- 
rity Council. And Turkey has three times 
been elected to that primary peacekeeping 
body of the world organization. 

Since the day in 1947 when Pakistan was 
admitted to membership in the United Na- 
tions, 57 more nations have joined. Thus 
even the "youngest" of the CENTO countries 
ranks clearly among the veterans in the in- 
ternational council halls. 

The internal political stability of the na- 
tions represented here also deserves notice. 
In the past 6 months all five of us have in- 
stalled new administrations or renewed the 
mandate of existing administrations. In Paki- 
stan and the United States, incumbent heads 
of government were constitutionally re- 
elected. In Turkey and the United Kingdom, 
new governments came to power by orderly 
processes. In Iran the change in government 
was brought about by the tragic assassina- 
tion of Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour. 
But his distinguished colleague and friend. 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda, was called to take his 
place, and there was no pause in the ongoing 
program already endorsed by the people 
through national referendum. 

The basic political stability and orderly 
economic and social evolution of the CENTO 
countries stand in sharp contrast to tumultu- 
ous events in some other areas of the world. 

I do not draw these comparisons out of 

any desire that we indulge in a feast of self- 
congratulations. But there are good reasons 
why the CENTO region stands out as an 
area of stability and hope today. Out of 
strength of national purpose has come the 
wisdom of shared experience. The skills 
which have been developed in the arts of 
mutual defense and cooperation in CENTO 
have played no small part in producing the 
sound mixture of national self-confidence 
with international responsibility that is dem- 
onstrated today by the CENTO partners. 

CENTO has to its credit some important 
cooperative accomplishments, which my col- 
leagues have mentioned. We can all find 
satisfaction, for example, in the completion 
of another segment of the Turkey-Iran rail- 
way link — a CENTO project that will endure 
long after the headlines of this April day in 
1965 are forgotten. The CENTO communi- 
cations projects and the CENTO roads and 
ports projects will promote the welfare and 
prosperity of this region for decades to 
come. The young engineers, teachers, nurses, 
veterinarians, agricultural specialists, and 
nuclear scientists trained under CENTO's 
technical assistance program will be serving 
and helping their fellow countrymen a gen- 
eration after misguided young people else- 
where have learned, perhaps the hard way, 
that smashing windows and burning books 
are tactics of inifRans and barbarians and 
not of those who value knowledge and human 
progress. It is a pleasure to note the con- 
structive gains made under the auspices of 

The gratifying measure of security and 
stability attained by the members of this 
alliance releases energies for other long- 
cherished objectives. An American poet, 
James Russell Lowell, wrote that "new oc- 
casions teach new duties." But let us not 
allow "new occasions" — or certain novelties 
of appearance — to distract us from a solid 
understanding of old truths. The formation 
of CENTO was brought about in response 
to the threat of Communist aggression. And 
it was the threat of Communist aggression 
that led the United States to associate itself 
so intimately with the CENTO members. 



At our meeting last year I said: " 

So long as the Communist threat of aggression 
persists, there will be need for the CENTO shield. 

That statement still stands. As President 
Johnson said recently: ' 

The world is still full of peril for those who prize 
. . . freedom. 

In Southeast Asia, Communist aggression 
is more than a threat — it is a brutal actual- 
ity. All peoples who value independence and 
freedom for themselves have a vital stake in 
the repulse of Communist aggression in 
Southeast Asia and in deterring threats of 
aggression elsewhere. 

In this area CENTO has stood as a sign- 
post that warns "no trespassing." We must 
never make the terrible mistake of encour- 
aging or allowing ambitious aggressors to 
think that they can attack or molest us with 

The most elementary of the tested truths 
of our common experience is that the shield 
forged by CENTO has protected the inde- 
pendence of its members and enabled all of 
us to work together for economic develop- 
ment and a better life for the peoples of this 
region. It is a shield of which we can be 
proud for it threatens no one. Let us, there- 
fore, in this Council, seek new ways to add 
unity and strength to the family we know 
as CENTO. 


The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Coun- 
cil of Ministers held their Thirteenth Session in 
Tehran on April 7 and 8, 1965. Delegation leaders 
were : 

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran. 

H.E. Mr. M. Shoaib, Minister for Finance of 

H.E. Mr. Hasan Esat Isik, Foreigni Minister of 

The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom. 

The Honorable Dean Kusk, Secretary of State, 
United States of America. 

A message from His Imperial Majesty The Shah- 


'Ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866. 

anshah welcoming the delegations was delivered at 
the opening ceremony by the Minister of The Im- 
perial Court. The leaders of the delegations ex- 
pressed their appreciation of the gracious message 
from His Imperial Majesty and of the warm hos- 
pitality of the host country. 

With the Foreigrn Minister of Iran, as host, in the 
chair, the Council of Ministers welcomed Mr. Stew- 
art and Mr. I^ik to their first CENTO Ministerial 
meeting since assuming their present offices, and 
Mr. M. Shoaib as leader of the delegation of Paki- 
stan on this occasion. 

The Council expressed deep regret at the tragic 
death of Hassan Ali Mansour, the late Prime Min- 
ister of Iran, and paid tribute to Mr. Mansour's 
disting^uished services to the Government of Iran 
and his valuable participation in the work of the 
Alliance. They also marked with special respect the 
passing of the distinguished British leader and world 
statesman, Sir Winston Churchill, and paid tribute 
to his enduring place in the history of this century. 

The Council conducted a review of international 
developments as a whole, with special reference to 
those questions that are of direct interest to one or 
more of the countries represented. 

Taking into consideration existing treaties. Min- 
isters stressed their deep concern over the dangerous 
situation which continued in Cyprus and expressed 
their earnest desire for a just and lasting solution 
of the problem. 

The Council agreed that it remained essential, in 
the present uncertain world situation, to maintain 
a policy of preparedness and vigilance in self- 
defence. At the same time they re-aifirmed their 
determination to search for and seize every oppor- 
tunity to make further progress in the reduction of 
international tensions, with general disarmament and 
world peace the ultimate aims in view. They found 
that the Alliance continued to make its own dis- 
tinctive contribution to these aims, by discouraging 
aggression, maintaining regional stability, and de- 
veloping understanding among its members. 

The Council recognized that danger from sub- 
version and aggression still remained in the CENTO 
area. They welcomed the counter measures which 
member-countries were taking in this respect. 

The Council reviewed the report of the Military 
Committee. They took note that combined forces of 
the member-countries had gained valuable experience 
during the year from naval, military and air exer- 
cises successfully carried out under the auspices of 
CENTO. These broadened the professional skills 
of the armed forces of regional member States. They 
also noted the completion and bringing into operation 
of the CENTO permanent military telecommunica- 
tions network. 

The Council were pleased to note marked progress 
in major CENTO joint economic projects. The 
microwave telecommunications system linking Tur- 

MAY 3, 1965 


key, Iran and Pakistan had been completed and was 
in course of testing before being handed over in the 
very near future to the Governments of those coun- 
tries. The final stage of the high-frequency radio 
system linking the regional capitals and London 
■was also due for completion this summer. An im- 
portant extension of the railway in eastern Turkey 
to link with that being extended in Iran had been 
completed and opened to traffic. They further noted 
that CENTO programmes of technical cooperation 
were yielding useful results, in such fields as health, 
agriculture, scientific and technical knowledge. The 
practical benefits deriving from these would be 
enhanced by the unanimous decision of member- 
countries to increase their contributions to the Multi- 
lateral Technical Cooperation Fund. 

The Council agreed that, as existing projects were 
completed, every effort would be made to maintain 
the momentum and embark on new projects. The 
future shape of these would be the subject of study 
by economic experts of member-Governments at a 
meeting during the year. As a consequence, it is 
expected that guidelines would be laid down for the 
economic activities of the Alliance. By further 
developing its economic activities in the atmosphere 
of security and stability which the regional countries 
enjoyed, the Alliance would continue, in its second 
decade just begun, to help raise the living standards 
and increase the general well-being of the peoples 
of the region. 

The Council decided to hold their next meeting in 
Ankara in the spring of 1966. 

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation 
of Note on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam 

U.S./U.N. press release 4619 

Following is a letter from Ambassador 
Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations, to Ambassador Abdul 
Monem Rifa'i, President of the Security 

April 2, 1965 
Dear Mr. President: In a letter addressed 
to the President of the Security Council on 
March 27, 1965, the Permanent Representa- 
tive of the Soviet Union asked that there be 
circulated as a Security Council document 
what he described as "a note of March 26 
from the Soviet Government to the Gov- 

ernment of the United States" (S/6260). 

In actual fact, the communication to which 
the Soviet Representative referred was re- 
jected by the United States Embassy in 
Moscow. The reason was simple: the Soviet 
communication was based on the completely 
false allegation that poisonous gases ai'e be- 
ing used in South Viet-Nam in connection 
with resistance to the aggressive campaign 
of conquest being waged by North Viet-Nam 
against the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

Poisonous gases, the use of which would 
rightfully concern the conscience of human- 
ity, have not been used in Viet-Nam, nor 
is there any intention of employing them. The 
materials which were employed in Viet-Nam 
are commonly used by police forces in riot 
control in many parts of the world and are 
commonly accepted as appropriate for such 
purposes. They are non-toxic and of course 
are not prohibited by the Geneva Conven- 
tion of 1925, nor by any other understand- 
ings on the subject. These facts were of 
course entirely familiar to the Soviet Un- 
ion when it drafted the tendentious and will- 
fully misleading communication referred to 

The United States is, of course, assisting 
— and will continue to assist — the Republic 
of Viet-Nam in repelling subversion, terror- 
ism, and infiltration. At the same time, there 
is nothing the United States desires more 
than to have peace restored to that country 
as quickly as possible. 

The position of the United States Govern- 
ment on the matter raised in the Soviet 
communication was made incontrovertibly 
clear by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in a 
statement on March 24,^ the substance of 
which is attached. 

I would be grateful if you would have this 
letter and its attachment circulated as a 
Security Council document. 

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

Adlai E. Stevenson. 

For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 528. 




Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed doniments (such as 
those listed below) may be coTisulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated February 4 from the Representative of 
Cyprus replying to Turkish charges (S/6161). 
S/6173. Febi-uary 4, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated February 7 from the Representative of 
the United States regarding defensive action taken 
by U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements against 
certain military facilities in the southern area of 
North Viet-Nam on Febnjary 7 in response to at- 
tacks by Viet Cong forces on South Vietnamese 
air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, two barracks 
installations in the Pleiku area, and on a number 
of %-illages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. 
S/6174. February 8, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated February 8 from the Representative of 
Turkey transmitting the te.xt of a telegram from 
the Vice President of Cyprus regarding the situa- 
tion in Cyprus. S/6176. February 8, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated Februai-y 4 from the Representative of 
Senegal regarding the firing on Senegalese vil- 
lages from the territory of Portuguese Guinea. 
S/6177. February 8, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated Febi-uary 9 from the Representative of 
the U.S.S.R. transmitting a statement of the So- 
viet Government concerning "the aggressive acts 
of the armed forces of the United States of Amer- 
ica against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." 
S/6178. February 9, 1965. 3 pp. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In- 
formation furnished by states launching objects 
into orbit or beyond: United States, A/AC. 105/ 
INF.88, February 11, 1965, and A/AC.105/INF.90, 
March 11, 1965; U.S.S.R., A/AC.105/INF.89, 
March 1, 1965, and A/AC.105/INF.92, March 15, 
1965; Italy, A/AC.105/INF.91, March 11, 1965. 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
Letter dated February 18 from the Representative 
of the United States attaching a statement of the 
U.S. position on the resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly concerning the forthcoming 
elections in the Cook Islands. A/5895. February 
18, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated February 19 from the Representative 
of France stating his Government's reservations 
with regard to the interim financial arrangements 
approved bv the Assembly on Februaiy 18. 
A/5896. February 19, 1965. 2 pp. 

General Multilateral Treaties Concluded Under the 
Auspices of the League of Nations. Report of the 
Secretar>--General. A/5759. February 25, 1965. 
41 pp. 

Letter dated February 26 from the Secretary- 
General to the First Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia regard- 
ing Indone.iia's withdrawal from the United Na- 
tions. A/5899. February 26, 1965. 1 p. 


Current Actions 



Convention for unification of certain rules relating to 
international transportation by air and additional 
protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. En- 
tered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000. 
Confirmation of continued participation: Rwanda, 
December 1, 1964. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traflic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for 
signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.' 
Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Ivory Coast, Korea, Lebanon, Malagasy, Repub- 
lic, Malaysia, Monaco, Nicaragua, Philippines, 
Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yugo- 
slavia, April 9, 1965. 


Protocol for the prolongation of the international 
sugar agreement of December 1, 1958 (TIAS 
4389). Done at London August 1, 1963. Entered 
into force for the United States February 27, 1964. 
TIAS 5744. 

Ratification deposited: El Salvador, January 14, 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.' 
Signatures: Belgium,' April 13, 1965; Cuba, April 
14, 1965; Finland, April 16, 1965; Federal Re- 
public of Germany, April 15, 1965; Israel, 
April 12, 1965; Sweden,' April 14, 1965; South 
Africa, April 14, 1965. 


Ivory Coast 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed 
at Abidjan April 5, 1965. Entered into force April 
5, 1965. 

• Not in force. 

• Signed for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Un- 

■ Subject to ratification. 

MAY 3, 1965 




William J. Jorden as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs, effective April 11. (For biographic 
details, see Department of State press release 75 
dated April 17.) 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents, except in the case of free publications, 
which may be obtained from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet 
contains a map, a list of principal government offi- 
cials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, 
in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed 
below are available at 5^ each. 

Saudi Arabia. 
Senegal. Pub. 

Pub. 7758. 8 pp. 
Pub. 7835. 4 pp. 
7820. 8 pp. 

Educational and Cultural Diplomacy — 1963. This 
pamphlet reports on the increasing need for educa- 
tion throughout the world and the effective means of 
meeting the need through international exchange 
programs and related activities. Pub. 7765. Interna- 
tional Infoi-mation and Cultural series 87. 141 pp. 45(*. 

The Atlantic Community — Common Hopes and Com- 
mon Objectives. Text of an address made by Presi- 
dent Johnson at the 175th anniversary convocation at 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Pub. 7804. 
General Foreign Policy series 198. 11 pp. 15^'. 

International Understanding — Through the Perform- 
ing Arts. A i-eport to the Congi-ess and the public, by 
the Advisory Committee on the Arts, on the cultural 
presentations program of the Department of State, 
July 1, 1963— June 30, 1964. Pub. 7819. International 
Information and Cultural series 88. 106 pp. 35((. 

International Cooperation Year. Leaflet on President 
Johnson's proclamation designating 1965 as Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year in the United States. It 
focuses on how the U.S. Govemment and private citi- 
zen organizations may participate in commemorating 
the 20th anniversary of the United Nations during 
this year. Pub. 7827. International Organization and 
Conference series 61. 4 pp. Limited distribution. 

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 10 — Our Policy in South- 
east Asia: A Perspective. Article based on an ad- 
dress made by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, before the 
Washington Chamber of Commerce, Washington, Mo. 
Pub. 7832. Far Eastern series 129. 8 pp. 5«t. 
The American Republics in Partnership. Pamphlet to 
commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Inter- 
American System on April 14, 1965. Pub. 7833. Inter- 
American series 91. 15 pp. 15^. 
Aggression From the North — The Record of North 
Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam. 
Massive evidence of Hanoi's aggression obtained by 
the Government of South Viet-Nam summarized to 
inform U.S. citizens and the world of what is happen- 
ing in Viet-Nam. Pub. 7839. Far Eastern series 130. 
64 pp. 40!». 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan, 
extending agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Kabul October 31 and 
November 7, 1964. Entered into force November 7, 
1964. Effective March 31, 1964. TIAS 5714. 3 pp. 5^. 
Extradition. Supplementary convention with Bel- 
gium, supplementing the convention of October 26, 
1901, and the supplementary convention of June 20, 
1935 — Signed at Brussels November 14, 1963. En- 
tered into force December 25, 1964. TIAS 5715. 6 
pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia 
—Signed at La Paz March 25, 1964. Entered into 
force March 25, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 
5716. 14 pp. lO^;. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China — 
Signed at Taipei December 31, 1964. Entered into 
force December 31, 1964. With exchange of notes. 
TIAS 5717. 23 pp. 15<'. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with China — Signed at Taipei December 
31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5718. 22 pp. 15^. 
Trade — Quality Wheat. Agreements with European 
Economic Community and Member States, extending 
the date for beginning negotiations under paragraph 
B(i) of the agreement of March 7, 1962. Exchanges 
of letters— Signed at Brussels June 11 and July 20, 
1964, and June 28 and August 21, 1963. Entered 
into force July 20, 1964, and August 21, 1963, re- 
spectively. TIAS 5720. 4 pp. 5^*. 
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Iran, amending agreement of No- 
vember 16, 1964. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Tehran December 15, 1964. Entered into force De- 
cember 15, 1964. TIAS 5721. 2 pp. 5<>. 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel — 
Signed at Washington December 22, 1964. Entered 
into force December 22, 1964. With exchange of 
notes. TIAS 5722. 8 pp. 10^ 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Israel, extending agreement of July 12, 
1955, as amended and extended — Signed at Wash- 
ington August 19, 1964. Entered into force October 
1, 1964. TIAS 5723. 2 pp. 5('. 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Equipment, Materials, 
and Services. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of 
notes— Signed at Tokyo December 4, 1964. Entered 
into force December 4, 1964. TIAS 5724. 9 pp. 10^. 
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Kenya — Signed at Nairobi Decem- 
ber 7, 1964. Entered into force December 7, 1964. 
With exchange of notes — Signed at Nairobi Febru- 
aiy 3 and 4, 1965. TIAS 5725. 7 pp. lO^-. 



INDEX May 3, 1965 Vol. LII, No. 1349 

Africa. The Organization of African Unity . 669 

Agriculture. The Food for Peace Program 

and the Challenge of the Future (Johnson) . 682 


Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in 

Southeast Asia (Johnson) 650 

The Works of Peace (Johnson) 652 

Chile. Letters of Credence (Tomic Romero) . 655 


Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security 

Council and ECOSOC (Johnson) .... 678 
The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge 

of the Future (Johnson) 682 

Denmark. Letters of Credence (R<^nne) . . 655 

Department and Foreign Service. Designa- 
tions (Jorden) 690 

Disarmament. Arms Control — Foundation 
Stone in the Ramparts We Watch (Foster) . 659 

Economic Affairs 

International Trade (Mann) 665 

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest 

Equalization Tax (Executive order) . 667 

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in 

Southeast Asia (Johnson) 650 

United States Expresses Views on Laurel- 

Langley Agreement (William P. Bundy) , 664 

Foreign Aid. The Food for Peace Program 
and the Challenge of the Future (Johnson) . 682 

Germany. U.S. Protests Harassment on Access 
Routes to Berlin 658 

Health, Education, and Welfare. The Works of 
Peace (Johnson) 652 

Indonesia. Ambassador Bunker Concludes 
Meetings With Indonesian Leaders (joint 
communique) 654 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Tehran 

(Rusk, final communique) 685 

The Organization of African Unity .... 669 


Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest 
Equalization Tax (Executive order) . 667 

U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Coopera- 
tion in Medical Science (Johnson, U.S. ad- 
visory group) 667 

Middle East. Central Treaty Organization 
Meets at Tehran (Rusk, final communique) . 685 

Military Affairs. SecretaTT Rules Out Sus- 
pension of U.S. Raids on North Viet-Nam . 651 

Philippines. United States Expresses Views 
on Laurel-Langley Agreement (William P. 
Bundy) 664 

Presidential Documents 

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security 
Council and ECOSOC 678 

The Food for Peace Program and the Chal- 
lenge of the Future 682 

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest 
Equalization Tax 667 

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in 
Southeast Asia 650 

U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Coopera- 
tion in Medical Science 667 

The Works of Peace 652 

Public Affairs. Jorden designated Deputy 
Assistant Secretary 690 

Publications. Recent Releases 690 

Science. U.S. and Japan Begin Program of 
Cooperation in Medical Science (Johnson, 
U.S. advisory group) 667 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . 689 


U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on 
Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . . 688 

U.S. Protests Harassment of Ships by Soviets; 
Rejects Soviet Charges (texts of notes) . 655 

U.S. Protests Harassment on Access Routes to 
Berlin 658 

United Kingdom. Letters of Credence (Dean) 655 

United Nations 

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security 
Council and ECOSOC (Johnson) .... 678 

Current U.N. Documents 689 

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note 
on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . 688 


Secretary Rules Out Suspension of U.S. Raids 

on North Viet-Nam 651 

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in 

Southeast Asia (Johnson) 650 

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on 

Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . . 688 

Name Index 

Bundy, William P 664 

Bunker, Ellsworth 654 

Dean, Sir Patrick 655 

Foster, William C 659 

Johnson, President . . . 650, 652, 667, 678, 682 

Jorden, William J 690 

Mann, Thomas C 665 

R0nne, Torben 655 

Rusk, Secretary 651, 685 

Stevenson, Adlai E 688 

Sukarno, President 654 

Tomic Romero, Radomiro 655 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 12 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
65 of March 31; 68 of April 2; and 69 of April 









Harriman: "The Sino-Soviet 
Conflict" (excerpts). 

Jorden designated Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs (biographic 

Program for visit of Prime 
Minister of Italy. 

Not printed. 


• Ca 770.22S/I 

Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 




(GPO) I 


Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia 



President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, published 
a pamphlet under the title Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia, is a major statement of I 
policy on Southeast Asia. Here the President proposes broad outlines for a settlement of the c 
flict in Viet-Nam and suggests a greatly expanded cooperative effort for the development 
Southeast Asia. 

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment 

"As it reaches its 16th anniversary, NATO is clearly approaching a time of testing : 
we cannot be sure precisely how it will be adapted to the circumstances of the future," says Da 
H. Popper, Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, in a special art 
written for the Bulletin. This review and forward estimate examines the organization's streng 
and weaknesses and discusses some of its current problems. 




Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order 
payable to Supt. of Documents) 

Please send me 

publication 7872, 10 cents. 

copies of Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asfij 

Please send me 

copies of NATO After Sixteen Years: An Awnj 

versary Assessment, publication 7876, 10 cents. 











Vol. LII, No. 1350 

-ton Pijfilic t.;f.t;ir\ 
Krintejident . nt? 

May 10, 1965 


Address by Secretary Rusk 694. 



by Richard N. Gardner 701 


by Leonard Unger 712 

by Under Secretary Mann 720 



Address by Vice President Humphrey 726 

For index see inside back cover 

The Control of Force in International Relations 

Address by Secretary Rusk '■ 

When this distinguished Society was 
founded 59 years ago, the then Secretary of 
State, Elihu Root, became its first president. 
With the passage of time, the Secretary of 
State has been elevated to a less demanding 
role, that of honorary president. Secretary 
Root himself not only established the prec- 
edent of becoming president while Secre- 
tary of State; he also superseded it by con- 
tinuing to serve as your president for 18 
years. The Proceedings of the first meeting 
indicate that Secretary Root not only pre- 
sided and delivered an address but that he 
also selected the menu for the dinner. 

The year 1907, when the first of the 
Society's annual meetings was held, today ap- 
pears to have been one of those moments in 
American history when we were concentrat- 
ing upon building our American society, 

' Made before the American Society of Interna- 
tional Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23 (press 
release 82). 

essentially untroubled by what took place " 
beyond our borders. But the founders of i 
this Society realized that the United States J 
could not remain aloof from the world. It ' 
is one of the achievements of this Society A 
that, from its inception, it has spread the ■ 
realization that the United States cannot - 
opt out of the community of nations — that g 
international affairs are part of our national i 
affairs. f 

Questions of war and peace occupied the \ 
Society at its first meeting. Among the sub- "i 
jects discussed were the possibility of the 
immunity of private property from bellig- ^ 
erent seizure upon the high seas and 
whether trade in contraband of war was 
unneutral. Limitations upon recourse to 
force then proposed were embryonic, as 
is illustrated by the fact one topic for dis- 
cussion related to restrictions upon the use 
of armed force in the collection of contract 
obligations. The distance between those 







to ii 


of in 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.G., 
20402. Pkice: 52 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15 : single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 







ideas and the restrictions upon recourse to 
armed force contained in the Charter of the 
United Nations is vast. It is to these chai-ter 
restrictions — and their place in the practice 
and malpractice of states — that I shall ad- 
dress much of my remarks this evening. 

The Kind of World We Seek 

Current United States policy arouses the 
criticism that it is at once too legal and too 
tough. Time was when the criticism of 
American concern with the legal element in 
international relations was that it led to 
softness — to a "legalistic-moralistic" ap- 
proach to foreign affairs which conformed 
more to the ideal than to the real. 

Today, criticism of American attachment 
to the role of law is that it leads not to 
softness but to severity. We are criticized 
not for sacrificing our national interests to 
international interests but for endeavoring 
to impose the international interest upon 
other nations. We are criticized for acting 
as if the Charter of the United Nations 
means what it says. We are criticized for 
treating the statement of the law by the In- 
ternational Court of Justice as authorita- 
tive. We are criticized for taking collective 
security seriously. 

This criticism is, I think, a sign of 
strength — of our strength and of the strength 
of international law. It is a tribute to a 
blending of political purpose with legal ethic. 

American foreign policy is at once prin- 
cipled and pragmatic. Its central objective 
is our national safety and well-being — to 
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity." But we know we can no 
longer find security and well-being in de- 
fenses and policies which are confined to 
North America, or the Western Hemi- 
sphere, or the North Atlantic community. 

This has become a very small planet. We 
have to be concerned with all of it — with 
all of its land, waters, atmosphere, and with 
surrounding space. We have a deep national 
interest in peace, the prevention of aggres- 
sion, the faithful performance of agree- 
ments, the grov^h of international law. Our 

MAY 10, 1965 

foreign policy is rooted in the profoundly 
practical realization that the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter 
must animate the behavior of states if man- 
kind is to prosper or is even to survive. Or 
at least they must animate enough states 
with enough will and enough resources to 
see to it that others do not violate those 
rules with impunity. 

The preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the 
charter set forth abiding purposes of Amer- 
ican policy. This is not surprising, since we 
took the lead in drafting the charter — at a 
time when the biggest war in history was 
still raging and we and others were thinking 
deeply about its frightful costs and the 
ghastly mistakes and miscalculations which 
led to it. 

The kind of world we seek is the kind set 
forth in the opening sections of the charter : 
a world community of independent states, 
each with the institutions of its own choice 
but cooperating with one another to pro- 
mote their mutual welfare, a world in 
which the use of force is effectively in- 
hibited, a world of expanding human rights 
and well-being, a world of expanding in- 
ternational law, a world in which an agree- 
ment is a commitment and not just a tactic. 

We believe that this is the sort of world a 
great majoritj'^ of the governments of the 
world desire. We believe it is the sort of 
world man must achieve if he is not to 
perish. As I said on another occasion : * 

If once the international rule of law could be dis- 
cussed with a certain condescension as a Utopian 
ideal, today it becomes an elementary practical neces- 
sity. Pacta sjint servanda now becomes the basis of 

Unhappily, a minority of governments is 
committed to different ideas of the conduct 
and organization of human affairs. They 
are dedicated to the promotion of the Com- 
munist world revolution. And their doctrine 
justifies any technique, any ruse, any de- 
ceit, which contributes to that end. They 
may differ as to tactics from time to time. 

* For an address by Secretary Rusk before the 
American Law Institute on May 22, 1964, see Bul- 
letin of June 8, 1964, p. 886. 


And the two principal Communist powers 
are competitors for the leadership of the 
world Communist movement. But both are 
committed to the eventual communization of 
the entire world. 

The overriding issue of our time is which 
concepts are to prevail: those set forth in 
the United Nations Charter or those pro- 
claimed in the name of a world revolution. 

Charter Prohibitions on Use of Force 

The paramount commitment of the charter 
is article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: 

All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 

This comprehensive limitation went be- 
yond the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. This more sweeping commitment 
sought to apply a bitter lesson of the inter- 
war period — that the threat or use of force, 
whether or not called "war," feeds on suc- 
cess. The indelible lesson of those years is 
that the time to stop aggression is at its 
very beginning. 

The exceptions to the prohibitions on the 
use or threat of force were expressly set 
forth in the charter. The use of force is 
legal : 

— as a collective measure by the United 
Nations, or 

— as action by regional agencies in ac- 
cordance with chapter VIII of the charter, 

— in individual or collective self-defense. 

When article 2, paragraph 4, was written 
it was widely regarded as general interna- 
tional law, governing both members and 
nonmembers of the United Nations. And on 
the universal reach of the principle em- 
bodied in article 2, paragraph 4, wide agree- 
ment remains. 

Thus, last year, a United Nations Special 
Committee on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 

Cooperation Among States met in Mexico 
City. All shades of United Nations opin- 
ion were represented. The Committee's pur- 
pose was to study and possibly to elaborate 
certain of those principles. The Committee 
debated much and agreed on little. But on 
one point, it reached swift and unanimous 
agreement: that all states, and not only all 
members of the United Nations, are bound 
to refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independ- 
ence of any state. Nonrecognition of the 
statehood of a political entity was held not 
to affect the international application of this 
cardinal rule of general international law. 

But at this same meeting in Mexico City, 
Czechoslovakia, with the warm support of 
the Soviet Union and some other members, 
proposed formally another exemption from 
the limitations on use of force. Their pro- 
posal stated that : 

The prohibition of the use of force shall not af- 
fect . . . self-defense of nations against colonial 
domination in the exercise of the right of self- 

The United States is all for self-defense. 
We are against colonial domination — we led 
the way in throwing it off. We have long 
favored self-determination, in practice as 
well as in words — indeed, we favor it for 
the entire world, including the peoples behind 
the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. But we 
could not accept the Czech proposal. And we 
were pleased that the Special Committee 
found the Czech proposal unacceptable. 

The primary reason why we opposed that 
attempt to rewrite the charter — apart from 
the inadmissibility of rewriting the charter 
at all by such means — was that we knew 
the meaning behind the words. We knew 
that, like so many statements from such 
sources, it used upside-dowm language — that 
it would in effect authorize a state to wage 
war, to use force internationally, as long as 
it claimed it was doing so to "liberate" some- 
body from "colonial domination." In short, 
the Czech resolution proposed to give to so- 
called "wars of national liberation" the same 




jxemption from the limitation on the use of 
:orce which the charter accords to defense 
jgainst aggression. 

What Is a "War of National Liberation"? 

What is a "war of national libex'ation" ? 
.t is, in essence, any war which furthers 
he Communist world revolution — what, in 
)roader terms, the Communists have long 
•eferred to as a "just" war. The term "war 
: >f national liberation" is used not only to 
' ' lenote armed insurrection by people still un- 
ler colonial rule — there are not many of 
hose left outside the Communist world. It 
s used to denote any effort led by Com- 
nunists to overthrow by force any non-Com- 
nunist government. 

Thus the war in South Viet-Nam is called 
I "war of national liberation." And those 
vho would overthrow various other non- 
!Jommunist governments in Asia, Africa, 
md Latin America are called the "forces of 
lational liberation." 

Nobody in his right mind would deny that 
Venezuela is not only a truly independent 
lation but that it has a government chosen 
n a free election. But the leaders of the 
Tommunist insurgency in Venezuela are de- 
scribed as leaders of a fight for "national 
," iberation" — not only by themselves and by 
'^■. jastro and the Chinese Communists but by 
^''' ;he Soviet Communists. 

A recent editorial in Pravda spoke of the 

'peoples of Latin America . . . marching 

'^ firmly along the path of struggle for their 

' lational independence" and said, ". . . the 

ipsurge of the national liberation movement 

" Ji Latin American countries has been to a 

.?Teat extent a result of the activities of 

Communist parties." It added : 

The Soviet people have regarded and still regard 
. t as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples 
"' Sghting for their independence. True to their in- 
**'' xrnational duty the Soviet people have been and 
; i: will remain on the side of the Latin American 
jif. patriots. 

0^' ; In Communist doctrine and practice, a 
s* aon-Communist government may be labeled 
sff' and denounced as "colonialist," "reaction- 

ary," or a "puppet," and any state so labeled 
by the Communists automatically becomes 
fair game — while Communist intervention 
by force in non-Communist states is justified 
as "self-defense" or part of the "struggle 
against colonial domination." "Self-determi- 
nation" seems to mean that any Communist 
nation can determine by itself that any non- 
Communist state is a victim of colonialist 
domination and therefore a justifiable target 
for a "war of liberation." 

As the risks of overt aggression, whether 
nuclear or with conventional forces, have be- 
come increasingly evident, the Communists 
have put increasing stress on the "war 
of national liberation." The Chinese Com- 
munists have been more militant in language 
and behavior than the Soviet Communists. 
But the Soviet Communist leadership also 
has consistently proclaimed its commitment 
in principle to support wars of national lib- 
eration. This commitment was reaffirmed 
as recently as Monday of this week by Mr. 
Kosygin [Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of 
the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers]. 

International law does not restrict inter- 
nal revolution within a state or revolution 
against colonial authority. But international 
law does restrict what third powers may 
lawfully do in support of insurrection. It is 
these restrictions which are challenged by 
the doctrine, and violated by the practice, 
of "wars of liberation." 

It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine 
of "wars of liberation" would amount to 
scuttling the modern international law of 
peace which the charter prescribes. And 
acceptance of the practice of "wars of liber- 
ation," as defined by the Communists, 
would mean the breakdown of peace itself. 

South Viet-Nam's Right of Self-Defense 

Viet-Nam presents a clear current case of 
the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. 
I would agree with General Giap [Vo Ngu- 
yen Giap, North Vietnamese Commander in 
Chief] and other Communists that it is a 
test case for "wars of national liberation." 
We intend to meet that test. 

Tl>' iMAY 10, 1965 


Were the insurgency in South Viet-Nam 
truly indigenous and self-sustained, interna- 
tional law would not be involved. But the 
fact is that it receives vital external sup- 
port — in organization and direction, in train- 
ing, in men, in weapons and other supplies. 
That external support is unlawful for a 
double reason. First, it contravenes general 
international law, which the United Nations 
Charter here expresses. Second, it contra- 
venes particular international law : the 1954 
Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 
Geneva agreements on Laos. 

In resisting the aggression against it, the 
Republic of Viet-Nam is exercising its right 
of self-defense. It called upon us and other 
states for assistance. And in the exercise 
of the right of collective self-defense under 
the United Nations Charter, we and other 
nations are providing such assistance. 

The American policy of assisting South 
Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was in- 
augurated under President Eisenhower and 
continued under Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. Our assistance has been increased 
because the aggression from the North has 
been augmented. Our assistance now en- 
compasses the bombing of North Viet-Nam. 
The bombing is designed to interdict, as far 
as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be 
necessary, continued aggression against the 
Republic of Viet-Nam. 

When that aggression ceases, collective 
measures in defense against it will cease. As 
President Johnson has declared : * 

... if that aggression is stopped, the people 
and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to 
settle their own future, and the need for supporting 
American military action there will end. 

The fact that the demarcation line be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam was in- 
tended to be temporary does not make the 
assault on South Viet-Nam any less of 
an aggression. The demarcation lines be- 
tween North and South Korea and between 
East and West Germany are temporary. But 
that did not make the North Korean inva- 
sion of South Korea a permissible use of 


Let's not forget the salient features of the ' 
1962 agreements on Laos.'' Laos was to bei Xffl' 
independent and neutral. All foreign troops, W' 
regular or irregular, and other military! "" 
personnel were to be withdrawn within 75 i Ik 
days, except a limited number of French: we : 
instructors as requested by the Lao Gov-' dot 
ernment. No arms were to be introduced into Me. 
Laos except at the request of that Gov-'! Bke 
ernment. The signatories agreed to refrainii aablf 
"from all direct or indirect interference ini' itiitioi 
the internal affairs" of Laos. They promised; Her 
also not to use Lao territory to intervene iuij fc ai 
the internal affairs of other countries — £J yii 
stipulation that plainly prohibited the pas-; 'fcto 
sage of arms and men from North Viet-Namii 
to South Viet-Nam by way of Laos. An In-ij 
ternational Control Commission of three was' 
to assure compliance with the agreements.! 

What happened? The non-Communist ele-i 
ments complied. The Communists did not; 
At no time since that agreement was signed; ile vi 
have either the Pathet Lao or the Nortb 
Viet-Nam authorities complied with it. Thi\ 
North Vietnamese left several thousand, 
troops there — the backbone of almost everji jji^j^ 
Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridoj, 
through Laos to South Viet-Nam continued, 
And the Communists barred the areas un; 
der their control both to the Governmeni! 
of Laos and the International Control Comi 


; 11 apt 

Nature of Struggle in Viet-Nam 

To revert to Viet-Nam: I continue ti 
hear and see nonsense about the nature o: 
the struggle there. I sometimes wonder a 
the gullibility of educated men and the stub 
born disregard of plain facts by men whi 
are supposed to be helping our young t 
learn — especially to learn how to think. 

Hanoi has never made a secret of its de 
signs. It publicly proclaimed in 1960 a re 
newal of the assault on South Viet-Nair 
Quite obviously its hopes of taking ove 
South Viet-Nam from within had withere 
to close to zero — and the remarkable eco 
nomic and social progress of South Viet 





'Ibid., Apr. 12, 1965, p. 527. 

♦ For text, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. 



Nam contrasted, most disagreeably for the 
Nortli Vietnamese Communists, with their 
own miserable economic performance. 

The facts about the extei-nal involvement 
have been documented in white papers " 
and other publications of the Department of 
State. The International Control Commission 
ihas held that there is evidence "beyond rea- 
sonable doubt" of North Vietnamese inter- 

There is no evidence that the Viet Cong 
has any significant popular following in 
South Viet-Nam. It relies heavily on terror. 
Most of its reinforcements in recent months 
have been North Vietnamese from the North 
Vietnamese Army. 

Let us be clear about what is involved to- 
day in Southeast Asia. We are not involved 
with empty phrases or conceptions which 
ride upon the clouds. We are talking about 
the vital national interests of the United 
States in the peace of the Pacific. We are 
talking about the appetite for aggression — 
an appetite which grows upon feeding and 
which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are 
talking about the safety of nations with 
whom we are allied — and the integrity of the 
American commitment to join in meeting 

It is true that we also believe that every 
small state has a right to be unmolested by 
its neighbors even though it is within reach 
)f a great power. It is true that we are 
:ommitted to general principles of law and 
procedure which reject the idea that men 
ind arms can be sent freely across frontiers 
;o absorb a neighbor. But underlying the gen- 
eral principles is the harsh reality that our 
)wn security is threatened by those who 
.vould embark upon a course of aggression 

'A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nayn's Effort 
To Conquer South Viet-Nam, Department of State 
lublication 7308, released in December 1961, Parts I 
;25 cents) and 11 (55 cents), and Aggression From 
he North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Cam- 
laign To Conquer South Viet-Nam, Department of 
State publication 7839, released in February 1965 
;40 cents) ; for sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
nents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
on, D. C, 20402. 

whose announced ultimate purpose is our 
own destruction. 

Once again we hear expressed the views 
which cost the men of my generation a 
terrible price in World War II. We are told 
that Southeast Asia is far away — but so 
were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told 
that, if we insist that someone stop shoot- 
ing, that is asking them for unconditional 
surrender. We are told that perhaps the 
aggressor will be content with just one more 
bite. We are told that, if we prove faithless 
on one commitment, perhaps others would 
believe us about other commitments in other 
places. We are told that, if we stop resisting, 
perhaps the other side will have a change of 
heart. We are asked to stop hitting bridges 
and radar sites and ammunition depots 
without requiring that the other side stop its 
slaughter of thousands of civilians and its 
bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals 
and railways and buses. 

Surely we have learned over the past 
three decades that the acceptance of ag- 
gression leads only to a sure catastrophe. 
Surely we have learned that the aggressor 
must face the consequences of his action and 
be saved from the frightful miscalculation 
that brings all to ruin. It is the purpose of 
law to guide men away from such events, 
to establish rules of conduct which are 
deeply rooted in the reality of experience. 

A "Common Law of Mankind" 

Before closing I should like to turn away 
from the immediate difficulties and dangers 
of the situation in Southeast Asia and re- 
mind you of the dramatic progress that 
shapes and is being shaped by expanding 
international law. 

A "common law of mankind" — to use the 
happy phrase of your distinguished colleague 
Wilfred Jenks — is growing as the world 
shrinks and as the vistas of space expand. 
This year is, by proclamation of the General 
Assembly, International Cooperation Year, a 
year to direct attention to the common in- 
terests of mankind and to accelerate the 
joint efforts being undertaken to further 
them. Those common interests are enormous 

MAY 10, 1965 



and intricate, and the joint efforts which 
further them are developing fast, although 
perhaps not fast enough. 

In the 19th century the United States at- 
tended an average of one international con- 
ference a year. Nowr we attend nearly 600 
a year. We are party to 4,300 treaties and 
other international agreements in force. 
Three-fourths of these were signed in the 
last 25 years. Our interest in the observ- 
ance of all of these treaties and agreements 
is profound, whether the issue is peace in 
Laos, or the payment of United Nations 
assessments, or the allocation of radio fre- 
quencies, or the application of airline safe- 
guards, or the control of illicit traffic in nar- 
cotics, or any other issue which states have 
chosen to regulate through the lawmaking 
process. The writing of international cooper- 
ation into international law is meaningful 
only if the law is obeyed — and only if the 
international institutions which administer 
and develop the law function in accordance 
with agreed procedures, until the procedures 
are changed. 

Everything suggests that the rate of 
grovii;h in international law, like the rate of 
change in almost every other field these 
days, is rising at a very steep angle. 

In recent years the law of the sea has been 
developed and codified, but it first evolved 
in a leisurely fashion over the centuries. 
International agreements to regulate aerial 
navigation had to be worked out within the 
period of a couple of decades. Now, within 
the first few years of man's adventures in 
outer space, we are deeply involved in the 
creation of international institutions, regula- 
tions, and law to govern this effort. 

Already the United Nations has developed 
a set of legal principles to govern the use 
of outer space and declared celestial bodies 
free from national appropriation. 

Already nations, including the United 
States and the Soviet Union, have agreed 
not to orbit weapons of mass destruction in 
outer space. 

Already the Legal Subcommittee of the 
United Nations Committee on Outer Space 
is formulating international agreements on 

liability for damage caused by the reentry Oj 
objects launched into outer space and on resi 
cue and return of astronauts and space olj 
jects. I 

Already the first international sounding] 
rocket range has been established in Indii 
and is being offered for United Nations spor. 
sorship. j 

To make orderly space exploration posi 
sible at this stage, the International Tele' 
communication Union had to allocate radij 
frequencies for the purpose. j 

To take advantage of weather reportin;] 
and forecasting potential of observatio:! 
satellites, married to computer technologjij 
the World Meteorological Organization i' 
creating a vast system of data acquisitioiii 
analysis, and distribution which depend)! 
entirely on international agreement, regula 
tion, and standards. 

And to start building a single global coir, 
munications satellite system, we have createJj 
a novel international institution in whicij 
a private American corporation shares owBJ 
ership with 45 governments. | 

This is but part of the story of how thij 
pace of discovery and invention forces us t\ 
reach out for international agreement, t! 
build international institutions, to do thing 
in accordance with an expanding interna ^ 
tional and transnational law. Phenomenal a 
the growth of treaty obligations is, the trutj 
innovation of 20th-century international la\ 
lies more in the fact that we have nearly 8< 
international institutions which are capabl, 
of carrying out those obligations. i 

It is important that the processes an* 
products of international cooperation be ur 
derstood and appreciated; and it is import 
ant that their potential be much furthe 
developed. It is also important that th 
broader significance of the contributions oj 
international cooperation to the solving oj 
international problems of an economic, so; 
cial, scientific, and humanitarian characte 
not be overestimated. For all the progres 
of peace could be incinerated in war. 

"Thus the control of force in Internationa 
relations remains the paramount problec 
which confronts the diplomat and the lawye 



-and the man in the street and the man in 
he rice field. Most of mankind is not in an 
tnmediate position to grapple very directly 
/ith that problem, but the problem is no 
;ss crucial. The responsibility of those, in 
our profession and mine, who do grapple 

with it is the greater. I am happy to acknowl- 
edge that this Society, in thinking and de- 
bating courageously and constructively 
about the conditions of peace, continues to 
make its unique contribution and to make 
it well. 

Inited Nations Procedures and Power Realities: 
he International Apportionment Problem 

by Richard N. Gardner 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs^ 

I have always looked forward to annual 
leetings of this Society with anticipa- 
on — but never more so than this year. One 
jason, of course, is the very great honor 
f participating in this evening's program 
)gether with the Secretary of State. The 
ther reason is the particularly timely and 
nportant theme to which you are devoting 
lese annual meetings — "The Development 
f International Law by International Organ- 

Some people, to be sure, may have reser- 
ations about the decision to devote all of 
our meetings this year to this particular 

• On one side there are those who may feel 
lat the problems of international organiza- 
ons are not sufficiently "legal" to sustain 
le interest of practicing lawyers and law 

On the other side there are those who 

ay feel that law and lawyers already have 
•0 much to do with foreign policy, in the 
eld of international organizations and else- 

here, and that this program of yours is 
ardly designed to keep them in their place. 

' Address made before the American Society of 
ternational Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23. 

Those who hold this latter view would 
probably agree with the judgment of Sir 
Harold Nicolson, the famous British writer 
on diplomacy, that "the worst kind of diplo- 
matists are missionaries, fanatics and law- 

Fortunately Sir Harold Nicolson's view on 
this subject has not prevailed in the United 
States. Since 1789, 45 out of 52 of our Sec- 
retaries of State have been members of the 
bar. One member of that small band of seven 
who have not been lawyers — the Secretary 
of State we honor here tonight — does not 
conceal the fact that he was studying law 
when the war intervened. It cut off what un- 
doubtedly would have been a brilliant ca- 
reer at the bar, and it no doubt made him 
Secretary of State several years sooner. 

My views on this subject are undoubtedly 
self-serving. I am a great believer in the 
deep involvement of lawyers in foreign pol- 
icy, particularly in the field of international 
organization. Those laymen who complain 
about the lavv^yer's role in this area tend to 
think of law as the mechanical application of 
principles found in cases and textbooks. Few 
lawyers today would accept so restrictive a 
definition of their function. Most of us like 
to think of ourselves as practicing what a 

AY 10, 1965 


colleague on the Harvard law faculty has 
described as "Eunomics — the science of good 

It is not surprising that in the Depart- 
ment of State today there are many more 
lawyers outside than inside the Legal Ad- 
viser's office. Several, like myself, are in 
the Bureau of International Organization Af- 
fairs, trying to apply "the science of good 
arrangements" to the major tasks of peace- 
keeping and nation-building which our coun- 
try is undertaking on a multilateral basis. 

Together with our colleagues in the office 
of the Legal Adviser, we have been apply- 
ing the lavi^er's skills in problem-solving to 
some of the exciting enterprises undertaken 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administra- 
tions — to developing the institutional com- 
ponents for partial and general disarma- 
ment, to negotiating ground rules for U.N. 
peacekeeping forces, to drafting principles 
for the peaceful uses of outer space, to 
establishing interim arrangements for glob- 
al satellite communications, to inaugurating 
a U.N./FAO World Food Program, to creat- 
ing a World Weather Watch under the World 
Meteorological Organization, to launching 
new United Nations trade machinery, and 
to analysis of the possible functions of a 
United Nations High Commissioner for Hu- 
man Rights. 

Growth in Membership and Responsibility 

Of all our preoccupations these last 4 
years in the field of international organiza- 
tion the one which best illustrates the rele- 
vance of law and legal skills has been our 
effort to adapt the decisioimiaking proce- 
dures of the United Nations and its family of 
agencies to take adequate account of world 
power realities. 

The Secretary of State himself called spe- 
cial attention to this problem in his Ham- 
marskjold Lecture at Columbia University 
on January 10, 1964.^ He pointed out that a 
two-thirds vote could now be put together in 
the General Assembly, at least in theory, by 
members representing only 10 percent of the 

population of U.N. members and 5 perciit 
of contributions to the regular budget, ie 
noted that the rapid and radical expansn 
of the organization may require some adii- 
tation of procedures if the U.N. is to remia 
relevant to the real world and therefore i :- 
fective in that world. 

The reason for our preoccupation with t s 
subject is obvious. The United Nations Ip 
grown from 51 to 114 members in i 
last 20 years. A parallel increase has tal 
place in the membership of the specialijjl 
and affiliated agencies. U.N. memberslp 
may reach a total of 125 to 130 before 
finally levels off. 

What makes this extraordinary incres^ 
in membership particularly significant fre) 
a constitutional point of view is the simuh. 
neous increase in the U.N.'s capacity to a,-. 
The United States has played a leading ro|i 
in the strengthening of the action responi|' 
bilities of the United Nations system in boi 
peacekeeping and development. We want 
continue to play this role in the years ah( 

It is obvious that, as the U.N. develops ; 
increasing capacity to act, there will be i 
creasing concern with the procedures 
which this capacity is exercised. The m; 
fest disproportion between voting pow, 
and real power is now a central preoccup: 
tion of persons concerned with the future ■ 
the world organization. Unless we can fii 
ways to allay the anxieties felt on this su- 
ject in the United States and in other coui, 
tries, it will be increasingly difficult to uii 
the U.N. in the years ahead for impo 
tant tasks of peacekeeping and developmen 

To be sure, it is important not to eve? 
state the problem which is inherent in tl 
present constitutional situation. As Da 
Hammarskjold reminded us some years ag 
in an annual report to the General Assembl 
[U.N. doc. A/3594/ Add. 1], the members c j 
the United Nations may have equal votes bv 
they are far from having equal influence : 


For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 113. 


The criticism of "one nation, one vote," irr< 
spective of size or strength, as constituting an ol 
stacle to arriving at just and representative solu 
tions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The Genert 
Assembly is not a parliament of elected individui 


L,- jmbers; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the 
legates of member states represent governmental 
licies, and these policies are subject to all the 
fluences that would prevail in international life 
any case. 

Anyone who believes that United States 
fluence in the United Nations is measured 
■ the fact that it has less than one-hun- 
(■edth of the votes in the General Assembly 
,ils completely to understand the realities 
' power as they are reflected in the world 
■ganization. These realities include the fact 
at the United States is the principal con- 
ibutor to the U.N.'s regular budget, is by 
r the largest supporter of the U.N.'s 
jacekeeping and development programs, 
id is making by far the largest individual 
mtribution to the defense and development 
;■ the non-Communist world. On U.N. deci- 
'^^'■^- 'ons of vital importance to the United 
,ates, the voting of other countries has 
3en considerably influenced by U.S. views. 
Nevertheless, after these and other qual- 
cations are made, it remains true that the 
■•esent procedures do need to be improved 
1 the light both of the growth of U.N. mem- 
!'-'■ jrship and the growth of U.N. responsibil- 
Ire ies. The last UNESCO [United Nations 
"'■ ' ducational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
ition] Conference, for example, voted a 
udget by a large majority of votes which 
epresented less than 30 percent of the 
jnds that had to be raised to make the budg- 
t a reality. And at the United Nations 
•onference on Trade and Development in 
leneva last spring there was a disturbing 
endency of the 75 (now 77) less developed 
jjiPuntries to use their automatic two-thirds 
lajority to vote recommendations for action 
'i, ] n trade and development over the opposi- 
tion of the ver>- minority of developed coun- 
ies to whom the recommendations were 

On the whole, the majority of small coun- 
ries have not behaved as irresponsibly as 
.e pessimists have predicted. We hope in 
e years ahead that the "revolution of ris- 
ng expectations" will be matched by an "evo- 
heC* ution of rising responsibility." But we can- 
in*'' lot base our participation in the U.N. on 

MAY 10. 1965 

Assffl "' 

hope alone. Sound procedural adaptations 
can help make this hope a reality. 

Rationalizing the Decisionmaking Process 

The constitutional problem here involved 
is not unique to the U.N. We have sometimes 
referred to these difficulties in the U.N. as 
the "international apportionment problem" 
— because the word "apportionment" has a 
very poignant meaning in our domestic polit- 
ical life through the recent actions of our 
Supreme Court and State legislatures. 

Indeed, we are dealing here with problems 
in the management of power reminiscent of 
those which confronted our own Constitu- 
tional Convention in Philadelphia nearly 200 
years ago. In Philadelphia then, as in the 
United Nations system today, the problem 
was how to reconcile the sovereign equality 
of states with the fact that some states are 
very small and other states are very large. 
The sovereign equality of states is one of 
the fundamental principles of international 
law. In the words of a famous case decided 
many years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court : 
"Russia and Geneva have equal rights." Ar- 
ticle 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations 
Charter declares that the United Nations is 
based on the principle of sovereign equality. 
The sovereign equality of states, however, 
has never meant the equal right to partici- 
pate in the decisionmaking process of inter- 
national organizations. The composition of 
the Security Council and other councils, the 
veto provision, the amendment process — 
these and other provisions of the charter all 
accord special privileges to certain mem- 
bers. So the structure of the United Na- 
tions from the very beginning recognized the 
need to reconcile the principle of sovereign 
equality with the uneven disposition of real 
power and real responsibility for implement- 
ing U.N. decisions. Appropriate means of 
balancing these considerations were also in- 
corporated in the constitutions of the spe- 
cialized agencies. 

Quite apart from charter provisions, pro- 
cedures have been developed over the years 
to adapt decisionmaking procedures to pow- 
er realities. In the last several years this 


central problem has occasioned a vast amount 
of staff work in our own and other govern- 
ments — and a considerable amount of discus- 
sion and negotiation in the U.N. system. 

We have explored with other nations many 
different procedures for rationalizing the de- 
cisionmaking process. We recognize that no 
one procedure is appropriate for all cases : 

— Certain procedures may be appropriate 
for the voting of General Assembly resolu- 
tions which merely manifest the views of 
members and have no binding legal effect. 

— Other procedures may be appropriate 
when the General Assembly is exercising 
its mandatory power to assess. 

— Still other procedures may be appropri- 
ate in specialized agencies lending substan- 
tial sums of money for exchange stabiliza- 
tion or economic development. 

So our search for adequate procedures 
has been undertaken on a case-by-case basis 
with special regard for the peculiarities of 
each case. 

Before turning to a discussion of possible 
procedures, it may be useful to identify one 
solution to the problem which we have not 
considered. We have rejected the notion that 
most or all important U.N. operations should 
be subject to the "principle of unanimity." 

Specifically, we have rejected the 20-year- 
old Soviet demand that all peacekeeping oper- 
ations of the U.N. should be under the ex- 
clusive jurisdiction of the Security Council 
and thus subject to great-power veto. While 
recognizing that the Security Council has 
the exclusive right to initiate mandatory 
peacekeeping actions that impose binding 
obligations on states, we have consistently 
recognized the residual authority of the Gen- 
eral Assembly to launch voluntary peace- 
keeping operations. We have defended the 
charter power of the Assembly to assess the 
membership for such operations, while recog- 
nizing that in practice many peacekeeping 
operations can be more appropriately fi- 
nanced by methods other than by every- 
member assessment. 

Some Americans, I know, feel strongly 
that we must not expose the vital interests 

of the United States to the possibility thij 
the Assembly would lay mandatory obli 
gations on us against our will. Fears ha^; 
been expressed that the United Natioi 
would send a force into some area again: 
our political opposition — and make us p£, 
for such ventures besides. It has been suji 
gested that in the arrears issue we are tr;l 
ing to enforce on the U.S.S.R. and France ; 
principle that we would never allow to li 
enforced against ourselves. ; 

There are several important points to li 
considered in connection with this assertio. 
The Congo and Middle East operations we 
launched with the acquiescence of the Sovi 
Union and France. The General Assemb 
has never recommended any peacekeeph, 
operation against the negative vote of a b' 
power. Indeed, the Assembly has only recoi 
mended a peacekeeping operation once — ^tl 
United Nations Emergency Force — and th 
was with the consent of the territorial sO) 

The Assembly cannot, in any case, initial 
binding enforcement action requiring mei 
bers to contribute men and logistical suppo 
to military operations. It has never attemp 
ed to do this — and there is no reason to su 
pose it ever will. Moreover, the Assembl; 
indeed the U.N., is estopped by article ) 
paragraph 7, of the charter from unlawf 
intervention in matters within a membei. 
domestic jurisdiction. 

Finally, in the light of the article 19 e 
perience, it is clear that the Assembly w 
be very cautious in the future in exercisii 
its right to initiate and assess for volu 
tary peacekeeping operations. These consi 
erations are usually overlooked by those wl 
claim that the principle for which the Unit 
States has been contending in the article : 
crisis ^ is incompatible with our national i 

The argument that, if we were like tl 
Soviet Union, we would not want to pj 
for peacekeeping operations we oppose, 
unpersuasive for another reason: The p( 
icies we pursue do not lead the United N 

" For a U.S. statement, see ibid., Feb. 15, 1965, 



tions to undertake peacekeeping actions 
directed apainst what we see as our vital 

If the United States were engaged in pro- 
moting the overthrow of foreign govern- 
ments and institutions, it would have reason 
to fear the effective implementation of 
United Nations principles. 

But, in view of what in fact American 
principles and purposes are, we have every 
reason to uphold the authority of the United 
Nations. We have every reason to uphold the 
law, as the International Court of Justice 
has found it to be. We have every reason 
to favor impartially applying the law of the 
charter, for we have no reason to fear im- 
partial application of that law. If we seek 
a world ruled by law rather than force, we 
naturally must seek to apply and defend the 
law we now have. 

In short, the United States has been pre- 
pared to take whatever risks are inherent 
in the principle that voluntary peacekeeping 
operations may be initiated and financed by 
the General Assembly free from great-power 
veto because we recognize a long-term in- 
terest in developing this means of contain- 
ing violence in the nuclear age. We want to 
minimize these risks, of course, but not at 
the cost of crippling the capacity of the 
United Nations to act for peace and security. 

To put it another way, we are persuaded 
Df the need to protect the interests of our- 
selves and other large and middle powers in 
;he United Nations vehicle. But we do not 
want to do this by draining all the gasoline 
mt of the motor. We prefer to keep the 
gasoline in — and to keep the vehicle on the 
•oad through the introduction of "power 

'Power Steering" 

How can "power steering" be built in to 
he United Nations vehicle? Diplomats and 
cholars have explored six main approaches 
o this problem : 

. Weighted Voting 

Most public discussion of the intema- 
ional apportionment question has focused 

on proposals to introduce weighted voting in 
the General Assembly and in the conferences 
of the major U.N. agencies. 

Weighted voting exists, of course, in the 
four financial agencies of the United Na- 
tions system — ^the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development, the Interna- 
tional Finance Corporation, and the Inter- 
national Development Association. In each 
of these voting power is roughly propor- 
tionate to financial contribution. Weighted 
voting is also employed in the main interna- 
tional commodity arrangements, where it 
is related to the size of participating coun- 
tries' trade in the particular commodity. 
Except for these financial and trade arrange- 
ments, it is not otherwise employed in the 
United Nations system. 

But most U.N. members, while willing to 
employ weighted voting for decisions on the 
disbursement of loans or the administration 
of commodity agreements, are not prepared 
to introduce this system across the board to 
cover recommendations of the General As- 
sembly and other bodies. 

The obvious practical impediment to the 
introduction of weighted voting in the 
General Assembly is that it would require 
amendment of the U.N. Charter — and 
therefore the approval not only of the Soviet 
Union, France, and other members of the 
Security Council but also of two-thirds of 
the membership of the General Assembly. In 
the present state of international relations, 
it is hard to imagine the permanent mem- 
bers of the Council and two-thirds of the 
Assembly agreeing on any formula which 
would assign different weights to their 
share in the decisionmaking process. 

The most likely consequence of pressing 
for a charter review conference to consider 
weighted voting, as some have urged, would 
be to provide a golden opportunity for the 
Communist countries and others to press 
for amendments diminishing the powers that 
the U.N. has developed under the charter 
during the last 20 years and that have gen- 
erally promoted the objectives of U.S. foreign 

ifAV in 1QCK 

Even if it were possible to amend the 
charter to provide for weighted voting, it is 
not at all certain that our national interest 
would be served by the result. No system 
of weighted voting could conceivably be ne- 
gotiated which did not weigh population as 
a major factor. It is questionable whether 
such an arrangement would suit a country 
like ours, which has only 6 percent of the 
world's population and which, together with 
its NATO allies, has only 16 percent. If pop- 
ulation were a primary criterion, India with 
its 450 million people and China with its 700 
million people might well end up with more 
votes than the United States. 

Of course, it is always possible to con- 
struct hypothetical systems of weighted 
voting congenial to our interests, based 
mainly on such factors as literacy, per cap- 
ita income, and military power. But such 
systems are simply not negotiable — at least, 
not in the foreseeable future. 

The Department of State in 1962 con- 
ducted a study of various weighted-voting 
formulas based on population and contribu- 
tions to the U.N. budget. When these for- 
mulas were applied to 178 key votes that took 
place in the General Assembly between 1954 
and 1961, it was found that, while they 
would have somewhat reduced the number 
of resolutions passed over U.S. opposition, 
they would have reduced much more the 
number of resolutions supported by the 
United States and passed over Communist 
opposition. The same conclusion was reached 
in projecting these formulas to 1970, hav- 
ing regard to further increases in member- 

The results of this study reflect the fact 
that the desire for political independence 
and economic progress has put most U.N. 
members on the same side as the United 
States on most important matters — partic- 
ularly where action is involved as well as 

We have therefore concluded that any 
system of weighted voting taking popula- 
tion substantially into account — and, I re- 
peat, no weighted voting system would be 


negotiable that failed to do this — would helpi 
Communist countries more than ourselves,' 
by making it easier for them to achieve a, 
blocking one-third vote on U.N. actions fori 
peace and welfare that are in the interesti 
of the United States and other nations of; 
the non-Communist world. I 

2. Dual Voting i 

Dual voting — or a system of double ma-' 
jorities — has recently been advanced by' 
some commentators as a possible answer,; 
Benjamin Cohen, for example, has pro- 
posed that General Assembly decisions on 
substantive matters should be made in thej 
future by a two-thirds majority of mem-;l 
bers present and voting, provided that thej 
majority includes two-thirds of the mem.; 
bers of the Security Council. | 

Dual voting has two great advantages as! 
compared with weighted voting : j 

— It does not offend directly the "one na.} 
tion, one vote" principle. i 

— It does not require a complicated nei( 
gotiation involving national prestige ii 
which different weights have to be assignee 
to different members. 

But most members of the United Nationij 
would probably feel that the introduction o:; 
dual voting on all substantive matters woul(' 
require charter amendment. It is doubtfu; 
that a sufficient consensus on the desiri 
ability of dual voting presently exists fo: 
such an amendment to be approved. ■ 

It is always possible, of course, that duai i|j| 
voting might be introduced in selected area 
of U.N. decisionmaking. At the U.N. Con, 4 
ference on Trade and Development in Gene 
va last year the non-Communist industrial |}i 
countries, in the closing weeks of the con' 
ference, proposed a system of dual votini 
for the new U.N. trade machinery. UndS' 
this proposal, decisions on certain impor 
tant matters in the periodic Trade and De 
velopment Conference were to be taken by 
two-thirds majority, including a majority o 
developed countries and a majority of les 
developed countries; in the Trade and Devel 



opment Board such decisions would be taken 
by a plain majority, including a majority 
of developed countries and a majority of 
less developed countries. 

This proposal found some support not 
only anionp developed countries but also 
among less developed countries, some of 
whom recognized the futility of voting self- 
serving resolutions without the concurrence 
of at least a majority of those countries to 
whom the recommendations were addressed. 

But the idea involved too great a change 
in existing procedures to gain approval at 
Geneva. And some of the Western indus- 
trial countries even developed second 
thoughts on the proposal — on the grounds 
that special voting procedures of this kind 
might cause greater significance to be at- 
tached to U.N. recommendations than they 
were prepared to accept. 

3. Bicameralism 

Bicameralism in one form or other is an 
approach to the international apportion- 
ment problem offering greater possibilities 
in the short run than either weighted or 
dual voting. 

In its extreme form bicameralism would 
mean treating the Security Council and the 
General Assembly as an "Upper House" and 
a "Lower House" and requiring that deci- 
sions on some or all matters would have to 
be passed by both of them. For example, 
the veto could continue to apply to enforce- 
ment action ; but voluntary peacekeeping op- 
erations and perhaps recommendations in 
other areas could be adopted by two-thirds 
of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 
members of the Security Council (9 mem- 
bers of the enlarged Council of 15). 

Here again, this kind of proposal would 
probably require charter amendment. It is 
therefore not a practical possibility in the 
foreseeable future. But more tentative and 
informal steps in the direction of bicameral- 
ism may be possible. 

In September 1964 the United States sub- 
mitted to the Working Group of 21 a pro- 
posal covering arrangements for initiating 

and financing U.N. peacekeeping opera- 
tions involving the use of military forces.* 
We proposed that all proposals to initiate 
such peacekeeping operations should be con- 
sidered first in the Security Council. The 
General Assembly would not authorize or 
assume control of such operations unless the 
Council had demonstrated that it was unable 
to take action. 

This proposal would work a change in 
present procedures. While, under the charter, 
the Security Council would normally be ex- 
pected to consider a threat to peace and se- 
curity in the first instance, there is no re- 
quirement that the Security Council should 
first consider a particular peacekeeping op- 
eration. In the Suez crisis, for example, the 
Security Council met before the General As- 
sembly convened in emergency special ses- 
sion, but it did not consider the proposal for 
the establishment of the United Nations 
Emergency Force. This proposal was 
initiated in the Assembly itself. 

A new arrangement by which proposals 
for the establishment of peacekeeping forces 
would first be submitted to the Council 
would be a step in the direction of strength- 
ening the primary responsibility of the 
Council in the peacekeeping field. It should 
commend itself not only to those members 
who are seeking to strengthen the Council's 
role but to all members who want to work 
out a rational distribution of powers be- 
tween the Council and the Assembly. 

The UNEF, Congo, and Cyprus operations 
illustrated the importance of getting U.N. 
troops to world trouble spots without undue 
delay. Therefore any proposal requiring 
prior resort to the Council should contain 
safeguards — perhaps a fixed time limit — 
to avoid jeopardizing the ability of the As- 
sembly to take timely action under its resid- 
ual powers. 

Enlargement of the Security Council 
could also aid our efforts to deal with 
the international apportionment problem 
through measures of modified bicameralism. 

* For text, see ibid., Oct. 5, 1964, p. 488, 

iMAY 10, 1965 


If the Security Council is to discharge more 
effectively its primary responsibility in the 
field of peace and security, it must be suf- 
ficiently representative of the U.N. mem- 
bership as a vi^hole to have the confidence 
of the membership. This is not possible 
without enlargement. 

The General Assembly has approved the 
first charter amendments in the history of 
the United Nations — amendments enlarg- 
ing the Security Council from 11 to 15 mem- 
bers and the Economic and Social Council 
from 18 to 27 members. The President of 
the United States recently sent a message 
to the Senate asking for advice and consent 
to the ratification of these amendments.' 
Hearings will shortly commence upon them 
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Affirmative action upon these amendments 
is clearly desirable. 

The enlargement of the Security Council 
is designed to eliminate the contentious 
problem of sharing an inadequate number of 
seats. The new understanding for the dis- 
tribution of the elective seats embodied in 
the Assembly resolution proposing the 
amendment is realistic and equitable. It allo- 
cates two seats to Western European coun- 
tries and others, two to Latin America, one to 
Eastern Europe, and five to Africa and Asia. 
Enlargement should reduce the tendency to 
split terms in Security Council elections and 
should relieve mounting pressures against 
seats now held by Western European and 
Latin American countries. 

4. Committees With Selective Representation 

Probably the most promising method yet 
devised for building greater responsibility 
into United Nations decisionmaking is that 
of committees with selective representation. 

The basic concept was provided in the 
charter provision for a Security Council 
with 11 members, including the 5 perma- 
nent members which bear the principal re- 
sponsibility for the maintenance of peace 
and security. The same concept is em- 
bodied in the charters of a number of the 
specialized agencies — for example, in the 

" For text, see ibid., May 3, 1965, p. 678. 

Governing Body of the International Laboi 
Organization, the 10 members of chief ini 
dustrial importance have permanent seats, i 

Even where no specific provision is mad! 
for permanent seats for a certain categorl 
of members, elections to the executive board! 
of U.N. agencies have normally taken ac{ 
count of the special responsibilities of meml 
bers in the particular functional area o! 
cooperation, whether it be telecommunicai 
tions, weather forecasting, or medical n' 
search. Presumably this will continue to bj 
true in the future as well. | 

In the case of the Security Council th{ 
charter itself declares that "due regard' 
should be "specially paid, in the first ii' 
stance to the contribution of Members c' 
the United Nations to the maintenance (; 
international peace and security and to tli 
other purposes of the Organization" as we' 
as to equitable geographic distribution. Th;| 
provision has not received the attention 
deserves. It would enhance the effectivene; 
of an enlarged Council if this consideratic- 
could be adequately reflected in Counc 
elections in the years ahead. 

The members of the United Nations ha^ 
found committees with selective represent; 
tion particularly useful in the financial fiel 
The General Assembly's Advisory Commi 
tee on Administration and Budgetary Que 
tions bears responsibility for examining ai 
reporting on the Secretary-General's U.I 
budget estimates. The United States has su 
ported the effective operation of this sm.' 
12-man body, which is not merely repr 
sentative of the major geographic groups 
the United Nations but also reflects coi; 
parative contributions to the U.N. budg< 
We have sought to strengthen the autho 
ity of similar groups in the specializi 
agencies, and we believe members mig: 
usefully consider the possibility of creatir 
such groups in agencies which do not ha! 

We also favor use of a committee wi 
selective representation in the peacekeepii: 
field. Our working paper to the Comm 
tee of 21 last September proposed that t '■ 
General Assembly establish a standing Sr 



cial Finance Committee. The composition of 
this committee would be similar to that of 
the present Workinp Group of 21 — it 
would include the permanent members of the 
Security Council and a relatively high per- 
centage of those member states in each 
geographic area that are large financial con- 
tributors to the United Nations. The General 
Assembly, in apportioning expenses for 
peacekeeping operations, would act only on 
a recommendation from the committee passed 
by a two-thirds majority of the committee's 

One great advantage of the committee ap- 
proach is that it does not require amend- 
ment of the U.N. Charter or the constitu- 
tions of the various specialized agencies. 
The proposed Special Finance Committee for 
peacekeeping operations, for example, could 
ibe constituted under and governed by firm 
irules of procedure by the General Assembly. 
In effect, the As.sembly would be adopting a 
.-^elf-denying ordinance to act only upon pro- 
^ iposals first adopted in this new suborgan. 

5. Informal Relations With International 

m < Informal relations with the international 
'ecretariats may also provide a useful ap- 
;)roach. Obviously, the Secretary-Gen- 

ijP feral of the United Nations and the heads of 
he specialized and affiliated agencies en- 
rage in a continuous process of consultation 
vith the membership. In these consultations 
hey naturally take account of the differing 
esponsibilities which the members have for 
upporting the work of their organizations. 
During the United Nations Operation in 
he Congo, for example, the Secretariat sys- 
ematically consulted an advisory commit- 

^ pe of countries that contributed military 
ersonnel. More informally, consultation 
as carried on with key contributors of 
jrvices and money. For example, the United 
tates and other major contributors were in 
"equent touch with the Secretary-General 
'id his staff in New York and with the 
lief of the U.N. Congo operation in Leo- 
Mdville. This was a truly international un- 

dertaking. At the same time, its conduct I'e- 
flected the views of the major supporters of 
the operation. 

So far the heads of U.N. agencies have 
generally paid close attention to the views 
of the countries with special financial and 
other responsibilities. The problem has 
mainly been the inability of these countries 
to organize themselves effectively for the 
timely transmission of their viewpoints to 
the agency heads. 

In recent months the United States Gov- 
ernment has made special efforts to deal 
with this problem. We have sought to take 
a longer range view of international orga- 
nization activities and to develop our own 
position on programs and budgets far enough 
in advance so that the executive heads of the 
agencies can take these views into account at 
the time the program and budget is being 

Our objective here is to put the executive 
heads of the agencies in a position to take 
into account the views of their major con- 
tributors early in the budget cycle, before 
their proposals to the executive boards and 
conferences are frozen. This is immeasur- 
ably better than having them formulate 
their programs and budgets in the dark — 
only to be met suddenly at the general con- 
ference with the opposition of major con- 

During the past year the United States 
has begun a systematic series of consulta- 
tions with some of the other major contrib- 
utors in an effort to develop common 
positions on the programs and budgets of 
the international agencies. We have found 
this process of consultation very useful. As 
governmental positions emerge on various 
issues facing the specialized agencies, they 
are presented informally to the Directors 

We believe that, in the long run, this ex- 
change of views among governments and 
with secretariats will make for more effec- 
tive participation by the larger contribu- 
tors in the international organizations — 
and consequently for more realistic program 
proposals in the agencies. 

AY 10, 1965 


6. Conciliation 

The most recent, and perhaps the most 
original, procedural innovation in U.N. deci- 
sionmaking is the conciliation procedure 
established by the last General Assembly for 
the new U.N. machinery in the field of 
trade and development. 

The need for the conciliation procedure 
became apparent during the United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Development 
at Geneva.* In the closing days of UNCTAD, 
at which I served as vice chairman of the 
U.S. delegation, there was an encouraging 
disposition to reach a consensus on some sub- 
jects. But there were also instances when the 
voting bloc of less developed countries passed 
resolutions over the opposition of the minor- 
ity of industrial countries on matters involv- 
ing important economic interests. 

Some delegates argued that this was no 
cause for concern, since the resolutions were 
recommendations only — and any resolutions 
of the new trade machinery would be rec- 
ommendations only. But the United States 
and other countries pointed out that the cur- 
rency of such recommendations would be 
hopelessly debased if they failed to reflect a 
substantial consensus among all countries, 
including particularly the countries bear- 
ing the principal responsibility for imple- 
menting them. 

Trade questions have traditionally been 
dealt with among nations by negotiation — 
not legislation. Undoubtedly there is a con- 
structive role for institutions whose primary 
purpose is to articulate through recommen- 
dations the measures which should be under- 
taken by both developed and less developed 
countries to deal with the trade problems of 
the latter. But such institutions can only 
operate through a process of persuasion. 

Persuasion is assisted when delegates seek 
a consensus through conciliation and express 
that consensus in resolutions. If it is not 
assisted, it may even be set back by the pas- 
sage of self-serving resolutions by auto- 

• For text of the preamble and recommendations of 
the Final Act adopted by the Conference, see ibid., 
Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150. 

matic majorities. Public opinion in the in-i 
dustrial countries is likely to react adversely 
to recommendations that are passed over the 
opposition of the industrial countries but; 
call for concessions by them. 

What is wanted, in the last analysis, is not; 
voting, but results. Because this was recog-; 
nized by most delegations, a last-minutel 
agreement was reached at Geneva that the 
new UNCTAD machinery should contain i 
procedures , 

. . . designed to establish a process of conciliation! 
to take place before voting and to provide an ade-i 
quate basis for the adoption of recommendations withi 
regard to proposals of a specific nature for action! 
substantially affecting the economic or financial in-j 
terests of particular countries. | 

The task of working out these procedures 
was left to a special committee appointed 
by the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions. I had the privilege of serving as th(, 
U.S. expert on this committee. The concilia 
tion procedure which the committee devisee 
will operate in the periodic Conference, ir; 
the Trade and Development Board, and irj 
its committees. i 

Under this procedure, conciliation can bij 
initiated and voting suspended on any res 
olution, upon the motion of a very smal 
number of countries (10 in the Conference 
5 in the Board, and 3 in committees) or upoi 
the motion of the president of the Conferenci 
or chairman of the Board. 

The initiation of conciliation is automa 
tic. However, guidelines are provided defin 
ing the kind of resolutions which are appro 
priate for the conciliation procedure. 

Following a motion for conciliation, a con 
ciliation group is appointed with adequat 
representation of countries interested i 
the subject matter. If the conciliation grou 
cannot reach agreement at the same sessio 
of the Conference or Board, it reports t 
the next session of the Conference or Boan, 
whichever comes first. 

If the conciliation group has reached agret 
ment, the agreed resolution can be votec 
If it has not, a decision can be take 
continuing conciliation for a further perioi 
or the original proposal, or some variar 



'thereof, can be voted in the normal way. 

In the event that a vote is taken after 
unsuccessful conciliation, the resolution will 
cite the report of the conciliation group 
(which may contain minority as well as ma- 
jority views), and the records of the United 
'Nations will show how the members voted 
n the resolution. 

These procedures offer important bene- 
fits to all U.N. members : 

— For the minority of developed countries, 
hey provide some safeguard against the 
voting of unacceptable resolutions by auto- 
iiatic majorities and a "cooling off" pe- 
•iod of 6 months or more during which ef- 
forts at compromise can be sought through 
luiet diplomacy. 
— For the majority of less developed 
ountries, they afford a means of engaging 
he developed countries in a sustained debate 
'uring which the developed countries explain 
he reasons for their opposition to proposals 
f the majority. 

It is too early to see just how the concilia- 
ion procedure will work in practice, but we 
nay hazard one prediction : The main value 
if the new procedures may be less in their 
ictual use than in the subtle way in which 
heir mere existence influences member gov- 
•rnments in the direction of compromise 
ather than voting on disagreed proposals. 

dural adaptation and innovation is already 
undei-way throughout the U.N. system. 

Of course, procedures in and of them- 
selves are only part of the problem. What is 
really required is widespread recognition of 
the common interest in basing U.N. deci- 
sions on an adequate consensus — a consen- 
sus which includes the support of most of the 
countries bearing the principal responsibil- 
ities for action. 

Will such a recognition be forthcoming? 
The cynic may ask why the majority of 
small countries should accept any restraint 
on the use of their voting power. The answer 
is clear enough. 

If United Nations procedures cannot be 
adapted to take account of power realities, 
the large and middle powers will increas- 
ingly pursue their national interests out- 
side the U.N. system. 

If, on the other hand, the necessary pro- 
cedural adjustments can be carried out, the 
United Nations and its agencies will be able 
to assume increasing responsibilities for 
action in both peacekeeping and develop- 

This is the fundamental reason why the 
important procedural adjustments now un- 
derway in the United Nations sei've the en- 
lightened long-term interests of all its mem- 

'aking Account of Power Realities 

This catalog of procedures for coping with 
he international apportionment problem 
hould serve to indicate four things: 

" — First, that the United States and other 
luntries are very much aware of the need 
) adapt U.N. procedures to take account of 
ower realities. 

— Second, that a wide variety of alter- 
ative procedures can be developed to come 
) grips with the problem. 

— Third, that the most practical of these 
rocedures can be put into effect without 
nendment of the U.N. Charter or of the 
institutions of other U.N. agencies. 

— Fourth, that a great process of proce- 

AY 10, 1965 

U.S. Willing To Participate 
in Conference on Cambodia 

Statement by Secretary Rttsk'^ 

It has been proposed that an international 
conference composed of the governments of 
the countries which took part in the Geneva 
conference of 1954 be called to consider the 
question of the neutrality and territorial in- 
tegrity of Cambodia. 

After reviewing this proposal with the 
President last week, and at his direction, 
we have informed a number of interested 

' Made on Apr. 25 in response to inquiries from 
news correspondents. 


governments that if such a conference is 
called we will gladly participate. The Pres- 
ident would appoint Ambassador Averell 
Harriman as our representative to the dis- 

Cambodia desires independence and neu- 
trality. Here, as elsewhere in Asia, the 

United States wholeheai'tedly supports thel 
right of each nation to shape its own course.! 
To support this right for Cambodia is fully 
consistent with the purpose of the United 
States to support the right of every nation 
in Southeast Asia to lead a free and inde- 
pendent existence. 

Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia 

by Leonard Unger 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs^ 

The importance of the Southeast Asia is- 
sue to every American cannot be over- 
stressed. This became crystal clear to me 
during the 6I/2 years I served our Govern- 
ment in that area, and I value this chance to 
share my thoughts with you. 

I shall talk, if I may, to four related sets 
of questions : First, what are our fundamen- 
tal objectives in Southeast Asia, and what 
Communist strategy are we encountering 
there? Secondly, what are our objectives in 
Viet-Nam, and how close are we to achiev- 
ing them? Third, what is the present status 
of South Viet-Nam — militarily and politi- 
cally? And finally, what does the future 
hold for Viet-Nam and for Southeast Asia? 

We believe that our objectives in South- 
east Asia are shared by the major Western 
and neighboring nations concerned with its 
development and by the non-Communist na- 
tions in the area itself. Those objectives 

First, that the nations of Southeast Asia, 
as with all other Asian states, should de- 
velop as free and independent countries 
according to their own views and toward in- 
creasingly democratic structures. 

^ Address made before the Detroit Economic Club, 
Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 19 (press release 77). 

Second, that the nations of the are; 
should not threaten each other or outsid. 
nations. ; 

Third, that no single Asian nation should 
either control other nations or exercise domi 
ination either for the whole area or for an;, 
major part of it. | 

And fourth, that the nations of the Fa 
East should maintain and increase their tie 
with the West in trade and culture, as . 
major means of knitting together a peacefu 
and stable world. 

These objectives are not just pious gen 
eralities, nor is Southeast Asia just a con 
figuration on a map. Distant though it ma; 
seem from Detroit, that area has grea 
strategic significance to the United State 
and the free world. Its location across east 
west air and sea lanes flanks the India 
subcontinent on one side and Australia, Nei 
Zealand, and the Philippines on the othei 
and dominates the gateway between the Pi 
cif ic and Indian Oceans. 

In Communist hands this area would pes 
a most serious threat to the security of th 
United States and to the family of fret 
world nations to which we belong. To defen 
Southeast Asia, we must meet the challeng 
in South Viet-Nam. 



Communist "Wars of Liberation" 

Equally important, South Viet-Nam rep- 
resents a major test of communism's new 
- strategy of "wars of liberation." In 1950 the 
•■ Communists tried to conquer South Korea 
by direct aggression — by sending North Ko- 
rean, and later Chinese Communist, troops 
across the boundary into South Korea. With 
the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Se- 
curity Council, the U.N. was able to con- 
demn the aggression and to mount a United 
Nations Command to assist South Korea. 
The United States played by far the great- 
est outside role in a conflict that brought 
more than 157,000 U.S. casualties and cost 
us at least $18 billion in direct expenses. In 
the end we were able to restore an inde- 
pendent South Korea, although a unified and 
free Korea was left to be worked out in the 

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected 
hree elements : 

— a recognition that aggression of any sort 

Tiust be met early and head on or it will 

lave to be met later and in tougher circum- 

fgi stances. We had relearned the lessons of the 

I930's — Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, 

tlui Czechoslovakia. 

te» I — a recognition that a defense line in Asia, 

re,! rtated in terms of an island perimeter, did 

r;i^ lot adequately define our vital interests — 

hat those vital interests could be affected 

ly action in Asia itself. 

— an understanding that, for the future, 
. power vacuum was an invitation to aggres- 
ion, that there must be local political, eco- 
omic, and military strength in being to 
.lake aggression unprofitable, but also that 
here must be a demonstrated willingness of 
lajor external power to assist if required. 

After the Communists' open aggression 
liled in Korea, they had to look for a more 
ffective strategy of conquest. They chose to 
mcentrate on "wars of national liberation" 
-the label they use to describe aggression 
irected and supplied from outside a nation 
ut cloaked in nationalist guise so that it 
)uld be made to appear an indigenous in- 

That strategy was tried on a relatively 
primitive scale, but was defeated in Malaya 
and the Philippines only because of a long 
and arduous struggle by the people of those 
countries, with assistance provided by the 
British and the United States. In Africa and 
Latin America such "wars of liberation" 
are already being threatened. But by far the 
most highly refined and ambitious attempt 
at such aggression by the Communists is 
taking place today in Viet-Nam. Hanoi has 
worked hard to persuade world opinion that 
the National Front for the Liberation of 
South Viet-Nam — which is the formal name 
adopted by the Viet Cong — is an authentic 
national movement. But the only thing gen- 
uine about the National Liberation Front is 
the word "Front." And the only liberation 
being offered the people of South Viet-Nam 
amounts to domination by Hanoi. 

In order to cope with this veiled aggres- 
sion, free nations must determine the real 
source of the aggression and take steps to 
defend themselves from this source. In Viet- 
Nam this has meant ending privileged sanc- 
tuary heretofore afforded North Viet-Nam 
— the true source of the Viet Cong move- 

The "wars of national liberation" ap- 
proach has been adopted as an essential ele- 
ment of Communist China's expansionist 
policy. If this technique adopted by Hanoi 
should be allowed to succeed in Viet-Nam, 
we would be confirming Peiping's contention 
that militant revolutionary struggle is a 
more productive Communist path than Mos- 
cow's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. We 
could expect "wars of national liberation" 
to spread. Thailand has already been iden- 
tified by Communist China as being the next 
target for a so-called "liberation struggle." ^ 
Peiping's Foreign Minister Chen Yi has 
promised it for this year. Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma — one Asian nation after another — 
could expect increasing Communist pres- 
sures. Other weakly defended nations on 
other continents would experience this new 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 5, 1965, 
p. 489. 

AY 10, 1965 



threat of aggression by proxy. 

Even the Asian Communists have ac- 
knowledged that Viet-Nam represents an 
important test situation for indirect aggres- 
sion. North Viet-Nam's Premier Pham Van 
Dong recently commented that : 

The experience of our compatriots in South Viet- 
Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially 
the peoples of South America. 

General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, the much- 
touted leader of North Viet-Nam's army, 
was even more explicit. In another recent 
statement, he said that, 

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national lib- 
eration movement of our time. ... If the special war- 
fare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South 
Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated every- 
where in the world. 

Our strong posture in Viet-Nam then 
seeks peace and security in three dimen- 
sions: for South Viet-Nam, for the sake of 
Southeast Asia's independence and security 
generally, and for the other small nations 
that would face the same kind of subversive 
threat from without if the Communists were 
to succeed in Viet-Nam. As President John- 
son has stated frequently : The United States 
seeks no military bases or special position 
in Viet-Nam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 
Our simple purpose is to help free people 
maintain themselves. The United States 
position has no coloration of colonialism or 
imperialism. This is clear to the people of 
South Viet-Nam and to most of the world. 
We are concerned with the fate of 15 million 
South Vietnamese, and we will withdraw 
when their interests have been safeguarded. 

I have heard it asserted that there is some 
kind of historical inevitability regarding the 
extension of Chinese Communist power over 
Southeast Asia. This is questionable even as 
history, for the area has not in fact been 
dominated by China for most of the last 
thousand years. Above all, the whole con- 
cept of such given spheres of domination is 
out of keeping both with the realities of the 
diffusion of power and national self-confi- 
dence today and with the kind of peaceful 
world that must come into being in the next 

If we act with deliberation and a measured 
firmness now, we can help to put time on 
our side in Asia. The free world has checked 
Soviet expansionist moves in the past 20 
years, and now the Russians have too much 
to lose to readily think of precipitating a 
major war. If we can check the Commu- 
nists in Asia until the time when they have 
too much to lose materially — until moderat- 
ing forces have a chance to assert their in- 
fluence — then the threat of war in Asia may 
slowly fade away. 

I 'i 

U.S. Objectives in Viet-Nam | 

President Johnson stated our immediate I 
goal in Viet-Nam in the simplest terms. On ; 
April 7th he said : * 

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-^ 
Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing 
for ourselves — only that the people of South Viet-' 
Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their i 
own way. 

We are in Viet-Nam because the people, 
there have requested our help. President! s!! 
Eisenhower pledged our assistance in 1954,' 
that pledge was renewed by both President 
Kennedy and President Johnson, and we will, 
continue to honor that commitment as long' 
as aggression from the North persists. 

The core of the problem in South Viet- 
Nam is the infiltration by North Viet-NaK 
of tens of thousands of trained military per 
sonnel, including the hard-core leaders am; 
technicians. Their illegal entry has beei' 
compounded by the infiltration through lane 
and sea routes of large amounts of weapon; 
and other military supplies made in Commu 
nist China, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere 

In terms of personnel, our best estimat 
is that the infiltrated manpower from Nort] 
Viet-Nam — after allowances for casualtie 
at the overall Viet Cong rate of roughly 1 
percent per year — represents a majorit} 
and certainly the key leadership and tech 
nical skill, of the hard-core Viet Cong. I 
terms of equipment, the Vietnamese Goverr 
ment's losses in weapons on a net basis hav 

' For text of an address made by Presidei 
Johnson at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimor 
Md., see ihid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 



lot exceeded 30 percent of the weapons re- 
luirements of the Viet Cong. Therefore, it 
s clear that, although some small part of 
he balance has come from weapons cached 
n 1954, the far greater part — almost cer- 
ainly a majority and probably between 60 
.nd 70 percent — has come directly from the 

All this, of course, is contrary to the 1954 
ieneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 

ii igreement on Laos. I mention the latter be- 
ause it is an established fact that Hanoi 
las been both threatening Laos and using 
^aos as a corridor for supplying personnel 
nd arms to the Viet Cong. 
Our State Department has documented 
he character and intensity of North Viet- 
nam's aggressive efforts since 1959 in the 
ecent white paper, * and in the similar re- 
■ort issued in 1961.o The 1962 report of the 

!» international Control Commission for Viet- 
nam also spelled out North Viet-Nam's ag- 

>" Tessive actions in flagrant violation of the 
954 and 1962 agreements. 
What Hanoi was up to then is even more 

:- .pparent now. In the ICC report of February 

Ri .3, 1965, the Canadian delegate to the ICC, 
•Ir. J. B. Seaborn, said that, 

. . . the events which have taken place in both 
• orth and South Viet-Nam since February 7 are 
»■•* he direct result of the intensification of the aggres- 
•■' ive policy of the Government of North Viet-Nam. 

le pointed to 

. . . the continuing fact that North Viet-Nam has 

creased its efforts to incite, encourage, and sup- 

ort hostile activities in South Viet-Nam, aimed at 

he overthrow of the South Vietnamese administra- 

* Aggression From the North: The Record of 
'orth Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet- 

am, Department of State publication 7839, for sale 
y the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govem- 
lent Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (40 
ents). For the te.xt of this pamphlet (without pic- 
ures and appendixes), see BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 
965, p. 404. 

'A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort 
Conquer South Viet-Nam, Department of State 
ublication 7308, Parts I and II, for sale by the 
uperintendent of Documents (25 cents and 55 cents 

In a recent network television interview 
Mr. Seaborn said that perhaps even more 
significant than the actual numbers of North 
Vietnamese infiltrators is the quality and 
type of people Hanoi has been sending, in 
that they are essentially the trained officers 
and specialists who serve as the backbone 
of the Viet Cong movement. 

Another aspect of this is that within the 
last year Hanoi has been sending primarily 
native-born North Vietnamese to fight in the 
South. From 1959 until last year. North 
Viet-Nam primarily utilized a pool of South 
Vietnamese who had fought with the Viet 
Minh against the French and went north in 
1954 to become citizens of North Viet-Nam. 

The Communists are fond of saying that 
whether the Viet Cong are born in the North 
or South, they are still Vietnamese and 
therefore an indigenous revolt must be tak- 
ing place. Certainly, they are Vietnamese, 
and the North Koreans who swept across 
their boundary in 1950 to attack South Korea 
were also Koreans. However, this did not 
make the Korean war an indigenous revolt 
from the point of view of either world se- 
curity or in terms of acceptable standards of 

By the same token, if West Germany were 
to take similar action against East Germany, 
it is doubtful that the East Germans, the 
Soviet Union, and the rest of the Commu- 
nist bloc would stand aside on the grounds 
that it was nothing more than an indigenous 

The simple issue is that military person- 
nel and arms have been sent across an in- 
ternational demarcation line (just as valid a 
border as Korea or Germany) contrary to 
international agreements and law to destroy 
the freedom of a neighboring people. 

The hard-core leaders and technicians 
serving the so-called National Liberation 
Front of South Viet-Nam are not serving 
the interests of the people of South Viet- 
Nam but were sent by and are serving the 
interests of their masters in the North. In 
addition to them, there are, of course, a sub- 
stantial number of South Vietnamese who, 
largely by terror and intimidation, have 

JAY 10, 1965 


been recruited into the Viet Cong movement. 

But, as the President recently put it, 
Hanoi's support of the Viet Cong is the 
"heartbeat" of the war." It is for that rea- 
son, and because Hanoi has stepped up its 
aggression, that the Government of South 
Viet-Nam and the United States have been 
forced to increase our response and strike 
through the air at the true source of the 
aggression — North Viet-Nam. This does not 
represent a change of purpose on our part 
but a change in the means we believe are 
necessary to stem aggression. 

And there can be no doubt that our ac- 
tions are fully justified as an exercise of the 
right of individual and collective self-defense 
recognized by article 51 of the United Na- 
tions Charter and under the accepted stand- 
ards of international law. 

No Reply From Communists to Peace Appeal 

The United States recognizes that peace 
cannot be secured in Viet-Nam through 
purely military means. The Communists, on 
the other hand, appear to think that they 
can reach their goal — the total control of 
South Viet-Nam — by military action. Presi- 
dent Johnson's Baltimore speech dramatized 
something that must never be lost sight of: 
that it is the Communists, and not ourselves, 
who have kept South Viet-Nam in a state of 
warfare and bloodshed; that it is the Com- 
munists, and not ourselves, who refuse peace. 
The Communists in Viet-Nam are endeavor- 
ing to act out an old dictum of Mao Tse- 
tung's : "Political power grows from the bar- 
rel of a gun." 

Almost 2 weeks ago President Johnson de- 
clared that we remained ready for uncon- 
ditional discussions with the Communist 
governments concerned. He ruled out no 
path toward arranging these discussions and 
emphasized that we will never be second in 
the search for a peaceful settlement in Viet- 

The essence of the President's speech was 
contained in the United States' reply on the 

following day to the appeal for peace in Viet- 
Nam by the 17 nonalined nations.'' i 

The worldwide reaction to these two state-! 
ments has been gratifying. Many govern-i 
ments which had been either unenthusiastici 
or disapproved of our strong stand in Viet-i 
Nam said that the President had taken a| 
generous initiative. The consensus of world; 
opinion was that the decision for either con-i 
tinued conflict or peace in Asia was now up[ 
to Hanoi and the Communist powers. , 

Since then, all diplomatic channels have: 
been open. And what has been the Commu- 
nist response? Of course, the shrill propa-l 
ganda index from the Communist capitals 
remains as high as ever, but cutting through i 
the vituperation and invective, the Commu-, 
nist reactions to the President's speech have i 
still appeared clearly negative. None of the 
Communist capitals involved — Hanoi, Pei-: 
ping, and Moscow — has thus far replied toi 
the peace appeal of the 17 nonalined na- 
tions. We hope that they will shortly do soi 
— and in responsible terms. I 

Military Situation in South Viet-Nam 

Switching from the international sphere, 
I would like to briefly discuss where we are, 
in Viet-Nam in the military and political 
spheres. I will preface my remarks by 
stressing our belief that each of these 
spheres is essential to the ultimate security; 
and well-being of South Viet-Nam. 

As to the military situation, the threat of 
the Viet Cong in many areas of South Viet-j 
Nam remains a grave one. They have rel- i 
ative freedom of movement in wide areas.- 
Our best assessment is that the Viet Cong ' 
exercise practical control over about 25 per- ' 
cent of the population of South Viet-Nam 
and are capable of varying degrees of or- 
ganized harassment and intimidation, assas- ! 
sination and terror, in relation to another 
35 to 40 percent of the population. 

Yet the Government of South Viet-Nam, ] 
with our help, still has great assets. For ex- 
ample, the month of March proved an en- 

' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

' For text, see ibid., p. 610. 



courapinjr one for the Viet-Nam Republic. 
Government forces were on the offensive 
throughout the country, seeking contact 
with strong Viet Cong units. Recent experi- 
ence in Viet-Nam would seem to support 
the theorem that the attacking unit usually 
wins the battle. Of the 11 significant Gov- 
ernment-initiated engagements in March, 
the Government won all 11 with the Com- 
munist forces suffering heavy losses. But 
of the seven engagements initiated by the 
Viet Cong, the enemy won five and lost but 

There also were encouraging performances 
by regional and popular forces last month; 
in no instance did one of these local militia 
units fail to stand its ground in the face of 
a Viet Cong attack. 

The morale and confidence of the South 

Vietnamese people and military forces also 

continued to improve. A number of factors 

contributed to this: the air strikes against 

North Viet-Nam, the U. S. air strikes within 

South Viet-Nam, and the arrival of several 

contingents of U. S. Marines at Da Nang for 

security duty. These developments have 

been rightly interpreted by the South Viet- 

*'''^ namese as firm indicators that the United 

''f States intends to assist South Viet-Nam un- 

"''^ til Hanoi ceases its aggression in the South. 

In the civilian population, all elements — 

titjf Buddhist, Catholic, student, university, la- 

:'.ir7 bor, and business leaders — have voiced 

support for the recent developments. 

I want to make it clear that the Viet Cong 
must still be defeated in South Viet-Nam. I 
think the people of South Viet-Nam, with 
. our help, are more than equal to the task. In 
spite of all their efforts, the Communists 
have not gotten very far in their campaign 
to win over the ordinary Vietnamese. 

Political Developments Over Last 10 Years 

We often read about political instability 
in Saigon and war weariness in the country- 
side. But Saigon is far removed from the 
vast majority of Vietnamese, and our re- 
ports show that most Vietnamese villagers 
and soldiers do not want to be dominated by 
the Viet Cong. 

There is considerable other evidence to 
support this. First, the South Vietnamese 
forces would not fight so hard and suffer so 
many casualties if they did not believe in 
their cause. While much American blood has 
been spilled in this important conflict, it is 
important to remember that by far the great- 
est amount of fighting and dying is being 
done by South Vietnamese in defense of 
their country. 

Since 1959 South Viet-Nam has suffered 
nearly 80,000 military and civilian casualties. 
This would be the equivalent of nearly 1 
million United States casualties in relation 
to the total population. 

Secondly, the South Vietnamese people 
have not "voted with their feet" toward the 
Viet Cong but on the contrary are even now 
heading away in great numbers as refugees 
from Viet Cong-controlled areas. Since the 
beginning of the year, more than 200,000 
have chosen to leave Viet Cong areas in the 
northern portion of South Viet-Nam. 

In short, when you consider the degree of 
intimidation and terror of which the Viet 
Cong have been capable over the last 5 years 
— something which it is hard to realize un- 
less one has studied the comparable cases of 
Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines — the be- 
havior of the South Vietnamese people 
seems clearly to support the conclusion that 
the great majority of the South Vietnamese 
people are fundamentally anti-Communist. 
And it may interest you that this conclusion, 
in precisely these words, was recently reached 
by a distinguished Frenchman, General 
[Andre] Beaufre, who had revisited South 
Viet-Nam at length after having known the 
area intimately as a senior French officer 
in the early 1950's. 

Let me make one other point about polit- 
ical developments in South Viet-Nam over 
the last 10 years. It is true that there was 
opposition to the government of President 
Diem throughout the period of his control, 
and of course this opposition culminated in 
his overthrow, and most unfortunately in 
his death, in November 1963. But the im- 
portant point is that the domestic opposi- 
tion to Diem was throughout a totally dif- 

MAY 10, 1965 


ferent movement than the Viet Cong and the 
Liberation Front, which are the creatures 
of Hanoi. No significant member of the op- 
position to Diem ever went over to the Viet 
Cong, and it is notable that the present Gov- 
ernment of South Viet-Nam is headed by 
the very men who were themselves the 
leaders of that opposition. There should be 
no confusion on this point. 

So much for the situation within South 
Viet-Nam. I could say much about it, and 
particularly about the critical political and 
economic efforts that are now underway, 
with our support, in what is in the last analy- 
sis a contest for the loyalties and support of 
the people themselves. But, I repeat, there 
can be little doubt of the underlying opposi- 
tion to communism in South Viet-Nam, and 
there is every evidence that the present 
Government is going about its job in an in- 
creasingly effective way. 

Let me touch now on another aspect of the 
conflict that is sometimes misunderstood. 
This is the impression, occasionally voiced, 
that South Viet-Nam and the United States 
are fighting alone in that area. 

Sir Robert Menzies, Australia's Prime 
Minister, recently paid us high tribute when 
he said that America's stand in Viet-Nam 
was the greatest act of moral courage since 
Britain stood alone at the beginning of 
World War IL These are gratifying words, 
and, while it is true that we are providing 
the greatest share of assistance, a total of 33 
free-world nations, including Australia, are 
providing assistance to South Viet-Nam or 
have agreed to do so — some in the military 
field, some in the economic field, and some 
in both of these sectors. Their assistance is 
proof that Americans are not the only ones 
who recognize the importance of what is at 
stake in Viet-Nam. 

Nor does Viet-Nam represent a white 
man's war against Asians. Koreans, Fili- 
pinos, Nationalist Chinese, Malaysians, 
Japanese, and Thais are assisting the South 
Vietnamese by either economic aid or 
military contributions. In particular, the 
Koreans' 2,000-man force of engineers and 
security troops is a major contribution in 
terms of per capita population. 



Exciting Possibilities for Economic ProgressI 

Although we possess the capacity for| 
a lengthy conflict in Viet-Nam — and our; ; 
strength has hardly been tapped — we seekj | 
only the path to peace. And we would hopel ■ 
that North Viet-Nam will see that there is a^ 
much better course than guns, killing, andj 
terrorism, not only for the people of Viet-: 
Nam but for all the peoples of Southeast] 
Asia. j 

That course is one of cooperation between! 
all the peoples of that area for the peaceful 
development of a fertile and potentially richj 
portion of the world. We hope that the! 
countries of Southeast Asia will associate 
themselves in a massive cooperative effort! 
to bring those riches to fruition for morei , 
than 100 million people. ; 

Many exciting possibilities exist, but the 
plans to achieve them must come from the! 
leaders of Asia. This program should reflect] 
their wishes and interests. Others could 
provide assistance only if they desire and| 
request it. We are pleased that the Secre-j| 
tary-General of the United Nations has! ' 
indicated his readiness to use his great 
prestige and his intimate knowledge of 
Asia's needs to initiate work upon these co-' ' 
operative opportunities. I li 

The President has already indicated that,i 
once this cooperative effort is underway, we 
would hope to support it generously and that 
we would hope that other industrialized coun-tf 
tries — including the Soviet Union — wouldi 
join in this development venture. 

Great opportunity exists in coopei-ative 
effort to harness the energies of the vast 
Mekong River. Other opportunities exist in 
every field in Southeast Asia: health and 
medicine, education, communications, indus- 
try, transportation, agriculture, trade, com- 
merce, and science. 

North Viet-Nam could, in an environment] 'Pf 
of peace, benefit greatly by participating in] 
such cooperative ventures. We would hope 
that a chair would be provided for her 
and that she would not want to leave it 
vacant. Her people deserve to share along 
with others the welfare benefits of economic 
progress in their Asian area. Meanwhile, 






rem advances in the welfare of the peoples of 
Southeast Asia must go forward. 

In the meantime, two other facts should 
be restated : 
First, that as long as Hanoi persists in 


her aggression against South Viet-Nam, we 

TG i* 

will take whatever actions are necessary to 
. * convince the leaders in North Viet-Nam that 
,,' their efforts are self-defeating as well as 
^ futile. 

Secondly, that our offer for unconditional 

, discussions remains in effect. We will sit 

, , down at any time with the governments 

^ involved. Although the Communist response 

has been negative thus far, the offer re- 

„ mams open. 

If North Viet-Nam holds to its aggressive 
^ path, we can only remind her leaders of 
President Johnson's words on April 7th : 
"We will not be defeated. 
"We will not grow tired. 
"We will not withdraw, either openly or 
under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." 







is' 3 



President and Mr. Black Discuss 
Asian Economic Progress 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated April 20 

I have had a good talk with Mr. Eugene 
Black on our efforts to assist in the econom- 
ic progress of Southeast Asia.* He has given 
me an encouraging report on the discussions 
which he had in New York with the Secre- 
tary-General and other leaders of the U.N. 

Mr. Black tells me that those discussions 
strongly support our view that this is cen- 
trally a matter for Asian leadership. Our 
hope is to act in cooperative support of the 
efforts of the Asian peoples themselves. Mr. 
Black tells me that this position is under- 
stood in the U.N. 

Mr. Black has reported that he is deeply 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, 
p. 606. 

MAY 10, 19G5 

impressed by the quality of the work which 
has been carried forward under the Lower 
Mekong Basin Coordinating Committee. He 
has expressed to the Secretary-General our 
strong support for the work of this com- 
mittee and for the pattern of cooperation 
among the Mekong states which it repre- 

Mr. Black has discussed with me the proj- 
ect for an Asian Development Bank. He re- 
ports that, after discussions both in New 
York and Washington, he finds agreement 
within this Government that under appro- 
priate conditions and with sound manage- 
ment such a bank would be of considerable 
value in promoting regional development in 
Asia. I agree with this position and believe 
that the United States would wish to parti- 
cipate if such a bank can be established. 

In addition to regional plans and programs 
Mr. Black and I have discussed more imme- 
diate actions to increase the direct flow of 
food and medicine and other supplies from 
this country to the people of Southeast Asia. 
At my direction, plans for this purpose are 
being developed urgently in appropriate 
agencies of the government. 

President To Keep Schedule 
of Visits to Minimum 

White House Announcement 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated April 16 

In light of the congressional workload for 
the next 2 or 3 months and the situation in 
Viet-Nam, the President is not planning any 
trips abroad and is keeping his schedule to 
a minimum. We have already had several 
visits this year, and the President has 
agreed with other governments that some 
anticipated visits will be scheduled for the 
fail instead of late spring. The Governments 
of Pakistan and India have graciously 
agreed to the postponement of the prospec- 
tive visits of President [Mohammed] Ayub 
[Khan] and Prime Minister [Lai Bahadur] 


Disparities in Progress Between Nations 

by Thomas C. Mann 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

It is gratifying for me to be able to partic- 
ipate in this meeting with members and 
guests of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science. Your Academy has made 
so many valuable contributions to a better 
understanding about the world in which we 
live that I could only hope that ways can be 
found for a more adequate dialog between 
those of us who work in the Department of 
State and those, like yourselves, who are 
knowledgeable about foreign affairs. 

It is a particular pleasure to meet Arthur 
Whitaker. I have read and admired some of 
his writings and, I must confess, have used 
some of his ideas and some of his phrases 
from time to time to good advantage. 

Since the arrangements for this evening 
were made, I have been given a new assign- 
ment, and Mr. [Jack Hood] Vaughn has been 
put in charge of the Bureau of Inter-Ameri- 
can Affairs. In deference to these changes, 
I should like to alter somewhat the subject 
assigned to me and think with you instead 
for a few minutes about some of the causes 
of disparities in the degree of economic and 
social progress which different nations have 
been able to achieve. 

I should like to make clear in the beginning 
that I have no intention of propounding a 
theory or doctrine. Theories are, at best, 
only aids for thought, and, at worst, they 
impair objectivity, perspective, and balance. 

^ Address made before the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on 
Apr. 9 (press release 72). 

In recent decades we think we have learnedj 
— mostly by trial and error — something; 
about techniques for helping to promote eco- 
nomic and social progress in other lands, but 
these techniques are still far from being anj 
exact science. 

I hope no one will deduce from what I am 
about to say that I am suggesting how de-i 
veloping nations should manage their affairs. ! 
Each developing country and each regional 
trading group must find its own path to 
progress. Conformity is neither feasible nor 
desirable. I would go one step further: The 
important thing is whether a particular eco- 
nomic and social system, not in theory but 
in fact, produces the greatest good for the 
greatest number of its people within a frame- 
work of freedom. It is the result, not the 
theory, that matters in the end. 

Within this framework of ideas, I should 
like to begin by recalling that less than 200 
years ago our country began its independent 
political life. Our material assets were 
limited. We had very little capital of our 
own. Our educational plant was primitive 
and inadequate. We had no industry to speak 
of. Our countryside, where all but a frac- 
tion of our people lived, was equally primi- 
tive, and where it was not primitive, it was 
feudal. Sailing ships were our principal con- 
nection with the outside world. Inflation 
was rampant, and confidence in our currency 
was low. "Not worth a continental" is a 
phrase that comes down to us in our own 




Yet our country — and I should emphasize 
that the same may be said of a good many 
other highly industrialized nations — has 
made astonishing progress on both the eco- 
nomic and social fronts in a relatively short 
span of time. 

Similarly, some developing nations have 
made good progress even though they still 
face formidable problems common to their 
stages of development. Still other less de- 
veloped countries have made very little. 

It would be folly to try within the short 
space of these remarks to reduce to a simple 
formula the many and complex causes for 
these disparities. However, one factor which 
immediately suggests itself is the matter of 
time. Some nations have but recently gained 
their independence and, preoccupied with 
political problems, have not yet had adequate 
opportunity to put their collective minds to 
the economic and social aspects of nation- 
building. Others, which have enjoyed longer 
periods of political independence, only re- 
cently have begun to think seriously about 
economic development and social progress. 

I recall, for example, that in my first as- 
signment abroad in the early 1940's I was 
somewhat surprised to learn that intellec- 
tuals and political leaders were principally 
concerned ^\^th political and cultural theo- 
ries. Discussions usually settled on such 
topics as maintenance of the values of Greco- 
Roman culture, poetry, travel, and various 
political topics. Only 20 years ago such 
phrases as "common market," "gross na- 
tional product," "terms of trade," and "per 
capita income," which today one hears on 
every hand, were seldom, if ever, mentioned. 
Indeed, the principal criticism of the United 
States in those days in that area was that 
we had sacrificed the good things of the 
spirit for a crass materialism which had 
made us slaves to money and "comfort." 

So, when we become impatient with the 
rate of progress today it is well to recall 
that some parts of the developing world have 
only recently — very recently — begun to put 
their minds and hearts into the business of 
national economic and social reform. Never- 
theless, political leaders and economists in 

the developing regions are better prepared 
today to manage a modem society than were 
their predecessors of only two decades ago. 
Assuming that developed and developing 
nations can both keep their eyes on the 
issues of economic and social progress — as- 
suming peoples do not become distracted by 
excessive nationalism, doctrinalism, or short- 
term political considerations — we shall see 
rapid improvement in important areas of 
the developing part of the world, and this in 
spite of the population explosion which lays 
such a heavy burden on those working to 
improve individual income and opportunity. 

Aid and Trade-Components of Development 

The potential of improving and accelerat- 
ing progress is very much greater today than 
it was in the past. In spite of all the diffi- 
culties, the rate of growth in underdeveloped 
countries was already much higher in the 
past decade than in previous decades. It can 
increase and improve further. 

In earlier times it was perhaps thought — 
or more accurately, assumed — that aid pro- 
gi-ams by themselves would rapidly bring 
about economic and social progress. Great 
expectations were created. Criticisms of the 
United States in those days were largely 
centered on the size of our aid program. The 
assumption was that large aid programs 
would bring prompt solutions to development 

Later, when it became clear that these 
programs, while an important component of 
development, were no substitute for sus- 
tained internal effort and discipline, high 
expectations gave way to a certain amount 
of disillusionment. And this, in turn, has led 
to proposals for a restructuring of world 
markets and of trade flows so as to bring 
about a larger transfer of resources from 
developed to developing areas. In this sense, 
it can perhaps be said that what is proposed 
are new policies which would use trade as a 
supplement to existing flows of capital. 

Trade is of course an important com- 
ponent — there is perhaps no more impoi-tant 
component — of progress. I can only express 
the hope, however, that none of us will per- 

MAY 10, 1965 


mit our attention and energy to be diverted 
from the equally important business of cre- 
ating internal conditions which are propi- 
tious for progress and without which no 
amount of external resources will get the 
job done. 

Let us not make trade the only tree in the 
forest as we once did with aid. 

Aside from this, and speaking of the mer- 
its and demerits of the proposals developed 
at the recent meetings on trade and develop- 
ment at Alta Gracia and Geneva, we have 
viewed some of them with sympathy and 
others with misgivings. 

The press has spoken a great deal about 
our attitude toward preferences. As you 
know, we have followed since the 1930's a 
policy of liberal, nondiscriminatory trade. 
That is still our policy. We have made no 
proposals or counterproposals about trade 
preferences, nor do we have any plans to 
do so. Developing nations themselves are not 
wholly in agreement on how the proposed 
preferences should be applied in practice, 
and we would in any case have to know a 
great deal more about their several views 
before we would come to conclusions. 

Perhaps I should add, in passing, that the 
new trade proposals do not explain how it 
is that so many nations, in a world environ- 
ment less hospitable than today's, were able 
to accomplish so much with so little outside 
help. They do not explain the great dispari- 
ties which exist between developing nations 
themselves. They do not explain our own 
experience in foreign economic cooperation: 
Why is it that the very same programs — 
loans, technical assistance, trade, and capital 
flows — have produced very rapid progress in 
some countries and, in others which have 
received the same level of assistance per 
capita, very little progress or none at all? 

Developed nations indeed have a very heavy 
responsibility in the shrinking world in 
which we live. We ought to be good and 
cooperative neighbors, not only because this 
is in our tradition but because world progress 
and peace and understanding serve our true 
national interests as well as the true national 
interests of others. We must not only main- 

tain an adequate level of aid, but we mus1 
seek to make its use more effective. We musli 
maintain policies of liberal trade, not onlj! 
because we must import in order to exporii 
but because developing nations must be ablC| 
to earn the foreign exchange with which tc! 
pay for capital imports. We must help othersl 
progress by making available on a continuing' 
basis improved technology and know-how.j 
which are the products of advanced research.. 
We must continue to make available United! 
States private sector loans and investments: 
for those who need and want them. , 

Factors of Economic and Social Progress 

But we should not deceive ourselves: Only 
the developing nation itself, and the regional 
trading group itself, can create the internal! 
conditions essential for a high and sustained; 
rate of economic growrth and social progress.! 
Developed nations can supply what Deanij 
Acheson once referred to as "missing com- 
ponents in an otherwise favorable situa- 
tion." But they cannot, by themselves, create^ 
favorable internal situations in developing 
nations. i 

We have in our country an unusual capac- 
ity for self-criticism and self-doubt, per- 
haps even a tendency to have complexes of 
guilt. It is necessary that we continue to put; 
the spotlight on ourselves as well as on our 
shortcomings, which are perhaps consider-; 
able, and on our problems, which are for- 
midable. But I would hope that we can from: 
time to time have the spotlight swing in a; 
more balanced arc so that we can look more 
carefully at the responsibilities which de- 
veloping nations have for their own progress. 

Allow me to suggest some of the questions 
we might ask ourselves about the policies of 
developing countries : 

1. Is an adequate degree of competition 
permitted within the national territory — at 
least are conditions conducive to competition 
being built into the system — or is the eco- 
nomic system set up to protect monopolies 
owned by a state or a few individuals? If we 
accept the thesis — which I believe all ex- 
perience in the free-market economies and 





in the centrally planned economies has 
proven — that vigorous competition is essen- 

itial to efficiency throughout the economy, 

I then without competition: 

How is the consumer to have access to 

I quality goods at a fair price? 

How is the worker to obtain increases in 

'his real wages if inefficient industries pre- 
clude improvement in his productivity? 

I How is the economy to earn foreign ex- 
change if its monopolies cannot compete 
abroad ? 

2. Is a real effort being made to create 
the right kind of free-trade area or other 
regional trading arrangement? Because we 
believe that national markets are often not 
large enough to support efficient industry, 
we have supported the Common Market in 
Europe and the Central American Common 
Market, as well as the Latin American Free 
Trade Area. This is still our policy. The 
real question is whether regional trading 
arrangements in the developing nations will 
actually take full advantage of these larger 
markets by permitting an adequate level of 
competition between the developing coun- 
tries themselves or whether they will frus- 
trate this opportunity by not only being in- 
ward-looking in respect of the outside world 
but also restrictive, through devices of vari- 
ous kinds, in terms of their trade with each 
other and in a degree which will hamper 
their o^\^l development. 

3. In the case of government-o\vned and 
-managed business enterprises, have mean- 
ingful measures been taken to make them effi- 
cient and self-sustaining, or, under the guise 
of political expediency, are they permitted to 
incur large annual deficits which substan- 
tially reduce the government's ability to use 
its funds for development? There are those 
who believe that privately owned enterprises 
are more efficient. Others think differently. 
What matters is that they should be efficient. 
Apart from doctrine, the question of achiev- 
ing greater efficiency in those state-owned 
enterprises which have long incurred large 
annual deficits nevertheless remains. It is a 
simple question of achieving a productive use 
of scarce resources, a simple question of eco- 

nomic waste and diminished opportunities 
for social progress. 

4. Is inflation, of a kind incompatible with 
sustained progress, encouraged by monetary, 
fiscal, and other policies of the developing 
country, or is there a program to achieve 
monetary stability, without stifling growth, 
by the exercise of the necessary disciplines? 

5. Are the affairs of government managed 
in such a way as to build among its own 
people a feeling of confidence, an incentive 
for effort and risk, and a sense of a develop- 
ment mission? And, related to this: In any 
society, day-to-day transaction of official and 
private business depends on the faithful ex- 
ecution of agreements. Society increasingly 
depends on contractual arrangements as the 
process of development gathers pace and 
brings with it new complexities — the build- 
ing of confidence that individuals and govern- 
ments will honor their contracts, freely 
entered into, is an essential component of 
progress. The incentives and security which 
people believe they have, or the lack of 
them, are vital in determining whether there 
will be a high rate of investment or flights 
of capital, a high rate of personal labor 
effort or a lack of it; indeed, political insti- 
tutions themselves may ultimately rest on 
the degree of confidence and security which 
people feel toward their own governments. 

6. Is there a bona fide and sustained effort 
to improve tax collections and modernize tax 
policies where these are needed? A better 
mobilization of resources is indispensable if 
governments are to provide infrastructure 
and the education and other facilities needed 
to create equality of opportunity for all their 

7. Is there land reform designed not only 
to bring about a more equitable distribution 
of the land but to provide the farmer, the 
poorest and most oppressed member of so 
many societies, with all of the things he 
needs to make the land produce and so con- 
tribute to his own income and the well-being 
of the national economy? 

These are not by any means all of the 
factors that have to do with economic and 
social progress. They are illustrative only. 

MAY 10, 1965 


But they do suggest that the tasks before us, 
more developed and less developed nations 
alike, developing nations all, are not simple 
or easy. 

But if there are no simple solutions or pat 
formulas, the rewards for success are great 
in terms not only of national achievement 
but also in terms of the improvement and en- 
richment of the spiritual and material lives 
of all human beings. This is our greatest 
vision and our ultimate goal. 

Group To Study Trade Relations 
With Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 

The White House announced on April 4 
the membership of a Special Presidential 
Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With 
Eastern European Countries and the U.S.S.R. 
This committee of private citizens is ex- 
ploring the possibilities and implications of 
expanding peaceful trade with the countries 
of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. On 
completion of its investigations, the Commit- 
tee will report its findings and recommenda- 
tions to the President. 

The members are as follows: 
J. Irwin Miller, chairman, chairman of the board, 
Cummins Engine Co., Inc.; member, executive 
committee, World Council of Churches. 
Ehigene R. Black, chairman, Brookings Institution; 
past president, International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development. 
William Blackie, president. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co.; director and chairman of the Foreign Com- 
merce Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
George R. Brown, chairman of the board. Brown 
and Root, Inc.; chairman, board of trustees. Rice 
Charles W. Engelhard, Jr., chairman of the board, 
Engelhard Industries; director, Foreign Policy 
Dr. James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Lab- 
oratories; past member. President's Science Ad- 
visory Committee. 
Nathaniel Goldfinger, director of research, AFL- 

CIO; trustee. Joint Council on Economic Eda 
cation. [ 

Crawford H. Greenewalt, chairman of the board; 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.; chairman: 
Radio Free Europe Fund. ! 

William A. Hewitt, chairman of the board, Deerei 
and Co. ; trustee, U.S. Council of the Internationa:' 
Chamber of Commerce. [ 

Dr. Max F. Millikan, professor of economics anc« 
director. Center for International Studies, Massa-i 
chusetts Institute of Technology; president, WorW| 
Peace Foundation. \ 

Charles G. Mortimer, chairman of the board. Gen-' 
eral Poods Corp.; trustee. Committee for Eco- 
nomic Development. I 

Dr. Herman B Wells, chancellor, Indiana Univer-i 
sity; former U.S. delegate to U.N. General; 

President Orders New Study 
of Watch Movements Imports 

The White Hoitse on April 5 released the 
following letter from President Johnson to^ 
Buford Ellington, Director of the Office of 
Emergency Planning. 

Dear Mr. Ellington : I should appreciate 
your initiating an investigation, in accord- 
ance with Section 232(b) of the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962, as amended, to deter- 
mine the effects on the national security of 
imports of watch movements. A long period 
has elapsed since the last full investigation of 
this matter, which led to the issuance of a 
report in early 1958 by the Office of Defense 
Mobilization, and it would seem useful to 
have an up-to-date assessment of the situa- 

I hope that the experience which OEP's 
predecessor agency, along with the Depart- 
ments of Defense, Commerce, and Labor, 
gained in the earlier investigation would 
mean that a new review involving these and 
other agencies, could be concluded within the 
next six months. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 









President Notes Anniversary 
of American Specialist Program 

Letter to Secretary Rusk 

April 15, 1965 

Dear Mr. Secretary: Friendly relations 
with other nations are increasingly served by 
American citizens working in ways very dif- 
ferent from those traditionally associated 
with foreign policy. 

I am glad that this is so. It is one of the 
most hopeful of the foreign policy develop- 
ments we have seen in the two decades since 
World War II. 

In our preoccupation with day-to-day 
problems we sometimes overlook the impor- 
tance of these steady, unflagging efforts to 
broaden the foundations for peace. 

I therefore commend the Department of 
State for directing public notice to this 15th 
anniversary of the "American Specialist" 
program. A great variety of American citi- 
zens have gone abroad to serve as "American 
Specialists" — to meet and talk with their 
counterparts in other countries in their roles 
as authors, judges, professors, actors, 
artists, coaches, composers, and many others. 

They represent the diverse fabric of Amer- 
ican life. They go abroad to tell of their pro- 
fessions and activities, and to tell of the 
America of which these activities are a part. 
And they go to learn — through direct ex- 
changes with citizens of other countries, 
often including vigorously inquiring young 
people. These face-to-face exchanges open 
doors to greater mutual understanding. 

In the midst of the critical issues that cur- 
rently divide us from the ruling governments 
of some countries, we must not forget that 
there are common interests and insights that 
unite us with peoples all over the world. 
Cooperation between men begins when they 
understand this elemental fact. It is the road 
to progress and hope for all mankind. 

This is the peaceful road our people want 
to travel. Our history has shown this count- 
less times and in countless ways. 

One such way is this virtually world-wide 
program, in which private citizens carry 
with them to other countries an authentic 
sense of America — not only in demonstrat- 
ing their career specialties, but also in ex- 
pressing our basic conamitment to a better 
life for all men. 

Some 2,500 Americans have now done this, 
under this program. Some 300 currently go 
out each year. I hope there will be many, 
many more in the future. 

To all who have served America in this 
way I want to express our nation's deep 

What each such representative does in his 
two or three months abroad cannot, by itself, 
make a peaceful world. But hundreds and 
thousands like him — under both public and 
private programs, and representing the 
many aspects of American life that interlock 
with life in other lands — can make a differ- 
ence over the years. 

They help to increase that margin of 
safety — that margin of understanding 
among peoples — on which peace for all man- 
kind must ultimately depend. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Communism in Latin America. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 
16-March 30, 1965, 123 pp.; report of the Subcom- 
mittee on Inter-American Affairs, H. Kept. 237, 
April 14, 1965, 18 pp. 

January 1965 Economic Report of the President. 
Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 
Part 3. February 25-27, 1965. 199 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part 
IV, March 9-15, 1965, 166 pp.; Part V, March 
16-19, 1965, 105 pp.; Part VI, March 23-2S, 1965, 
158 pp.; Part VII, March 25-31, 1965, 132 pp. 

Aggression From the North: The Record of North 
Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet- 
Nam. Department of State publication 7839, re- 
leased February 1965. H. Doc. 136. March 11, 
1965. 64 pp. 

MAY 10, 1965 



75th Anniversary of the Organization of American States: 
The Record of the Inter-American System 

1 ««l 

Address by Vice President Humphrey^ 

It is so good and refreshing to be here 
with you, my brothers and sisters of the 
Americas, in this Casa de las Americas. This 
House of the Americas is a beautiful home 
and one that is very dear to all of us. 

We meet today as members of a flourish- 
ing inter-American system whose roots go 
back 139 years to the Congress of Panama 
convened in 1826 by that great patriot of 
this hemisphere, Simon Bolivar. Then 
Bolivar saw our hemisphere as "independent 
nations bound together by a common set of 
laws which would govern their foreign rela- 
tions and afford them a right to survival 
through a general and permanent congress." 
He was a man of vision and history. 

We meet today to commemorate the 75th 
anniversary of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States, which in 1890 institutionalized 
this idea of hemispheric cooperation into a 
functioning international system. We meet 
to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the 
oldest and, I think, the most successful 
international organization in existence, a 
model for other nations who wish to move 
from the uncertainty of nationalism to the 
stability of a functioning regional system. 
So, Mr. Chairman, Ambassadors, and 

^ Made before a protocolary session of the Council 
of the Organization of American States at the Pan 
American Union, Washington, D.C., on Pan Amer- 
ican Day, Apr. 14 (as-delivered text). 


fellow Americans, I am honored to accept 
your invitation to be with you in this Hall 
of the Americas on this memorable occasion. 
I am honored to join the representatives of 
the free Republics of Latin America, with 
whom, as President Johnson has stated, 
". . . our country has always felt . . . 
special ties of interest and affection." ^ 

We are friends; we are partners; and we 
are good neighbors. Let me pay my respects 
to the heroes of the Americas : the Father of 
our own country, George Washington; one 
whose death we have commemorated and yet 
whose great works we have commemorated 
— Abraham Lincoln; and Simon Bolivar, 
San Martin, Hidalgo, O'Higgins, Sucre, 
Morazan, and Marti, just to mention a few. 
These are names of history, and they bind 
us together into a family of brothers and 

During the past 75 years, the nations of 
the hemispheric system have developed 
instruments to preserve the peace and the 
security of this hemisphere. We have made a 
distinct contribution to peace. The cause of 
peace — peace in the hemisphere and peace in 
the world — is well served by the cooperation 
and the solidarity which have developed in 
the Americas. Friend and foe alike would do 
well to take note of this living cooperation 

' Bulletin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 


and solidarity, for it has signified our 
mutual dedication to common goals and com- 
mon progress. There is no greater service 
that one can perfoitn than to build for an 
enduring peace. 

The United States has made known its 
dedication to hemispheric development and 
security through many measures and many 
men. We have done this through Franklin 
Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy — and we 
are reminded of Franklin Roosevelt this 
week because it was just 20 years ago that 
he left us, after a lifetime of service to the 
cause of freedom. We have made known our 
dedication through the Rio Pact, and more 
recently through idealism in the commit- 
ment of the Alliance for Progress. These 
American initiatives have made this hemi- 
sphere safe, while laying the groundwork 
for long-term social and economic develop- 

The Alliance for Progress 

During the past decade, we have gone 
beyond preserving security against external 
threats. We have begun to confront the 
internal threat posed by economic and social 
inequality. Building upon the previous pro- 
posals of Latin American statesmen, the 
late, beloved President of the United States, 
John F. Kennedy, 4 years ago proposed a 
new charter of freedom and hope, a new 
Alliance for Progress to "assist free men and 
free governments in casting off the chains 
of poverty." * 

I think some of us here remember that 
evening in the East Room of the White 
House when this great proposal was enun- 
ciated,'* and we recall so vividly the sense of 
the new spirit, the new strength, that it gave 
to all of us. Today the world knows and 
will long remember the change and the 
changes that have resulted in this hemi- 
sphere because of that initiative and what 
has followed from it. 

' Ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 

* For an address made by President Kennedy on 
Mar. 13, 1961, at a White House reception for Latin 
American diplomats and Members of Congn^ess, see 
ibid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. 

The Alliance for Progress is our alliance. 
The alliance represents a peaceful revolu- 
tion against human injustice and depriva- 
tion here in our hemisphere. As is stated in 
the preamble to the Charter of Punta del 
Este,'* the alliance aims "to unite in a com- 
mon effort to bring our people accelerated 
economic progress and broader social justice 
within the framework of personal dignity 
and political liberty." It is not, however, 
merely designed to promote economic devel- 
opment — important as that may be — but to 
bring all men in the Americas out of the 
shadows of injustice and despair and into 
the bright sunshine of human rights and 
human dignity, to bring us out of the 
lethargy of social neglect and into lively 
participation in the political, social, and 
economic life of the community. 

Symbols of Hope and Imagination 

The Alliance for Progress represents the 
latest development in the life of the inter- 
American system. Four years of experience 
under the alliance have deepened our under- 
standing of this new development and have 
sharpened our perception of what the Alli- 
ance for Progress is and what it is not. 

Looking at it today, what does this new 
development in the inter-American system 
represent? Today we realize that the success 
of the alliance depends on much more than 
economic development. We realize that for 
it to succeed it must have a political content 
and an ideological substance, in addition to 
a strong program of economic development. 
Man does not live by bread alone. He is 
also moved deeply by ideas as well as by his 
need for material things. 

The alliance needs symbols of hope and 
imagination. It is not just a matter of satis- 
fying physical needs and raising the ma- 
terial standards of living. What is equally 
important is inspiring hope in the people, 
commanding the intellectual and emotional 
allegiance of those who will shape the future 
of their country. 

What can be accomplished in a material 

' For text, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

MAY 10, 1965 


sense in a very limited period of time will 
always fall short of our expectations. This 
should not discourage us. What is important 
is that we are prepared to give some evidence 
that progress is being made, that material 
betterment is on the way, and that there is 
sound reason for believing that the unmet 
material problems of society can and will be 
solved in the future. 

It has been said many times, but it needs 
to be said again, that the longest journey is 
the first step. My fellow Americans, we 
have made the first step. The first step was 
firm, and it was one that has started us on 
the journey to success. 

I am speaking in essence of the politics 
of hope, because man must have hope and 
the belief that he can overcome his problems, 
that he can find solutions to his difficulties. 
This means, of course, that there must be 
both short-range, socially oriented programs 
to give visible evidence of immediate prog- 
ress and long-range development projects 
which are essential to the building of a viable 
economy. It isn't a